THIRD ENDORSEMENT on ltr 5830 of 1 Feb 18

From: Commander, U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific
To: File

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

1. I have reviewed this investigation and determined it is in substantial compliance with the reference. No further investigation is warranted.

2. The endorsements, memoranda, and the Investigating Officer’s (IO) findings of fact, opinions and recommendations are approved with the following comments:

3. I extend my sincere gratitude to the Royal Australian Navy, especially to the HMAS Melville crew, in locating the wreckage and deploying their divers to secure the site and recover our fallen Marines. Additionally, I want extend my gratitude to our sister service, and especially to the USNS Salvor crew, for their extensive search, rescue, and subsequent recovery operations.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

5. On behalf of Marines and Sailors of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, I wish to express my deepest sympathy and heartfelt condolences to the family, friends, and colleagues of (b3)(10USC§130)(b6), (b3)(10USC§130)(b6), and (b3)(10USC§130)(b6).

D. H. BERGER

Copy to:
DCA
DC, M&RA
DC, PP&O
Commander, MARCORSYSCOM
CG, TECOM
CG, III MEF
CG, 1st MAW
File
SECOND ENDORSEMENT on (b) (6) Itr 5830/FO436 of 1 Feb 18

From: Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force
To: Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

Encl: (1) CO, 31st MEU memo 5830/CO of 12 Feb 18
(2) COMSEVENTHFLT memo 5830 Ser N013/011J of 2 Mar 18

1. Forwarded.

2. On behalf of the Marines and Sailors of III Marine Expeditionary Force, I, too, wish to express my deepest sympathy and sincere condolences to the family, friends, and colleagues of (b) (5). We, regrettably, lost great Marines.

3. I reviewed this investigation and the memorandum endorsements at enclosures (1) and (2). I concur with the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations with the following comments:

(b) (5)

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4. I concur that the deaths of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and injuries sustained by other Marines aboard this mishap aircraft, occurred in the line of duty, not due to the members' misconduct. I recommend that this investigation be closed.

5. The U.S. Navy's search and rescue efforts and the Australian Defense Force's subsequent recovery operations were thorough, exhaustive, and demonstrated profound dignity for our fallen Marines. I am grateful for the dedication and professionalism exhibited by our Navy brethren and Australian partners.

L. D. NICHOLSON

Copy to:
COMSEVENTHFLT
CG, MCPAC-MCB Camp Butler
CG, 1st MAW
CO, 31st MEU
AC/S G-3, III MEF
File
MEMORANDUM on CI ltr 5830 did 1 Feb 18

From: Commanding Officer, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit
To: Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN)

1. I have reviewed the findings and opinions of the Investigating Officer, and have commented on all recommendations.

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This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. Exemptions (b)(5) applies.
10. A Tiger team of subject matter experts from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) arrived to assist the squadron through this tragedy and ensure they were safe to conduct flight operations. After the Tiger team inspection, VMM 265 (REIN) executed their Get Well Plan and successfully passed numerous inspections.

**Inspections:**

- 1st MAW Commanding General Readiness Inspection (4-16 September 2017)
- MALS Quality Assurance (11-13 October 2017)
- MALS-36 Maintenance Program Assist (30 October – 3 November 2017)
- 1st MAW Maintenance Program Assist (11-15 December 2017)
- Commanding General 1st MAW directed inspection HMLA-369 (25 January 2018)
- Commander, Naval Forces Inspection (29 January - 1 February 2018)

VMM 265 (REIN) received 93.3% grade on the Commander, Naval Forces (CNAF) inspection. Based on their performance VMM 265 (REIN) was ranked in the top 10% of the units the CNAF
Team had inspected over the past year, including squadrons in both the United States Navy and United States Marine Corps. I am confident that the squadron is capable of executing safe flight operations in support of MEU missions.

11. I am thankful and appreciative of the comprehensive search and respectful recovery operation for [redacted]. Additionally, I am extremely proud of the unrelenting perseverance and unfailing devotion to duty exhibited by our Marines, the United States Navy, and the Australian Navy in their efforts to search for and recover our Marines.

12. We all mourn the tragic loss of our Marines. On behalf of the Marines and Sailors of the 31st MEU, I wish to express my deepest sympathy and sincere condolence to the families, friends, and loved ones of [redacted].

13. For questions regarding this matter, the point of contact is [redacted], Staff Judge Advocate, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, or email: [redacted].

Copy to:
File
From: Commander, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force  

Subj: SEVENTH FLEET COMMENT ON INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHPON ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA  

Ref: (a) USMC ltr 5830 of 1 Feb 18  
     (b) CG, 1st MAW ltr 5830 of 12 Feb 18  

1. I have reviewed references (a) and (b), the subject investigation and 1st Marine Air Wing endorsement. I concur with the Findings of Fact, Opinions, and Recommendations. This review is submitted in the form of a comment on Navy equities for consideration by follow-on endorsers.  

4. Point of contact for this matter, Fleet Judge Advocate, JAGC, USN is available at [b] and [b]...
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on ltr 5830 of 2 Feb 18

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
To: Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

1. Readdressed and forwarded.

2. First and foremost, we mourn the tragic loss of our Marines. On behalf of the Marines and Sailors of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW), I wish to express my deepest sympathy and sincere condolences to the families, friends, and loved ones of [redacted].

3. On 5 August 2017, Marines and Sailors from Golf Battery, Battalion Landing Team (BLT), 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (3/5) were simulating an embassy reinforcement mission at Raspberry Creek, Queensland, Australia. MV-22B Ospreys from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 265 Reinforced (VMM-265 (REIN)) were tasked with simulating a Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) and extracting the Marines and Sailors of BLT 3/5 from the embassy and flying them to safety aboard U.S. Navy vessels off the coast. This mission was complex, challenging, and included flying into and out of a highly congested operational area. Executing this mission required a detailed plan and superior technical performance. The Marines manning the mishap aircraft were mission capable, fully-trained, and qualified. The mishap aircraft was mechanically sound.

4. [redacted]

5. After the collision with GREEN BAY, the mishap aircraft fell into the ocean. Sailors from GREEN BAY immediately launched a rescue operation and recovered 23 of the 26 personnel that were aboard the mishap aircraft.

6. The United States Navy and the Australian Navy performed an exhaustive search and dignified recovery operation for [redacted]. I am profoundly grateful for the assistance and tireless efforts by those who searched for and recovered our Marines.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

7. In addition to this investigation, I sent a team of subject matter experts from 1st MAW to assist VMM-265 (REIN) through this tragedy and to review and reinforce procedural compliance. I also directed Marine Aircraft Group 36 (MAG-36) to inspect, assist, and correct any and all deficiencies encountered with VMM-265 (REIN). [b](6)

8. I find that the deaths of [b](10USCS130)(b6) [b](6), [b](7)(C) [b](7)(C), [b](6)
occurred “in the line of duty and not due to their misconduct.” This investigation will be forwarded to their commanding officers to make appropriate entries in their medical and service records.

9. I find the injuries suffered by [b](6) [b](6)
occurred “in the line of duty and not due to their misconduct.” This investigation will be forwarded to their commanding officers to make appropriate entries in their medical and service records.

10. I concur with findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the Investigating Officer, and I recommend the investigation be closed.

11. The findings within this investigation show the inherent dangers of conducting naval aviation operations. They reconfirm the need to constantly evaluate risks, identify unsafe conditions, and ensure established internal controls safeguarding operations are being followed in order to safely execute aviation missions.

T. D. WEIDLEY

Copy to:
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMEXSTRKGRU SEVEN
CO, 31st MEU
SJA, COMSEVENTHFLT
SJA, III MEF
SJA, COMEXSTRKGRU SEVEN
SJA, 1st MAW
SJA, 31st MEU
File
From: [REDACTED], USMC
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN)

Encl: (1) 9 August 2017 MV-22 Mishap Command Investigation Appointment Letter
(2) Command Investigation Extension Approval
(3) VMM-265 (REIN) Flight Schedules for 2-5 August 2017
(4) Signed RAW for mishap aircraft
(5) Transcription of interview of...
(6) Transcription of interview of...
(7) Transcription of interview of...
(8) Transcription of interview of...
(9) Transcription of interview of...
(10) Transcription of interview of...
(11) Transcription of interview of...
(12) Transcription of interview of...
(13) Transcription of interview of...
(14) Transcription of interview of...
(15) Transcription of interview of...
(16) Transcription of interview of...
(17) Transcription of interview of TOLMEY crew
(18) Transcription of interview of MAGNUS crew
(19) Transcription of interview of...
(20) Transcription of interview of...
(21) Transcription of interview of...
(22) Transcription of interview of...
(23) Transcription of interview of...
(24) Consolidated interview questionnaires from the passengers of mishap aircraft
(25) Excerpts from NATOPS Jacket and Flight Logbook for...
(26) Excerpts from NATOPS Jacket and Flight Logbook for...
(27) Excerpts from NATOPS Jacket and Flight Logbook for...
(28) Excerpts from NATOPS Jacket and Flight Logbook for...
(29) Excerpts from NATOPS Jacket and Flight Logbook for...
(30) Consolidated MSHARP reports for the crew of mishap aircraft
(31) 5 August 2017 Flight Smartpack and Load Computation
(32) 5 August 2017 Flight Weather Packet from mishap aircraft
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

(33) Recovered KVADR Flight Data Warnings, Cautions and Advisories from mishap aircraft
(34) Recovered Flight Data Flight Recreation from mishap aircraft
(35) USS GREEN BAY Officer of the Day Logbook
(36) USS GREEN BAY Training Records and Certifications
(37) NAVAIR assistance request for JAGMAN Investigation MV-22B; Bureau Number (BuNo): 168634; Mishap Date (5 August 2017)
(38) Engineering Analysis and Supporting Data for JAGMAN Investigation MV-22B; BuNo: 168634; Mishap Date (5 August 2017)
(39) Engineering Analysis and presentation supporting the MV-22B Amphibious Operations Summit 2-3 November 2017
(40) NVMC 3100.11C MV-22B Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual
(41) Joint Flight Operations Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)
(42) VMM-265 (REIN) MV-22B MSHARP HOTBOARDS
(43) Excerpts of VMM-265 (REIN) Maintenance Records
(45) NAVAIR 00-80T-122 Air Capable Ships NATOPS Flight Manual
(46) CNAF M-3710.7 NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions Manual
(47) NAVAIR 00-80T-123 Aircrrew Systems NATOPS Manual
(48) MCO 3502.3B Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) PTP
(49) Autopsy Report for [3]
(50) Autopsy Report for [3]
(51) Autopsy Report for [3]
(52) Photographs from recovery of [3]
(53) Photographs from recovery of [3]
(54) Photographs from recovery of [3]
(55) Photographs of damage to the USS GREEN BAY
(56) Photographs of damage to UH-1 Y BuNo 168784
(57) Photographs of mishap aircraft’s Left Hand Proprotor Hub
(58) Non-mishap aircraft MV-22B Maintenance data
(59) Statement of [3]
(60) Consolidated VMM-265 (REIN) NAVFLIR data
(61) Excerpt of transcript of interview with [3]
(62) COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2 (Naval Aviation Maintenance Program)
(63) MV-22B Maintenance Publications
(64) Consolidated Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) 11 Air Plan for 5 August 2017
(65) Consolidated Air Traffic Control (ATC) transcripts
(66) Nacelle Switch Discrete Signal Plot for mishap aircraft
(67) Photographic Evidence of BuNo 168634 post mishap
(68) Consolidated Royal Australian Navy and USNS SALVOR Dive Updates
(69) Golf Battery Helicopter Egress Training Roster
(70) 31st MEU Smart Book
(71) Helicopter Egress Training Statement on Incompletion
(72) USS GREEN BAY flight deck videos
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

(73) Excerpt of transcript of interview with
(74) USMC Press Releases
(75) Excerpt from Ship Aviation Facilities Resume
(76) Additional aircrew certification documents

1. This report completes an investigation conducted in accordance with reference (a) and enclosures (1) and (2) to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding a MV-22B aircraft mishap resulting in the death of three Marines, injury to 23 personnel and the total loss of the aircraft which occurred 5 August 2017 off the coast of Rockhampton, Queensland, Australia.

2. In compliance with 10 U.S.C. 2255 and reference (a), USMC, is qualified to conduct this investigation having extensive tactical aviation experience. USN was assigned as an Assistant Investigating Officer (AIO) having extensive shipboard and naval aviation experience. USMC was assigned as the Assistant Investigating Officer having extensive tactical aviation experience, and prior experience in the conduct of aircraft mishap command investigations.

3. USMC, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), provided legal guidance during this command investigation. We also consulted with SJA, 1st MAW.

4. Command Structure: The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is a smaller sized Marine Air Ground Task Force, subordinate to the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The 31st MEU is commanded by USMC, and is comprised of approximately 2,200 Marines and Sailors embarked aboard three amphibious ships. The ships are manned by another 2,100 Marines and Sailors, and are designated an Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON). The PHIBRON is commanded by a senior Navy Captain (Commodore). The MEU and PHIBRON are called an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). The 31st MEU and PHIBRON 11, Naval Surface Forces Pacific, Sasebo, Japan, form the ARG. PHIBRON 11 consisted of three amphibious ships; USS BONHOMME RICHARD (LHD 6), USS GREEN BAY (LPD 20) and the USS ASHLAND (LSD 48). PHIBRON 11’s higher headquarters is SEVENTH Fleet, Yokosuka, Japan, U. S. Navy. The major components of a MEU are a Command Element (CE), a Ground Combat Element (GCE), an Aviation Combat element (ACE), and a Logistics Combat Element (LCE). The GCE for a MEU is the Battalion Landing Team (BLT). The ACE provides both rotary and fixed wing air support. Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 265 (VMM-265 (REIN)) was the designated 31st MEU, ACE. The GCE was BLT 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5).

5. All reasonably available and relevant evidence was collected. In coordination with SEVENTH Fleet and the 31st MEU, III MEF, Okinawa, Japan, this investigation team reported to BONHOMME RICHARD on 9 August 2017 to conduct all investigative actions, to conduct interviews, and to document all injuries to personnel and damage to U.S. Government property. Due to the complexity of this investigation and concurrent related investigations, we maintained strict accountability of all witness’ statements and documentary evidence. However, during this inquiry, while aboard BONHOMME RICHARD, we became aware of privileged information.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

related to a separate investigation. We did not inquire into this information because it was privileged, not relevant to the mishap, and exceeded the scope of the investigation as described in Enclosure (1). Privileged information was not used or included in this investigation report, and did not influence any of the findings, opinions, or recommendations.

6. All times are listed in Australian Eastern Standard Time (AEST).

7. The Findings of Fact (FoF) are organized by subject area in the following order:

   a. Identity of United States Service members involved in the mishap.

   b. VMM-265 (REIN) Training, Scheduling, Human Factors Monitoring, Manpower and Operations.

   c. USS GREEN BAY (LPD 20) Certifications and Operations.

   d. Background and Experience of [b3](10USC§130)(b6).

   e. Background and Experience of [b3](10USC§130).

   f. Background and Experience of [b3](10USC§130)(b6).

   g. Background and Experience of [b3](10USC§130)(b6).

   h. Background and Experience of [b3](10USC§130)(b6).

   i. Mishap aircraft and VMM-265 (REIN) Maintenance.

   j. Aircrew summary of previous 72 hours.

   k. Mishap flight.

   l. Post mishap and Search and Rescue (SAR) efforts.

   m. Recovery of [b3](10USC§130)(b6), [b3](10USC§130)(b6), [b3](10USC§130)(b6), and mishap aircraft.


   o. Description of damages to USS GREEN BAY and UH-1Y BuNo 168784.


8. On the afternoon of 5 August 2017, a MV-22B, Bureau Number 168634 (mishap aircraft), assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 265 (VMM-265) Reinforced (REIN) serving the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) was piloted by [b3](10USC§130)(b6), USMC and [b3](10USC§130)(b6), USMC, and crewed by [b3](10USC§130)(b6), USMC, [10USC§1

Executive Summary
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MishAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

USMC, and USMC, when it crashed off the coast of Rockhampton, Queensland, Australia during a routine training mission.

9. (b) (5)

a. USMC, USMC, and USMC died as a result of the mishap. These deaths all occurred in the line of duty (LOD) and were not the result of misconduct.

b. The following personnel suffered injuries as a result of this mishap. These injuries all occurred in the LOD and were not due to their own misconduct.

(1) USMC, VMM-265 (REIN);
(2) USMC, BLT 3/5;
(3) USMC, BLT 3/5;
(4) USMC, VMM-265 (REIN);
(5) USMC, BLT 3/5;
(6) USMC, BLT 3/5;
(7) USMC, BLT 3/5;
(8) USMC, BLT 3/5;
(9) USMC, VMM-265 (REIN);
(10) USMC, BLT 3/5;
(11) USMC, BLT 3/5;
(12) USMC, BLT 3/5;
(13) USMC, BLT 3/5;
(14) USMC, 31st MEU CE;
(15) USMC, BLT 3/5;
(16) USMC, BLT 3/5;
(17) USMC, BLT 3/5;
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHPAC INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTTER SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

(18) USMC, BLT 3/5; (19) USMC, BLT 3/5; (20) USMC, BLT 3/5; (21) USMC, BLT 3/5; (22) USMC, BLT 3/5; and (23) USN, BLT 3/5.

c. The mishap resulted in the complete loss of the mishap aircraft, damage to GREEN BAY, and damage to a UH-1Y that was parked on the deck of GREEN BAY.

d. were all qualified and medically fit for flight duties. The pilots and aircrew maintained at least eight hours of crew rest the night prior to the mishap and showed no indications of fatigue or stress leading up to the mishap flight.

Findings of Fact

A. Identity of United States Service members involved in the mishap.

1. was the Tiltrotor Aircraft Commander1 of the mishap aircraft. [Encl. 3, 4]
2. was the Tiltrotor Second Pilot2 (T2P) of the mishap aircraft. [Encl. 3, 4]
3. and were the crew chiefs3 (CC) of the mishap aircraft. [Encl. 3, 4]
4. and were permanently assigned to VMM-265 (REIN). [Encl. 3]
5. were authorized passengers from BLT 3/5 on the mishap aircraft. [Encl. 3, 5, 6, 13, 24]

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1 Tiltrotor Aircraft Commander is a designation given by a squadron commanding officer that allows an aviator to sign and be responsible for an aircraft. The TAC takes command of an aircraft and is responsible for its safe operation in the accomplishment of the assigned mission.

2 Tiltrotor Second Pilot, also known as “copilot,” can refer to either (1) another pilot in a specific aircraft or (2) an aviator’s status or seniority as opposed to the more senior designation of “pilot” within an aviation squadron.

3 Crew Chief is an aircrew member responsible for aircraft maintenance and all cargo and passenger operations.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

6. [Redacted] was an authorized passenger from the Combat Camera section of the 31st MEU CE. [Encl. 3, 5, 6, 24]

B. VMM-265 (REIN) Training, Scheduling, Human Factors Monitoring, Manpower and Operations.

7. The planning, scheduling, and operation of the mishap aircraft were routine and required to occur within the scope of CNAF M-3710.7, T&R of the MV-22B, and the Joint Flight Operations Standard Operating Procedures\(^4\) (SOP). [Encl. 3, 4, 40, 41, 46]

8. The VMM-265 (REIN) Operations Officer\(^5\), departed the squadron mid deployment on Permanent Change of Station orders (PCS), and assumed Operations Officer duties beginning 2 August 2017. [Encl. 9, 11]

9. The Pilot Training Officer (PTO)\(^6\), Operation’s Officer, and Squadron Commanding Officer (CO) are responsible for the allocation of aircrew human resources and risk management within a squadron. [Encl. 4]

10. On 5 August 2017, [Redacted] completed and signed a Risk Assessment Worksheet\(^7\) (RAW) prior to the mishap flight, and assessed the overall risk of the mishap flight to be “Low.” [Encl. 4, 5]

11. The mishap aircraft was one of three MV-22Bs scheduled to participate in a simulated Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation\(^8\) (NEO) as part of 31st MEU’s training plan. [Encl. 3]

12. [Redacted] JSMC, VMM-265 (REIN), was assigned as the “division leader under instruction” for the NEO training mission, and [Redacted] was the actual division leader. [Encl. 3, 5, 14]

13. The mission confirmation brief\(^9\) occurred at 1330 on 3 August 2017. Later that day, it was rebriefed at the direction of the MEU Command Element, and confirmed at approximately 2100. [Encl. 3, 5, 14]

14. The Joint Flight Operations SOP dictates: “Aircrrew and Maintenance Marines shall be afforded eight hours of uninterrupted sleep per day, per reference (a). Marines should maintain a

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\(^4\) The Joint Flight Operations Standard Operating Procedures are a shared set of procedures governing Okinawa based MV-22 Osprey squadrons.

\(^5\) Operations Officer is the squadron manager responsible for unit level ground and aviation training.

\(^6\) Pilot Training Officer is the squadron manager responsible for pilot training.

\(^7\) A Risk Assessment Worksheet is a standardized form used to identify and mitigate the risks associated with a given flight event. This includes human factors, aircrew experience, training, proficiency, mission complexities, and environmental conditions.

\(^8\) Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations are executed to remove non-combatants from a hostile area or region.

\(^9\) A Division Leader is a pilot qualified to lead a flight of up to four aircraft. Pilots are considered “under instruction” when undergoing the qualification syllabus.

\(^9\) Mission confirmation briefs are formal briefs given to a military commander in order to gain approval for mission execution.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

minimum of 10 hours in garrison and nine hours when embarked from the end of their work day to the start of their next crew/work day for crew rest purposes. End of work day is defined as one hour after aircraft shutdown, and start of work day is the first assigned military duty or expected time of arrival for planning, aircraft pre-flight, or maintenance duties.” [Encl. 41]

15. At 2109 on 4 August 2017, the evening before the mishap flight, and landed and conducted engine shutdown as scheduled. [Encl. 3]

16. On 5 August 2017, the crew of the mishap aircraft were scheduled to brief at 0600, and except for all arrived at the ready room between 0545 and 0600. [Encl. 3, 8]

17. arrived at the mishap flight’s morning briefing at 0545 on 5 August 2017, which afforded him less than the squadron recommended 9 hours of crew rest when embarked at sea, but was given sufficient crew rest to meet the required minimum of 8 hours uninterrupted sleep prior to his flight on 5 August 2017. [Encl. 3, 41, 46, 58]

18. Commanding Officers are empowered as a qualifying authority to designate flight personnel as Carrier Qualified (CQ) and issue certification thereof. [Encl. 46]

19. Marine Corps flight personnel shall have a certification signed by the qualifying authority placed in their NATOPS flight personnel training/qualification jacket. [Encl. 46]

20. CQ certifications for were not in their NATOPS flight personnel training/qualification jacket immediately after the mishap. [Encl. 27, 29]

21. CQ certifications for both were produced by the squadron to investigators on 27 January 2018. [Encl. 27, 29, 76]

22. The CQ’s of and were not properly documented in their NATOPS flight personnel training/qualification jackets and flight logbooks at the time of the mishap. [Encl. 27, 29, 40, 44, 46]

23. completed day CQ training on 3 June 2017 and night systems CQ on 9 June 2017. His training was documented in Marine Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (MSHARP). [Encl. 27, 40]

24. completed day CQ training on 3 June 2017 and night systems CQ training on 10 June 2017, and his training was documented in MSHARP. [Encl. 29, 40]

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11 End of workday is defined as one hour after aircraft shutdown, and start of workday is the first assigned military duty or expected time of arrival for planning, aircraft pre-flight, or maintenance duties.

12 Crew rest is the non-duty time before a flight duty period begins. Crew rest includes free time for meals, transportation and rest and must include an opportunity for 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep time for every 24-hour period. Crew rest does not begin until after termination of official duties and is required prior to reporting for preflight preparations.

13 Marine Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program is an electronic readiness and qualification tracking program.
25. The squadron relied primarily on MSHARP, a readiness and qualification tracking program, for flight schedule validation and error checking for qualification discrepancies. [Encl. 11, 44, 46]

26. [b3](10USC§130)(b6) was not certified CQ in MSHARP at the time of the mishap. [Encl. 30]

27. Aviation Training Forms (ATF) documenting the CQ training of [b3](10USC§130)(b6) and [b3](10USC§130)(b6) were not in their NATOPS flight personnel training/qualification jackets at the time of the mishap, but were later provided to investigators on 27 January 2018. [Encl. 27, 29, 76]

28. Annual egress training conducted locally for other than ejection seat equipped aircraft shall be recorded on OPNAV 3760/32F in individual NATOPS jackets. [Encl. 46]

29. Annual egress training for [b3](10USC§130)(b6) and [b3](10USC§130)(b6) was not properly documented on form OPNAV 3760/32F in their NATOPS jackets. [Encl. 27, 28, 29, 44, 46]

30. Annual egress training was current for all pilots and crew members on their most recent NATOPS evaluation forms. [Encl. 27, 28, 29, 44, 46]

31. The lack of CQ certified enlisted aircrew was an ongoing concern for squadron operations and scheduling. [Encl. 9, 11]

C. **USS GREEN BAY (LPD 20) Certifications and Operations.**

32. **USS GREEN BAY (LPD 20)** is a San Antonio class amphibious transport dock. [Encl. 75]

33. GREEN BAY’s flight deck has six landing spots for aircraft (see picture below). [Encl. 45]
34. On 5 August 2017, at the time of the mishap, there were five aircraft parked on the deck of GREEN BAY in the configuration depicted. [Encl. 72]

35. The wind operations envelope\(^\text{14}\) governing MV-22B operations on the GREEN BAY’s Spot \(^\text{15}\) states: “\([w]inds less than 5 knots may result in torque transients up to 15\% beyond the NATOPS Hover Out of Ground Effect (HOGE) zero wind prediction.\)”\(^\text{16}\) [Encl. 45]

36. GREEN BAY’s flight deck was properly certified to conduct MV-22B operations. [Encl. 36]

37. GREEN BAY’s flight deck crew was properly certified to conduct MV-22B operations. [Encl. 36]

38. The crew of GREEN BAY observed all applicable requirements governing the conduct of flight operations. [Encl. 36, 45]

39. GREEN BAY was properly certified to conduct Search and Rescue (SAR) operations. [Encl. 36, 45]

40. The Joint Flight Operations SOP states the aircraft commander is responsible for ensuring that all manifested passengers receive an emergency procedures brief. The Combat Cargo Officer\(^\text{17}\)

\(^{14}\) The wind operations envelope governs the allowable wind direction and speed parameters for aircraft takeoff and landing operations on amphibious shipping.

\(^{15}\) Spot 5, is the most starboard side aft landing spot on all LPD class ships.

\(^{16}\) Torque transients are manifested as increases or decreases in the amount of aircraft engine power required to execute a given maneuver.

\(^{17}\) Combat Cargo Officer is responsible for all passenger and cargo movements of a ship.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

(CCO) is the responsible officer during shipboard operations and the Assault Force Commander\(^\text{18}\) (AFC) has responsibility during tactical troop lifts. [Encl. 41]

41. The Joint Flight Operation SOP was not provided to PHIBRON 11 or GREEN BAY. [Encl. 19, 41]

42. GREEN BAY's Combat Cargo Staff Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (SNCOIC), stated that the Joint Flight Operation SOP had not been provided to the Combat Cargo division of GREEN BAY. [Encl. 19, 41]

43. VMM-265 (REIN) did not train the Combat Cargo division of GREEN BAY on the Joint Flight Operation SOP requirements, or how to properly provide an egress brief for the aircraft attached to the 31st MEU. [Encl. 19]

D. Background and Experience of [b] (8) [b]

44. was designated as a Naval Aviator on 2 July 2009. [Encl. 25]

45. completed aviation physiology and water survival refresher training on 27 January 2015. [Encl. 25]

46. earned his Tiltrotor Aircraft Commander (TAC), Basic Instructor Pilot (BIP), Section Leader (SL), Low Altitude Training Instructor (LATI), Functional Check Pilot (FCP), Division Leader (DL), Instrument Evahuator, Crew Resource Management Facilitator (CRMF), Night Systems Instructor (NSI), Aerial Refueling Instructor (ARI), Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI), Assistant NATOPS Instructor (ANI), Flight Lead (FL), and Air Mission Commander (AMC) qualifications and designations. [Encl. 25]

47. At the time of the mishap, had 1947.7 total current flight hours that included 1688.6 MV-22B flight hours. [Encl. 25]

48. logged 7.3, 37.5, and 63.7 flight hours in the last 30, 60, and 90 days respectively. [Encl. 25]

49. was current\(^{19}\) and proficient\(^{20}\) in T&R Manual code 2932 (Day CQ)\(^{21}\). [Encl. 30]

50. There was no history of any aviation related mishaps involving prior to the 5 August 2017 mishap flight. [Encl. 25]

\(^{18}\) Assault Force Commander is the commander of ground troops during an air assault.

\(^{19}\) Currency is a control measure used to provide an additional margin of safety based on exposure frequency to a particular skill. It is a measure of time since the last event demanding that specific skill. Loss of currency does not affect a less of proficiency.

\(^{20}\) Proficiency is a measure of achievement of a specific skill.

\(^{21}\) Carrier Qualification certifies aircrew to operate and land on amphibious ships.
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51. Flight physical was current with an expiration date of 31 October 2017. [Encl. 25]
52. Was physically qualified and aeronautically adapted for unrestricted flight status. [Encl. 25]

E. Background and Experience of [b3] (10USC§130)

53. [b3] (10USC§130) was designated as a Naval Aviator on 2 March 2016. [Encl. 26]
54. [b3] (10USC§130) completed aviation physiology and water survival training on 16 June 2016. [Encl. 26]
55. [b3] (10USC§130) was a qualified Tiltrotor Second Pilot (T2P). [Encl. 26]
56. [b3] (10USC§130) last MV-22B NATOPS evaluation was on 20 September 2016. At that time, he had 27.1 MV-22B hours and 220.9 total flight hours. [Encl. 26]
57. No discrepancies were found with [b3] (10USC§130) NATOPS training or currency. [Encl. 26]
58. At the time of the mishap, [b3] (10USC§130) had 339.7 total flight hours that included 145.9 MV-22B flight hours. [Encl. 26]
59. [b3] (10USC§130) logged 19.2, 32.0, and 37.5 flight hours in the last 30, 60, and 90 days respectively. [Encl. 20]
60. [b3] (10USC§130) was current and proficient in T&R Manual code 2932 Day CQ. [Encl. 30]
61. On 5 August 2017, [b3] (10USC§130) was scheduled to fly with [b3] (10USC§130) who is a qualified TAC. [Encl. 3]
62. There was no history of any aviation related mishaps involving [b3] (10USC§130) prior to the 5 August 2017 mishap flight. [Encl. 26]
63. [b3] (10USC§130) flight physical was current with an expiration date of 31 January 2018. [Encl. 26]
64. [b3] (10USC§130) was physically qualified and aeronautically adapted for unrestricted flight status. [Encl. 26]

F. Background and Experience of [b3] (6)

65. [b5] (10USC§130)(6) completed aircrew flight training at Marine Medium Tiltrotor Training Squadron (VMMT) 204. [Encl. 27]
66. [b5] (10USC§130)(6) was designated as a Crew Chief on 5 April 2013. [Encl. 27]
67. [b5] (10USC§130)(6) completed aviation physiology and water survival training on 9 March 2016. [Encl. 27]
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68. At the time of the 22 June 2017 MV-22B NATOPS evaluation, he had 774.9 MV-22B hours and 774.9 total flight hours. [Encl. 27]

69. Completed the training for Day CQ on 3 June 2017 and Night Systems CQ on 9 June 2017. [Encl. 27]

70. At the time of the mishap, CQ had not been recorded in his NATOPS jacket or flight logbook. [Encl. 27]

71. At the time of the mishap, had 774.9 total flight hours. [Encl. 27]

72. Logged 19.3, 46.0, and 67.5 flight hours in the last 30, 60, and 90 days respectively. [Encl. 27]

73. was current and proficient in T&R Manual code 2932 Day CQ. [Encl. 30]

74. There was no history of any aviation related mishaps involving prior to the 5 August 2017 mishap flight. [Encl. 27]

75. Flight physical was dated 19 September 2016 with an expiration date of 30 September 2017. [Encl. 27]

76. was physically qualified and aeronautically adapted for unrestricted flight status. [Encl. 27]

G. Background and Experience of

77. completed aircrew flight training at VMMT-204. [Encl. 28]

78. was designated as a Crew Chief on 11 July 2013. [Encl. 28]

79. was current in aviation physiology and water survival training with an expiration date of 30 November 2020. [Encl. 28]

80. Earned his Basic Instructor Crew Chief, LATI, NSI, Tail Gunnery Instructor, and Weapons Training Instructor (WTI) designations. [Encl. 28]

81. At the time of the 23 July 2017 MV-22B NATOPS evaluation, he had 1023.5 MV-22B hours and 1023.5 total hours. [Encl. 28]

82. At the time of the mishap, had 1035.0 total flight hours. [Encl. 28]

83. Logged 42.7, 65.1, and 84.3 flight hours in the last 30, 60, and 90 days respectively. [Encl. 28]

84. was current and proficient in T&R Manual code 2932 Day CQ. [Encl. 30]
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85. There was no history of an aviation mishap involving [REDACTED] prior to the 5 August 2017 mishap flight. [Encl. 28]

86. [REDACTED] flight physical was current with an expiration date of 31 May 2018. [Encl. 28]

87. [REDACTED] was physically qualified and aeronautically adapted for unrestricted flight status. [Encl. 28]

H. Background and Experience of [REDACTED].

88. [REDACTED] completed aircrew flight training at VMMT-204. [Encl. 29]

89. [REDACTED] was designated as a Crew Chief on 4 February 2016. [Encl. 29]

90. [REDACTED] was current in aviation physiology and water survival training with an expiration date of 30 April 2019. [Encl. 29]

91. At the time of [REDACTED] 22 February 2017 MV-22B NATOPS evaluation, he had 259.8 MV-22B hours and 259.8 total hours. [Encl. 29]

92. At the time of the mishap, [REDACTED] CQ was not documented in his NATOPS jacket or flight logbook. [Encl. 29]

93. [REDACTED] completed the training for Day CQ on 3 June 2017 and Night Systems CQ on 10 June 2017. [Encl. 29]

94. [REDACTED] was current and proficient in the T&R Manual code 2932 Day CQ. [Encl. 30]

95. At the time of the mishap, [REDACTED] had 382.9 total flight hours. [Encl. 29]

96. [REDACTED] logged 20.2, 31.2, and 48.3 flight hours in the last 30, 60, and 90 days respectively. [Encl. 29]

97. There was no history of an aviation related mishap involving [REDACTED] prior to the 5 August 2017 mishap flight. [Encl. 29]

98. [REDACTED] flight physical was current with an expiration date of 28 Feb 2018. [Encl. 29]

99. [REDACTED] was physically qualified and aeronautically adapted for unrestricted flight status. [Encl. 29]

I. Mishap Aircraft and VMM-265 (REIN) Maintenance.

100. The mishap aircraft was an MV-22B, BuNo 168634, assigned to VMM-265 (REIN), Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Okinawa, Japan. [Encl. 43]

101. At the time of the mishap, the aircraft had 203.2 hours logged on the airframe. [Encl. 43]
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102. The mishap aircraft was current and compliant with all pertinent technical directives. [Encl. 43]

103. The mishap aircraft had not yet reached sufficient flight time to undergo a major inspection. [Encl. 43]

104. The most recent Functional Check Flight\textsuperscript{22} (FCF) was conducted on 16 Jul 2017 in order to correct high vibrations in the proprotors. Rotor Track and Balance\textsuperscript{23} (RT&B) adjustments were made, and the mishap aircraft was listed as safe for flight. [Encl. 43]

105. Completed FCF checklists must be retained in the aircraft’s history file for a minimum of 6 months, or one phase cycle, whichever is greater. [Encl. 62]

106. The FCF checklist used to perform the 16 July 2017 FCF could not be located by the VMM-265 (REIN) Maintenance Department. [Encl. 43, 61]

107. The mishap aircraft had 14 open Maintenance Action Forms (MAF)\textsuperscript{24} in the Aircraft Discrepancy Book\textsuperscript{25} (ADB). Seven of these MAFs were for airframes changes to be completed in the future and had no effect on the mishap aircraft’s day to day flight operations. The remaining seven MAFs were written as “Up” discrepancies, meaning that the aircraft remained safe for flight with these open maintenance actions. [Encl. 43]

108. The VMM-265 (REIN) Avionics Division Officer in Charge, Staff Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge, and two Collateral Duty Quality Assurance Representatives executed permanent change of station orders, did not deploy with the unit, and were replaced by new personnel. [Encl. 10]

109. The mishap aircraft’s Turnaround Inspection\textsuperscript{26} was completed by [b3](10USC§130)(b6) [b3](10USC§130)(b6) USMC, VMM-265 (REIN), on the morning of 4 August 2017 prior to shift change at 0700. [Encl. 43]

110. The majority of the mishap aircraft’s Daily Inspection\textsuperscript{27} was completed by on the morning of 4 August 2017 prior to 0700. [Encl. 43]

\textsuperscript{22} Functional check flights are performed to ensure proper aircraft function following maintenance.

\textsuperscript{23} Rotor Track and Balance are FCF’s performed following maintenance on the aircraft’s proprotor hub.

\textsuperscript{24} Maintenance Action Forms record various maintenance tasks that have been identified for a particular aircraft.

\textsuperscript{25} An Aircraft Discrepancy Book is a record of documenting the maintenance status of an aircraft.

\textsuperscript{26} Turnaround Inspection is conducted between flights to verify proper servicing, detect defects that may have occurred during the previous flight, and verify the aircraft is safe for the next flight. The Turnaround Inspection is valid for a period of 24 hours commencing from the date and time the inspection is completed, provided no flight and no maintenance other than servicing occurs during this period.

\textsuperscript{27} Daily Inspection is conducted to inspect for defects to a greater depth than the turnaround inspection. A Daily Inspection is valid for a period of 72 hours commencing from the date and time the inspection is completed, provided no flight and no maintenance other than servicing occurs during this period.
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111. The incomplete portions of the Daily Inspection included inspection of the Right-Hand Nacelle and the performance of a preflight flight control system operational check, which were later completed by [REDACTED] on the morning of 5 August 2017. [Encl. 7, 43]

112. On the morning of 4 August 2017 at 0900, a downing discrepancy with the Blade Fold Wing Stow (BFWS) system on the mishap aircraft (BuNo 168634) was discovered. This discrepancy was recorded and entered into the ADB via MAF 20MCAR5. [Encl. 43]

113. MAF 20MCAR5 required maintenance to address a Blade Fold Control Unit (BFCU) failure to operate properly while on Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) power. [Encl. 43]

114. Tools, equipment, hardware, parts and other materials must be inspected, inventoried, and accounted for prior to, during, and after maintenance completion. These must be documented pursuant to a squadron’s Tool Control Program (TCP). [Encl. 62]

115. Beginning and End of Shift All Tools Accounted For (ATAF) procedures mandated by the squadron’s TCP were not followed by multiple work centers in the VMM-265 (REIN) maintenance department. Tool boxes were not brought to the work center at shift change, and instead remained checked-out on the flight deck. [Encl. 43]

116. The Avionics work center began work on MAF 20MCAR5 on the mishap aircraft at approximately 0936 on 4 August 2017. [Encl. 43]

117. The Central De-Ice Distributor (CDD) used to repair the mishap aircraft was cannibalized from another squadron aircraft, BuNo 168216, on 4 August 2017. [Encl. 43]

118. Proper tool accountability procedures were not used when maintainers shifted from cannibalization MAF 20MCARB on BuNo 168216, and entered work to install the CDD on the mishap aircraft (BuNo 168634) under MAF 20MCAR5. [Encl. 43]

119. (b3)(10USC§130)(b6) USMC, VMM-265 (REIN) and (b3)(10USC§130)(b6) JSMC, VMM-265 (REIN) began their shift at approximately 1830 on 4 August 2017. [Encl. 22]

120. Work on MAF 20MCAR5 continued through the shift change at 1900 on 4 August 2017. [Encl. 43]

121. A maintenance workday shall not exceed 12 hours without CO/Det OIC authorization. [Encl. 41, 62]
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122. [Redacted] and [Redacted] remained working on the mishap aircraft through the next morning’s shift change at 0700, completed maintenance at approximately 0745, and electronically logged work on the mishap aircraft as late as 0759 on 5 August 2017. [Encl. 22, 43]

123. [Redacted] and [Redacted] extended their crew day by 90 minutes, without approval of the Commanding Officer. [Encl. 9, 22, 43]

124. In violation of the squadron’s TCP, the tool control log for the Avionics work center shows that the tools used by [Redacted] and [Redacted] to perform the maintenance on the mishap aircraft were not signed back into the logbook after the completion of maintenance. [Encl. 43]

125. On the day of the mishap, tools were improperly accounted for during shift changes and upon completion of maintenance on another aircraft before being used on the mishap aircraft. [Encl 43]

126. At approximately 0745, [Redacted] completed the remaining Daily Inspection maintenance procedures, finishing [Redacted] inspection from the previous day. [Encl. 7, 43]

127. The removal and replacement of the CDD shows that maintenance was performed on the mishap aircraft after [Redacted] completed his portion of the Daily and Turnaround Inspections, necessitating another Daily and Turnaround Inspection be completed prior to the mishap flight on 5 August 2017. However, no re-inspections occurred. [Encl. 7, 21, 43, 62]

128. At 0756 on 5 August 2017, over 24 hours after [Redacted] completed the Turnaround Inspection, both the Turnaround inspection and the Daily Inspection were electronically signed off in Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System (NALCOMIS) by [Redacted] USMC, VMM-265 (REIN), a maintenance controller. [Encl. 43]

129. [Redacted] created a work order (MCN: 2OMCATA) at 0753 on 5 August 2017 which stated “LH CDD mount bolts require sealant.” [Encl. 22, 43]

130. Work order MCN: 2OMCATA was not processed into a new MAF by maintenance control or entered into the ADB at 1604, the time of the mishap. [Encl. 43]

131. At 0759, [Redacted] signed off MAF 2OMCAR5 and annotated, “For sealant of mount bolts refer to MCN: 2OMCATA.” [Encl. 22, 43]

132. MV-22 IETMS procedure to Replace Left CDD is an 87-step process. [Encl. 63]

133. The Replace Left CDD procedure dictates the application of P/S 870 B-1/2 sealant and allowance for cure time in steps 80-87. [Encl. 63]

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31 Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System is electronic maintenance control software.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

134. Omitted steps 80-87 and signed off MAF 2OMCAR5 without approval from Quality Assurance or the chain of command. [Encl. 22, 43, 62, 63]

135. The application of sealant and allowance for cure time in steps 80-87 were not completed prior to the mishap flight on 5 August 2017. [Encl. 63]

136. The mishap aircraft was certified safe for flight on 5 August 2017 at 0802 by b3\(10USC\$130\)(b) USMC VMM-265 (REIN) a maintenance controller. [Encl. 43]

137. Safe for flight certification occurred prior to all steps being completed on the maintenance task, maintenance documentation being completed, without valid daily and turnaround inspections, and accounting for all tools, parts and aircraft being free of foreign objects. [Encl. 43, 62, 63]

138. The mishap aircraft was physically signed for by b3\(10USC\$130\)(b) at approximately 0815 on 5 August 2017 and conducted flight operations from 0920-1604. [Encl. 5, 6, 43]

139. MAF 2OMCAR5 shows that maintenance was completed and signed off on 5 August 2017 at 0825 with the work performed by b3\(10USC\$130\)(b) USMC, VMM-265 (REIN), and inspected by b3\(10USC\$130\)(b) USMC, VMM-265 (REIN). [Encl. 43]

140. The MAF stated that the Avionics work center had removed and replaced the Left-hand proprotor CDD in accordance with the procedures with all parts accounted for (APAF) and (ATAF) and that the area was free of any foreign objects (AFF). [Encl. 43]

141. Model K Flight Data Recorder\(^{32}\) (KVADR) and Vibration, Structural Life and Engine Diagnostics System\(^{33}\) (VSLED) systems were installed on the mishap aircraft. [Encl. 33]

142. Analysis of recovered KVADR and VSLED data showed no evidence of any degradation in the state of operation or malfunction prior to 16:03:46 on 5 August 2017 that would contribute to mishap aircraft crash. [Encl. 33]

143. All emergency egress, safety and survival equipment for mishap aircraft was up to date for scheduled inspections, and was in good working order. [Encl. 43]

144. Upon reclamation of the mishap aircraft, the LH CDD was inspected by investigators, and all mounting hardware remained in place and appeared to be properly installed. [Encl. 57]

145. All tools used on the mishap aircraft were accounted for by investigators after the mishap. [Encl. 43]

\(^{32}\) Model K Flight Data Recorder provides many functions of a traditional flight data recorder (black box).

\(^{33}\) Vibration, Structural Life and Engine Diagnostics System records data which supports maintenance functions relating to the aircraft. VSLED data is retrieved at the completion of a flight and analyzed by maintainers.
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I. Aircrew summary of previous 72 hours.

J.1 Previous 72 Hours: [Redacted] Reconstruction.

146. On 2 August 2017, [Redacted] was not scheduled for any flight duties. No unusual occurrences were noted during this period. [Encl. 3, 5, 6]

147. [Redacted] was scheduled for a night flight on 3 August 2017, but that flight was cancelled. No unusual occurrences were noted during this period. [Encl. 3, 5, 6]

148. [Redacted] was scheduled for and executed a night carrier landing flight on 4 August 2017 from 1530-2100. The event was conducted as scheduled with [Redacted] exiting the aircraft at approximately 2000. No unusual occurrences were noted during this period. [Encl. 3, 5, 6]

J.2 Previous 72 Hours: [Redacted] Reconstruction.

149. From 2-4 August 2017, [Redacted] was not scheduled for any flight duties. No unusual occurrences were noted during this period. [Encl. 3]

J.3 Previous 72 Hours: [Redacted] Reconstruction.

150. From 2-3 August 2017, [Redacted] was not scheduled for any flight duties. No unusual occurrences were noted during this period. [Encl. 3, 8]

151. On 4 August 2017, [Redacted] was scheduled for and executed a night carrier landing flight from 1530-2100. The event was conducted as scheduled with [Redacted] landing at approximately 2100. No unusual occurrences were noted during this period. [Encl. 3, 8]

J.4 Previous 72 Hours: [Redacted] Reconstruction.

152. From 2-4 August 2017, [Redacted] was not scheduled for any flight duties. No unusual occurrences were noted during this period. [Encl. 3, 7]

J.5 Previous 72 Hours: [Redacted] Reconstruction.

153. On 2 August 2017, [Redacted] was not scheduled for any flight duties. No unusual occurrences were noted during this period. [Encl. 3]

154. On 3 August 2017, [Redacted] was scheduled for and executed a night carrier landing flight from 1445-2100. The event was conducted as scheduled with [Redacted] landing at approximately 2100. No unusual occurrences were noted during this period. [Encl. 3, 60]

155. On 4 August 2017, [Redacted] was scheduled for a night carrier landing flight from 1530-2100. [Encl. 3]
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156. This document is as having flown the 4 August 2017 event as scheduled both on the Naval Flight Subsystem (NAVFLIR) and in his flight logbook. [Encl. 3, 60]

157. Conducted flight related duties until no later than 2130 on 4 August 2017. [Encl. 3, 43, 60]

K. Mishap flight.

K.1 Mission Overview.

158. PUFF 01 (PF01), the mishap aircraft and PUFF 03 (PF03) were scheduled to conduct a routine, daytime, Amphibious Integration Training (AIT) mission in the Shoalwater Bay Training Area (SWBTA), Australia. The mishap flight’s mission included conducting combat assault transport (CAT) training in SWBTA, and daytime shipboard landings to various amphibious ships assigned to Expeditionary Strike Group 7 (ESG-7). [Encl. 3, 31, 64]


159. Arrived at the Squadron spaces at approximately 0545. [Encl. 3, 6, 7]

160. Arrived at the Squadron spaces at approximately 0550. [Encl. 7]

161. Met the crew on the flight deck at approximately 0600. [Encl. 8]

162. All crewmembers stated they felt normal, were not suffering from any abnormal stressors, and felt prepared for the flight. [Encl. 4, 5, 6]

163. The flight brief was given at approximately 0600 by [b3]TAC of the mishap aircraft, and the division leader (under instruction) designated on the flight schedule. [Encl. 5, 6, 14]

164. The weather report reflected northerly winds ranging from 10-15 knots, unrestricted visibility, and no cloud layer. [Encl. 32]

165. At the flight brief, learned that maintenance was still in progress on the mishap aircraft. [Encl. 5, 6]

166. The weight and power computation were properly completed, and the document was signed and accepted by [b3]. [Encl. 31]

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34 The Naval Flight Record Subsystem serves as a single, integrated source of flight data for the Aviation Maintenance and Material Management (AV-3M) of the Maintenance Data System (MDS), the Aviation Data Warehouse (ADW), the Marine Corps Sierra Hotel Aviation Reporting Program (MSTAH) and all other existing up-line reporting systems.

35 Amphibious Integration Training is a MEU training phase meant to prepare the unit for certification.
167. did the majority of the planning and coordination with the supported BLT 3/5 planners as he was the division leader (under instruction). received the information required to execute the mission during the flight brief. [Encl. 5, 6, 14]

168. The flight brief was executed as scheduled at 0600. delivered the brief. The plan was to depart BONHOMME RICHARD, proceed to Raspberry Creek (RC) in SWBTA to insert personnel, return to amphibious shipping to conduct logistical support, and then return to RC to conduct three passenger movements from RC to amphibious shipping. [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 64]

169. After the flight brief, the mishap aircraft’s crew conducted a NATOPS flight crew brief that was led by. [Encl. 5, 6]

170. and checked out their flight gear at approximately 0800. [Encl. 5, 6]

171. then reviewed the ADB in Maintenance Control and learned that maintenance was still occurring on the mishap aircraft. [Encl. 5, 6]

172. physically signed the ADB’s acceptance sheet at approximately 0815, which allowed the Maintenance Controller to input his signature into NALCOMIS after the aircraft’s digital ADB was signed safe for flight by maintenance control. [Encl. 5, 6, 43]

173. arrived on the flight deck at approximately 0820, and conducted preflight inspection. [Encl. 5, 6]

174. was seated in the right pilot seat on the right side of the mishap aircraft cockpit. [Encl. 5, 6]

175. was seated in the left pilot seat on the left side of the mishap aircraft cockpit. [Encl. 5, 6]

176. crew position was on the left side of the mishap aircraft ramp. [Encl. 8]

177. crew position was on the right side of the mishap aircraft ramp. [Encl. 7]

178. crew position was in the forward cabin near the cockpit and crew chief door. [Encl. 5, 6, 7, 8]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSMREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

179. The crew of mishap aircraft executed normal pre-start and startup checks on the mishap aircraft. [Encl. 5, 6, 7, 8]

180. All aircraft advised that they were ready to load passengers. [Encl. 5, 6]

181. After aircraft startup, it was notified that the mishap aircraft had an extra 1000 pounds of fuel onboard. [Encl. 5, 6, 14]

182. Directed that PF01 and mishap aircraft swap assigned passengers to compensate for the additional fuel in the mishap aircraft. [Encl. 14]

183. PF03, as TAC, was instructed to depart and conduct a range sweep in support of 31st MEU operations. [Encl. 3, 14]

184. PF01 and the mishap aircraft loaded a combined 39 passengers and then launched at 09:19:30. [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 33]


185. PF01 and the mishap aircraft launched and proceeded to RC in SWBTA and landed to disembark their passengers at 09:37:50. [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 33]

186. PF03 conducted the assigned range sweep and returned as a single ship to BONHOMME RICHARD. [Encl. 5, 6, 14]

187. PF01 and the mishap aircraft took off and departed RC at 09:44:12, and proceeded to BONHOMME RICHARD. [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 33]

188. PF01 and the mishap aircraft arrived at BONHOMME RICHARD at 10:03:51, refueled, and the mishap aircraft loaded one passenger and miscellaneous cargo bound for ASHLAND to conduct assigned Pax/Mail/Cargo (PMC) operations. [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 33]

189. The mishap aircraft took off as a single aircraft from BONHOMME RICHARD at 10:36:09, and landed on ASHLAND at 10:46:28. [Encl. 5, 6, 33]

190. The mishap aircraft off-loaded and took off from ASHLAND at 10:56:38, then proceeded back to BONHOMME RICHARD, and landed at approximately 11:15:11. [Encl. 5, 6, 33]

191. PF01, the mishap aircraft, and PF03 reconstituted on deck of BONHOMME RICHARD and remained on deck until 11:37:56. [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 33]

192. While on deck, a simulated mass casualty contingency was called as part of AIT training. [Encl. 5, 6, 14]

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36 Reconstituted means that all aircraft and personnel from the flight division have re-grouped at a single location.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

193. PF01, the mishap aircraft and PF03 loaded the mass casualty contingency personnel and transited from BONHOMME RICHARD back to RC, landing at 12:14:17. [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 33]

194. PF01, the mishap aircraft, and PF03 off-loaded the mass casualty contingency personnel, and remained on deck at RC while awaiting passengers needing transportation back to BONHOMME RICHARD. [Encl. 5, 6, 14]

195. At 12:44:58, PF01, the mishap aircraft, and PF03 departed from RC with their passengers for BONHOMME RICHARD. [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 33]

196. The mishap aircraft landed aboard BONHOMME RICHARD at 13:02:37. [Encl. 5, 6, 33]

197. On arrival, [b3](10USC§130)(b6)USMC, VMM-265 (REIN), standing [b3](10USC§130)(b6)Primary Flight Control Office, [b3](10USC§130)(b6)briefed [b3](10USC§130)(b6)and [b3](10USC§130)(b6)of changes to BONHOMME RICHARD’s Air Plan[b3](10USC§130)(b6). [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 64]

198. The Air Plan change required PF01-flight to make an extra passenger run between RC and amphibious shipping. This change adjusted PF01, the mishap aircraft and PF03’s final land time for the day’s flight from 1645 to 1815, and required a crew day extension. [Encl. 3, 5, 6, 14, 64]

199. At 13:34:04, PF01, the mishap aircraft, and PF03 departed BONHOMME RICHARD and proceeded back to RC for another passenger movement. [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 33]

200. PF01, the mishap aircraft and PF03 landed back at RC at 13:50:48, and remained on deck to load its next set of passengers. [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 33]

201. After loading passengers, PF01, mishap aircraft, and PF03 departed RC at 14:18:58 and proceeded back to BONHOMME RICHARD. [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 33]

202. PF01, the mishap aircraft, and PF03 arrived back at BONHOMME RICHARD and, after being in a holding pattern, the mishap aircraft landed at 14:49:09. [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 33]

K.4 Mishap Flight.

