From: __________
To: Commanding General, Training and Education Command
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF [b][6]__________, THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN)
(b) [b][2]__________
(c) [b][2]__________
(d) MCO 3504.2A (OPREP-3 Reporting)
(e) MCO 3404.4e (MARCORCASASTPRO)
(f) MHU SOP
(g) MARADMIN 580/12 (Reporting Requirements ICO DODSER)
(h) Reg Policy Ltr 2-16
(i) MARADMIN 073/14 (MIP)
(j) MCO 1200.17E (MOS MANUAL)
(k) MCO P5060.20 w/ Ch 1 (Marine Corps Drill and Ceremonies Manual)
(l) MCO 1500.59 (Marine Corps Martial Arts Program)
(m) [b][2]__________
(n) MCO 1510.32F
(o) SECNAV M-5210.1
(p) MARADMIN 363/06
(q) TRNGCMD Policy Ltr 13-14
(r) [b][2]__________
(s) [b][2]__________
(t) [b][2]__________
(u) [b][2]__________
(v) [b][2]__________
(w) [b][2]__________
(x) [b][2]__________
(y) [b][2]__________
(z) [b][2]__________
(aa) Reg Policy Ltr Equal Opportunity
(bb) Reg Policy Ltr Hazing
(cc) Reg Policy Ltr Safety

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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
DEATH OF (b)(6) [REDACTED], THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION,
THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

(dd) Reg Policy Ltr SAPR
(ee) BnO 5500.2D (OOD)
(ff) Bn Policy Ltr 3-15
(gg) Bn Policy Ltr Hazing
(hh) 3d Recruit Training Battalion Climate Surveys
(ii) (b)(6) [REDACTED] IGMC Investigation
(jj) (b)(6) [REDACTED] Command Investigations
(kk) (b)(6) [REDACTED] Command Investigation
(ll) (b)(6) [REDACTED] Command Investigation
(mm) (b)(6) [REDACTED] Command Investigation
(nn) Chow Hall Command Investigation
(oo) U.S. v. Thomas 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986)
(pp) MARCORSEPMAN
(qq) IRAM

Encl (b)(6) Appointing Order dtd 7 Apr 2016
Appointing Order Modification dtd 26 Apr 16
Appointing Order Modification dtd 4 May 16
Extension Request dtd 14 Jun 16 w/end
Extension Request dtd 28 Jun 16 w/end
Request for Electronic Data w/o Encls dtd 27 Apr 16
Command Authorization for Search and Seizure dtd 27 Apr 16
Terms and Connectors for Electronic Data Search
Assignment to Conduct “Taint Review” Regarding Email
Correspondence and Other Electronic Media dtd 1 May
16

Marine Corps Recruit Information Support System
(b)(6) [REDACTED] Summary of Interview ICO Conducted
on 30 Apr 16
(b)(6) [REDACTED] Department of Defense Form
1966
(b)(6) [REDACTED] Department of Defense Form
2808
(b)(6) [REDACTED] USMEPCOM Form 40
(b)(6) [REDACTED] Evaluation Card
(b)(2) [REDACTED]
(b)(6) [REDACTED] Voluntary
Statement to PMO dtd 18 Mar 16
(b)(6) [REDACTED] NCIS Statement dtd
21 Mar 16
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF [REDACTED], THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

Interview Transcript
Standard Medical Evaluation Form A
Beaufort County Sheriff’s Office 911 Call Log dtd 28 Mar 16
BMH Medical Record
Preliminary Autopsy Report
Final Autopsy Report
Brigadier General Terry V. Williams Interview Transcript Part 1 dtd 4 May 16
Brigadier General Terry V. Williams Interview Transcript Part 2
Brigadier General Terry V. Williams Audio Part 3
Interview Transcript dtd 3 May 16 Part 1
Interview Transcript Part 2
Summary of Interview ICO
Interview Transcript dtd 30 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO
Summary of Interview ICO
Interview Transcript dtd 28 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO
Summary of Interview ICO
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 16 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 21 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 17 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO
Summary of Interview ICO
Summary of Interview ICO

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Subject: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF (b)(6) [REDACTED], THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

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Summary of Interview ICO
Drill Instructor Jacket ICO
Marine Corps Order 1200.17E (MOS Manual)
Company K Team Composition Matrix
Drill Instructor Jacket ICO
Navy Regulation 0802
Email dtd 10 Feb 16
Email dtd 9 Jun 16
Summary of Interview ICO
Summary of Interview ICO
Drill Instructor Jacket ICO
Drill Instructor Jacket ICO
Email dtd 5 Apr 16
Drill Instructor Jacket ICO
Summary of Interview ICO
Summary of Interview ICO
FD-1 Scoop Sheet
Drop and Add Stats and Rosters
Training Matrix
Marine Corps Order 1510.32F (Recruit Training)
Company K Schedule
 Eight Day Brief ICO
Third Recruit Training Battalion Billeting Diagram
Squad Bay Photo 1
Squad Bay Photo 2
Squad Bay Photo 3
Floor Plan B Diagram
Squad Bay Photo 4
Squad Bay Photo 5
Squad Bay Photo 6
Floor Plan A Diagram
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF [REDACTED], THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

Summary of Interview ICO dtd 13 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 17 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 15 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 14 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 10 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 15 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 15 Apr 16
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Summary of Interview ICO dtd 17 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 14 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 23 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 23 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 17 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 17 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 17 Apr 16
Summary of Mass Interview ICO Recruit Separation Platoon
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
DEATH OF [REDACTED], THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION,
THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

Summary of Interview ICO dtd 13 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 13 Apr 16
Marine Corps Drill and Ceremonies Manual
Scuzz Brush and Note Picture
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 14 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 15 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 13 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 12 Apr 16
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Summary of Interview ICO dtd 14 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 14 Apr 16
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Summary of Interview ICO dtd 14 Apr 16
dtd 13 Apr 16
Firewatch Rosters Platoon 3042
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 12 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 13 Apr 16
NCIS statement dtd 14 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 13 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 13 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 12 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 13 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 13 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 13 Apr 16
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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF ____________, THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

Summary of Interview ICO dtd 12 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 13 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 12 April 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 12 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 13 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 14 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 14 Apr 16
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Summary of Interview ICO dtd 12 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 12 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO dtd 12 Apr 16
Evaluation Card
Evaluation Card
Evaluation Card
PMO Report dtd 13 Mar 16
Email dtd 13 Mar 16
Email dtd 2 Dec 16
Recruit Incident Report Emails
HQMC Operational Report Email
MCO 3504.2A OPREP-3 (Incident Reporting)
Summary of Interview ICO
SOI East Email dtd 12 July 16
SOI West Email dtd 12 July 16
MARADMIN 073/14 (Marine Intercept Program)
MARADMIN 461/15 (Update to Marine Intercept Program)
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF [REDACTED], THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

Marine Corps Order 1720.2 (Suicide Prevention Program)
Marine Corps Order 3040.4 (Marine Corps Casualty Assistance Program)
MARADMIN 580/12 DOD Suicide Reporting Requirements
Mental Health Unit Attrition Email dtd 7 Apr 16
Summary of Interview ICO

Recruit Liaison Services Form ICO
Mental Health Unit Documents
Mental Health Unit Standard Operating Procedures
Inter-Service Support Agreement
Summary of Interview ICO
MHU Trial Training West Coast - Email

Email dtd 1 Dec 15
PMO Statement
Note
PMO Statement
NCIS Statement
NCIS Statement
Summary of Interview ICO
Summary of Interview ICO

NCIS Diagram of Fall
NCIS Interview
Photo #1 of Access Stairs
Photo #2 of Access Stairs
MUSC Medical Record
PMO Dispatch Log
Station 1 Phone Log
Basic Individual Record
Basic Individual Record
Basic Individual Record
Summary of Interview ICO
Basic Individual Record
Basic Individual Record
Basic Individual Record
Platoon 3042 Firewatch Logbook

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(b) (6) Drill Instructor Jacket
(b) (6) PAO Media Release
(b) (6) Summary of Interview ICO
(b) (6) Summary of Interview ICO
(b) (6) Summary of Interview ICO
(b) (6) Summary of Interview ICO
(b) (6) Summary of Interview ICO
(b) (6) Summary of Interview ICO
(b) (6) Relief for Cause Packages
(b) (6) Summary of Interview ICO
(b) (6) Summary of Interview ICO
(b) (6) Computer Screenshot
(b) (6) Recruit Training Regiment Legal Tracker
(b) (6) Email dtd 19 Aug 15
(b) (6) Summary of Interview ICO
(b) (6) Marine Corps Order 5354.1D W CH 1
(b) (6) Recruit Training Regiment Logbook (2008-2015)
(b) (6) Change of Command Article
(b) (6) Summary of Interview ICO
(b) (6) Interview Transcript of
(b) (6) Interview Transcript of
(b) (6) Command Investigation
(b) (6) Command Investigation
(b) (6) Allegation dtd 3 Nov 15
(b) (6) Email 5 Nov 15 at 1319
(b) (6) Email 5 Nov 15 at 1336
(b) (6) Email 5 Nov 15 at 1445
(b) (6) Email 5 Nov 15 at 1511
(b) (6) Email 5 Nov 15 at 1544
(b) (6) Email dtd 5 Nov 15
(b) (6) Email dtd 6 Nov 15
(b) (6) Summary of Interview ICO
(b) (6) Lance Corporal Personal Interview Sheet
(b) (6) Email dtd 13 Nov 15
(b) (6) Email dtd 19 Feb 16
(b) (6) Email dtd 11 Apr 16
(b) (6) dtd 3 Dec 16
(b) (6) dtd 24 Jan 16
(b) (6) Effective Roster 1 Apr 16
(b) (6) Effective Roster 5 Feb 16
(b) (6) Email dtd 19 Apr 16
(b) (6) dtd 2 Feb 16
(b) (6) Defense Travel System Email to

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Preliminary Statement

1. In accordance with the references, and as directed by enclosures (1)-(5), a command investigation was conducted into the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of [REDACTED] on 18 March 2016. Additionally, the Investigating Officer was tasked with providing specific comments on whether the existing policies, standing operating procedures, and orders, including reference (b) [REDACTED], should be revised.

2. Summary.

   a. This investigation recommends punitive or administrative action against eight (8) Marines, including [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]. Additionally, this investigation recommends changes to existing policies, standard operating procedures, and orders; to include the [REDACTED], and improvements in training for recruit training leaders and other commanders. It further recommends investigation into care provided by the Mental Health Unit of the Naval Hospital.
b. On 18 March 2016, (b)(6) vaulted over a stairwell railing on the third deck of the Company K recruit training barracks on board Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island. He fell to the ground below where he impacted a stairwell. The injuries he sustained in the fall resulted in (b)(6) death. The facts and circumstances indicated several factors contributed to (b)(6) death, including maltreatment by his drill instructor team, leadership failures at multiple levels of command, and administrative and process failures, that if avoided, could have reduced the risk of his death.

c. The leadership, supervisory, and administrative failures at the company, battalion, and regimental levels set the conditions permitting this tragic event to unfold. Evidence was found of multiple errors and omissions, to include failures to supervise and take required actions by a number of officers and staff non-commissioned officers in the recruit’s chain of command, some of which rose to the level of dereliction of duty. At the battalion and regimental level, there were leadership, administrative, and process failures which led to the assignment of (b)(6) as the (b)(6) of (b)(6) platoon, despite credible allegations of prior recruit abuse. Additionally, the investigation revealed administrative and process failures which limited awareness by the leadership at the Depot level regarding recruit abuse and hazing.

d. Lastly, the investigation revealed process flaws and deficiencies in mental health care policies and procedures, both in the Mental Health Unit at the Naval Hospital and in the Recruit Training Regiment that caused (b)(6) to be evaluated as fit for training when there were clear indications that he should have been disqualified. These issues also resulted in his return to his training platoon without the benefit of a mental health trial training program designed to assist recruits with difficulty adapting to the recruit training environment. These factors were exacerbated by lapses in coordination and communication between the Recruit Training Regiment and the Mental Health Unit.

3. Pursuant to enclosure (1), I was appointed as the investigating officer by Brigadier General T. V. Williams, U.S. Marine Corps, Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot

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On 7 April 2016, [REDACTED], U.S. Marine Corps, was assigned as the legal advisor for the investigation. During the course of the investigation, [REDACTED] and the personnel assigned to the [REDACTED], were deemed to be fact witnesses, a situation which required the assignment of a new legal advisor. On 26 April 2016, the Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island/Eastern Recruiting Region, assigned [REDACTED], USMC, as the legal advisor, and extended the completion date for the report of investigation to 15 May 2016 (encl (2)). On 4 May 2016, the Commanding General, Training and Education Command, assumed responsibility of this investigation as the Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island/Eastern Recruiting Region became a fact witness in the investigation. The new convening order extended the completion date for the report to 15 June 2016 (encl (3)). The increasing scope and complexity of the investigation required additional time to complete. I requested an extension for an additional 10 days on 14 June 2016, and an extension for an additional 28 days on 28 June 2016 (encls (4) and (5)). The extensions were granted resulting in a final due date of 15 July 2016.

4. This report of investigation addresses all known events and processes that may have contributed to [REDACTED] death. The investigation included an in-depth examination of all available facts and circumstances from the time that [REDACTED] began the process of recruitment until his death on 18 March, 2016, in addition to some events occurring after his death. All relevant and reasonably available evidence was collected. Documents, publicly available directives, and official correspondence were gathered through consent of the individual, where required, and also through the use of a search authorization. Testimonial evidence was gathered via in-person and telephonic interviews conducted by the investigation team. Initially, by agreement with [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], the Investigating Officer did not notify the leadership of allegations of past conduct that would not immediately endanger recruits, in order to create a [REDACTED]
permissive environment for fact gathering during the investigation. Unfortunately, during witness interviews with recruits from platoon 3042, allegations of ongoing physical abuse arose, necessitating the notification of the command and suspension of two drill instructors from their duties while the investigation continued. Subsequently, as the command rightly moved to address shortcomings and set corrective actions in motion, the investigative team found it more difficult to obtain information relevant to practices in place prior to [b](6) death.

