

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay.

SGT (b) (6) It reflects all of the DODAC's that were provided.

LTCOL (b) (6) That is not my question. My question is: Is the document that Corporal (b) (6) prepared for you that reads "Yuma, Arizona" at the top and the four-part document that reads "Pallet Load Plan," do those reflect the same DODAC's and ammo quantities between the two documents? And if there is an inconsistency, what is it?

SGT (b) (6) I am going to go from top to bottom, if that is all right, sir?

LTCOL (b) (6) Sure.

MAJ (b) (6) I will give you a [indiscernible] if you want to make marks, little tick marks by it or anything like that.

SGT (b) (6) That's all right. Thank you though, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) You're welcome.

SGT (b) (6) Minor as far as the containers that they are in, but I would no way -- and I don't want to revolve -- or sorry -- but disregard the answer, but I wouldn't regard to this at all. This was just a simple draft for an idea of what the weight might be before we got it. I mean, that's --

LTCOL (b) (6) By "this," you are pointing to the four-part pallet load plan?

SGT (b) (6) Yeah, the colorful picture. But per what I utilized, because -- I used this.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. So what you are pointing to is the one that reads "Yuma, Arizona"?

SGT (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) The loading -- how would you describe that? Packaging list?

SGT (b) (6) It's like an ammunition list, like a digest almost.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. And this is the one that Corporal (b) (6) provided you?

SGT (b) (6) Yeah. All I really used was the DODAC's, the descriptions, and the quantity so that I could get my actual.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. Are there any DODAC's on the list that Corporal (b) (6) provided you that are not on this four-part quad?

SGT (b) (6) Not that I can see from going from top to bottom.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. So based on these DODAC's and the class on the HAZDEC's, the 1.1E, you are saying the compatibility check would have been done at the ASP prior to this ammunition list being put on the pallet certified for road worthy from the ASP up to Cherry Point?

SGT (b) (6) I wouldn't say that I know, but I would most definitely assume so.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay.

SGT (b) (6) I couldn't imaging personnel at the ASP loading ammunition without knowing if it is compatible that would --

LTCOL (b) (6) Over the road requirement, right?

SGT (b) (6) Any kind of requirement really. I don't think --

LTCOL (b) (6) When Corporal (b) (6) picked it up, does he sign for the ordinance from the ASP?

SGT (b) (6) I mean, I want to say -- again, I am not as familiarized with the ASP. I would have -- you would have to ask him that. I don't know how it -- really all I know is pre-stage. They help him band it. They load it up onto the truck. I have done it with the personnel there before, and then they review the documentation of what is being requested. I know that they do that a good while in advance. When you forecast the ammunition, they already have to review to make sure that it's good to go.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. Hang on. So when you told me a moment ago that the compatibility check would have been done at the ASP, that is your presumption, correct? You don't know that to be true because you don't work in the ASP; is that a fair

statement? You presume that it would be done, but you can't say for certain that it is done there, right?

SGT (b) (6) That's -- I would have to think back because it's something that definitely would have checked with to make sure that that was good.

LTCOL (b) (6) And then do you do another compatibility check between those DODAC's and those class numbers, the 1.1E for instance, with any publication that you referenced, as the Embark Chief for the Company, AFMAN, CFR-49, or anything else to ensure that those DODAC's are compatible before they are packaged and palletized for shipment on an aircraft?

SGT (b) (6) The packing instruction, that is given to me as well as the authorization.

LTCOL (b) (6) So you understand that those two things to be the same, the class number and the packing instruction?

SGT (b) (6) No. But the packing instruction is in regards to the class and division number for the round that I am looking up.

LTCOL (b) (6) Does the packing instruction reference any compatibility with any other DODAC's or any other -- excuse me -- not DODAC's, but any other class numbers, for instance, the 1.4G or the 1.1E --

SGT (b) (6) I would have to look back --

LTCOL (b) (6) Let me finish the question. -- or the 1.4S, is there a chart that you are aware of that references each of these class numbers and whether they are compatible with the other?

SGT (b) (6) Yeah. I have seen it. I just -- I would have to refer to it. I know --

LTCOL (b) (6) Did you refer to it before this particular pallet?

SGT (b) (6) Yeah. I know I did because we had a round that was coming with us that would have required a completely separate Lima pallet, and that is the round that they had removed. I believe it was mortars.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay.

SGT (b) (6) And I actually created that Lima pallet and had to remove it because I found that the compatibility between the mortars and the rest of the rounds weren't able to be palletized on the same Lima, and I didn't find that with anything else.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. So based on your experience, the pallet as it was loaded on Y-72, all of those DODAC's and class numbers were compatible?

SGT (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay.

SGT (b) (6) As far as I know, yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) Last question. Oxygen tanks, how are they transported? Are they half full? Are they empty? How much stuff is in there or do you even know that? No idea?

SGT (b) (6) I wouldn't touch it. I wouldn't mess that. I just -- I had them open it. I checked the package that was in. I made sure that that was the package that was made for the oxygen tank. And I mean that's -- it had the same, you know, it was made for it.

LTCOL (b) (6) Unlike the RZR's where you say, hey, it needs to be 50 percent or 75 percent full?

SGT (b) (6) Yeah as far as that. And it was small, small, small. I called up the APO and was like "What do I do about the oxygen?"

LTCOL (b) (6) Give me a description. 24-ounce beer can? Football?

SGT (b) (6) It was actually a pain to find because it was from medical, so it was even smaller than that. There was --

LTCOL (b) (6) Smaller than a scuba tank?

SGT (b) (6) Most definitely.

LTCOL (b) (6) Taller than that fire extinguisher?

SGT (b) (6) Yes -- well, I would say about where the instruction begin down to the bottom.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. So --

SGT (b) (6) And then you had the cap at the top; and of course I inspected the cap to make sure the cap wasn't leaking anything, and then I inspected around it to make that there wasn't any punctures just like I did with the containers because that is really what it is.

LTCOL (b) (6) So I don't have any more questions. I realize that was detailed.

SGT (b) (6) I really hope that I was actually --

MAJ (b) (6) You are very helpful. I have a got a couple more questions, if you don't mind.

SGT (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) You are educating us.

SGT (b) (6) I don't want to seem like I am coming off as, like, hostile.

MAJ (b) (6) No, you are not at all. We are over here and we are trying to learn from you. Okay. The mortars you removed, did they have one of these numbers like this, one of these 1.4S, 1.4G? Do you remember what those were?

SGT (b) (6) I should have. It was early, early on, so I had to create a separate HAZDEC for it, and I don't even remember if I got to the HAZDEC before they were removed. I know that someone was like, yeah, these are going to have to go on a different Lima pallet.

MAJ (b) (6) Would be on email or something, that whole transaction? Can we find out what that was?

SGT (b) (6) That is not something that I would have.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

SGT (b) (6) But I know for a fact that they were rechecking that -- these are not --

LTCOL (b) (6) Were they HE mortars?

SGT (b) (6) I am pretty -- it was something large that just couldn't --

LTCOL (b) (6) Is that --

SGT (b) (6) It was ridiculous too because I was looking at it and it weighed like nothing, like 100 pounds. I was like, I am not using up a pallet position for 100 pounds. I would rather just remove them completely. Why spend -- that's -- I mean, we had that pallet position, but still that's --

LTCOL (b) (6) Are you saying that you would have -- had you had taken the mortars, you would have, based on the incompatibility, would have put them on a different pallet on the same plane?

SGT (b) (6) Most definitely.

LTCOL (b) (6) Or are you required to put them on a different plane?

SGT (b) (6) Didn't even get to that point to look it up. I just knew they weren't compatible.

LTCOL (b) (6) And so what does not compatible mean to you? It can't be on the same pallet?

SGT (b) (6) Yes. Actually, for specifically for those rounds, they weren't able to be on the same pallet with the other ammunition because I remember we had done planning that we were going to put them in pallet position 5 and then have that one in pallet position 6 since it was a heavier load.

MAJ (b) (6) I want to make sure I understand the ICODES. I am a little fuzzy here. So this is what you presented -- this is what you all presented. You didn't initiate it. Somebody else initiated it.

SGT (b) (6) That one I sent him.

MAJ (b) (6) And you sent this to him, right, but you didn't initiate it. It had the whole Chapter 3 on there before you did it, right?

SGT (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And then you sent it. Now, my understanding is that you used this in order to help indicate what may be incompatible.

SGT (b) (6) No.

MAJ (b) (6) No, not all?

SGT (b) (6) Not even in the least.

MAJ (b) (6) So when you talk about red flag, what does that mean?

SGT (b) (6) Weight. My biggest thing with ICODES is most definitely weight. Everything in regards to whether it is compatible is, to me, HAZDEC's. So when I am thinking like -- when I am thinking ICODES, I am really think, like, "Can it fly with this weight being here?" And then that is almost in my eyes, like an extra, like, it is saying, okay, so this is what is in that, but this is so much more in depth that it's like -- this holds more as far as HAZMAT in my eyes. The data holds more as far as "What are the limitations of this aircraft and what can that aircraft handle?" So that's how I see ICODES; that's why I am very specific on making sure that --

MAJ (b) (6) From a weight and balance perspective?

SGT (b) (6) Yeah. That is definitely what is mainly for as well as, you know, getting cargo packs and everything; that most definitely is its main purpose.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And one more question.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) ASP, the ammo tech put this all together?
Is he part of the ASP?

SGT (b) (6) No.

MAJ (b) (6) That is Corporal (b) (6)

SGT (b) (6) He is with Hotel Company.

MAJ (b) (6) And that is Corporal (b) (6)

SGT (b) (6) Yes. But he put it together at the ASP with ASP personnel.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. That's all.

SGT (b) (6) They were present for the creation of this pallet.

[The interview ended.]

[END OF PAGE]

INTERVIEW OF LANCE CORPORAL (b) (6) FROM 25 JULY 2017

[Interview began at 1222 on 25 July 2017.]

LTCOL (b) (6) Today is Tuesday, July 25th, and it's 1222. This is the Commanding General's Investigation into the crash of Y-72. I am the investigator, Lieutenant Colonel (b) (6) and we are investigating Lance Corporal (b) (6)

Lance Corporal (b) (6) do you see we are recording the interview?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) And do you authorize us to record the interview?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Thank you very much.

I want to start out, Lance Corporal (b) (6) just tell us in your words about what happened that day with the loading of Y-62 and Y-72.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir. Before we do any of that, gentlemen, I would like to request my Commanding Officer in here.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. We are not going to have your Commanding Officer come in here because this is just an interview. There is no other -- by having other people in here, I think we affect the information that comes in.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) We want to get it fresh from every individual, so it works that way.

LCPL (b) (6) I would -- I wish to say nothing without my Commanding Officer present, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. We are going to end the interview for Lance Corporal (b) (6) at this point.

[The interview was stopped.]

[The interview began at 1243 on 25 July 2017.]

LTCOL (b) (6) Tuesday, July 25, 2017 at 1243 in an interview with Lance Corporal (b) (6) I am Lieutenant Colonel (b) (6) the Investigating Officer, for the Commanding General's command investigation concerning the crash of Y-72.

Lance Corporal (b) (6) do you see we are recording the conversation?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) And do you authorize us to record the conversation?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. Lance Corporal (b) (6) just tell us about that day and what you remember about the Yankee flights.

LCPL (b) (6) It was Friday afternoon. I had just almost gotten done doing another joint inspection for a C-17. There was a few things that I still needed to do for it; but aside from that, it was my first time meeting Sergeant (b) (6) who was

an embarkation for 2d Raider Battalion. We were in our operations officer where we handle operations for our flights and stuff, and I was sitting in there. He introduces himself. He gives me the paperwork for his joint inspection. It was going to be a fast joint inspection -- faster than the C-17 because it was only two ISU's and a RZR going onto the aircraft. So I go through some of the paperwork. I look at it just to get an understanding of what I was going to inspect and what was going to be in there so that way I wasn't going to get any surprises.

After I do that, I -- he weighs everything, the ISU's, the RZR's; and then after he gets done with that, he writes down his weights. So I have the paperwork. I hand him the paperwork. We go outside, and I inspect the first RZR and everything was fine with it. The fuel level was where it was supposed to be at, which was less than half a tank. There was no leakages. Everything was strapped down inside the RZR. Nothing seemed wrong with it. So he got some of the paperwork and they taped it on there, and then I came back out later after that to sign it; but before I did any of that, I inspected the ISU's, the integrity of the ISU's just to make sure that nothing was damaged on the ISU, the teeth of the ISU at that bottom, the -- all of the pins and hooks, d-rings. I made sure that all of that stuff was on there.

After that, I had them open both sides of the first ISU, which didn't have anything hazardous inside of it. I had them pull out a few things. A lot of stuff was personal gear that a lot of MARSOC personnel put inside of their containers and stuff. There were some tools. There wasn't anything that would cause a hazard or anything. So I go to the other side, the same thing basically. So when I got done with that one, I went on to the next ISU, which had the batteries and it had the aerosols -- the paint. I looked inside. There wasn't anything that they hadn't stated. So after I checked all of the HAZMAT and some of the other containers that were inside of the ISU, I go to the other side and they had a compressed oxygen tank in a black case, which they had a hazardous document for that. So I just wanted to make sure it was what they said it was.

After that portion of the joint inspection was done, the ammunition hadn't got there yet, so we went to the Ops office. We talked for a few minutes about what was going to happen on Sunday, about the transportation of the ammunition, about what time Sergeant (b) (6) was going to get there, about some of the paperwork, about the load plan; and Sergeant (b) (6) said something about the RZR being closer to the inside of the aircraft rather than the outside, and he said that he had spoken with the load master and that is how the load master wanted it because usually hazardous material should always be at the rear

of the aircraft just in case it needs to get dropped because it could -- let's say it was some sort of leakage that just popped up onto the RZR, well, you don't want to dump everything so you want to put the HAZMAT last, but that wasn't the case. That is how the load master wanted it. So I said if the load master is fine with that, I am fine with it. You spoke to him, so I take your word on that.

After that -- so I kept some of the paperwork, then the joint inspection for the day for that portion was done, but it wasn't completely done. Sunday comes, Sergeant (b)(6) brings the ammunition around -- I want to say it was in the afternoon, after 12, and I am at the CALA waiting for it. It gets offloaded. We put it on pallets, and we weight it with scales that we provided to them. I was staged -- the ammunition tech, Corporal (b)(6) has the paperwork for it, and he explains to me this is that and this is this, and I look over it. They strap it down with -- it already had the banding wire on it, then we put the 5,000 pound straps on there, which there were like seven straps of that on there. It was all secured. All of the d-rings were used on each side of the pallet. So then after that, I look over it, everything is tight, and I -- Sergeant (b)(6) tells me that he didn't bring the hazard class stickers that are supposed to go on ammunition like if it's 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3. So I tell him it is fine. You don't have to put

them on today, but we can come back here early in the morning tomorrow and we can get all of that stuff on there -- the HAZDEC's, the placard, and the hazard class stickers. I will be here with because I was going to come look at it again. I have to be there for it to get loaded onto the aircraft anyways. So I don't think I missed anything else on that day.

So Monday morning, we are going by our usual business. Sergeant (b) (6) comes. He has the placard and the hazardous documents that have to go on the pallet and the class stickers that are supposed to go on there. Then, a man named Mr.

(b) (6) comes and he -- he is part of the ordinance manager or something like that. I have never spoken to him. I didn't even know there was a billet for that. So he comes and he speaks to Sergeant (b) (6), and Sergeant (b) (6) and my squad leader tell me that I have to give him my joint inspector paperwork and my hazardous documents and the load plan for the aircraft. So I go over to him and I give him all of the paperwork that I had, and he looks over it and he says that there is some things that need to be fixed on there. And he tells me that the hazardous document, the packaging for the ammunition can was supposed to be steel instead of aluminum, so he wanted us to get -- he wanted for us to fix that. He also didn't like some things that were on the pallet itself. He wanted a top net on the pallet for more security of the

ammunition. He wanted the banding wire on there to have two crimps. He wanted proper shipping names and the UN numbers on the cans. And the light boxes, which is ammunition that has -- isn't full of rounds to be orange instead of saying light box, which is basically a box that has less ammunition than what a full box would have. So we did that. We didn't switch the ammunition cans from the -- we didn't put them in orange cans. It was too late. They were already strapped down with the banding wire and stuff, so we just left it as light boxes. But for next time, he said to just get that done, and I told him that I would.

So the C-130's had arrived, and I was getting all of the stuff that Mr. (b) (6) had requested me to do. They were here, and they started loading. So I wasn't specifically there for the -- I was on the lot, but I was too busy running around trying to grab all of the stuff that we needed for the ammunition pallet, so I didn't see if the RZR went on first, but I am pretty sure it did because that is how the load master wanted it. So I grabbed all of the stuff, and I gave it to a Gunnery Sergeant (b) (6) who took it back to the CALA. The ammunition tech fixed all of the stuff that Mr. (b) (6) had asked us to do. So Sergeant (b) (6) and I stayed back at the APOE. On the computer, Sergeant (b) (6) fixed whatever Mr. (b) (6) had asked. So then we got that printed out because

we thought Mr. (b) (6) was going to be there and he was going to go look over the hazardous document. When we got there, Mr. (b) (6) wasn't there anymore probably because had been waiting for us for over -- I don't know. He wanted us to be there at 12, but we couldn't be there at 12 because we still had to get a few other things done. So he looked at the pallet, and he said that the pallet was fine. Everything was good on the pallet. Everything that he had requested of us to fix was fixed. That is what the ammunition tech said. So he said that it was good to go, so I was relieved by that.

When we got there, we had the hazardous document that we thought that he was going to look over but he didn't. Sergeant (b) (6), myself, Corporal (b) (6) and Gunnery Sergeant (b) (6) -- I think that is his name. I am not too positive. But there was a gunnery sergeant. I don't know if it was Gunnery Sergeant (b) (6) or (b) (6). But he was -- they were all there. I gave the hazardous document to Sergeant (b) (6), and I said "Could you please look over this to make sure that it's fine and it's good to go?" because he is an ammo tech, and he said "Yes, it's fine." So we got it -- we put it on the ammunition pallet. We put the hazard classes on the boxes, and we got the placard on there. Then I had -- since we had to print over a few things, I had to get Sergeant (b) (6) signature on the hazardous document again because we had to fix

that. So he got everything signed for me, and the C-130 was still in the APOE pits at that time.

So I went back to the APO with Sergeant (b)(6) -- no, I think I went back to the APO by myself; and then afterwards, Sergeant (b)(6) and Gunnery Sergeant (b)(6) went back to the APO. I made copies of all of the paperwork to give to the aircrew. We give copies of the joint inspector's paperwork, the hazardous documents of everything that is hazardous inside of the aircraft, and the load plan just so that way they have copies and they can look at it. If they have any questions, they can question us about it. So I made copies of it, and I took it to the Ops -- the operations office. I got the passenger manifest, and I just stuffed it in there with the paperwork that I had from my joint inspection. Then I walk over to the aircraft and I see Gunnery Sergeant (b)(6) and Sergeant (b)(6) on their way back from the aircraft, and they tell me that they spoke to the load master about what had happened with Mr. (b)(6) just in case someone was to go out there and let them know what happened. They said that the load master said it was fine; that they will look at it when it gets into the aircraft. And I tell them "Okay, thank you for letting me know that." So I walk over to the aircraft, and then I speak with, I believe, it was the load master -- he was a gunnery sergeant -- and I gave him the paperwork. I let him know what was in there.

I tell him it's the load plan, the manifest, the hazardous documents, the joint inspector's paperwork, and then I told him that I knew that he spoke to the two gentlemen that just had talked to him about Mr. (b) (6) about the ammunition pallet. I asked him if he had questions to me about, and he said, no, and that was it. I tell him "Okay, thank you for everything." I leave, and the C-130 is still in the pits when I am on the way back to the CALA because I had to wait for the ammunition pallet to still be loaded into the C-130.

So when I get back, I am, like, what is taking for the C-130 to come over here? I thought everything was loaded onto it already. So someone radios over to our Bird NCO, which he -- that is the billet of the person who speaks to the APO from the bird, and they said that they were waiting for us to bring the ammunition pallet to the pits. We said, no, that the C-130 had to come to the CALA and pick up the ammunition pallet. And after a few minutes, the C-130 comes. Then (b) (6), the operator, come, he picks up the pallet and takes it to the aircraft; and after it gets loaded, we leave. I go back to the APO. I send up my paperwork to 2d MEF. I tell Sergeant (b) (6) and Sergeant (b) (6) that everything has been loaded onto the C-130 and that it was good to go. I spoke with the load master, and that was it.

LTCOL (b) (6) Let me ask you a couple of questions.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) You said that -- I guess you were referring to Friday --

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) -- when the load came in and you go back to the ISU and you inspect it and you look on the -- you looked at the teeth on the bottom of the ISU, what does that mean?

LCPL (b) (6) The teeth -- so the pallet itself has the teeth on the pallet. It is basically what helps it get into the aircraft. So if a tooth is chipped on there, then it won't properly secure into the aircraft -- it won't secure to the aircraft compartment.

LTCOL (b) (6) Is it the part that goes on the rollers --

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) -- that comes up through?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) I got you. Okay. Another question about what you did on Friday. You talked about the order of the placement into the aircraft of the ISU's with respect to the RZR.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) So on the plane with three RZR's, I understand the RZR's backed in.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) For the plane with one RZR, it was driven in forward.

LCPL (b) (6) I don't know. I wasn't specifically there for it.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) I did not see it get loaded on.

LTCOL (b) (6) And then what did they put on after that? What was the next ISU put on?

LCPL (b) (6) I would have to look at the load plan because I forgot if it was supposed to be the HAZMAT one or the non-HAZMAT. It was the non-HAZMAT. So the one that -- this one right here -- so it was the RZR, the non-HAZMAT ISU, the HAZMAT ISU, and the ammunition pallet.

LTCOL (b) (6) Got you.

LCPL (b) (6) That is how the order should have been, but I don't know if they said we want the HAZMAT ISU first because I wasn't there. I was doing other things for Mr. (b) (6)

LTCOL (b) (6) But you indicated on Friday that -- you said something along the lines that that is the way it should be, but that they wanted it another way on Friday.

LCPL (b) (6) No. I said -- I didn't say that. I said that the -- so Sergeant (b) (6) said to me that how load plan was, and he said that the MRZR was going to get loaded on first, and that is not usually how we would do it or as an embarker

would. They would put all of the hazardous materials on last just in case something was to happen. Any leakages from the RZR, they would have to dump everything rather than just the RZR itself.

LTCOL (b) (6) I am with you.

LCPL (b) (6) So they -- that is how they wanted it.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. I see. So what you were saying is that that first pallet right here --

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) -- technically should have been up here and the RZR in the back so that you had the hazardous cargo in the back. I got you.

LCPL (b) (6) That's what -- if I was creating a load plan as an embarker that is what I would have done.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. That is what I was trying to make sure. I was confused by that. I appreciate that.

MAJ (b) (6) So this is more of what you would be used to seeing?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes. That is what I would have -- that would have been -- if I was the embarker for this flight, I would have made a load plan like that. But if the load master -- if I get in contact with the load master of the aircraft and he tells me to switch it around, I am going to switch it around for him because that's his aircraft and that is

his preference, and I am not going to say, no, to him just because he would probably be more experienced than I was.

MAJ (b) (6) That is just purely based off of HAZMAT, right?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. You said that there was an ammo tech who fixed the load. Who was the ammo tech?

LCPL (b) (6) He is part of 2d Raider Battalion. His name was Corporal (b) (6) He was at the CALA the entire time because it was -- he was the ammo tech for that flight, and he -- by saying "he fixed the load," is he and the gunnery sergeant put the crimps on that Mr. (b) (6) wanted. They got the top net onto it, and they put the proper shipping names onto the ammunition cans.

LTCOL (b) (6) Got you. Who -- now, (b) (6) on Monday said he had a problem with the ammo pallet, and he listed the issue with the ammo pallet, and then these were re-fixed by the ammo tech, Corporal (b) (6) right?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) But did (b) (6) come back and recheck the pallet after it was fixed?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, he did. He was there. He told us, me and Sergeant (b) (6) to be there at 12, but we weren't there at exactly 12. We came, like, 15 minutes after that, twenty

minutes after that because he was still -- Sergeant (b) (6) was still fixing the hazardous document that he wanted us to fix, but Corporal (b) (6) and Gunnery Sergeant (b) (6) were there because they were waiting for Mr. (b) (6) and myself --

LTCOL (b) (6) Got you.

LCPL (b) (6) -- and Sergeant (b) (6) Sergeant (b) (6) was also at the CALA waiting for us too. So I wasn't specifically there when Mr. (b) (6) was over there checking, but he approved it through Gunnery Sergeant (b) (6) and Corporal (b) (6) and Sergeant (b) (6).

LTCOL (b) (6) Got you.

LCPL (b) (6) I am pretty sure Sergeant (b) (6) was there because Sergeant (b) (6) was waiting there for me to bring the hazardous documents because I had asked him to come to the CALA and just look over my hazardous documents.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. What are your specific qualifications?

LCPL (b) (6) I am joint inspector certified. I am load planner certified and HAZMAT certified, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Are they all current?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) How long have you been doing this job?

LCPL (b) (6) I just got joint inspector certified in January.

LTCOL (b) (6) January. How about the other ones?

LCPL (b) (6) I have load planners since 2016 of June or July, and HAZMAT not long after that.

LTCOL (b) (6) And before you went off to those two schools to the load planner certification and the HAZMAT certification, how long had you been working do this job? When did you go to your MOS school?

LCPL (b) (6) I went in October of 2015, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Got you. So I think you have covered pretty much of the joint inspection process. Is there anything else you need to tell me about that?

LCPL (b) (6) I don't think so, sir. I don't think I missed anything.

LTCOL (b) (6) All right. Go ahead.

MAJ (b) (6) So did you see Sergeant (b) (6) put the stickers on the ammo?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, I did. Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. So before the ammo pallet was loaded on to the plane at the CALA, you physically walked over or you drove over and you saw it, you looked at it, it met the criteria?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) So he did actually bring them back on Monday like he said he was going to?

LCPL (b) (6) I am sorry.

MAJ (b) (6) All of the stickers. So Sunday --

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, he did.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) So from your experience working there, you guys don't have any procedure to work with the explosives safety officer, Mr. (b) (6) right?

LCPL (b) (6) No, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) You just -- this is the first interaction with him. So when he showed up, who did you inform that you met this Mr. (b) (6)

LCPL (b) (6) I wasn't the first person that he spoke to when he went in there.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) He spoke to Sergeant (b) (6) r, Sergeant (b) (6), and my squad leader, and I was in one of the bays when they came and grabbed and said "Where is your paperwork at?" and I said "In my locker." I went and I grabbed it for him because they said that he needed to see it.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. Got you. Do you know if they told everyone up the chain of command that some unique person that they have never talked to before --

LCPL (b) (6) I think our sergeant spoke to our commanding officer, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. So on the load plan that we have, you have already talked us through page 1, which is the depiction of where everything is; page 2 clarifies it. Just so I am clear, on page 2, the section that says "HZ" is HAZMAT, right?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) So position 1, "Yes." Got it. We have doc HAZDEC for the RZR. Position 2 is "No." Position 3 is "Yes." Position 4 is "Yes," which is the ammo pallet.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) And on page 3 is where we do the sign-offs.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) So Sergeant (b) (6) signs it because he is the guy from 2d Raider Battalion, right?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) And then yourself, you certify that the load is good to go, you approved it --

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) -- and then you sign for the air terminal representative as well?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) And is that normal for you to sign both positions?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Does this person have to be JI? I am sorry. For the air terminal position, does it have to be a JI qualified person?

LCPL (b) (6) I think they just have to be load planner certified.

MAJ (b) (6) Load planner certified?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes -- or, not, actually, it has to be the air terminal representative. So I am pretty sure that the joint inspector has to sign off on this because they have to approve the load plan because they are doing the joint inspection. So if they see something about the load plan that they don't like that the embarker did or they make any recommendations, then they don't have to sign that.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. But it is not uncommon for it to be the same person like you did right here?

LCPL (b) (6) It is not.

MAJ (b) (6) This is normal?

LCPL (b) (6) It is normal.

MAJ (b) (6) That you are the same person?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And then when you take -- you said you reference -- you got all the stuff together, important

documents, you gave it to the gunny. Did he sign anything for you?

LCPL (b) (6) No, he didn't, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And did you ask for his signature?

LCPL (b) (6) I didn't, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. So this is the just the original copy that you had, so all of the copies you guys have, there is no aircrew signing off that they have, you know, their little block; is that normal?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir. I have never worked a flight that they would usually sign that.

MAJ (b) (6) Is that with all the units?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) It's just not something that -- it wasn't forced through the APOE. No one has ever told me "You have to get an aircrew member signature."

MAJ (b) (6) Right.

LCPL (b) (6) So I --

MAJ (b) (6) And there is nothing in your training -- your embark training that teaches you that that is a requirement?

LCPL (b) (6) No. I have never been told "This is a requirement for cargo to go inside of the aircraft. If you

don't get that signature, then the cargo can't go on." It never been said to me.

MAJ (b) (6) And for your record purposes, how long do you have to keep a load plan?

LCPL (b) (6) I think it is -- not saying a load plan, but mission folders that we keep with all of the aircraft information with our Wells reports, the load plans, the hazardous documents, the joint inspector's paperwork, anything else that would be received from that flight, we keep for fours, three years, I think. We package it in a folder, and we keep hold of it.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. Is this something you usually get in advance, the load plan, from the individual or do you get it as they show up?

LCPL (b) (6) From the embarker, sir?

MAJ (b) (6) Right.

LCPL (b) (6) Usually, they have it when they get to the APOE and we do the inspection, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And have you done much work with the 2d Marine Raider Battalion?

LCPL (b) (6) I worked with them two other times, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Any issues working with them in the past?

LCPL (b) (6) No, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. Nothing has been wrong?

LCPL (b) (6) No, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) All right. Can you -- this is -- so I am going to show you the enclosure for the ammo piece of the HAZDEC's, pages 1 through 3. Can you show me and kind of explain what was changed on this if you recall exactly?

LCPL (b) (6) So I know that -- okay. So it says "steel can" right here. Before, it was "aluminum cans."

MAJ (b) (6) But they were actually steel cans?

LCPL (b) (6) So I asked Sergeant (b) (6), and he said that the can itself has a mixture of aluminum and steel. The majority of it was steel. So I -- because I was confused myself; and when I asked him that, I was, like, "Okay, that's something that I didn't know." So we got that fixed. And then I added -- we added some -- the authorizations, which were these. I don't know -- I don't think they were on there the first time, but just for a few of them. So I went back through them, and then I just added them onto there, and I think that was it, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) And what is an authorization?

LCPL (b) (6) Basically, provisions that you are kind of like supposed to look at it, like, so P-5 would be passenger aircraft only; P-4 would be cargo and aircraft only -- or cargo aircraft only, which would be these selections right here for that.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. So like on page 2, what is P-4?

LCPL (b) (6) P-4 would be passenger -- it would be cargo aircraft only, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Cargo aircraft only.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And then nothing changed on the class, right?

LCPL (b) (6) No, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) All the classes stayed constant?

LCPL (b) (6) All the classes and the net explosive weights stayed the same, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And this is the only HAZDEC that changed -- that you had to change before they took the load, right?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir. It was just for the ammunition.

MAJ (b) (6) And did Mr. (b) (6) review this before it got loaded on the plane?

LCPL (b) (6) He looked at the other one, and he --

MAJ (b) (6) The previous one?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes. Which had the wrong cans that it was in, and we brought the other one to the CALA because we thought he was going to be there, but he had left.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) I had Sergeant (b) (6) look at it, and he said it was fine.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. So your ammo tech, Sergeant (b) (6), did the oversight?

LCPL (b) (6) The CLC ammo tech. Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Right. Okay. Did -- while you made this, is Sergeant (b) (6) -- and it's clear that he signed it -- so he also made sure it was correct?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Let's see with that, you said there was -- in the second -- or in the third position, the second ISU -- yep, third position, second ISU, it calls for HAZMAT, and you said there was the compressed oxygen, 968 lithium batteries, and a bunch of 22, I guess, aluminum or paint aluminum, I am guessing spray paint, something along those lines. Is there a reason why these two HAZDEC's are not combined?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes. Because the lithium batteries and the paint were on one side of ISU; and the other side of this ISU had the compressed oxygen, and that is why. Because in the ISU itself, there is a wall in between that. So to specify which one had a certain HAZMAT, we put it on the wall of whichever one. So if the side of the lithium batteries one and the paint, we put this hazard placard on there. And then on the other

side, we put the compressed oxygen one on, and then we also put the class stickers on there too.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. Just remind me again. So P-4 is what?

LCPL (b) (6) Cargo aircraft only, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) For the authorization, P-5 is what?

LCPL (b) (6) Passenger and cargo aircraft only, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And so, you know, hopefully, you can -- you will show me because I know you can. In the AFMAN, you know, with these things, you separated -- they are separated inside the ISU by a wall --

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) -- where does it say that the separation of the wall constitutes compatibility with these items or are these already compatible to be in the same container?

LCPL (b) (6) I don't think they would cause any hazard to each other, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Could you look that up? Could you show me how these are all compatible? I am not very good at this stuff. We have got an AFMAN right here.

LTCOL (b) (6) We don't know anything about the AFMAN, so we are trying to learn about all this stuff.

LCPL (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) I just know how to look at a load plan.

LCPL (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) You can scroll with two fingers like that if you need.

LCPL (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) Or if you want to search for something, you can do it over here.

MAJ (b) (6) Take your time, no rush.

LCPL (b) (6) Okay. So if I go over here, I see the UN number, lithium batteries including -- so that is 340, and then I would go to the special provisions over here and then the packaging paragraph, and that is where it would state if it was incompatible with Class 8 items or Class 2.2, and it didn't say any of that.

MAJ (b) (6) So it doesn't say that right there?

LCPL (b) (6) No. Well, this is just what the AFMAN says; but if you want --

MAJ (b) (6) Show him what it says.

LCPL (b) (6) So you would look at the paragraph that it was in, and then it -- so you would go to the paragraph itself and it would say whether it was compatible with that class or it cannot be put in the same place as that item.

MAJ (b) (6) So can you show me where these are compatible?

LCPL (b) (6) Where this would be compatible?

MAJ (b) (6) No. These three items together.

LCPL (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) Can you kind of walk the dog for me?

MAJ (b) (6) Would it just be that paragraph?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) I am sorry. It is kind of confusing. You can use two fingers and scroll up and down or you can type it up there.

LCPL (b) (6) Oh, okay. So this is the packaging instructions right here, and you can read through that.

MAJ (b) (6) Are you all done?

MAJ (b) (6) Yep.

LTCOL (b) (6) Wait a second. Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) So this right here, Protective Enclosures, for example, "fully enclosed wooden slated crates." So an ISU is clearly more than that wooden slated crate.

MAJ (b) (6) How is that -- that's for the actual --

LCPL (b) (6) That is for the packaging inside of the ISU itself, and it was in a plastic box; they were in a plastic box.

LTCOL (b) (6) They were all in a plastic box?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) How many were in each plastic box?

LCPL (b) (6) I did not get a count of how many were in each plastic box.

LTCOL (b) (6) How many plastic boxes were there?

LCPL (b) (6) I think there was two. I think there was two, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Two plastic boxes. How big were they?

LCPL (b) (6) They were pretty big, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) All right.

LCPL (b) (6) They were like --

LTCOL (b) (6) Bigger than this couch?

LCPL (b) (6) No, no, sir. Like about that big maybe, and the height was probably like that.

LTCOL (b) (6) So they were about this high?

LCPL (b) (6) Um-huh. They were pretty big.

LTCOL (b) (6) And then they were square?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) And they were laid down into the pallet?

LCPL (b) (6) They were easily accessible in the ISU, so they were, like, right in front in the front, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) All right. I am having an issue --

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) -- understanding this. I am picturing an ISU -- stand back there on the other side. I am one side of the ISU, you are the other side, it is eight feet. Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) So inside this ISU, eight feet, you open the doors.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Where are the lithium batteries?

LCPL (b) (6) Right in front in the front, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Right in the front?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. And they are four or eight feet wide? How wide is the box?

LCPL (b) (6) No, the box is not four. It was not that big. So like that big, and maybe like about that tall.

LTCOL (b) (6) Got you. So it is about three feet?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) About three or four feet wide box, and about two to three feet tall?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. Were they on top of each other, the two boxes?

LCPL (b) (6) I think they were right next to each other, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) So they are next to each other, and you are telling me there is a wall inside the ISU. Right. So is the wall running this way when you open the doors?

LCPL (b) (6) No. It's -- so you open the doors, and the wall is like that.

LTCOL (b) (6) So you are just looking at half of the
ISU --

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, exactly.

LTCOL (b) (6) -- when you open the first two doors?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. So what you have is here in this --
was it the left or right side?

LCPL (b) (6) It was on the right side.

LTCOL (b) (6) It was on the right side. -- are two
stacks of lithium batteries?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) You closed those doors, and you walked
around the other side, you opened it, and that is where the --

LCPL (b) (6) -- compressed oxygen was, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) -- compressed oxygen was?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Where was the paint with respect to the two
boxes of lithium?

LCPL (b) (6) It was next to them, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) So the paint, and how was the paint
packaged?

LCPL (b) (6) It was closed in a box, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) How big was that box?

LCPL (b) (6) It wasn't that big. It was like about that big.

LTCOL (b) (6) Maybe two feet by --

LCPL (b) (6) Probably like -- yes, two feet by like two feet.

LTCOL (b) (6) So it's a big square of two feet by two feet by two feet. The two lithium boxes of lithium batteries are here, and then you have a two foot box of paint -- spray paint right here?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Was the paint in a cardboard box?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. I understand the packaging part. Where does it say what is not compatible code-wise with it? Do you know what I mean?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) So that explains that piece. Thank you very much.

LCPL (b) (6) I think if it was incompatible, it would state that it was not incompatible, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Let me ask you this.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) If I gave you unlimited time, you could find it, I am sure. When you do this and you do the JI, are you sitting down and you are pulling out the AFMAN, you are cross-comparing the HAZDEC's to HAZDEC's or -- is that what you are doing?

LCPL (b) (6) I am looking to see if all the remarks on it are correct. I look to see if the class that it is under is correct, the UN number, how many, the packaging instructions, the authorizations.

LTCOL (b) (6) What else?

LCPL (b) (6) This information right here: if it was going to the correct location, the airport departure, the serial numbers -- but they didn't have -- this is supposed to be the TCN's; but since it was going within the United States, it didn't have to have a TCN reference on it. The co-signee, which would be the representative from the battalion that it was coming from or whoever, and the shipper information.

MAJ (b) (6) But you are checking for compatibility, right?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) So when Sergeant (b) (6) created this, he checks all that as well, correct?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Because he is the one generated it. So when it comes time and you and Sergeant (b) (6) sit down and you do

this JI on it on, I believe it was Friday, did you guys both sit down with the AFMAN and he walked the dog for you to show where they are compatible or how did you guys determine it was compatible?

LCPL (b) (6) I looked at it, sir, and it didn't say anything about it being incompatible.

MAJ (b) (6) And how did you verify that?

LCPL (b) (6) Through the AFMAN. I just -- I looked at the references on it.

MAJ (b) (6) So you don't have like a cheat sheet that you are using to cross-talk --

LCPL (b) (6) No.

MAJ (b) (6) -- or anything like that?

LCPL (b) (6) No, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) So how long do you think it would take to do that on average for just this, these three things?

LCPL (b) (6) It depends on how much stuff was on it. So this probably wouldn't take long, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. So can we do that?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) Can you show me?

LCPL (b) (6) I am not timing you. I just want to understand --

LTCOL (b) (6) We are learning a lot from you. Thank you.

MAJ (b) (6) -- where it all comes from and how this whole thing works.

LCPL (b) (6) So this is the provisions that it had for the lithium batteries. So it had -- so I looked at this, but I thought I saw A5-11, where did I see that at? Okay. So I think I saw it on the AFMAN over here. It doesn't give you any information on whether it is compatible or incompatible; but if it was to not be put together or if it would be incompatible, then it would be put in there, sir. So if two items can't be put together, it would be stated on there.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. There is not like a chart that you use that flows across?

LCPL (b) (6) No. That is only for ammunition, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Only for ammunition?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. So there is nothing that says that, you know, a Class 9 and a Class 8 aren't incompatible with a Class 2.2, nothing says that?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir. If it was incompatible and it wasn't supposed to be together, then it would state that you may not put these two items in the same ISU or it would have to separate by ISU.

MAJ (b) (6) And the fact that the batteries were in a thick plastic container, it meets the criteria for the packing? The packaging requirement for lithium batteries?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And can -- you said that P-4 is a passenger only plane.

LCPL (b) (6) Cargo aircraft only, yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Or cargo. I am sorry. So in reference to a C-130, is that how a C-130 is viewed?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) Is that how your understanding of the AFMAN is?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes. Cargo --

MAJ (b) (6) No matter what they are carrying, it's a cargo plane.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) So if they -- having passengers onboard, does not constitute an issue with that?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. I don't have any more questions on this particular one. Does you guys?

MAJ (b) (6) Not on this one.

MAJ (b) (6) Now, the ordinance -- Major (b) (6) I think you have actually got a good bead on how you want to go down that road.

MAJ (b) (6) Yeah. It's -- we are going back to compatibility here.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) So we all know the load, so the ammo was in the back there, and we know why it is in the back. So now I just want to talk about compatibility --

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) -- with the ammo. So if you could educate me on that.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) All right. So knowing you are a HAZMAT Marine, so is there anything, like, when you look at the ammo HAZDEC's, is there anything that jumps out at you that you know from -- that you remember from HAZMAT School where they were like, Hey, if you see this, you need to double check. You need to really dig on this. Is there anything like that?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes. The hazard class is really important.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) So when I looked at the compatibility table on the CFR-49, the table lists some -- what is compatible or what needs to be separated by pallet or what cannot go inside of

the aircraft with each other at all no matter what. And that is what I look it with the hazard class.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. Is there anything on here that met hat criteria?

LCPL (b) (6) No, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. Not even -- I mean, so all of this ammo can be packed together on one pallet?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Where is that chart? Can you walk me through that chart? It is in the AFMAN; isn't it?

LCPL (b) (6) It is not in the AFMAN.

MAJ (b) (6) It's not?

LCPL (b) (6) It is in the CFR-49.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. But there is information in the AFMAN about --

LCPL (b) (6) I don't think the AFMAN has information ammunition, but --

MAJ (b) (6) So far, this is the only pub that we have, so I am just going to type in one in particular.

LCPL (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) So this right here, it talks about explosives, and here is your designators right there as well and you classes.

LCPL (b) (6) When I certified this, I didn't use the AFMAN for it. I used the CFR-49. Whenever I do ammunition, I don't use that AFMAN for that. I use the CFR-49.

MAJ (b) (6) Is the CFR more restrictive than the AFMAN?

LCPL (b) (6) No. It is the same -- I believe it is the same thing as that, but I don't -- I never used the AFMAN for it. I just -- when we did the HAZMAT course, when we were certifying ammunition, we always used the CFR. So that is just how I have always used it. I have never looked at the AFMAN for ammunition.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) Is that because it is an easier pub to read?

LCPL (b) (6) For me it is because I do have -- I am more used to doing it, so that is how we did it in the course.

MAJ (b) (6) But during the course, did they say you could do it through the AFMAN?

LCPL (b) (6) I don't remember. I don't think they ever brought the AFMAN up for that, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) What is your ordinance -- Sergeant (b) (6) does he use the AFMAN or does use the CFR when he does his stuff?

LCPL (b) (6) I don't know, sir. I don't know what he uses.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) Is there an authorization in here that would say "must be on a separate aircraft" or "it must be on its own aircraft"? There is nothing in there?

LCPL (b) (6) No, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Where does it say in the CFR that it has to be on its own aircraft? In the chart?

LCPL (b) (6) So it is just -- the HAZMAT table that you were looking at earlier where it has the packing instructions and the authorization, if you go to those paragraphs and read through them that is where you can find that, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. I want to see just while were are -- since this is the only document that we have, I want to take a look at this real quick. That is not what it was. The ones that we had were 0006, which is that one right there. So under special provision, cargo aircraft only, packing subparagraph A5.12.

LCPL (b) (6) I think you would have to write -- what is it? UN --

MAJ (b) (6) -- 0006. And you can type it in up top if you want.

LCPL (b) (6) So then you would go to this paragraph A5.12.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) So this -- I don't know why it is not coming up. I typed it, but --

MAJ (b) (6) That was actually it. You were on the right page. So this -- so there is A5.13 and A5.12.

LCPL (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) Package and boxes or drums under packing not required, so they were in one of these, I guess, either --

LCPL (b) (6) A wooden box.

MAJ (b) (6) A wooden box. Okay. Yeah. And it is there. Is there a quick way to check on compatibility?

LCPL (b) (6) For ammunition?

MAJ (b) (6) Yeah.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Is it the CFR?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) That is the CFR-49?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) If I were to pull up the CFR-49, you could talk me through all that right now?

LCPL (b) (6) I have notes written on my CFR-49, but I could show you if it was compatible or incompatible.

MAJ (b) (6) Is there a particular section you need?

LCPL (b) (6) It would be the ammunition capability table, sir.

[Personnel were trying to locate CFR-49 via Internet search.]

MAJ (b) (6) If I were to ask one of your guys to bring over your book, would they know where it is at?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes. It is in my locker.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

LTCOL (b) (6) I am going to pause this.

[The audio recording was paused.]

[The audio recording was started.]

LCPL (b) (6) So this is just for Class 1.

MAJ (b) (6) Class 1, okay. It's Class 2, I think.

LCPL (b) (6) It's Class 1.

MAJ (b) (6) It is Class 1?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) They all should be Class 1, I think.

LTCOL (b) (6) And we have got the CFR-49 pulled up electronically right now.

LCPL (b) (6) Okay. So if I go to 1.1E right here, which was Class 1, 1.1E, I go to the G, which is right here, it would have a "6" right there. So then I would have to reference that "6," and that is what I was telling you gentlemen that I had written down on my CFR-49; that is what I would reference.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) So is it okay if we just wait for the CFR-49 that I have?

MAJ (b) (6) My question with that is: Are you just going to look at a note or are we actually going to pull up the actual reference to the "6"?

LCPL (b) (6) I can look for the reference.

MAJ (b) (6) Because if you are just pulling up a note, you know, that is just your memory of what is correct.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes. So "6" means explosive articles incompatibility Group G, other than fireworks and those requiring special storage may be loaded and transported without articles in compatibility Groups C, D, and E provided no explosive substance are carried in the same rail car. So it is compatible as long as it's not -- other than fireworks and those requiring special stowage. So if it is not a firework, then it is compatible.

MAJ (b) (6) What constitutes a firework?

LCPL (b) (6) Fireworks themselves --

LTCOL (b) (6) Go back down to that note again.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir. So these were just cartridges for weapons with the E and then -- which one did we look at?

MAJ (b) (6) When you say they are cartridges for weapons, so --

LCPL (b) (6) Just regular ammunition rounds.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. But they -- are they not HE rounds?
They are explosive rounds, right?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) Fireworks, I believe it would say fireworks
here, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. But you are not sure?

LCPL (b) (6) I am pretty sure that it would say in the
proper shipping name "fireworks."

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) I have never worked with fireworks
themselves, but those would be part of the proper shipping name,
sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Can I read that again one more time?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) We are talking about Note 6?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) And we are talking about the -- any
potential conflict between items G or E, right?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) It means "explosive articles in
compatibility Group G, other than fireworks and those requiring
special stowage" -- so take those out -- "may be loaded and
transported with articles of compatibility Group C, D, and E

provided no substances are carried -- no explosive substances are carried in the same rail car."

LCPL (b) (6) Rail car would probably be for rail transport, sir. The CFR refers to rail, vessel, and cargo aircraft.

MAJ (b) (6) That is on page 731 of the CFR.

MAJ (b) (6) In school, did you guys have a lot -- you went over all of this stuff with ordinance in particular or is ordinance kind of a subsection or how did that work?

LCPL (b) (6) It was a two-week course. The CFR-49 is this thick, so it has -- so it's a lot of referencing and knowing what you read, the majority of the time. They didn't go through every single little thing on there, but they went through specific things so like ammunition and hazardous materials and stuff like that and the compatibility table; that is one of the biggest things that you have to look at when you are certifying HAZMAT, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) So if you were to run into a question, because you are a brand new JI doing it for seven months, who would you go to if you have a question?

LCPL (b) (6) To the other joint inspector, which would be Corporal (b) (6) and then before that, I would go to Corporal (b) (6). He was with us, but he recently just got out. There is also Corporal (b) (6) who is at the armory now; but I know that if

I did have any questions, I could go to him. We all got certified at the same time, but I just --

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) Except Corporal (b) (6). When he was there, I would the majority of the time, ask him.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And all of the other JI's you have been dealing with since January, has there been any other issues with compatibilities or loads with any of the units or anything?

LCPL (b) (6) No, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. Any issues working with aircrew as far as them not wanting it or wanting more documentation or --

LCPL (b) (6) No, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) -- things changed, anything like that?

LCPL (b) (6) No, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) So this is like a one-off moment, it never happened before and you had to change something?

LCPL (b) (6) No, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And I guess the last thing. With the P-4's, cargo only, what says in that manual that, you know, a C-130 can carry passengers and cargo at the same time, but it doesn't make it, you know, a passenger plane? Do you know what I mean?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) Is there a reference?

LCPL (b) (6) So I think that when it says passenger aircraft, it would be passengers like regular aircraft that is full of 100 passengers, which that would be considered a passenger aircraft. And then that stuff would get loaded onto the belly of the bird. I think that is what is referencing when it says passenger in aircraft.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. So if I had a full C-130 load and had 80 Marines in there, would I still be --

LCPL (b) (6) You probably wouldn't be able to fit 80 Marines onto a C-130 with a full load. You would probably --

MAJ (b) (6) Well, I am not saying with a full -- if my load was mainly Marines and then I had some stuff on back ramp, am I still a cargo aircraft? Do you know what I mean?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) How did I -- where is the --

LTCOL (b) (6) When does a C-130 -- I understand your position as a cargo -- when would it become a passenger airplane and where is that authority we can look that up? What defines that?

LCPL (b) (6) I wouldn't know that, sir. I just know that if it was to be just a passenger aircraft only, then it would only have to carry just passengers, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Passengers not associated with the mission?

MAJ (b) (6) So to your knowledge, everything is -- if there -- they have to, like, military; is that what makes it --

LCPL (b) (6) I think it would just have to be cargo aircraft and -- so for passengers, it would just have to be just passengers only with a load of HAZMAT, which wouldn't be authorized. And for cargo aircraft only would have to be a cargo flight, and the mission would be just for cargo, the importance would be the cargo to get to the destination.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. So even though we have cargo that meets that criteria and we have Marines on the plane, it is still a cargo plane?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, it would be considered a cargo aircraft.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) Let me look up the passenger eligibility real quick.

MAJ (b) (6) They don't make it easy, do they?

LTCOL (b) (6) This is tuff. Where would it -- do you have any idea which document would make a differential between a railway car and a plane?

LCPL (b) (6) They have -- on the CFR, they have railway, vessel, and cargo whenever you are looking at the tables.

LTCOL (b) (6) It defines those, railway, vessel, and cargo?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes. So I can show you right now actually. So it would vessel stowage over here, cargo, and we have vessels, cargo for aircraft, and passenger aircraft/rail.

LTCOL (b) (6) So passenger aircraft and rail would be considered together?

LCPL (b) (6) No, no, no. So passenger aircraft and rail would be -- it would have the limitations for it, like, for an item for here would be forbidden, it would tell you. For cargo aircraft only or passenger and aircraft, it would be forbidden. That is just an example I am giving you, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. So walk through this chart with that ammo pallet with these numbers and show us how it applies.

