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- JAGMAN 0225(f)(3)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION MIRAMAR
P. O. BOX 452022
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92145-2022

IN REPLY REFER TO
5830
CG
31 JAN 2025

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF
To: File

Subj: CLOSE OUT OF THE COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION
HELICOPTER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361)
MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

Ref: (a) First Endorsement to CI involving HMH-361 Mishap dtd 15 Oct 24
(b) Implementation of Recommendation Letter dtd 15 Oct 24
(c) Disposition Letter ICO CO, HMH-361, dtd 5 Dec 24
(d) JAGINST 5800.7G w/ CH-2 (JAGMAN)

1. By this letter, the subject Command Investigation (CI) is closed. This letter further supplements reference (a) to record an administrative correction and to document the exceptions to the Investigating Officer's recommendation in the CI. This letter also records additional steps taken after issuance of reference (a), as noted in references (b)-(c) and other matters not otherwise previously detailed.

2. Administrative Correction and Exceptions to the Investigating Officer's Recommendation

(a) Reference (a) was administratively corrected to be addressed to file.

(b) Reference (a) concurred with the findings, opinions, and recommendations of the Investigating Officer (IO) with some exceptions.

(1) Regarding the IO's recommendation at PART THREE: RECOMMENDATIONS, paragraph 3.a, I determined that Commanding Officer (CO), HMH-361's "two-minute conversation between the CO and MP1 about an aircraft issue and plan to return home" represented more than just "liberal and deferential command philosophy." As noted in reference (c), I found that the "two-minute" conversation exhibited poor judgment that went beyond what the IO noted.

(2) Regarding the IO's recommendation at PART THREE: RECOMMENDATIONS, paragraph 3.b, I determined that the CO should be relieved of command in addition to receiving a Non-Punitive Letter of Caution (NPLOC). While the IO recommended a NPLOC for violating Article 92, UCMJ, I found that the CO's failure to consult and receive authorization from the Group CO were more indicative of a temporary lapse in judgment that occasionally befalls Marine officers in command than an intentional violation of Article 92, UCMJ. The CO was expected to exercise greater care in the performance of his duties than the judgment he had shown as noted in reference (c).

Subj: CLOSE OUT OF THE COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

3. Additional Matters

(a) Upon issuance of reference (a), I directed implementation of the IO's recommendations at PART THREE: RECOMMENDATIONS, paragraphs 4-5. See reference (b).

(b) On 18 November 2024, after careful consideration of various matters and in-depth consultation with the Staff Judge Advocate and other key staff personnel, I relieved the CO of command due to loss of trust and confidence in his ability to continue serving as the CO, HMH-361.

(c) To ensure thoroughness, from the date of issuance of reference (a) and until the date of this letter, the Staff Judge Advocate and other key staff personnel reviewed the CI, effectuated implementation of reference (b), and further coordinated with other potential stakeholders to determine whether additional investigation or endorsement were required.

(d) No additional investigation or endorsement is required.

4. Release. Any release of the CI will be handled in accordance with the applicable rules at such time when the release is required or otherwise warranted. We shall further ensure that the next of kin are properly notified of any pending releases.

5. The point of contact is the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 3d MAW, at (858) 307-8993.

(b) (6)

J. B. WELLONS



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
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IN REPLY REFER TO

5830

CG

5 Dec 24

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF
To: File

Subj: DISPOSITION ACTION IN THE CASE OF (b) (6)
(b) (6) COMMANDING OFFICER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER
SQUADRON 361, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 16

Ref: (a) CG 3d MAW ltr 5830/CG dtd 15 Oct 24 (First Endorsement to CI)
(b) IO ltr 5830/CI dtd 11 Jun 24 (CI into CH-53E, HMH-361, Mishap)
(c) CG 3d MAW ltr 5830/CG dtd 15 Oct 24 (Implementation of Recommendations of IO)
(d) MCO 5800.16 – V15 (Officer Misconduct and Substandard Performance of Duty)
(e) NPLOC ICO (b) (6) dtd 19 Nov 24

1. This accounts for the disposition action taken in the case of (b) (6)
(b) (6) Commanding Officer, Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMH-361), Marine
Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16).

2. Background. Reference (a) is my endorsement to the Command Investigation (CI) into the facts and circumstances surrounding the CH-53E Super Stallion, HMH-361, mishap that occurred on or about 6 February 2024 as reflected in reference (b). Reference (c) is my direction to the Chief of Staff implementing the recommendations of the Investigating Officer (IO) at reference (b), except for the recommendation by the IO under Part Three, Paragraph 3, of reference (b) at page 58, regarding (b) (6) (SNO).

3. Disposition Action.

a. After careful consideration of all pertinent matters, including references (a) through (d), and in-depth consultation with the Staff Judge Advocate and other key staff personnel, I relieved SNO of command, effective 18 November 2024, due to loss of trust and confidence in his ability to continue serving as the Commanding Officer (CO), HMH-361. SNO was further issued reference (e), which administratively cautioned SNO and served as a corrective measure for him to exercise greater care in the performance of his duties to measure up to the high standards required of all Marine Corps officers.

b. As noted in reference (a), I concurred with the findings, opinions, and recommendations of the IO in reference (b), with some exceptions. Those exceptions are noted in references (a) and (c) and herein.

(1) Specific to the findings regarding the SNO, I concurred with the IO and determined that SNO's decision to authorize the mishap flight was not a direct causal or contributing factor in the mishap.

Subj: DISPOSITION ACTION IN THE CASE OF (b) (6)
(b) (6) COMMANDING OFFICER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER
SQUADRON 361, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 16

(2) I also concurred with the IO that the SNO exceeded his authority in approving the mishap flight and should have sought MAG-16 CO's approval for a flight after a nighttime Precautionary Emergency Landing (PEL) for associated maintenance actions.

(3) While I agree that SNO's failure to consult and receive authorization from the MAG-16 CO may satisfy the elements for a technical violation under Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice, such failure by the SNO was more indicative of a temporary lapse in judgment that occasionally befalls Marine officers in command. As noted in reference (b), there was ambiguity of the term "maintenance actions" under Group Order P3710.29M, Standard Operating Procedures for Air Operations, March 2021, which appears to have affected SNO's decision to not consult with and seek approval from MAG-16 CO.

(4) Although SNO's failure to consult with and receive authorization from MAG-16 CO for the mishap flight may be attributable to a temporary lapse in judgment, his "two-minute" conversation with the mishap pilot about the aircraft issue and plan to return home exhibited poor judgment that went beyond what the IO noted in reference (b) as "a more liberal and deferential command philosophy."

c. As noted above, I relieved SNO of command due to loss of trust and confidence in his ability to continue serving as the CO, HMH-361. SNO's actions as reflected in reference (b) was not a causal or contributing factor in the mishap. However, I find that he displayed poor judgment and exceeded his authority to approve the mishap flight. SNO should have sought MAG-16 CO's guidance and approval for a flight after a nighttime PEL with associated maintenance actions. This is notwithstanding the fact that there appears to have been ambiguity with the term "maintenance actions." Under the circumstances, SNO should have taken more time to speak with the mishap pilot about the aircraft issue and discuss a more thorough plan to return home, including weather conditions, planned route of flight, crew day, and fatigue level and human factors.

d. The poor judgment by the SNO was indicative of substandard performance of duty. SNO was expected to exercise greater care in the performance of his duties than the judgment he showed on 6 February 2024. SNO's poor judgment on this isolated incident also appears to be an exception than the norm, and he has generally demonstrated standards of conduct and performance expected of Marine officers. Further, based on the very limited circumstances of this case, it appears that SNO's substandard performance of duty does not rise to the level where processing for separation may be appropriate nor otherwise rise to level of misconduct requiring reporting and processing under reference (d).

4. All appropriate follow-on administrative actions, including adverse fitness report, as applicable, will be processed in accordance with pertinent rules and regulations.

Subj: DISPOSITION ACTION IN THE CASE OF (b) (6)
(b) (6), COMMANDING OFFICER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER
SQUADRON 361, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 16

5. The point of contact is the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 3d MAW, at (858) 307-8993.

(b) (6)

J. B. WELLONS

Copy to:
CG, I MEF
OSJA, I MEF
OSJA, 3d MAW



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
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IN REPLY REFER TO

5830

CG

OCT 15 2024

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on (b) (6) ltr 5830/CI dtd 11 Jun 24

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF
To: File

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER, MARINE
HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED
ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

1. I have reviewed the subject investigation and concur with the findings, opinions, and recommendations of the Investigating Officer, with exceptions noted in this endorsement.
2. On the night of 6 February 2024, a CH-53E from HMH-361, call sign "TIGER 43," crashed into a mountain ridge near Pine Valley, CA during an attempted return flight from Imperial County Airport, CA to MCAS Miramar, CA. First and foremost, we mourn the tragic loss of the five Marines who perished in this mishap. There are no words adequate to express the sorrow that follows such a tragedy, and we will always honor the memory of the TIGER 43 crew. On behalf of the Marines and Sailors of 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW), I also wish to express my deepest sympathies and sincere condolences to the families, friends and loved ones of (b) (6).

3. The tragic consequences of this mishap necessitated a thorough and exhaustive investigation that was conducted with the highest level of professionalism and expertise. To that end, the Investigating Officer (IO) assembled a team composed of the best and most well-informed experts available, to determine the cause of this mishap and ensure the most complete and accurate understanding of how to prevent such a mishap in the future. The investigative team consisted of three pilots with a combined total of over 40 years of military flying experience and over 5,000 flight hours, including graduates from the CH-53E Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course, and Aviation Safety School. The team also included a CH-53E maintenance expert with over 17 years of experience maintaining the CH-53E. This team produced a thorough and complete investigation with over 100 enclosures. Further, prior to this endorsement, I held various meetings with key staff members to carefully examine, analyze, and discuss the investigation and its findings.

4. *Causal Factors.* Having reviewed all available data and analysis, the IO determined the root cause of the TIGER 43 mishap was pilot error, which included the mishap pilot's failure to maintain both a safe obstacle clearance and Visual Flight Rules (VFR) visibility requirements, resulting in a fatal controlled flight into terrain. To determine what happened during the mishap, the investigation evaluated multiple theories suggested by the available evidence. While I agree

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

with the IO's findings and opinions regarding the *causal factors*, I note the IO's determination was limited by the evidence that currently exists, which required the IO to make certain assumptions, and the standard of proof applicable in accordance with the Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN).

5. *Contributing Factors.* The investigation identified additional contributing factors, including the presence of moderate icing conditions and cloud layers along the mishap route that prevented a safe transit above factor terrain. The investigation further determined these deteriorating weather conditions should have been a signal to the mishap crew of TIGER 43 that a safe transit from Imperial County Airport to MCAS Miramar was not feasible, despite the earlier forecasted and observed weather report that supported TIGER 43's initial departure from Creech Air Force Base to Imperial County. I agree with the IO's findings and opinions regarding the *contributing factors*. An extensive analysis of these factors is contained within this investigation, and it indicates the mishap crew should have been cognizant of the probability that the enroute forecasted weather conditions prevented a safe return flight from Imperial County to MCAS Miramar.

6. *Other Factors.* The investigation considered additional non-causal and non-contributing factors, including the decision-making of the mishap squadron Commanding Officer (CO), who authorized the mishap flight after the TIGER 43 crew conducted a nighttime precautionary emergency landing (PEL) into Imperial County Airport on the flight that immediately preceded the mishap flight.

(b) (6)

b. After completing this repair, the mishap pilot conducted a phone call with the squadron CO to request authorization for a "one shot" flight back to MCAS Miramar, and the squadron CO cleared the flight for return to MCAS Miramar. The IO concluded the squadron CO exceeded his authority by approving the mishap flight, because the Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16) CO retains the authority to approve a nighttime flight following the completion of maintenance actions in the aftermath of a PEL.

c. The IO further determined that the mishap squadron CO's decision to authorize the mishap flight was not a direct causal or contributing factor in this mishap, and I concur with this finding. I also concur with the IO that the squadron CO exceeded his authority in approving the mishap flight and should have sought MAG-16 CO's approval for a flight after a nighttime PEL with associated maintenance actions.

7. I will take appropriate action on the investigation's findings and recommendations via separate correspondence.

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ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

8. The 3d MAW and the Marine Corps aviation community will utilize the findings and recommendations of this investigation to make us better in both practice and execution. Again, I extend my deepest condolences to the families of our fallen Marines, and I also offer my deepest gratitude and admiration for the first responders who assisted with the response to this mishap, along with the investigative and engineering teams who assisted in this investigation. I commend them for their exemplary conduct and attention-to-detail, both in responding to this mishap and completing such a thorough investigation.

9. The point of contact is the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 3d MAW, at (858) 307-8993.

(b) (6)

J. B. WELLONS



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
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SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92145-2022

IN REPLY REFER TO

5830

CG

OCT 15 2024

From: Commanding General

To: Chief of Staff

Subj: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN THE COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

Ref: (a) (b) (6) s ltr 5830/CI dtd 11 Jun 24

1. I concur with the recommendations of the Investigating Officer (IO) in pages 58-59 of reference (a).

2. You will oversee the following matters.

a. Coordinate with MCAS Miramar regarding the IO's recommendation to:

(1) Redraft enclosure (39) of reference (a) "to incorporate overdue aircraft checklist, procedures, update formalized reporting guidance, and clarify MCAS Miramar's role when supporting tenant unit aviation mishaps," and

(2) Train all Airfield ODOs on updated mishap checklist procedures.

b. Clarification of Wing Order 3100.3D, 3d MAW Incident Reporting Procedures, December 2023 and Sharepoint Website, regarding reporting requirements when addressing PEL execution and incorporation of overdue aircraft reporting requirements and direct guidance within the order.

c. Direct 3d MAW DOSS to ensure:

(1) All subordinate group and squadron aviation mishap checklists properly capture the correct maritime and CONUS-based SAR agencies, and

(2) All subordinate group and squadron aircrew understand the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of federal, state, and local agencies in supporting aviation mishap or overdue aircraft procedures.

d. Ensure 3d MAW G-3 determine:

(1) The proper role of the WOCC in supporting aviation mishap and overdue aircraft procedures, and

(2) 3d MAW's role in supporting maritime or CONUS-based military SAR response efforts.

Subj: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN THE COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

e. Coordinate with MAG-16 to ensure:

(1) The term “maintenance actions” is clearly defined within Group Order P3710.29M, Standard Operating Procedures for Air Operations, March 2021.

(2) Clarify the approval authority for a night recovery following a PEL if “maintenance actions” are not warranted under Group Order P3710.29M, Standard Operating Procedures for Air Operations, March 2021.

(3) Brief this mishap to all aircrew in a lessons learned-type setting including topics like on-deck and in-flight decision-making, weather requirements, NVG perceptions errors and visual illusions, maintenance actions and approval authorities.

(4) HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW, update Squadron Order 3710.2F, HMH-361 Flight Operations Standing Operating Procedures, August 2023, to align the squadron’s definition of crew day and approved schedule change authorities with Wing Order 3710.39J, 3d MAW Standard Operating Procedures for Air Operations, June 2023.

(5) HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW, update enclosure (72) of reference (a) to align with 3d MAW DOSS’s mishap checklist recommendations.

f. Coordinate with MAG-39 to ensure:

(1) Review of internal SOPs is completed to ensure PEL authorities are clearly defined, and

(2) Brief this mishap to all aircrew in a lessons learned-type setting including topics like on-deck and in-flight decision-making, weather requirements, NVG perceptions errors and visual illusions, maintenance actions and approval authorities.

3. Regarding the recommendation by the IO under Part Three, Paragraph 3, of reference (a) at page 58, I will act via separate correspondence.

4. The point of contact is the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 3d MAW, at (858) 307-8993.

(b) (6)

J. B. WELLONS

Copy to:
CO, MCAS Miramar
DOSS, 3d MAW
G-3, 3d MAW
CO, MAG-16
CO, HMH-361
CO, MAG-39



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

THIRD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION MIRAMAR
P.O. BOX 452038
SAN DIEGO CA 92145-2038

5830
CI
11 Jun 24

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) /7518 USMC

To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7G w/Ch 2 (JAGMAN)
(b) U.S. Code Title 10, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 134, Subchapter II, Section 2255 (Aircraft Accident Investigation Boards)
(c) NAVAIR 01-H53BE-Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) Flight Manual Navy Model CH-53E, Aug 2022
(d) NAVAIR 01- H53BE-NFM-500 Pilot's/Aircrew Pocket Checklist CH-53E, Aug 2022
(e) ANTPP 3-22.3-CH53 Combat Aircraft Fundamentals, Feb 2023
(f) Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), Night Vision Device (NVD) Manual 10th Edition, Oct 2018
(g) NAVMC 3500.14E CH 1, Aviation Training and Readiness Program Manual, Sep 2020
(h) NAVMC 3500.47E.0.11 CH-53 Training and Readiness Manual, Nov 2023
(i) CH-53E Naval Aviation Technical Information Product (NATIP), NTRP 3-22.4-CH53E, May 2023
(j) COMNAVAIRFORINST 3710.7, NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions Manual, Sep 2023
(k) OPNAVIST 3750.6S, Naval Aviation Safety Program, May 2014
(l) COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2D CH-1, Naval Aviation Maintenance Program, Feb 2022
(m) SqdnO 3710.2F, HMH-361 Flight Operations Standing Operating Procedures, Aug 2023
(n) WgO 3710.39J, 3d MAW Standard Operating Procedures for Air Operations, June 2023
(o) NAVAIR 16-35HUD-1 CH-2, Heads Up Display Technical Manual, Apr 2017
(p) MAG-16 & MAG-39 Rotary Wing / Tiltrotor Pilot Controller Handbook, Jan 2022
(q) A1-H53CE-MMO-000 Organizational Level Maintenance, No. 2 Engine Dual Thermal Detection System - Operational Checkout Test Procedure
(r) GruO P3710.29M, MAG-16 Standard Operating Procedures for Air Operations, Mar 2021
(s) WgO 3100.3D, 3d MAW Incident Reporting Procedures, Dec 2023 and Sharepoint Website
(t) FAA-H-8083-28, Aviation Weather Handbook, Dec 2022
(u) Federal Aviation Regulations - Aeronautical Information Manual (FAR-AIM), 21 March 2024
(v) WgO 5442.3F, 3d Aircraft Readiness, October 2023
(w) MCO 5100.29C Volume 9, Navy and Marine Corps Safety Investigation and Reporting Manual, 27 September 2021
(x) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Multi-Radar Multi-Sensor Operational and Beta Product Viewer
(y) National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Langley Research Center Web-Based Archives

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

- (z) Google Earth, Web-Based
- (aa) Naval Air Systems Command, V-22 Airframe Bulletins NO. 199, NO. 199-2, 200-RA, 201, 201-A1
- (ab) Autopsy Examination Reports, ME24-0024/25/26/27/28, 29 March 2024
- (ac) MAWTS-1 CH-53E Academic Support Package (ASP) Night Operational Environment, April 2024
- (ad) MAWTS-1 CH-53E ASP Night Operations and Planning Aids, April 2024
- (ae) MAWTS-1 CH-53E ASP NVG Misperceptions and Illusions, April 2024
- (af) NOAA, Aviation Weather Center, Web-Based Product Viewer
- (ag) FAA ADS-B FAA Keyhole Markup Language Zipped File and FAA ADS-B TIGER 43 Video
- (ah) HMH-361 Defense Organizational Climate Survey, February 2023 and October 2024
- (ai) Manual for Courts-Martial, 2019
- (aj) National Search and Rescue (SAR) Plan of the United States, 2016

- Encl:
- (1) Appointing Order from Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF dtd 12 Feb 24
 - (2) Authorization of Command Investigation Extension by Commanding General, 3d MAW, FMF dtd 26 Mar 24
 - (3) Command Investigation Team Appointment Letters
 - (4) Line of Duty Preliminary Inquiry into the death of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) /7566 USMC
 - (5) Line of Duty Preliminary Inquiry into the death of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) /7566 USMC
 - (6) Line of Duty Preliminary Inquiry into the death of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) /7566 USMC
 - (7) Line of Duty Preliminary Inquiry into the death of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) /6173 USMC
 - (8) Line of Duty Preliminary Inquiry into the death of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) /6173 USMC
 - (9) HMM-361 Daily Flight Schedule, 5 & 6 February 2024 - Versions 1, 2
 - (10) HMM-361 Daily Flight Schedule, 6 February 2024 - Version 3
 - (11) HMH-361 Daily Flight Schedule Email Traffic, 4-6 February 2024
 - (12) HMM-361 Daily Flight Schedule, 7 February 2024
 - (13) HMH-361 Weekly Flight Schedule, 4-10 February 2024
 - (14) HMH-361 Risk Analysis Worksheets, 6 February 2024
 - (15) Individual Risk Analysis Worksheet, 6 February 2024
 - (16) Weight and Power Performance Data, 6 February 2024
 - (17) Aviation Mishap Board Senior Member Email Traffic
 - (18) HMH-361 Aviation Maintenance Supply Readiness Reports
 - (19) Mishap Pilots Qualifications and Designation Letters
 - (20) Mishap Crew Chief Qualifications and Designation Letters
 - (21) HMH-361 Pilot Marine Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (M-SHARP) T&R Event Proficiency, 30/60/90
 - (22) HMH-361 Crew Chief Marine Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (M-SHARP) T&R Event Proficiency, 30/60/90(23)
 - (23) Interview Summary, MAG-16 Commanding Officer
 - (24) Interview Summary, Written Interview Questions, Article 31b Rights, HMH-361 Commanding Officer (CO)
 - (25) Interview Summary, HMH-361 Executive Officer (XO)
 - (26) Interview Summary, HMH-361 Operations Officer (OPSO)
 - (27) Interview Summary, HMH-361 Aircraft Maintenance Officer (AMO)
 - (28) Interview Summary, HMH-361 Director of Safety and Standardization (DOSS)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

- (29) Interview Summary, HMH-361 Daily Schedule Writer
- (30) Interview Summary, HMH-361 Weekly Schedule Writer
- (31) Interview Summary, HMH-361 Operations Duty Officer (ODO)
- (32) Interview Summary, HMH-361 Safe for Flight (SFF) Maintenance Controller
- (33) Interview Summary, HMH-361 Quality Assurance Chief
- (34) Interview Summary, HMH-361 Senior Quality Assurance Representative
- (35) Interview Summary, HMH-361 TIGER 42, Crew Chief
- (36) Interview Summary, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar PM ODO (Airfield ODO)
- (37) Interview Summary, MCAS Miramar AM ODO
- (38) Interview Summary, MCAS Miramar Airfield Manager
- (39) MCAS Miramar, Aircraft Mishap Checklist, 14 September 2019
- (40) MCAS Miramar PM ODO Logbook Entries, 6 February 2024
- (41) MCAS Miramar AM ODO Logbook Entries, 7 February 2024
- (42) MCAS Miramar Mission Assurance Officer Email Traffic
- (43) Interview Summary, MAWTS-1 Instructor Pilot
- (44) California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) Incident Response Checklist, Tablet Command Summary, Dispatch Summary
- (45) Interview Summary, CAL FIRE Chief
- (46) 3d MAW Command Duty Officer Email Statement, 6-7 February 2024
- (47) United States Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) Incident Response Checklist, 7 February 2024
- (48) Mishap Pilots Logbooks
- (49) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Email Traffic
- (50) FAA Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast ADS-B Spreadsheet
- (51) MAG-16 History Overview
- (52) Mishap Pilot 1, OPNAVINST 3710.7 NATOPS and Instrument Evaluations
- (53) Mishap Pilot 1, DD Form 2992, Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operational Duty (Up-Chit)
- (54) Mishap Pilot 2, OPNAVINST 3710.7 NATOPS and Instrument Evaluations
- (55) Mishap Pilot 2, DD Form 2992, Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operational Duty (Up-Chit)
- (56) Mishap Pilot 3, OPNAVINST 3710.7 NATOPS and Instrument Evaluations
- (57) Mishap Pilot 3, DD Form 2992, Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operational Duty (Up-Chit)
- (58) Mishap Crew Chief 1, OPNAVINST 3710.7 NATOPS Evaluation
- (59) Mishap Crew Chief 1, DD Form 2992, Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operational Duty (Up-Chit)
- (60) Mishap Crew Chief 2, OPNAVINST 3710.7 NATOPS Evaluation
- (61) Mishap Crew Chief 2, DD Form 2992, Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operational Duty (Up-Chit)
- (62) HMH-361 PM Operations Duty Officer Flight Brief, 6 February 2024
- (63) HMH-462 Avionics QAR Quality Assurance Representative Email
- (64) TIGER 41 DD-1801 and DD-1801-1 Weather Brief, 6 February 2024
- (65) Aviation Weather Products and Notice to Airman (NOTAM) Data, 6 February 2024
- (66) United States Instrument Flight Rules (Low-Altitude) and Visual Flight Rules Chart Screenshots
- (67) HMH-361 ODO Personnel Notes, 6-7 February 2024
- (68) HMH-361 ODO Logbook, 6 February 2024
- (69) United States Coast Guard San Diego Section Dispatch Audio Recordings, 6 and 7 February 2024
- (70) MP1 Emergency Procedures Exam, February 2024

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- (71) HMH-361 ODO Phone Screenshots
- (72) HMH-361 Aviation Mishap Plan, 28 January 2024
- (73) HMH-361 Monthly Calendar, January 2023-February 2024
- (74) Mishap Binder Chronology Timeline, 7 February 2024
- (75) Mishap Checklist Team Handwritten Notepad Chronology Timeline, 7 February 2024
- (76) HMH-361 Mishap Squadron Company Grade Pilot Phone Screenshots
- (77) HMH-361 Creech Detachment Senior Quality Assurance Representative Phone Screenshots
- (78) Golden Acorn Casino Windmill Data
- (79) Interview Summary, United States Border Patrol Agent
- (80) HMH-361 Flight Surgeon Email Traffic
- (81) Interview Summary, MWSS-371 Corpsman
- (82) Interview Summary, MWSS-371 Senior Staff Non-Commissioned Officer
- (83) Interview Summary, 3D MAW Current Operations Officer
- (84) AFRCC Overview PowerPoint, 2024
- (85) Civil Air Patrol National Radar Analysis Team Screenshots, 7 February 2024
- (86) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 26 (MALS-16) Material Readiness Emails and Excel Documents
- (87) 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron PowerPoint for Navy Safety Command, 13 February 2024
- (88) Mishap Aircraft Crash Site Top-Down Photo, February 2024
- (89) Mishap Aircraft Crash Site Photos, 13 February 2024
- (90) Initial Fleet Readiness Center Field Observation Reports, March 2024
- (91) Naval Air (NAVAIR) Warfare Center Aircraft Division Aeromechanics Safety Investigation Support Team (ASIST) Engineering Analysis and Supporting Data Report, 4 Apr 2024
- (92) 3d MAW Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Officer Email
- (93) 3d MAW G-8 Email Traffic
- (94) HMH-361 Fiscal Year 2023, 2024 Sortie Based Training Plan (SBTP) Execution Summary
- (95) 3d MAW Equal Opportunity Representative Email, 3 May 2024
- (96) HMH-361 Creech D-30 Unit Training Detachment and Final Letter of Instruction, 22 December 2023 and 22 January 2024
- (97) Command Investigation Team Subject Matter Expert TIGER 43 Simulator Flight Write-Up, 8 April 2024
- (98) Mishap Aircraft AADB, Aircraft Inspection and Acceptance Record, Daily and Turnaround Inspection, Aircraft Workload, Scheduled Inspections, Time Critical Technical Directives, Paperwork Work Orders, and Aircraft Flight Hours
- (99) HMH-361 Unit Personnel Availability, 11 April 2024
- (100) HMH-361 Commanding Officer Biography
- (101) Interview Summary, California Civil Air Patrol Representative,
- (102) Mishap Crew Chief Logbooks
- (103) MCAS Miramar, MAG-16, 3d MAW Duty Officer Logbooks
- (104) Select Acronyms and Abbreviations
- (105) Listing of Personnel associated with the HMH-361 Class A Mishap that occurred on 6 February 2024

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Pursuant to enclosure (1) and in accordance with reference (a), this report concludes a Command Investigation (CI) into the facts and circumstances surrounding the CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter, Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMH-361) mishap that occurred on or about 6 February 2024.

2. On 6 February 2024, the Mishap Aircraft (MA) was CH-53E BUNO 164366. The MA's callsign was "TIGER 43." The mishap occurred near Pine Valley, California. The mishap resulted in the deaths of five active-duty service members of the U.S. Marine Corps and the destruction of the MA.

3. The CI Investigating Officer (IO) collected all reasonably available evidence for this investigation and followed all applicable rules and regulations. The CI satisfied enclosure (1)'s requirements. Over the course of the CI, the IO consulted with the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW), in accordance with enclosure (1).

4. Pursuant to enclosure (1), the IO assembled a Command Investigation Team. Each member signed a nondisclosure agreement and was directed not to discuss the CI with non-members unless the IO provided written permission. The Command Investigation Team had three active-duty Marine Corps pilots, one active-duty Marine Corps maintenance subject matter expert, and one reserve Marine Corps judge advocate.

a. The three pilots have a combined total of over 40 years of military flying experience, over 5000 flight hours, and 2185 CH-53E specific flight hours. All three pilots graduated from the Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course. One pilot is a certified Aviation Safety Officer as required by reference (a).

b. The maintenance subject matter expert has over 17 years of CH-53E operational and maintenance experience. The maintenance subject matter expert has served in a variety of billets ranging from Crew Chief to Maintenance Control Chief to Quality Assurance Chief.

c. The reserve judge advocate served in a purely administrative support capacity and did not provide any legal advice to the IO nor serve as a Legal Advisor.