5. During the course of the investigation, several difficulties were encountered, as outlined below.

   a. Conflicts and missing information.

      1. Several witnesses provided limited or no information to the investigating officer when requested. [b](6) was cooperative and helpful during the investigation and during his interview; however, when questioned about his failure to relieve [b](6) and others of their duties as drill instructors while they were under investigation, he invoked his right to remain silent. [b](6) witnesses also invoked their rights to counsel or silence as indicated in section 2.e., below.

      2. Due to the inherently chaotic and stressful conditions occurring in the process of recruit training, particularly during the first phase of training, recruits often cannot recall specific dates or times of events they have witnessed. Additionally, the noise of drill instructors’ and fellow recruits’ voices, combined with a requirement for recruits to stare straight ahead at the “position of attention” affected the perceptions of recruits on deck in the squadbay and in the training area, limiting the number of visual witnesses and their actual observances of events as they occurred. Further, a platoon policy that any recruit who looked at another recruit who was undergoing incentive training was bound to join him caused recruits to avert their eyes when being watched by the drill instructors.

   b. Records Management. Due to failures at several levels within the chain of command to properly execute custodial responsibility of records and their routing, the investigation
team had difficulty obtaining information required. This problem was specifically encountered while trying to obtain prior command investigations into allegations of recruit abuse at Third Recruit Training Battalion and the Recruit Training Regiment, the record of disposition of personal effects, personnel reports, battalion-level orders for personnel movements, and drill instructor training jackets.

c. Records of Email Correspondence. The Investigating Officer determined that access to information stored in the email accounts of Marines within the chain of command was necessary to complete the investigation (encl (6)). A command authorization to search for the emails was executed by the Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island/Eastern Recruiting Region, while he was the convening authority responsible for the investigation (encl (7)). The search authorization was forwarded with an official request from the Investigating Officer to the Marine Corps Network Operations and Security Center via the legal advisor on 27 April 2016 (encl (8)). The emails were not obtained until 16 May 2016 due to the size of the request, the need for supplemental identifying information to complete the request, and the required processing time. Upon receipt of the data, investigators noted that the amount of data received was very large, since the Marine Corps Network Operations and Security Center apparently did not sort the data via a Boolean tool. The large amount of data required significant manpower and time to review and sort for relevant information.

d. Independent legal review of correspondence. Emails belonging to both the [b](6) and [b](6) were included in the search. Due to the possibility of violating [b](6) held between [b](6) and the various commanders assigned to Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island/Eastern Recruiting Region, an additional review of the emails was necessary to ensure that only emails dealing directly with the investigation were turned over to the investigating officer. [b](6), U.S. Marine Corps, an active duty judge advocate, was assigned to conduct the review of the emails, a so-called “taint review,” which she completed on 23 May 2016 (encl (9)). The approved materials were provided to the investigating officer on 24 May 2016. The
external hard drive with the emails provided for review is currently in the possession of the


e. Medical Personnel Participation. As stated in paragraph 2.d. above, the investigation team identified several areas of concern with the medical care provided to; however, gaining the cooperation of the medical personnel was complicated by several factors, including a reluctance on the part of the hospital to provide information about care based on perceived Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) restrictions, the supported/supporting relationship between the Recruit Depot and the Navy command, and the desire of witnesses to seek legal advice or avoid perceived self-incrimination. , stated that he would not speak with the investigative team unless an attorney was present. , invoked his right to remain silent during a portion of the interview relating to care. As a result, I have recommended a separate inquiry by officials from Navy Medicine be conducted into the adequacy of care provided to.

6. This investigation is marked “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” because it contains personally identifying information (PII) protected under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 522(a). Information covered under HIPAA and its various implementing regulations is also contained in this investigation and must be safeguarded.

7. Personnel Contacted

(a) Brigadier General Terry V. Williams EDIPI: USMC
(b) EDIPI: USMC
(c) EDIPI: USMC
(d) EDIPI: USMC
(e) EDIPI: USMC
(f) EDIPI: USMC
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF [REDacted], THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

(g) [REDacted]
(h) [REDacted] EDIPI: [REDacted] USMC
(i) [REDacted] EDIPI: [REDacted] USMC
(j) [REDacted] EDIPI: [REDacted] USMC
(k) [REDacted] EDIPI: [REDacted] USMC
(l) [REDacted]
(m) [REDacted] EDIPI: [REDacted] USMC
(n) [REDacted] EDIPI: [REDacted] USMC
(o) [REDacted] EDIPI: [REDacted] USMC
(p) [REDacted] EDIPI: [REDacted] USMC
(q) [REDacted] EDIPI: [REDacted] USMC
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(t) [REDacted] EDIPI: [REDacted] USMC
(u) [REDacted] EDIPI: [REDacted]
(v) [REDacted] USMC
(w) [REDacted] USMC
(x) [REDacted] USMC
(y) [REDacted] USMC
(z) [REDacted] USMC
(aa) [REDacted] USMC
(bb) [REDacted] USMC
(cc) [REDacted] USMC
(dd) [REDacted] USMC
(ee) [REDacted] USMC
(ff) [REDacted] EDIPI: 16

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DEATH OF (b)(6) , THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

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THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

(ccc) [REDACTED] USMC

(ddd) [REDACTED] USMC

(eee) [REDACTED] USMC

(fff) [REDACTED] USMC

(ggg) [REDACTED] USMC

(hhh) [REDACTED] USMC

(iii) [REDACTED] USMC

(jjj) [REDACTED] USMC

(kkk) [REDACTED] USMC

(lll) [REDACTED] USMC

(mmm) [REDACTED] USMC

(nn) [REDACTED] USMC

(ooo) [REDACTED] USMC

(ppp) [REDACTED] USMC

(qqq) [REDACTED] USMC

(rrr) [REDACTED] USMC

(sss) [REDACTED] USMC

(ttt) [REDACTED] USMC

(uuu) [REDACTED] USMC

(vvv) [REDACTED] USMC

(www) [REDACTED] USMC

.xxx) [REDACTED] USMC

(yy) [REDACTED] USMC

(zzz) [REDACTED] USMC

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USMC

(aaaa) [REDACTED] EDIPI: [REDACTED] USMC

(bbbb) [REDACTED] EDIPI:

(bbb) [REDACTED] USMC

(cccc) [REDACTED] EDIPI:

(dddd) [REDACTED] EDIPI: [REDACTED] USMC

(eeee) [REDACTED] EDIPI: [REDACTED] USMC

(ffff) [REDACTED] EDIPI: [REDACTED] USMC

(gggg) [REDACTED] EDIPI: [REDACTED] USMC

(hhhh) [REDACTED] EDIPI: [REDACTED] USMC

(iiii) [REDACTED] EDIPI: [REDACTED] USMC

(jjjj) [REDACTED] EDIPI: [REDACTED] USMC

(kkkk) [REDACTED] EDIPI: [REDACTED] USMC

(llll) [REDACTED] EDIPI: [REDACTED] USMC

(mmmm) [REDACTED]
Findings of Fact

1. [b](b) first made contact with a U.S. Marine Corps recruiter at Marine Corps Recruiting Substation Wyandotte, Michigan, on 7 March 2015. [Encls (10), (11)]

2. During his recruitment, [b] never indicated any history of suicidal ideations, suicide attempts, or other mental health concerns. [Encls (11), (12)]

3. [Encl (12)]

4. On 8 July 2015, [b] was medically screened at Military Entrance Processing Station, Detroit, Michigan, and was found to be in good health and qualified for service. [Encls (13), (14)]

5. On 8 July 2015, [b] enlisted in the United States Marine Corps at age 19, and was obligated to serve at least four years on active duty. [Encl (12)]

6. On 7 March 2016, [b] arrived at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina. [Encls (12), (15)]

7. Between 7 and 12 March 2016, [b] completed administrative processing known as “receiving” with the other recruits who arrived during that same timeframe. [Encl (15), (16)]

8. [b] was received or “picked up” by his training company on 12 March 2016. [Encl (15)]

9. [b] was assigned to Platoon 3042. [Encl (15)]

10. [b] made a verbal threat of suicide prior to 0745 on 13 March 2016, after less than one full day of forming. [Encls (15), (17), (18), (19), (20)]

11. At about 0535 18 March 2016, five days after joining Platoon 3042, [b] vaulted over a stairwell railing on the third deck of the Company K recruit training barracks.
sustaining injuries resulting in his death. [Encls (21), (22), (23), (24)]

(b)(6) Chain of Command

12. Brigadier General Williams was the Commanding General of Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island/Eastern Recruiting Region. [Encls (25), (26), (27)]

13. [b](6) was [b](6). [Encls (28), (29)]

14. [b](6) was [b](6). [Encl (30)]

15. [b](6) was [b](6). [Encl (31)]

16. [b](6) was [b](6). [Encl (32)]

17. [b](6) was the [b](6), the [b](6). [Encl (33)]

18. [b](6) was [b](6). [Encl (34)]

19. [b](6) was [b](6). [Encl (35)]

20. [b](6) and assumed the billet on 30 November 2015. [Encl (36)]

21. [b](6) was [b](6). [Encl (37)]

22. [b](6) was [b](6). [Encl (38)]

23. [b](6). [Encl (39)]
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24. As [REDACTED], [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]. [Encl (39)]

25. [REDACTED] was out of the office on paternity leave, which began before Platoon 3042 was picked up and ended after [REDACTED] death. [Encl (39)]

26. During [REDACTED] absence, [REDACTED] served as [REDACTED]. [Encl (40)]

27. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] in charge of [REDACTED]. [Encl (40)]

28. [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]. [Encl (41)]

29. [REDACTED] for Platoon 3042 was [REDACTED]. [Encl (19)]

30. [REDACTED], often referred to as [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]. [Encl (42)]

31. Platoon 3042’s [REDACTED], also known as [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]. [Encl (43)]

32. Platoon 3042’s [REDACTED], also known as [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]. [Encls (44), (45)]

Platoon 3042, Company K, Third Recruit Training Battalion

33. Drill instructors supervise and instruct or assist in commanding and instructing a recruit platoon. [Encl (46)]

34. Drill instructor teams are organized with a senior drill instructor and drill instructors. The drill instructors are unofficially billeted by experience, as the experienced drill instructor, and “numbered hats,” i.e., third hat, fourth hat, etc. [Encl (47)]

35. [REDACTED] was assigned as [REDACTED] for Platoon 3042. This was his first cycle as a [REDACTED]. [Encls (19), (48)]
36. (b) (6) checked in to Third Recruit Training Battalion on 18 June 2014. [Encl (48)]

37. (b) (6) had previously served as a drill instructor for three recruit training cycles: twice as a numbered hat and once as an experienced drill instructor. Platoon 3042 was his fourth cycle as a drill instructor. [Encl (48)]

38. (b) (6) drill instructor jacket (record) does not include any references to allegations of misconduct, recruit abuse, or any written counselings. [Encl (48)]

39. During a recruit training tour, drill instructors normally rotate to a billet away from recruit training platoons, usually for a period of seven to eleven months. This is commonly referred to as being “on quota.” [Encl (49)]

40. (b) (6) went on quota to (b) (6) on 5 August 2015. [Encl (48)]

41. Pursuant to his inherent command authority, (b) (6) approved transfers within the elements of his (b) (6). [Encls (36), (50)]

42. On 1 February 2016, (b) (6) returned to a recruit training company as (b) (6), Third Recruit Training Battalion. [Encl (48)]

43. On 8 March 2016, (b) (6) was moved from (b) to serve as (b) for Platoon 3042, Company K, Third Recruit Training Battalion. [Encl (48)]

44. The senior drill instructor of a platoon is generally regarded as the billet most important to the success of a recruit training platoon. [Encls (31), (33)]

45. (b) (6) taught his subordinate drill instructors that in order to be successful at training recruits they needed to “hate recruits.” [Encl (19)]
46. (b)(6) has heard drill instructors say that you need to “hate” recruits in order to train them. [Encl (38)]

47. (b)(6) stated that he hated recruits too much to enjoy the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor ceremony of his previous cycle. [Encl (51)]

48. (b)(6) believed that the primary responsibility of the numbered hats was “to be a nuisance or an irritant to recruits.” He believed that the more junior the drill instructor, the more “intense” they should be. [Encl (19)]

49. (b)(6) taught his drill instructors that “everywhere a drill instructor goes, he should be running.” [Encl (19)]

50. (b)(2) [Encl (52)]

51. (b)(6) recognized “hat hazing” as an issue that he focused on during his weekly discussions with drill instructors. [Encl (33)]

52. (b)(6) found indications on his command climate survey that “hat hazing” was occurring within Third Recruit Training Battalion. [Encl (34)]

53. The specific roles played by the experienced drill instructor or the “numbered hats” on the drill instructor team are not defined in either the (b)(2) or the (b)(2). [Encls (16), (53), (54)]

54. (b)(2) [Encls (16), (53)]

55. Although there are no defined roles within a drill instructor team, a hierarchy of drill instructor “roles” exists.
This hierarchy places the senior drill instructor on top, the experienced drill instructor in the middle, and the numbered hats at the bottom. [Encls (19), (33), (34), (38), (39), (42), (43), (44), (47), (48), (55), (56)]

56. The goal is for drill instructors to move up within the hierarchy. [Encls (33), (34), (36), (48), (57), (58)]

57. Drill instructors are evaluated on their performance within their individual “roles” as a numbered hat, experienced drill instructor, or senior drill instructor. [Encls (34), (39), (48), (57)]

58. The numbered hats are largely evaluated on their ability to stress and discipline recruits. [Encls (34), (38), (39), (43), (44), (48), (55), (57)]

59. Within the “green belt” drill instructors (experienced drill instructors and numbered hats) of Company K, the roles of the drill instructors were based primarily on drill field seniority. [Encl (47)]

60. [b](6) stated he was trained and believed that numbered hats should be running around like “cavemen.” [Encl (19)]

61. [b] believed the third hat had more of a teaching responsibility than the fourth hat. [Encl (19)]