LCPL (b) (6) Okay.

MAJ (b) (6) And our comment about your notes, you can use your notes as long as you can back it up. There is nothing wrong with that.

LCPL (b) (6) Well, this isn't mine.

MAJ (b) (6) Oh. It is not yours. Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) No.

MAJ (b) (6) Sir, can you read this paragraph real quick?

LTCOL (b) (6) Um-huh. So the way I read this, this says that it is not -- those guys were not passengers for purposes of this manual.

MAJ (b) (6) Yeah.

LTCOL (b) (6) It says that if they were to be passengers, then it would governed under the DOTSB.

MAJ (b) (6) But that's for this, contract air.

LTCOL (b) (6) I don't think this passenger -- I am not -- I don't know if this applies to that; it's a different definition. Does that make sense?

MAJ (b) (6) It does.

LTCOL (b) (6) Her document says passenger aircraft/railway, and that would actually kind of go to it -- well, I am not certain.

MAJ (b) (6) Yeah.

LTCOL (b) (6) I am just kind of -- off of my first read. All right. So let's walk through this.

LCPL (b) (6) So you would look at this 1.4S, cartridges for weapons.

LTCOL (b) (6) Help me here. What am I looking at? 1.4S, is this where I am looking right here?

LCPL (b) (6) No. Right here, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) All right. So this is 1.4S.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes. The UN number, you would at that. You would look if it was allowable for passenger and aircraft or cargo, which it is allowed 25kg or 100; and then --

LTCOL (b) (6) Hold on. Cargo aircraft only, passenger aircraft, rail. All right. So we are saying we are using cargo aircraft only.

LCPL (b) (6) Um-huh.

LTCOL (b) (6) We haven't decided how to define those two things, and you are saying that for 1.4S -- pull up that chart over here so I can see the designations -- it is going to use 25 to 100kg depending on how we classify it. All right. Where is the --

MAJ (b) (6) Which chart?

LTCOL (b) (6) The chart that has the written classifications beside them. Here you go. That is it right there. All right. I just want to make sure we are reading this right. 1.4S, so then we come to 1.4G. Do you see 1.4G? There we go.

LCPL (b) (6) Sir, that would be in signals and smoke.

LTCOL (b) (6) Right. Am I bothering you? I am just trying to see how you do it.

LCPL (b) (6) No, sir. You are fine.

LTCOL (b) (6) All right. Here we go. There it is.

LCPL (b) (6) Right here, UN197.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) So passenger or cargo aircraft --

LTCOL (b) (6) Forbidden.

LCPL (b) (6) -- forbidden.

LTCOL (b) (6) Seventy-five gram cargo.

LCPL (b) (6) Cargo aircraft only, and this was under cargo aircraft only right there, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) All right. Let's do 1.1E.

LCPL (b) (6) So that is cartridges for weapons.

LTCOL (b) (6) Is this the one right here? Is this the right UN number?

LCPL (b) (6) UN006, yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) All right.

LCPL (b) (6) Okay. So I am confused right now because it says cartridges for weapons right here, 006, 1.1E, it says forbidden; but when we looked at it on the compatibility table, it was allowed.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. This is not the compatibility table is what you are telling me, right?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, it is not.

LTCOL (b) (6) Or this is?

LCPL (b) (6) No, this is not. This is just a table --

LTCOL (b) (6) So there is a second table -- okay. So the way I understand it is you use this table out of the CFR to see how much or what they will allow --

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) -- on a particular type of vessel.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) But then there is a second chart that shows if the cargo within the airplane is not compatible with each other, right?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) All right. So this is where you look the first part up?

LCPL (b) (6) Um-huh.

LTCOL (b) (6) And then where do we get that compatibility chart to see what --

LCPL (b) (6) Well, on mine, I had a sticker on it, so I don't know exactly where it is at. I just trying -- I know it is somewhere back here, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) All right.

MAJ (b) (6) I think you were closed to page 700; 731 was the reference previously. And that previous chart you were looking at was on page 221 of the CFR-49.

LCPL (b) (6) You said it was closed to 731, sir?

MAJ (b) (6) I think so. Yeah. Page 730.

LTCOL (b) (6) Do you have a paragraph number for that?

MAJ (b) (6) 174.81.

LTCOL (b) (6) 174.81. It's not in this book. That is 174, and that doesn't -- is that us?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

LTCOL (b) (6) Awesome.

LCPL (b) (6) So 1.1E -- so again, you would look over here and look to see if it was compatible with the S, the G, and the -- whatever other ones they had.

LTCOL (b) (6) E, S, G -- was there an F?

LCPL (b) (6) I don't think so, sir. No, there was no F, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) All right.

LCPL (b) (6) So E, and you look at the G right here, it has a 6; and then no F; G, it was blank; and then S, which will be 4/5; 5 would be -- it means 1.4S, fireworks, may not be loaded on the same transport vehicle with divisions 1.1 or 1.2 materials. So again, that references to fireworks. Then 4 means --

LTCOL (b) (6) Go ahead. I am sorry.

LCPL (b) (6) No, go ahead, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) 4 means see Section 177.835. We will look at that in a second. We will go through that.

MAJ (b) (6) Lance Corporal (b) (6) was that -- that was 1.4S; is that right?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. We need to look at -- hold on one second. We need to look at 177.835G. Hold on. Don't go there yet. All right. And Note 6.

LCPL (b) (6) Note 6.

LTCOL (b) (6) Let's read this together.

LCPL (b) (6) Okay.

LTCOL (b) (6) It means explosive articles in compatibility Group G, other than fireworks and those requiring special handling, may be loaded, transported, and stored with other explosive articles of compatibility Groups C, D, and E provided that explosive substances such as those not contained in articles are not carried in the same transport vehicle.

LCPL (b) (6) I think that is what we read on the other one, sir, and it was -- the other one said rail vehicle.

LTCOL (b) (6) Yeah.

MAJ (b) (6) I think so. But you are saying that when you went to the first chart up on page 221 that there was a discrepancy --

LCPL (b) (6) Um-huh.

MAJ (b) (6) -- forbidden; is that right?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir. That is what I saw on this, but this is -- I don't know how -- because I have a green one. I don't know what year it was published, sir. So when I use mine --

MAJ (b) (6) So this is a 2016.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Do you know what year yours is?

LCPL (b) (6) I think mine may be 2015, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) That is the one that I got when I went to the course.

MAJ (b) (6) I see. Okay.

LTCOL (b) (6) When we get done with this --

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) -- I do need to see your version, okay?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) So would this be the most up to date probably?

LTCOL (b) (6) Yeah. Has a 2017 been published yet?

LCPL (b) (6) I don't know, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) You're not sure, okay. That is understandable.

MAJ (b) (6) Just one more time, can you look on the front there, page 221, where you helped me find the discrepancy because you might have solved the pub problem. Do you know what I mean?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir. 221 you said, sir?

MAJ (b) (6) Whichever page it was exactly. I think it was 221. I was in the ball park. You were looking at it previously and said it didn't match or you said that it was interesting.

LCPL (b) (6) It is right here. It was page 213, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) I am sorry, 213. And that's for what type?

LCPL (b) (6) 1.1E, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) 1.1E, okay.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) And on what line is it saying that it doesn't jive?

LCPL (b) (6) The quality and limitations.

MAJ (b) (6) And is there another section? Because you said forbidden, forbidden in two places.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) What is the other place?

LCPL (b) (6) Right here. It is the quality and limitations, it is for both passenger and cargo.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. So forbidden for passengers and cargo.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) Got it. And that is the chart -- the HAZMAT table on page 213; but if you go back to -- I think you were on page 730 -- it actually shows that it is okay.

LCPL (b) (6) It -- for the segregation of it, yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. All right. Got it.

MAJ (b) (6) What would the other shipment be? Truck or vessel?

MAJ (b) (6) Completely -- so I am not talking about the books anymore.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) You were probably one of the last people to talk to the gunny.

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) What was he like when you talked to him? Just overall, you know -- if you can remember -- I know it's a long time ago, and I know we have just been talking through boring publications. So can you just talk to like his demeanor? If you seen how he seemed at the time?

LCPL (b) (6) He seemed fine, sir. He was really nice. He smiled when I went over there.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. There was no, like, fire up, you know, at the lance corporal, no knife hands?

LCPL (b) (6) No, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

LCPL (b) (6) He just -- I gave him the paperwork. I told him what happened. He was like "It's fine. I will take a look at it when it gets here."

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. No questions -- he already knew about the ordinance issue, right?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes.

MAJ (b) (6) And he didn't have any questions or anything?

LCPL (b) (6) No, he did not, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. Anything else -- did anything else while your time out there with the C-130 crew -- the crew

members, anything else look out of place or people look frazzled? I know it probably wasn't the thing that was on your mind at the time.

LCPL (b) (6) No, not that I can think of anything, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. If I understand correctly, you guys showed up to work at 0300 that day; is that right?

LCPL (b) (6) I didn't. That was the other --

MAJ (b) (6) You didn't?

LCPL (b) (6) I did not. That was the other working squad's working week. That -- the night that everything happened is when I went into work at 0200, so that was Tuesday morning when I went into work at 0200.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. So on Sunday, you are doing stuff. When did you leave work on Sunday? Can you recall?

LCPL (b) (6) Around 1600.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And you showed up to work on Monday when?

LCPL (b) (6) I want to say 0730 because that is the normal time.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And you stayed until?

LCPL (b) (6) Until probably passed working hours. I would say like --

MAJ (b) (6) What is that? I don't know what that is.

LCPL (b) (6) Like 1630, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And you came back again at 0200 to start the next evolution?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. Is that because you are like the only -- one of two people that are JI's?

LCPL (b) (6) No, sir. We just had flights that night, passenger flights.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. Got you. All right. And from a, you know, you are a young, hard charging Marine, do you feel like you are getting overworked at any point? Does the schedule -- are you getting rest compensation for these kind of weird hours, you know, that kind of stuff?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir, we do.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. So you don't feel overtaxed or --

LCPL (b) (6) Well, working at the APOE is overall it is going to be hectic and sometimes you do feel like you are rushed and stuff, but that is just how it is. Just last week, we had, like, six flights running off the same time, but we all work together and we all work as a team, and nobody screams at each other whenever it comes down to these missions. We try to get the mission done. So it is tiring sometimes, but we do get rewarded in the end with time off, and they let us go early or have us come in later on in the day depending on the hours that we work. If we were to come in at 0100 in the morning until

1200, then we would get cut right after those flights were done, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Got you. But your sergeants take care of you, right?

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. And if you run into a point where, like, man, you just -- I can't do this right now, I need a break, is there some way you can -- are you comfortable to talk to your NCO's to be like, hey, I need like five minutes to clear my head or have you ever been in a situation like that?

LCPL (b) (6) I have never been in a situation like that, but I am sure that they would take that into account and look out for me, sir.

MAJ (b) (6) Okay. Great. Sir, I don't have any further questions.

LTCOL (b) (6) I just need you to show me that segregation table again --

LCPL (b) (6) Yes, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) -- that had the Note 6 reference.

LCPL (b) (6) Right there, sir.

LTCOL (b) (6) Thank you very much.

LCPL (b) (6) No problem.

LTCOL (b) (6) I appreciate it. Does anybody got anything else?

MAJ (b) (6) No.

MAJ (b) (6) No.

LTCOL (b) (6) All right. Then we will end the interview.

[The interview concluded.]

[END OF PAGE]

1 LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. It's Tuesday, July 25th, 2017,
2 at 1427. This is the 4th Marine Air Wing Commanding General's
3 command investigation. I'm Lieutenant Colonel (b) (6) the
4 investigator. And I'm speaking in interview with (b) (6)
5 (b) (6) who is the explosive safety officer for Marine Corps
6 Air Station Cherry Point.

7 **Questions by Lieutenant Colonel (b) (6)**

8 Q. Mr. (b) (6) do you see that we're recording this
9 conversation?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And do you authorize a recording of this conversation?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Mr. (b) (6) please tell us about the events of
14 July 10th and loading the cargo for Yankee 62 and 72.

15 A. Okay. We have to clarify, I did not -- we did -- I was
16 not there for the loading of the cargo.

17 Q. I understand that.

18 A. Okay.

19 Q. But you were involved with part of the inspection
20 process with the loading for the cargo.

21 A. I have oversight.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Not in -- not in the process.

24 Q. Gotcha.

25

1 A. Okay. And my oversight is explosive safety, such as
2 them citing and placing ammunition in the wrong area.

3 Q. Gotcha. Okay.

4 A. That's my venue.

5 Okay. So the morning of the 10th at 7:00, 7:05 a.m., I
6 went to the CALA, the Combat Aircraft Loading Area, okay.

7 Q. Um-hmm.

8 A. I went to the CALA to check on the ammunition that was
9 delivered from Hotel Company, 2d MRB.

10 Q. Um-hmm.

11 A. All right. When I arrived at the CALA, the gate was
12 closed and locked, which is not uncommon because that is a
13 Level 2 Class security area.

14 Okay. I have venue over the CALA, because I do all the
15 siting there as far as telling the aircraft where they park and
16 where to put explosives for loading.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. On that particular morning when I arrived, the gate was
19 locked. I unlocked it, I entered the gate, and relocked it.

20 While driving towards the CALA, you encounter first the
21 OSA, the Ordnance Staging Area. When I went to the OSA and as it
22 became visible to me, I noted that there was no flag flying for a
23 Bravo flag indicating there was an explosive op going on.

24 I also noted that there was not a fire symbol present
25 indicating the type of hazard for a fire symbol. As I got even

1 closer, I noted a pickup truck sitting there with the motor
2 running. I also noted that there was a lima 463 pallet sitting
3 behind the truck and the OSA pad. And it was -- apparently had
4 material on it that was strapped down.

5 I pulled up next to the truck and parked and sat there
6 for a moment thinking that the guard would come out and challenge
7 me. I was not challenged. After a few minutes, I got out of my
8 vehicle and I went over to the flag pole and I raised the Bravo
9 flag to indicate an explosive op was present.

10 I then went to the fire symbol board and flipped it to
11 Fire Symbol 1, designating for a 1.1 hazard. Upon that, I went
12 directly over to the lima pallet and looked at the lima pallet.
13 When I looked at the lima pallet, I noted that there were
14 discrepancies with the pallet.

15 After noticing that, I took pictures of it.

16 MAJ (b) (6) Sir, are these -- are these your pictures
17 you took?

18 MR. (b) (6) Yeah, they look like them.

19 MAJ (b) (6) These are pictures we received from I
20 believe a communication between you and MRB -- 2d MRB kind of
21 showing the discrepancies that existed with --

22 MR. (b) (6) Yes.

23 MAJ (b) (6) Yes.

24 MR. (b) (6) Those are them.

25 MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

1 MR. (b) (6) So I took photos of -- of the
2 discrepancies that I noted with the shipment.

3 And after doing that, I went back to the pickup truck
4 and I knocked on the window. When I knobbed on the window -- it
5 was the rear window of the pickup. It was a four-door truck -- a
6 young man in civilian attire arose from the backseat. He rolled
7 down the window and he asked if I could help me -- or if he could
8 help me. And I said -- I told him who I was and I asked him if
9 he was the ammunition tech for 2d MRB or what was his role. And
10 he said I'm the guard that was assigned. I'm a critical skills
11 operator.

12 Okay. I said all right, that's what I needed to know.
13 And I said I'll catch you later and I left.

14 MAJ (b) (6) Can I -- can I cut you off for one second?

15 MR. (b) (6) Um-hmm.

16 **Questions by Major (b) (6)**

17 Q. So when you showed up you noticed, you know, the Bravo
18 flag wasn't up and the fire switch wasn't -- or light wasn't on
19 to the right position.

20 A. Um-hmm.

21 Q. Did you know there was a 1.1 there already because you
22 had a HAZDEC earlier, or how'd you know a 1.1 was present?

23 A. I looked at the pallets.

24 Q. So you walked over to the pallets --

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. -- you saw there was a 1.1 --
2 A. Yeah. But I knew --
3 Q. -- then you walked back to the flag pole and --
4 A. I knew there were supposed to be 1.1 on there.
5 Q. How'd you know that though?
6 A. Because Mr. -- what is it? I think it was Mr. -- or
7 Sergeant (b) (6) --
8 Q. Okay. Yeah.
9 A. -- sent me an advanced shipment.
10 Q. Okay. So you had an idea --
11 A. They -- yeah. They always send --
12 Q. Did they do something like this?
13 A. That -- he sent this to me.
14 Q. Okay. This is the enclosure, it's color coded, it
15 shows the pallet load plan, and everything that goes with that.
16 A. Right. And it also --
17 Q. It had, I'm assuming --
18 A. Yes. Right there.
19 Q. -- this piece which is the manifest list.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. And after reviewing this, even though he did not put
23 HAZ class and compatibility on here, I know that a B546 is a 1.1E
24 item.
25

1 Q. Check.

2 A. You know, after doing this for 30 years, you know these
3 DODECs really well.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. So that was the first red flag for the day.

7 A. Well, the first red flag was that it was -- there was
8 no flag. And then if there was no fire symbol, then there was
9 not an active present guard.

10 Q. Yeah.

11 A. Which are all disturbing. And then --

12 Q. And did that Marine need to have -- since he's the
13 guard, did he have ordnance with him to be guard or -- I don't
14 know what the rules are.

15 A. He -- he should have had small arms with him and a
16 handgun.

17 Q. Did he?

18 A. That I don't know.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. That I don't know.

21 Q. Did you get his name by the way?

22 A. I did not get his name but when I looked in the back of
23 the truck, there was green gear sitting there with stenciling on
24 it that said Leach.

25

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Which led me to believe that it belonged to Corp -- or
3 Sergeant Talon Leach.

4 Q. Is that a Marine you know or --

5 A. No. I just learned of him from the -- the names that
6 were posted through the news media.

7 Q. I see.

8 A. That was rather disturbing after meeting him.

9 Q. Gotcha.

10 A. Okay. After leaving the -- the CALA, I went back to
11 the gate, locked the gate and left. I went back to the
12 department safety office, the JSO, the Joint Safety Office, and I
13 reviewed my photographs. I had sent -- I sent them to myself on
14 my e-mail server and noted all the different discrepancies and I
15 pulled them over and put them into paint and wrote down what was
16 wrong with them.

17 All right. And the more and more I looked at that, the
18 more and more I knew that something was a miff, because it did
19 not meet the standards of the AFMAN and -- for an air flight.

20 Q. When you say that, what do you mean? What -- what in
21 the AFMAN didn't match?

22 A. Well, if --

23 Q. I can give you your -- your photos back, sir.

24 A. Yeah. If you review the photos, the first thing to me
25 that was obvious was that it only had four straps on it going

1 over the pallets.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. There's a six strap minimum, if you don't use a cargo
4 net. Okay. So that -- that alerted me right away.

5 Now the anti-sway or the shifting straps, I don't count
6 those because you're actually supposed to have six over the
7 pallets. The side shift, those are great to add on as a
8 secondary measure. But the strapping, if you don't use a top
9 cargo net, it's supposed to be so that if you flip that Lima 463
10 upside down, nothing falls off.

11 Q. Makes sense.

12 A. Okay. The next thing I noted, if you looked at the
13 individual wooden pallets that you would note that the seals on
14 the steel strapping -- the inch and a quarter steel strapping,
15 only had one crimp on them. In all explosive operations when
16 banding munitions to a pallet, you always use two crimps on the
17 seal.

18 Q. Is that something that they do --

19 A. This being the seal.

20 Q. -- when they put it together?

21 A. When they put the -- when they put the boxes on the
22 pallet and put the steel bands over it, then they crimp it twice.

23 Q. I see.

24 A. Yeah. Because it -- it changes its load tensile
25 strength.

1 Q. Makes sense.

2 A. Okay. I also noted when I was looking at the boxes
3 that the boxes were missing the minimum requirements. And what I
4 mean by that is proper shipping name, United Nation's number,
5 that -- that nature. I also noted that some of the boxes were
6 marked as light but not marked light in accordance with the
7 MIL-STD-129P.

8 Q. What does that mean?

9 A. The MIL-STD is a joint regulation that governs the
10 preservation and packaging of all ammunition explosives.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. And from the MIL-STD, it's a joint regulation so that
13 it is actually a MIL-STD for all services. So if you build
14 something to a MIL-STD, it's good for any service. And that's
15 why they utilize it especially in this venue, because the AFMAN
16 is almost itself a MIL-STD. All services use the AFMAN. And if
17 you look underneath the AFMAN 20-424[sic], it'll go down, it'll
18 tell you the Marine Corps order, the Army order, so on and so
19 forth.

20 Q. And, sir, when you're doing all this stuff, are you
21 referencing the AFMAN or the CFR-49? For what's the --

22 A. These here?

23 Q. Yeah. What's the controlling document?

24 A. Well, the CFR is gonna always take venue.
25

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Because it governs transportation. And the AFMAN
3 mirrors the CFR.

4 Q. Which is the -- so the CF -- which is the most
5 restrictive?

6 A. Well, it depends. I've seen company commanders make
7 the most restrictive document, you know.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. But in -- in this case, the CFR and the AFMAN are
10 hand-in-hand, they say the same thing. So there's not one that
11 is more restrictive than the other because they say identical
12 things.

13 Q. So when you're reviewing HAZDECs for this --

14 A. Uh-huh.

15 Q. -- are you referencing the AFMAN or the CFR or --

16 A. You would -- if you're dealing with a flight, now
17 you're referencing the AFMAN.

18 Q. Okay. But just this --

19 A. There's three modes of transportation.

20 Q. Right. Okay.

21 A. Ground, air, and vessel. Air is covered by not only
22 the CFR in a certain chapter --

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. -- and then it's covered by the AFMAN.

25

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Okay. And then it goes even further down the road,
3 because there's more AFMANs after that other one.

4 MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

5 LTCOL (b) (6) Let me pause it right quick.

6 MR. (b) (6) So the -- so the AFMAN basically
7 reiterates the CFR-49 in the section that applies to air, all
8 right. And then from the AFMAN, it can be broken down even
9 further. And there's a lot of micro PUBs coming out of the
10 AFMAN, and there's -- the AFMAN is full of attachments, but they
11 are three times as easier to read than the Code of Federal
12 Regulation because the Code of Federal Regulation, you will
13 literally jump from the front to the back 30 times to look up one
14 piece.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. And -- and the CRF is very vague in a lot of areas. So
17 there's -- there's a -- you have the AFMAN and -- and it can get
18 even more complicated if you bring civilian air into it, then you
19 got to go into the IATA.

20 Q. So --

21 A. And that's a lot of fun.

22 Q. Just so I'm really tracking, everything -- the AFMAN
23 mirrors the CFR.

24 A. Um-hmm.

25

1 Q. But it -- in this particular case, could it -- it could
2 be more restrictive than the CFR.

3 A. The AFMAN being more restrictive? It -- it can be
4 because it gives commanders latitude.

5 Q. Okay. So an embark Marine should be using an AFMAN
6 more than the CFR, per se.

7 A. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, because -- and the AFMAN -- like,
8 for like an airfield, the point of embarkation, that officer that
9 runs that unit too can also imply -- or restrict and do other --
10 put restrictions on the Marine or the Sailor, whoever's doing the
11 embarking, saying that not only are you going to follow the CFR
12 and then the AFMAN, then I want things this way to my SOP.

13 Q. I see.

14 A. So that everybody does it standardized.

15 Q. Before -- before I -- before you leave today, can I get
16 you to show me in the AFMAN, like, where we can cross-reference
17 all these codes and stuff?

18 A. Oh, God. It's -- if you're ready for about a
19 three-hour class.

20 Q. Sure. Yeah. I can do that.

21 A. Yeah. It's -- yeah. Do you have a copy of the AFMAN
22 here?

23 Q. We've got a electronic copy, yeah.

24 A. Okay. It's -- I can show it to you in a nutshell and
25 it'll make real sense to you.

1 Q. All right. Thank you.

2 A. Getting back to the -- the pallets, so we had already
3 talked about it missing the minimum marking requirements. We
4 talked about it being -- missing the light box markings
5 correctly.

6 LTCOL (b) (6) Explain that a little bit. What does
7 that mean?

8 MR. (b) (6) Now all services differ on light
9 boxes. That's why the AFMAN will specifically call out the
10 MIL-STD-129 for marking and labeling. And you're -- you're
11 allowed to take a -- like a -- a label with an orange background
12 and a contrast of black writing on it and put it on the container
13 but you have to put it on all sides of the container if you do
14 that.

15 So most military members will opt out and paint the
16 entire can orange. And that's -- that's in the MIL-STD-129P.
17 And -- and then take a black marking and write light box on it.

18 And there's controversy on the word "light box" because
19 the Air Force decided a long time ago they're going to spell it
20 L-I-T-E and the Army and the Marine Corps and the Navy says, no,
21 that's not how you spell light. It's L-I-G-H-T. So there's
22 controversy on that too.

23 LTCOL (b) (6) Light box meaning something that's --

24 MR. (b) (6) The box is not at its total capacity
25 as designed.

1 LTCOL (b) (6) Gotcha. Thanks.

2 MR. (b) (6) So if a box of 9-millimeter is
3 supposed to have 2,000 rounds and it only had a thousand rounds
4 in it, it would be now a light box.

5 LTCOL (b) (6) Thank you.

6 MR. (b) (6) Yep.

7 The other things I had noted was that there was a
8 coffee cup sitting on top of a pallet. Now why does that disturb
9 me as the ESO? It's mainly because the OP 5 -- the NAVSEA OP 5
10 will tell you that you're not to eat or drink in an ammunition
11 area or in an ammunition operation. Okay. And when I found a
12 coffee cup sitting on the ammo that tells me they were doing that
13 in fact or walked up there and threw it away on top of the
14 pallet. One or the two.

15 And the reason for that being that wood treated
16 ammunition boxes are chemically treated with preservatives and
17 insecticides. And if -- if servicemembers tend to eat and drink
18 during ammunition operations, they're ingesting these. And so
19 now it becomes an industrial hygiene matter.

20 Okay. The other thing I noted about the shipment too,
21 that a top net was not placed on the material. And of course,
22 the top net is what would hold it to the pallet should the pallet
23 be flipped.

24 Now when you go to a short stack, it's very difficult
25 to get a top net on because of their size, but you can cinch them

1 up and then use additional strapping over the top net as
2 required. And -- and that makes a big difference. Because then
3 you're not gonna let even the smallest of boxes slip through the
4 net. And that's why that top net's so critical.

5 Well, as I said, when I -- when I'd looked at all these
6 deficiencies, I thought to myself there's -- there's no way that
7 this material has had a JI on it yet -- or a joint inspection, I
8 should say, which would be DD Form 2133. And that's a JI
9 inspection.

10 LTCOL (b) (6) A DD Form what?

11 MR. (b) (6) 2133.

12 LTCOL (b) (6) Thank you.

13 MR. (b) (6) Yep.

14 So with that in my mind, I thought, you know, I need to
15 go over to the APOE and see if they did do a JI on it and to see
16 if it was done properly.

17 So I drove over to the APOE at CLC-21 here on the air
18 field at Cherry Point and gained admittance and met a young
19 Sergeant named (b) (6), and he took me to the office. I had asked
20 him, you in charge and he said, no, it's Sergeant (b) (6).
21 I said, well, can you take me to Sergeant (b) (6).

22 So he took me to the office and -- and got Sergeant
23 (b) (6) for me. While I was waiting for Sergeant
24 (b) (6) to show, Sergeant (b) (6) showed up and greeted
25 me. I know Sergeant (b) (6) because he's the explosive safety

1 rep for CLC-21.

2 (b) (6) -- Sergeant (b) (6) then showed up
3 and greeted me, and I asked her if the JI had been done on Hotel
4 Company's ammunition; and if it has been done, I need to see the
5 documents and who did the inspection. She said that Lance
6 Corporal -- I think the name's right -- (b) (6) (b) (6) -- had
7 done the inspection. So she gathered up (b) (6) and -- and had
8 (b) (6) get the documents.

9 They returned with the documents and handed them to me.
10 Well, I started reviewing the documents. The first thing I noted
11 she -- the first document on the list was the HAZDEC. We refer
12 to them as candy stripes. When I looked at the HAZDEC, I
13 automatically knew there was something wrong with them. Now I
14 had noted that in the packaging on the HAZDEC, it said that they
15 were all 4B1 boxes -- or the vast majority listed on the HAZDEC
16 were 4B1. 4B1 means it's an aluminum container.

17 Well, having been in the industry a long time, I know
18 that there are very, very few items that are packaged in aluminum
19 for the military. We use steel. So the packaging should be 4A1
20 or a 4C1 with a 4A1 inner pack.

21 Well, I asked Lance Corporal (b) (6) at that time if she
22 knew the difference between aluminum and a steel container and
23 how to tell the difference by reading the pop making, the
24 Performance Oriented Packaging marking on the side of the
25 container, and she didn't answer me.

1 Then I started to review -- well, at that time I had
2 told them that they needed to correct their HAZDEC because they
3 were wrong. There wasn't an aluminum container out there. After
4 looking at the HAZDEC, I started to review the JI. I will say
5 when I did review the HAZDEC, though, there were additional
6 pages. One of them had oxygen on it, and one of them had lithium
7 batteries on it that I -- that's what I remember.

8 When I started reviewing the DD Form 2133, I skimmed
9 through it and I hit Block 12. And if you look in Block 12 on
10 the last one, last column, that was for the ammunition pallet.
11 And when you go down to hazardous material, I noted that it had a
12 line drawn through it not a check mark meaning that it was
13 nonapplicable.

14 So I couldn't asked the Lance Corporal, I said are you
15 qualified to do a JI? Did you have Ammo 62 and Ammo 81? And she
16 said yes. And I said, now how can you be qualified if you're
17 gonna hand me a hazard declaration and a JI that says
18 nonapplicable at the same time?

19 **Questions by Major (b) (6)**

20 Q. So let me get this straight, sir. So on this JI, so
21 when they say this it's the final copy, this is what they gave
22 us.

23 A. Okay.

24 Q. You're saying on Section 12, Row H, hazardous
25 materials, preparation packaging, that they had an N/A put here?

1 A. Not an N/A, just a hash mark.

2 Q. A hash mark like they did right here?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So this is not the copy that you've seen?

5 A. This whole line was hash marks.

6 Q. The whole line was checked nothing.

7 A. From what I remember, yes, they were all hash marks.

8 Q. And that was on what date?

9 A. That was on the 10th.

10 Q. That was on the morning of the 10th. This was

11 supposedly finished on the --

12 A. That says the 7th.

13 Q. -- the 7th.

14 A. I have a hard time gripping that too.

15 Q. Sure is interesting.

16 A. Okay. So --

17 Q. Did you see a finalized version of this before the

18 cargo left?

19 A. No.

20 Q. No. Okay.

21 A. No, I didn't.

22 Q. So the last version you saw at Item H, Section 12H, was

23 all tacked out?

24 A. Yes.

25

1 Q. Meaning no HAZMAT.

2 A. Yes. That's what --

3 Q. Do you know --

4 A. That's what I remember. And especially -- the only one
5 I really concentrate on is that ammo pallet, you know, because
6 the other areas aren't my venue.

7 Q. Do you know -- this is the HAZDECs that they gave us
8 for the ordnance -- not all of them, but do you know, does this
9 meet the criteria for the corrections that you had asked for?

10 A. Yeah. This looks -- this is corrected. This isn't the
11 same copy that I had read.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Yeah. Yeah. This was --

14 Q. So had you seen this HAZDEC and this version of the JI,
15 would you -- would anything throw you off or does this all look
16 good now? According to this and to that, does that pretty
17 much --

18 A. Well, I --

19 Q. -- like, yeah, that meets the letter, minus the fact
20 that the date's screwed up?

21 A. Yeah. If -- if I reviewed this against the JI, I mean,
22 only that one block would be applicable in that fourth column
23 there. The only thing that I would not know by looking at this
24 is if they got their packing instruction and their authorization,
25 otherwise, their special provisions correct. Because this column

1 on the end, that's actually special provisions. But other than
2 that, it -- it looks like it would be correct.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. Sorry for interrupting. Thank you.

6 A. Um-hmm.

7 Let's see, so after having talked to (b) (6) and
8 referenced her qualification and her tell me she was qualified, I
9 asked her then how did she do that; how could she check that
10 block with a hash mark? And she said that's what I was directed
11 to do -- or that's what I was told to do; that's how we do it
12 here. And I said well that's -- that's incorrect.

13 And I looked at Sergeant (b) (6) and I said
14 Sergeant (b) (6) I want this HAZDEC fixed, I want the JI
15 redone, and I will be at the pallet at twelve o'clock to
16 reinspect it to see that you've done your job. And at that time
17 I left.

18 LTCOL (b) (6) What time was that? Guess.

19 MR. (b) (6) I would estimate probably around
20 10:30 to 10:45 because it's probably an hour and a half before
21 noon.

22 Then I went back to the office and got engaged in the
23 rest of my 27 tasks. Noon -- at twelve o'clock, I went back to
24 the CALA. So I went back to the CALA and drove down to the OSA
25 and noted that the ammunition was still sitting at the OSA.

1 There was one -- one Marine present and that was the Corporal
2 (b) (6) and he was an ammo tech -- 2311 ammo tech.

3 I know Corporal (b) (6) personally, because he worked
4 for me at Lejeune when I was stationed there -- or worked down
5 there as a DoD employee. And then I guess he moved to MRB. So I
6 greeted (b) (6) and he asked me of course what was wrong with
7 the pallet.

8 So we started going over the entire pallet as I just
9 did with you gentlemen. And at that time I noticed that they had
10 corrected some of the deficiencies. They had put proper shipping
11 names and UN numbers on all the containers, and they -- they
12 appeared to put more labels or paint or something on containers.
13 It's difficult to see a box and everything on it when they're all
14 strapped down, so I couldn't tell you all the markings that they
15 put on it. But I did note that the seals were not done -- or
16 they were not crimped a second time yet.

17 Okay. And when I was discussing all these deficiencies
18 with (b) (6) -- Corporal (b) (6), Gunnery Sergeant (b) (6)
19 showed up carrying a pair of crimpers. He handed them to
20 Corporal (b) (6) and told him to get crimping. And (b) (6)
21 started crimping pallets -- or seals on pallets straps.

22 The Gunny had asked me what was wrong with the pallet,
23 so I went through it another time with the Gunnery Sergeant;
24 explained to him what all was wrong with his pallet. And I
25 pointed over across the -- the OSA to a pallet -- or a pile of

1 cargo straps -- or cargo nets, and I said there's your cargo
2 nets, you really need to put a cargo top net on this pallet.
3 Well, they immediately, after they got done crimping, grabbed the
4 top net, laid it out and threw it over the pallet and started to
5 band it down and strap it down.

6 And I told them that if they had any problems or
7 anything that they -- they could contact me at any time. And if
8 they need PME's or training in this area to just let me know and I
9 could teach them. If they wanted to get a PME at Cherry Point,
10 they could bring their ammo techs up here and I would teach them
11 and instruct them.

12 And at that time I went back to station ordnance and
13 got involved again with other problems on base.

14 **Questions by Major (b) (6)**

15 Q. Roughly what time would that be?

16 A. Let's see --

17 Q. It sounds like a lot of stuff transpired since noon.

18 A. I would think 12:30, maybe a half an hour later.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. Did you ever see Lance Corporal (b) (6) again?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Or anybody from APOE come back out?

24 A. No, I didn't see -- on that day, no.

25

1 Q. Did they ever try to get back in touch with you to
2 verify that what they had done met your request for everything?

3 A. No. No.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. And the -- this is the odd thing, gentlemen, my venue
6 as the base explosive safety officer is just that, to ensure that
7 people are doing things safely in an explosive arena, whether
8 they're shipping it, whether they're storing it, whether they're
9 moving it or handling it and how they handle it.

10 In this case, I was disturbed because I know what it
11 should look like and I know what it didn't look like, and it made
12 me wonder whether or not an inspection had been done or it was
13 going to be done, so I had to investigate. Because I did not
14 want it going on the plane that way.

15 Q. Right.

16 A. Now, the consequence of this particular munition
17 though, one of the things that's important to know about this --
18 these munitions, these are what they refer to as cartridged
19 munitions. So none of these munitions contain an EED or an EID,
20 okay, which would make them a sensitive munition.

21 In other words, if I was to give any of these items to
22 a Marine and put him in full tactical outfit in gear with his
23 vest and all his bandoleers, he could wear this stuff aboard the
24 aircraft.

25

1 Q. Hm.

2 A. So now having it in DOT POP performance containers and
3 being properly tied to a pallet, it's safer then them wearing
4 them on their body.

5 Q. Okay. So there's nothing in here that doesn't jive
6 with all that stuff? All that stuff is compatible, syncs up and
7 all that --

8 A. This stuff here is all good. Now, I know there -- you
9 know, you have -- you have a C-item here, you got S-items, you
10 got an E-item, you got a G-item, but the G-item isn't a
11 fireworks.

12 Q. What makes it a firework? I don't really --

13 A. UN300 and above. 300 to 335, those are fireworks.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. It's weird. You just remember that stuff after you've
16 been doing it a long time. Yeah. But C, D and E are compatible.
17 And they're compatible with G as long as G isn't fireworks.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. And like an illume round isn't a firework?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Or a --

23 A. None of these are fireworks. And that's why the proper
24 shipping name and the UN number is so critical when you do an air
25 flight. You look at the top of that container -- especially

1 pilots. Pilots are notorious. They want to know. They want to
2 see those proper shipping names, because they know if they see a
3 detonator or a firework or an incendiary or a tear gas or an
4 incapacitating agent, then that alerts them to look for other
5 things. And there's just -- I don't know. Just been doing this
6 too long.

7 Q. So when you walked away and you went back to your
8 office, everything that you saw left you feeling -- give you warm
9 and fuzzy this thing's gonna get on that plane well?

10 A. Well, I'm not gonna say that.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. I'm gonna say that I was more comfortable that there
13 was now a Gunnery Sergeant that was an embarker present.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. And that he was correcting the deficiencies with the
16 Corporal.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Now, I would have been a lot happier had the embarkers
19 been present because, in reality, as soon as Gunnery (b) (6) was
20 done with that pallet, he should have requested a new JI because
21 he has changed the inspection standard.

22 Q. So when the ordnance leaves the CALA, you know, gets on
23 the plane, who's the final authority on that?

24 A. The crew master or loadmaster on that aircraft.

25 Q. And then before --

1 A. But the pilot -- the pilot can say nope.

2 Q. Right. And before that, like, is it the -- is it
3 APOE's the final authority? Is it the MRB's the final authority?

4 A. No, it's the APOE is the one that does the HAZDEC.
5 They have the authority.

6 Q. Okay. So they stop it if they see something wrong.

7 A. Anything. Yeah.

8 Q. And they've got to re -- if there's any tweak to
9 anything, they've got to redo whatever paperwork.

10 A. They -- they should redo it.

11 Q. They should.

12 A. Yep.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. They should redo it. Because if you look at the HAZDEC
15 and -- and if you go through it and then you develop your load
16 plan, they have to give every pilot a brief, okay.

17 Q. When you say "they," you mean the?

18 A. The APOE.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Okay. If I build a -- if I build a hazardous material
21 shipment for you as the pilot and I hand you that, it's telling
22 you that I've looked at everything.

23 Q. Um-hmm.

24 A. And I've inspected it all and then that it meets the
25 requirement from the Code of Federal Regulation.

1 Q. So when --

2 A. That's what this is telling you.

3 Q. Right. So when --

4 A. And this is your loadmaster.

5 Q. So my loadmaster signs this.

6 A. Um-hmm.

7 Q. Is there anything that says that he has to sign this

8 and that APOE should keep it with a signed copy?

9 A. I don't know.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Because I've worked with so many services. They all do

12 it differently.

13 Q. Right.

14 A. And so much of this is automated through different

15 systems now.

16 MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

17 LTCOL (b) (6) So purposes of here at Cherry Point, is

18 there a chance there's one of those floating around with an

19 aircrew signature on it?

20 MR. (b) (6) I have really no knowledge. No idea.

21 Because I don't -- I don't interfere with the -- that's -- that's

22 procedural for the APOE.

23 LTCOL (b) (6) Um-hmm.

24 MR. (b) (6) That has nothing to do with my venue.

25 LTCOL (b) (6) Um-hmm.

1 MR. (b) (6) You know? So I don't get involved in
2 my -- other lanes. I try to stay out of them.

3 LTCOL (b) (6) Got it.

4 **Questions by Lieutenant Colonel (b) (6)**

5 Q. Did you have any interaction with any of the crews?

6 A. Which crews?

7 Q. The -- the Yankee crews.

8 A. I didn't even meet them or say hello to them when they
9 got here. Just the guard.

10 Q. Well, you said the Gunnery Sergeant. That's not the
11 Gunnery Sergeant from the crew.

12 A. No, he's the ammo --

13 Q. Gotcha.

14 A. -- or embarker.

15 Q. Okay. I want to double-check on that.

16 A. Yeah. That's (b) (6) Gunnery Sergeant (b) (6)

17 Q. Yep. Do you have -- your job, I think you're the only
18 one that does your job on base, right?

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. There's nobody else.

21 A. I'm the only one, yeah.

22 Q. It's amazing. Are you aware of any other -- like, you
23 showed -- those photos are awesome. Thank you very much.

24 Are you aware of any other photos or texts or
25 information out there describing the flight?

1 A. No. But I was thinking about something this morning
2 that might be of relevance, may not be. A lot of the airfield is
3 covered by camera. Now whether or not there's -- those cameras
4 cover the CALA and the OSA and if the -- and I don't know if that
5 footage is saved or if it goes into a loop and recycled over --

6 Q. Um-hmm.

7 A. I don't know those things.

8 Q. Right.

9 A. All right. Because if you've ever been into our EOC,
10 my God, I mean, for dispatch, there must be 20 monitors in there
11 with camera that are split four ways with pictures everywhere
12 that's going around this base.

13 Q. Gotcha.

14 A. And I would encourage you to look at camera footage
15 maybe through PMO or air operations. And then I would encourage
16 you again to find out if there were vehicles -- government GSA
17 vehicles involved in any part of this, because all the ones on
18 Cherry Point are equipped with dash cams.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. But they only click on if there's an incident, you
21 know; if you jerk the wheel too hard or whatever. But I don't
22 know. It's a possibility.

23 Q. Gotcha.

24 A. It might help you.

25

1 **Questions by Major (b) (6)**

2 Q. Have you ever had a load like this that was -- have you
3 ever had to correct loads before besides this one or is this kind
4 of like a one-off?

5 A. Well, I've been in the industry a long time, okay. So
6 it's hard to quantify.

7 Q. Well, I understand. Like in -- let's say in the last
8 year at Cherry Point.

9 A. Okay. I'll -- I will give you a little historical
10 data. I used to work at Cherry -- at Camp Lejeune, all right.
11 In January 11, 2016 I came to Cherry Point, okay. Prior to
12 coming here I worked as a material handler at the Ammunition
13 Storage Point for Lejeune. One of my jobs over there was to
14 supervise Marines in building these packages. And to help them
15 build them and to teach them how to build a package. Then I came
16 up here. I have not had a good shipment since I left Lejeune.

17 Q. What does that mean?

18 A. I have never had a Marine unit bring a pallet here that
19 met all my widgets.

20 Q. And not your requirements, but the manual's
21 requirements.

22 A. The manual.

23 Q. Got it.

24 A. Because the vast majority of Marines don't understand
25 HAZDECs because they're not qualified for HAZDECs.

1 Q. So when you find an error, is that -- is there a report
2 that you send out that you're documenting --

3 A. I write a letter.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. I write a letter back to that command or I'll call that
6 command and say, hey, your shipment is wrong. You need to send
7 people up here to correct it. When they get here, come by and
8 see me and I'll tell you what's wrong with it.

9 LTCOL (b) (6) Did you write a letter for this one?

10 MR. (b) (6) For this one? No. I actually went
11 back to my desk and sent all that information to the G-4. I
12 think it was Captain (b) (6) (b) (6).

13 **Questions by Major (b) (6) continued:**

14 Q. So from your perspective there's a problem with people
15 knowing how to create these things.

16 A. Well, part of the reason I went out there that morning
17 at seven o'clock was because I knew that there were two shipments
18 moving through over the weekend. One that was supposed to have
19 came in, material delivered on Saturday for a Sunday shipment;
20 and then material to be delivered Sunday for a Monday shipment.
21 Gulf Company delivering Saturday; Hotel Company delivering
22 Sunday, and consequently.

23 Q. So if people at the APOE have a problem with all this
24 stuff, are they -- do they know they can contact you? Are you
25 kind of the final authority on base?

1 A. I'm not a final authority. I'm just an oversight for
2 safety.

3 Q. Oversight. Okay.

4 A. And there's a big difference.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. There's a huge difference.

7 Q. So you can advise them on what to do, but they don't --

8 A. I can advise them that their stuff is a mistake.

9 Q. -- necessarily have to listen to you.

10 A. Yeah. They don't have to listen to me, and they can
11 ship it wrong; but they can pay the consequence too.

12 Q. Gotcha.

13 A. Yeah. A lot of people disregard what I tell them.
14 Like, for instance, this ammunition was sited and placed on the
15 OSA. And I gave them a map telling them to put it in the red
16 label area on the CALA. Those are two different pieces of real
17 estate.

18 Q. Gotcha.

19 A. The OSA is not sited for explosives. The CALA is. The
20 OSA is for green gear. Now you can use the OSA pad to download
21 your ordnance off your truck and drive it over to the CALA with a
22 forklift. That's allowed.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. So the -- there's a lot of different venues here.

25

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Yeah.

3 **Questions by Lieutenant Colonel (b) (6)**

4 Q. How many hours do you work a day? What time'd you come
5 in and what time do you leave?

6 A. Well, I hate to say it, but I only work eight, sir. I
7 could work all 24 of them.

8 Q. Keeps you busy.

9 A. I have 27 programs that I run.

10 LTCOL (b) (6) So you had that -- just talking this --
11 the reason I ask is because you just talked about those two
12 flights. Somebody came in for Saturday to load for Sunday?

13 MR. (b) (6) Gulf Company, 2d MRB, the sister
14 squadron to Hotel, came in Saturday and flew Sunday.

15 **Questions by Lieutenant Colonel (b) (6) continued:**

16 Q. Did you have a chance to look at that?

17 A. No, because they delivered -- and I don't work
18 weekends.

19 Q. Gotcha.

20 A. And they won't pay me to work weekends or give me the
21 comp time to work weekends, so...

22 Q. Yeah. Wow. So those don't get reviewed by an
23 explosives safety officer?

24 A. No. And it's not really my job to review them.

25

1 Q. No, no. I'm not pointing at you. But I want you to
2 understand --

3 A. That -- what I -- oh, I understand sir.

4 Q. We have a common theme running through these things
5 about manpower.

6 A. Um-hmm.

7 Q. I just wanted to --

8 A. It's a consistent problem.

9 Q. And I just wanted to -- wanted to see --

10 A. Yep.

11 Q. -- you know, more to it -- this is more about the
12 effects of the reduced manpower with the Marine Corps right now.

13 A. And I'll be honest with you, sir. Now this is opinion.
14 Please remember this, opinion. I find it a systemic problem
15 throughout the entire Marine Corps. But I also find that same
16 problem in the other services. And I've dealt with all services,
17 because they all come here to train because of the size of our
18 CALA and its capability, meaning we can actually bring a C-5 here
19 and turn it around on the CALA and load.

20 Q. Gotcha.

21 A. And we can bring C-17s, C-9s. We can bring all these
22 different aircraft aboard station because our strip's long enough
23 and our CALA's huge.

24 Q. Yeah.

25

1 A. So I encounter all services and they all have a
2 systemic problem when it comes to ammunition and transportation.

3 Q. Gotcha.

4 A. And it's just not the air. It's ground too.

5 LTCOL (b) (6) Right.

6 MR. (b) (6) Ground crews.

7 **Questions by Lieutenant Colonel (b) (6)**

8 Q. Do certain units have certain history with you, certain
9 reputation with you?

10 A. Yes, they do.

11 Q. And what's the reputation from 2d Raider Battalion?

12 A. I know the 2d and the 3d MRBs pretty well and the
13 personnel that have worked for those units. And historically,
14 that they -- they've had problems in the past.

15 Q. Like what?

16 A. Sir, don't want to ask that one.

17 Q. No, actually I do, because I want to make sure we solve
18 this problem.

19 A. I believe in the past, 3d MRB, the problem before this
20 was a different battalion. I believe it was 3d. And I can't
21 remember if it was Lima or Mike or November. I can't remember
22 which company. But they brought ammunition up here, staged it,
23 and then put a Motor-T operators up here to stand guard that were
24 not pistol qualed and gave them a pistol to guard the ammunition.

25

1 And then at six o'clock in the morning, the guard
2 called his Gunny and said, hey, my shift's over, what do you want
3 me to do. He told him to come back. So the junior Marine took
4 his 9-millimeter and all the rounds and put it inside the guard
5 shack and left it and got in his POV and drove home.

6 I went out there with my Marine that works for me, and
7 I find an unsecured ammunition on the CALA in the OSA with an SRC
8 rating of 1, which means I got a shoulder fired rocket out there.
9 That's a level -- I mean, you can't leave that thing anywhere.
10 It requires a hand-to-hand signature if I give it to you.

11 Q. So you're saying that one time before out -- was it the
12 OSA or the CALA?

13 A. Well that particular time, it was at the OSA again.

14 Q. At the OSA, a 3d MRB Marine just left a weapon out
15 there?

16 A. Yep. We looked for him for a while, because we thought
17 he might have killed himself or something. We didn't know where
18 he went.

19 MAJ (b) (6) And how can you get to the CALA? Is there
20 more than one way to get there?

21 MR. (b) (6) You can either go in the flight line
22 and go across the flight line to the CALA like you were an
23 aircraft, or you can go down the access road and then into the
24 CALA road.

25

1 MAJ (b) (6) And only -- besides a key, is there like,
2 you know, barb wire on the top, all sorts of stuff?

3 MR. (b) (6) No. No. No. We do -- that's a
4 MILCON that's happening next year. They're putting fence around
5 everything in preparation for the strike fighter.

6 Yeah. I -- I've encountered problems with MRB, but
7 I've encountered problems with 2d MAR. I've encountered problems
8 with 135th SOAR, Army unit out of Fort Bragg.

9 LTCOL (b) (6) Right.

10 MR. (b) (6) I've -- 17th CAB, Fort Bragg. 165th.
11 96th.

12 LTCOL (b) (6) 17th CAB? Really?

13 MR. (b) (6) Yeah.

14 LTCOL (b) (6) How about VMGR?

15 MR. (b) (6) VMGR, the only problems I've had with
16 them is over in Hanger 250 doing their job.

17 LTCOL (b) (6) Is that 252?

18 MR. (b) (6) Yeah.

19 LTCOL (b) (6) How about 452 up in New York?

20 MR. (b) (6) No.

21 LTCOL (b) (6) No -- no relationship?

22 MR. (b) (6) Is that the Yankees?

23 LTCOL (b) (6) Yeah.

24 MR. (b) (6) Yeah. No. I've had them come in
25 here a few months ago.

1 LTCOL (b) (6) Yeah.

2 MR. (b) (6) It might have been six months ago.
3 They even brought me a patch. Pretty good group of guys. They
4 were pretty much spot on. I had a lot of -- they were -- I was
5 really happy with them, and I guess they were tickled with
6 everything too because they left me a patch.

7 LTCOL (b) (6) Gotcha. You say they were very
8 professional? Is that what you're saying?

9 MR. (b) (6) I think the 452 did real well.

10 LTCOL (b) (6) Gotcha.

11 MR. (b) (6) Yeah.

12 MAJ (b) (6) I have a PUB question, sir. So if we were
13 going through this and this is the --

14 LTCOL (b) (6) Do -- do you want to record this?

15 MAJ (b) (6) -- CFR-49, and it seemed like a
16 discrepancy in the PUB. But for the 1.1E.

17 MR. (b) (6) Um-hmm.

18 **Questions by Major (b) (6)**

19 Q. When I tracked it across to where it's forbidden, it
20 says forbidden for quantity limitations on passengers and cargo
21 aircraft for both respectively.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. And I don't really know this stuff very well so that's
24 what seemed like to be an error with the section further in the
25 back.