5. The IO conducted numerous in-person interviews of witnesses aboard Marine Corps Air Station Miramar. Other interviews occurred by telephone.

a. Prior to any interview or questioning, the IO advised all witnesses, except for four witnesses, of the purpose of the CI per reference (a) and explained the difference with the Aircraft Mishap Board (AMB) in accordance with reference (a) and enclosure (1). The IO contacted the four witnesses after initial interviews and advised them of both reference (a)'s and enclosure (1)'s requirements. No privileged or incriminating information was discussed during the initial interviews. None of the four witnesses elected to change or modify their statements when retroactively contacted and advised.

b. This report contains summaries of select interviews. When necessary, the IO requested that certain witnesses sign their written statements. These

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individuals were given a copy of their respective interview to review and make any changes that were deemed appropriate before signing.

c. Conducting in-person interviews instead of simply seeking written statements allowed the IO to form clear opinions about the mishap, naturally pursue topics of conversation during an interview, confront witnesses, and assess each witness's demeanor and nonverbal communication. In the IO's opinion, all applicable personnel and witnesses fully cooperated with the CI.

d. In addition to the IO, members of the Command Investigation Team were present at certain witness interviews to aid the IO.

6. The IO began the CI without any knowledge of facts that any potential witnesses committed dereliction of duty or any other violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Over the course of the CI, only one witness became suspected of a violation of the UCMJ. The IO advised that witness at the initial interview of Article 31(b) rights under the UCMJ regarding a suspected Article 92 violation. That witness partially waived that witness's rights. No other witnesses became suspected of a violation of the UCMJ before, during, or after their interviews. Therefore, the IO did not advise them pursuant to Article 31(b) of the UCMJ nor seek a waiver of their rights.

7. The IO submitted one extension request of the CI. The approval was granted on 26 March 2024 and is contained in enclosure (2).

8. Line of duty determinations for all deceased service members were made prior to the conclusion of the CI. The deaths were determined to have occurred in the line of duty, and not due to misconduct. The IO has no change to the line of duty determinations contained within enclosures 4 through 8.

9. Enclosures 4 through 105 contain material pertinent to the CI. The IO certifies those enclosures are true and accurate copies.

10. All times in this report are local Pacific Standard Time (PST) unless otherwise annotated. Several items use or reference ZULU time, or Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). PST was eight hours behind ZULU/UTC time during the CI.

11. The IO attempted to accurately represent all times in this report. However, such accuracy may be limited and approximated based on the IO's analysis of witness statements, radar data, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) information, and MA positioning data.

12. All photographs listed in the enclosures were taken by the AMB or by the Command Investigation Team on or about 13 February 2024 at the mishap site. During the CI, the AMB did not provide any privileged materials to the IO.

13. In anticipation of public release, this report does not contain in its body the names of the deceased. The names are found in enclosure (105).

14. This report has three parts: Part One (Findings of Fact), Part Two (Opinions), and Part Three (Recommendations).

15. Part One has eight different sections:

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- a. Section One: CH-53E Platform Overview, NATOPS Overview, and relevant procedures;
- b. Section Two: Mishap Squadron (MS) Background and Material Readiness;
- c. Section Three: MA Readiness;
- d. Section Four: Mishap Aircrew (MAC) Readiness;
- e. Section Five: Organizational Data;
- f. Section Six: Aviation Weather, Night Vision Device Considerations, and Navigation;
- g. Section Seven: Mishap Timeline of Events, and;
- f. Section Eight: Overall Damages and Costs.

16. To develop these sections, the IO reviewed available data sources which included TIGER 43's radar and ADS-B flight path, indirect witness statements, a crash site survey, initial Fleet Readiness Center Field Observations, and a Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division Aeromechanics Safety Investigation Support Team edited for JAGMAN receipt. The IO also reviewed Naval Service Training and Readiness Manuals and tactical publications to gain a comprehensive understanding of CH-53E roles, responsibilities, and standardization metrics. The IO researched MAC readiness within the Marine-Sierra Hotel Aviation Reporting Program (M-SHARP), all applicable directives, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and command climate data. For aircraft readiness, the IO reviewed digital and printed records from the HMH-361 and MALS-16 maintenance systems. The IO relied upon weather data from multiple military and federal agencies to ascertain the environmental conditions prior to and during the mishap.

17. Part Two, the IO presents opinions in four sections:

- a. Section One: Causal Factors;
- b. Section Two: Non-Causal But Contributing Factors;
- c. Section Three: Non-Factors Worth of Discussion, and;
- d. Section Four: Non-Factors.

18. There were no direct witnesses to the mishap. The MA's Integrated Mechanical Diagnostics System (IMDS) memory cards, which record the aircraft's flight and maintenance data, have not yet been recovered from the mishap site because they cannot be located. The MA was not equipped with a Crash Survivable Flight Data Recorder. Limited aviation weather reporting stations in the vicinity of the mishap, paired with enroute mountainous terrain, and TIGER 43's low altitude limited the IO's factual determination of real time weather experienced by the mishap crew in the minutes before the mishap. These limitations required the IO to develop assumptions, based upon cumulative factual data, to provide detailed causal factors to the root cause within Part Two.

19. Part Three, the IO's recommendations are presented in a single section.

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20. In this report, notes are added for clarity or context. These notes are italicized, prefaced with the word "NOTE", and are placed at the end of paragraphs.

21. Over the course of the CI, the IO and Command Investigation Team investigated and explored, in detail, various potential causes of the mishap. They evaluated possible scenarios and simulations. This methodology enabled reaching reasonable conclusions through a process of elimination.

22. In summary, TIGER 43 departed Imperial County Airfield, California at 2209 on 6 February 2024 with a destination of Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)(B)

[REDACTED] Inclement weather conditions were forecasted along TIGER 43's route of flight and in the vicinity of the mishap site. However, the IO was unable to determine the real-time visibility, or actual weather conditions experienced at altitude, by the mishap crew in their approach to the mishap site. Unfortunately, the IO believes that this information will never be known. The current evidence shows poor weather did not necessarily exist to preclude TIGER 43's flight.

23. The available data and analysis indicate that the root cause of the mishap was pilot error in the failure to maintain obstacle clearance requirements. This error tragically resulted in a fatal, Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) event on the evening of 6 February 2024. We may never know the exact reason for this root cause and the IO cannot pinpoint one explanation. To determine what led to the error, this report evaluates multiple realistic theories suggested by the evidence under reference (a)'s standard of proof.

***** PART ONE: FINDINGS OF FACT *****

SECTION ONE: CH-53E PLATFORM OVERVIEW, NATOPS OVERVIEW, AND RELEVANT PROCEDURES. This section provides a broad overview of the CH-53E platform, a limited introduction to select aircraft systems, and procedures relevant to the investigation.

1. The CH-53E assault transport helicopter is manufactured by Sikorsky Aircraft. The helicopter is equipped with a seven-blade main rotor and a four-blade canted tail rotor, designed for both land and ship-based operation. Power is furnished by three T64-GE-419 engines that can produce (b)(3)(B) shaft horsepower. The CH-53E aircraft dimensions are listed within Figure 1. [Ref (c)]

2. The helicopter's design gross weight is (b)(3)(B) pounds and is the weight at which the maximum g load may be sustained. The helicopter is designed to carry (b)(3)(B) pounds of cargo externally at a cruise speed of at least (b)(3)(B) knots and can range (b)(3)(B) nautical miles on a sea level tropical day. At its

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destination, the helicopter can hover for (b)(3)(B) minutes, release its cargo, fly
an additional (b)(3)(B) nautical miles without a payload, and have (b)(3)(B) minutes of
fuel in reserve. [Ref (c)]

3.

(b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

Figure 1. CH-53E Aircraft Dimensions. [Ref (c)]

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4.

(b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

Figure 2. CH-53E Engine Layout. [Ref (c)]

(b)(3)(B)

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



Figure 3. No. 2 ENGINE OVERHEAT Caution Light Emergency Procedure. [Ref (c)]

6. [REDACTED]



7. The following aural warning cues are presented to aircrew via headset:
[Ref (c)]

a. "WHOOOP WHOOOP, PULL UP, PULL UP", indicates the aircraft has penetrated a fixed minimum recovery altitude and a recovery maneuver should be initiated. This aural warning is predictive. NAVAIR Fleet Support Team

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(FST) Engineers are unable to identify the exact threshold for this aural cue. [Ref (c), Encl (91)]

b. "ALTITUDE ALTITUDE", indicates the helicopter initiated a descent below the pilot selected minimum recovery altitude as indicated by the radar altimeter's bug setting. This aural warning is non-predictive. [Ref (c), Encl (91)]

c. "PULL UP, PULL UP", indicates an altitude lost due to descending flight, rising terrain (or a combination of both). This aural warning is predictive. NAVAIR FST Engineers are unable to identify the exact threshold for this aural cue. [Ref (c), Encl (91)]

8. The CH-53E helicopter is required to comply with a series of operating limitations. Of these, that flight into forecasted or known moderate or severe icing conditions is specifically prohibited. [Ref (c)]

9. The terms IMMEDIATELY, POSSIBLE, and PRACTICAL are used to highlight the degree of urgency in which a landing must be made. [Ref (c)]

a. "LAND IMMEDIATELY" means that a landing must be executed without delay. Primary consideration is for the survival of the occupants. [[Ref (c)]

b. "LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE" means to land at the first site at which a safe landing can be made. [Ref (c)]

c. "LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICAL" means extended flight is not recommended. The landing site and duration of flight is at the discretion of the pilot in command.

10. Without subsequent fire indications, a (b)(3)(B) (b)(3)(B) would meet LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICAL landing criteria. [Ref (c)]

11. A precautionary emergency landing (PEL) is defined as a landing when further flight is possible but inadvisable. Determining such landings is governed by the following: [Ref (c)]

a. When an indication is received and continued flight would jeopardize the safety of the helicopter or crew. [Ref (c)]

b. When control function is questionable, or instruments fail that are essential for continued flight. [Ref (c)]

c. Any condition of uncertainty or distress. [Ref (c)]

d. Helicopter aircrews are advised that further flight will not be attempted until the issue has been determined and/or corrected. Most precautionary landing instances require a follow-on maintenance inspection to be completed by qualified personnel before further flight is attempted. [Ref (b)(3)(B)]

12. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

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(b)(3)(B)

13. If presented with Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), when operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), CH-53E aircrews would attempt to maintain Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) by avoiding or circumnavigating IMC. [Ref (c-e), Encl (26, 28, 30, 97)]

14. To enable this process, aircrew could slow to no less than (b)(3)(B) knots and descend no lower than (b)(3)(B) feet AGL or transition to Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). [Ref (c-e), Encl (26, 28, 30, 97)]

15. However, if the transition to IMC was inadvertent, the CH-53E aircrew would execute Inadvertent IMC (IIMC) procedures. IIMC procedures call for the CH-53E aircrew to level the aircraft and ensure coordinated flight in all three flight axes. [Ref (c-e), Encl (26, 28, 30, 97)]

16. Immediately following this maneuver, a standard rate climb of (b)(3)(B) feet per minute would be initiated and would continue until the aircraft had reached the applicable Minimum Safe Altitude for obstacle clearance. If required, aircrews would also turn away from any known terrain to maintain a safe clearance distance. [Ref (c-e), Encl (26, 28, 30, 97)]

SECTION TWO: UNIT BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL READINESS. This section addresses HMH-361's timeline leading up to the mishap, the unit's maintenance readiness, V-22 red stripe impacts, and the squadron's command climate.

17. HMH-361 is based at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar, and is one of four CH-53E squadrons within MAG-16. HMH-361 along with HMH-462, HMH-465, and HMH-466 comprise what is effectively known as "HMH-West." The MS consists of approximately (b)(3)(B) Marines and Sailors, and (b)(3)(B) CH-53E aircraft. [Encl (18, 51, 99)]

18. The MS completed post-deployment leave on 9 (b)(3)(B) 2023 with the HMH-361 Commanding Officer's (CO) Change of Command on (b)(3)(B) Cross-country operations were conducted from (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS was tasked with two mandated support evolutions on (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS's actual and forecast flight hours were (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) respectively. NOTE: The CO had previously filled an Aviation Maintenance Officer role in a prior squadron before this command tour. [Encl (94, 100, 103)]

19. In (b)(3)(B) 2023, a Unit Deployment for Training (UTD) to Naval Air Facility (NAF) El Centro, California, was conducted from (b)(3)(B) 2023. From (b)(3)(B) 2023, a mid-cycle Maintenance Program Assessment was completed and cross-country operations to (b)(3)(B) were initiated on (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS completed a Defense Organization Climate Survey (DEOCS). No mandated tasking concurred. The MS's actual and forecast flight hours were (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) respectively. [Encl (94, 95, 103)]

20.

(b)(2)

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(b)(2)

21. In (b)(3)(B) 2023, (b)(3)(B) cross-country operations continued from (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS supported (b)(3)(B) with aircraft and personnel. The MS was issued mandated tasking on 1, 10, and 11 March 2023. The MS's actual and forecast flight hours were (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) respectively. [Encl (94, 103)]

22. In (b)(3)(B) 2023, MCAS Yuma cross-country operations were conducted from (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS was issued mandated tasking on (b)(3)(B) (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS's actual and forecast flight hours were (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) respectively. [Encl (94, 103)]

23. In (b)(3)(B) 2023, Travis Air Force Base (AFB), California cross-country operations were conducted from (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS was issued mandated tasking on (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS's actual and forecast flight hours were (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) respectively. [Encl (94, 103)]

24. In (b)(3)(B) 2023, a Mountain Home AFB UTD was conducted from (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS was issued mandated tasking on (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS's actual and forecast flight hours were (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) respectively. [Encl (94, 103)]

25. In (b)(3)(B) 2023, the MS manned Miramar Fire Bucket alert lines from (b)(3)(B) 2023 and supported three mandated events on (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS deployed in support of Service Level Training Exercise (SLTE) (b)(3)(B) from (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS's actual and forecast flight hours in (b)(3)(B) were (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B). The MS's actual and forecast flight hours in August were (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) respectively. [Encl (94, 103)]

26. In (b)(3)(B) 2023, a successful MALD-16 Maintenance Inspection was completed on (b)(3)(B) Davis Monthan AFB, Arizona cross-country operations were conducted. MS was issued mandated tasking on (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS's actual and forecast flight hours were (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) respectively. [Encl (94, 103)]

27. In (b)(3)(B) 2023, a successful 3d MAF Aviation Logistics Management Assist Team (ALMAT) Inspection was completed. The MS completed another DEOCS. The MS was issued mandated tasking on (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS's actual and forecast flight hours were (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) respectively. [Encl (27, 94, 103)]

28. (b)(2)

29. Notwithstanding operational stress comments, of the 11 individuals interviewed who could offer internal insight regarding HMH-361's command climate, two individuals provided negative comments. However, those comments were moot based upon timeline, internal solutions, and improving metrics. [Encl (25-35, 95), Ref (ah)]

30. In (b)(3)(B) 2023, the MS was issued mandated tasking on (b)(3)(B) 2023. The MS's actual and forecast flight hours were (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) [Encl (94, 103)]

31. Maintenance readiness rates from (b)(3)(B) 2023 to (b)(3)(B) 2024 were as depicted in Figure 4. [Encl (86), Ref (1, v)]

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Figure 4. HMH-West Averaged AMSRR Data from [REDACTED] [Encl (86), Ref (l,v)]

32. Naval Air Systems Command issued a red stripe memorandum grounding all V-22 aircraft from 6 December 2023 to 8 March 2024. As a result, mandated tasking originally allocated to MAG-16's MV-22s was shifted to HMH-West. [Ref (aa), Encl (26)]

33. In (b)(3)(B) 2023, the MS was originally tasked with (b)(3)(B) mandated support events, however this increased to (b)(3)(B) as the unit supported presidential lift requirements from (b)(3)(B) 2023 and Parts, Mail, and Cargo (PMC) "runs" on (b)(3)(B) 2023. The re-allocated tasking forced the MS to modify planned cross-countries and to work weekends to manage aircraft material readiness. The MS's actual and forecast flight hours were (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) respectively. [Encl (26, 94, 103), Ref (aa)]

34. In (b)(3)(B) 2024, the MS was originally tasked with zero mandated events, but this increased to two on (b)(3)(B) 2024 as PMC runs were added on (b)(3)(B) (b)(3)(B) 2024. A successful Commander, Naval Air Forces Maintenance Inspection occurred from (b)(3)(B) 2024. The re-allocated tasking resulted again in modified cross-countries and the need to work limited weekends to support maintenance readiness. Additionally, feasibility support requests to fulfill added presidential lift requirements fostered an environment of uncertainty the week prior to the MS's Creech AFB UTD. Ultimately, the ask of the MS was limited. HMH-361 supported the requirement from a spare aircraft role and managed the unplanned maintenance requirement with the unit's simultaneous UTD departure. The MS's actual and forecast flight hours were (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) respectively. NOTE: Mandatory tasking is traditionally coordinated and issued (b)(3)(B) prior to the required date. [Encl (26, 27, 94, 103), Ref (aa)]

35. From 31 January to 7 February 2024, the MS executed a Creech AFB UTD in support of the squadron's Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP). [Encl (96)]

36. In (b)(3)(B) 2024, the MS was originally tasked with six mandated evolutions scheduled on 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, and 27 February 2024. In addition to the unit's Creech AFB UTD, it was also required to complete Deck Landing Qualifications on 21 and 22 February 2024 following the President's Day 96-hour liberty period. [Encl (26, 94)]

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37. Prior to the mishap, MAG-16 had reduced the MS's assigned tasking on both (b)(3)(B) 2024, to a one aircraft requirement. [Encl (26)]

38. The HMH-361 Aviation Maintenance Officer (AMO) stated that the V-22 red stripe directly contributed to the mishap. His rationale pointed toward higher mandated tasking requirements within HMH-West and the lack of relief granted by higher headquarters. The AMO highlighted HMH-462 and the squadron's (b)(3)(B) priority events within the (b)(3)(B) 2024. In the AMO's opinion, the MS's acceptance of tasking on (b)(3)(B) 2024 was only done to ease the operational burden that had been placed on HMH-462. The MS's (b)(3)(B) 2024 flight schedule had been specifically written to ensure early aircraft return. This early return was meant to manage material readiness prior to the unit's (b)(3)(B) 2024 tasking. [Encl (27)]

39. Multiple members of the MS stated they felt operational and maintenance pressure due to the V-22 red stripe. [Encl (25, 26, 27, 30, 32)]

40. The CO stated that the CO did not perceive there to be any negative impact, either operationally or maintenance wise, related to the V-22 red stripe. [Encl (24)]

41. The MS deployed overseas in the (b)(3)(B) [Encl (26, 27)]

SECTION THREE: MA READINESS. This section addresses the MA's material readiness and legality for flight.

42. MA, CH-53E BUNO 164366, had 6415.5 total flight hours prior to (b)(3)(B) (b)(3)(B) 2024 and was last flown on (b)(3)(B) 2024. [Encl (98)]

43. The MA was properly released for flight and certified in accordance with reference (1) by a qualified Safe for Flight (SFF) maintenance controller. [Encl (98)]

44. Mishap Pilot 1 (MP1) signed and accepted the MA, affirming that he had reviewed the MA's discrepancies over the last 10 flights and had confirmed the helicopter's weight and balance. [Encl (98)]

45. There were no uncompleted maintenance actions or Time Critical Technical Directives (TCTD). [Encl (98)]

46. There were no high-time components that exceeded mean-time-between failure rates. [Encl (98)]

47. All components installed on the aircraft were correct according to required parts, material, and maintenance procedure specifications. [Encl (98)]

48. On (b)(3)(B) 2024, the MA was listed as FMC with a total of (b)(3)(B) open work orders none of which degraded mission capability. [Encl (98)]

a. The MA had experienced at least one other (b)(3)(B) (b)(3)(B) in the preceding month. [Encl (31)]

b. The MA experienced a (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

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49. The MA's pilot side maps were unable to be loaded or initialized. *NOTE: The pilot side corresponds to the right cockpit seat position.* [Ref (c), Encl (98)]

50. There is no evidence of maintenance malpractice. [Encl (98)]

51. There is no evidence of component material condition failure. [Encl (98)]

52. The MA did have a AN/AYQ-23(V) GPWS that was installed and recovered. [Encl (91)]

53. The MA's GPWS recorded approximately (b)(3)(B) minutes and (b)(3)(B) seconds of data from system power on to power removal. During that time, (b)(3)(B) different system events were recorded based upon varying thresholds or exceedances. Of the (b)(3)(B) events, (b)(3)(B) voice audible alerts were provided. The (b)(3)(B) voice alerts generate questions of data validity as (b)(3)(B) are clearly erroneous. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]

54. It is unclear if the final three GPWS alerts provided between (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) are entirely valid. However, they do correlate correctly with the MA's flight path in the minutes prior to the mishap. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]

SECTION FOUR: MAC READINESS. This section addresses each of the mishap aircrew's qualifications, designations, flight hours, medical readiness, human factors, crew day, and offers a characterization of each member based upon summarized interviews.

Mishap Pilot 1 (MP1)

55. MP1 was the MA Helicopter Aircraft Commander (HAC) on 6 February 2024. [Encl (10, 19, 52)]

56. On 6 February 2024, MP1 was on active duty in the Regular Marine Corps. [Encl (4)]

57. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

58. (b)(3)(B)
(b)(3)(B)

59. (b)(3)(B)
(b)(3)(B)

60. (b)(3)(B)
(b)(3)(B)

61. (b)(3)(B)
(b)(3)(B)

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62. MP1 was a Prospective WTI and was slated to attend the 2-24 WTI CH-53E Course. [Encl (26-31)]

63. MP1's last flight prior to (b)(3)(B) 2024 was on (b)(3)(B) 2024, for a (b)(3)(B) sortie was in support of a weather canceled MAWTS-1 certification flight. [Encl (21, 26, 28)]

64. MP1 was a highly qualified CH-53E Instructor Pilot who held the following qualifications: (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

65. MP1's total flight time was (b)(3)(B) as a CH-53E (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B) of (b)(3)(B). Note: MP1's flight hours within enclosure (b)(3)(B)

66. (b)(3)(B) Note: MP1's flight hours within enclosure (48) (b)(3)(B) The flight hour hard deck for 3d MAW CH-53E aircrew is 10 hours per month. [Encl (21, 48), ref(n)]

67. MP1 was current, qualified, and proficient to conduct the assigned mission on (b)(3)(B) 2024. [Encl (10, 14, 19, 21, 70), Ref (h)]

68. MP1 conducted a NATOPS Evaluation open book test, closed book test, and check simulator in accordance with reference (j) and was determined to be well qualified to serve as a HAC on 31 August 2023. [Encl (52)]

69. (b)(3)(B)

70. There are no indications that MP1 was involved in preflight planning or mission preparations that caused MP1 to violate required crew rest prior to the 6 February 2024 sortie. [Encl (9, 10, 28, 31)]

71. MP1 was characterized as a smart, patient, and skilled leader who possessed a superior aviation acumen. MP1 was also characterized as a conservative, analytical decision-maker whose approachability enabled enhanced Crew Resource Management (CRM). MP1 would routinely address the lowest ranking crew member to determine their comfortability when making risk-based decisions. [Encl (24-31)]

72. MP1's NATOPS briefs were categorized as standardized, situational awareness (SA) enhancing, and addressed emergency procedures with the appropriate amount of detail. [Encl (28, 31)]

Mishap Pilot 2 (MP2)

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73. MP2 was the MA Helicopter Second Pilot (H2P) during both the Creech AFB to Imperial County leg and the Imperial County to MCAS Miramar leg on 6 February 2024. *NOTE: This would have been during TIGER 43's second and third flights that evening.* [Encl (10, 19, 17, 31)]

74. MP2 was on active duty in the Regular Marine Corps on 6 February 2024. [Encl (5)]

75. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

76. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

77. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

78. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

79. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

80. MP2's last flight prior to (b)(3)(B) 2024 was on (b)(3)(B) 2024, for a (b)(3)(B) [Encl (21)]

81. MP2 held the following qualifications: (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

82. MP2's total flight time was (b)(3)(B) hours, with (b)(3)(B) hours in the CH-53E, (b)(3)(B) hours of NVG time, and (b)(3)(B) hours of LLL time. *Note: MP2's flight hours within enclosure (48) were calculated without simulator time included.* [Encl (21)]

83. MP2 had flown (b)(3)(B) hours in the past 30-days, (b)(3)(B) hours in the past 60-days, and (b)(3)(B) hours in the past 90-days. *Note: MP2's flight hours within enclosure (48) were calculated without simulator time included.* [Encl (21), ref(n)]

84. MP2 was current, qualified, and proficient to conduct the assigned mission on 6 February 2024. [Encl (10, 14, 19, 21), Ref (h)]

85. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

86. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

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87. There were no indications that MP2 was involved in preflight planning or mission preparations that caused MP2 to violate required crew rest prior to the 6 February 2024 sortie. [Encl (9, 10, 28, 31)]

88. MP2 was characterized as an aspiring H2P, who's natural skillset placed MP2 at the top of his peer group and was the next prospective HAC to begin training. MP2's ease of nature, affable demeanor, and conservative thought processes were known qualities within the HMH-361 ready room. [Encl (24-31)]

Mishap Pilot 3 (MP3)

89. MP3 was the MA Helicopter Second Pilot (H2P) during the Creech AFB to Creech AFB leg on 6 February 2024. *NOTE: This would have been during TIGER 43's first flight that evening.* [Encl (10, 29, 31, 19)]

90. MP3 was a passenger (non-flight crew member) during the subsequent flight legs on 6 February 2024. [Encl (17, 31)]

91. MP3 was on active duty in the Regular Marine Corps on 6 February 2024. [Encl (6)]

92. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

93. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

94. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

95. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

96. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

97. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

98. MP3's last flight prior to (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

99. MP3 held the following qualifications: (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

100. MP3's total flight time was (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

Note: MP3's flight hours within enclosure (48) were calculated without simulator time included. [Encl (21)]

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101. MP3 had flown (b)(3)(B) hours in the past 30-days, (b)(3)(B) hours in the past 60-days, and (b)(3)(B) hours in the past 90-days. Note: MP3's flight hours within enclosure (48) were calculated without simulator time included. [Encl (21), ref(n)]

102. MP3 was current and proficient to conduct the assigned mission on (b)(3)(B) 2024. MP3 was not qualified to conduct the assigned mission on (b)(3)(B) 2024; however, MP3 was assigned to fly with a qualified (b)(3)(B) [Encl (10, 14), Ref (h)]

103. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

104. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

105. There were no indications that MP3 was involved in preflight planning or mission preparations that caused MP3 to violate required crew rest prior to the 6 February 2024 sortie. [Encl (9, 10, 29, 31)].

106. MP3 was characterized as a junior H2P who was smart, ambitious, and a hard worker. MP3 was respected by the HMH-361 Ready Room and within the Operations Department. [Encl (23-31)]

Mishap Crew Chief 1 (MCC1)

107. Mishap Crew Chief 1 (MCC1) was a designated Crew Chief on 6 February 2024. [Encl (14, 20, 31, 58)]

108. On 6 February 2024, MCC1 was on active duty in the Regular Marine Corps. [Encl (7)]

109. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

110. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

111. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

112. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

113. (b)(3)(B) [Encl (25, 27)]

114. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

115. MCC1's last flight prior to (b)(3)(B) 2024, for (b)(3)(B) [Encl (22, 102)]

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116. MCC1 was highly qualified and held the following qualifications: (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

117. MCC1's total special crew time was (b)(3)(B) hours, with (b)(3)(B) hours in the CH-53E, (b)(3)(B) hours of NVG time, and (b)(3)(B) hours of LLL time. Note: MCC1's flight hours within are calculated via enclosure (102) without simulator time included. [Encl (102)]

118. MCC1 had flown (b)(3)(B) hours in the past 30-days, (b)(3)(B) hours in the past 60-days, and (b)(3)(B) hours in the past 90-days. Note: MCC1's flight hours within are calculated via enclosure (102) without simulator time included. [Encl (22), ref(n)]

119. MCC1 was current, qualified, and proficient to conduct the assigned mission on 6 February 2024. [Encl (10, 14, 20, 22)]

120. MCC1 conducted a NATOPS evaluation open book test, closed book test, and a NATOPS check flight in accordance with reference (j). (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

121. There were no indications that MCC1 was involved in maintenance or mission preparations that caused MCC1 to violate required crew rest prior to the 6 February 2024 sortie. [Encl (9, 10)]

122. MCC1 was characterized as an extremely proficient CH-53E Crew Chief who represented the standard for technical proficiency. MCC1 was also characterized as professionally vocal, one who was routinely ahead of the aircraft, and a crew chief who practiced sound CRM routinely. MCC1 was described as a humble and proficient (b)(3)(B). Further statements regarding MCC1 are a slight dichotomy. One junior MS Crew Chief stated MCC1 tended to press situations to ensure mission execution while other statements from MS pilots and personnel countered this point. [Encl (24-28, 31, 33-35)]

Mishap Crew Chief 2 (MCC2)

123. MCC2 was a designated Crew Chief on (b)(3)(B) 2024. [Encl (9, 20, 60)]

124. On (b)(3)(B) 2024, MCC2 was on active duty in the Regular Marine Corps. [Encl (8)]

125.

(b)(3)(B)

126. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

127. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

[Encl (25, 27, 35)]

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128. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

129. MCC2's last flight prior to (b)(3)(B) 2024 was on (b)(3)(B) 2024, for a (b)(3)(B) [Encl (102)]

130. MCC2 held the following qualifications: (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

131. MCC2's total special crew time was (b)(3)(B) hours, with (b)(3)(B) hours in the CH-53E, (b)(3)(B) hours of NVG time, and (b)(3)(B) hours of LLL time. MP3 had flown (b)(3)(B) hours in the past 30-days, (b)(3)(B) hours in the past 60-days, and (b)(3)(B) hours in the past 90-days. Note: MCC1's flight hours within are calculated via enclosure (102) without simulator time included. [Encl (102), ref(n)]

132. MCC2 was current, qualified, and proficient to conduct the assigned mission on 6 February 2024. [Encl (10, 14, 20, 102)]

133. MCC2 conducted a NATOPS evaluation open book test, closed book test,

(b)(3)(B)

134. There were no indications that MCC2 was involved in maintenance or mission preparations that caused MCC2 to violate required crew rest prior to the 6 February 2024 sortie. [Encl (9, 10)]

135. MCC2 was characterized as an experienced CH-53E Crew Chief who's proficiency exceeded his rank. MCC2 was also characterized as a kind individual who had grown from adversity within the preceding year. [Encl (24, 31, 35)]

SECTION FIVE: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA. This section highlights relevant segments within multiple references and MS members' interpretations or statements.