62. [b] believed only the experienced drill instructor should teach drill. [Encls (19), (39)]

63. [b] stated that he “would be surprised to see a third hat teaching drill.” [Encl (39)]

64. The Recruit Depot leadership was aware of “hat hazing” within the Recruit Training Regiment. [Encls (30), (32), (33), (34)]

65. [b] had [b] designed to prevent “hat hazing.” [Encls (31), (52)]
66. (b)(6) stated that he saw less hat hazing after the publication of (b)(2). [Encl (32)]

67. (b)(6), (b)(6), has heard the following:
   a. Numbered hats consistently running unnecessarily;
   b. Drill instructors not allowing new drill instructors to sit in the duty hut;
   c. Drill instructors making new drill instructors sleep on the floor instead of in the racks in the duty hut;
   d. Sergeants standing at parade rest to speak to other sergeants in order to show respect to drill instructors in a "higher" billet. [Encl (38)]

68. (b)(6) stated that he took proactive steps to ensure that these things did not occur in his company. [Encl (38)]

69. (b)(6), (b)(6), has heard some drill instructors say that an experienced drill instructor’s job is to make a fourth hat quit. [Encl (30)]

70. Numbered hats in the Recruit Training Regiment are known to run unnecessarily while the senior drill instructors and experienced drill instructors do not. [Encls (19), (30), (34), (38), (55), (59)]

71. (b)(6) stated that he does not see SDIs running but that he does see EDIs, 3rd, and 4th hats running. [Encl (32)]

72. On one occasion, (b)(6) observed a drill instructor running at sling arms in the Service “C” uniform. When asked why he was running, the Marine responded, “I am a drill instructor. It is what is expected. It is a sign of weakness or laziness [if I do not] and this is how I develop discipline and endurance.” [Encl (34)]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF (b)(6), THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

73. (b)(6) has witnessed drill instructors running everywhere and believed that there was a sense of entitlement amongst the senior drill instructors and experienced drill instructors. [Encl (30)]

74. (b)(6), who has completed multiple combat tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan, to include being a part of named operations, was not allowed to teach recruits because he was a numbered hat. (b)(6) believed his role was to “run and scream.” [Encls (19), (43), (60)]

75. Platoon 3042 was (b)(6) second full training cycle as a drill instructor. [Encls (43), (60)]

76. (b)(6) stated that he routinely “got in trouble” in his previous platoon for straying from his intended role and trying to teach recruits. [Encl (43)]

77. (b)(6) was assigned as the third hat for Platoon 3042, Company K, Third Recruit Training Battalion. [Encls (43), (47)]

78. (b)(6) found it frustrating that with 15 years of experience, as a third hat, he was limited to screaming and would get in trouble for trying to teach or talk to the recruits. [Encl (43)]

79. (b)(6) stated that there are some drill instructors that feel the need to “bad mouth” and overly stress new drill instructors. [Encl (32)]

80. (b)(6) stated the command had indications that there was a lack of professionalism on the part of some senior drill instructors who were treating junior drill instructors like recruits. [Encl (32)]

81. (b)(6) believed that hat hazing could lead to mistreatment of recruits. [Encl (38)]

82. (b)(6) believed that hat hazing could lead to mistreatment of recruits. [Encl (30)]

83. (b)(6) did not allow his drill instructors to eat in the chow hall during recruit meal times and instead

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required his drill instructors to eat in the duty hut. [Encl (19)]

84. (b)(6) directed his drill instructors to spend their time during recruit meal times making corrections on recruits’ behavior in the chow hall. [Encl (19)]

85. (b)(6) promised his drill instructors that he would give them breaks and provide them food and drinks, especially during the “brutal” first ten days of training. [Encl (19)]

86. (b)(6) was assigned as (b)(6) for Platoon 3042, Company K, Third Recruit Training Battalion. [Encls (42), (57)]

87. (b)(6) had previously served as a drill instructor for three cycles: two as a numbered hat and one as an experienced drill instructor. [Encls (42), (57)]

88. From 1 April 2015 to 21 October 2015, (b)(6) worked on quota as a martial arts instructor. [Encl (57)]

89. (b)(6) was assigned as the fourth hat for Platoon 3042, Company K, Third Recruit Training Battalion. (b)(6) had previously served one partial cycle as a drill instructor. [Encls (44), (45), (47)]

90. (b)(6) stated that his role as a fourth hat was to run, scream, make corrections constantly, incentive train, and teach limited knowledge. [Encl (44)]

91. On 5 April 2016, (b)(6) wrote in an email that, according to his Fitbit, he runs an average of 29 miles per day while serving as the fourth hat. [Encl (59)]

92. In addition to the drill instructors assigned to Platoon 3042, from 15 to 19 March 2016, two student drill instructors, (b)(6) and (b)(6) were present with the platoon to observe recruit training as part of their training to become drill instructors. [Encls (61), (62)]
93. For the first four training days, the two observing drill instructor students were present with the platoon for the majority of the day. [Encl (61)]

94. The drill instructor students believed their role was to run around, scream, and make corrections. [Encl (61)]

**Training Environment**

95. On Saturday, 12 March 2016, the recruits of Platoon 3042 were "picked up" by their drill instructors between 0800 and 0930. [Encl (63)]

96. There were 59 Recruits "picked up" in Platoon 3042. [Encl (64)]

97. [Encls (16), (65), (66)]

98. Tuesday, 15 March 2016, was Platoon 3042’s first training day (TD-1). [Encl (67)]

99. The recruits of Platoon 3042 were billeted on the third floor (deck) in Building 683, a three-story barracks that housed the recruits of Company K. [Encls (68), (69), (70), (71), (72)]

100. The recruits’ main living area, or “squadbay,” also known as the “house,” is a large open room, approximately 60 yards long by 15 yards wide. [Encls (69), (73), (74), (75), (76)]

101. The recruits’ common bathroom area, or “head” includes the sinks, toilets, showers or “rain room,” and urinals. [Encls (69), (73)]

102. The recruit shower is an area, approximately 36 feet by 17 feet, which cannot be seen from the main squadbay or the rest of the head. [Encls (69), (73)]

103. In the back corner of the head area, next to the shower room, the laundry room or “Maytag room,” is a small space about 12 feet by 8 feet with two washing machines and two large dryers. [Encl (73)]
104. At the end of the squadbay, opposite the head, is the drill instructors’ duty hut, also known as the “senior drill instructor’s house” or “drill instructors’ house.” [Encls (39), (55), (69), (77)]

105. The duty hut is separated from the squadbay by a wall with a window and a door that opens to the squadbay. [Encls (69), (73), (77)]

106. The area of the squadbay directly in front of the duty hut and up to the first recruit’s rack is called the quarterdeck. This area also contains rubber mats for “incentive training.” [Encls (73), (74), (75), (76), (78), (79)]

107. The main squadbay has two exits, each with double doors, or “hatches” that open outward. The “front hatch” is located at the same end of the squadbay as the duty hut. The “back hatch” or “rear hatch” is located at the opposite end of the squadbay adjacent to the head. [Encls (74), (77)]

108. The aisle in the center of the squadbay (center aisle) is known as the “highway,” the “center highway,” the “drill instructor highway,” or the “senior drill instructor’s highway.” It is marked with blue lines about fifteen feet apart that run the length of the squadbay. [Encls (19), (74), (75), (76)]

109. The recruits’ bunk beds (racks) are arranged on each side of the center aisle. [Encl (74)]

110. When ordered to “get on line,” recruits stand at the position of attention at the end of their racks, facing the center aisle in the middle of the squadbay with their feet on the lines demarcating the center aisle. [Encls (19), (74)]

111. Marine Corps Order 1510.32F (RECRUIT TRAINING) requires that recruit training be conducted in a professional manner and prohibits hazing, maltreatment, and abuse of authority. [Encl (66)]

112. [Encl (16)]

113. [Encl (16)]
117. The recruits of Platoon 3042 were subject to hazing and maltreatment through the execution of unauthorized incentive training. [Encls (79), (80), (81), (82), (83), (84), (85), (86), (87), (88), (89), (90), (91), (92), (93), (94), (95), (96), (97), (98)]

118. [Encl (16)]

119. Incentive training was ordered by the drill instructors of Platoon 3042 on multiple occasions in the recruit shower and included exercises colloquially referred to as “down-ups,” “pay-me’s,” “lunges,” and “electric chairs.” [Encls (83), (86), (87), (88), (95), (97)]

120. “Down-ups” are performed by a recruit by first standing upright with his arms down at his sides; he then quickly drops to a pushup position on the floor and uses his arms to lower his body to the prone position. He then pushes himself up off the
deck and quickly returns to the starting position (standing). [Encls (86), (87)]

121. A “pay-me” is performed like a “down-up,” but when the recruit is in the prone position he extends his arms past his head and slaps the deck before returning to the push-up position and jumping back to the starting position. [Encls (86), (87)]

122. “Lunges” are performed by stepping forward with one leg far enough to place the opposite knee on the deck while the forward thigh is parallel to the deck, touching the knee to the deck, and then repeating with the opposite leg. Recruits conducted lunges from one end of the shower room to the other. [Encls (79), (83), (97)]

123. “Electric chairs” are performed by having recruits squat with their backs pressed against the shower walls with their thighs parallel to the deck and their heels against the wall. During “electric chairs,” drill instructors also made the recruits hold their arms extended parallel to the deck, in front of their bodies. [Encls (79), (83), (91), (94), (95), (97), (99), (100), (101)]

124. Unauthorized incentive training was also ordered on several occasions in the squadbay through the repeated movement, carrying and holding out of footlockers, daypacks and laundry detergent bottles, and requiring recruits to “clean” the squadbay in stressful and painful positions. [Encls (79), (80), (81), (82), (83), (84), (85), (86), (87), (88), (89), (90), (91), (92), (93), (94), (95), (96), (97), (98)]

125. A recruit’s footlocker has a metal handle on each side and is roughly the same width as a recruit’s twinsized rack. It is used to store a recruit’s gear and personal items. [Encl (74)]

126. Unauthorized incentive training using footlockers was colloquially referred to as “bus drivers” and “trail arms.” [Encls (79), (80), (81), (82), (83), (84), (85), (86), (87), (88), (89), (90), (91), (92), (93), (94), (95), (96), (97), (98)]

127. “Bus drivers” were performed by recruits standing on line holding their footlockers either against their chests or with their arms fully extended and parallel to the deck while turning
the footlockers left and right as though the footlocker were a steering wheel. [Encls (79), (80), (82), (83), (85), (89), (90), (91), (92), (93), (95), (97), (98)]

128. “Trail arms” with footlockers was performed by requiring recruits to use one arm extended behind their back, to hold their footlockers approximately three inches off the deck. [Encls (79), (80), (81), (82), (83), (85), (86), (89), (90), (91), (92), (93), (94), (95), (96), (97), (98), (102)]

129. (b)(6) ordered recruits to move footlockers around the squadbay for periods of time ranging between ten minutes to an hour. [Encl (19)]

130. The term “scuzz brush” refers to a handheld, nylon-bristled scrub brush, about eight inches long by two and one-half inches across that is used to clean the squadbay and the recruits’ individually issued gear. [Encl (103)]

131. On many occasions the drill instructors ordered the recruits to “scuzz brush the squadbay,” which required each recruit to place both of his hands on the brush, with the bristles on the deck, and push the brush along the deck, while bent at the waist without standing or allowing their knees to touch the deck, from one end of the squadbay to the other while the drill instructors were counting down as fast as they could. [Encls (79), (81), (82), (83), (85), (86), (87), (88), (89), (90), (91), (92), (93), (94), (95), (96), (97), (98), (99), (104), (105)]

132. Platoon 3042 was routinely required to “scuzz brush” the squadbay for periods of time between fifteen and forty minutes. [Encls (91), (94), (95), (104)]

133. (b)(2) [Encls (16), (19), (96)]

134. (b)(2). [Encl (16)]
135. The drill instructors made the recruits conduct “get backs” in their squadbay over and over again, which consisted of recruits running back and forth between two different locations. [Encl (19)]

136. [b](2) [Encl (16)]

137. [b](2) [Encl (16)]

138. [b](2) [Encl (16)]

139. Most of the allegations of unauthorized incentive training occurred during Basic Daily Routine. [Encls (38), (99)]

140. [b](2) [Encl (16)]

141. [b](2) [Encls (16), (19), (36), (43)]
142. (b)(6) routinely violated the regulations regarding touching recruits by physically assaulting them. [Encls (79), (85), (88), (89), (93), (106), (107), (108)]

143. (b)(6) choked (b)(6) in the shower and caused (b)(6) head to hit the wall three times. [Encls (79), (89), (106)]

144. The drill instructors of Platoon 3042 specifically directed recruits to assault other recruits and authorized them to use physical force to enforce rules in the squadbay and classrooms. [Encls (79), (85), (89), (90), (91), (93), (94), (95), (107)]

145. (b)(6) ordered (b)(6) to choke (b)(6). [Encls (79), (89), (93)]

146. When (b)(6) only pretended to choke (b)(6), (b)(6) pushed (b)(6) aside and choked (b)(6) until (b)(6) was satisfied. [Encls (79), (86), (89), (90), (93), (109), (110), (111)]

147. (b)(6) ordered (b)(6) to choke (b)(6) and (b)(6) complied. [Encls (85), (107)]

148. While standing firewatch, (b)(6) was attempting to set up a podium made of footlockers. (b)(6) kicked a footlocker (b)(6) was carrying causing (b)(6) to fall which resulted in a cut on his arm and a bruise on his leg. [Encls (79), (81), (99), (101), (112), (113), (114)]

149. (b)(6) stated that while standing firewatch (b)(6) forced him to choke himself with a dog tag chain (thin metal chain) when he failed to report his post properly. [Encl (95)]

150. (b)(6) ordered (b)(6) to engage in unauthorized incentive training by making him clean the floor of the squadbay with a towel without letting his knees touch the deck. [Encls (84), (95), (99)]
151. (b) also violated the regulations regarding touching recruits by physically assaulting them. [Encls (79), (84), (85), (88), (91), (99), (100), (101), (115)]