1 A. It would -- you'll -- you'll have to go a little bit
2 deeper in this though, 'cause -- I don't know how to explain
3 this. It -- it -- it's -- when -- when you apply this to
4 commercial air, it's totally different.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Now, if I -- if you look at Table 4-2 in the AFMAN,
7 okay -- look at Table 4-2 in the AFMAN, and then look at
8 Table 6 -- or Column 6 and Column 7, which are essentially the
9 same ones you have here.

10 Q. Um-hmm.

11 A. Okay. And they're gonna tell you what the restrictions
12 are. And that will be under special provisions. So you -- under
13 special provisions, you would be looking at Column 7.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Did you see that, Major?

16 MAJ (b) (6) I'm pulling it up, sir.

17 MR. (b) (6) That's a big damn table, so you'll
18 see it. There it is.

19 MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

20 MR. (b) (6) That's it.

21 MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

22 MR. (b) (6) Okay. So here -- here you go.

23 MAJ (b) (6) Oh, that's for --

24 MR. (b) (6) Special provisions and six.

25 MAJ (b) (6) There it goes. That's 4-1. Should I

1 go further?

2 MR. (b) (6) No, that's it.

3 MAJ (b) (6) This is it then?

4 MR. (b) (6) That's it.

5 MAJ (b) (6) Special Provisions, six and seven. So
6 now --

7 MR. (b) (6) So if you look at special provisions
8 and then -- then you want to go down to --

9 MAJ (b) (6) I need to look up the UN0006; is that
10 right?

11 MR. (b) (6) No, you don't want to do that.

12 MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

13 MR. (b) (6) You want to -- you want to go down to
14 cartridges for weapons.

15 IMC: Okay.

16 MR. (b) (6) Yeah. And then you would go to
17 whatever this one was if you're -- if you're concerned with it.
18 Yep. Cartridges for weapons.

19 **Questions by Major (b) (6)**

20 Q. You -- you caught my attention when you said you knew
21 you had a -- a one -- a 1.1 --

22 A. Um-hmm.

23 Q. -- on the pallet.

24 A. It doesn't bother me.

25 Q. Okay. But that --

1 A. [unintelligible].

2 Q. That's -- that's something that we're trying to get to
3 the bottom of, that 1.1E.

4 A. Okay.

5 Q. So here's cartridges coming up here.

6 A. Yeah. This is a two-week class to teach you all this
7 stuff.

8 Q. I'm sure it is.

9 A. And even then you don't have it till you've been doing
10 it awhile.

11 Q. So that's the item that -- right there.

12 A. Cartridges with weapon, bursting charge. That's the
13 certain -- what's the date on this one, do you know?

14 Q. This is the 2012.

15 A. 2012.

16 Q. Yeah. Which was in effect --

17 A. Right.

18 Q. -- at the time.

19 A. Okay. So it's authorized for a P4 movement and
20 packaging will be A512. But the important part is it tells you
21 P4, but did you notice there's no other special provisions?
22 Like, these numbers?

23 Q. Yes.

24 A. That's -- that's very good.

25 Q. That's good?

1 A. That means there's no restrictions.

2 Q. No restrictions.

3 A. Yeah. Just -- you're only restriction is P4.

4 So then if you go to the bottom -- or the -- the bottom
5 of this table, at the very end of this table you're gonna get all
6 our P-codes.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Yeah. And then drop down to that P-code.

9 Q. It is a big table.

10 A. It's huge. I can't remember. It's kind of like the
11 SLO[ph], AC-SAF. That thing's 5700 pages. That's just the ammo
12 PUB.

13 MAJ (b) (6) They don't make it easy.

14 MR. (b) (6) Okay.

15 MAJ (b) (6) Okay. Got it all the way down.

16 MR. (b) (6) Yeah. You almost have to be a CPA to
17 do half this stuff. The only reason I remember half of it is
18 just doing it so long.

19 Okay. So now you're already past. Those are the
20 numbers that comply to the Column 7.

21 MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

22 MR. (b) (6) So go -- keep going. There you go.

23 MAJ (b) (6) P-codes.

24 MR. (b) (6) There you go. P4. So transport this
25 material on cargo aircraft only.

1 MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

2 MR. (b) (6) Okay. And then it tells you
3 deviations are authorized according to Paragraph 2-2.

4 MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

5 MR. (b) (6) And Attachment 22. Duty passengers
6 do not require deviation.

7 Now if you go to Attachment 22 and you read it on 2-2,
8 it's basically gonna tell you that a green shirter is not a green
9 shirter. He's now cargo.

10 MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

11 LTCOL (b) (6) He's now what?

12 MR. (b) (6) Cargo.

13 LTCOL (b) (6) Okay.

14 MR. (b) (6) Yeah.

15 MAJ (b) (6) Yeah. We're --

16 MR. (b) (6) And that'll -- it just means that
17 being he is a Department of Defense on a training op --

18 LTCOL (b) (6) He's not a passenger.

19 MR. (b) (6) He's not a passenger.

20 MAJ (b) (6) So the caveat's if you had someone who was
21 Space-A.

22 MR. (b) (6) Couldn't put him on that flight.

23 MAJ (b) (6) Couldn't put him on that flight.

24 MR. (b) (6) Nope.

25 MAJ (b) (6) So that's right here.

1 MR. (b) (6) Yep.

2 MAJ (b) (6) Compatibility waivers. And then the
3 movement deviations.

4 MR. (b) (6) Yeah. See there's move -- do not
5 transport passengers with hazardous materials cargo aircraft in
6 41 and 42. Eligibility P-codes sometimes. So see Attachment 22
7 for deviation authority. And then go to 22 and there you go. It
8 says that you're cargo.

9 MAJ (b) (6) Participants involved in a tactical --

10 MR. (b) (6) Contingency [inaudible] or deployment
11 ops.

12 MAJ (b) (6) They are not considered passengers.

13 MR. (b) (6) They are not passengers anymore.
14 Yeah. Right.

15 LTCOL (b) (6) So they're not considered passengers.
16 But what about the differentiation between a passenger plane and
17 a cargo airplane? Is that to determine which one --

18 MR. (b) (6) There's no -- there's -- it --

19 LTCOL (b) (6) Is that used to make that determination
20 or is that determines --

21 MR. (b) (6) To determine whether to use a
22 passenger vehicle -- or a passenger plane or a cargo plane?

23 LTCOL (b) (6) So on one of the requirements --
24 remember, we looked that up -- it said that -- she showed us in
25 the CFR how she checks it. 1.1E, make sure the UN code went

1 across. And then she went across that table. And on the right
2 it said, hey, if it's a passenger airplane, you can take this
3 much of it or you can't take it at all. And if it's a cargo
4 airplane, it could be this or this.

5 My question is this: Does that designation, whether a
6 person's a passenger or not -- you said green shirts or not,
7 which that's how I read it -- does that have anything to do with
8 the delineation between whether this is a passenger airplane or a
9 cargo airplane?

10 MR. (b) (6) The P4 just tells you that it's
11 cargo.

12 LTCOL (b) (6) Gotcha.

13 MR. (b) (6) So, I mean, as soon as -- as soon
14 as -- as soon as you pick up one item on that manifest that's P4,
15 you're into cargo mode.

16 LTCOL (b) (6) Okay. All right.

17 MR. (b) (6) So there is no reason to even look at
18 passenger anymore.

19 Now the only thing that would highlight you then at
20 that time is if you went to the APOE and they were putting people
21 in civilian clothes on that plane. You'd be like, oh, no, hell
22 no, not going. That would be a big red flag.

23 LTCOL (b) (6) Gotcha.

24 MR. (b) (6) And the pilot would have done that
25 automatically. He would have said, no, go back.

1 But, yeah. Once you see your P-codes, those -- those
2 list all your restrictions as far as passenger or cargo.

3 MAJ (b) (6) Okay.

4 MR. (b) (6) And that's -- the AFMAN's actually so
5 much easier to read than that.

6 LTCOL (b) (6) That's what we're gonna do.

7 MAJ (b) (6) [Inaudible].

8 MR. (b) (6) Now one of the things I was gonna
9 tell you, gentlemen, and unfortunately during the time and the
10 course of the day after leaving the OSA that day with Gunnery
11 Sergeant and Corporal (b) (6), I wanted to get back out there
12 to see it off. But with my other 20-some programs on base, I was
13 unable to do so.

14 LTCOL (b) (6) Gotcha.

15 MR. (b) (6) And I was -- I'm pretty confident,
16 usually the loadmasters know what they're doing. You know,
17 because ammunition is historically the last pallet on the plane.
18 You always put your hazard to the closest exit.

19 MAJ (b) (6) Um-hmm.

20 MR. (b) (6) Now, with all the rules and things
21 that have changed in the world with the CFR and the AFMAN
22 pertaining to the use of lithium batteries and that stuff, that
23 really worries me.

24 I also would encourage you gentlemen to also look at
25 the -- what do they call it? -- the MCRP. That is the unit

1 embarkation handbook. And the AFMAN. If you're reading the
2 AFMAN, they talk about hidden problems. And it lists common,
3 missed, hidden problems.

4 And -- and it's historically the same things that have
5 plagued the FAA over the last 20 years. And one of the biggest
6 items on that list is lithium. There's other things though.
7 Batteries particularly have been a problem with FAA flights
8 causing incredible damage, but there's been other things such as
9 concealed discrepancies in equipment that had cylinders.

10 So, I mean, when you look at green gear and that green
11 gear isn't defined, you've opened up container of container in
12 container of hidden problems unless they're manifested or
13 itemized. But there is a listing inside the AFMAN that says --

14 MAJ (b) (6) Hidden cargo --

15 MR. (b) (6) Hidden hazardous shipment.

16 MAJ (b) (6) Hidden hazardous shipment.

17 MR. (b) (6) Yeah.

18 MAJ (b) (6) Yeah.

19 MR. (b) (6) And -- and that's something very
20 important that often gets overlooked.

21 MAJ (b) (6) Do you deal with the lithium battery side
22 of it or no?

23 MR. (b) (6) No.

24 LTCOL (b) (6) What page is that on?

25 MR. (b) (6) It's not explosive.

1 MAJ (b) (6) Yeah.
2 MAJ (b) (6) 50. Five-zero.
3 MR. (b) (6) Now the Navy has published a lot of
4 new stuff on that.
5 MAJ (b) (6) Yeah.
6 LTCOL (b) (6) Thanks.
7 MR. (b) (6) It's on the NOSA website for lithium.
8 It's very, very eye opening.
9 LTCOL (b) (6) Thank you.
10 (b) (6) you got anything else?
11 LTCOL (b) (6) No. That's been very eye opening.
12 MAJ (b) (6) Yeah.
13 LTCOL (b) (6) Thank you so much. I think that
14 concludes our interview.
15 MR. (b) (6) All right, sir.

16 [END OF PAGE]
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06/26/2012

SURFACE HOURLY ABBREVIATED FORMAT

ONE HEADER RECORD FOLLOWED BY DATA RECORDS:

COLUMN DATA DESCRIPTION

01-06 USAF = AIR FORCE CATALOG STATION NUMBER
08-12 WBAN = NCDC WBAN NUMBER
14-25 YR--MODAHMNMN = YEAR-MONTH-DAY-HOUR-MINUTE IN GREENWICH MEAN TIME (GMT)
27-29 DIR = WIND DIRECTION IN COMPASS DEGREES, 990 = VARIABLE, REPORTED AS
'***' WHEN AIR IS CALM (SPD WILL THEN BE 000)
31-37 SPD & GUS = WIND SPEED & GUST IN MILES PER HOUR
39-41 CLG = CLOUD CEILING--LOWEST OPAQUE LAYER
WITH 5/8 OR GREATER COVERAGE, IN HUNDREDS OF FEET,
722 = UNLIMITED
43-45 SKC = SKY COVER -- CLR-CLEAR, SCT-SCATTERED-1/8 TO 4/8,
BKN-BROKEN-5/8 TO 7/8, OVC-OVERCAST,
OBS-OBSCURED, POB-PARTIAL OBSCURATION
47-47 L = LOW CLOUD TYPE, SEE BELOW
49-49 M = MIDDLE CLOUD TYPE, SEE BELOW
51-51 H = HIGH CLOUD TYPE, SEE BELOW
53-56 VSB = VISIBILITY IN STATUTE MILES TO NEAREST TENTH
NOTE: FOR SOME STATIONS, VISIBILITY IS REPORTED ONLY UP TO A
MAXIMUM OF 7 OR 10 MILES IN METAR OBSERVATIONS, BUT TO HIGHER
VALUES IN SYNOPTIC OBSERVATIONS, WHICH CAUSES THE VALUES TO
FLUCTUATE FROM ONE DATA RECORD TO THE NEXT. ALSO, VALUES
ORIGINALLY REPORTED AS '10' MAY APPEAR AS '10.1' DUE TO DATA
BEING ARCHIVED IN METRIC UNITS AND CONVERTED BACK TO ENGLISH.
58-68 MW MW MW MW = MANUALLY OBSERVED PRESENT WEATHER--LISTED BELOW IN PRESENT WEATHER
TABLE
70-80 AW AW AW AW = AUTO-OBSERVED PRESENT WEATHER--LISTED BELOW IN PRESENT WEATHER TABLE
82-82 W = PAST WEATHER INDICATOR, SEE BELOW
84-92 TEMP & DEWP = TEMPERATURE & DEW POINT IN FAHRENHEIT
94-99 SLP = SEA LEVEL PRESSURE IN MILLIBARS TO NEAREST TENTH
101-105 ALT = ALTIMETER SETTING IN INCHES TO NEAREST HUNDREDTH
107-112 STP = STATION PRESSURE IN MILLIBARS TO NEAREST TENTH
114-116 MAX = MAXIMUM TEMPERATURE IN FAHRENHEIT (TIME PERIOD VARIES)
118-120 MIN = MINIMUM TEMPERATURE IN FAHRENHEIT (TIME PERIOD VARIES)
122-126 PCP01 = 1-HOUR LIQUID PRECIP REPORT IN INCHES AND HUNDREDTHS --
THAT IS, THE PRECIP FOR THE PRECEDING 1 HOUR PERIOD
128-132 PCP06 = 6-HOUR LIQUID PRECIP REPORT IN INCHES AND HUNDREDTHS --
THAT IS, THE PRECIP FOR THE PRECEDING 6 HOUR PERIOD
134-138 PCP24 = 24-HOUR LIQUID PRECIP REPORT IN INCHES AND HUNDREDTHS
THAT IS, THE PRECIP FOR THE PRECEDING 24 HOUR PERIOD
140-144 PCPXX = LIQUID PRECIP REPORT IN INCHES AND HUNDREDTHS, FOR
A PERIOD OTHER THAN 1, 6, OR 24 HOURS (USUALLY FOR 12 HOUR PERIOD
FOR STATIONS OUTSIDE THE U.S., AND FOR 3 HOUR PERIOD FOR THE U.S.)
T = TRACE FOR ANY PRECIP FIELD
146-147 SD = SNOW DEPTH IN INCHES

NOTES:

- *'s IN FIELD INDICATES ELEMENT NOT REPORTED.
- SOME VALUES WERE CONVERTED FROM METRIC TO ENGLISH UNITS. THIS WILL OCCASIONALLY RESULT IN MINOR DIFFERENCES VS ORIGINAL DATA DUE TO ROUNDING.
- COLUMN POSITION REFERS TO ASCII TEXT DATA.
- THIS FORMAT CAN BE EASILY IMPORTED INTO A SPREADSHEET OR A DATABASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM SINCE FIELDS ARE SPACE-DELIMITED.

- THIS FORMAT DOES NOT INCLUDE QUALITY CONTROL FLAGS, WHICH ARE AVAILABLE IN THE ADVANCED FORMAT THROUGH THE CLIMATE DATA ONLINE SYSTEM.

PRESENT WEATHER CODE TABLE

The code that denotes a specific type of weather observed.

00-49 No precipitation at the station at the time of observation

00-19 No precipitation, fog, ice fog (except for 11 and 12), duststorm, sandstorm, drifting or blowing snow at the station at the time of observation or, except for 09 and 17, during the preceding hour

00: Cloud development not observed or not observable
01: Clouds generally dissolving or becoming less developed
02: State of sky on the whole unchanged
03: Clouds generally forming or developing
04: Visibility reduced by smoke, e.g. veldt or forest fires, industrial smoke or volcanic ashes
05: Haze
06: Widespread dust in suspension in the air, not raised by wind at or near the station at the time of observation
07: Dust or sand raised by wind at or near the station at the time of observation, but no well-developed dust whirl(s) or sand whirl(s), and no duststorm or sandstorm seen or, in the case of ships, blowing spray at the station
08: Well developed dust whirl(s) or sand whirl(s) seen at or near the station during the preceding hour or at the time of observation, but no duststorm or sandstorm
09: Duststorm or sandstorm within sight at the time of observation, or at the station during the preceding hour
10: Mist
11: Patches of shallow fog or ice fog at the station, whether on land or sea, not deeper than about 2 meters on land or 10 meters at sea
12: More or less continuous shallow fog or ice fog at the station, whether on land or sea, not deeper than about 2 meters on land or 10 meters at sea
13: Lightning visible, no thunder heard
14: Precipitation within sight, not reaching the ground or the surface of the sea
15: Precipitation within sight, reaching the ground or the surface of the sea, but distant, i.e., estimated to be more than 5 km from the station
16: Precipitation within sight, reaching the ground or the surface of the sea, near to, but not at the station
17: Thunderstorm, but no precipitation at the time of observation
18: Squalls at or within sight of the station during the preceding hour or at the time of observation
19: Funnel cloud(s) (Tornado cloud or waterspout) at or within sight of the station during the preceding hour or at the time of observation

20-29 Precipitation, fog, ice fog or thunderstorm at the station during the preceding hour, but not at the time of observation

20: Drizzle (not freezing) or snow grains not falling as shower(s)
21: Rain (not freezing) not falling as shower(s)
22: Snow not falling as shower(s)
23: Rain and snow or ice pellets not falling as shower(s)
24: Freezing drizzle or freezing rain not falling as shower(s)
25: Shower(s) of rain
26: Shower(s) of snow or of rain and snow

27: Shower(s) of hail (Hail, small hail, snow pellets), or rain and hail

28: Fog or ice fog

29: Thunderstorm (with or without precipitation)

30-39 Duststorm, sandstorm, or blowing snow

30: Slight or moderate duststorm or sandstorm has decreased during the preceding hour

31: Slight or moderate duststorm or sandstorm no appreciable change during the preceding hour

32: Slight or moderate duststorm or sandstorm has begun or has increased during the preceding hour

33: Severe duststorm or sandstorm has decreased during the preceding hour

34: Severe duststorm or sandstorm no appreciable change during the preceding hour

35: Severe duststorm or sandstorm has begun or has increased during the preceding hour

36: Slight or moderate drifting snow generally low (below eye level)

37: Heavy drifting snow generally low (below eye level)

38: Slight or moderate blowing snow generally high (above eye level)

39: Heavy blowing snow generally high (above eye level)

40-49 Fog or ice fog at the time of observation

40: Fog or ice fog at a distance at the time of observation, but not at the station during the preceding hour, the fog or ice fog extending to a level above that of the observer

41: Fog or ice fog in patches

42: Fog or ice fog, sky visible, has become thinner during the preceding hour

43: Fog or ice fog, sky invisible, has become thinner during the preceding hour

44: Fog or ice fog, sky visible, no appreciable change during the preceding hour

45: Fog or ice fog, sky invisible, no appreciable change during the preceding hour

46: Fog or ice fog, sky invisible, has begun or has become thicker during the preceding hour

47: Fog or ice fog, sky invisible, has begun or has become thicker during the preceding hour

48: Fog, depositing rime, sky visible

49: Fog, depositing rime, sky invisible

50-99 Precipitation at the station at the time of observation

50-59 Drizzle

50: Drizzle, not freezing, intermittent, slight at time of observation

51: Drizzle, not freezing, continuous, slight at time of observation

52: Drizzle, not freezing, intermittent, moderate at time of observation

53: Drizzle, not freezing, continuous, moderate at time of observation

54: Drizzle, not freezing, intermittent, heavy (dense) at time of observation

55: Drizzle, not freezing, continuous, heavy (dense) at time of observation

56: Drizzle, freezing, slight

57: Drizzle, freezing, moderate or heavy (dense)

58: Drizzle and rain, slight

59: Drizzle and rain, moderate or heavy

60-69 Rain

60: Rain, not freezing, intermittent, slight at time of observation
61: Rain, not freezing, continuous, slight at time of observation
62: Rain, not freezing, intermittent, moderate at time of observation
63: Rain, not freezing, continuous, moderate at time of observation
64: Rain, not freezing, intermittent, heavy at time of observation
65: Rain, not freezing, continuous, heavy at time of observation
66: Rain, freezing, slight
67: Rain, freezing, moderate or heavy
68: Rain or drizzle and snow, slight
69: Rain or drizzle and snow, moderate or heavy

70-79 Solid precipitation not in showers

70: Intermittent fall of snowflakes, slight at time of observation
71: Continuous fall of snowflakes, slight at time of observation
72: Intermittent fall of snowflakes, moderate at time of observation
73: Continuous fall of snowflakes, moderate at time of observation
74: Intermittent fall of snowflakes, heavy at time of observation
75: Continuous fall of snowflakes, heavy at time of observation
76: Diamond dust (with or without fog)
77: Snow grains (with or without fog)
78: Isolated star-like snow crystals (with or without fog)
79: Ice pellets

80-99 Showery precipitation, or precipitation with current or recent thunderstorm

80: Rain shower(s), slight
81: Rain shower(s), moderate or heavy
82: Rain shower(s), violent
83: Shower(s) of rain and snow mixed, slight
84: Shower(s) of rain and snow mixed, moderate or heavy
85: Show shower(s), slight
86: Snow shower(s), moderate or heavy
87: Shower(s) of snow pellets or small hail, with or without rain or rain and snow mixed, slight
88: Shower(s) of snow pellets or small hail, with or without rain or rain and snow mixed, moderate or heavy
89: Shower(s) of hail (hail, small hail, snow pellets) , with or without rain or rain and snow mixed, not associated with thunder, slight
90: Shower(s) of hail (hail, small hail, snow pellets), with or without rain or rain and snow mixed, not associated with thunder, moderate or heavy
91: Slight rain at time of observation, thunderstorm during the preceding hour but not at time of observation
92: Moderate or heavy rain at time of observation, thunderstorm during the preceding hour but not at time of observation
93: Slight snow, or rain and snow mixed or hail (Hail, small hail, snow pellets), at time of observation, thunderstorm during the preceding hour but not at time of observation
94: Moderate or heavy snow, or rain and snow mixed or hail(Hail, small hail, snow pellets) at time of observation, thunderstorm during the preceding hour but not at time of observation
95: Thunderstorm, slight or moderate, without hail (Hail, small hail, snow pellets), but with rain and/or snow at time of observation, thunderstorm at time of observation
96: Thunderstorm, slight or moderate, with hail (hail, small hail, snow pellets) at time of observation, thunderstorm at time of observation
97: Thunderstorm, heavy, without hail (Hail, small hail, snow pellets), but with rain and/or snow at time of observation, thunderstorm at time of observation

98: Thunderstorm combined with duststorm or sandstorm at time of observation, thunderstorm at time of observation
99: Thunderstorm, heavy, with hail (Hail, small hail, snow pellets) at time of observation, thunderstorm at time of observation

PAST WEATHER CODE TABLE

The code that denotes a specific type of past weather observed.

0: Cloud covering 1/2 or less of the sky throughout the appropriate period
1: Cloud covering more than 1/2 of the sky during part of the appropriate period and covering 1/2 or less during part of the period
2: Cloud covering more than 1/2 of the sky throughout the appropriate period
3: Sandstorm, duststorm or blowing snow
4: Fog or ice fog or thick haze
5: Drizzle
6: Rain
7: Snow, or rain and snow mixed
8: Shower(s)
9: Thunderstorm(s) with or without precipitation

LOW CLOUD TYPE

0: No low clouds
1: Cumulus humulis or Cumulus fractus other than of bad weather or both
2: Cumulus mediocris or congestus, with or without Cumulus of species fractus or humulis or Stratocumulus all having bases at the same level
3: Cumulonimbus calvus, with or without Cumulus, Stratocumulus or Stratus
4: Stratocumulus cumulogenitus
5: Stratocumulus other than Stratocumulus cumulogenitus
6: Stratus nebulosus or Stratus fractus other than of bad weather, or both
7: Stratus fractus or Cumulus fractus of bad weather, or both (pannus) usually below Altostratus or Nimbostratus
8: Cumulus and Stratocumulus other than Stratocumulus cumulogenitus, with bases at different levels
9: Cumulonimbus capillatus (often with an anvil), with or without Cumulonimbus calvus, Cumulus, Stratocumulus, Stratus or pannus

MIDDLE CLOUD TYPE

0: No middle clouds
1: Altostratus translucidus
2: Altostratus opacus or Nimbostratus
3: Altocumulus translucidus at a single level
4: Patches (often lenticular) of Altocumulus translucidus, continually changing and occurring at one or more levels
5: Altocumulus translucidus in bands, or one or more layers of Altocumulus translucidus or opacus, progressively invading the sky; these Altocumulus clouds generally thicken as a whole
6: Altocumulus cumulogenitus (or cumulonimbogenitus)
7: Altocumulus translucidus or opacus in two or more layers, or Altocumulus opacus in a single layer, not progressively invading the sky, or Altocumulus with Altostratus or Nimbostratus
8: Altocumulus castellanus or floccus
9: Altocumulus of a chaotic sky; generally at several levels

HIGH CLOUD TYPE

0: No High Clouds

1: Cirrus fibratus, sometimes uncinus, not progressively invading the sky

2: Cirrus spissatus, in patches or entangled sheaves, which usually do not increase and sometimes seem to be the remains of the upper part of a Cumulonimbus; or Cirrus castellanus or floccus

3: Cirrus spissatus cumulonimbogenitus

4: Cirrus uncinus or fibratus, or both, progressively invading the sky; they generally thicken as a whole

5: Cirrus (often in bands) and Cirrostratus, or Cirrostratus alone, progressively invading the sky; they generally thicken as a whole, but the continuous veil does not reach 45 degrees above the horizon

6: Cirrus (often in bands) and Cirrostratus, or Cirrostratus alone, progressively invading the sky; they generally thicken as a whole; the continuous veil extends more than 45 degrees above the horizon, without the sky being totally covered

7: Cirrostratus covering the whole sky

8: Cirrostratus not progressively invading the sky and not entirely covering it

9: Cirrocumulus alone, or Cirrocumulus predominant among the High clouds

Navigation Log

FltPlan.com

Monday 07-10-17

Dept. 1345L - Arr: 1734L

IFR	YANKY72	Type C130/I	300Kts	Dep. KNKT
Dept. 1745Z	16,000	ROUTE (see below)		
Crest KNJK	ETE 6:49			
FDB 0900	Altin:	ON FILE 452	SOB 17	Color. GY

ATIS:127.47

CInc:125.95

FSS 800-992-7433 (1-62-2)

ATC Cinc issues? FltPlan, 1-203-262-8383

Elev:29 Gnd:128.62 Twr:121.3

EWN ILM J4 IRQ J52 TXK J42 ABI J66 EWM J4 SSO J50 GBN J2 IPL

NOTE==> Your Departure Date/Time needs to be updated. No Forecast winds for that far in the past: using winds valid for 07/14/2017 14:00:00Z

KNKT to KNJK : TC=267° : (FMS winds: 87°/ 3) : MC= 276° : ST. LINE=1924nm : AIRWAY=1999nm : Extra=4%

Winds Aloft	FL180 ISA(-21) Comp	FL160 ISA(-17) Comp	FL140 ISA(-13) Comp	FL120 ISA(-09) Comp
EWN	285/015 +15 -012	289/016 +15 -013	293/016 +15 -014	283/016 +15 -013
ILM	290/010 +15 -004	295/011 +15 -004	300/013 +16 -003	290/011 +15 -005
FLO	263/012 +15 -012	268/012 +15 -012	274/011 +15 -011	284/009 +15 -009
CAE	245/012 +15 -012	245/010 +15 -010	245/009 +15 -009	278/008 +15 -007
IRQ	227/012 +14 -010	228/010 +15 -009	228/009 +15 -007	271/006 +15 -006
AJFEB	213/012 +14 -006	215/011 +14 -007	217/012 +14 -007	214/010 +14 -005
ATL	213/011 +14 -007	215/011 +14 -007	216/012 +14 -008	212/010 +14 -006
VUZ	226/004 +14 -003	218/006 +14 -004	211/008 +14 -004	200/008 +14 -003
IGB	232/004 +14 -004	208/004 +14 -003	184/004 +14 -001	176/006 +14 +000
SQS	264/002 +14 -002	100/002 +15 +002	075/002 +15 +002	082/003 +15 +003
TXK	041/008 +15 +005	029/008 +15 +004	016/007 +14 +002	005/006 +14 +001
FUZ	030/009 +16 +007	359/008 +15 +002	328/006 +15 -002	246/004 +15 -003
ABI	115/006 +15 +005	141/006 +15 +003	165/005 +16 +000	150/008 +15 +002
BGS	132/014 +15 +009	139/014 +15 +009	145/016 +15 +008	139/017 +15 +010
EWM	068/015 +16 +015	074/015 +16 +015	081/016 +16 +015	085/013 +15 +013
SSO	051/018 +15 +013	052/019 +15 +013	054/019 +16 +014	057/014 +15 +011
TFD	043/014 +15 +006	052/013 +16 +008	060/012 +17 +009	053/012 +17 +007
GBN	051/013 +15 +009	063/012 +15 +010	075/010 +16 +009	062/010 +17 +008
MOHAK	070/013 +15 +012	092/012 +15 +011	114/011 +16 +009	105/010 +17 +009
BZA	074/012 +15 +012	098/012 +15 +011	123/011 +16 +009	114/010 +17 +009
Avg. Trip Winds=>	+ 3 Tailwind	+ 3 Tailwind	+ 2 Tailwind	+ 2 Tailwind
FLT TIME==>	6:49(+00) 300TAS	6:49(+00) 300TAS	7:01(+12) 290TAS	7:14(+25) 280TAS
Fuel Burn==>	38,378 Lbs	40,348 Lbs	43,871 Lbs	42,255 Lbs

FIX	ST	LAT/LON	InB/Out	Leg	Rem	Fuel Burn Leg Tot.	Leg	Rem	ETE	WX
KNKT CHERRY POINT	NC	N3454.2W07652.8	—/330	0	1999	500 500.0	0:00	6:49	0:00	
EWN 113.6 NEW BERN	NC	N3504.4W07702.7	329/232	13	1986	669 1169	0:06	6:43	0:06	122.65
ILM 117.0 WILMINGTON	NC	N3421.1W07752.5	231/273	60	1926	1471 2640	0:16	6:27	0:22	122.65
FLO 115.2 FLORENCE	SC	N3414.0W07939.4	268/255	89	1837	1929 4569	0:18	6:09	0:40	122.65
CAE 114.7 COLUMBIA	SC	N3351.4W08103.2	254/263	73	1764	1587 6156	0:16	5:53	0:56	122.65
IRQ 113.9 COLLIERIES	SC	N3342.4W08209.7	264/272	56	1708	1203 7359	0:11	5:42	1:07	122.65
AJFEB 113.9/272/101	GA	N3338.4W08410.2	272/272	101	1607	2149 9509	0:21	5:21	1:28	122.65
ATL 116.9 ATLANTA	GA	N3337.7W08426.1	272/277	13	1594	273 9782	0:03	5:18	1:31	122.65
VUZ 114.4 VULCAN	AL	N3340.2W08654.0	268/261	123	1471	2570 12.4	0:25	4:53	1:56	122.65
IGB 116.2 BIGBEE	MS	N3329.1W08830.8	258/266	82	1389	1685 14.0	0:16	4:37	2:12	122.65
SQS 114.7 SIDON	MS	N3327.8W09016.6	266/269	88	1301	1779 15.8	0:18	4:19	2:30	122.65
TXK 116.3 TEXARKANA	AR	N3330.8W09404.4	263/250	191	1110	3790 19.6	0:38	3:41	3:08	122.65
FUZ 115.7 RANGER	TX	N3253.4W09710.8	250/255	161	949	3147 22.8	0:32	3:09	3:40	122.65
ABI 113.7 ABILENE	TX	N3228.9W09951.8	249/256	138	811	2669 25.4	0:27	2:42	4:07	122.65
BGS 114.3 BIG SPRING	TX	N3223.1W10129.0	255/254	82	729	1552 27.0	0:16	2:26	4:23	122.65

NWS SRRS PRODUCTS FOR:
2017071000 to 2017071023

FDUS14 KWBC 100203

DATA BASED ON 100000Z

VALID 101200Z FOR USE 0900-1800Z. TEMPS NEG ABV 24000

FT	3000	6000	9000	12000	18000	24000	30000	34000	39000
ACK	2516	2309+09	2418+08	2527+04	2535-10	2538-23	264238	264648	257656
ACY	2211	2612+11	2717+05	2520+05	2524-09	2628-21	263637	254448	256557
AST	3317	3212+10	2915+07	2716+02	2724-11	2733-23	284440	295548	295555
AVP	2319	2520+10	2527+04	2628+03	2639-10	2643-22	264839	264749	265059
AXN	0518	0407+14	0116+08	3420+04	3137-08	3042-20	305237	316147	315857
BDL	2516	2413+09	2415+04	2532+02	2643-11	2543-22	265039	254849	255659
BGR	2521	2632+09	2632+03	2634-02	2548-12	2554-23	256140	256551	256158
BML	2526	2628+09	2532+03	2535-02	2550-13	2555-24	256641	257150	256859
BRL	2543	2530+21	2529+12	2633+07	2745-10	3051-19	314434	323944	333156
CGI	2421	2619+18	2714+11	2912+03	2708-07	3116-19	331635	341446	331657
CHS	2115	2115+15	2214+10	2214+05	2420-07	2523-17	232633	222744	252356
CLL	2421	2312+16	3311+11	3308+05	0305-07	0909-17	081132	040743	011053
CMH	2418	2922+13	3017+08	2914+03	2728-10	2829-21	302738	333648	346657
COU	2436	2519+20	2516+13	2610+07	3013-08	3020-20	312035	322346	321757
CSG	9900	9900+15	2106+10	2207+05	2406-06	2606-18	262033	262643	273356
CVG	2622	2819+14	2916+08	2914+04	2819-10	2927-21	323436	334446	334657
DLH	0306	3406+12	3109+06	3217+02	3134-10	3144-22	315938	316647	316657
EKN		2516+10	2815+09	2619+05	2727-09	2632-21	263838	263748	273859
EVV	2519	2413+16	2815+11	2913+04	2715-08	3022-19	322635	323046	333457
EYW	1213	1211+15	1113+12	1110+07	1706-08	1208-19	130734	140644	990056
FLO	1910	1911+15	2315+09	2414+04	2710-08	2721-18	233433	224244	244456
FOT	3524	3514+17	3007+12	2410+06	2721-06	2825-19	302536	332846	282756
FSD	0221	3618+19	3131+15	3037+09	3031-08	3036-19	304635	315247	314857
FSM	2117	2118+17	2116+11	2214+05	9900-05	0307-18	021336	351945	332653
FWA	2620	2616+15	2519+10	2623+03	2824-11	2926-20	312437	305147	328258
GAG		2416+23	2708+15	3111+07	9900-05	9900-19	021634	341444	331852
GRI		2932+25	2922+18	2716+10	2812-09	3114-19	332134	332545	313054
GSP	2905	9900+14	2309+10	2512+06	2510-07	2714-19	262735	262845	263356
HAT	2217	2417+14	2518+09	2622+04	2525-08	2429-18	243334	234144	244456
HSV	9900	0511+16	0213+09	9900+06	9900-06	9900-18	331335	341745	311555
H51	1609	0709+17	0905+12	9900+06	9900-07	9900-17	180933	110743	110953
H52	9900	1008+17	9900+12	9900+05	0607-08	0407-18	081132	071443	071555
H61	1313	1511+16	1607+10	1808+05	2015-07	1612-18	081033	071543	062055
LBB		2320+21	9900+15	0408+07	1109-05	0908-17	010833	361243	341053
LCH	2405	9900+15	3107+10	2909+05	2911-07	9900-16	030632	020543	990054
LND			2310+17	2609+10	2712-07	2620-19	253634	254545	274353
LSE	9900	3117+16	3027+10	2834+05	3133-08	3244-20	314536	303945	275057
LWS	2809	2606+16	2413+11	2327+06	2338-12	2344-23	235438	236048	236454
MBW			2614	2617+11	2713-07	2916-18	292934	293245	283555
MCW	1920	2823+22	2842+16	2847+08	3042-08	3143-20	325036	325246	262256
MGM	9900	2505+15	2206+10	2206+05	3006-05	2606-18	261933	272442	293056
MKG	2210	2518+14	2516+08	2427+01	2716-11	2730-22	295936	297447	299659
MLB	1614	1611+16	1609+11	1805+06	9900-08	1406-18	140934	100844	061555
MLS		2010+21	2609+16	2911+08	2718-10	2818-21	285236	277846	286554
MOT		9900+14	3219+11	3229+04	3130-10	2932-22	294537	305847	294956
MQT	9900	2907+10	2817+05	2824+00	2923-12	3029-25	304340	295748	296255
MRF			0509+15	0414+07	0805-07	0609-16	051732	041943	030854
OMA	2644	2939+24	2831+17	2725+09	2724-09	3127-19	343335	343845	341955
ONT	9900	2605+22	1206+16	1109+09	1006-08	1614-18	152132	162542	202152
ORF	9900	9900+13	2419+07	2528+04	2529-08	2532-19	245134	245645	246157
PFN	2211	2108+16	2208+11	2107+05	2408-07	9900-18	990032	290642	331555
PHX	1108	3208+23	3209+17	9900+10	2106-06	2105-17	130832	111843	241154
PIR		0116+18	3330+14	3236+07	2938-08	2830-19	293535	305046	315456
PSX	1913	9900+16	9900+11	2608+06	2806-07	3506-17	111232	081843	121454
PUB			3005+19	0607+12	0406-06	0108-17	361934	352144	331953

PWM	2520	2619+10	2524+03	2532-01	2549-11	2551-23	255839	255750	255959
RDM		3107+14	2610+10	2419+04	2431-10	2537-22	254638	254848	255154
ROA	9900	2311+13	2520+09	2522+03	2722-08	2622-21	262937	263547	263657
ROW		1914	2208+16	2405+09	1707-07	0908-17	350933	011443	010953
SAC	1914	2115+23	2114+14	2017+09	2513-06	2420-19	242436	223444	244250
SAV	2011	2215+15	2313+10	2315+06	2518-07	2318-18	211633	211543	271855
SIY		9900+16	2310+12	2320+06	2526-07	2631-20	273437	273547	264155
SLN	2431	2514+24	2908+16	3405+09	3205-08	3014-20	351534	361644	341854
SPI	2531	2422+19	2521+12	2418+06	2828-10	3035-19	313335	323044	334457
SPS	2320	2309+20	9900+12	3411+06	0710-05	0511-17	350734	321042	311753
SYR	2620	2522+09	2523+03	2732+00	2641-12	2653-24	266039	266550	266359
TCC		2320	2419+15	2408+09	1506-05	0806-18	031033	341543	330953
TUL	2217	2215+18	2209+13	2311+06	9900-05	0209-18	011235	362144	342354
TVC	2611	2614+12	2724+06	2822+00	2926-12	2951-23	287838	287949	299757
TYS	9900	0109+14	3406+09	2512+06	2714-07	2816-20	312336	312846	313256
T01	2006	9900+16	9900+11	2906+06	2907-07	9900-17	071232	071443	100955
T06	9900	9900+16	9900+11	2607+05	2909-07	9900-17	040932	040842	080754
T07	2305	9900+16	9900+11	9900+06	9900-07	9900-18	070632	030743	051254
WJF		2909+23	9900+17	9900+10	9900-08	1508-18	162033	172542	211952
YKM	3121	2407+13	2515+09	2522+03	2429-12	2434-24	234441	235049	245052
ZUN			2914+16	0107+11	1208-06	9900-17	041133	351443	341454
4J3	1605	1808+15	1911+11	1810+05	1806-07	9900-18	070933	071143	031354

FDUS12 KWBC 100203

DATA BASED ON 100000Z

VALID 100600Z FOR USE 0500-0900Z. TEMPS NEG ABV 24000

FT	3000	6000	9000	12000	18000	24000	30000	34000	39000
ACK	2613	3006+10	2718+08	2627+04	2637-10	2537-23	254340	256047	257954
ACY	2615	2824+11	2518+10	2521+05	2525-10	2623-23	264138	255747	258154
AST	3315	3009+12	2613+08	2615+03	2527-12	2530-23	243740	244349	244352
AVP	2417	2614+10	2520+06	2626+03	2633-10	2631-23	272939	283449	273760
AXN	0625	0315+14	3219+10	3024+05	3031-07	3146-19	304936	304747	304956
BDL	2616	2611+10	2514+05	2525+02	2540-11	2539-24	263239	263349	254958
BGR	2818	2618+09	2625+03	2531-02	2542-12	2649-24	265340	275151	265857
BML	2728	2837+09	2734+04	2631-02	2640-12	2643-24	265240	265251	265860
BRL	2329	2422+19	2617+12	2808+07	3126-11	3141-21	314935	324846	325157
CGI	2419	2710+18	2610+11	2608+03	3517-07	3320-19	322335	312646	313057
CHS	2012	2015+16	2117+11	2218+06	2322-07	2423-17	242033	252343	252755
CLL	1812	2808+17	3412+11	3410+06	3513-06	3510-17	010832	990043	131354
CMH	2314	3119+13	2921+08	2918+04	2725-09	2832-21	283538	283649	284359
COU	2327	2422+18	2413+13	2905+06	3417-08	3226-19	323036	322846	312957
CSG	9900	9900+15	9900+10	2505+06	2213-06	2909-17	271933	272642	283354
CVG	2313	2716+14	3120+08	3118+04	2824-09	2830-21	293337	293848	294459
DLH	0309	0406+13	3005+06	3020+01	3030-11	3043-23	305639	316648	317556
EKN		2323+12	2419+09	2518+04	2616-09	2922-21	282837	283148	264059
EVV	2421	2613+16	3011+09	3410+05	3119-08	3126-20	313536	314447	314657
EYW	1117	1111+17	1108+12	1409+07	1510-07	1316-18	111033	111043	110555
FLO	2109	2215+16	2317+10	2214+05	2110-08	2317-18	243133	253444	254155
FOT	3627	3516+18	2805+14	2508+07	2524-07	2530-19	252736	262446	243754
FSD	2830	3021+24	2831+17	2840+09	3235-07	3235-19	313836	324746	335957
FSM	2020	2114+17	2012+12	1709+06	0510-05	0312-18	321335	312844	303453
FWA	2325	2726+14	3120+08	3320+02	2934-10	2933-22	283738	284249	294660
GAG		2206+22	9900+15	9900+08	0510-05	0106-19	341933	331843	322553
GRI		2529+25	2713+18	3112+10	3514-07	3314-20	322135	322945	334355
GSP	2009	9900+15	2407+10	2414+06	2509-07	2813-20	253535	254544	264855
HAT	2117	2317+14	2420+10	2523+05	2519-07	2429-18	243733	244144	244055
HSV	0706	0509+17	0313+10	9900+06	2505-07	3308-19	311435	293044	294454
H51	1407	0309+18	0205+13	9900+07	9900-07	9900-16	221133	241743	271554
H52	9900	0711+17	0608+12	0606+06	9900-06	9900-17	070932	071142	051254
H61	1308	1508+16	1509+11	1610+05	1616-07	1411-17	090733	091143	101755
LBB		2117+23	2707+15	3608+08	0912-06	0612-18	311632	321343	241353
LCH	2905	9900+15	2807+11	2506+06	9900-06	0509-16	341131	331043	990054
LND			0905+16	9900+11	2816-07	2825-19	273234	283445	263055
LSE	2136	2338+16	2426+10	2225+04	2731-11	3136-19	335234	326546	318157
LWS	2814	2713+18	2318+13	2430+07	2436-10	2440-22	244538	244747	235755

MBW		1312	1607+12	2817-07	3227-18	293434	293045	293653
MCW	1728	2129+17	2333+12	2637+05	2946-08	3147-18	324734	324645
MGM	0805	1705+16	9900+11	9900+06	2410-05	2808-17	271833	282442
MKG	2519	2821+13	3123+06	3031+01	3034-12	2939-23	294939	295249
MLB	1609	1608+16	1409+11	1607+06	1808-07	1510-18	141234	101044
MLS		1816+22	2216+15	2514+07	3116-08	2821-21	264835	265146
MOT		3209+14	3312+08	3220+04	3233-09	3138-21	304637	296647
MQT	3210	3014+11	2919+05	2926-01	3033-12	3038-25	304342	305051
MRF			1305+15	0111+08	0215-06	0512-17	041733	051543
OMA	2248	2534+23	2717+18	3019+09	3324-08	3223-20	313135	313746
ONT	9900	2807+22	3605+17	0208+09	1112-07	1318-17	142032	152542
ORF	1806	2609+14	2523+09	2528+04	2528-08	2534-20	255834	256444
PFN	2005	9900+16	2007+11	2107+06	2109-06	9900-17	330532	990042
PHX	3019	3021+24	3213+16	9900+09	1510-06	1211-16	101932	081743
PIR		3522+22	3033+16	2937+08	3124-07	3131-19	313935	315346
PSX	2211	3205+18	9900+12	9900+07	9900-07	2508-16	130532	100542
PUB			2005+19	0808+11	0113-06	3614-18	351634	331444
PWM	2919	2922+10	2724+04	2632-01	2644-11	2644-24	264140	263950
RDM		3008+15	2513+12	2223+06	2333-10	2439-21	244637	234647
ROA	2213	2312+13	2516+07	2514+05	2716-08	2819-21	272637	263946
ROW		1914	2012+16	2307+08	0706-07	3613-17	351132	341243
SAC	2110	1914+24	2113+16	2119+09	2612-05	2516-19	232236	222844
SAV	2209	1913+16	2117+11	2215+06	2318-07	2219-17	241432	251843
SIY		9900+17	2309+13	2115+07	2423-07	2435-20	243537	243547
SLN	2137	2419+23	2913+15	3605+09	3612-07	3121-19	322335	332644
SPI	2423	2619+18	2718+11	3108+06	3225-10	3133-20	314435	324746
SPS	2015	2310+20	3307+14	3606+07	0513-05	0313-17	321533	302442
SYR	2621	2524+09	2423+03	2524-01	2637-11	2642-23	264739	265250
TCC		2317	2118+17	2114+08	1111-06	0505-17	341833	322043
TUL	2028	2017+18	1806+13	1306+06	0513-05	0111-18	331635	322644
TVC	2815	2928+11	3025+05	3029+00	3032-12	3034-24	304741	296050
TYS	9900	9900+14	2505+10	2408+06	2811-07	2917-20	291936	273146
T01	9900	9900+17	3106+12	2907+06	9900-07	9900-16	360932	340842
T06	9900	9900+16	9900+11	9900+05	2306-07	9900-17	340832	350742
T07	9900	9900+17	9900+11	9900+06	9900-06	9900-17	070532	080542
WJF		2913+24	3311+18	3609+10	1305-07	1414-17	152133	162643
YKM	3231	2511+16	2318+10	2420+04	2429-11	2439-23	245038	235348
ZUN			2311+16	3409+11	0616-07	0411-16	011032	321043
4J3	9900	1607+16	1607+11	1707+06	1607-07	1406-17	050732	060942

FDUS16 KWBC 100203

DATA BASED ON 100000Z

VALID 110000Z FOR USE 1800-0500Z. TEMPS NEG ABV 24000

FT	3000	6000	9000	12000	18000	24000	30000	34000	39000
ACK	2517	2722+12	2617+07	2525+05	2630-09	2744-21	273937	295547	304558
ACY	2121	2418+13	2717+08	2518+06	2629-08	2633-19	291534	313545	314857
AST	3321	3013+08	2714+04	2621+00	2829-10	2846-21	276135	276645	276655
AVP	2217	2220+12	2616+08	2515+03	2627-09	2644-19	254935	285645	286558
AXN	3505	3505+14	3114+11	3223+06	3233-09	3036-21	305337	305747	306456
BDL	2226	2627+12	2624+08	2521+03	2629-09	2646-20	285336	295647	297658
BGR	2520	2624+11	2723+06	2624+01	2632-12	2643-24	265141	286550	286457
BML	2514	2420+11	2619+05	2521+00	2733-11	2642-24	275640	289048	289259
BRL	2627	2731+20	2830+14	2937+09	3129-06	3039-18	294235	294046	304556
CGI	2226	2425+20	2617+13	3607+09	3512-06	3210-18	281635	231945	241556
CHS	2013	2515+15	2616+11	2614+07	2612-07	2520-17	231933	231743	251856
CLL	2015	2808+18	3208+11	3407+06	0209-06	3606-17	190732	151042	990054
CMH	2225	2532+16	2738+11	3039+03	3135-07	3136-19	283833	284243	274857
COU	2326	2523+22	2913+15	3314+09	3220-06	3113-18	311935	322445	323156
CSG	2109	2205+16	2306+12	2207+06	9900-04	9900-18	251233	262243	272355
CVG	2226	2632+18	2730+12	3128+05	3133-07	3033-18	283834	274444	264057
DLH	3110	3110+12	3117+08	3123+04	3136-09	3143-21	313838	313349	306058
EKN		2317+16	2515+09	2721+04	2737-09	2644-17	264033	273344	293457
EVV	2227	2530+20	2621+13	3417+09	3319-07	3119-18	283135	243544	222757
EYW	1012	1309+17	1106+12	9900+07	0105-07	0608-18	130632	150743	161156
FLO	2315	2611+16	2810+11	2910+07	2905-06	2815-18	233333	243343	253057