203. The mishap aircraft refueled to approximately 10,400 pounds of fuel and then departed BONHOMME RICHARD at 15:15:31. [Encl. 5, 6, 33]

204. PF01, the mishap aircraft, and PF03 returned to and landed at RC at 15:33:13. [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 33]

37 Primary Flight Control Officer is the Commanding Officer’s direct representative to shipboard agencies during flight operations.
38 Air Plan is the approved schedule of air operations on an amphibious ship for a given day.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

205. The mishap aircraft had approximately 9300 pounds of fuel when it landed at RC. [Encl. 5, 6, 33]

206. The mishap aircraft loaded 21 passengers and associated equipment in the zone at RC until takeoff at 15:49:48. [Encl. 5, 6, 33]

207. Per squadron Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), the aircraft commander is responsible for ensuring that all manifested passengers receive an emergency procedures brief. The Combat Cargo Officer (CCO) is the responsible officer during shipboard operations and the Assault Force Commander (AFC) has responsibility during tactical troop lifts. [Encl. 41]

208. The AFC for the mishap mission was the Golf Battery Commanding Officer. [Encl. 13]

209. did not provide an egress brief to the passengers involved in the mishap. [Encl. 13]

210. did not receive training on how to provide an egress brief for aircraft attached to the 31st MEU. [Encl. 13]

211. The passengers loaded included two from the 31st MEU Command Element, and 19 Marines and one Sailor from Golf Battery, BLT 3/5: and and and. [Encl. 13]

212. The passengers’ gear was floor loaded, unsecured, and included personal weapons, riot shields, pelican cases of non-lethal force equipment, and daypacks with one day’s worth of supplies. Their weights were accounted for and calculated at 300 pounds per person by. [Encl. 5, 6, 13]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTFRITOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

213. The preflight load computation reflected that with a 5% power margin, that the mishap aircraft, including a crew of four, had a useful load of 14,900 pounds. [Encl. 31]

214. When executing the mission, the mishap aircraft was manned by five crew members. [Encl. 3, 5, 6]

215. Fuel load on board at the time of the mishap was 8,200 pounds. [Encl. 33]

216. Eight of the 21 passengers did not secure themselves using the aircraft restraints. [Encl. 24]

217. The mishap aircraft, and PF01 lifted together from RC at 15:49:48, and proceeded as a section flight to GREEN BAY. [Encl. 5, 6, 14, 33]

218. PF01 remained on deck at RC to continue loading passengers. [Encl. 5, 6, 14]

219. Lifting off from RC, [REDACTED], did not note anything out of the ordinary. This assessment was corroborated by the mishap aircraft’s KVADR data. [Encl. 5, 6, 33]

220. The mishap aircraft contacted the shipboard controlling agency aboard GREEN BAY at 15:51:42 and reported they had two hours and 15 minutes of fuel left and, with 24 personnel on board. [Encl. 5, 6, 65]

221. At the time of the mishap, the mishap aircraft had 26 total personnel aboard. [Encl. 5, 6, 7, 8, 13]

222. The mishap aircraft initially experienced problems receiving the GREEN BAY’s Tactical Air Navigation\(^\text{39}\) (TACAN) signal, and received guidance from the shipboard air traffic controlling agency. [Encl. 5, 6, 65]

223. At 15:58:17, the mishap aircraft switched radio frequencies to GREEN BAY launch and land (L/L) frequency. [Encl. 5, 6, 65]

224. Mishap aircraft conducted landing checks in accordance with NATOPS. [Encl. 5, 6, 44]

225. Mishap aircraft conducted a visual approach to GREEN BAY, and received a landing clearance for Spot 5. [Encl. 5, 6]

226. GREEN BAY’s Spot 5 is an authorized MV-22B landing spot. [Encl. 5, 6, 45]

227. A folded UH-1Y aircraft was in vicinity of Spot 1. [Encl. 72]

228. A folded UH-1Y aircraft was located on Spot 3. [Encl. 72]

229. Two folded AH-1Z aircraft were located in the vicinity of Spot 4. [Encl. 72]

\(^{39}\) Tactical Air Navigation signal is a radio signal used for aircraft navigation.
230. A folded AH-1Z aircraft was located on Spot 6. [Encl. 72]

231. The deck layout at the time of the mishap was in compliance with NATOPS. [Encl. 45, 72]

232. At 16:03:35 the mishap aircraft was approximately 0.1 nautical miles from GREEN BAY, at 10 Knots Calibrated Airspeed (KCAS), and at 75 feet Above Ground Level (AGL), with 90° nacelle set. [Encl. 5, 6, 33, 34]

233. GREEN BAY’s Base Recovery Course was approximately 005 degrees with light winds and no pitch or roll. [Encl. 5, 6, 33, 34]

234. Day time pitch limits for the MV-22B on Spot 5 is 2°, and the roll limit is 4°. [Encl. 45]

235. Max Day time wind limits for landing the MV-22B on Spot 5 is 25 knots. [Encl. 45]

236. At 16:03:45 [b3] at the controls of the mishap aircraft, recognized and attempted to correct a 200-300 foot per minute rate of descent with an application of power using the Thrust Control Lever (TCL). [Encl. 5, 6, 33, 34]

237. At 16:03:46 a TCL OVERTRAVEL advisory posted in the aircraft meaning that [b3] had applied all available aircraft power, and pushed the TCL into the overtravel region. [Encl. 33, 34]

238. The Mast Torque (Qm) available and provided by mishap aircraft at 16:03:46 was 116-117%. [Encl. 33, 34, 39]
239. At 16:03:46, unable to arrest the rate of descent, began to move the mishap aircraft nacelles forward from 90°. [Encl. 33, 34, 06]

240. With the mishap aircraft's nose approaching the deck edge, and the forward nacelle control input being made by , Qm available fell to approximately 108%. [Encl. 33, 34, 66]

241. At 16:03:47, one of the pilots made a right pedal input, in conjunction with cyclic inputs of increasingly larger amplitude. [Encl. 33, 34]

242. At 16:03:50 the mishap aircraft's left nacelle struck the flight deck of GREEN BAY, and the aircraft fuselage impacted the side of the ship near the left nose of the aircraft. [Encl. 33, 34]

243. Mishap aircraft's control inputs, momentum, and relative motion compared to GREEN BAY caused it to continue to move forward along the starboard side catwalk below the flight deck until it impacted a steel stairway. [Encl. 33, 34]

244. Concurrently, the left proprotor blades struck the flight deck repeatedly, sending large debris flying, and damaging a nearby UH-1Y (aircraft BuNo 168784). [Encl. 33, 34, 55, 56]

245. The mishap aircraft's collision with the stairway occurred primarily to the left pilot cockpit, and caused the entire aircraft frame to pivot around the cockpit, reaching an apex of approximately -60° of pitch. [Encl. 33, 34]

246. The impact with the stairway punctured a hole in the aircraft cockpit at seat location, and the force generated by the crash crushed the cockpit display panel and aircraft structure inward, all of which struck . [Encl. 33, 34, 49]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B
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247. The impact with the stairway stopped all forward motion of mishap aircraft. The force of
gravity caused the mishap aircraft to fall vertically down onto the ship’s catwalk. The mishap
aircraft fuselage once again hit the catwalk, at which time it rolled to its right and fell
approximately 30 feet into the water. [Encl. 33, 34]

248. [redacted] suffered multiple fatal injuries. [Encl 33, 34, 49, 52, 55, 67, 72]

249. As a result of the aircraft’s impact with the ship, unsecured personnel and gear in the mishap
aircraft cabin were propelled forward. [Encl. 13, 24]

250. While standing near the crew chief door, [redacted] was thrown into the forward cabin
bulkhead and then struck by personnel and equipment thrown forward by the force of the
impact. [Encl. 13, 24, 50]

L. Post Mishap and Search and Rescue (SAR) efforts.

251. At 16:03:54, the mishap aircraft entered the water off the coast of Rockhampton, Queensland,
Australia in vicinity of S 22°35'32", E 151°06'20". [Encl. 33]

252. The mishap aircraft impacted the water in a nose low, right wing down attitude. [Encl. 5, 6]

253. Impact with GREEN BAY’s stairway, crushed the left cockpit area and window supports,
allowing the aircraft to rapidly fill with water and assume a nose down attitude in the water.
[Encl. 5, 6]

254. The force generated by the crash pushed the cockpit display panel and aircraft structure into
breaking his left leg and hip. [Encl. 5, 6]

255. [redacted] released his restraints and freed himself from the wreckage around him. He then
egressed through the hole created in the aircraft on the left side of the cockpit. [Encl. 5, 6]

256. The crew chief door on the right side of the aircraft remained open, accelerating the intrusion
of water into the aircraft cabin. [Encl. 13, 24]

257. [redacted] remained attached by his Aircrew Endurance Vest (AEV) restraint system to
the aircraft, and did not actuate his emergency release. [Encl. 53]

258. [redacted] Helicopter Aircrew Breathing Device (HABD) bottle was recovered with its
contents unexpended. [Encl. 53]

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40 AEV restraint system serves to attach and secure an aircrew member to the aircraft.
41 Helicopter Aircrew Breathing Device is a small SCUBA tank worn by aircrew and passengers when conducting
overwater flight.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

259. did not activate his Life Preserver Unit (LPU). [Encl. 53]

260. It was determined that died by drowning. [Encl. 13, 24, 50]

261. Due to the nose low aircraft attitude, and were suspended from the aircraft by their AEV restraint system. [Encl. 7, 8]

262. Neither nor was able to actuate the CMU-38 quick release mechanism on their AEV. [Encl. 7, 8]

263. Both and required assistance in detaching their AEV restraint systems from the aircraft and were assisted by some of the Marine passengers and then they executed an egress from the mishap aircraft. [Encl. 7, 8]

264. was seated in the forward third of the cabin, and was rapidly submerged by water intrusion from the cockpit damage, and open crew chief door. [Encl. 13, 24]

265. was properly restrained at the time of the crash. [Encl. 13, 24]

266. Aircraft restraint system functioned properly. [Encl. 38]

267. HABD bottle was recovered with its contents unexpended. [Encl. 54]

268. did not activate his LPU at any point while attempting to egress. [Encl. 54]

269. It was determined that died by drowning. [Encl. 24, 51]

270. Unsecured gear created an obstacle to egress for passengers in the forward half of the aircraft cabin, and blocked the crew chief door. [Encl. 13, 24]

271. As the aircraft filled with water, the mishap aircraft’s center of gravity shifted which caused the aircraft to roll further to its right and invert, while maintaining a nose low orientation. [Encl. 7, 8, 13, 24, 67]

272. As the mishap aircraft rolled inverted, the unsecured equipment and baggage changed orientation, which removed obstructions from the crew door, and provided a primary egress route for passengers in the forward third of the cabin. [Encl. 13, 24, 67]

273. In the rear of the cabin, following instruction from the mishap aircraft’s crew chiefs, activated the left side aft emergency egress handle and the window blew out. The system functioned as designed. [Encl. 7, 8, 24]

274. The left side aft window was the primary egress route for passengers in the middle third of the cabin. [Encl. 7, 8, 24]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

275. activated the right aft emergency egress handle. The system actuated and created an egress, however the passenger seat in front of the window remained fixed in position, posing an obstacle to egress. [Encl. 7]

276. Passengers seated in the aft third of the cabin primarily egressed via the ramp and door located at the aft of the aircraft cabin. [Encl. 24]

277. Following mishap aircraft entering the water, personnel aboard GREEN BAY threw flotation devices to the survivors in the water. [Encl. 7, 8, 13, 24, 67]

278. Two life rafts from UH-1Y helicopters located aboard GREEN BAY’s flight deck were thrown to the survivors. [Encl. 7, 8, 13, 24, 67]

279. One raft landed right-side up and was able to be used by egressing personnel, a second raft inflated upside down. [Encl. 7, 8, 13, 24, 67]

280. By 1609, all but the tail of the mishap aircraft was submerged. [Encl. 67]

281. At the time of the mishap, BONHOMME RICHARD was located approximately 10 nautical miles from GREEN BAY, and dispatched its Search and Rescue helicopter, callsign KNIGHTRIDER 07 (KR07), to the scene. [Encl. 16]

282. At 1610, KR07 arrived on scene. [Encl. 16, 23]

283. By 1612, the mishap aircraft had completely submerged. [Encl. 67]

284. In accordance with minimum SAR requirements GREEN BAY had a safety boat ready with a crew assigned and available. [Encl. 45]

285. At 1612, GREEN BAY deployed the 7-meter life boat, MAGNUS, to assist to the survivors. [Encl. 18, 67]

286. A qualified rescue swimmer, deployed with MAGNUS, recovered 5 survivors from the water. [Encl. 5, 6, 18]

287. The MAGNUS crew then recovered from the UH-1Y life raft due to his injuries being the most severe of the mishap survivors. [Encl. 5, 6, 18]

288. and the 5 survivors recovered from the water were taken by MAGNUS to medical personnel onboard GREEN BAY. [Encl. 5, 6, 18]

289. Remaining survivors made their way to the life raft, gained accountability, and it was then determined that three personnel remained unaccounted for: [Encl. 20, 24]

290. Due to communication difficulties with GREEN BAY, KR07 deployed into the water its rescue swimmer to assess the condition of the survivors. [Encl. 16, 23]
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291. did not have a swimmer communications unit\(^{42}\) (SCU), as they were not available for this deployment. [Encl. 16, 23]

292. The SAR detachment supporting PHIBRON 11 trained to conduct SAR hoisting evolutions via hand signals in accordance with NATOPS. [Encl. 16, 23, 45]

293. After initial triage at the life raft, at 1654, recovered by hoist to the KR07. [Encl. 16, 23, 24]

294. At 1656, GREEN BAY launched a second 7-meter life boat, TOLMEY, which recovered 17 personnel from the life raft, and brought them to medical personnel on board GREEN BAY. [Encl. 16, 17, 24]

295. KR07 transported to medical staff aboard BONHOMME RICHARD at approximately 1658. [Encl. 16, 23, 24]

296. 23 of the 26 personnel on board mishap aircraft were recovered. [Encl. 16, 17, 24]

297. Due to the well-defined location of the mishap the SAR efforts were initially conducted within a relatively localized area in order to maximize the likelihood of detecting any remaining survivors. [Encl. 16, 17, 35]

298. BONHOMME RICHARD, GREEN BAY, ASHLAND, MAGNUS, TOLMEY, KR02 and KR07 conducted search operations until the early morning hours of 6 August 2017. At its maximum, the search area expanded to 396 square miles. [Encl. 16, 17, 35]

M. Recovery of and the Mishap Aircraft (BuNo 168634).

299. Approximately 24 hours after the crash, HMAS MELVILLE (A 246), a Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Leeuwin class hydrographic survey vessel, arrived on station to aid in locating the wreckage and to deploy divers to secure and assess the site. [Encl. 68]

300. MELVILLE, using its sonar capabilities, swept the area in vicinity of the mishap, and identified an area suspected to be the mishap aircraft. [Encl. 67, 68]

301. Sonar images identified what appeared to be the mishap aircraft upside down in approximately 180 feet of water. The ocean floor appeared relatively flat, with the bottom consisting of loose sand and silt. [Encl. 67, 68]

302. On 7 August 2017, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) divers reached the wreckage and observed a body still attached to the aircraft near the crew door. [Encl. 67, 68]

\(^{42}\) A swimmer communications unit provides a radio linkage between the rescue swimmer and the rescue aircraft.
303. Despite multiple attempts by ADF divers and the aid of a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV), the position of the aircraft, variable ocean currents, sea conditions, and the depth of the water, prevented access to cockpit. [Encl. 67, 68]

304. ADF dive personnel conducted multiple dives and surveyed the wreckage with the ROV in the subsequent days. [Encl. 67, 68]

305. On 10 August 2017, a body in vicinity of the crew door was recovered and officially identified as [Redacted] [Encl. 53, 67, 68]

306. By 10 August 2017, obstructions preventing access to the cabin were removed and a second body was observed unrestrained inside the aircraft cabin. [Encl. 54, 67, 68]

307. On 12 August 2017, the body found in the aircraft cabin was recovered and identified as [Redacted] [Encl. 54, 67, 68]

308. [Redacted] [Encl. 52, 67, 68]

309. [Redacted] [Encl. 52, 67, 68]

310. On 15 August 2017 the remains of [Redacted] and [Redacted] were transferred from amphibious shipping to Royal Australian Air Force Base (RAAF) Amberley, Queensland, Australia and ultimately repatriated to the United States for further examination and autopsy. [Encl. 67, 68]

311. On 19 August 2017, USNS SALVOR (TARS52), a dedicated salvage ship, arrived at the mishap site, relieved MELVILLE, and assumed the recovery effort of [Redacted] and the salvage of the mishap aircraft. [Encl. 67, 68]

312. On 25 August 2017, the remains discovered in the left pilot seat were recovered to the surface and were officially identified as [Redacted] [Encl. 52, 67, 68]

313. [Redacted] HABD and Life Preserver Unit (LPU) were not recovered. [Encl. 67, 68]

314. On 25 August 2017, the remains of [Redacted] were transferred from amphibious shipping to RAAF Amberley, and later repatriated to the United States for further examination and autopsy. [Encl. 68, 74]

315. Following the recovery of [Redacted] SALVOR began efforts to recover the mishap aircraft from the ocean floor. [Encl. 68]

316. On 31 August 2017, SALVOR was able to recover the aircraft wreckage, which was then transported via contract commercial shipping to Townsville, Queensland, Australia. [Encl. 68]
317. On 2 September 2017, the mishap aircraft wreckage arrived at the port of Townsville for inspection, breakdown, and to await transportation to the site of its final disposition. [Encl. 67, 68]


318. The 31st MEU and PHIBRON 11 together formed the Expeditionary Strike Group. [Encl. 12, 13, 15]

319. The 31st MEU was the direct higher headquarters of VMM-265 (REIN) and BLT 3/5, and the command that approved the mission conducted by the mishap aircraft and Golf Battery, BLT 3/5. [Encl. 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13]

320. BLT 3/5, is the GCE of the 31st MEU. [Encl. 12, 13, 15]

321. BLT 3/5 experienced an increased operational tempo in both unit-level training and pre-deployment exercises since the previous summer prior to deploying to Okinawa. The battalion participated in 1st Marine Division’s exercises Steel Knight and Seahorse Wind in December 2016, the Integrated Training Exercise at Twentynine Palms in November 2016, a battalion-level final exercise in September 2016, and in late July and August 2016, MCWL’s Marine Air Ground Task Force Integrated Exercise, and in June 2016 the Southern California portion of the Rim-of-the-Pacific exercise. [Encl. 12, 13, 15]

322. On 2 August 2017, the 31st MEU directed an Embassy Reinforcement training mission into RC using personnel from Golf Battery, BLT 3/5. [Encl. 12, 13]

323. Golf Battery, BLT 3/5, led by 13065401108SC513104095 was selected to perform the Embassy Reinforcement due to their prior training in the application of non-lethal force. [Encl. 12, 13]


325. Golf Battery’s pre-deployment training was disassociated from 3/5 training in California prior to deploying to Okinawa to serve as part of the 31st MEU. [Encl. 12, 13, 15]

326. Golf Battery’s primarily mission was to provide artillery and indirect fires in support of BLT 3/5. [Encl. 12, 13]

327. Golf Battery’s primary means of movement from ship to shore was via surface movement. [Encl. 12, 13]

328. The 31st MEU and BLT 3/5 classified personnel as either “frequent or infrequent flyers.” [Encl. 12, 13, 15]

329. Frequent overwater flight is not explicitly defined by higher directives and there is no mention of the term “infrequent” flight overwater. [Encl. 48]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

330. Directives governing MEU operations provide no definition as to what classifies personnel conducting overwater flight as a “frequent” flyer. [Encl. 48, 70]

331. MEU directives state “Command Element individuals involved in frequent overwater flights must participate in helicopter egress and Helicopter Aircrew Breathing Device bottle training. [Encl. 48]

332. MEU directives require helicopter egress/HABD training for all GCE personnel involved in frequent over-water flights. [Encl. 48]

333. NATOPS states that the passenger version of Survival Egress Air (SEA), formerly HABD, is only for use by personnel who have successfully completed non-aircrew Naval Aviation Survival Training Program (NASTP) for class 3 aircraft (helicopter/tiltrotor) and are current in that training. [Encl. 47]

334. 31st MEU personnel understood that designated frequent flyers are required to be trained and qualified in helicopter egress training to include: HABD, Shallow Water Egress Trainer, SWET), and Helicopter “Dunker” Training. [Encl. 12, 13, 48]

335. 31st MEU personnel understood that infrequent flyers are required to be trained and qualified in only HABD and SWET. [Encl. 12, 13, 48]

336. HABD and SWET were not completed for 384 BLT 3/5 personnel deployed with the 31st MEU, due to lack of training resources, competing training requirements, rapid embarkation upon arrival in Okinawa, and lost training days due to a contract expiration. [Encl. 12, 15, 48]

337. Nearly all of Golf Battery’s personnel were considered infrequent flyers. [Encl. 13]

338. The 31st MEU directed Golf Battery to insert into RC via CH-53E helicopters on 4 August 2017, and extract via MV-22Bs on 5 August 2017 after the completion of training. [Encl. 13]

339. Of the 21 passengers aboard the mishap aircraft, 20 were personnel from Golf Battery. [Encl. 69]

340. As a Combat Camera Marine, 31st MEU, was defined as a frequent flyer within the CE and was trained and qualified in HABD, SWET, and Dunker training. [Encl. 13, 24]

341. Out of the 21 Passengers aboard mishap aircraft, seven had not received any type of helicopter emergency egress training. [Encl. 69]

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43 Shallow Water Egress Trainer is water egress training designed to give personnel the required skill to use survival equipment for underwater egress.

44 Helicopter “Dunker” Training is water egress training designed to simulate an actual egress from an underwater helicopter.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

342. Two passengers, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], attended and failed helicopter emergency egress training. [Encl. 69, 71]

343. In training paperwork, he indicated that the cause of his failure was “[f]umbling and forgetting the steps while underwater.” [Encl. 71]

344. Paperwork stated that he personally felt the training offered was adequate and that the staff had attempted to assist him through his difficulties, but nothing could be done to make it possible for him to complete the training in the future. [Encl. 71]

345. During mission planning, Golf Battery’s status as infrequent flyers was not considered in the risk management process by Golf Battery, BLT 3/5 or the 31st MEU Command Element. [Encl. 12, 13]

346. and training failures were not considered by Golf Battery, BLT 3/5 or 31st MEU leadership in the risk management process. [Encl. 12, 13]

O. Description of damages to GREEN BAY and the mishap aircraft.

347. The mishap aircraft’s impacts with GREEN BAY caused external damage to the ship’s aft starboard quarter. [Encl. 55]

348. Damage sustained included: dents and scrapes to the ship’s exterior and flight deck non-skid top coating, damage to the deck edge netting, and significant damage to the catwalk and stairway. [Encl. 55]

349. The impact of mishap aircraft’s left proprotors with the flight deck caused damage to a nearby UH-1Y helicopter, BuNo 168784. [Encl. 55]

350. Damages included fuselage entry and exit holes, caused by flying debris from mishap aircraft. [Encl. 56]

P. Engineering Determinations.

351. On 9 December 2015, a different MV-22B, in a separate Class A aviation mishap, settled with power onto USS NEW ORLEANS (LPD 18). [Encl. 39]

352. NEW ORLEANS and GREEN BAY are the same class of ship: San Antonio-Class Amphibious Transport Dock. [Encl. 39]

353. The mishap MV-22B aircraft in both incidents were conducting operations at similar gross weights and planned power margins of 5% off the 112% NATOPS limit in a HOGE. [Encl. 39, 44]

354. NAVAIR Engineers, utilizing KVADR data recovered from both incidents, discovered the presence of recirculated downwash reflecting off the hull of the ship and back into the rotor arc in both incidents. [Encl. 33, 39]
355. The mishap aircraft’s degree of recirculation was higher due to the further forward assigned landing on Spot 5 of the GREEN BAY, vice Spot 2 in the NEW ORLEANS incident. [Encl. 33, 39]

356. The effect of recirculation on Spot 5 was worse for mishap aircraft due to the approach geometry and increased hull area in opposition to the downwash signature. [Encl. 39]

357. NAVAIR engineers determined that for mishap aircraft, 27,500 lbs/rotor of thrust was required for level, 1g flight. [Encl. 39]

358. The mishap aircraft entered a thrust deficit beginning at 16:03:42. [Encl. 33, 39]

359. The maximum average thrust deficit of 3.2% (~880 lbs/rotor) occurred at 16:03:44, resulting in a 200-300 ft/min rate of descent. [Encl. 33, 39]

360. Additional mast torque required to restore each rotor to 1g thrust calculated using HOGE performance predictions was ≈ 5.5%. [Encl. 33, 39]

361. Influence of recirculation peaked at 1.5 rotor diameters from the ship’s deck edge. [Encl. 33, 39]

362. NAVAIR engineering analysis replicating the event used an actuator disk model more likely to predict mean rather than peak impacts. The resulting analysis was likely a conservative assessment of the impact of recirculation. [Encl. 39]

363. NAVAIR Engineering analysis replicating the event used fixed rotor controls trimmed to 98% thrust target. The resulting analysis was likely a conservative assessment of the impact of recirculation. [Encl. 39]

364. NAVAIR Engineering models replicating the event ignored the impact of aircraft download. The resulting analysis was likely a conservative assessment of the impact of recirculation. [Encl. 39]

365. Flight control laws dictate that if a large lateral input is commanded, the torque command is momentarily reduced (clamped) to accommodate the large Differential Collective Pitch (DCP) command. [Encl. 39, 44]

366. Torque clamping is only active for brief periods of time that coincide with peaks in DCP command. [Encl. 39]

367. Power available in the MV-22B can be reduced by a maximum of 16.5% due to the torque clamping (117.4% – 16.5% = 100.9%) effect. [Encl. 39]

368. Torque clamping command will be active for as long as the large DCP cross-feed command persists. [Encl. 39, 44]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION Mishap INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

369. NAVAIR analysis and developmental flight testing of V-22 aircraft showed a potential to get clamping down to 112% during some shipboard operations, driving the NATOPS limit of 112%. [Encl. 39, 44]

370. Shore based testing demonstrated that Increased Lateral Control Power (ILCP) is not normally a factor inside of the MV-22 NATOPS operating envelope. [Encl. 39]

371. No evidence of torque clamping causing a reduction in torque was found on the mishap aircraft’s approach to GREEN BAY. [Encl. 33, 39]

372. At approach termination, the mishap aircraft’s lateral cyclic inputs drove up DCP momentarily, but were of a short enough duration to not directly impact average torque. [Encl. 33, 34, 39]

373. Torque transient NATOPS notes are common on military rotary-wing and powered-lift aircraft. [Encl. 39, 45]

374. Torque transient NATOPS notes range anywhere from 5% to 25% degradations. [Encl. 39, 45]

375. Torque transient NATOPS notes are based on flight test recommendations. [Encl. 39, 45]

376. As with the MV-22B, all torque transient guidance takes the form of NATOPS notes on Launch and Recovery charts. [Encl. 39, 45]

377. The MV-22 consistently has more torque transient guidance notes than other platforms (almost every Launch and Recovery) due to Higher Disk Loading, Rotor Configuration, Asymmetric ground effect, Rotor – Airframe interactions, Downwash and Pitch up with Sideslip aerodynamic tendencies. [Encl. 39, 44]

378. All effects cumulatively peak at the deck edge, and all or just a few may be present in any given approach. [Encl. 39, 45]

Opinions

A. VMM-265 (REIN) Command Oversight

1. [b][5] [FoF 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 31, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 115, 116, 119, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138]

B. VMM-265 (REIN) Operations and Safety Departments.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

(b) (5) [FoF 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 31]

(b) (5) [FoF 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31]

C. VMM-265 (REIN) Maintenance Department.

(b) (5) [FoF 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 114, 115, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137]

(b) (5) [FoF 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137]
D. Aerodynamic effects.

7. [FoF 114, 115, 118, 124, 125, 137, 145]

(b) (5)

(b) (5) [FoF 205, 206, 212, 213, 214, 215, 225, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 353, 355, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361]

8. (b) (5)

(b) (5) [FoF 205, 206, 212, 213, 214, 215, 225, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235]

9. (b) (5)

(b) (5) [FoF 353, 355, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361]

E. The mishap aircrew.

10. Evaluation of [FoF 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52]

(b) (5)

11. Evaluation of [FoF 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52]

(b) (5)
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

F. Most probable mishap explanation.

12. Evaluations of [FoF 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99]

[b] (5)

13. [bk] (5)

[b] (5)

[b] (5)

[b] (5)

[b] (5)
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

G. **Line of Duty Determinations.**

17. [FOF 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 216, 221, 249, 270, 272] suffered injuries while in the line of duty and not due to his own misconduct. [b] (6), [b] (7)(C)

18. [b][10 USC §134] died while in the line of duty and not due to his own misconduct. [b] (6), [b] (7)(C)

19. [b][10 USC §134] died and [b][10 USC §134] sustained injuries while in the line of duty and not due to their own misconduct. [b] (6)

20. [b][10 USC §134] died while in the line of duty and not due to his own misconduct. [b] (6)

21. [b] (5)
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA


Recommendations

1. VMM-265 (REIN) Command Oversight.

2. MV-22B Shipboard Procedures.

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

4. MV-22B Cargo Restraint Procedures

5. CMU-38 Release Levers Re-design

6. Emergency Egress Training

7. Trained/Untrained/Failures
Subject: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP INVOLVING THE MV-22B OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 (REINFORCED) ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF ROCKHAMPTON, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

8. 31st MEU ACE Stabilization.
From: Commanding General
To: Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet
Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AVIATION MISHAP OF AN MV-22 OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF AUSTRALIA

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F

1. I have carefully considered the initial reporting of a Class A aviation mishap involving a MV-22 Osprey assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 265, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, off the coast of Australia. Based on initial reporting, I have determined this mishap a major incident pursuant to reference (a).

2. Pursuant to paragraph 0203b(2) of reference (a), the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, is assigned the commander responsible for convening a command investigation and will take cognizance over the case. Direct liaison is authorized with all activities concerned.

3. Based on initial reporting, this major incident involves U.S. Navy commands under the cognizance of Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet. Pursuant to paragraph 0205c of reference (a), request Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet, direct those under his cognizance to cooperate in the investigation, including reasonable access to relevant personnel, equipment, and records associated with this mishap, and the allocation of an appropriate Naval officer for duty as an assistant investigating officer.

L. D. NICHOLSON

Copy to:
COMEXSTRKGRU SEVEN
CO, 31st MEU
SJA, III MEF
SJA, COMSEVENTHFLT
SJA, COMEXSTRKGRU SEVEN
SJA, 1st MAW
SJA, 31st MEU
File
From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
To: (b3)(10USC§130)(b6) USMC

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AVIATION MISHAP OF AN MV-22 OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF AUSTRALIA

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F
(b) CG, III MEF Ltr 5830/CG of 09-AUG-2017

1. This letter appoints you to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the aviation mishap in which an MV-22 Osprey from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 265 (VMM-265) crashed off the coast of Australia on 5 August 2017. This Command Investigation is convened to investigate the circumstances surrounding a Class A mishap in compliance with 10 U.S.C. § 2255.

2. You are directed to investigate the cause of the mishap, the resulting damage to the aircraft, the USS GREEN BAY, and any other military property so affected, and the cause of any injury or death of any servicemember. Provide a recommendation regarding a line of duty/misconduct determination for each injured or deceased servicemember. Additionally, investigate the search and rescue operation conducted immediately following the mishap and the subsequent recovery operation. Investigate any fault, neglect, or responsibility therefore, and recommend appropriate administrative or disciplinary action. Report your findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in writing, via letter form, within 60 days from the date of this appointment order, unless an extension of time is granted. If you have not previously done so, read Chapter II of reference (a) in its entirety before beginning your investigation.

3. This investigation is your primary duty and takes precedence over your regularly assigned duties until complete. You are directed to consult with a member of the Armed Forces or an officer or employee of the Department of Defense who possesses knowledge and expertise relevant to aviation mishap investigations.

4. (b3)(10USC§130)(b6) USN and (b3)(10USC§130)(b6) USMC, are each appointed as Assistant Investigating Officer. Other investigative team members may be added to provide necessary expertise or administrative support, as required. (b3)(10USC§130)(b6) USMC, a judge advocate, is hereby appointed as Legal Advisor. You are directed to seek legal advice from him. You may also seek legal advice from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Staff Judge Advocate.

5. During the conduct of this investigation, you are to observe the requirements of the Privacy Act, Article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and paragraphs 0209, Parts E and F, and Appendix A-2-n of reference (a).
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AVIATION MISHAP OF AN MV-22 OSPREY OF MARINE MEDIUM TILTROTOR SQUADRON 265 ON 5 AUGUST 2017 OFF THE COAST OF AUSTRALIA

6. Note that there is concurrent aviation mishap safety investigation into this incident, and a JAGMAN is considered collateral to the safety investigation. You are directed to ensure your investigation does not violate the privileged nature of the safety investigation. Specifically, you are prohibited from using privileged statements provided in conjunction with the aviation mishap safety investigation. No witness will be questioned regarding information provided to the aviation mishap safety investigation under the promise of confidentiality. Finally, you may not use the opinions, analysis, or conclusion of the aviation mishap safety investigation, or any subsequent endorsements thereof.

7. The point of contact for this matter is 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Staff Judge Advocate, (b3)(10USC§130)(b6) and (b3)(10USC§130)(b6)

T. D. WEIDLEY

Copy to:
CG, III MEF
CO, 31st MEU
CO, VMM-265
SJA
File
From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
To: (b3)(10USC§130)(b6) USMC

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION ICO 5 AUGUST 2017 MV-22B MISHAP COMMAND INVESTIGATION

1. Returned. Your request for an extension is granted. Your investigation is now due 29 December 2017

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6)

Copy to:
SJA, 1st MAW
From: (b3)(10USC§130)(b6) USMC
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION ICO 5 AUGUST 2017 MV-22B MISHAP COMMAND INVESTIGATION

Ref: (a) IO Appointment Letter 5830 CG dated 9 August 2017

1. I request an extension of time for completing the command investigation for which I have been appointed by the reference. I request a new submission date of 29 December 2017.

2. The reason for this request is to allow the transcription service provider to complete transcriptions for nineteen interviews. The nineteen interviews are the most critical of the seventy interviews conducted during the investigation, and require verbatim transcription for insertion into the record of enclosures.

Copy to:
SJA, 1st MAW
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2. 2000/1800/1330

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**Questions of the Day:**

- **MV-228 IP:** NAC ELEVATION FUEL EXCERPTING HAS ___ WHICH DIRECTS A NONCIRCULAR FUEL FLOW AROUND THE EXCHANGER. (OIL TEMP: 180° F, OIL TEMP: 180° F)
- **MV-228 OP:** EACH NAC EL AV EXCERPTING HAS ___ WHICH DIRECTS A NONCIRCULAR FUEL FLOW AROUND THE EXCHANGER. (OIL TEMP: 180° F, OIL TEMP: 180° F)
- **CH-53E IP:** CAT LAMBD PLANE'S OIL PRESSURE IS BELOW APPROXIMATELY ___ (OIL TEMP: 180° F, OIL PRESS: 180° F)
- **CH-53E OP:** CAT LAMBD PLANE'S OIL PRESSURE IS BELOW APPROXIMATELY ___ (OIL TEMP: 180° F, OIL PRESS: 180° F)
- **T/A:** LIGHTING CONDITION 3 (LB) IS FOR NAC FLIGHTS ___ RESTRICTED AREAS (OUTSIDE)
**Flight Events**

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<td>0900/1100/1615</td>
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<tr>
<td>6502</td>
<td>0915</td>
<td>MV-22B</td>
<td>0915/1300/1630</td>
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<td>0915/1300/1630</td>
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<tr>
<td>6503</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>MV-22B</td>
<td>1445/1745/2100</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1445</td>
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**Ground Events**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0730</td>
<td></td>
<td>AM MIX MEETING</td>
<td>READY ROOM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0730</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAT MEETING</td>
<td>CONFERENCE ROOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>0730</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAT MEETING</td>
<td>CONFERENCE ROOM</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>MAIN PLANNING GROUP</td>
<td>CONFERENCE ROOM</td>
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<td>1200</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>AVIATION PLANNING BOARD</td>
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<td>1300</td>
<td>1500</td>
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<td>1700</td>
<td>MEU MEETING</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>LSO STRIKE CONFIRMATION</td>
<td>WEATHER ROOM</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- [10 USC § 130](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/130)

**Questions of the Day:**
- **MV-22B EP:**
  - Aggressive maneuvering during VTOL mode flight with relative winds greater than ____ knots may lead to pitch-up with side lift (DEL TAIL ROTOR TAND SM SERVO MALFUNCTION).  
  - To prevent inadvertent load release, the minimum weight for the single point external cargo automatic release mode is ____.
  - A quick of airspace with which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires is an ____ and are named after ____ MANUFACTURERS (AIRSPACE COORDINATION AREA).

**b3** (10 USC § 130) **(b6)**
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VMM-265 (REIN)
Risk Assessment Worksheet

RISK ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flight Schedule (GPS)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outside Agency Frag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Proficiency &gt; Reasonable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircrew qualified for event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate aircraft scheduled</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Risk = L, I training flight with a qualified instructor | M |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Tasks</th>
<th>Task Specific Risk Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General FAM/NRF/NAV/EX</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulation</td>
<td>T2</td>
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<td>CAL</td>
<td>T3</td>
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<td>T4</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIF</td>
<td>T5</td>
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<tr>
<td>L/H/IRF</td>
<td>T6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>T7</td>
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<td>AA</td>
<td>T8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ordinance</td>
<td>T9</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASE</td>
<td>T10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GT/RDCM</td>
<td>T11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>T12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop/Com/CLP</td>
<td>T13</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIP Support</td>
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<td>PAT</td>
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<th>AOC</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flight Brief (LOGO)</th>
<th>FLIGHT CREDITS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Change</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Change</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircrew Status Interference with mission</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R &amp; I Current</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly FP Test / Diverter Line Complete</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Operating Areas</th>
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<tr>
<td>NVG HIL</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVG LLL</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVG D</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVG R</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24 HR - DSS SIGNATURE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 HR - CO SIGNATURE</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 HR - MAG / MEU SIGN</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Exposure</th>
<th>CRITICAL</th>
<th>PROBABLY</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>UNLIKELY</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>COPILOT: G-502</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIRCRAFT: (b3)(10USC §130)(b6)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Interference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly FP Test / Diverter Line Complete</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Level Approval</td>
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</table>

Aircrew Interference with Mission | L |
R & I Current | L |
Monthly FP Test / Diverter Line Complete | L |

Have you identified any hazards that require additional risk controls? If yes, what are they? No
Will the plan require anyone to operate near a crew performance, aircraft, or environmental limit? No
Are you clear on the flight and mission objectives, will it correlate well with what you think the CO attended when signing the flight schedule? Yes
What is the riskiest thing you will do on this mission? How will you mitigate that risk? [Redacted]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>M</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission requires a deviation from SOP/NATO/OPS/OPNAV</td>
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<td>L</td>
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<td>Dissimilar aircraft (Non-Related)</td>
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<td>L</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots and aircrew from all other squadron</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAL site DOD</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAL site in populated area</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Surveyed Zone</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RVL flight or sim within 30 days</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LZ survey completed</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FCF CONDUCTED AT NIGHT</td>
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<td>L</td>
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<td>Greater than a Division in LAT/ERF profile</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Has the pilot or copilot flown the route?</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Route certification or re-validation?</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AMC/EP/AF Briefs completed face to face</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>MV-22 Combat Assault Transport</td>
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<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dissimilar receivers</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAR required with no subsequent divert</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range regulations established/received</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS: DAS, FAC(A), Sim CAS</td>
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<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surface Fires (Arty, Mortar)</td>
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<td>Is DZ Bldg/Ship/Structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soft Duck</td>
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<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td>L</td>
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<td>If Friendly aircraft - more than a section</td>
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<td>Free play allowed</td>
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<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>Face to face with HST brief planned</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load crosses populated areas</td>
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<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAT environment</td>
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<td>DOD certified area</td>
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<td>Certified Load</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greater than 3 aircraft in the FCLP pattern with a briefed deconfliction plan</td>
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<td>Published launch/recovery wind limits</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unaided</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>US Ship</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Is a non-qualified person at the controls?</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAT over 27 deg C/80 deg F</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS/SMAP</td>
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</table>
It is 25 August 2017. We are at Brisbane, Australia. The time on deck is 0923. My name is [redacted], Legal Advisor for the JAGMAN investigation. We are here this morning for the interview of [redacted] in the presence of the Investigating Officer, [redacted], and Assisting Investigating Officer, [redacted].

Prior to coming onto the record, I discussed the completely voluntary nature of participation in the JAGMAN investigation. [redacted] understood. He agreed to sit down and speak with us. At what point, I handed him a Privacy Act statement, which he reviewed and signed. I then gave him a warning advisement about statements providing origin of disease or injury. He read through each paragraph and initialed. He does desire to make a statement and he signed the document. I also then discussed that he is potentially then a witness for both the Aviation Mishap Safety Investigation as well as the JAGMAN investigation. We went over the different objectives of the two investigations, the reasons why procedures vary, the need to preserve the privileged nature of the Aviation Mishap Safety Investigation, and the fact that neither command nor administrative action may alter the privileged character of statements provided to the Aviation Mishap Board and such statements will not be available to the JAGMAN investigation from any official source.
Sir, is that accurate?

Yes.

Sir.

Sir.

Yes, sir.

Kind of what we've done so far in the investigation is basically we've tried to build from the squadron itself kind of--we talked to maintenance department. We talked to operations department, safety, and ETOPs. We've talked to some of the mishap aircrew, We talked to some of the passengers that were on the aircraft. We've talked to USS GREEN BAY. So basically, what we've done is try to take a holistic view of what occurred on the 5th of August.

At this point, we're just kind of interested in hearing your take of roughly that 24-hour period up from before the mishap, through the mishap, and then kind of your impression of kind of how that went for you personally that day and what was going on.

Yes, sir.

Like I said before, everybody has their own semi-take on what was--what occurred. So you're just one more piece of the puzzle.
Yes, sir. So you would like for me to try to start maybe a 24-hour period prior.

If you could start maybe the night prior, I guess.

Okay. The night prior.

So, sir, I have a schedule starting effectively when you were in port in Brisbane that I can show to you for reference. So if you could just talk to us, 72-hours prior you getting back on the ship is our understanding after being away.

I think everything went underway on the 2nd.

The 2nd of August?

Yeah, the 2nd of August. And I think the first day back on the ship is generally like a no-fly day and a general administrative cleanup, formations, and getting a good accountability of everybody to make sure that we're not leaving anybody behind.

As for the 3rd, I think we attempted to do flight operations that day, but I believe they were canceled. So just kind of another standard day. Nothing out of the ordinary for the 3rd.

For the 4th of August, I know that we--I think we did a brief somewhere around maybe 1530 or 1545 that night for like a 1800 or 1830 launch to do some night-system CQ. Just to re-punch everybody. I had been away--I had gotten to take a
commercial flight back to Okinawa to see my newborn and I had been away from the ship for approximately like 15 days or so. So I was able to get onto a flight with . We were able to get out and do a little bit of night-system CQ. I think they landed me around 2100 so that way I could be back and basically in my living quarters for preserving crew rest or—excuse me, preserving crew rest for the next day because we had a 0600 brief for a division that was going to participate in a—like a simulated NEO and embassy reinforcement. So I was able to get back to my living space and get my time and get to bed like around 2130 or 2200-ish, somewhere around there.

Then just got up the next day around 0515 or so. Just got showered and ready for work and had a little bit to eat and was down in the ready-room spaces about 0545 just getting ready for our brief. The brief itself was a little bit nonstandard because the brief was on the SIPR side that day and the SIPR went down, so the brief was done basically via the tactical pocket guide and printed products. So that was a little bit different for everybody as opposed to the normal PowerPoint presentation.

: Can I just stop you there real quick?
: Yeah.
: So on the 3rd of August.
: Yes.
This is the 3rd's flight schedule. We've got you on the flight schedule showing 6501 for a 1745 to 2100 flight. Did that flight occur?

I feel like—if I remember correctly, that flight was cancelled. Like, we didn’t fly on the 3rd, but we did it on the 4th.

Okay.

Yeah.

So a bunch of the—talking with so you ended up giving—you were slated to give him a division lead under instruction on the morning of the 5th, but most of the planning, it looks like, goes—so CAT-1, CAT-2, 0700 on the 3rd into the confirmation briefs. So if you could just talk to us a little bit about how involved were you with that portion, the flight planning?

The planning itself I was not—I was due a crew rest. I was not available for that that day. So basically, they took to basically brief me up on everything kind of the morning of.

The morning of the 5th that is?

Yeah.

So the night of the 4th, you were also scheduled to fly?

Yeah. Actually, I wouldn't say that. When I came back to the ready room that evening to drop gear off and
everything, I know did--he kind of talked through stuff big blue arrow like, "This is what's going to happen. This is what we're planning to do." Yeah, I think we kind of walked through--he didn’t walk through in like super finite detail like timeline up and down arrows, but he did kind of walk me through what all was going to happen. And then I walked back to spaces.

Do you recall on the 3rd or 4th getting debriefed on any issues that they had in the confirmation brief for the NEO?

Only--no, the only issue that I think I was debriefed on was that they were trying to mix basically administrative movement with tactical scenario.

Okay.

So I think that was the only gripe I really remembered hearing that was an issue at all. So basically, you're kind of coming out of a scenario to move stuff around the ARG. So I think that is the only thing that I can really recall that was a true issue with planning.

So the PMC lines essentially getting added last minute type thing?

I don’t remember if they said they were last minute, if they were kind of there to begin with and they just had to figure out how to basically put them into the scenario.

But to the best of your knowledge, they were there relatively early on the entire time you were really doing
mission planning on the 5th and figuring out the flight was expected you were going to have to execute those PMC lines?

Right. I guess--yeah. I guess the way that I was explained to me is that fairly typical of the 31st MEU with, you know, adding a dash of administrative movements into tactical scenario. So it's really not too terribly out of the norm I would say for the 31st MEU and all that they try to do in a short timeframe. But yeah, I think that was the only think that was brought to my attention in terms of the only real problem with planning. I think because most people don’t like to break scenario to have to do administrative movement. So it kind of tends to throw things a little off kilter.

So the night of the 3rd, you don’t recall if you actually flew that night. You think it got canceled and you ended up flying on the 4th?

Yeah, if I remember correctly, I just thought flight ops in general I thought were canceled that evening. That's why I got scheduled again the following evening to fly that same flight.

Okay. So the 4th, showing yourself with , with that 2100 land time. You already talked to us about how you got out of the plane a little bit early.

Right. At 2100 is when they were going to let me out.
This is the flight schedule for the 4th. It looks like leading a section, RNS insert.

So did you go do the RNS insert with? Yes. We did that and then we just commenced to CQ I believe for a couple of bounces.

So basically re-punching yourself for currency proficiency at night--

Right.

--with since you'd been off the ship?

Yes.

We're showing that--when you took off on the 5th, you had about 7.3 hours in the last 30 days mostly probably due to being away from the squadron. You felt current and proficient on the 5th?

Current and proficient on the 5th?

Yeah, so after doing this flight?

Yes. I mean, it was daytime flight, you know, I guess just due to the amount of shipboard experience, definitely did not feel uncomfortable going from ship to shore in daylight.

Okay. Do you recall on the night of the 4th--this is the schedule as it was originally written. Do your recall--were there any schedule changes for 6501, 5502? Particularly with enlisted aircrew.
I can't say that I really recall any changes.

I don't recall any changes.

So the best of your knowledge, these crew chiefs flew with you for the portion of the flight that you were on with?

Trying to think back to that flight. I can't remember speaking with on that flight. Because, generally, when you fly with a crew, you know you--

Yeah.

Yeah. I'm sorry. I can't say for certain that there was a crew change. I just don't remember speaking with on that flight. I think I definitely remember speaking with.

Okay.

Because, generally, I mean when you go do a flight--unfortunately, not being the aircraft commander, not being the one doing the debrief, I'm sorry. I don't recall if anybody changed that night. I apologize.

That's fine. But was on the aircraft still when you left.

I don't remember if he swapped out himself or not because he was on with me the next morning. So basically, once I departed, you know, it's dark out. I wasn't watching anybody else depart with me.

Sure.
: Yeah.

: So now, once you--you leave the flight deck. It's the night of the 4th. Are you down in maintenance control?

: No, not really. I mean, I--because we're pretty serious about maintaining appropriate crew rest and whatnot. So just went down to Flight E, turned all gear in. Made sure--property briefed with those guys, went into the ready room to drop off, you know, basically, cockpit bag and everything. That's when we saw I think for maybe a handful of minutes and he just kind of again, big blue arrow, and then went back to the--just back to the burling area and kind of got ready for bed. Probably checked an email or two. I have a Japanese etiquette book that I'm through so I think I read a short chapter. That takes about five minutes. I read through a Japanese etiquette book chapter. May have had a discussion or two with the roommates. And the best of my recollection is like 2200 basically the room--everybody in the room was basically ready to knock out. Except for--I think my--one of my roommates may have still be flying. I am not sure which one.

: I think is one of your roommates.

: Yeah, he was one of the roommates. So I guess he was still flying or debriefing at that point because I guess
the schedule would have been over by roughly an hour when I was
going to call lights out basically.

So the best of your knowledge got eight hours
of uninterrupted sleep that night?

Yeah, usually not too terribly difficult for
me on the ship.

The night of the 4th, do you recall just as
the AMO, where were you standing on aircraft--or launches the
next day? To the best of your recollection.

I think we may have been like four aircrafts
were down, but two of them were down for like a software loads
and then two were down for--one was done basically for Wing Stow
system and another aircraft could have been down for--I can't
remember what else it was at this point, sorry. But I think at
least at a minimum it was four aircraft down.

Was the aircraft down for the Wing Stow system
13?

No, it was Aircraft 10.

Aircraft 10.

Yeah.

Okay. Were they doing work call the night of
the 4th on 13?

I don’t recall any work being done on 13 on
the night of the 4th. I think mainly it was because I didn’t
really go back through control that night, you know, so between
the nightly maintenance meeting, which I think I missed that
evening because of man time and everything. Things are fairly
dynamic and things change pretty quickly with pulling out and
getting piano keyed on the spot. So I don’t recall anything on
13 being worked on. I think a couple days prior it may have had
some stuff worked on. I can't remember if it was just specials
or just something real minor.

: So based on the flight schedule, would you say
you're just somewhat out of the loop as to the real ends and
outs of what's going on maintenance wise because of having to
fly those two nights?

: Yeah, for that evening, I feel like, yes, I
was. Just due to the scheduling. Again, you have to be very
careful because you can go into maintenance control and you will
be in there much longer than you anticipate. So I didn’t even
bother that evening. I figured, you know, you get a really good
pass down kind of early in the morning when we come in because
that pass down starts getting generated pretty early in the wee
hours of the morning, you know, when night crew wraps up. So
you're going to have a pretty good idea that morning.

: Now, morning of the--so you wake up morning of
the 4th. If you need to take a minute, we can.

: Sorry, just needed to shift. You said wake up
morning of the 4th?

: Waking up the morning of the 5th--
Oh, the 5th.

--getting ready to go to brief, can you just talk--you talked a little bit about the nonstandard brief due to the PowerPoints.

Right.

Do you feel like--was the plan effectively conveyed?

It was. And I think for the most part, if I remember correctly, there was a question asked about familiarity like, "Who had flown into the area? Who had flown into Raspberry Creek?" I think I was one of the only folks who hadn’t done that. But the way the plan was laid out was pretty simple and it accounted for making adjustments on the fly, if need be, just because where we were going to be landing that day, those landing points were new.

I think that was kind of one of the biggest concerns of the day and maybe friction points was that those landing spots were new. I don’t think that anybody had landed there before. But the FC on the ground has basically walked the deck and given us things like slope, no shrubbery, micro terrain, consistency of the soil and whatnot, and nearby obstacles and kind of talked through that. And I think that it was caught in the brief that one of the landing points may have been slightly off. So when you looked at the diagram, the landing point was
slightly off from where it should have been placed on the picture.

: Okay.

: So that was addressed and it was talked through like, "You know if that is kind of true to scale, then that does not provide enough room," then the flight leader or instructioner, , talked about how to kind of adjust the pattern basically or basically provide a margin of safety just in case those spots were not adequate for separation.

: On the 5th, just looking at the flight schedule once again. It looks like you have a division of three MV-22s, Puff-01 through -03, a backup aircraft/SCF aircraft Puff-04 and then two CH-53Es, Movius-31 [ph] and 32, that are kind of conducting the same mission with your three ship.

: Yes.

: So can you talk to me about what that relationship was? Kind of looking at the schedules, so had there been flight lead? Should you have been annotated as a flight lead?