152. Immediately after being choked in the shower by , left the shower room while touching his head and was assaulted by in that grabbed his head, spun him around, and bent him over backwards. [Encl (99)]

153. On another occasion, grabbed by the blouse, because was not running fast enough to satisfy . [Encl (95)]

154. [Encl (16)]

155. [Encl (16)]

156. Because the squad leaders in Platoon 3042 were responsible for their small units (i.e., their squads), they would be punished by the drill instructors when recruits in their respective units made mistakes. [Encls (79), (88), (90), (100)]

157. Billet holders would often hit recruits, or use other physical force, when recruits nodded off in class, failed to move fast enough, etc., at the direction of their drill instructors. Drill instructors would often tell billet holders to “hit harder” or “put more strength into it.” [Encls (79), (88), (90), (91), (95), (97), (100)]

158. [Encl (16)]

159. While practicing drill, the drill instructors routinely used excessive force by slapping recruits’ hands, pushing recruits and pulling them by their clothing while claiming that the actions were necessary to make “drill corrections.” [Encls (78), (79), (93), (95), (97), (100), (116), (117), (118)]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF [b](6) [b] [b] [b], THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

160. [b](2) [b] [b] [b] [Encl (16)]

161. [b](6) [b] [b] [b], who was assigned as [b] [b] [b] for Platoon 3042 after [b](6) [b] [b] was removed, stated that some drill instructors call male recruits “bitches” and “faggots,” but drill instructors view the words as “terms of endearment” rather than abusive epithets. [Encl (55)]

162. The recruits of Platoon 3042 were routinely verbally abused by the drill instructors. [Encls (78), (79), (80), (86), (88), (89), (91), (95), (97), (99), (100), (101), (108), (112), (115), (119), (120), (121), (122), (123)]

163. Drill instructors routinely addressed or referred to the recruits in Platoon 3042 by various derogatory names, including, but not limited to: “faggots,” “maggots,” “bitches,” “little shits,” “pussies,” and “retards.” [Encls (78), (79), (80), (86), (88), (89), (91), (95), (97), (99), (100), (101), (108), (112), (115), (119), (120), (121), (122), (123)]

164. [b](6) [b] [b] [b] referred to [b](6) [b] [b] [b] [b] [b], who was born in Russia, as “the Russian” or “cosmonaut” and asked him, “Are you a communist spy?” [Encls (79), (82), (83), (84), (85), (86), (88), (91), (101), (104), (106), (107), (108), (110), (111), (112), (113), (115), (116), (119), (121), (124), (125), (126), (127), (128), (129), (130), (131), (132)]

165. [b](6) [b] [b] [b] repeatedly used the term “terrorist” when addressing or referring to [b](6) [b] [b] [b]. Various recruits stated that [b](6) [b] [b] [b] [b] would also ask [b](6) [b] if he was a “terrorist” or if he needed his “turban.” [Encls (79), (84), (88), (89), (93), (96), (97), (101), (104), (106), (107), (108), (111), (112), (115), (116), (123), (124), (125), (128), (130), (131), (132), (133), (134), (135)]

166. On 21 March 2016, [b](6) [b] [b] made a statement to Naval Criminal Investigative Service [b](6) [b] [b] stating that he was unaware of [b](6) [b] [b] ethnic or religious background. [Encl (18)]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF [REDACTED], THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

167. [REDACTED]. [Encl (136)]

168. On 17 March 2016, Platoon 3042 received instruction on Marine Corps Martial Arts Program punches and then practiced the newly learned techniques. [Encl (47)]

169. [REDACTED] was paired with [REDACTED] during Marine Corps Martial Arts Program training. [REDACTED] was instructed by [REDACTED] to engage in drills that were different from what the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program instructors were teaching, in that [REDACTED] ordered the throwing of “a flurry of punches” as hard as [REDACTED] could punch. During the drill, [REDACTED] was punched once on the right side of his body, once in the jaw, and once in the body. [Encl (91)]

170. Prior to pairing [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] for punching drills, [REDACTED] told [REDACTED], “I told you I would get mine,” and ordered [REDACTED] to hold a pad with broken straps for [REDACTED] to punch. [REDACTED] dropped the bag and was struck several times in the body, sustaining two broken ribs from the assault. [Encls (83), (99)]

171. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED], “[REDACTED], you’re going to pay for that” and “MCMAP is today, [REDACTED]” [Encl (101)]

172. [REDACTED] has heard drill instructors in referencing pending Marine Corps Martial Arts Program training say words to the effect of “just wait; you’ll get yours,” and “just wait; we’ll settle this later.” [Encl (100)]

173. [REDACTED] paired [REDACTED] against [REDACTED] for punching practice. The drill instructors told [REDACTED] not to listen for the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program instructor’s commands, but instead “just to keep punching.” [Encls (99), (100)]

174. [REDACTED] weighed about 227 pounds. [Encl (137)]

175. [REDACTED] weighed about 188 pounds. [Encl (138)]
176. [b](6) was required to punch [b](6) excessively during the exercise, driving him backwards, knocking him to the ground, and giving [b](6) a bloody nose. [Encls (99), (100)]

177. The abuse caused [b](6) to cry during the event, as he had promised [b](6) that he would help him to get through training. [Encls (99), (100)]

178. When [b](6) finished punching practice with [b](6), he was paired with [b](6). [Encls (83), (100), (101)]

179. [b](6) weighed about 146 pounds. [Encl (139)]

180. [b](6) claims that no physical abuse occurred during the time he was paired with [b](6) because the drill instructor walked away; however, there were no witnesses who could corroborate this event. [Encl (100)]

181. Drill instructors would routinely pair recruits from other platoons with [b](6) during Marine Corps Martial Arts Program training. On one occasion, [b](6) instructed [b](6) to “leg sweep the recruit [from the other platoon] as hard as he could.” Eventually, the other recruit became angry and punched [b](6), giving him a black eye. [Encls (79), (88), (99), (100)]

182. On 21 March 2016, Platoon 3042 began training with pugil sticks as part of their Marine Corps Martial Arts Program training. [Encl (47)]

183. [b](2) [Encl (136)]

184. [b](2) [Encl (136)]

185. [b](2) [Encl (136)]
186. [b](2) [Encl (136)]

187. During a pugil sticks training session, [b](6) was matched to fight against a bigger and stronger recruit. [Encls (84), (99), (104)]

188. [b] (2), [b] (6) [Encls (84), (99), (104), (136)]

189. [b] (2), [b] (6) [Encls (84), (99), (104), (136)]

190. As [b] helmet came off, the other recruit struck [b] on the back of the head as he lay prone on the ground. [Encls (84), (99), (104)]

191. [b] was taken to the hospital in an ambulance because he exhibited concussion-like symptoms. [Encls (99), (104)]

192. [b] stated that during pugil sticks training he was also ordered by drill instructors to keep hitting a recruit who was “out of the fight” and that he struck his opponent four or five times before the whistle finally sounded. [Encl (104)]

193. [b] fought three times during one pugil stick event while drill instructors paired smaller recruits against him. [Encl (100)]

194. The recruits of Platoon 3042 believed the drill instructors of Platoon 3042 used the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program as an opportunity to pair small unit leaders or stronger recruits against the weaker or poorly performing recruits in order to punish them. [Encls (79), (83), (88), (91), (94), (99), (104), (107), (125)]
195. (b)(6) was dropped on 22 March 2015, the seventh day of training, due to a 5th and 6th fractured rib sustained from Marine Corps Martial Arts Program training. [Encls (64), (83)]

196. The same night in which (b)(6) was forced to choke himself, (b)(6) required him to perform unauthorized incentive training by forcing him to clean the floor of the squadbay with a towel while not permitting him to touch his knees to the deck. [Encls (95), (99)]

197. After “cleaning” the floor for nearly an hour, (b)(6) felt severe pain in his legs. [Encl (95)]

198. (b)(6) was ordered to “clean” the floors with (b)(6), but when (b)(6) became exhausted after (b)(6) left the squadbay, (b)(6) told (b)(6) to go lie down. [Encl (84)]

199. The following morning, (b)(6) was in pain and had difficulty walking. [Encl (95)]

200. (b)(6) was later diagnosed with rhabdomyolysis, a condition caused by extreme muscle strain. [Encl (99)]

201. (b)(6) was dropped from Platoon 3042 as result of rhabdomyolysis and subcutaneous emphysema on 23 March. [Encls (95), (138)]

202. [Encl (16)]

203. On 23 March, (b)(6) Recruit Evaluation Card entry annotates that (b)(6) “is being dropped for Pneumomediastinum/Rhabdo.” The Recruit Evaluation Cards are maintained by the drill instructors. [Encl (138)]

204. The Recruit Drop Roster lists the reason for (b)(6) drop only as pneumonia. [Encl (64)]

205. (b)(6) went to medical on 22 and 25 March for rhabdomyolysis and pneumonia. [Encl (140)]
206. Like (b)(6), (b)(6) was diagnosed with rhabdomyolysis and pneumonia before being dropped from Platoon 3042. [Encls (91), (140)]

207. The Recruit Drop Roster lists the reason for (b)(6) drop only as pneumonia. [Encl (64)]

208. [Encl (16)]

209. [Encl (16)]

210. [Encl (16)]

211. Prior to 0720 on 13 March 2016, (b)(6) told (b)(6) that he (b)(6) if required to return to training. [Encls (18), (19), (20), (139)]

212. When asked how (b)(6) replied that he would (b)(6) [Encls (18), (19), (20), (139)]

213. (b)(6) asked (b)(6) how his family would feel if he returned home from training without becoming a Marine, and (b)(6) answered that he would (b)(6) [Encl (18)]

214. (b)(6) stated that he recognized that he was not convincing (b)(6) to continue his training, so (b)(6) asked (b)(6), (b)(6) as well. [Encls (18), (117)]
215. During the ensuing discussion with [b](6) interrupted him and stated, “The future does not matter.” [Encls (18), (41), (117)]

216. [b](6) directed [b](6) to call emergency medical services in order to transport [b](6) to Beaufort Memorial Hospital. [Encl (117)]

217. [b](6) inquired whether [b](6) had experienced previous [b](6), to which [b](6) responded that he had previous [b](6), but had not told his recruiter about them. [Encl (117)]

218. [b](6) then instructed [b](6) to remove his belt and shoelaces while he awaited transport to the hospital. [Encl (117)]

219. [b](6) indicated to [b](6) that he could be administratively separated from the Marine Corps for fraudulent enlistment because he had failed to disclose [b](6) was present at the time of the discussion. [Encls (19), (117)]

220. [b](6) went to the company office to inform the [b](6), that [b](6) had expressed a [b](6) and that [b](6) was calling emergency medical services. [Encl (117)]

221. At 0720 on 13 March 2016, [b](6) called emergency medical services, and military police were dispatched to the Third Recruit Training Battalion barracks. [Encl (18)]

222. At 0724, military police arrived and spoke with [b](6), who told them that he “could not handle” drill instructors yelling at him and hitting him. [Encls (37), (117)]

223. [b](6) dismissed [b](6) complaint of being hit as mere “drill corrections” by his drill instructors. [Encls (41), (117)]

224. At 0740, the request to have [b](6) taken to the hospital for further evaluation was denied by fire dispatch
based on emergency medical services protocol that required a recruit engage in self-harm or an actual suicide attempt to qualify for emergency transport. [Encls (19), (117), (141)]

225. At 0748, (b)(6) was notified of (b)(6) . [Encls (117), (141)]

226. (b)(6) informed (b)(6) that emergency medical services would not take (b)(6) to Beaufort Memorial Hospital and that (b)(6) had made allegations of being hit by the drill instructors. [Encl (117)]

227. At 0828, (b)(6) reported to (b)(6) , via email that (b)(6) had made a . [Encl (142)]

228. (b)(6) ordered (b)(6) to be “cross-decked,” meaning that he would be billeted in an adjacent platoon’s squadbay with a full-time recruit [Encls (19), (36), (37), (41), (56), (142)]

229. A (b)(6) is a recruit who is charged with watching the cross-decked recruit at all times, including overnight. By local rules, the shadow watch operates as an additional firewatch. The recruit being watched must request permission to leave the rack and the shadow watch must wake up the drill instructor if anything goes wrong. [Encls (19), (37), (40), (41), (142)]

230. (b)(2) [Encl (16)]

231. (b)(2) [Encl (16)]

232. (b)(6) went back to the company office to discuss how to transport (b)(6) to Beaufort Memorial Hospital. [Encl (117)]
233. Concurrently, (b) (6)_________________ visited (b) (6)_________________ in the adjacent squadbay. During discussion, (b) (6)_________________ recanted his (b) (6)_________________, stating words to the effect of, “I want to continue to train.” [Encl (19)]

234. (b) (6)_________________ then called (b) (6)_________________ and reported that (b) (6)_________________ had recanted his (b) (6)_________________ and desired to train. [Encl (117)]

235. After learning of (b) (6)_________________ recantation, (b) (6)_________________ determined that (b) (6)_________________ did not require hospitalization and would continue to be “cross-decked” to the adjacent platoon. [Encls (37), (40), (41)]

236. (b) (2)_________________ [Encl (16)]

237. (b) (2)_________________ [Encl (16)]

238. (b) (2)_________________ [Encl (16)]

239. (b) (2), (b) (6)_________________ [Encls (16), (37), (142)]

240. (b) (6)_________________ informed (b) (6)_________________, who concurred with the plan to not hospitalize (b) (6)_________________. [Encls (34), (37)]

241. (b) (6)_________________ viewed Recruit Liaison Services as a tool to be used to prior to recruits visiting the (b) (6)_________________ and fully understand the consequences of
their words when they do speak to the [Encl (143)]

242. [b](6) believed that in the “vast majority of cases, even recruits expressing [b](6) do not present an immediate safety concern that would mitigate against the use of Recruit Liaison Services” prior to sending the recruits to the [b](6). [Encl (143)]