136. PELs require FLASH report submissions to the 3d MAW command deck via the Incident Reporting System (IRS). Reference (s) does not explicitly address overdue aircraft procedures. [Ref (s)]

137. No IRS submission, relating to the mishap, was conducted by the MS in February 2024. [Ref (s)]

138. The CO, Executive Officer (XO), Operations Officer (OPSO), and AMO stated the MA's PEL did not meet reporting requirements as the MA did not declare an emergency, divert, or execute an unplanned Remain Over Night (RON). Additionally, the PEL was conducted at the intended point of landing which further removed the requirement. [Encl (17, 23-27)]

139. The MS's SOP definition of crew day violates reference (n). The MS's definition states that crew day ends at land time as opposed to engine shutdown. [Ref (m, n)]

140. The MS's delegation of flight schedule changes post CO signature violates reference (n). The MS delegates schedule changes (post CO signature)

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to the XO, AMO, OPSO, and DOSS. Reference (n) limits this authority to the CO, XO, and detachment commanders only. [Ref (m, n)]

141. Reference (n) states "that due to the varying dynamic missions of 3d MAW's multiple aircraft types, it is not always practical to file IFR flight plans. When not on an IFR flight plan, aircraft should utilize flight following to the maximum extent possible when their cruising altitudes permits ATC radar coverage". [Ref (n)]

142. Reference (l) addresses "QA Requirements for Transient or In-Flight Maintenance" and states:

a. During transient or in-flight maintenance, the pilot-in-command or the senior aircrew maintenance person will inspect the work performed from a technical standpoint and sign for Quality Assurance (QA). [Ref (l)]

b. The inspector will ensure adequate maintenance was performed to correct the discrepancy. [Ref (l)]

c. Maintenance areas are free of foreign objects. [Ref (l)]

d. Opened panels or doors are correctly closed. [Ref (l)]

e. If transit or in-flight maintenance involves flight safety, a QAR must re-inspect the repairs on return to home base. [Ref (l)]

143. Reference (r) also defines a PEL, and delegated recovery authorities, within MAG-16. [Ref (r)]




Figure 5. Verbatim MAG-16 SOP PEL Language. [Ref (r)]

144. Reference (r) does not explicitly define "maintenance actions" or who is authorized to approve a night recovery following a PEL when "maintenance actions" are not performed. MAG-16 COs are directed to follow the applicable references cited within the MAG-16 SOP for Air Operations. [Ref (r)]

145. The MAG-16 SOP for Air Operations indirectly cites reference (l) via reference (n) and defines the following: [Ref (r, n, l)]

a. "MAINTENANCE", or the function of retaining material in or restoring it to a serviceable condition. Maintenance includes servicing, repair, modification, modernization, overhaul, rebuild, test, reclamation, inspection, and condition determination. [Ref (l)]

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b. "MAINTENANCE ACTION", or any one of a number of types of specific maintenance operations necessary to retain an item in or restore it to a specified condition. [Ref (1)]

c. "TROUBLESHOOTING", or a maintenance documentation code used when the time expended in locating a discrepancy is great enough to warrant separating from repair time. [Ref (1)]

146. The CO stated that neither "maintenance actions" or "troubleshooting" are defined within reference (r, n). [Encl (24)]

147. The CO stated that commander's discretion, common sense, and experience guide the interpretation of where troubleshooting ends and maintenance action begins. [Encl (24)]

148. The CO stated that CH-53E aircrew are required to routinely troubleshoot during start evolutions and that if a maintenance action form was not required, the CO did not consider it a maintenance action. [Encl (24)]

149. The CO stated the MAC did execute a PEL at Imperial County Airfield. [Encl (24)]

150. Based upon his interpretation of maintenance actions, the CO stated that the CO was unaware of any maintenance actions completed by the MAC. [Encl (24)]

151. As a result, the CO stated that the threshold to gain MAG-16 Commanding Officer approval, for a night recovery post a PEL, was not met. [Encl (24), Ref (r)]

152. The first time the MAG-16 Commanding Officer and the CO spoke was shortly after midnight on 7 February 2024. [Encl (23)]

153. The MS's internal PEL guidance is listed within Figure 6. [Ref (m)]




Figure 6. Verbatim MS SOP PEL Language. [Ref (m)]

154. Article 92 (10 United States Code 892) addresses the failure to obey an order or regulation. Elements of Article 92's failure to obey other lawful order are: [Ref (ai)]

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- a. That a member of the armed forces issued a certain lawful order;
- b. That the accused had knowledge of the order; [Ref (ai)]
- c. That the accused had a duty to obey the order; [Ref (ai)]
- d. That the accused failed to obey the order. [Ref (ai)]
- e. Reference (r), is a lawful order, approved by the MAG-16 Commanding Officer. [Ref (r)]
- f. The CO stated the CO had knowledge of reference (r). [Encl (24)]
- g. The CO was the HMH-361 Commanding Officer on 6 February 2024. Additionally, reference (r) states "MAG-16 squadrons shall utilize the guidance contained herein in order to operate in a safe and efficient manner" and "CO's shall be guided by the provisions of this SOP and applicable references in the conduct of air operations and related functions". [Encl (9, 10), Ref (r)]

SECTION SIX: AVIATION WEATHER, NIGHT VISION DEVICE (NVD) CONSIDERATIONS, AND NAVIGATION. This section provides a summary of aviation weather conditions and addresses the impact of light levels, terrain, and weather upon NVGs and FLIR devices, specifically upon AN/AVS-9 F4949R (NVGs) and AN/AAQ-29R (FLIR). Navigation regulatory procedures are also addressed. *NOTE: In-depth aviation weather analysis is addressed within enclosure (65).*

Aviation Weather

- 155. Departure, enroute, and destination weather conditions of TIGER 43's first two legs were determinable and legal. [Encl (65), Ref (j, u)]
- 156. Departure and destination forecast and observed weather conditions at Imperial County Airfield and at MCAS Miramar were determinable and legal. [Encl (65), Ref (j, u)]
- 157. A convective significant weather advisory was forecasted in the Southern California area. However, it did not impact the mishap. [Encl (65)]
- 158. Enroute forecasted and observed weather conditions were prohibitive to both IFR and local VFR course rules execution. Both regimes of flight would have required sustained flight within moderate icing conditions. *NOTE: "Course rules" is a generic term used to describe a formalized, procedural routing of VFR aircraft.* [Encl (27, 65, 66), Ref (c, p)]
- 159. Forecasted and observed enroute weather conditions from 2209 to 2239 were determinable and legal. [Encl (65), Ref (j, u)]
- 160. Forecasted and observed enroute weather conditions from 2240 to 2244 are only partially determinable. [Encl (65)]
 - a. The IO was able to determine that, TIGER 43 operated in conditions of "light-to-moderate" precipitation and within 500 feet of an observed freezing layer. TIGER 43 also operated within areas in which observed cloud bases ranged from 1650 to 6500 feet AGL with thicknesses that ranged from 3200 feet to 23000 feet AGL. Forecasted advisories called for both IMC and

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mountain obscuration conditions and moderate icing from the surface to 25000 feet AGL. Nevertheless, visibility and obscuration values are not fully determinable as addressed below. [Encl (65)]

b. While aviation advisory, satellite, radar, and multi-spectrum outputs are informative they cannot provide the granule detail needed between 2240 and 2244 to address real-time visibility and mountain obscuration values. There are multiple reasons for this information gap. [Encl (65)]

(1) The nearest aviation weather reporting station is approximately 27 miles from the mishap site (Gillespie Field, El Cajon, California). Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAF) and Meteorological Terminal Air Reports (METAR)-the products that are generated from aviation weather reporting stations-are only valid within a five-mile radius of the reported site. This restriction limits the usefulness of stations outside the stated radius. [Encl (65), Ref (t,u)]

(2) Visibility and mountain obscuration values require aviation weather reporting systems or Pilot Reports (PIREPS) of which neither were available or applicable to the mishap site. [Encl (65)]

NVD Considerations

161. MAC NVG and FLIR images would have been degraded. This degradation would have stemmed from a cumulative effect of multiple environmental and terrain-based factors. *NOTE: "NVD" is a term that includes both NVGs and FLIR.* [Encl (65), Ref (f, ac, ad, ae)]

162. Light Level and NVG Performance. LLL conditions, defined as illumination below 0.0022 lux, limit NVG gain levels and introduces visual noise to the NVG image. Forecasted illumination values in the vicinity of the mishap site were 0.0000 lux. Cloud cover and the lack of cultural lighting along TIGER 43's route of flight from 2240 to 2244 would have ensured that illumination levels remained stable at 0.0000 lux. *NOTE: "Lux" is a value meant to measure the total light available for NVG use.* [Encl (65), Ref (f, g, ac, ad, ae, ag)]

163. Precipitation and NVG Performance. Precipitation's particulate size and concentration can have varying effects upon NVGs. Within "light precipitation", NVGs perform better than the unaided eye as near-infrared (IR) energy is transmitted more readily. Within "moderate" to "heavy" precipitation, near-IR energy becomes blocked and degrades NVG imaging. This degraded image impacts the user's visual acuity, the ability to process terrain, and exacerbates known depth perception and distance estimation errors. TIGER 43 operated in areas of "light-to-moderate" precipitation from 2240 to 2244. [Encl (65), Ref (f, g, ac, ad, ae, ag)]

164. Albedo, Contrast, and NVG Performance. NVG images are impacted by how light is reflected off a surface (albedo) and the degree of reflection between various surfaces (contrast). Wet surfaces have a reduced albedo in comparison to dry surfaces. Surfaces with similar soils and vegetation experience reduced contrast as they lack albedo variances. TIGER 43 operated over wet, similar soil and vegetative terrain that would have degraded NVG performance from 2240 to 2244. However, the terrain and its elevation contours would have provided some textural and contrast cues and could have enabled MAC comfort levels. [Encl (65), Ref (f, g, ac, ad, ae, ag)]

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165. Thin Cloud Layers and NVG Performance. The presence of thin clouds that progress into thicker ones can result in hidden terrain features. Low lying clouds between hills can present a dangerous situation as aircrew may lack the ability to distinguish between clouds and terrain. Thicker clouds also reduce near-IR contrast and negatively impact image details. These factors can produce a false perception of distance in which aircrew may not see terrain. Also, clouds may become progressively thicker which would allow the pilot to progress through the cloud without initially perceiving a "cloud wall." Even if a cloud is detected, the perception may be that it is off at a distance. TIGER 43 operated in a forecasted area of mountainous obscuration and IMC from 2240 to 2244. TIGER 43 operated in observed areas in which cloud bases ranged from 1650 to 6500 feet AGL. [Encl (65), Ref (f)]

166. Temperature Differentials and FLIR performance. FLIR images are impacted by temperature differentials (ΔT) between various surfaces as they cool and heat at different rates. Uniformed precipitation can cool an area to a similar temperature, minimizing ΔT , and present a degraded FLIR image. TIGER 43 operated over uniformly cool terrain from 2240-2244. [Encl (65), Ref (f, g, ag)]

167. Absolute Humidity and FLIR performance. FLIR images are also impacted by absolute humidity or the concentration of water vapor within a parcel of air. Accurate Target Acquisition Weapons Software (TAWS) data in the vicinity of the mishap site could not be determined due to aviation weather reporting station proximity. Absolute humidity values from 2240-2244 were not determinable. [Encl (65), Ref (f)]

Navigation

168. TIGER 43's route of flight required night VFR weather minimums of 3 statute miles of visibility while maintaining 500 feet below, 1000 feet above, and 2000 feet horizontal distance from any clouds. [Ref (j, u)]

169. Maximum elevation figures within a 20 nautical mile radius of the mishap site required an altitude greater than 6700 to 7100 feet MSL to ensure obstacle clearance while under VFR. [Encl (66)]

170. If TIGER 43 had executed IFR between Imperial County Airport and MCAS Miramar, the aircraft would have been required to maintain a minimum safe altitude of 7000 to 9900 feet MSL. [Encl (66)]

171. VFR helicopter (or tiltrotor) aircraft returning from the east to MCAS Miramar are expected to execute Yuma Course Rules. This standardized routing begins at (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

172. When returning from Imperial County Airfield, aircrews traditionally proceed (b)(3)(B)

173. Using Interstate 8 for navigational purposes is not addressed by reference (p). It was stated that Interstate 8 navigation to intercept Yuma

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Course Rules was known within the HMH-361 ready room. However, it was not a standardized procedure. It was also stated that Interstate 8 navigation to intercept Yuma Course Rules was rarely used, if ever, and only when operating within unrestricted, daytime VMC. This limitation was due to known mountainous terrain that flanked Interstate 8 in the vicinity of Pine Valley. *NOTE: The utilization of Interstate 8 for VFR navigation is legal if statutory visibility, cloud, and safe distances are maintained.* [Encl (25-29) Ref (j, u)]

SECTION SEVEN: MISHAP TIMELINE OF EVENTS. The timeline within this section begins on 31 January 2024 with the squadron's deployment to Creech AFB. The timeline ends at 1345 on 7 February 2024 when the competent medical authority arrived on-site and concurred with the informal death determination.

Wednesday, 31 January 2024 - Thursday, 1 February 2024

174. HMH-361 deployed (b)(3)(B) CH-53Es and associated personnel to Creech AFB in support of the squadron's PTP and NSI certification sorties. [Encl (13, 26, 27, 96)]

175. The CO, OPSO, AMO, and Director of Standardization and Safety (DOSS) deployed in support of the UTD. The XO served as the Remain Behind Element (RBE) Officer-in-Charge (OIC) at MCAS Miramar. *NOTE: The DOSS and the Aviation Safety Officer (ASO) are the same individual.* [Encl (24-28)]

Sunday, 4 February 2024

176. The CO approved two flight schedules, one for 5 February and one for 6 February 2024. Both flight schedules, and the required Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW), were screened and signed by the appropriate supervisors and reviewers. *NOTE: The early schedule signing of 6 February 2024's flight schedule was a function of limited schedule writers paired with (b)(3)(B) (b)(3)(B)* The individual RAWs were not retained for this flight schedule. [Encl (9, 26, 29)]

177. 5 February 2024 was the primary date for a MAWTS-1 NSI certification. [Encl (9, 13, 26)]

178. 6 February 2024 was the alternate date with TIGER 41 and TIGER 42 serving as the (b)(3)(B) section. TIGER 43 and TIGER 44 were to conduct (b)(3)(B) was not required. MCC1-2 were scheduled with TIGER 42. MP1, MP3 were schedule with TIGER 43. MP2 was scheduled with TIGER 44. [Encl (9, 13, 26)]

Monday, 5 February 2024

179. Due to prohibitive weather, the scheduled MAWTS-1 (b)(3)(B) was cancelled and shifted to the alternate date. [Encl (9, 26, 30)]

180. Due to scheduling errors that were not originally identified, the initial 6 February 2024 flight schedule had to be re-written. [Encl (9, 26)]

181. At 1819, the 6 February 2024 Version 2 flight schedule was signed by the CO and distributed. TIGER 44's line was removed entirely. TIGER 43's line was unchanged but would now return to MCAS Miramar as a single ship. MP1, MP3, and MCC1-2's schedules remained unchanged. MP2 was removed from the

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flight schedule entirely. This flight schedule was screened and signed by the appropriate supervisors and reviewers. *NOTE: The RAW was not retained for this flight schedule.* [Encl (9, 24, 26, 30)]

182. After schedule distribution, it was noted that the flight schedule was not properly marked with "Version 2". This paired with NSI certification requirements and unscheduled aircraft maintenance resulted in a third flight schedule being drafted. [Encl (9, 24, 26)]

183. At 2259, the CO received the 6 February 2024 Version 3 flight schedule and RAW 3.3 for review. MP2 and MCC1-2 were added to TIGER 43. MP1 and MP3 schedules were unchanged. The mission sets were unchanged and the return to MCAS Miramar post (b)(3)(B) was still authorized. MP2 was actively aware of the schedule change as he helped draft the document. [Encl (10, 14, 24, 31)]

184. (b)(3)(B)
(b)(3)(B)

185. At 2315, the CO approved the flight schedule via a one-word email response of "approved". No additional comments were made. The CO stated his lack of comments were due to the digital nature of schedule routing and that he would have written "concur" with the DOSS's 24-hour mitigation assessment as he traditionally had executed. [Encl (10, 14, 24, 27)]

186. At 2338, the 6 February 2024 Version 3 flight schedule was distributed. This flight schedule, guided by RAW 3.3, authorized the mishap flight. TIGER 43 was ultimately scheduled for a 1230 hotel muster, a 1400 brief, 1730 takeoff, and a 2330 land time. TIGER 43 was approved to conduct LLL CALS, TERF, External Lift, and Tactical Employment mission sets. Once TIGER 43 was complete supporting TIGER 41's NSI check, a ferry flight to MCAS Miramar was authorized. [Encl (11, 24, 26, 27, 30)]

187. Multiple mishap squadron members stated that it was unusual that three versions of a flight schedule were released. [Encl (26, 27, 28, 30)]

188. Multiple mishap squadron members also stated that a 2338 flight schedule distribution time was well outside the unit's normal battle rhythm. However, all members of TIGER 43 were aware of the flight schedule prior to entering crew rest. [Encl (26, 27, 28, 30, 35)]

189. At some point that evening, the OPSO requested a 12-hour crew day extension for the MAC on 6 February 2024. This crew day extension was approved by the CO. In accordance with enclosure (14), this approval increased the assessed risk to medium (i.e., the event now required specific squadron CO approval). [Encl (14, 24)]

Tuesday, 6 February 2024

190. The MS reported (b)(3)(B) aircraft assigned, (b)(3)(B) in reporting, (b)(3)(B) aircraft out of reporting, (b)(3)(B)
(b)(3)(B)

191. Material readiness of the (b)(3)(B) Creech-based CH-53E aircraft was reported per Figure 7. [Encl (18)]

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Figure 7. Detailed Creech AFB-based AMSRR data. [Encl (18)]

192. Tuesday morning the CO departed Creech AFB and returned to the local San Diego area via commercial air travel. [Encl (10, 24)]

193. At 1230, all night flight crew members and the Operations Duty Officer (ODO) mustered at the lodging location and departed. At 1315, the ODO and MP1-3 arrived at Creech AFB. With the 12-hour crew day extension issued by the CO, an engine shutdown of 0115 would have been required. *NOTE: MCAS Miramar closed at 2400 the night of the mishap.* [Encl (31)]

194. At 1320, the ODO executed a pass down with the off going duty officer. The ODOs discussed local area weather conditions and aircraft assignments for that evening. The ODO would serve as a singular ODO for that evening's operations. HMH-361 did not coordinate for an in-person ODO to support TIGER 43's MCAS Miramar arrival. [Encl (31, 71)]

195. From 1331-1335, the ODO contacted both MCAS Miramar and Creech AFB Base Weather sections and requested Creech AFB maximum atmospheric values. Weight and power performance data was only completed for Creech AFB. [Encl (16, 31, 62, 71)]

196. The ODO lacked computer access due to Ivanti network isolation and UTD operations. As a result, the ODO asked the Daily Schedule Writer and MP3, who were actively writing the 7 February 2024 flight schedule, to pull-up the generated ODO Brief. The ODO discovered that the brief had not been properly saved and had to be rapidly re-built. During this rebuilding process MCAS Miramar weather and NOTAMs were not incorporated. [Encl (31, 62, 71)]

197. MCC1 displayed a rushing mentality prior to the mass brief. MCC1 stated he wanted to depart Creech AFB and was willing to RON elsewhere as long as MCC1 departed Creech AFB. [Encl (35)]

198. At 1410, the ODO mass briefed TIGER 41-43. All members of the MAC were present. Local area weather and NOTAMs, to include Imperial County Airport, were briefed. No applicable NOTAMs were noted other than a partial ramp closure at Lake Havasu. Weather and NOTAMs for MCAS Miramar, and its surrounding area, were not briefed. [Encl (31 35, 62, 67)]

199. MP1 and MCC1 were witnessed discussing and reviewing MCAS Miramar weather conditions prior to their initial Creech AFB departure. [Encl (28, 31)]

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200. At 1415, the ODO brief concluded, and the aircrews transitioned to a tactical mass brief. [Encl (30, 31, 63, 67)]

201. At 1420, the ODO completed handwritten flight plans for TIGER 41-43. All flight plans mirrored enclosure (64) except TIGER 43's flight plan. TIGER 43's remarks section stated that the aircraft would recover at MCAS Miramar. However, the destination airport was listed as Creech AFB with an approximate arrival time of 2130. *NOTE: TIGER 42-43's flight plans were not retained. Enclosure (64) was not constructed as a stopover flight plan.* [Encl (31, 67, 64)]

202. At 1430, the ODO requested weather briefings, based upon the handwritten flight plans, from both MCAS Miramar and Creech AFB Base Weather. [Encl (31)]

203. At 1515, the tactical mass brief concluded and the individual aircrews separated for aircraft specific NATOPS briefs. The MAC conducted their NATOPS brief, however no witness can attest to what was discussed. [Encl (29, 30, 31, 63, 67)]

204. NATOPS briefs encompass a wide variety of items ranging from administrative and emergency procedures, IIMC, spatial disorientation, and obstacle and weather hazards. [Ref (e)]

205. At 1534, the ODO received and distributed the weather briefing generated by Creech AFB. All briefings mirrored enclosure (64) and only addressed local Creech weather conditions. *NOTE: TIGER 42-43's weather briefings were not retained.* [Encl (31, 64)]

206. Before walking to the aircraft, MP1 asked the OPSO how important it was that the MA be returned to MCAS Miramar. The OPSO stated that the intent of the return was to enable follow-on maintenance prior to mandated tasking later that week. The OPSO's language made it clear that was only a desire and not a requirement. [Encl (26)]

207. MP1 also spoke with the AMO and asked for his opinion regarding decision-making if faced with prohibitive weather. The AMO stated that MP1 should reposition the MA to Imperial County if weather permitted. Once on deck at Imperial, MP1 should reevaluate the weather and decide whether to continue to MCAS Miramar, divert to MCAS Yuma, Arizona, or remain in place. [Encl (27)]

208. Prior to MP1's initial departure he completed an individualized RAW for TIGER 43. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

209. At (b)(3)(B) the ODO received and distributed the weather briefing generated by MCAS Miramar. Parts I through V only addressed Creech local weather. However, graphical attachments depicted areas of light-to-moderate

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precipitation, low IFR, and areas of low-pressure along TIGER 43's mishap leg. [Encl (31, 64)]

210. At 1733, TIGER 43 called outbound from Creech AFB and departed VFR. [Encl (67)]

211. At 1900, TIGER 43 reported that they were Safe-on-Deck (SOD) at Creech AFB post NSI support. MP1, MP2, and MCC1 departed the MA and proceeded to the ready room to discuss weather conditions. [Encl (31)]

212. MP3 and MCC2 remained with the MA. The ODO believed MP3 and MCC2 remained with the aircraft as it was likely still turning. [Encl (31)]

213. MP2 and the ODO reviewed all applicable weather data to include METARs, TAFs, advisories, satellite, and radar images. MP2 and the ODO agreed weather conditions permitted the MA's repositioning to Imperial County. MP1 reviewed the same weather as MP2 and the ODO. [Encl (31)]

214. The ODO stated he harbored internal doubts if a return leg to MCAS Miramar would be permissible but was unable to recall if that reservation was verbally stated. [Encl (31)]

215. The ODO recalled witnessing an additional conversation between the AMO and MP1. During this conversation, the AMO stated a phrase that imparted the weather guidance of "if you can make it you should go." The ODO believed MP1 was seeking corroboration and not that the AMO was being directive to press a questionable weather scenario. ODO stated it seemed like MP1 "wanted someone to tell him it was okay to go [to MCAS Miramar]". [Encl (31)]

216. The AMO does not recall this interaction and stated he simply gave MP1 a "fist bump" and departed for the evening. [Encl (27)]

217. The ODO believed MP1's desire for corroboration was a function of poor weather that had impacted MP1 the week prior. MP1 stated he "almost didn't make it back [to Creech AFB due to pushing poor weather conditions]." [Encl (31)]

218. As the weather review was being finalized, MCC1 entered the ready room and stated that the MAC could divert to MCAS Yuma if needed. MP1-2 and MCC1 then departed the ready room. [Encl (31)]

219. At 1923, TIGER 43 called outbound and departed to Imperial County VFR at 1925. [Encl (31, 67)]

220. At 2044, Airman's Meteorological (AIRMET) Sierra (IFR and mountain obscuration conditions) became active. The AIRMET laterally incorporated all of Southern California from Imperial to San Diego until 0100. [Encl (65)]

221. At 2044, AIRMET Zulu (Moderate Icing) also became active. The AIRMET laterally incorporated all of Southern California from Imperial to San Diego until 0200. Specifically, the AIRMET Zulu forecasted a freezing level between the surface and 7000 feet AGL and a freezing layer from the freezing level to 25000 feet MSL. [Encl (65)]

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222. On final approach into Imperial County, TIGER 43 experienced a (b)(3)(B)
(b)(3)(B)

223. At 2106, TIGER 43 landed at Imperial County Airport. [Encl (17)]

224. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

225. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

Figure 8. NO.2 Engine Dual Thermal Detector Wiring picture taken by MCC1. [Encl (77)]

226. At 2115, TIGER 43 completed a cold refueling evolution. [[Encl (67)]]

227. At 2116, TIGER 43 reported SOD at Imperial County via the official business squadron chat. [Encl (71)]

228. At 2120, MP1 requested updated freezing levels at MCAS Miramar via the squadron company grade chat. [Encl (71)]

229. At 2121, the ODO reported updated freezing levels at MCAS Miramar at 5500 feet MSL. [Encl (71)]

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230. At 2132, MCAS Miramar observed calm winds, 10 miles visibility, few clouds at 1900 feet AGL, scattered clouds at 2700 feet AGL, and a broken cloud layer at 3600 feet AGL. [Encl (65), Ref (u)]

231. At 2135, Gillespie Field observed light winds, visibility of 10 miles, scattered clouds at 2400 feet AGL, a broken cloud layer at 3500 feet AGL, and an overcast cloud layer at 7500 feet AGL. [Encl (65), Ref (u)]

232. At 2141, MP1 requested a vertical cross-section to determine if clouds were observed above 5000 feet MSL. [Encl (71), Ref (t)]

233. At 2148, MP1 called the CO. From 2148 to 2150, MP1 and the CO spoke.

(b)(3)(B)

234. MP1 stated, that (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

235. MP1 was calm and rational during the conversation with the CO. [Encl (24)]

236. MP1 briefed the CO on his plan to continue to MCAS Miramar. [Encl (24)]

237. The CO advised MP1 that (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

The CO's final guidance to MP1 was to fly conservative and to fly safe. [Encl (24)]

238. The CO stated that he approved the plan that MP1's briefed and that he considered it low risk. [Encl (24)]

239. MP1 and the CO did not discuss weather, LLL conditions, aviation advisories, planned routes of flight, radar data, freezing levels, use of Interstate 8 for navigation, or fatigue levels. Overt discussions of a PEL were not discussed. [Encl (24)]

240. CO stated he believed MP1 would return via Yuma Course Rules (i.e., the standard routing for most training flights coming from eastern working areas). [Encl (24)]

241. At 2150, the ODO provided a screenshot of MCAS Miramar's TAF and METAR stating "Cloud layers low right about now from the TAF. METAR says otherwise". MCAS Miramar observed calm winds, 10 miles visibility, few clouds at 1900 feet AGL, scattered clouds at 2700 feet AGL, and a broken cloud layer at 3600 feet AGL. [Encl (31, 71), Ref (u)]

242. The ODO was unable to locally generate the requested vertical cross-section model due to connectivity limitations. *NOTE: This information could have been determined by visiting NOAA's Aviation Weather Center website via smartphone.* [Encl (31, 71), Ref (t, af)]

243. At 2150, MCAS Miramar forecasted winds of 250 degrees at 10 knots, unrestricted visibility, light rain showers, scattered clouds at 1500 feet AGL, a broken cloud layer at 2000 feet AGL, and moderate icing from 6000 feet to 8000 feet AGL. A becoming line was forecasted from 1900 to 2100, stating

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that a broken cloud layer at 1000 feet AGL could be expected. From 2100 to 2300, temporary weather conditions were also forecasted. These temporary conditions stated that 3 miles of visibility, rain, mist, and a broken cloud layer at 800 feet AGL could also be expected. [Encl (71), ref (u)]

244. At 2152, the ODO contacted MCAS Miramar Base Weather for a vertical cross-section model at MCAS Miramar. [Encl (31, 71)]

245. At 2153, MP1 requested the base frequency for Hanger 220 at MCAS Yuma via company grade squadron chat. *NOTE: Hanger 220 was HMH-465'S temporary deployed space at MCAS Yuma.* [Encl (31, 71)]

246. At 2153, Imperial County observed winds of 230 degrees at 13 gusting 18 knots, visibility of 10 miles, and few clouds at 9500 feet AGL. [Encl (65)].