FOT	3522	3510+18	3307+13	2908+08	2916-05	2821-18	282134	281845	281657
FSD	0805	0205+16	3216+15	3121+08	3133-08	3043-20	295334	295345	305755
FSM	1813	2014+19	2210+12	9900+06	0210-05	3607-18	340835	331244	341852
FWA	2235	2443+16	2641+11	2738+06	2929-05	2932-18	305034	296143	296956
GAG		1913+26	2112+17	2310+08	3609-05	3609-17	011234	021444	320651
GRI		1910+23	2418+17	2716+10	3221-07	3124-18	302934	303445	303755
GSP	2112	2410+15	3008+11	2710+09	3112-05	3114-19	241534	990043	081057
HAT	2320	2319+16	2215+11	2217+05	2325-08	2423-18	242632	242843	263556
HSV	9900	9900+17	0505+10	3608+07	0212-05	3506-18	191234	190945	190656
H51	1009	9900+18	9900+13	9900+07	9900-07	9900-16	261032	251743	170754
H52	1107	9900+17	0806+12	0608+06	1005-07	9900-18	061132	061342	081654
H61	9900	1007+17	1205+12	1605+07	1812-07	1412-18	070633	071143	062854
LBB		1815+25	1814+16	1908+07	0610-04	0405-17	340633	280543	290652
LCH	2405	2108+16	2209+11	2308+06	9900-06	9900-16	290632	250642	250854
LND			2209+18	2509+10	2817-07	2632-18	245333	246644	256455
LSE	3608	3409+15	3213+11	3020+06	3031-08	3037-20	305037	305147	305456
LWS	2909	2810+15	2418+09	2426+03	2433-11	2542-22	265137	275646	275754
MBW			9900	2513+11	2627-06	2530-17	262733	253543	275157
MCW	0108	0309+17	3215+13	2926+08	3026-07	3038-19	305335	316946	316455
MGM	9900	9900+16	9900+11	9900+06	2707-04	9900-18	251532	262543	263255
MKG	3508	2917+15	2825+11	2925+05	2935-07	3039-20	295336	295947	274556
MLB	1312	0906+17	1305+11	9900+06	9900-07	1407-17	120733	990043	990055
MLS		2310+26	2310+17	2311+08	2725-08	2630-21	263837	264647	266555
MOT		1718+18	2522+14	2619+07	3117-10	3028-22	284737	294748	285756
MQT	9900	3012+11	2816+05	2921+02	3028-10	3043-23	305839	296048	296757
MRF			1316+15	0307+09	0309-05	3613-16	350732	990043	080953
OMA	0211	2715+24	2719+16	2927+09	3129-07	2932-18	303634	313245	314555
ONT	2411	2513+21	2505+16	9900+09	1511-07	1715-18	201333	211840	201151
ORF	2318	2407+16	2413+11	2516+05	2717-07	2622-19	263033	263343	281356
PFN	2207	9900+16	9900+11	2207+06	9900-06	9900-17	990032	990042	250855
PHX	2814	2815+25	3013+16	0407+10	2006-05	9900-16	161631	181542	080754
PIR		1406+22	3205+15	2913+08	3024-08	2837-20	285834	285846	296354
PSX	1410	9900+18	2905+13	3106+07	3507-06	9900-17	140833	121942	142154
PUB			1509+21	1509+13	9900-05	2611-16	990033	332343	343155
PWM	2418	2519+11	2615+06	2620+02	2630-11	2745-23	285739	288248	298659
RDM		3112+14	2516+10	2520+04	2638-09	2745-18	275235	275245	285356
ROA	2111	2311+15	2713+10	2913+07	2927-08	2929-18	241233	261044	311857
ROW		1715	1715+18	1812+09	0809-05	0608-17	350933	301542	330853
SAC	2206	2110+22	2212+15	2512+09	2416-06	2411-19	990035	251044	244150
SAV	1809	2611+16	2510+11	2710+06	2415-06	2315-17	211633	231343	261456
SIY		3210+18	2313+12	2415+07	2722-05	2729-18	282734	272645	272656
SLN	2017	2016+24	9900+16	9900+10	3609-06	3311-17	320934	311544	322254
SPI	2433	2637+21	2732+14	3030+09	3024-06	3027-18	303235	293446	283356
SPS	1815	1915+21	2306+13	0114+07	0414-05	0606-17	320633	301143	301552
SYR	2218	2421+12	2520+06	2620+01	2629-11	2636-22	276635	277646	279158
TCC		2015	2015+19	2015+10	0405-04	3505-17	021134	021044	311152
TUL	1821	2311+20	2405+14	9900+08	3610-04	3209-18	360534	341044	351453
TVC	9900	9900+12	3012+09	3019+04	2929-09	3040-21	294538	294548	295556
TYS	9900	2105+17	9900+12	3307+08	3315-07	3218-18	231234	171043	990056
T01	9900	9900+17	2605+12	2806+06	2305-07	9900-16	110732	101142	140954
T06	9900	9900+16	3005+12	3005+06	2206-07	9900-17	990032	990042	990054
T07	9900	9900+17	9900+12	9900+06	9900-06	9900-17	990032	990042	100954
WJF		2718+24	3014+17	3105+09	1406-07	1613-18	181133	201040	990050
YKM	3112	2910+13	2712+08	2616+02	2629-12	2739-22	276036	287245	286555
ZUN			2911+22	2911+13	0505-05	0911-15	990032	360742	331354
4J3	9900	9900+16	2005+11	2005+06	1809-06	1608-17	100533	081442	041455

FDUS11 KWBC 100203

DATA BASED ON 100000Z

VALID 100600Z FOR USE 0500-0900Z. TEMPS NEG ABV 24000

FT	3000	6000	9000	12000	18000	24000	30000	34000	39000
ABI		2008+21	9900+14	0208+07	0613-06	0617-17	021232	351142	990054
ABQ			1913+17	9900+10	0424-07	0318-16	351332	291543	321654
ABR	0427	3619+17	3219+13	3026+08	3134-07	3139-19	315136	316446	316857
AGC	2416	2318+10	2520+08	2522+04	2623-10	2733-21	273938	283949	273959

ALB	2517	2620+10	2521+04	2525+00	2639-11	2635-23	263339	273650	274260
ALS				9900+12	0311-06	0215-17	361833	352244	322153
AMA		2116	2512+16	2909+08	0911-05	0305-18	331633	332042	331552
ATL	9900	9900+15	2110+11	2209+06	9900-07	2712-18	262434	263543	274354
BAM			2910+20	2908+11	2513-08	2422-19	213734	214145	234051
BCE				3310+11	0908-06	2207-17	221532	241843	221856
BFF		3008	9900+19	9900+11	2806-08	2914-18	302434	303145	312954
BHM	0707	9900+15	0305+11	9900+06	9900-06	3109-18	272034	283642	284754
BIH		9900	3513+18	3609+10	1105-07	2409-18	212933	203544	202152
BIL		2011	1809+17	2405+09	2916-08	2821-21	264535	266046	266155
BLH	2315	1811+24	1209+17	0911+09	1414-06	1523-17	132432	132242	141954
BNA	9900	9900+15	3207+10	3512+03	3008-06	3116-20	312436	313046	304056
BOI		9900+26	9900+18	2207+10	2526-09	2631-21	235135	235845	236253
BOS	2716	3013+10	2715+05	2629+01	2642-10	2541-23	263640	263749	255757
BRO	1417	1414+17	1416+12	1518+07	1314-07	9900-17	301732	292643	292454
BUF	2528	2628+10	2519+05	2522-01	2639-12	2647-23	265339	265450	275660
CAE	1910	1909+16	2111+10	2213+05	2307-08	2522-18	242733	253144	253855
CAR	2820	2725+07	2530+02	2539-03	2544-14	2554-25	266741	266651	266556
CLE	2516	2617+10	2822+07	2822+03	2731-10	2837-22	284138	283949	274560
CRP	2012	9900+19	1705+12	1607+07	1806-07	9900-16	990034	990043	120953
CRW	2512	2415+11	2615+10	2614+05	2815-08	2922-21	282737	283148	273959
CZI			0911+17	1310+09	2723-08	2833-19	284035	284245	284556
DAL	2016	9900+18	9900+12	9900+05	0409-06	0311-17	331132	261542	281554
DBQ	2330	2525+19	2519+12	2518+04	2928-11	3140-22	316936	327646	317258
DEN			1908+20	2206+12	3417-07	3413-17	332334	341745	312153
DIK		9900+17	3220+13	3121+06	3125-08	2929-20	295036	286546	295958
DLN			3007+14	2508+08	2622-08	2631-20	244936	236846	246855
DRT	1728	1518+19	1311+13	1311+08	0805-06	0311-18	051333	061543	081153
DSM	2246	2631+21	2523+16	2920+09	3131-09	3140-20	314435	314546	324457
ECK	2519	2521+10	2729+05	2833+00	2841-12	2746-24	285139	285849	286059
ELP		1210	1407+18	9900+10	0612-07	0215-16	360832	361143	031453
ELY			9900+17	3207+10	2414-07	2328-18	202933	203144	213653
EMI	1814	2519+12	2721+06	2520+05	2519-10	2721-23	283038	283348	265757
FAT	9900	9900+23	9900+18	2408+09	1807-07	2108-18	202834	203043	211951
GPI		2811+21	2317+14	2224+06	2428-10	2433-22	243838	234447	245456
FMN			3511+19	3110+12	9900-07	0210-17	011532	361343	311655
GCK		2014+24	2609+17	9900+09	3507-05	3409-19	332134	332044	312753
GEG		2411+18	2315+11	2420+05	2337-11	2342-23	244839	235248	245955
GFK	0113	3511+13	3313+08	3316+02	3230-09	3247-22	316237	316147	316757
GGW		1618+21	2318+15	2722+07	3016-09	2921-21	274636	275647	285556
GJT			9900+21	9900+13	9900-06	2607-18	301433	321744	282555
GLD		2125	2414+18	0707+11	0211-07	3217-19	332534	332245	322353
GRB	2513	2820+14	2922+07	2927+00	2935-12	3045-23	306039	306749	307257
GTF		2424	2212+17	2208+09	2720-10	2627-22	244937	245146	255355
HOU	1709	2105+16	2613+12	2712+07	2510-06	1906-17	021231	361542	341655
ICT	2033	2412+21	9900+15	9900+07	0214-05	3210-19	322135	332444	312553
ILM	2316	2316+16	2420+11	2420+05	2418-08	2428-18	242834	243744	253755
IMB			2610+13	2221+07	2332-10	2340-22	244437	244547	235755
IND	2227	2723+15	2917+09	3513+04	3026-10	3027-21	293837	304748	305358
INK		1622+22	9900+15	0208+08	0715-07	0411-16	360732	351043	130854
INL	3311	3113+11	3017+05	3024+00	3125-12	3132-25	315640	317049	317256
JAN	1006	1405+17	0713+12	0710+05	9900-06	9900-17	302332	283142	293755
JAX	2308	2013+15	2114+10	2112+06	2114-07	2017-17	200832	990043	340555
JFK	2412	2605+10	2621+09	2625+04	2533-10	2531-24	263339	264248	256555
JOT	2424	2721+16	2811+11	3114+04	3128-11	3040-22	314937	326647	327657
LAS		9900+26	9900+18	9900+09	2011-06	1915-17	161232	181743	173654
LIT	1913	1708+18	1805+12	1306+04	0510-06	0312-19	330935	303344	303854
LKV			9900+15	2014+08	2329-07	2434-20	243637	243846	235353
LOU	2213	2715+15	3116+08	3314+05	2816-08	2927-21	303237	303847	304358
LRD	1731	1521+19	1623+13	1418+07	1110-07	9900-17	291334	292143	320953
MEM	1705	1505+18	3605+12	3608+03	0606-06	0112-19	321535	302945	303954
MIA	1111	1210+16	1309+11	1408+07	1505-08	1313-18	121134	130844	990055
MKC	2236	2418+22	2614+13	2806+08	3516-07	3223-19	312735	322746	312756
MOB	0705	1106+16	9900+11	9900+05	2605-06	2905-17	260932	280942	311454
MSP	1710	9900+15	3310+09	3220+04	3039-09	3151-20	306336	296645	277855

MSY	9900	9900+16	9900+11	9900+05	1908-06	9900-16	340632	320842	330754
OKC	2020	2306+19	9900+14	9900+07	0512-05	0311-18	332334	322143	302453
ONL		2817+26	2912+18	2817+10	3223-07	3225-19	313035	323745	335056
OTH	0114	3408+13	2809+10	2611+04	2528-09	2536-21	254037	244347	244554
PDX	3411	2912+12	2616+09	2517+03	2429-11	2436-23	244639	235348	235453
PIE	9900	1707+16	1708+11	1709+06	1717-07	1612-17	110933	071243	071754
PIH		3410	2406+20	2108+11	2816-07	2531-19	232834	234345	255055
PLB	2630	2635+09	2632+03	2633-03	2639-13	2647-24	265740	266251	266260
PRC			2908+16	3606+08	1008-06	1210-16	141231	141343	140756
PSB		2523+10	2528+06	2526+03	2627-10	2731-22	273539	284050	284260
RAP		0609+22	3106+17	2911+10	3026-08	2926-19	293835	293946	304555
RBL	1609	1807+22	2005+15	2108+07	2425-06	2423-20	242436	233245	235051
RDU	2006	2306+14	2418+10	2422+05	2522-08	2624-20	255034	245444	256056
RIC	2111	2614+13	2513+07	2417+05	2525-09	2629-21	264836	257045	257355
RKS			0610	3210+12	2615-07	2715-18	282634	283145	272555
RNO		2713	2516+17	2215+11	2216-07	2422-20	223235	223844	234050
SAN	1807	9900+21	0708+16	0814+09	1313-07	1321-17	132232	142442	152652
SAT	2020	1906+18	1507+13	1409+07	9900-06	2905-17	990034	050743	111753
SBA	9900	0407+23	0308+17	0206+10	1508-07	1613-18	161833	162342	181251
SEA	0106	2905+09	2709+07	2514+03	2420-13	2426-24	233840	234649	234953
SFO	2711	2308+24	2309+15	2208+09	2707-05	2309-19	231736	222544	223450
SGF	2225	2323+18	2214+13	2107+05	0315-07	3415-18	332236	322146	302455
SHV	1709	1516+18	1313+12	0808+06	0206-05	0307-18	312432	292642	303254
SLC		9900	2905+18	2708+10	1906-07	2318-18	242333	243344	243355
SSM	2612	2819+09	2923+03	2929-02	3040-13	3046-26	305042	305152	305857
STL	2525	2517+18	2515+12	2907+06	3318-09	3227-20	323635	324046	323957
TLH	2205	2107+15	2209+11	2310+06	2113-06	2306-17	990032	280742	301354
TRI		2408+14	2315+09	2317+05	2915-07	2918-20	282136	273246	265055
TUS		3114+24	3408+17	0605+09	1011-06	1011-17	091132	071642	990053
2XG	1917	2011+16	1907+10	1909+06	2008-07	1813-17	181633	171343	060955

FDUS10 KWBC 100203

DATA BASED ON 100000Z

VALID 110000Z FOR USE 1800-0500Z. TEMPS NEG ABV 24000

FT 45000 53000

ABI 070763 080970

ABQ 351763 990071

ABR 297460 293064

AGC 254967 281961

ALB 277762 263459

ALS 321463 250571

AMA 990062 990070

ATL 272866 280767

BAM 255361 261866

BCE 262363 231571

BFF 273764 272066

BHM 282665 320666

BIH 241463 231368

BIL 257359 271962

BLH 172063 120772

BNA 302565 321665

BOI 255159 262664

BOS 286562 253559

BRO 990065 081370

BUF 284661 273360

CAE 263166 250968

CAR 265353 253955

CLE 284365 282660

CRP 111364 081371

CRW 283969 281663

CZI 255663 262965

DAL 010763 080970

DBQ 316460 292762

DEN 282063 261468

DIK 277659 282362

DLN	255659	251862
DRT	081564	071670
DSM	325761	302566
ECK	294861	303159
ELP	031063	050972
ELY	253063	232168
EMI	274967	262162
FAT	251763	221168
GPI	243953	252558
FMN	291464	241071
GCK	281362	280970
GEG	264255	262656
GFK	296558	303359
GGW	255157	272259
GJT	272864	261569
GLD	281963	261269
GRB	305359	293260
GTF	255357	252558
HOU	110865	080871
ICT	321961	291070
ILM	252465	251667
IMB	274560	252760
IND	313062	302263
INK	080764	051571
INL	306457	303357
JAN	312264	010969
JAX	990065	251070
JFK	284764	262761
JOT	252965	303664
LAS	221562	221171
LIT	322062	362269
LKV	253861	252262
LOU	312067	321863
LRD	130864	071771
MEM	311663	352267
MIA	990065	110871
MKC	333661	291869
MOB	311565	060669
MSP	306959	303761
MSY	350765	071070
OKC	361262	020670
ONL	295062	282566
OTH	263563	262361
PDX	274659	262158
PIE	111867	990070
PIH	246461	273065
PLB	276358	263856
PRC	211362	190773
PSB	245667	272361
RAP	265562	282164
RBL	254161	252666
RDU	273166	261365
RIC	273868	261564
RKS	254163	252668
RNO	254661	252066
SAN	161164	120871
SAT	101664	071371
SBA	990064	140970
SEA	274555	252356
SFO	253162	231567
SGF	342860	322069
SHV	341363	061270
SLC	254063	242468
SSM	295157	293657
STL	334361	322766

TLH 320965 990070
TRI 283267 271164
TUS 140563 020573
2XG 130866 251069

FDUS15 KWBC 100203

DATA BASED ON 100000Z

VALID 110000Z FOR USE 1800-0500Z. TEMPS NEG ABV 24000

FT	3000	6000	9000	12000	18000	24000	30000	34000	39000
ABI		2012+22	2011+13	0708+07	0715-05	0510-16	281033	251443	990053
ABQ			9900+21	9900+12	0410-05	0309-16	021532	022042	042655
ABR	9900	1405+16	3414+14	3323+07	3024-08	2935-21	295336	287145	296855
AGC	2218	2529+14	2530+08	2529+02	2637-09	2740-19	264233	264543	294257
ALB	2219	2417+11	2618+07	2621+02	2632-10	2646-21	266136	286947	288660
ALS				2206+14	9900-05	1705-16	020832	342542	342155
AMA		1914	2013+18	2013+09	0307-04	3605-18	040734	020544	301051
ATL	1905	9900+15	2305+12	9900+07	9900-05	9900-18	221234	252544	252556
BAM			2614+20	2615+11	2425-06	2527-19	252335	252645	244953
BCE				2811+11	2212-05	2315-16	212832	222543	251755
BFF		1312	1710+17	2407+10	2718-07	2731-16	274432	285143	285356
BHM	9900	9900+15	9900+11	9900+08	0309-05	9900-18	201034	251644	262755
BIH		9900	2812+19	3010+11	9900-06	1506-19	190934	202343	252049
BIL		3109	2309+17	2213+09	2330-09	2440-21	254036	264245	265756
BLH	2215	2215+24	2409+17	9900+10	1712-06	1813-16	172033	171741	181052
BNA	2113	2408+18	3306+11	3406+07	3613-06	3313-18	231634	192144	172056
BOI		3207+22	2814+14	2621+06	2537-07	2637-19	264536	284745	274856
BOS	2323	2620+12	2623+07	2523+04	2631-10	2746-21	285637	287147	297259
BRO	1414	1511+18	1413+12	1417+07	1111-06	2006-17	200732	271543	261555
BUF	2222	2325+11	2317+06	2218+00	2332-10	2648-19	265635	265945	266558
CAE	2311	3306+17	2607+11	2708+07	2607-06	2812-18	242333	242943	253257
CAR	2315	2621+09	2529+04	2631-01	2642-14	2648-26	265442	265752	265757
CLE	2423	2546+15	2846+08	2835+03	3034-08	3035-19	274534	275044	277157
CRP	1414	1306+19	1408+13	1507+07	9900-07	9900-17	200633	180943	141454
CRW	2216	2519+16	2818+11	3028+06	3139-09	2742-17	273633	272943	292657
CZI			2510+19	2408+10	2916-07	2729-18	254934	256144	266854
DAL	1712	2608+19	2907+12	9900+05	0512-05	0508-17	271733	272243	291253
DBQ	0212	2911+16	2917+13	2930+09	3031-07	3035-19	294436	294546	305155
DEN			2810+20	9900+13	1707-06	2711-17	282232	272742	273055
DIK		1821+22	2215+15	2313+07	2313-10	2727-21	284236	285147	276955
DLN			3214+15	2524+09	2339-09	2442-21	264037	253846	254354
DRT	1520	1521+19	1523+13	1314+08	9900-05	9900-18	101233	112242	082353
DSM	3413	2818+22	2829+17	2933+09	3034-08	3040-19	304534	325146	314955
ECK	2408	3018+12	2823+07	2830+03	2939-08	2939-20	283937	274347	275556
ELP		9900	9900+19	9900+10	0209-06	3205-16	330832	360743	360953
ELY			3106+22	3107+13	2708-07	2516-18	233633	224744	233552
EMI	2114	2220+14	2621+08	2715+04	2729-08	2636-18	243035	294044	305257
FAT	3109	3107+24	2710+16	2615+09	9900-07	9900-19	201534	211642	252249
GPI		2510+18	2512+09	2522+03	2534-11	2435-23	244338	245050	245354
FMN			3305+23	9900+14	9900-05	2309-16	271332	331542	011754
GCK		1615+27	1814+18	2015+09	3206-05	3311-16	351134	341844	331253
GEG		2414+15	2413+07	2419+02	2427-13	2532-23	253739	264547	275253
GFK	9900	2807+13	3114+11	3228+05	3333-10	3033-22	293238	294647	295757
GGW		2915+24	2914+15	2917+06	2516-12	2432-21	253137	264347	256558
GJT			3012+20	2811+12	2213-05	2223-16	232532	252942	273356
GLD		1618	1718+19	1710+12	3409-06	3014-16	320733	332744	311955
GRB	3405	3510+13	3115+09	3020+05	2931-08	3039-21	304737	295747	295056
GTF		2607	2912+13	2819+06	2539-11	2448-22	255138	236347	236056
HOU	9900	3010+17	3011+11	3113+05	0220-06	0112-16	990032	120643	141054
ICT	1817	2014+22	1410+15	1110+10	3211-06	3310-18	010634	360644	341653
ILM	2318	2415+15	2610+10	2706+05	9900-06	3010-17	232132	242943	253257
IMB			2515+09	2523+04	2537-09	2647-19	285334	275645	285556
IND	2334	2638+19	2733+13	2932+06	3130-06	2932-18	303435	274144	264956
INK		1519+24	1516+15	0710+10	0710-05	0307-16	320533	990043	990053
INL	3111	3211+10	3217+07	3222+02	3140-10	3151-22	325838	305749	306559
JAN	9900	9900+16	9900+11	9900+06	9900-06	9900-17	282433	273143	273154

JAX	9900	9900+16	9900+11	2405+06	2212-06	2011-17	151133	100943	990055
JFK	2126	2420+13	2719+08	2620+05	2629-08	2639-20	283735	294646	306359
JOT	3411	2918+18	2824+14	2829+08	3031-06	2932-16	273732	253842	233653
LAS		2007+28	2210+19	2312+11	2207-06	1915-17	192133	192343	201152
LIT	1909	1916+19	1908+12	0306+06	0509-04	0407-18	300835	301345	311953
LKV			2613+15	2613+06	2629-06	2735-18	283234	273445	283556
LOU	2223	2625+19	2721+12	3320+08	3223-07	3123-18	283734	253844	252256
LRD	1419	1421+17	1523+13	1420+07	1106-06	9900-17	241533	232443	170853
MEM	2010	2211+19	9900+11	0106+06	0210-05	3608-18	260935	250845	291155
MIA	1307	1105+16	1309+11	1211+06	0511-07	0814-18	990032	990043	240655
MKC	2322	2619+24	2913+16	3210+10	3313-06	3014-18	322034	351945	323255
MOB	9900	9900+16	2705+11	2705+06	1607-06	9900-17	281132	291142	281555
MSP	9900	3408+13	3214+10	3121+05	3130-08	3037-21	305337	305746	306156
MSY	9900	9900+16	9900+11	9900+06	1708-06	9900-16	270532	260542	261154
OKC	1822	2317+21	3007+14	3411+08	0212-05	0206-18	360534	990044	321151
ONL		9900+22	3407+16	2720+09	2931-08	2937-18	284534	294145	304654
OTH	0117	3511+12	3010+09	2719+04	2738-06	2740-18	274234	274145	274457
PDX	3012	3114+09	2813+06	2620+01	2627-11	2744-20	275935	276345	276355
PIE	3606	1105+16	9900+12	1805+07	1809-08	1305-18	090933	111542	112354
PIH		2614	2616+18	2522+10	2534-08	2536-19	254435	245445	246553
PLB	2316	2320+10	2521+05	2620+01	2630-11	2642-24	276639	278649	780159
PRC			2710+18	2808+10	2106-05	2011-16	171732	171742	140554
PSB		2423+13	2622+08	2617+02	2537-10	2647-19	254034	264544	285757
RAP		1618+23	2019+15	2309+09	3018-08	2831-18	265033	276645	286255
RBL	1707	9900+21	2406+13	2514+08	2617-05	2812-18	301035	310845	281256
RDU	2118	9900+16	2508+11	2613+06	2916-06	2818-19	262434	243243	243356
RIC	2019	2415+15	2616+09	2519+06	2724-07	2726-19	990032	321544	310956
RKS			2510	9900+09	3108-06	2730-17	244132	234743	245656
RNO		2615	2515+17	2317+10	2319-06	2515-19	260735	261045	244152
SAN	2206	2006+22	1907+15	1808+09	1516-07	1914-17	211232	211640	201052
SAT	1415	1514+18	1610+12	1508+07	9900-06	9900-17	141133	131943	121654
SBA	9900	3206+23	0105+16	0505+09	0808-07	1209-18	220533	240741	990050
SEA	2306	3007+07	2808+05	2612+00	2626-13	2735-23	275638	277245	276954
SFO	2911	2609+21	2611+15	2612+10	2412-06	2408-19	220936	241743	253950
SGF	2119	2419+19	2205+14	0713+10	3510-06	3211-18	331134	361645	352855
SHV	1808	1505+16	1405+11	0506+07	0412-04	0407-18	282433	282543	272153
SLC		9900	2807+18	3110+10	3014-07	2626-17	244533	235543	244553
SSM	9900	3010+10	2818+05	2923+02	2930-11	2939-24	295339	296148	296557
STL	2328	2629+20	2816+14	3219+09	3222-06	3116-18	311935	291946	302756
TLH	2006	9900+16	2205+11	2208+06	2006-07	2310-17	220832	240743	271055
TRI		2209+17	9900+11	3211+08	3220-07	3024-18	251333	230944	351057
TUS		3116+26	3216+17	3410+10	9900-05	9900-15	140931	170942	990054
2XG	1506	1805+17	2105+11	9900+06	9900-06	2108-17	151233	111544	091955

FDUS13 KWBC 100203

DATA BASED ON 100000Z

VALID 101200Z FOR USE 0900-1800Z. TEMPS NEG ABV 24000

FT	3000	6000	9000	12000	18000	24000	30000	34000	39000
ABI		2409+20	0507+14	0316+06	1012-05	0709-17	361232	341042	280553
ABQ			3406+16	3207+10	0611-06	0513-16	032133	362043	362353
ABR	0617	0317+13	3421+10	3232+07	3033-08	2937-20	304836	305446	305657
AGC	2515	2915+11	2917+07	2722+04	2627-10	2630-22	273838	283949	283759
ALB	2517	2419+09	2321+02	2633+01	2650-12	2649-23	255839	265849	265659
ALS				3306+11	0608-06	0410-17	012034	352444	333053
AMA		2528	2711+16	9900+07	1006-05	0305-18	041433	331143	321352
ATL	9900	1805+15	2208+09	2408+06	9900-07	2606-18	272035	272244	273055
BAM			2715+17	2414+10	2421-07	2526-20	234035	235344	234851
BCE				9900+10	1916-06	2313-17	241533	232244	252755
BFF		1006	2307+18	2412+11	3118-07	3115-18	302835	323045	303654
BHM	0905	9900+15	9900+11	2105+06	0407-05	9900-18	311234	301345	282755
BIH		9900	9900+17	9900+09	2308-07	2512-18	202934	203843	232552
BIL		2711	2613+16	2614+08	2417-09	2626-21	265436	257446	267254
BLH	2008	1811+24	1612+16	1711+09	2008-07	1717-17	152532	152342	201953
BNA	9900	2805+15	3510+09	3411+04	2910-06	2912-19	332135	362546	352257
BOI		2009+21	2013+17	2216+10	2328-09	2429-21	244337	235746	247053

BOS	2416	2415+10	2415+03	2531+02	2545-11	2543-23	264839	264850	255759
BRO	1522	1419+19	1416+12	1515+06	1610-07	9900-17	280932	291743	291755
BUF	2525	2618+09	2721+05	2825+01	2737-13	2743-24	275539	265850	275858
CAE	1906	2211+15	2311+10	2410+05	2615-07	2520-18	233133	233344	243656
CAR	2313	2518+07	2527+02	2536-03	2552-14	2557-25	247942	258451	246857
CLE	2621	2919+12	2918+07	2720+02	2924-11	2838-22	284138	315248	327058
CRP	1719	1408+18	1606+12	1908+06	9900-07	0106-17	161133	122243	131554
CRW	2609	3517+13	3114+08	2915+05	2725-09	2629-21	283337	283248	293258
CZI			2214+16	2616+09	2910-08	2728-20	274035	275345	275354
DAL	2018	9900+18	9900+11	9900+05	0906-06	0708-17	301233	291742	302054
DBQ	0414	3612+14	3117+10	2928+04	2844-07	2848-18	284933	284744	273957
DEN			2708+20	2507+12	9900-07	3209-18	331834	332145	322153
DIK		9900+18	3317+14	3124+06	2823-09	2828-21	293937	296046	296056
DLN			2309+16	2720+09	2622-09	2527-22	254537	246346	246954
DRT	1826	1624+18	1618+12	1512+08	9900-07	0807-18	062333	062343	081353
DSM	2656	2843+24	2836+17	2833+08	2932-09	3033-20	334335	354045	351157
ECK	2713	2915+12	2824+07	2928+01	2834-12	2737-23	306239	308249	319457
ELP		1913	9900+17	9900+09	0206-07	0509-17	350832	021743	011054
ELY			2114+16	2606+09	9900-07	2418-18	223433	224344	234654
EMI	2417	2518+12	2519+07	2622+04	2630-09	2631-21	263938	254648	264958
FAT	9900	3005+22	2505+17	2307+09	2208-07	2508-19	202534	203143	232351
GPI		2614+18	2522+11	2430+05	2443-11	2442-23	244538	245048	245256
FMN			9900+17	3308+11	0808-06	0709-17	331033	331644	332654
GCK		2114+24	2406+16	2205+09	9900-05	3507-19	361734	361245	342052
GEG		2421+16	2521+09	2422+04	2339-12	2345-24	235039	236549	236354
GFK	0312	3617+12	3414+06	3222+02	3136-10	3142-21	304938	315648	306156
GGW		2216+23	2514+16	2613+07	2619-10	2721-23	274738	275047	275556
GJT			9900+19	9900+12	2209-07	2713-17	261433	271544	272955
GLD		2416	9900+19	1005+11	9900-07	3513-17	361834	011545	332553
GRB	2412	2417+12	2422+06	2618+01	2924-09	2833-21	295136	286545	277258
GTF		2914	2717+15	2618+07	2419-10	2425-22	254138	254947	256256
HOU	2213	2607+16	3113+10	2817+05	2614-06	2706-17	081032	060843	131353
ICT	2325	2110+23	9900+14	0109+08	3306-06	3010-20	351435	361644	351853
ILM	2216	2412+15	2416+10	2319+05	2425-08	2427-18	233533	244044	243855
IMB			2514+11	2326+05	2333-11	2340-22	245038	236148	246153
IND	2722	2622+16	2820+10	2520+04	2922-08	3025-20	314536	324946	326458
INK		1613+22	0810+15	0910+07	0809-07	0909-16	360832	351043	300854
INL	3512	3313+09	3120+04	3126+01	3132-12	3137-24	325739	316948	317657
JAN	9900	9900+17	0711+11	9900+04	9900-07	9900-18	301333	302743	303455
JAX	1910	2211+15	2213+11	2312+06	2217-07	2013-18	170733	990043	330955
JFK	2708	3016+10	2821+06	2526+04	2533-10	2634-22	264238	254649	255858
JOT	2831	2825+16	2526+09	2433+02	2638-10	2939-20	315534	306345	308457
LAS		9900+24	2006+17	1810+09	2212-06	2115-17	182233	182642	212954
LIT	1811	2007+18	1906+12	2107+04	0707-05	9900-18	361035	341245	313253
LKV			2512+13	2517+06	2427-08	2437-20	254337	244647	245354
LOU	2617	2814+15	3114+08	3010+05	2717-09	2925-20	333735	334446	334857
LRD	1731	1526+18	1525+12	1420+06	1306-07	1105-18	990034	990043	990053
MEM	1908	2409+18	9900+11	0206+03	0305-06	9900-18	331035	341246	331456
MIA	1415	1313+16	1312+11	1308+06	1106-08	1211-19	130834	190544	990056
MKC	2433	2618+22	2716+14	3306+10	3209-08	3115-20	322135	343146	362856
MOB	9900	9900+15	2706+10	2505+05	2806-07	2105-18	280932	311342	321554
MSP	0314	0505+14	3405+09	3212+05	3136-08	3046-20	305637	316147	305056
MSY	9900	1906+15	1705+11	9900+05	2506-07	9900-17	360732	011142	990054
OKC	2320	2510+19	2705+13	2807+07	0605-05	0510-18	031334	331543	332152
ONL		3522+23	3016+17	2924+09	3026-08	2823-19	313335	313546	324756
OTH	0209	3409+12	2812+09	2713+05	2724-09	2830-20	304436	315646	314757
PDX	3206	3013+11	2817+08	2619+03	2626-11	2732-23	284040	294848	284954
PIE	1410	1608+16	1808+11	1909+06	2014-07	1712-18	080934	052043	061955
PIH		1612	2108+17	2610+10	2412-08	2524-20	244235	234945	245652
PLB	2518	2428+09	2540+03	2643-02	2641-13	2654-25	256641	257350	267358
PRC			9900+17	1806+10	2208-06	2009-17	140832	161243	221353
PSB		2415+09	2617+08	2624+03	2634-10	2638-22	264439	264749	274659
RAP		0707+19	9900+16	2608+08	2521-08	2827-19	304235	294845	295255
RBL	1507	1705+21	2011+15	2114+07	2531-06	2529-20	252736	252946	244653
RDU	9900	2005+14	2415+08	2517+05	2520-08	2622-20	254435	245045	245657

RIC	9900	2607+13	2517+06	2622+04	2626-08	2625-20	253336	244946	246057
RKS			2609	3108+11	2417-07	2521-18	242534	253545	284752
RNO		2610	2416+16	2123+09	2518-06	2627-20	233136	224244	234651
SAN	2006	9900+21	9900+16	1607+08	1513-08	1616-18	152732	152741	191652
SAT	1820	1609+18	1708+12	1911+06	9900-07	9900-17	130734	122742	131654
SBA	9900	9900+22	9900+17	0707+10	1108-08	1105-19	171533	191542	231051
SEA	3308	3208+08	2912+07	2716+02	2621-13	2629-25	273141	273650	274052
SFO	3011	2609+22	2408+15	2207+09	2609-06	2515-19	241936	223044	243850
SGF	2328	2319+18	2316+13	2413+06	2306-07	3114-19	321536	341446	342156
SHV	1612	1609+16	1310+11	9900+05	0205-05	9900-18	321333	292642	312854
SLC		9900	3506+17	2410+09	2418-08	2523-18	243933	254644	255353
SSM	2711	2817+09	2828+04	2835-01	2935-13	2941-25	294342	295051	295956
STL	2529	2524+19	2521+12	2517+06	2918-08	3025-19	312535	312246	321857
TLH	2212	2211+16	2310+11	2210+05	2210-08	2005-18	990032	260743	321554
TRI		3307+14	2607+09	2513+05	2717-07	2719-20	282736	292846	293357
TUS		3510+23	3608+16	2005+09	9900-07	9900-17	110932	101342	240553
2XG	2014	1911+16	1809+10	1809+06	1707-07	1910-17	191033	170744	060956

FDUS16 KWBC 101402

DATA BASED ON 101200Z

VALID 111200Z FOR USE 0600-1700Z. TEMPS NEG ABV 24000

FT	3000	6000	9000	12000	18000	24000	30000	34000	39000
ACK	2319	2422+12	2623+07	2629+03	2539-10	2540-20	265234	275344	274756
ACY	2718	2725+15	2526+08	2632+03	2434-08	2632-18	253634	263544	263255
AST	3417	3214+08	3115+06	3118+03	3030-10	3038-22	284737	265047	274556
AVP	2729	2833+14	2832+09	2730+04	2532-09	2439-19	243835	254445	285657
AXN	1820	2111+17	2408+12	2613+05	2728-11	2823-22	293835	285345	268756
BDL	2523	2432+14	2536+08	2533+02	2631-08	2636-20	275935	265845	265258
BGR	2218	2323+11	2426+05	2629+00	2739-12	2655-22	256838	266747	266857
BML	2111	2317+10	2528+06	2634+01	2645-11	2650-22	266038	276247	277958
BRL	2409	2823+19	2929+14	2930+08	2929-09	2825-18	323834	335344	324755
CGI	2521	2517+19	2407+12	1706+08	2509-08	3110-17	352234	351744	150555
CHS	2413	2508+15	2411+10	2511+05	9900-07	1909-17	211433	221744	241457
CLL	2117	2106+18	9900+11	9900+05	9900-07	1109-17	140933	141443	091353
CMH	2531	2742+17	2737+12	2736+06	2927-09	3029-19	303935	304145	275556
COU	2628	2510+20	2506+14	2710+08	2613-09	2711-17	331534	362945	331753
CSG	9900	9900+15	2105+10	2207+05	9900-07	9900-19	260835	261944	272255
CVG	2738	2526+18	2731+13	2835+07	3127-08	3135-19	334434	312944	283956
DLH	9900	3106+12	3219+10	3127+03	2935-10	3042-22	305337	304947	296458
EKN		2729+15	2731+11	2836+05	2730-09	2735-19	283035	252545	253755
EVV	2824	2516+18	2612+13	2517+08	2922-08	3021-18	352934	351644	311155
EYW	1313	1009+16	1406+12	9900+07	3409-08	9900-18	030833	010843	050856
FLO	2508	2510+15	2707+11	2810+05	9900-07	2311-18	232133	242144	251356
FOT	3622	0111+17	9900+12	2809+07	2820-05	2727-18	272635	272646	262357
FSD	1908	2522+19	2534+13	2539+06	2443-07	2444-18	264133	264244	264258
FSM	2119	2406+17	1906+11	9900+05	1505-05	9900-19	091334	091043	070553
FWA	2925	2820+16	2825+13	2831+08	2928-08	3039-20	315535	315446	295254
GAG		2526+24	2606+16	9900+08	9900-05	0505-18	062334	042944	060752
GRI		2119+24	2118+17	2219+10	2324-07	2631-18	282833	293044	301256
GSP	2410	9900+16	2605+10	2808+07	2706-07	2509-19	200834	241844	990056
HAT	2413	2512+15	2516+10	2518+05	2422-07	2424-18	242733	242944	242856
HSV	2006	1706+16	0810+12	2405+07	9900-06	9900-19	020635	031045	011054
H51	1409	1707+18	1305+13	1507+06	1405-07	0905-17	180533	251043	230655
H52	1411	1308+16	1608+11	1405+06	0605-08	0507-17	051132	070943	071055
H61	1511	1609+16	1510+11	1407+06	9900-08	0807-18	080933	081243	042155
LBB		2020+22	1507+16	0408+08	1010-05	0711-18	051634	052543	990051
LCH	2311	2609+15	9900+10	9900+05	2206-07	9900-17	080633	170943	990054
LND			2711+18	2620+09	2723-07	2626-19	263735	264845	266055
LSE	9900	3109+16	3215+12	3221+06	3028-09	2931-21	314536	318044	299957
LWS	9900	2405+11	2609+06	2618+01	2634-11	2743-22	266238	267446	267054
MBW			2920	2917+10	2713-06	2624-18	264033	275045	265154
MCW	1406	3008+18	3112+14	3018+07	2824-09	2933-19	305134	306445	297756
MGM	2206	2007+15	2207+10	2405+06	9900-07	9900-19	260935	272144	272355
MKG	3207	3108+15	2912+10	2917+05	3029-09	2939-21	295136	305546	306556
MLB	1509	1207+17	9900+12	9900+06	1207-07	1012-19	031734	022244	032856

MLS	2822+19	2623+12	2624+05	2537-10	2643-19	265336	265546	266256
MOT	2622+18	2526+12	2634+05	2737-09	2633-20	263737	254048	275156
MQT 2707	2610+10	3018+07	3128+03	3045-10	3046-23	305138	316248	326858
MRF		0105+16	0110+08	0607-07	0914-17	031333	011143	351353
OMA 2406	2819+22	2617+15	2519+08	2422-09	2528-18	273433	293944	303656
ONT 9900	2609+22	9900+16	1810+09	2111-07	2216-19	222432	222441	231551
ORF 2517	2611+15	2813+09	2617+06	2520-07	2525-18	252434	271244	301756
PFN 2107	2011+16	2008+11	1805+06	9900-07	9900-18	280733	310743	281856
PHX 2314	2810+23	2907+16	9900+08	2908-06	2110-16	201531	211742	221653
PIR	2413+19	2106+14	2910+06	2824-07	2927-20	275135	275545	266053
PSX 2110	1006+18	9900+12	9900+06	9900-07	1108-17	130734	190744	111653
PUB		2510+19	2810+12	2606-05	2408-17	301433	291743	282655
PWM 2220	2322+11	2426+06	2532+02	2641-11	2650-21	266037	265647	266758
RDM	3006+10	2913+08	2817+04	2830-08	2837-20	274136	273846	264456
ROA 2816	2920+18	2912+11	2711+05	2818-07	2923-18	262335	252244	262556
ROW	2019	2012+16	9900+09	1011-05	0911-17	052033	054143	031752
SAC 1809	2011+20	2114+14	2212+09	2514-06	2807-19	020836	990045	254050
SAV 2309	2407+15	2411+10	2510+05	2410-07	2310-18	210933	230644	260857
SIY	9900+15	2306+11	2512+05	2722-05	2729-18	272935	273446	263556
SLN 2234	2214+23	1714+18	1613+10	9900-05	2511-18	990033	351344	351554
SPI 2833	2823+19	2824+13	2826+08	2831-09	2924-17	313634	344745	312853
SPS 2432	2415+21	1306+13	0513+06	1210-05	1008-18	070834	990044	030551
SYR 9900	2613+12	2817+07	2721+03	2634-09	2734-21	273237	254747	266258
TCC	2235	2615+17	2206+09	1307-04	0709-16	061933	053043	041855
TUL 2125	2509+19	2606+12	9900+06	9900-05	9900-19	101334	081144	990053
TVC 3207	2808+12	2816+07	3024+04	3030-09	2934-22	294438	304547	305556
TYS 2411	9900+17	0307+11	9900+06	2811-07	3012-19	280934	310544	320956
T01 1810	9900+17	2107+11	2310+06	2206-07	9900-17	090733	151243	141054
T06 1505	1505+16	1806+11	1906+05	9900-07	3505-17	090632	130543	990054
T07 1708	1806+15	1906+11	1905+06	9900-07	9900-18	030533	990043	300755
WJF	2914+23	3009+16	2506+09	1807-08	2311-19	222332	222140	251050
YKM 3222	2806+10	2910+06	2914+02	2926-11	2938-22	295737	297745	286856
ZUN		3106+16	0607+10	3008-06	9900-16	180631	210842	261655
4J3 1706	1806+15	1708+10	1705+06	9900-07	1206-18	060733	020843	361656

FDUS14 KWBC 101402

DATA BASED ON 101200Z

VALID 110000Z FOR USE 2100-0600Z. TEMPS NEG ABV 24000

FT 3000	6000	9000	12000	18000	24000	30000	34000	39000
ACK 2417	2824+12	2625+07	2422+06	2529-08	2638-20	265135	274846	264956
ACY 2119	2418+13	2716+08	2517+06	2729-08	2634-19	242834	252345	253356
AST 3318	3013+08	2814+05	2719+00	2833-10	2847-21	276636	277246	277055
AVP 2217	2321+12	2720+08	2522+02	2630-09	2638-19	245434	256345	276758
AXN 3605	3606+14	3115+11	3326+06	3131-09	3036-21	305037	306846	306656
BDL 2221	2422+12	2623+07	2421+04	2531-10	2641-20	256335	266446	276357
BGR 2418	2520+11	2720+06	2522+01	2631-11	2641-24	277638	279147	289759
BML 2518	2424+11	2520+05	2519+00	2527-11	2637-24	267337	269047	279860
BRL 2624	2727+20	2826+13	2934+09	3128-06	3032-18	293736	304946	315456
CGI 2226	2626+20	2615+13	0611+09	3510-07	3111-19	292135	292544	302856
CHS 1811	2308+16	2510+11	2614+06	2520-06	2520-17	241733	221643	202356
CLL 1914	2311+18	3107+12	3406+06	9900-06	2806-17	180932	151642	151253
CMH 2429	2633+17	2835+11	2938+05	3133-07	3031-19	283834	264544	265455
COU 2325	2621+21	2814+15	3113+09	3112-07	2908-19	312034	332645	323256
CSG 2208	2105+16	9900+11	9900+06	3505-06	2507-18	252133	262643	272555
CVG 2328	2735+19	2825+13	3025+06	3224-08	3226-19	293135	274044	254255
DLH 3007	3009+12	3219+09	3122+04	3130-09	3136-21	304238	295048	305757
EKN	2423+16	2722+10	2824+04	2735-08	2931-18	293533	262944	303556
EVV 2326	2727+20	2720+13	3412+08	3320-07	3319-19	292535	273144	273356
EYW 1109	1308+17	1310+12	1409+07	3009-08	9900-18	090833	090643	990055
FLO 2216	9900+16	2505+11	2707+06	3106-07	3017-17	242933	223143	223856
FOT 3523	3512+18	3209+13	2911+08	2920-05	2822-18	282135	271746	271457
FSD 0805	0305+16	3317+15	3219+09	3029-07	3040-19	294734	305646	305255
FSM 1711	2015+19	2209+12	9900+06	0407-05	9900-18	340835	311143	331853
FWA 2338	2544+17	2747+11	2842+08	3035-06	3037-18	304435	304446	304356
GAG	1811+25	1911+16	2210+08	3409-05	3507-18	351034	361144	320851

GRI	1909+23	2515+18	2820+10	3220-07	2824-18	301733	311745	312654
GSP	2112	2110+15	2505+11	2907+07	3211-06	2911-18	251734	252444
HAT	2320	2419+15	2516+11	2511+05	2710-08	2527-17	243433	234043
HSV	9900	1106+17	0713+11	9900+07	0307-06	9900-18	250835	261245
H51	1308	0806+18	0405+13	9900+07	9900-07	9900-16	261133	261743
H52	1207	1005+16	0806+11	9900+06	9900-07	0707-18	061232	061642
H61	9900	1407+17	9900+12	1605+06	1711-08	1209-18	051033	041943
LBB		1915+25	1914+16	2011+07	0811-05	0506-17	330833	281043
LCH	1807	2107+16	2207+11	2106+05	2106-06	2805-16	990032	200542
LND			9900+19	2608+10	2718-08	2637-18	245433	246244
LSE	3507	9900+15	3111+11	3020+06	3033-08	3036-20	294836	304947
LWS	2908	2810+14	2421+08	2426+02	2533-13	2541-23	265538	276246
MBW			3011	2810+10	2525-06	2428-17	253333	254044
MCW	3608	3408+17	3114+13	3027+09	3029-07	3136-19	305435	316046
MGM	2105	2206+16	2408+10	9900+06	3205-05	2605-18	262033	272543
MKG	9900	3008+15	2919+10	2826+05	2938-08	2940-20	294637	295046
MLB	1412	9900+16	9900+11	1205+06	1405-06	1407-18	090634	060544
MLS		2410+26	2410+17	2511+09	2715-09	2729-21	264237	265047
MOT		1820+18	2620+15	2719+07	2825-10	2828-23	274338	275146
MQT	9900	3013+11	2924+05	3024+03	3029-11	3042-22	315538	315648
MRF			1213+16	0406+08	0312-06	3613-16	341132	330743
OMA	0206	2613+23	2815+17	2922+09	3127-08	3027-18	302834	303345
ONT	2412	2408+22	2305+16	9900+09	1509-08	1809-18	211032	191640
ORF	2316	2506+15	2410+10	2515+07	2821-07	2626-18	244433	245043
PFN	2210	9900+16	2305+11	2307+06	9900-06	9900-17	990032	990042
PHX	2813	2814+26	2812+17	3306+10	2205-05	1805-16	151331	161242
PIR		1407+22	9900+16	2711+08	2818-09	2735-19	274734	275345
PSX	1413	9900+18	3105+13	3306+06	3305-06	2206-17	141333	122243
PUB			1511+21	1509+13	9900-06	2509-17	300833	332143
PWM	2519	2622+11	2611+06	2518+02	2527-11	2640-23	267636	268647
RDM		3112+14	2516+09	2620+03	2732-08	2742-18	275135	275646
ROA	2111	2313+16	2711+09	3012+06	2725-07	2726-18	292635	282144
ROW		2212	1815+18	1814+09	0807-05	9900-16	321132	291743
SAC	2206	2210+22	2314+15	2415+10	2517-06	2609-18	020536	990045
SAV	1812	2410+16	2408+11	2609+06	2516-07	2615-17	231032	221443
SIY		3211+17	2413+12	2515+07	2828-06	2729-18	273135	272945
SLN	1919	2113+24	9900+17	9900+10	3511-07	3314-17	290534	260544
SPI	2430	2734+20	2831+14	2927+09	3025-06	3026-18	303236	293846
SPS	1715	1816+21	2808+14	3413+07	0612-05	0406-18	300834	290943
SYR	2415	2320+11	2519+06	2419+00	2427-11	2645-21	266535	267446
TCC		1914	2015+19	2015+10	0805-05	9900-17	010933	350744
TUL	1818	2209+20	2306+14	1706+08	3608-05	3107-19	350634	331043
TVC	9900	3305+12	2811+07	2817+02	2931-10	3043-21	305137	305147
TYS	9900	9900+17	0207+11	3508+07	2913-06	3015-18	281834	271444
T01	1406	2006+17	2508+12	2811+06	2207-07	9900-17	090832	080642
T06	9900	9900+15	9900+11	3005+06	2306-07	9900-17	990031	990042
T07	9900	9900+16	9900+11	9900+06	9900-07	9900-17	990032	990042
WJF		2716+24	2911+17	3005+09	1505-08	1408-18	201032	201741
YKM	3015	2911+12	2713+08	2617+02	2628-12	2742-22	276337	277546
ZUN			2911+22	2811+13	9900-06	0806-16	990031	990042
4J3	9900	2005+17	1806+12	1907+06	1709-06	1506-17	070732	051242

FDUS10 KWBC 101402

DATA BASED ON 101200Z

VALID 111200Z FOR USE 0600-1700Z. TEMPS NEG ABV 24000

FT 45000 53000

ABI 081663 081071

ABQ 341363 100972

ABR 276962 282963

AGC 293763 292664

ALB 263759 283961

ALS 260762 990072

AMA 990063 990072

ATL 352766 341766

BAM 255962 262066

BCE	271563	281170
BFF	274363	272268
BHM	342365	361868
BIH	252764	261368
BIL	265261	261862
BLH	251164	990071
BNA	332362	021766
BOI	264861	252162
BOS	256166	273160
BRO	040665	091471
BUF	285062	272861
CAE	271766	301166
CAR	265455	273856
CLE	295062	292064
CRP	091564	071871
CRW	283866	321865
CZI	265661	282665
DAL	061463	051071
DBQ	315262	303665
DEN	281963	251169
DIK	273958	292662
DLN	264760	262961
DRT	071664	081570
DSM	293662	303067
ECK	295061	312959
ELP	362263	081372
ELY	254063	261269
EMI	282667	281862
FAT	252764	271168
GPI	264254	251957
FMN	301163	120571
GCK	260963	281372
GEG	274454	262057
GFK	286258	303659
GGW	274557	282760
GJT	282163	280870
GLD	271563	261671
GRB	306160	313861
GTF	264557	251658
HOU	081664	061771
ICT	261163	291570
ILM	261766	260767
IMB	265060	272560
IND	325564	342464
INK	051663	080971
INL	285058	313758
JAN	362163	011570
JAX	030765	310869
JFK	243169	272662
JOT	315862	313365
LAS	250863	290671
LIT	022463	051569
LKV	264062	272262
LOU	333765	012464
LRD	061464	071871
MEM	012963	051767
MIA	361465	091271
MKC	281763	312569
MOB	311665	021269
MSP	297561	303162
MSY	331266	051170
OKC	990063	290671
ONL	284662	282767
OTH	264162	272361
PDX	274760	262158