243. [b](6) believed that transporting recruits with [b](6) to Beaufort Memorial Hospital was unnecessary because of his belief that Beaufort Memorial Hospital would simply monitor the recruit overnight, and that this function could be accomplished by the training company. [Encl (34)]

244. After [b](6) recanted his [b](6), [b](6), conducted a “personal interview” with [b](6). [Encls (37), (40), (41)]

245. [b](2) [b](2). [Encl (16)]

246. [b](2) [b](2). [Encl (16)]

247. [b](2) [b](2). [Encl (16)]

248. [b](6) was briefed by [b](6), prior to the personal interview, that [b](6) had made an allegation that he had been hit by his drill instructors. [Encl (40)]
249. Platoon 3042 received instruction from their drill instructors regarding what constituted proper drill corrections. [Encl (19), (36), (43)]

250. (b)(6) dismissed allegation as a “drill correction.” [Encl (19), (36), (43)]

251. (b)(6) accepted dismissal of the allegation as a “drill correction” without further investigation. [Encl (40)]

252. During the personal interview, (b)(6) asked no specific questions about allegation that he had been hit by his drill instructors. Instead, he used the general format of a personal interview and accepted general denial of physical abuse. [Encl (40)]

253. After completing the personal interview, (b)(6) annotated in Recruit Evaluation Card that a “[Personal Interview] was conducted in accordance to the Recruit Training Order and there were no allegations.” [Encl (139)]

254. (b)(6) failed to report to allegation that his drill instructors had hit him. [Encl (37), (142)]

255. (b)(2)

256. (b)(2)

257. (b)(6) stated he believed statement that he did not like being hit was ambiguous, and that statement did not represent a “violation” without more details. [Encl (37)]

258. (b)(6) stated that he relied upon the “violation” language in the Recruit Training Order, paragraph 6008.1, to
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justify not reporting allegation of abuse because he determined the allegation did not rise to the level
of a “violation.” [Encl (37)]

259. believed that recruits often verbalized suicidal ideations as a means to get out of training. [Encl (34)]

260. also was concerned that recruits verbalized suicidal ideations as a means to get out of training. [Encl (117)]

261. believed was fabricating his suicidal threat in order to be separated from the Marine Corps because interrupted with the “magic words that would send him home.” [Encl (40)]

262. believed that the recruits often verbalized suicidal ideations as a means to get out of training. [Encl (36)]

263. was concerned that recruits verbalized suicidal ideations as a means to get out of training. [Encl (117)]

Serious Incident Reporting Requirements

264. Third Recruit Training Battalion did not submit a Recruit Incident Report after calling emergency medical services and the Provost Marshal’s Office in response to . [Encls (145), (146)]

265. [Encl (16)]

266. [b](2)
267. The Recruit Training Regiment currently does not file an OPREP-3 Serious Incident Report in the event of suicidal ideations by a Marine or recruit unless the Marine or recruit actually makes a bona fide suicidal ideation as diagnosed by a mental health provider. [Encl (31)]

268. An OPREP-3 Serious Incident Report was not made concerning 13 March. By the common understanding of the staff at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island at the time, an OPREP-3 Serious Incident Report was not required. [Encls (147), (148), (149), (150)]

269. The Marine Intercept Program was promulgated by MARADMIN 073/14 on 21 February 2014, and is not applicable to the Marine Corps Reserve or the Marine Corps Recruit Depots. [Encl (151)]

270. MARADMIN 073/14 distinguishes the Marine Intercept Program from the Marine Corps utilization of standardized reporting systems for suicidal ideations. The Marine Intercept Program still references the Commander’s requirement to report suicidal ideations per Marine Corps Order 3504.2A. [Encl (151)]

271. On 23 September 2015, the Marine Intercept Program was updated by MARADMIN 461/15. MARADMIN 461/15 makes reference to the Commander’s requirement to complete a Serious Incident Report on all suicidal ideations. [Encls (147), (152)]

272. Marine Corps Order 3040.4, the Marine Corps Casualty Assistance Program, dated 1 March 2011, requires apparent suicide attempts be verified by medical authorities prior to being reported via a Department of Defense Suicide Event Report, but the order does not discuss suicidal ideations. [Encl (153)]

273. Marine Corps Order 1720.2, the Marine Corps Suicide Prevention Program, dated 10 April 2012, and defines a suicidal ideation as “any thought of engaging in suicide-related behavior.” [Encl (154)]

274. The Marine Corps Suicide Prevention Program requires a Department of Defense Suicide Event Report for suicides and...
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medically verified suicide attempts, but not for suicidal
ideations. [Encls (154), (153)]

275. MARADMIN 580/12 (Reporting Requirements ICO Department of
Defense Suicide Event Report), dated 11 October 2012, requires
the reporting of suicides and medically verified attempted
suicides, but it does not address the reporting of suicidal
ideations. [Encl (155)]

276. In fiscal year 2015, suicidal ideations and attempts
constituted the number one reason for recruit separation for
mental health concerns. [Encl (156)]

277. (b)(6) stated that he requested guidance from
Headquarters Marine Corps and was informed that an OPREP-3
report should not be made for every verbal threat of suicide or
expression of suicidal thought by a recruit. [Encl (31)]

278. The Recruit Training Regiment reported that given the
frequency of suicidal ideations among recruits, an OPREP-3
reporting requirement for every verbal threat of suicide or
expression of suicidal thought would be overly burdensome and
unhelpful. [Encl (31)]

279. (b)(2) [REDACTED]... [Encls (148),
(149), (150)]

14 March – Evaluation by Recruit Liaison Services and Mental
Health Unit

280. The career recruiters at Recruit Liaison Services perform
two main functions: 1) they try to determine whether recruits
or their recruiters provided false information that enabled a
fraudulent enlistment and 2) they try to motivate recruits
having difficulty (who properly enlisted) to return to training.
[Encl (157)]

281. On 14 March 2016, (b)(6) personally took
(b)(6) [REDACTED] to the Recruit Liaison Services office before
(b)(6) [REDACTED] evaluation at the (b)(6) [REDACTED]. [Encls
(19), (37), (157)]
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282. (b)(6) [REDACTED] met with (b)(6) [REDACTED] . [Encl (157)]

283. (b)(6) [REDACTED] said that drill instructors who accompany recruits to Recruit Liaison Services normally stay in a separate waiting room so that the recruits are more comfortable and will speak honestly. [Encl (157)]

284. (b)(6) [REDACTED] stood about ten feet away from (b)(6) [REDACTED] while the recruit talked to (b)(6) [REDACTED] . [Encl (157)]

285. (b)(6) [REDACTED] explained to (b)(6) [REDACTED] the rights set forth on the “RIGHTS/ACKNOWLEDGEMENT STATEMENT” [sic] used by the Recruit Liaison Services. [Encl (157)]

286. The Recruit Liaison Services requires recruits to fill out a rights advisement and acknowledgment statement prior to talking with the Recruit Liaison Services staff. [Encls (157), (158)]

287. The Recruit Liaison Services rights/acknowledgment form is similar to an Article 31(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice Rights Advisement; however, it does not provide a place to inform the recruit of the nature of any suspected violations. [Encl (158)]

288. The Recruit Liaison Services rights/acknowledgment form differs from Article 31(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice Rights Advisements in that the Recruit Liaison Services form tells recruits that any statements they make may be used in further waiver and/or discharge/separation proceedings rather than at a trial by court-martial. [Encl (158)]

289. (b)(6) [REDACTED] provided a voluntary statement in which he said that he had told (b)(6) [REDACTED] that he “wants to quit and this recruit (b)(6) [REDACTED]. This Recruit thought it was the only way to quit. This Recruit never meant that and regrets it.” [Encl (159)]

290. (b)(6) [REDACTED] told (b)(6) [REDACTED] that he believed that threatening to (b)(6) [REDACTED] was the easy way to
get out of recruit training, but that he now recognized that “he had said something stupid.”  [Encl (157)]

291. **[b](6)** stated that he was now motivated to return to training.  [Encl (157), (159)]

292. During his interview with **[b](6)**, **[b](6)** denied to **[b](6)** any history of expressing  **[b](6)**  [Encl (157)]

293. After meeting with **[b](6)** at the Recruit Liaison Services Office, **[b](6)** was taken to the  **[b](6)**.  [Encls (19), (20), (37), (158), (159)]

294. The Mental Health Unit’s primary function is to serve as a mental health urgent care clinic for recruits.  [Encl (160)]

295. The Mental Health Unit’s hours of operation are 0630 to 1530 on weekdays, or until recruit business is completed, whichever is later.  [Encl (160)]

296. There is an Interservice Support Agreement between the Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island/Eastern Recruiting Region, and **[b](6)**, capturing the entirety of the command relationship between **[b](6)** and Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island.  [Encl (161)]

297. Contrary to the mental health providers preference to see recruits first, the Mental Health Unit standard operating procedures require that recruits be referred to the Mental Health Unit only after being properly assessed by **[b](6)**, **[b](6)**, and **[b](6)**.  [Encl (160)]

298. The Mental Health Unit standard operating procedures states that because its focus is on recruits in training, its mission is distinct from, and higher risk than, a traditional outpatient clinic.  [Encl (160)]

299. **[b](6)**, evaluated **[b](6)** at the Mental Health Unit in the Branch Medical Clinic on board MCRD Parris Island.  [Encl (162)]
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300. [REDACTED] was an unlicensed psychologist in the process of completing the requirements to obtain a psychology license. He was permitted to practice under the supervision of [REDACTED]. [Encl (162)]

301. [REDACTED] exercises his duties by monitoring the notes and other documents produced during sessions with patients. [Encl (162)]

302. [REDACTED] reports that [REDACTED] would occasionally sit in with patients or evaluate those patients himself if encountered a unique or unfamiliar situation. [Encl (162)]

303. The Mental Health Unit standard operating procedure requires a formal Plan of Supervision for unlicensed psychologists and requires the Department Head of each clinic to be responsible for the oversight of a monthly peer-review process for providers in their respective departments. [Encl (160)]

304. The investigating officer was unable to determine whether the plan or execution of supervisory responsibilities by [REDACTED] was adequate because documentation was not provided, invoked his right to remain silent during the interview, and requested that Navy counsel be present during his interview. [Encl (162)]

305. The Mental Health Unit standard operating procedure recognizes that a recruit with a suicide plan raises greater concerns than a recruit with only an ideation. [Encl (160)]

306. In determining whether or not to recommend a recruit be returned to training, [REDACTED] stated that he focuses on whether a patient has articulated a plan, and if so, the specificity and lethality of the plan. [Encl (162)]

307. Providers at the Mental Health Unit are reliant on the recruit’s command to provide adequate and accurate information about recruit’s prior statements. Medical Evaluation Form A is utilized to pass this information from the command to the provider. [Encl (162)]

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308. (b)(6) stated on (b)(6) Medical Evaluation Form A that (b)(6) was having difficulty adapting to recruit training and that he seemed uncommitted to continue training.” [Encl (20)]

309. (b)(6) Medical Evaluation Form A did not identify (b)(6) [Encls (18), (20)]

310. (b)(6) Medical Evaluation Form A did not contain information regarding statements made to (b)(6) about (b)(6) reported pre-service. [Encls (20), (117)]

311. After evaluating (b)(6), (b)(6) concluded the following:

   a. Assessment: no current diagnosis;

   b. There is no evidence of a disqualifying mental health condition;

   c. SNR [said named recruit] is highly motivated to continue training (10/10);

   d. SNR [said named Recruit] is currently deemed to be at low risk for harm;

   e. Training prognosis: fair;

   f. No Mental Health Unit follow-up; and,

   g. Recommendation: return to training. [Encl (159)]

312. (b)(2) [Encl (160)]
313. [b](2) __________________________. [Encls (16), (163), (164)]

314. [b](2) __________________________. [Encl (66)]

315. [b](6) __________________________ had no knowledge of any recruit ever being placed on the trial training program. [Encl (162)]

316. [b](2) __________________________. [Encl (165)]

317. [b](2) __________________________. [Encl (165)]

318. [b](2) __________________________. [Encl (165)]

319. [b](2) __________________________. [Encl (165)]

320. [b](2) __________________________. [Encl (160)]

321. [b](2) __________________________
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322. [Encls (160), (161)]

323. [Encls (31), (34), (162), (165)]

324. [Encl (160)]

325. [Encl (16)]

326. [Encl (162)]

327. [Encl (162)]

328. [Encl (160)]

329. [Encl (160)]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF [REDACTED], THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

330. [REDACTED] [Encl (160)]

331. [REDACTED] [Encl (160)]

332. [REDACTED] [Encl (160)]

333. [REDACTED] [Encl (160)]

334. [REDACTED] [Encl (160)]

335. [REDACTED] [Encl (160)]

336. [REDACTED] [Encl (165)]

337. [REDACTED] [Encl (165)]

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338. [REDACTED]. [Encl (165)]

339. When [REDACTED] returned to Platoon 3042 on 14 March 2016, [REDACTED] told his subordinate drill instructors to ease [REDACTED] back into training. [Encls (19), (42)]

340. [REDACTED] understood the senior drill instructor’s instruction to mean that the drill instructors should not order [REDACTED] to do incentive training for simple mistakes. [Encl (42)]

341. [REDACTED] was never made aware of the fact that [REDACTED] had made a suicidal ideation or had been evaluated by the Mental Health Unit. [Encl (43)]

18 March 2016 – [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

342. On 17 March 2016, [REDACTED] assumed the duties of firewatch for Platoon 3042 from 2300 until around 2350. [Encl (114)]

343. [REDACTED], [REDACTED] rackmate, stated that at approximately 0200 on 18 March 2016, [REDACTED] woke him, asking to talk. Exhausted from training and in pain from injuries sustained during Marine Corps Martial Arts Program training, [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] to go to sleep. [Encl (99)]

344. On the morning of 18 March 2016, training day four, all of the drill instructors assigned to Platoon 3042, to include the two drill instructor School students were present with the recruits at reveille at 0400. [Encls (44), (61), (62)]

345. Platoon 3042 was scheduled to leave the squadbay for the chow hall (recruit cafeteria) at 0415. [Encl (63)]
346. Before the platoon left the squadbay to go to morning chow, (b)(6) yelled at (b)(6) because the recruit was not sounding off. [Encls (61), (62)]