247. At 2155, the ODO passed the following via company grade squadron chat "7.5 ceilings, 17K cloud tops FL [freezing level] still 5.5k between 2200-2300". *NOTE: This was a textual passage of the requested vertical cross-section.* [Encl (31, 71)]

248. At 2155, Gillespie Field observed calm winds, visibility of 10 miles, few clouds at 2500 feet AGL, a broken cloud layer at 5000 feet AGL, and an overcast cloud layer at 8000 feet AGL. [Encl (65)]

249. At 2155, MCAS Miramar observed calm winds, visibility of 8 miles, light rain, few clouds at 3400 feet AGL, a broken cloud layer at 7000 feet AGL, and an overcast cloud layer at 11000 feet AGL. [Encl (65)]

250. At 2156, MP1 requested MCAS Yuma field hours via the company grade squadron chat. [Encl (31, 71)]

251. At 2157, MCAS Yuma observed winds at 140 degrees at 15 knots, visibility of 7 miles, few clouds at 6000 and 8500 feet AGL, and a broken cloud layer at 10000 feet AGL. Forecasted winds were reported at 180 degrees at 5 knots, unrestricted visibility, few clouds at 8000 feet AGL, scattered clouds at 10000 feet AGL, and moderate icing conditions above 8000 feet AGL. [Encl (65)]

252. At 2200, MP3 informed the ODO via direct text message of the (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

and that the aircraft was fine. MP3 stated that the CO had given permission for a "one shot home". [Encl (31, 34, 71)]

253. Reference (m) states that "at no point will an aircraft be flow with a 'temp-fix' or a 'one-shot' without approval from the CO." [Ref (m)]

254. At 2200, the MCAS Miramar TAF updated and forecasted light rain showers, thunderstorms in the vicinity and mist. The 1000-foot broken cloud layer remained with moderate icing now extending from 6000 feet to 17000 feet AGL. The temporary forecasted line shifted from 2100-2300 to 2400-0400 and called for 1 mile visibility, rain showers, mist, and a broken cloud layer at 700 feet AGL. [Encl (65)]

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255. At 2208, MP3 informed the ODO of the MAC's contingency branch plan. MP3 stated "Plan is head home VFR. If we get (b)(3)(B) but before we enter clouds, we will discuss but likely continue. In clouds past pine valley we continue." [Encl (31, 71)]

256. This contingency plan was not addressed during MP1 and the CO's phone conversation. [Encl (24)]

257. At 2205, MP3 informed the ODO that the MAC had seven sets of NVGs on board. MP1 was sitting in the co-pilot seat (left seat) and MP2 was sitting in the pilot seat (right seat). [Encl (17, 31, 71)]

258. At 2208:56 (Figure 9), TIGER 43's initial ADS-B return was recorded at (b)(3)(B) over Imperial County. [Encl (49, 50, 87), Ref (z, ag)]

259. (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)




Figure 9. MA KIPL Departure at 2209. [Encl (49, 50, 87), Ref (z, ag)].

260. TIGER 43 departed Imperial County VFR. [Encl (49)]

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261. TIGER 43 never transitioned to IFR or VFR flight following. [Encl (49)]

262. From 2209-2221 (Figure 10), TIGER 43 proceeded (b)(3)(B) in a continuous (b)(3)(B) to (b)(3)(B) feet MSL and (b)(3)(B) TIGER 43's rate of climb was approximately (b)(3)(B) feet per minute with airspeeds varying between (b)(3)(B) knots groundspeed (GS). [Encl (50, 87), Ref (z, ag)].



Figure 10. MA (b)(3)(B) route of flight from 2209-2221. [Encl (50, 87), Ref (z, ag)]

263. At 2215, Gillespie Field's METAR updated with observed scattered clouds at 2300 feet AGL and an overcast cloud layer at 4800 feet AGL. [Encl (65)]

264. From 2221-2224:30 (Figure 11), TIGER 43 passed over (b)(3)(B) California and proceeded (b)(3)(B) TIGER 43 completed its initial climb out and maintained an altitude of (b)(3)(B) feet MSL. [Encl (50, 87), Ref (z, ag)]




Figure 11. MA (b)(3)(B) route of flight from 2221-2224. [Encl (50, 87), Ref (z, ag)]

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265. From 2224:30-2230:30 (Figure 12), TIGER 43 initiated a (b)(3)(B) (b)(3)(B) from (b)(3)(B) MSL (b)(3)(B) feet AGL). TIGER 43's rate of (b)(3)(B) was approximately (b)(3)(B) feet per minute with airspeeds varying between (b)(3)(B) GS. [Encl (50, 87), Ref (z, ag)]




Figure 12. (b)(3)(B)

[Encl (50, 87), Ref (z, ag)]

266. From 2230:30-2239:30 (Figure 13), TIGER 43 continued (b)(3)(B) (b)(3)(B) California. TIGER 43's altitude ranged from (b)(3)(B) as terrain elevation gradually rose from 1860 feet MSL to 4130 feet MSL. TIGER 43's airspeed was (b)(3)(B) GS. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]

267. At 2233, a MS Company Grade Pilot queried MP3 if TIGER 43 would RON at MCAS Yuma. MP3 stated that a MCAS Yuma RON was an option, but they were enroute to MCAS Miramar. [Encl (76)]

268. At 2235, Gillespie's METAR updated again with observed visibility of 5 miles, light rain, broken cloud layers at 2300 and 4200 feet AGL, and an overcast cloud layer of 7500 feet AGL. [Encl (65)]

269. At 2237, MP3 informed the MS Company Grade Pilot that (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

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


Figure 13. (b)(3)(B) route of flight from 2230-2240. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]

270. From 2239:30-2240 (Figure 14, 15), TIGER 43 departed its (b)(3)(B) flight path and offset 0.5 miles south. This offset allowed TIGER 43 to circumvent the Golden Acorn Casino and a wind turbine as it (b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

271. The circumvented wind turbine is approximately 397 feet AGL (4548 feet MSL) and is highlighted by a red circle within Figure 15. Without an offset, TIGER 43 would have cleared the wind turbine laterally by (b)(3)(B) (b)(3)(B) Golden Acorn Casino security footage depicted a rainy environment with the recorded area unobstructed by clouds or fog. [Encl (17, 50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]




Figure 14. MA offset around Golden Acorn Casino at 2240. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]

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


Figure 15. Detailed screenshot of Golden Acorn Casino and Windmill (circled in red). [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]

272. From 2240-2242 (Figure 16), TIGER 43 (b)(3)(B) initially then (b)(3)(B) TIGER 43 (b)(3)(B) from (b)(3)(B) with an airspeed (b)(3)(B) GS. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]




Figure 16. MA transition (b)(3)(B) bound from 2240-2242. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]

273. From 2242-2242:30 (Figure 17, 18), TIGER 43 maintained an approximate heading of (b)(3)(B) degrees while maintaining an altitude of (b)(3)(B) (b)(3)(B) The terrain TIGER 43 passed over during this time was relatively

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stable at (b)(3)(B) TIGER 43's airspeed (b)(3)(B) GS. [Encl (25, 50, 87, 91), Ref (u, z, ag)]

274. The Command Investigation Team re-created and flew TIGER 43's route of flight within a simulated environment. At an altitude of (b)(3)(B) feet MSL, (b)(3)(B) was not visible due to mountainous terrain. [Encl (97)]




Figure 17. MA transition cross (b)(3)(B) from 2242-2244. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]



Figure 18. Stadium view from MA route of flight from 2242-2244 from a western prospective. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]

275. From 2242:30-2243:05 (Figure 17, 18), TIGER 43 maintained the same (b)(3)(B) The terrain elevation gradually rose from 3600 feet to 4200 feet MSL. (b)(3)(B) (b)(3)(B) [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]

276. While re-creating the mishap flight, a Command Investigation Team pilot would have executed IIMC procedures multiple times during this period. [Encl (97)]

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277. From 2243:05-2243:14 (Figure 19-23), TIGER 43's (b)(3)(B) (b)(3)(B) During this time, the terrain elevation rapidly increased from approximately 4200 feet to 5175 feet MSL. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]




Figure 19. MA ownship point of view approaching the first mountain ridge at 2243. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]

278. At 2243:15 (Figure 19-23), TIGER 43 vertically cleared the first of two mountain ridges by (b)(3)(B) feet AGL. [Encl (17, 50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]

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Figure 20. Stadium view from MA route of flight from 2242:30-2244 from a northeast prospective. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]




Figure 21. Stadium view from 2243:30-2244 from a northeast prospective at MA altitude. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]




Figure 22. Overview view of first and second mountain ridges. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]

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279. Textual 84 RADES and graphical FAA ADS-B data cease at (b)(3)(B) and (b)(3)(B). It was during this time that TIGER 43 approached the second of two mountain ridges. [Encl (50, 87), Ref (z, ag)]

280. The aircraft's GPWS recorded that TIGER 43 may have been at (b)(3)(B) feet AGL and received a voice warning of "ALTITUDE, ALTITUDE". Two seconds after this initial voice warning, GPWS data suggests the TIGER 43 received another voice warning of "WHOOOP, WHOOOP, PULL-UP, PULL-UP". GPWS power-on timelines place TIGER 43 in the vicinity of the mishap site when these voice warnings were issued. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]

281. Multiple false GPWS voice alerts were experienced prior to these final warnings. [Encl (91)]

282. Shortly after 2243:17-24 (Figure 23), TIGER 43 impacted the second mountain ridge killing MP1-3 and MCC 1-2. [Encl (48, 50, 87, 89-91), Ref (c, z, ab, ag)]




Figure 23. Statium View of first and second mountain ridges. [Encl (50, 87, 91), Ref (z, ag)]

283. There is no evidence of an in-flight fire. TIGER 43's cockpit engine instruments appear frozen upon impact with normal gauge values consistent with level flight. No emergency beacon was reported on any frequency. [Encl (48-50, 87, 89-91), Ref (c, d, z, ab, ag)]

(b)(3)(B) Security camera footage along Interstate 8 (Figure 24), approximately 3.6 miles west from the mishap site and 1300 feet lower, recorded active rainfall and unobscured images of the interstate. [Encl (65)]

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


Figure 24: Interstate 8 Security Camera Footage. Red circle highlights rain fall. [Encl (65)]

Post - Mishap Events

285. At 2301, the ODO informed the OPSO that TIGER 43 had experienced an (b)(3)(B) [REDACTED] The ODO passed that TIGER 43 had landed at Imperial County, was re-assessing the weather, and had been given approval for a "one-shot" to MCAS Miramar. ODO was unable to confirm if TIGER 43 had taken off. [Encl (31, 71)]

286. At 2305, the ODO queries MP3 if TIGER 43 had taken off. [Encl (31, 67)]

287. At 2329, the ODO contacted the Imperial County Fix Operator Base (FBO) to determine TIGER 43's takeoff status. FBO personnel initially reported that TIGER 43 had departed at 2230. NOTE: This is 21 minutes later than TIGER 43's actual takeoff time. [Encl (31, 67)]

288. At 2336, the ODO contacted the HMH-361 Squadron Duty Officer (SDO), who was located at MCAS Miramar, for an update. The SDO had no information regarding TIGER 43. [Encl (31, 67)]

289. At 2345, the ODO attempted to contact the HMH-465 ODO at MCAS Yuma but was unsuccessful. [Encl (31, 67)]

290. At 2349, the ODO attempted to contact MCAS Yuma but was unsuccessful. [Encl (31, 67)]

291. At 2350, the ODO contacted MCAS Miramar Base Operations to determine if TIGER 43 had landed. MCAS Miramar PM Airfield ODO [Airfield ODO] then contacted tower personnel. It was relayed that no aircraft had landed in the past several hours (due to poor weather) and that Air Traffic Control was not expecting or in contact with TIGER 43. [Encl (31, 67, 74, 75)]

292. During his interview, the Airfield ODO clarified his logbook entry stating neither the ODO nor himself specifically confirmed whether TIGER 43 had taken off. The Airfield ODO confirmed his original logbook entry was

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misleading and was based upon feeling as opposed to fact. [Encl (31, 67, 74, 75)]

293. At 2352, the ODO interrupted TIGER 41 and TIGER 42's debrief and informed both aircrews that TIGER 43 was overdue. The Pilot Training Officer, left the debrief, and accompanied the ODO back to the ready room to assist in contacting TIGER 43. [Encl (31, 67)]

294. At 2356, the ODO re-attempted contact with MCAS Yuma but was unsuccessful. [Encl (31, 67)]

295. At 2358, a mishap checklist member again contacted MCAS Miramar Base Operations. After re-confirming with tower personnel, the Airfield ODO relayed the lack of information and provided the phone number to San Diego Terminal Radar Approach Control (SOCAL TRACON). *NOTE: A "mishap checklist member" is a collective term meant to address one of six individuals who may have executed, or helped to execute, steps within enclosure (72). Due to the stressful nature of the event, record keeping during various periods is unclear.* [Encl (29, 31, 36, 40)]

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296. At 0000, MCAS Miramar closed. The Airfield ODO departed immediately. The Airfield ODO had a copy of HMH-361's flight schedule and was aware that TIGER 43's destination was MCAS Miramar. [Encl (36, 40)]

297. The Airfield ODO stated in his last 15 years it was "very rare" for him to receive an overdue aircraft notification. He also stated that if it had been known that TIGER 43 was inbound to MCAS Miramar the airfield's hours may have been modified to support the aircraft's arrival. The Airfield ODO contacted no one until speaking with the MCAS Miramar Airfield Manager the next morning. [Encl (36, 38)]

298. The MCAS Miramar Airfield Manager stated he should have received an immediate phone call upon the report that TIGER 43 was overdue. This notification would have triggered follow-on reporting criteria that may have activated MCAS Miramar's Emergency Operations Center (EOC). [Encl (38)]

299. The EOC would have only acted as an enabling entity as its informal governance is locally based within five miles of the airfield. MCAS Miramar Airfield ODO directives and checklists do not address overdue aircraft procedures. [Encl (42)]

300. From 0005-0011, the ODO attempted to contact the MAC but was unsuccessful. [Encl (67)]

301. At 0010, SOCAL TRACON was contacted by a mishap checklist member. SOCAL TRACON reported that it had no beacon codes or radar data for TIGER 43. [Encl (75)]

302. At 0014, the ODO again contacted Imperial County Airport FBO personnel to re-confirm the previously passed takeoff time of 2230. [Encl (67)]

303. At 0015, 0019, and 0029, mishap checklist members attempted to confirm that MCAS Camp Pendleton, Naval Air Station North Island, and Twentynine Palms did not have contact with TIGER 43. [Encl (29, 31, 75)]

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304. At 0023, Los Angeles Air Traffic Control Center (LA ARTCC) was contacted by a mishap checklist member. [Encl (75)]

305. At 0025, a mishap checklist member confirmed that Lake Havasu City Airport did not have contact with TIGER 43. [Encl (74)]

306. At 0029, LA ARTCC confirmed no contact with TIGER 43, however a DD-1801 Flight Plan was on-file. *NOTE: It is unclear if this was TIGER 43's original Creech to Creech flight plan or an additional flight plan filed by TIGER 43 during their time on deck in Imperial.* [Encl (75)]

307. At 0030-0033, the ODO attempted to contact NAF El Centro Base Operations but was unsuccessful. [Encl (67)]

308. At 0032, a mishap checklist member contacted the OPSO. [Encl (74)]

309. At 0032-0035, a mishap checklist member contacted the CO. [Encl (75)]

310. At 0034, the ODO attempted to contact MCAS Camp Pendleton but was unsuccessful. [Encl (67)]

311. At 0038-0041, 3d MAW Public Affairs Officer (PAO) was informed that TIGER 43 was overdue. [Encl (67, 75)]

312. At 0042, the MCAS Miramar Command Duty Officer (CDO) was contacted by the ASO. The MCAS Miramar CDO stated that he did not have any information regarding TIGER 43 or any additional means to contact MCAS Miramar Base Operations. [Encl (29, 103)]

313. At 0050, a mishap checklist member notified the MAG-16 Group Duty Officer (GDO). The MAG-16 GDO contacted both the MAG-16 XO and the 3d MAW CDO. [Encl (103)]

314. At 0045, a mishap checklist member attempted to contact Brawley Municipal Airport but was unsuccessful. [Encl (75)]

315. At 0052, the MAWTS-1 IP contacted the United States Coast Guard Sector San Diego (CG SEC SD) to request SAR assistance. From 0052-0101, a brief narrative, timeline, and data regarding TIGER 43 was passed. [Encl (69, 75)]

316. CG SEC SD was contacted after multiple attempts to coordinate SAR support with MCAS Miramar Base Operations had been unsuccessful. [Encl (28, 75)]

317. At 0100, a mishap checklist member contacted the San Diego Police Department (SDPD). SDPD was unable to confirm TIGER 43's status. [Encl (75)]

318. From 0109-0112, the CG SEC SD representative contacted the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) requested assistance, and relayed TIGER 43's narrative, timeline, and data. The AFRCC representative stated AFRCC would begin coordination with the Civil Air Patrol's (CAP) National Headquarters (NHQ) Radar Forensics Team and that they would be in contact. [Encl (69)]

319. At 0113, a mishap checklist member notified Creech AFB Base Operations. [Encl (75)]

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320. At 0116, the 3d MAW CDO annotated he had been contacted by the MAG-16 GDO and informed that TIGER 43 was overdue. [Encl (46, 103)]

321. The 3d MAW CDO attempted to inform the 3d MAW Staff Secretary (SSEC) at 0140, then again at 0430. At 0510, the 3d MAW CDO and SSEC spoke via phone. The 3d MAW CDO relayed that TIGER 43 was overdue, that OPREP-3 reporting had occurred, and that he hadn't spoken to any other individual, apart from the MCAS Miramar CDO at 0130. This was the first the SSEC had heard that TIGER 43 was overdue. [Encl (46, 103)]

322. At 0120, a mishap checklist member contacted the AMO. [Encl (75)]

323. At 0129, the CG SEC SD representative reengaged with a mishap checklist member to determine if any updated information had been received by the squadron. [Encl (75)]

324. From 0131-0136, the MAWTS-1 IP spoke with the CG SEC SD representative. The CG SEC SD representative stated that they had contacted both the AFRCC and locally based emergency response personnel. The CG SEC SD representative advised that CG SEC SD had informally tracked TIGER 43 via open-source ADS-B information. [Encl (69, 75)]

325. The CG SEC SD representative passed the last known ADS-B point which was recorded as a logbook entry at 0132. The mishap logbook entry stated

(b)(3)(B)

(b)(3)(B)

The CG SEC SD representative stated he would call back in five minutes as CG SEC SD was actively determining airborne SAR initiation. [Encl (69, 75)]

326. At 0131, the AFRCC formally alerted by CG District 11, Alameda Search and Rescue Region (SRR) that TIGER 43 was overdue. NOTE: CG District 11, Alameda SRR is CG SEC SD's higher headquarters element. [Encl (47, 84)]

327. At 0140, the MAWTS-1 IP and CG SEC SD representative discussed fuel exhaustion and SAR assets. [Encl (75)]

328. At 0142, the ODO received text message pictures from Imperial County FBO personnel confirming that TIGER 43 had departed from Imperial County. [Encl (75)]

329. At 0142, the San Diego County Sheriff (SDCS) informed a mishap checklist member they were responding to TIGER 43's last known ADS-B point. [Encl (29, 75)]

330. At 0146, LA ARTCC issued an Alert Notice (ALNOT) for TIGER 43. [Encl (84)]

331. At 0149, SDCS verified they would be launching both aviation and ground-based assets. [Encl (75)]

332. At 0150, MAG-16 GDO informs a mishap checklist member that an in-person attempt to locate the Airfield ODO at MCAS Miramar Base Operations was unsuccessful. [Encl (75)]

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333. At 0155, a mishap checklist member attempted to contact Cameron Fire Department but was unsuccessful. [Encl (75)]

334. At 0154, AFRCC formally tasked NHQ CAP Radar and Cell Phone Forensics and Teams and began initial coordination with California CAP. [Encl (84)]

335. At 0158, the NHQ CAP Cell Phone Forensics Team began location analysis. [Encl (75)]

336. From 0158-0200, the CG SEC SD representative again contacted the AFRCC. The CG SEC SD representative specified that AFRCC was the lead SAR agency. The AFRCC representative stated they were actively attempting to contact the California CAP, however they were not yet successful. [Encl (69)]

337. CG SEC SD representative advised that CG aviation assets could possibly support if needed. [Encl (69)]

338. At 0200, SDCS launched ground-based SAR assets. [Encl (75)]

339. By 0207, the California CAP had been contacted and had determined weather conditions were prohibitive to aviation SAR assets but were dispatching a ground team. [Encl (84)]

340. At 0208, the MAWTS-1 IP corrected the open-source ADS-B information with AFRCC, updating the labeled callsign from "TIGER 11" to "TIGER 43". [Encl (75)]

341. At 0209, the CG SEC SD representative informed the MAWTS-1 IP weather was now prohibitive to CG aviation assets and that AFRCC was the primary SAR coordinating agency. [Encl (75)]

342. At 0219, the ASO contacted the CO to provide updated AFRCC and CG SEC SD information. [Encl (75)]

343. At 0220, California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CALFIRE) established a Unified Command structure and initiated Incident Commander Checklist procedures. [Encl (44, 45)]

344. Overall accident response governance resides with San Diego County Fire Department. The Department delegates authority to CALFIRE in various scenarios. [Encl (45)]

345. At 0221, the ODO contacted the 3d MAW PAO and discussed holding statements. [Encl (75)]

346. At 0225, SDCS launched a helicopter SAR asset. [Encl (75)]

347. At 0230, the ASO was contacted by Leidos Flight Service. [Encl (75)]

348. At 0235, the ASO updated SDCS as to TIGER 43's last known ADS-B position. [Encl (29, 44, 75)]

349. At 0238, the MAWTS-1 IP informed the AFRCC that SDCS had launched a helicopter SAR asset. [Encl (75)]

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350. At 0242, the California Office of Emergency Services was notified by AFRCC. Centralized California-based SAR coordination was initiated. [Encl (84)]

351. Between 0245-0326, the CALFIRE Chief and SDCS ground personnel arrived in vicinity of TIGER 43's last known ADS-B position. A search pattern was attempted; however, weather, topography, and vegetation proved to be prohibitive. [Encl (44, 45)]

352. At 0249, the ASO was informed by the SDCS Watch Commander that the previously launched helicopter was unable to reach the last known position due to prohibitive weather. It was also stated that CALFIRE and SDCS ground personnel were able to reach Fred Canyon Road, however it was not drivable. The SDCS Watch Commander passed an estimated time of arrival of 0700. [Encl (75)]

353. Fred Canyon Road is an unimproved roadway that bisects the first and second mountain ridges depicted in Figure 22. [Encl (75), Ref (z)]

354. At 0258 and 0330, two conversations occurred between the ASO and the CO. [Encl (75)]

355. At 0330, CALFIRE requested Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue (BORSTAR) and SDCS SAR support. *NOTE: These are specialized, on-demand teams. As a result, neither are continually staffed and a phone recall was required to initiate support.* [Encl (45)]

356. At 0341, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) contacted the MAWTS-1 IP and coordinated BORSTAR support. [Encl (75)]

357. At 0344, the CALFIRE Chief established the Incident Command Post (ICP) at Kitchen Creek Helibase. [Encl (44, 45)]

358. Unified Command members who were on-site at this time were CALFIRE, SDCS, and U.S. Forest Service. The CALFIRE Chief assumed the de facto role of Unified Commander. California CAP was still enroute. [Encl (44, 45)]

359. At 0357, the CALFIRE Chief was informed that AFRCC was leading the SAR response effort, and once California CAP was on-site, they would fill the Unified Commander role. [Encl (45, 101)]

360. At 0400, all mishap checklist members depart Creech AFB and return to lodging. [Encl (29, 31, 44, 45)]

361. At 0545, the CALFIRE Chief requested a military representative at the ICP. *NOTE: It is unclear who this request was made to.* [Encl (44, 45)]

362. From 0500-0615, the Unified Command began massing personnel and assets. [Encl (44, 45)]

363. During this time, the Unified Command strategized how best to employ ground-based SAR while the current weather conditions were evaluated. [Encl (44, 45)]

364. From 0615-0730, ground-based SAR personnel begin to execute briefed search patterns. [Encl (44, 45, 79)]

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365. At 0654, MCAS Miramar opened early to support the SAR effort. [Encl (41, 42)]

366. At 0700, the 3d MAW Wing Operations Command Center (WOCC) was established. Coordination with the Unified Command structure and internal coordination with tenant units was initiated. [Encl (80)]

366. At 0730, the MWSS-371 Senior Staff Non-Commissioned Officer (Senior SNCO) was informed of TIGER 43 and departed for the ICP. [Encl (82)]

367. At 0730-0745, the ICP communicated updated search coordinates to ground-based SAR personnel. [Encl (79)]

368. At 0751, CG SEC SD contacted CALFIRE and stated that weather was no longer prohibitive and that CG aviation assets were available. [Encl (44, 45)]

369. At 0800, a United States Border Patrol Agent (BPA), who was part of the employed ground-based SAR personnel, synced in-person with BORSTAR. Updated search locations were discussed. The BPA departed to one location and BORSTAR members to another. [Encl (79)]

370. At 0830, the BPA reported smelling jet fuel. Upon hearing this, BORSTAR terminated their search and begin transiting to the BPA's location. [Encl (79)]

371. At 0841, the BPA reported visual contact of TIGER 43 at 150 yards. Both smoke and fire were actively seen. [Encl (44, 79)]

372. At 0847, the BPA arrived at the mishap site and reported TIGER 43's position. [Encl (79)]

373. From 0847-0945, the BPA waited on-scene as the only SAR personnel. The BPA stated he was vigilant to preserve the mishap site and was visually able to identify the location of four MAC members. [Encl (79)]

374. At 0930, the MWSS-371 Senior SNCO arrived at the ICP, integrated with the Unified Command structure, and began coordination for follow-on MWSS-371 personnel. The MWSS-371 Senior SNCO stated the environment inside the ICP was chaotic. The MWSS-371 Senior SNCO, with CBP, established an outer cordon of the mishap site as media personnel were massing. [Encl (82)]

375. From 0945-0953, additional ground SAR personnel arrived at the mishap site, and the BPA departed. [Encl (79)]

376. At 0954, CALFIRE reported that MP1-3 and MCC1-2 were deceased. [Encl (44)]

377. Between 1200-1230, follow-on MWSS-371 personnel arrived at the ICP to include the MWSS-371 Corpsman. [Encl (82)]

378. Between 1330-1344, MWSS-371 personnel, along with the MWSS-371 Senior SNCO and Corpsman, arrived at the mishap site. Site specific security was actively being maintained by members of the California CAP. Weather at the mishap site was reported as temperatures below freezing, with 8-10 inches of

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snow on the ground, winds at 30 to 40 knots, and limited visibility of 10-15 feet. These weather conditions remain throughout the day. [Encl (17, 81, 82)]

379. The MWSS-371 Staff SNCO located the first of two tablets that were recovered from the mishap site. One tablet was destroyed, the other was functioning with Boeing's Foreflight application open and active. [Encl (17, 81, 82)]

380. At 1345, the MWSS-371 Corpsman concurred with CALFIRE's time of death of 0954. [Encl (81, 82)]

SECTION EIGHT: OVERALL DAMAGES / COST. This section addresses damages, costs, and hazardous material exposure concerns current as of 23 April 2024.

381. Although no injuries were reported, all individuals who visited the mishap site during the initial days and weeks following the mishap may have ingested fumes and/or may have been exposed to hazardous and/or low-grade radioactive material. All those impacted should have the event documented appropriately within their medical records. [Encl (92)]

382. The estimated replacement cost for the MA is \$71,800,000. [Encl (93)]

383. The estimated environmental and hazardous waste clean-up cost is \$500,000. [Encl (93)]

384. Reclamation efforts are still active. Temporary duty costs are currently estimated at \$6,066.75. Fuel transportation costs are currently estimated at \$9,800.00. [Encl (93)]

***** PART TWO: OPINIONS *****

SECTION ONE: CAUSAL FACTORS (CF). This section addresses Causal Factors that directly caused the mishap.

1. CF 1 (Root Cause): MP1 failed to maintain a safe obstacle clearance altitude which resulted in a fatal CFIT event. TIGER 43's terrain impact is categorized as a CFIT event as the helicopter was established in a stable regime of flight, no end game pilot inputs were noted, and frozen engine instrumentation values depict constant power settings for level flight. As stated within the preliminary statement, limitations required the IO to develop assumptions, based upon cumulative factual data, to provide CFs which may have contributed to the root cause. [FF 168-170, 273-283]

a. Assumption One: MP1-2 and MCC1-2 were actively donned, goggled, and used NVG's for visual reference from at least 2223 to 2243. [FF 64, 67, 81, 84, 163, 257, 265, 270-272]

b. Assumption Two: MP1-2 and MCC1-2 experienced degraded NVD performance from at least 2240 to 2244. [FF 160a, 161-166]

c. Assumption Three: MP1-2 understood the MA's lateral positioning from 2238 to 2244 and Interstate 8 was unobscured. [FF 13-16, 169, 171, 173, 269, 271, 273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 284]

d. Assumption Four: MP1-2 were actively navigating to Pine Valley, via system waypoint or dead reckoning, as visual references with Interstate 8

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

were blocked by mountainous terrain. MP1-2's (b)(3)(B) from 2240 to 2244 was a purposeful effort to minimize canyon-like terrain along (b)(3)(B) [FF 13-16, 171, 173, 271, 273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 284, 379]

c. Assumption Five: MP1-2 and MCC1-2 were aware of current METARs, TAFs, radar, satellite, and aviation advisories that impacted their route of flight. [FF 206, 207, 209, 220, 221, 213, 215, 229, 241, 243, 247, 255, 379]

2. CF 2: MP1 failed to maintain VFR visibility requirements. While the exact visibility is not determinable, TIGER 43's CFIT directly highlights MP1-2 and MCC1-2's inability to timely assess and avoid factor terrain. Degraded NVG imaging and reduced acuity likely prevented MP1-2 from maintaining at least three miles of flight visibility. Three miles of visibility would have enabled MP1-2 to identify both mountain ridges at approximately 2241:48 (or when TIGER 43 crossed (b)(3)(B) bound). At 2241:48, MP1-2 would have had approximately one minute to input the proper commands and comfortably avoid terrain. *NOTE: It is not determinable if MP1-2 and MCC1-2 continued (b)(3)(B) by maintaining only ground reference as opposed to horizontal flight visibility.* [FF 160a, 161-166, 168, 272-282]

3. CF 3: Spatial misorientation may have prevented MP1-2 and MCC1-2 from conducting terrain clearance tasks. *NOTE: Spatial misorientation is unrecognized by aircrew as they are mistakenly comfortable with the attitude or flightpath of an aircraft or are distracted from monitoring flight instruments. As a result, aircrew unconsciously accept peripheral visual cues such as outside horizons or cloud banks as opposed to flight instruments or navigational maps.* [FF 160a, 161-166, 272-282, Ref (j, ae)]

a. Degraded NVG imaging, paired with terrain, low cloud layers, and the possibility of mountain obscuration may have created false visual cues. These cues may have gone unrecognized by TIGER 43 and resulted in the acceptance of a dangerous flight regime. MP1-2 and MCC1-2 most likely believed they were operating legally and within their comfort level. [FF 13-16, 160a, 161-166, 168, Ref (ae)]

b. TIGER 43's speed increase from (b)(3)(B) and its subsequent (b)(3)(B) may indicate a momentary breakdown in scan and may point toward a period of increased task loading. This momentary (b)(3)(B) would have further complicated the recognition of false visual cues. However, this (b)(3)(B) could also be a result of a tailwind component. [FF 13-16, 160a, 272-282, Ref (j, ae)]

c. The claim that TIGER 43 was operating within their comfort level is also supported by the rate of speed maintained prior to the CFIT. At (b)(3)(B) GS, MP1-2 and MCC1-2 would have been confident in their abilities to effectively clear terrain as aircrews are permitted to slow to as little as (b)(3)(B) knots to increase pilot reaction time. TIGER 43 crossed the first ridge line at (b)(3)(B) feet AGL and was above the (b)(3)(B) feet AGL minimum. These metrics combined with TIGER 43's speed indicate the MP1-2 most likely saw the first ridge line but failed to see the second. [FF 13-16, 160a, 161-166, 272-282]

d. MP1's decision to not execute IIMC procedures, or return to Imperial County Airfield, after (b)(3)(B) at approximately 2242 is likely

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

a result of a perception error. [FF 13-16, 160a, 161-166, 272-282, Ref (j, ae)]

SECTION TWO: NON-CAUSAL BUT CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (NCCF). This section addresses factors that are non-causal but were present during the mishap.

