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Intelligence Division


Intelligence Division

Deputy Commandant for Information


Mahnken, Thomas G. (2002).  Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1941.  Cornell University Press. This is a significant book on the record of U.S. Intelligence in uncovering -- and missing -- important innovations of foreign militaries between the World Wars. Most startling is how often U.S. Intelligence "got it right" and why it was wrong when it failed. Offers an intriguing historical perspective with practical implications that can be applied today. (Maj, CWO4, IA3).

Koch,  Brig. Gen. Oscar W.,  Hays, Robert G. (1999).    G-2: Intelligence for Patton. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, Ltc.  Best read with FMFRP 12-16 Front Line Intelligence. Koch's vignettes reinforce basic FMFRP 12-16 ideas and provide a very good model for the modern relationship between commander and intelligence officer. Perhaps most enlightening in  understanding how Patton was ready to respond to the German offensive resulting in the Battle of the Buldge--his "2" had warned him ahead of time, seeing signs everyone else seems to have missed.  (MSgt/1st Sgt, LtCol, CWO5).

Dingman, Roger. (2009).  Deciphering the Rising Sun: Navy and Marine Corps Codebreakers, Translator, and Interpreters in the Pacific Wars, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.  Dingman's work details the rapid transformation within the Office of Naval Intelligence to deal with the looming war with Japan and its many successes in execution of that conflict. The author compares and contrasts t his performance with parallel Department of Defense effort during the ramp up and conduct of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.  (MSySgt/SgtMaj, LtCol, COW5, IA4).

Clark, Eugene Franklin , Commander, USN. (2002). The Secrets of Inchon: The Untold Story of the Most Daring Covert Mission of the Korean War. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.  Despite the sensational title, this is an outstanding treatment of how one reconnaissance team provided essential tactical intelligence.  Navy Lieutenant Clark penetrated into the enemy defenses of the Inchon area and provided intelligence information critical to the scuccess of the Marine landings in September of 1950. (LCpl, 2ndLt, WO).

Hiam, C. Michael,  Hanover, NH (2006). Who the Hell are We Fighting? The Story of Sam Adams and the Vietnam Intelligence Wars. Steerforth Press.   While there have been a number of books detailing the particular sides of the intelligence controversy surrounding the Westmoreland vs. CBS libel suit, this book is the most comprehensive and scholarly. It details the story of a relatively junior CIA civilian analyst who uncovered major methodological errors within USMACV J2 insurgent Order of Battle analyses. i will give those who believe "you have to be nearest to the fight to fully understand it" some pause for considered reflection. (MSgt/1st Sgt, Maj/CWO4, IA3).

Wirtz, James. (1991) The Tet Offensive -- Intelligence Failure in War.  Ithaca, NY: Corenll University Press.  No apologist Doctor Wirtz, the Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies at the Naval at the Postgraduate School, goes into extensive detail on how and why the U.S. Missed the call on the Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968. A very well documented study paying particular attention to the tactical collection and analysis level.  (MSgt/1st Sgt. Col/GO/, IS5/DISL/SES).

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