347. Instead of speaking or yelling, (b)(6) pointed to his throat and silently mouthed words. [Encls (61), (62)]

348. While (b)(6) and (b)(6) were yelling at him, (b)(6) handed a note to (b)(6). [Encls (61), (62)]

349. (b)(6), walked up to them, took the note, and told the drill instructor student observers, including a staff non-commissioned officer, to “go away” before he addressed (b)(6) himself. [Encls (42), (61), (62)]

350. (b)(6) gave (b)(6) note to (b)(6) without reading it, and quickly left the squad bay as directed. [Encl (166)]

351. (b)(6) note said, “This recruit has to go to medical. This recruits throat has been swollen for 3 days and is getting worse. When this recruit drinks and eats, it hurts and has trouble. This recruit also coughed blood a few times last night. And this recruit completely lost his voice and can barely whisper. This recruits whole neck is in a lot of pain.” [sic] [Encl (167)]

352. (b)(6) told (b)(6) that they would deal with the matter after morning chow. [Encl (42)]

353. (b)(6) gave (b)(6) note to (b)(6) before the platoon left the squadbay for morning chow. [Encls (42), (168), (169)]

354. As the meal ended, (b)(6) said that he asked (b)(6) for help distributing cups, but (b)(6) ignored him and sat at the table staring blankly. [Encl (115)]

355. Between approximately 0510 and 0530, Platoon 3042 returned to their barracks and began cleaning the squadbay. [Encls (18), (169), (170)]
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356. (b)(6) __________ ordered (b)(6) __________ to report to him in the front of the squadbay near the quarterdeck, purportedly to fill out a sick call chit so that (b)(6) __________ could go to medical. [Encls (18), (169), (170)]

357. (b)(6) __________ appeared irritated that (b)(6) __________ repeatedly failed to report in, or provide the appropriate greeting of the day. [Encls (19), (78), (96), (97), (108), (112), (116), (119), (124), (171)]

358. (b)(6) __________ ordered (b)(6) __________ to engage in a series of “get-backs,” requiring (b)(6) __________ to run between the entrance of the head at the back of squadbay and the front of the squadbay near the quarterdeck. [Encls (19), (78), (96), (97), (108), (116), (124), (171)]

359. The distance between the quarterdeck and the head is approximately 144 feet. [Encl (77)]

360. During the course of the “get-backs,” (b)(6) __________ placed his hands around his throat so that his thumbs were touching the front of his neck, while his other fingers were wrapped around the back his neck and his forearms were parallel to the floor. At some point, (b)(6) __________ began to cry. [Encls (19), (78), (89), (96), (97), (104), (108), (112), (115), (116), (120), (121), (130), (170), (172)]

361. (b)(6) __________ told (b)(6) __________ words to the effect of, “I don’t care what’s wrong with you. You’re going to say something back to me.” [Encl (19)]

362. As (b)(6) __________ returned to (b)(6) __________, he then dropped or fell to the floor, still clutching his throat. [Encls (19), (90), (104), (105), (113), (115), (118), (124), (130), (135)]

363. (b)(6) __________ and (b)(6) __________ stated that they believed (b)(6) __________ was actually unconscious when he fell to the ground. [Encls (19), (93)]

364. Eight of the recruits who observed (b)(6) __________ drop to the floor near the quarterdeck believed (b)(6) __________ was feigning unconsciousness. [Encls (80), (104), (105), (115), (116), (118), (124), (130)]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF [b](6) [b] [b] [b], THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

365. As [b](6) [b] [b] [b] approached [b](6) [b] [b] [b] he repeatedly yelled at [b](6) [b] [b] [b], claiming [b](6) [b] [b] was faking and ordering him to get up. [Encls (79), (81), (84), (89), (90), (93), (104), (105), (112), (123), (124), (130)]

366. [b](2)

367. [b](6) [b] [b] [b] claims that he executed a sternum rub, by rubbing his knuckles on [b](6) [b] [b] [b] sternum for the purpose of providing a mildly painful stimulus to revive [b](6) [b] [b]; however, other recruits and drill instructors in the squadbay failed to substantiate that the sternum rub occurred. [Encls (18), (99), (116)]

368. [b](2)

369. When [b](6) [b] [b] [b] did not respond, [b](6) [b] [b] [b] continued to yell at [b](6) [b] [b] [b] and asked if he was “ok.” [Encls (44), (81), (84), (93), (96), (105), (115), (123)]

370. [b](6) [b] [b] then forcefully slapped [b](6) [b] [b] [b] face between one and three times. [Encls (19), (80), (84), (96), (112), (113), (115), (116), (124), (128), (130), (135)]

371. The slap or slaps to [b](6) [b] [b] [b] face were hard enough to generate a sound across the squadbay. [Encls (19), (80), (84), (96), (112), (113), (115), (116), (124), (128)]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF (b)(6), THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

372. After being slapped, (b)(6) stood up holding his face, turned away from (b)(6), and ran once more in the direction of the head. [Encls (19), (43), (44), (85), (89), (90)]

373. Upon passing the last rack on the right, (b)(6) veered toward the rear hatch and forcefully opened the door leading out to stairwell 1A. [Encls (18), (19), (43), (73), (85), (89), (90), (121), (133)]

374. (b)(6) ran to the railing in the stairwell and vaulted over it by placing his hands on the railing and attempting to propel his legs over. [Encls (90), (121)]

375. While attempting to vault the railing, (b)(6) foot or feet caught the railing. [Encls (90), (121)]

376. After (b)(6) foot or feet caught the railing, he appeared to trip or tumble over the railing. [Encl (90)]

377. (b)(6) fell approximately 38.5 feet to the ground below. [Encl (174)]

378. (b)(6) landed on the access stairs between the ground level and the stairwell. [Encls (18), (175)]

379. The access stairs consisted of eight concrete steps, with steel hand rails along each side and one in the center. [Encls (176), (177)]

380. Medical personnel later concluded that (b)(6) . [Encl (178)]

381. (b)(6) ran down the stairwell to render aid to (b)(6), where he tried to immobilize (b)(6) head and neck. [Encls (18), (170)]

382. (b)(6) saw (b)(6) exit the back hatch, then called 911. [Encls (170), (179)]

383. (b)(6), (b)(6) was walking between Buildings 683 and 684 while conducting his rounds when he heard (b)(6) impact the stairwell. [Encls (69), (174), (175)]

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384. [b](6) called 911 and initially reached Beaufort County’s 911 dispatcher before he was transferred to Parris Island’s dispatcher. [Encl (175)]

385. [b](6) and [b](6) were in the duty hut with the hatch closed during the course of these events. [Encls (44), (169)]

386. After hearing commotion in the squadbay, [b](6) called [b](6). [Encl (169)]

387. [b](6) ran down the stairs to assist [b](6). [Encl (44)]

388. Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island Station 1 received the emergency call for [b](6) at 0536 and immediately dispatched Unit M-54 and TRK-572, advanced life support vehicle, with six emergency services personnel. [Encl (180)]

389. At approximately 0540, Unit M-54 arrived at Building 683 and began to treat [b](6). [Encl (180)]

390. On-scene paramedics told the dispatcher they needed a Life Flight air ambulance (air ambulance) to transport [b](6) to a hospital in Savannah, Georgia, but they were told by the dispatcher that the air ambulance was unable to respond due to unfavorable weather conditions. [Encl (180)]

391. A second air ambulance transport from Charleston, South Carolina, was arranged with an estimated time of arrival of 30 minutes. [Encl (180)]

392. In anticipation of the air ambulance’s arrival, the paramedics took [b](6) to the parade deck where he would be readily available for transfer onto the air ambulance. [Encl (180)]

393. Due to the delayed response time of the air ambulance, the paramedics decided to transport [b](6) to Beaufort Memorial Hospital via ground. [Encl (180)]

394. At 0653, [b](6) arrived at Beaufort Memorial Hospital in Beaufort, South Carolina. [Encl (22)]

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395. As medical personnel treated [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b](6) [b}(5)]
Continued Hazing and Abuse of Platoon 3042

403. After the death, [b](6) was assigned as the third hat for Platoon 3042. [Encls (79), (84), (100), (101), (104)]

404. Instances of recruit abuse continued to occur in Platoon 3042 after the death of [b](6). [Encls (79), (84), (100), (101), (104)]

405. [b](2), [b](6) by chocking recruits and grabbing recruits by the blouse. [Encls (47), (78), (84), (88), (100), (101), (115)]

406. [b](2), [b](6) by unlawfully grabbing recruits, to include placing his hands around recruits’ necks and choking them. [Encls (79), (84), (100), (101), (104)]

407. While the recruits were getting dressed and undressed repeatedly, [b](6) grabbed [b](6) with both hands around the throat, choking the recruit so that he could not breathe. [Encl (104)]

408. [b](6) had to rip himself out of [b](6) grasp to make the drill instructor stop. [Encl (104)]

409. [b](6) observed [b](6) choke [b](6) near the mess hall because [b](6) failed to sound off to [b](6) satisfaction. [Encl (104)]

410. [b](6) required recruits to perform unauthorized incentive training by causing the recruits to “scuzz brush the squadbay,” which required each recruit to place both of his hands on the brush, with the bristles on the deck, and push the brush along the deck. [Encls (85), (88), (105)]

411. [b](6) required recruits to perform unauthorized incentive training by causing them to repetitively move footlockers and hold footlockers and other objects parallel to the deck for the purpose of causing pain and exhaustion. [Encls (88), (105)]
412. (b)(6) ordered the platoon to hold rifles out by the barrel using only two fingers. When (b)(6) moved slowly to retrieve a rifle, (b)(6) punished the platoon by making them hold their rifles out while (b)(6) walked back on line. [Encls (99), (100)]

413. (b)(6) forced (b)(6) to squat or perform lunges at each footlocker as he checked whether they were locked. (b)(6) forced (b)(6) to check all of the locks in this manner several times for failing to complete the task in the allotted time. [Encl (99)]

Company K Staff

414. United States Navy Regulation 0802 gives absolute responsibility, and commensurate responsibility, to the Commanding Officer for his command except when, and to the extent to which, he or she has been relieved therefrom by competent authority, or as provided elsewhere in the U.S. Navy Regulations. [Encl (50)]

415. Marine Corps Order 1510.32F (“Recruit Training”) states, “supervision is the key to proper execution and safe conduct of training.” [Encl (66)]

416. (b)(6), served as (b)(6) for two full training cycles. [Encl (37)]

417. (b)(6) took command of Company K on 9 June 2015, after having served one and one-half training cycles as a Series Commander and one series as (b)(6). [Encl (37)]

418. (b)(6) . [Encl (181)]

419. (b)(6) . [Encl (181)]

420. (b)(6) . [Encl (181)]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
DEATH OF (b)(6) [REDACTED], THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION,
THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

421. [b][6] [Encl (181)]
422. [b][6] [Encl (181)]
423. [b][6] [Encl (182)]
424. [b][6] [Encl (182)]
425. [b][6] [Encl (182)]
426. [b][6] [Encl (183)]
427. [b][6] [Encl (183)]
428. [b][6] [Encl (183)]
429. [b][6] [Encls (40), (184)]
430. [b][6] [Encl (40)]
431. [b][6] [Encl (185)]
432. [b][6] [Encl (185)]
433. [b][6] has extensive experience as a drill
instructor. [Encl (185)]

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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF [REDACTED], THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

434. [REDACTED]. [Encl (185)]

435. [REDACTED]. [Encl (185)]

436. [REDACTED]. [Encl (186)]

437. [REDACTED]. [Encl (186)]

438. [REDACTED]. [Encl (186)]

439. [REDACTED]. [Encl (186)]

440. [REDACTED] first encountered [REDACTED] on 13 March, when he learned of [REDACTED] verbal threat of [REDACTED] [Encl (37)]

441. [REDACTED] understood that the role of the officer in recruit training is to supervise training. [Encl (37)]

442. [REDACTED] referred to officer supervision as the “stock answer” to the role of the officer. [Encl (37)]

443. Instead, [REDACTED] believed that the most important role of the officer is to “create a climate that points the company in the right direction” and that an officer will “fail if he plans to be on deck at all times in order to catch drill instructor misconduct.” [Encl (37)]

444. The following are a list of quotations which demonstrate the command philosophy of [REDACTED] at Company K:

   a. “The climate is more important because if the drill instructors want to hide something from you they can;”

   b. “The drill instructors are with the recruits 24/7 and if your plan as an officer is to always be there to catch it, you will fail;”

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c. “You cannot be on every deck all the time, and even if you were on the decks frequently, you would undermine the senior drill instructor and drill instructors;”

d. “Officers do not spend time on deck because training stops if an officer comes on deck;”

e. “Leadership is different in the fleet than in the Recruit Training Battalion. In the fleet the officer will know more about his MOS than anyone else. Here by design, you do not know the subject matter;” and,

f. “The only reason we [officers] are here is because of Ribbon Creek.” [Encl (37)]

445. [b](6) believed that “drill instructors know how to stay out of trouble because of the training they receive at drill instructor school,” and that his role is to help them to stay out of trouble by eliminating external stressors like family problems and internal stressors like a focus on attrition. [Encl (37)]

446. [b](6) stated that he was taught that officers should always make their presence known when they enter the squadbays or the duty huts, so he would normally announce his presence by raising the blinds in the duty hut or standing prominently in front of the window so that he could be seen by anyone in the squadbay. [Encl (37)]

447. Other than scheduled hygiene inspections, Company K officers rarely spent any time in the squadbays observing drill instructors interacting with recruits. Instead, they observed the actions of the drill instructors and recruits through the duty hut window. [Encls (37), (39), (40), (41)]

448. Platoon 3042’s recruit firewatch logbook does not record duty personnel entering or exiting its deck between 14 March 2016, and the morning of 18 March 2016. [Encl (187)]