NOTE: It is not determinable what role fatigue or the desire to "get home" played in the mishap as individual MAC interviews are required to effectively evaluate these items. [FF 197, 206, 207, 208, 282]

1. NCCF 1: Moderate icing conditions paired with cloud layers prevented TIGER 43 from transiting above factor terrain. These limitations should have been an indication to MP1 that the ability to safely transit to MCAS Miramar was not feasible. The decision to takeoff to determine if the forecasted weather conditions were prohibitive was not wrong. However, the decision does give the IO pause when viewing the totality and combined effects of extended crew day, a previous in-flight emergency, self-declared "get-home-itis", low light levels, mountainous terrain, moderate icing, and the need to transit cloud layers to execute a VFR recovery. [FF 8, 158, 160a, 169-173, 189, 208, 220, 221, 241, 249, 243, 254]

2. NCCF 2: MP1's decision to continue (b)(3)(B) bound from 2240 to 2244. CF3 likely impacted this decision. However, continued flight, after the forecasted weather was most likely verified, is a decision-making error that placed TIGER 43 into a hazardous flight regime. [CF3, FF 160a, 161-166, 220, 221, 241, 249, 243, 254, 272-282]

SECTION THREE: NON-FACTORS WORTH OF DISCUSSION (NFWOD). This section addresses items that were uncovered during the investigation and were not causal or contributing factors to the mishap but require follow-on recommendations to prevent reoccurrence.

1. NFWOD 1: Reference (r)'s indirect definition of "maintenance actions" resulted in an interpretation error. As a result, the CO failed to properly identify that a "maintenance action" had occurred when the MAC repaired

(b)(3)(B)

2. NFWOD 2: The CO's interpretation error, and his subsequent flight authorization, violated reference (r) and prevented risk-based decisions from being conducted at the appropriate level. [FF 11, 12, 142-153, 233, 234, 238, 285]

a. Reference (1) defines the roles and responsibilities of multiple billets to include that of the Commanding Officer and the Aviation Maintenance Officer. The CO has held both of these positions. The CO's statement indicating that since reference (r) does not directly define "maintenance actions" and that the CO was forced to use commanders' discretion and good judgment is misleading. Based upon the CO's background, this definition should have been self-evident. Regardless, the CO could have easily sought internal QA clarification or conferred with the MAG-16 Commanding Officer after identifying the need for clarity. Neither of these options occurred. [FF 11, 12, 18, 142-152, 233, 234, 238, 285]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

b. Reference (r) discusses three distinct points which, if met, would invoke MAG-16 Commanding Officer approval. All three points were satisfied on the evening of 6 February 2024. [FF 143]

(1) Point 1: A PEL occurred. TIGER 43 executed a PEL at Imperial County Airfield. [FF 10, 11, 143, 149, 153, 222]

(2) Point 2: A night-recovery was intended. TIGER 43 attempted to execute a night-recovery. [FF 186, 236, 238, 258]

(3) Point 3: Maintenance action occurred. The CO was aware that the (b)(3)(B) meets the definition of a "maintenance action". [FF 142, 144, 145, 233, 234, 237, 238]

c. The CO's approval of TIGER 43's mishap leg, and his failure to consult and receive authorization from the MAG-16 Commanding Officer, satisfies the final element required to substantiate an Article 92 violation of the UCMJ. [FF 11, 12, 142, 143-147, 149-151, 152, 154, 233, 234, 238, 285]

3. NFWOD 3: Mishap checklist procedures failed to correctly identify SAR roles, responsibilities, and agency authorities and resulted in confusion among multiple entities. [FF 299, 315, 316, 322]

a. Enclosure (72) directs squadron personnel to alert and activate SAR assets when required. Specifically, enclosure (72) directs that MCAS Miramar Base Operations should be contacted as "Base Operations will be able to launch the SAR and provide security for up to 48 hours". This statement is misleading, and in the case of TIGER 43, false. MCAS Miramar Base Operations is the primary response cell when addressing aircraft mishaps on-station or within the immediate vicinity in which Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) personnel can respond in a timely manner (approximately five miles). MCAS Miramar Base Operations does not possess any authorities to activate or launch any airborne SAR assets directly. Enclosure (39) directs MCAS Miramar Airfield ODO's to contact ARFF Dispatch or to contact SOCAL TRACON or Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility, San Diego (FACSFAC San Diego) when addressing off-base, over land or over water response requirements. [Encl (39, 72), FF 299]

b. In the case of an overdue aircraft, SOCAL TRACON and FASCFAC (through SOCAL TRACON) would subsequently contact AFRCC or CG District 11, Alameda SRR after a one-hour information request timeline was completed and an ALNOT was issued. [FF336, Encl (43, 44), Ref (aj)]

c. AFRCC is a subordinate unit of the United States Northern Command and is responsible for all CONUS-based Department of Defense (DoD) SAR efforts via its 24-hour watch floor located at Tyndall AFB, Florida. AFRCC manages all incoming notifications, validates the SAR requirement, and coordinates various DoD, federal, state, and local agencies to properly meet the required SAR need. AFRCC does not have direct SAR tasking authority. [Ref (aj), Encl (84)]

d. CG District 11, Alameda SRR is responsible for all maritime SAR efforts in the vicinity of MCAS Miramar. CG District 11, Alameda SRR controls four sectors to include CG SEC SD. CG aviation assets will only proceed

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

inland if current tasking allows or AFRCC specifically requests a capability that can only be fulfilled by a CG platform. CG District 11, Alameda SRR has direct SAR tasking authority of both organic CG aviation assets and Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron alert lines positioned at Naval Air Station North Island, California. [Ref (aj), Encl 69, 84]]

e. Enclosure (72)'s direction does not align with expected SAR response protocols. The MS should have contacted SOCAL TRACON to initiate an information request. This information request would have transitioned into an ALNOT. Upon ALNOT issuance, the AFRCC, with the aid of the MS, would have coordinated a centralized SAR response. The execution of enclosure (72)'s guidance unintentionally created a decentralized response and invoked confusion across multiple entities. [Ref (aj), Encl (72, 84)]

e. However, the SAR response in locating the MA did work. The Mishap Checklist Team received an ADS-B location of TIGER 43 at 0131, approximately 40 minutes after the initial CG SEC SD notification. This resulted in SAR personnel arriving in the vicinity of the mishap at 0245 (CALFIRE was alerted at 0222 and arrived 23 minutes later). Adverse weather conditions are what elongated the SAR effort. [FF 315, 324, 325, 351, 352, 362, Ref (aj), Encl (72, 84)]

f. The Airfield ODO, while inept, did not adversely affect the SAR response. However, the Airfield ODO's limited actions and immediate departure did invoke confusion and reduced Mishap Checklist Team situational awareness during a period of criticality. [FF 291, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299]

4. NEWOD 4: Failure to complete IRS reporting post-PEL. Per reference (s), a flash report is required upon PEL execution. Outdated email guidance, paired with reference (s)'s wording (and formatting), resulted in the MS's failure to report the Imperial PEL to higher headquarters. [FF 136-138, Encl (17)]

SECTION FOUR: NON-FACTORS (NF). This section addresses items that were dismissed.

1. NF 1: Maintenance malpractice, material condition, or material failure. There is no evidence currently to support any of these claims, although the IO notes multiple engineering investigations are still pending. [FF 43, 45-48, 50, 51, 280, 277, 283]]

2. NF 2: V-22 Red Stripe. While the V-22 red stripe pressurized the squadron it did not cause or contribute to the mishap. [FF 33, 34, 36-39]

a. The CO, AMO, and OPSO highlighted to MP1 that a return to MCAS Miramar was a desire and not a requirement. [FF 206, 207, 237]

b. The February 2024 mandated tasking was known weeks prior and the squadron's RBE could have supported the event on (b)(3)(B) 2024 even without UTD aircraft. MAG-16 had reduced this mandated event from a (b)(3)(B) to a (b)(3)(B) aircraft requirement in the days leading up to the mishap. [FF 34, 37, Encl (18)]

c. From January 2023 to January 2024, the (b)(3)(B) (b)(3)(B) The V-22 red stripe occurred on 6 December 2023. In December 2023, the MS exceeded its monthly average at (b)(3)(B)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

percent but (b)(3)(B) These two data points are of limited value but support the claim that the MS was continuing to bracket their monthly average. [FF 18, 19, 21-27, 30, 33, 34]

d. The CO specifically stated that he did not perceive there to be any negative maintenance or adverse operational impacts due to the V-22 red stripe. [FF 40]

3. NF 3: Adverse command climate. Other than the documented periods of stress, there is no evidence that adverse command climate influenced or impacted the mishap. [FF 28, 29]

***** PART THREE: RECOMMENDATIONS *****

1. No further investigation is required.

2. No disciplinary action against any Marine or unit is warranted by this mishap.

3. No administrative action against any Marine except for the CO is warranted by this mishap.

a. In the opinion of the IO, the CO meets all required elements to substantiate a violation of Article 92 of the UCMJ. However, the CO's actions did not directly cause or contribute to the mishap. Reference (r) lacks explicit clarity. Commanding officers impart a special trust and confidence when designating a HAC. HACs are required to make difficult decisions during combat and within distributed peacetime operations. Although the IO has reservations about the sufficiency of a two-minute conversation between the CO and MP1 about an aircraft issue and plan to return home, that conversation was not necessarily wrongly conducted. Rather, it represented a more liberal and deferential command philosophy.

b. For the above reasons, the IO recommends that the CO receive a Non-Punitive Letter of Caution for violating Article 92 of the UCMJ.

4. It is recommended that the following actions are taken by MCAS Miramar:

a. Redraft enclosure (39) to incorporate overdue aircraft checklist procedures, update formalized reporting guidance, and clarify MCAS Miramar's role when supporting tenant unit aviation mishaps.

b. Train all Airfield ODOs on updated mishap checklist procedures once complete.

5. Recommend the following actions are taken by 3d MAW:

a. 3d MAW Chief of Staff:

(1) Clarify reference (s) reporting requirements when addressing PEL execution.

(2) Incorporate overdue aircraft reporting requirements and direct guidance within reference (s).

b. 3d MAW DOSS:

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER, MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

(1) Ensure all subordinate group and squadron aviation mishap checklists properly capture the correct maritime and CONUS-based SAR agencies.

(2) Ensure all subordinate group and squadron aircrew understand the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of federal, state, and local agencies in supporting aviation mishap or overdue aircraft procedures.

c. 3d MAW G-3:

(1) Determine the proper role of the WOCC in supporting aviation mishap and overdue aircraft procedures.

(2) Determine 3d MAW's role in supporting maritime or CONUS-based military SAR response efforts.

d. MAG-16, 3d MAW:

(1) Within reference (r), clearly define the term "maintenance actions".

(2) Within reference (r), clarify who has the authority to approve a night recovery following a PEL if "maintenance actions" are not warranted.

(3) Brief this mishap to all aircrew in a lessons learned-type setting. Lessons learned should address on-deck and in-flight decision-making, weather requirements, NVG perception errors and visual illusions, maintenance actions, and approval authorities.

e. HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW:

(1) Update reference (m) to align the squadron's definition of crew day and approved schedule change authorities with reference (n).

(2) Update enclosure (72) to align with 3d MAW DOSS's mishap checklist recommendations.

f. MAG-39, 3d MAW:

(1) Review internal SOPs to ensure PEL authorities are clearly defined.

(2) Brief this mishap to all aircrew in a lessons learned-type setting. Lessons learned should address on-deck and in-flight decision-making, weather requirements, NVG perception errors and visual illusions, maintenance actions, and approval authorities.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

3D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION MIRAMAR
P. O. BOX 452022
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92145-2022

IN REPLY REFER TO

5830

CG

12 Feb 24

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), U.S. Marine Corps

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER (CH-53E), MARINE
HEAVY HELICOPTOR SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361), MISHAP THAT OCCURRED
ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7G w/Ch 2 (JAGMAN)

1. This Command Investigation (CI) is convened to investigate the circumstances surrounding a Class A aviation mishap in compliance with 10 U.S.C. § 2255. You are appointed, per the reference, as the investigating officer to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject mishap.

2. The CI shall include matters outlined under Appendix A-2-n, paragraph d, of the reference, as applicable, including any resulting injuries to personnel and damage to equipment; CH-53E mechanical operations and applicable regulations; operator qualifications and competence; operations planning and execution; conditions (weather, terrain, and otherwise) at the time of the mishap; the mode of operation of the CH-53E at the time of the mishap; and any other factor that may have contributed to the mishap and/or relevant actions following the mishap. As appropriate, provide an opinion or opinions as to the cause or causes of the mishap, and any causal fault or neglect. If the conduct or performance of duty of any service member associated with this mishap is found to be substandard, make recommendations regarding corrective, disciplinary, and/or administrative action.

3. You are also directed to complete a line of duty determination Preliminary Inquiry (PI), as appropriate and in compliance with the reference, for any deceased or injured service members involved in this mishap. The PI will be provided separately from and will be an enclosure to the CI to ensure service members and their families receive appropriate benefits in a timely manner.

4. Paragraph 0209, as well as Parts E and F, of the reference will guide your investigation. Chapter II, Appendix A-2-k of the reference provides amplifying guidance pertaining to line of duty/misconduct determinations. Templates for PI and CI reports can be found at Appendix A-2-c and A-2-e of the reference, respectively.

5. You shall submit your PI and CI reports in writing no later than 14 and 60 calendar days respectively (26 February 2024 and 12 April 2024) from the date of this letter unless an extension of time is granted. If you require additional time, you shall submit a written extension request

Enclosure (1)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER (CH-53E), MARINE
HEAVY HELICOPTOR SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361), MISHAP THAT OCCURRED
ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

to me with detailed justification for the delay. Any request for extension shall be submitted via the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW). Any request and associated response shall be included as an enclosure to your report.

6. This is your primary duty until the PI and CI reports are completed, unless otherwise relieved of such duty by competent authority. 3d MAW staff and subordinate commanders are directed to furnish all necessary assistance during this investigation. In the event you require assistance outside of 3d MAW, you are authorized to employ the 3d MAW Chief of Staff to coordinate further investigative assistance at those outside commands or organizations.

7. Note that there is a concurrent safety investigation being conducted into this mishap. A JAGMAN investigation in accordance with the reference is considered collateral to the safety investigation. You are directed to ensure your investigation does not violate the privileged nature of the safety investigation. Specifically, you are prohibited from using privileged statements provided in conjunction with the safety investigation. No witness will be questioned regarding information provided to the safety investigation team under promise of confidentiality. Finally, you may not use the opinions, analysis, or conclusions of the safety investigation or any subsequent endorsements thereof, in your PI or CI reports.

8. During the conduct of this investigation, you are to observe the requirements of the Privacy Act and Article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

9. You are authorized and encouraged to form an investigative team using additional service members to provide any necessary expertise and supplemental investigative or administrative support in accordance with the reference.

10. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) USMC, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) USMC, both judge advocates from the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA), 3d MAW, are hereby appointed as Legal Advisors.

11. The point of contact for this matter is the OSJA, 3d MAW, at (858) 307-8993.

(b) (6)

M. J. BORGSCHULTE

Copy to:
CO, HMH-361
CO, MAG-16
File



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
THIRD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF
POST OFFICE BOX 452038
SAN DIEGO, CA 92145-2030

5830
CI
26 Mar 24

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), U.S. Marine Corps
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7G w/Ch 2 (JAGMAN)

Subj: REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION TO COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER (CH-53E), MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

1. In accordance with the reference, I request a 60-day extension to complete the investigation due to the following:

a. Naval Air Systems Command's (NAVAIR) Aeromechanics Safety Investigation Support Team Report (ASIST) is still pending. The report will incorporate the results of 26 Engineering Investigations (EI) and will provide in-depth engineering, mishap, and crash site analysis.

b. Armed Forces Medical Examiner's (AFME) Autopsy and Supplemental Information Report is still pending. The report will provide medical analysis regarding the fatal injuries sustained by the mishap aircrew.

2. Both reports are expected no later than 15 May 2024. The extension enables Investigating Officer review, analysis, and report incorporation.

3. I will report my findings no later than 11 June 2024, unless an additional extension of time is again granted.

4. The point of contact is (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) at 858-307-5077
or (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

First Endorsement on (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Ltr 5830 of 26 Mar 24

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), U.S. Marine Corps

Subj: REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION TO COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION HELICOPTER (CH-53E), MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361 (HMH-361) MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 6 FEBRUARY 2024

1. Returned, approved.

2. Return your written investigation to me in letter form no later than 11 June 2024.

(b) (6)

M. J. BORGSCHULTE

Enclosure (2)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

THIRD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FM
POST OFFICE BOX 452038
SAN DIEGO, CA 92145-2030

5830
CI
26 Mar 24

From: Investigating Officer

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) /7566 USMC

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBER APPOINTMENT

Ref: (a) Command Investigation Appointing Letter dtd 12 Feb 24
(b) JAGINST 5800.7G w/Ch 2 (JAGMAN)

1. This letter memorializes that you are a Team Member of the Command Investigation into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter (CH-53E), Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMH-361), Mishap that Occurred on or about 6 February 2024 (Investigation). This is pursuant to my authorization in paragraph nine of reference (a) to form an investigative team to provide any necessary expertise and supplemental investigative or administrative support in accordance with reference (b).

2. Your leadership has agreed to your participation as an Investigation Team Member and granted you permission to support the Investigation. Please note that no separate funding is available for your participation. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing does not directly fund your participation.

3. I have previously directed you as an Investigation Team Member not to share the information, of any nature and in any format, with any other persons or entities, including other government personnel, except with other Investigation Team Members or unless expressly authorized in writing by me. You have signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement for the Investigation. I hereby give you permission to share this letter with your unit, leadership, and anyone else at your discretion. You may use this letter to verify your participation as a Team Member and justify accommodations for your support to the Investigation.

4. I greatly thank you for your support to date and for your future contributions. If you or anyone else has questions about your involvement as an Investigation Team Member, I can be reached at (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

THIRD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FM
POST OFFICE BOX 452038
SAN DIEGO, CA 92145-2030

5830
CI
26 Mar 24

From: Investigating Officer
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), United States Marine Corps

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBER APPOINTMENT

Ref: (a) Command Investigation Appointing Letter dtd 12 Feb 24
(b) JAGINST 5800.7G w/Ch 2 (JAGMAN)


1. This letter memorializes that you are a Team Member of the Command Investigation into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter (CH-53E), Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMH-361), Mishap that Occurred on or about 6 February 2024 (Investigation). This is pursuant to my authorization in paragraph nine of reference (a) to form an investigative team to provide any necessary expertise and supplemental investigative or administrative support in accordance with reference (b).

2. Your unit, Judge Advocate Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, has granted Direct Liaison Authorized for your role as an Investigation Team Member. As a Reserve Marine, you are expected to appropriately use and manage requisite drill and other appropriate funding sources through your unit to properly serve as an Investigation Team Member. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing does not fund your participation.

3. Of note, although you currently have the Military Occupational Specialty of Judge Advocate (4402) and hold a Judge Advocate billet in the Reserve, you are not the Legal Advisor for the Investigation. The Investigation Legal Advisor has been separately appointed in paragraph 10 of reference (a). Therefore, you will not provide legal advice for the Investigation. Rather, my expectation is for you to provide other necessary expertise and supplemental investigative or administrative support.

4. I have previously directed you as an Investigation Team Member not to share the information, of any nature and in any format, with any other persons or entities, including other government personnel, except with other Investigation Team Members or unless expressly authorized in writing by me. You have signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement for the Investigation. I hereby give you permission to share this letter with your unit, civilian employer, and anyone else at your discretion. You may use this letter to verify your participation as a Team Member and justify accommodations for your support to the Investigation.

5. I greatly thank you for your support to date and for your future contributions. If you or anyone else has questions about your involvement as an Investigation Team Member, I can be reached at (b)(6),(b)(7)(c).





UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

THIRD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FM
POST OFFICE BOX 452038
SAN DIEGO, CA 92145-2030

5830
CI
26 Mar 24

From: Investigating Officer

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) /7566 USMC

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBER APPOINTMENT

Ref: (a) Command Investigation Appointing Letter dtd 12 Feb 24
(b) JAGINST 5800.7G w/Ch 2 (JAGMAN)

1. This letter memorializes that you are a Team Member of the Command Investigation into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter (CH-53E), Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMH-361), Mishap that Occurred on or about 6 February 2024 (Investigation). This is pursuant to my authorization in paragraph nine of reference (a) to form an investigative team to provide any necessary expertise and supplemental investigative or administrative support in accordance with reference (b).

2. Your leadership has agreed to your participation as an Investigation Team Member and granted you permission to support the Investigation. Please note that no separate funding is available for your participation. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing does not directly fund your participation.

3. I have previously directed you as an Investigation Team Member not to share the information, of any nature and in any format, with any other persons or entities, including other government personnel, except with other Investigation Team Members or unless expressly authorized in writing by me. You have signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement for the Investigation. I hereby give you permission to share this letter with your unit, leadership, and anyone else at your discretion. You may use this letter to verify your participation as a Team Member and justify accommodations for your support to the Investigation.

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(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

THIRD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FM
POST OFFICE BOX 452038
SAN DIEGO, CA 92145-2030

5830
CI
26 Mar 24

From: Investigating Officer

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) / 6113 USMC

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBER APPOINTMENT

Ref: (a) Command Investigation Appointing Letter dtd 12 Feb 24
(b) JAGINST 5800.7G w/Ch 2 (JAGMAN)

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(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b) (6)

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361
Marine Aircraft Group 16
3D Marine Aircraft Wing FMF
San Diego CA 92145-2060



(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)





UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361
Marine Aircraft Group 16
3D Marine Aircraft Wing FMF
San Diego CA 92145-2060



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(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361
Marine Aircraft Group 16
3D Marine Aircraft Wing FMF
San Diego CA 92145-2060



(b) (3) (B)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Sunday, February 4, 2024 9:18 PM
To: HMH361OFFICERS <HMH361OFFICERS@usmc.mil>; HMH361ALLHANDS <HMH361ALLHANDS@usmc.mil>; HMH361SNCOS <HMH361SNCOS@usmc.mil>; MAG16HQS3 <MAG16HQS3@usmc.mil>; SMB MIRAMARMCAS S-3 FLIGHT PLANNING <smbmiramarmcas.s3flp@usmc.mil>; SMB MIRAMARMCAS S-3 AIOPS <smbmiramarmcas.s3aop@usmc.mil>; MIRAMARMCAS_ODO <miramarmcas.odo@usmc.mil>; 432OSS.OSAA.1@US.AF.MIL; (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)@US.AF.MIL; (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)@US.AF.MIL
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] HMH-361 FLIGHT SCHEDULE 5-6 FEBRUARY 2024

Good Evening Flying Tigers,

Attached is the Flight Schedule for 5-6 February 2024. If there are any questions or concerns, please contact the Operations department.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
HMH-361 Flying Tigers

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Monday, February 5, 2024 6:19 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) HMH361OFFICERS <HMH361OFFICERS@usmc.mil>; HMH361ALLHANDS <HMH361ALLHANDS@usmc.mil>; HMH361SNCOS <HMH361SNCOS@usmc.mil>; MAG16HQS3 <MAG16HQS3@usmc.mil>; SMB MIRAMARMCAS S-3 FLIGHT PLANNING <smbmiramarmcas.s3flp@usmc.mil>; SMB MIRAMARMCAS S-3 AIROPS <smbmiramarmcas.s3aop@usmc.mil>; MIRAMARMCAS_ODO <miramarmcas.odo@usmc.mil>; 432OSS.OSAA.1@US.AF.MIL; (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: *UPDATED* HMH-361 FLIGHT SCHEDULE 5-6 FEBRUARY 2024

Good Evening Flying Tigers,

Attached is the *Updated* Flight Schedule for 5-6 February 2024. If there are any questions or concerns, please contact the Operations department.

V/R,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

HMH-361 Flightline OIC

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Monday, February 5, 2024 11:15 PM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: Re: Flight Schedule for Review

Approved

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

USMC

MAG-16, HMH-361, Commanding Officer

MAG-16, 3d MAW, I MEF, FMF PAC

Marine Corps Air Station Miramar | San Diego, CA

NIPR: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

SIPR: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Personal (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Office Phone: +1 858-307-7627

Personal (iPhone/Signal/WhatsApp): (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Monday, February 5, 2024 10:59:48 PM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: Flight Schedule for Review

Good Evening Sir,

An updated schedule and RAW for tomorrow are attached for your review. Please let me or

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) know if you have any questions or concerns.

Very Respectfully

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), USMC

HMH-361

S-3, Schedule Writer

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Monday, February 5, 2024 11:38 PM

To: HMMH361OFFICERS <HMMH361OFFICERS@usmc.mil>; HMMH361SNCOS <HMMH361SNCOS@usmc.mil>; HMMH361ALLHANDS <HMMH361ALLHANDS@usmc.mil>; MAG16HQS3 <MAG16HQS3@usmc.mil>; SMB MIRAMARMCAS S-3 FLIGHT PLANNING <smbmiramarmcas.s3flp@usmc.mil>; SMB MIRAMARMCAS S-3 AIROPS <smbmiramarmcas.s3aop@usmc.mil>; MIRAMARMCAS_ODO <miramarmcas.odo@usmc.mil>; 432 OSS/OSAA <432oss.osaa.1@us.af.mil>; (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: *UPDATED* HMMH-361 FLIGHT SCHEDULE 6 FEB 2024 V3

Good Evening Flying Tigers,

Attached are the *Updated* Flight Schedule and RAW for 6 February 2024. If there are any questions or concerns, please contact the Operations department.

Very Respectfully

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), USMC

HMMH-361, MAG-16

S-3, Schedule Writer



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361
Marine Aircraft Group 16
3D Marine Aircraft Wing FMF
San Diego CA 92145-2060



(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)




PRIOR TO FLIGHT RISK ASSESSMENT

EVENT 4-1 DATE 2/6/24



(b) (3) (B)



nc play
direct

TIGER 43
Individual
RAW



PRIOR TO FLIGHT RISK ASSESSMENT

EVENT 4043 DATE 6 FEB 24



(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)



From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2024 12:43 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: TIGER 43 Cell Phones & Ipads

(b)(6),
(b)(7)

Realized I don't think I ever responded to this email. Sorry, been at Cornerstone for the past few weeks and am playing some catchup. This is what we know regarding ForeFlight:

-2 total iPads were recovered; one was essentially destroyed; no usable info could be pulled. (It was found underneath some wreckage, so assumption is that it was somewhere loose in the cockpit... potentially on the instrument panel, sitting next to the pilot seat, or somewhere else like that). The other was in good shape and found inside a nav bag or personal bag. When it was unlocked, the app that was open on the screen was ForeFlight and the specific portion within ForeFlight was the MCAS Yuma 'info page' (not the airfield diagram, but the general info like operating hours, freqs, runway info, etc). Beyond that, I don't know if there were any overlays selected beyond airspace.

-I don't know the total number of phones we recovered- I only recall seeing one of the CC's phones. It was still in good shape and located in his flight bag. We did not unlock it to access texts, missed calls, etc. and I believe it was returned to the family like that. I would have to ask the medical examiner if any of the other crewmembers' phones were pulled from their flight suits.

Sorry, not much help other than the single iPad noted above.

S/F,
(b)(6),
(b)(7)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

MAG-16 Operations Officer
3d Marine Air Wing, I MEF
Work: (858) 307-1662
Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
NIPR: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
SIPR:

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Tuesday, April 9, 2024 4:07 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: 20240409 Sync-Up

(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

-We do have confirmation of aircrew seats: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was sitting left seat, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was right. We confirmed this based on the weight adjustment dials/locking knobs (the seats are mirror-image of each other, with these dials facing inboard).

-Never able to locate the IMDS after exhaustive search. We're wrapping up debris recovery this week and then I think we'll sift through again once we get it all to East Miramar.

-I think we've probably hit a plateau WRT data updates. All the smaller components that we submitted for EI have been received but we haven't gotten any of those results back yet. Still waiting to retrieve the big stuff off the mountain (engines, etc). Scheduled to start that process on Thursday.

S/F,
(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

MAG-16 Operations Officer
3d Marine Air Wing, I MEF
Work: (858) 307-1662

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

NIP (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
SIPR (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2024 7:27 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: Re: 20240409 Sync-Up

(b)(6),

Sorry for late follow up. In PCola and just now catching up on emails.

The short answer is that I can't definitively prove they were wearing goggles because we didn't recover any helmets with parts still mounted. Not surprising, though, considering the state of the helmets (most of the visors were also torn off) and how easy it is to knock off the NVG mounts and battery packs under just normal use. We did recover lots of individual parts of the goggles- ie, broken tubes, battery packs, etc- relatively near the aircrew, indicating to me they weren't in the case. We also found at least one empty NVG case that still had zippers closed next to the aircraft commander's seat.

Our assumption is they were all aided, except probably the passenger. The autopsy reports seem to confirm NVGs were worn based on some of the facial injuries sustained, though those could have also come from literally anything.