: I guess, my understanding was they were operating as a separate section. But earlier in the planning, that they had walked through everything in the objective area with that section.

: Okay.
If I remember correctly too, I think they talked about--yeah, I guess they were just supposed to operate as two separate entities. So they provided the standard separation in the objective area, the same communication net. You know they knew each other's net to be able to talk to each other and get each other. And definitely during the flight, there were assignments to reach over to them and just kind of say, "How are they doing? Where are they at?" and just check on positioning and how they were coming along with their mission and kind of a way to keep accountability as well.

Okay.

You know if there were going to be any simulated American citizens coming out of the embassy, there was a lot of coordination I believe the day prior on kind of how to maintain deconfliction and then accountability with the separate entity.

Do you feel like the plan kept everyone deconflicted appropriately and--

Yeah, I--

--for command and control wise?

Yeah, their routing--so basically, there was range control--like a procedural control, range control so one layer of safety and then there was someone controlling the objective area itself on TADD as well. As well as the aircraft being able--they knew how to get ahold of each other as well.
Sorry, the different, the two different elements knew how to reach out and get ahold of each other as well. So it seemed like the standard forms of deconfliction.

: All right.

: Yeah.

: So you finished a mission brief. You go do your individual cock and NATOPS brief. Your crew on the 5th was yourself as the aircraft commander, and , and .

Who was at the NATOPS brief to the best of your remembrance?

: I think I remember and being there. I can't say that I remember actually being at the brief. Yeah, I just don’t remember if he was there or not.

: Okay. But you remember two crew chiefs being there, not all three?

: To the best of my recollection, I think two people were there, two crew chiefs were there from each aircraft.

: And you remember being there but not sure about the second one?

: Yeah, I feel more positive about saying that was there. Usually, the more junior crew chief is kind of the one that works everything else out, gets the plane prepped and does all that, and then usually gets back-briefed on
any of the plans. So to the best of my recollection, I don’t remember being there.

But even with landing at 2100 the night before, will that second chief land around 2100 the night before--

That's one thing that I'm not sure about is whether or not stayed with the plane. Again, I was just basically one of a couple co-pilots the night prior. So I don’t remember the aircraft commander briefing anything specifically the night prior about him departing. I don't remember--I don’t reflect specific about him saying that he was leaving. And then, basically, it was very efficient hot seat. Deck crew was working really well. And then, once we took chalks and chains, I was able to basically be free of the buckles and pins are in, you know, I'm free of the buckles and I'm in the back. And usually, the crew chiefs are all in the back talking as well, you know, if there is going to be any swap. I just remember--like basically, once I departed the rotor arc, I didn’t really look back over my shoulder to see if was behind me or if he was departing the flight deck as well.

So in your brief, there were no--any concerns about crew rest? Who they brought up? To the best of your knowledge.

To the best of my knowledge, yeah, that brief the night prior, I don’t--I don’t remember--I just think I was
aware—I had been told specifically, "Hey, you're going to be on the schedule for tomorrow so you need to make sure that you're back on deck by 2100 and out of the workspaces.

And getting your crew rest?

Correct.

So post-brief, what's going on? Probably around 7 a.m.

Post-brief I think—I know like I said we did our brief, basically SOP brief for us. I think people departed. Basically the crew chiefs departed to go continue to prep the plane. and I, I think we probably talked about a few things as well. Just kind of techniques and whatnot. Because he was always like a really good listener. He was a really good student. Basically, a student pilot. I mean, whenever you were giving him an X, he was always willing to listen. Very humble individual and he always seemed to take technique and advice onboard, so I think I was probably giving him a little bit of a spill and whatnot for the day. After that, I think we just went and got flight gear on. I think I did go to maintenance control just to kind of see how things were going that morning with everything.

Do you remember—how was maintenance control that morning?

I really don’t think that the situation had improved much overnight. I think it was still roughly like four
planes down, but there were other planes. You know not that big
of a worry. I think maybe talking with control about some of
the avionics stuff with the software uploads. You know there
was a new Jazz [ph] upload that was coming or that was in the
works and they talked about how some stuff had potentially--they
found the reason why they were not able to load the software
onto certain boxes, as avionics calls it. Because I think that
they had actually--there had been a step like--they weren't sure
if one of the softwares loaded in one of the boxes and so they
went on to do the next one, but then they found out that the
overall software-jazz load didn’t load. So I guess they
determined--or brought it back to--one of the boxes didn’t load
properly, so they had to start all over again. So that was kind
of the download that I think I got for that morning.

: Okay. So basically just uploading the new
software as planes go into routine inspections types of stuff?

: Right. Because I think the--basically, the
procedure would call for like, when the aircraft goes into the
next 35 hour, then it was due to basically have the software
dropped on it.

: Do you remember Aircraft 13, when you're at
the ODO brief, was your aircraft safe for flight at brief or
were they still working it?

: If I recall correctly, I think it did need
something done to it. It was still working through one minor
issue. I don’t remember what it was. I'm sorry, I don’t recall what it was, but I think I do remember having to come back so I was able to kind of prescreen and then they were like, "Hey, you need to come back--we will come back and finalize everything." If I remember correctly, it was talking to that morning.

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6) : is he your night controller or your day controller?

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6) : He is night.

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6) : That's our understanding he's nights.

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6) : He's nights. I guess he was just hanging out a little bit longer that morning when I talked to him. I guess because they hadn’t quite had the 7 o'clock maintenance meeting anyway yet. So I guess turnover had not happened yet when I spoke with him. Yeah, there was one more thing to be signed off, but I don’t remember what it was. I'm sorry, I do not recall.

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6) : Okay. So are you able to sign the ACE sheet at that point and they are going to contingency you?

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6) : I think what we discussed is like, "Hey, if we--"basically, if it comes out on line, like it's complete. We're just waiting for it to be routed. They were like, "We can contingency you in." I think I actually did get contingenced in that day if I remember correctly. So I went back and
reviewed the book again for the change and I think I just got
contingenced in.

: So they--
: Or basically written into the ACE sheet.
: So you think they were ending work on the math
on 13?
: Right. I think something had just not been
signed off yet.
: Okay.
: I apologize. I feel like I would have
remembered a lot more about this.
: So you get up on the flight. You get your
flight gear. You're up on the flight deck. Do you remember
approximately what time that was? You were scheduled for a 0900
launch.
: Yeah, I was thinking we were a few minutes
early. So like 30 minutes prior is the typical man time. I
believe, and I were up there about maybe 40 minutes prior.
: Okay.
: So he conducted some of the walk around. I
conducted some of the walk around. We talked a little bit. I
think we had a delay with the flight deck crew as well. I want
to say that the crew chiefs were lightening everything off and
getting it spread. We just had a delay for some reason. I
don't know exactly what it was. I can't remember if it was a
LSE or what. But there was a delay. But the plane was spread. Everything was fine with it. All preflight checks and whatnot. And I think that we went through kind of the normal timeline. Kind of start and RIO and all that good stuff.

: Do you recall having to run back downstairs to sign off the daily, anything like that on 13?

: I don’t recall that.

: Okay.

: No.

: All right. So normal line off, just a little bit delayed due to other factors?

: Right. Due to other factors. And then, once we actually did get started, everything was fine, I think, with everybody's planes all across the board. And then we had kind of another delay of takeoff due to—we had 1,000 more pounds of fuel in the plane than we were supposed to.

: Okay.

: I think per what was asked for. And it just sort of worked out. it was kind of the perfect amount of weight with—the serial was 1000 pounds less than mine so we worked—instead of bringing serials blah, blah, blah, go to Dash-2 and serials blah, blah, blah, go to . They were trying to coordinate just a quick swap. So instead of having to wait there and burn fuel. We figured it would just be a real easy swap of serials because the zone was not massive. It wasn’t
going to have to be--it wasn’t like a raid or anything so
wherever they landed was fine. It wasn’t imperative that they
land at said set specific spot. So we were able to coordinate a
spot so that way we didn’t have to delay takeoff at all. So I
had 1000 pounds more fuel and his serials weighed 1000 less. So
basically, ran the calculations under the glass and double
checked them with the numbers and it worked out.

: So reports have you guys lifting around 0920. Does that sound about right?

: It was supposed to be a 0900 launch.

: 0900 launch.

: I was thinking more along the lines of about
0915 or 17.

: Sure. Departure, anything strange?

: No. We did our--lift into hover, got our
torque checked. Everything was good. We had a few percentage
torques above what--excuse me, the aircraft was utilizing a few
percentage torque less than what we had calculated on the glass
for the weights and the higgy and that checked. All of the
gauges were good and the temperatures were good. And we got a
clear to slide and nothing seemed out of the norm for the
performance of the aircraft.

: This is kind of for reference. I will just
leave this with you for a little bit. So this is the airplan.
This is Change 1. So looking at the air plan has you all
lifting at 0900 with a first hit into Raspberry Creek. So you can just talk us through that, that first leg and the landing.

[Dash-3 aircraft for Nor-prickly [ph], they were asked to do a range sweep that morning.

Okay.

So they basically went off on their own thing and they went to a known checkpoint and altitude that was previously briefed, and they went through—they conducted their range sweep and they went back to that segue point to kind of remain free and clear.

Okay.

So nothing out of the norm. I think there was maybe a scattered layer or so. Kind of a few, a scattered layer. Maybe some cumulus clouds and maybe like at 2500 feet or so, 2000 to 2500 feet.

Okay. Do you know about what the temperature was?

I don’t recall what the temperature was. Sorry. But we talked—I think on the first time around it was my responsibility to talk to range control.

Okay.

So we checked in with them. And if I recall correctly, I think on the first route in I think they asked us to change our routing or to utilize different waypoints. So we did that. And basically kind of approached, I believe,
Raspberry Creek from like the southeast and then made kind of a
right 180 approach into the zone.

Okay.

The zone is easily recognizable and you can
identify it from probably a couple of miles away. There is a
lot of buildings there at Raspberry Creek. It looks kind of
like a mount town, so to speak.

Okay.

Large tower there may be like 100, 125 feet
high. But the zone was very easily identifiable in relation to
the buildings. And there were personnel scattered out kind of
in the mount town area and in the vicinity of the tower and on
top of some of the buildings. We had briefed--because we
weren’t really sure of the--they said that it was kind of like
loose dirt. So we kind of briefed to at least a level 3 RVL at
a minimum going in there. So I briefed that. Conducted just
like a no hover RVL approach behind Dash-2. Uneventful.

Communications were pretty good with the guys that
were in control of the zone. I don’t remember the call sign at
this point right now. But got in there and offloaded the first
set of passengers. And then, after that, everybody was free and
clear. We were clear to lift.

So about 39, 40 people?

Thirty-six I think what it was. Yeah, about
36 people total. Yeah, I'm sorry, I think 39 was the number.
So two relatively full aircraft?

Yeah. And then we were placed to lift. And I think range control had asked us to stay in pretty close communications with them as we basically got near Raspberry Creek and as we departed. I think they kind of wanted keep a closer route on our routing.

All right.

So we departed out of Raspberry Creek. If I remember correctly, we were able to look over to the pre-brief waypoints in routing to the 53s. I think we were able to see them and their space where they were at so we had visual with them. And then we proceeded back to the BONHOMME RICHARD.

Looking at the air plan as well as looking at your mission SMART pack, which I can give you if you want to reference, shortly after takeoff and your landing in Raspberry Creek, section AV-8s is due to takeoff. Based on what we're seeing from the mission SMART pack, that's for an expeditionary strike.

Yeah, they didn’t have any involvement with us. I think that is why the range sweep went that morning was they were supposed to be range sweeping for that. But there was no communication involvement with those guys whatsoever and really kind of transparent to our mission at that point, unless we basically heard them on the radios when returning to the big deck.
But actually, I don’t recall, honestly, all day hearing them on the radios, and they didn’t take over—basically, the paddles will take over your anchorman or frequency for a little bit. But I don’t recall them being on that at all that day. We weren’t asked to hold our communications for them at all.

: Okay. So you're heading back to the BONHOMME RICHARD. How does that one go? Are you flying?

: No, actually flew pretty much all day. I think I got a landing ashore that day. But no, he is flying. Again, he is a very good stick. And again, a very humble young man in the cockpit so always taking advice and stuff onboard and taking constructive criticism really well. So he's pretty easy to work with.

But we went back to the big deck. At this point, I think we took a bit of fuel to like 10.5. I think we took like a bunch of purple bags of mail. Because I remember that I had never seen purple bags before. It had always been yellow bags of mail. So a bunch of loose pony and I think—and a few boxes. And there was supposed to be two passengers, but I think we only had one show up.

: Okay.

: So I think we made a couple of calls to [ph] to ask about the extra passenger. But he wasn’t available or wasn’t there. So to the best of my recollection we took off
fairly close to the timeline to the ASHLAND to drop that stuff off.

: So the landing at the BHR, anything notable about it?

: No.

: No.

: No, not really. I think there were one or two landings that day where the ship was making some good speed because I think they were trying to nullify a slight tail end. Okay.

: To put us within limitations. I don’t think that was the one. I think it may have been a few down the road. But that was the only one that I think was out of the norm. All of the landings that day to the big deck were actually really pretty good. I don’t say that very lightly because I am fairly-—I mean, I want these guys to be really good, but no, I think had made some pretty good landings especially from the left seat all day.

: So you head over to ASHLAND.

: Yeah, again, I don’t think if they are calling up to or the [ph]. Who knows who they are calling up there to work the tower, but the communications are normally a little bit nonstandard there so we have to walk through those kind of CRM wise and just be aware of that. so I think we kind of talked through that a little bit in
terms of just, again, just talking through that with... Because I had asked him--because I wasn’t sure that day, "Like how many times have you been to the small deck?" He was like, "I've been a couple--I've been a few times now." I think he had landed expanded spots at the GREEN BAY and he'd landed Spot 1 at the ASHLAND as well. Very--again, after we kind of walked through all of the slightly nonstandard communications, we did our checklist. All of the CRM stuff was covered. We had already had good weights leaving--lifting and leaving the BONHOMME RICHARD so we actually--we didn’t double check weights since we already had less than 70 percent required to hoagie [ph]. So that was a very nice landing on that one for him. A really good call from the crew chiefs. We were debriefing that on the go, because a lot of the crew chiefs tend to put the aircraft a little further back than it should be, because it is just their sight picture. Instead of putting the nose wheel tangential to the circle in the lineup line. The crew actually did a really good job doing that. So we debriefed that and tried to kind of lock that in so if we had to make another run or anything. So we kind of talked about locking that sight picture in.

We offloaded all of the gear over there. We kind of--it tends to be kind of an informal chat over the tower with those guys typically because I think they get a little bored up there. So we probably said a few things back and forth just...
saying hello and nice to work with each other. I remember calling over to [b3](10USC§130)(b6) because I could basically see the GREEN BAY, and we could still see them on deck there or what we thought was them so we called them. We called the tower at GREEN BAY and just confirmed they were still on deck, if 01 was deck. They did, and so he rogered up on the tower frequency.

And then we met on our own interflight, on another frequency, just to kind of talk too, about what was going on with him, how he was doing, how I was progressing and that we would meet again here on the big deck here shortly. And I think, after that, I think we ended up meeting back on the big deck and reconstituting the division.

: Okay. So you trans end from ASHLAND back to BHR?

: Yes.

: [b3](10USC§130)(b6) takes that landing again?

: I believe, yes. I am pretty sure he took that landing as well.

: Talking with [10USC§130] and [10USC§130], they mentioned that I think on this landing you may have commented on some vibes you were feeling in the aircraft. Do you recall anything along those lines, on the landings?

: Vibes, no. I think we landed Spot 6.

: Okay.
And, I think he asked a question about why the right nacelle would dip so much. And I think we were talking about that cross control because you have a lot of right cyclic when you're landing there. Especially, if you're not super heavy, you'll end up putting a lot of right cyclic and you'll actually end up landing on your right main and sometimes your nose can kind of—if you're not lined up and you're still kind of flying the plane all the way to the deck, before the other two—like before the other main and the nose touch. If you're flying all the way to the deck and you put it in pedal control, you'll feel kind of like you're rotating about a main before you set everything down. And I think it was just a little bit of roll in the plane when we sat down and he was kind of—I think we were talking about how to try to cancel that out without inducing PIO. So I don’t think it was vibration related. I think it was more along the lines of knowing to cancel—or to expect a good dip in the right side sometimes if you have a lot of right cyclic and to maintain your position.

So to the best of your recollection, it wasn’t any talk about vibes. It was about the weird airflow you get off the superstructure there on Spot 6 and how to counter that?

Yeah, because you are getting buffer—it is a high possibility—you know me pretty well and most people do. I try to minimize discussion of things and unfortunately sometimes give a little too much detail, but we probably did talk about
some of the wind interactions and whatnot. Yeah, to the best of my recollection, I don’t think we talked about any weird vibrations. It was just interactions with superstructure and what the plane feels like when you go to land. A little bit more right to settle down on the deck.

: So, for the rest of the flight, you don’t recall any weird vibes that you discussed or anything like that?

: I really don’t recall anything about vibrations in the plane. I mean, if someone may have asked--because I am trying to remember because there was a flight that I either had with 13 or another flight where someone was talking about 13 and they were talking about doing--because they did an RTB recently because I think the blades had been painted so they wanted to do a rear, track, and balance. I don’t think that discussion happened during that flight. I feel like that discussion happened maybe on a different flight. Just kind of mentioning how the vibrations had changed or the vibrations weren’t there in that plane as it were before. So I’m sorry, I don’t recall talking about vibes in that aircraft on that flight.

: Okay. Not on any of the boat landings?

: No.

: Okay. I wanted to ask that upfront. So you get back to BHR. Anything nonstandard or not planned happen at this point?
At this point, I think we--there was a little bit of sitting around timeline. I think we had gotten a lot of PMC stuff done ahead of the timeline. When I came back from the ASHLAND, I know I sat overhead for a little bit. Ship was doing some maneuvering. I think there may have been--a 60 was coming back in to get fuel or whatnot. I know  was coming back from the GREEN BAY so I think they sequenced him in before me to land and left me up topside in the overhead and then the ship was kind of maneuvering underneath me. It was still VMC, but there was kind of large cloud bank that we couldn’t really maintained VMC if we remained. So we just kind of remained five miles of mother and kind of circle cleared the clouds by at least 1,000 we were trying to stay clear of them.

So once he landed, I think was able to come back in. I can't recall specifically if whether or not Dash-3 was already on deck, which I think he was. He was already on deck. So we kind of reconstituted and then there was a little bit of a delay because I don’t think that we had passengers to take at this point back to shore. I think we were going to go back in and start processing the simulated American citizens at this point.

So pretty much on timeline at this point, back on deck BHR maybe a little early around 1045, 1100? Yeah, I think if anything we were left of timeline.

Left of timeline.
Yeah.

Okay.

So we had--I want to say that we kind of got everything resituated here, got reconstituted, and I think we were ready to go back in into the zone area and begin picking up people. So I think we launched as division out of here. I think we all reconfirmed what our responsibilities were communications wise. And then as we went into the objective area--I think we got somewhat of a routing change again. We were given a couple of waypoints. And I think at this point the routing never changed again. It was just they had given us a couple of different waypoints.

Because I think range control was concerned about an Australian helicopter that was coming in to do some operations there and he was supposed to be working like 2,000 feet below at a specific waypoint, which I'm sorry I can't remember. But he wasn't supposed to go like any further south from that waypoint. And they had a time block of when he was supposed to show. I don't think they knew exactly when he was specifically going to show up so we monitored that. And again, they asked they were asking us when we were in the vicinity of Raspberry Creek and then again when we were lifting.

So division goes in--

So on that lift out of BHR, had they called a contingency or anything?
Yeah, that's true. I'm sorry. I think they had called a cherry picker. So they dedicated that Nightingale.

Nightingale.

Okay. Thank you. I appreciate. I couldn’t remember which—there was quite a few back and forth.

Sure.

Yeah, I think everybody recalculated numbers and crunched them to sure we were good with the fuel loads we had. Sorry, we took those guys in and landed them--I think Dash-3 on this landing. We were not sure because our positioning where we were it did not quite look like the diagram like there was going to be room. So Dash-3 kind of sequenced in a little bit behind us. he thought there was plenty of room behind us to land, but once he kind of lost visual with the rest of the flight coming to land, we asked him to wave off and he concurred and he waved off and then came back around and landed in front of lead over on the far south portion of the zone and I was on the far north—in the north portion of the zone.

So I think we offloaded the Nightingale personnel. It felt like it was an half an hour I think on the timing that they worked through all of their mass causality drills and then they got folks together. I think they had like 10 causalities that they wanted to bring back. And I think they said that they were all litter-born patients. And they called over the radio saying, "Hey, we will bring them to the aircrafts on litters,
but they'll actually be able sit--they will just sit in a seat
and strap in as normal."

: Okay.

: So I think we had room for everybody on that.
I think that was all well and good and we lifted out of there in
sequence and then proceeded back to the BONHOMME RICHARD to drop
them off.

And then, after that, I think this is where the call
was made to start processing the AMSETS. Because I think that
we actually got AMSETS in the FCE all in one go, which seemed
out of order and not necessarily as briefed, but I think
something had changed.

: So, now, basically because of that
Nightingale, you're off the airplan, right?

: Yes, I think we had gone off the air plan a
little bit. I think there was some fear about how that was
going to affect Harrier launches. I think the leader
potentially.

: Okay.

: I know we came back and we were delayed
because they weren't expecting us to have a down arrow at a
certain time, but I'm sorry I don't recall the exact time it
was. But they were like, "Yeah, we weren't expecting you back
until time X." And we're like, "It's a mission. The timeline
is a wonderful thing to plan to, but obviously during the mission that ebbs and flows a little bit.

: So basically 31st MEU calls this Nightingale contingency and then, to the best of your knowledge, they don’t rework the air plan to factor in those extra landings for the contingency?

: I don’t think they made a change. I just think that they basically--the tower, I guess, talked to the ship's captain and probably the MEU CO and they worked it out. But that was when we had actually gone back in to actually get the FCE. Because I know I had (b3)(10USC§130)(b6) on board with me because I talked to him over ICS and let him know, "Hey, sir. There is a delay because I think they are worried about us coming back off timeline and that we might jeopardize a Harrier launch.

: So basically because you weren’t making this down arrow and now you're trying to make this Nightingale happen, the ship doesn’t respond well and they're worried?

: They weren’t discourteous or anything because I was stripes up in tower and he was like, "Hey, guys. We weren’t expecting you back right now. We're probably have to--we'll finagle here with the ship's captain," is kind of what I remember him saying and so he did. I think (b3)(10USC§130)(b6) was in the tower acting as basically the watchdog at that point so I think he was trying to work things there. We were in contact with him
just saying, "Hey, man. It's the mission again. You need to please remember to be flexible and all this and stuff." We try not to be rude because we don’t want to strain our relations with the boat by any means. And I think we were just trying to express a little bit of frustration to him and not directly at the tower and just kind of let him work some magic. So it seemed like within seven or eight minutes, probably no more than 10, things were worked out and they allowed us to come back in and set them down and offload some of the American citizens we processed and then the FCE as well.

So the next portion, I remember there being a little concertation about is that they wanted to bring the 53s back early because they were really concerned about them being able to accomplish anymore hits into the zone and be back in time to be stuffed and put away for jet launches. That was a concern.

So right now I am showing your Change 1 to the airplan. So somewhere after that Nightingale, this Change 1 gets signed off.

Okay.

And do you recall ever getting a new airplan?

I don’t. I don’t recall one being run out to the airplane.

And as you were saying, this air plan had the 53s now landing an half an hour early?
Yeah, that is what had been discussed because that really. Because we were going to be able to basically do one more wave. Like one more wave for V-22s and one more wave for 53s and I think it had been planned out and we double checked numbers a couple of times on the deck. Both on Raspberry Creek and on the ship that we would be able to get everybody out with the section of 53s and then the division V-22s and that would be it. But I think because they wanted to take the 53s away we were trying to kind of calculate what we would have to do to get basically another wave of V-22s into Raspberry Creek to get the remainder of the people out. It was going to be like a real small number that remained I think.

Okay. On the original air plan and per the original plan, were you expecting to go to GREEN BAY for those hits?

If I recall correctly, I think we were supposed to basically--yeah, I had planned to go to GREEN BAY the whole time and I think--I can't remember if lead was going to be the one to go to ASHLAND or not. But I can't remember if he was supposed to go there originally or not. Because that is what it turned into all V-22s going to GREEN BAY to offload personnel that belonged over there. And then the two 53s were going to have to figure out the remainder where they were going to go. I don’t remember exactly where--if the remainder of the folks that weren’t going to be able to get picked up by 53s were
going to have to go to the big deck. I believe--so it was somewhat clean. It was like division goes back in and grabs a large portion of personnel, we go offload them at the GREEN BAY, and then at this point, Dash-3 would be free to go home and then a section of V-22s would just be able to go back and capture the remainder of the folks in Raspberry Creek and then bring them back to the big deck.

: So we've been going about an hour and change now. Do you need a break or anything?
: There is a little bit of discomfort, but I'll be okay.
: Are you sure?
: Yeah, because it's typically around about 1100 that I hit a little bit of a wall. So if you are okay to continue, I feel okay.
: Just let us know.
: No problem.
: All right. So you guys are back in Raspberry Creek, who are you guys unloading?
: I want to say that we're unloading the security element at this point or a portion of the security element because they were--this was the last load before we go back out to GREEN BAY and basically have our--the mishap occurs, correct? I think we are on the same sheet of music. It was like a security element. They were guys like with assault
packs. Just the assault packs and a couple of like—there were
shields. I think shields and batons, if I remember correctly.

How heavy did they seem?

We calculated them at 300 pounds apiece because they just had some of the riot gear and then just their
day packs. I think we calculated them at 6300 pounds and,
because had an extra crew chief, we calculated at 200
because he is a very skinny individual and all he brings with
him is just his bag and his gear. So I think we calculated
somewhere around 6500 pounds is what we would be lifting out of
there, which was kind of the standard number that we had been
lifting that day in terms of weight. Somewhere around about the
6000, 6300-pound area is kind of what we had been lifting that
day.

So let me ask you, lifting BHR, did you, you know, this fuel stop is kind of an amorphous because you have to
execute that contingency. What was your fuel state when you
were headed—when you lifted BHR and went back to Raspberry
Creek?

I think we got like 10.4 in fuel.

Okay.

They cut it a little bit early. And I think
somewhere around 10.0 whenever we launched from the BHR to go
back inland.
Okay. And then distance, time, fuel to Raspberry Creek? You're about 20 minutes, 25?

Roughly about 15 minutes.

Fifteen.

Yeah, so I think by the time we landed I think we had just slightly over 9.

Okay.

And then we sat there--I think we--I think maybe 9.4 or 9.3 and then we sat there for a while because it takes a while for everybody to load up and whatnot. I remember making a comment about water jugs. He was like, "Do you want me to have them empty them if they have water in them?" I was like, "Absolutely, please. Let's minimize anything." The only thing I don't recall getting a confirmation back from him is whether or not--like he never said, "All water jugs are empty." Because we went back to crunching numbers because--

had been kind of that thing where you are fostering the environment of, hey, show me, kind of taste, touch, and smell, show me everything. And he had been sort of crunching numbers and I was sitting there backing him up, or when I had crunched numbers, he had backed me up.

So I thought CRM went well all day and this is what gets me and just about breaks my heart to think about this, but when we were back at the BHR, we talked about, like face-to-face, I remember looking at him and being like, "Look, we've
already been out for a while. It's been a long day kind of already. This is the part where you have to be very careful."

We had a face-to-face about this is kind of that time of day where you start to get tired. We have to be really careful of not missing stuff.

I know the crew chiefs were in the back and I think someone made a comment about that like a one word comment and we were kind of talking back and forth about being careful, being careful with RVL lining back in the zone. Because we know that each time—we discussed that every time we've landed, we've been within a .1 of our landing point, which is good. Sorry, .01 of our landing point, which is good, but every time you are off by that 60 feet that is a potential for kicking up a whole new little bit and dust. So you may go back in there thinking, "Oh, it's only going to be so much because we already kicked it up,"

but if you're to the right of your last landing point, you know you may kick up a lot more—you may find a spot that you get right over it and you're kicking up a lot more.

So we talked about that. We talked about just being careful of the weights or whatnot and just being aware of not missing things and always asking questions and backing each other up if something doesn’t seem right. I remember we had that discussion before we launched.

Sorry, we're back in Raspberry Creek loading these guys up. I don’t recall coming back and saying that they
had ensured every water jug was offloaded because that can add up pretty quickly. I don’t remember seeing more than maybe four or five water jugs in hand, basically. It took Dash-2, myself, and Dash-3 basically a long time to load up, but it took lead even longer. They still had guys standing out behind in the back of the aircraft.

At this point, I think game plan was, "Hey, if you guys are good and to keep things rolling, do you want to go ahead," and basically, I would take like a section lead at this point and take the section back out to the GREEN BAY and begin offload. And I think I made a suggestion over the radio. I was like, "Is that fine if I go in first because by the time I'm done offloading, lead will most likely be in the overhead and ready to land by the time that I am ready to lift," so we thought that would work out. So the only that kind of--I said I was sorry to Dash-3 because I knew that that strung him out for a little bit longer, but all he had to do is simply offload and he would got back to BONHOMME RICHARD and we were having to go back to Raspberry Creek to get the last load of people.

So we loaded up. And I think we calculated--I think we may have just calculated for 6600 pounds just to give the extra 100 pounds.

: Okay. But you had been sitting in the zone now for a half an hour?

: Probably at least 25 minutes or so.
So what would you estimate your fuel state now?

I think we were--I want to say that we were at the 9.0 to 8.8 region because I think that's what we called out. One of the two of us called that out and I think he had one less person than I did.

Okay.

So I think I remember that it worked out pretty decently. I remember had crunched the numbers and was saying like, "We've got--we need to burn down 100 pounds or so," if I remember correctly. It was somewhere around 600 to 800 pounds. Maybe 600 pounds to basically be in there perfect back at the ship.

Five percent.

Yeah, we would have our five percent off of 112. Yeah, we agreed to everything. I told Dash-2 that I would make--because I had been making range calls all day. So it was pretty easy. No big deal.

We got permission to lift. We lifted. I don't recall anything seemed out of the norm at this point with aircraft. Because when you lift you typically get--one engine will go left engine temp. It will temp for a little bit and come back down. It's pretty typical. So I think we probably experienced those throughout the day. You know whenever you go--sometimes when you go lifting into a higgy on the ship, you know you can get a
temp real quick and it will come back down or, when you've got to put full power in, you will get that and it will subside and go right back down in the green. Sometimes just the force of the push of full power, just the speed at which someone pushes the engines might I guess put in that power to man signal the boat quicker than you need. But I didn’t recall seeing anything out of the norm with any of the gauges and we lifted the gear, conducted our after landing checks, and proceeded out via our altitude and appropriate air speed. I think that routing had not really changed again at this point.

    We talked to range control. I think the Australian helicopter--it was some sort of medical flight--I don’t think it was military, but some sort of medical flight was conducting practice in the area. So they actually checked on station--they were en route. They thought that they were going to be there within the next 30 minutes or so. That they were going to be at that wav point they had said. And we're like, "Okay. That's great because we're going to be well clear, but we'll be back in again," which we had said again to range control to him just to let him know kind of what our plans were.

    At this point, we're heading back out. It's about a 10- to 12-minute flight back out. We're heading back out to the GREEN BAY. I remember working through the communications between the two of us. I think Dash-2 checked in with Green Crown and we checked in with Icepack and worked through center
and over to the tower. I don’t think we had DME. I think the
ASHLAND had DME that day, but I don’t think that GREEN BAY was
able to get like negative yard stick after we basically—we
couldn’t see them through, the visual. We could see the two
different small decks that make out the GREEN BAY, because GREEN
BAY was actually closer to the BONHOMME RICHARD at that point.
I think the ASHLAND was the farthest away; closest to the range,
but the farthest way from the BONHOMME RICHARD.

: So when you checked in with Icepack, we have a
transcript. You checked in with about 2 plus 15 in gas. So how
much in pounds, to the best of your recollection?

: So usually that is about 8 something. So we
know we can make that gas lasts so sometimes when you look at
certain amount, you know, "I'm at 8.6 right now or I'm at 8.5 or
so," I can make that fuel lasts longer if I go high and I go
130. Sometimes those are really rough estimates. Heck, you can
check in or leave the ship saying you have four-and-a-half hours
of gas if you sit overhead the ship. Yeah, but I think 2.15 was
a rough estimate just because we thought about max E not
necessarily burning at like 190 or--

: SOP holding.

: Yeah, SOP holding. We thought we would check
in with kind of max endurance. So at this point, we had to
describe to tower what was going on I think. In case--now, I am
now the lead of the section. I had not been over to that ship
at all that day so I am kind of unfamiliar--they are kind of unfamiliar with me at this point and I asked for my Dash-3 to be able to enter the overhead. And the way that we were lining up with the ship was we were leaving the range going feet wet and proceeding southeast, and I think they were heading kind of heading like a northeasterly kind of heading in PRC.

: Okay.

: So we requested permission to cross the bow to set up for a straight in for expanded Spot 5. So, at this point, I was asking "Confirm, you have been to an expanded spot. You know where we're going?"

He was like, "Yeah, I know exactly where we are going."

I said, "Half right-hand side of the ship."

We worked through the landing checklist and Dash-2 had kissed off at this point to take the overhead. I verbalized and went through and pointed at everything in the cockpit, waited for the gear to get down and locked, hear everything click, and then we finalized everything with the nose lock into gear. Obviously, because we know that you can't do it too soon because it will give you a nose--you're not centered and you won't be able to actually push the brakes to pull the handle up until you wait for everything to be situated in the hydraulic system.

Did that, I think vocalized again that confirmed three down lock with the brake and the nose lock was set. So we know...
the full checklist had been done. Not a whole lot of chatter
from the crew really at this point except for talking about line
up and speeds and we talked about I think maybe a more steep
approach just to be aware of sea spray, salt spray. Because I
think we discussed it on the last one. The approach was really
good, it was just a little bit more flat, then kind incur that
sea spray. So we want to--

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6): That was when you were landing at the ASHLAND?
(b3)(10USC§130)(b6): Yeah, that was at the ASHLAND earlier. So
that was, again, it was really good. I was just trying to say
just be a touch steeper so you try to avoid that salt spray.

And I really don’t recall--I guess as we basically
turned final, between [ ] and I, we were talking him a little
bit to the lineup line because it's a little later in the day,
it’s a little bit hazy, you know, you can't quite make out the
markings on the deck, but for those who have done it a few
times, you kind of know where to lineup on kind of the corner of
the stern there.

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6): So to the best of your recollection, who is in
the tunnel as the crew chiefs?

remember him, he's--yeah. Kind of some of the younger guys are
kind of quick to call your lineup. He was kind of quick to call
the lineup and say, "I think we need to work ourselves more to
the right," because we were a bit aft of the ship.
But as far as like speed—I remember looking down and getting a torque check basically at that point to see how we were doing. Nothing seemed out of the norm. Because it is hard to tell because if someone is putting in power to kind of maintain altitude. I was trying to wait for it to settle down, but I think I remember seeing it kind of in the 60s probably. Who knows? He's kind of moving some things around and then he slows down to—he just sailed at 300 feet and everything is down locked. I think we called a beam, basically, and they said that we are Charlie to Spot 5.

Okay. I am just going to pause real quick and go back to the zone in Raspberry Creek.

Yes.

A real quick follow-up question.

Yes.

So you said—been on deck a long time, did the crew chiefs say anything like these guys—they're unable to really verify that everyone gets in and buckled or did they say that everything was good to go? Do you recall any conversations like that?

No, they got the count. If I remember correctly, I thought they basically got a count—they gave us a number as they were walking.

Okay.
They were trying to do the count beforehand and then the count once they're seated to double check. I don't recall hearing any problems with them being strapped in or buckled or anything.

Okay.

I think those guys are pretty serious about making sure that everybody is strapped in. Normally, there are comments about, "These guys are taking a long time to get buckled in," but no, I don't remember them saying anything about--

Did you have any feelings of being rushed at this point because you know you had to make this second hit and sunset's coming up?

Really no. I don't think we did. I think we just tried to make a plan that streamlined or tried to as efficient as possible with what we had left. I mean, I feel like we are pretty safety minded and conservative at the squadron in terms of, "Don't be rushed. Don't push it." If we're getting fatigued or whatnot, we're not going to put anybody in harm's way because we want to--have to make them miss training. So it's not really--I don't feel like--we don't exist really in that climate. I feel like it's much more conservative in my opinion. I mean, it seems like we're in a climate of conservative.

That is from the squadron and the MEU?
Yeah, absolutely. Really, we didn’t have a whole lot of X check items that day. There really wasn’t even that much pressure with you know, we're like, "Sir, we're delayed," and he was like, "Okay." And we were trying to figure out why because we didn’t understand why other than--there was a big gap in time between us being able to get on deck--we were in the overhead. We were like, "There's 45 minutes before the launch. We have plenty of time to take chalks to chains, get guys off." They could still do a combat fog walk if they were worried about dirt and get us free and clear. So we weren’t really feeling the rush. I think we were slightly unhappy that they took the 53's kind of away from us. That could have made it a very--what we thought much more smooth--

Extract.

Extract, yeah.

All right. So we can go back to you were rolling final, just rolling about 80 nacelle.

Yeah, just rolling about 80 nacelle. Because we didn’t have DME and in really didn’t think--at the point, I didn’t think it was appropriate to call and ask about yard stick. Because once we had been on short final lead, we saw the ship. I mean, technically, it's a visual approach. You know the DME is a great way to back yourself up, but if you're 100 feet from the deck edge and you're doing more than 30 knots over
the ground, unless the ship is moving quite quickly, that might
be an issue. I mean, it was smooth and controlled. It didn’t
feel stalled out at all. Just felt like it was steady and
smooth.

When they gave you the Charlie Spot 5, do you
remember about what they called the winds?
I want to say they were like off the bow to
like slightly starboard.
Okay.
For the spot.
Okay.
But they were very minimal.
Like under 5? Under 10?
I feel like they were around the 5 to 6 range
maybe. I want to recall that I heard like somewhere around 5
knots. I was thinking like, "Okay. We don’t have much wind."
But it a head wind. It wasn’t like a true
tail wind or anything like that?
I don’t recall it being a tail wind at all. I
want to say it was like kind of a four quarter component like
very slightly off--
Okay.
--the bow. Like even maybe to the point that,
if it shifted a little bit, we wouldn’t even get the benefits of
it because of the superstructure. I think that kind of went
through my mind. But yeah, he had a very nice approach. He was very controlled it what it felt like. And for the life of me, I don’t remember looking down. Because we didn’t have DME, I feel like my scan was not the same as normal. Because now I am kind of scanning visually more bow to stern to check closure rate. And closure rate seemed very adequate. Seemed very adequate. It’s not like we were, you know, getting stalled out and had to ask him to come forward or anything like that. It was a very commensurate rate of speed, you know, with standard operating procedure.

So as we get closer to the edge of the ship, I feel like we were somewhere where the coming is no longer--starting to become no longer visible off the nose of the aircraft, but it is kind of working its way over where we have to look to side to see the coming and the scupper. Started to notice like the decent rate started to pick up a little bit and, you know, there is a power call from--I want to say that it was from both and--I could hear 's voice on the ramp because he is checking the left side. I am pretty sure that he was the one up checking the left side of the aircraft.

: What was your visibility like from the right seat with the starboard to port Spot 5 approach?

: Fairly decent. I feel like I could see a lot. I believe there was an aircraft tied down at bunk spot 3 in
front of us and then the typical skid layout upon on the forward
portion of the flight deck.

: Slashed?

: Yeah, just slashed and everything. I don’t
recall an aircraft being directly across from me on the other
spot. But as we coming over the coming just where the nose
gears are beginning to work its way in the vicinity of the
coming, maybe not right over the coming, but I’m losing
visibility of the coming.

: This interview is paused. Time on
deck is 1039.

[Pause.]

: This interview is resumed. Time on
deck is 1042.

: Just resume from where we were?

: Yeah.

: Okay. So at this point, lined up on file.

Everything seems to be working as advertised. We are kind of
beginning to go where the coming is no longer visible on screen,
but it feels like it's coming underneath the wind screen and
kind of starting to line up over here at the 45. If I recall
correctly, no pedal movements or anything was made yet, but it
feels like we were coming over the coming and at that point it
feels like there is drop, like a sink. The nose kind of felt
like it dipped a touch because it felt like my visibility kind
of improved a little bit.

: So the nose came down?

: Maybe just a little bit of the nose began to
fall.

: What is saying if you recall?

: I think had said, "Power. Power." I
And then I want to say I recall that there was some space left
on the TCL. We pushed it forward and we got no response. So
basically at this point it just kind of kept sinking. I want to
say that it was a couple of hundred foot per minute rate. It
wasn’t excessive. It didn’t feel excessive. It just felt like
there was nothing you could do. and the thing is, too, I don’t
even really think we began to really truly like any nose up to D
cell at this or no aft nacelle to D cell. It was just like it
was very smooth and it was like we were going to basically cross
the deck edge and just be able to put the pedal in and it was
going to be a touch of right--right nacelle down to kind of stop
any movement left at that point.

At that point, we didn’t feel like we had enough power
to continue. I don’t recall seeing anything with the gauges at
this point. I just remember being very frightened. And I am
not extremely positive after--I pushed the TCL forward. I think
he did the same. I am not extremely positive what inputs he was
making over there, if any at all. If he just kind of locked up.
I feel like I kind of froze a little bit as well just because of
what was happening. We hit. We were hitting the side of the
ship. Kind of hitting the scupper, the coming somewhere in the
nose area. And I remember the plane kind of rotating a little
bit to the right. And again. I am not really sure of the
controlling inputs at this point. Because I was just thinking--
it was kind of a quick flash of thinking back to the NEW ORLEANS
where they had landed on the back, but I think they were able to
put enough on the plane on the ship where you know they could
keep it there and keep it safe where people could get out. That
kind of flashed through my mind real quick, but I was like we
are nowhere near that. We don’t have hardly any of the plane on
the deck of the ship and just remember kind of moving to the
right. The plane moving to the right, moving to the right, and
then I remember--it was like we were caught on the gallery deck.
Like maybe the floor portion of the belly was caught on the
gallery deck and so we began to kind of scrape along and skid
and then--I don’t remember really any change in the sound of
anything in terms of like engines. Let me back up a second
because I left out this portion.

We got an RPM low. So what I don’t 100 percent
recollect is whether it happened as we hit or if it happened
right when the TCL movement was full forward and--so it was near
simultaneous to the impact of the deck we got an RPM low. And then, after that, that is kind of when we roll right.

: Oh, the first impact of the deck.

: Yeah, the first impact of the deck. Yes, with the first impact of the deck, there was an RPM low, so near simultaneous. I just don’t remember if it happened like on more impact or if it happened right before. But I want to say that it happened right before. I don’t feel like we'd hit the deck yet when it triggered. I remember looking down and seeing it on the MFD. We began to kind of slide, what I felt the belly was on the gallery deck.

And here is where things start to get--I feel like there is a lot of mental picture and detail all at once. Just things happening all at one time. I remember the plane like lounged or scraped forward and it's like we hit one of the ladder wells that went down into the gallery deck area. I remember the impact--I think that impact hitting that, is basically what hit--impacted my knee. And then I don’t remember feeling the pain in my hip, but I remember feeling like--the multifunction's display had basically hit my knee and crushed it and I remember probably giving out a--I felt like I said a verbal no out loud. I think just trying to grunt in pain. I think I gave a no. I don’t remember at this point recalling hearing any conversation or anything from anybody. I've tried to kind of replay it quite a few times and see if I remember
hearing anybody say anything. I don’t even remember looking
over and seeing [REDACTED] at this point. Like, I think, once I made
the impact and that ladder well hit my leg, unfortunately, I
think my focus shrunk a little bit.

All I can remember thinking was that--looking over and
feeling like that plane was about to rotate to the right and
thinking that I want to get the ECLs off. I was just thinking
about the note about engines going into water and causing
catoptric damage if they ingest it and they would send blades
everywhere. And that is what I was thinking as we began to roll
because I remember looking right and seeing water and looking
back up at the ECLs. And then, as I had the thought about going
up to the ECLs, I remember looking back right again because I
think I was just frightened at this point and I remember
thinking about trying to pop the window.

I think we hit another jolt and I want to say that I
was able to at least get the ECLs out of D tent, but I felt like
we had another major jolt in the aircraft and I think the pain
in my leg being smashed. Again, I don’t remember getting the
ECLs all the way off. I really don’t. But as far as I can
remember, I remember trying to get them out of D tent.

And then, as we rolled right, I tried to reach for the
handle to blow the window, but I was unsuccessful. I don’t know
if I was unsuccessful because I just wasn’t extremely cognizant
of what I was doing just with everything that was going on or if
I actually actuated it and nothing happened. I want to say I was more of not cognizant just because of the pain in my leg and everything happening so fast and hitting the water and just the thought of hitting the water that I don’t think I was able to get that release.

I remember hitting the water and the cabin filling pretty quickly. Like the cabin filled probably within seconds. So maybe about eight seconds. I remember just holding my own breath for a little bit trying to remain calm. I remember seeing pictures of my family in my head for a few seconds. Just kind of thinking of the fact that I had come back from seeing my newborn daughter and awful this situation was. And I think I was able to get my helmet cord undone and then I was able to somehow—I don’t know how in the world, but I think I do remember hearing like different noises like in the structure of the airplane as we shifted a little bit. I am not really cognizant of the orientation of the plane to be honest with you. I really thought we were like this and remained like this for a little while. Because I could feel like I could see light from the right side as I looked over. I could see like a lot of light. Like the window was gone.

So I feel like the way the structure of the aircraft was bending—I don’t think I was able to get my seat down. That is not what got my leg out. I think that maybe the way the
aircraft was bending my leg was able to be freed and it took a bit of flesh with it, but it was able to get free.

I remember unbuckling or thinking about where my oxygen was. I remember trying to reach over--and I think at this point, as I've gone back over this mentally and as I remember how I came out of the water and how I was situated as I came out of the water. I didn’t have the cognizance at the time that the plane was just nose down. So I am thinking that we are kind of on our right side and had gotten the window blown. I thought that he'd blown the window because there was a lot of space on the left side. And I remember reaching around and trying to feel, you know, trying to do the hand over hand to get out and not really recalling what I was feeling. But I guess at this time thinking about the orientation of the plane, I guess I would have been feeling my dashboard and then the side of the plane. I was sure because I was actually able to get out that he'd blown the window. He wasn’t there. Because when you look over in a normal flight, when you look over where people situate themselves, there would have been no way—if he would have just blown the window and he was just sitting there in place, I don’t think I would have had a chance to get--there would not have been enough room to go by him. And of course, if he was there, with plenty of oxygen, I would have tried to get him out. But I didn’t know he was there. I have since then been told obviously that he was still strapped in the plane and that a large portion
I guess of the window framing in the cockpit was torn off. I thought he had gotten out. I thought for sure that he had been able to get out of the plane. I thought that he'd blown the window since it was that much room to get out.

I just remember—actually, getting out of the aircraft, being free of the airframe, and then looking up and being able to make out light above. Swam for a little bit. At this point, I just think adrenaline. I didn’t really feel any pain with the leg and just trying to swim and remember I have lobes to help me here and I should probably use them at some point. So I think it was maybe 40 to 50 feet. Just thinking about where the nose of the plane was and how much tail was kind of barely sticking out at the time. Because the plane seemed—as I got free on the surface, it seemed that the plane kind of bobbed quite a bit as it sat there. Yeah, somewhere around 40 to 50, I was able to get to service. I think that may be like 20 feet below I was able to pop the lobes and get them inflated. And then I was on the surface. I feel like I was kind of far away from everybody else in the beginning.

And then I realized that my foot was sort of going back and forth like this as I was floating. And realized that I probably shouldn't move it so I just kicked with one leg and arm tried to get nearer other folks, other Marines, and tried to get them together and load up. I feel like I had a little bit of cognizance in the beginning. It was just adrenaline kind of
kicking in at that point. But I feel like that quickly faded as the pain set in.

I remember [REDACTED]. I feel like [REDACTED] jumped in the water to come get me. At this point, I think somebody took a raft, maybe out of a Huey, is what I assumed, because it was much smaller than our normal rafts and had thrown it in the water and inflated it--I guess inflating throwing it in the water. They were starting to get people into it. I remember seeing [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was there. I remember [REDACTED] being up on the tail of the aircraft, too, getting people out. He was very cognizant and being very directive with everything and trying to get people to huddle up. I think he jumped in the water after that. I think he grabbed me again. Excuse me that was the time that he had grabbed me and then was pulling me over to the floatation device. And they pulled me up into the floatation device. And corpsman was there. They immediately started stripping away at my leg because I think it was bleeding pretty badly and they basically put a pressure dressing on all of the lacerations and whatnot. Very professional. They were talking to me and doing exactly what they should. And doing a really good job.

I just remember asking, "Have we got everybody? Have we got everybody?" And they didn’t know at the time. It was very early. You know the first few minutes. Shortly after that, they were yelling back and forth with people I think in
like a RLB that had been launched from the GREEN BAY, the ready life boat. And they had brought them over to the floatation device. I think I had probably assessed as probably the worst injury at this point with a broken leg. And I don’t think that we quite knew about the hip and whatnot at that moment. So they got me moved over to the boat. Getting ready to go back to the GREEN BAY, I think got called back over because they thought that they had another injury, but it ended up being a false alarm. But they brought me back over to the ship and then got me all strapped up and off and onto the ship and into medical. And from there, it's kind of all medical attention stuff.

: From the best of your recollections, what do you recall about the medical care on GREEN BAY?

: On GREEN BAY, I recall that the morphine unfortunately was four days expired. They were trying to position me—because the leg, you know, they kept my leg sort of at a bend. And I couldn’t really sit comfortably because the hip is dislocated and broken. And my leg obviously is broken. They were doing everything they could. I think they gave me the best pain killer they had. I can't remember what it was. I think they walked through everything. They tried to keep me just kind of reticent and aware of everything. Talking to me. I was shivering pretty bad because I had been in wet clothes for a while. It is cold on the ship. They were trying to warm me up. Doc, the same corpsman that was wrapping my leg up, kept
coming back and talking to me. I would say the only complaint out of the whole thing was having a corpsman practice a catheter for the first time on me I would say would be the major complaint, but everything else was good.

Sorry, a little bit of humor in there. It's kind of a way to deal with everything.

: No, this team enjoys that.

: It just happened to be a female corpsman who had never done it before and it was rather painful. But I didn’t complain. They were trying to take care of me. I think they tried to collect as much medical information as possible and then they were talking about there was going to be a MEDEVAC via 60 back over to big deck into the hour. I think the hour ended up turning into an hour and a half, maybe an hour and 45 minutes. It was hard to take track. They were taking dog tags off, watches off. They were cutting me out of all of my gear and all of my flight suit and skivvies and everything and just had me wrapped up. I think they were trying to warm me up for the most part.

I don’t remember if they were running IVs and that kind of stuff, but I know that they basically got me all strapped up and ready to move. And they moved me through the ship up to the flight deck and I got the flight over to the BHR. I think I kind of maybe clunked out a little bit between coming off the helicopter and I think they brought me down via the ramp
and opened the two main doors on the ramp and brought me into medical. I think I kind of came to at that point. A swarm of medical personnel from every department. A lot faces I've known because I've come out there to certify that MEU on several occasions as the nonparticipating squadron. So I felt like I had a lot of familiar faces and whatnot.

A lot of compassion. A lot of kindness. A lot of good talking to and keeping me together and everything. And I think they did a really nice job. I was not expecting it, to be honest with you, from Navy medicine. I was expecting everything to be a lot more by the numbers and let's just get this guy, you know, as mended up as possible. Let's get him a helicopter and let's get him out of here.

But I mean, I feel like--had three chaplains that came down and talked to me. You know my CO's down there, XO. The MEU CO. They allowed several of the other Marines to come down and just say hi to me real quick. Harrier flight doc, was there. He stayed with me I thing through a pretty good chunk of it. Yeah, but just a lot of compassion. Harrier flight doc, was there. He held my hand and talked to me for most of the procedures, for most of the stuff that I had done there. I think they did a lot of portable x-rays on me. was busy suturing up this hand and I think they basically got me to a stable portion where they were ready to fly me to Rock Hampton.
Okay.

So I remember--just a little bit apprehensive about being strapped up again because you basically can't move and being put back on a helicopter and going over water again, but I figured it would be okay and then we got to Rock Hampton.

What asset did they use to move you to Rock Hampton?

I am pretty sure it was 60 to move me to both, both small deck to big deck and big deck to shore.

Okay. Can you estimate how long until you got to the Rock Hampton Hospital?

I want to say maybe half to 4--maybe half an hour to 40 minutes maybe tops.

Okay.

But I think an half an hour would probably be a pretty good set standard because I remember being in a bit of pain and thinking--I was able to talk a little bit to [REDACTED], who went with me, and then kind of able to--at least yell a little bit through cranials and whatnot. They were trying to keep me comfortable and whatnot. And then the flight and basically the aircrew trying to do the same because it was starting to get some pretty intense SWETs and whatnot and they were--she was trying to open the door for me to get some airflow and everything and whatnot. Yeah, but I feel like no more than a half an hour.
Okay. So you get to Rock Hampton. Rock Hampton, I think from there I am transported via ambulance, ground transport, to Rock Hampton. And I am starting to get pretty tired and weak at this point and I just remember [b3](10USC§130)(b6) was a really good advocate for my care. Definitely hats off to him because remember there were a couple of instances where the docs were talking about something and he was like, "I don’t really feel that it was adequate," and I think he was trying to ask for something different or more. So I felt pretty comfortable that he was watching over me really well.