449. The officers of Third Recruit Training Battalion did not walk the squadbays for the purpose of supervision of recruit training without their enlisted counterparts. [Encls (36), (37), (38), (40), (41), (55), (99)]
450. [b](6) expects his chief drill instructors to advise their series commanders that it is in their best interest to always walk the decks with the chief drill instructors. [Encl (38)]

451. [b](6) believed that the drill instructors did not like it when the officers would walk the decks alone. He believed that the drill instructors felt as though they were “being watched” or that the officers were “snooping.” [Encl (38)]

452. [b](6) discouraged his company commander from touring the area without him, as he desired to explain anything the officer saw that the officer did not understand. [Encl (38)]

453. When a Marine in a billet higher than senior drill instructor enters the squadbay, recruits initiate “hatch procedures.” [Encls (37), (39), (40), (41), (99)]

454. The “hatch procedures,” require the entire platoon to cease whatever they are doing and come to the position of attention. The recruits then announce the name, rank, and billet of the Marine who has entered the squadbay, and render the appropriate greeting of the day. The recruits remain at the position of attention until the Marine who triggered the “hatch procedures” instructs them to “carry on.” [Encl (40)]

455. The entire platoon sounding off during hatch procedures creates an audible signal that leadership is in the area, and the sound can be heard throughout the barracks area. [Encls (37), (39), (40), (43), (55)]

456. One reason the officers of Company K avoided entering the squadbays was their perception that “hatch procedures” interrupted training and Basic Daily Routine being conducted by the drill instructors. [Encls (37), (39), (40), (55)]

457. [b](2) [Encl (164)]
Command Climate at Third Recruit Training Battalion

The drill instructors of Third Recruit Training Battalion had low morale. [Encls (25), (31), (36)] [Ref (hh)]

From the summer of 2014 through March 2016, the morale of the Third Recruit Training Battalion company grade officers was also low. [Encls (35), (190), (191), (192), (193)] [Ref (hh)]

The company grade officers in Third Recruit Training Battalion referred to [b](6) as [b](6) [Encls (39), (193), (194)]
468. On 29 July 2015, an Inspector General of the Marine Corps Hotline Complaint Investigation was initiated into allegations of military reprisal by [b](6)___________________. [Ref (ii)]

469. During the course of the military reprisal investigation evidence of new misconduct by [b](6)___________________. came to the IGMC’s attention. [Ref (ii)]

470. The Inspector General of the Marine Corps substantiated allegations against [b](6)___________________. for [b](6)___________________. [Ref (ii)]

471. [b](6)___________________. attempted to influence [b](6)___________________. testimony to the Inspector General with a favorable fitness report. [Encl (35)] [Ref (ii)]

472. [b](6)___________________. stated [b](6)___________________. routinely ridiculed, belittled, and threatened his [b](6)___________________. [Encl (35)]

473. [b](6)___________________. routinely told [b](6)___________________. company commanders that the difference between a board selected commander and [b]___________________. company commanders was that the company commanders could easily be fired. [Encls (35), (192), (195)]

474. [b](6)___________________. once advised [b](6)___________________. battalion that they all could consider themselves as having a non-punitive letter of caution, meaning that only more serious forms of punishment would be considered for future lapses. [Encls (35), (36), (193)]

475. [b](6)___________________. was routinely abrasive in his interactions with his officers. [Encls (35), (190), (193)]

476. [b](6)___________________. believed his biggest challenge was ending recruit abuse and applied “all [his] authorities and all [his] control” to stop it. [Encls (34), (190)]
477. [b] [2]

[Redacted] would punish drill instructors in an inappropriately severe manner and that [b] [6] was more likely than not to end a drill instructor’s career over seemingly minor misconduct. [Encls (25), (34), (190), (193), (197), (198)] [Ref (ii)]

480. There was a perception in Company K that [b] [6] would punish drill instructors in an inappropriately severe manner and that [b] [6] was more likely than not to end a drill instructor’s career over seemingly minor misconduct. [Encls (25), (34), (190), (193), (197), (198)] [Ref (ii)]

481. Several company grade officers routinely refrained from reporting what they perceived to be “minor misconduct” to their battalion commander based on these perceptions. [Encls (190), (197)]

482. On several occasions, [b] [6] directed company commanders to give drill instructors formal counselings and the company commanders failed to do as directed. [Encls (188), (190), (198)] [Ref (jj)]

483. [b] [6], [b] [6], the [b] [6] was relieved as a result of the Commanding General’s loss of trust and confidence in [b] ability to command. [Ref (kk)]

484. The Commanding General’s endorsement on the command investigation into allegations of misconduct by [b] [6] stated, [b] [6] created a hostile, repressive, and unprofessional command climate that was pervasive throughout [b] [6] command.” [Ref (kk)]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF (b)(6), THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION, THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MARCH 2016

485. (b)(6) kept a redacted copy of the command investigation on his work computer and told words to the effect that, “this could happen to me.” [Encls (35), (199)]

486. (b)(6) was perceived to be motivated by his own self-interest rather than by the performance or well-being of his command. [Encls (31), (35), (193), (198)]

487. After relief, (b)(6) began to treat disciplinary matters with more leniency. [Encls (35), (192), (193), (197)]

488. (b)(6), there were no relief-for-cause packages submitted by (b)(6). [Encls (196), (200)]

489. The company grade officers in Third Recruit Training Battalion generally believed that (b)(6) became inconsistent in decision making process. [Encls (36), (190), (191), (198)]

490. On 7 July 2015, (b)(6), Platoon 3068, alleged that (b)(6) rubbed a scuzz brush on the side of his face as punishment for leaving the brush in the duty hut. [Ref (11)]

491. On 8 July 2015, (b)(6) directed (b)(6) to conduct a command investigation into the allegations made by (b)(6). [Ref (11)]

492. (b)(6) command investigation substantiated the allegation made by (b)(6) and recommended that (b)(6) be relieved for cause and that charges be referred to a special court-martial for trial. [Ref (11)]

493. On 10 July 2015, (b)(6) submitted his report of investigation to (b)(6) which included color photographs of (b)(6) injuries. [Ref (11)]

494. On 13 July 2015, (b)(6) endorsed (b)(6) command investigation saying that he would
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
DEATH OF [REDACTED], THIRD RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION,
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495. [REDACTED] was never processed for relief for cause
and continued to work as a drill instructor. [Encls (36),
(196), (201)]

Command Investigation Processes

496. In the event of an allegation of recruit abuse or other
Recruit Training Order violation, the company commander is
required to notify the battalion commander as soon as possible,
normally within one hour. [Encl (144)]

497. The battalion commander will notify the Recruit Training
Regiment commanding officer and convene a preliminary inquiry or
command investigation within twenty-four hours of being notified
of an allegation of recruit abuse or other Recruit Training
Order violation. [Encl (144)]

498. The battalion commander's endorsement to a preliminary
inquiry must specifically state his or her determination to
either take no further investigative action or to convene a
command investigation. [Encl (144)]

499. The battalion commander’s endorsement to a preliminary
inquiry must also include an account of disciplinary action or
corrective actions intended or taken (if appropriate). [Encl
(144)]

500. The battalion commander will retain a copy of a preliminary
inquiry in official files and forward the original inquiry with
endorsement to the Recruit Training Regiment Commanding Officer
within ten days of the convening order. [Encl (144)]

501. The battalion commander's endorsement to a command
investigation will specifically approve, disapprove, modify, or
add to the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations.
[Encl (144)]

502. The battalion commander’s endorsement to a command
investigation must detail disciplinary or corrective actions
intended or taken. [Encl (144)]
503. The battalion commander will retain a copy of the command investigation in official files and forward the original investigation with endorsement to the Recruit Training Regiment Commanding Officer within 30 days of the convening order. [Encl (144)]

504. Paragraph 0209(g)(1) of the Manual of the Judge Advocate General requires a general court-martial convening authority superior to the convening authority to review every command investigation unless the original convening authority determines that the investigation would be of no interest to anyone outside his or her command. [Ref (a)]

505. Command investigations are not closed and are not to be considered final until the last reviewing authority (usually a general court-martial convening authority) determines that further endorsement is not necessary. [Ref (a)]

506. Marine Corps Order 1510.32F charges the Commanding General of Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island/Eastern Recruiting Region with ensuring recruit training “... is conducted in a professional manner. Hazing, maltreatment, abuse of authority, or other illegal alternatives to leadership are counter-productive practices and are expressly forbidden.” [Encl (66)]

507. [Encl (202)]

508. [Encl (202)]

509. From 1 January 2014 to 5 May 2016, the Recruit Training Regiment S-1 tracked 122 command investigations as having been “completed.” [Encl (200)]

510. It is the convening authority’s responsibility to ensure completed command investigations are routed to the general

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court-martial convening authority for review and close out. [Ref (a)]

511. The subject matter of 112 of the command investigations required general court-martial convening authority review. [Encls (66), (200), (203)] [Ref (a)]

512. From 1 January 2014 to 5 May 2016, the Recruit Training Regiment’s S-1 logbook accounts for only 49 command investigations delivered to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. [Encls (204), (205)]

513. During the same period, Recruit Training Regiment S-1’s logbook accounts for 53 command investigations as delivered to the Command Inspector General. [Encl (204)]

514. Of the 53 investigations delivered to the Office of the Inspector General, only 14 were copies of those submitted through the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, meaning that 39 of the investigations provided to the Inspector General were improperly routed for review. [Encl (204)]

515. The Quality Assurance Program, part of the command Inspector General’s office, compiles statistics on command investigations and preliminary inquiries it receives, but does not forward the command investigations for further processing. [Encls (206), (207)]

516. The Command Inspector General does not brief the Commanding General on the command investigations his office receives from the Recruit Training Regiment or statistics compiled by the Quality Assurance Program. [Encl (207)]

517. Brigadier General Williams gave, “by direction” authority to sign all command investigations that he did not take for action at his level. [Encls (26), (208)]

518. [Encl (209)]
519. \[b](6)\] routinely exercised \[b] “by direction” authority to endorse and close out command investigations to satisfy the required general court-martial convening authority action. [Encls (26), (208)] [Ref (a)]

520. \[b](2)\]

521. Brigadier General Williams expected that \[b](6)\] would brief him on those investigations that either required him to take general court-martial action or had concluded with a special court-martial. [Encl (26)]

522. The Staff Judge Advocate would normally brief the Commanding General on command investigations when:

a. It was \[b\] recommendation that the Commanding General take the case for action at his level;

b. The subordinate command referred charges to a Special Court-Martial; or

c. The subordinate command offered the accused non-judicial punishment. [Encl (208)]

523. A commanding officer who delegates authority to subordinates is not relieved of the continued responsibility for the safety, well-being and efficiency of the entire command. [Encl (50)]

Command Investigations Concerning \[b](6)\]

524. Prior to being assigned as \[b](6)\] \[b](6)\] was the subject of one preliminary inquiry, and two command investigations. The subject of the inquiries were recruit abuse and other \[b](2)\] violations. [Encls (210), (211)] [Ref (mm)]
525. On 12 February 2015, (b) (6) convened a preliminary inquiry into an allegation of recruit abuse against the drill instructors of Platoon 3020. [Encl (211)]

526. The drill instructors of Platoon 3020 were accused of hazing recruits, physically abusing recruits, ordering recruits to physically harm other recruits, denying recruits opportunities to drink water, harassing recruits while the recruits were supposed to be sleeping, and instructing the recruits to lie to medical personnel, family members, and officers about how drill instructors “broke rules.” [Encl (211)]

527. (b) (6) was one of the drill instructors assigned to Platoon 3020 in February 2015. [Encls (48), (211)]

528. On 17 February 2015, the preliminary inquiry failed to substantiate the allegations. [Encl (211)]

529. On 18 February 2015, (b) (6) concurred and positively endorsed the preliminary inquiry’s findings. [Encl (211)]

530. On 25 February 2015, (b) (6), (b) (6), concurred with the preliminary inquiry’s findings. [Encl (211)]

531. Neither the allegations nor the findings of the 12 February 2015, preliminary inquiry are recorded in (b) (6) drill instructor jacket as required. [Encl (48)]

532. On 2 November 2015, (b) (6), after returning from a 200-day unauthorized absence, alleged to (b) (6) that while at recruit training he was hazed by (b) (6) and he therefore did not report to the school of infantry out of overwhelming apprehension for his health and safety in the Marine Corps. [Encl (210)]

533. On 3 November 2015, the Recruit Training Regiment received an email from (b) (6) containing (b) (6). [Encl (212)]
534. Alleged that required him to perform unauthorized incentive training and assaulted him on multiple occasions including punching, slapping, kicking, and head-butting. [Encl (210)]

535. On 3 November 2015, Marine Aviation Training Support Group 23 received statements from three students, making allegations against seven drill instructors for hazing, abuse, and other violations of the Recruit Training Order. [Ref (mm)]

536. The three Marines accused and other drill instructors of possessing and being under the influence of alcohol in the presence of recruits, ordering to get into a clothes dryer and turning it on while was inside, hazing and abusing because of his religion (Muslim), and assaulting . [hereinafter investigation] [Ref (mm)]

537. At 1319 on 5 November 2015, , , informed , that Training Command had initiated a Serious Incident Report in response to , , and allegations. [Encl (213)]

538. At 1336 on 5 November 2015, sent a summary to Commanding General, Training and Education Command, carbon copying . [Encl (214)]

539. At 1445 on 5 November 2015, forwarded the summary of allegations to , , requesting advice as to whether the Recruit Training Regiment should take the allegations for action. [Encl (215)]

540. At 1448 on 5 November 2015, received from the three former recruits’ statements with the specific allegations of abuse. [Encl (216)]
541. At 1511 on 5 November 2015, [b](6) forward the statements of [b](6), [b](6), and [b](6) to [b](6), [b](6), and [b](6). [Encl (216)]

542. At 1543 on 5 November 2015, [b](6) recommended to [b](6) that the Recruit Training Regiment conduct the Command Investigation into the allegations. [Encl (217)]

543. At 1544 on 5 November 2015, [b](6) concurred with recommendation that the Recruit Training Regiment conduct the Command Investigation. [Encl (217)]