PIE 061767 990069
PIH 265762 261865
PLB 285558 273959
PRC 251463 990071
PSB 283562 293162
RAP 266461 262664
RBL 254561 272165
RDU 281068 291865
RIC 272267 272266
RKS 265062 261867
RNO 255062 271767
SAN 240964 090570
SAT 082163 081770
SBA 990064 990070
SEA 274256 262057
SFO 253463 281168
SGF 341563 332068
SHV 041563 031570
SLC 265063 281769
SSM 295758 303658
STL 332864 332765
TLH 311665 990069
TRI 261468 341566
TUS 271565 111173
2XG 061365 290568

FDUS15 KWBC 101402

DATA BASED ON 101200Z

VALID 111200Z FOR USE 0600-1700Z. TEMPS NEG ABV 24000

FT	3000	6000	9000	12000	18000	24000	30000	34000	39000
ABI		2211+19	1610+13	1913+07	0910-06	1011-17	050633	990043	360552
ABQ			9900+16	2507+10	9900-05	0506-16	031032	351143	330955
ABR	2130	2120+20	1917+13	1913+05	2524-08	2824-20	284136	275245	266154
AGC	2629	2835+15	2737+10	2738+04	2828-08	2828-19	273634	264845	266056
ALB	2619	2519+12	2524+08	2528+02	2736-09	2639-20	265135	266746	276759
ALS				2709+11	2507-05	2605-17	310533	311243	282355
AMA		2328	2613+17	9900+08	9900-04	0710-17	062433	053744	060952
ATL	9900	9900+15	2307+10	2405+05	9900-07	9900-19	150735	200745	251055
BAM			2511+15	2325+10	2623-06	2617-18	251136	252146	244453
BCE				2812+09	2411-06	2514-18	222933	223842	233453
BFF		2211	3212+17	3213+10	2718-07	2727-18	274633	275044	264654
BHM	9900	1906+15	2311+11	2205+06	0809-06	9900-19	990035	990045	340754
BIH		9900	9900+16	1608+09	9900-07	9900-19	261136	242741	252950
BIL		3217	2915+12	2722+05	2637-11	2646-19	265835	266146	256255
BLH	9900	2208+23	2007+16	1908+09	2507-07	2313-18	232231	232241	221952
BNA	2312	2505+18	9900+11	1007+07	2906-08	2809-19	362134	032544	062356
BOI		3411+19	2708+12	2522+04	2640-07	2639-20	264735	264846	255055
BOS	2326	2329+18	2432+07	2535+02	2637-10	2639-20	265036	276545	275957
BRO	1615	1715+18	1516+12	1414+06	1214-07	1312-17	200733	211443	231655
BUF	3305	2713+13	2818+08	2622+03	2728-08	2829-21	272837	263447	265557
CAE	2510	2609+15	2508+10	2607+05	9900-07	2208-18	221633	231744	251357
CAR	2422	2426+10	2430+04	2529-02	2636-13	2646-26	256342	257050	268355
CLE	2927	2829+15	2628+10	2636+05	2827-08	2934-20	283537	283945	275255
CRP	1812	1410+18	1509+12	1608+06	1606-08	1010-18	151033	190845	150953
CRW	2628	2719+17	2724+12	2831+06	2836-09	2736-19	293234	292645	242655
CZI			2721+18	2725+09	2726-07	2633-19	273935	274746	265156
DAL	2427	2509+19	9900+11	1906+06	0812-05	1111-18	990033	270743	310653
DBQ	9900	3011+18	3119+13	3024+08	3029-07	2834-20	313935	327844	307956
DEN			3114+19	3114+11	2718-05	2419-17	262032	263143	263456
DIK		3220+19	2727+13	2637+06	2633-09	2632-20	264237	275147	275956
DLN			2405+11	2522+04	2640-10	2650-19	265835	256146	256355
DRT	1719	1621+17	1623+13	1716+07	1509-07	1212-18	071933	041843	031452
DSM	1511	2919+20	3026+14	2923+08	2726-09	2823-18	282334	303345	293854
ECK	0307	3309+13	2913+08	2819+05	2824-08	2929-21	283938	294147	294556
ELP		2915	2307+16	9900+09	9900-06	1012-16	022532	023842	362753

ELY		3009+17	9900+10	2312-07	2413-19	242035	243543	244151
EMI	2620	2825+15	2628+10	2735+03	2537-09	2540-19	273335	273244
FAT	3205	9900+22	2308+15	2410+08	1608-07	3305-19	240935	242441
GPI		2810+13	2712+05	2721+00	2623-14	2633-24	264740	255548
FMN			3122+17	3110+10	2210-06	2106-16	240532	270843
GCK		2417+26	2310+18	2309+09	2508-05	3208-17	030933	361644
GEG		2615+12	2708+06	2613+00	2725-13	2833-23	274140	274748
GFK	1935	2025+16	2322+11	2627+03	2523-10	2737-20	284736	293847
GGW		3209+16	2917+10	2725+04	2532-12	2539-22	266237	267446
GJT			9900+18	2709+10	2514-06	2520-18	252832	253643
GLD		2217	2211+19	2508+12	2514-06	2316-17	271633	301944
GRB	2508	2713+13	2918+08	3123+04	3033-08	3040-21	304737	315047
GTF		3606	2718+06	2628+02	2632-13	2645-22	266937	257646
HOU	2213	0505+17	0208+11	3505+05	9900-07	0807-17	111233	131944
ICT	2234	2422+22	2409+14	1411+10	2707-06	9900-18	071233	051644
ILM	2515	2510+15	2614+10	2713+05	2212-07	2315-17	242433	242244
IMB			2715+08	2622+03	2732-09	2744-20	275136	274746
IND	2736	2830+20	2833+13	2837+07	2938-09	3036-18	324034	323945
INK		1816+20	9900+16	0206+08	0911-06	0818-17	020734	030543
INL	1405	3507+10	3119+08	2932+03	2840-11	2942-22	304838	295849
JAN	2008	1812+15	2009+10	1907+06	9900-07	0707-18	990034	291943
JAX	1911	9900+15	2106+10	2108+05	2008-08	1706-18	990034	021044
JFK	2730	2531+15	2434+08	2535+03	2633-08	2536-19	263834	254044
JOT	2812	2813+17	3020+13	2926+08	3029-08	2937-19	304135	326845
LAS		2111+26	2112+17	2010+09	2107-08	2414-19	232533	232541
LIT	2111	1409+18	1013+11	9900+06	1208-05	9900-18	081134	071344
LKV			2409+11	2516+05	2627-06	2728-20	273635	263946
LOU	2731	2518+17	2617+13	2721+07	3127-07	2928-19	353735	342444
LRD	1627	1624+18	1623+13	1619+06	1313-08	1013-18	160935	990044
MEM	2010	1210+17	1017+11	1506+07	1206-06	3406-18	041334	051944
MIA	1413	1008+18	9900+13	9900+07	1111-09	0908-19	361034	342144
MKC	2526	2308+22	2005+16	2306+09	2510-08	2611-18	260933	361644
MOB	9900	2105+15	2005+10	1907+05	9900-07	9900-18	280933	261443
MSP	1506	2907+16	3309+13	3217+06	2830-11	2823-21	304435	297444
MSY	2306	2206+15	2106+11	2105+06	9900-07	9900-17	990033	240743
OKC	2328	2515+21	9900+13	3611+06	1506-05	0905-18	081234	071144
ONL		2227+23	2433+16	2543+09	2550-08	2936-18	274733	274544
OTH	0315	3613+11	3511+09	3213+05	2923-07	2824-20	273436	263846
PDX	3415	3115+08	3116+07	3017+03	3030-10	3040-21	285136	275046
PIE	1807	1605+16	1306+11	1405+06	9900-08	1208-18	090533	021243
PIH		2510	2411+16	2521+08	2531-08	2638-19	263835	253745
PLB	2709	2710+11	2719+06	2726+02	2734-11	2745-22	275438	276348
PRC			9900+17	2107+09	2613-07	2217-17	203032	202842
PSB		2833+13	2825+08	2725+02	2734-08	2632-19	263834	275045
RAP		3307+23	3010+16	3018+09	2723-08	2831-20	274336	274945
RBL	9900	9900+18	1906+12	2408+08	2620-06	2720-18	271935	281646
RDU	2613	2608+16	2915+10	3112+07	2514-07	2520-18	251634	251244
RIC	2521	2614+16	2709+09	2914+05	2528-08	2731-18	253034	272644
RKS			2716	2816+10	2720-07	2521-18	264233	254745
RNO		2706	2308+14	2217+09	2520-06	2712-18	310636	290646
SAN	9900	2305+21	1910+15	1714+08	2111-07	2322-17	242532	222241
SAT	1817	1616+18	1713+13	1712+06	1706-08	1111-17	120935	120944
SBA	9900	3406+22	3605+16	0406+08	1008-08	2206-19	221433	231340
SEA	0406	3308+05	3110+05	3015+01	2928-12	2939-23	305738	296746
SFO	2710	2511+20	2313+15	2411+10	2513-06	2608-19	990036	261244
SGF	2425	2311+19	2110+13	1214+09	2307-07	9900-17	010834	351045
SHV	2408	3109+15	9900+12	3605+05	1014-05	0909-18	320533	291643
SLC		1907	2409+17	2410+10	2715-08	2514-19	253234	244645
SSM	2910	2917+09	2924+04	2929+01	2938-10	2845-22	284639	295149
STL	2730	2608+20	2613+14	2717+08	2720-09	2918-17	332534	343345
TLH	2307	2011+15	2010+11	1909+05	2105-07	9900-18	990033	300543
TRI		2810+17	3208+11	9900+06	2815-07	3017-19	271734	271244
TUS		2716+21	3315+15	3615+07	0306-05	9900-16	170631	200642
2XG	1809	1705+16	9900+11	9900+07	1406-07	1407-18	080934	061044

FDUS13 KWBC 101402

DATA BASED ON 101200Z

VALID 110000Z FOR USE 2100-0600Z. TEMPS NEG ABV 24000

FT	3000	6000	9000	12000	18000	24000	30000	34000	39000
ABI		1814+22	1810+13	0512+06	0812-05	0509-17	270733	270843	990053
ABQ			9900+21	9900+12	0508-05	0408-16	030932	011342	032455
ABR	1206	9900+18	3514+14	3317+07	3126-09	3038-21	286535	286346	296455
AGC	2323	2533+14	2729+09	2935+04	3142-08	3134-19	272933	264244	275557
ALB	2317	2419+12	2422+06	2523+02	2526-11	2646-20	256935	258146	267859
ALS				9900+14	9900-06	9900-17	011232	342442	352155
AMA		1913	2012+18	2012+09	0408-04	3407-18	360934	350744	311351
ATL	1606	9900+16	9900+11	9900+06	9900-06	2806-18	241834	242444	242955
BAM			2617+20	2518+11	2528-06	2521-19	271835	252445	244653
BCE				2913+11	2011-06	2017-17	212732	232543	272154
BFF		1409	1610+18	2110+10	2718-06	2734-17	274132	274044	283754
BHM	9900	2105+15	9900+10	9900+07	0408-05	9900-18	250834	271844	272954
BIH		9900	2607+19	3010+11	0105-06	9900-19	150934	191744	252650
BIL		2314	2312+17	2414+09	2536-10	2542-20	273536	283746	265755
BLH	2214	2214+25	2211+17	9900+10	2007-07	1913-17	172332	162842	171152
BNA	2311	2508+18	3207+12	0211+06	3211-06	3214-19	281534	251944	212256
BOI		3206+22	2712+15	2521+07	2540-08	2642-19	274636	285046	274856
BOS	2421	2717+11	2621+08	2424+04	2530-10	2646-20	267335	276646	276257
BRO	1519	1517+17	1517+13	1414+06	1206-07	2208-17	231332	262043	272455
BUF	2220	2418+12	2625+06	2727+01	2833-10	2842-21	275536	267445	257258
CAE	2015	9900+16	9900+11	2808+06	3107-06	2914-18	233033	233343	233556
CAR	2315	2623+09	2630+04	2632-01	2641-14	2650-25	265742	267051	277557
CLE	2626	2835+15	2827+10	2935+04	2934-07	2940-19	274536	265845	266356
CRP	1519	1611+18	1508+13	1406+07	9900-07	2006-17	210934	180844	150853
CRW	2221	2424+16	2823+11	2922+05	2927-08	3028-19	293132	262644	302455
CZI			2705+17	2906+09	2925-07	2636-19	255534	256644	266553
DAL	1812	2111+18	2809+12	9900+06	0609-05	0307-17	261733	251843	271053
DBQ	3207	2811+16	2815+13	2930+09	3034-07	3039-19	293936	294246	315455
DEN			1914+19	1611+11	3010-06	2816-16	262531	252742	252655
DIK		1822+23	2124+14	2321+07	2725-09	2832-20	275136	266146	276955
DLN			2815+17	2618+08	2437-09	2446-21	254637	254947	254954
DRT	1520	1521+20	1622+13	1312+07	9900-06	9900-17	071033	071942	071752
DSM	3409	2717+21	2823+16	2934+09	3032-08	2936-18	314035	314445	305056
ECK	2307	2907+13	2708+08	2918+03	2938-09	2946-20	294536	274347	284857
ELP		1005	9900+19	9900+10	0108-06	3108-16	990032	270943	360653
ELY			9900+21	2806+12	2814-07	2518-18	223333	224543	233553
EMI	2217	2220+14	2721+09	2822+04	2730-08	2632-19	253533	262944	253956
FAT	3110	3207+23	2907+17	2608+09	9900-07	9900-19	181435	211442	252449
GPI		2408+18	2411+10	2519+02	2333-12	2334-24	243939	245049	245053
FMN			3609+23	3307+14	9900-06	2506-16	261432	321242	041855
GCK		1516+26	1615+17	2008+10	3107-05	3112-17	341534	341744	301152
GEG		2415+14	2413+06	2518+02	2521-13	2531-24	253640	264747	275452
GFK	1805	9900+14	3217+12	3131+05	3134-10	3035-23	294538	295047	295956
GGW		2708+25	2709+16	2715+08	2723-11	2533-22	263638	265148	265356
GJT			3011+21	2810+12	2116-06	2419-16	242532	262543	283055
GLD		1718	1718+19	1713+11	3207-06	3115-17	321933	332944	321853
GRB	0705	3209+14	3113+08	3017+04	3032-08	3040-21	303838	304147	304957
GTF		9900	3308+13	2911+05	2441-11	2347-22	234638	234948	244855
HOU	1505	3606+17	3411+12	3510+07	3415-06	2306-17	180932	131243	141754
ICT	1817	1915+21	1115+16	1112+10	3410-06	3113-18	320534	330544	311252
ILM	2213	2512+16	2510+11	2607+05	2723-06	2527-17	232433	222643	213556
IMB			2518+09	2623+03	2635-10	2746-19	275535	276046	286056
IND	2334	2737+20	2733+13	2935+07	3128-07	3032-19	303636	283646	274156
INK		1516+25	1515+16	0707+09	0610-05	0306-16	320732	320943	040653
INL	3010	3111+11	3217+07	3123+03	3136-10	3144-22	304338	294449	295758
JAN	9900	1905+16	9900+11	9900+06	9900-06	0406-17	282633	283343	283354
JAX	9900	2205+16	2406+11	2310+06	2118-07	2011-17	990032	010742	010955
JFK	2224	2422+12	2621+06	2420+05	2628-09	2637-19	243934	264145	254357
JOT	3012	2722+18	2730+13	2835+08	2935-07	3037-19	284336	284547	294157
LAS		2007+28	2209+19	2312+10	2606-07	1813-17	202132	192642	221253
LIT	1908	1816+19	1806+11	0606+05	0708-04	0407-18	310935	301544	302353

LKV		2613+14	2613+06	2631-06	2735-18	273535	283646	283657
LOU	2324	2730+19	2823+13	3211+07	3322-08	3322-19	282734	263644
LRD	1424	1422+18	1517+11	1315+08	1405-06	2305-17	231334	241643
MEM	2109	2207+18	9900+11	0508+05	9900-05	3608-18	300835	301145
MIA	1409	9900+16	1209+12	1307+07	1110-08	0912-18	050934	340944
MKC	2321	2620+23	2914+16	3013+10	3311-07	3012-18	321734	301645
MOB	2309	9900+16	2505+11	2606+06	9900-07	9900-17	281132	281442
MSP	0107	3408+15	3213+11	3121+06	3132-08	3036-21	304837	305647
MSY	2305	2406+15	2606+11	2706+06	1809-07	9900-17	290732	290942
OKC	1719	2115+21	3007+14	3008+08	0308-05	0206-18	310734	290944
ONL		9900+22	2809+17	2815+09	3027-08	2931-18	283534	293745
OTH	0115	3408+12	3010+08	2818+04	2836-06	2740-18	274435	274446
PDX	3013	3014+09	2815+06	2720+01	2832-09	2845-20	276236	276546
PIE	9900	9900+16	1906+11	2009+06	9900-08	1111-17	091732	081842
PIH		2714	2615+18	2422+10	2534-07	2537-20	264336	254945
PLB	2418	2423+11	2621+05	2520+00	2527-11	2634-25	266938	268647
PRC			2812+18	2813+09	2112-05	2013-16	171531	181442
PSB		2225+13	2524+08	2723+02	2728-09	2741-19	264934	255444
RAP		1612+24	1713+15	2010+07	2635-07	2746-17	265034	275645
RBL	1707	9900+20	2508+13	2515+08	2716-05	2914-18	301135	310846
RDU	2118	2410+15	2908+10	2810+07	2816-06	2719-18	243934	234643
RIC	2116	2315+14	2914+09	2908+07	2824-07	2627-19	254234	245943
RKS			2411	3011+10	2915-07	2539-17	244333	244343
RNO		2616	2517+17	2422+10	2523-06	2712-18	320736	290546
SAN	2307	2206+21	1806+15	1711+08	1714-07	2112-17	191032	191540
SAT	1518	1516+18	1707+12	1407+07	9900-06	2107-17	161034	121543
SBA	9900	3207+23	0209+16	0408+08	0908-08	0909-19	210533	211040
SEA	2205	2906+07	2912+05	2716+00	2725-13	2736-23	275438	276846
SFO	2911	2610+21	2514+15	2416+10	2512-06	2510-19	990036	250944
SGF	2219	2419+18	2205+14	0912+10	3605-07	3014-18	341034	351545
SHV	1606	1407+16	1305+13	9900+07	0614-04	0507-18	282333	272543
SLC		9900	3005+19	2908+11	2722-06	2626-18	244633	235743
SSM	2808	3018+11	2927+05	2927+01	2934-11	2945-24	305840	306548
STL	2427	2626+20	2816+14	3118+08	3118-07	2912-19	312235	312946
TLH	2211	2006+16	2109+11	2211+06	1907-06	9900-17	990032	320842
TRI		2210+17	9900+11	3111+07	2820-07	2820-18	292234	292044
TUS		3015+26	3114+18	3309+10	0405-06	0606-16	140731	140942
2XG	1607	1705+17	9900+12	9900+07	2205-06	1807-17	131134	121244

FDUS11 KWBC 101402

DATA BASED ON 101200Z

VALID 101800Z FOR USE 1700-2100Z. TEMPS NEG ABV 24000

FT	3000	6000	9000	12000	18000	24000	30000	34000	39000
ABI		1908+21	1505+14	0607+06	0711-06	0908-17	990033	270543	300853
ABQ			3206+17	3411+11	0313-06	0408-17	051533	031943	031454
ABR	9900	0306+15	3519+13	3424+07	3128-08	2934-20	294336	305946	306256
AGC	2013	2320+13	2625+08	2832+03	2639-09	2640-20	234334	253746	294758
ALB	2213	2318+10	2524+04	2727+02	2741-11	2750-22	276438	287547	308558
ALS				0206+13	0609-06	9900-18	050934	361744	013254
AMA		2310	2309+17	2312+08	0806-05	0705-18	990033	330944	310952
ATL	9900	2905+15	2307+09	2610+06	2005-07	2410-18	990034	241244	271056
BAM			2510+16	2426+08	2523-07	2521-20	243836	235045	235352
BCE				2807+11	2407-07	2113-17	212033	222544	273454
BFF		1310	2107+17	2411+11	2619-07	2620-19	271734	292445	303454
BHM	9900	9900+15	9900+11	2805+06	9900-06	9900-18	990034	231044	261155
BIH		9900	2305+17	2605+10	2706-07	9900-19	212334	203443	242451
BIL		2510	2916+16	2920+08	2623-09	2528-21	254436	255546	256554
BLH	2010	1707+23	1610+16	2009+09	2005-08	1717-17	172332	172442	201653
BNA	2108	2607+17	3310+10	3508+04	3012-06	3117-19	291435	230644	990056
BOI		2605+19	2912+14	2415+07	2435-09	2441-21	254738	245247	246253
BOS	2316	2418+10	2522+07	2629+03	2638-11	2554-23	266638	266649	275557
BRO	1414	1517+16	1515+12	1615+06	1508-08	1510-17	230933	261744	261554
BUF	2422	2417+11	2617+06	2722+01	2731-11	2649-21	266336	267247	277960
CAE	2007	9900+15	2509+10	2513+05	2808-07	2510-18	212433	202843	213457
CAR	2310	2717+08	2625+02	2628-03	2553-15	2660-26	276442	266652	256756

CLE	2411	2409+13	2521+08	2634+02	2642-09	2540-19	254235	254645	285358
CRP	1611	1812+18	1810+12	1706+06	9900-08	1308-17	151133	131644	121253
CRW	2212	2720+15	2820+09	2919+03	2732-08	2732-20	232133	221644	261456
CZI			2608+16	9900+09	2508-08	2322-18	243834	244845	265554
DAL	2006	2608+19	2605+11	2405+05	0505-06	9900-17	261133	251642	281353
DBQ	2610	2412+15	2926+15	2835+09	2941-07	3043-20	304737	314347	304056
DEN			2205+20	2307+13	2911-07	2514-18	281033	301844	333054
DIK		2021+20	2216+15	2514+07	2825-10	2733-21	274736	286246	285956
DLN			2013+16	2320+10	2329-11	2434-22	244539	245748	247153
DRT	1618	1629+19	1617+13	1207+07	9900-07	9900-17	081633	072042	061453
DSM	2815	3017+22	2929+17	2832+09	2937-08	2932-19	303235	314046	314056
ECK	2013	2414+13	2619+07	2628+01	2737-10	2742-21	274436	255346	266859
ELP		9900	9900+17	0407+09	3210-07	9900-17	990032	130543	020953
ELY			2606+18	2607+10	2207-08	2311-18	223134	224244	243752
EMI	2211	2213+12	2523+08	2724+04	2635-08	2535-19	221934	292046	301756
FAT	9900	9900+22	2805+16	2507+09	9900-07	3505-19	201935	212343	242350
GPI		2605+17	2612+09	2422+04	2346-13	2340-24	224640	225451	235753
FMN			2906+18	3511+12	9900-06	9900-17	080533	340544	323055
GCK		2009+25	1909+17	1705+09	2908-05	3406-18	351034	341345	350952
GEG		2415+12	2215+08	2220+03	2326-13	2432-25	254140	254249	254653
GFK	9900	3409+12	3215+08	3223+04	3137-10	3041-22	303838	304547	295357
GGW		2411+22	2511+16	2710+08	2620-11	2528-23	263238	273747	265156
GJT			2606+19	2508+12	2414-06	2314-18	231833	252144	293755
GLD		1706	1708+18	1412+11	3510-07	2709-18	321534	321545	301353
GRB	0905	2805+12	2910+08	2915+02	3030-09	3044-21	305337	304947	294657
GTF		9900	2511+14	2520+07	2533-11	2335-23	234339	245249	246454
HOU	9900	3010+16	3212+11	3113+05	2807-07	9900-17	131232	131643	131754
ICT	2016	2115+22	1010+15	0816+09	3010-05	2914-19	360534	990044	321853
ILM	2215	2516+15	2618+10	2622+05	2518-07	2420-18	232533	222843	223157
IMB			2516+09	2423+03	2435-10	2642-21	264737	275147	275155
IND	2223	2529+17	2932+11	3126+05	3239-10	3232-19	283533	273544	284356
INK		1611+23	1212+15	1008+07	0407-07	0906-16	990032	990043	360754
INL	3112	3113+08	3218+06	3224+02	3132-11	3143-23	315638	315848	316058
JAN	9900	0706+17	0709+11	9900+05	9900-06	9900-17	261434	272743	282854
JAX	2007	2511+16	2309+10	2210+06	2116-07	2012-18	990033	040543	050855
JFK	2115	2424+12	2426+05	2723+04	2633-09	2645-20	264536	305547	315158
JOT	2318	2622+16	2638+13	2842+07	3044-08	3136-19	304037	303946	284957
LAS		2008+25	2415+17	2417+09	2007-07	1913-18	182633	202742	242553
LIT	1808	1714+18	1708+12	9900+04	0409-05	0105-18	230535	240944	281553
LKV			2413+11	2425+05	2532-07	2735-19	293936	294046	283757
LOU	2317	2524+17	2822+11	2922+05	2931-08	2936-20	273034	262444	292155
LRD	1416	1526+17	1624+12	1516+07	1407-07	1610-18	210734	990043	020553
MEM	1908	9900+18	9900+11	9900+04	0505-06	3409-19	990035	180844	210855
MIA	1309	1410+16	1406+12	9900+07	1312-08	1113-19	100634	990044	990056
MKC	2320	2624+22	3016+15	3112+09	2911-08	3207-19	331534	332245	302656
MOB	9900	2705+15	2706+10	2609+05	9900-07	2305-17	250932	271242	291755
MSP	0111	0108+14	3312+10	3118+05	3035-08	3042-20	304938	305447	305657
MSY	9900	2409+15	2307+10	2206+05	9900-07	2605-17	990032	990042	250654
OKC	1915	2313+19	2309+13	3105+06	3605-05	9900-18	990034	330644	311252
ONL		0116+22	3219+16	2820+09	2832-08	2832-19	303134	303245	303655
OTH	0211	3512+12	3112+09	2717+03	2837-07	2847-19	295135	295046	295157
PDX	3109	3114+09	2914+07	2716+01	2628-12	2641-22	285837	286746	286154
PIE	9900	1512+16	1509+11	1709+06	1908-07	9900-18	080834	061743	052155
PIH		2214	2519+17	2621+10	2416-09	2525-21	254636	246345	246451
PLB	2313	2522+10	2629+04	2629-01	2738-12	2745-25	274941	275450	286656
PRC			9900+16	2911+09	2009-07	1810-17	161732	181443	262053
PSB		2312+11	2721+07	2721+02	2641-09	2646-19	254436	273947	305758
RAP		1911+21	2310+15	2605+08	2625-07	2626-18	273235	284546	294854
RBL	1706	2008+19	2211+14	2317+07	2621-06	2821-18	321735	341746	272056
RDU	1705	2806+14	2716+09	2621+06	2718-08	2521-19	243334	224944	234856
RIC	1908	2208+13	2722+07	2721+05	2724-07	2525-19	242834	243445	232055
RKS			2711	2713+09	2427-07	2432-18	253334	264145	274454
RNO		2311	2314+16	2325+09	2523-06	2621-20	262136	243245	234651
SAN	9900	9900+21	9900+15	1512+08	1514-08	1713-18	182032	191341	211052
SAT	1711	1816+18	1814+12	1707+06	9900-08	1507-17	141633	122243	091752

SBA	9900	0206+22	0407+16	0608+08	0912-08	0509-19	160934	201140	230750
SEA	9900	9900+07	3009+06	2712+01	2518-14	2526-24	263241	273848	274552
SFO	3113	2609+22	2312+15	2220+09	2612-06	2714-19	251336	242044	243750
SGF	2220	2326+17	2412+13	0507+08	3010-06	3017-18	330835	290645	261855
SHV	1705	1305+16	1315+12	0705+06	0405-05	9900-18	261733	272442	282253
SLC	9900	2608+16	2606+09	2612-08	2419-19	243634	244844	254452	
SSM	2906	3018+11	2826+05	2829+00	2831-12	2833-25	294141	295150	295755
STL	2322	2529+20	2715+13	3119+08	3120-07	3317-19	321836	282045	243255
TLH	2205	2414+15	2310+10	2212+06	2308-07	2106-18	990032	270543	291055
TRI		2905+16	2809+09	2813+06	2617-07	2824-19	261936	270845	031355
TUS		3207+23	3407+16	9900+09	9900-07	9900-18	091031	101042	290653
2XG	2013	2009+16	2007+11	2005+07	9900-07	1907-17	161134	121444	091955

FDUS12 KWBC 101402

DATA BASED ON 101200Z

VALID 101800Z FOR USE 1700-2100Z. TEMPS NEG ABV 24000

FT	3000	6000	9000	12000	18000	24000	30000	34000	39000
ACK	2320	2419+12	2424+10	2424+05	2531-10	2544-22	266238	256447	255358
ACY	2116	2316+12	2719+06	2719+05	2630-08	2636-19	282634	312946	261557
AST	3216	3213+08	2914+06	2717+01	2728-13	2740-23	296437	297346	296754
AVP	2114	2220+11	2423+06	2624+03	2738-09	2647-20	264836	285547	307158
AXN	0109	0212+13	3414+10	3218+05	3134-09	3143-20	304937	305647	305657
BDL	2414	2416+10	2724+05	2629+03	2638-10	2651-22	266438	286547	307458
BGR	2322	2430+10	2535+04	2630-01	2740-13	2650-24	256641	257451	256658
BML	2417	2424+10	2628+04	2627-01	2738-12	2643-25	264941	265550	265257
BRL	2424	2737+21	2735+16	2836+09	3036-07	3129-19	322735	312746	283556
CGI	2220	2523+19	2520+12	2912+05	3215-06	3219-19	311635	271345	211956
CHS	2205	2613+15	2515+10	2418+05	2225-07	2122-18	231333	241343	251356
CLL	2008	2512+17	3005+11	3209+05	0105-07	1807-17	151232	120942	140953
CMH	2120	2627+15	2627+10	2733+05	2638-10	2737-19	254333	273845	294856
COU	2322	2524+21	2912+13	3214+09	3014-07	3114-19	341535	331745	283055
CSG	9900	9900+15	2508+11	2510+05	2408-06	2407-18	251534	252344	261755
CVG	2320	2527+16	2726+11	2830+05	2835-10	2837-19	273133	272744	293555
DLH	3408	3205+11	3014+07	3121+03	3132-10	3042-21	304738	304648	305457
EKN		2515+14	2817+08	2922+03	2735-08	2634-20	212433	251645	292156
EVV	2218	2524+18	2723+12	3121+06	3131-08	3034-19	282734	252444	222056
EYW	1312	1312+16	1313+11	1210+07	2808-08	9900-19	090734	120744	110655
FLO	2011	2611+15	2614+10	2520+05	2812-07	2415-18	202533	213043	223257
FOT	3620	3515+17	3209+12	2909+07	2819-06	3019-18	312235	322046	331758
FSD	0309	3612+17	3219+15	3122+09	2932-08	2847-19	304436	315745	315857
FSM	1913	2117+18	2115+11	9900+05	0108-05	9900-18	990035	310544	311453
FWA	2318	2737+15	2844+10	2841+04	3041-09	3135-19	273634	273945	285657
GAG		2907+23	2805+16	9900+08	9900-05	3205-19	360635	340944	340951
GRI		0408+23	2907+18	2718+10	2919-08	2817-18	301934	321945	292456
GSP	9900	9900+15	2813+09	2716+06	2707-07	2513-18	261235	231945	232956
HAT	2218	2318+15	2419+10	2618+04	2713-07	2517-18	243333	234043	213856
HSV	9900	0712+17	0415+10	2706+06	9900-06	3006-19	990034	150944	131456
H51	1406	9900+19	9900+13	9900+06	9900-07	9900-17	190933	241443	171253
H52	0806	9900+16	0605+12	9900+07	0807-07	0809-18	101332	081442	081654
H61	1505	1307+16	1408+11	1607+06	1708-08	1307-18	080933	071743	062254
LBB		2114+23	2007+16	9900+07	0507-06	0909-17	990033	990043	300753
LCH	2607	2506+15	2106+10	2309+05	2507-06	9900-17	990032	990042	170554
LND			2805+17	2810+09	2522-08	2532-19	253934	265045	265053
LSE	0106	2707+16	2913+10	3021+07	3037-07	3043-20	305137	304947	304957
LWS	2805	2411+13	2317+09	2227+04	2341-12	2441-23	254739	254748	255154
MBW			2811	2612+10	2523-07	2523-19	263034	273645	294053
MCW	0112	3412+18	3118+14	3027+09	2936-07	2945-20	304636	304247	315056
MGM	9900	9900+15	2409+10	2606+05	2808-06	2206-18	251734	262443	282055
MKG	2114	2913+13	2916+08	2922+04	2938-08	2941-20	294637	283947	284657
MLB	1611	1610+16	1607+11	9900+06	9900-08	1406-18	140734	090944	071855
MLS		2416+22	2217+15	2417+08	2627-09	2535-21	265535	266346	266255
MOT		2008+15	2909+12	2924+06	2930-10	2929-22	283538	283947	285156
MQT	3506	3009+11	2819+05	2925+00	2925-12	3035-23	305339	306348	306857
MRF			0905+15	0412+07	0207-07	9900-16	031032	050943	021153
OMA	3310	3213+23	3116+17	2822+09	2928-08	2922-18	303234	323845	313655

ONT	2306	9900+22	1107+16	1305+08	1309-08	1308-18	172532	182341	231452
ORF	9900	2205+14	2720+09	2624+05	2722-08	2525-19	244133	235644	245456
PFN	2207	2206+15	2307+10	2309+05	2505-07	9900-17	210532	250642	300955
PHX	9900	3307+23	3013+16	2812+09	2006-07	1908-17	141332	141042	281053
PIR		3511+20	3516+15	3322+07	3027-08	2835-19	294535	304946	295155
PSX	1906	2806+17	2805+12	2906+06	2605-08	1406-17	131233	122043	132053
PUB			9900+20	9900+13	0207-06	9900-18	010934	361644	351354
PWM	2320	2425+10	2522+05	2522+01	2744-12	2652-24	256740	257250	265957
RDM		2909+12	2612+08	2618+03	2633-10	2646-20	285436	286046	285456
ROA	2405	2507+15	2718+08	2917+05	2624-08	2626-19	242135	201045	141355
ROW		1809	2008+17	2306+08	9900-06	1705-17	350532	340543	330553
SAC	1912	2211+22	2213+15	2320+08	2519-06	2718-19	271036	251745	243851
SAV	9900	2412+15	2415+10	2317+05	2221-07	2216-18	241133	250943	240756
SIY		9900+16	2508+11	2417+06	2627-07	2828-18	303435	303446	302957
SLN	2114	2315+23	9900+16	0305+08	3012-07	3208-18	990034	990044	321955
SPI	2328	2532+21	2726+13	2933+07	3133-07	3223-19	322536	302545	264356
SPS	1707	2509+20	2409+13	3408+06	0506-05	0707-18	990034	990043	301252
SYR	2216	2218+10	2518+06	2721+00	2732-11	2749-22	277437	279148	298858
TCC		2110	2113+17	2111+09	1208-05	1607-18	020533	360944	310652
TUL	1917	2215+18	2408+12	9900+07	3507-05	9900-18	310635	360744	321553
TVC	9900	2908+12	2913+06	2816+01	2927-10	2939-22	295338	295747	295656
TYS	9900	9900+16	3409+10	2909+06	2611-06	2819-19	291735	321345	022156
T01	2506	1805+17	2006+11	2408+06	9900-07	9900-17	101332	121042	131354
T06	9900	9900+16	2606+11	2907+06	9900-07	9900-17	990032	990042	140654
T07	9900	9900+15	9900+11	9900+06	9900-07	1505-17	990032	990042	040954
WJF		2806+22	9900+16	9900+09	0908-08	0908-19	172033	182441	231351
YKM	3013	2707+11	2811+08	2515+02	2522-12	2532-23	254139	264448	264853
ZUN			2808+18	9900+11	9900-07	0705-17	091232	040843	321252
4J3	1707	1907+16	2208+11	2108+06	1705-08	1406-18	090732	060842	041254

station	validUTC	levelcode	pressure_mb	height_m	tmpc	dwpc	drct	speed_kts	bearing	range_sm
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,6.0	34865.0	-37.3	-75.3	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,6.1	34747.0	M,M	95.0	26,246.0	22.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	4,7.0	33800.0	-35.7	-73.7	90.0	43,244.0	20.0	
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,7.1	33694.0	-35.5	-73.5	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,7.3	33528.0	M,M	80.0	45,243.0	19.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,7.5	33315.0	-36.7	-74.7	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,8.0	32874.0	-41.3	-78.3	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,8.9	32154.0	-42.7	-78.7	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,9.2	31930.0	-41.3	-78.3	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,9.5	31699.0	M,M	85.0	59,237.0	15.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,9.9	31437.0	-44.9	-79.9	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	4,10.0	31370.0	-44.9	-79.9	80.0	42,235.0	14.0	
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,10.9	30784.0	-44.9	-79.9	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,11.4	30480.0	M,M	75.0	46,232.0	12.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,12.4	29919.0	-41.9	-77.9	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,13.0	29601.0	-43.5	-79.5	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,13.1	29565.0	M,M	60.0	34,229.0	10.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,14.3	28956.0	M,M	65.0	38,227.0	9.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,15.0	28651.0	M,M	85.0	36,225.0	8.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,15.7	28346.0	M,M	80.0	37,222.0	8.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,16.4	28041.0	M,M	95.0	33,219.0	7.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,17.5	27611.0	-44.3	-80.3	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,18.0	27432.0	M,M	100.0	32,212.0	7.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,19.8	26796.0	-49.9	-83.9	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	4,20.0	26730.0	-49.9	-83.9	95.0	29,203.0	6.0	
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,22.7	25908.0	M,M	90.0	40,189.0	6.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,23.5	25670.0	-50.5	-84.5	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,23.7	25603.0	M,M	85.0	24,184.0	6.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,24.2	25480.0	-51.5	-84.5	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,24.6	25376.0	-54.1	-87.1	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,26.0	25022.0	-55.9	-87.9	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,28.7	24384.0	M,M	90.0	24,169.0	6.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	4,30.0	24110.0	-53.9	-86.9	90.0	23,166.0	6.0	
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,31.6	23774.0	M,M	95.0	21,163.0	6.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,33.1	23469.0	M,M	80.0	28,159.0	6.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,34.7	23164.0	M,M	65.0	20,156.0	6.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,35.4	23042.0	-54.3	-87.3	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,37.4	22692.0	-55.9	-87.9	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,38.2	22555.0	M,M	90.0	12,151.0	6.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,39.3	22377.0	-54.9	-86.9	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,40.1	22250.0	M,M	110.0	18,149.0	6.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,42.1	21945.0	M,M	85.0	22,147.0	7.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,44.1	21640.0	M,M	100.0	21,145.0	7.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,44.4	21602.0	-56.5	-88.5	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,46.3	21336.0	M,M	80.0	21,142.0	7.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,46.7	21282.0	-55.7	-87.7	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	4,50.0	20850.0	-57.3	-89.3	95.0	21,139.0	7.0	
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,51.8	20622.0	-58.3	-89.3	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,53.5	20421.0	M,M	95.0	30,136.0	8.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,54.7	20283.0	-61.7	-91.7	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,62.2	19493.0	-63.7	-93.7	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,63.8	19337.0	-62.7	-92.7	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,65.2	19202.0	M,M	75.0	25,127.0	9.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,68.6	18897.0	M,M	45.0	10,126.0	9.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	4,70.0	18770.0	-64.7	-94.7	50.0	7,125.0	9.0	
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,72.1	18592.0	M,M	80.0	6,125.0	9.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,74.0	18432.0	-67.1	-96.1	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	6,75.8	18288.0	M,M	70.0	11,124.0	9.0		
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,77.2	18177.0	-66.3	-95.3	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,84.7	17621.0	-69.1	-97.1	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	4,100.0	16630.0	-68.3	-94.3	320.0	12,118.0	9.0	
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,102.0	16509.0	-69.5	-94.5	M,M,M,M			
KJAN	2017-07-10	12:00:00	5,110.0	16059.0	-68.3	-91.3	M,M,M,M			

KJAN,2017-07-10 12:00:00,5,113.0,15899.0,-71.4,-92.4,M,M,M,M
KJAN,2017-07-10 12:00:00,5,119.0,15593.0,-70.4,-92.4,M,M,M,M
KJAN,2017-07-10 12:00:00,6,126.2,15240.0,M,M,305.0,13,116.0,8.0
KJAN,2017-07-10 12:00:00,5,137.0,14750.0,-66.1,-95.1,M,M,M,M
KJAN,2017-07-10 12:00:00,5,141.0,14576.0,-66.1,-95.1,M,M,M,M
KJAN,2017-07-10 12:00:00,4,150.0,14200.0,-64.1,-94.1,340.0,17,113.0,7.0
KJAN,2017-07-10 12:00:00,6,154.4,14020.0,M,M,320.0,15,113.0,7.0
KJAN,2017-07-10 12:00:00,5,165.0,13610.0,-61.9,-91.9,M,M,M,M
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Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: August 21, 2017

To: (b) (6) Acting Group Manager, Safety and Technical Training,
Litigation Support Group, AJI-17 (b) (6)

From: (b) (6) Manager, Quality Control Group, AJV-EI

Subject: **INFORMATION:** Certification Statement
Aircraft Accident, YANKY72
Itta Bena, MS, July 10, 2017

I certify that air traffic aircraft accident package, ZME-ARTCC-0277, has been reviewed and is complete.



Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: August 22, 2017

To: (b) (6) Director, Eastern Service Center

From: (b) (6), Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center

Subject: **INFORMATION:** Certification Statement
Aircraft Accident, YANKY72
Itta Bena, MS, July 10, 2017

I certify that air traffic aircraft accident package, ZME-ARTCC-0277, has been reviewed and is complete.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PACKAGE
ZME-ARTCC-0277
YANKY72, C130
July 10, 2017, 2100 UTC
Destroy: January 10, 2020 UTC

SECTION 1.
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SECTION 2.

FAA Form 8020-6, Report of Aircraft Accident, and
FAA Form(s) 8020-6-1, Report of Aircraft Accident (Continuation Sheet)

FAA Form 8020-6, Report of Aircraft Accident

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION		REPORT DATE August 22, 2017	REPORT NO. ZME-ARTCC-0277				
		NAME OF REPORTING FACILITY Memphis ARTCC (ZME)					
REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT							
1. AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION AND TYPE YANKY72, C130	2. DATE/TIME OF ACCIDENT (UTC) July 10, 2017, 2100 UTC	3. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT (MANDATORY) Itta Bena, MS					
		LATITUDE/LONGITUDE (OPTIONAL) Unknown					
4. NATURE OF ACCIDENT Aircraft crashed enroute.		5. TYPE OF FLIGHT IFR Flight Plan					
6. FLIGHT CREW	NAME	POSITION	ADDRESS (CITY AND STATE)	UNINJURED	INJURED	FATALITY	UNKNOWN
	Unknown Unknown	Pilot	Unknown, Unknown			X	
	Unknown Unknown	Co-Pilot	Unknown, Unknown			X	
7. PASSENGER DATA	NUMBER ABOARD AIRCRAFT 14	NUMBER UNINJURED 0	NUMBER INJURED 0	NUMBER FATALITIES 14			
8. AIRCRAFT DAMAGE Destroyed		9. PROPERTY DAMAGE Unknown					
10. OPERATING STATUS OF NAVIGATIONAL AIDS/LIGHTS/COMMUNICATIONS Normal							
11. WEATHER DATA (USE UTC DATE/TIME)	REPORT JUST PRIOR TO ACCIDENT GREENWOOD SPECI - 2053 UTC: automated, wind variable at three knots, visibility one zero statute miles, clear, temperature three three, dew point one nine, altimeter three zero zero zero						
	FIRST REPORT SUBSEQUENT TO ACCIDENT GREENWOOD METAR - 2153 UTC: automated, wind two nine zero at four knots, visibility one zero statute miles, clear, temperature three three, dew point two one, altimeter three zero zero zero						
12. ATO PERSONNEL INVOLVED	NAME	FACILITY	OPERATING POSITION		CHECK IF EYEWITNESS		
	(b) (6)	ZME ARTCC	R12 R				
		ZME ARTCC	R65-66 R				
		ZME ARTCC	R15-67 R				
		ZME ARTCC	R15-67 R				
		ZME ARTCC	D15-67 RA				
		ZME ARTCC	D15-67 RA				
*OPERATING INITIALS							
(b) (6)							



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
(Continuation Sheet)

REPORT DATE

August 17, 2017

REPORT NO.

ZME-ARTCC-0277

NAME OF REPORTING FACILITY

Washington ARTCC (ZDC)

14. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT

July 10, 2017

ALL TIMES BELOW ARE COORDINATED UNIVERSAL TIME
UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED

- 1813 YANKY72 was handed off from Cherry Point Approach Control (NKT) to Washington ARTCC (ZDC), New Bern Sector (EWN).
- 1814 NKT called EWN and advised that YANKY72 was requesting direct to FLO VORTAC. EWN approved the request.
- 1815 YANKY72 made initial contact with EWN climbing to FL200.
- 1816 YANKY72 requested deviation for weather. EWN approved the request.
- 1817 ZDC Sampson Sector (SAM) accepted handoff on YANKY72. YANKY72 was instructed to contact SAM on 135.3.
- 1818 YANKY72 made initial contact with SAM.
- 1823 YANKY72 requested to level off at 14,000 feet for weather. SAM approved the request.
- 1825 YANKY72 requested climb to FL200. SAM approved the request.
- 1831 YANKY72 requested FL180 as the final. SAM approved the request.
- 1836 Jacksonville ARTCC (ZJX) accepted the handoff on YANKY72. YANKY72 was instructed to contact ZJX on 133.45.

No More Follows



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
(Continuation Sheet)

REPORT DATE

July 13, 2017

REPORT NO.

ZME-ARTCC-0277

NAME OF REPORTING FACILITY

Jacksonville ARTCC (ZJX)

14. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT

July 10, 2017

ALL TIMES BELOW ARE COORDINATED UNIVERSAL TIME
UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED

- 1836 YANKY72 made initial contact with Jacksonville Center (ZJX) Florence (R71) sector and reported level at FL180. R71 instructed YANKY72 to squawk 3025. YANKY72 acknowledged and complied.
- 1837 R71 asked YANKY72 if he wanted routing to keep him clear of the precipitation ahead of him. YANKY72 said that he did.
- 1838 R71 cleared YANKY72 direct Vance direct Colliers with the rest of his route unchanged.
- 1844 R71 provided YANKY72 with traffic information.
- 1845 Washington Center requested control for climb for NKS412 reference YANKY72. The Florence radar-associate (D71) controller approved it.
- 1901 R71 instructed YANKY72 to contact ZJX on 124.7 MHz. YANKY72 acknowledged.
- 1902 YANKY72 made initial contact with ZJX Columbia (R72) sector and reported level FL180. R72 acknowledged.
- 1905 R72 provided YANKY72 with traffic information.
- 1907 YANKY72 advised that he had traffic in sight.
- 1909 R72 provided YANKY72 with precipitation information. YANKY72 acknowledged.
- 1915 R72 instructed YANKY72 to contact Atlanta Center on 128.1 MHz. YANKY72 acknowledged.

No More Follows



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
(Continuation Sheet)

REPORT DATE

July 14, 2017

REPORT NO.

ZME-ARTCC-0277

NAME OF REPORTING FACILITY

Atlanta ARTCC (ZTL)


14. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT

July 10, 2017

ALL TIMES BELOW ARE COORDINATED UNIVERSAL TIME
UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED

- 1915 YANKY72 checked on the ZTL Sinca Sector (R19) at FL180. R19 acknowledged.
- 1918 R19 instructed YANKY72 to change his transponder code. YANKY72 acknowledged.
- 1921 R19 switched YANKY72 to the ZTL East Departure Sector (R16). YANKY72 acknowledged. YANKY72 checked on the R16 frequency at FL180. R16 acknowledged.
- 1933 R16 issued traffic to YANKY72. YANKY72 acknowledged.
- 1934 YANKY72 reported the traffic in sight to R16. R16 acknowledged and issued additional traffic. YANKY72 acknowledged.
- 1935 YANKY72 reported the traffic in sight to R16. R16 acknowledged and issued additional traffic. YANKY72 acknowledged.
- 1936 YANKY72 reported the traffic in sight to R16. R16 acknowledged.
- 1941 R16 switched YANKY72 to the ZTL West Departure Sector (R04). YANKY72 acknowledged. YANKY72 checked on the R04 frequency at FL180. R04 acknowledged.
- 2005 R04 switched YANKY72 to the ZTL Maxwell Sector (R14). YANKY72 acknowledged. YANKY72 checked on the R14 frequency at FL180. R14 acknowledged.
- 2016 R14 switched YANKY72 to Columbus Approach. YANKY72 acknowledged.

No More Follows

 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT (Continuation Sheet)	REPORT DATE August 14, 2017	REPORT NO ZME-ARTCC-0277
	NAME OF REPORTING FACILITY Memphis ARTCC (ZME)	

14. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT

July 10, 2017

ALL TIMES BELOW ARE COORDINATED UNIVERSAL TIME
UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED

2033 YANKY72 checks on frequency with Memphis ARTCC (ZME) Columbus Low and Hamilton Low Altitude Radar Control Position (R12/13) at 18,000 feet requesting 20,000 feet. R12/13 asks if that is YANKY72 requesting 22,000 feet.

2034 YANKY72 responds affirmative. R12/13 responds roger, stand by. R12/13 calls Columbus Approach (CBM) requesting control of YANKY72. CBM releases YANKY72. R12/13 climbs YANKY72 to 22,000 feet. YANKY72 acknowledges.

2039 R12/13 calls traffic to YANKY72. YANKY72 acknowledges.

2040 YANKY72 requests 20,000 feet, R12/13 clears YANKY72 to 20,000 feet. YANKY72 acknowledges. R12/13 calls Kewanee Low and Jackson Low Altitude Radar Control Position (R65/66) to advise YANKY72 is stopping at 20,000 feet. R65/66 acknowledges. R12/13 switches YANKY72 to frequency 132.5. YANKY72 acknowledges.

2041 YANKY72 checks on R65/66 frequency at 20,000 feet. R65/66 acknowledges.

2046 R65/66 switches YANKY72 to frequency 135.87. YANKY72 acknowledges. YANKY72 checks on Helena Low and Greenville Low Altitude Radar Control Position (R15/67).

2047 R15/67 acknowledges.

2050 R15/67 calls YANKY72 three times. No acknowledgement.

2051 R15/67 calls YANKY72 on Guard Frequency. No acknowledgement. R15/67 calls YANKY72. No acknowledgement.

2053 R15/67 calls YANKY72. No acknowledgement.

2055 R15/67 calls YANKY72. No acknowledgement. Helena/Greenville Low Altitude Radar Associate Control Position (D15/67) calls Greenville Tower and asks if they establish communications with YANKY72 to advise. Greenville Tower acknowledges.

2056 R15/67 calls YANKY72. R15/67 asks BTQ485 if he sees smoke, BTQ485 acknowledges. R15/67 asks BTQ485 to deviate over towards the smoke. BTQ485 acknowledges. D15/67 calls Greenwood Tower asks if they establish communications with YANKY72 to advise. Greenwood Tower acknowledges.

2059 R15/67 asks BTQ485 if he sees anything at his 12 o'clock and 5 miles.

2100 BTQ485 says he sees a blackish smoke cloud in the center of a agricultural field.

2101 BTQ485 says there ia an aircraft circling the smoke. R15/67 says we are looking for a C130.

 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT (Continuation Sheet)	REPORT DATE August 14, 2017	REPORT NO ZME-ARTCC-0277
	NAME OF REPORTING FACILITY Memphis ARTCC (ZME)	

14. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT

2102 BTQ485 says aircraft circling is definitely not large enough to be a C130. R15/67 asks BTQ485 if he can make out what is burning. BTQ485 says it does not look like the field is burning, it looks like something hit there or was placed there then set on fire.