At that point, I think they talked to me about what was going to have to happen and pretty soon I think they had I pre-opted and ready to go into resetting my hip and whatnot. And so I think at that point they gave me some pretty hefty anesthesia and I feel like I was gone for maybe a couple hours. I would say that I didn’t see clocks or anything anywhere, so I don’t know exactly.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): So basically that was the first surgery? [b3](10USC§130)(b6): Yeah, that was the first procedure I had was them having to do that.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): About how long until they move you to Brisbane? [b3](10USC§130)(b6): I want to say that it was early the next morning. Because I feel like we were in Rock Hampton through
the wee hours of the morning. And I think, probably before
dawn, they actually put me on--I don’t think I spent another day
there. I think they put me on an air ambulance and loaded me up
and then [redacted] and I were loaded onto that. I remember
he was afraid that--at first they told him he was not going to
be able to fly with us. It was just going to be me. And so, I
think he spent a lot of time trying to figure that out and was
able to get on the flight with me. And I want to say--I can't
remember if it was dark or not, but I want to say that it was in
the wee hours of the morning when we were able to get into
ground transportation to come here.

[redacted]: Okay. So you've been in Brisbane Hospital
follow on care?

[redacted]: I guess this is probably the 6th.

[redacted]: Okay. Since the 6th of August, 7th of August?

[redacted]: Yes.

[redacted]: Can you--just for investigative purposes,
we're wanting to quantify all injuries and damages so can you
run down the list of the injuries you sustained?

[redacted]: Yes.

[redacted]: No matter how minor.

(b) (6)
Okay. Did you ingest any fuel?

Sir, we can get a more complete list after everything is done with.

Okay. Thank you.

Okay. Just a couple sporadic follow-up questions. In the zone, when you're picking up these passengers, let's say Raspberry Creek, what you're expectation
of providing them a passenger brief or egress brief? Who does that? Who is responsible for that?

Typically, the crew chief that go grab them, go grab the serials, are the ones that give them an egress brief. So that is kind of a standard operating procedure, you know, whatever crew chief goes and grabs, does that, that brief for passengers.

Did you discuss that with your crew chiefs before they, in particular, grabbed the Golf Battery of Marines who were going to GREEN BAY?

I don’t think so. I think that it's generally more of a first brief of the day or a passenger briefing guide. You might touch it there. I think everybody for the most part would understand if you said, "SOP," but I think some of us still kind of breaks it down, you know, "Whoever grabs the serials, you're doing the safety brief for these guys."

Okay.

I did not confirm. I will say that I did not confirm whether or not that was done. I do remember that I did not specifically confirm that that serial had had a safety brief or an egress brief from the crew chief.

Okay.

Because it's almost 11 now, we're good for today. We can always come, too. Since he said that this is the time of day that he says that typically for him is the--
Luckily, we've just been --

I mean, we've had plenty of time to talk to you for about two hours so I am comfortable with calling a break today and then coming back maybe tomorrow or the next day depending on whichever feels for you.

Yes, sir. It just depends on what you all have left. I mean, if it's -- it's just a little bit of minor discomfort. I apologize. My face probably --

No worries. Like I said, we're in no rush. This is ample for right now. I'm giving you a chance to rest a little bit and relax.

Yes, sir.

Can you go ahead and--

This interview is terminated. Time on deck is 1110.
CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPT

I, [b3](10USC§130)(b6), do hereby certify that the foregoing was transcribed from a digital recording not made by me, but transcribed verbatim by me or under my supervision to the best of my ability, taken at the time and place set out in the record above.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6)
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW OF

26 August 2017
Brisbane, Australia

INTERVIEWERS:

Transcript Prepared by:

CVV Transcripts

FOUO
It is 26 August 2017 in Brisbane, Australia. Time on deck is 1150. This is the second interview with in the presence of the Investigating Officer, and Assistant Investigating Officer. My name is , the Legal Advisor. was again willing to speak with us again today and he had no questions.

Sir.

So we wanted to talk a little bit—we're going to just spot hit a couple things from our discussion yesterday.

Okay.

The first one we wanted to discuss, I am going to bring up a couple of maintenance records at ADB and go through it a little bit with you and also wanted to focus on your conversation with on the safe for flight process for 13.

Yeah, actually, I did remember why because there were two delays that happened on the flight deck that morning. I do remember the last thing. I think they had to finish a daily card, a 5060 is the thing that we had to wait on to be finished. That was the only thing open card when I looked at the book so I was trying to rack my brain last night and remember why. And it was why there were people on the plane, when I got there, and why were delayed for takeoff. So I think they had to do a 5060 and then rundown signoff and then they
were going to do contingency in the end and then it was a delay in the serial swap that caused the late takeoff. Sorry, I racked my brain yesterday trying to remember why exactly—

: Why were they asking about that?

: Huh?

: It makes sense. So just bringing up the ACE sheets. We're going to kind of walk through it play by play as you're going downstairs—or going upstairs from maintenance control.

Okay. So this ACE sheet, do you recall—we've got you kind of pen-and-inking this one with signing the safe for flight box also in ink. Did that occur down in maintenance control or is that up on the flight deck?

: I think that was maintenance control.

: Do you remember approximately what time because we don’t have the time on it?

: I don’t remember approximately what the time was for that.

: Yesterday you told us that you went up on the flight deck about 40 minutes early.

: Yeah, I don’t remember exactly where that was. Let me think. My best approximation would be that it was generally before going up to the flight deck would be my best recollection of it so I guess it would be about 45 minutes prior.
So do you recall, when you signed this, any debriefing, discussion of the ongoing maintenance aside from the daily?

No, I don’t remember anything other than the fact that they need to run a 5060 because—I thought it was like one of those things that the plane couldn’t get pulled out to do that—that part of the card. So it was like, "Hey, it's already pulled out on the spot. They're running it right now. That's it. That's all that needs to be done."

Okay. So inside the ADB, there's three separate ACE sheets, I guess as it went through when we secured it at 1600. So after you had that pen and ink one, this is the second on that they put in where it is signed off by Lance who looks like was the 3/10 desk sergeant for that morning.

Okay.

And then last, this looks like they are contingency you in post-flight.

Okay.

So did you talk to at all after you signed the ACE sheet? Like up on the flight deck, was he up there?

No. I don’t remember—no, he didn’t come up or anything like that.
So, when you signed the book, did it have the daily and turnaround sheets in it like this?

To the best of my memory, those are always--pretty much always in there. I don’t remember them not being in there.

Sir, do you remember signing off on that?

Signing the ACE itself?

Yes, sir.

I am pretty sure that I remember signing off on that.

Okay.

So this is the turnaround maintenance record for 13.

Okay.

If you see it, it is signed off completion date of "5 August 2017" at "8:00 a.m." So you're saying it was in there when you looked at it?

I don’t remember it not being there. It's usually--I look through that because I'm looking through those dates and whatnot to see when they're complete.

So, in this case, what are you looking for on the turnaround?
I would just be looking for the completion date and time to make sure that's it's within the appropriate amount of time.

Okay. The 24 hours. And that time being 24 hours based on that completion date?

Yeah. Okay. Now, that's the second page of the turnaround all still done by . Do you know if he is a night-crew or day-crew Marine?

No, I don’t remember if he was the day or nights.

Now, what about the daily maintenance records for 13, what are you looking for on this one?

Kind of the same thing. The same completion time, it's within the 72-hour timeframe.

So basically, you're just really looking for that card. And then, in this case, like you were saying, most of the work is signed off by and then cards 6--12, the 12 series cards for the left nacelle.

Right.

Right nacelle, rather, which would have been the over deck nacelle are signed off by the morning of.
Okay.

And then the 5060 card 14 is signed off by the morning of.

Yeah.

So, when you looked at this that morning, no concerns?

No. I guess, I would have to walk through that just from them saying, "Hey, we're just working through 5060 right now." That was the only open thing left.

So a little bit of the backstory of 13, you don't recall--to the best of your knowledge, all day on the 4th, it was an up plane and running as up?

Yeah, I don't remember if it was an up plane or not on the 4th. I just remember that there were like four, maybe five planes. Like yesterday I was saying to the best of my ability I remember it being like four planes down that day.

So basically like eight up planes or so.

Yeah.

So this is a discrepancy that was open and completed at--can you tell me what time the MAF signed off?

This is 5 August 2017, 0825.

So, 0825. So 25 minutes after that daily was signed off on Aircraft 13 for, I believe, full control unit one post FNC while operating APU downing discrepancy.
So you weren’t briefed on this MAF at all. Do you recall seeing it in the book?

I don’t.

No?

I recall—I do recall that that plane had that problem like the day prior. I thought that was something that was a fixed the day prior I guess. It is good to jog my memory to see these things actually because I thought like part was canned or like a short and a blade fold unit. So I think they ended up canning it or something from 10.

Exactly. So they ended up—they cut a can MAF on Aircraft 10 to can the central deice distributor, which can you—as AMO, which you're not allowed to central deice distributor and/or V-22 pilot?

Well, the knowledge of that would be like that's unfortunately how a blade fold control unit gets its power, you know, run the power to be able to fold everything up. It's kind of an unfortunate process that it has to go through that particular piece because if that piece fails then they have to switch out a lot of stuff.

So, in this case, it’s a down discrepancy because your shipboard ops?

Yeah.

So they're working. They basically can a CDD off of 10, swap both blade fold control units and then are
putting this thing on 13. Do you know how long it approximately takes to do that type of work?

Well, if you can get the spot, probably about--if I remember correctly, probably about a shift of work. The biggest thing is all of the adhesive or all of the bonded material because if that gets bonded real--because not only do they facet it in place, but there is always--sorry, the sealant.

The sealant.

Yeah, there's sealant in some areas as well and that's kind of the tricky part of them to get that off. So usually, it takes about a shift or so to work through it.

Okay. So, in this case, with a cannibalization, does that increase the time? Making it even more than a shift?

I guess that depends on the manpower available, too. You know if there's no other jobs that's going on at the same time because you usually try to have enough manpower to work two jobs simultaneously. And if they didn't have anything else going on--I think they had a couple of people dedicated to doing the jazz drop. If I remember correctly, I think they were able to work one small set of guys working on 13 on the 4th, and I think somebody else was going down to can it off 10 to the best of my knowledge. Because I do remember going up and seeing it like the day prior and seeing working on it the day prior or at least supervising the
work. I guess I would be making an assumption if I said it took more than a shift.

Okay.

Just because of all of those variables.

So say it was the same group of people and now you--same group canning the CDD off of 10 and putting it on 13.

Yeah, I guess that would probably eat up their entire day and it would probably get passed off to the next shift.

So looking at this completed MAF, can you tell me when they started the job?

It looks like they started it the day prior on 4th August.

So morning of the 4th and then completed once again at 0825 on the 5th.

Okay.

Basically, it's getting signed off. What's your understanding of dailies and turnarounds and if you're performing major maintenance?

Well, normally--in terms of how we try to get those things done?

[Affirmative response.]

I know that--I'm trying not to mix previous squadron SOPs. We try to have those things a couple hours prior to--or have an aircraft safe for flight at least a couple of
hours before launch time so that it's not right down to the wire.

: So would you consider--this CDD is that a major maintenance?

: Uh...

: Taking off the spinner dome and everything to do that.

: Well, I would consider it lengthy and somewhat involved.

: Okay. We also wanted to ask you a little bit about the FCF card performed on Aircraft 13 on the 16th of July.

: Okay. I would have been gone at this time. I would have been back in Okinawa I think. I left on the 13th of July and went back to Okinawa. I do remember getting a debrief about--they went dirt deck.

: [Affirmative response.]

: This aircraft I think went and did a dirt deck.

: Yeah.

: Yeah.

: So did you delegate--what's an FCF card?

: So that's just kind of like a--I guess at the discretion or confidence I guess.

: So basically AMO directed?

Yeah. I guess.
So, when you went on leave, did you delegate that to anybody?

No--that authority to do that?

Yeah.

I did not.

You did not. So in this case, we had a couple previous MAFs for high vibrations on Aircraft 13. And then, at some point, somebody gives it an F card where they perform a rotor check imbalance.

I don’t know if they circled the wrong thing. Adjustments for tip weight yet. Do you think they circled the wrong thing?

It's possible, unfortunately, we can't--we know that they made adjustments, but we don’t have the FCF card, quality assurance can't provide it to us. Right now, it looks like it's missing. Probably with the dirt det and everything. So we were just looking to see if you had any insight as to what was going on with this plane.

I really didn’t because that was something that was kind of--I wasn’t asked about it. I wasn’t really--no one talked to me about it while I was away to be honest with you. I just came back and I think I remember telling me that they had done that leather out there. I guess the blades had been painted. They had some erosion on them and they had been painted. And a couple of people had mentioned
that they thought the aircraft had kind of like an up and down
lope to it. Had been sitting on deck and they talked about
waiting to RTB it. But I guess it—I guess at some point—I
don’t remember the dates, but I remember they said they flew it
and they got high vibrations and then they looked at the
vibrations and they were—I guess, they had done like a one-time
inspection and—I apologize if this is not all right or
anything.

: This is the back-brief that you got?
: Yeah. So it had high vibes. They look at the
vibes. The vibes are kind of within. It wasn’t—I guess there
were other aircrafts out there that had more severe vibrations.
So I think they—I can't remember if they did a confidence
flight on it to just do like basically—to check to see if it
got high vibrations again. I guess the consensus was to put it
on someone to do a RTB on it just to go ahead and bring it back
with them, since it had been painted—since the blades had been
painted. Because I think a few of the blades were painted,
maybe like four or so.

: Okay. So when you looked at this MAF, any
concerns when you were [indiscernible - coughing] the plane?
: No, I guess I didn’t even notice that it was
circled "F" through there. No, because—they'd said, hey, we
did a rotor track balance alignment and tried to bring the
vibrations down a little bit.
When you're flying Aircraft 13 the day of the mishap, did you notice anything, was it—how was the vibration balance?

How was the vibrations balance?

Yeah.

No. I really didn’t. Again, like our discussion yesterday was mainly just kind of wake interaction with superstructure. I don’t—because sometimes there's like short conversations, like you'll hit a gust of wind or you'll be on takeoff and the plane will kind of shutter when you maybe hit some kind of crosswind or whatnot. A lot sometimes people comment on that and go, "Oh, what was that?" The planes kind of do that. I don’t remember any discussions like that that day about any shuddering other than our discussion about the wake interaction with superstructure.

Okay. Aircraft 13, so we didn’t really talk about it yesterday. At any point during the flight on the 5th prior to the mishap, did you get extended in terms of flight time based on the changes to the air plan and the 53s getting canceled?

I think they talked about extending us, but I think we were under the impression that we could get everything done kind of on a normal--I guess, the normal bounds.

Okay.
If I remember correctly, I think they moved jet launches. They kind of shifted those to kind of help accommodate. But that was at least what they were talking about doing when we were talking to [D](6).

Okay.

So I think he did try to work an air plan change to give us like maybe another half an hour. I do remember [D](6) querying [D](6) about it. He was like, "Do you think you can get it done in the amount of time on the air plan?" And I think [D](10USC §130)(6) took a couple of minutes to work through the problem. He thought he could, but he said, "Go ahead and ask for an air plan change just in case we run into any delays loading, so that way we're not causing any problems with the ship or anything like that. I think the plan was to basically to be able to do everything per timeline. But I think the shift right was there in case it was needed.

But did you anticipate--so you were scheduled that day for a 5.5. Did you anticipate logging any more than a 5.5?

I really didn’t. I didn’t anticipate it. I guess, I really didn’t think much about logging much more than--like I said, I thought, you know, "He's got a plan for us to be able to make. To kind of do everything per timeline."

And you anticipated most of that would be sitting on deck time and not flight time?
Yeah, a lot of loading time.

All right. When you were in maintenance control reading through the book, something that we noticed, for the 35 and 70 hour, can you tell us how many hours are remaining?

For the 35 hour, 2.7 for all of those; and 70 hour, 6.8.

Okay. So did you have any discussion as to--so you're logging in a 5.5, 2.7 remaining.

Yeah, because I guess we would be able to put another 3.5 hours on top of that.

So going in to the 10 percent?

Yeah.

So is that a conversation you had?

Actually, we didn’t have that conversation. I guess like if it usually adds up--I guess, that's kind of true. Normally they would tell you, "Hey, we're going to go into the negative on this particular inspection, but we're good to go by 10 percent. So don’t fly--you've got to land it by set time. You can't fly any more than this amount of time."

So I know you had been kind of off station and then scheduled to do night go's for a bit.

Yeah.

So with this 2.7 remaining, 6.8 on the 70 hour remaining, some parts of it anyway, was it part of a larger
maintenance plan that we need to fly 13 in order to put in these
inspections?

[63](10USC§130)(b6): Trying to think and remember because I know
that we had a movement of kind of phase stuff because 10 was an
aircraft that was supposed to be phased and then it went down
for like the blade so I think we overfly 11. And then 11 went
into phase, and I think the next one was supposed to be 9. Like
9 and 13 were the next ones. I don’t remember there being any
discussion like that.

Like you're saying that was a must fly today kind of
aircraft? Is that your question?

[63](10USC§130)(b6): Yeah, was the department just really wanting
to fly 13?

[63](10USC§130)(b6): You know I didn’t really talk to [REDACTED] that
morning at all and his is kind of more of the driver of those
things. Like, you know, we like to drive this aircraft this
much to kind of stay on phase or we'd like to hold off on this
aircraft because--he's more of the one who talks to me about
that. He wasn’t there at the time. So really it was just the
discussion of talking with [REDACTED].

[63](10USC§130)(b6): So not something you all discussed nor were
you under the impression that we really want to fly 13, to get
an inspection, so it's ready for CERTX, anything like that?

[63](10USC§130)(b6): I'm trying to remember because the last time I
would talked about that would have been like July.
Early July?

Early July would have been the last time we discussed that. I think we were talking about wanting to do another phase, but it was up in the air. If we were going to try to do 10, then maybe 9 would have been the next. Because I think 14 had like airframes changes.

Okay.

We wouldn’t be able to do that on the ship. We can't do that so we have to preserve 14 because there is no way--we couldn’t get a deviation. Because I guess we reached out to TICOM for deviation to see if we could not do the airframe change on 14 and just phase it and finish that once we got ashore. But I think they didn’t grant that. And that's kind of--so I came back a couple of days and I got thrown right onto nights and I guess, just kind of getting back and reading through 400 emails and trying to get back in the groove of things, I really don’t remember much discussion with about like, "Yeah, we want to try to do anything with 13."

So this wasn’t in your wheelhouse as well as the maintenance on 13 really wasn’t something that concerned you?

No, I feel awful to say that it really wasn’t.

Okay. We're just trying to figure whose--so you said would have been making those decisions and then?
Yeah, kind of driving--he's usually got a really steady plan on how to kind of preserve and/or fly something to try to get a couple of hours off of it. It's ready to go into phase and makes sense. You remember the ship is a little tricky with phase and whatnot especially when there is two extra Harriers and a lot of stuff down the hangar bay.

Do you recall on the mishap flight--you told us yesterday that you had talked with It sounds like posthumously he was promoted to I don’t we are waiting on the official word on that, but talking to do you recall him saying, "Hey, I've been to GREEN BAY. I've done expanded spots"?

Yes, absolutely. He said he'd done it a handful of times. I don’t think we actually--we didn’t put a number to it.

Okay.

But he said, "I've done Spot 2 a couple of times and I've been over to GREEN BAY a couple of times as well." I guess on some PMC runs and whatnot. And that would have to expanded spot because of how they're set up over there.

Do you recall any conversation with the crew chiefs, whether or not had been there?

I don’t. I don’t recall any conversation about having been before.
So you don’t recall them going up private and
talking about anything along those lines?

I think they had gone up private a couple of
times that day just discussing some stuff. But I don’t remember
it being about—no one said, "Hey, hasn’t been over here
before. We’re going to discuss some stuff real quick," or,
"We’re going to do a crew swap before we get there." So no one
had mentioned that. That they were going up private to talk
about it.

Okay. So not really sure about experience on GREEN BAY?

No. Because he’d done the calls for the LSD
that day as well and they were really good because it was
exactly what we were trying to achieve. But I think I had done
a lot of FCOPs with him as well back in Okinawa so I think he
exactly knew what sight picture and everything—what it is I
like to try to achieve when landing on an LSD.

Okay. Is there anything else on this you
wanted to add?

How about just the tool control
policy in general type stuff?

Looking at Aircraft 13, would you say,
certainly prior to you leaving in July, what is your
understanding of how work centers are doing tool control at the
beginning of shift, end of shift, ATAF?
Typical. You'll see guys watching over that. I think we have a lot fewer tools now than we did back home. I think we end up not--the way it was described to me is like we don’t have as many toolboxes now as we did, but I think we did--we just did a tool room audit.

Well, we did a self-assessment recently because we had set up a schedule to do a self-assessment in July, excuse me, self-assessment in June and I think we checked on self-assessments in July. And then, while I was gone, it was actually the timeframe of when we were supposed to start the special audits because we had already targeted like tool room and tool control to go ahead and do like a special audit internally. Just because it is always such a big hit. Especially when we move, you know, from shore to ship. We inventoried a lot of stuff ashore, and I think a couple of our quadcons end up being left behind. So we ended up getting some stuff a little bit later and whatnot. I gave them that stuff all inventoried. But as far as tool control within the shops, nothing outside of the appropriate before shift change CDI checking toolboxes.

Are those beginning of shift, end of shift day tasks, do they occur—say if they are in worked, are they coming back down to the work center and are they having them in the work center? Are they doing it up on the flight deck?
Flight line is the people that I usually see the most. They are doing theirs kind of inside of the garage there. They don’t do their ATADs out on the flight deck. I don’t think I’ve ever seen anybody do an ATAD on the flight deck. It is always kind of inside the skin of the ship I think.

Okay.

Yeah.

So AVI, you'd expect they are going down to their work center or at least in the garage and coming--

Yes.

You'd expect they'd come out of work on their job and ATAD the box?

Yes, that's my understanding of how everything works. Again, if someone was doing that and that wasn’t caught, then obviously that's a big thing I guess. But generally, I think the idea is not to do it on the flight deck because that potentially could create [indiscernible] in itself or something can get lost.

So it's your understanding that that's not correct procedure?

Absolutely.

Overall, the department is not doing it that way?

Correct. Because typically I walk the flight deck. I try to walk the flight deck a pretty chunk during the
day at multiple times. Probably not always during shift change, but I have bounced around quite a bit during ATAF and everything. It seems like everything is going according to plan. Trying to get clean, you know, check for chips, missing items, things are not marked properly. The typical ordeal.

Okay. So say for instance, Aircraft 10, the can MAF for the CDD in Aircraft 10, the can MAF for the CDD in Aircraft 13, what is your understanding for the tool control for that? So it's kind of basically the same job, right? CDD on, CDD off, probably the same tools required. Do they have to go and ATAF those tools in between doing those separate jobs?

Well, once something is--well, basically, I guess it's an ATAF after--because even if something is pulled off, if an item is pulled off and canning plugs are taped off and things are wired tied up and out of the way, then there is supposed to be like an ATAF and then, you know, and ATAF there and then part would be moved into the next job. And then basically, they would begin work taking off the other part. Unless, there are two teams working. That would be the only difference. Like two teams basically being assigned to help out. Like one is going to go ahead and work. Again, they should ATAF that completion and once everything has been wire tired and taped and all of that. And I guess whether or not they're going to put the, you know, that part wouldn't go back on 10 obviously because it's bad. But then the plane would be
takeoff and I guess that's all accounted for moving stuff. I think it has to be accounted for that way. It has to be annotated that you're accounting for wiring and things the way it is. Like if the part is missing, you still have to annotate like something about wiring and stuff. Sorry, I apologize. Too deep in the weeds here.

So as the AMO, you order a part to get canned. In this case, a CDD off of 10. That cannibalization MAF should that be getting--does that get signed off--does the can MAF get signed off or does it not get signed off until a replacement part comes in? How does that work?

You mean once the part is taken off?

So you order--cannibalize the CDD off of Aircraft 10 and put it on 13 or does or somebody. How does that--how should that look documentation wise? What's that process?

That's actually a really good question. I am not really sure about when it gets signed off to be honest with you. I know that--I did sit down with him at one point and, again, I had been down there for three months. I remember talking about--they always say. "We don't want to do a dirty can." Sometimes we get, you know, we've got an aircraft from the other squadron and we go back through all of their cannibalization MAFs and there is something called like a dirty cann where it's like--it's not done in the proper order.
Okay.

I'm sorry. But I don’t recall exactly when that MAF is signed off.

Or how it is supposed to look?

I apologize. I don’t quite have the interworking knowledge of when that MAF is exactly signed off.

So, in the case of Aircraft 13, that morning, looking at the work, it looks like that work gets signed off just prior to your launch on the CDD.

You said that it was signed off at 0825, right?

0825.

So we would have been--that would have been prior to us walking. Like I said, we walked about 40 minutes prior.

So it sounds like you'd be on the flight deck as that was getting signed off?

Yeah. Kind of simultaneously.

But from what you saw when you got on the flight deck, it was just having to do the DND?

No, because was up there, but there were two other Marines, too. I think they were doing a rep of some sort like three 5060. Yeah, because they spread the plane and they did a rep like three 5060. Because I actually--I think I remember asking--I think I asked them what they were doing.
And one of them was getting ready to hop out and I was like
"Hey, are you trying to get a repetition right now?" and they
were like, "Yes, sir, we are." And I was like, "Go ahead and
I'll do the walk around with So that's why we both
ended up doing the walk around.

So did you have any concerns as they did the
CDD on the nacelle, now that we're basically briefing you that
that work occurred that morning, any concerns about the daily
and it not being valid because maintenance was performed on the
plane?

I guess at the time I wasn’t thinking through
that.

You weren’t thinking--basically, you weren’t
necessarily briefed that work had just been completed?

Yeah. No, I was only briefed that they needed
to spread the plane around 5060 and enter those logs. That's
all I can remember being told.

The next question from me would be like along
the lines of, if in maintenance department somewhere, anywhere
someone was going to deviate from a standard procedure, what
would your expectation be of how that would be handled?

I don’t understand your question, sir.

Like a worker as in work on something. They
decide, "Hey, at this point, we can stop here," because in their
opinion it's not a safe for flight issue or anything along those
lines and, "We can continue this maintenance later." But they have not actually completed all of the steps associated with that maintenance action.

At that point, it's not impossible because it's happened. But in your mind, how would you explain your mind of what you think of--how that would be handled in terms of internal to the Maintenance Department? Who all would be involved in that decision-making process?

I can't say that I've actually ever seen that or been privy to that all because I think usually everything is complete by the time you're looking at the book.

I agree with you. That would far more--that would be in the 90--I figure in the high 90s percentage of.

I can't say that I've ever, you know, maybe someone is working like a paint MAF or something like that kind of thing, sir?

Well, in that case--

Or just maybe scrubbing a bust and rust or something like that?

I guess in my mind is just in the case if they--you've sort of answered it already. You've never seen that sort of thing.

Yes, sir.
So, in your mind, if somebody brought that kind of thing to your attention, you would probably remember it or know that you had--

Yes, sir.

Okay.

I've never seen that at all. Usually, you know maintenance means that this plane is going to be a flier today, stay off of it, don’t touch it. That's usually mentioned in maintenance meetings. But yes, sir, I've never seen anything like that before where maintenance is stopped on a plane and the it's released basically.

So basically, a plane gets either a daily turnaround and safed.

Yeah.

And your understanding is, if you want to fly that plane--

Yeah, even the situation like we're in right here. That's not very typical to have something so close where it is like, we just need to finish this one card. I mean, I guess, I may have seen that like two other times where they-- they really wanted to fly that plane and they were like, There's one card left on it. It's usually like a 5060, something that had to be done spread and it can be done kind of in the preflight. You know in the preflight time it can done.
Honestly, I've probably have seen that like two times. And probably once on this float and maybe once on our float from 15, I think, is the last time I think I remember ever actually experiencing that myself.

: Right. So, if work were performed say on the left nacelle, would you expect that at least those cards would be redone on the daily?

: If work was performed on the left nacelle, those cards would be redone on the daily. I guess. If I understand your question correctly.

: I mean, the plane captain does a daily. He is certifying, you know, he does his specific cards, like in this case--

: Yeah, like the spinner nose on, all good and someone goes and does a bladefold control unit or something like that afterwards. Like having to basically redo that area or redo that portion of the card to double check, yeah.

: Basically, invalidate the old daily on it, right, if they perform work on it?

: Yeah, I guess that would be the most prudent way to go about it.

: I'm done with maintenance questions. If we plan to move onto--to try to get some analysis of the flight.

: , any questions? Anything that comes up in your mind from the--
No, sir. That answered all of the questions.

Okay. Just one second. Let me kind of get robed through the metal part of the--

If a choice was made to say deviate from items or delay say--for instance, you're replacing a window on a front wind screen and you don’t necessarily have the HAZMAT yet or you're waiting on the HAZMAT, but you say, "We still want to fly it. We're going to use a different HAZMAT." What would you expect that process to be if you were going to get that approved and return that aircraft to a flying status?

Using a different HAZMAT? I guess--and you have to forgive me. I've only been down there for three months and I'm still learning a lot of stuff, but I haven't seen anything like that yet.

Okay.

But I mean, I would probably--my assumption would be I would probably start asking the experts themselves there. And be like, "if you want to use a different HAZMAT--I am pretty sure between getting airframes together, you know, someone like [ph] who is like all systems, getting maintenance control together and then probably Q/A together and then talk about, "Hey, can we actually deviate? Is there anything in any publication that says that we can utilize a different HAZMAT?" Then, I would expect them to do the research
on that and then I guess reach out to the appropriate entities, you know, whether that is like classed-S TICOM, those guys and get a response from it and say, "Yes, you're allowed to do that." If it doesn't say in the pubs already that there is an alternate.

Because I know—I guess I have learned that there are—sometimes a task will give you even down to the eight different ways you can do something and whatnot, in terms of like say when we had that—the blade punctured the tip cap of the vert stat when we were back home. There was eight different repairs for that with number eight being a temporary patch, and then seven through one were all like permanent fixes, different ways it could be done. So I guess I would expect them to look through the pubs and kind of give feedback on that, but I haven't really seen anything in terms of a big deviation without using the appropriate HAZMAT so far.

So you'd expect it to be high-level discussion, yourself at a minimum involved?

Right. Absolutely.

I have three questions that are maybe a little bit harder—

Yes, sir.

--but more in the sense of—the first is like they were doing work on the CDD. They did the bolts. They torqued them. They did safety wire. They safety wired. But
for your awareness, as far as we can tell, they skipped applying
sealant to the bolts on Aircraft 13 that day. One of the things
obviously is that we dig through this thing and ask kind of
roundabout questions and everything like that. We never got a
really good answer about why--like you just talked about, the
high-level discussion.

: Yes, sir.

: Do you have any understanding of why--like
maybe there wasn’t--I mean, this is--as the maintenance officer
you kind of know your departments and how they get along. How
do maintenance control and QA get along right now in 265?

: Pretty well.

: And I don’t mean that to be a loaded question.

: Yes, sir. I mean, staff NCOs know each other
pretty well. I mean, they all--they're all older gentleman that
are set in their ways. For the most part, they discuss things
in open forum pretty often.

: Okay.

: We discuss things all together on a regular
basis and I think a lot of that is teaching me. They do a lot
of that to help me learn.

: Okay.

: And then obviously being a part of the
decision making and whatnot. But I know QA and several of the
controllers have a really good relationship inside of work and outside of work. I think they work pretty well together.

And then the other is certain Marines spoke of a perceived pressure when we would kind of would ask them about, "Like what do you mean? When you say 'getting the job done'," and so we were a little bit trying to understand more of that. And again, this is kind of nebulous question in the sense was--over time of just listening to interviews, I develop my own interpretation, but I was wondering if there was anything like that that you ever felt yourself even or that there is such a thing?

I do, sir, but I try to kind of shield the guys from that because I get--we always kind of feel like--I guess look at the maintenance record there, the previous NCO had a really great maintenance record, you know, being number one V-22 ratings for a long time. And when I came down there, I asked a lot of questions as to why that was. Why are we so much, you know, because I feel like we're head and shoulders above other people. A spreadsheet was sent to me back in June, after having been on the job for about a month, and it explained all of the different percentages from the different MAGs and whatnot. And it was kind of interesting to see like how much--where our percentage is at compared to other people.

I know that, you know, we don't go out to the west coast and we don't bang it up in the dust and we're not swapping
blades out and engines out all the time. You know the
maintenance department seemed really smart about, "If we're
going to do something, we're not going down a plane in the
middle of the week when we can use it." Like for a window,
we'll just wait for the weekend and we'll CT over the weekend or
something like that. Just kind of figuring our good times to do
maintenance.

But I feel like there is kind of a little bit of
perceived pressure because when I talked to the chiefs and then
also in meetings. All I ask is to do it per the manual and to
do it right. That's all I ask. If we don't have up planes to
fly, we don't have up planes to fly. I mean, that's the nature
of it. But definitely please don't feel pressure to get
something done just because--I feel like there was a little bit
of a culture of, "I want to have--we want to have this really
high readiness," and that's not necessarily the case. If we've
got eight or seven up airplanes, heck, man, you're doing way
better than most of the fleet.

: Right.

: So I mean, the goal--obviously, you want to be
above 50 percent, but the goal is to try to have 75 percent. I
think that is the goal that everybody reaches for is 75 percent
from my understanding and what was kind of passed down.

But, yes, sir, that's a thing.
I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but you believe it is due to their previous--that their maintenance record that they had maintained for a long time.

Yes, sir. And not to try to speak ill of them or anything like that.

No, and believe me I don’t like to have to ask these questions.

Yes, sir.

But I was trying to understand.

But I think there probably is and I was trying to--if I can speak a little bit freely about it, but trying to kind of undo that a little and be like, "Guys, take the right amount of time that you need. It's on a ship. Things are harder now. We don’t want to try to rush through things. This is not the place to try to rush through things. Just do the job and do the job right." And obviously you can't--I don’t even know what do the job right is for every job myself. I'm still learning. But just to at least ask them to not feel overly pressured to have the best maintenance in the Marine Corps, the best maintenance readiness. It's okay that we have 60 percent or we have six up airplanes one day. Stuff happens. Stuff breaks. So it's okay. so I try to tell that to the chiefs and when I go talk to the shops as well to try to just--I guess to try to bat that perceived pressure a little bit away because I kind of felt like that did exist. I think the previous
maintenance officer is extremely--he's a very aggressive individual and always wanted things to be--he was striving for like 100 percent kind of deal and that's kind of a hard thing to do.

No, and I agree with you and I understand. I was just trying kind of feel of like--because usually when we ask someone like why they--they mention it, but like when you ask them why or what, they didn’t have a great answer for us.

For why they felt the pressure.

Yeah, for why. They just said that they felt it.

Yes, sir.

So it just kind of left me with that question because that was their thing.

Other than someone directly telling you like or standing over your shoulder or tapping their foot off to the side of the, you know, the job site, I really don’t know how they could have much pressure.

Yeah, no worries. That's the end of my questions that I have.

Yes, sir.

Has the department faced any personnel challenges recently?

A lot of really good experiences have left. There is--I won't call it like a mass exodus or anything but
there have been people who've PCS'd. You know, grade AVI Marine. Several other gents as well that have--a lot of the CDIs and some Qs and some very mature, experienced individuals that have moved on.

And that was kind of a talk going into this float was that, "We understand that we still have some good experience and that experience that we have on hand now will be leaving soon as well, so we'll face another small exodus here probably at the beginning of the year." But we understand, yeah, we have a lot of junior guys and that's just something to be aware of. And staff NCOs were in that discussion and kind of understood that and understood their trials and what they had to--what they needed to do to start growing the younger guys and making sure that they were kind of tucked under wing and getting good repetitions and watching people do stuff the right way.

And that stuff was a good--maybe not a big formal discussion, but kind of on an individual basis with each one of the chiefs kind of talking through because I kind of asked. What are our challenges? What do we expect a challenge in? You know a lot of it isn’t personal. I mean, airframes is a huge one. You know it's a massive turnover in qualifications and whatnot and there's about to be, again, another big outflux as well. So that was kind of a little bit of a fear for this deployment and then post and being on here.

: How about avionics in particular?
AVI, you know a couple of guys just gaining quals. Again, usually a smart group of guys, but yeah, still of course. Especially like with [REDACTED] leaving. That's a huge hit to the department itself because he was a flyer and a maintainer as well. Especially like with—like right now, we loss [REDACTED], who was really experienced in AVI and got a new one, a brand-new one, who was previously I think AVI at the—I think 262. And then—

He had been the AVI at 262?

No, sir. I apologize. I think it was a frog avionics guy at 262.

Once upon a time.

Once upon a time, yes.

Okay.

Yes, because he had just gotten to the ship I think basically when I had gotten back so I got to sit down and talk to him a few days—basically getting back in Brisbane.

So the AVIO changed out or at least a new one arrived while you were gone?

Yes, sir. We basically deployed without one.

Okay. But then the master sergeant and the gunnery sergeant are not transitioning guys as well. Just again, still getting spooled up and getting up to speed with everything. So not extremely experienced in the V-22.
Had you had any issues with any AVI CDIs in recent memory?

AVI CDIs, are you talking about not doing things the proper way?

Right. Having to get counseled by

Not that I am aware of, no. I remember making, made a couple. I don’t remember anybody getting revoked or anything.

Okay. specifically. What’s your opinion of him as a maintainer, as an AVI CDI?

I would say I’ve had fairly minimal interaction with him so far. So yeah, I would say that is probably still be like a non-observed territory.

Okay.

Probably less 90 days of real, true seeing him work, seeing guys like and and some of the other guys work. But I don’t think that I’ve really seen him, specifically.

No real formed opinion one way or the other?

No, no real formed opinion.

If we’re going to do--

The video, yes, sir.

Then let’s terminate the interview if that’s okay.
That's okay.

We're finished with all of the questions.

Sir, do you want to swear him to the statement?

All right. At this point, I know you can't stand up, but if you'll raise your right hand.

Yes, sir.

Do you swear or affirm that the statement you've provided is the truth to the best of your knowledge so help you God?

I do swear, yes, sir, so help me God.

Cool.

This interview is terminated. Time on deck is 1241.
CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPT

I, (b3)(10USC§130)(b6), do hereby certify that the foregoing was transcribed from a digital recording not made by me, but transcribed verbatim by me or under my supervision to the best of my ability, taken at the time and place set out in the record above.

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6)
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW OF

14 August 2017

Location: Not provided

INTERVIEWERS:

Transcript Prepared by:

CVV Transcripts
The date is 14 August 2017. The time on deck is 1458. We are here for the interview of , in the presence of the Investigating Officer, , and the Assistant Investigating Officer, .

Before we came on the record, I discussed again with voluntary nature of the interview process with the JAGMAN Investigation. I asked if he would like to review his privacy act statement or his line-of-duty determination warning sheet. He is fine from viewing it and filling it out yesterday, sir.

: All right.

First off, thanks for taking the time to talk to us yesterday and then, obviously, taking the time to talk to us today. I told you about how we went about the investigation yesterday. We've talked maintenance, we've talked safety; we're now pretty much ready to start talking to you, , the actual, no-kidding aircrew that were on the flight because you all have a perspective that I can't get from the passengers because they are not aircrew savvy and don't have the understanding you and have.

My understanding is that you are one of the more experienced members of the three aircrew. Does that sound about right?

: Yes, sir. We were the crew chiefs.

: Is a WTI?
No, sir.

Okay. So you are the most qualified aircrew personnel that was on there. So what we are going to talk about today for this part is really more about the mishap flight, what led up to it, day prior, overnight, then the actual mission itself, and then what, no kidding, in the mishap, and then in the recovery phase as best you can. Does that make sense?

Yes, sir.

Obviously having been around mishaps and some of this stuff myself, it could be hard for you to talk about. I got it. It's about what you are comfortable telling us so that we can have a better understanding, but what I am asking you to do is go back through an event that's not an event that everybody wants to always do. But I'm hoping to learn some stuff that will help us understand better so that it doesn't happen again if that makes sense. So while it's tough, there's also a reason why we do that. Does that make sense?

Yes, sir.

So if any of the questions touch too close to home, just let me know. I completely understand, all right?

Yes, sir.

So let me take you back. I'd like to start the day prior to the flight, so on August 4th. My understanding is that there was a flight that went out that night. I'm not sure, were you on the flight that went out the night prior?
I want to say no.

I think was maybe, ?

Yes, sir. So I had Corporals Course that night. So we finished up; I actually left early to maintain crew rest.

Yes. What time did you leave back, roughly?

I believe it was about 20. 2000? Absolutely, sir.

So these guys had been obviously scheduled for the night go, previously. I don't remember exactly why --I can't remember if they pulled him off the flight early or something, but was told by to be at brief according to the next day's schedule.

Okay.

But I think did the entire flight the whole entire night because he came in late that night. I don't remember if it set it on the schedule, but he was told by, the [ph]EDUM, the crew chief EDUM, to show up at man time. It had already been preplanned out with the pilots and everything.

So was supposed to go the brief and was just supposed to show up later?

Yes, sir.
So as a crew chief, WTI, and a SITAG, how many crew chiefs are required to land at the ship at night?

Two, sir.

How many did have that night?

He had two.

So if he landed at 2100, he probably had both. was probably aboard, right?

Yes, sir. One again, got home late because he lives right underneath me. lived a few racks down, so I didn't really see him come and go ever.

But you knew when comes in?

Yes, sir. Because had told me the night before, so the night they were flying, that was going to show up at man time. So he was just letting me know to not expect him at brief.

Okay. So basically, you and took the brief then?

Yes, sir.

What time did you get there for brief?

I was there approximately 10 and 15 minutes prior.

Okay. What about ?

He was there when I got there, so about 10-15 minutes prior.
He was there when you got there already?

Yes, sir.

Do you know what time on that morning--it's a 6 o'clock brief, but what time did you say you woke up that day?

Me, personally, I woke up at about 0530. It was a little bit later than I normally do for brief, so I was a little bit more rushed, but at the same time, it wasn't--I mean, we're on a boat, so----

You just throw your bag on, shave really quick, then head on up that way?

Yes, sir.

Had looked that morning more bright-eyed and bushytailed, a little tired?

He looked fine to me. He's always been kind of, like, more sluggish. To me, he's never been the guy that's running around.

Doesn't move fast.

Right. Not anything against him, that's just--

It's an observation.

Yes, sir.

No worries.

People say I'm bald. I know you don't believe that.

That's funny, sir.
: See what I'm saying? So it's just an observation.

: Sir, he seemed normal. He wasn't falling asleep during brief or anything. There's a couple of points throughout the brief where I was sitting him down and talking about tactical portions of the brief because we were doing inserts and stuff like that. Originally, we were scheduled to take a 240. No rounds or anything, but just as a training aide. I know he didn't do much tactical flights, like with the IBEs and HAs and everything, so I was talking him through all that. So I was actually trying to get him on the ramp so he can experience that a little bit more.

So we had already originally planned it that me and him were going to be on the ramp and was going to be in the tunnel for at least the first portion of the flight. So that is what we had said at brief. So we briefed everything that is normal, the weather and the mission.

: From your perspective, did you stay all the way through NATOPS brief and everything like that?

: Yes, sir.

: Nothing unusual in the weather brief you got, background brief, the NATOPS brief; all that was just regular as far as you were concerned. You didn't see anything odd or unusual?

: Yes, sir. Everything seemed normal.
So we finished all the METOC and TACROM and all those briefs. We conducted the actual mission brief, and then afterwards, me, and sat down in the back, and then the NATOPS brief, which I was going to debrief. Obviously, I was taking notes on everything and I had the Smart Pack and everything, so I was going to debrief when he showed up at man time as planned.

So we got done with the NATOPS brief and we were all getting our flight gear, but was going to grab the Pelican Case from patrol while I went to ordnance to pick up the 240. So I picked up the 240 and went to Flight E and picked up my Flight-E gear. Then I went back up to the flight line. That's the flight line shop and that's where I met back up with. At that point, we had walked out to the plane and that's when we saw--so during the debrief, the ODO passed that our plane, Aircraft 13, was still being worked on currently. At that exact time, it was being worked on by AVI for a blade full patrol unit, I think it was two.

: So that got mentioned in the ODO brief that there was something they were working on?

: Yes, sir.

: Before we get too much further, do you recall roughly about what time the brief down in the Ready Room broke up or what time it was done or how long it took?
I want to say maybe half hour, 45 minutes.

Okay.

So we got up to the plane. got in the plane and started setting up. Meanwhile, I walked over to (b3)(10USC§130)(b6), who was on, I believe it was NUTS, which was in front of us. I was just casually talking shit because we had just finished brief and AVI is still working on the plane. The spinner dome was still off, so casually talking to him.

After that, I walked back to the plane, set up the gun on the mount and everything, made sure everything was secured. I set up my gear, and that's when I was walking (b3)(10USC§130)(b6) through the general movement of the mount and everything so that he had a good feel for it because he's a basic qualified crew chief, so it's not like he gets gun time all the time. So I was just walking him through everything to loosen all the rust off.

Then we were slowly getting the plane ready. I was trying to casually talk about the mission, going through the Smart Pack info, going through the ASSET and ASLOT and everything, making sure he understood everything. What we were really doing is waiting for AVI to finish up with their stuff.

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6): Had your pilots come out to the aircraft or anything yet?

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6): They did, right about the time that AVI was putting on the last couple screws on the spinner dome.

I believe it as [b3](10USC§130)(b6) that showed up first because once again, we were talking shit about AVI taking forever to do whatever they do.

How many AVI guys do you think were out there working on it, roughly?

I would say five to six. [b3](10USC§130)(b6) was out there overseeing it with [b3](10USC§130)(b6) and maybe [b3](10USC§130)(b6) from maintenance control.

Basically just waiting for it to be done?

Yes, sir. Because the plane still needed to finish daily, getting the daily done, which I was the plane captain for that.

While you were out there, do you recall anyone talking about the work on a CDD, like sealant getting applied later, or anything along those line?

You said, "Sealing it?"

Sealant.

No. I didn't hear anything about the job. They just told me when they were done. So once they had told me that they were done, that's when I--Oh, so they also needed starts and hours for the APU. That's part of the daily. So [b3](10USC§130)(b6) was up there with me. We were talking casually about stuff, but that's when he reminded me I needed starts and hours. So while they were finishing up the spinner dome, I hopped up on the mid-wing, popped it open, got the starts and
hours, and gave it to [b3](10USC§130)(b6) because he said he was going
to go down to control and do it. Everything was starting to get
a little bit more rushed at this point.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Do you wear a watch or anything like that?
[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Yes, sir.
[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Did you ever look at your watch and go, "Hey,
it's about this time right now that they are finishing up," or
at any point did you look at your watch and go, "It's 8 or
whatever time," or did you just know you were getting closer to
takeoff time?
[b3](10USC§130)(b6): I just knew that we were getting closer to the
takeoff time. I don't really remember the times.
[b3](10USC§130)(b6): That's okay. Sometime people are like, "I
distinctly remember it was X time," or something like that.
[b3](10USC§130)(b6): I just remember it was getting closer and
closer to the man time. So right about the time that AVI was
finishing up, [b3](10USC§130)(b6) showed up to the plane, so I sat
back there and debriefed him on everything that was briefed in
ATOPS and what I expected of him because him and [b3](10USC§130)(b6)
without getting the NEOX, so I was talking to him about it. All
of the functions and everything of NEO and what to expect and
see and do and everything. At that point, somewhere right after
I finish up with them, that was when AVI had let off the plane
and unfolded it. That was my que to go inside really quick,
grab a harness and float coat and jump up and do the 50-60.
: Had you seen \textcolor{red}{(b)(6)} to this point yet out at the aircraft or anything?

: I believe I did. I'm pretty sure I did.

: Okay.

: But I wouldn't put my money on it to be honest, but pretty sure I did.

: Okay.

: \textcolor{red}{[b3](10USC§130)(b6)} was out there though.

: Okay.

: So in the time that it took for me to go inside, grab a harness, a float coat, and some coffee, by the time I got back out there, \textcolor{red}{[b3](10USC§130)(b6)} and \textcolor{red}{[b3](10USC§130)(b6)} had switched. So now \textcolor{red}{[b3](10USC§130)(b6)} was in the tunnel.

: Do you know why there was a switch other than a "Hey, I'd like to be here," or anything like that?

: I'm not really sure. Honestly, I thought it was because \textcolor{red}{[b3](10USC§130)(b6)} was doing the, "Hey, I'm a sergeant," and everybody wants to be on the ramp for whatever reason. Honestly, I didn't really care because I had planned on switching them anyway throughout the day.

: So that's just where you started at though?

: Yes, sir. Because I remember making a comment to \textcolor{red}{[b3](10USC§130)(b6)} about, "Are you going to let him do that to you," kind of thing?
He said he didn't care. He likes flying in the front anyway. But I told him I was going to switch him so he can get some gun time.

: Be back by it and get experience with it?

: Yes, sir.

: At this point, is on the aircraft?

: Yes, sir. So now pretty much everybody is out there, the aircraft is unfolded and spread?

: Yes, sir. So I had to play the 50-60, went back inside, signed it all off. I called control looking for the A-sheet. That's when they were like, "Hey, we're still working on the ABIMAF." Which, of course, looking back, probably should have waited a little bit longer, but , who was running the desk at the time.

: In flight line?

: Flight line, yes, sir.

He said he was going to handle it. At that point, all he had to do was sign off the A-sheet.

: Is it a contingency sign that he would--in terms of "Hey, you did it," how does he sign it off?

: So I actually sign off the daily. So I sign off all the open cards and all he had to do was sign off the A-sheet, which is just verifying the fuel and oxygen quantity.
Is that because you told him, "Hey, it's good" then, is that how that goes?

At that point, the control had already screened the actual daily and turn around, so it was good. He was just signing for the fuel.

Did he really know what the fuel state was in there, like, you told him?

I told him the fuel and oxygen.

So you told him, "Hey, it's good and the fuel and everything is good?"

Yes, sir, for the A-sheet. I personally signed off the daily and turnaround.

I just wanted to make sure because you see the name, you're like, who is this guy; because as far as I know, did parts of the DND, I know did parts of the DND, I know supposed to did it, and now I see . That makes sense, you know what I mean?

Yes, sir.

How did sign for the aircraft if they had been working on it and he's up at the aircraft, do you know how that got handled?

So that's what I was just thinking about a couple minutes ago. I guess I wasn't really thinking about it at the time, if there was an open map on it that was getting signed off, he would have had to have signed for it. I'm
actually not sure how he signed it. It would make sense that maybe
the controllers brought up the book for him because there was a
handful of them up there, but I didn't see the book up there at all.

You mentioned, any other controllers that were up there? Obviously,
is flying with you, so it's not him, but who might have been up there
did have the book or something?

You had up there. You also had . I'm pretty sure was up there, too.

But they couldn't possibly have had the completed daily, right, because you just sign for it downstairs?

Yes, sir.

Could they have printed it off on the flight deck and someone stuck it in there?

I don't think so.

Did you ever see him, like, was he in the seat at this point strapped in, , or did you ever see him unstrap and "Damn, I have to go downstairs?" Not that that ever happens to pilots because we never make mistakes like that, right? You know what I mean?

He might have done that. Because at this point, I was still getting undressed from the float coat and
harness and getting back into my Flight-E vest and everything. I guess that's bad SA on my part.

I: You can't watch everybody all the time. You are doing your part, but just trying to help us understand how that process all went down in a timeframe when there was a lot of things going on very close around that time.

O: Yes, sir. I do remember the time it took. Everything was going pretty quick because by the time I had my Flight-E gear on and everything, the engines were starting.

I: So, by that point, if he had gone, he was back in his seat and going through engine start and everything like that?

O: Yes, sir. I can't start the plan by himself, so it had to be.

O: Exactly, you can't trust lieutenants.

I: Yes, sir. So at that point, we did the normal aircraft startup; everything checked out.

I: Was the whole startup, would you say it was a not even like a hey, we had to tap the gauge kind of startup or everything was good first time, all ops check, flight control check, no issues?

I: Yes, sir. Everything was working fine. So and had got the plane up to Step 19. I wasn't part of that because that was in the process of me running around getting everything else situated from the daily.
But by the time I got back on the plane, there was nothing wrong with it.

The plane started up great. I did the [23:04] pound check; everything looked good for the pound check. At that point, we were supposed to take PAX. I forgot how many, but that was the first confusion of the day. There was confusion between the PAX going from the plane in front of us, which was Nuts, or 00, and then our plane. So at one point we had like 30-some people flying on our plane and obviously we don't carry that much, so if I remember right, we were delayed by maybe 15-20 minutes trying to figure that all out. Not to mention Combat Cargo kept trying to roll in and throw in mail with us because they thought we were going to Ashland, which we were, but not on that hit.

So I want to say it was between about 15-20 minutes of a delay because of the PAX issue we finally got everyone strapped in. We took off from the BHR and then we went and did the insert into----

Can I stop you right there before you get too much further than that. I just have a couple questions before we move into the insert.

In your time in the brief, in your time up on the aircraft, no issues? They weren't like barking at each other in the cockpit, good crew resource management, good use of checklist. Was there anything?
There was no friction at that point. I believe at one point there was a little friction point, but I believe that was mostly the next bounce to the beach.

That's okay. Just up to this point, the brief was fine? We will make our way through, but normal start up, good CRM, you know what I mean, everything was fine?

Yes, sir. The CRM was pretty strong.

So at this point, you all are ready to take off?

Yes, sir. We were ready to take off, so we took off. We inserted the PAX or troops.

Would you say from the ship to that first drop off that you all flew the route no problems, no issues, and you flew just as briefed through that portion of the flight?

Yes, sir.

Okay.