Finally, while this certainly isn't proof, I've never heard of a helo crew flying at night unaided unless it was for a specific T&R event requiring it- and even then the instructor is required to be goggled.

Sorry, probably more circumstantial than you were hoping for.

S/F,

(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

MAG-16 Operations Officer
3d Marine Air Wing, I MEF
desk: (858) 307-1662
personal cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
NIPR (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
SIPR:

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2024 6:23 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: Follow-Up

(b)(6),

Flightplan file attached for the (b) (6) route. BLUF: appears to be a (b) (6) and time at (b) (6).

For Golden Acorn, our mx rep watched the video in their security center. He said it was grainy and couldn't see much, but could definitely tell it was raining (visible precip). He said it was not foggy but there was moisture on the camera and you could see it raining in the parking lot. He screened the +/-15 mins of when the aircraft would have flown by but no footage of TR43.

S/F,

(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

MAG-16 Operations Officer
3d Marine Air Wing, I MEF
Work: (858) 307-1662
Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
NIPR: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
SIPR: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Monday, May 20, 2024 10:49 AM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: Follow-Up

(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

I combed through all our mishap photos and can't seem to find any of the RADALT. Could have sworn we had some so I'm asking the other members to take a look.

In other news, I found some security cam footage from an auto repair shop in Campo. There is visible precip in the foreground (I'd classify it as something less than light drizzle). The ground is wet and doesn't look foggy but it's hard to tell with the camera field of view. File is too big to send but I'll try to get you a link.

S/F.

(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

MAG-16 Operations Officer
3d Marine Air Wing, I MEF
Work: (858) 307-1662
Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
NIPR: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
SIPR:

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: FW: Incident Reporting Pyramid
Date: Monday, May 20, 2024 9:56:20 AM
Attachments: [Incident Reporting Pyramid Jul 23.pdf](#)

(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

See below and attached for the email from CoS to MAG XO's regarding updated reporting requirements (specifically WRT PELs).

The callout box in question is "PEL in-flight emergencies only. Routine RON for planned mx after planned fuel or ordnance stop will be reported via flight ops rollup."

S/F,

(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

MAG-16 Operations Officer

3d Marine Air Wing, I MEF

Work: (858) 307-1662

Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

NIPR: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

SIPR: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Monday, May 20, 2024 9:51 AM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: Fwd: Incident Reporting Pyramid

(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

As discussed this morning, this guidance was passed shortly after (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) took over as Chief of Staff. This was the interim guidance that the units were operating under. I hope this helps and please let me know if you need anything else!

V/R,

(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

MAG-16 PSD OIC

Office: 858-307-6845

Work cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Personal cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent from Command phone

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Friday, July 21, 2023 5:37 PM
To: 3MAW GROUP XO'S <3MAWGROUPIXOS@usmc.mil>
Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: Incident Reporting Pyramid

XOs,

This is what I'd like you and your squadrons to use to evaluate reporting requirements. Standing by for questions.

Have a great weekend!

S/F,

(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Chief of Staff

3d MAW

I MEF, FMFPAC

Office: (858)307-7291

DSN: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

VOSIP: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

SVTC: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b) (2)

(b) (2)

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HMH-361 - CH-53E Crew Chief 30 60 90

Generated on 02/13/2024 1514 UTC-08:00

(b) (3) (B)



SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

NOTICE

DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THE CONTENTS
OF THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT PROPER
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Rank:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Service:.....U.S. Marine Corps

Unit:.....MAG-16, Commanding Officer

Date:.....13 March 2024, 18-20 March, 17 April 2024

On 13 March 2024, I met with the Investigating Officer in person. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview with me, to include the differences between the two simultaneous investigations. I understood my statement is not privileged. I swore or affirmed to tell the Investigating Officer the truth. I agreed to have my interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

On 18-20 March 2024, I exchanged emails with the Investigating Officer. On 17 April 2024, I again met with the Investigating Officer in person. During this meeting, the Investigating Officer sought to clarify my answer regarding Paragraph 3008 of MAG-16's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Air Operations.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of my interview with the Investigating Officer:

I did not communicate with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) on the evening of 6 February 2024. I believe my first conversation with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was just after midnight. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated his aircraft had triggered the 15-minute overdue threshold.

The Investigating Officer provided me a printout of Paragraph 3008 of MAG-16's SOP for Air Operations for review [which addressed PEL authorities and requirements]. After review, I stated that my guidance for a night-time recovering following a confirmed PEL resided with myself regardless if maintenance actions were performed or not.

I did not authorize (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) or the aircrew of TIGER 43, to execute a night recovery at MCAS Miramar following a PEL at Imperial County.

During my email exchange with the Investigating Officer, I provided how MAG-16 Commanders and Staff Officers informally communicate reporting requirements prior to submitting Flash reports.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 On 17 April 2024, I clarified my response to Paragraph 3008 and stated
2 that my guidance matched the verbatim language within the Paragraph 3008.
3 Specifically, that maintenance actions had to have occurred as opposed to my
4 previous "regardless" statement.

5 I was directed not to discuss my statement to the Investigating Officer
6 with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) with
7 certain exceptions.

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
To:
Subject: RE: CUI: Interview Statement
Date: Wednesday, May 29, 2024 11:30:05 AM

(b)
(c)

Approved, thank you.

Let me know if you need anything else.

R/S.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 16

Work: 858-307-1614

Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

NIPR: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

SIPR:

Tandberg: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Tuesday, May 28, 2024 4:43 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: CUI: Interview Statement

Sir,

Attached is a summary of our discussions together.

If no changes are required, please reply with "Approved".

If you have like to modify, please do so with track changes enable.

V/R,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Office: 858-307-4549/5077

BB: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Cell

1. Describe (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) aviation acumen, CRM, and ORM skill sets as a CH-53E pilot.

Outstanding leader. Outstanding instructor. Very calm and even keeled demeanor. Patient and understanding communicator. Very approachable by junior officers and young enlisted. He was not afraid to ask hard questions or challenge ideas. Highly skilled, yet conservative decision maker. He was our next student to go to WTI in the spring. He was the airframes OIC and was very well respected.

2. Describe (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) aviation acumen, CRM, and ORM skill sets as a CH-53E pilot.

Newly qualified night systems qualified co-pilot with lots of future potential. We had identified him as a possible fast track to future WTI candidate due to his well above average airmanship skills. He was a very jovial person and was very happy to help out with flight planning or any aspects of his ground job. He worked in the operations department and had developed the base knowledge and was going to start writing weekly training schedules during the deployment. Even with his known and recognized advanced skills in airmanship, he still operated the aircraft conservatively and appropriately for the mission and flew the aircraft well within NATOPS limits at all times. He never brought ego into the cockpit nor into the ready room.

3. Describe (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) aviation acumen, CRM, and ORM skill sets as a CH-53E pilot.

He hadn't been in the squadron for very long. Most of my interactions with him were in my office while he was getting the schedule signed. I did not get a chance to fly with him personally. During HFCs and other discussions, I didn't receive any reports that he was an especially outstanding performer or that he was underperforming. He was a very smart individual, and he had a lot of potential from my interactions with him the few months he was in the squadron. He was a hard worker and was well respected in the ready room and in the operations department.

4. Describe (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) aviation acumen, CRM, and ORM skill sets as a CH-53E crew chief.

One of our top crew chief instructors. He was an excellent crew member and was very calm while teaching developing crew chiefs and brand-new aerial observers. When a decision was made within the crew, he was always assertive in his communication to ensure the entire crew had all of the information available at the time. He was not overly aggressive in the aircraft, which created an open learning environment for pilots and aircrew.

5. Describe (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) aviation acumen, CRM, and ORM skill sets as a CH-53E crew chief.

Reserved crew chief but hard worker. Did not have issues with communications amongst crew members. He was quiet and had no issues speaking up when there was a problem. He was always smiling every time I saw him. He received a (b)(6) prior to me taking command, but you wouldn't know he had been (b)(6), other than him holding the rank of (b)(6). He bounced back and was a solid contributor to the flight line shop.

6. How did the MV-22 "red stripe" (i.e., aircraft type/model/series grounding) negatively impact HMH-361's operational and maintenance readiness?

All assault support frag tasking that was normally spread out between V-22s and CH-53s now all fell to CH-53s. You will have to request actual stats from I MEF to see if there was an overall decrease in tasking due to the red stripe or if it remained the same. MAG can give you a list of FRAGs that were issued to the squadrons over the last year to see if you can see any trends.

I did not perceive there to be any negative impact to operational and maintenance readiness within my squadron due to the red stripe. I came from HMH-463 in Hawaii and we had multiple frags per week because we were the only heavy lift squadron on the island. When I arrived at MAG-16 after having been away for 7 years, I was surprised at the low amount of frags. My viewpoint as a Marine and as a commander is that if we can support the Marines on the ground and help them complete their training, that is what we are here for. We can always find a way to tie our training objectives into their training.

(b) (3) (B)

When the red stripe happened, staff at multiple levels indicated that the 53s would have to pick up the slack left from the V-22 red stripe. It was no different than it has been in the past on any MEU or in Afghanistan. 53s always pick up the slack from the V-22. We also enjoy joking, giving the V-22 community a good ribbing now and then about how much more we can lift than them. On my last deployment, we would lift 12 tri-walls and the V-22s only had the power to lift 1 tri-wall. We would jokingly tell them to get out of our way so we could move their loads for them.

7. Was relief for the squadron from enduring requirements (e.g., monthly cross countries, quarterly Deployments For Trainings [DFTs], etc.) requested? If so, describe how and to whom, and what was the outcome.

(b) (3) (B)

8. Was relief for the squadron from higher echelon tasking (e.g., "frag" tasking) requested? If so, describe how and to whom, and what was the outcome.

No relief was requested. Conversations were had that tasking will remain the same and that heavy lift will pick up the slack. CH-53 culture as a whole embraces the Marine Corps mentality of "do more with less" which is a constant message from our commandant and other senior leaders. I can't quote anyone in particular, but that was the conversations that were had. Task and Purpose did an article on the subject. <https://taskandpurpose.com/news/marines-osprey-super-stallion/>

9. Were there concerns or mitigation strategies or both focused on managing the ready room's flight hour tactical hard deck?

We manage the ready room's flight hour tactical hard deck by focusing on flight hours per pilot per month, and we have been doing that for a few months since the new Wing SOP published in September (page 1-5). 10 hours is the hard deck for aircraft per Wing SOP for CH-53s. We balance through building the weeklies to ensure each pilot maintains the minimum required hours.

HMH-361 historically had higher than average pilot hours per pilot per month within the MAG. As of the hot board that was published on 2 February, the NSI average in aircraft in the last 30 days was (b) (3) (B), Co-pilot (b) (3) (B). During that 30-day period, there were two 96s.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), (b) (7) had (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) had (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), (b) (7) had (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) had 26.1. They had all flown since that hot board was published from my memory and would have met the minimum flight hour hard deck at the time of the mishap. I no longer have accurate access to their exact flight hours due to AMB isolation of reports.

10. How many times were "get-well" maintenance plans required from 1 November 2023 to 6 February 2024?

(b) (3) (B)

11. Based upon HMH-361's 6 February 2024 Aviation Maintenance Supply Readiness Report (AMSRR), could other aircraft positioned at MCAS Miramar have been utilized to support the squadron's 8 and 9 February 2024 "frags" as opposed to retrograding BUNO 164366?

HMH-West has no issues with asking for relief in supporting each other's frags if we are experiencing a dip in maintenance. Asking for another squadron to pick up a frag is not unusual if there is a significant amount of unscheduled maintenance. We are pretty good about registering shortfalls early so we can complete any tasking as a team within MAG-16. Last minute frags,

other than HMX-1 presidential support, are not the norm. Usually, we register a shortfall early so someone else could pick up the tasking, which they normally do.

I can't speak to the other two squadron's readiness levels during the week in question from memory, but I believe all 3 squadrons were on the road. 465 at Yuma ISO SLTE. 462 in Yuma ISO their NSI checks. 361 was in Creech for NSI checks.

Prior to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) launch, he had a discussion with the maintenance officer, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) about the frag on 8 February. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) asked how important it was to get the aircraft home (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) told him something to the effect that it wasn't a big deal if they didn't, and no pressure if they couldn't make it home.

12. How are intermediate stops officially authorized per HMH-361's Flight Schedule?

(b) (3) (B)

13. On 6 February 2024, how was TIGER 43's KINS to KIPL leg officially authorized, noting the Flight Schedule makes no mention of KIPL?

(b) (3) (B)

14. For the squadron, how many times since 12 January 2023 have multiple signed Flight Schedules been issued?

Not often. You would have to refer to our records for exactly how many times.

Wing and MAG SOPs don't address schedule changes. Squadron SOPs say changes "shall" route through Safety and Ops before reaching me for approval. Normally, Ops brings me the change, which would indicate that it had been routed properly. Normally a second version is only released if there are major changes needed to the flight schedule because some emerging need came up after it was signed.

Generally, a "red pen" change is conducted for minor changes. It is because someone couldn't fly for whatever reason, they had a personal issue, they were sick, etc. There could also be administrative issues that were missed in the planning process. If we can fix the problem by putting someone else into the person who fell out place, we will "red pen" them into the schedule at the duty desk and a record of that original flight schedule is kept. The goal is to have zero red pen changes. I don't have access to those day's hard copies because of the AMB. We try to avoid those as we develop the flight schedule.

I will deny red pens for reasons of convenience as a forcing function for better and more accurate detailed planning. If it was out of their control, or a mistake, I'll normally sign the change. If the red pen change is brought to me by the Duty, I will ask if it has been routed properly. I've denied changes that seemed as if they were made for reasons of convenience.

15. How did you sign the final version of the 6 February 2024 Flight Schedule?

Feb 5-6 schedule was released on Feb 4 by (b)(6),(b)(7). Releasing a 2-day schedule is not unusual when the majority of the pilots are on the flight schedule. Version 2 was released by (b)(6),(b)(7) on Feb 5. I believe the changes were needed because Ops did not account for 2 of the 3 crew chiefs having to get their checks on the second day. If they were scheduled on version 1, it would have just been a red pen schedule change to drop them. Version 3 was released on Feb 5, cutting the section line down to 1 return line due to the nose gear box replacement of the second aircraft. The flight schedule was e-mailed to me at 2259 on Feb 5 by (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). I replied "approved" at 2315 according to Outlook.

16. What documents are required to accompany a Flight Schedule for Command screening and review when approving the Flight Schedule by email, text message, or phone call?

The flight schedule and RAW (risk assessment worksheet) is sent to me. I normally give a digital approval either via e-mail or text so we have it in writing that I approved the schedule. In this instance, I received the flight schedule and RAW via email, and I replied "approved" at 2315.

17. For 6 February 2024's first Flight Schedule, were you timely provided all the required documents to accompany a Flight Schedule to enable Command screening and review when approving by email, text message, or phone?

Yes, V1 was sent to me on Feb 4 at 2055 by (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). It contained the 5-6 Feb flight schedule and the RAWs for 5 and 6 Feb.

18. For 6 February 2024's second Flight Schedule, were you timely provided all the required documents to accompany a Flight Schedule to enable Command screening and review when approving by email, text message, or phone?

Yes, V2 was distributed by (b)(6),(b)(7) at 1819 on 5 Feb.

19. For 6 February 2024's third Flight Schedule, were you timely provided all the required documents to accompany a Flight Schedule to enable Command screening and review when approving by email, text message, or phone?

Yes, V3 Flight schedule was e-mailed to me at 2259 on 5 Feb by (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). I replied "approved" at 2315 according to Outlook. All flight schedules and changes are screened by appropriate sections: Ops, DoSS, Mx. V3 was to capture the NSI cancelation from the night before to roll Alpha and Lepak to the second night and to address the nose gearbox failure of one of the aircraft that was supposed to return to Miramar.

The reasons for changes are normally communicated in person, and there isn't a record of why the changes happened. My maintenance officer told me about the nose gear box problem and not being able to send the aircraft home that day, which was relayed through the operations officer for my approval for the change.

20. For 7 February 2024's Flight Schedule, were you timely provided all the required documents to accompany a Flight Schedule to enable Command screening and review when approving by email, text message, or phone?

Yes, I received the schedule at 1829 on 6 Feb for review. It contained the RAW, the flight schedule, and the Creech Retrograde Roster. I responded via Signal to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) at 1857 with approval.

21. Are Command comments traditionally provided within HMH-361's Risk Assessment Worksheets?

Command comment requirements based on risk level are not dictated by Wing and Squadron SOPs. The risk assessment worksheet isn't mentioned in the Wing or MAG SOPs. Squadron SOP has high risk as MEU/MAG commander approval on the RAW.

Our practice is to require command comments when there is medium risk and above. This practice does not stem from any written instruction, policy, or SOP. The only place I am aware of that the requirement for medium risk must be signed off by the Squadron CO is on the RAW itself, which is a house made document. I am unaware if this requirement comes from another publication.

22. Were written Command comments provided within 6 February 2024's Risk Assessment Worksheet?

(b) (3) (B)

comment due to the digital nature. I would have also put "concur" with the Doss mitigation if it was a hand signed schedule.

23. Were voice Command comments provided within 6 February 2024's Risk Assessment Worksheet? If so, how?

No.

24. How was the beginning of Crew Day defined during the Creech DFT (e.g. from muster/hotel departure, arrival within the squadron's deployed spaces, etc.)?

Crew day per the Squadron SOP is defined as the time an individual shows up to work to the time they land or the last maintenance action is performed. The normal crew day is 10 hours, extendable up to 12 hours by the Squadron CO. Crew day starts at arrival to Creech "at the time aircrew first report for, or begin, assigned military duties" per Wing SOP. The crew day does not start at the beginning of a commute.

It isn't unusual for Marines to commute one or more hours in the San Diego area. At Creech, there was roughly a one-hour drive time from the JW Marriott to the Creech squadron spaces. This was in line with the commute situation at Miramar. The commute issues here have been discussed very frequently at the operational level because Marines are forced to live far away from base due to the high cost of living in San Diego.

Even though the commuting issue is discussed at different levels of leadership, nothing has been done about it officially. The only guidance I've received or passed on is to be aware of your Marines' individual commute times and ensure they are getting enough rest to fulfill their work requirements. I had no concerns with any human factors to include crew rest during the Creech DFT.

25. How was the end of the 10-hour Crew Day defined during the Creech DFT (e.g. by land time, engine shutdown/rotator disengagement, etc.)?

Wing SOP defines the end of Crew Day as "aircraft engine shutdown."

26. Was a Crew Day extension issued to TIGER 43?

Yes, crew day was requested to me in-person verbally via the OPSO and I approved the extension.

27. On 6 February 2024, did you speak in person with any of the TIGER 43 crew? If so, with who and when?

No. (b)(6),(b)(7) called me at 2148. The call lasted 2 minutes. SgtMaj and I had returned to San Diego via commercial air the morning of 6 Jan due to the 3d MAW commanders conference the following day.

28. On 6 February 2024, did you speak over the phone with any of the TIGER 43 crew? If so, with who and when?

Yes. (b)(6),(b)(7) called me at 2148. The call lasted 2 minutes.

29. On 6 February 2024, did you text, email, or otherwise exchange digital messages with any of the TIGER 43 crew? If so, with who and when? Provide a copy, such as a screenshot, of those messages.

We did not communicate via text. We only had the previously mentioned phone call.

30. On the evening of 6 February 2024, did you speak to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) over the phone following TIGER 43's landing at KIPL?

Yes. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) called me at 2148. The call lasted 2 minutes.

31. On the evening of 6 February 2024, did you exchange text or other messages with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) following TIGER 43's landing at KIPL?

Yes. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) called me at 2148. The call lasted 2 minutes.

32. If you communicated with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) on the evening of 6 February 2024, following TIGER 43's landing at KIPL, did you discuss any of the following items with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)?

(a) TIGER 43's No.2 Engine Overtemp Caution Light?

Yes.

(b) TIGER 43's inflight actions and recovery decision?

He informed me they shut down the #2 engine while on final to IPL when they received the light.

(c) TIGER 43's on-deck troubleshooting actions?

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had communicated to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) with assistance for troubleshooting the erroneous #2 engine overtemp light. They found a frayed wire and put a piece of electrical tape on the wire. The overtemp light was confirmed as erroneous upon the discovery of the frayed wire.

(d) TIGER 43's crew day, fatigue level, and human factors?

We did not discuss. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) sounded perfectly fine and very rational. He articulated his school of thought about what had happened, his plan, and his going forward solution.

(e) Departure, Enroute, and Destination TAF/METARs?

Did not discuss.

(f) Low Light NVG conditions?

Did not discuss.

(g) Active Convective SIGMET and AIRMET Zulu, Sierra?

Did not discuss.

(h) Planned route of flight (VFR or IFR options)?

Did not discuss.

(i) NEXRAD returns for the route of flight?

Did not discuss.

(j) Freezing Levels?

Did not discuss.

(k) Use of I-8 for navigation?

Did not discuss.

(l) Flight decision points if the No.2 Engine Overtemp Caution Light returned enroute from KIPL to KNKX?

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) asked if he could turn up, and if the light was extinguished if he would RTB to Miramar. I told him if the light came back while on deck, he stays at IPL. I told him if the light comes back after they take off, they return to IPL. My last words to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) were “fly conservative, fly safe.”

33. If “yes” to any of the items in the previous questions, what guidance did you provide to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) about that item or those items?

Above for each item.

34. Would your guidance in the previous question have been any different if (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) were a junior Helicopter Aircraft Commander? A senior Department Head?

My guidance to all of the pilots is to fly conservatively, legally, and don’t push a bad situation. A tactically sound plan is inherently safe. All of our missions are routine and nothing in training is worth risking life or damaging an aircraft.

35. How is a Precautionary Emergency Landing (PEL) defined?

Per MAG SOP: “PEL is described as a landing when further flight is inadvisable. Further flight shall not be attempted until the cause of the PEL has been determined and corrected.”

36. If a PEL is executed at a planned destination, does that change how it is viewed and/or reported?

In accordance with the Chief of Staff guidance regarding Flash Reports, they would be required if there was a “declared aircraft emergency/Precautionary Emergency Landing/Divert,” meaning “ANY aircraft that declares an emergency – regardless of where they land” and “any aircraft that lands at a location not on the flight schedule (not planned)” will be flashed. If an aircraft breaks or is weathered at its intended point of landing, no flash report is required, only an update in the daily Ops rollup.

In this instance, Tiger 43 crew did not declare an emergency. They did not land at an unplanned airfield or in an austere environment. IPL was their planned fuel stop on their way back to Miramar. They had a 6.0 flight which required fuel. IPL has hot fuel and Creech has cold fuel. IPL is the most efficient way to get fuel in our training area of Southern California.

Due to confirmation of the erroneous indication while on the ground, there wasn't a reason to remain overnight with a 100% functional aircraft. Conversations in the past and guidance from the Wing Chief of Staff when it comes to whether or not to send up a report is "what are the effects?"

Did they land at an airfield they intended on landing at? Yes, IPL for fuel as an intermediate stop.

Do they have to RON when they didn't plan to? If yes, no flash is required, only location update via ops.

Was there some indication in the aircraft that occurred, and we were able to continue on our mission as planned? This is one of those instances. The crew received an erroneous indication. Their guidance from me was to monitor that system closely and if the indication came back, they were to return to IPL and stay the night. The result was they did not receive the indications on their turn up or they wouldn't have launched. They didn't receive the indications in flight after they departed IPL or they would have returned.

37. How are "maintenance actions" defined?

The MAG SOP does not define a "maintenance action."

As CH-53s we have maintainers on the aircraft to "troubleshoot" for every start. They will do things like bang on starters to get them to start, or hold cables in certain positions to get engines to start, for example. If it doesn't require the sign off of a maintenance action form or MAF, I don't consider it a maintenance action.

38. On the evening of 6 February 2024, did (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) request approval to takeoff from KIPL in order recovery to KNKX?

Yes. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) requested approval from me to depart from IPL if there were no other indications from the #2 engine overheat system. I gave him that approval with the caveats that if it comes back at start up, he shuts down. If it comes back at flight, he returns to IPL and RONs. I've briefed every pilot that they can call me anytime for any reason if they have a question or they need guidance. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did exactly that.

39. If "yes" to the previous question, who approved it?

Me, via phone to him. After he explained the situation, and his planned way forward, I approved his plan.

40. Did you personally review/check forecasted or actual weather conditions applicable to TIGER 43's KIPL to KNKX flight leg?

No. It is the responsibility of pilots to check required items before flight weather, NOTAMS etc. ODO will brief all required items during the flight brief. Pilots are required to request periodic updates to weather or any other factors that may affect the flight.

41. How were the cumulative effects of (1) actual and forecasted weather, (2) a preceding emergency, (3) a planned night recovery, and (4) operating at the end of TIGER 43's Crew Day considered?

I was not present for the flight brief. Most flights in a CH-53 are recovered near the end of their crew day at night.

42. Did those cumulative effects increase TIGER 43's risk level?

Tiger 43 RAW was listed as Low. All crew had flown within 1 day under NVG except (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). He flew 4 days prior. They were the most proficient crew on the schedule that day according to the RAW.

43. On the evening of 6 February 2024, how did you believe TIGER 43 was going to return to KNKX?

IPL for fuel and course rules via the Yuma route. This is the standard routing for the majority of our flight training.

44. According to the MAG-16 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), who is authorized to approve a night recovery following a PEL [after maintenance actions are completed]?

A maintenance action is not currently defined within the MAG SOP. However, when "maintenance actions" are completed on an aircraft, the MAG CO is the approving authority per the MAG SOP.

45. On the evening of 6 February 2024, who did you believe was authorized to approve a night recovery following a PEL [after maintenance actions were completed]?

No maintenance actions were completed on the aircraft in question while at IPL to my knowledge. Troubleshooting and maintenance actions are two different things. Neither are specifically defined within squadron, MAG, or Wing SOPs and CO discretion, common sense, and experience guide the interpretation where troubleshooting ends and maintenance action begins.

47. How many times have you requested MAG-16 CO approval regarding a nighttime recovery following a PEL [after maintenance actions were completed]?

Possibly once, but I don't remember the details. I have had crews request to launch after maintenance actions have been performed and I have denied them without asking for MAG CO approval. One example is when a window fell out of the aircraft at IPL while over the runway (TFOA reported). We already had an aircraft down at IPL. The crews asked if they could pull

that window and install it and return to Miramar that night. I told them no and to park both aircraft and we would recover both of them the following day. Even though the MAG SOP does not define "maintenance action" I consider a window replacement a very obvious maintenance action.

48. What were your actions after initial overdue notification until the Creech main body arrival?

I got out of bed in San Diego and drove to the hangar to start the mishap procedures. SgtMaj and I had returned to San Diego via commercial air the morning of Jan 6 due to the 3d MAW commanders conference the following day.

49. What was your staff guidance after initial overdue notification until the Creech main body's arrival?

Conduct the mishap procedures. I called in my XO and SgtMaj. We had staff at Creech working search and rescue. OPSO had the lead in Creech.

50. Are there any other individuals who should be interviewed regarding this investigation?

I'm unaware of who all has been interviewed. Anyone who was at Creech could be a potential interviewee.

51. Is there anything else relevant to this investigation that you would like to share?

No.

ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Rank/Rate: (b)(6)
Activity: Commanding Officer Unit: HMMH-361, MAG-16
Telephone Number: (b)(6)

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: Article 92 (orders violation) as I may have violated Paragraph 3008, Section 3 of Group Order P3710.29M (MAG-16 SOP for Air Ops) in authorizing TIGER43's night recovery following a PEL and that:

- ☐ (b)(6), I have the right to remain silent
- ☐ (b)(6), Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
- ☐ (b)(7)(c) I have the right to consult with legal counsel prior to any questioning. This legal counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expenses, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
- ☐ I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
- ☐ I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

- ☐ (b)(6), I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:
 - ☐ (b)(6), I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
 - ☐ (b)(6), I expressly desire to make a statement.
 - ☒ ~~I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.~~
 - ☐ ~~I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.~~
 - ☒ (b)(6) This acknowledgement and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

2024.03.15

(b)(6)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

2024 03/15
& Date)

****Continued on next page (If statement provided)****

Understanding my rights under U.C.M.J. Article 31, I wish to make the following statement:

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....
Service:.....U.S. Marine Corps
Unit:.....HMH-361
Date:.....15 March 2024

NOTICE

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OF THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT PROPER
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE

On 15 March 2024, I met with the Investigating Officer in person aboard Marine Corps Air Station Miramar. Also present was an additional member of the Investigation Team and my privately retained legal counsel. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview with me, to include the differences with a safety investigation. I understood my statement was not privileged. I agreed to have my interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded. I swore or affirmed to tell the Investigating Officer the truth.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of my interview with the Investigating Officer:

I had an opportunity to review the questions that the Investigating Officer sent to me in advance. My counsel provided the Investigating Officer a copy of my written responses to those questions. The Investigating Officer advised me pursuant to Article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I reviewed the written advisement with my counsel. I acknowledged my rights, partially waived them, and initialed the written advisement.

(b) (3) (B)

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 I discussed my response to Question 11 with the Investigating Officer.
2 The intent was to bring two aircraft back after the NSI checks to minimize
3 the maintenance burden. The Creech retrograde would be executed via waves as
4 opposed to one large flight.

5 I discussed my responses to Question 24 and Question 25 with the
6 Investigating Officer. I agreed that crew day, specifically during the Creech
7 UTD, began at aircrew's arrival within the squadron spaces. I defined crew
8 day ending at engine shutdown per 3d MAW SOP, as opposed to land time.
9 Regarding whether the squadron SOP is less or more restrictive than the 3d
10 MAW SOP, the HMMH-361 SOP is less restrictive. I would have to review my
11 exact wording. The 3d MAW SOP is the most current. Mine is the second most.
12 MAG-16's SOP is two years old. There are updates that need to occur. We
13 account for a 10-hour crew day when determining land times. Specifically, we
14 provide a buffer for taxi times (and such) and do not traditionally schedule
15 a 10-hour crew day to be coincident with scheduled land times.

16 I discussed my responses to Question 26 with the Investigating Officer.
17 My Operations Officer asked me the day prior for a 12-hour crew day extension
18 for TIGER 43 to account for any possible delays during the crew's return to
19 MCAS Miramar. I verbally approved a 12-hour crew day extension for TIGER 43.