2103 BTQ485 asks R15/67 if wants him to make another pass. R15/67 says yes if you have enough time. BTQ485 acknowledges.

2107 BTQ485 says black smoke looks like fuel or rubber, 40 yards long and several cars are on the side of the road.

2113 D15/67 calls Fort Worth ARTCC and coordinates status of YANKY72. Fort Worth ARTCC acknowledges.

2114 R15/67 vectors ALLEY55 to assist with event. ALLEY55 acknowledges.

2115 R15/67 descends ALLEY55 to 5,000 feet. ALLEY 55 acknowledges. ALLEY55 sees black smoke. R15/67 clears ALLEY55 to deviate towards that smoke. ALLEY55 acknowledges.

2116 R15/67 asks ALLEY55 to verify what is causing the smoke.

2121 R15/67 switches ALLEY55 to R65/66.

2122 ALLEY55 checks on R65/66. R65/66 acknowledges.

2125 ALLEY55 says he sees smoke and something burning but cannot make out what it is.

2131 R15/67 records a relief briefing and says R15/67 lost radar and communication with YANKY72.

2136 PRIDE44 checks on R65/66 and says there is a lot of smoke south of Highway 82, but can't identify if it is an aircraft.

2137 R65/66 calls Greenwood Tower asking if they have communications with cropdusters to the west. R65/66 advises that a C130 may have crashed. Greenwood Tower advises an ag aircraft may have crashed.

2138 R65/66 asks Greenwood Tower to confirm it was an agriculture plane. Greenwood Tower replies i'll call you back.

2141 Greenwood Tower calls R65/66 and advises an ag pilot thinks it was a C130 that went down.

No More Follows

SECTION 3.
Review of Services Memo(s)



Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: July 17, 2017

To: Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6) Manager, Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center

Subject: **INFORMATION:** Review of Services Memo
Aircraft Accident, YANKY72
Itta Bena, MS, July 10, 2017

ZDC ARTCC conducted a review of services concerning YANKY72 and was determined to have routine services. As a supporting facility with routine services I certify the following data has been retained in accordance with FAA Order 8020.16. Additionally, I certify that the following originals/digital copies are on file in this office.

FAA Form 7230-4
FAA Form 7230-10
FAA Form 8020-6-1
Personnel Log(s)
Certified Original Copy(ies) of Voice Recording(s)
Certified Working Copy(ies) of Voice Recording(s)
Facility Layout Chart(s)
National Track Analysis Report
SAR and Adaptation Files
Weather Products

ZME-ARTCC-0277

YANKY72



Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: July 14, 2017

To: Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center

(b) (6)

Manager, Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control

From: Center

Subject: **INFORMATION:** Review of Services Memo
Aircraft Accident, YANKY72
Itta Bena, MS, July 10, 2017

ZJX ARTCC conducted a review of services concerning YANKY72 and was determined to have routine services. As a supporting facility with routine services I certify the following data has been retained in accordance with FAA Order 8020.16. Additionally, I certify that the following originals/digital copies are on file in this office.

FAA Form 8020-6-1

Certified Original Copy(ies) of Voice Recording(s)

Certified Working Copy(ies) of Voice Recording(s)

Email accident notification

ERAM SAR files



Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: July 14, 2017

To: Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center

From: (b) (6) Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center

Subject: **INFORMATION:** Review of Services Memo
Aircraft Accident, YANKY72
Itta Bena, MS, July 10, 2017

ZTL ARTCC conducted a review of services concerning YANKY72 and was determined to have routine services. As a supporting facility with routine services I certify the following data has been retained in accordance with FAA Order 8020.16. Additionally, I certify that the following originals/digital copies are on file in this office.

FAA Form 7230-4
FAA Form 7230-10
FAA Form 8020-6-1
Personnel Log(s)
Certified Original Copy(ies) of Voice Recording(s)
Certified Working Copy(ies) of Voice Recording(s)
Facility Layout Chart(s)
National Track Analysis Report
Surveillance Track History Report
Input Output Log Report
Weather Products



Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: August 14, 2017

To: Memphis Accident File ZME-ARTCC-0277

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6) Manager, Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center

Subject: **INFORMATION:** Review of Services Memo
Aircraft Accident, YANKY72
Itta Bena, MS, July 10, 2017

ZME ARTCC conducted a review of services concerning YANKY72 and was determined to have pertinent services. As the holding facility with pertinent services I certify the following data has been retained in accordance with FAA Order 8020.16. Additionally, I certify that the following originals/digital copies are on file in this office.

FAA Form 7230-4
FAA Form 7230-10
FAA Form 8020-6
FAA Form 8020-6-1
FAA Form 8020-9
FAA Form 8020-3
Personnel Log(s)
Certified Original Copy(ies) of Voice Recording(s)
Certified Working Copy(ies) of Voice Recording(s)
Facility Layout Chart(s)
Transcription(s) of Voice Recording(s)
National Track Analysis Report
Surveillance Track History Report
Input Output Log Report
Command Syntax Report
Mandatory Occurrence Report
ERAM Map Adaptation
Weather Products
ERAM SATORI Maps
SAR DATA
SATORI

ZME-ARTCC-0277

YANKY72

Review of Services Memo

ZME-ARTCC-0277
YANKY72

...

SECTION 4.

FAA Form(s) 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation

DAILY RECORD OF FACILITY OPERATION				PAGE NO Page 1 of 1
				DATE Jul 10, 2017
LOCATION	IDENTIFICATION	TYPE FACILITY	OPERATING POSITION	CHECKED (b) (6)
Memphis, TN	ZME	ARTCC	ZME Watch Desk	AIR TRAFFIC MANAGER Sarah M. Mcvay
UTC TIME	REMARKS			
0500	(b) (6) and (b) (6) on. WCLC, CPPL: NONE -- CK			
0630	NAS Certified. -- CK			
0727	Stuck flight plan report received and vetted. -- CK			
1035	(b) (6) on. WCLC -- DE			
1225	WX/TFC/EQUIP Briefing Complete. -- DE			
1404	Stuck flight plan report received and vetted. -- DE			
1845	(b) (6) on. WCLC. -- AA			
2011	WX/TFC/EQUIP Briefing Complete. -- AA			
2200	ZDC declared ATC ZERO due to environmental hazard. -- RP			
2211	Stuck flight plan report received and vetted. -- AA			
M 2307	ZME-M-2017/07/10-0001 -- AAL212R -- PU			
0157	ZDC ATC Limited. -- RP			
M 0204	ZME-M-2017/07/10-0003 -- YANKY72 -- AA			
M 0224	ZME-M-2017/07/10-0004 -- SNAP89 -- RP			
0239	Digital Audio Legal Recorder (DALR) Checks Complete. -- AA			
0300	(b) (6) and (b) (6) on. WCLC. -- BM			
M 0404	ZME-M-2017/07/10-0005 -- FDX1316 -- BM			
M 0437	ZME-M-2017/07/10-0006 -- ENY3340 -- WC			
0459	COB -- BM			
ELS				
I CERTIFY that entries above are correct, that all scheduled operations have been accomplished except as noted, and that all abnormal occurrences and conditions have been recorded.				

FAA Form 7230-4

Air Traffic Mandatory Occurrence Report

ZME-M-2017/07/10-0003

1. Reporting FAC ID			2. Date UTC (dd/mm/yyyy)							3. Time UTC				4. Significant Occurrence?													
Z	M	E	1	0	0	7	2	0	1	7	2	1	0	0	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No												
5. MOR reported by (select one): <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <input type="radio"/> Controller providing services <input type="radio"/> CIC <input type="radio"/> External Facility Referral </div> <div> <input type="radio"/> FLM <input type="radio"/> Aircraft Owner/Operator <input type="radio"/> Hotline (Describe in summary) </div> <div> <input type="radio"/> Internal Facility Review <input type="radio"/> Electronically Detected <input type="radio"/> Other (Describe in summary) </div> </div>																											
Brasher warning given? <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No Training in progress? <input checked="" type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No																											
EMERGENCY MORs																											
H1. MOR type $\frac{1}{2}$ in-flight emergency conditions involving (select one): <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <input type="radio"/> Medical emergency <input type="radio"/> Fuel quantity </div> <div> <input type="radio"/> Inflight equipment malfunction <input type="radio"/> Bird strike </div> <div> <input type="radio"/> Pilot Disorientation <input checked="" type="radio"/> Other (describe in summary) </div> <div> <input type="radio"/> VFR in/on top IFR conditions </div> </div>																											
H1a. Aircraft information: <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; margin-top: 5px;"> <tr> <td style="width: 15%;">Aircraft ID</td> <td style="width: 20%;">Aircraft type/suffix</td> <td style="width: 15%;">IFR/VFR:</td> <td style="width: 20%;">Facility communicating with A/C</td> <td style="width: 20%;">Position communicating with A/C</td> <td style="width: 10%;">Frequency</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">YANKY72</td> <td style="text-align: center;">C130/I</td> <td> <input type="radio"/> IFR <input checked="" type="radio"/> VFR </td> <td style="text-align: center;">ZME</td> <td style="text-align: center;">R15</td> <td style="text-align: center;">135.87</td> </tr> </table>																Aircraft ID	Aircraft type/suffix	IFR/VFR:	Facility communicating with A/C	Position communicating with A/C	Frequency	YANKY72	C130/I	<input type="radio"/> IFR <input checked="" type="radio"/> VFR	ZME	R15	135.87
Aircraft ID	Aircraft type/suffix	IFR/VFR:	Facility communicating with A/C	Position communicating with A/C	Frequency																						
YANKY72	C130/I	<input type="radio"/> IFR <input checked="" type="radio"/> VFR	ZME	R15	135.87																						
H1b. Malfunctioning equipment component: <small>Only complete for mechanical MORs</small>				H1c. Passenger or crew condition: <small>Only complete for medical MORs</small>				H1d. Medical assistance aboard: <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Unknown																			
H2. MOR type $\frac{1}{2}$ in-flight security conditions involving (select one): <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; margin-top: 5px;"> <input checked="" type="radio"/> Laser light illumination <input type="radio"/> Hijack <input type="radio"/> Bomb threat </div>																											
H2b. Nearest major city: <small>Only complete for laser light illuminations</small>				H2c. Altitude: 				H2d. Route information: <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; margin-top: 5px;"> <tr> <td style="width: 33%;">Departed</td> <td style="width: 33%;">Destination</td> <td style="width: 33%;">Diverted to</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">KNKT</td> <td style="text-align: center;">KNJK</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>				Departed	Destination	Diverted to	KNKT	KNJK											
Departed	Destination	Diverted to																									
KNKT	KNJK																										
H2e. Location (lat/long or fix/radial distance); 				H2f. Time DEN notified (UTC): <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; margin-top: 5px;"> <tr> <td style="width: 25%; height: 20px;"></td> <td style="width: 25%;"></td> <td style="width: 25%;"></td> <td style="width: 25%;"></td> </tr> </table>																							

Air Traffic Mandatory Occurrence Report

ZME-M-2017/07/10-0003

SUMMARY

J1. Summary ¶ 1/2 provide a brief summary for all MORs in this section that will provide enough information for QA to understand what occurred. Include information about items that require additional information in the specific MOR you are reporting.

AT 2050:13 R15 lost radio and radar contact with YANKY72 KNKT..KNJK. After attempting to contact the aircraft several times the FLM reported the event to the OMIC. OMIC issues ALNOT and aircraft start reporting smoke in the vicinity of the last radar position of YANKY72. Leflore county sheriff (b) contacted and confirms downed aircraft in that area. All information passed to ATM, ROC, DEN, RCC. NATCA. All other details of this event covered in SRT and dash 9.

Air Traffic Mandatory Occurrence Report

ZME-M-2017/07/10-0003

SEPARATION		
Was this a loss of separation?		
<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	Applicable Separation Rule: _____	
Separation Used: <div style="display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; padding: 5px;"> <div style="width: 25%;"><input type="radio"/> Course Divergence</div> <div style="width: 25%;"><input type="radio"/> MARSAS</div> <div style="width: 25%;"><input type="radio"/> Mode C Interlace</div> <div style="width: 25%;"><input type="radio"/> Opposite Course (Report Passing)</div> <div style="width: 25%;"><input type="radio"/> Other Facility</div> <div style="width: 25%;"><input type="radio"/> Procedure/Waiver</div> <div style="width: 25%;"><input type="radio"/> Report/Observe Leaving Altitude</div> <div style="width: 25%;"><input type="radio"/> Terminal Transition</div> <div style="width: 25%;"><input type="radio"/> Tower Visual Separation</div> <div style="width: 25%;"><input type="radio"/> VFR Aircraft</div> <div style="width: 25%;"><input type="radio"/> Visual Approach</div> <div style="width: 25%;"><input type="radio"/> Visual Separation</div> <div style="width: 25%;"><input type="radio"/> Other</div> </div>		
RISK ANALYSIS		
Was this a Risk Analysis Event?		
<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	RAE Score: _____	
PILOT DEVIATION		
Was this a possible pilot deviation?		
<input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No	Preliminary Number: _____	
SURFACE EVENT		
Was this a possible Surface Event?		
<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	Classification: _____	
VEHICLE/PEDESTRIAN DEVIATION		
Was this a possible Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviation?		
<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	Preliminary Number: _____	
NMAC		
Was this a NMAC?		
<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	NMAC Number: _____	

Air Traffic Mandatory Occurrence Report

ZME-M-2017/07/10-0003

QA SUMMARY

QA REVIEWED. NORMAL ATC SERVICE PROVIDED.

SECTION 5.
Personnel Log(s)

PERSONNEL LOG		REGION		FACILITY		AREA ID			DATE			
		ASO		ZME		AREA 6			MONTH: JUL	DAY: 10	YEAR: 2017	
NAME	CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	HOURS ON DUTY	HOURS ON LEAVE	LEAVE TYPE	HOURS NON POSITION DUTIES ASGNDE	HOURS POSITION DUTIES ASGNDE	REMARKS FOR: ALL ABSENCES FROM FACILITY, TRNG, TDY AND NON POSITIONAL DUTIES			
(b) (6)	R	06:00	14:00	08+00			00+33	04+21				
	R	06:00	14:00	08+00			00+41	04+47				
	R	06:00	14:00	08+00			01+05	05+30				
	R	06:00	14:00	08+00			00+52	03+55				
	R	06:30	14:30	08+00			01+42	04+39				
	R	06:30	14:30	08+00			01+36	04+01				
	R	06:30	14:30	16+00			01+07	04+55				
	54	22:30	06:30									
	R	06:30	14:30	08+00			01+43	05+12				
	R	06:47	14:47	08+00			00+59	04+04				
	R	06:51	14:51	08+00			01+16	05+14				
	R	07:00	15:00	08+00			08+00	00+00				
	R	07:00	15:00	08+00			08+00	00+00				
	R	08:50	18:50	10+00			01+20	06+20				
	9	13:15	13:45	08+30			02+08	06+20				
	R	13:45	21:45									
	R	13:20	21:20	08+00			00+49	05+37				
	R	13:20	21:20	08+00			00+50	04+34				
	R	13:23	21:23	08+00			01+04	03+46				
	R	13:30	21:30	08+00			01+06	04+28				
SUPERVISORY CERTIFICATE	NAME		CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	INTLS	NAME		CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	INTLS
THE SIGNATURES ABOVE CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE ENTRIES ARE CORRECT (Signatures and times in charge are noted on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation)												

PERSONNEL LOG		REGION		FACILITY		AREA ID			DATE		
		ASO		ZME		AREA 6			MONTH: JUL	DAY: 10	YEAR: 2017
NAME	CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	HOURS ON DUTY	HOURS ON LEAVE	LEAVE TYPE	HOURS NON POSITION DUTIES ASGNDE	HOURS POSITION DUTIES ASGNDE	REMARKS FOR: ALL ABSENCES FROM FACILITY, TRNG, TDY AND NON POSITIONAL DUTIES		
(b) (6)	R	14:05	22:05	08+00			00+49	04+10			
	R	14:20	22:20	08+00			00+30	04+27			
	R	14:20	22:20	08+00			00+41	05+20			
	R	14:20	22:20	08+00			01+37	04+25			
	R	14:20	22:20	08+00			01+26	05+52			
	R	22:05	06:05	08+00			00+08	04+05			
	R	22:05	06:05	08+00			00+09	07+51			
	R	22:05	06:05	08+00			00+08	03+49			
					08+00	Leave	00+00	00+00			
					08+00	Leave	00+00	00+00			
					08+00	Leave	00+00	00+00			
					08+00	Leave	00+00	00+00			
					08+00	Leave	00+00	00+00			
					08+00	Leave	00+00	00+00			
					08+00	Leave	00+00	00+00			
	SUPERVISORY CERTIFICATE		NAME	CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	INTLS	NAME	CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF
THE SIGNATURES ABOVE CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE ENTRIES ARE CORRECT (Signatures and times in charge are noted on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation)											

PERSONNEL LOG		REGION		FACILITY		AREA ID			DATE		
		ASO		ZME		AREA 6			MONTH: JUL	DAY: 10	YEAR: 2017
NAME	CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	HOURS ON DUTY	HOURS ON LEAVE	LEAVE TYPE	HOURS NON POSITION DUTIES ASGNDE	HOURS POSITION DUTIES ASGNDE	REMARKS FOR: ALL ABSENCES FROM FACILITY, TRNG, TDY AND NON POSITIONAL DUTIES		
(b) (6)					08+00	Leave	00+00	00+00			
	78	12:10	20:10	08+00			00+35	04+56			
	57	13:30	20:00	06+30			00+32	03+40			
SUPERVISORY CERTIFICATE	NAME	CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	INTLS	NAME	CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	INTLS	
THE SIGNATURES ABOVE CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE ENTRIES ARE CORRECT (Signatures and times in charge are noted on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation)											

PERSONNEL LOG		REGION		FACILITY		AREA ID			DATE				
		ASO		ZME		AREA 4			MONTH: JUL	DAY: 10	YEAR: 2017		
NAME	CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	HOURS ON DUTY	HOURS ON LEAVE	LEAVE TYPE	HOURS NON POSITION DUTIES ASGNDE	HOURS POSITION DUTIES ASGNDE	REMARKS FOR: ALL ABSENCES FROM FACILITY, TRNG, TDY AND NON POSITIONAL DUTIES				
(b) (6)	R	06:00	14:00	08+00			00+37	04+26					
	R	06:00	14:00	08+00			00+46	03+43					
	R	06:00	14:00	08+00			00+27	04+39					
	R	06:00	14:00	08+00			01+23	04+38					
	R	06:00	14:00	08+30			00+25	06+46					
	9	14:00	14:30										
	R	06:30	14:30	08+00			00+32	04+50					
	R	06:30	14:30	08+00			01+55	03+37					
	R	06:30	14:30	08+00			00+35	04+35					
	R	06:30	14:30	08+00			01+56	03+51					
	R	06:30	14:30	08+00			00+00	06+26					
	R	06:32	14:32	08+00			02+00	05+26					
	R	06:53	14:53	08+00			02+15	05+17					
	R	06:57	14:57	08+00			01+08	04+27					
	R	07:00	15:00	08+00			08+00	00+00					
	R	11:30	19:30	08+00			00+32	04+21					
	9	12:20	14:20	08+30	01+30	Leave	04+56	03+14					
	R	14:20	20:50										
	9	12:20	14:20	10+00			04+41	03+45					
	R	14:20	22:20										
	R	13:20	21:20	08+00			02+17	03+47					
	SUPERVISORY CERTIFICATE	NAME		CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	INTLS	NAME		CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	INTLS
THE SIGNATURES ABOVE CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE ENTRIES ARE CORRECT (Signatures and times in charge are noted on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation)													

PERSONNEL LOG		REGION		FACILITY		AREA ID			DATE		
		ASO		ZME		AREA 4			MONTH: JUL	DAY: 10	YEAR: 2017
NAME	CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	HOURS ON DUTY	HOURS ON LEAVE	LEAVE TYPE	HOURS NON POSITION DUTIES ASGNDE	HOURS POSITION DUTIES ASGNDE	REMARKS FOR: ALL ABSENCES FROM FACILITY, TRNG, TDY AND NON POSITIONAL DUTIES		
(b) (6)	R	13:20	21:20	08+00			05+00	02+34			
	R	13:20	20:50	07+30	00+30	Leave	03+47	02+16			
	R	13:20	21:20	08+00			01+38	05+01			
	R	13:20	21:20	08+00			00+39	04+42			
	R	13:45	21:45	08+00			00+59	02+26			
	R	14:20	22:20	08+00			00+39	04+45			
	R	14:20	22:20	08+00			04+42	02+24			
	R	14:20	22:20	08+00			00+48	04+42			
	R	14:35	21:30	06+55	01+05	Leave	00+35	03+45			
	R	22:05	06:05	08+00			00+13	04+40			
	R	22:05	06:05	08+00			00+16	05+26			
	R	22:05	06:05	08+00			00+07	05+42			
					08+00	Leave	00+00	00+00			
					08+00	Leave	00+00	00+00			
					08+00	Leave	00+00	00+00			
					08+00	Leave	00+00	00+00			
					08+00	Leave	00+00	00+00			
	50	14:20	22:20	08+00			00+47	03+58			
SUPERVISORY CERTIFICATE	NAME	CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	INTLS	NAME	CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	INTLS	
THE SIGNATURES ABOVE CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE ENTRIES ARE CORRECT (Signatures and times in charge are noted on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation)											

PERSONNEL LOG		REGION		FACILITY		AREA ID			DATE		
		ASO		ZME		AREA 4			MONTH: JUL	DAY: 10	YEAR: 2017
NAME	CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	HOURS ON DUTY	HOURS ON LEAVE	LEAVE TYPE	HOURS NON POSITION DUTIES ASGNDE	HOURS POSITION DUTIES ASGNDE	REMARKS FOR: ALL ABSENCES FROM FACILITY, TRNG, TDY AND NON POSITIONAL DUTIES		
(b) (6)											
	SUPERVISORY CERTIFICATE	NAME	CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	INTLS	NAME	CODE	TIME ON	TIME OFF	INTLS
THE SIGNATURES ABOVE CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE ENTRIES ARE CORRECT (Signatures and times in charge are noted on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation)											

SECTION 6.

FAA Form(s) 7230-10, Position Log, or automated equivalent

POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	R12	R	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500		1201		R14	R
1202	(b) (6)	1330	C		
1331		1512	C		
1513		1553	C		
1554		1727	C		
1728		1829	C		
1830		1919	C		
1920		2114	C		
2115		2158	C		
2159		2306	C		
2307		0007	C		
0008		0045	C		
0046		0113	C		
0114		0157	C		
CODE: C - ATCS/ATA S - Supervisor/Staff Spec T - Trainee/Developmental M - Trainee/Developmental Monitoring R - Trainee/Developmental Certification/ Evaluation					

FAA Form 7230-10 (6-94) NSN: 0052-00-024-6102 Electronic Version (OmniForm)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552

POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	R65	R	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500	(b) (6)	0808	C		
0809		0900	C		
0901		1059	C		
1100		1200	C		
1201		1232	C		
1233		1327	C		
1328		1447	C		
1448		1548	C		
1549		1631	C		
1632		1717	C		
1718		1749	C		
1750		1819	C		
1820		1919	C		
1920		2019	C		
CODE: C - ATCS/ATA S - Supervisor/Staff Spec T - Trainee/Developmental M - Trainee/Developmental Monitoring R - Trainee/Developmental Certification/ Evaluation					

FAA Form 7230-10 (6-94) NSN: 0052-00-024-6102 Electronic Version (OmniForm)

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552

POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	R15	R	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500		1216		R65	R
1217	(b) (6)	1424	T		
1217		1424	C		
1425		1458	C		
1459		1703	T		
1459		1703	C		
1704		1747	C		
1748		1851	T		
1748		1851	C		
1852		1919	C		
1920		1951	C		
1920		1951	T		
1952		2025	C		
2026		2133	C		
CODE: C - ATCS/ATA S - Supervisor/Staff Spec T - Trainee/Developmental M - Trainee/Developmental Monitoring R - Trainee/Developmental Certification/ Evaluation					

FAA Form 7230-10 (6-94) NSN: 0052-00-024-6102 Electronic Version (OmniForm)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552

[illegible]

FAA Form 7230-10 (6-94) NSN: 0052-00-024-6102 Electronic Version (OmniForm)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552

POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	D15	RA	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500		1830		R15	R
1831	(b) (6)	1851	C		
1831		1851	T		
1852		1919		R15	R
1920		1938	C		
1920		1938	T		
1939		2010		R15	R
2011		2134	C		
2011		2134	T		
2135		0136		R15	R
0137		0209		D65	RA
0210		0459		R15	R

CODE:

C - ATCS/ATA	M - Trainee/Developmental Monitoring
S - Supervisor/Staff Spec	R - Trainee/Developmental Certification/ Evaluation
T - Trainee/Developmental	

FAA Form 7230-10 (6-94) NSN: 0052-00-024-6102 Electronic Version (OmniForm)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552

POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	6OSIC	O	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500		1059		Closed	
1100	(b) (6)	1153	S		
1154		1300	C		
1301		1424	S		
1425		1454	C		
1455		1721	S		
1722		1759	C		
1800		1844	S		
1845		1948	S		
1950		2041	C		
2042		2045	C		
2046		0121	S		
0122		0204	C		
0205		0244	S		
CODE: C - ATCS/ATA S - Supervisor/Staff Spec T - Trainee/Developmental M - Trainee/Developmental Monitoring R - Trainee/Developmental Certification/ Evaluation					

FAA Form 7230-10 (6-94) NSN: 0052-00-024-6102 Electronic Version (OmniForm)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552

FAA Form 7230-10 (6-94) NSN: 0052-00-024-6102 Electronic Version (OmniForm)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552

[illegible]

FAA Form 7230-10 (6-94) NSN: 0052-00-024-6102 Electronic Version (OmniForm)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552

[illegible]

ZME-ARTCC-0277
YANKY72

[illegible]

FAA Form 7230-10 (6-94) NSN: 0052-00-024-6102 Electronic Version (OmniForm)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552

FAA Form 7230-10 (6-94) NSN: 0052-00-024-6102 Electronic Version (OmniForm)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552

POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	D30	RA	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500		1259		R30	R
1300		1308		D31	RA
1309		0103		R30	R
0104		0123		D31	RA
0124		0459		R30	R

CODE:
C - ATCS/ATA M - Trainee/Developmental Monitoring
S - Supervisor/Staff Spec R - Trainee/Developmental Certification/
T - Trainee/Developmental Evaluation

FAA Form 7230-10 (8-94) NSN: 0052-00-024-6102 Electronic Version (OmniForm)

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POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	D42	RA	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500		1802		R42	R
1803		1814		D14	RA
1815		1920		R42	R
1921		2044		D14	RA
2045		2125		R42	R
2126		2234		D14	RA
2235		0459		R42	R

CODE:

C - ATCS/ATA

S - Supervisor/Staff Spec

T - Trainee/Developmental

M - Trainee/Developmental Monitoring

R - Trainee/Developmental Certification/
Evaluation

FAA Form 7230-10 (8-94) NSN: 0052-00-024-6102 Electronic Version (OmniForm)

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[illegible]

ZME-ARTCC-0277
YANKY72

[illegible]

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POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	R14	R	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500	(b) (6)	0559	C		
0600		1059	C		
1100		1129	C		
1130		1131	C		
1132		1154	T		
1132		1154	C		
1155		1256	R		
1155		1256	C		
1257		1257		60SIC	O
1258		1308	C		
1309		1350	C		
1351		1547	C		
1548		1628	C		
1629		1807	C		
CODE: C - ATCS/ATA S - Supervisor/Staff Spec T - Trainee/Developmental M - Trainee/Developmental Monitoring R - Trainee/Developmental Certification/ Evaluation					

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POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	R14	R	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
1808	(b) (6)	1907	C		
1908		1931	C		
1932		2005	C		
2006		2045	C		
2046		2204	C		
2205		2259	C		
2300		2342	C		
2343		0026	C		
0027		0040	C		
0041		0459		R12	R

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T - Trainee/Developmental	

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POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	R31	R	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500	(b) (6)	0841	C		
0842		0845	C		
0846		1059	C		
1100		1207	C		
1208		1234	C		
1235		1349	C		
1350		1446	C		
1447		1622	C		
1623		1713	C		
1714		1823	C		
1824		1919	C		
1920		1946	C		
1947		2123	C		
2124		2230	C		
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POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	R32	R	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500		1104		R31	R
1105	(b) (6)	1131	C		
1132		1335	C		
1336		1435	C		
1436		1551	C		
1552		1647	C		
1648		1819	C		
1820		1938	C		
1939		2025	C		
2026		2126	C		
2127		2231	C		
2232		2343	C		
2344		0033	C		
0034		0126	C		

CODE:

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T - Trainee/Developmental	Evaluation

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POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	D43	RA	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500		0740		D46	RA
0741		1304		R43	R
1305	(b) (6)	1329	C		
1330		1439		R43	R
1440		1445	C		
1446		1720		R43	R
1721		1854	C		
1855		1919		R43	R
1920		1935	C		
1936		2015		R43	R
2016		2018	C		
2019		2205		R43	R
2206		2235	C		
2236		0134		R43	R
CODE: C - ATCS/ATA S - Supervisor/Staff Spec T - Trainee/Developmental M - Trainee/Developmental Monitoring R - Trainee/Developmental Certification/ Evaluation					

FAA Form 7230-10 (6-94) NSN: 0052-00-024-6102 Electronic Version (OmniForm)

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POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	D46	RA	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500	(b) (6)	1205		R46	R
1206		1318	C		
1206		1318	T		
1319		1354		R46	R
1355		1514	C		
1355		1514	T		
1515		1644		R46	R
1645		1807	C		
1645		1807	T		
1808		1819		R46	R
1820		1828	C		
1829		1859	C		
1829		1859	T		
1900		0459		R46	R

CODE:

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S - Supervisor/Staff Spec	R - Trainee/Developmental Certification/
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POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER		(3) POS	(4) DATE	
ZME	D67		RA	07/10/2017	
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500		1830		R67	R
1831		1851		D15	RA
1852		1919		R67	R
1920		1938		D15	RA
1939		2010		R67	R
2011		2134		D15	RA
2135		0136		R67	R
0137		0209		D65	RA
0210		0459		R67	R

CODE:

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T - Trainee/Developmental

M - Trainee/Developmental Monitoring

R - Trainee/Developmental Certification/
Evaluation

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[illegible]

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POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	R43	R	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500		1100		R46	R
1101	(b) (6)	1129	C		
1130		1203	C		
1204		1246	C		
1247		1341	C		
1342		1459	C		
1500		1535	C		
1536		1624	C		
1625		1719	C		
1720		1745	C		
1746		1821	C		
1822		1826	C		
1827		1937	C		
1827		1937	T		
CODE: C - ATCS/ATA S - Supervisor/Staff Spec T - Trainee/Developmental M - Trainee/Developmental Monitoring R - Trainee/Developmental Certification/ Evaluation					

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POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	R43	R	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
1938	(b) (6)	2018	C		
2019		2103	C		
2019		2103	T		
2104		2144	C		
2145		2204	C		
2145		2204	T		
2205		2243	C		
2244		2334	C		
2335		0026	C		
0027		0105	C		
0106		0136	C		
0137		0220	C		
0221		0307	C		
0308		0459		R46	R

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POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	R45	R	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500		1227		R46	R
1228	(b) (6)	1236	C		
1237		1329	C		
1330		1404	C		
1405		1528	C		
1529		1625	C		
1626		1700	C		
1701		1741	C		
1742		1752	C		
1753		1807	C		
1808		1827		R46	R
1828		1921	C		
1922		2027	C		
2028		2055	C		
CODE: C - ATCS/ATA S - Supervisor/Staff Spec T - Trainee/Developmental M - Trainee/Developmental Monitoring R - Trainee/Developmental Certification/ Evaluation					

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POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	R46	R	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
0500	(b) (6)	0659	C		
0700		1059	C		
1100		1103	C		
1104		1129	C		
1130		1133	C		
1134		1142	C		
1143		1205	C		
1206		1311	C		
1312		1405	C		
1406		1514	C		
1515		1612	C		
1613		1635	C		
1636		1808	C		
1809		1824	C		
CODE: C - ATCS/ATA S - Supervisor/Staff Spec T - Trainee/Developmental M - Trainee/Developmental Monitoring R - Trainee/Developmental Certification/ Evaluation					

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POSITION LOG					
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(3) POS	(4) DATE		
ZME	R46	R	07/10/2017		
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	WHERE COMBINED	
				(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER	(10) POSITION TYPE
1825	(b) (6)	1937	C		
1938		2021	C		
2022		2050	C		
2051		2144	C		
2145		2235	C		
2236		2316	C		
2317		2348	C		
2349		0030	C		
0031		0130	C		
0131		0217	C		
0218		0304	C		
0305		0316	C		
0317		0459	C		

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T - Trainee/Developmental	Evaluation

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

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SECTION 7.
Facility Layout Chart(s)



ZME-ARTCC-0277
YANKY72

SECTION 8.
Transcription of Voice Recording(s)



Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: August 14, 2017

To: Aircraft Accident File ZME-ARTCC-0277

From: Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center

Subject: **INFORMATION:** Partial Transcript
Aircraft Accident, YANKY72
Itta Bena, MS, July 10, 2017

This transcription covers the Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) R15-67 R position for the time period from July 10, 2017, 2016 UTC, to July 10, 2017, 2153 UTC.

Agencies Making Transmissions

YANKY72
Memphis ARTCC Helena Low Altitude
Radar Control Position
BTQ485
ALLEY55

Abbreviations

YANKY72
R15
BTQ485
ALLEY55

I certify that the following is a true transcription of the recorded
craft Accident involving YANKY72.

(b) (6)

Support Specialist
ZME

2016
(2017-2045)

2046

2046:56 YANKY72 memphis center yanky seven two on thirty five eight seven
2047

2047:01 R15 yanky seven two memphis center roger

2048

2049

2050

2050:12 R15 yanky seven two memphis center

2050:36 R15 yanky seven two memphis center

2050:51 2051	R15	yanky seven two memphis center how do you hear
2051:07	R15	yanky seven two memphis center on guard yanky seven two memphis center on guard contact memphis center one three five point eight seven
2051:48 2052 2053	R15	yanky seven two memphis center how do you hear
2053:13	R15	yanky seven two memphis center how do you hear
2053:19 2054 2055	R15	yanky seven two memphis center
2055:18 2056	R15	yanky seven two memphis center
2056:05	R15	yanky seven two memphis center how do you hear
2056:13	R15	boutique four eighty five memphis
2056:15	BTQ485	boutique four eighty five go ahead
2056:17	R15	do you see anything out at your ah two o'clock one to two o'clock in about one six miles at ah i don't know smoke or anything out that way
2056:30	BTQ485	yeah we do actually we got some ah blackish smoke rising bout that that direction
2056:47	R15	boutique uh four eighty five can you deviate over that way
2056:51	BTQ485	affirmative we can ah do you want us to go down
2056:54	R15	boutique four eighty five ah just ah if you don't mind just maintain ah eight thousand i guess and fly heading of one zero zero and let me know if you see anything out that way
2057:06	BTQ485	okay eight thousand and one zero zero on the heading we will go over there and check it out boutique four eighty

five

2058
2059
2059:56 R15 boutique four eighty five are you seeing anything at your
twelve o'clock in about ah five---six miles

2100

2100:01 BTQ485 yes it's definitely a smoke cloud blackish color ah from
here it looks like it's out directly center of a uh
agricultural field

2101

2101:10 R15 boutique four eighty five go ahead

2101:12 BTQ485 yeah there is a aircraft circling ah the plume of smoke at
this time down there

2101:24 R15 boutique four eighty five roger

2101:35 R15 boutique four eighty five can you make out the type of
aircraft

2101:38 BTQ485 the one that's flying around

2101:40 R15 affirmative

2101:41 BTQ485 ah alright one second

2101:44 R15 boutique four eighty five we're looking for a c one thirty
2102

2102:28 BTQ485 center boutique four eighty five

2102:31 R15 boutique four eighty five go ahead

2102:33 BTQ485 yeah ah the aircraft that are flying around it are
definitely not as large as a c one thirty so i'd say
negative on that

2102:42 R15 boutique four eighty five roger can you make out what
what's burning

2102:49 BTQ485 ah negative it doesn't it does not look like it's the field itself that's burning it does look like it's uh something that was either hit there or placed there and then set on fire so i don't want to say for sure

2103:11 BTQ485 do you need us to do another pass

2103:23 R15 boutique four eighty five if you have time we could ah we could use the help but ah do you want like a lower altitude or

2103:32 BTQ485 yeah we need we'll we go down to six thousand we got time for one more pass boutique four eighty five

2103:39 R15 boutique four eighty five descend and maintain six thousand

2103:42 BTQ485 six thousand boutique four eighty five

2103:45 BTQ485 and are we cleared for a turn around here

2103:47 R15 boutique four eighty five you are cleared to make a right three sixty

2103:52 BTQ485 boutique four eighty five thanks
2104
(2105-2106)
2107

2107:41 BTQ485 center boutique four eighty five

2107:42 R15 boutique four eighty five go ahead

2107:45 BTQ485 yeah ah it's very dark black smoke like ah fuel or rubber ah i would say it's probably forty yards long black ah smoke coming from the fire ah there'e quite a few cars on the road next to it right now ah piling up there

2108:09 R15 boutique four eighty five roger thanks for your help

ZME-ARTCC-0277
YANKY72

Page 5 of 6

2108:12 BTQ485 you're welcome we're going to head direct nashville at
this time boutique four eighty five

2108:16 R15 boutique four eighty five cleared to the nashville airport
via direct climb and maintain flight level two three zero

2108:21 BTQ485 climb and maintain two three zero and ah direct nashville
boutique four eighty five

2108:25 R15 boutique four eighty five thanks for your help

2108:27 BTQ485 you're welcome
2109
(2110-2113)
2114

2114:20 R15 alley five five memphis center

2114:23 ALLEY55 go for alley five five

2114:25 R15 alley five five uh i was wondering if you can check
something out for me it is at your zero four five
(unintelligible) zero four five heading (unintelligible)
black smoke

2114:37 ALLEY55 zero four five alley five five

2114:47 R15 alley five five do you have the can you accept a lower
altitude

2114:52 ALLEY55 affirm alley five five

2114:58 R15 alley five five descend and maintain five thousand
2115

2115:01 ALLEY55 five thousand alley five five

2115:33 ALLEY55 center alley five five

2115:35 R15 alley five five go ahead

Page 6 of 6

2115:37 ALLEY55 yeah there looks like we see some black smoke off our nose---we could drive in further uh to make sure

2115:50 R15 alley five five you are cleared to deviate towards that smoke maintain five thousand

2115:55 ALLEY55 deviate toward the smoke maintain five thousand alley five five

2116:00 R15 alley five five uh and if you can verify what is causing the smoke we were talking to a c one thirty in that area and we were just checking to make sure it is not that aircraft

2116:09 ALLEY55 alley five five affirm heading that way
2117
(2118-2119)
2120

2120:58 ALLEY55 center alley five five uh we like to request three thousand if able

2121:04 R15 alley five five descend and maintain four thousand

2121:08 ALLEY55 alley five five four thousand

2121:10 R15 alley five five descend and maintain three thousand one hundred

2121:14 ALLEY55 alley five five three thousand one hundred

2121:56 R15 alley five five contact memphis center one three two point five

2122:00 ALLEY55 one three two point five alley five five
2122
(2123-2152)
2153

End of Transcript



Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: August 14, 2017

To: Aircraft Accident File ZME-ARTCC-0277

From: Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center

Subject: **INFORMATION:** Partial Transcript
Aircraft Accident, YANKY72
Itta Bena, MS, July 10, 2017

This transcription covers the Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) D15-67 RA position for the time period from July 10, 2017, 2016 UTC, to July 10, 2017, 2153 UTC.

Agencies Making Transmissions	Abbreviations
YANKY72	YANKY72
Memphis ARTCC Helena Low Altitude Radar Control Position	R15
Memphis ARTCC Helena Low Altitude Radar Associate Position	D15
Greenville Tower	GLH TWR
Greenwood Tower	GWO TWR
BTQ485	BTQ485
Fort Worth ARTCC Monroe Low	ZFW
ALLEY55	ALLEY55

I certify that the following is a true transcription of the recorded conversations pertaining to the subject Aircraft Accident involving YANKY72.

(b) (6)

Support Specialist
ZME

2016
(2017-2045)

2046
2046:56 YANKY72 memphis center yanky seven two on thirty five eight seven
2047

2047:01 R15 yanky seven two memphis center roger
2048
2049

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2050

2050:12 R15 yanky seven two memphis center

2050:36 R15 yanky seven two memphis center

2050:51 R15 yanky seven two memphis center how do you hear
2051

2051:07 R15 yanky seven two memphis center on guard yanky seven two
memphis center on guard contact memphis center one three
five point eight seven

2051:48 R15 yanky seven two memphis center how do you hear
2052

2053
2053:13 R15 yanky seven two memphis center how do you hear

2053:19 R15 yanky seven two memphis center
2054

2055
2055:18 R15 yanky seven two memphis center

2055:22 D15 greenville greenville eighty one

2055:25 GLH TWR greenville

2055:26 D15 hey if you hear anything from a yanky seven two can you
please let us know

2055:31 GLH TWR yanky seven two

2055:32 D15 he's a c one thirty that we lost out east of you and we
thinking he may ah tryin land somewhere we don't know if
something went wrong or not

2055:39 GLH TWR okay and ah how far east was he

2055:41 D15 ah about thirty miles

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YANKY72

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2055:42 GLH TWR oh okay

2055:43 D15 alright (unintelligible)

2055:44 GLH TWR thanks whiskey fox
2056

2056:05 R15 yanky seven two memphis center how do you hear

2056:10 D15 tower eighty eight

2056:18 GWO TWR go ahead

2056:19 D15 yeah let us know if you talk to a yanky seven two it's a c
one thirty we lost up at twenty thousand feet west of ya
about twenty miles we don't know what's going on he may
try and land somewhere

2056:29 GWO TWR alright

2056:30 D15 alright thanks

2056:32 BTQ485 ah blackish smoke raising bout that that direction

2056:47 R15 boutique uh four eighty five can you deviate over that way

2056:51 BTQ485 affirmative we can ah do you want us to go down

2056:54 R15 boutique four eighty five ah just ah if you don't mind
just maintain ah eight thousand i guess and fly heading
of one zero zero and let me know

2058
2059
2059:56 R15 boutique four eighty five are you seeing anything at your
twelve o'clock in about ah five---six miles
2100

2100:01 BTQ485 yes it's definitely a smoke cloud blackish color ah from
here it looks like it's out directly center of a uh
agricultural field
2101

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YANKY72

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2101:10 R15 boutique four eighty five go ahead

2101:12 BTQ485 yeah there is a aircraft circling ah the plume of smoke at this time down there

2101:24 R15 boutique four eighty five roger

2101:35 R15 boutique four eighty five can you make out the type of aircraft

2101:38 BTQ485 the one that's flying around

2101:40 R15 affirmative

2101:41 BTQ485 ah alright one second

2101:44 R15 boutique four eighty five we're looking for a c one thirty
2102

2102:28 BTQ485 center boutique four eighty five

2102:31 R15 boutique four eighty five go ahead

2102:33 BTQ485 yeah ah the aircraft that are flying around it are definitely not as large as a c one thirty so i'd say negative on that

2102:42 R15 boutique four eighty five roger can you make out what what's uh burning

2102:49 BTQ485 ah negative it doesn't it does not look like it's the field itself that's burning it does look like it's uh something that was either hit there or placed there and then set on fire so i don't want to say for sure

2103:11 BTQ485 do you need us to do another pass

2103:23 R15 boutique four eighty five if you have time we could ah we

could use the help but ah do you want like a lower altitude or

2103:32 BTQ485 yeah we need we'll we go down to six thousand we got time for one more pass boutique four eighty five

2103:39 R15 boutique four eighty five descend and maintain six thousand

2103:42 BTQ485 six thousand boutique four eighty five

2103:45 BTQ485 and are we cleared for a turn around here

2103:47 R15 boutique four eighty five you are cleared to make a right three sixty

2103:52 BTQ485 boutique four eighty five thanks

2104

(2105-2106)

2107

2107:41 BTQ485 center boutique four eighty five

2107:42 R15 boutique four eighty five go ahead

2107:45 BTQ485 yeah ah it's very dark black smoke like ah fuel or rubber ah i would say it's probably forty yards long black ah smoke coming from the fire ah there'e quite a few cars on the road next to it right now ah piling up there

2108:09 R15 boutique four eighty five roger thanks for your help

2108:12 BTQ485 you're welcome we're going to head direct nashville at this time boutique four eighty five

2108:16 R15 boutique four eighty five cleared to the nashville airport via direct climb and maintain flight level two three zero

2108:21 BTQ485 climb and maintain two three zero and ah direct nashville

boutique four eighty five

2108:25 R15 boutique four eighty five thanks for your help

2108:27 BTQ485 you're welcome

2109

(2110-2112)

2113

2113:09 D15 monroe forty eight

2113:13 ZFW monroe

2113:14 D15 yeah you got strips on yanky seven two

2113:19 ZFW i do

2113:19 D15 alright

2113:20 ZFW actually yeah i do

2113:21 D15 alright he he may come over to you we don't know we lost him west of greenwood and there's a big fire on the ground so he might have crashed we don't really know what happened but we didn't want to violate your airspace if he is still flying he we don't know what happened we lost radio and radar

2113:36 ZFW okay

2113:36 D15 so we'll let you know

2113:38 ZFW alright

2113:38 D15 alright

2113:39 ZFW (unintelligible)
2114

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YANKY72

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2114:20 R15 alley five five memphis center

2114:23 ALLEY55 go for alley five five

2114:25 R15 alley five five uh i was wondering if you can check something out for me it is at your zero four five it would be a zero four five heading and see if you can fly in that direction to see if you see any black smoke

2114:37 ALLEY55 zero four five alley five five
2115

2115:33 ALLEY55 center alley five five

2115:35 R15 alley five five go ahead

2115:37 ALLEY55 yeah there looks like we see some black smoke off our nose---we could drive in further uh to make sure

2115:50 R15 alley five five you are cleared to deviate towards that smoke maintain five thousand

2115:55 ALLEY55 deviate toward the smoke maintain five thousand alley five five

2116:00 R15 alley five five uh and if you can verify what is causing the smoke we were talking to a c one thirty in that area and we were just checking to make sure it is not that aircraft

2116:09 ALLEY55 alley five five affirm heading that way
2117
(2118-2119)
2120

2120:58 ALLEY55 center alley five five uh we like to request three thousand if able

2121:04 R15 alley five five descend and maintain four thousand

2121:08 ALLEY55 alley five five four thousand

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YANKY72

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2121:10 R15 alley five five descend and maintain three thousand one hundred

2121:56 R15 alley five five contact memphis center one three two point five

2122:00 ALLEY55 one three two point five alley five five
2122
(2123-2152)
2153

End of Transcript

SECTION 9.

FAA Form(s) 8020-3, Facility Accident/Incident Notification Record



Aircraft Identification	YANKY72
Date	3/10/17
Airport	GWO

[illegible]

SECTION 10.
Weather Products

Memphis ARTCC

Weather Products 7/10/2017 UTC

SPECI KGWO 102053Z AUTO VRB03KT 10SM CLR 33/19 A3000 RMK AO2 SLP158 T03280194
56015

METAR KGWO 102153Z AUTO 29004KT 10SM CLR 33/21 A3000 RMK AO2 SLP156 T03330211

I certify the attached copy of the METARs originated from the APG-link to
archived weather is an accurate copy of the original.

(b) (6)

Support Specialist
ZME

ZME-ARTCC-0277
YANKY72

122

Convective SIGMETs

760
WSUS32 KNCI 101955
SIGC
-MKCC WST 101955
CONVECTIVE SIGMET 52C
VALID UNTIL 2155Z
MS LA TX AND LA CSTL WTRS
FROM 20NE AEX-10SSW HRV-70W LEV-50NNW LCH-20NE AEX
AREA TS MOV FROM 18015KT. TOPS ABV FL450.

Center Weather Advisories

FAUS21 KZME 102023
ZME1 CWA 102020
ZME CWA 101 VALID UNTIL 102100
FROM 45S MHZ-40S MEI
AREA SHRA/TS...10 NM WIDE...MOVG FM 19010KT. MAX TOPS FL310.
MOD PCPN LIKELY.

AIRMETs

WAUS43 KNCI 101534 AAA
-CHIT WA 101534 AMD
AIRMET TANGO UPDT 3 FOR TURB VALID UNTIL 102100

AIRMET TURB...MO IL IN KY TN
FROM CVG TO HNN TO HMV TO 20S VXV TO 20E BNA TO 50WSW BWG TO
40NNE DYC TO 20ESE FAM TO 50W PXV TO 60S AXC TO CVG
MOD TURB BTN FL280 AND FL400. CONDS CONTG BYD 21Z ENDG 21-00Z.

WAUS43 KNCI 102045
-CHIT WA 102045
AIRMET TANGO UPDT 4 FOR TURB AND LLWS VALID UNTIL 110300

AIRMET TURB...IN KY TN
FROM CVG TO HNN TO HMV TO 20SSW VXV TO BNA TO 40SW IJU TO CVG
MOD TURB BTN FL280 AND FL400. CONDS ENDG 21-00Z.

WAUS44 KNCI 101445
-DEWT WA 101445
AIRMET TANGO UPDT 2 FOR TURB VALID UNTIL 102100

AIRMET TURB...TN MO IL IN KY
FROM CVG TO HNN TO HMV TO 20S VXV TO 20E BNA TO 50WSW BWG TO
40NNE DYC TO 20ESE FAM TO 50W PXV TO 60S AXC TO CVG
MOD TURB BTN FL280 AND FL400. CONDS CONTG BYD 21Z ENDG 21-00Z.

WAUS44 KPCI 102045
-DFWT WA 102045
AIRMET TANGO UPDT 3 FOR TURB VALID UNTIL 110300

AIRMET TURB...TN IN KY
FROM CVG TO HNN TO HMV TO 20SSW VXV TO BNA TO 40SW IIU TO CVG
MOD TURB BTN FL280 AND FL400. CONDS ENDG 21-00Z.

Text FAs

KY
W...SCT-BKN CI. 01Z SCT CI. OTLK..VFR.
CNTRL...SCT060 BKN CI. 00Z SCT CI. OTLK...VFR.
E...SCT-BKN070 TOP 090. 03Z SCT CI. OTLK...VFR 09Z MVFR BR.

AR
SKC OR SCT050-060. 00Z SKC. OTLK...VFR 10Z MVFR BR SWRN PTNS.

TN
W...SKC. OTLK..VFR.
CNTRL-E...SKC OR SCT CI. OTLK...VFR.

MS
N HLF...SKC OR SCT CI. OTLK...VFR.
S HLF...SCT035. TIL 01Z ISOL -TSRA SRN PTNS. CB TOP FL430.
OTLK...VFR.

Weather Impact Graphic issued by CWSU ZME at 18Z



Memphis TRACON Forecast issued by CWSU ZME at 12Z



SECTION 11.