So we got into the zone. I forgot what it was called. It was like Raspberry Creek or something like that. So we inserted them. The first landing was probably about a Level 1, maybe 2 RDL, so not a big deal. It was a landing. It wasn't hard or anything, it was a normal landing. At that point, we dropped the----

It's up in the window in the front and you and \( b3 \)(10USC§130)(b6) back on the tail. Were you on the right side or the left side?
was on the left side of the aircraft and I was on the right side of the aircraft.

With the weapon mounted on the left side of the aircraft?

The weapon was mounted on the right side.

Okay. So if you are looking up the tunnel toward the cockpit, it's on the right or left?

Aircraft right. So 13, actually, it's such a new plane that we hadn't been able to install the new floor boards yet to install the gun mount on the left side. Because that was my question when I first walked up to the plane, "What is this?"

But they had been installed on the right side?

Yes, sir. So was positioned on the left side of the ramp and I was on the right. So for the insert, I was talking through the actual tactical scenario. We are in the HA now, waiting for the IP call, and at that point, dropped the ramp and deploy the weapon and everything. So I was just trying to warm him up to it because this guy's from HMX, so he's been in just as long as me. A little bit longer actually, but he's got HMX experience.

Not as much tactical side.

So I was trying to warm him up in that sense. So we landed and dropped off the troops that we had. And I believe it was on that same hit to Raspberry Creek, there was
two Australian guys that needed a ride back to the BHR, so we made the appropriate calls just double checking, making sure it was all good. So we took those guys.

: Did they get on your aircraft?

: Yes, sir.

: And was the one making those calls calling back or ?

: I believe he was talking back to the ship, but he let know, who was the section lead under instruction, I believe. Or maybe it was division lead. But anyways, we made a bunch of bounces back and forth that day, so it all kind of jumbled together, but I'm pretty sure the first one was when we took two Australian guys to the BHR.

So we took off from Raspberry Creek. There was no problem with power or anything getting out of the zone. It was maybe a 20 to 30-minute transit from Raspberry Creek to the BHR. So once we got on the BHR, we dropped off the Australian guys and that's where we picked up the PMC tasking, which was a bunch of mail.

: Do you recall on that landing back to BHR, any issues with that landing, like, good landing, bad landing, left, right, forward, anything unusual about it, and which of the pilots actually performed it?
I can't remember who performed it, but for that one, I believed we landed on Spot 4, which I'm pretty sure is a right-seat landing, right?

Spot 4 is an idle.

I can't remember exactly who.

I'm assuming that [b3](10USC§130)(b6) is in the right seat and [b3](10USC§130)(b6) obviously is left seat, right?

Yes, sir.

Yes, sir. For that landing it was all good.

So we dropped off the Australian guys, picked up the PMC tasking, which was a lot of mail. So at that point, [b3](10USC§130)(b6) got out to pee. Meanwhile, I went inside because we finally found cargo nets that we've had forever and never used. It was perfect timing because I finally wanted to use these things. I went inside to get coffee and the cargo net and use the bathroom.

As I came out and was coming up to the plane, [b3](10USC§130)(b6) was going inside, so we passed each other on the flight deck. He saw me with my coffee in one hand and so he was basically in front of me and we did the whole high-five thing. He walked inside and I walked to the plane at which point we were unloading the cargo, which was a bunch of bags of mail. I believe me and [b3](10USC§130)(b6) were setting up the cargo net and getting
the mail piled up so the net would cover it all. I believe we
were also taking fuel and was outside doing that.

So once we got everything situated and the cargo strapped down with the net, the fueling was complete, was back, and we pulled the pins.

: Do you recall what fuel load you had up to that point, what they said they filled to that time?
: I don't remember.
: Okay. Keep going.
: Pulled the pins and everything. That was the first friction point, at least for me for the flight because we had everything set up and then we had--I forgot how we decided it, but we decided it, but we were going to stow out of there, so just a normal stow.
: Was it due to weight? Was there a reason why you would stow as opposed to just doing a normal takeoff?
: I can't really remember, but I think it might have had to do with experience for

: Okay.

: So that was the first friction point really---

: Before you go too far on that, I have one more question. In the brief, earlier on, was it mentioned that after
our first, we'll do a stow, or is it just something that came up?

[redacted]: I don't remember it during the brief. If I remember right, it just came up.

[redacted]: Okay.

[redacted]: I think it's just because they were offering it and decided to take the stow. So at that point, we were all buttoned up in the back, so the ramp was closed and the cargo door was open just a crack. Then at that point, obviously me and [redacted] were in the back, so we couldn't see up front, so we were just listening. We had rolled down the missed cells and there was a problem. It wasn't a mechanical problem, but I think [redacted] had accidentally kicked off the brakes or something like that because we started rolling before the LSE had even cleared us to take off. So at that point we had started rolling and [redacted] just started yelling at him to throw on the breaks and everything. So we rolled maybe 2 to 3 feet forward before we got the breaks back on and everything was settled back out. At that point, the LSE had finished the interruption offer, "Clear to take off." Everything was fine from there.

Once we had gotten in transition, that was when [redacted] did his whole debrief of what he did wrong.

[redacted]: How would you characterize that, professional, was he yelling at him?
It was definitely professional, sir. Obviously, during the initial roll away—— I'm sure he probably said a few choice words. He was just screaming for breaks and everything. Once we got in the air, he was actually apologizing, like, "Hey man, sorry I yelled at you like that." Then it was just completely professional and no pressure in the cockpit. If anything, I felt like had eased up after the debrief point because was apologizing for yelling at him.

At that point we went over to Ashland. That landing was fine. When you landed on Ashland, do you recall who did that landing? Was it a left-seat landing, right-seat landing?

I believe it was a left-seat landing. At that point, we were on deck, we got chocks and chains. But that landing didn't strike you as anything was unusual? How would you characterize the approach? Everything was normal, came in low, came in high, came in right on profile, cross the deck low, medium, normal; anything you can tell me about that?

For that one, it was a pretty normal landing. I believe we had overshot it by a little bit and at that point, it was the HLA landing.
Do you know the Spot 2 there?

So instead of hitting the circle, we went a little past it.

Did you ever get the tram behind you and unload?

Yes, sir.

Nose wheel in the circle?

Yes, sir. It was all good.

Was there any discussion after landing? Anything about good job, do this different, do that something else?

Yes, sir. It was the typical debrief where it was like, "Hey, try not to drag it in" because we were kicking in salt water. So if anything, maybe we were a little bit too low. Not too low, but just a little bit lower than the typical, but everything was fine. I didn't feel uncomfortable. It was a pretty normal landing.

Okay.

While we were unloading the cargo and everything, he was debriefing. So at that point, we finished unloading all the cargo, which was the mail, and I'm pretty sure we didn't have any PAX from the Ashland. So we called up and ready and everything, so we broke chains and chocks, took off, did the power check. Everything felt fine.
We had all the power that we needed and we slid and went back to the BHR.

Had you all taken any gas while you are on Ashland at all or anything?

No, sir. So we slid and went back to the BHR. Once we got on the BHR, that was when we picked up the----

I apologize for interrupting, but I want to talk about the landings because to me, it all comes toward the last one. So for that landing and the approach around the boat, everything normal there? Do you remember if it was a left-seat or right-seat landing? Anything unusual about that one?

To the BHR?

Yes. On that return to BHR.

That one was a right-seat landing and if I remember right, that was the one where there was the whole Harrier fiasco going on.

After you landed there was the Harrier fiasco? Explain that part to us.

So while we were coming back to BHR, we were put in the overhead because it was plane. They were on Spot 7 I think, so right next to the port elevator, and there was a Harrier on the elevator. It was all chained down to the elevator and everything. I guess the tower and watchdog was trying to get them to taxi. They called the Tram Line taxi to the next spot so that they could take off not just
in a hover because they wanted them to clear the Harrier that
was on the port elevator.

So there was this huge argument because and his whole entire crew were like, "This is a
terrible idea," because the Nacelle was definitely going to run
into the Harrier. Tower and watchdog were like, "You're good,
there's plenty of people out there watching. This is all on the
radio and we're in the overhead just listening to this whole
thing go down.

I don't know if it's a funny joke, but we were up
there joking about it.

: According to this, depending on the timeframe,
 or , do you recall which, or
?

: For watchdog?

: Yes.

: It was . But I think was getting pressured from Tower. Everybody was
telling them they were okay to taxi forward and they were saying
no. I could see, like, we are going to hit this Harrier just
parked there. So there was a huge argument. I'd probably say a
10-minute long argument.

: So for you guys in the overhead, it's humorous
to listen to the argument for them I imagine, but it seems odd I
suppose? Had that happened before at all on this deployment? I
agree, I find it a little odd. Okay, fucking lower the
elevator.

[3,10USC§13006]: That's what we were trying to bring up, but
they didn't want to move the elevator. We also brought up the
fact that they could just take off like a helicopter, but Tower
was saying they don't want them to take off like a helicopter
because they were worried about damaging the Harrier.

[3,10USC§13006]: Which is vaguely funny, so I'm with you.

Although it sounds jacked, but you have to be in the Marine
Corps to see the humor in all of this.

[3,10USC§13006]: There's like four entities just arguing about
a plane moving. So the Harrier was on the elevator. and crew didn't want to taxi forward because they
believed that the Naselle was going to hit the Harrier. The
Tower wouldn't allow them to take off in a hover because they
thought it was going to damage the Harrier.

[3,10USC§13006]: So pardon the culture reference, but we've
achieved a Mexican standoff on Spot 7 with a Harrier on the port
elevator.

[3,10USC§13006]: Right. It was a pretty legit, heated argument
over the radio, so we were in the overhead just listening to
this all go down. Eventually they just told them to sit there
and wait and that they were going to recover us because at that
point we were on the nightingale. So at that point they told
them to sit there and hold.
When the nightingale call had been called?

I believe so.

Can I ask you one more question before we move on too far from this part where they were still arguing. Was in that conversation offering suggestions or was he quiet? Who, no kidding, was----

It was as the watchdog, whoever who was in the Tower.

Air boss or mini, whoever was on at that time?

Yeah. Then was throwing in some small suggestions here and there, but for the most part he was just trying to stay out of it because it was also check for review or something like that.

So we ended up coming in, and we landed on Spot 6 I think, like dead center in the island. So had taken that one.

Same thing, no issues with that landing?

So this one, it wasn't like an issue, but this is why I half-way thought it was humorous, but as we were coming in, we totally overflew the Harrier, too, so everybody was talking about that.

I find it odd that they would put you to 6 after all that conversation on all the other stuff.

By the time we hit the deck, so it was a firm, typical boat landing, but at that point, our tail was cocked
more to the right. But it was during that landing that had started talking how there may be a weird vibration in the plane, but it was nothing that we felt in the back. It was just something that he had felt, so I figured it was one of those things that only a pilot could feel in the controls. He said it wasn't a big deal and wasn't really affecting him, but it was just an odd vibration.

: It was something he noticed?
: Yes, sir.

I specifically remember it because I had done the daily. Actually, any plane that I had done a daily on I was flying and someone mentions something, I'm naturally running through my head if I missed anything.

: I wonder what that is, yeah.
: Do you recall off hand, AVSS, was that working that flight?
: I believe they had cycled it a couple times. We had brought that up as a CRM factor, should we possibly talk to somebody about this, is it that big of a deal? He said it wasn't a big deal and it was a minor issue.

: To the best of your knowledge, can you recall exactly what he said it was? Did he explain what he felt or what it was doing?
If I remember right, he brought it up asking if he had—I don't remember the exact words or anything.

To the best of your recollection on what he said.

He said something like, "It felt a little weird there for a second. Just a little vibration," and that's basically what it was.

That's okay. Not being a V-22 guy, it helps me talk through things that I can get a better feel for it if that makes sense. That's why I ask.

He said vibration, not like it is wake interference with the superstructure there on 6. He specifically said vibration to the best of your recollection?

Yes, sir. He specifically said the vibration.

So then the conversation then between him and after that, anything come out of that?

There were small comments here and there, remove transition to airplane mode, it was bumpy, or I thought we just did an RTB on this or something like that. It was just stuff like that. It was such a small comment. It wasn't a big deal, but it was the fact that I had done the daily was the only reason I remember it.

Yeah. Why you say that makes perfect sense.
So during that hit, we picked up the nightingale package, I believe it was a bunch of Corpsmen or something like that. We grabbed those guys, I don't remember taking fuel for that one, so we took off from BHR in helicopter mode and hovered for takeoff. We flew back to Raspberry Creek.

During the takeoff, nobody said anything unusual when you transitioned to airplane mode? No issues there or during that flight all the way over there after the vibration comment from earlier?

Yes, sir. Everything was fine. We got back into Raspberry Creek and we landed. That was another Level 2 RBL; the worst really.

Do you recall who did that landing?

I do not.

Okay.

So at that point, we landed. We dropped off those guys and I believe that was the one that we sat on deck for probably 20-30 minutes or something like that.

Waiting for other aircraft or something to come?

Yes, sir. This is where it starts to get a little jumbled.

No worries.

I believe this is the one where it's us on deck, then there was another plane on deck. Whatever plane
1. was in the plane that was in the air still.

2. bird?

3. So they were trying to find a spot to land in the area that we were landing at, so while they were flying in the overhead, they decided that there was a clear spot to land behind us, so they briefed everyone on the flight because aircraft 00 was off to our right, almost perpendicular.

4. Straight out from you?

5. Yes, sir. And they briefed everybody, "Hey, this is where we are going to go." Obviously, we had been doing RVLs, so they had passed that, "Hey, if we get in the cloud and you guys see something, let us know."

6. So at that point, told them we'd let you know. So at this point, me and were standing on the ground outside of the plane, and the ramp was down behind the plane, so we knew they were coming down behind us.

7. This might sound like an odd question, but did you all unhook your gunner belt so you can get out and go over there?

8. Yes, sir. The gunner belts were off because at this point we are also loading the patients, I think, that had injuries and stuff. So we knew that they were coming, so I was keeping my eye on him.
At that point, was like, "Obviously we can't see anything up front, so we are just going to stay quiet and are not going to say anything until they get on deck." So all that we were doing was waiting on us.

: Listening to you guys, right?

: Right. So if we were to tell them to waive off, he would say it over the radio immediately. So we sat there quietly. and I were sitting there watching them come in and it looks like a pretty steep approach and, obviously, out of nowhere, all that dust came up, and they were in a Level 5 RVL at maybe 40-50 feet. They still had some speed on them and me and looked at each other and were like, "20 bucks says they won't make it kind of thing."

Meanwhile, all the patients and there's a combat camera chick running around right in our vicinity because we had already told them the plane was coming in behind us, so stay clear of that. Again, the dust cloud was coming, you could see the layer coming, and then it started getting pretty close and out of nowhere we saw the nose of the plane poking out of the cloud and the glass head was way off, like, they were going to either land on us or over us. So at that point we waved off and called "Wave off" over the radio, so they waved off.

Talking to later on it turned out they didn't see us until they were in the wave off and they were
like, "Oh, that could have been bad." At that point they had circled back around looking for another landing point in our LZ. They had picked a spot in front of 00, so to our 1 or 2 o'clock. They came back around and landed there all well and fine. Everything was fine from there. But while they were landing behind us, we were at 75 Naselle, the ECLs pulled back. So after they landed, we finished loading up our patients. So they were all numbered at that point. All the planes were full of the patients or the nightingale stuff. So we took off from Raspberry Creek. Once again, the power was good. We had enough power to get out.

: Do you recall the fuel load or anything? I know you all are in the back, do you ever hear or them every talking about how much fuel is left or anything like that at that point, a status check?

: Once again, we had been at Raspberry Creek a handful of times a day, but I remember at one point when we were leaving Raspberry Creek we were at 4 or 5, so 4,500. I'm not sure if it was that time or not. But we took off from Raspberry Creek, transitioned, and we did the 20 to 30-minute flight back to the BHR. We landed in Spot 6, right in front of the island.

: Was the Harrier still there and everything like that?

: Yes, sir.
Before you go too much further, ask that same thing on that approach. Anything unusual in that transition from helicopter after takeoff there to airplane or anything in the back or in the transitioning back at the BHR landing?

No, sir. Everything was fine at that point. The landing was fine. Typical boat landing.

Do you recall left-seat, right-seat, anything unusual or different, or who did it?

I believe that was also a left-seat landing, so [10USC§130](b6)

Okay.

We landed and dropped those guys off. I went inside while [10USC§130](b6) took fuel.

Did you have a discussion about how much fuel you were going to take based off of where you thought you were going or anything like that? Did you hear the pilots discussing it?

Yes, sir. I believe at that point we had also taken 10 or 10.5 because we were going to go back to Raspberry Creek and then come back to the BHR. The Raspberry Creek, we were expecting cargo and PAX, so we weren't trying to bag it out or anything.

So at that point I walked inside, went to the bathroom, got more coffee; then during that run, that's when I brought the cargo net in from earlier because I was already
headed inside. I came back to the plane, finished helping fuel because I took over and went inside to go to the bathroom and get water, stuff like that. I think it was during that point that went inside to get a water. So I finished up the fueling. I believe we grabbed two guys, I think, that were examiners or referees or whatever. We were taking them back to Raspberry Creek.

Once again, everything was fine. Took off with the two PAX. Took off and took them to Raspberry Creek.

Pardon me for asking the same thing: No problems with transitions or anything like that mentioned or no comments?

No, sir. It was all smooth and everything was fine.

We went to Raspberry Creek. That was a Level 2, maybe 3 RVL. Because we had been using the same landing point all day. So we dropped off the two guys, one of which had taken off with a cranial, so I ran after him. That's how I knew they were like the surveyors or whatever because by the time I got to him, he already had a checklist out and was watching everything go down.

So at that point, we sat on deck for a little while and that's when we started loading up all the gear. So it was like a generator, a water purification device or something like
that. It was quite a bit of gear they had driven over with a 7 ton. So they filled up the plane with all their stuff, but we had enough seats for, I believe, it was 11 people after we were done.

After we got everything on there, we secured it and cargo strapped it all down, so it was all good. Then we loaded up the PAX, so this is the flight we had the MEU CO on board. So at that point, everybody is strapped in, the LPUs were on, cranials were on.

: So the MEU CO flew on your aircraft?
: Yes, sir. So he was sitting in the first seat on the left. We waited for a little bit longer for everybody else to load up their planes and that's when we took off. This is right where the biggest friction point was for the whole mission because by the time we called Tower to let them know we were coming into land, they were like, "What are you talking about?" Because that's when there was a huge mix-up between our timeline and the deck cycle.

: With the air boss and the air department on the ship pad?
: Right. So at that point, they were tracking two totally different things. So they ended up putting us in the overhead. was trying to work it through to push it where we need to get on deck, but the boat was all pissed off because they weren't tracking us and were planning on
launching jets. You know how that is on a boat. So we were in
the overhead, but [b3](10USC§130)(b6) was trying to convince them
to let us land to drop off our stuff. It wasn't really working
that well. [b3](10USC§130)(b6) was inputting some ideas to [b3](10USC§130)(b6).

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Nobody on the ship knew that the MEU CO was
actually on your aircraft or anything like that?

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): So at this point because I'm pretty sure the
MEU CO is a pilot or something or at least he knows what's going
typically on the plane.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Was he on an ICS cranial or something?

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): No. At least I didn't know and remember from
the brief that he was going to be on the plane, otherwise I
obviously would have brought one. So he picked up on the fact
that we were in a holding pattern because we had gained altitude
and slowed down.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Were you all in the overhead at that point?

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Yes, sir. So at that point, he looked at me
and I think at that point, me and [b3](10USC§130)(b6) were like, "Oh
crap, here we do." So at that point, typically the first thing
you do in holding his pull out the snacks, so we are sitting
there eating. It was pretty obvious that we were in a holding
pattern. So the MEU CO looked at us and obviously he had things
to do, so he's doing hand and arm signals for "holding." We are
like, yeah.
He's like, "For jets?"
We're like, "Yeah."

After maybe 5 or 10 minutes of this arguing back and forth with the Tower and trying to get a deck space, I was like, "Hey, sir, we have the MEU CO back here, obviously this guy has some power."

Long story short, I ended up having to take off my helmet and give it to him so that he could talk to and coach him or whatever he did. At that point, obviously I couldn't hear. I was on ICS. That lasted for about 5 minutes. I did have my CEPs in, so I did have my ear protection.

: It's okay. Yeah.
: So at that point, the MEU CO had my helmet on and was talking to . Obviously, for those 5 minutes, I had no idea what was going on with the plane, but it felt fine. So after their conversation, magically I got my helmet back and we were coming in to land, so we got permission to land on the boat.

I was hooked back up and secured and everything, so everything was back to normal. Then I asked for a quick down and dirty of what just happened.

: Was this before you landed?
: Yes, sir. He told me the MEU CO said to call the LFOC and get ahold of the stuff. At that point, everything had worked out, so we came in.
I believe we landed Spot 5 right in front of the door because we had a lot of heavy gear. During that landing, I believe it was a right-seat landing because I had once again talked about the weird vibration that he felt.

: After landing?
: Yes, sir.
: Or during the approach?
: It wasn't during the approach. He said it was in the hover during the lower altitude, so 10 feet and lower. But again, it was such a casual thing that he was like, "Hey, it felt a little weird." I think we were all just selling it off as it just needs an RTB, rotator balance.

: No worries. Do you recall if they are checking avionics, was there anything different that they were talking about or doing at that point?
: No, they were doing the typical stat checks and everything.
: Okay. But nothing is showing up as being odd or out of place or out of the ordinary?
: No, sir.
: Okay.
: Actually, if I can rewind back to when we were picking up the MEU CO at Raspberry Creek. While we were on deck waiting, we were unloading everything, we had a wing fire fail.

: You had a wing fire protection fail?
Yes, sir. So we had to cycle all the circuit breakers and everything.

Wing fire protection fail, is that specific to a certain wing?

It's like the whole system.

It's actually the mid-wing, sir.

Okay.

So that posted during that and cleared after we troubleshooted it and cycled everything.

Not common, but also usually clears with normal troubleshooting steps.

So that happened before. Through the whole, entire flight, nothing unusual happened. So we are at the BHR and everything was fine. At that point, we unloaded all the PAX and everything. We also unloaded all of the gear and everything. It was like a handful of the 5-gallon water jugs and everything.

You mentioned you took 10 or 10.5 gas the last time then gone in and came back. Did you all take gas or anything this time before you launched again?

I can't remember, sir.

Okay.

We unloaded. During the whole getting everybody on the flight deck jet launch fiasco, the MEU CO got on ICS, that was when they said to call back all the 53s. So
they cancelled their tasking and were like, we need you guys back on the BHR to shut down, that way we can stuff you for the jet launch. Since we can go quite a bit faster than they can, they figured we could just take care of their tasking.

Then we realized that we weren't going to be able to come back at, I believe 1630 was our original landing time, so that's when we got the hour extension up to the crew day. I believe it was a 1730 man time.

A little bit prior to sunset landing? You had that discussion going on?

Yes, sir.

So crew days, do you remember who worked that? Was it? Was it?

I believe it was, but I'm not 100 percent positive on that.

But there was an extension that was done about 1730?

Yes, sir. That was so we could take that 53 tasking, which was taking PAX from Raspberry Creek to the Green Bay.

Just to clarify, in your earlier briefs in the daytime and morning, you all had planned to go to basically Raspberry Creek, obviously, Ashland at some point for PMC, but this Green Bay part was a new thing that you all hadn't planned for that day?
Yes, sir.

So you all hadn't talking about landing at Green Bay?

Obviously, when it came up, we talked about it. We talked about it because Green Bay has the extended spots, that was when said, "Hey, can you go on private?" So we went on private. We were on private ICS in the back so the pilots couldn't hear it, but between me, him, and, we all talked to each other. That's when he told me, "I've never landed on the Green Bay."

That's when we talked about LZ Swan in Okinawa, that's the FCLP pad for that deck, minus the extended spots. So I was like, "Hey, it's just like that." It depends on what spot we are going to use and I talked him through that. He had a firm understanding of the normal spots on the Green Bay because that's how everybody gets their FCLPs in Okinawa since the LHG FCLP pads fall.

Yeah. The only reason I say that is because it wasn't a brief during the morning where you had looked at Green Bay and had a conversation about Green Bay or anything up until this point in the flight later in the afternoon?

Not that I remember.

Do you recall saying anything about his experience with Green Bay, had he been there?
So he had also not been there, which is why he was talking him along with everything.

Okay.

So with, I talked about it and went through all the calls and procedures and everything. I had him repeat it all back to me because some people just say, "Yes, yes, yes," and at the end of the day they actually don't.

That's at least one of my techniques when I teach people is to have them repeat it back to make sure they have an understanding.

He repeated it all back like I had told him, so I felt he had a firm understanding of what was going to happen. Because at that point, obviously, we didn't know which spot we were taking, but that was if we had an extended spot. I had also offered to take the front to show him and do the typical demonstration thing like, "Hey, this is what it should look like."

He said he got it and had also said, "Hey, you want to switch," because we were also doing another tactical insert into Raspberry Creek, which was going to theoretically able to get on the gun and do his familiarization.

Tell you what, it's been a while. Did you want to take a break for a couple minutes? Use the restroom, grab a cup of coffee, anything like that? Definitely not a
trick question. You've got pretty far and were about to get to
a point where there is a lot of stuff.

We can take a break if you want, sir.

The time on deck is 1615.

[Recess.]

The time on deck is 1621. All
members who were present prior to the breaker again present.

All right. So at this point, you all are
ready to take off from the Bonhomme Richard?

Yes, sir. At this point, me and
had gone over, on private ICS, talked about all the calls
expected and what to look out for, what's going to happen when
we land at the Green Bay if we were going to use the extended
spot just because he had never done an extended spot before.

So we took off, everything was normal, felt good, and
everything was smooth. We went into Raspberry Creek, so it's
still us three aircraft, so we were the Dash 2 flight. So
everybody had taken up their normal landing point. As we were
coming in--actually, I think it was on deck we were talking to
the Marines on deck and they asked us, "Hey, who do you want in
which plane?"

We were like, "I don't care, just get in one because
we are all going to the same place." Obviously, it was worded
more professionally, but they were like, "Okay, cool."
Well, you had to sort it out since it was planned for 53s, so they were trying to figure out who was supposed to be on what airplane now, because V-22s are taking everybody back to Green Bay.

Yes, sir. So they had already worked that out before we got there because they got passed that it was going to be Ospreys instead of 53s. So they broke them up into 3 groups and the guy sent one group to each plane and that was going to be your group. So that was that.

was still in the tunnel, was on the ramp, and I was on the ramp. Same places, was still on the aircraft-left and I was on aircraft-right. Once again, on deck right before we started loading everybody up, had to ask if he wanted to switch. Once again, was adamant about staying up there. So wherever you feel comfortable, go with it.

To get the X for Neo, which we were doing that day, didn't require you to be on the ramp or to gun or anything.

It was kind of a personal preference type thing?

Yes, sir. So with saying that, I wasn't going to push it because it had already been a long day. If everybody was comfortable with where they were at, that was fine.
So at that point we start loading up the PAX. As they were loading up, that was when we noticed they had their riot gear, so they had the riot shields, a couple of them had shotguns along with their M-16s or M-4s. I believe they also had their LV pack. So they all loaded up. It was 21 PAX per plane because we were still planning on coming back, if I remember right, after the hit at Green Bay.

Back to BHR?

I believe we were going back to Raspberry Creek to pick up the last couple guys if I remember right.

The PAX, when they came, did they already have their LPUs on and everything like that?

No, sir. At that point, we had left the LPUs in their seats. I've found that it's quicker for the PAX onload portion to get them all on the plane and strapped in, and the LPUs on.

Did they get any sort of egress brief from the crew?

I'm going to say no, sir.

So they come on, the LPUs are in the seats, they put them on. Who helps them put it on or checks them? Do they just do it themselves? How does it go?

was in charge of the first 8 Marines on the front of the plane, and me and were checking the guys in the back. We were looking for
seatbelts to be fastened, so waistbands and shoulder straps, along with LPUs being on and done up properly, so around the waste, zipped up.

We had been sitting on deck for about 15-20 minutes, so Aircraft 00, I believe that was the plane, they had cargo or something that was bulky and weird because we were already up and ready waiting on them and so was our Dash Last, which was the plane.

We were sitting there trying to figure out how long it was going to take for Aircraft 00 to be ready. So we were completely up and ready so all we had to do was go. There was still 10-15 people still lined up behind Aircraft 00 while they were loading it.

After waiting, I believe we were in a rush because we still had to come back. I don't remember where the idea came from, but had agreed to leave them in the zone.

: Have 2 and 3 head on back to Green Bay?

: Yes. That way we can have this rotation thing going. So they agreed. said, "I think we are going to stay."

was jokingly like, "has section lead," or something like that. He actually started to believe it because he started mumbling. I guess you have to know him, but he was put on the spot and started, kind of, helmet firing. On our side, was laughing and
saying, "How much you want to bet this guy is freaking out right now?" Long story short, [b3](10USC§130)(b6) was like, "Just kidding, man. I got it."

[b3](10USC§130)(b6) was like, "Okay, you got it."

So it was a positive takeover and [b3](10USC§130)(b6) said, "I've got lead." We made the appropriate radio calls and took off, everything was fine.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): No issues with transition on this final takeoff toward the Green Bay or anything?

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Yes, sir.

We had taken off. Power was good. There was no lag or anything.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): No issues that anybody is talking about, so it's all just a regular flight?

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Yes, sir.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Do you recall at any point a call for fuel check before we go back?

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): I know [b3](10USC§130)(b6) had done a stat check. I don't remember how much the fuel was, but I want to say it was definitely under 7,000 pounds.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): So [b3](10USC§130)(b6) had done a stat check and it was under 7,000 pounds?

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Yes, sir.

Once again, it was about a 20 to 30-minute flight to the Green Bay.
My understanding from the briefs that you all were transiting about 2,000 feet or 3,000 feet, somewhere around there? Do you recall what altitude you were transiting back and forth at?

I don't remember the exact altitude, sir.

Could you estimated as high, low?

I want to say it was between 2,000 and 3,000.

Okay. Do you remember roughly what airspeed you were flying, typically, for the day? Was there a briefed air speed for en route?

If I remember, I think it was like 220 or 240, typical speed.

Basically no problem taking off, no problem transitioning, you are flying roughly 2,000 to 3,000 feet between 220 to 240.

MGTs yellow, green?

No, we didn't have a problem with MGTs that I remember. I can't remember at what point throughout the flight it was, but we did have an RPM low at one point. It was in airplane mode, but it had been corrected because I guess had pulled back power to fast or something like that.

You got a beep?

It was a beep issue.
It wasn't an aircraft issue, it was a pilot thing?

It was pilot induced at that point. Yes, sir.

I want to say that was some point during the middle of the flight.

And you called that, "RPM low in airplane mode."

So at this point, you all are the section lead, you are flying back, there have been no troubles. So you are getting closer to Green Bay. Can you describe, starting with the last 5 minutes of flight, kind of how the sequencing went in those few or last minutes before the mishap occurred?

Everything, kind of seemed wrong. We had already briefed our Dash 2 that we were going to go in first, drop the PAX while they were in the overhead. At that point, it's like wild. If I remember right, we were talking to the Green Bay. It's not like we were stressed out and rushing or anything because I'm pretty sure it was on that hit was when was talking to Tower and in the background, there was some music, and he commented, "What are you guys listening to?" It was like Kesha or whatever.

The Green Bay was listening to Kesha?

I'm pretty sure it was Green Bay.

Obviously it wasn't you guys.
Right. So it was either Green Bay or the Ashland, but I'm more leaning towards the Green Bay. At that point, it was just like background music.

So he was just making polite conversation?

Yes, sir.

And who doesn't like Kesha, right?

Right. So there was like no stress about going in there. Nobody was rushing or anything. It was obviously to the point where was casually joking with the guy on the radio.

So we had gone in; we had converted. Once again, everything felt fine. Once we had converted to airplane mode, we did all the proper landing checks; gears down, parking break was on and everything.

At that time when you all do landing checks, do you all lower the ramp to level or does that happen later?

We do it once the gear comes down because at that point, it gives us the hydraulic power to be able to drop it.

So after the gear comes down, you can lower the ramp to level. Is that the standard kind of thing?

Two level, so the ramp is level. He was doing all their appropriate calls. Once again, it was who was at the controls.
So it was called out as a left-seat landing to the Green Bay at some point, so they knew on the ship it was a left-seat landing?

Yes, sir.

Green Bay called back?

They had done all their appropriate calls. The wind calls were good. They had already cleared Charlie Spot 5, which is the extended spot.

So clear to land Charlie Spot 5?

Yes, sir.

Before you go on that part, so they clear to land Charlie Spot 5 acknowledging left seat when they called back?

What do you mean, sir.

Usually they will say, left-seat clear.

Clear to land left seat.

Charlie Spot 5, left seat; did you hear that?

Yes, sir.

Okay.

At that point, I was like, "Hey, [redacted], you remember how we all do this?"

He's like, "Yeah, I got it."

I was like, "Cool."

Up to this, had gotten any instruction from?

FOUO
Yes, sir.

It sounded like he knew what was going on?

Yes, sir. Everything seemed like it was going well. There were no vibrations or anything that I felt on the ramp.

So at this point, we've turned final, we're all set and clear to land Charlie Spot 5. is in the front-right window?

Right, so the crew hook.

As you are looking forward into the aircraft, you are on the right side of the ramp?

Yes, sir.

And is on the left side of the ramp looking forward?

Yes, sir.

How are you guys arranged now for this landing in the back? I know he's in the window because I can see him coming in and out of the window periodically on the landing, where are you guys and how are you?

So, he had his hand on the ledge of the empennage, so he was in a squat position leaning to see down the left side of the aircraft.

I was on the right side, which had the gun mount, so I was just kind of casually holding onto the gun and looking down
the right side. Obviously, if [b3](10USC§130)(b6) wasn't there, I would have
been looking down the left side.

: Just so you had coverage on both?
: Right. But since he was already there, he had
the left side. So basically, I was just covering the right side
so when we did, theoretically, slide over the deck, I was going
to back up [b3](10USC§130)(b6) on the scuppered. So that's what I
was expecting.

That's when we came in. On the initial approach, it
did feel slow because we were kicking up a lot of salt spray and
everything because I remember looking at all the water running
down the side of the plane.

: It looked like there was a lot on the front
canopy as well, did any of the pilots ever say anything or
complain about it?
: No.
: Okay.
: I just remember the salt spray was coming down
the side of the tail. I was thinking it was going to be
interesting to clean and see someone get back obviously because
of direct salt water on the plane.

I was just looking at the water basically, so there's
nothing really for me to see at that point. So right about that
point, I was just kind of casually looking over to the left side
of the plane and seeing how we were on the deck, but [b3](10USC§130)(b6)
still had the actual left side where he's looking down
the left side of the plane. Everything felt fine. From the
water, it felt like the appropriate altitude for the Green Bay.
The speed, once again, was slow, slower than normal. But I've
done Green Bay or Ashland landings that slow before, so it's not
something uncomfortable at that point.

At that point, was making the appropriate
calls. had said, "Hey, little right of lineup,
come left for lineup."

was like, "Yeah, yeah, good correction
call."

The next call after that was saying,
"Nose over deck edge" call, and that was the last clear
transmission for the rest of the thing.

Before you go much further from that moment
right there to that last little bit, when you mentioned
making the correct calls, was he doing altitudes and air
speeds? What kind of calls was he making for in that last bit of final approach kind of thing?

He was talking about the cell angles and stuff
like that.

Do you remember if he was saying 87, 90, a
number, or anything?
I couldn't tell you really. I just remember it was like cell movements. Because most junior pilots have trouble dealing with the nose pitch thing with the nacelles.

Did it feel nose-up at all?

No, it felt level.

Altitude was level?

I think we were level. For me, from the back, this whole thing came at me like a surprise, but it felt level.

He was basically just coaching him on the cells or something like that is what you recall?

Yes, sir.

And pardon my ignorance. As a 53 guy, one of the things that we are talking more about as we are approaching in is basically your altitude so that you know you are on your profile, and your airspeed so that you know you are either slowing down as appropriate and everything like that. I guess my question is, would you consider the nacelle conversation as normal conversation? It's hard for me to say what normal is like, but you seem to think it was normal.

It sounded like a typical landing nacelle conversation between instructor pilot and student.

For me, I'm just trying to educate myself on what normal and not normal.
So at that point, you've struck it as normal conversation and now was making the nose over the deck edge call, and then...

Right as he was saying the nose over deck edge call, I was casually looking to see the deck. Then that was when just a split second--this is a weird timeline for me. It was like, "Nose over deck edge," then it felt like a harder than normal tail slide.

Like a hard than normal slide kind of thing, yeah.

Like a left-wing down with a right kick?

Right. And that was when I saw the deck and it was like we were almost level and that's when I was like, "Oh, shit."

In that brief second.

Then it was like, "Oh." Next thing I knew, it was just a huge hit. Then I was on the ramp and then I was inside of the cabin. I don't even remember necessarily like flying through the cabin, but next thing I remember I was just next to the left seat. At that point, the tail was higher than normal. I just saw the sky. The weird part for me was when I was looking up, I didn't see anybody. I remember seeing the six to eight seats that were there full of people originally, was just empty. And I didn't see there.
Towards the back of the aircraft you mean, or which seats were those?

In the back of the plane.

Okay. So they all appeared empty to you?

Yes, sir. So after action, it was clearly they unbuckled.

SO you think the PAX unbuckled before landing?

Or after the mishap and in that jumbled time frame, by the time you looked at the seats, they were already out of their seats, working to get out or something?

Right. So when I was talking to medical, they said after the initial impact, they were like, "I'm out," and they all unbuckled. So I think maybe they thought that was the impact. So I guess it makes sense.

In my experience, nobody was in those seats. I couldn't see and the gun mount was just sitting there. It was like one of those picture things. It was just the sky. And it felt like we were banging against----

Against the side of the ship kind of thing?

Yes, sir. It felt like horizontal banging.

Like somebody had grabbed the plane and was banging it back and forth. So at this point, we were significantly nose down. Obviously, this is the craziest thing that I have ever experienced. Obviously, we were in a boat environment and everything, which means water, so my first instinct was, "I'm
not trying to drown today." So I already got my HABID [ph] bottle in. Obviously, I had it already turned on from the pre-flight. Everything was already hooked up and everything, so I was basically preparing for it.

After the initial shock forward, I was right next to the left-back window when we were doing those weird jarring hits, and then we had a really hard one and I got shot across the other side of the cabin.

: Back to the right side of the cabin as you are looking forward?

: Yes, sir. At that point, my mouth piece had fallen out, and somewhere between the left window and right window, I had blacked out for a second or so because it took me a second to realize what was going on again.

While all this was going down, obviously, everybody or somebody was screaming over ICS.

: Do you recall any of the wording that was being said over ICS at that point?

: Not aircrew wise, but we were having RPM low.

: Okay. So distinctly hear the RPM low, but none of the pilot conversation or anything that might be up there or anything like that?

: No. I think at that point, everybody knew what was going on.
And you didn't hear RPM low or anything like that prior to the first impact?

Right, sir. The first time I heard it was when I was right up against that window, which was kind of weird. So I had got slammed to the next side, then I saw the tail had become level again with the flight deck because for a couple seconds I saw the flight deck again. This is all looking out the ramp and this was all while the side hits were going, I saw the horizon, then the sky again, then I saw the side of the boat, and at that point, I'm assuming we had already dropped below the deck. So this is all like nose down, and that's when we made impact with the water.

I kind of blacked out during that point, initially, but I remember hitting the water with the plane, basically upright.

Not upside down. So you didn't hit the water upside down?

Right. So, if anything, we may have been a little right wing down or something, but for the most part, we were give-or-take level.

Okay.

Then at that point, was when the water started rushing in.

Do you recall if it came from the front first, or the back first, or anything like that?
Honestly, I think it was a little bit of both, because I remember seeing it coming in from the ramp. But I want to say most of my body was pretty under water before that amount of water could have came in.

At this point, I was laying face down and the plane was filling full of water. All those bags that had riot shields and stuff like that had been tossed. So that's when they all had piled on top of me. I never got my mouth piece back in, so I was under water and this is by the back window.

Was it dark in the cabin? Was it light in the cabin? Could you see? Could you not see?

Before I was under water, I could see.

Just normal like being in the cabin?

Yes, sir. There was adrenaline going on, but it felt like everything was going really fast. I ended up basically stuck under water with all of the bags on top of me. I was trying to swim in the direction I thought was the last point of the ramp, but at that point, my leg had gotten jammed under something and I couldn't get my leg out. I remembered the air and obviously I knew where it was. I grabbed it and fed it up and got the air going, which obviously helped.

I had grabbed onto something hard; I think it was a seat, and was jerking on my leg. Eventually I had pulled it free from whatever it was stuck on. Then I kept swimming in that same direction. I ended up getting out of the water, but
obviously I was still in the cabin. At that point I knew the plane was flipping.

: Turning over?

: Yeah. So I couldn't tell you the direction it was flipping because I was in the middle of all this stuff. But I remember feeling it flip.

: You can feel the motion. Yeah.

: I had surfaced and was still in the cabin. I could see we were nose down and I could see the tail was starting to rise up a little bit and obviously it was sinking.

My next reaction was detaching myself from the plane. The release is on the vest, but at that point I was basically hanging from it because the tail was up, and it wasn't unlatching. That was not a good situation. Right about this time is when I started to pick up my surroundings. All the way up until that point, I was just along for the ride basically, and wasn't able to figure out where everybody was at.

: You are becoming more aware of what's going on?

: Yes. So at that point, I noticed was trying to climb out from some of the gear and get out of the water. That's when I started looking around seeing all the passengers and stuff struggling to get out of the water. This is all still in the cabin. The tail was still up in the air.
I gave up on the emergency release on the vest and went to grab it because it attaches from the extension, so I grabbed it from there because I knew that was going to work because that's how I attach and detach all the time. By the time I grabbed it, all the tension was already on it because it had all my weight on it, so I ended up just pulling on it and had just enough tension to get it off. At that point, I thought I was free from the plane. I was like, "Cool, I'm good."

That's what I was mostly worried about was getting caught up and drug down with the plane, but at that moment, I saw a huge hole, which was the ramp and door open, and I knew I can get out there.

So at that point, I started looking around me to see who I can help that was worse off than me. I saw and he was trying to undue his belt. I saw his glove was stuck. He was trying to do it the same way I did it. His glove got stuck in the clip or something. I pulled him back and undid it for him. I knew he was free then and he would be good, too.

Then I looked around and there were maybe 8 or 9 passengers swimming and struggling around us. I was in the middle of the cabin, so I was yelling to blow the windows because what I can remember, the tail was at a pretty good angle, so it was a decent climb to get up. I was like, "Hey, the window is right there." At that point, the water level was
still below the windows, which is the key to blowing the
windows.

I checked the windows first to make sure that they are
still above water and it was a couple inches above the water
still. So at that point, I pointed in the general direction of
the aircraft-right window because at this point it was going to
flip upside down, so I was like, "Hey, blow that one."

: The aircraft is turning upside down, so it
would be the right window that is like the tails up over there?

: Right. So I was like, "Blow that one."

Meanwhile, at the time I thought it was that I
was like, "Get the window," but apparently it was one of the
passengers. Meanwhile, I was on the other window, because
honestly, I've always wanted to do it, so I was like, this is my
chance to do it.

: Did it work?

: It worked.

: How about a loud noise?

: Yeah, it was like a shotgun blast right in my
face. I remember in all the trainings and the EPs and
everything, it's like face away, try not to be dead in front of
it. Fortunately, the way the plane was angled, I was just
barely off from dead center, but at that point, it was try
anything. That's when I blew it. The window went out and I was
above it with the tail up. I want to say like 3 to 4 guys had
gotten out the window. At this point, the tunnel vision was
kicking in and I was just focused on that window, but I guess
people were going out the other window too.

       I was sitting there making sure everybody was getting
out. Once the water level had risen to the window, I was the
last guy, at least in my sight. He was kicking out and I kept
checking to make sure my main avenue of escape was still
available because I didn't want to swim down and through. At
that point, that was the last guy. I think I was already on the tail and since I was in the cabin, I did a quick
scan and there's bags everywhere. The best way I could even
describe it was like a bowl of cereal where the cereal is all of
the bags and everything.

       I've heard that description. Yeah.
       So I was just sitting there, and I didn't see
anybody else, so I was like, "Hey, that's my que." I was on my
hands and knees climbing, like baby crawling out the door. At
this point, the plane had leveled out a little bit more though,
so it wasn't as much of an uphill climb as it was originally.
But I do remember the chain cans that we used to have on the
ramp, the chains had busted, and they were everywhere. I just
remember looking at the spider web of chains. I was making
mental notes of everything, like I want to punch this guy in the
face when I get back. I hate this guy because he did it to us.
But the chain things was----
It's things that you learn in times like that of why you do certain things and it sounds stupid all the way up until you get to that point in your life. Believe me, I understand.

It was like a spider web of chains and I was tripping and slipping on them. I got halfway up the tail and got clothes lined and was like, "What the fuck?" Turns out I forgot the long cord. So I unplugged my long cord and was like, "Cool." I got up on the tail and it was just me and [b3](10USC§130)(b6) on the tail. We are just looking at each other being like, "I can't believe this shit is happening."

I turned around, double checked the cabin because obviously at this point we were still at a higher angle. When I was in there earlier, it was just bags, so maybe I missed somebody or something. So, at that point, I looked down and the cabin and once again, it was like looking into a bowl of cereal. I didn't see anybody on the surface. At this point, the water level was probably like where the ramp starts if that makes any sense. So the cabin was basically almost completely full of water. That's when me and [b3](10USC§130)(b6) were like, "Hey." We got everybody out that we could physically in our way. At this point we were like, "Who else made it out?" That's when we started looking around.

The flyers, our vests have the LPUs that are black, so it stands out while the passengers wore yellow, so we were
looking for black LPUs. Honestly, it sounds bad saying it out loud, but at that point we didn't see any black LPUs. There were yellow LPUs floating all around, so we knew at the very least we thought we had got all the passengers out in time. But we knew the crew were still in there. So naturally, at that point, we did a double scan.

I was like, "I don't see it, do you?"

He's like, "I don't see shit." Talking about the black LPUs. At that point, obviously we knew where I was, so I ran back in the cabin. My plan was to swim through the cabin because I've always been a stronger swimmer. I thought I could do it at that point, but I kept trying to get through the bags, but it was a thick layer of bags. Even when I was trying to tread into the cabin, I could feel my feet kicking bags, so it was a good 4 or 5 feet layer of bags. At that point I was like, it's not going to work.

This isn't working, the plane is still sinking, I'm going to get back on the tail and assess the situation from there. So I got back up and that's when our was like, "I don't see him." He went back in there too and tried to do the same thing I did, but it didn't work. At that point we were still sitting on the tail because at that point after both our attempts to go back in. The water was midway down the ramp towards the end. At that point, I was looking down the side of
the plane trying to figure out if I was going to be able to swim from the outside and try and get in from the window or whatever. This whole time I was hyperventilating. When I was stuck under water, I didn't get to my air, I got the wind knocked out of me because I was desperate for some air. I don't know why I just decided drinking fucking water was a better idea, so I ended up taking two or three gulps of the jet-fueled water before I got the air in. So by the time I got out, I was hyperventilating, but I was still doing all this stuff.

So I was sitting on the tail and I was trying to figure out if it was physically possible for me to get to the tunnel from the outside and back without getting sucked in from the plane sinking and all that other stuff. I checked my hack bow [ph] and there was little to no air left in there. I was like, maybe if I had a full bottle I probably would have. Long story short, I was just like, no, it's not going to work.

I looked at [ph] and was like, "Hey man, that's it." At that point, the water level was almost at the end of the ramp because the 240 was still mounted, which is like one of those weird things I remember, watching the 240 slowly sink into the water. I was like, "I think that's it. That's all we can do."

So I jumped into the water and pulled my LPU. It inflated, and I just started swimming. A couple seconds after I got in the water, that's when I started paying attention to the passengers that we did get out. For whatever reason, there was
a handful of them swimming around without shirts on and LPUs off. So it was bizarre to see that because I know they all had them on beforehand.

: Maybe they were just trying to get them off because they were----

: Apparently it was to get the FLAK off. I guess the training they received was to take the LPU off and take the FLAK off.

: So they were just out in the ocean swimming.

: Yeah. Basically.

: With no shirts?

: They kicked their boots off and took their shirts off. There was a handful of them without shirts on and it was just bizarre to see. One of the guys was swimming up to me; it looked like he was struggling a bit. Luckily the people on the Green Bay, on the deck, there was a Huey on one of the spots right next to the side, so they threw in their life raft, so there were two life rafts in the water. A handful of people up on the deck were throwing in their float coats and everything. So right about that time when I was swimming to try to help that guy, a random red float coat was floating by that was already inflated. So I was like, "Here you go, man," and helped him into that. Then obviously then the life raft started coming around, so I was trying to herd everybody and help random people out.
Then somewhere in my swimming around, I saw a LPU because I saw the LPU. I was like, cool, there's another black LPU. I swam up to him and was like, "Hey, sir, good to see you." He looked like he was in pain and I was like, "Are you good?"

He said, "I kind of busted up my leg I think." At this point, we are still under water for the most part and can't see anything. So I was talking to him.

I was like, "There is a life raft over there we can start heading to."

He was like, "Yeah, cool." Then he told me how he couldn't really use his leg. It was right about that time that had swam up to us, so we were helping get to the life raft. Along the way there were more dudes swimming around without LPUs on.

At this point, have you seen a boat, a RIB, or anything in the water coming by yet?

and I were like the last ones to get out of the aircraft. So I remember sitting in the water with the LPU when I was helping the first guy I saw and they were lowering the davit or whatever.

So they were getting it in the water fairly quickly would you say?

At that point, the tail was the only thing left out of the water. So whatever timeframe that was.
But you were helping that one guy with the red float coat, that's about the time they were lowering the boat into the water and everything like that?

Yes, sir.

Have you seen a helicopter or anything at this point?

Yes, sir. So at right about this point, our Dash 2 had been circling overhead.

You didn't see the Navy or the SAR helo or anything yet?

At that point, I don't remember seeing the 60 flying around us until I was in the life raft. Then again, I wasn't really looking for it.

No worries. I was just trying to think in terms of the rescue effort for you guys. You mentioned they threw life rafts, float coats, then you said by the time you are helping that first guy with the coat, they were lowering the boat. I'm trying to get a feel for how fast.

Do you recall how far Green Bay was from where you guys were and where your grouping of people was?

I would say maybe a couple of hundred yards because I could make out the people on the deck throwing down stuff.

Say 200 yards?
I would say about 200 yards because I could still hear them screaming on the flight deck.

And then the water conditions, was it wavy, not to wavy?

I would say it was pretty calm because I didn't have a problem at all swimming.

You work getting pummeled by the waves?

No, sir.

How about the water temperature? Obviously, it would feel cool, but did you think it was excessively cold or what, in your opinion?

This is another hard thing to explain because the jet fuel was everywhere, so naturally, everybody's skin was tingling.

So you were itching because you got fuel on you like with a fuel spill?

Yes, sir. But at the same time, in my opinion, the water wasn't bad, it was comfortable.

I wasn't even cold until I had been in the life raft for 15 to 20 minutes. At that point it was obviously the winds and everything. I don't really remember much of the SAR aspect of it until I was in the life raft because by the time I got to the life raft, I was herding the last couple dudes in. 

I don't know if you've seen him, but he's a little bit bigger dude then me, so I would say he has more power behind his
strokes to pull another person, so that's why we decided [b](6) would take him and I was going to grab the stragglers.

By the time we got to the life raft, we weren't even far behind them. Right as I was getting up on there, they were pulling [b](6) in. I was maybe two or three guys behind [b](6). So it was [b](6), then two or three guys, then I was the next guy in. That's when, luckily, we had a Corpsman in the group and as soon as someone came in the raft, he would be like, "Are you good? What is hurting?"

Obviously [b](6) was hurt the most, so that's when the guy cut open his pants and we saw his leg. We started doing first aid, and I was just holding his leg straight because the Corpsman knows more than I do.

It was right about that point that the boat was circling looking for anyone in the water. I want to say that was about the time the 60 was starting to circle. That whole entire time, our Dash 2, [b](6) plane, was circling overhead. I remember looking up and seeing the ramp level.

[b](6): Do you recall how high they were?
[b](6): The 22s?
[b](6): Yeah. Did it look like they had come down lower?
[b](6): I would say so, sir. I would say 1,000 to 1,500, give or take. I could see the ramp was level and
[indiscernible] on that plane, so he's probably the one on the ramp. Anyway, the 60 was like 50 feet below. So we were doing the first aid thing. At one point, there was blood, sea dye marker, fuel, and seawater all inside the raft and I guess it was screwing up the bandages or the gauze. So at that point, I was like, "I got a first aid kit right here," so we ripped it open and started using that stuff.

Everyone was in the life raft except for [indiscernible], who was adamant about hanging on the outside of the raft right next to the door.

[10USC§130](b6): Was it because of space or anything like that?
[10USC§130](b6): It probably was.
[10USC§130](b6): And you got [10USC§130](b6) laid out and everything.

[10USC§130](b6): I would say 3 to 5 minutes later the boat came up to us and was like, "Hey, is anybody injured?"

We were like, "Yeah, we have [10USC§130](b6) here." Of course, at that point, we had his leg bandaged and his fingers were messed up. We ended up putting him and someone else that had a head laceration or something in the boat. They were just making sure the most injured went first. They told us to stay there and they would be back. The whole time, the 60 was circling.

I think [10USC§130](b6) climbed into the raft then because me and him were sitting next to each other. We were
looking around and noticing the missing faces. The 60 would come in to a 5- to 10-foot hover and every time, I would be like, "Hey, maybe that's it," and they would pull up and keep circling. So maybe they thought it was somebody.

Yeah. They were probably looking and trying to verify if it was a body or a bag or something like that.