20 I showed and offered a copy of 3d MAW IRS documentation regarding
21 Question 36 to the Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer informed
22 me that he already had a copy.

23 I discussed my responses to Question 44 and Question 45 with the
24 Investigating Officer. The MAG-16 SOP does not specify who can authorize a
25 night recovery following a PEL if maintenance actions are not executed. The
26 Investigating Officer asked my opinion about who can authorize a night
27 recovery after maintenance actions are performed post-PEL.

28 I replied and asked the Investigating Officer, "per the SOP, what's the
29 definition of a maintenance action?". The Investigating Officer stated the
30 MAG-16 SOP does not specifically define what maintenance actions are. The
31 Investigating Officer stated that it could be possibly defined via
32 publications stored on maintenance laptops (i.e, Portable Electronic
33 Maintenance Aids [PEMA]).

34 The Investigating Officer asked, where does the authority reside to
35 approve a night recovery, post-PEL, when successful maintenance was performed
36 on deck? I replied, "I could read you the MAG SOP." However, maintenance
37 action is not defined in the MAG SOP and nor does it reference a PEMA or any
38 other document to help define what a maintenance action is.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

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1 I discussed my response to Question 47 with the Investigating Officer.
2 I cannot recall an aircraft recovering at night following a PEL since I took
3 command. Usually when something happens, whatever the malfunction is, we will
4 leave the aircraft. It is not uncommon for an aircraft to stay overnight at
5 Imperial. Normally, we will fly as a section, and would simply shift aircrew
6 members into the good aircraft, fly home, and then recover the overnight
7 aircraft the following day. I could not remember how often that has happened
8 since I took command. I directed the Investigating Officer to my Operations
9 Officer to determine that data if required.

10 I discussed my response to Question 32 with the Investigating Officer.
11 In my opinion, shutting down an engine in flight would not trip the
12 definition of a PEL as defined by the chief-of-staff's guidance and what is
13 written in the SOPs. The Investigating Officer asked me, "how about in
14 accordance with NATOPS?" I replied, "you could interpret emergency procedures
15 as anything." So, depending on how you shut down an engine on the deck, that
16 could be considered executing an emergency procedure. The Investigating
17 Officer asked me, "so, when TIGER 43, with a [No.2 Engine Overheat Caution
18 Light] shut down the engine on final, in your opinion, that was not a PEL?" I
19 replied, per the chief-of-staff's guidance, if you do not declare an
20 emergency, that does not require a flash report. So, a PEL by itself, does
21 not meet the criteria.

22 I stated, per NATOPS, technically, they executed a Precautionary
23 Emergency Landing. However, based upon the chief-of-staff's guidance, not all
24 PELs are reportable. I confirmed a nighttime recovery post maintenance
25 action may only be authorized by the MAG-16 CO. Again, I stated maintenance
26 actions are not defined.

27 Troubleshooting and maintenance actions are two different things.
28 Neither are specifically defined within the squadron, MAG, or wing SOPs and
29 CO discretion, common sense, and experience guide the interpretation where
30 troubleshooting ends and maintenance action begins. The Investigating Officer
31 asked me, "in your understanding, did TIGER 43 execute a PEL into Imperial?"
32 I replied, "yes" but "they did not perform maintenance action."

33 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) contacted me on 6 February 2024 because I have expressed
34 to all my pilots that if they ever have any questions about anything, that
35 they can call me. That phone call was a result of that guidance.

36 What TIGER 43 executed on deck was troubleshooting. I put all the
37 information about my phone call with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) in my written responses to
38 summarize. The most comprehensive answer is to Question 38. Yes, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

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1 requested approval from me to depart IPL if there were no other indications
2 from the number No.2 engine overheat system. I gave (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) the approval
3 with the caveats that if it came back at start up, he would shut down. If it
4 came back in flight, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would return to IPL and RON. I brief every
5 pilot that they can call me anytime for any reason if they have a question or
6 they need guidance. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did exactly that. I approved the plan that
7 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) briefed me. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) told me what indications they had and
8 what their resulting actions were. At no time was it overtly stated that
9 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had executed a PEL and it was never overtly stated that I
10 approved a nighttime recovery. I approved the plan that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) laid
11 forward.

12 When I was asked by the Investigating Officer to recall my UTD
13 departure, I stated that I flew back commercially on the morning [of 6
14 February 2024] to San Diego. I did not note deteriorating weather conditions
15 during the day. I went out to dinner that night. I ate outside at a
16 restaurant around 1900 and the weather was fine. Pilots in the past who have
17 brought up human factors bring them up to me. In (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) case, he did
18 not bring up any human factors or weather concerns. I trust that all pilots
19 are considering those factors before and during flight.

20 TIGER 43 did not conduct a maintenance action simply because they
21 placed tape on a frayed wire. We frequently manipulate systems to get them to
22 function properly. For example, we bang on starters to get them to go. I
23 would not consider that maintenance. This is the same. What was known was
24 the No.2 engine Overheat Caution Light came on and a piece of tape was placed
25 on a frayed wire. I explained to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) that if the light came back on
26 during start, he would need to shut back down. That would have indicated
27 follow-on maintenance would be required to fix the system. Placing tape on a
28 frayed wire was troubleshooting and not a maintenance action.

29 There is no requirement, to my knowledge, that addresses a
30 qualification to troubleshoot. So, it is agnostic. The qualification of a
31 Marine does not automatically mean that a follow-on action is true (e.g.,
32 just because a CDQAR performs troubleshooting does not translate those steps
33 into a maintenance action).

34 I did not detect any anxiety in (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) voice. There was no
35 discussion between (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and I about weather, icing, or anything along
36 those lines. I have confidence that pilots are going to do what they say - I
37 trust them. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did not directly discuss Yuma course rules with me,
38 but that is the standard return from the Imperial Valley.

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1 I did not think that the plan that was briefed increased the risk
2 level. At that point, the condition of the aircraft was 100 percent sound, if
3 the caution light did not reassert. I did not feel that there was any reason
4 that I had to confer with the MAG-16 CO.

5 I had no reservations about (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) course of action. I do not
6 want to speculate as to whether other individuals would consider TIGER 43's
7 action troubleshooting. I am confident it was troubleshooting. TIGER 43's PEL
8 did not require approval at the MAG CO level because the follow-on actions
9 were troubleshooting. The MAG-16 SOP's language specifically talks about
10 night recoveries following the completion of maintenance actions. It is an
11 "and" statement in which all three of the following have to be true in order
12 to trigger a MAG-16 CO approval requirement: a PEL, a night recovery, and
13 maintenance action.

14 I was directed not to discuss my statement to the Investigating Officer
15 with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) with
16 certain exceptions. I discussed future availability with the Investigating
17 Officer.

18 END OF STATEMENT

19
20 I, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), U.S. Marine Corps, have had an
21 opportunity to review the above summary of my statement to the Investigating
22 Officer for the Command Investigation into the facts and circumstances
23 surrounding the CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter mishap that occurred on or
24 about 6 February 2024. I agree that the summary accurately reflects my
25 interview and swear or affirm that it is true and accurate to the best of my
26 knowledge.

27 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
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29 Signature: _____ Date: _____
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SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b) (6)

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Service:.....U.S. Marine Corps
Unit:.....HMH-361
Date:.....5 March 2024

NOTICE

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On 5 March 2024, I met with the Investigating Officer in person. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview with me, to include the difference with a safety investigation. I understood my statement is not privileged. I swore or affirmed to tell the Investigation Officer the truth. I agreed to have my interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of my interview with the Investigating Officer:

I was originally an enlisted reservist for motor transportation. I did my first six years in the fleet as a pilot on the East Coast with HMH-464. I volunteered to go to Okinawa for three years. I was the air officer with 5th ANGLICO from 2019 to 2022. I arrived at MAG-16 in 2022. I went through my refresh. I arrived at the squadron about a year ago and have been an Executive Officer for about a year. I received my NSI check back in June [2023] with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), actually. I started the Executive Officer position on 15 March 2024. I will transition next week to be the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Detachment Officer-in-Charge and the Executive Officer for the Aviation Combat Element (VMM-262).

Traditionally, what I have seen in an HMH is that the senior person in the safety shop is a senior captain ASO because there are not enough field grade officers to go around and the DOS is not a department head tour. People are not left there unless they are just getting in and waiting for a different department head spot to open up. When I arrived, a captain was our DOS. The then-DOS was a rockstar and is my number one performance-wise. The shop had been slightly undermanned, so the DOS had another captain (who is now active duty at our Reserve squadron) who took over for the DOS when the DOS changed stations. The new DOS was not a fantastic performer. The new DOS "held it down" essentially, as an ASO, which was that DOS' qualification.

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1 When that DOS transitioned, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) came onboard to be the
2 DOS. We had a really great cascading turnover plan that was supposed to kick
3 off at the beginning of this year. It was two weeks for (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) to move
4 into the OPSO seat with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would then
5 turn over to go down and be the AMO. The AMO would have turned over with me
6 to be the XO, ending at this time this year. That whole plan went out the
7 window when the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit HMH Detachment Officer-in-
8 Charge got "soft" relieved. I want to say that was the first or second week
9 of December 2023. The AMO was pulled to be the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
10 Detachment Officer-in-Charge and then (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) took over OPSO, (b)(6),
11 (b)(6), took over AMO, and I stayed on as the Executive Officer. So, when (b)(6),
12 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) transitioned out of DOS, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) who had been the ASO,
13 "fleeted up" to DOS and has been the DOS ever since.

14 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had gone from being the flight line Officer-
15 in-Charge to ASO and covered the gap between (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) who left
16 before (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) could go to ASO school, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
17 was also at EWS [at the time]. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) went to ASO school and was
18 our one-of-one ASO here on deck. Right now, we have (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) who is an
19 ASO and the DOS, and we have (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) who is an ASO. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
20 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had been on the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit Detachment. After
21 the mishap, we got (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) back sooner-than-planned. The S-1
22 Officer-in-Charge is currently at ASO school as a long-term plan to make sure
23 we do not have all these gaps.

24 The GSO was a captain dual-hatting as GSO and S-2 Officer-in-Charge. We
25 do not rate one until we deploy. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) has been the NATOPS officer
26 and has since taken over GSO.

27 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had left for the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit on,
28 I want to say, mid-January [2024]. It was when the USS Somerset [LPD 25]
29 left, mid-to-late January. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was supposed to come back 28
30 March 2024 when the TACRON was going to be composited, which would trigger
31 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) release back to us.

32 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was available, and knew to be available, the whole amount
33 of time that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was on the USS Somerset. I know (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
34 (b)(6), would have "one off" days, such as running a marathon this past
35 weekend.

36 We had a "Class A" mishap in the Spring, which was a mechanical
37 failure. It was remarkable that nothing else happened. The problem ended up
38 being fleet-wide. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had been on that AMB as well.

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1 Amongst the other O4s, were doing - had been doing - our due diligence
2 all along. There was an additional level of scrutiny that was given to
3 scheduling, and crews, and revamping our ORM and Risk Assessment Worksheets.
4 I identified early on - I showed up, asked questions like "is this useful?"
5 and "how are we doing crew pairings, how are we providing time for training?"
6 So, from late springs last year [2023] through now we have been trying to
7 improve some of our risk mitigation stuff, sent some individuals to CRM-I. We
8 had them come back and teach the ready room. We have had, like I said, we are
9 in the process of - the stand board has gone over an hour, and the Risk
10 Assessment Worksheet. We have been working on that and the mishap has slowed
11 it down. We had slapped the table on what we wanted it to look like and now
12 the actual churning out excel stuff has to happen. We have, like, the sheet
13 that gets routed with the schedule and that has all the proficiency and
14 currency data on it as an opportunity for the OPSO, DOS, and CO to put in
15 their mitigation. Then, there is a half sheet that the aircraft commander
16 does the day of, and it asks "has there been sufficient time to plan?" and
17 similar items. I did not feel that had to be a separate document, because the
18 whole back of our RAW is blank and it does not really do anything in terms of
19 risk mitigation. So, we went back to "what does this buy for us?" and "is it
20 an effective tool for mitigating risk?" We talked through that in the stand
21 board and, like I said, we decided what our output of a better product would
22 be. It just has to get made. That is in work. I think, that, the OPSO, AMO,
23 and I - and I spend a lot of time on the schedule every day looking at group
24 pairings, looking at scheduled events, and ground events, before it gets to
25 the CO, kind of as the CO's last stop I look a lot of the operations stuff, I
26 spent almost my first six years doing operations, so I look at a lot of
27 Training and Readiness stuff, and I look at a lot of the safety stuff, before
28 it gets to the CO.

29 MAG requires a hard deck report that operations provide. We have had a
30 bout of low readiness, long-term down aircraft and some aircraft that were in
31 extended depot or reset-level maintenance. We had a lot of the same type of
32 issues - some weird hydraulic stuff going on, that multiple aircraft were
33 having the same or similar-type issues. It took extended troubleshooting to
34 lock some of that stuff down.

35 This kind of goes back to October [2023] or November [2023]. With the
36 threshold for the flight hours hard deck, we have done a lot to supplement
37 with similar usage and stuff like that. If you look back at our historical
38 hard deck reports, there are certain people who are below the hard deck that

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1 were medically down, or TAD, or at a course. So, if you start to pull out the
2 ones that are below the threshold, there was usually some corresponding
3 reason other than they were not just flying.

4 The MV-22 Red Stripe has impacted HMH-361. We have picked up a lot of
5 extra tasking. Prior to the mishap, we were doing POTUS support as part of a
6 "tag team" HMH West effort. We did a lot of 15th Marine Expeditionary Support
7 for PMC with CERTEX and COMPTUEX. I flew in, I want to say, November [2023]
8 or December [2023], I was in the seat for over eight hours for, like, seven-
9 hour, multiple PMC runs between the ship and here or the ship and Camp
10 Pendleton that all should have been Osprey stuff. We have had - it was either
11 the day after the mishap, or the following day - we had a fast-rope frag for
12 EOTG. That, I got to assume, was on the minds of that crew. Speculating, of
13 course. We do not know why they launched that evening out of Imperial. My
14 assumption is that our upcoming frag requirements were a factor in their
15 decision. It has been - we also had another POTUS support after the new year.

16 I think the Marines felt what was being asked of us and the rest of the
17 HMHs. We had our CNAF inspection in the beginning of January [2024]. The
18 Marines crushed it. But, when the Commanding General came the next week to
19 hand out coins and Bravo Zulus, the first question the Commanding General got
20 asked is, "when can we expect the Ospreys to start picking up their share of
21 the load because we are getting run ragged?"

22 Fatigue had been an active leadership challenge to keep everybody
23 engaged. Obviously, we had our own readiness reasons to turn a corner. Adding
24 to the challenge to improve our readiness for our own needs - on top of it -
25 we got all this tasking. And, really, that was impacting our ability to do
26 what we wanted to do with those flight hours. You do your best to make sure
27 that there was training that went along with the frag support because it kind
28 of shoehorns you in to specific, you still have to do this.

29 We had the CNAF tasking to take people out to the one of the CVNs, as
30 well, so that was also coming up after the mishap. So, I think we were onto
31 two or three frag support. Coming out of the CNAP, they had like 40 frag
32 requests.

33 There was some tasking that we did not have put on our plate because of
34 our Creech Detachment. That satisfied the quarterly DFT and it was the MCREE
35 for the UDP, and it was also meant to be NSI checks. The MCCRE fell out
36 because of lodging availability. So, when the date window shifted or
37 compressed, the focus became NSI checks. The plan was to flow aircraft back
38 to Miramar to start prepping for the CNAF frags that we had.

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1 In the PVFT and Operations/Maintenance synchs, and operations synchs,
2 both internal to the squadron and with the MAG, I know there was a lot of
3 "sausage making" how to balance the things we had to do and the other things
4 we had to do. The deployment requirements, and our own readiness, our own
5 MCCRE, our own NSI checks. So, we had blended as much as we could, and then
6 we indicated where we could not accept extra things. I would have to go back
7 through my emails to find it, but there were things being asked of us for
8 Creech - or, there were metrics we needed to hit - or Creech was going to get
9 cancelled altogether. I think - or I would assume - that the operations team
10 would have any documents about readiness metrics for deployment and the
11 additional tasking. The DRRS items are confidential and on SIPR.

12 There was a meeting that, I think, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) went over to
13 at the MAG. All the OPSOs, and I want to say, all the XOs were there. I
14 remember (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) saying when (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) came back that "we got
15 steamrolled by rank" and there were things we would have to do because we
16 were the junior person in the room. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would know better about the
17 context of that meeting. At the time, I was the acting CO because the CO was
18 in Quantico serving on a Reserve promotion board. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) said, "that
19 was a rough meeting."

20 I had a "By Direction" letter since I got in the seat as XO. And I have
21 had acting letters for - I remember this number - for a total of 52 days
22 [cumulative] over the last year for left-seat, right-seat leave blocks and
23 the bulk of that for the board. "Acting Letters" are not common unless the CO
24 is unavailable. There are a couple of things in our SOP, regarding like
25 schedule changes, that are covered in the "By Direction" letter. I could
26 provide my "By Direction" letter to the Investigating Officer. It says, in
27 all cases, except where delegation is not authorized. The CO was in Hawaii
28 for Thanksgiving and in Costa Rica. The "By Direction" was for schedule,
29 awards, nonjudicial punishment, and anything that did not change policy,
30 mission, or - something else. I did not hold nonjudicial punishment during
31 those 52 days.

32 Per the HMH-361 SOP, the CO is the primary for [flight] schedule
33 changes, but the XO, OPSO, and AMO are also delegated the ability to sign it.
34 What I have - the approach that we take to that - the CO's stance and
35 guidance is generally, if the CO is reachable, whether present or not, the CO
36 likes to be the one to make the schedule change, even if it is a "verbal, yes
37 I approve that." If the CO is really unavailable, you send it to the CO and
38

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1 the CO will send back. I can only think of a handful of times where I or the
2 AMO have done schedule changes in lieu of sending to the CO.

3 A crew day is ten hours from showing up for work-related duties to
4 landing. That is ten hours for day flights, night flights, FCF, across the
5 board, extendable up to twelve hours with the CO's approval.

6 Our SOP is nested within the MAW SOP [no waivers to deviate]. We had
7 one occasion where we were being asked to do something - a frag - for a frag-
8 type event, that required a crew day that violated the MAW SOP. We brought it
9 up to the MAG, and asked, is the MAW going to provide us an Exception to
10 Policy? And that was, like, a big question that everyone was like, ah, we
11 will get with the G-3 on this.

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22 (b) (3) (B)
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36 Land as soon as practical. It would have NATOPS landing criteria. The
37 MAW incident reporting procedures make PELs kind of - you can massage a PEL.
38 They were planning on going to Imperial anyway, it is land as soon as

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1 practical. They went to Imperial. So, I think [it] does not constitute a PEL
2 because they went - they were planning to go and the maintenance discrepancy
3 - turned out - seems to be avionics. I believe they landed, confirmed that it
4 was in fact an avionics gripe, and were able to clear it and proceed on.

5 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) texted our group chat that they were on deck in Imperial
6 and that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was going to check the weather to decide - to determine
7 - if they were going to launch. And, about an hour later, I texted (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
8 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) directly to say, hey, did you guys end up launching? And, by that point,
9 they had already crashed.

10 I do not believe there was a conversation between (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
11 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) for permission for a night recovery of that
12 aircraft.

13 That day, the sixth, I had not seen the CO since before the CO went to
14 Quantico for the board, because the CO returned from the board straight to
15 Creech, so the CO and Sergeant Major flew back that late afternoon from Vegas
16 to Miramar. I do not remember their itinerary information, but they flew back
17 to San Diego that day. But, the CO had been up on comms in our Signal chat -
18 the whole officer one, as well the department head chat. I am not aware of a
19 conversation between the CO and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) or what happened beyond the
20 group chat between the CO and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

21 On 6 February 2024, I flew an aircraft out of North Island, it was dark
22 by the time I left. I had gone out, there are a couple FCF procedures we have
23 to do, landed in North Island, got picked up, brought back up to [Miramar]
24 and was getting cleaned up for the day and then headed home. That night was
25 supposed to be NSI checks - take two - because they had weathered out the
26 night before. So, intimately aware of what was going on and getting updates
27 from the Creech ODO. TIGER 43 was the, like, flying backup and once they were
28 not needed to execute the plan, they started pushing home.

29 I do not think there was a plan to have an ODO back [at Miramar]. I
30 think Creech was "ODO'ing" from up there. There was no plan for that.

31 I started getting settled down to go to bed at 2330. I was tracking
32 updates. I had been looking at their ADS-B for the guys up at Creech, just
33 online, make sure they made it out. I saw (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had about made it to
34 Imperial, and shortly after that, they had texted they were on deck. My son
35 got out of bed, just after midnight, and when I put my son down, I texted
36 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and was like - that was just after midnight, fuel closes at one,
37 I was wondering where they were "did you guys ever launch out of Imperial?"
38 The CO has always been really good about making sure that people knew that

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1 there was no expectation to push a bad situation. The CO has been nothing but
2 supportive of, "you are the guy flying the plane" and "make whatever decision
3 you think is the right decision" and I will support you "but don't feel like
4 you need to be a hero." That is it, in no uncertain terms.

5 I sent (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) that text, went to bed. About 20 minutes later, I
6 got the call from the CO saying TIGER 43 had not landed yet. The CO said the
7 CO was headed in and that the CO would meet me [at Miramar]. The CO said they
8 were going to start getting in touch with a SAR bird. That was at about 0043,
9 I want to say. I am comfortable sharing screenshots of the text and call logs
10 with the Investigating Officer. There were a lot of phone calls that day. It
11 was [indeed] 0049 when the CO called.

12 We were on the phone for less than two minutes. Then, at 0051, I called
13 the FBO at Imperial to ask them what time - make sure TIGER 43 was not still
14 there - and to ask how long it had been since they left. My next phone calls
15 from there were to start calling people to head into work. The previous
16 adjutant who had just transitioned to be the assistant flightline OIC, I
17 called that individual because the current adjutant is at ASO school. The CO
18 called me back at 0140. I was just passing the MAW headquarters building. The
19 CO was already here. Then, my next calls outbound were around 0315 in the
20 morning to start brining people in with their service uniforms for the
21 initial DUSTWUN notifications.

22 CO wanted to push the individuals who would be the CACOs out early to
23 make the notifications as soon as possible. Having gone through the CACO
24 training and having talked with the Headquarters, Marine Corps casualty
25 branch guys that "you can't do that," I had to remind the CO that we could
26 not do all that yet. They were - I do not remember the notification times
27 stamps - I do have, looking at my phone log for my work phone, a call at 0330
28 in the morning [on 7 February 2024] with casualty branch. I called them, we
29 spoke for about ten minutes. We spoke again around 0430 for another ten
30 minutes.

31 The CO had arrived about 30 minutes before me [at work].

32 We reached out to the guys at Creech. They had a MAWTS instructor,
33 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) there. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was one of my old copilots from the
34 East Coast. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was helping them initiate the missing aircraft plan
35 with the ODO. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had some points of contact. They had reached out to
36 Coast Guard SAR in San Diego. The thing that is frustrating is that the field
37 closed here [at Miramar] so there was no one to do this on behalf of the
38 aircraft, from like an air station level, so they are trying to do it at

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1 Creech. They call the Coast Guard and the Coast Guard said they are for over
2 water - the Air Force handles over land. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) knew - had all - the
3 points of contact for the Air Force overland search and rescue in Florida.
4 So, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) called them and was working to get them the information they
5 needed to determine who and when was going to launch.

6 I have been a situation where I have been on my way back and headwinds
7 and delays at Imperial were pushing it to where we were not going to land.
8 Like, my ETA to land here was a few minutes after the field closed. SO, it
9 was like, "where are we going to go? Where do we head next?" We ended up
10 getting relayed through SoCal approach, approval from the airfield ODO who
11 had contacted the airfield manager to get closed field recovery approved at
12 like 0107 in the morning - crash and fire rescue [arrived]. PMO still, like,
13 came over and said "you made an authorized landing." Our plan was to go to
14 North Island or back to Imperial had we not gotten that.

15 Without having the binder in front of me, and not having it memorized,
16 whoever the ODO was for those flight operations - whether it was Miramar or
17 it was Creech or 29 Palms - whoever was the ODO would start executing [the
18 mishap checklist]. I want to say the first page - page zero - is "bring all
19 these people in" in this order and "start delegating" the following tasks to
20 them. SAR is one of the first steps.

21 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was running the checklist up there. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had
22 just found out that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had not passed the NSI check. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
23 had then had to transition from, basically, that debrief to, hey, these guys
24 never landed. I feel - I could not imagine - having to do that, what (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
25 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) went through. They transitioned immediately to, "let's figure out what
26 happened" and start executing the mishap - at least the initial steps - while
27 we try to locate where they are.

28 They were executing the mishap procedures. They had the whole binder up
29 at Creech. I was executing the official notification [process] with Marine
30 Corps Operation Center, Casualty Branch. We had an S-1 (b)(6),(b) already in,
31 so that corporal started doing the DUSTWUN and PCRs. The S-1 chief did not
32 have, at the time, computer access. The (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
33 and was the first one able to arrive. The CO was speaking to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
34 and was in with the S-1 (b)(6),(b) helping that (b)(6),(b) get some of the
35 initial PCR [items] going while I was on the phone with the MCOC and talking
36 to casualty branch. The S-1 (b)(6),(b) was pulling all the Records of Emergency
37 Data, to provide to Casualty Branch so they could start identifying CACOs.

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1 There are twelve CACOs in all, three of them were local and the other
2 nine are cross-country for parents and siblings.

3 We had gotten to the point where the wreckage had been found - I do not
4 have the exact time stamp for that - it was right around first light. After
5 Coast Guard said they could not support, from Creech they had called San
6 Diego County Sheriff. They were in the process of getting aircraft spooled up
7 to launch. They actually did launch and had to turn back for weather. I was
8 letting (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) run through the Air Force [Rescue Center] to see if maybe
9 they could launch the rescue squadron out of Tucson. I do not think they ever
10 ended up launching. I do not have any of the communications or time stamps
11 from the Air Force side, but I do not recall them ever supporting.

12 Most of the direct communication with people trying to locate the
13 aircraft were happening from Creech, I want to say it was (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
14 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was talking to the Air Force Command Center in Florida try to get
15 them to launch some sort of search and rescue. Ultimately found out, after
16 first light, that it was Civil Air Patrol that found them - not airborne, but
17 on foot. Border Patrol, they, had by the time we had gotten confirmation that
18 the wreckage was found - it was through Civil Air Patrol. I had been talking
19 with CalFire - they had - I do not remember the name - some sort of a command
20 center. CalFire may have been the lead agency out in the mountains. I think
21 they took it over as a first responder, but not something we initiated. It
22 was, "we got people here" [in the mountains]. I have all the points-of-
23 contact for these entities. I kept a tracker of everybody for, like, those
24 first 72 hours. I can send the point-of-contact list to the Investigating
25 Officer. I shared the name of the CalFire point-of-contact, who was running
26 some sort of a command center. I had points-of-contact for California Civil
27 Air Patrol as the incident commander, Forestry Service, Border Patrol, and
28 another CalFire individual who was out on the mishap site. My only
29 interaction with the San Diego County Sheriff was not direct, it was through
30 the guys up at Creech.

31 MWSS-371 in Yuma had been mobilized to go out to the site to get
32 military out there. This was through the WOCC, which had stood up at this
33 point. That was the first points of contact I had for Marines getting out to
34 the site. There was a master sergeant and HM1 or HM2, and that was the
35 corpsman who could go up and determine that there were five separate
36 causalities. I only have the phone number for the WOCC operations floor.

37 The master sergeant was the MWSS Detachment OIC. CalFire had said, yes,
38 there are casualties here, and the corpsman had actually identified five

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1 distinct casualties to definitely say they were all deceased. So, that is
2 when we updated the duty status, whereabouts unknown, PCRs deceased, and had
3 to make the second notifications some point later in the morning, 0800 or
4 0900 timeframe [on 7 February 2024]. The Investigating Officer shared with me
5 the relevant time stamps for these events from documents. I have text
6 messages with that corpsman. (b)(6).(b)(7) was the corpsman.

7 That night, I got about 25 minutes of sleep. It feels like it was very
8 long time, and at the same time happened very quickly. I texted the corpsman
9 at 1254 [on 7 February 2024] to see if they had a progress update. They did
10 not have signal. So, I spent the next two hours calling the corpsman and the
11 master sergeant to see - I knew they had arrived. At 1509, the corpsman
12 texted me back to say they had just got back from the site and finished their
13 debrief. I texted the corpsman back at 1515 and impressed upon the corpsman
14 was whether or not the corpsman could say there were five deceased and could
15 verify that as the medical authority. At 1518, the corpsman said four are
16 easily identifiable and one is completely identifiable. So, I messaged, for
17 reporting purposes, can you say the five people from the aircraft are
18 deceased? The corpsman said, yes Sir, they are all five deceased. So, from
19 1528, that was, all five are deceased. At that point the S-1 could start
20 updating the PCRs with Casualty Branch.

21 I do not know why a not seriously injured PCRs went out. (b)(6).(b)
22 (b)(6).(b)(7)(c) was, basically, on the phone with casualty branch, going back-and-
23 froth with meeting whatever information requirements they had. There were a
24 bunch of times the corporal sent them [items] and they would call back and say,
25 update this. So, that whole process is frustrating. I do not really thing the
26 S-1 chief was that involved - and, I could be totally wrong. The handful of
27 times I was in there, the corporal was, like, on the phone, plugging away at
28 stuff. The staff sergeant - the corporal had been sent home because the corporal
29 had been there a long time - was using the staff sergeant's CAC and the staff
30 sergeant was the one doing the deceased notifications, which, again, went back
31 to the beginning and familiarity with the process, which kind of slowed things
32 down.

33 The first communications I got back from the [MWSS Detachment] master
34 sergeant was at 1643 that day, even after I had talked to the corpsman. I got
35 the corpsman's number at 1026 from the MWSS XO. I got the master sergeant's
36 name and number shortly after that. I do not have any messages with the
37 master sergeant. I have attempted calls that went to voicemail. The first
38 time I heard back was from the corpsman.