Other

UTC (Zulu) Time Conversion Chart

UTC (Zulu)	PST/ ALDT	PDT/ MST	MDT/ CST	CDT/ EST	EDT/ AST	ALST	HST
0000*	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	1500	1400
0100	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	1600	1500
0200	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200	1700	1600
0300	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	1800	1700
0400	2000	2100	2200	2300	0000*	1900	1800
0500	2100	2200	2300	0000*	0100	2000	1900
0600	2200	2300	0000*	0100	0200	2100	2000
0700	2300	0000*	0100	0200	0300	2200	2100
0800	0000*	0100	0200	0300	0400	2300	2200
0900	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0000*	2300
1000	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	0100	0000*
1100	0300	0400	0500	0600	0700	0200	0100
1200	0400	0500	0600	0700	0800	0300	0200
1300	0500	0600	0700	0800	0900	0400	0300
1400	0600	0700	0800	0900	1000	0500	0400
1500	0700	0800	0900	1000	1100	0600	0500
1600	0800	0900	1000	1100	1200	0700	0600
1700	0900	1000	1100	1200	1300	0800	0700
1800	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400	0900	0800
1900	1100	1200	1300	1400	1500	1000	0900
2000	1200	1300	1400	1500	1600	1100	1000
2100	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1200	1100
2200	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1300	1200
2300	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	1400	1300
2400	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	1500	1400


The time *0000 and 2400 are interchangeable. The time 2400 is associated with the date of the day ending, and 0000 with the day just starting.

UTC = Coordinated Universal Time, or Zulu
PST = Pacific Standard Time (UTC - 8 hours)
ALDT = Alaskan Daylight Time (UTC - 8 hours)
PDT = Pacific Daylight Time (UTC - 7 hours)
MST = Mountain Standard Time (UTC - 7 hours)
MDT = Mountain Daylight Time (UTC - 6 hours)
CST = Central Standard Time (UTC - 6 hours)
CDT = Central Daylight Time (UTC - 5 hours)
EST = Eastern Standard Time (UTC - 5 hours)
EDT = Eastern Daylight Time (UTC - 4 hours)
AST = Atlantic Standard Time (UTC - 4 hours)
ALST = Alaskan Standard Time (UTC - 9 hours)
HST = Hawaiian Standard Time (UTC - 10 hours)

ZME-ARTCC-0277

YANKY72

84TH RADAR EVALUATION SQUADRON (RADES) ANALYSIS (SCOA) SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL INFORMATION (STINFO)



FORENSIC DATA ANALYSIS

- REQUESTOR: USAF HAF AFSEC

- 84 RADES/SCOA

Ph: Comm (801) 777-6052 , DSN 777-6052

DATE OF REPORT: 14 Jul 2017

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


10 JUL 17 KC-130 (CLASS A MISHAP)

INCLUDES:

- ENTIRE RECORDED FLIGHT PATH OF KC-130


(ALL DATA POINTS PROVIDED IN FILENAME "10JUN17_KC-130CLASSA_MS.CSV")



10 JUL 17 KC-130 (CLASS A MISHAP)

INCLUDES:


- RECORDED FLIGHT PATH OF KC-130 – NORTH CAROLINA PORTION
(ALL DATA POINTS PROVIDED IN FILENAME "10JUN17_KC-130CLASSA_MS.CSV")



10 JUL 17 KC-130 (CLASS A MISHAP)

INCLUDES:

- RECORDED FLIGHT PATH OF KC-130 – SOUTH CAROLINA PORTION
(ALL DATA POINTS PROVIDED IN FILENAME "10JUN17_KC-130CLASSA_MS.CSV")




10 JUL 17 KC-130 (CLASS A MISHAP)

INCLUDES:

- RECORDED FLIGHT PATH OF KC-130 – GEORGIA PORTION

(ALL DATA POINTS PROVIDED IN FILENAME “10JUN17_KC-130CLASSA_MS.CSV”)




10 JUL 17 KC-130 (CLASS A MISHAP)

INCLUDES:

- RECORDED FLIGHT PATH OF KC-130 – ALABAMA PORTION

(ALL DATA POINTS PROVIDED IN FILENAME "10JUN17_KC-130CLASSA_MS.CSV")






10 JUL 17 KC-130 (CLASS A MISHAP)

INCLUDES:


- RECORDED FLIGHT PATH OF KC-130 – MISSISSIPPI PORTION

(ALL DATA POINTS PROVIDED IN FILENAME "10JUN17_KC-130CLASSA_MS.CSV")



INCLUDES:

- RADAR SITE DATA FROM: 5086_AEX / 5591_QNM / 5097_QPC / 5166_QRB / 5423_QYB
- LAST 2 MIN 3 SEC (APPROXIMATE) OF KC-130 FLIGHT DATA
- SEARCH ONLY HITS DEPICTING POTENTIAL DEBRIS FIELD



10 JUL 17 KC-130 (CLASS A MISHAP)

INCLUDES:

- EMBEDDED MP4 VIDEO OF APPROX LAST 2 MIN FLIGHT PATH OF KC-130 AT 20X SPEED
 - * DOUBLE-CLICK ON PICTURE TO OPEN AND PLAY VIDEO



Last 2 min at 20 x speed.mp4



10 JUL 17 KC-130 (CLASS A MISHAP)

INCLUDES:

- RADAR SITE DATA FROM: 5086_AEX / 5591_QNM / 5097_QPC / 5166_QRB / 5423_QYB
- SEARCH ONLY HITS DEPICTING POTENTIAL DEBRIS FIELD



10 JUL 17 KC-130 (CLASS A MISHAP)

INCLUDES:

- EMBEDDED MP4 VIDEO OF SURROUNDING AIRSPACE DURING KC-130 INCIDENT AT 20X SPEED
 - * DOUBLE-CLICK ON PICTURE TO OPEN AND PLAY VIDEO



Surrounding area last 2 min at 20x speed.mp4

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Materials Engineering Report



Materials Engineering Division (AIR-4.3.4)
In-Service Support Center
Fleet Readiness Center East, Cherry Point, North Carolina

Report Number: CP6811083MER1

Date Submitted: July 2017

Analyst: (b) (6)

Submitted By: (b) (6)

Analyst's Phone #: (b) (6)

Submitter's Phone #: (b) (6)

Reference ID:

Submitter's Organization: 4.3.1

Analysis/Service Requested: Document the wreckage observations pertaining to the Center Fuselage Structure and the right outboard section of the Horizontal Stabilizer of Class A mishap aircraft 165000.

1. Background Information:

On July 10, 2017 KC-130T aircraft BuNo 165000 experienced an in-flight breakup at approximately 20,000 foot altitude resulting in loss of the aircraft and crew. Per the request of the Naval Safety Center, the C-130 Fleet Support Team arrived on-site in Greenwood, Mississippi July 12, 2017, to provide assistance for the aircraft recovery, reconstruction, and mishap investigation. Materials engineering support was requested for the reconstructive effort and arrived on July 19, 2017. The aircraft debris field was geographically split into two locations; the North site and the South site. The North site consisted of aircraft structure and components forward of Fuselage Station (FS) 477, the Right Hand (RH) outer section of the horizontal stabilizer, RH elevator, propeller assemblies (Propeller) and Reduction Gearboxes (RGB) from engines #2 and #3, and multiple individual propeller blades and airfoil fragments. The debris field was essentially a straight line from East to West with the quantity of parts and components increasing in the Westerly direction. The South site (referred to as the Main Wreckage Site in this report) contained the remaining structure and components of the fuselage aft of FS 477, Left Hand (LH) wing, RH wing, center wing, cargo ramp, cargo door, vertical stabilizer, rudder, center and LH outer section of horizontal stabilizer, LH elevator, main landing gear, all four engines, and the Propellers and RGBs from engines #1 and #4. The aircraft structure located at the main wreckage site was recovered however it is not documented in this report since the structure remained in-tact until ground impact and a large portion was consumed by fire. The Propellers, RGBs, and engines were recovered for investigation and the findings are recorded in separate reports.

Prepared By:	Date Completed: 11/3/2017	Approved By:	Date Approved: 11/3/2017
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Distribution:

Reproduction of this report, except in full, must receive prior written approval from the Materials Engineering Division.

NAVAIR Cherry Point Materials Engineering Report CP6819585MER1 documents the failure analysis performed on Blade 4 from Propeller #2. This blade liberated in flight as a consequence of fatigue cracking that initiated from intergranular cracking at the root end of the blade. Wreckage reconstruction revealed that the center fuselage incurred damage on both sides of the aircraft that was attributed to intrusion from two different propeller assemblies, one site occurred from the liberated blade and one from Propeller Assembly #3 that departed the right wing. This report documents the material observations specific to the center fuselage section spanning FS 245 thru FS 477, the RH outer section of the horizontal stabilizer, and the control cables for the engine throttles, propeller condition, aileron, elevator, and rudder.

2. Analysis of Reconstruction:

Large and small pieces of the fuselage forward of the center wing structure were recovered from the North site. The center fuselage section between FS 245 and FS 477 was recovered as one floor panel, two fairly intact side panels, four large upper section pieces and numerous smaller pieces of side and upper structure. The flight station forward of FS 165 was mostly consumed by ground fire. The forward fuselage section from FS 165 thru FS 245 was recovered in multiple pieces but was not included in the reconstruction effort of the center fuselage due to the mangled condition of the parts.

The left and right sides of the center fuselage showed damage from the intrusion of two separate propeller blades. Damage on the left side occurred at FS 377 coincident with the propeller arc plane. The damage was consistent with a liberated blade (identified as Blade 4 of Propeller #2) impacting in a near vertical orientation with the tip cutting through the side skin approximately 36" below the upper Left Buttock Line (LBL) 61 longeron and the root end of the blade impacting approximately 19" above LBL 61. Intrusion resulted in overload failure of the LBL 61 longeron on both sides of the point of impact at FS 377. The interior of the fuselage right side panel showed damage that was attributed to the liberated blade passing through the occupiable space of the fuselage and attempting to exit the structure. This damage occurred near Water Line (WL) 200 between ring segments at FS 383.67 and FS 397. Exit of the blade through the right side panel appeared to have been prevented by a robust stanchion bracket from a troop seatback support beam stowage assembly. The airfoil of Blade 4 from Propeller #2 exhibited damage consistent with the reconstructed attitude of blade entry into the left side of the fuselage.

The right side fuselage structure incurred significantly greater damage as a consequence of intrusion of Propeller Assembly #3, which departed the right wing due to overload failure of the propeller RGB case. The intruding blade of this propeller assembly entered approximately 33" below the upper Right Buttock Line (RBL) 61 longeron. The intrusion caused overload failure of the RBL 61 longeron to each side of blade impact and continued upward to exit approximately 10" below RBL 20 longeron. Embedding of Propeller #3 in the upper section pushed the upper structure aft resulting in an accordion-like buckling failure of RBL 20 longeron. As a consequence of the outward buckling of the upper panel and loss of both longerons RBL 61 and RBL 20, a large upper section panel from the propeller strike at FS 350 aft to FS 477 appeared to have immediately liberated. The propeller strike may have also promoted liberation of a side panel section below RBL 61 longeron and aft to the wheel well fairing.

The fuselage section forward of the intrusion damage collapsed as a unit toward the left resulting in both side panels to tear away from the floor panel. The behavior of the side panels to separate in tandem suggests that the upper section was attached, at least in part, during collapse of the fuselage section forward of the intrusion damage. Entrapment of the intruding blade from the left against the right side panel also indicates that the center fuselage structure was relatively intact prior to blade

impact from the left side of the aircraft and that fuselage collapse followed after the attempted exit of the blade through the right side panel and the additional propeller impact from the right. Although consumed by ground fire, distortion of the primary structure aft of the blade intrusion area indicates that the center wing structure was sufficiently intact to resist liberation of the upper and side structures as a consequence of the intrusion damage. The forward fuselage section separated from the FS 245 bulkhead by tearing away in tension along the upper rivet pattern and shearing either the bulkhead attachment fasteners or failing the chine angle, bending away to the right with respect to the center section. Although not reconstructed in detail due to investigative time constraints, there was sufficient evidence to indicate that the forward fuselage structure was at least relatively intact when it separated from the center fuselage section because the structure on the left and right sides behaved in tandem. There was no evidence of in-flight fire damage within the center section of the fuselage nor was there evidence of stray ammunition discharge.

The RH outer section of the horizontal stabilizer and RH elevator liberated as a consequence of impact from Propeller #3. One blade from the propeller impacted with sufficient force to cut through the leading edge, front beam assembly and middle interior stringer at Horizontal Stabilizer Station (HSS) 130. The adjacent blade impacted the leading edge at HSS 180 but did not reach the front beam assembly. Separation of the RH outer section of the horizontal stabilizer occurred coincident with the HSS 130 impact. The RH elevator was considered to be securely attached prior to separation of the RH outer section of the horizontal stabilizer and separated as a consequence of the horizontal stabilizer damage.

3. Center Fuselage Section FS 245 – FS 477:

Description of Construction:

The forward fuselage section consists of the skin and structure forward of FS 245. The center fuselage section consists of structure between FS 245 and FS 737 less the center wing structure between FS 517 and FS 597. The all-metal structure is composed of bulkheads, rings, longerons, truss members and intercostals and other supporting members. Schematics of center fuselage structure, annotated with the terminology used in this report and simplified for clarity, are provided in Figures 1 and 2.

The barrel-shape center fuselage construct has side panels that attach to an upper section along the upper Buttock Line (BL) 61 (there are upper and lower longerons at BL 61 for each side of the fuselage, references to BL 61 longeron for this discussion speak to the upper longeron). The upper section basic construct has a center panel attached to upper side panels along LBL 20 and RBL 20 longerons. BL 61 and BL 20 longerons are longitudinal stiffeners with a basic I-beam cross-section and attaches to the upper skin by means of a dual rivet pattern along the upper leg and to the side skin by a dual rivet pattern along the lower leg. The side and upper sections are reinforced vertically by ring segments (alternatively called rings or segments) spaced at regular intervals (3 per 20" span). The ring segments are a T-shape modified with an additional stiffening leg at the interior end of the ring segment. The ring segments are riveted to the skin along the aft leg of the 'T' and stiffened by an L-bracket. At 20" intervals, each ring is stiffened and riveted on both the forward and aft legs of the T-form. Also at each major 20" interval, the upper and side ring segments are tied across the longeron by a strap. The two intermediate rings between each major segment are truncated in length short of reaching the BL 61 longeron attachment and do not strap the side rings across to upper rings. An example of the construction at the union between the side and upper section is shown in Figure 3 for clarification.




Figure 1: Center Fuselage Upper Section FS 245 – FS 477





Figure 2: Center Fuselage Side Section FS 245 – FS 477



Primary ring segments that strap across to upper rings



Intermediate ring segments that stop short of BL 61 longeron

Figure 3: View of RH side panel near BL 61 showing interior configuration as it attaches to the upper panel

Recovered Wreckage, Center Fuselage Section:

The center fuselage structure evaluated in detail for this investigation is shown in Figures 4-6 and as reconstructed in Figures 7-9.

The left side was recovered as one largely intact panel from floor to upper LBL 61 longeron, extending in length from FS 245 to FS 390 (to include the crew escape hatch). The right side was recovered as a largely intact panel extending in length from FS 245 to FS 390 (to include the crew escape hatch), with two additional pieces aft to FS 437 and small skin pieces liberated from the vicinity of FS 363.67 to FS 390.33. The floor panel piece extended from FS 245 to FS 457.

The upper section was recovered as four large panels and numerous smaller pieces that were liberated from the two areas of intrusion. The forward-most large upper panel was intact from FS 245 to FS 330.33 with exception that a triangular piece containing the mast antenna was liberated from the left upper section. The adjacent upper panel was fairly intact between FS 330.33 and FS 383.67 and continued forward with a partial panel section on the left side to FS 297. The third panel of upper section was divided into two main sections, left and right split along RBL 20 longeron. The left section extended from FS 390 to FS 477 and the right section (comprised of two pieces) extended from FS 363.67 to FS 437 and FS 403.67 to FS 477. Additional smaller pieces of upper section comprised the region between FS 330 to FS 383.67 on the right side and FS 377 to FS 390 on the left. One region was unaccounted for between FS 383.67 and FS 397 extending from the fuselage center line to the RBL 20 longeron.

Propellers #2 (left-wing, inboard) and #3 (right-wing, inboard) were recovered from the North site. Two diametrically opposed blades separated from Propeller #2; Blade 4 as a consequence of fatigue cracking at the root end and Blade 2 by overload. All blades remained attached to Propeller #3 until ground impact, when Blade 3 failed at the root via overload. The basic blade condition for the two liberated propeller assemblies is as follows:

Prop 1		Prop 2		Prop 3		Prop 4	
Blade 1	Ground impact fail; tip not recovered	Blade 1	Intact	Blade 1	Intact	Blade 1	Ground impact fail
Blade 2	Ground impact fail	Blade 2	Depart in flight Fatigue	Blade 2	Intact	Blade 2	Intact
Blade 3	Intact	Blade 3	Ground impact fail	Blade 3	Ground impact fail	Blade 3	Intact
Blade 4	Ground impact fail	Blade 4	Depart in flight Overload	Blade 4	Intact	Blade 4	Ground impact fail



Figure 4: Center Fuselage Side Section Panels



Figure 5: Center Fuselage Upper Section Forward of Center Wing Box



Figure 6: Center Fuselage Floor Section Forward of Center Wing Box

Left side



Right side



Figure 7: Center Fuselage Side Structure, FS 245 – FS 477




Figure 8: Center Fuselage Side and Upper Section, FS 245 – FS 477



Figure 9: Center Fuselage Upper Section, FS 245 – FS 477

Left Center Fuselage Blade Intrusion Damage:

Structural damage attributed to intrusion by Blade 4 from Propeller #2 occurred in a near vertical plane at FS 377 coincident with the propeller arc plane. The hole in the side fuselage was bounded at the lower edge near WL 222 (approximately 36" below LBL 61 longeron) and at the upper edge approximately 19" above LBL 61 longeron. The width of the intrusion was bounded between FS 377 and FS 397 (Figures 10-11). The fuselage side panel was crushed inward above and below LBL 61 longeron. Red paint transfer on the exterior skin surface at the lower bounds of the intrusion damage was attributed to the red paint stripe at the tip of the liberated Blade 4 from Propeller #2, which showed corresponding abrasive scars at the tip of the airfoil. A 14" long section of LBL 61 longeron liberated from the side structure between FS 370 to FS 384. The middle of the longeron section was slightly bowed in the upward direction, had impact damage spanning 1.5" in the middle of the lower cap and failed by overload 7" to each side of the impact damage. Failure of the upper LBL 61 longeron was attributed to impact from the trailing edge of the blade, which had a triangular piece of similar geometry missing from the edge of the airfoil. Figure 12 shows a closer view of the left side fuselage damage at the blade impact site and views of the liberated piece of longeron shown next to trailing edge foil damage on Blade 4 from Propeller #2. The lower photo shows re-alignment of a mock full-scale blade oriented with the blade tip at the lower boundary of the intrusion damage. The triangular piece missing from the trailing edge of the blade foil aligns precisely with the impact on the LBL 61 longeron at FS 377. Distortion of the longeron indicates that the local fuselage structure was sufficiently intact to offer resistance to failure of the longeron upon impact from the blade.

The upper fuselage section damage above LBL 61 longeron, between FS 377 and FS 397, was bounded approximately 19" above LBL 61 longeron and fragmented into multiple pieces with each piece showing abrasion and inward crushing from an object intruding into the structure. Much of the outer skin surrounding the damage had black material transfer that appeared rubber-like in nature. The structure was sliced inward along the edge of FS 377 ring segment and forced inward, tearing out a small panel piece approximately 17" in length between FS 377 and FS 390. A 17" long piece of skin (ice shield) also tore away in tension from FS 377 forward to FS 363 as the structure was forced inward. Skin panels to each side and immediately above the intrusion were rolled outward pulling away from rivets along the ring segments.



FS 377 – FS 392,
19" above LBL 61 longeron

FS 377 – FS 392,
36" below LBL 61 longeron

Figure 10: Center Fuselage Upper Section, FS 245 – FS 477



Figure 11: Blade 4 of Propeller #3 Impact Site on LH side of Center Fuselage



Impact to LBL 61 longeron at FS 377




Figure 12: Reconstruction of Blade 4 of Propeller #2 to LH Side Panel

Evidence of Blade 4, Propeller #2, transiting through the center fuselage occupiable space and impacting the fuselage right side structure was found near WL 200, between FS 383.67 and FS 397 ring segments. The damage of interest is annotated in Figure 13 showing an interior and exterior view of the right side structure. The skin between FS 383.67 and FS 390.33 ring segments was dented outward and heavily scored over a 10" distance at approximately WL 200. FS 383.67, FS 390.44 and FS 397 ring segments were crushed downward against the skin and FS 390 ring segment was split lengthwise between WL 180 and WL 220. The two intercostals attached to FS 397 ring segment were flattened against the wall and all three ring segments were heavily abraded and had black material transferred to the contact area. The center fuselage right side skin separated along FS 390.33 just behind the strike location. As shown in a closer view in the lower left photo of Figure 13, the skin separated by tearing along the rivet pattern with fastener tear-out directly aft at each dome nut fastener.

The lack of bulk structural distortion at the WL 200 impact site suggests the liberated blade was prevented from passing completely through the side structure. The stanchion bracket for a troop seatback support beam stowage assembly (P/N 3326704) mounted between FS 377 and FS 397 ring segments was bent into a cup-shape that closely conformed to the root end contours of the liberated blade and showed black material transfer near the forward upper edge. The heavy aluminum bracket in Figure 14 shows the damage attributed to impact from Blade 4, Propeller #2. A parachute stowage support structure mounted in the same area (matched to tubes attached to side panel) also showed buckling damage and one parachute cover had black material transferred across the fabric cover (Figure 15). (No laboratory chemical comparison was performed on the black material transfer due to the obvious physical conformity between the blade and bracket damage).




Figure 13: Center Fuselage Section Right Side

Impact damage from Blade 4 of Propeller #2
impacting RH side panel near WL 200 between
FS 377 – FS 397



Liberated Blade 4, Propeller #2



Figure 14: Troop Seatback Support Beam
Stowage Bracket, P/N 3326704



Figure 15: Parachute Stowage Support Structure and Cover

Showing crush damage and black material transfer likely from contact with the butt end of Blade 4 from Propeller 2

Right Center Fuselage Blade Intrusion Damage:

The right side and upper sections of the center fuselage showed intrusion damage oriented at a diagonal across the upper side of the aircraft (Figures 16-20). The lower boundary of the hole was near FS 383.67, approximately 33" below RBL 61 longeron; the upper boundary was approximately 20" below RBL 20 longeron near FS 350. The side panel was crushed inward and red paint (attributed to the tip strip on a blade) was transferred to the exterior skin near the lower bounds of the hole (Figure 18). The side skin was sliced upward to RBL 61 longeron producing a saw-tooth edge along the slice with the tooth direction rolled inward and pointing upward (Figure 19). The RBL 61 longeron twisted upwards and split lengthwise from FS 363.67 forward to FS 317 as the blade transited through the structure and failed in overload between FS 363.67 and FS 370.33 ring segments. The side skin below RBL 61 longeron, between FS 370 and FS 390, was forced inward and crushed aft and tore along the rivet pattern of FS 390 ring segment upward to RBL 61 longeron. The upper section tore along the rivet pattern of FS 330.33 ring segment, between RBL 61 longeron and RBL 20 longeron, and liberated two pieces of upper section in front of the impact. The upper panel behind the impact was crushed aft by Propeller #3 and caused RBL 20 longeron to fail in overload, in an accordion-like manner at alternating ring segments from FS 350.33 to FS 383.67.

Failure of RBL 61 and RBL 20 longerons and accordion-like buckling aft of the impact site, prompted liberation of upper section from FS 363.67 aft to FS 477 and bounded by RBL 61 and RBL 20 longerons. This section lifted upward and rolled outward, bending to the right along the upper leg of RBL 61 longeron, evidenced by creasing of the upper skin following the edge of RBL 61 longeron between FS 370 and FS 450. The upper section separated by shear overload of the dual rivet pattern along the RBL 20 longeron upper leg between FS 403.67 and FS 437.00. The RBL 20 longeron failed via torsional bending overload upward and to the right at FS 437. The side skin separated from this panel by tensile pull-out along the RBL 61 longeron lower leg. RBL 61 longeron failed in torsional overload near FS 450 allowing the panel to depart upward and to the right. As shown in Figure 20, the aft end of this upper panel section was buckled diagonally from FS 423 at RBL 61 longeron to FS 437 at RBL 20 longeron and the RBL 61 lower longeron was deflected outward and up at the aft point of fracture at FS 450. Severe distortion of the structure surrounding the impact site indicates that the right side and upper fuselage section was structurally rigid at the time of propeller intrusion and the structure offered resistance to liberation of large panel pieces aft of the strike.

The fuselage side section panel aft of the strike bulged outward from FS 390 to FS 430 and the side skin split along FS 390 in tension from RBL 61 longeron downward to the wheel well fairing. This section of side panel tore away from the fuselage in the aft and right direction as evidenced by the diagonal buckling crease angled upward and aft from the wheel well fairing to RBL 61 longeron near FS 447. It was not determined when this panel departed other than it separated after or in concert with liberation of the adjacent upper panel between FS 363.67 and FS 477.



Figure 16: Right Center Fuselage Section, FS 245 – FS 477




Figure 17: Overhead view of Right Side Center Fuselage Section
Damage attributed to Intrusion of the liberated #3 Propeller



Figure 18: Right Side Impact Damage




Figure 19: Lower Boundary of Propeller Intrusion



Figure 20: Closer view of Fuselage Center Section Upper Surface STA 330-477

Disassociation of Center and Forward Fuselage Structure:

Analysis of the Observations: The manner of disassociation of the center fuselage structure and the forward fuselage structure was determined by visually examining the attachments along the side panel to upper section and the side panel to the floor. The cumulative damage suggests that the center fuselage between FS 245 and FS 477 collapsed to the left with respect to the floor, behaving as a fairly rigid barrel-structure. Side panel separation from the floor and fragmentation of the remaining upper section likely occurred in concert as the structure collapsed to the left. The forward fuselage section forward of FS 200 was largely consumed by ground fire. Structure between FS 200 and FS 245 was recovered in multiple, heavily mangled pieces from the North site. Due to the condition, this structure was not evaluated in detail during reconstruction of the center fuselage wreckage. The fuselage structure forward of FS 245 separated from the bulkhead and frame assembly by tensile tearing across the top frame attachment and departing away from the floor bulkhead toward the right.

Findings/Observations: As described previously, it appeared that a large panel of upper section between FS 363.67 and FS 437 departed up and to the right as an immediate consequence of the intrusion from Propeller #3. Aft of the propeller intrusion on the right side of the fuselage, the side skin split from RBL 61 upper longeron to the floor panel. The skin separated through the rivet pattern of FS 390.33 ring segment in nearly pure tension, as demonstrated by dome nut/screw tear out in the aft direction at every fifth fastener. The split in the side panel occurred immediately aft of both sites of major structural damage caused by attempted exit of the liberated blade from Propeller #2 and the intrusion damage caused by Propeller #3. The side structure aft of the split was deflected outward above the main landing gear wheel well causing a diagonal crease angled upward and aft to the RBL 61 longeron (Figure 21). It was not definitive if this skin split was a consequence of the Propeller #2 blade impact, intrusion of the Propeller #3 or final disassociation of the center fuselage section.



Figure 21: Right Center Fuselage Section

The RBL 61 upper longeron bent in the upward direction and failed in overload through the entire cross section at the propeller impact site near FS 367. The body of the longeron was torn away from the side panel from FS 367 forward to FS 317 where it fractured again through the cross section via torsional overload. The lower leg of the longeron along this section remained with the side panel. The right side panel forward of the propeller strike was relatively intact to FS 245. The crease formed along the upper edge of RBL 61 longeron aft of FS 363.67 (Figure 22), attributed to the aft panel departing up and toward the right, was not present on the section forward of the strike indicating that the forward upper section remained attached immediately after the propeller strike. Separation of the upper panel from the side panel between FS 245 and FS 317 occurred by shear along the dual rivet pattern in the RBL 61 longeron upper leg. Separation of the ring segment tying across the longeron between upper and side panels forward of FS 317 failed in tension.



Figure 22: Right Center Fuselage Section

On the left side of the fuselage forward of the strike damage, the separation behavior of the upper section from the side panel was fairly similar to that observed on the right. Separation occurred mainly by shear failure of the dual rivet pattern along the RBL 61 and LBL 61 longeron upper legs. Failure of the joint tying the upper ring segments to side ring segments showed increased tensile bending beyond that observed on the right side, evidence of the upper section collapsing onto the left side along the LBL 61 longeron. At FS 257, the upper skin tore along the ring segment from LBL 61 to the upper forward corner of the mast antenna brace support block spanning fore-aft on the interior of the upper structure. The skin tear continued diagonally upward to LBL 20 near FS 277, aft along the lower edge of the longeron to FS 297 and then downward to LBL 61, liberating a triangular piece containing the mast antenna. The antenna brace was slightly twisted to the left within the structure at the forward end, further evidence of the structure collapsing toward the left as a relative unit.

FS 297, 303.33, and 310.33 ring segments were broken approximately 7" to the left of LBL 20 from what appeared to be an object transiting from aft to forward, inside to outside splitting the upper section lengthwise just below LBL 20 longeron. This upper side structure between FS 290 and FS 330, which was attached to the upper panel piece extending aft to FS 377, was peeled outward bending about FS 343.67 (Figure 23). The upper skin pulled through the rivet pattern away from the FS 297-FS 310.33 ring segments below the lengthwise split and was locally bent over to the left.

Aft of the intrusion damage from the liberated blade of Propeller #2, the LH fuselage side panel separated from the upper section by fracture of the LBL 61 longeron lower leg, with the longeron remaining attached to the upper panel aft to FS 477. This panel showed minimal distortion with exception of skin peeling upward at FS 390 in the immediate vicinity of the blade intrusion.

Red paint was found transferred to the edges of multiple ring segments on the right upper section interior between FS 397 and FS 417. The paint was analyzed by FTIR (Fourier-transform Infrared Spectroscopy) to be alkyd-based, dissimilar in chemistry to the epoxy-based red paint collected from multiple places on Blade 4 from Propeller #2. The alkyd-based paint transfer was also dissimilar in chemistry to the polyvinylchloride sticker attached to the airfoil surface of Blade 4. The paint transfer on the upper section interior was likely sourced from spray paint used to mark wreckage recovered in the field that possibly transferred to the upper section during transit to the hanger.


The control cables for the engine throttles, propeller condition, aileron, elevator, and rudder were recovered severed into a variety of lengths either by failure during the break-up or during wreckage recovery and relocation to the hanger site. The cable sections were generally not identifiable as to function nor were total lengths for each cable verified. All cable sections were examined at 50x stereoscopic magnification during the hanger reconstruction effort for evidence of propeller blade contact. If evidence of contact was present it was not discerned on any length of recovered cable.

←Forward



Figure 23: Left Upper Section

Evidence of how the side panels separated from the floor panel was gathered from examination of the floor structure. The basic construct of the floor panel to side attachment is shown in Figure 24. A chine assembly forms the side closure of the floor structure along each side and a bulkhead assembly provides rigidity to the front of the panel at FS 245. The fuselage side structure attaches to the floor by bolting to floor fittings at each of the primary ring segments (FS 257, FS 277, FS 297, etc.). The fuselage side skin attaches along the length of the floor panel by a dual rivet pattern to the chine outboard leg, with the chine overlapping the side skin. The belly skin attaches by a double rivet pattern along the chine inboard leg, again with the chine overlapping the belly skin.



The center fuselage floor panel from FS 245 to FS 457 (Figure 25) was recovered from the North site. The forward end of the panel was relatively intact; the FS 245 bulkhead was secure as an assembly and showed minimal distortion (Figure 26). The center-to-forward fuselage attachment at the FS 245 bulkhead separated by stripping of the attach bolt threads at the right side and overload failure of the chine assembly across the production splice joint on the left. The chine assembly was bent approximately 20 degrees to the right. The attachment bolt at the right side was similarly bent to the right basically mirroring the deflection of the left chine fracture. The barrel nut was properly oriented within in the left chine assembly with the barrel seated to the aft side of the housing as required. There was no evidence of rubbing or rivet working at either bulkhead attachment. The similarity in distortion at the left and right sides of the floor panel attachment between the center and forward fuselage suggests that the lower fuselage structure immediately forward of FS 245 acted as a fairly rigid structure as it separated to the right away from the FS 245 bulkhead. The cockpit structure forward of FS 200 was essentially consumed in ground fire. Multiple pieces of heavily mangled fuselage structure between FS 200 and FS 245 were not reconstructed during this evaluation.

The aft end of the floor panel structure was crushed in an accordion-like manner in the downward direction with the belly skin buckling between the ring segments from FS 357 to the end of the panel at FS 457 (Figure 27). On the left side, the chine assembly was torn completely out of the floor panel aft of FS 397 and fractured from top to bottom midway between FS 377 and FS 397 ring segments. The belly skin split away from the floor cap along FS 377 across the bottom of the floor panel. The most forward belly skin buckle occurred near FS 377 with the belly skin tearing away from the chine assembly by fracture of the chine inboard leg between FS 337 and FS 377. On the right side, the floor collapsed downward by collapse of the chine assembly and buckling of the belly skin at near FS 390.33. The fuselage side skin remained attached to the floor panel in the wheel well area from FS 397 to FS 457.

Forward Right



Forward Left



Aft Right



Aft Left



Figure 25: Floor Section, Center Fuselage FS 245 – FS 457

Right Side, FS 245



Left Side, FS 245



Figure 26: Floor Panel Forward End

Left Side, FS 357 – FS 457



Right Side, FS 357 – FS 457



Figure 27: Floor Panel Aft End

The left side panel of the center fuselage tore away from the floor panel leaning to the left. Views of each fitting are shown in Figure 28. Fractures of all floor fittings and ring segments were visually verified as overload. At the front of the panel, the FS 245 bulkhead fitting failed in tension just above the lowest bolt in the chine attachment. Minimal to no distortion was associated with fracture of this fitting. FS 257 ring segment separated by tensile failure of the chine floor fitting across the lowest bolt holes. Failure of ring segments at FS 277, FS 297, FS 317 and FS 337 occurred by tearing across the upper bolt hole in the floor fitting. Failure of the FS 357, FS 377, and FS 397 primary ring segments occurred through the lowest bolt hole of the floor fitting. The chine assembly was torn completely out of the floor panel aft of FS 397 failing the floor fittings inboard of the chine. The chine assembly collapsed and tore around the lower edge of the FS 357 and FS 377 fittings and ruptured completely through the cross section just aft of FS 397. As the panel rolled outward, the ring segments were forced inward to crush against the chine assembly aft of FS 317. The intermediate ring segments and floor fittings crushed against the chine assembly denting the chine web near FS 310, puncturing it aft of FS 317 and forcing the fitting completely through the web aft of FS 357. Between each primary ring segment where the two intermediate frames are not joined to the floor, panel separation occurred by overload failure of the chine assembly outboard leg. Most of the fuselage skin between FS 285 to FS 337, with exception of a panel to each side of FS 283.67 ring segment, rolled outward approximately 11" above the lower edge (Figure 29). The damage collectively suggests that the fuselage left side panel departed the floor rolling outward toward the left.



Figure 28: Left Side Floor Fitting to Ring Segment Joint along Chine Assembly



Figure 29: Left Side Panel, Center Fuselage Section

The right side panel of the center fuselage separated from the floor panel by collapsing toward the left. Views of each fitting are shown in Figure 30. Fractures of all floor fittings and ring segments were visually verified as overload. The FS 245 bulkhead fitting and side panel ring segment failed in tension near the plane of the bulkhead upper cap. At the lower end of the FS 257, FS 277, FS 297, and FS 337 primary ring segments, the skin panel tore away from the floor fitting by tensile tear-out along the vertical rivet pattern on each side of the fitting. The ring segments failed via tensile bending overload through the upper bolt hole in the floor fitting. FS 357 and FS 377 ring segments failed across the floor fitting at the lowest set of bolt holes near the chine assembly (indicative of higher loading and/or higher strain rate than failure at the forward ring segments to drive failure into the stronger structure). Near FS 390, the chine assembly collapsed as a consequence of the floor panel buckling downward at the aft end. The fuselage side skin tore upward from FS 390 across to the third set of rivets attaching FS 397 ring segment to the floor fitting, upward through three rivets in the forward leg of the fitting, then diagonally across to the top of the floor fitting and continued aft past FS 417 under the wheel well fairing (Figure 31). FS 397 ring segments failed in tension immediately above the floor fitting. The floor fitting and FS 417 ring segment failed in tension immediately above the chine assembly through the lowest set of bolt holes. The chine assembly and floor fittings from FS 457 to FS 471 were torn out of the floor panel.



Figure 30: Right Side Floor attachment along Chine Assembly



Figure 31: Right Side Floor Fitting separation aft of FS 390

4. Right-hand Outboard Section of the Horizontal Stabilizer and Elevator

Description per the NAVAIR 01-75GAA-3 Structural Repair Manual for the KC-130T Aircraft: The horizontal stabilizer is an all-metal structure consisting of a box beam, leading edges, trailing edges and tip structures. The leading edges consist of outer skin, beaded inner skin, and rib formers attached to upper and lower front beam caps by piano-type hinges. The box beam structure consists of front and rear beams and ribs covered by upper and lower skins. The stabilizer bulkhead at fuselage station 1041 is subjected to cabin pressures. The elevator is a full-cantilever, all-metal structure attached to the horizontal stabilizer rear beam by five hinge fittings. The structure consists of clad aluminum skins, front and rear beams, intercostals and ribs. The trim tab is hinged to the elevator trailing edge. Figure 32 is provided as reference for terminology used in this report with aspects of the construction simplified for clarity.




Figure 32: Schematic of Horizontal Stabilizer and Elevator

Analysis of Observations: The RH outer section of the horizontal stabilizer departed during flight as a consequence of impact from Propeller #3. The elevator appeared to have been secure to the stabilizer and separated as a consequence of liberation of the RH outer section of the stabilizer. The propeller impact sliced through approximately 75% of the stabilizer chord-wise section separating the front beam assembly and internal stringer. Overload failure of the remaining structure and rear beam assembly resulted in separation of the RH outer section of the horizontal stabilizer. Initial propeller impact occurred at HSS 130 with Blade 1 oriented such that the airfoil tip end presented to the leading edge. The span of the blade pushed aft through the stabilizer and rotated downward on contact with the front beam assembly to slice through the lower surface. During this repositioning of the propeller transiting through the stabilizer, the adjacent Blade 2 impacted near HSS 180. This blade presented trailing edge first to the stabilizer and sliced through the leading edge, halting before contact with the front beam.

The right elevator was considered to be securely attached prior to separation from the stabilizer. Damage indicated that the elevator twisted span wise outboard of HSS 122 and separated upward and outboard with respect to the stabilizer (or the outer end of the stabilizer deflected downward with respect to the elevator).

Reconstruction:

Figure 33 documents reconstruction of the RH outer section of the horizontal stabilizer and RH elevator (the inboard piece of lower skin was cut from the center structure to facilitate evaluation in proximity to the liberated pieces). One large section of horizontal stabilizer structure, a section of stabilizer rear beam assembly, two pieces of right elevator and two detached hinge fittings were recovered from the North site. The large stabilizer section extended from HSS 130 to the tip; the rear beam section extended between HSS 122 and HSS 180 with approximately 5" of lower skin attached. The outboard elevator sections extended from HSS 190 to the tip and the inner section extended from HSS 120 to HSS 190. Structure inboard of the break remained attached to the stabilizer center section and fuselage until ground impact. The upper skin of section HSS 61 - HSS 130 tore away but was recovered in proximity to the center section at the main wreckage site.



Figure 33: Right Outboard Section of Horizontal Stabilizer and Elevator

Structural failure of the RH outer section of the horizontal stabilizer occurred at HSS 130 as a consequence of impact with the propeller assembly, which separated from the wing in flight due to failure of the RGB case. Blade 1 from Propeller #3 appeared to have impacted the leading edge of the stabilizer presenting the trailing edge first. The blade sliced through the upper skin, front beam assembly and internal stringer constituting approximately 75% of the chordal cross-section of the stabilizer. The leading edge skin was crushed downward and outward against the rib at HSS 130. The upper skin showed saw-tooth curls running aft to the front beam characteristic features of structure being sliced by an object passing through it. The lower skin inboard of HSS 130 was torn in the downward direction and the anti-icing heater ejector tube was severed and pushed aft against the front beam. The dissimilarity in damage between upper skin and lower skin separation suggests that the intruding blade transited spanwise through the upper skin structure and upon contact with the front beam rolled downward to force the lower structure outward. The blade continued through the stabilizer structure to completely slice through the front beam assembly and internal stringer. Red paint transferred along the upper skin structure and front beam further support blade tip entry attitude of the propeller assembly. The upper skin aft of the stringer tore diagonally inboard to the trailing edge near HSS 122 and the lower skin tore outboard to HSS 180 resulting in liberation of a section of the rear beam assembly.



Figure 34: HSS 130 Impact Damage
Leading Edge of Horizontal Stabilizer RH outer section




Figure 35: HSS 130 Impact Damage

The horizontal stabilizer also had leading edge damage between HSS 174 and HSS 180, shown in Figure 36. As at HSS 130, the narrow slice was consistent with the geometry of the airfoil edge of a propeller blade. The intrusion sliced through the leading edge at a diagonal angled outboard from bottom to top. Intrusion forced the leading edge to buckle downward between HSS 174 and HSS 180 and then sliced through the anti-icing ejector tube, stopping short of cutting the front beam assembly. A linear imprint crushed into the upper skin surface of the buckled leading edge structure was of similar geometry as the trailing edge of a propeller blade.



Crease



Figure 36: HSS 180 Impact Damage
Leading Edge of Horizontal Stabilizer RH Outer Section

The RH stabilizer section inboard of HSS 130 remained attached to the center section until ground impact. The upper skin structure between HSS 61 and HSS 128 was recovered from the Main Wreckage Site in proximity to the empennage and tore away at ground impact. A 20" piece of front beam between HSS 102 and HSS 122 remained attached to the lower skin structure as was the rear beam between HSS 61 and HSS 122. The front beam between HSS 61 and HSS 120 was not included in the stabilizer hanger reconstruction. The inboard piece of lower structure was cut from the fuselage to facilitate examination with the RH outer section of the stabilizer. A 58" section of the rear beam between HSS 122 and HSS 180 was recovered from the North site along with two hinge fittings that detached from HSS 180 and HSS 239 of the horizontal stabilizer. The fitting inboard of the break and at the stabilizer tip (HSS 122 and HSS 299) remained attached to the rear beam although the hinge pin fractured at the tip of the elevator.

Figure 37 documents the #3 Propeller that was recovered from the North site. All four blades remained attached to the propeller assembly until ground impact. Blade 1 (Figure 38) was in the feathered position on recovery and the foil was bent along the span in the direction advancing rotation. Blade 2 (Figure 39) was in a low to negative pitch position on recovery. Blade 3 fractured by overload on ground impact and multiple pieces constituting 19" of the tip end were recovered from the North site but distant from the Propeller impact site. Blade 4, was in a near feathered pitch position on recovery and the tip end fragmented on ground impact.




Figure 37: Propeller Assembly #3



Upper airfoil surface



Lower airfoil surface

Figure 38: Propeller #3, Blade 1



Figure 39: Propeller #3, Blade 2

Based on blade scars, Blade 1 was the most likely candidate to have impacted the stabilizer at HSS 130 and by association, Blade 2 was most likely to have impacted at HSS 180 (Blade 4 showed no contact with structure; Blade 3 is in the wrong orientation to Blade 1 to create the damage at HSS 180). The damage on Blade 1 corresponds well with the stabilizer damage at HSS 130 with the blade impacting tip first and pushing through the stabilizer along the span of the blade. As shown in the left photo of Figure 38, approximately 15” of the trailing edge was missing from the tip of Blade 1 and the impact damage was oriented from tip crushing inboard. The crush damage appeared characteristic of impact with robust structure like the front beam spar cap and stringer. Both surfaces of the blade airfoil had abrasive scars oriented in the spanwise direction extending from tip toward root which rotated abruptly toward the trailing edge just inboard of the sticker. Similarly, the trailing edge of Blade 2 airfoil was crushed approximately 20-25” from the tip end and had chordwise abrasive scars running from trailing edge toward leading edge.

Using a crude mock-up of a propeller assembly, and recognizing that a flat blade does not fully replicate the true contours of an airfoil, the scar damage and tip crushing witnessed on Blade 1 was replicated by pushing a blade through the stabilizer with the airfoil oriented spanwise then rotating downward after passing through the front beam assembly. A sequence of the reconstructed evolution of propeller impact based on blade scar damage and stabilizer damage is shown in Figure 40. As the mock-up propeller rotates downward, the trailing edge of Blade 2 contacts the stabilizer leading edge at HSS 180 in the approximate location to account for the trailing edge damage witnessed on Blade 2. Reconstruction of the mock-up blades against the leading edge damage to conform to the stabilizer signatures revealed that both blades likely impacted with approximately 40-45 degree pitch attitude.



Figure 40: Reconstructed sequence of Propeller #3 impact to Horizontal Stabilizer

Descriptions of the elevator attach points outboard of the stabilizer break are detailed as follows:

- HSS 122 (Figure 41): The stabilizer rear beam web inboard of HSS 122 buckled downward and the hinge fitting and supporting rib assembly collapsed outboard. The hinge fitting bearing was destroyed and the bearing outer race was crushed around the upper quadrant on the outboard side due to binding against the elevator pin. This damage serves to indicate that the hinge deflection occurred as the elevator separated from the stabilizer during flight and not as a consequence of ground impact. The leading edge of the elevator showed two impact marks from the hinge being forced against the elevator after separation from the pin. One impact was oriented relatively parallel to normal alignment and the second was angled inboard at the lower edge indicating that the fitting rotated outboard with respect to the elevator. The upper and lower skins of the leading edge showed no interference with the trailing edge of the stabilizer. The pin showed multiple signatures of interference against the hinge bearing inner race, both located inboard of normal hinge position and evidence of elevator separation. The first impact occurred with slight hinge separation along the pin but squarely seated and the second occurred with more hinge separation and angled similar to the recovered orientation of the HSS 122 hinge as collapsed on the stabilizer rear beam




Figure 41: Elevator Hinge Fitting HSS122

- HSS 180 (Figure 42): The hinge fitting was torn out of the stabilizer by overload of the upper and lower support attachments to the rear beam and stabilizer trailing edge. Distortion of the attachment brackets and the direction of rivet tear-out indicate that the hinge was pulled outboard and aft to separate from the rear beam. On the elevator, the upper edge was crushed upward at the outboard corner of the pin housing support due to over-travel of the elevator in the upward direction relative to the stabilizer. The hinge bearing was intact and rotated freely. The inner race was crushed on the inboard side but orientation to the elevator pin could not be reestablished because the inner race was free to rotate within the housing. The hinge pin was intact. The elevator leading edge and lower skin corner were dented inward consistent with the hinge fitting arm crushed flat across the surface.



Figure 42: HSS 180 Elevator Hinge Attachment

- HSS 238 (Figure 43): The hinge fitting separated by shearing the rivets to the upper and lower supports due to the hinge being pulled aft. The hinge rolled inboard to locally tear the rear beam web and fold the web flat against the fitting. The hinge bearing was intact and free to rotate. The elevator pin was intact and the upper skin surrounding the pin housing was deflected upward due to interference with the hinge.



Figure 43: HSS 238 Elevator Hinge Attachment

- HSS 296 (Figure 44): The outboard hinge fitting remained attached to the rear beam. The pin failed via overload bending in the upward direction. The hinge bearing was destroyed and the outer ring captured within the hinge fitting was crushed at the upper quadrant on the outboard face, consistent with the elevator/pin deflecting upward with respect to the stabilizer. The upper skin surrounding the pin housing was bent upward in the same location as HSS 180 and HSS 238 but more extensively, signifying increasing twist along the elevator.




Figure 44: HSS 296 Elevator Hinge Attachment

Both elevator sections from HSS 61 to the tip were recovered from the North site. The break at HSS 190 occurred by compressive buckling, likely as a consequence of separation of the right outboard section of the horizontal stabilizer. The trim tab was intact and secure to the trailing edge. A semicircular dent in trim tab swept outboard between HSS 95 HSS 130. Based on the red paint transfer and similarity in geometry to a fragment of airfoil tip from Propeller #3, Blade 3, the trailing edge damage was likely a consequence of impact with a liberated fragment of Blade 3 airfoil rather than impact with an intact blade. (Figure 45)



Figure 45: Lower Surface of Elevator near HSS 95 – HSS 130
Blade tip fragment from Propeller #3, Blade 3

Examination of the blade damage on Propeller #3 in context to the intrusion damage witnessed by the horizontal stabilizer and the right side of the center fuselage, it is likely that Blade 3 embedded into the fuselage structure creating the intrusion damage to the side and upper sections. This conclusion was reached more as a matter of deduction rather than based on specific correlation of damage between the blade and fuselage signatures. As previously described, damage witnessed by Blades 1 and 2 of Propeller #3 correlate well with the damage witnessed by the horizontal stabilizer. Blade 4 exhibited no evidence of contact with airframe structure. Blade 3, which remained attached to Propeller #3 until ground impact, was fragmented at the outboard end and showed severe abrasive damage across the chord on the lower third of the airfoil surface. The airfoil tip fragments from Blade 3 were recovered from the North wreckage site and distant from the impact site of Propeller #3. The damage observed to the Blade 3 airfoil was considered consistent with impact against airframe structure. Figure 46 documents damage on one of the larger tip fragments showing large gouges and abrasive scoring across the chord approximately 9" from the tip end of the blade.



Figure 46: Propeller #3, Blade 3
Damage likely caused by intrusion into center fuselage airframe structure



Materials Engineering Report



*Materials Engineering Division (AIR-4.3.4)
In-Service Support Center
Fleet Readiness Center East, Cherry Point, North Carolina*

Report Number:	CP6819585MER1	Date Submitted:	18 July, 2017
Analyst:	(b) (6)	Submitted By:	(b) (6)
Analyst's Phone #:	(b) (6)	Submitter's Phone #:	(b) (6)
Reference ID:	WC2EI-PROP-0021-17M	Submitter's Organization:	4.4.2.5

Analysis/Service Requested: Failure Analysis
System: KC-130T
Part Nomenclature: Aircraft Propeller Blade
Part Number: A7111D-2
Serial Number: N844995A

Summary

This report discusses the failure investigation of a propeller blade (PN A7111D-2; SN N844995A) that departed from KC-130T BuNo 165000 at cruise on July 10, 2017 over Greenwood, Mississippi. The subject blade came from prop #2 (PN 54H60-111; SN N244247); the #4 blade position.

- Intergranular attack was present within the bushing bore and not removed at the last overhaul dated Sept, 2011.
 - Evidenced by anodize coating extending into intergranular cracking (IGC).
- An intergranular radial crack propagated from IGC through 64% of the shank wall cross section for a length of about 2.7"
- Fatigue initiated from the outer bound of the radial crack and propagated circumferentially for an arc length of 100° prior to catastrophic overload failure and blade departure.

Prepared By:	(b) (6)	Date Completed:	5 Oct, 2017	Approved By:	(b) (6)	Date Approved:	5 Oct, 2017
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Distribution: 4.3.4.1, submitter

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1. Purpose and Background

This report discusses the failure investigation of a propeller blade (PN A7111D-2; SN N844995A) that departed from KC-130T BuNo 165000 at cruise on July 10, 2017 over Greenwood, Mississippi. The subject blade came from prop #2 (PN 54H60-111; SN N244247); the #4 blade position. Analysis of the reconstructed aircraft fuselage is detailed in Materials Engineering Report CP06811083MER1. An assessment of the additional 15 blades associated with this mishap can be found in Materials Engineering Report CP6829129MER1. A necrology of failures compiled by the OEM, UTC Aerospace Systems (UTAS, formerly Hamilton Sundstrand), cites numerous instances of radial cracks in the bushing and taper bore regions (Appendix A). Corrosion pitting is also often detailed. Although the last failure in the necrology is dated 2010, one blade overhaul facility (Warner Robins Air Logistics Complex) reported scrapping 11 blades (10 Air Force, 1 Navy) this past year for radial cracking. Blade SN N844995A is the first known occurrence of a radial crack which did not propagate fully through the blade shank's thickness prior to initiating a circumferential fatigue crack.