At this time, everything was starting to slow down.

Do you wear a watch when you fly or anything like that?

Yes, sir, but my watch broke.

No worries. I was just wondering if at any point you had checked and remembered a distinct time.

I was trying to check my watch, but it was done.

Probably out of habit and you keep going, "Damnit." I got you.

I'd say maybe 5 to 10 minutes later, the 60 was circling, so was the 22 overhead. The 60 came pretty close to us, and say 30 to 40 feet from us and dropped off a swimmer. The swimmer came up and was like, "Hey, we are going to take you up one-by-one."

Had the boat or any other RIBs come back or anything?

No.
So at this point you had only seen one boat or was there more than one boat?

At this point, there was two boats, but the one boat had taken and another guy back. The other one was just zigzagging looking for other survivors. Obviously, I figured anyone left in the raft was fine.

But the SAR guy was like, "We are going to take you guys up one-by-one." So he grabbed the first guy he saw. He swam right up to the door and grabbed the first guy and tried to take off to the 60. He was swimming with this guy, but it didn't look like he was doing much because it didn't seem like he was going anywhere because there was all this downwash.

Right about that point after he made it 10 feet from us and one of the RIBs came up and was like, "Hey guys, pile in."

They were trying to get the swimmers attention to say, "Hey, don't worry about it," but this swimmer was dead set on getting this guy in the helicopter for whatever reason.

Plus, he was down in the water and may not have heard anyone.

So at this point, me and grabbed a handful of guys that were looking like they were out of it.

Get them out of the raft and into the RIB?

Yeah. We started with them and got everybody in there. and I had both taken off our vests
because it was fine. The helmets were already off, the vests were off, but we had left it inside of the raft because we knew an investigation would go down and you guys would want it.

We were helping everybody get in the boat and by the time this thing was filled up, it was like me, and four more Marines left inside the raft. They were all sergeants and one may have been a staff, so they were all pretty well----

: More senior Marines?
: Yes, sir.

So at that point, the boat was like, "Hey, sorry we can't hold you; we'll be back."

None of us were injured, so we were like, whatever. So we were out there for another 5 to 10 minutes before the next one came by.

: Would you say at this point the first RIB took and one other guy. They went first, so they are offloading. There is a RIB zigzagging. Then helicopter drops a guy in the water. He swims over there and while he's by the boat, the third RIB shows up.

: If I remember right, there was only two.
: So this is maybe RIB coming back to you guys then?
: I actually think it was the one that was zigzagging, sir.
Okay. It stopped zigzagging to come get you guys. So two RIBs and the one helicopter at this point that you recall?

So we just hung out for another 5 to 10 minutes until another boat came and we all piled into that one. We got everybody out of the raft at that point. They made sure we were all good. We took a long way back to the boat doing S-turns looking for additional people and stuff like that. They made sure we were good before we headed back to the boat.

We pulled up next to the Green Bay and the whole time, the rescue swimmer was still trying to get on the 60. I never did see that guy get hoisted out to be honest.

Eventually he did. We know.

So we pulled up next to the Green Bay. Of course, this is about when my adrenaline was starting to go down. That's when I was like, "My leg really does hurt," because it was hard to walk on. They asked if I was good because I was limping around. They wanted to do x-rays and stuff, but everything turned out fine.

At that point, they take you from the deck to medical on the ship?

We all walked up and in the hangar deck, they had all these cots and stuff laid out because everyone is covered in fuel. So they were working on the decontamination process. Basically, they had a guy in the corner with a hose to...
hose everybody down. I got to a litter and pulled off my boots, flight suit, skivvy shirt, socks, and was just sitting there in my underwear.

Then some guy came back with a card and was like, "Hey, what's your name, social," all the general information and stuff like that and slapped it on my wrist. They walked me over to the guy with the hose and he hosed me down just to get most of the initial fuel off. They threw a blanket over me. As soon as I got hosed off, they pulled me into this side room where they were going to x-ray me just to check out my leg.

[b] (6)

[b] (6)

[b] (6)

As far as that, with the fuel ingestion, were there any other injuries that they diagnosed you with, as little as bruises and scratches?
Any other questions or anything like that?

No, sir.

That's about all we got for you right now, what we are going to do in a second is we'll
stand up, I'll have you raise your right hand, swear or affirm
this statement is the truth to the best of your knowledge.

Obviously, we have to continue. We are going to talk
to (b3)(10 USC § 130)(b6), but as we get more information, we might
come back and ask you some more questions as we encounter
different parts of the things that we see and stuff like that,
but this is helpful for us to try and help us better piece it
all together. We appreciate you helping us get smarter on what
happened and stuff like that.

Do you have any questions for us or anything right
now?

: In regard to the investigation?
: Sure. Anything.
: I was just wondering if I could actually see--
because you guys have a video of it and everything, right?
: Have you seen a video of the mishap yet?
: Not yet.
: We obviously have that. Sometimes it's a
little traumatic. If you want to see it, we can show it to you.
It's entirely up to you. We can do that in a minute after we
finish if you'd like to do that.
: I think that would be interesting to see.
: Okay. If you'll stand up and raise your right
hand.
 did as directed.]
Do you swear or affirm the statement you provided is the truth, to the best of your knowledge, so help you God?

Yes, sir.

Corporal, now that you've given your statement, I'm asking that you do not discuss your statement with anybody else, that includes people in your chain of command. If they do ask you where they are at, what you talked about, inform them that I have advised you as a Judge Advocate not to discuss your testimony. And if they have questions about it, they can direct it to, the Investigating Officer.

Do you have any questions about that?

No, sir.

This interview is terminated. The time on deck is 1736.

[END OF PAGE]
CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPT

I, [redacted], do hereby certify that the foregoing was transcribed from a digital recording not made by me, but transcribed verbatim by me or under my supervision to the best of my ability, taken at the time and place set out in the record above.

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6)

FOUO
It is 14 August 2017. The time on deck is 1819. We are aboard the USS BONHOMME RICHARD. I am the Legal Advisor. We are here to conduct the interview of in the presence of the Investigating Officer, and is also present.

Prior to coming onto the record, I advised of the completely voluntary nature of this investigation. He chose to make a statement. I had him read over the Privacy Act statement. He did not have any questions and then sign the statement. I then advised him that he is a potential witness of both the Aviation Mishap Safety Investigation as well as the JAGMAN investigation, and I read him the different objectives of the two investigations, the reasons why procedures vary, the need to preserve the privileged nature of the Aviation Mishap Safety Investigation, and the fact that neither command or administrative action may alter the privileged character of statements provided to the Aviation Mishap Board and such statements will not be available to the JAGMAN investigation from any official source.

Sir.

All right. , thanks for coming. We appreciate you taking the time to do this with us.

Yes, sir.
Obviously, you've been told now what the different types of the investigations are kind of on our side, what we're doing, and the way that I have chosen to sort of approach this investigation is, yesterday, we spent a significant time talking to maintenance, maintenance departments, different parts of it with the intent of, "Hey, we have a safer flight of aircraft to go and do the mission." Talked to ops a little bit yesterday, a little bit today about, "Hey, working on how we schedule, getting the right crews, making sure that we have current-proficient up crews to go do that particular mission." We talked a little bit last night to--a lot last night to about, "Hey, The mission and how it got planned and executed and everything like that." And then we just finished a little while ago today talking to safety department about, "Hey, how do you we cross-check, verify, and make sure everything, you know, schedules are done right, things like that." Same thing that we end up with good crews. And then, now, we've started talking to before you, now you. We're going to talk to when we get to Brisbane. But basically now at this point, we're just trying to figure out, "Hey, what no kidding happened on the aircraft that day," if it makes sense.

So what we're going to do is we're going to start roughly, probably about the day prior on August 4th. We will talk you through some of the schedules, some of the things that
we kind of see and other stuff like that and then we will
basically go into the day of August 5th and then kind of just
have you kind of give us a--from the soup to nuts kind of, "Hey-
-all the way through--at which point, we're on the GREEN BAY.
Does that make sense?

: Yes, sir.

: What we'll do is we will start there with a
couple questions and just to get started off so we kind of have
an understanding of how we got to the morning of August 5th.
And then, at that point, we're pretty much just going to let you
talk and occasionally we might interrupt. Just bear with us as
we try to clarify to build a better understanding of, "Hey, when
you day that what do you mean?" or just ask you other stuff of
questions about that to help us better understand the end result
being--we have a better idea of what happened in the mishap kind
of thing. Does that make sense?

: Yes, sir.

: That's kind of how we chose to approach it.

With that, I'll turn it over to .

: Hey, . Good evening.

: Good evening, sir.

: Doing good? Got chow?

: Yes, sir.
All right. Cool. So starting out of the 4th, both you and were on a fly the night of the 4th. Do you remember that?

Yes, sir., I do.

I'm showing a 2100 land time.

Yes, sir.

Is that about when both aircraft landed?

Yes, sir. It was very close, maybe like two or three minutes prior to that, sir.

Okay. Looking at the download, at least for Aircraft 7, which was plane, he shut down around 2110-ish with both engines.

Yes, sir.

About the same for you?

Yes, sir.

All right. Now, the next morning, it was a brief 0600, right?

Yes, it was, sir.

Now, do you recall did sprint off the flight deck or did he check on the plane, put covers on? Do you remember seeing him?

I did not see him solely because I was flying with [ph], and at that time, he was in front of the aircraft. So while he was taking care of everything outside of the aircraft, I was tightening up all of
our cargo straps and doing intake covers, exhaust covers, doing
legitimately that I could, so that once the aircraft was shut
down, I could leave.

: So after the flight, you didn’t see that night?

: I did not, sir. I don’t remember seeing him.

: Okay. Now, for yourself, did give you any instructions for the next morning?

: Yes, sir. He told me to show up on the flight
deck to the aircraft at 0800 and that I would be back-briefed on
everything that was going on once I showed up to the plane.

: Do you know if he gave the same instructions
to ?

: I do not, sir.

: Don’t know?

: I am not sure.

: So you didn’t show up—you showed up on the
flight deck when?

: At 0800, sir.

: At 0800. So executed per instructions.

: Woke up—my alarm went off at 0730. I got up.
I shaved my face, brushed my teeth, got some—like some of my
chow together, and then I went upstairs to Flight E by 0745 and
was on the flight deck by 0800.
And even though you're a controller, you're pretty tied in with the flight line?

I am.

Okay.

Yes, sir.

Okay. So a concern that we had initially is that is also scheduled for EWE that night.

Yes, sir.

Do you know anything about how that--

He did not do that, sir.

Okay. He didn’t do that.

Basically, the way that we work the EWEs and EWOs, if there is something that is interfering with that, somebody else in the shop will just take over.

So it's just handled within flight line?

Yes, sir. Everything is handled within the shop.

All right. With that, maybe I think we pick it up around 0730. You’re up, feeling rested.

Yes, sir.

You're moving up to the flight deck. Just start telling us your story.

Okay, sir. So, once I got up, like I said, brushed my teeth, shaved my face. Got up to the flight deck and was finishing up with up with his inspection
and, by the time he came down, I had straightened myself away in
the aircraft, put my belongings where I wanted them, and
proceeded to talk with about what was going on
that day. He gave me my SMART pack inventory and we went
through page by page the--what was going to transpire throughout
the day.

: So you got up to the flight deck around 0800?
: Yes, sir.
: Was anybody still out there working on 13?
: No, sir. That was done. At the time that I
had gotten up there, they were running the 50/60, the conversion
area for the DND. was up top looking at that, got off
the aircraft, went in, signed off the DND the rest of way, and
then came back out and we were ready to roll.

: Did you see at all on the flight
deck at that time?
: Yes, sir. We actually--as I was going into
Flight E, he was coming out of Flight E.

: Okay. So around 0800, he was up on the flight
deck?
: Same deal, yes, sir.
: Okay. But the plane had not been safe for
flight yet because of the DND still?
: Yes, sir.
: Okay. So what happened next?
So next, after and I went through everything that was going on, we just went through our normal routine starting the aircraft, had to load 21 pax on the aircraft and drop them off in the LZ Raspberry Creek. From there, we picked up two Australian personnel.

Honestly, we're going to need even more step by step than that.

Oh, okay.

Tell us getting out of the chalks, getting out on time. We're you a little late?

We were a little late solely due to combat cargo. They--we were originally supposed to take a certain group of serials, but because we had a stow spot and a little bit more room for weight to come onboard, we ended up taking a different serial. So there was some slight confusion between that so getting the passengers loaded was a little bit more difficult than usual. But nothing out of the--honestly, out of the ordinary for operation. Combat cargo is what it is and the ship is what it is.

Where were you positioned on the aircraft?

I was on the ramp, sir.

Okay. On the ramp.

Yes, sir.

Now, if I'm looking in the ramp, left side? Right side?
If you're looking in the ramp, I was on the left side, sir.

Okay.

Facing the front of the plane.

Okay. And then opposite the 240?

Yes. [Redacted] was on the right side with the 240.

Okay. So turn up, startup?

Turn up, startup?

Turn up, startup was the usual easy, no issues. We just went through the checklist and everything was good.

So y'all were on Spot 4, if you recall?

Yes, sir. We were because we [indiscernible].

Okay. And then the stow, who did it, [Redacted] or [Redacted]?

I believe it was [Redacted] that did it. I don't--I really don't remember that.

How would you describe the departure?

It was a typical departure. It was smooth. Nothing--everything was calm. Everybody was in a calm collective mindset. No rush for that. That's one of the things that I'm really big on is like, "Hey, I know we rushed trying to get the pax in. I know we rushed trying to get the cargo in,
but, yeah, let's take a step back, run through, make sure that everything is what it is before we take off so that we're safe."

: Now, for you getting in there--you weren’t able to go to the flight brief. Did they catch you up and give you an ETOP brief?

: Yes, sir.

: Okay.

: I was briefed for everything. We had the big SMART pack that was--listed all of our zones, where we were going, what our secondary zones were, our flight paths to and from the zones, how many hits we were taking, how many pax were on each one, everything. I had been briefed very thoroughly for what I was doing that day.

: Okay. So, now, you've taken off?

: We took off and flew to Raspberry Creek. I believe it was flying the--basically, the majority of the day. That's just kind of how is. He's an instructor, and was coming up in the world.

We were second to land in the zone. We landed there--I mean there was an RBL. It was slight dust kick up, but nothing that we lost contact with the deck. Nothing that we were in a huge dust cloud or anything for any extended period of time. It was just the typical landing in some dirt.
And then I was--I mounted the 240. As soon as we hit our IP, I deployed the weapon and was running through the scenario as if it were real world. Once we landed, I put the ramp down and deployed the weapon to the deployed state for cover to the zone and we started off loading pax.

After our pax were off, they had told us that we were going to take two Australians to--Australian military members back to the BHR. So we waited on deck for a couple of minutes to pick those guys up. And then everybody got situated, got their LPUs and cranials--actually, I'm sorry, it was three Australians. Got everybody their LPUs and cranials. Got them strapped in. They were all in front of the aircraft. And there were no issues there. So we took off from there, came back to the BHR and had dropped them off. At that point, we then picked up a PMC hit.

: Okay. Did you take gas on this?
: We did. As soon as we--
: Do you know about what--
: I believe it was 10-5.
: 10-5.
: I believe 10-5.
: Before, for the landing there like the trail as you're coming back to BHR on that first--anything unusual about the transition?
Not at all, sir. Everything was smooth. There were no signs of loss of power. There was nothing. No different motions. Nobody had noticed anything different. We ran stat checks throughout the entire day nonstop. If wasn’t doing it, was doing it.

Okay. So basically, coming back into ship landing, no issues with landing, transition zones, stuff like that?

Not at all, sir.

Do you recall who flew it?

I don’t, sir. I don’t at all.

Okay.

So, once we landed, off loaded our passengers and started loading. We had 25 boxes of mail—or bags of mail, sorry. And we had six free boxes, just cardboard boxes of, I think, maybe some HAZMAT or something.

Okay.

I don’t recall exactly what was in them. But we had all of that stacked and cargo netted. We took gas to 10-5 and then we took off and went to the ASHLAND to drop off--

About how long was that flight or how far away was ASHLAND?

The ASHLAND was only like 20 miles away. So it was real short. It was a quick flight. Nothing too far.
Transition to airplane mode?

Transition to airplane mode, went and did a pattern in holding while they were waiting to get a screen deck and then we landed on the ASHLAND. Off loaded all of our cargo-

So that landing was at Spot 2 on the ASHLAND?

I don’t remember what number it was because the ASHLAND is the big circle with a cross.

Aft most.

Yes, aft left. Yes, it was aft.

Okay. Do you remember who took that one?

I believe it was as well.

Okay. Normal profile?

Normal profile. Everything was smooth and simple because it was a straight in so there's no crossing, nothing like that. It was just smooth straight in and put her down. There was no issues. So we off loaded all of our cargo and came back to the BHR.

At that point is when they had called the Nightingale Exercise, which was inserting Marines into the Zone 4, because we were doing a NEO that day. So they had called for that. There was some transition time period on the deck that we were getting our plan put together exactly what we were going to do. So we ended up taking another 21 dudes out to Raspberry Creek. They all got off the aircraft.
Departure from BHR?  

Departure from the BHR was normal. I don’t remember--

Any issues with--on the deck?

Nothing. There was nothing on the deck. No issues on the deck. The only issues that we had throughout the flight that day was--I believe it was our right box. I want to say the temperature was fluctuating about 20 degrees jumping up and down. So it was a transducer like signal issue and not an actual maintenance issue. But throughout the fluctuations, it was still within limits the entire time. Nothing went above. Nothing went below. So we were in normal operating range the entire time. We had just like a wing fire controller fail that we had reset with circuit breaker 4 and retested and that was perfectly fine and converter 2 failed a couple of times during the flight. We would pull the circuit breaker to reset it and it would last for a while and then it would do it again. But nothing that was in a--that was nothing that was a safer flight issue with the aircraft. Everything was operating as it was supposed to.

So we loaded the 21 passengers onto the aircraft, got everybody LPUs, got everybody seated, cranial--well, they were wearing Kevlars and not cranials. But after that, we took off. I don’t remember if it was a stow or not at that point. But we had not taken fuel at that--for that load.
Do you know where about what fuel state the aircraft was at when it lifted?

I don’t, sir. I don’t. so we had brought those guess to Raspberry Creek as well, dropped them off, and it was at that point where there was a IED explosion near where we were operating and they had called for CA-SEVAC. So we were CA-SEVAC'ing. We had 10 passengers that were MEDEVACs and then we loaded the rest of the aircraft with just extra people to just get them out. So I think we took off with a total of 18 pax and we brought them back to the BHR. That was our second hit.

Our third hit to--

The landing?

The landing back at the BHR was normal. There was no fluctuations, no issues. Everything was smooth.

Were you thrown up in holding? Did you get to land right way?

No, at that point, we weren’t in holding. We landed right away. We landed on Spot 4 so that we could load our CA-SEVAC straight to medical. And that was it with that.

For that, we went back to Raspberry Creek. That takeoff was also normal. No indications of anything. Everything was smooth. Everything was normal.

Came into Raspberry Creek and loaded up a lot of cargo. So that took like 30 minutes of loading all of the cargo
and we had taken 10 pax with that as well. It was when the MEU XO had come onboard.

Was the MEU XO--you mean CO? Do you recall?

I want to say it was the MEU XO.

Okay.

Wild?

or ?

. Sorry, it was . Yes, it was .

So we were flying him back with the other nine passengers and all of the cargo. Came back to the BHR. Normal approach. Normal landing. No issues.

But, on our transition back, there was radio talk of--the boat was making the 53s come back and shut down early to support--from my understanding, it was to support Harrier launches. So they were trying to make us hold for an extended period of time, which we had the gas and everything to do so, but it was more so a mission essential that we landed right away because he still had 103 pax in the zone. Between three aircrafts, we would have all had to make two additional hits instead of one hit. Our plan was we were dropping off the cargo, the passengers, and we were going to do one more hit. But because we lost the 53s, we had to do two. So they kept asking for timeline for that, how long it was going to take us to do that, do we need an extension. And was
basically fighting with them like, "If you get me on deck right
now, we won't need to extend. If you let the 53s take some more
passengers, we won't have to extend, but if things take too
long, then we're obviously going to have to extend because we
have to make an extra hit now." And they kind of weren't really
getting that.

So it took a little bit of time to fight through and
at one point, requested that we put on ICS so
that he could speak with him and let him know about the
transpiring events that we were going to be potentially in
holding for like 40 minutes and just wanted to bring the
situation to light, so that maybe when he got on deck he could
try and make an impact towards it and see what he could work out
for us.

Could you hear their conversation?

I could, yes, sir.

What were they saying?

was being real cool and calm like
always is. He was just explaining to him like,
"Hey, sir, this is kind of messed up. This is what they're
doing to us. This is why we're up here. This is why we're
holding right now just to let you know." But he was like, "But
if there is something that we can do," and that point, the MEU
XO had basically said, "Call the LFCC and have the LFCC take
care of the situation. Make him make the ship's captain understand what needs to happen."

Nothing really came about that with the rest of the flight. We actually ended up landing 15 minutes after the conversation. It was a little bit frustrating, but at that point everybody had smoothed everything out and we were all back on the, "Hey, let's just continue on our mission." So, once we landed the aircraft, there were no issues with that. We just unloaded our cargo, unloaded our passengers. We took fuel again and I believe that was at 10-5 also.

Then, at that point is when we transitioned--we took off from the BHR, again, with no issues.

: Did you do the refueling?
: No, I did the refueling. I was unloading all of the cargo while he was doing that.
: Okay.
: Well, I started unloading all of the cargo, while they were refueling, and then came in and helped me finish unloading things. I basically had shewed him back away to the front of the aircraft. I was like, "You've been doing this. Just take a seat for a little bit. Relax, hang out, and I'll take care of this." I pulled everything off and the forklift ended up coming up and we loaded everything onto a forklift and took it off. And then once we were done fueling, we had our plan to go back
to the zone. So called for chalks to chains and took off from the BHR with no issues again.

At that point, we were flying back by ourselves to Raspberry Creek. There were no passengers.

: Still with ? Were you guys Dash 2?

: We were Dash 2. was lead and then--I can't think of his name.

: ?

: Yes, was Dash 3.

: Okay.

: So we all three landed in Raspberry Creek. Again, no issues with the landings. Nothing. Still a little bit of slight dust, but nothing, nothing crazy. We loaded on 21 passengers.

: Anything interesting about their load out? Were they heavy?

: They were--a lot of them had just like mid-assault packs, light gear. They had riot shields. Like knee pads and stuff like that. A lot of them had their M-16s as well as a shotgun. They weren't heavy pax, they didn’t have LBs and stuff like that. They were pretty light.

We had run our curve calc every single time that we had cargo or anything, every time we took off from the boat, and we had the power all day. There was no question or doubt about
that. Every single time the numbers were what they needed to be. So these guys were actually a little bit lighter, I would say, than our first couple of go's. So 21 passengers came on. Everybody got LPUs.

[FOUO]: Did you give them LPUs as they were coming on?

[FOUO]: We left LPUs in each seat. So we had just put them in each seat for them for when they came on. And I'd seen one guy that was like, "Hey, I don't have an LPU, what's going on?" So one of the sergeants handed an LPU over to him. It was because a guy had skipped a seat. So I had told him. "Hey, grab that. Put it on," and we went through them. Everybody was strapped in LPUs.

[FOUO]: So these guys had been in the zone overnight or for some extended period? You didn't take them there that day?

[FOUO]: I don't think they were the people that we brought that day.

[FOUO]: Did you guys give them some sort of egress brief when they got on the plane or after takeoff?

[FOUO]: We didn't.

[FOUO]: Okay.

[FOUO]: We didn't.

[FOUO]: So they've got all of their LPUs on?

[FOUO]: Yeah, they've got all of their LPUs on and seatbelts on and all of that kind of stuff. And from there,
took off and we had planned--one of the aircrafts was still
loading passengers at the time and we had said, "Hey, only one
of us can land on the GREEN BAY at once, so let's just try and
operate as singles now," but not as singles, if that makes
sense.

So our aircraft and [b3](10USC§130)(b6) aircraft had--
I believe it was him, had taken off and headed for the GREEN
BAY. The approach to the GREEN BAY was--

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): In route comms?
[b3](10USC§130)(b6): In route comms, everything was normal.
[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Do you remember who was flying?
[b3](10USC§130)(b6): [b3](10USC§130)(b6). He basically flew the
majority of the day. Nothing was crazy. Nothing was--everybody
was calm. We were all in a good state of mind. Just ready to
do what we had to do and get done. We had talked--myself and
[b3](10USC§130)(b6) had talked to [b3](10USC§130)(b6) earlier in the day
about landing on the GREEN BAY because I don't think that he'd
done it before.

Just the way that the procedure works and we were
under the understanding that if we did the port to starboard
approach, which is what we did, that whoever is in the tunnel at
the time always takes the lineup and the air speed and all of
that kind of stuff making sure that we're on track for that.
And whenever he calls, "Nose over deck," whoever is on the ramp
is going to clear the left and slide them over the spot and then
the guy in the tunnel is going to pick back up and do the calls
to the deck because he can see the right tire and scupper and
it's just safest that way.

So shortly before coming in, we had readdressed and
basically, "Hey, you understand what needs to go on?" Like, we
were all on the same page, briefed it on exactly what was going
to happen. As soon as he called, "Nose over deck," I was going
to pick the calls up. And we started—we did a couple of
overhead patterns while they were trying to get a green deck for
us. Comms were quiet. It was just—there was nothing on that
ship so there was nothing coming back from them other than when
we had addressed them.

So [b3](10USC§130)(b6) was flying and [b3](10USC§130)(b6) was
doing the instruction. It was calm. It was cool. Everybody
was good.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6) : What was he talking to him about?
[b3](10USC§130)(b6) : Just the—so we were at one point coming in a
little fast so we had slowed down. We were steep at one point
so we had just kind of—had corrected him on that. There were
just small minuet issues that every pilot goes through coming on
the boat and [b3](10USC§130)(b6) had handled it as if it were any other
approach, any other landing. Just doing small instructions,
"Hey, we're a little fast. Hey, we're a little slow."

[b3](10USC§130)(b6) : Did he say anything about the cells?
[b3](10USC§130)(b6) : I don’t recall that.
Do you recall specifically?

I don’t recall that. He was just giving him small adjustments. And we had seem normal—the approach was almost perfect. We were good. I was on the ramp hanging out, looking towards the front of the aircraft, starting to search for the ship. At the point that the ship came into view, it was basically as the main mount was—like I had seen the netting. Is basically when the ship came into view. I noticed that we were low. I noticed that we were still coming down. And so I called for power, "Power. Power. Power," to try to initiate a climb to come back up and stable out. At which point, I—

Any acknowledgement from the cockpit?

That was kind of right at the point of when everything had happened. I called for power. I don’t—

Sorry to stop you. Do you recall calling "Nose over deck" or anything like that?

I really don't. At the point that everything happened, I am kind of fuzzy. I just remember seeing like over the ramp and seeing it and I'd, "Power. Power. Power." At which point I had felt an initial jolt and I realized that we were still over the water. From where I was, the ramp was still over the water. And I kind of knew, at that point, that it was not an intended strike or hit.

So I jumped to a seat. My back left seat was open. I always keep it open. I had my bag hanging on the D-ring over
the ramp. So I leapt from my spot straight backwards and hit my seat and just grabbed on. I grabbed like this. At which point, the second contact, I guess you can say, had struck when I was thrown to the other side of the cabin.

Do you recall at any point a large left wing down type sensation?

I don’t. At that point, I was—I couldn’t really see what was going on anymore because I jumped to my seat. That’s when things kind of got a little bit fuzzy. I jumped to my seat. I was holding on for a couple of seconds, maybe two, maybe three seconds when the next hit and I got launched to the other side of the aircraft. Hit my back against people, the window. I am not certain exactly what it was.

Were there Marines in the seats closest to the aft of the aircraft?

Yes.

Do you recall whether those seats were still filled when you got launched forward?

I do not.

They weren’t?

No, I don’t know. Because at that point, I’d just been thrown backwards and I just basically grabbed—my gunner’s belt was coming up beneath my arm and I’d just basically grabbed my belt and I was trying to—I don’t even know what I was trying to do honestly. I just remember looking up
and seeing the sky and then feeling more just jolts and I had started getting tossed back and forth. And the end state was the water. We were nose down. I could tell that we were nose down because I could still see the sky. I was hanging from my belt. We were in a slight right. So the right wing was down a little bit more because I was on the opposite side of the aircraft of which my belt was hooked to.

My instant reaction was to climb up my belt, try to get off of people. I mean, there were people everywhere. So I was just trying to get in a different position. I realized I couldn’t. I yelled back to blow the two windows out. They almost, seconds later, popped open. And people had started to go out the windows. I attempted my gunner's belt release and it didn’t release. So the water had come up to basically waist level, and I was just trying to climb up my belt to get to the top of the aircraft. I don’t know why I was trying to go that way. My belt wouldn’t unhook, and I thought that that was my only option to get unhook, was to loosen tension on it.

So I basically was trying to climb up it, climbing up the seats, when the aircraft had rolled upside. And at that point, was a little bit easier to get up. People were still pushing as I was trying to unhook from the midsection of the belt. And I was just getting trampled on. So I turned around and just started pulling people. Pulling them out from behind
me to go so that: one, I wasn’t stepping on them; and two, they weren’t trying to climb over top of me.

So I had gotten a little bit further up the aircraft and my belt was still stretched tight. And there was a Marine that came up--he was climbing seats. And he had basically gotten to the point where my gunner's belt was hooked up and I just looked at him and was like, "Help me. Help me get undone."

So he grabbed my belt and pulled it tight enough for me to unclip it real quick, and I just climbed up the rest of the way to where--the opening to where the ramp is was standing up there and just pulling people out.

Did you have sight of me at this point?

When I yelled back to blow the windows, he was basically right behind me. At that point, when I was going back up, I didn’t have sight of him until I got to the top. I don’t really remember seeing him again until I got out of the aircraft and stood on the tail for a minute and just kind of looked at the surroundings. I started counting heads. I counted 23 people and there were 3 guys that were on the tail with me.

One of the sergeants was helping people get their LPUs to get into the water. I asked him how many people he had sight of just to make sure my count was still good. And then I saw and floating. I yelled to him as to how they were and he replied, "Have you seen and?"
told him, "I can't see them. I don't know where they are." I threw my helmet off over into the water and I got back into the aircraft and started pulling packs and throwing them out of the aircraft so that I could try and go back in.

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6): You and weren't together for that?

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6): No, I think he was in the water. From what I remember, he was in the water. I don't know.


(b3)(10USC§130)(b6): I was the only one there and there was only two or three people that were on the tail at that point. It was one of the sergeants actually, "Do you need a hand?" At that point, we were sinking so fast and there was so much floating to the top that I couldn’t get through. At that point, it was going fast. I just turned around and looked at the dude and was like, "Get off the fucking plane. Get in the water and go towards the group of people."

I kind of, again, looked out at my surroundings. I'd saw a group of people towards the front of the aircraft, a group of people towards the back of the aircraft. There were a couple of guys that had shed everything to get their flak off; I guess and I was like, "Get an LPU. Get something on this guy. You go hold on to two people to stay afloat." And then I blew my LPU up and I got in the water and started swimming towards the other group of people with and .
Got over with them and had everybody come together into a tight group to link up and I was just talking to [REDACTED]. He told me that his leg was pretty boogered. He was like, "I don't think I can move it. I can't really do much." At that point, I was like, "No worries, man. Just relax and keep afloat." And I just grabbed ahold of the back of his vest and I swam him to the life raft. I helped pick him up and put him in the raft.

There was a couple of dudes already in the raft. One of them was a corpsman. One of them was the sergeant that I was telling you about that was on the back of the plane helping me. So they immediately started accessing his condition, immediately started patching up and gauzing his leg. They cut his suit open and was patching him up the best that they could to stop the bleeding and stuff.

I was, at that point, yelling towards other people, "Hey, just keep your back to me. Swim to me. Just kick with your legs. Come to me."

: Any sight of the davit or boat in the water at this point?

: At that point, I don't remember the davit. I remember the V-22 ahead and I remember 60. The 60 was flying around probably looking for people that were struggling I guess. So I was yelling at the dudes that could swim like, "Hey, keep following my voice. Come to me. We'll get you on the raft."
We just started loading people up on the raft and, at that point, I was still outside of the raft. I was just holding on to it because there were a lot of people in there and with getting his leg patched up, there wasn’t really much room.

So a couple of minutes later is when we saw the davit. Was yelling for them to come over to us to get him. He needed like immediate medical attention. So they came over, instructed everybody to unclip the canopy, take that off of the life raft because we weren’t going to be able to pull him out the door and keep him stabilized at the same time. So we just unclipped everything and I was holding the raft to the boat. And they had pulled over and another Marine that was actually--I as told later that he was like basically face down in the fuel for a short period time before somebody got to him so he ingested a lot of fuel. So we took him and put him on the boat as well. Everybody else was fine. No severe injuries. Nothing that needed attention. So we sent them to just go and drop them off so they could start getting worked on.

At that point, I had gotten up on the raft. I didn’t get in. I was sitting on the edge just searching, just looking trying to find anybody that needed help. Anybody that wasn’t swimming. They were taking roll call. The guys that were in the aircraft they were taking roll call on the raft, which is
when we realized that the only person that everybody hadn’t seen
aside from [b3](10USC§130)(b6) and [b3](10USC§130)(b6) was [b](6).

So at that point, there was then two davits in the
water. We told them, "Hey, we're missing three," give them the
names and they started searching. They had split. One went
left. One went right. And they were just making circles.

There was no sign, so eventually, it came back over to
us and we started--I'd ditched my vest at that point and I had
just put it in entrance to the raft so that everybody--
everything was still going to be there and accounted for. That
way if it was needed for obviously an investigation. [b](6) and
I had both taken our vests off, but I had left them there for
the investigation. That's kind of--we were already thinking
about that like, "Hey, they're going to want these so don’t put
them in the water. I'm going to put them right here."

Sergeant, whose idea was that to
leave the vests? Who had that level of thinking?

That was mine.

Okay.

That and I didn’t really know--I know we were
right next to a boat, but I didn’t know what was going to
happen. There is a lot of stuff in there that you need.

The davit, one of them had come to us so I got out of
the raft and they were having trouble getting to us so I just
swam the raft to them. It was only a couple of feet, but got up
and was holding them together with another guy as they just took as many people as they could. Actually, before they came up the 60 had kicked out a rescue swimmer and there as another Marine that had ingested quite a bit of fuel that was kind of like out of it, so we had the decision that he would go with the rescue swimmer to get lifted into the 60.

Were you given a choice?

I don’t really know--

It seemed to make sense to you at the time?

It did. It seemed that we didn’t know how long we were going to be out there and he was in so-so condition so I felt that that was the fastest way to get him medical attention that he needed. So he had gotten out and went to the-- the rescue swimmer grabbed him and started swimming him off to get hoisted up, which ironically took a lot longer than it took for us to get on the davit. But he made it to the ship before we did so that was good.

So we started pulling people onto the davit and they left about four of us. was one of them so I had gotten back onto the life raft. Me, , and three people other than that or two people other than that. We kicked all of the lance corporals and the corporals off, the lowest guys first, to get them back. So we just got back on the raft and sat there for a couple of minutes. And when the davit came back up and
said we're just going to take you all. So the rest of us got on and they took us back to the ship, climbed up the ladder,

Did they do anything medical attention wise at that point?

Yeah. So was--his leg was a little bruised up so--him and I were the last two off. But I followed him up just to make sure like if he fell--I probably couldn't have caught him, but I was like I'm here behind you.

So we went up, basically, walked straight up the ramps into the hangar where they had already had litters put out and it was just immediate triage. Running through everybody like, "Hey, are you okay? Do you feel anything?" Run through our bodies real quick just to see if there were any injuries that needed to be attended to right away. And for the most part, everybody that had gotten off the davit into--onto the boat, we were all in good condition.

They had pulled hoses out to start stripping us down and spraying the fuel off of us. Everybody was like on fire. They were doing that on us. And just sitting on the litter extensions, they attached the white cards to us, took our blood pressure, check our heart, our pulse and everything like that and just did the initial triage assessment. Started moving anybody that had questionable pain to x-rays.

At that point, we'd kind of gotten separated from the group. needed an x-ray and basically and was like, "I'm
not going—sorry. They said that [redacted] needed an x-ray because of his leg. I basically told them I wasn’t going anywhere without him so we just sat in the little x-ray room waiting. He was laying on a stretcher and I was sitting in a chair. Just talking to each other.

Eventually, they moved us into the big—ICU is what they call it. The bunks and the hospital beds all in one big room. They had given us like the hospital clothes to change into to get all of our fuel covered stuff off of us. And kept going through the initial triage. Like they'd checked our blood pressure time and time again just to ensure that everybody had gotten covered. They had a big white board with everybody's name on that came in. From there, got us showers and chow. And so the night went. Everybody got a chest x-ray just to ensure there was no issues there with fuel ingestion and breathing in and all of that kind of stuff.
Any marks on your helmet or anything like that when you threw it off? I know you kind of threw it in the water.
I didn’t even look at it. I just tossed it. I actually tossed it to and was like, "Hey, hold this until I get back." They didn’t, but it’s okay.
No hard feelings?

No hard feelings. I will forgive them.

Did at any point in the day talk about anything like any unusual vibrations? Anything that he was feeling or anything?

At one point in the beginning of the flight, yes. So 13 has been a little bit notorious the past couple of months, if you will, for vibrations. We had painted the rain erosion on the blades; and ever since then, we had vibes.

Is it a coat of paint on the blades?

Yes.

And sand and fill type of thing?

No. Rain erosion is basically a--almost like a nonskid. It's a thick rubber basically just to keep from what it's called, rain erosion, the dirt from eroding the actual blade itself. It's just a protective coating, but it goes on thick. But we--as maintenance control as well as Q/A, we had kept running over and over again watching the vibe levels and everything was in limitations. Nothing called for a RTB. Nothing like that.

Do you know if they ever did a RTB?

We did eventually. We knew that we were going to be doing a dirt deck. We knew that we were going to be flying that plane into the sand. So notoriously the sand wears the blades. So what we didn’t want to do spending three days on
the ship doing an RTB, having a down aircraft—and not to
mention, fighting for the FCF line when the plane was still safe
to fly just for it to go out there and then erode for us to have
to do an RTB again. So at the end of the dirt deck, we did an
RTB then and everything came back into spectrum to where it
needed to be and we were good with everything.

But at the beginning of the flight, it might have been
on startup, I remember commenting, "Man, I thought
we did a RTB on this thing." But as we started up, everything
smoothed out and everything was normal after that.

Do you recall offhand—I know you'd been
flying the night before so you might not have been as tied in as
to what was going on in control. Do you know what work they
were doing in the morning on the 13?

I know they replaced a CDD. They were doing
that throughout the night, which is why the—just before I had
showed up AVI had finished their op check of the CDD and was
signing them off.

Have you ever heard of—I mean, in your
experience as a flight liner replaced a bunch of CDDs?

No.

Or helped AVI?

Never.
I never did. My background was from HMX and it was brand-new and all taken care of. We didn’t—

Crew chief didn’t mech as much?

No, we mech’ed. We mech’ed a lot. I’m just saying that we didn’t have the maintenance issues because everything was brand-new.

I mean, in your capacity as controller, do you recall any talk about sealant or anything in regards to that CDD?

I don’t. I knew nothing about the actual maintenance task. When I fly, I distant myself for the day or the day prior, the evening prior. I focus on what I’m doing as a flyer. I kind of put my flight line hat back on.

Did mention anything about it in the plane? Like, "They just finished work on 13."

I don’t recall anything being said. Like I knew what was going on, but there wasn’t anything out of the ordinary that was mentioned.

Okay.

I don’t have anything else for right now. Tell you what what we’re going to do I will get you to stand up in a second. We will have you raise your hand and basically swear or affirm that the statement is the truth to the best of your knowledge. And then, after that, will have a couple things for you about a written statement. And then the
way that we intend to do this is we keep interviewing.

Tomorrow, we've got a whole another set of interviews with a bunch of different people. We keep interviewing and then at some point we may want to talk to you again just to kind of, "Hey, we've learned some other stuff by different people about something," Hey, run that by--does that jive with what you remember. But we appreciate you taking the time to help us try to figure out the best we can about what happened and stuff like that.

: Absolutely, sir.
: It is helpful for us.
: That's what I'm here for.
: I appreciate it.
: Yes, sir.
: If you would.
: All right. If you would raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the statement you provided is the truth to the best of your knowledge so help you God?
: I do.
: All right. Sir.
: Sergeant, I just need to advise you now that you've given your statement to not discuss that statement with anybody else. If people have questions about what you've said or the questions that were asked of you, I need you to tell them that you've been advised by the judge advocate.
not to discuss the investigation. If they have questions, they
can direct it to the investigating officer, [b3](10USC§130)(b6).
Do you understand all of that?

: I do, sir.

: Okay. Thank you.

: Yes, sir.

: This interview is terminated. Time on deck is 1922.
CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPT

I, (b3)(10USC§130)(b6), do hereby certify that the foregoing was transcribed from a digital recording not made by me, but transcribed verbatim by me or under my supervision to the best of my ability, taken at the time and place set out in the record above.
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW OF

21 August 2017

USS BONHOMME RICHARD

INTERVIEWERS:

TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY:
It is 21 August 2017, aboard the USS BONHOMME RICHARD. The time on deck is 1427. My name is [REDACTED], legal advisor for the JAGMAN Investigation. We are here, this afternoon, for the interview of [REDACTED], in the presence of the Investigating Officer, [REDACTED], and the Assistant Investigating Officer, [REDACTED].

Prior to coming on the record, I advised [REDACTED] of the completely voluntary nature of participation in the JAGMAN Investigation. He understood and agreed to sit down with us. At which point, we went over the Privacy Act statement, which he read and signed. I then notified him that he is potentially a witness for both the Aviation Mishap Safety Investigation, as well as the JAGMAN Investigation. We went over the different objectives of the two investigations, the reason why procedures vary, the need to preserve the privileged nature of the Aviation Mishap Safety Investigation, and the fact that neither command nor administrative action may alter the privileged character of the statements provided to the Aviation Mishap Board, and such statements will not be available to the JAGMAN Investigation from any official source.

Is that all correct, sir?

[REDACTED]: Yes.

[REDACTED]: Thank you.
All right, thank you for sitting down to talk with us. I appreciate you taking the time to do so. Kind of the way to do this, first, I'll ask questions just about you in general, to kind of establish who you are, kind of your bonafides, kind of stuff like that.

Okay.

Your experience and everything like that. And then we'll ask you some questions, sort of related around to the mishap and stuff like that. Just kind of for your own essay, sort of the way we have built, going through the investigation was, at this point, we started with maintenance, we talked into Ops, then we talked to Squadron Safety NATOPS, at that point, started mishap aircrew, at a point we went to GREEN BAY, talked to the mishap--the passengers, the people and all of them.

GREEN BAY ship, kind of their tower, deck crews, all the other people associated from the GREEN BAY side. Came back here to iron out a couple interviews that we just weren't able to do before we go, do AIT circuit schedule, and then basically finish up today with the SAR crew that did part of the rescue for mishap survivors and then, obviously, XO and now you.

Okay.

That's kind of how we have built it. What we've found is that each person, depending on their position kind of has a piece of the puzzle, that kind of helps us all piece together and thread everything together. Obviously,
depending on where someone was, from their perspective, obviously, you know, it gives, "Oh, okay. Somebody might not have." Or it's based on rank. Or a job may not have had that perspective. So, that's kind of the reason why at this point we're finishing up with you and the XO. And then at that point, we have pretty much done everything that we need to do, relative to our initial round of interviews here.

So, with that said, to kind of lead, how long have you been in the Marine Corps?

I joined on August 9th, 1988, boot camp in 1989, and then commissioned in 1997. So, it depends on what date you want to use, but almost 29 years since I actually enlisted, signed the papers.

Okay. How long have you been with VMM-265?

Since May 12th of 2016.

And can you tell me your MOS?

Yes, 7532.

And that is what?

Tilt Rotor Pilot.

Okay. Can you talk to me about just basically your career, your experience, your background to kind of establish who you are?

Sure. Just starting with officer stuff, I assume.

Whatever anything you think is pertinent.
Okay. But you can start with enlisted, that's fine too.

Okay. Enlisted in the reserves in 1988, went to boot camp. I did just a regular reserve enlistment, so I didn't do the 89-day thing. Went to MOS school as a COM Center Operator. Went to Marine Combat Training and then about nine months after I finished all my training, deployed to Desert Storm. That's where I decided that I wanted to make the Marine Corps a career. So, met some Harrier pilots there that inspired me to be a pilot. So, I came back, started college, and started PLC Juniors. Finished PLC Juniors and at the time, Bill Clinton was the President and a lot of people not making augmentation, so my OSO talked me into putting in an appointment for the Naval Academy, which I got accepted for.

So, about two-and-a-half years through regular college, I went off to Annapolis, did my four years there, and got commissioned in May of 1997. Went to Delta Company, 1997, TBS. Was the Honor Grad out of TBS, so I got to go start flight school immediately after that. So, about February of 1998, went down to flight school and pretty much breezed through that, winging in October of 1999.

And then at that point, I took orders to Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. Went to HMT 301, spent about
six months there, and I believe joined the Ugly Angels in about
May of 2000.

I spent four years with the Ugly Angels and about
1,000 hours in CH-53s. I made it up through Night Systems
Instructor and Assault Fight Lead. And then took a transition
to the V-22 Program. Checked into VMX-22 in May of 2004, where
I served as a schedule writer and pretty much did about nine
months there, just doing schedule writing and helping out with
various things and finally started training to the airplane.
Went over to VMMT-204 in early 2005 and was an instructor after
100 hours in the V-22 became an FRS Instructor.

So, I started instructing, became a Night Systems
Flight Instructor [NSFI] so I could do highlight stuff, land eye
all those things built up. Became the First Captain in NSFI in
the aircraft and then chalked over to VMM-266, helped stand up
the squadron. Again, serving primarily as a flight instructor,
mostly doing night stuff but I was the assistant OPS-O and the
intelligence officer for the squadron and S-4 during my two
years there. Finished up that tour with a culminating tour in
Iraq.

Came back from Iraq, got sent over to VMM-264 to be
the operations officer, stood up that squadron. Same thing,
FOC, deployed to Afghanistan, served as OPS-O first, then was
made the QAO to potentially become the AMO. Because I got
selected for school, I didn't end up being the AMO.
I instead went over to S-4 to finish up the last couple months that I was with VMM-264. At that point, left the fleet, went to Command and Staff College, did my year there, earned the master's degree and then went to the Pentagon.

Three years in PP&O, working in the Pacific Division. And then selected for Command, did all the appropriate required schools to come out here. Came out to 1 MAW, spent about six months at wing, where I served as the Deputy COPS-O, really more so the special projects officer.

I got put in charge of Cobra Gold, so I was the MARFOR operations officer for Cobra Gold. I supported Cobra Gold and then came back and went down and joined the group for a couple months, where again, I was primarily just special projects officer doing investigations, things like that. And then finally, took command of the squadron, May of last year.

Okay. At this point, you've established you have got a wide and varied background, very experienced. Switching gears, a little bit now, kind of coming back more towards the squadron now, as it exists currently. Can you talk to me a little bit about the Ops scheduling process? Just kind of what you guys are doing here on the boat now?

Yeah, right now, so. And I mean that, not like is relative to an individual day, but just how a schedule makes it eventually ultimately to you to be signed?
Okay. So, the typical boat stuff is that there is a main planning group at 0900 in the morning. In theory, they are supposed to come out of that MPG with a priorities set for the next day. I could talk about some of the difficulties we've had with that, decisions not being—anyways. I'll come back to kind of the issues with the process. But MPG and then at noon, we have the APB, where really at that point, they are supposed to work out the detailed schedule and the flight deck window. Based on what we have planned either through CATs, you know, Crisis Action Team Planning, if we are doing an exercise or, you know, a CERTX or AIT, or unit level training based on what my pilot training officer and crew chiefs have come up with as required training for the squadron. That feeds into the APB where we build the detailed air planning schedule.

And then at that point, it is handed over to the schedule writers who at that point, route it through the normal chain. They write the schedule, it goes to the OPS-O. The OPS-O, of course, coordinates it with Maintenance to make sure that we can support that. Then it goes through Safety, where Safety takes a look at it, you know, making sure that all the CNAF, AKA OPNAV stuff is met, squadron SOPs, all those things. And then from there to the XO and then eventually to me for signing.

Okay.
That's in a perfect world.

Can you talk a little bit about the scheduling of the flight schedule for the day prior and the day of the mishap? Anything unusual about those two schedules that stand out in your mind now, at this point post-mishap. Kind of have a chance to look back at anything?

Yes, I do remember some specifics about that. But in general, I would say that we've had some issues with the MPG and the APB.

Okay.

And it has not been ideal. There have been days where we have signed a schedule at 0200 a.m. There have been days where most days are fairly late in the day, because the ship has competing priorities. The ESG is embarked, the ESG owns TACRON and quite often, ESG will have a different vision of what the air piece of the day is going to be and then of course, you have got the PHIBRON, who runs the surface planning board. So, quite often, there would be a lot of different directions at the MPG and this is where some of the issues started. The MPG would quite often--they would come out of the meeting without having set the priorities. And I'm talking things like, are the Harriers a priority? Is the VMM the priority? Is PIM the priority? Is it some Navy training? Are we doing CATF or DATF? Are we doing S2C or Sea Control and SC2, I think they call it. I'm blanking on that acronym right now.
So, a lot of issues coming out of there. And quite often, they'll come out of the MPG saying, "Well, well table this until the APB. And then they can go to the APB and kind of still not have clear guidance on what the priority was, quite often building an airplan that would change several more times throughout the day.

So, I don't know that that fed into these two schedules, but I do know I can remember some specifics about the day of the mishap. So, we had a CAT the day prior on August the 4th for NEO, and the plan was that we were going to put the ECC in on the night of the 4th. But due to the CLB not being ready for that, late in the day on the 4th, it was decided that we would put the ECC in on the morning of the 5th to facilitate what the CLB needed to happen. So, originally, we had planned for Saturday, August the 5th, to be a 0800 brief and a later launch to go to a later flight window. But because the ECC did not go in on the night of the 4th, we ended up having to slide late in the planning process. We slid the schedule left by a couple of hours to a 0600 brief for the 5th of August. The Safety and Ops, I think, all identified that we would be close on some crew days. But there were no violations of the SOPs. And I do know that some of the individuals, the crew chiefs, were told not to even show up at the brief. I do not know whether or not was told that. But I do know that he was still scheduled for the nine hours of rest required
by our SOP. And of course, OPNAV says eight hours is the minimum. "Shall" for the eight hours, "should" for our planning factors for the nine hours.

So, it was tight, but it is during AIT, so I think there was a mindset of, "we're surging right now." And nobody in the schedule writing process flagged that as an issue. And I think that's how we ended up with a tighter schedule than we would have liked.

Anything else about scheduling for those involved?

Well, in hindsight, as I look at things, I do see that we have three crew chiefs on that line. I haven't gone and asked people why we had three on there. I don't know if it was just to facilitate the NEOs, but this was a NEO—you know, we were flying people out. We were doing a non-combatant evacuation out of this simulated embassy in the Shoalwater Bay training area. Like I said, it was noted that they were flying all--the crew members were flying late on the evening, until 2100. 0600, again, that gives them the nine hours of crew rest required by the SOP.

They were supposed to-- actually, was the first to fly. He was done no later than 2000, so he was allowed 10 hours of crew day. and were supposed to be immediately upon landing, exit the aircraft and go get their crew rest at that time. And then, of course, the
600 brief. I know for a fact, was told not to show up for the brief. Again, I can't ask whether he was given that option or not. But the plan, as it was briefed to me, was that would come to the brief, since he was not flying the night before, he would get the weather updates, aircraft assignment, all that. And then would show up at the aircraft and get the NATOPS brief at the aircraft. So, just to give them some more time in their--to give them more rest. Again, I think part of the thought process was, "We're not violating the squadron SOP here." It's tight, but the goal was to actually just have them show up at the aircraft. Again, I don't know whether or not was ever told that or if he just decided to show up on his own.

Okay. Moving on to NATOPS routing. Can you talk to me about how something that's an event that's flown, how it ends up as a signed designation letter with you and obviously the other places that it needs to be done?

Yes.

How that's done?

Just like it's always been done. The code is flown, the ATF is supposed to be written within two days. The ATF is then forwarded to NATOPS, where they track it. You know, they are supposed to take a copy of the schedule and scan
it for any culminating events and know to go look for those ATFs.

So, if you have something that's like, your night system CQ code, which means that you are CQ complete, that should be a cue to them to start looking for that paperwork. Ops is also supposed to work with NATOPS to make sure that that stuff is done.

So, a lot of times, when a code is done, really, you are supposed to have two failsafe mechanisms to make sure the paperwork is on Ops, telling Safety that it's done, and then the NATOPS officer himself is supposed to get and scan the schedule to make sure it's done. If the instructor is doing the right thing, he writes an ATF and it gets sent to NATOPS, where again now you have an ATF that you know should be a cue to go do the paperwork.

Once that is brought to the NATOPS officer's attention, he gens up the paperwork and routes it up through the director of Safety and Sanitization to the XO and then finally to me for signature.

: Okay.

: I sign those. They come to me in a blue folder. I sign them off, we return them to NATOPS and, of course, they are supposed to file them in the jacket at that point.
Okay. As far as I can tell then, a code obviously needs to be flown.

Yes.

ATF would start the process for NATOPS to let them know that that's done. And then NATOPS designation letters go up, you know, develop so they can go route it for signature. Is the process here that ATFs go with the NATOPS designation letter?

They are supposed to.

Do they ever not?