544. On 5 November 2015, [b](6) directed the Recruit Training Regiment to conduct a command investigation into the allegations. [Encl (218)]

545. Other allegations of recruit abuse and maltreatment were reported to Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island/Eastern Recruiting Region by Training and Education Command and were processed in the same manner as the investigation. [Ref (nn)]

546. Brigadier General Williams stated he assumed that the Recruit Training Regiment would follow its normal investigative processes, to include suspending the drill instructors. [Encl (25)]

547. For allegations originating from outside of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island/Eastern Recruiting Region command but otherwise concerning depot personnel, Brigadier General Williams would normally have only cursory information of the allegations as he allowed [b](6) to direct the inquiry to proceed in the normal investigative process at the Recruit Training Regiment level. [Encl (25)]

548. These investigations are routinely and properly transmitted to the Recruit Training Regiment for action. The normal investigative process and JAGMAN review was the only feedback process at the depot level to track or otherwise supervise the progress of these investigations. [Encls (25), (28), (29)]
549. Brigadier General Williams stated he avoided involvement in the command investigative process out of a concern that he could exert unlawful command influence on the cases. [Encl (25)]

550. Unlawful command influence occurs when senior personnel, wittingly or unwittingly, have acted to influence court members, witnesses, or others participating in military justice cases. [Ref (oo)]

551. On 5 November 2015, [b] asked and his [b], [b], about the duty status of the several drill instructors who were implicated in the [b] investigation. [Encl (31)]

552. [b] told that the Marines implicated in the [b] investigation were not at that time in platoons as drill instructors directly engaged with recruits but that they were in quota billets; teaching, or in the S-3. [Encl (31)]

553. directed that the Marines implicated in the [b] investigation remain in their quota billets, and did not direct to suspend the drill instructors from their duties. [Encls (31), (34)]

554. , despite requesting updates weekly or biweekly at the Recruit Training Regiment staff meeting, was not given access to the written [b] investigation until on or about 5 February 2016. [Encls (31), (32), (34), (35), (36)]

555. believed the pending Inspector General of the Marine Corps investigation against him contributed to the Recruit Training Regiment’s delay in informing him of the specifics of the [b] investigation. [Encl (34)]

556. On 6 November 2015, signed the appointing orders convening both the [b] and [b] investigations. [Encls (210), (219)] [Ref (mm)]
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557. [redacted] was a subject under investigation in both the [redacted] and the [redacted] investigations. [Encl (210)] [Ref (mm)]

558. [redacted] was the officer appointed to conduct the [redacted] investigation. [Ref (mm)]

559. The Manual of the Judge Advocate General requires that command investigations be completed using “personal interviews,” or other reliable administrative methods. [Reference (a)]

560. [redacted], recommended keep the questions sent to the Recruits “vague” so that they would not “lead” the recruits and recommended use a “personal interview” form similar to that used by the training company officers to conduct routine personal interviews with recruits. [Encl (220)]

561. [redacted] developed a survey form which contained generalized questions about whether the witnesses had seen or experienced different forms of abuse during their training. [Encl (220)] [Ref (mm)]

562. The investigation questionnaires sent out by [redacted] were referred to as “personal interviews.” [Encl (221)]

563. Although some of the scenarios described in the questionnaire were clearly derived from the allegations made by the former recruits, the questionnaire failed to inquire about the specific allegations. [Encl (221)]

564. [redacted] sent out 42 “personal interview” questionnaires to the Marines of Platoon 3054. [redacted] received responses from 24 Marines by initial 5 January 2016 deadline. Only four of the responses contained any corroboration, and [redacted] considered the corroboration to be “vague.” [Encl (220)] [Ref (mm)]

565. [redacted] experienced delays in [redacted] investigation due to the holiday schedule and [redacted] duties as [redacted]. [Encl (220)]
566. After completing the initial draft of [b](6) investigation, [b](6) substantiated some of the allegations; however, [b](6) lacked the resources necessary to do the investigation thoroughly enough to produce evidence sufficient to support the standard of proof at courts-martial. [Encl (220)]

567. On 13 November 2015, [b](6) emailed [b](6) to express his concern about the number of allegations of recruit abuse and drill instructor misconduct arising out of Lima Company. [Encl (222)]

568. On 30 November 2015, [b](6) assumed the billet of [b](6). [Encl (36)]

569. Between 30 November 2015 and 18 March 2016, [b](6) remained unaware of the details of the [b](6) investigation despite his inquiries to [b](6). [Encls (36), (223), (224)]

570. On 3 December 2015, [b](6) submitted the completed [b](6) investigation, failing to substantiate the allegations against [b](6). [Encl (210)]

571. On 3 December 2015, [b](6) sent [b](6) an email that contained a list of all [b](6) investigations into recruit abuse from February 2015 to 3 December 2015. [Encl (225)]

572. On or about 6 January 2016, [b](6) submitted the [b](6) investigation to [b](6). Despite the use of sub-optimal investigation techniques, [b](6) substantiated a number of the allegations and recommended that [b](6) be charged and tried by special court-martial. [Encl (220)] [Ref (mm)]

573. On 13 January 2016, [b](b) concurred with and endorsed the unsubstantiated [b](6) investigation to the Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island/Eastern Recruiting Region. [Encl (210)]

574. The [b](6) investigation was the second unsubstantiated investigation within one year involving [b](6)
that included allegations of physical abuse, hazing, and Recruit Training Order violations. [Encls (210), (211)]

575. Neither the allegations made against nor the subsequent command investigation by is documented in drill instructor jacket. [Encl (48)]

576. At 1711 on 24 January 2016, emailed, with his analysis of the investigation. stated that he believed by a preponderance of the evidence that the drill instructors did what they were alleged to have done, and that and the other Marines involved needed to be “sat down,” meaning suspended from their duties. also concurred with the investigating officer’s recommendation for court-martial of . [Encl (226)]

577. At 1810 on 24 January 2016, replied to conclusions and that he would review the investigation the next day. He stated, “I agree with your way ahead. I’ll review tomorrow and then if necessary, coordinate with Third Recruit Training Battalion to sit down and [sic] current drill instructors.” [Encl (226)]

578. Effective rosters listing drill instructors available for drill instructor duties within Third Recruit Training Battalion were submitted to the Regiment weekly. is reported as “effective” (meaning available to train recruits) until 1 April 2016, when he is reported for the first time as “non-effective” as a result of a “pending investigation.” [Encls (227), (228)]

579. On 5 February, the Recruit Training Regiment’s effective roster does not reflect that any of the drill instructors implicated in the investigation were suspended. [Encls (227) (228)]

580. did not direct to suspend as a drill instructor until after death on 18 March 2016. [Encl (34)]
581. On or about 25 January 2016, (b)(6) directed (b)(6) to make administrative corrections to the (b)(6) investigation. [Encls (226), (229)]

582. On 28 January 2016, (b)(6) turned in a corrected version of the (b)(6) investigation to (b)(6). [Encl (229)]

583. On 1 February 2016, (b)(6) was reassigned from the Battalion S-4 to the operations section (S-3), Company I, Third Recruit Training Battalion, in order to make him more readily available to (b)(6) for assignment as a senior drill instructor, in the event that the (b)(6) investigation was not substantiated. [Encls (36), (48), (197), (224)]

584. On 2 February 2016, (b)(6), (b)(6) sent the (b)(6) investigation to (b)(6), (b)(6), (b)(6), for legal review. [Encl (230)]

585. On or about 3 February 2016, the Third Recruit Training Battalion leadership team determined that because the investigation still had not been closed by the Recruit Training Regiment or forwarded to the Staff Judge Advocate, they would not assign (b)(6) to a Recruit Training platoon with (b)(6). [Encls (35), (36), (37), (197), (224)]

586. On or about 5 February 2016, (b)(6) reviewed the completed (b)(6) investigation at the Recruit Training Regiment Headquarters. [Encls (31), (34), (231)]

587. In evaluating the (b)(6) investigation, (b)(6) did not feel that the investigation included sufficient corroborating evidence to substantiate the allegations or take legal action. [Encls (32), (34)]

588. Between 2 February and 19 February, the (b)(6) investigation underwent Staff Judge Advocate review. [Encls (208), (230), (232), (233), (234), (235)]

589. On or about 19 February 2016, (b)(6) informed (b)(6) that (b) believed some of the misconduct alleged in the (b)(6) investigation had occurred,
but that the investigation in its present state could not support any action more serious than a 6105 counseling. [Encls (208), (235), (236)]

590. [b](6) advised that the evidence would be insufficient to convict [b](6) at court-martial and recommended that [b](6) gather additional corroborating evidence for disciplinary action. [Encls (33), (208), (233), (236)]

591. [b](6), during a conversation with [b](6), made the remark that the [b] investigation would likely result in a “6105 counseling.” [Encl (31)]

592. A “6105 counseling” is a formal, written counseling from a commanding officer to a Marine about deficiencies, and it is intended to afford an opportunity to the Marine to overcome those deficiencies prior to a point at which it would become necessary to initiate adverse administrative action against the Marine. [Refs (pp),(qq)]

593. At 1119 on 19 February 2016, [b](6) sent an email to [b](6) about the legal status of the drill instructors involved in the [b] investigation. [Encl (236)]

594. At 1749 on 19 February 2016, [b](6) replied to [b](6) email offering only “preliminary feedback” stating in pertinent part, “There may be enough to offer NJP, but if the Marines refuse, the recourse may be a 6105 and keep it moving.” [Encl (236)]

595. At 1809 on 19 February 2016, [b](6) forwarded the email to [b](6). [Encl (236)]

596. On 19 February 2016, [b](6) and [b](6) received [b](6) email with regard to the [b] investigation allegations. [Encls (34), (36), (237)]

597. At some date between 25 February and 15 March, [b](6) advised [b](6) that she should try to contact at least 80 percent of [b] platoon. [Encls (208), (238)]
598. On 8 March 2016, (b) (6) ________, without additional coordination with (b) (6) ________, assigned (b) (6) ________ to Platoon 3042, Company K, Third Recruit Training Battalion, as (b) (6) ________. [Encls (34), (35), (48)]

599. On 9 March 2016, (b) (6) ________ attended Company K pick-up and recognized that (b) (6) ________ was serving as (b) (6) ________. [Encl (33)]

600. (b) (2) ________ (b) (2) ________ (b) (2) ________ (b) (2) ________ [Encl (49)]

601. Normally, the Recruit Training Regiment is not involved in the composition of the drill instructor teams. [Encls (31), (32), (33), (36)]

602. (b) (2) ________ (b) (2) ________ (b) (2) ________ (b) (2) ________ [Encls (31), (34)]

603. On 8 March 2016, (b) (6) ________ had completed seven months of a quota billet rotation. Though a quota billet rotation is normally nine to eleven months, it is often shorter for gunnery sergeants as they are in short supply and are needed for leadership billet assignments. [Encls (34), (36), (48), (49)]

604. There is a preference to assign senior drill instructors of equal or senior rank to their drill instructors. (b) (6) ________ desired to place a Gunner Sergeant senior drill instructor in Company K to permit the assignment of (b) (6) ________ to that company. (b) (6) ________ possessed the requisite experience for a (b) (6) ________. [Encl (34)]

605. (b) (6) ________ knew that the ordinary procedure for a drill instructor pending investigation was to order that

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the drill instructor be suspended from his duties or “sat down.” [Encl (34)]

606. [b](6) believed that [b](6) had ample opportunity and situational awareness of personnel moves within Third Recruit Training Battalion to stop [b](6) assignment as [b](6) if [b](6) had so desired. [Encls (34), (237)]

607. At 1113 on 15 March 2016, [b](6) recommended that the investigating officer, [b](6), interview more witnesses to develop evidence in the case. [Encl (238)]

608. On 17 March 2016, the day before [b](6) death, the investigating officer received via email a written “personal interview” form from [b](6) platoon. [b](6) answers to the general questions posed in the “personal interview” provided corroboration, including specific facts further substantiating the most serious allegations. [Encls (208), (233), (239)] [Ref (mm)]

609. [b](6) stated that on 17 March, she attempted unsuccessfully to reach [b](6) several times via telephone to discuss corroborating evidence against [b](6). [Encl (239)]

610. After [b](6) death on 18 March 2016, [b](6) sent an email verifying with [b](6) that [b](6) had never been suspended and that the decision not to suspend was based upon their belief that the evidence in the [b](6) investigation lacked veracity due to the delay in reporting the allegation and the fact that some of the Marines reporting the allegations were being processed for administrative separation. [b](6) confirmed. [Encl (240)]

611. On the afternoon of 18 March 2016, after [b](6) death, [b](6) informed [b](6) about the corroborating information [b] had received the day before concerning [b](6). [Encls (220), (233), (239)]
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612. As early as 1448, Company K leadership was aware (b)(6) had slapped (b)(6) in the face during the sequence of events leading up to (b)(6) suicide. [Encls (37), (41), (241)]

613. (b)(6) was not suspended for having slapped (b)(6). [Encls (31), (34)]

614. At 1711 on 18 March 2016, (b)(6) emailed (b)(6) the statement (b)(6) had received on 17 March from (b)(6). [Encl (242)]

615. Between 1711 and 1836 on 18 March, (b)(6) ordered (b)(6) to remove (b)(6) as (b)(6) of platoon 3042. [Encls (31), (34), (36)]

616. (b)(6) emailed (b)(6) at 1836 on 18 March, confirming that (b)(6) had been relieved of his duties as (b)(6); however, he failed to suspend him from his duties as a drill instructor pending further review of the new evidence received in the (b)(6) investigation. (b)(6) assigned (b)(6) to other duties in Company K, stating “his belt has been taken but not the campaign cover.” [Encl (243)]

617. (b)(6) stated that he chose to allow (b)(6) to retain his campaign cover to, “ease the tense feelings currently with him, his peers, and around the battalion.” [Encl (243)]

618. (b)(6) was reassigned to the company operations section in Company K after he was relieved of his duties as (b)(6). [Encl (243)]

619. Though not assigned as instructors in training platoons, drill instructors in the company operations section work within the company training area and continue to have access to recruits. [Encl (31)]