The blade is made from an aluminum forging and consists of a butt end, shank, and airfoil (Figure 1). The upset forged taper bore portion of the blade's shank serves to lighten the blade and hold the blade plug and balancing lead. An aluminum bronze bushing is press fit into the bore, located by two drive pins and secured by two screws. The bushing translates rotational loads to the blade and is used to adjust the blade pitch. The highly stressed fillet located in the outer diameter (OD) of the blade shank ("OD Fillet") is cold rolled to improve the fatigue performance of the blade.

The galvanic couple formed by an aluminum-aluminum bronze interface (blade-blade bushing interface) is more reactive than the commonly known to avoid aluminum-steel interface (Figure 2). Currently several surface treatments are used at this interface meant to protect against corrosion and prevent stress corrosion cracking (SCC) propagation. These include a compressive residual stress layer imparted by either shot peening or low plasticity burnishing (LPB). The purpose of the compressive layer is to counteract any tensile stresses (residual stresses from forging process, hoop stresses from bushing press fit, on wing blade bending, etc.) which may promote the propagation of a crack by SCC mechanisms. To mitigate corrosion which leads to intergranular cracking and potentially SCC, the entire taper bore (including bushing bore) is to be anodized and receive a Permatreat coating. The bushing is to be wet installed with epoxy primer with the intent to isolate the dissimilar metals and prevent galvanic effects.

In addition to the numerous surface treatments/protection schemes and because of the many corrosion related radial cracking failures of these blades, some corrosion mitigation practices have been implemented. Currently the propellers are rotated every 56 days. Since, at rest, the #1 blade position is always at 12 o'clock, the 56 day rotation is meant to redistribute the hydraulic fluid which in theory coats the blade taper bores and prevents moisture/other electrolytes from collecting; thereby, preventing corrosion. If this rotation is missed the blades need to be pulled from the prop for an eddy current inspection of the taper bore (bushing still installed) every 100 hours until the next overhaul. This inspection could find radial cracks that extend past the outboard tip of the bushing. Outboard and inboard directions are with reference to the propeller system unless otherwise indicated. Outboard indicating the direction towards blade tip, and inboard indicating direction towards the blade butt. Aside from prop rotation and the conditional eddy current inspection the blades are overhauled every 5000 hours.

The subject blade was manufactured in 1983 and was last overhauled in September of 2011. For clarification purposes the taper bore, bushing bore, and other associated surfaces will be as annotated in Figure 3. At the Sept 2011 overhaul the blade came in with a shot peened taper and bushing bore. The blade was then reworked which included reprocessing the bushing bore by LPB at Warner Robins Air

Logistics Complex. Following the 2011 overhaul the blade was installed in the current prop in the #4 position. There are at least two instances of the prop slightly exceeding 56 days before being rotated (idle 60 days in Feb and Apr 2012) with no indication of taper bore eddy current inspections being performed. The prop was installed on BuNo 165000 in Oct 2014 at the #2 position (with the subject blade in position #4) and had accumulated approximately 1316 hours since last overhaul prior to failure.

2. Analysis

Material Analysis

Per applicable engineering drawings the blade is to be manufactured from aluminum alloy 7076 per HS26 and heat treated to the T6 condition. Chemical analysis performed via Optical Emission Spectroscopy showed the blade chemistry met drawing requirements. The material hardness was required to be 140 HB minimum at the shank end. The hardness of the subject blade was 88 HRB, corresponding to approximately 147 HB per ASTM # E 140, conforming to the drawing requirements. The electrical conductivity of the subject blade material measured 33 %IACS comparable to typical values cited for 7076-T6 (approximately 35 %IACS) found through internet searches. Unlike other wrought aluminum alloys there is no published conductivity range for 7076-T6 in AMS 2658.

Visual Analysis

A circumferential fatigue crack located in the OD fillet liberated the blade tip/airfoil and shank from the butt end. For ease of transportation the large airfoil was removed from the fractured shank prior to shipping the part to the Materials Lab in Cherry Point, NC. Figure 4 shows the reduced blade shank and butt end fractures of the subject blade in the condition which they were received by the lab. The fatigue propagated on two planes separated by a radial crack that extended (verified by eddy current) 2.25" into the taper bore. The separation of fatigue planes by the radial crack indicates the radial crack was present prior to fatigue initiation and influenced the propagation of the circumferential fatigue crack.

The fatigue fracture surface from the blade shank can be seen after cleaning by acetate tape replicas (used to strip dirt/loose debris from the fracture surface) followed by ultrasonic cleaning in ethanol, in Figure 5. The fatigue crack extended 5.5" around the circumference for an arc length of approximately 100° with initiation at the outer bound (outer here referencing towards shank OD) of the radial crack located at the 30° blade index marking. A discussion of the fatigue fracture surface features and propagation can be found in the subsequent *Fractography* section. The radial crack was fully opened in the lab revealing an intergranular fracture topography. Once opened (Figure 6) the fatigue could be seen initiating directly from the outer bound of the radial crack before propagating outward (towards OD) and circumferentially on two planes as previously shown in Figure 5. A discussion of the radial fracture surface features can also be found in the subsequent *Fractography* section. The entire radial crack fracture surface is shown in Figure 7. Relevant dimensions for the radial and fatigue cracks are shown in Figure 8. The radial crack initiated from the shank's inner diameter (ID) and did not break through the outer diameter before initiating the fatigue crack. The fatigue crack initiated from the outer bound of the radial crack, propagated towards the OD and circumferentially on two planes roughly 1-1.25" below the outboard tip of the bushing. At the time of failure the total length of the radial crack was approximately 2.7" with about 1.25" extending past the outboard tip of the bushing (inspectable crack length with bushing installed). Historically radial cracks tend to reach lengths around 5-6" and break through to the OD before initiating a circumferential fatigue crack. The subject crack, roughly 3" in length, progressed through only 64% of the blade shank's cross section before fatigue initiated and is the first known occurrence of fatigue initiating from a radial crack not fully through the blade shank's wall thickness.

Although an exact origin could not be identified, geometry of the radial crack suggested an origin near the outboard end of the bushing seat (indicated in Figure 7, & Figure 8). This area is considered a “hot spot” as far as corrosion related failures are concerned (referred to as “distal end of bushing seat” in necrology – Appendix A). It is in this area that pitting (a precursor to intergranular cracking) is usually concentrated and numerous historical radial cracks have been found. In this area, on the subject blade, a circumferential band of flakey material was observed (Figure 9, also indicated in Figure 6). Sectioning through this band revealed intergranular cracking (IGC) emanating from tunnel-like corrosion pits beneath the surface. On top of and within the pits/IGC was a gold colored, non-conductive surface coating chemically confirmed via EDS (Figure 10) to be anodize. Also observed in the band of IGC and additionally throughout the bushing seat were gold bottomed craters. Metallurgical cross sections through some of the craters revealed them to also be corrosion pits covered in anodize. The presence of anodize within corrosion pits and the band of IGC provides clear evidence that the corrosion damage was present and subsequently processed over at the Sept 2011 overhaul.

An assessment of the protective surface coatings observed on the subject blade’s taper bore showed the previously discussed anodize coating present throughout the taper and bushing bore (although anodize was coated over preexisting corrosion) but no indication of the Permatreat coating that should have also been applied to the entire taper and bushing bore surfaces. Additionally, there was no evidence of epoxy primer (from wet installation of the bushing) within the bushing bore. The lack of Permatreat and primer coverage is a non-compliance with NAVAIR manual requirements.

The taper bore plug was removed along with the lead wool used to balance the blades. Corrosion was noted on the aluminum parts of the plug as well as within the lead wool (Figure 11). When the lead wool was placed in plastic bag moisture collected within the bag. Prior to receipt by lab, the airfoil was sectioned from the shank fracture (approximately 12” outboard of fracture surface) which exposed the outboard tip of the taper bore (plugged portion) to the atmosphere. Reportedly the shank was immediately packaged for shipment. While possible that the electrolyte/moisture was introduced during the time the taper bore had been exposed to the atmosphere, it cannot be dismissed that electrolyte/moisture may have been trapped or migrated into the outboard, plugged portion of the taper bore.

Metallography

A metallographically prepared cross section was made through the band of IGC (Figure 12). Tunnel like pits can be seen following the grain flow from the forging process, running roughly 45 degrees from the surface (ID surface of the bushing bore). The tunnel-like pits extended to depths of 15 thou (0.015”) before transitioning to more hairline-like IGC. IGC was observed to depths in excess of 50 thou and also ran roughly 45 degrees to the surface.

Fractography

Representative Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) images of the radial crack can be seen in Figure 13. The fracture surface had an intergranular topography covered in heavy corrosion product that required the use of acetate replicating tape to strip from the surface. As previously mentioned, fatigue could be seen initiating from intergranular fracture topography at the outer bound of the radial crack. At the approximate origin of the radial crack were layers of flakey material similar to what was observed at the band of IGC on the bushing bore surface (Figure 9) and in the cross sectional view (Figure 12). This suggests that the radial crack was formed as the network of IGC connected/coalesced and propagated through the thickness of the blade shank.

Historically the intergranular radial cracks occurring in blade taper or bushing bores have been classified as stress corrosion cracks (Appendix A). Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is a form of IGC that propagates rapidly, usually leading to catastrophic failures as the tight/hairline-like nature of the intergranular cracking is difficult to inspect for. Stress corrosion requires the presence of an electrolyte, a sustained tensile force, and a susceptible material. The compressive stress layer imparted by either LPB, in the case of the subject blade, or shot peening acts as a hurdle to any applied tensile stresses (such as hoop stresses from bushing press fit, blade bending with prop at rest, residual stresses from the forging process, etc.). It is possible for intergranular corrosion attack to penetrate through the compressive layer and then form a crack that propagates by SCC mechanisms but numerous radial cracks have originated from pits much smaller than the depth of the compressive layer. And, although these cracks have been occurring as far back as the 1970's a clear understanding of what forces are driving the SCC are still not understood. Furthermore, a 2010 report by Hamilton Sundstrand (now UTAS) on the SCC Resistance of 7076-T6 forgings showed the material to be highly resistant to SCC. Because SCC propagates more rapidly than IGC the conservative approach would be to treat these cracks as SCC. Until a better understanding of the forces driving the crack and material susceptibility/electrolyte chemistry are understood (see *Bushing Analysis* for discussion on presence of lead in bushing bore) the subject report remains at an intergranular radial crack classification. Nonetheless the taper and bushing bore surfaces must be protected from corrosion to prevent these types of cracks from occurring.

The fatigue initiated subsurface, at the outer bound of the radial crack where it propagated towards the OD, breaking through that surface first, as well as splitting onto two circumferential planes. The longer of the two fatigue planes extended approximately 65mm from the origin (tip of radial crack). The fatigue was characterized into three regions; the first extended from the origin to about 35mm, approximately when the fatigue crack broke through to the ID, and consisted entirely of fatigue fracture with no indications of ductility (overload fracture). Between 35 and 50 mm the fracture was mostly fatigue but ductility began to present and increased with distance from the origin. Finally between 50 and 65 mm the fatigue fracture was highly unstable with large amounts of ductility/overload and some fatigue scattered throughout. A macroscopic map of the fatigue fracture surface is shown in Figure 14 and representative SEM images are provided in Figure 15. Representative striations at various distances from the fatigue origin are shown in Figure 16.

Striation counting work was performed in the Materials Lab at Sikorsky's Stratford, CT location using a transmission electron microscope and acetate tape replicas from the fracture surface. Summary of the work can be found below in Table 1.

Following discussions with UTAS stress analysis expertise it was determined that propagation of the fatigue crack is motivated by the blade flexing/bending/twisting stresses which are largest in magnitude in the direction of the 1P Moment vector. The exact location and magnitude of the 1P Moment vector is dependent on flight conditions such as takeoff/cruise, altitude, etc. Since the initiation of the fatigue crack is dictated by the location of the radial crack, and the propagation of the fatigue is motivated by a dynamic 1P Moment vector, the critical (circumferential) crack length prior to catastrophic overload has been shown to vary throughout historical instances ranging anywhere from 90° to 300°. For reference, a sketch of the subject fatigue crack with respect to the 1P Moment vector at climb conditions is shown in Figure 17.

Table 1 – Fatigue Striation Density

KC- 130T BuNo 165000			
Blade SN N844995A			
Distance from origin (mm)	Striations per micron		Crack Velocity (mm/cycle)
15	15.25		6.56E-05
16	20.6		4.85E-05
24	13.2	6.5 coarse	7.58E-05
25	11.5		8.70E-05
26	11.4		8.77E-05
30	9.1		1.10E-04
31	11.6		8.62E-05
31.7	11.6		8.62E-05
42	14.9		6.71E-05
44	16.4		6.10E-05
55	10.6	4 coarse	9.43E-05
56	6.2		1.61E-04
58	8	4.5 coarse	1.25E-04
59	5.4	3 coarse	1.85E-04
60	5.92	3 coarse	1.69E-04
62.5	6.6	3.6 coarse	1.52E-04
64	6.4		1.56E-04

Residual Stress Analysis

To verify the compressive stress layer from the LPB process X-ray diffraction (XRD) analysis was used. XRD was performed at Technology for Energy Corporation (TEC) Materials Testing Division in Knoxville, TN. A total of five locations were tested. Within the LPB processed bushing bore, locations at approximate distances of 0.1”, 1.5” and 3” from the butt end were tested. One location in the shot peened taper bore (“Outboard shotpeen”) was tested as well as an exterior location to verify cold rolling was performed on the OD fillet (“Cold Roll-fillet Region”). Results, shown in Figure 18, are less than values cited in Lambda Report No 12794 detailing the development of the LPB rework procedure for these blades with depths of compression on the order of 0.05” and maximum compressive stresses on the order of –90 ksi. A smaller depth of compression was recorded for the LPB-3” region, the area where the band of IGC was found. Additional residual stress testing is being performed in this region to better understand the stress state of the material.

Precision Measurement

A series of measurements were made on the subject blade’s butt end pre and post bushing removal as well as on the bushing, post removal at the Precision Measurement Center located at Cherry Point, NC. The results were disseminated to the PROPS IPT in separate documents and can be located by contacting an appropriate team member.

Bushing Analysis

The subject blade's bushing is shown, after removal from the butt end and hot wash cleaning, in Figure 19. There was no visual indication of primer from wet installation on the outboard 2+ inches of the bushing OD. Comparison to several other recently removed bushings supported the claim that some visual indication of primer would be evident even after service if primer had been applied to the surface. The lack of primer on the outboard end of subject bushing is a non-conformance to manual requirements that the entire bushing OD (press fit surface) be coated. Surface roughness measurements performed in the lab in the longitudinal direction on the bushing OD resulted in an Ra of 58.5 μin . Two circumferential overload (confirmed via SEM) cracks located diametrically opposite the radial crack and fatigue origin were likely caused during the liberation of the blade tip. The upper/outboard crack had an arc length of 95°, and the lower/inboard crack was 90° long. The two fracture surfaces and representative SEM images showing dimpled overload fracture are provided in Figure 20.

A wear step present within the bushing ID inboard-most 0.5" extended for approximately 90° arc length. The maximum height/depth of the wear step was located adjacent to the "A" index, the height was recorded by PMC.

Chemical analysis of a dark spot observed on the bushing OD (indicated by green arrow in Figure 19) showed the substance to be lead. Similar lead flakes have reportedly been found on Air Force bushings, details of which can be found in Report No. AFRL/RXS 17-023. Lead may have been transferred to the bushing bore surface when the blade was being balanced. The exact significance of this finding is unknown; however, lead may contribute to galvanic effects or potentially effect electrolyte chemistry and have a direct impact on initiation/propagation of the radial crack and warrants further investigation.

Although not explicitly stated on the drawing, through email correspondence the bushing material was determined to be aluminum-bronze consistent with AMS4870. OES analysis found the subject bushing material to conform. Fourier-transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR) and X-ray Fluorescence (XRF) of the primer substance found it consistent with MIL-PRF-23377, conforming to instructions in NAVAIR 03-20C-4. Details of this analysis can be found in Materials Engineering Report CP6829129MER5.

3. Discussion

Evidence of inadequate removal of corrosion damage drove the investigation to a review of the blade's overhaul manual. While a full interrogation of the NAVAIR 03-20C-4 manual was not within the scope of this report a limited review of the revision that the subject blade was processed to, as well as the current manual identified examples of conflicting direction or vague/confusing statements that could offer an opportunity for insufficient detection of corrosion or otherwise misprocessing of blade hardware. This is based upon a strict interpretation of the manual irrespective of traveler documents or artisan intervention.

Ever since the implementation of the LPB process in 2010 it became the preferred method of imparting compressive stresses to the bushing bore. So, whenever a blade with a shot peened taper bore would come in for overhaul, along with whatever rework it required, the bushing bore would be reprocessed with LPB. Following the 03-20C-4 manual dated Sept 2010 (manual in place at time of Sept 2011 overhaul) the blade would receive a series of non-destructive inspections prior to LPB. The blade bushing, and plug would be pulled and any lead wool would be removed. To remove lead that smeared/transferred onto the taper bore surface as well as adhesive residue, instructions are to glass bead blast the entire taper bore including the bushing seat. Instructions follow to mask certain areas and then

blast the taper bore “except smooth areas”. This is concerning, because blades that have already received LPB would have a smooth bushing bore, and blades that have not yet received LPB could potentially have a smooth bushing bore if some reaming was performed to achieve proper bushing fit. The current (2017) 03-20C-4 manual was checked to see if this contradiction had been cleared up and the same exact language exists. Now that LPB is considered the preferred treatment this is particularly concerning since the majority of blades will have smooth, LPB processed bushing bores and language such as this leaves interpretation open to whether or not the artisan should blast the bushing bore. Furthermore, the intent on whether or not the bushing bore should be blasted and concerns with blasting on top of LPB, etc. are not understood.

Following the glass blasting is a caustic etch and desmut; laboratory trials showed this process did not remove anodize/Permatreat coatings so, if the bushing bore was not glass blasted the old anodic and Permatreat coatings would still be present. Borescope is the first prescribed inspection looking for corrosion, gouges and scratches at 10X. Extensive instructions follow calling for operator breaks at prescribed intervals, recertification on inspection standards. Mock borescope inspections performed in the lab surfaces that had Permatreat and anodize proved extremely difficult due to high reflectivity, and coloration differences. The type of tunnel-like pitting observed (Figure 9, Figure 12) appeared only as small pinpricks to the surface and could very easily be missed or mistaken for nothing with surface coatings present.

The next inspection is fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) to find cracks. As a precursor to the inspection the old anodic coating from the entire blade would be stripped (also removing Permatreat). Instructions are to inspect for “linear or aligned indications” and confirm indications with eddy current. Examples of the FPI indications for the band of IGC on the subject blade are shown in Figure 21. These indications would not be cause for rejection per the 2010 manual or current manual revisions. Additionally the manual does not specify a dwell time which allows artisans to use the minimum time per NAVAIR 01-1A-16-1/T.O. 33B-1-1 of 30 minutes. Best practices to inspect for SCC/IGC, which is well known to be the mode of fracture for these radial cracks (reference radial cracking necrology – Appendix A), as prescribed in NAVAIR 01-1A-16-1/T.O. 33B-1-1 is a minimum 240 minute dwell. The longer dwell time is to account for the very tight nature of IGC and allow the penetrant maximum time to seep into the hairline fractures (Figure 12) and allow for the best chance to find the crack.

The use of eddy current to confirm these indications would not be ideal either. Eddy current is optimized to find a crack running perpendicular to the surface. Because of how the taper and bushing bore is formed (upset forging) the grain flow runs approximately 45° to the surface. The mechanism by which aluminum alloys corrode is intergranular, so the corrosion and subsequent cracking will follow the grain flow and run 45° to the surface. Eddy current over the band of IGC, where IGC is known to be at least 50 thou deep, was only picking up roughly a 5 thou indication, barely above the noise level, and certainly not a cause for rejection.

After inspections a flow chart is referenced to determine if the blade requires rework. If the bushing bore does not have LPB, and no corrosion was found in the aforementioned inspections, the blade would go directly to LPB with no instructions to ream off old shot peening texture and existing compressive stresses. It is currently not understood how LPB over shot peening texture would affect the bushing bore surface and what the stress state/transitions would be beneath the surface.

In addition to the manual’s FPI inspection inadequacies, best practices to inspect for corrosion in aluminum alloys per NAVAIR 01-1A-509-2 include a glass blasting procedure prior to inspection.

Results of this process on the band of IGC are shown in Figure 22 where the corrosion damage is immediately noticed on the blasted surface. Corrosion indications revealed by this process during inspection would require rework. Following rework the surface would be glass blasted again until no corrosion indications were found or the blade exceeded its rework limits. This blasting procedure is meant to enhance the surface for inspection and not to remove or clean corrosion damage. Further development of this process is still being pursued.

Additional scrutiny of the current (2017) 03-20C-4 manual found another contradiction in the STRIPPING OF ANODIC COATING section. It states both in the same section that it is and is not mandatory to strip the entire anodic coating to facilitate inspection (Figure 23).

In addition to the direct contradictions found in the current and prior manuals there are numerous other instances where the language can be left to artisan interpretation. One section will explicitly call out taper and bushing bore surfaces and another section will only refer to taper bore (one example in 2017 manual WP 005 00 pg 12 lines a(5) versus b), the latter leaving interpretation open as to whether or not to include the bushing bore surface.

Understanding that ultimately the processing steps are governed by the travelers organized by the respective blade overhaul facilities, the processing order outlined in the document governing those travelers, in other words the 03-20C-4 manual, allow for potential quality escapes. One such example presents in WP 005 00 section 13E, when just prior to shot peening the taper bore (taper bore as defined in Figure 3) instructions are to mask the bushing bore. The taper bore would then be shot peened, and with no instructions to remove masking artisans are told to do a bluing check for bushing fit. Assuming the artisan removed the masking to perform the bluing check this would lead to the taper bore and the bushing bore, since masking was removed, to be anodized prior to LPB. And again it is open to interpretation whether or not anodize would be stripped prior to LPB.

This is not meant to be a definitive list of concerns but meant to address the need for further scrutiny and cleanup of the NAVAIR 03-20C-4 blade overhaul manual.

4. Conclusions

This report discusses the failure investigation of a propeller blade (PN A7111D-2; SN N844995A) that departed from KC-130T BuNo 165000 at cruise on July 10, 2017 over Greenwood, Mississippi. The subject blade came from prop #2 (PN 54H60-111; SN N244247); the #4 blade position.

- Intergranular attack was present within the bushing bore and not removed at the last overhaul dated Sept, 2011.
 - Evidenced by anodize coating extending into intergranular cracking (IGC).
- An intergranular radial crack propagated from IGC through 64% of the shank wall cross section for a length of about 2.7"
- Fatigue initiated from the outer bound of the radial crack and propagated circumferentially for an arc length of 100° prior to catastrophic overload failure and blade departure.




Figure 1 - A7111D-2 Propeller Blade and Cross Section




Figure 2 - Galvanic series for metals and alloys in seawater






Figure 3 – Taper and Bushing Bore Surfaces Annotated

Shank Fracture



Butt End Fracture





Figure 4 - Blade tip and butt ends in condition received by lab. Red arrows indicates radial crack. Yellow dotted line shows radial crack length extending into taper bore. Note separation of fatigue planes through step formed by radial crack indicated by black dotted line top right image.







Figure 5 - Fatigue fracture surface indicated by red dotted line and associated dimensions. Blade degree indices annotated in purple boxes. Fatigue origin indicated by red dot. Yellow arrow (top image) indicates radial crack location and yellow dimensions (bottom image) are with respect to radial crack.

Fatigue fracture surface with arrows indicating crack propagation direction



Radial crack fracture surface




Figure 6 - Initiation and propagation of circumferential fatigue crack from intergranular radial crack.




Figure 7 - Intergranular radial crack fracture surface. Red dot indicates fatigue origin. Blade shank ID (taper and bushing bore surfaces) is on right.




Figure 8 – Schematic showing radial and fatigue crack location in cross section and relevant dimensions. Purple arrow indicates approximate origin of radial crack.




Figure 9 -Bushing bore surfaces – Note changing scale bars




Figure 10 - Chemical analysis with elemental mapping software showing anodize within pits/cracks in band of IGC. Top is SEM image with surfaces indicated.



Figure 11 - Taper bore plug and lead wool showing corrosion damage




Figure 12 – Longitudinal (top) and Axial (bottom) views of metallurgically prepared cross sections through band of IGC (As-polished)




Figure 13 - Representative SEM images from intergranular radial crack; a) Fatigue initiating from outer bound of radial crack; b) Backscattered SEM image showing approximate origin of radial crack (topography similar to Figure 12a); c) Representative fracture surface

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


Figure 14 - Fatigue Fracture Surface. From 0-35mm only fatigue fracture observed. 35-50mm ductility (overload) began to present. 50-65mm was mixed mode fracture with some fatigue within overload fracture.




Figure 15 - Representative SEM images from various locations along fatigue fracture surface. Number indicated is distance from origin. Yellow arrow indicates fatigue propagation direction. All Images 250X




Figure 16 - Representative SEM images showing fatigue striations from various locations along fatigue fracture surface. Number indicated is distance from origin.





Figure 17 - Sketch of subject fatigue crack (red) and radial crack (green) with respect to 1P Moment vector and blade angle at climb conditions. View is from hub looking towards blade tip, airfoil shown at 42" reference station.



Location	Surface Stress (ksi)	Max Compressive Stress (ksi)	Compressive Depth (in)
A: LPB-0.1"	-33.81	-62.22	0.035
B: LPB-1.5"	-46.62	-70.06	>0.060
C: LPB-3"	-22.60	-62.79	0.030
D: Outboard Shotpeen	-27.85	-58.72	0.040
E: Cold Roll – OD Fillet	--29.54	-55.33	>0.040




Figure 18 - Residual Stress Analysis XRD Results. Approximate locations shown in cross section.




Figure 19 - P2B4 Blade Bushing; a) View from side showing crack locations; b) View looking outboard; c) Looking at ID of cracked section. Green arrow indicated lead flake. Blue arrows bracket outboard crack and red arrows bracket inboard crack.





Figure 20 - Bushing fracture surfaces (view looking outboard) and representative SEM Images at 500X (left) and 1500X (right)

Normal Lighting



UV Lighting
(FPI Indications will fluoresce)








Figure 21 - FPI Indications from band of IGC on subject blade. In all images bushing bore surface is shown and circumferential fracture is upper surface. Blade tip direction is down.




Figure 22 - Adjacent bushing bore surfaces containing band of IGC. Top) No Alteration, anodize still present; Bottom) Surface after gentle glass blasting which removed surface coatings and enhanced visible indication of corrosion damage












NAVAIR 03-20C-4 Change 8 – 1 July 2013		004 00 Page 17
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;">  SODIUM HYDROXIDE ASTM D456 </div> <div style="text-align: center;">  SODIUM HYDROXIDE ASTM D456 </div> <div style="text-align: center;">  SODIUM HYDROXIDE ASTM D456 </div> </div> <div style="text-align: center; margin: 10px 0;">  </div> <p>For blades with formed foam fairings, it is necessary to completely remove residual foam from blade surface in accordance with PLASTIC FORMED FAIRING REMOVAL, this WP, because foam can cover cracks and they will not be detected during fluorescent penetrant inspection.</p> <div style="border: 2px solid red; padding: 5px; margin: 10px 0;"> <p>It is mandatory that entire blade surface including blade butt taper bore, fillet, bushing screw holes and drive pin holes be stripped of its old anodic surface at overhaul (before inspection) to facilitate inspection and rework procedures.</p> </div> <div style="text-align: center; margin: 10px 0;"> NOTE </div> <p>De-oxidizing (stripping) of blades and caustic etch are two entirely separate processes and should not be construed to be related.</p> <p>22. STRIPPING OF ANODIC COATING AND CAUSTIC ETCH. Use sodium hydroxide for removal of anodic coating as follows to strip areas including filter, taper bore, butt OD, butt face, blade bushing screw holes and drive pin holes.</p> <div style="text-align: center; margin: 10px 0;">  </div> <p>Do not, under any circumstances, immerse in etch solution soda blades with fairings (3, Figure 1), rubber parts, corrosion barriers, teflon strips (24), bushing (23), drive pins (22), screws (10) or threaded screw inserts attached.</p> <div style="text-align: center; margin: 10px 0;"> NOTE </div> <div style="border: 2px solid red; padding: 5px; margin: 10px 0;"> <p>It is not necessary to strip anodize prior to fluorescent penetrant inspection.</p> </div> <p>a. Prior to etching and cleaning, slide thrust washers toward tip of blade as far as possible with washers remaining loose on blade. Retain in position away from shank end by use of wooden or cork wedges inserted between ID of thrust washers and blade.</p>	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;">  SODIUM HYDROXIDE ASTM D456 </div> <div style="text-align: center;">  SODIUM HYDROXIDE ASTM D456 </div> </div> <p>b. Immerse blade in 16 oz. of sodium hydroxide per gallon water for 10 minutes to assure removal of all existing anodize coating</p> <p>c. Immediately following etch, thoroughly cold water rinse the blade.</p> <p>(1) Check for presence of anodize coating with a continuity tester. Lack of continuity indicates residual coating and blade must be restripped.</p> <div style="text-align: center; margin: 10px 0;">  </div> <p>Repeat anodic coating stripping process only one time, if necessary.</p> <p>(2) If anodize coating is still present, steps b through step c, substep (1) can be repeated <u>only one time</u>.</p> <div style="text-align: center; margin: 10px 0;"> NOTE </div> <p>It is not necessary to caustic etch prior to fluorescent penetrant inspection.</p> <p>d. A caustic etch of blades in preparation for fluorescent penetrant inspection may be performed as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Fill the etch tank 1/2 full of water. (2) Slowly and with constant agitation, add 15-16 ounces of sodium hydroxide per gallon of final solution volume. (3) Immerse the blade into the etch solution until a black smut is formed for a length of time not to exceed 30 seconds. (4) Thoroughly cold water rinse. <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center; margin-top: 10px;"> <div style="text-align: center;">  DE-SMUT SOLUTION ISOPREP 184 </div> <div style="text-align: center;">  DE-SMUT SOLUTION ISOPREP 184 </div> <div style="text-align: center;">  DE-SMUT SOLUTION ISOPREP 184 </div> </div> <p>(5) De-smut the etched area by immersing into a 20-25% by volume Isoprep 184 solution or equivalent.</p>	

Figure 23 - Excerpt from current (Change 11 dated 3.2017) 03-20C-4. Contradicting statements within same section are indicated.

Materials Engineering Report CP6819585MER1

Appendix A (pg 1 of 3)

Necrology of Intergranular Cracks in Taper and Bushing Bores of 7076-T6 Propeller Blades
Excerpt from Hamilton Sundstrand Report HSER29567

Item	Propeller Model	Blade P/N	Blade S/N	Installation	History	Remarks	Report
1	43E60-623	R6917A-14	N 898884	U. S. Air Force C-123K	315.7 Hours TSO	Origin at 0.040 inch deep corrosion pit	FI 78-06
2	43D50-651	7107D-0	N 805681	Royal Malay Air Force DHC-4A	1.3 Hours TSO	Origin at shallow corrosion pit. In storage for 18 months	FI 79-60
3 (1)*	54H60-91	7111A-2	N 758148	U. S. Air Force C-130B	54.2 Hours TSO	Taper bore had been machined; crack origin not present	FI 80-46
4 (2)	54H60-77	7121B-2	N 772298	National Oceanic and Atmospheric	0 Hours	Shallow corrosion at origin. In storage for 24 months following overhaul	FI 82-09
5 (3)			N 772297	Agency WP-3D	TSO	Mate to Item 4. Both leaked on initial run-up on aircraft	Not examined
6	43E60-623	6917A-14	N 808853	U. S. Force C-123K	2,411.7 Hours TSO	Origin at 0.015 inch deep corrosion pit	FI 82-22
7 (4) [F1]**	54H60-111	7111D-2	N 767858	U. S. Marine Corps KC-130F	664.5 Hours TSO	Origin at corrosion pit in taper bore. Crack bifurcated in fillet area and propagated circumferentially around in fatigue	HSER 10311
8 (5) [F2]	54H60-117	A7111D-2	N 794659	Transamerica Airlines L-382	15,909.6 Hours TSO	Origin in fretted material. Crack turned to chordal orientation in fillet area and propagated in fatigue	FI 86-27
9 (6) [F3]	54H60-77	7121A-2	N 781479	U. S. Navy Engine Test Stand at Alameda NAD	≈ 1,000 Hours TT	Origin at a band of corrosion. Used sparingly between 1976 and 1988. Crack turned to chordal orientation in fillet and propagated in fatigue	FI 88-60
10 (7)	54H60-91	A7111E-2	N 755009	U. S. Air Force C-130	3,329.6 Hours TSO	Origin at distal edge of bushing seat. A second crack was removed and not returned	FI 90-10
11 (8) [F4]	54H60-77	A7121B-2	N 812274	U. S. Navy P-3C	109.6 Hours TSO	Blade fractured in fatigue across retention fillet; distal section not recovered. In storage for 55 months prior to final installation	FI 95-61

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Appendix A (pg 2 of 3)

Necrology of Intergranular Cracks in Taper and Bushing Bores of 7076-T6 Propeller Blades
Excerpt from Hamilton Sundstrand Report HSER29567

Item	Propeller Model	Blade P/N	Blade S/N	Installation	History	Remarks	Report
12 (9) [F5]	54H60-111	7111A-2	N 795090	U. S. Navy C-130T	183.5 Hours TSO	Origin at corrosion pit at distal end of bushing seat. Crack turned in fillet to chordal orientation and propagated in fatigue. In storage for 48 months prior to final installation	FI 96-34
13 (10) [F6]	54H60-77	7121A-2	N 771344	U. S. Navy P-3C	5,705 Hours TSO	Origin at distal end of bushing seat. Crack turned to chordal orientation in fillet and propagated in fatigue	FI 98-48
14 (11) [F7]	54H60-111	7111A-2	N 795485	U. S. Marine Corps	3,401 Hours	Origin near distal end of bushing seat. Crack turned toward chordal orientation in retention fillet. In "on-wing" storage for 25 months	FI 04-27
15 (12)			N 795486	KC-130F	TSI	Crack through shank Mate to Item 14	
16 (13) [F8]	54H60-111	7111D-2	N 795488	U. S. Navy C-130T	510.3 Hours	Origin of radial crack at distal end of bushing seat. Crack turned toward chordal orientation with extensive fatigue crack propagation. Had been in off-wing storage for 2 weeks in 1998 and for 7 months in 2000-2001	FI 04-32
17 (14) [F9]	54H60-77	7121B-2	N 812067	U. S. Navy P-3C	2,626 Hours TSO	Two radial cracks with origins at the distal end of the bushing seat. One crack turned towards the radial orientation and propagated for a short distance in fatigue	FI 08-12 <i>W/L 11074</i>
18 (15)	54H60-77	7121B-2	N 812420	Pacific Propeller Engine Test Stand	Unknown	Origin of radial crack at distal end of bushing seat	----
19 (16) [F10]	54H60-111	7111D-2	N 793341	Royal Saudi Air Force C-130H	1,090 Hours TS SB 136	Origin of radial crack at distal end of bushing seat	FI 08-14 <i>HSER 29566</i>

Materials Engineering Report CP6819585MER1

Appendix A (pg 3 of 3)

Necrology of Intergranular Cracks in Taper and Bushing Bores of 7076-T6 Propeller Blades
Excerpt from Hamilton Sundstrand Report HSER29567

Item	Propeller Model	Blade P/N	Blade S/N	Installation	History	Remarks	Report
20 (17) [F11]	54H60-77	7121A-2	N 812826	U. S. Navy P-3C	≈ 60 Hours since on- wing inspection TT & TSO Unknown	One radial crack with origin under bushing near distal end. Crack turned in fillet and propagated in fatigue Idle in on- wing storage for 6 months	FI 08-16 <i>HSER 29565</i> <i>WL 1438</i>
21 (18) [F12]	54H60-117	7111E-2	N 801444	<i>Fuerza Aérea</i> <i>Argentina</i> (Argentine Air Force)C-130H	2,666 Hours TSO	One radial crack through the section of the shank with origin on taper bore. Crack turned and propagated in fatigue for a short distance	FI 08-17 <i>HSER 29566</i> <i>WL 490</i>

* (number) indicates numeration for 54H60 model propeller blades only.

** [F number] indicates numeration for those 54H60 blades radial intergranular crack turned in the blade fillet to become a fatigue crack.

HSER 29567

SCC 5407

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, August 24, 2018 12:31 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) Maj (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Detection of Radial Crack past bushing
Signed By: (b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) CIV FRC-East, 4.4.2.5
(b) (6)
Sent: Friday, August 17, 2018 2:23 PM
To: (b) (6) LtCol (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Detection of Radial Crack past bushing

LtCol (b) (6)

I agree that it could also be stated that there is no guarantee the crack had not grown past the bushing. Since we do not understand the crack growth rates on P2B4 for both the radial crack and the fatigue crack. The radial crack may or may not have been past the bushing if inspected at any time prior to the mishap flight.

V/R
(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
NAVAIR-4.4.2.5
FRC East ISSC: Cherry Point, NC
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) LtCol (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, August 17, 2018 11:40
To: (b) (6) CN (b) (6)
Subject: Detection of Radial Crack past bushing

(b) (6)

Thanks again for your help.

With respect to the possibility of the radial crack having grown past the distal end of the installed bushing.

It is your position that there is no guarantee that the radial crack had grown past the bushing and therefore could not have been detected.

But after our team reviewed data points collected throughout this investigation, we realized that the blade flew 73.3 hours and that a majority of that time the circumferential fatigue crack was growing up until the liberation on 10 July 2017. This means that there is a distinct possibility/probability that the radial crack had grown past the bushing while the plane was not flying and was in its phase inspection between 1 March 2017 and 24 May 2017.

So from a logical perspective it could also be stated that there is no guarantee that the radial crack had not grown past the bushing and could have been detected.

Thanks again for all your help,

LtCol (b) (6)

LtCol (b) (6)

4th MAW

JAGMAN IO

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

LtCol (b) (6)

4th MAW

JAGMAN IO

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2018 4:03 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Radial Crack and Circumferential Crack Growth Rates
Signed By: (b) (6)

Pretty Heavy Stuff.

Semper Fi

LtCo (b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)
[mailto:(b) (6)@y.mil]
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2018 3:57 PM
To: (b) (6)@usmc.mil>
Subject: Radial Crack and Circumferential Crack Growth Rates

(b) (6)

To answer your question about crack growth rates:

1. Since the radial crack had not grown to the outer shank of the propeller, and due to the location of the circumferential fatigue crack no on wing eddy current inspection would have detected the crack which caused blade 4 from propeller 2 to liberate.
2. There is no evidence or data from the investigation to characterize how fast the radial crack and circumferential crack formed and grew; such that there is no way to tell whether removing the prop during the ISO in May 2017 and conducting the intermediate level inspection per tech data (magnifying glass for the outer shank or internal eddy current inspection) would have discovered either the radial crack or circumferential crack which propagated allowing the blade to liberate.
3. It is less likely that during the November 2014 ISO inspection, removing the prop and conducting the intermediate level inspection per tech data (magnifying glass for the outer shank or internal eddy current inspection) would have discovered either the radial crack or circumferential crack which propagated allowing the blade to liberate.

V/R

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

NAVAIR-4.4.2.5

ERC East ISSC: Cherry Point, NC

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

.om:

(b) (6)

Sent:

Monday, April 16, 2018 7:16 AM

To:

(b) (6)

Cc:

Subject:

RE: crack growth

Signed By:

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Since the crack growth rates are unknown, we do not know if that on the morning of 10 July 2017 the corrosion pitting, intergranular cracking, radial crack, or circumferential crack had grown past the bushing and would have been visible in the blade taper bore.

Sorry for not getting you a response on Friday.

V/R

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

AVAIR-4.4.2.5

RC East ISSC: Cherry Point, NC

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, April 13, 2018 9:50 AM

To: (b) (6) RC-East, 4.4.2.5

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: crack growth

(b) (6)

Thanks for your help.

Just to review our conversation.

There is no evidence that suggests that, on the morning of 10 July 2017, that
he

Corrosion Pitting

Intergranular Cracking
Radial Crack or
Circumferential Crack

Had grown past or was visible inside the taper bore past the bushing bore.

Please confirm,

Thanks

LtCol (b) (6)

4th MAW

JAGMAN IO

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, April 5, 2018 11:04 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: (b) (6)
Signed By: (b) (6)

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Categories: (b) (6)

(b) (6)



-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, April 5, 2018 10:47 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: (b) (6)

(b) (6)



(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE
MARINE FORCES RESERVE
2000 OPELOUSAS AVENUE
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70114-1500

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5830
FRC-E
15 Aug 18

From: (b) (6) Fleet Readiness Center East, Cherry Point, NC
To: on Mishap Investigation Team

Subj: KC-130T MISHAP (VMGR-452) STATEMENT

1. Background:

a. My Primary Billet is the Propeller Integrated Product Team Leader at Fleet Readiness Center East (FRC-East), Cherry Point, NC. I previously served as the C-130 and P-3 Propeller Senior Engineer.

b. I hold academic degrees and/or certifications in Mechanical Engineering (BS) from Western New England University. I hold DAWIA Level 3 certification in Systems Engineering (SPRDE-SE) and have completed the US Air Force Jet Engine Mishap Investigation Course.

c. I have worked with FRC-East for 7 years all with the Propeller Team. I previously worked for 2 years with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) at UTC Aerospace Systems (Hamilton Sundstrand) supporting propeller systems. I have worked on and around C-130s for 7 years and specifically the propellers and their blades for 9 years.

2. Depot Level Maintenance on C-130 Propeller Blades:

a. The Warner Robins Air Logistics Complex (WR-ALC) blade overhaul procedure for U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps propeller blades in 2011 required the following: (1) blade tear down, bushing and plug removal and cleaning; (2) glass bead blast of taper bore; (3) caustic soda etch; (4) borescope inspection of taper bore; (5) FPI of taper bore, screw holes and drive pin hole; (6) taper bore back-up inspection by eddy current; (7) meandering winding magnetometry (MWM); (8) taper bore ream; (9) beveled thrust ring grinding; (10) thrust ring inspection - mag particle; (11) butt face cut; (12) cold roll retention fillet; (13) airfoil shot peen; (14) airfoil grit blast; (15) low plasticity burnishing (LPB) of taper bore; (16) chromic acid anodizing; (17) permatreat taper bore; (18) foam application; (19) fairing rubber goods, heater installation; (20) balancing; (21) fit check of bushing; (22) wet installation of bushing; (23) final build-up and balance check; (24) disassembly; (25) application of preservative and packaging. These procedures would be performed IAW the NAVAIR Technical Manual 03-20C-4.

Subj: KC-130T MISHAP (VMGR-452) STATEMENT

b. During the required overhaul process on U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps C-130 propeller blades, technicians at WR-ALC have a duty to determine the presence of corrosion in the taper bore area. The manual creating this duty and governing the overhaul process in 2011 is NAVAIR Technical Manual 03-20C-4, Change 6 (dated 15 August 2011) (Depot Maintenance With Illustrated Parts Breakdown - Aluminum Alloy Propeller Blades). The three inspections in the 2011 overhaul process used to determine the presence of corrosion on a blade are (1) the borescope inspection, (2) the florescent penetrant inspection (FPI), and (3) the eddy current inspection.

c. I cannot verify and do not know if WR-ALC conducted eddy current inspections in 2011 as required in technical data.

d. Per the Engineering Investigation conducted on propeller two blade four (P2B4), corrosion was present in the taper bore when the blade went in to WR-ALC for overhaul in 2011. I am confident of this fact because of the presence of anodize in corrosion pits and in intergranular cracking (IGC) on the blade. Anodizing the blade is a step in the overhaul process and would have last occurred at WR-ALC in 2011. The anodizing liquid seeped into the existing corrosion pits and IGC and essentially fossilized the pits and cracks. Based on the amount and location of anodize in the taper bore of P2B4 and the other steps in my post-mishap analysis of the blade, I believe the corrosion was advanced enough in 2011 that it should have been detected by a properly trained technician conducting the standard overhaul procedures IAW NAVAIR 03-20C-4 for Navy blades at WR-ALC in 2011.

e. The anodization process involves immersing the propeller blade in a series of solutions to clean and electrolytically coat the surface of the blade and taper bore to provide corrosion protection.

f. If corrosion is detected on a blade, the corrosion should be annotated and then removed by the same or another technician at WR-ALC. In 2011, the removal of any identified corrosion should have been verified by another technician per NAVAIR Technical Manual 03-20C-4, Change 6.

g. The corrosion and IGC on P2B4 in 2011 should have been removed during overhaul at WR-ALC IAW NAVAIR 03-20C-4, but it was not.

h. This crack on P2B4 is the first known occurrence of a circumferential fatigue crack initiating from a radial crack which had not grown to pass fully through to the outer diameter blade shank wall of a propeller produced by UTC Aerospace Systems.

Subj: KC-130T MISHAP (VMGR-452) STATEMENT

i. The manual governing the blade overhaul process in 2011 (NAVAIR Technical Manual 03-20C-4, Change 6) contained some inadequate explanations and contradictions. However, technicians assigned to conduct the overhaul process at WR-ALC in 2011 would have had enough training, experience, and observation skills to detect the corrosion on P2B4 IAW NAVAIR 03-20C-4 despite deficiencies in the manual.

j. Regarding quality control (QC) for Air Force blades at WR-ALC, a "second stamp" check only occurs for "flight safety" steps in the process. The borescope inspection or the FPI were not considered a flight safety step in 2011 therefore would not have received a second stamp inspection.

k. The only QC requirements the Navy imposed upon WR-ALC in 2011 were the "QA" checks stated at various steps in NAVAIR 03-20C-4.

l. Based on my personal experience and knowledge of WR-ALC and the blade overhaul process, I believe that deficiencies and concerns to include corrosion observed in the 2017 Navy audit corroborate the existence of these same and/or similar deficiencies in 2011.

3. Intermediate and Operational Level Maintenance Actions on C-130 Propeller Blades

a. Eddy current inspections are the only intermediate-level and operational-level maintenance actions that could detect a crack that was not visible on the outer surface of a blade.

b. An eddy current inspection tool should use 150 kilohertz on this type of blade IAW NAVAIR 03-20CBBJ-2.

c. An off-wing eddy current inspection can only detect a crack that has extended beyond the distal end of the installed bushing. A bushing is not authorized to be removed below the depot level.

d. An on-wing eddy current inspection could not have detected the crack on P2B4 since the crack was not within the detectable region of the blade shank. Furthermore, an on-wing eddy current inspection can only inspect a very small area of the blade shank outer diameter.

e. An off-wing eddy current inspection could theoretically have detected the radial crack by probing the taper bore (inner surface) - but only if the crack had extended beyond the distal end of the installed bushing and was within the detection depth at the time of the inspection.

f. Since the fatigue crack never went past the bushing, an off-wing eddy current inspection on P2B4 could not have detected the fatigue

Subj: KC-130T MISHAP (VMGR-452) STATEMENT

crack, unless it had propagated to the outer diameter of the blade shank.

g. The growth rate of a radial crack is variable and unknown. A crack can potentially grow significantly during a single flight. Therefore, the crack may or may not have been detectable by an off-wing eddy current inspection even on the morning of the final flight.

h. Regarding the missed 56-Day Conditional Inspection in 2012, the benefit of the inspection (agitating hydraulic fluid) would have had little or no impact on the growth of the IGC and cracks because of the extent of the corrosion and IGC that existed in 2011. Additionally, hydraulic fluid helps prevent corrosion, but has little to no effect on existing corrosion.

i. An off-wing eddy current inspection of the taper bore should be conducted any time a propeller is broken down during intermediate-level maintenance generally, at a Marine aviation logistics squadron (MALs) IAW NAVAIR 03-20CBBJ-2.

j. Corrosion pits can lead to intergranular cracking (IGC). On P2B4 the IGC grew into a Radial crack (crack with orientation running from ID to OD and spreading axially towards the blade butt and the blade tip). A circumferential (orientation about the circumference of the blade shank) fatigue crack developed from the radial crack.

4. I have limited knowledge of the implementation of the DMISA. I don't know of any regularly scheduled quality audits or records documenting quality audits of WR-ALC.

5. As a result of this mishap, the Air Force has convened an Independent Review Team (IRT), which I am a supporting member. The purpose is to aid in assessing operational risk to the USAF C-130 fleet, and identify and improve the blade overhaul process at WR-ALC.

a. The IRT has upgraded and improved the borescope process to include adding robotics which capture and inspect the taper bore. This step will be verified and inspected by a human technician which now has a higher definition and resolution image to identify corrosion and pitting.

b. The IRT also is upgrading and improving the eddy current inspection to try to provide automation and sensitivity to the screening process. This will increase the coverage area as well as allow the blade to be completely covered and allow the technician the ability to inspect the whole taper bore.

c. The IRT upgraded FPI inspection to incorporate robotics and to completely submerge the blades within the chemical substance (penetrant). Additionally, they have increased the time the blade is

Subj: KC-130T MISHAP (VMGR-452) STATEMENT

within the substance (penetrant) to four hours of dwell time before the technician reviews the blade for corrosion and cracks.

d. The IRT will incorporate the glass bead blast, MWM, permatreat, epoxy coating, and wet bushing installation to all blades and not just U.S. Navy blades.

e. The IRT is updating the mapping process (work control documents) with regard to the blade overhaul process to automate and computerize the annotation and tracking of deficiencies within one centralized electronic file. This will allow the deficiency to be tracked and inspected for completion.

f. Technical Manuals between NAVAIR the USAF and UTAS are being updated to reflect the same overhaul process and procedures between services.

I can be reached at (b) (6) or
(b) (6) for any further questions.

(b) (6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HQ WARNER ROBINS AIR LOGISTICS CENTER (AFMC)
ROBINS AIR FORCE BASE GEORGIA

*Not
held*

001 198

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

FROM: 78 ABW/XPRC

SUBJECT: Finalized Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) #R-546, Naval Air Systems
Command Liaison

Attached is the finalized MOA between Robins AFB and the Naval Air Systems Command
Liaison located in WR-ALC/LB. Point of contact is (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Chief, 78th Air Base Wing Manpower

Attachment:
#R-546

DISTRIBUTION:
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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

BETWEEN

NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND

PROGRAM MANAGER AIR 207

Patuxent River MD

AND

WARNER ROBINS-AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

C-130 SYSTEM PROGRAM OFFICE

ROBINS, AIR FORCE BASE

Warner Robins GA

17 July 1998

1. **PURPOSE:** This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) establishes the relationship between Warner Robins-Air Logistic Center (WR-ALC), Robins Air Force Base GA, and the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Program Manager Air 207 (PMA207), Patuxent River MD. The position, covered in this MOA, will be filled with a Department of Navy (DoN) Civilian GS-0343-13, as a Technical Representative. The position will be placed in residence in the US Air Force (USAF) C-130 System Program Office (SPO). The Technical Representative serves as the central point of contact within the SPO for C-130 matters pertinent to the Navy.

2. **AGREEMENTS:**

a. **Robins AFB and/or WR-ALC Functions and Responsibilities:**

(1) WR-ALC/LB will provide adequate office supplies, furniture, equipment, and space, (Bldg. 300 Bay "G") equivalent to WR-ALC co-workers of the same rate/grade, to include personal computer software and LAN components to enable connection(s) to WR-ALC systems, E-mail and INTERNET. Provide services relating to the operation of ADP associated equipment, publications distribution, and reference library, on a non-cost reimbursable basis.