Yeah, sometimes. Sometimes, you know, if you have somebody going out on a flight that they are required to be complete on, they will get a verbal from the instructor that the code is complete. Or they'll check the NAVFLIR and see that, yes, it's complete.

But yes, I'm not going to say that every single ATF is routed within the 48 hours. But rather, you know, again, we're extremely--oh, I haven't said this. We're extremely tight on qualified crew members, so it's not a perfect system. You know, the paperwork is, I think legal without the ATF. That's part of our process to route it with it, but really, the qualification letter is the legal document saying that it's complete.

So, yes, we have signed off qualification letters before, saying, "All right, where's the ATF? Follow up with the ATF." And particularly, not so much for flight leadership
stuff. You know, if this is a section leader check or something like that, I think the ATF becomes more important for a qualification where, "Hey, I've flown the four events and now I'm qualified." You know, again, we'll check with the instructor, we'll make sure that's logged on the NAVFLIR and hand to me. Again, it should be done, but if it's not done, that's a little more. I would rather--you know, a lot of times, again, we need that person to fly on that next schedule. So, we'll follow up with ATF.

: And you feel confident at that point, that they're properly trained and able to conduct that route?

: Yes. Again, at least I've personally talked to people about them being done before. I know that NATOPS, before they do the letter will check with the instructor to make sure that it is indeed complete. And there's actually a spot on the NAVFLIR, and if you go to M-SHARP and log it, it's either complete or it's not complete. Well, I've never heard of somebody being complete if they're not qualified, so, to me, that box being clicked means, they have met the standard and again, it's not like a flight leadership thing, where maybe there's more to talk about. Something like CQs is you've flown the SIM, you've done the FCOP, and you've done the day and the night.
Okay, we've hit all the codes, all of them are marked complete in M-SHARP, they're all green, they all got dates. Okay, we're done.

Would you say though, that if you were, say, like in our case, investigators that then come in and then we are going to go then to look is someone--I'm going to pull a log book, a flight log book, I'm going to pull a NATOPS jacket, I'm going to pull an APR, I'm going to look in M-SHARP.

Right.

If the only one of those though that's marked is M-SHARP, do you see where investigators would then go, "Hey, maybe these people aren't by letter of law actually qualified to do what they're doing."

Yes.

One of the things along those lines, is I think a lot of people, talking with me from schedule writers to other people was, their sole metric of whether somebody was designated or not was to look at M-SHARP. Basically, they would do an M-SHARP validation to see if somebody popped for a code, and then if they saw the code, they were completely good. Unfortunately, most people didn't go check a logbook or in the case of NATOPS, they might not have looked whether or not--had not ever looked at some of the other stuff or never routed any paperwork where it had to have looked to see if they had ever gotten it back.
Right. Yeah, so I agree with you and I don't like to throw people under the bus, but you know, it seems as though my NATOPS officer was not--did not have good desktop procedures. And having been a NATOPS officer before, I think it was something that we thought was fairly straight forward. I was signing the letters.

In fact, we found a folder full of letters stuck in a cabinet where the people in question, I think that maybe weren't in the log books or the NATOPS shack is when you looked. We have their letters, they were signed, they just weren't filed. And to me, that is a very simple step that should have been followed up on. And when you put the letter in the NATOPS jacket, the logbook should be signed right then and there.

So, I think it was taken for granted that the young officer had five weeks of turn over and when we left Futenma, we were told he was doing a good job I think maybe just getting on the ship changed the environment for him. I think he was spending a lot of time trying to mission plan and help out down in the ready room and stuff and he let those duties fall by the wayside. But certainly, looking back on it, we did not have a good system to ensure that that was done. I think schedule writers look in M-SHARP to see when they validate, and if nobody popped, I can understand why they would think they were complete.
The only other thing that the Ops guys never did to look to check, additionally beyond the M-SHARP validation, is to okay, check the QUAL DES matrix to see if people were qualified in there either. Because those weren't inserted in there.

In M-SHARP?

Yes.

Okay.

So, it was one of those things where everybody is supposed to be backstopping each other, and then each was sort of taking a view that their own individual part was good, but not necessarily done, looking at some of the others.

Yes. Right. What's frustrating is literally a couple times before this happened, something would come up where I would see somebody on the schedule that I didn't think was qualified, and we would start pulling the string and find out that sure enough, you know, "Oh, we're missing a deferral." And every single time that happened, I would say, "Go pull the books and make sure all the paperwork is done correctly." And you know, shame on me.

Again, I assumed that since I was signing the letters that the filing of those letters and the last simple steps of log in and out was being taken--you know, was taking place. But again, now, I know that we have some additional training to do
in there. And since then, we've cleaned that up, but it doesn't change the fact that it wasn't in place for this.

The officer that just gave up that job, is one of my best captains. And he was doing a great job. And it's hard for me to picture how poorly it went over, literally the two months since.

We spoke to [b3](10USC§130)(b6), and one of the questions we specifically asked him was, "Did you spend time?" And he told us he had it roughly a month of turn over with him and we asked about that sort of thing. If he had actually, you know, talked through. Because he could talk me through the procedures and the steps.

Right. Yeah.

So, in that case.

Again, you know, when I was the NATOPS officer, if QUAL DES got routed the head shed once a month, it was my chance to sit down and check everything, validate everything. We didn't have M-SHARP at the time, but to make sure the log book was good, the APR had the ATFs, all that. You know, it's something that is several levels down from me, that now I wish I would have paid closer attention to. But I guess I made the false assumption that the DOS was overseeing these things and you know, since I was signing the letters and asking the questions, I thought that that stuff was watertight.
We spoke to [redacted] and he has told us that since the mishap, post-mishap, that there has been a direct NATOPS line for people to go back and look at their jackets. Again, to look at that sort of thing.

Yeah, the day that we learned about that, we pulled all the jackets for everybody on the flight and we did that for the next several days, just to make sure everything was good. And again, frustratingly, we were only missing a couple letters. Most of the letters were done. They were just sitting in folders and never filed. So, and of course, the log books and the M-SHARP and all that was not done. But there were a couple—we found a couple others that had just plain been missed. You know, some stuff that—most of it very recently, because of the changeover. I would like to give the officer the benefit of the doubt, and say it was because of the new environment, but I don't know.

Okay, changing gears a little bit to talk about the planning and briefing for the actual locating mission that they ended up executing. My understanding is that the planning and briefing for the mission that was executed on the 5th, was actually conducted on the 3rd, in terms of the CAT brief, CAT-1, CAT-2 and the confirmation brief?

That sounds correct.
The CAT-1 brief I'm told, roughly, went somewhere, depending on who we talk to, went roughly about 0700 or 0800 in the morning, on the morning of the 3rd.

0700 a.m., yes sir.

DO you recall anything about that? Kind of like any conversations about how they chose which COA was going to be chosen, or what the options, or what type of options were expressed to be developed as COAs?

Yes, I do. Because of the location of the embassy, we didn't think that surface was a realistic option. That we would have to bring 7-tons ashore and that I'm guessing at the distance, I think it's like 40 kilometers or something like that; 40 clicks. I actually advised against it when we were doing the COA voting at the end. COA-1 was, you know, a surface to bring the vehicles in and then the vehicles going all the way to the embassy, loading up the AMSETS. Traveling back to the surface vessels and then getting on surface vessels, with some air as overhead coverage.

Okay.

But the other option was just you know, air directly in there with the vehicles as a backup. SO, they were still going to run some 7-tons and that was going to be the backup to the plan. So, those were the two COAs. I voted for COA-2, because they said that moving AMSETS 40 kilometers through bad guy territory was not protecting them.
Okay.

That even with coverage, that wouldn't prevent IEDs and things like that. You know, even with sky coverage overhead, that to me that seemed like the riskier option than the actual air evacuation of the AMSETS.

Okay.

So, we did that, they broke up. Everybody voted for COA-2 and then broke up and went off to planning. If I remember right, they came back—well, CAT-1 was just the COA's throwing them out. CAT-2 was where we came back and briefed those two COAs and then it was decided to go with COA-2. And if I remember right, we planned that all day. And I think we were supposed to do the confirmation brief that night. But if I remember right, it slid to the confirmation brief being the next day on the 4th, on the afternoon.

Okay.

1330, I believe. Well, I can't remember. This says 1330, on the 3rd, but I don't remember the exact time on that.

Sr, we also have a couple questions on the embassy reinforcement CAT.

Okay.

Which went on according to your flight schedule at 0700 a.m. for the CAT-1 and then slightly late in the morning for CAT-2?
Yes.

And in particular, the COAs that were briefed for the embassy reinforcement, which essentially brought Golf Battery ashore on the 4th?

Yeah.

Sir, can you talk to us just a little bit about those COAs to the bet of your recollection, sir?

All right, so we've done embassy reinforcement at least three times on this float, maybe four. I can't remember if we did it for Talisman Sabre, but we did it for our Cali Beach training. We did it for AIT and we did it for CERTX. So, I cannot remember the specifics about CAT-1 embassy and reinforcement. The only thing I do remember is the day prior, we identified the primary zone for the embassy reinforcement as being no good. It's a large zone called Bob White, LZ Bob White. And the alternate was identified as a field next to Bob White.

Bob White had a large cement object in the middle of it and it was probably level for RBL conditions. The alternate zone had soccer goals in it. So, I do remember that for this embassy reinforcement, that we had briefed, that we were going to have to use alternate zones on the south side of the embassy. But I don't remember the actual discussion as to which COAs we were going to go with and why. I do remember it was an air reinforcement and we were going to put the FCE and--yeah, it's
starting to come back. So, it was combined. We were going to 
put the FCE and the security element in at the exact same time. 
Because something in the intel brief had just escalated straight 
to the point where, "Hey, we're not just going to put an FCE in 
and then see where it goes. We're going security element and 
FCE." If I remember right, we put security in with CH-53s and 
FCE went in via V-22s. And that's all I really remember 
specifically about that.

: Do you recall any discussion about the 
security element being inserted? Any risk mitigation measures 
as to who was getting inserted and why?

: Who was getting inserted and why?

: In this case, Golf Battery.

: No. Nothing specific to Golf Battery.

Again, the only thing--I remember it because I had actually 
flown in there. I remember discussing specifically the LZs 
because they were briefing Bob White and that zone again. And I 
spoke up and I said, "Bob White's got a large object in the 
center of it and it's RBL condition's not good, and the 
alternate has those soccer goals in it."

So, real time, ORM they're saying, "Can't use those 
zones. We either have to go up the street to Gala and Ganot, or 
we have to land on the back side of the embassy if those will 
support it." And I think that's what they opted to do. I did
not fly on either of these events, but I do remember the
discussions revolving around those.

I know you've probably confirmed two dozen missions since this. Do you recall, by chance, when that briefing was confirmed, on the 3rd--sorry, on the 2nd, what ORM was briefed at that confirmation brief?

Okay.

Particularly, major ACE hazards.

Just, you know, the standard stuff, weather, you know, the ORM blue. I'll be honest, doing the R2P2, a lot of times, they throw up the ORM blue slide and it is literally like, "Here is ORM blue, any questions?" Click. So, and the font on the slides are so small that even from my position right behind the MEU CO, I can't read them. So, a lot of times I'm just relying on the speaker to say, "Here's our main thing." Sometimes they do and sometimes they just say, "ORM blue?" And you know, the MEU CO will look out for a second, and they'll click over, and they'll go, "ORM red." And that is the extent of the ORM.

That is the extent ORM is briefed at these confirmation briefs?

Sometimes. I mean, I think there have been a couple more in-depth conversations, but again, the R2P2 process, I think they've tried to net down the amount of time spent on the slides. A lot of times it is throwing it up and I
think that the assumption there is that it's getting briefed at
the flight briefs and the lower level detailed briefs, rather
than to the whole room at the confirmation brief.

: Thank you, sir.

: Yep.

: So, at the CAT-1 air option, the CAT-2 brief,
later on at 1300.

: Yeah.

: Can you talk to me about the CAT-2 brief that
day?

: So CAT2 went at 0900 or 0930. So, CAT-1
was, "Here's the issue, INTEL update," and then the CO says, "I
want a surface and I want an air COA." And that was it at the
CAT-1. We went off, came back at 0900 or 0930. This says 0930.
Came back and said, "Okay, here's the two specific COAs." And
that's where we discussed the surface with the vehicles,
traveling the 40 kilometers and we're the air, with the vehicles
as a backup.

: Okay.

: And then the confirmation was supposed to
go at 1330, but I don't remember it going at 1330. I know the
schedule says it did, but.

: From talking with people, what I'm told is
that there was one at that time, but the new CO was not happy
with what was--I guess there were difficulties with that brief. I'm told that hyperlinks didn't work.

Yes.

And that the mission that started getting briefed by whoever it was that started briefing wasn't the correct. At which point, the new CO said--

That's correct.

I am told that he then basically directed, "Hey, we'll do this later after--"

RNS insert, I think.

After the expo strike.

After expo strike that evening or something.

You are correct. And now, you've jogged my memory, because I actually went to the CAT-1 and then I flew during the confirmation brief time and I came back and was told that we had to redo the confirmation brief because there were some issues with it. So, you are correct, sir.

Do you recall who told you there were some issues with the conference room?

I am; did.

Okay, and then at that point, I'm told that later that night it was rebriefed again at 2030.

[Affirmative response.]
And the new CO approved the brief, you know, the air COA that had been chosen previously, I believe to go. Were you at that brief?

I was. I don't remember if it was the 3rd or the 4th. I don't remember the specific date, but I do remember coming back to the brief and I did--whatever day it went on, I was there.

By our recollection, it occurred on the 3rd.

Okay.

And then it was able to go. The one thing that COA-1 brief, air and surface, we got that, that makes sense. The second part then, was, you know, I guess CAT-2 went a little bit later like at 0900 0930, definitely air. Do you recall--one of the things that is odd to us, is the embassy--if Golf Battery does it, their primary means of movement is surface. I.e., that's what their expectation is, is that they were going to do?

Right.

But somehow, an AIRCO was chosen and then the alternate, they're not even the alternate--Kilo Company.

Right.

Kilo is primary, Lima Company is the secondary.

Yes.
Golf Battery was not a thought of, or I don't believe, thought of itself as an air insertion force, but somehow they're conducting that mission on the 5th.

Right.

Well going in on the 4th, being pulled out on the 5th.

You are correct, and I think it was--and I can't remember why, but I do believe that Kilo Company was already inserted.

My understanding is, that on the 4th, they were doing some kind of helo raid or something like that?

Yes.

Or they were about to do a helo raid the next, there was something that why Kilo wasn't.

It was, yes.

But then that highlighted the question of, "If not Kilo, then why not Lima?" considering they're another air company, had training, other things like that, that Golf Battery--we, in the end resolve, understand, did not have or possess to insert the cases. Do you recall anything like that?

Yes.

At the CAT-1 brief, the CAT-2, or the confirmation?

Sir, I think that Lima Company also had an event going, like a boat raid going also. And again, we've done
several exercises all in a row. I have literally been to 50 CAT and confirmation briefs. But I do remember that specific conversation that, "Hey, sir, normally we would use Kilo for this, but Kilo is executing this."

: Do you recall who said that?

: Yes, the BLT OPS-O.

: Okay.

: Because he was briefing these COAs. And actually, it may have been, and I'm butchering his name.

: Okay.

: The COB XO. Because I think NEO falls under him. It was one of the two. A lot of times, these guys get up and they jointly brief, because one's providing security and the other one is doing the actual AMSET processing, and all these kinds of things.

: Okay.

: I'm sorry, it's been two weeks already and I can't remember specifically who said that. But I do remember the conversation that Kilo is already being utilized. And I think even the Sparrow Hawk was basically set aside. They didn't want to touch the Sparrow Hawk because that might be used for something else. So, at that point, and I think Kilo was also--I'm sorry, I think Golf was this side on because they were also looking at the non-kinetic options and that typically is
the Arty Battery. So, I think they were trying to use the non-kinetic experts. You know, the nonlethal. So, I think that drove them to decide to go with Golf.

But the surface option was just not realistic because of the time and because of the enemy threat that was briefed. There was at least a platoon of people sitting at the beach. In fact, this is coming back. I am pretty sure that Lima was supposed to be doing an amphibious raid, or boat raid to the beach there, which was where the enemy situation was. And we decided they were talking about bringing vehicles in during that and being able to use those. And we decided that that didn't make sense because you would have enemy potentially out there that could injure or kill the AMSETS.

: Okay.

: Does that match what--again, I'm struggling to kind of separate a lot of these events from each other. I do remember a conversation about why we couldn't use Kilo Company.

: Okay. And that's more the question on our part, is ultimately, how is it decided that Golf Battery becomes?

: I think nonlethal was part of that conversation Because they wanted to bring their experts in and I don't remember any conversation about, "Hey, they're not helo trained." Or anything like that. Just, "Here's probably the
preferred forces, these guys, because of their nonlethal
capabilities."

Okay. Do you recall ever, and this is more
along those lines? There is a term that is thrown out here
called, a frequent flyer, an infrequent flyer. Do you ever
recall that sort of thing being considered in any of these
things, or ever being mentioned?

Not until after the mishap.

And after the mishap, was that the first time
you heard of the term?

It was. Yes, because then when we started
digging down on who had had the training and stuff like that,
you know, it was decided that, "Hey, we didn't even address
this. So, this is something that--"

And who was that conversation with?

It was with the--really, the primary
conversation, I remember was after our 8-day brief to
We were all sitting in a room, and had asked the question about swim. "Hey, I'm curious how many
of these guys had been through swim qual, and how many had
failed?" And those numbers were actually pulled during that.
We sent somebody off to go get those numbers.

So, the first time that we had actually identified
that only 17 of them had been to the training, 4 had not gone to
the training. 17 had been to the training and of those 17, I
believe that 2 had failed, if I remember right. And I might be
going those numbers wrong.

: Do you recall who pulled the numbers for the
trained/untrained kind of thing?

: I don't I think walked out of the room to go ask somebody to get those numbers.
Ad they came back with a roster, with the actual stick roster
and they had added a column and put all the training information
as a final column. "Yes, no, did not attend and failed." But I
do remember there were two failures, one of them being .

: Okay. But there was a roster that came back in with?

: There was.

: Okay. So, but other than that, regardless of
the confirmation brief, you don't recall any other conversations
about who's trained, not trained, any of that kind of stuff
relative, other than just the idea of air COA and who's going to
do it, kind of thing.

: Sir, it might have been on that blue ORM slide. But I do not specifically remember the discussion about
frequent flyers or anything like that.

: No worries. But even then, it's not a
conversation. Along that line, frequent/infrequent, apparently
there is a new SOP that where they determine who is and who
isn't based on the sort of--it kind of depends on what training is sort of supposed to be required for the people that do it. But obviously, I the ACE isn't talking about that kind of thing, with the new or anyone else is, then it doesn't really matter who is or isn't.

: Yes, sir.

: That's my own assessment just kind of sitting here on the top. That's something I've never heard anybody in the ACE asking people getting on, if they are trained. I think there is an assumption that if you are part of the MEU, then you've been through that training.

: Okay.

: And come to find out, we don't even have the capacity to train everybody. And so, what they do is they cherry pick. "Hey, this guy flies a lot, make sure he goes to the training." And apparently, there is no SOP about, if somebody fails, you know, do they even get to come on the MEU or are they moved to a nonflying type situation. I think those are all changes.

: But all that conversation occurred post-debrief?

: Post, yes, sir.

: Okay.

: Similarly, between frequent and infrequent flyer, anybody could be a frequent flyer, some people could be
an infrequent flyer, but there is a further step of whether just trained or untrained. And then more importantly, what training they've had. There is obviously sweat training, which is a more limited, than a full on helo dunker training.

: That's right.

: Again, I find that you don't recall any of that, even just not frequent infrequent, just how any people are trained, aren't trained, but they'll be training and that kind of thing?

: Sr, I was not in the room when any of those conversations took place. I'm not going to say that nobody ever talked about it. I go to most the CATs and the confirmation briefs and as I already stated, it might have been up on the blue slide that I couldn't read. I don't remember it specifically being discussed. The first conversation ever about--

: Is following comments at the debrief?

: Yes, sir. That was the first time I ever heard anybody say anything about whether or not people had been through this training.

: Training.

: I have not been to the training because I go to Aviation Swim Qual. So, I don't even know.
Which gets us both of the trainings that they would get.

Yes, sir. All of it, yes sir. And from what I understand, sometimes, they would try to fit two classes in one day at Hansen and the first class might actually do SWEAT, HABD bottle, and dunker, and then the second class they'll just do SWEAT and HABD bottle because they run out of time and they just don't bring them back, they just say, "Well, we didn't have time today, you're done. Go away."

For your ACE Marines and maintainers, do they go to SWET and dunker?

They do. They do.

Do you know if it's in terms of they are requiring for them is it just SWET, is it Helo dunker, or what?

I think they do. I think they go through the same training. I have not--again, I have never gone up there. I wanted to go a couple of times myself. The schedule didn't work out because it is usually some other MAG brief or something. But the way I understand, they do--they are supposed to do all three for my maintainers as well. They are supposed to go SWET, HABD bottle, and Helo dunker, but again, there is such a--you know, I hear the classes are no more than 20 people and they can only run like two a day. Well, those numbers don't work out. You know, if you have got--and it's not open every single day. So, if you're trying to get a BLT of 1300 Marines
through that and trying to get the ACE through there. I think we were given three days to get all of our people trained and it was a huge push at the squadron. It was, "Everybody will go on one of these days." So, again, I think that there is a serious capacity issue with the training that if you do fail, obviously, you should go back and redo the training, but I don't think that that's even entertained because well, you had your chance, no we have got more people to do this training on.

: Okay. Now, going to the day of the mishap itself, can you kind of describe for me your day, sort of before the mishap and then we'll talk about after you were notified what happened.

: Yes, sir.

: The day of the mishap case, kind of talk to me about your day.

: I'll be honest, I don't remember a lot before the mishap. It was a pretty traumatic day. I was working out when the mishap actually occurred.

: Okay.

: It was midafternoon, I had walked around. I think we had probably done some CAT briefs that day also. I typically try to go to the flight briefs. I don't even remember if I went to that flight brief. I don't think I did because it was 0600 a.m. and I have a 0630 Maintenance meeting that I do every morning; and then usually the 0700 o'clock CAT, if that's
taking place. So, I don't remember going to that meeting or that brief. So, I probably got up, went to the Maintenance meeting, and then if there was a CAT, I went to that. If not, I usually still go see the MEU CO and brief him on the maintenance readiness piece, give him some slides, so that he can go to his 0730 with the admiral and update the admiral.

: And when you say, "update the admiral," are you talking then the ESG is embarked here?

: Yes, sir.

: Has the ESG been embarked the whole time you guys have been out here on this deployment?

: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

: Okay.

: So, I don't remember a lot about the early afternoon. I went to chow and I was sitting in the room working on some paperwork with the XO and then, you know, I have got my bike trainer in my room. I'll take my bat phone and I put it by the trainer and you know, I don't wear headphones or anything. I put the TV on behind me to watch the flight deck and you know, I can turn around and see who's launching and landing and stuff. But it's my time to get my workout in. So, I hopped on the bike. I remember the phone ringing, answered the room phone and he just said, "We have an airplane in the water." And went running out the room. So, I hopped off the bike, towel
dried off, threw on my flight suit, probably in 20 seconds and was sprinting for the LFCC.

: Okay.

: And then, cut my hand on my way down there and spent the next three hours in the LFCC, just waiting to hear the updates. Talking to people. You know, it started off--I remember it started off that I think we had seven people visible and then you know, grew at one point I remember hearing 13 and then the final count, obviously was 23 of 26. And then after that, I went down to medical when they brought in, which was fairly early evening. So I think I spent most of that afternoon in the LFCC talking with the MEU CO. Obviously overseeing the whole mishap process. So, you know, I was directing people what phones to man and making sure all the OPREP and the Naval Safety Center and all those different requirements were met.

: Were they running that out of the LFCC?

: No, they were running that out of the ready room, but they were sending-- would come down and give me an update, and I could also call the Ready Room. It was specifically done that way, because the LFCC was packed with people and that was allowing us to use the ready room. We have two phones in the ready room, where they were able to do all the mishap requirements.
I went down, and I saw when he was brought back to the ship. Stayed down there until they got ready to MEDEVAC him to the hospital. And then I don't remember a whole lot after that. I know I stayed up very late until at least 0200 or 0300 and then obviously didn't get a lot of sleep that night. So, kind of everything after the medical piece is a bit of a blur.

Did you guys have a squadron formation or all officer or something like that?

Yes. Yes.

Officer Staff NCO?

Yes, Officers and staff NCOs in the ready room.

Okay.

Again, pretty emotional, obviously, for me. So, all the staff NCOs and officers were in there and I broke the news to them that we were missing the three Marines. And I gave them the speech about making sure the processes are done the right way. That the CACO notifications, all that stuff. I said, you know, a lot happened here. III MEF was wanting to get a news thing out on Facebook. I am always against that.

They did the same thing to the December mishap. They had posted something on Facebook before I had even told the spouse of the individual involved. So, I told them something
had been posted on Facebook, but it will not communicate any
information until the CACO notification had done its process.

: Did you guys drop in river city in any way?
: We were, but some people have access during
river city. You know, the ability to get out. And so, I had
heard that even the GREEN BAY had the ability to get cell phone
service from where they were sitting. So, I also called over to
the GREEN BAY and talked to the Det OIC over there and said,
"Collect all the videos." Because I had heard that people had
taken videos. "Make sure that we have copies of those, but make
sure that they can't be disseminated inappropriately and make
sure that you talk to the Marines and tell them that they are
prohibited from calling or sending any sort of information home
until the CACO process does the right thing."

I've heard all the lessons learned from HMH-463's
mishap about, you know, just the nightmare that they had to deal
with the information getting out before the CACO process had
happened. So, that was one of the specific things I had talked
to the staff NCOs and Officers about.

: At that point, then, do you recall what time
you went to bed that night, or if you did?
: Yeah, I think I laid down. You know,
Sergeant Major and XO, we were all huddling and just talking
about how to take care of the command and the things we needed
to do. We kept telling each other "get some rest," but I think
it was 0230 or 0300 when I actually went and laid down. And pretty, you know, restless night. You know, three hours of just kind of lying in bed. I think I had a couple of those—you know, overwhelmed by just sheer exhaustion, probably pass out for a few minutes, but I would quickly wake up, just thinking about the mishap.

: Okay. Then post mishap, can you talk about the next day, the next couple of days, just kind of what went on then around that time?

: Yeah, so several meetings with the Marines. So, the next day, I had an all hands formation and got up there and told the Marines what had happened and again, reminded them about the CACO process. Told them what I knew about the mishap. By that point, I had seen the video and I said, based on—and maintenance had done a preliminary look at everything we knew about Aircraft 13. So, I informed the Marines that based on the information that we had, we didn't see anything that was a telltale sign of what had caused the mishap. By that point, I had talked to, I think—no, that was later that day. So, I did not actually talk to the Marines about that at that point.

Because I talked to the crew chiefs later that night when they came back from the GREEN BAY. So, I talked to the Marines just about the loss and, "Hey, go get help if you need help." And all that stuff. And then I talked to some of the leadership again, and I said, "What do you want to do today?"
And I was told by flightline staff NCOIC and the staff sergeant in there, "Hey, sir, we just need to get back to work."

So, obviously, we weren't going to fly and the MEU CO was telling me that he thought we should take one day off. I thought that two days was more appropriate. Because no kidding, we had lost a pilot and a crew chief, both extremely well-liked individuals in the squadron. I thought that one day was too fast. And by that point, I had already kind of laid out a recovery plan in my mind. I think we had five days until CERTX began, because it was August 6th at this point. CERTX started on the 12th. So, I kind of worked backwards with a crawl, walk, run. So, I said, day and night CQs on this day. Because it is low light during CERTX, so I wanted to make sure we did some goggle flying. Day CQs on this day. And we had already heard about the commandant coming. So, my plan for recovery was, on the 9th, to go pick up the commandant. I think we actually ended up taking three days off. I'm pretty sure we picked up the commandant either the 8th or the 9th, I can't remember. Do we have those by any chance?

We only have up through the mishap, sir.

Well, anyway, my plan was PMC for the commandant run, with very senior people doing that, so I flew that flight with senior crew chiefs and all that. Day CQ was the next day with some PMC also, and then day into night CQ is the following night. So, I worked backwards. I said, "Okay, we
have two or three days to get people back in the mindset of flying." So, what I was originally told, that everybody wanted to do was not to fly but to continue to work. Because they thought it would keep the Marines distracted. So, we worked that first day. Not everybody. Again, at the formation, I said, "Hey, if you are distracted and you are in no shape to be out here working, that's okay. Talk to your chain of command. If you want to stay at work." So, again, I consulted with senior maintenance leadership. I talked to the XO, talked to the sergeant major, talked to the MEU CO, talked to the MEU sergeant major. Everybody agreed that we thought the best thing was to keep people busy. Not to just let them go dwell on this and their berthing.

So, we kind of had an option of doing work that day. Maintenance Control put people to work. Later on, that night, a bunch of the staff NCOs came in and said that they thought that that was the wrong move and that they felt like we had jumped back into things too soon. And one of those individuals was the exact person that told me we needed to get back to work. And I have had this conversation with him, so, you know, we've talked about it. I think there was a change of heart after the first day. So, that's exactly what we did. That's what I do, I listen to what people say and they said that they thought people shouldn't be working on aircraft distracted. I said, "Okay. I agree with you."
So, the plan we came up with for the second day was that night, night crew was given their entire night off. The next day, day crew came in and they held shop level discussions. Again, I had another staff NCO officer talk. I told them everything I knew that was at this point. We had kind of looked at all the maintenance stuff. So, I talked to all the staff NCOs and Officers, told the shop's staff NCOs and officers that we didn’t really have an appropriate venue, like a theater, for us to have a 500 person sit down, so I needed them to go back to their shops and have shop-level discussions and make sure everybody was doing okay. And then me and sergeant major would walk around and engage shops individually, just to check in with people.

So, what they ended up doing was they had about an hour and a half set aside to have a shop-level discussion. We had the chaplain set up five different prayer services that day. So, they could go take some spiritual time if they needed to. And then they were given the rest of the day off to go work out, to do whatever they wanted to do to take their mind off things.

Okay.

The same thing happened that night. They did shop-level discussions for the night crew that night. They had had their night off the previous night. And then the night crew worked on the DNTs for the commandant the following day. So, we basically took a 24-hour period where no work was done,
they did a shop level discussion and they were given the
opportunity to go see the chaplain and stuff like that. Then we
did the crawl, walk, run, kind of build back up to flying and
you know, at that point, got back in the groove of things for
cERTX.

: Was there ever conversation anywhere about
cancelling CERTX or not doing this?
: Not at my level.
: Okay.
: So, I do believe that the MEU CO talked to
the MEF CG. I think that the fact that this was not in Okinawa,
and CERTX evaluators, 20 or 30 plus people were on their way.
And you know, I'll be honest, I think just everybody thought the
right thing to do was to get back to flying. So, we had enough
time between now and then to go ahead and get back to flying. I
agreed with them.

You know, I said some people--we had a lot of
conversations. I talked to a chaplain, I talked to medical
professionals. I think we all agree that a lot of people would
rather just get back to what we do. And with no clear evidence
that we had some to worry about with the aircraft, that really
it was just about managing the people and making sure that we
safely got back to flying. So, that's what we did. We did the
whole stand down, followed by the buildup to flying and then
right into the CERTX.
Okay.

And even during CERTX, we had several conversations. The MEU CO was definitely in tune to my desires not to do heavy air type stuff early on. So, the first couple days, I think there were some options to do air COAs and we would opt for the surface COA just to continue to give us some time off.

You spoke to [b3](10USC§130)(b6) in medical? Can you recall your conversation with him?

Yeah, absolutely.

Anything that he relayed about specifically, obviously about the mishap or anything like that.

So, the first night, the only thing I said was, "How you doing buddy? You doing okay?" And of course, the first thing he asked me is, "Sir, they won't tell me about the crew. They won't tell me about the crew." And then at that point, I was like, "Hey, don't worry about it, just worry about getting better, you know. Everything is going to be okay." You know, just being very positive, trying to keep him--he was in a bad place. So, I didn't want to put that burden on him.

And then about, I think the next day--maybe two days later was the first opportunity I had to actually ask him what he remembered. Because, this was before we had gone back to flying, I wanted to make sure to talk to him. So, I had talked to both crew chiefs, and said, "Hey, did you guys have any
indications of engine failures? Any cautions? Anything that
you can remember short final?" Neither of the crew chiefs did.
The only thing they remember hearing was RPM low, but they all
agree that it was after the blades had struck the deck. So, it
was kind of simultaneous with that event happening.

So, again, I wanted to make sure that didn't have something to add to that. So, I called him and at
that point was where he had told me that, you know, somebody had
told him about the crew. So, you know, we had a brief
discussion about, "Hey man, I know you and I know that you are a
professional. You can't dwell on that right now. We're going
to look at this and we'll hopefully learn something from it.
But you know, I just need you to focus on getting better. And
can you talk about it for a minute?"

"Yes, sir."

Okay, "All I need to know is whether you saw anything
that makes you doubt the safety of continuing to fly? Because
we are going to go back to flying here. So, do you remember
anything at all that would make you doubt our ability to get
back to flying?"

"No, sir, I don't. All I remember is, we were on
approach--"

He told me, he said, "We did a power check coming out
of the zone." And I don't think he told me what number he saw,
but he said, "We had the ten percent margin required."
I do know that they had gotten gas before they had gone in to pick up the pax and that when they lifted from the zone, which was about 20 minutes away, that they had the power margins required to go to the ship at that point right then. They burned out more gas on the way to the ship. So, in his mind--and I think he also said that they did another calculation in flight on the way to the ship. So, in his mind, there was no doubt that they were within the torque requirements. But he said that he remembered coming into the spot and being a little bit short, but then all of a sudden, the aircraft did that dip and they struck the deck. And he told me that was on the controls.

I asked him, "Were you guarding the controls?"

And he was like, "No, not really guarding the controls." You know, because they weren't even over the spot yet starting to come down, so I think he was just counting him into the spot, kind of giving him the air speeds and altitudes. He said the felt the nose dip, but he doesn't even know if that was pilot input or something else.

So, anyway, that was about the extent of the conversation I had with him on that. And I asked him again, I was like, "So, if you were me, is there anything that would prevent you from continuing to fly?"

"No, sir."
So, again, just looking at the video, knowing that there were no engine failures or compressor stalls or anything that would be a dead giveaway that something was wrong with the aircraft. The guy sitting in the front watching the screen didn't see anything. You know, clearly, if you're posting to the power limiting area, you're going to get some warning caution advisories. You're going to see the gauges turning yellow, or you are going to get the power limiting caution there. So, he didn't see anything that was obvious to him that was a problem.

: But he didn't mention like a wave off being called or anything like that?

: No, no. He never said anything about a wave off. The only other thing he said was that when we were talking about the crew, and I think this was actually earlier in the conversation, he said, "I don't understand where [D] is, because I swam out his window and he wasn't there." So, and you know, he had a shattered leg, so he must have swum right by him without even realizing that he was in the seat. And I believe a good portion of the cockpit has been ripped away. So, he probably just saw a giant hole and swam right out it and never noticed that [D] was right there.

: Did he mention that earlier in the flight a couple times during landing that he mentioned a weird vibration to the crew?
I don't think he mentioned that. I heard somebody else say something about vibration. But 13 is actually been through a--they did a rotor track and balance on it because somebody else had said something about that months ago. And they ended up doing a rotor track and balance on the aircraft to rule out any sort of issues.

On that, for the weird vibe thing, one of the crew chief mentioned in our conversation with him, he didn't initially mention it, but then when we asked him, "Do you recall?" Then he was like, "Oh yeah, that's right, he said it." And so, each time was during landing to the ship earlier in the day. The other thing is, you just mentioned FCFR track and balance. One of the things that we asked and tried to find, we saw that had been--we asked for the card and QA could not find that card. So, that was one of the things we were trying to paperwork wise find because we noticed in the ADB that it was an FCF card was what was ordered, and an E card is actually what would, based off of what I know now after spending some time here. So, we were a little bit unsure of which. But then when we asked to find, they could not find that card.

Okay.

And so we were a little bit kind of trying to help us piece back together what was signed off, what was written down, and that stuff from the most recent.
That's the first I've heard of that. So, I don't know. Yeah, I mean, knowing what I know, you could go out there and there is nothing wrong with running an FCF profile, but if it is an FCF no kidding, directed, there should be a card and QA brief and all that stuff. So, hearing that, I don't know if somebody went out and just informally ran the rotor track and balance profile, because we do that quite often. Especially if we are doing FC training for a copilot. We'll say, "Hey, let's go ahead and run through the roto track and balance profile, okay? All right, that's how you do that."

But, if you've seen a MAF in there that says that it was done, then obviously, there should be a card and all the appropriate paperwork for it.

Outside of that, nothing else mentioned or any conversations?

Nope, I had a very short conversation with him about that.

Sir, on the schedule of the 4th, do you recall at any point making a pen and ink change in adjusting any of those crews that didn't fly as scheduled? That is a copy from your master flight files.

Right. On the 4th?

Yes, sir.

Nothing umps out at me. So, if I did, they are supposed to keep--it should say, "Master" on top and there
should be pen and ink changes. None of these look like masters because they usually write "ODO Master" on the top of the schedule.

: So, the S-3 was not able to produce those and neither are the ODOs at this time. This is out of the master flight file that the S-3 Ops clerks are keeping right now.

: Okay.

: Your 7041s.

: Since you drew my attention back to the schedule, I'm sure that people have talked about the EWE hear for.

: Yes, sir.

: So, the EWOE, EWE schedule is produced the month prior. So, it is kind of a blanket, you know, "here's the duty" and then the standard is, if you end up flying, if you are being scheduled then the shop will cover and just saw somebody out. And that is identified beforehand, so it's not like people don't just show up for EWE and from what I understand, Lance took spot here and he did not show up for EWE. Obviously because he flew until 2100. So, you asked me if there was anything else on the schedule. I just recalled that.

: Along those lines on that sort of thing, one of the things in our conversations that we were told pretty much for the most part, stuff up in that portion of the schedule
wasn't typically red penned or changed if there were changes to it. Because we were asking some of those kinds of things.

One of the things that we did when we saw it, was kind of the way it was mentioned to us, we were kind of like, "Well, this is my ideas." Okay, I have the flight schedule, I go direct it towards the commanding officer, is standing duty with Lieutenant so-and-so. They go out on the flight deck to do integrity watch. They are looking and something goofy happens and they both fall overboard.

Right.

Now, all of a sudden, you know, we don't know for sure who actually stood that duty.

Yes, sir.

Because in this case, the numerous people that we asked, no one could tell us that there was a change. Didn't know if or that had actually stood it.

Okay.

And so then it was one of those things, where that's why I was kind of like, well it is one of the things for Watchdog. People doing, not necessarily full swabs, but taking it for longer than certain periods of time for another person on the flight schedule. So, you are kind of like, well, on one hand I get it, on another hand I go, "Well, yes, but say the airplan had changed and something like that, or where, you know
they are not executing according to what the airplan has or somebody walked with a different airplan on the day of the mishap. You could have potentially where—and not that it happened in this case, but you could potentially have a different Watchdog that is not supposed to be on the Watchdog that has been watching the desk for 20 minutes.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Right. No, I agree with you, sir. If I had seen that, I would have acted for that to change.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): And the only other thing I asked and none of the schedulers had a super great answer was, "Well, if it was briefed the month prior, when you are doing a schedule the next day, when you see a conflict, why not just automatically go to the shop or ask the shop to have a different name.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Change it. I agree with you. I've never actually seen where somebody was on there in both places. This is a surprise to me and I did not catch this that night. I usually spend more time with the airplan and going through all this. I look up here, I look at this and I probably saw all the names but then when I got down here and started going through everything, I didn't notice that he was in both places. And I agree with you, sir, that is—now that I know about that, that is not acceptable.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): But based off our understanding, is that, at this point, now, [redacted] did not stand that duty?

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): He did not, I know that for a fact.
The challenge though, for us was that we couldn't initially for a good while establish that.

Yeah, I think we ended up asking and he was able to identify. There was a female Marine from flight line and then confirmed with her. But you're right. That shouldn't be like that. I mean, if you know that you are not going to have that guy on duty, why not just make the change on the schedule?

On maintenance in general, can you give us your understanding kind of where this maintenance department is at right now? Kind of your interpretation, your impression of where they are right now?

Right. So, maintenance has been probably my least concern since taking over this squadron. You know, I have a couple shops that tend to be more challenging that in my opinion, don't have the strong leadership. But up until this point, I have been blessed with a very, very, thorough, and capable maintenance division and maintenance department and a lot of that was because of. He took over as the AMO in February of last year. And by the time I had checked in, in May, he had kind of worked through some very painful reprogramming of those guys. They did not do 3M reports. There was a lot of just, you know, throwing stuff at the wall and hoping it stuck. The previous AMO had basically been fired. So, took over of a pretty shabby maintenance department.
He tore into the 4790 and he really pulled out the checklists and started building a maintenance department from the publications up.

So, when I took over, we had already led the Marine Corps for three months straight in maintenance readiness and I was very impressed with his oversight of the department. is an intrusive leader. So, very detail oriented. Some would say micromanaging. I would say intrusive. Like he is—if somebody comes in and says an airplane is down, he says, "Why is it down?"

"Well, because there's a hole in the blade."

"Okay, how big is the hole in the blade? Can we repair it?"

"No, sir, it's out of the limits."

"Okay, let's go look at it."

"Measure that for me."

"Well, I didn't actually measure it."

"Well, why not?"

"Well, because I know that's down."

"Okay, well go ahead, let's measure it."

"Oh, turns out it is in limits."

So, he went through several months of that kind of mindset with the maintenance department. And for the last year, well, from May until the end of April, I didn't have a lot to worry about with maintenance. We went through a MALS courtesy
inspection and then we went through a MALS inspection and then we went through the Wing AMI and we had the highest MALS score we have had that MALS had had, I think ever for the V-22 community. And then, we did a great job on the CNAF as well. I think a 94 percent on the CNAF, which was really good for the Okinawa-based VMMs.

In addition to that, we did a command climate survey in October, and said it was the highest scores he had ever seen for a squadron. Of course, obviously, most of the squadron is the maintenance department. So, felt really good about what they were doing down there and felt really good about the Marines actually enjoying what they were doing and being well led and cared for and all that. Right before, so then, the MEU came along, and we saw a couple little indications of people getting sloppy. I talked to the squadron. Every week I had a formation and I would always get out there and tell them they were doing a great job. But very early on, we started talking about ground mishaps. You know, that was big on DC Aviation's mind and so, for about two months prior, we were doing the Airfield revitalization.

Did you get a lot of ground mishaps? We did in May. Do you know how many? Two. Okay.
And I'll get to those. So, literally, in probably in March and April, every single formation, I would say, "Hey, heads on a swivel guys. We're doing the airfield revitalization. Make sure that--we have got all the airplanes packed into two-thirds it's normal space, so you know, make sure that you do things the right way and blah, blah, blah" and all that. We talked about it repeatedly.

And then we had an incident where one of my CDQs attempted to tow a V-22 with one of the 8-foot tow bars. Which is authorized in the NAM, but it is intended with the shipboard tug, which is the low tug. Not the one with the tall metal top. It was at night and they were towing out of a spot that we normally didn't park airplanes in because we had the airfield revitalization and as he pulled out, he started to turn, and the top of the tug impacted the nacelle as it was folded around in front. And punched a hole in one of the panels. We obviously, we talked to MAG CO. Turned out it didn't meet any reporting criteria, but it was to me a wake-up call.

So, again, that week numerous discussions with people about pay attention, make sure that you know you are doing the right thing. Tow crews needed to be supervised by the appropriate people, all that.

About a week later, we had another mishap in the exact same squad on the ramp. And at this point, had left the maintenance department. And I already told you was
supposed to be the OPS-O; he was moved down to AMO because I
didn't have anybody else to fill in there.

So, you know, [REDACTED] is struggling with, now we have
these two incidents back to back, almost same place, different
circumstances, but...

: What was the second mishap?
: The second one was--
: Just a generic.
: Yeah, so there was--the aircraft they were
towing was stowed and next to it was an aircraft that was--they
were doing some maintenance trouble shooting on and the tow crew
thought that the stowed V-22 would go under the blades of the
aircraft that was undergoing maintenance. Which, of course,
nobody in their right mind would ever try to tow under another
aircraft. But as they towed, again, off a spot of the airfield
that we do not park on, that you're not even supposed to park
on. But because of the airfield revitalization, they were
parking near the end of the airfield where there is probably
about a five or six-foot hill and it goes up to a flat spot that
they were using to park in. Because that is what MAG told us to
do. And as was towing the aircraft forward, as
it came onto the hill, the tail pitched up, rotated up, and then
ended up impacting the blades on the aircraft that was
undergoing maintenance. So, again, another wake-up call.
: Yeah.
Obviously, I was extremely pissed, and I told to make sure again that we are doing things the right way. Like, my question to him was, "How can we have a mishap in the exact same spot that we did a week ago? Didn't you guys talk to the Marines?" And all that kind of stuff. So, anyway, that was the first chink in the armor that I saw.

And again, we're transitioning, we've got now as the XO because my XO left this summer. moves downstairs, a job that he was not planning on taking, because he is the only other major in the squadron that can fill that job. I don't even have any other major selects in the squadron. And nobody else down in the Maintenance Department had the experience to lead the department. So, by de facto, went down there.

We are in the middle of Equist, we are undergoing airfield revitalization, so we have an incredibly compacted flight line. Literally, they have basically multiple slashes throughout the flight line. The area that we had out incidents in was kind of a slash-like area. Then we spotted airplanes, we were planning on flying and then we had another slash in front of the flight line shed. So, very dynamic situation.

And again, I talked about it routinely. I said, "Hey, pay attention, pay attention." So, anyway, that was the first time I had ever seen the Maintenance Department, in my opinion, make a big mistake.
So, up to this point, I had nothing but utmost confidence in the abilities of the Maintenance Department. In my opinion, everything they did, they were aggressive when it came to making up aircrafts. And when I say, "aggressive," I mean assertive. Not like taking risk, but hey, if there was something out of the limits and they knew they could put in for a deferral, that was what they would attempt to do, so that we could push that kind of stuff to phase inspections. Really efficient with things like--

Do you think it is possible that in that, eventually, over time that that got out of hand? The quota of just trying to make up aircraft?

I don't think the leadership ever intended for people to cut corners, if that's kind of where it's--what you're asking me. I think that maintenance control worked very closely with QA and said, "Okay, we have this, what can we do? Is this an immediate fix or is this something we can defer?"

like I said, very intrusive leader, would stay at the squadron until the wee hours of the morning, just to call on the West Coast and say, "Hey, we have tar coming your way and we are looking for a deferral." And he would have a conversation so that when that actually showed up, knew what we were looking for, you know, to try to do it. You know, I got briefed on all those things. Everything that they came and told me about sounded like solid, smart decision
making. "Hey, we don't change windscreens on Wednesday because
we are going to lose two days of a down aircraft because it has
got through cure time. Let's do windscreens on Friday morning."
Great idea. So, I had a very solid Maintenance team.
I had _, who had been
doing it for a long time. I had _ down there. A lot
of my staff NCOs in the shops had been with the squadron for
years. _, all-world guy, 3Qs system guy.
He's gone now. _ was also an AO, so we
could stick him on flights and he could serve dual purpose. A
number of gunnies that left over the summer, stuff like that.
So, when you ask me my assessment of the Maintenance
Department, now we took a huge hit this summer. And to me, the
31st MEU is a very unforgiving place to allow that to happen.
That while we're not stabilized--I understand that we don't have
the six months to work up because we rely on UDPs, but even the
core squadron, we have probably, I don't know the exact number,
we've probably executed 40 or 50 PCSs this summer. And these
are the guys the--so, my Maintenance Department lost their AMO,
their Maintenance chief, the two strongest staff NCOs in the
Maintenance Department both left before we came out to the ship.
My AVI officer who had been with the squadron for
three years, I mean, I could sit here and keep rattling this
off. I knew coming out here that the Maintenance Department--
But those people are not with you on this deployment?

They are not with me.

Yeah.

That's what I'm getting at is not only do I bring in new Dets, but I lost a quarter of my Maintenance Department to PC. A couple of the people, we were able to talk into coming out to the ship for a month, with the plan that, "Hey, you come out, help get some new guys up to speed. We've got some boot lance corporals here that you can help get trained up. If you are a flyer, or an experienced CQ guy, we want you to come out and then we'll send you home at the first port call." Which we did. We sent a number of people home after Sydney, and sent a number of people home after Brisbane. So, we're still executing PCSes as we talk.

So, you know, to me, the Maintenance Department was not where it was several months ago. With that being said, you know, there were no stand out red flags that would make me think that we weren't capable of doing our job. It was very challenging, a lot of my squadron formation discussions leading up to this, was that, "Hey, we're coming off a very hard year at the MAG and now we're going to the MEU, and this is going to be very dynamic. We're going to get on a ship, we're going to steam for two weeks and we are going to go straight into
Talisman Sabre. Make sure you guys are ready. Make sure your
guys are ready."

So, certainly something that I identified. And I
asked people to stick around. I asked--like, I didn't want my
Maintenance chief to leave. Wing made him go away. I said,
"Hey, I need to keep that guy. You know, I have a junior
Maintenance Department and I'm changing my MO and now you're
taking away my Maintenance chief too." Nope, time for him to
move. You know how those E-9s are. They got the E-9 Master
Guns up at Wing decides when people are leaving. They took my
maintenance control chief about six months ago. Right after I
got him trained up. Seven months of training and they came down
and said, "He's the only master sergeant in the Wing with fixed-
wing time." I literally--I mentioned it to General Sandborn. I
said, "Sir, I just got this guy trained. And he's got three-
year orders to VMM-265 and ALD comes down and takes this guy
from me."

So, I take my gunny who is getting promoted to first
sergeant out of airframes, a guy nowhere near the same quality
or training as the guy he's replacing and move him over. So,
this stuff goes on all the time and this summer was really bad
leading up to this. Like I said, AMO, maintenance chief,
several staff sergeants, the gunnies, two different gunnies.
Who, to me, weren't running the shop, they weren't even as good
as maintainers as the staff sergeants I lost, but all of these
people had a--my S-4 right now has two officers and two lance
 korps. Because I don't even have an S-4 chief down there.
 So, that's the state of this squadron as a whole right now.

 So, sir, to get back to your question, yeah, I knew
 that the maintenance department had taken a huge hit. And I
told, I told, I told, I told, "Hey, you need
to be talking to every single day. Ask him what he
did to make sure that we continue to do these things that have
made us successfully." You know, and I told, I joked with him, I said, "You're the AMO. You're my XO and
you're the AMO in still helping to make sure. I said, your
focus should be on making sure that Maintenance does not slip
from where the team that we have built down there."

 And you know, now looking at this, I think it was just
too much. I think the people leaving, the lack of experience of
the AMO, and is a phenomenal officer, but you know, he has
literally been in that seat for two months and he didn't even
going to the AMO school. Because it was an unplanned moved
to put him down there. So, all these things to me are things
that would explain why, if things are not being done right in
maintenance that that has a lot to do with it. I don't believe
that six months ago, if we could go back and look at whatever
issues you may have found, I think we'd find that they were in a
lot better place six months ago.

  , you got anything?
1  : No, sir.
2  : All right.
3  : I'm sorry, I know that was rambling, did
4  that answer your question, sir?
5  : Nope, that's good enough for me.
6  : Okay.
7  : And this moment, what I'll have you do is I'll
8  have you stand up, and raise your right hand.  Say basically
9  that this statement is true to the best of your knowledge and at
10  that point, I'll have  talk to you about some
11  paperwork.
12  : Okay.
13  : DO you swear or affirm the statement you
14  provided is the truth to the best of your knowledge, so help you
15  God?
16  : I do.
17  : Sir, thank you for providing a
18  statement.  I am going to ask that you not discuss your
19  statement with anybody else, as we're still interviewing people.
20  If people come up and ask you and they want to know what you
21  talked about or they have questions, they can direct that tot eh
22  investigating officer.
23  : Okay.
24  : Do you have any questions, sir?
25  : I do not.
Thank you, sir.

Thank you, gentlemen.

This interview is terminated. Time on deck is 1607.
CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPT

I, __________________, do hereby certify that the foregoing was transcribed from a digital recording not made by me, but transcribed verbatim by me or under my supervision to the best of my ability, taken at the time and place set out in the record above.

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6)
It is 21 August 2017, aboard the USS BONHOMME RICHARD. The time on deck is 1312. My name is [b3](10USC§130)(b6), legal advisor for the JAGMAN Investigation. We are here, this afternoon, for the interview of [b3](10USC§130)(b6), in the presence of the Investigating Officer, [b3](10USC§130)(b6) and the Assistant Investigating Officer, [b3](10USC§130)(b6).

Prior to coming onto the record, I discussed the completely voluntary nature of participation in the JAGMAN Investigation. [b3](10USC§130)(b6) understood, and he agreed to sit down and talk with us. I gave him a Privacy Act Statement, which he reviewed and signed. I then notified him that he is a potential witness, of the Aviation Mishap Safety Investigation and the JAGMAN Investigation. We went over the different objectives of the two investigations, the reason why procedures vary, the need to preserve the privileged nature of the Aviation Mishap Safety Investigation, and the fact that neither command nor administrative action may alter the privileged character of the statements provided to the Aviation Mishap Board, and such statements will not be available to the JAGMAN Investigation from any official source.

Is that all accurate, sir?

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): It is.

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): Sir?

[b3](10USC§130)(b6): All right, [b3](10USC§130)(b6), thank you for sitting down with us. I appreciate you taking the time to do so.
Yes, sir.

What we've found so far in this investigation is by interviewing multiple different people. Obviously, depending on where someone sat and time, each person might have a various piece of the puzzle that kind of helps us put together the whole thing or see it from--sometimes people are just limited by where they are, what their role in a particular unit is. Because we have interviewed the maintenance department, we have interviewed operations, we interviewed safety, mishap aircrew, the Marines that were on the aircraft, USS GREEN BAY flight deck, the tower, the rescue boats, SAR Helo. We've kind of in a certain light pieced together a lot of different things about the investigation. But that is kind of why we are working our way through and kind of why we've briefed it and it's increased in terms of squadron everyone up except for you and CO at this point. Then we are looking to go through our initial round of interviews. That is kind of how we got here.

Just the same thing, the way I have tried to build from ours, was we started looking at maintenance, working on, "Hey, we have a safe aircraft to go out and execute the mission." We looked at Ops, we were looking for qualified crews that get the schedule to go out and do the mission. We’re looking at safety, from those guys, providing safety oversight and doing a lot of the things that they are supposed to do and then obviously, we talked about the mishap crew, about how did
it go?  How did you brief it?  How did you execute?  What did 
you find good?  What did you find bad?  And then kind of like, 
no kidding, just the mishap itself, just kind of like, "what 
exactly happened?"  Because a lot of people--most people are 
focused right at that particular moment in time, but there is so 
much going on, it's interesting because of some of the people 
out there.  That's why we are basically at this point, just down 
to you and the CO.

: Yes, sir.

: The way I typically try and do these 
interviews, I talk to kind of the person, kind of establish the 
stuff about them, just kind of who they are, what they do, and 
their experience, and everything else that kind of gives 
everybody a sense of what their experience is and everything 
that you have to get them to this point.

So, then after doing that, then basically kind of go 
through some of the mishap stuff.  I mean, things in particular 
to it.  Things that maybe you can help us provide some 
information to, based off your perspective and what you know.

: Yes, sir.

: So, if you could, tell me, how long have you 
been in the Marine Corps?

: Over 13 years; 13 and some change, sir.

: And how long have you been in 265?

: A little over two years.
Okay.

May of '15.

And your MOS?

7532.

And can you talk to me about your experience, kind of what you've done in the Marine Corps up prior to know?

Yes, sir. Yes, sir. So, basically, same start up as everybody else, all the way up to my first fleet squadron. I did select V-22s out of flight school in 2005, I believe. Showed up to the fleet and my first squadron was the VMM-263. Standard progression at 263 up through WTI.

At 263, as far as jobwise, I started off as the Adjutant. From Adjutant, legal officer, I then went to air frames. I was the air frames OIC for roughly a year, I would guess at this point. After air frames, during the time I was in air frames, I went to WTI, came back as the PTO. After doing that for a little over a year, two deployments there on both MEU deployments, I went to Botswana after that and was the T&R syllabus sponsor for the V-22s, so did a lot of work with the NV-22 T&R Program Manual, and a lot of that kind of stuff, sir. On top of—you're familiar with, sir, the ad hoc SME areas? I was the NEO SME. I did AST-3, which was the big NEO mission. That was my evolution. I was the Air Defense Artillery SME and a few other things, DCM, DCMI guy.
Strangely enough, I was the Air Defense Artillery NEO SME. Small world.

Yes, sir.

Okay.

After that, I was asked to come out to 256 to be the OPSO, so I moved out here May of '15. I was the OPSO for about nine or ten months and plans changed. I became the maintenance officer, about ten months into that job. I did maintenance officer for about 15 months. Then was asked to stick around for a third year in the squadron for experience. Maintain some experience in the squadron, so I went to XO at that point. I started turnover in April. I think officially, May 1st was really my first day as the XO. And then of course, this float there.

Previous floats, so this is my third float with the 31st MEU. So, I guess all in all, this is my fifth MEU deployment.

So, your current billet is XO and you've had it roughly since May 1st?

Yes, sir.

And then who was the XO prior to you?

That would have been [ph].

All right, so, you have previous 31st MEU experience, roughly five MEUs?

Yes, sir.
I want to say you are fairly MEU savvy in how MEUs work, both east and west coast, and then, obviously, 31st is kind of its own unique MEU.

That's a great way to put it, sir.

And so, very experienced around the boat and the boat ops and everything like that. Going back now, in the timeframe before the mishap, can you tell me just on a general note, not necessarily related to this particular mishap, but ops scheduling, how does it work? How does the schedule get from wherever it is to you as the XO, and then kind of what happens from you to the CO?

All right, sir, so typically, starting off with how the schedule is routed to me. I don't always see it. Per our SOP, it's not required to go through me, but the CO, again based on experience and stuff, has asked me to pay particular attention to crew pairings and stuff like that as he is not a boat guy; he hasn't been on a boat deployment. So, that was kind of my area of focus.

So, as far as the scheduling goes and the 31st MEU in general, it's a little bit weird how on the ship, the air plan drives the schedule. So, again, not related necessarily to the mishap, but just speaking in general how the schedule works, it's typically finalized a lot later in the day. So, I would try, based on whatever it was, if I was flying or whatever, to try to get a heads up on crew pairings and such earlier on in
the day, so that it wasn't a change later on, once it got to me. And that primarily being another thing because of—well, never mind, it's not really applicable.

But anyways, I was trying to get a look earlier on, and then typically, after the APB, things would change. The schedule would change based on the air plan shifting. And then to be honest with you, the schedule does get done quite late because, what we are trying to avoid is writing a schedule that then doesn't match the air plan. Because if we sign it when it is ready to go in the afternoon, it never fails, the air plan changes post-1600, -1700; and now later on in the evening the schedule has changed and then now you have more confusion because there was a flight schedule already put out.

So, if I had to summarize it, sir, I would say that it is typically nonstandard schedule. Not necessarily the schedule writing, but schedule completion.

: Okay. That's just ops scheduling stuff. Do you recall anything unusually about the scheduled routing for the day, the day prior or the day of the mishap? Anything that stands out to you?

: Yes, sir. The one main thing that stood out to me, again, was I was flying that afternoon and evening. Timeframe wise, I believe I had a 2100 land time, 2000-2100. So before going into my brief, I got a quick glimpse of the schedule and what stood out to me, having looked back at it, is
that the original plan for the NEO was later on in the day. It was a 0800 or a 0900 brief, for an early afternoon launch.

So, at the ship, we typically--per our SOP, we schedule three hours for the brief just because of the dynamics of the ship, trying to get everything done and accomplished before walking to the aircraft and stuff. And then we show up to the aircraft sooner, usually, because of the spotting and unfolding and all those operations. So, we typically schedule three hours for that brief. So if it was a 0800 or 0900 brief, it would have been 1100 or 1200 take-off. And I believe that was what the flight window was at that time.

: And that was earlier in the day?

: That was early afternoon-ish, sir.

: Okay.

: The last time I had seen the schedule. So, then I flew that night. I flew with . I don't remember my crew chiefs. I think was with me. Do you have the schedule? It might help me refresh.

: August 4th? That's the one that was off the shared drive.

: Okay, yeah. So I had . And then I had another copilot, [ph], that's right. So, the idea was to get back in the saddle again. He was--I remember that this schedule, in particular, making sure that he didn't require a warm-up or anything more. He was a copilot,
but I remember looking at his last shipboard fly day. It was in 20-ish; 22, 23, 24, something like that. Because we had sent him home to go see his baby that had just been born when we pulled into port. So, between that time, everybody had kind of been in port and had about, roughly, between the no-fly dates on the front side and back side, about a week or so off. So, I remember that being a sticking point for me, when I saw the schedule the day before is making sure [REMOVED] was okay to just start off at night.

It was highlight level, from what I remember. Yeah, it was a highlight level event, so I remember saying, "All right, him with me." I was good with that crew to get him warmed back up. I was just the R&S insert and basically, we went out, did the insert, and came back. I got him his two landings so that he was proficient again to carry pax. The two-landing thing, we always try to get everybody two landings when they land at night to reset that, so that that stays with them for 30 days, vice just landing once and then now they have to go out again anyways if they were going to be proficient. You know what I'm saying.

: So, you were able to carry pax off the ship because it was just a take-off?

: No, I was able to--I'm just saying, in general, when he got back, I wanted to reset his two. He was still proficient, he had flown within 30 days, nights.
Okay, just to rehack the clock?

Yeah, just to rehack the clock. And then that was one of the specific things that we looked at. I wanted to make sure he was able to carry pax. And he was. It was his last night fly day was 20-something days. It was just the 20-something days is what stood out in my mind, and I wanted to make sure that he was good.

Do you recall, offhand, when you were in the brief, were there any last-minute schedule changes to what you saw here? Crew chief changes, based on maybe what happened on August 3rd? Or did you have [ph] and [ph] all night?

I believe--I can't recall right now. I am pretty sure--I don't recall. I mean, some of the schedule changes, I don't see. If there was a schedule change and it went straight to the CO, I would be speaking out of line if I told you that there was a schedule change. I'm not sure.

But if you logged on your NAVAIR, and I could show you the NAVAIR for aircraft 9, which flew that night, that says, "[b3](10USC§130)(b6) all night," those were the crew chiefs on the plan all night?

Yeah.

Keep going.

All right, so, anyways, got him his two night launches where he punched again on the way back. And then he
got out, it was a 2100 land. So, I want to say he was 1945-ish or so, 2000 timeframe when I got him out of the seat. 

"Him" being ?

, yeah. I'm looking at the 1816. I don't remember the air plan hot seat time, but I remember we were earlier than what was scheduled.

So, he got out and he was definitely out by, at the latest it was 2000 by the time he was out. And then I don't know where he went from there. I don't recall him--when I was looking at the schedule before I walked, I don't recall him being on the schedule either. I just remember it being at 0800 or 0900 brief.

All right, so that was the night before. As far as the flight goes. Then I got in the seat and repunched for nights. Then after that, I came back and did a debrief with and talked through some things. Went through the war room. By the time I got back into my office or my stateroom area, it was 2230 or so; 2200-2230, somewhere in between there. And when I walked in, the schedule was still not complete. The schedule writers were in there talking to the CO. I think he either signed it already, or was about to sign it. And he asked me if I was good with the crews.

I remember glancing at the crews. I'm trying to remember when it came to my attention that the schedule was--had slid left, to a 0600 take-off. I remember why it slid, I
remember asking why, but I can't remember the timeframe of when that happened. But I asked him why it slid left and it had something to do with the change. We were in the middle of AIT, so it wasn't a set schedule at all. And it was based on the situation that was continuing with the NEO stuff ashore.

And the original plan was to potentially insert the ECC on this day, I think with the 53s, they were going to try to knock that out. But that didn't end up happening because the ECC didn't get in there and start doing their thing that night. So that way, the first time the aircraft went in later on in the afternoon—or later morning, early afternoon, they would have been able to just immediately start extracting.

I guess the CLB had asked to move the flight window left, so that they could get the ECC in earlier. And I think that's the why behind it. But I don't remember at what point 0600 brief came up. But I do remember it did come up. I asked somebody about it, but I think that was after the schedule was already signed. And I remember everybody saying that it was good.

Okay. That's pretty much all there is in terms of the schedule really, and then the mishap. Post mishap, going back through the flight schedule and other stuff like that, I mean, people tend to do that, did you learn anything that you didn't know at the time, from the day prior? Like, you were like, "Oh wow, that's interesting, I didn't understand that
or didn't know that." You know, what I mean, at that time, was there something?

Yes, sir. I've reflected a lot on this, as much, you know, just trying to think the normal, "What could we have done differently?" One thing that stands out to me, is that the duties, the EWO and the EWE's are scheduled a month out. And we are quite limited on our crew chiefs, so it's not--I don't want to say its uncommon to me. We'll end up seeing these because they are scheduled out, so far out. We'll end up seeing crew names that go on and flight line--because the schedule, if it comes out late and somebody has to get put on the schedule because we are limited by crew chiefs, then if a crew chief is on EWO or EWE, they'll swap that out. They'll put somebody else in to stand in for that. Or if a guy is coming in late, and gets scheduled, has to fly again, typically, flight line will cover down on their post aircraft duties, and kick them out so they can go get on their crew rest or crew day.

So, that has been on my mind, wondering, because everything slid left, originally, at least in my mind, I knew we were at 2100 land. So, I was thinking crew rest, going into crew day, 0800 to 0900 didn't flash as a concern to me. Because even if somebody got out at 2100 or 2200, they would still be fine here on the ship to continue.

The last question I have relative to scheduling--Ops and scheduling right now is if there is a change
to the flight schedule, what is the standard practice for a
change? Like, if somebody identifies a change, or a change
needs to be made, what do they do?

They'll typically, the ODO will run it by the
OPS-O and then they will try to track down the CO and get the
schedule changed through the CO. Usually the OPS-O will either
handle that himself or delegate that to the ODO if he is good
with it. And then if the CO is not around, it will go to the XO
and myself. And if I'm not available, the OPS-O will make that
call. So per our SOP, it's CO, XO, OPS-O, in that order, can
make the final determination.

Okay. And is that a verbal or is that a pen
change to the original?

It's a pen change to the original flight
schedule with an initial.

For duties and other things like that, do you
know if they were doing that whenever they would swap somebody
out or change relative to a flight schedule?

I never had one brought to me for a duty
schedule change like that. I think for these EWOs and EWEs, I
asked early on in this float to get those on there, because
typically we just put the Watchdog and the ODO on there, as the
main duties. EWO and EWE are typically managed at a lower
level, but I wanted especially the safety folks and stuff like
that, to have sight of that. But I don't remember at what point
my conversation with somebody about getting those put on there, as an essay builder. But I never had anybody come to me specifically and write a change for any of those.

: Okay. I agree with you. I mean, my previous experience, we put EWO, EWE on the flight schedule, same thing, various names, Watchdog, we've always just called it tower flower, were the names.

: Yes, sir.

: One of the things that kind of percolated in my mind was when I was talking to different people about them just swapping out the duty, one of the things that kind of came up, was like, okay, if the EWO and the EWE are both out walking the deck and, God forbid, they both go overboard, but somebody changed the flight schedule; or say the different person standing the duty, all of a sudden, you find somebody who was supposed to be potentially, and then now who are we searching for. And that was kind of one of the things. Like with here, because it was a little bit difficult to then figure out--you know, for the longest time, initially, we were just like, because we you were trying to confirm, "Did stand that duty?" Some people were like, "I can't tell you." And then some people were like, "Well, no they didn't." Okay, well, then who stood it? "Well, I'm not sure." And so then eventually, we ironed out who we thought stood that duty. But then at the same time, what I found was I could see situations where it could end
up being the idea of potentially like, hey, the shop covers for that person.

The other thing along the lines of Watchdog, I don't know whether it is known or if it is schedule change, but I have been told that people sometimes go and cover for a certain period of time for someone else. And on the Watchdog thing, and it is kind of like, "Well, is that a pen change or is that a schedule change or is it something that we're going to add to the schedule?" And then they were like, "Oh, no, no, no, we'll cover for them for a bit."

So, we were kind of, in this area right here specifically, we ended up with--it drew more questions than it might have otherwise. And then the only other thing is then asking some people whether they specifically were doing pen changes and other stuff. A lot of times the answer was, no, they weren't.

: So, to answer that, sir, great point on the EWO and EWE. Having it pen and ink changed should be done, something to definitely change and make better in the future.

: And that is more why I kind of shared it.

: Now, as far as the typical duties that we're used to like the ODO and the Watchdog that are directly involved in flight operations, change outs, if they have occurred, without a schedule change, I am not aware of that. That would be nonstandard and unsatisfactory, if you ask me.
Now, I do know that if--what I know is acceptable, is that if somebody is up there on Watchdog, and they got to go make a head call, or they are going to go grab food for 30 minutes or something like that, they would typically find a period where the aircraft are away, give a pass down, somebody stands the duty for 30 minutes while they eat, and then they come back up. Now, in my mind that one wouldn't require necessarily a schedule change, because the guy is coming back on duty.

Now, we have had to change duties in the past, whether it be ODO or Watchdog. And I personally haven't had to sign any of those, but I would imagine that those changes are lined out, just like back home would change out an ODO.

It would be nonstandard if somebody is scheduled for a six-hour Watchdog, got taken off, if a pen and ink change wasn't done?

Yeah, in my experience. Yes. I haven't heard of that happening. If someone has said that that happened, that is nonstandard.

No worries. Moving out of the sort of Ops scheduling for the NATOPS, that sort of thing, kind of the risk mitigation and parts of it. Can you talk to me about how somebody has achieved a qualification, how that goes from being a flight flown to all paperwork is done with it, somewhere, including a CO signature on it?
Yes, sir, absolutely. So, after a flight, it is the responsibility of the NATOPS officer to gen up the qualification letter. They will gen up that qualification letter and send that to—or notify the PTO. In which case, the PTO ensures that the ATF is complete and then routes that through the CO. And then once the CO signs it, that will be put in the individual's NATOPS jacket by the NATOPS officer. A copy would be made to ensure that it goes in the APR as well. That's always been the standard in this squadron.

As far as the routing goes, typically to expedite that, we'll try to—I know the NATOPS Officer just have an open door, straight to the CO to get those things signed; that's the standard process.

I do know that in this case, that we had quite a few jobs that changed over all in that same timeframe and we had a new NATOPS officer. Procedures are a little bit, you know, a little bit different on a boat. Locations and stuff like that. And I do—since this occurred, I was informed that the NATOPS paperwork, although signed, was not put in the NATOPS drawer, not in the actual individual's NATOPS jacket. Which was a surprise by me, because we had a whole bunch of qualifications to do when we first got on this boat. A lot of young guys. And so when the schedules came by, I remember specifically, asking about paperwork to ensure that the CO had signed it. Because, again, I don't always see it.
I know there were a bunch of them produced all at once, a few days following our big CQ period. And the CO signed a whole bunch of them. So, when this came up, I specifically asked why the paperwork wasn't in the actual NATOPS jacket and the NATOPS officer just dropped the ball on that one. He had outed it, and it was signed. It was kind of off of radar at that point because it was signed. It simply needs to go in the jacket. And it wasn't put in the jacket, it was just left in the drawer there.

For the investigations records, can you, for the mishap crew of Puff-02, can you provide us those signed off CQ letters? If any in that folder pertain to any of that mishap crew. Just for the conduct of our investigation.

Yeah, I believe the AMB members already took those.

Okay, we can coordinate with the AMB then. I will ask. I will follow up and make sure. No worries.

If it is with the AMB, we'll get it. Thank you.

So, along that line, there is a process post all this. Have you implemented any steps different or are doing anything different relative to the NATOPS program following the mishap or anything like that?
No, sir, I wouldn't say that we necessarily changed anything. We just had a big--I take that back. I had everybody, I talked to the DOS and I said, "Everybody needs to have a NATOPS audit." So, we did a NATOPS audit to ensure that all the paperwork is in place for all the crews, just to tighten up all the series. And just to make sure if there was a hole there in the paperwork not getting put in the jacket, I just wanted to make sure that it was clear across the board. So, that was the one--I wouldn't call it a change, sir, I would say that it was just an off-cycle audit.

Okay, instead of birth month, doing everyone.

Yes, sir.

Okay.

And then I sat down with the NATOPS officer and the DOS. To be honest with you, I did it as a lesson learned for not only the NATOPS officer, but for the DOS, who is ultimately responsible for him. As the XO, I gave him what his job responsibility was, having known that that really is what his RS should have done for him already. So, it was kind of like a, "Hey, here's a lesson learned for both of you." But I was directing it at the new NATOPS Officer. And, basically, set up a battle rhythm for him. I knows my battle rhythms. I basically told him, "You need to set up a battle rhythm for all your requirements: Daily, weekly, quarterly, and yearly. And that way, every day, you can check off what you need to have
done. I walked him through what he should be doing when we do look at monthlys and weeklys. If he's looking at monthlys he should obviously be a few months ahead of knowing and pinging Ops on who has got something coming up.


[b3][10USC §130][b6] And then on the monthlys, when he sees it scheduled, he puts it on his radar to follow up with it. Then when he sees it on a weekly, it is one more check in the box. And then finally, to the last day, when he sees it on the daily, he knows the following day he's going to go into make sure that in that flight ops summary, make sure the flight was complete. If it was complete, now start the process of the paperwork.

[b3][10USC §130][b6] Okay.

[b3][10USC §130][b6] So, he got a huge education on that and so did his RS for supervisions.

[b3][10USC §130][b6] Along those lines, do you know who handles enlisted aircrew NATOPS in the squadron?

[b3][10USC §130][b6] Yes. Can I go back to a little bit of history on that, sir?

[b3][10USC §130][b6] Sure.

[b3][10USC §130][b6] All right, so, like I told you when I came here as the OPSO, I'm always used to having an enlisted air crew member in the DOS and one in operations as the scheduler. So, I tried to implement that right when I got here and was told that we didn't have the manpower for that. So, I lost that fight,
which is fine. And then, we are crew chief limited out here. And really, that one person, that enlisted air crew training member has been covering down on both of those jobs. And it has been that way since I got out here. However, the NATOPS jackets and stuff like that, from my understanding, was still the NATOPS officer that would cover down on that, [ph]. And this is when I was a maintenance officer; I'm trying to remember who--I remember him being the guy who----

turned over with [ph].

Okay.

Is what we've established after kind of going through our things most recently.

Yeah, was the guy right before him, but used to handle APRs and it was kind of like the backtrack of, you know, because what is in the qualifications. The NATOPS qualifications should be in the APRs as well. A copy of it at least. I remember him being--doing that for a while too.

So, again, I don't remember any particulars of DOS at that time. I just kind of remember a generalization. But I do remember as the OPSO, having to cover down, it was , who was our enlisted aircrew trainer. And he would help out with the DOS job as far as ensuring those guys were getting all their qualifications and stuff that they needed.
Okay. Would you be surprised if I told you in our conversations that the NATOPS officer viewed his job as doing just officer NATOPS and, for all intents and purposes, the enlisted aircrew training manager and NATOPS guy was pretty much left to do his own sort of like two separate NATOPS parts?

Yes, sir.

The other is then leaving govern and leaving NATOPS and Ops, is as the enlisted aircrew training manager, he kind of got feet in both worlds, he is working predominately schedules on the Ops side and then working NATOPS on the other. A consistent theme amongst people, was it is very hard to get ATFs. And so then my question was: Who is on--both the PTO and then the aircrew training manager have commented about how hard it is to get ATFs. I am kind of like, all right. I accept that at face value, but I also think, it makes your NATOPS process and everything else harder to manage if they are not getting those from the--so, just more for awareness for you. Those are statements that have been mentioned to us in the course of this. But what it does, they each sort of affect the other because it makes the process harder to sort of complete.

Yes, sir. I mean, I've seen that in pretty much every squadron that I have done fleet support for. You go through, and you know, you do your audits and stuff and then you see a lot of missing ATFs. You're exactly right.
And then in this case, then at least in the back to the NATOPS portion is, the enlisted aircrew training manager wasn't getting supervised or at least the NATOPS Officer didn't feel it was his job to check to make sure that that kind of thing was going to the enlisted. So it kind of just--as an area for awareness.

Is that consistent with the previous NATOPS officers as well? Were you able to ask that same question?

I was able to speak to, and commented to me that he had taken the time to explain the proper steps and procedures to before he--he said they had a month long turn over.

That is surprising to me. Because, like I said, again, that turn over period was occurring as I was moving upstairs, but I remember specifically seeing those two together a lot.

From appearances, it appears that both and each got their job about the same time and sort of fell into that kind of pattern of that was sort of how--at least that is how it was interpreted by them.

Yes, sir. I could see that.

Next, moving out from there, is the planning and briefing of the actual embassy reinforcement mission that
they ended up executing on the day of the 5th. Taking you back, based on what I am able to deduce, is on the 3rd of August, was the CAT-1 brief, is when it occurred.

Can I see the schedule? As well as the CAT-2 and then followed by confirmation brief later that night on the 3rd. Because certain parts were going to occur on the 4th, and then certain things were going to occur on the 5th.

Do you recall attending the CAT-1 brief, or were you involved at all in the CAT-1 brief for the--? My understanding is that would have been roughly around 0700-0800 on the 3rd.

So, I don't go to the CAT, sir. Okay. The CO goes with the OPS-O. But I do remember going--no, I missed the NEO confirmation brief. Because I was flying that night.

So then, obviously, if you don't go to any of the CATs, then you are not aware of any of the conversations that went with how which COA was chosen, a surface COA, an air COA, or anything of that kind of stuff?

No, sir. The only conversation I had with anybody about the execution of the NEO, was, like I said, when I talked to [ph]. I can't remember the timeframe about it, but I remember him telling me things that shifted left because of the CLB flights.
And I think it might have maybe for the 4th. I don't believe the 5th changed much from what they had originally briefed or anything like that.

In interviews with the schedule writers and mission planners.

So, that would have affected. I'm not sure if they were tracking that very well. That wouldn't have affected the 4th, it would have affected the 5th because the 5th was when the ECC had to be inserted. So, the 5th's schedule would have been affected by what happened right here on the 4th.

Okay. But again, you were not part of any of the conversations about the CAT briefs, the COA development or attending the confirmation brief?

No, sir. Not that I remember. I definitely wasn't at the CAT, sir.

Okay. So, then on the day of the mishap, obviously, you had flown the night before. Could you kind of talk me through what you were doing on the date of the mishap itself? Kind of you know, what was your day like that day?

Let's see. I'm trying to remember the specifics. Standard day, sir.

Well, I mean, do you remember roughly when you got up? I'm not asking for exact times or anything. Just kind of what you did or were doing on the day of the mishap kind of thing.
I remember exactly what I was doing. When I got the word, I was calling to get an update on the missions for the day. And that is when he was like, "You heard the news?" And I didn't, and he told me. So I went down--

Calling from your stateroom down to--?

Yes, sir. I believe I was in the stateroom, made a call.

Was the CO with you at the time or was he somewhere else?

No, he was working out in his stateroom; he was on his bike.

That is why I can't remember--it's frustrating I can't remember exactly what was going on because it was kind of like, you know, the shock factor. I just remember coming back into the room and telling him so that he could get cleaned up, and I went down to the LFCC.

But it was a standard morning for me. I don't remember what time I got up, but I typically, my normally battle rhythm is usually up by 0600 for breakfast before 0700 and then usually getting a follow-up on operations.

I might have gone up to Watchdog. I typically do that a lot, throughout the whole AIT and CERTX. I try to move myself around to just observe.

I do remember being up in the tower, but again, because it was two weeks or so ago, I don’t remember what days
 exactly I was up there. But, I'll typically go up there and watch the launches and make sure everything gets out on time. I might have done that that day; to be honest with you, I don't remember.

: Okay. So, then now that you've been notified, do you let the CO know because he's in the stateroom with you, and then you go to the LFCC?

: Yes, sir.

: Can you describe for me what happens once you're in the LFCC, kind of what's going on? What do you see? What are you doing?

: Yes, sir. I walked up to the MEU CO. He asked for the side number and who was on the aircraft. Either he asked or I just provided that information to him. And then at that point, we are trying to track down exactly who--what serials they had onboard and I just remember from that point on, it was gathering information on exactly who was on the aircraft at the time.

While also getting information from I believe was the one that was overhead at the time. I was trying to make sure the aircraft was recovering safely. I remember landing on spot 9. And then at that point, my concern was making sure that and those guys had stayed on station long enough to maintain SA and feed that back here while they launched the 60s over to that direction.
Any other conversations or anything going on in the LFCC around that time? Do you recall anything?

Nothing in particular, sir. Just a lot of RFIs out on people and we were just confirming. I did specifically ask one specific question I remember because there were three crew chiefs. I wanted to verify that, no kidding, all three of the crew chiefs were actually on board. I remember trying to track down [name redacted], because [name redacted] had landed. I saw him land with [name redacted], and I remember asking somebody to--I asked the OPS-O just to get verification that those three were all on the aircraft.

Okay. So, how long would you say you stayed in the LFCC that evening?

I was in there awhile, sir. I don't remember the exact time. I was kind of in and out. One, I stayed in there until all of our aircraft were safe on deck. And then from that point on, just kind of in and out.

Okay. Do you recall that evening anything that went on in the squadron or anything like that? Did you all call everybody together, did you have a--how did you all handle the post mishap? What did you all do outside of all the immediate action type stuff that the people are doing at their individual places?

Yes, sir. We wanted to address the squadron. And I want to say it was the officers and the staff NCOs that
first night. We were going to talk to those Marines. And then
I remember the ship's captain getting onboard and kind of
telling everybody what happened.

So, I remember there being some people upset about
that. But then we went to the ready room, and I know the CO
talked to all the officers and staff NCOs. I believe it was
immediately that night. I am almost certain.

: Okay.

: Just informed them of what happened.

: You said that happened in the ready room?

: It was in the ready room, sir.

: So then at what point did you finally get
confirmation or notification that we've counted, we've
recounted, we've got enough, we know that there were 26 onboard
and we've got 23 but we're missing, and then what turned out to ultimately be,

: At what point, sir?

: Yeah, when did you all realize that?

: That was in the LFCC. That was pretty quick,
I imagine, from what I remember. When I say "quick," I mean, I
remember that information flowing. There was a lot of traffic
coming over the T-chat [ph]. They were basically passing names
and numbers. And I remember pretty early on that it was
and [redacted], and then the [redacted] that we were waiting for
information on.

And actually, it just triggered my mind also more of
what happened that night. That was also, [redacted] came over,
because I remember being down in medical talking to him.

[green]10 USC § 13006: Any approximation on what time that MEDEVAC
occurred? Was it still daylight? Was it past sunset?

[green]10 USC § 13006: It was dark I think. But I didn't go outside.

I--no, I did. I was in the--it was dark because I was on the
ramp when they brought him in.

[green]10 USC § 13006: Like combat cargo kind of where you come in
and out?

[green]10 USC § 13006: Yes, sir. Yeah, I remember it being dark when
they pulled him.

[green]10 USC § 13006: So, after sunset?

[green]10 USC § 13006: Yes. Sorry I don't have times. I don't
remember the times.

[green]10 USC § 13006: Not uncommon. So, were you able to talk to
him at all?


[green]10 USC § 13006: Did you have a conversation with him?

[green]10 USC § 13006: I just remember telling him he was going to be
all right and he kept telling me he was sorry. I told him it
wasn't his fault. That he was going to be okay.
And did he offer any indication about cause of mishap, anything like, "Hey, something unusual happened." Anything at all like that?

No. He didn't at that time, sir. On the phone though, a few days later he made some comments about that kind of stuff.

Can you tell me what those comments were?

He just said that he thought he did everything right. Now, he was talking to the CO on the phone and the CO was just asking if he was okay and I think he went into asking about and the others, and the CO was trying not to give him a whole lot of details and just saying, "Hey, you know, everything is going to be fine." And then the CO relayed this to me, I think he said something to the effect of, that was sitting left seat and he was apologizing because he wasn't on the controls and he wasn't guarding the controls. So, he isn't sure exactly what happened, but he thought that maybe had made a play for the deck or something like that. But that's totally—I didn't hear him say that. That was the CO talking to me while he was on the phone.

But anyway, outside of that part, when you were talking to, did he offer anything else in your conversation with him that day?

He didn't offer anything, and I didn't ask him.
1: Just checking in on him?
2: Yes, sir.
3: But he was okay, coherent and everything? Do you know roughly how long it took from the time he got to BHR before they decided to send him back ashore, or did he go the next day?

4: I could probably figure it out. So, I think it was that night, yeah, because I grabbed my Blackberry, and I gave him kind of instructions on what to do once he got there and how to provide information back to the ship. I gave my Blackberry, and I gave him kind of instructions on what to do once he got there and how to provide information back to us and updates. He went and got a bag packed, packed a bag for as well. So, I want to say that it was that night that they decided to fly him to the shore.

5: And then, if you recall, they flew him directly to Brisbane, so he could go to the hospital there; is that right?
6: I don't remember, sir. I can't remember if they flew him directly to the hospital or if they flew him to the airport and an ambulance took him to the hospital.

7: But it was Rockhampton Hospital, is that accurate?
Yes. Yeah, because he didn't go to the location that he is at now until the first surgery was over with.

So, then do you recall roughly that time that night, what time you were able to finally get to the rack or do whatever you needed to do, but finally settle down for you guys? I mean, I know it is pretty intensive degree.

Sir, I didn't sleep much the next few days. I got to bed, but it was probably two or three o'clock in the morning when I laid down. Yeah, I remember I didn't sleep much.

Yeah. Anything else, like from that day of the mishap, anything pertinent that you think that would be helpful for s to know or kind of understand? Be it from pre-mishap, during mishap, post mishap, any area that you think in any of those areas that would be?

No, I mean, really, I think the big one for me was that sticking point of the mission change, the mission slide. That one has been in my mind since it happened.

Is there anything that now at this point, you have sat there, and you have probably been interviewed by multiple people. Is there like a, "I wonder how come nobody has asked me that"? Or this thing or something about that or questioned about. Is there anything like that that you know, "Hey, I don't know why no one has asked"?

I don't, sir. Not me in particular, no, sir.
Last couple questions. Maintenance Department, things like that. How they do their business. What can you tell me about the Maintenance Department in general?

Well, sir, having been the AMO previously, I know that when I first started as the AMO, we had a lot of good qualified people, but they were lacking in communication and cohesiveness. I think I developed a very tight organization down there. I can say that in my time down there—and was with me for a little while—we had improved processes and procedures, cover downs, there were checks and double checks.

I remember going through the first maintenance inspection on some programs that the reason why I went down to maintenance, there were some programs that had gone bad. And I remember those programs getting put back on track. And then we followed up with two more maintenance inspections. In the process of improving efficiencies and production and stuff like that, I mean, readiness drove up. Communication was a big factor in that. Teambuilding, we were doing a lot of that. A lot of communication, all the way down to the lowest member in the Maintenance Department, knowing what the mission was and what part they played in it, because I—again, I am a firm believer in doing that.

I think it drives morale, one. And also makes a guy feel like he is a part of the team. So, when I am speaking to the Maintenance Department in that, since we—I think we
accomplished that. We had MALs, maintenance inspection, AMI
that went really well, we scored well on that one. And then
finished it off in November of last year with a full wing AMI,
scored AMI and had, I think a 94 on that and no off-track
programs. So, the Maintenance Department that I remember, we
were doing really well.

Now, I was actually telling this just earlier
today, like, I thought, being the XO I would still be able to
maintain a little bit of SA. And to be honest with you, sir,
with everything else that is going on in the XO world, I have a
general idea of what's going on. I have been able to provide
some guidance and stuff to the Marines still and to when he would ask, like different COAs. "Hey, I'm thinking
about this aircraft for phase next." And big picture stuff.
But the down and dirty, the battle rhythms and stuff that we
have built and the things like that, I don't know if they are
still being used.

So, I would say that outside looking in, at that
point, I felt like the Maintenance Department, even though we--
let me back track. We did lose a lot of qualifications. The
Maintenance Department is very young right now. You have a lot
of junior CDIs and CDQs for that matter that they've met the
minimums and they've gotten there, but they don't have the
experience yet. So, we've lost a lot of talent down there. And
there was a lot of changeover. You have a Maintenance that
turned over, you have an AMO that turned over. You had QA turn
over. There was a lot of turn over going on. Just the nature
of the beast of manpower in Okinawa. So, I guess if you want--
I'm being honest about the Maintenance Department from now
compared--I can't speak to the procedures and stuff, but I can
tell you that they are younger.

[b3][10USC§130](b6): any questions?
[b3][10USC§130](b6): No, sir.
[b3][10USC§130](b6): That's pretty much all I got for you, [b3][10USC§130](b6). What I'll do now, is I will have you stand up, I'll ask
you to raise your right hand and swear or affirm the statement
you provided is the truth to the best of your knowledge and then
a little bit of paperwork and we'll be done.
[b3][10USC§130](b6): Yes, sir.
[b3][10USC§130](b6): Raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm
the statement you provided is the truth to the best of your
knowledge, so help you God?
[b3][10USC§130](b6): Yes, sir.
[b3][10USC§130](b6): Sir, thank you for providing us with
a statement. I am going to ask that you not discuss what we
talked about here with anybody else, as we are still
interviewing people. If people have questions and they want to
know what you talked about, they can direct their inquiries to
the investigating officer, [b3][10USC§130](b6). Do you have any
questions, sir?
No.

This interview is terminated. Time on deck is 1409.
CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPT

I, ____________________________, do hereby certify that the foregoing was transcribed from a digital recording not made by me, but transcribed verbatim by me or under my supervision to the best of my ability, taken at the time and place set out in the record above.

(b3)(10USC§130)(b6)
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW OF

Date: Not provided

U.S.S. BONHOMME RICHARD

INTERVIEWERS:

[Redacted], USMC
[Redacted], USMC
[Redacted], USMC, Legal Advisor

Transcript Prepared by:

[Redacted]

CVV Transcripts
The time on deck is 1004. My name is , the Legal Advisor for the JAGMAN Investigation. We are gathered to conduct the interview of ; in the presence of the Investigating Officer, , and .

Prior to coming onto the record, discussed the voluntary nature of his participation. agreed to participate, read over, and signed the Privacy Act Statement. I also went over the fact that he is potentially a witness for both the Aviation Mishap Safety Investigation, as well as the JAGMAN Investigation. And therefore, I advised him of the different objectives of the two investigations; the reason why procedures vary; the need to preserve the privileged nature of the Aviation Mishap Safety Investigation; and that, neither command, nor administrative action, may alter the privileged character of the statements provided to the aviation mishap board, and such statements will not be available to the JAGMAN Investigation from any official source.

Sir?

: All right. Hey, kind of the way we've taken the attack for this investigation, so far, is we started with maintenance yesterday. We spent a significant time with them. We're trying to work our way into Ops, we'll do safety next. We'll talk to the XO and CO later; as well as, mishap aircrew.

: Sure.
But, basically—we're trying to do—maintenance was, establish we had a safe for flight aircraft that was able to go out and fly that day; talking to Ops, we scheduled crews that were good-to-go, that could fly that day, whatever the mission was. And, kind of—we talked to whole last. Now, we're going to talk today about the flight itself. And then, lastly, hey, mishap guys--this is, hey, what kind of happened?

Yes, sir.

So that’s, kind of, the build approach that we've been using. So yesterday we talked to schedule writers. We talked to PTO, got some, kind of, ideas to them about how they do scheduling, things like that. And so, kind of—a couple things from me. One of the things I asked just a moment ago, but how long have you been the Ops-O?

Officially, I took over when we left Port Brisbane, I believe, on 2 August.

Okay.

I've been working in Ops since I got out to Oki on 11 May for the deployment with—departed 265 from Brisbane and we came back out on the ship. For the most part, would you say up until about two weeks ago, you were predominately dealing with just 53 flight schedule or were you doing both?

Both.
Okay.

Yes, sir.

Can you talk to me about, sort of, the shipboard scheduling process? In your opinion, how does it go? How do we go from there's an idea for something out there to it becomes a-—whatever, weekly schedule—monthly schedule, I don't know.

Yes, sir.

But, you know, all the way down into it. Talk me through that.

Essentially, starting with the fly out process. I know it's always, kind of, a battle getting people qualified. As the ship comes in, getting on the ship for the 31st MEU—when the squadron first takes the 31st MEU, 463 had RIM pax right before we actually came out for the 31st. So almost of the aircrew that I brought out were day CQ.

On the 53 side?

Yes, sir. And even some night CQs. Some of my counterparts from the 53 community said that in the past it's been different where people haven't been on the boat in a long period of time, they're basically starting from scratch trying to get CQ'd just for the fly on, things of that nature.

Does the 53 community acknowledge day CQ as a qual specifically, and the night CQ as a separate one? Or is it just CQ once you are night complete?
I've seen it both ways. I know when I was a PTO, we had written qualification letters that said "day CQ." I'd have to double check the T&R. I'm quite certain it's both day CQ and night CQ.

Okay. That there's two qualifications, one for each.

Yeah, so coming out in May with a group, boat pilot, and crew chief that were good day CQ'd, from the 53 community. I know the V-22 community, or 225, the squadron and Ops had a detailed plan on how they were going to start with flying on the ship with a certain number of people getting balances in training for pilots, crew chiefs, things of that nature. And then, coming back to Futenma, they had essentially, a three-day--like a 72-hour plan to get everyone--they needed either re-punched with their delinquency, with regard to proficiency or their initial qualifications or their initial codes or their initial trainings prior to the ship coming into port.

I know that--I'm trying to think of the dates, to be honest with you. I know it was June--I think the 2nd through the 4th were those days. The 4th, we actually flew three 53s on the ship. And the 4th was the last day the ship went into port. And then, I believe it left on the 9th.

I think all but one or two V-22s made it on by the 4th. All but one 53 made it on by the 4th. Then, we basically
had our in port period from the 4th to the 8th, I believe. And then, the ship left on the 9th. We flew the last aircraft on, and then we were underway.

At that point, aside from a few strap hangers, I believe, the co-pilot side of the house, we essentially were day CQ across the board. And then, we were looking for our first opportunity for night CQs. I basically had myself, my WTI, and I believe one co-pilot or signer that are night CQ. Essentially, when we went underway at nights, both TMSs were pretty thin. But then, obviously, you have to wait for a highlight period in order to initiate that training.

Do you recall, by chance, where fit into that picture on the V-22 side?

I do not, not off the top of my head. I know that we--obviously, started with signers again, you know, getting signers reps. When we went underway, I remember, basically, we had an outline of what we wanted to accomplish, people that needed to be trained, when is the APB. Essentially, we're lobbying for night CQ windows during the high level of proficiency and, of course, competing for deck time with all the other participants and players, to include VMA and PIM, standard stuff for underway, people that need to be trained and how that training is going to be conducted.

And then, for the most part, you're putting up about two or three V-22s in a CQ period. And then, about the same,
about two 53s. With about five aircraft airborne, usually one
or two of them in a straight pattern, and then three in the
pattern for initial CQ training.

So I was in the APB with and being WTAI and AMOs are trying to work through how many
aircraft we want to fly the duration of flight time. Typically,
a day and a night window when we're trying to get our initial
proficiency. And then, just currency with regards to night
balances for the ability to carry PAX at night that we needed
to.

: The--
: That period--if that answers your question, probably about 9 June, when we departed out our heavy, heavy
focus on a daily basis at the MPG and the APB was initial
proficiency or initial exposure to CQ environment, and then
currency with regard to legality of carrying PAX at night.

: One of the--everybody seems to--from talking, kind of through that part, you know, very diligent on the part
of scheduling CQs. The paperwork piece of this--
: Yes, sir.
: --seems a little bit, maybe not as strong.

So the question was: Was there a concerted effort at
the time, when we're doing a lot of people's initial-type stuff,
getting, you know--making--you know what I'm saying?
: Yes, sir.
Get the paperwork in, the designation letter signed or other stuff like that. Was that talked about much at the leadership level?

I know it was talked about. And I know at one point, everyone that was getting initial qualifications—well, every day when we write the schedule, we use validation through M-Sharp. So that identifies any issues that are documentation errors. I know from the 265 standpoint, when the 53 did attach, we basically pulled all our stuff to ensure that our quals and what not were tight, and that—

So you went through logbooks, NATOPS jackets, APRs—

Crew went through NATOPS and APRs from the 53 det and we ensured that signed acceptances of our entire det's qualifications. You know, standard NATOPS stuff.

I know from the 265 piece, pilots and aircrew, there was a large push for quals to be signed off as people were completing this initial training. I don't know if once it was signed, all this documentation then was put in jackets like they were supposed to be.

It sounds like, from what you're saying, the 53 det, because it came in as a separate entity, initially, they got a scrub of some kind, in terms of their—
We wanted to make sure that because we were--obviously, and this is my first MEU, but as we're attaching to a different unit, we now have a different CO. We needed to ensure that our quals are all accepted from that commanding officer.

All right. So you checked the logbooks, APRs, NATOPS jackets, plus--

Correct, I have a pilot in safety, so I had him--my NATOPS officer, basically, pull our NATOPS jackets. We did our instrument and NATOPS check that were going to expire on the boat ahead of time, just because I'm the only NATOPS instrument instructor. And I knew I was going to be taking over as the Ops-O and det OIC.

It'd be hard to make the schedule while you're in your deployment.

So we did NATOPs and instrument checks in the simulator before we left Futenma. And like I said, as a det joining a new command, I knew at a minimum, legality-wise, I had to have sign off on our acceptances. I know that, like I said, with this high CQ period from the 3rd through 4th, and then, essentially, leaving port on the 9th, waiting for a highlight window, that there was a large push with paperwork going through the command to get signed off with regards to the new qualifications with regards to CQ.

I know that had high visibility from the XO on it as well. And, within S-3 and the DOS. Like I
said, I don't know if maybe after a lot attention was paid to it, if it all made it into the appropriate NATOPS jackets afterwards. I'm not sure about that.

: Can you describe for us the process? Like, say somebody did an initial CQ. How does everyone know? Ops, NATOPS, CO, everybody, that everything's—you know what I mean? That everything's--

: Schedule writers--like I said, so when we went underway, I know that they were doing a top-down ensuring--I'm sure like most squadrons, signers are good first, instructors are good first. We left three pilots back in Futenma that were doing SI checks that were, basically, just had to join us in Brisbane. So top-down approach with regards to instructors, signers, and co-pilots.

As people were completing their CQs, obviously they're tracking on their hot board with regards to, they have completed. They got their five bounces. I know a couple nights—several nights, it was very tough to even get the five bounces. Basically, they need to turn it off before they were having to be rescheduled to do their initials, just based on deck time, lack of ability to complete training with regards to turns, winds, other aircraft. So I know a lot of these co-pilots had to get on schedule several times to get their five bounces to get their sign-offs.
Once they completed that event, I know that they would be coded for it. Obviously, the hot board reflects. My understanding was paperwork's—you know, had started routing that process thereafter.

Would you wait for the paperwork to be signed off before scheduling them again for CQ or was there any control process on that?

I mean, the—I know once people flew CQs, there was a concerted effort—again, not from the signer's perspective. And most of the signers, having done a 31st MEU already, it was really more of a—hey, they were delinquent and we just re-punch proficiency, and they already had designation within their jackets.

Within the co-pilot ranks, there's so many that were not qualified. Typically, once they got CQ'd, they—the intent was to move on and knock their peers out, pretty much from the top down.

Was there ever, like, a product that said, okay—hey, here's a list of all the people that have never CQ'd before? Okay. They need to fly these codes. They need to get these ATFs. They need to have a designation letter. It needs to go, you know, signed and then--

I don't know. I'm quite certain that all took place before my arrival. Because, like I said, they had a very detailed, meticulous plan for, like, a 72-hour training
period, with regards to pilots and crew chiefs. I know they validated, like the pre-reqs for CQs. And then, I know as people were obtaining CQs, it was essentially, hey, they're moving down the list. And then, essentially, updating the hot board and do routing paperwork.

: But, in terms of the standard process for--is there a standard process for the squadron if somebody does complete a thing? And we--

: Don't use them to do that qual until it's signed off--

: Or, we get a--you know, so-and-so flew that. We get ATFs. These--whoever gets the ATFs now gives them to NATOPS. NATOPS now generates a designation letter. ATFs and NATOPS--the letter of designation will go up the chain, whenever so everybody will see it or something.

: Yes, sir.

: And then, it gets signed off and comes back. And when it comes back, NATOPS comes down and goes, hey, I've got a signed letter. So somebody pulls out the logbook and goes, such-and-such was signed on that day. You know what I mean. And now I know, completely above board, straight up, everybody's 100 percent legit both--yes, they flew the code and it shows in M-Sharp, but their paperwork is all solid as well.

The only reason I'm, sort of pinging on that is because I just haven't got that from the various people and
sourcing that we've talked to, I haven't got it. What I've
gotten from most people so far is: Well, we knew they flew it
because it shows in M-Sharp. The hot board's showing that they
did CQs however many days ago, so we knew that. And we also
knew how many bounces they had done. So we knew that they were
either legit for day or night because M-Sharp says that they're
coded for a day or a night CQ. And the periodicity is okay
because--and they've done enough bounces to be qualified current
to carry PAX or do whatever.

But when I start to go a little bit further afield,
like, how about the logbooks? No one yet has gone, yeah, we do
this. And I go, okay.

So who exactly takes, the whatchamacallit from this
and gives them to NATOPS so that NATOPS knows that they're
cleared hot to do a designation letter other than, they looked
at M-Sharp and in M-Sharp they see a code, so it must be good.
So maybe the guy flew great or maybe he didn't, but, you know,
that--

: Yes, sir.

: I just haven't--if there's--is there anything
like that that you know of that's delineated somewhere that's
how it's done? Because I'm--you know what I'm saying? I'm
having trouble finding that chain of how it gets to the point
where some people--because then some people have log books that
have things in them, but others--some people have designation letters, but others don't.

: Yes, sir.

: And then, I go--I'm trying to build back to that. Is there anything like that that you know of? How does something make it to the--how does a designation letter--and we're going to talk to safety and NATOPS later--make it to the CO's desk?

: I don't know of a definitive procedure process that you're describing, sir.

: Okay. No worries. It's just, kind of, what I was trying to see--

: Yes, sir.

: Those are all my initial questions, if you--

: So is a schedule writer. I know you just took over as Ops-O, I think there on the 2nd; but, you had worked with him in Ops as a schedule writer, probably supervising him. Can you talk to me about what it was like--what he was like to work on a daily basis?

: How to work with?

: How to work with--you know, what was he like to work with and have him work for you?

: Just seemed like a very, not reserved, but just, kind of a quiet professional. He seemed well liked by everybody. I mean, honestly, he didn't say a whole lot to me,
when he would write up the schedule. But that was kind of, I heard he was close with a lot of people, and that was kind of one of those things, like he was quiet in some settings, but not quiet at all in other settings.

So we're kind of getting that perspective from a number of folks.

Oh, yeah.

Do you know what pilots was he particularly close to? And if you don't know--

I mean, I know. I mean, he spoke at his memorial service. I'm pretty sure they're best friends. But my det--all the schedule writers share a room. So, before the mishap, there was five of them in a room together, they were all very close. I know my schedule writers in his room were pretty devastated. And they said that, pretty much, loved by everybody, a really good guy. Essentially, like, everybody was his friend so. It's hard when you're a major and they're a lieutenant, knowing exactly, like, who's buddies. But it sounded like he was kind of buddies with everybody.

Shifting veins a little bit. What does 265 use for crew rest crew day on ship board?

Ship board, if we're going to go outside of a--so 12 hours for day, 10 hours for night. If we're going to go outside of 10 hours from night, then it's annotated on the schedule that we're utilizing a 12-hour crew day.
As far as crew rest?

Crew rest; I mean, we're utilizing OPNAV. Obviously, we're on the ship. At the same time, every attempt is made to still utilize 10 hours when, hey, we're leaving work and planning capacity, and shifting gears for going back to rest. Sometimes the challenge, obviously, on a ship board environment is the schedule for the next day with people being able to rack out knowing exactly what they're doing the next morning. I would say that, that's something that we're continually fighting.

So the joint SOP, REVORs [ph] SOP that the two Okinawan squadrons are using, 262 and 265, references a 9-hour crew day for ship board. And it's based off of engine shut down. Do you recall a plan of that or using that metric?

A 9-hour crew day?

Nine hours for crew rest.

Crew rest.

I can pull it up for you for your reference, here.

Well, that's, kind of like, usually when you say 10 hours at home, you've got to transit and whatnot. So like I say, we're still trying to get everyone out at that time period.

So can you--
Right, 8 hours uninterrupted; but, like I said, we're trying to utilize the 10 hours. So you're saying being more restrictive than-- Yeah. --which is fine. So they're going to, like, brief tomorrow at 0700; we're trying to make sure everyone's out of their workspaces at 2100. Still-- Perfect. At the same time, though, if it goes down to less than that with the eight hours of uninterrupted rest as a minimum.

So when I read the joint SOP, it's not necessarily rest, it's sleep. It specified sleep.

Right. Where they're actually in the rack. And for ship board, it specifies nine hours. Would you concur with that?

Yeah.

So looking at the flight schedule for the night of the 4th; specifically, line which flew in Aircraft 7 that night. Can you tell me who the crew chief was on that?

The one that's highlighted?

Yes.
Looking at Saturday, the 5th, can you give me what brief time was?

0600.

0600; so, doing mental math, that's exactly nine hours from landing until the brief time the next morning. Would you concur?

Yeah.

So looking at the maintenance downloads for Aircraft 7, which is the aircraft they flew the night before, that aircraft didn't shut down until 2110. And based on previous interviews, showed up about 10 minutes prior to brief at 0550. So is that in violation of the joint SOP in terms of scheduling?

Do you know if he shut the aircraft down?

We do know that he shut the aircraft down.

Okay.

And also that--per the NAFLIR, they landed at 2100, shut the aircraft down at 2110, assuming he, then, went straight to--someone how magic'd into bed down in--

I think it sounded like they said they stayed, like, maybe 20 minutes to put on covers or do some other stuff, but then they kicked him out. So then, he didn't stay around and do any other stuff.
So what would you say? His total crew rest afforded? How in your estimation is of that?

I mean, it sounds like that fell short of the nine hours. If he went to bed, I'm guessing, it was right around the eight-hour limit.

Do you know if—so your crew chief scheduler for V-22's is, is that right?

Correct.

Do you know if he tracks who's on day crew and night crew in terms of maintenance?

He does; yes.

Do you happen to know what crew was on?

I do not. I'm guessing if he was at 0600 brief, he had to be day crew.

He was night crew, in accordance with the staff NCOIC.

Okay.

So is that kind of standard practice to have guys go day/night like that with a pretty short turn?

I know that from the time that we flew on the ship, V-22 aircrew was, pretty much, a limiting factor of DERRs [ph] that we submit readiness and ability to crew aircraft. So I think in this scenario where we're trying to support an exercise, I think with regards to CQs, capabilities and quals, I