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1 My understanding is that border patrol was securing the site. CalFire
2 and Civil Air Patrol were running their incident command. I have an incident
3 command worksheet that I got from the CalFire commander. That is basically
4 their equivalent of their running notes. I will send this to the
5 Investigating Officer.

6 We [the CO and I] had several [speaker] phone calls with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
7 and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) also nearby. We discussed the reporting
8 requirements. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had been by the squadron at that point, and
9 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and the CO were talking. We had the CACO Marines come in,
10 getting into their alphas. We talked with casualty branch about when they
11 could actually go out.

12 I discussed with the Investigating Officer what we did for initial and
13 family notifications.

14 I discussed with the Investigating Officer our "River City" protocols
15 and the media guidance and inquiries.

16 We pulled all the [TIGER 43] logbooks and secured them in the AOPSO's
17 office, because the AOPSO had come in to be CACO.

18 I do not have the time the C-130 departed to arrive to Miramar. I
19 believe that portion of our chat is already gone. I discussed with the
20 Investigating Officer the return to Miramar and resources available to
21 Marines, such as the Chaplain and time. [Before the return,] we were on
22 single-shift maintenance [at Miramar] because everyone was at Creech.

23 My knowledge of the one-time approval was based on that number two
24 engine overheat. I think that was direct comments between (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and
25 the CO. That was not in the group chat. I do not know what the CO said to
26 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) but the culture, as I said, is "you are the aircraft
27 commander," "don't violate any policies," "you are the one that knows what
28 the situation is," [and] "I trust you to make the right decision." On 7
29 February 2024, the CO was talking about "could I have done something to have
30 prevent this?" or "what if I had stayed up at Creech and not come back here?"
31 I said, "what would you have said different than what you did say to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
32 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)" [The CO replied] "same thing I always tell you guys: don't push a bad
33 situation, fly conservatively, and don't be afraid to [stop] somewhere." I do
34 not know if that is what the CO said to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) before, but that has
35 always been the language and the culture and the guidance that the CO has
36 given in general. Certainly, no pressure from the CO to get back. I wish I
37 knew why the launched. It is not because someone told them to.

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1 There are no I-8 course rules. Course rules end at the class bravo
2 shelf at [Lake Jennings]. Spending my whole career on the East Coast, flying
3 around here has been a learning curve. People talk about "I-8 course rules"
4 as in "it is an option" to get home if you cannot make it up over where is
5 Pine Valley as an alternative to going up and around through Banning Pass.
6 Alternate means to getting over the hill include going IFR, going through
7 Banning Pass, I-8, and - no one really talks about this - the Navy has a set
8 of course rules kind of along the border that get you into Imperial Beach, so
9 you can go feet wet and come up the course. The I-8 corridor is not an
10 official thing but I have heard individuals talk about "course rules" in the
11 sense. It ends at Lake Jennings and then it is kind of like guidelines, but
12 there are common points that we use. But the altitudes are not dictated, the
13 routing is not dictated. It is "rules of the world" but it is ungoverned
14 because it is outside of controlled airspace. With that context, the I-8
15 course rules are no more or no less official than anything else once you get
16 past Lake Jennings. That is my understanding coming from the East Coast.
17 Everything past Lake Jennings is "here is generally where we go" and "here is
18 generally how we mitigate." "This is VFR." "We have these common
19 frequencies." "Here are points known to Navy and Marine Corps pilots that
20 operate over here - here are the rules-of-the-road as we transit the I-8
21 corridor." The checkpoints that you use to get in-and-out of Imperial or El
22 Centro are from Yuma. It is however you get to Lake Jennings is kind of up to
23 you. I have flow modified versions of what is our normal standard routing -
24 Placer City to Pine Valley to Lake Jennings is what I would say is the
25 standard. 500 altitude heading over the hill and if you are deviating for
26 weather, you make that call on the east county common frequency that
27 transitions at the boundary between El Centro and Imperial as you head into
28 Jennings. Once you are at Jennings, you are on course rules.

29 If you are in the I-8 corridor trying to get over the hill, I would not
30 even go to Pine Valley because they blasted that highway into the mountains.
31 You have to get up and out of there. If it were me, I would be taking I-8 to
32 get onto the other side of the terrain and then would head to Lake Jennings,
33 at 500 feet. I have gone not over the I-8, but south enough of the ordinary
34 checkpoints to get to Jennings. It is unpopulated and 500 feet to clear the
35 terrain. Lake Jennings is just north of the Gillespie service area. I have
36 only done that - rather, seen that as copilot - during daytime. I have never
37 seen that recovery attempted nighttime. I have done Banning - we were at 29
38 Palms and had to come through the Banning Pass and then come down the I-15.

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1 And I have done IFR recoveries, just climbing up the east side of the hill
2 and coming down that way.

3 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had been back at RBE. I would not say that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
4 was on the road a long time with "get-home-it is." (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) does have a
5 young child at home. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had been FCF'ing here with me and once
6 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) got to [Creech], (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was there a handful of days, less than
7 the rest of the detachment. I do not know what was going on at home with
8 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) child or conversations with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) spouse. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
9 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is solid. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) to my knowledge, had a healthy home environment.
10 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had great upbringing. I have met (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) parents now
11 several times. I do not think there was anything negative - no pending
12 divorce or pending animosity with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) spouse.

13 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was married and, I think, a dog as well. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
14 had no human factors, to my knowledge. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was always positive and
15 also had not been gone long.

16 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) always struck me as someone with a chip on the
17 shoulder. There had been times were (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) - you could tell - was
18 comfortable and relaxed in the aircraft to the point where (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
19 would be sitting on the ramp with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) feet hanging off. We
20 discussed how (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) could not be doing that - "you are a (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
21 and you are WTI." (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) corrected. Small adjustments, but nothing
22 like (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is a rule violator. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) has - I do not know
23 to what extent - general aviation experience outside of being crew chief, so
24 one of the more proficient crew chiefs. For example, during NATOPS brief that
25 crew chief will jump up and back us up. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is one of the more
26 capable crew chiefs to support [pilots] in that way.

27 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had some sort of legal thing or nonjudicial
28 punishment and had been a (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) for a while. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
29 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had just gotten back to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and probably should have been a
30 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had never stopped flying. I know during SLTE
31 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) witnessed one of the HMLA maintainers commit suicide.
32 That was the first time I had interacted with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) father,
33 because (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) father called. I know (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
34 was, at least initially, struggling with what (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had seen
35 up there. The maintainer (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) We had a couple
36 pilots, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and maintainers who had seen that and had
37 p at SLTE, at 29 Palms and also back at [Miramar].
38 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was generally quiet and kept a clean nose after the

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1 NJP. Other than whatever personal struggles (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was having
2 with seeing that suicide, nothing else going on.

3 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), I believe, was sitting in the back. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
4 has weird family dynamics with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) parents. I do not know if
5 that was affecting (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had lost one of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
6 (b)(6),(b)(7) grandparents. I discussed in further detail the family dynamic with
7 the Investigating Officer. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was riding in the back.

8 I have flown several times before with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was
9 knowledgeable, experienced, and had done the 31st MEU out in Okinawa. We flew
10 together a bit preparing for NSI checks. I did my NSI "re-punch." I did get
11 some of the debrief on that - again, this is back in June [2023]. There were
12 some weaknesses but they were not outside of the performance standard. It
13 noted things like, "this is your tendency" and "be aware of your tendencies
14 going forward." By all intents and purposes, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was well-prepared
15 to go to WTI. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was a strong flight leader and solid instructor.
16 When we did our MCCRE up in Camp Pendleton - we supported Steel Knight after
17 Thanksgiving [2023] into the first week of December. We were in Palm Springs
18 for three days and then we came back and had a planning day at Camp
19 Pendleton. We did a day and a night TRAP scenario. I watched (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) as
20 the mission XO plan all of that. Captain Nava was a strong planner. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
21 (b) was the actual division lead. By the time I had gotten out over the hill
22 on that particular flight, one of the other captains had gotten a cockpit
23 light so (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and I flew together. I have extensive working knowledge
24 of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) as a pilot both inter- and intra-flight, I have seen (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
25 (b)(6), planning and I have gone on detachment with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Other than
26 (b)(7) some of the noted "weaknesses" from (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(3)(B) Check, nothing
27 remarkable. And, as I have said, those are six months removed.

28 I discussed other possible witnesses for the investigation with the
29 Investigating Officer. I discussed communications I had with CalFire with the
30 Investigating Officer and told the Investigating Officer I would forward the
31 written communications. I discussed notification reports with the
32 Investigating Officer. I told the Investigating Officer that I could send
33 those notifications to the Investigating Officer.

34 I signed a Permissive Authorization for Search and Seizure for the
35 Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer did not take possession of
36 any of my personal property, such as a cell phone. I provided my personal
37 cell phone number to the Investigating Officer. I discussed my future
38 availability with the Investigating Officer. I was directed not to discuss my

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statement to the Investigating Officer with others per the Manual of the
Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.

END OF STATEMENT

I, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) U.S. Marine Corps, have had an opportunity to review
the above summary of my statement to the Investigating Officer for the
Command Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the CH-53E
Super Stallion Helicopter mishap that occurred on or about 6 February 2024. I
agree that the summary accurately reflects my interview and swear or affirm
that it is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

Signature: _____ Date: _____

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: CUI: Interview Summary
Date: Wednesday, May 29, 2024 1:43:05 PM

Sir,
Minus a few typos which do not affect the content or the meaning, there is nothing to change and I'm comfortable responding with "approved."

If you think I need to modify the document, please let me know. I probably won't have an opportunity to sit down and make all of the modifications until the end of next week.

Thanks.

r/s

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) <(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2024 1:06 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) <(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)>
Subject: CUI: Interview Summary

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Attached is a summary of our discussion together. If you would like the audio records, please advise.

If no changes are required, please reply with "Approved".

If you have like to modify, please do so with track changes enable.

S/F,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Office: 858-307-4549/5077

BB: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b) (6)

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)
Service:.....U.S. Marine Corps
Unit:.....HMH-361
Date:.....29 February 2024, 7 March 2024

NOTICE

DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THE CONTENTS
OF THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT PROPER
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE

On 29 February 2024 and on 7 March 2024, I met with the Investigating Officer in person. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview with me, to include the difference with a safety investigation. I understood my statement is not privileged. I swore or affirmed to tell the Investigation Officer the truth. I agreed to have my interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of my interview with the Investigating Officer:

I am a CH-53 pilot. I did my company-grade tour with HMH-361 as well from 2015 to 2019. I did a UDP to Japan in 2016 and deployed with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit from 2018 into 2019. I did a year of resident Expeditionary Warfare School. I have approximately 1,900 flight hours. I have just under 700 CH-53 hours.

I came back here, completed the refresh. I was in the DOSS for about two months, and shuffled over to take over the OPSO in December 2023. We are still working on the refresh.

The OPSO turnover was accelerated. The original plan was to do turnover between the AMO seat and OPSO seat in February 2024 into March 2024. We would come back from Creech and do the turnover. However, in December 2023 that accelerated with a 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit detachment vacancy occurring. So, the turnover was about two-and-a-half months early. We got about a solid week of dedicated turnover. My HMH-361 background is antiquated but assisted with my familiarity. There was then plenty of informal turnover after that.

For a daily flight schedule, we do not have signed business rules at this time. It is on my plate. The daily writer is usually an officer, although we are training aviation specialists to do it. There should be two writers assigned, for a 24-hour and 48-hour outlook. They typically write

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1 offline, then put into MSHARP. We have a separate document for risk
2 assessment. It then goes from to the COPSO, to the PTO, to the AOPSO, to me.
3 Not all of those individuals are necessary. At the very least, the PTO,
4 AOPSO, or I must see it. We sign it for operations. Typically the next stop
5 is maintenance, but it could be safety first.

6 For safety, we only had one ASO for a while, we now have two. That
7 original ASO was the only one who screens it for safety. Then, the flight
8 schedule is routed to the XO and then CO. We typically have a weekly
9 operations and maintenance synch meeting, where we talk through the current
10 and next week. Therefore, the daily should not be the first time they see it.
11 The weekly is typically signed on Fridays.

12 The CO's guidance is that the daily flight schedule should be signed
13 and promulgated at 1300 daily, which we have not done. My guidance is that it
14 should be in routing at 1000. The weekly should be done by Wednesday.

15 Within the operations department, either I, my AOPSO, or PTO can sign
16 for the flight schedule. Our previous ASO moved downstairs to take over
17 flightline. Unfortunately for us, that previous ASO was selected to augment
18 the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Even when that previous ASO is not in
19 safety, we will use that previous ASO for schedule validation purposes. In
20 generalities, losing the two individuals to the MEU did not make terrible our
21 readiness ratings because our company-grade officers and field grade
22 qualifications. The CO signs the flight schedule, or the XO if the CO is not
23 available by direction. The CO, if not in person, will receive digitally and
24 will give either verbal or email approval.

25 If we email the CO the materials, we include the schedule and the RAWs,
26 and any other attachments such as rosters. Validation should go to the CO,
27 but it does not always get included when emailed to him.

28 For Creech, the scheduling was very similar. I, the AMO, and the ASO
29 flew up the main body. The CO was delayed but flew up main body. The only
30 regular signer not up there was the XO, so we pulled the XO from the routing
31 chain.

32 The D minus 30 was an in-person brief to the CO and paper to CG. I was
33 originally the RBE OIC and that changed. There were (b) (3) (B)

34 [REDACTED]
35 [REDACTED] They were going to be absent in
36 February 2024. That was cancelled due to funding, I believe. Additionally, in
37 November 2023, (b) (3) (B) for the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
38 for COMPTUEX in January 2024. I was going to be absent until the end of

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1 January 2024. It was originally (b) (3) (B) helicopters in Creech for one month, so I
2 was going to miss the fly-off.

3 The CO was in Quantico for Marine Corps matters in January 2024 for an
4 indeterminate amount of time. That made the AMO the senior person planned at
5 the Creech Detachment. The Detachment was then reduced to get out before
6 Super Bowl weekend due to lodging in Las Vegas, Nevada. The decision was made
7 before the 2023 holidays and we decided to reduce the number of planes to
8 take. I ended up only supporting the Marine Expeditionary Unit for a reduced
9 timeline.

10 The CO is authorized to change flight schedule changes. I want to say,
11 up to 15 minutes, the ODO can approve. In the CO's absence, any department
12 head can authorize changes and they should be routed as a full schedule
13 change with a hard copy and red pen, for full review. Typically, we only do
14 another risk assessment if there is a crew change or another significant
15 change. Usually on the day of, MSHARP evaluation will not change.

16 For 6 February 2024, version one of the flight schedules came out with
17 5 and 6 February 2024 together. It is not common to have three different
18 versions of the flight schedule. That is the first time we have done that. It
19 was due to the amount of red ink we would have put on a schedule. That is the
20 reason for the versions. 5 and 6 February 2024 were going to be (b) (3) (B)

21 [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED]

26 We were going to do a two-day flight schedule. I generally do not like
27 two-day flight schedules because it forces more items in a shorter time
28 frame. We were not realistically going to route a flight schedule on Monday 5
29 February 2024. We routed the two-day version one on Sunday 4 February 2024.
30 This was also the day they were doing all the (b) (3) (B) . (b) (3) (B)

31 [REDACTED]

32 [REDACTED] We routed that flight schedule Sunday night. We
33 did not rush anything, but time was a finite resource and we were publishing
34 a two-day schedule with high-level training and contingency plans. That is,
35 there were manning restraints within operations and the safety department
36 coming 5 February 2024 that led us to initially draft 6 February 2024 with
37 the 5 February 2024 schedule. The schedule release at around 2100 was common
38 on det for the flight schedule release. I will offer that I have a very young

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1 operations department. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was an outstanding co-pilot and
2 operating above the level I would expect for nine months with the squadron,
3 and we were training (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) to write weekly plans. My daily writers
4 are all less than a year in the squadron. This is not atypical, but Creech
5 was the first schedule writing on a detachment. The goal is that the plan
6 should be out during business hours. It is not atypical for a detachment for
7 a schedule to be released late, but we failed to promulgate flight schedules
8 timely for the detachment.

9 With the original longer Creech schedule, the (b) (3) (B) were going to
10 go later in the week which would have given us more time to plan and prepare.
11 As the schedule condensed, we elected not to open the airfield for night
12 operations on Saturday 3 February and Sunday 4 February 2024 because of
13 "quiet" hours. Friday 2 February 2024 was the only trial run we had for the
14 candidates. Also, the weather was horrible. It almost precluded any useful
15 training for the two weeks we were there.

16 The initial intent was we were going to go into work on Sunday 4
17 February 2024. Someone asked, why are we going to all drive 45 minutes when
18 not required? Creech Airfield does have wifi in the transient building. We
19 took some communications Marines to have MCEN ports, which were extremely
20 slow. We would use that for anything that had to be ported into MCEN, but
21 most of what we were doing was on personals because of the virtual private
22 network being down. We went with the intent to have full communication
23 abilities. On Sunday 4 February 2024, we elected not to go to Creech, but do
24 everything out of the hotel using wifi.

25 We did send a PDSS up. We did know there was wifi. Some of it was
26 following the previous unit's actions at Creech.

27 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) wrote version one of flight schedule. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
28 another (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), made the Monday 5 February 2024 changes.

29 On 5 February 2024, one of our aircraft went hard down because of the
30 nose gearbox. We could not get the engine to get online. We typically would
31 not take a spare nose gearbox on detachment, but one is fairly easy to get up
32 there. We therefore changed version one to version two because of that
33 reduction from four aircraft to three aircraft. Version two to version three
34 was mostly about crew legality. We cut (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), and
35 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) from version one. We removed (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
36 because he was not getting any training and was just getting proficiency.
37 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was a very solid performer and had been idented for fast-track
38 for syllabus progression and the aircraft commander syllabus. What version

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1 two lacked was identifying that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was not qualified to carry
2 HST to and from the zone, which requires an NSQ crew, so the change was made
3 for version three. I am confident there is no flight note about (b)(6),(b)
4 (b)(6),(b) being unable to carry packs. We will sometimes note limitations on
5 the RAW. I have seen in the past, but not during my current time here, that a
6 line will reflect what is transporting HST so it is clearly delineated for
7 multiple aircraft. This is why (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was added to version three; he
8 was an NSQ copilot legal to carry passengers.

9 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was there when we started working the version three, at
10 Creech in the ready room.

11 HMH-361 defines a day crew day as 10-hours and night crew day as 10-
12 hours. When I was company grade, it was 12 hours for day. My personal stance
13 is that the muster before the 45-minute commute [at Creech] is the beginning
14 of your crew day. The counterargument is that [for example] if you live away
15 off-base, your commute does not count because it was your decision. My
16 response is that you are starting [at Creech] your work, talking to your co-
17 workers, and accelerating your daily schedule such as going to the gym
18 without choice. We did not identify the crew day there, but I would consider
19 it mustering at the lobby. We did not have anything written down. It ends at
20 rotor shutdown.

21 The logistics to and from the hotel to Creech (i.e. the van system) was
22 well-run.

23 There were no crew day waivers at Creech. We do not have a waiver to
24 deviate from 3d MAW SOP for approving flight schedules.

25 Version three of the flight schedule, on Monday 5 February 2024, was a
26 collective effort. As previous stated, it was supposed to be a division
27 during the day, and then was reduced down to, I believe, a single plane
28 flying on Monday 5 February 2024. Based on the weather Monday 5 February 2024
29 night, and maintenance, essentially all hands were there as version three was
30 started, although not there through completion and it being sent out. The
31 primaries for writing version three were the PTO, who took the first chop
32 with the PTO's initials on version three. My initials are on versions one and
33 two. I do not know who was working version three. I have learned since then,
34 it was mostly (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) with another captain. Version two was sent out
35 when taken off teams because of connectivity issues.

36 The day crew at Creech was sent out usually around 1700 and 1830, based
37 on completion of flights.

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1 A hard copy of the schedule validations would not be retained after
2 being routed that next day. I will try to pull from MSHARP but I do not know
3 if it will do it. There should have been previous versions of the RAW for 6
4 February 2024. RAW version three point three is referring to the iteration of
5 the document form, not that this is that many versions from that day. The CO
6 or OPSO can make comments, but are not required.

7 I had a good amount of schedule writers, starting with seven. One
8 became the flightline OIC, and then my senior weekly writer/COPSO was moving.
9 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) came over to look at weekly items. Anecdotally, I have been
10 curious about SOPs about who must sign flight schedules. I have had
11 conversations over my career with others about who has to sign the document,
12 including with an installation. I have never found in writing-but I will
13 check-who is required to sign our flight schedule. I am confident we have a
14 routing chain.

15 I need to double-check, but (b) (3) (B) aircraft arrived at Creech on (b)(6)
16 (b) (3) (B) 2024 and (b)(3)(B) the next day. Our flight schedule at Creech should have
17 been sent to our normal distribution list, which should include MCAS Miramar
18 base operations. It was mostly FCF back here.

19 On 6 February 2024, we had an explicit conversation about an ODO at
20 Miramar. We had the only available person at Miramar identified, but that
21 person went on leave that day. The ODO does not do much if an aircraft is
22 inbound from off station, so I gave instructions to check in with the Creech
23 ODO when safe on deck at Miramar.

24 I need to change my previous answer: this is not the first detachment
25 for a lot of the team. A lot of our new pilots had done a detachment at
26 29 Palms, California, and then we did one in Palm Springs, California.

27 Turning to my day on 6 February 2024, we were executing version three
28 of the flight schedule. Back home, a section was executing a fragmentary
29 order with zero impact on or input from us in Creech. At Creech, we had a
30 schedule planned (b) (3) (B)

31 [REDACTED]
32 [REDACTED]
33 [REDACTED]
34 [REDACTED]
35 [REDACTED]
36 [REDACTED]
37 [REDACTED]
38 [REDACTED]

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1 For Tuesday's day flight, we came in, briefed the section, briefed the
2 scheme of maneuver. I elected to do a weather RECCE with flight out from
3 field to see if terrain and TERF route would be workable. It was heavy
4 overcast at Creech at that point with okay visibility, and there was heavy
5 moisture but no precipitation. We were going to depart to the west toward
6 Desert Rock where our tactic scenarios were planned, including NSI checks.
7 The terrain gradually slopes up to the west and to check ceilings. We had
8 sufficient room to complete plots. The TERF route was completely unworkable
9 and, at best, it would have been marginal to try to continue VFR outside the
10 TERF routes to the west.

11 We came back to the field, we set up HST in the zone and then we worked
12 at LZ Peanut. One aircraft stopped getting airspeed indications, and we
13 followed them through a lap in the pattern as they went back to the airfield.
14 We told them to let us know when they get back. We transitioned to the
15 external load at LZ Blackrock. On our third pick, HST called "terminate." We
16 had a slight vertical drift up. At the beginning of the flight I had had a
17 tough time getting my aircraft started and I did get two engine issues that I
18 had never seen before on startup. QA had to look at an issue. The terminate
19 was because a hook was jammed with mud and the latch was stuck in the open
20 position. The hook issue ended up resulting in swapping a hook. We loaded HST
21 back up, took them home, returned and continued flying until the end of our
22 scheduled window, and then returned ourselves.

23 I do not know, or remember, why 366 which was re-rolled later in the
24 evening.

25 On 6 February 2024, the CO flew back to Miramar. The CO had flown on
26 Monday 5 February 2024, and then returned commercial air with Sergeant Major
27 on 6 February 2024. This was planned, but I do not remember the reason for
28 the return.

29 From my section Tuesday, nothing affected TIGER 43's ability to fly
30 that day.

31 Creech Airfield only does cold gas, which is a constraint. We did
32 hotseat startups, where crew would fly the aircraft, shuts down, gets
33 aircraft, makes sures systems are working, and turns aircraft over.

34 I think on 5 February 2024 after I had shut down, I think, I talked
35 over the whether TIGER 41 would fly terrain. I handed over the plane and
36 left.

37 I think it was when after we shut down that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) came to talk
38 to me on the flightline outside the building, I remember (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) saying

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1 "hey Sir, how important or big a deal is it to get this plane back to Miramar
2 tonight?" I explicitly to hold I did not care where the plane ended up that
3 night. The goals was to give maintenance time with the aircraft to support
4 the (b) (3) (B) . I told (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) , if it
5 makes sense to get home tonight, the intent is to get it to maintenance
6 earlier. If the weather precludes that, and you spend a night elsewhere such
7 as in Yuma, you are still giving maintenance a little more time on Wednesday.
8 But if you come back here, "we'll figure it out" and night crew will turn the
9 plane around for a return Wednesday day. I distinctly remember this
10 conversation. I was explicit it was not critical and there was no pressure or
11 driving factor other than giving additional time to maintenance. We talked
12 about additional places, such as Palm Springs, California, to land. Landing
13 at Imperial was an explicit plan for a fuel stop, and I do not think they
14 were going to do Havasu on the way down.

15 This conversation would have been roughly 1630, because I know we
16 landed within 15 minutes of our scheduled land time and they started up at
17 1700.

18 When [the] Creech [Detachment] was reduced from a month to two weeks
19 and six planes to four planes, that reduced the training benefit of going to
20 Creech. As we were looking at the fragmentary orders, maintenance was asking
21 if we could fly the planes home earlier on Tuesday night. I was reticent, not
22 because I needed the planes in Creech, but because it would reduce the 4.0 in
23 Creech and 6.0 retrograde on Wednesday into just a 4.0 in Creech. I did not
24 sit in on the final NSI flight brief, so I do not know when they would be
25 breaking off, but TIGER 43 would move HST to the zone. They would break off
26 and depart as a single via Imperial to [Marine Corps Air Station] Miramar.

27 We do not typically put stopovers in flight schedule. We used to put
28 the times in the flight schedule, but now we brief that the ODOs would call
29 Imperial for fuel. MAG SOP discusses flights outside the local area, but I do
30 not think there is a list of airfields where we can or cannot go.

31 For TIGER 43, I do not know where the pilots were sitting. In theory,
32 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) could have been flying other than the movement of people.

33 At Creech, I used a computer in the ready room. Flight planning and
34 discussion occurred in the next room over. I did not have a significant
35 conversation about weather for TIGER 43. The only explicit conversation I had
36 with the ODO was making sure TIGER 43 checked in at the end of the night, and
37 that would be passed to me.

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1 When drafting the flight schedule, the only conversations about weather
2 were similar to the one I had with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) about if weather precludes
3 the flight, we will recover.

4 I have high confidence in the ODO at the time. I have never had to tell
5 that ODO to do anything twice. The ODO had a dedicated desk and, radio and
6 computer. There was the formal ODO logbook. I do not know if we brought our
7 normal logbook or had a Creech-specific logbook. Safety had a mishap kit. A
8 captain currently is consolidating different mishap binders we have. It is
9 not in our SOP to conduct a mishap drill [at the Detachment] and I am
10 confident they did not conduct a mishap drill while we were there.

11 The week before the Creech det was supposed to start, we were planning
12 on sending a cross-country to Creech for training and site survey, but it was
13 cancelled. There was not specific plan about mishaps.

14 I have no recollection of who was around the ready room 1800 to 1900
15 the night of 6 February 2024. We wanted to make sure work duties were
16 completed and no one was being left behind.

17 On Monday 5 February 2024, when the CO was present, we watched the crew
18 stand around for about an hour and not fly because of the weather.

19 On 6 February 2024, I saw (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) again in the ready room and
20 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had flight gear on. I was headed out soon thereafter. I know
21 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had a conversation with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Since then and speaking to
22 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), I think (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and I were of the same mind that getting
23 TIGER 43 back for maintenance was the plan but not the priority for the
24 night.

25 I did not talk to the TIGER 43 personnel about weather considerations
26 on 6 February 2024. That said, on Friday 2 February 2024, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and I
27 were flying together and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was a crew chief in the back. There
28 was similar but not as bad weather as Monday and Tuesday, and thunderstorms
29 came. The signer in the other aircraft and I determined that it made sense
30 for (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and I to pick up HST that had been prepositioned because
31 ground transportation could not get them. We flew out, picked them up, flew
32 back in. Visibility was horrendous. We shut down and waited about two hours.
33 When we then flew again, visibility was clear and a beautiful night for
34 flying. During that two-hour window, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was very explicit and
35 vocal about "are we really getting anything out of this?" during the poor
36 weather. By the time we flew, the weather had cleared.

37 There is a signal chat with all the officers, the CO, (our DRC is on-
38 and-off of it), and Sergeant Major. I will tell you having returned to the

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1 squadron that I do not like it. While they were at SLTE, there were a lot of
2 updates that should have gone through the ODO to the OPSO to the CO. I think
3 not everything was necessary to share with everyone. It was good for
4 situational awareness. There is a department head signal chat group with the
5 CO, XO, and Sergeant Major, which now includes the DRC. It has the
6 maintenance officer, maintenance chief, and DOSS. I know there is at least a
7 company-grade WhatsApp chat that has existed since 2016.

8 On 6 February 2024, I returned to the Marriot. I worked out. I was
9 getting update phone messages and phone calls about the degrading weather.
10 None of this was with the TIGER 43 crew. At 2230, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had texted me
11 that an NSI check had failed for the pilot candidate. I sent a message (that
12 I though was sending to the ODO, and it was sent to all the other operations
13 officers on a different chat). I asked for an update around 2330 for TIGER 43
14 and the ODO said had not heard anything. I would be absolutely comfortable
15 sending any screenshots of conversations to the Investigation Officer. After
16 2300, I went to bed. Around midnight, I got a call that they had not heard
17 anything from TIGER 43 and that they were starting to look at our mishap
18 plan, which should start about 15 minutes after a late arrival. I think this
19 was around 30 minutes later.

20 I was not part of the phone call, but my understanding is that TIGER 43
21 previously spoke to the CO. I think they spoke to the ODO, and know they
22 spoke to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) about a number two overheat engine light.
23 This is a concern for the CH-53, generally. My understanding is that this
24 occurred close when they landed as planned to Imperial. I know we determined
25 this is not a PEL because it was a planned stop, which may be a mannerism of
26 the CH-53 community. We will not call it a PEL at times at night if it is a
27 preplanned landing and no maintenance was required or performed, and the
28 concern goes away. That will not be PEL. I think TIGER 43's concern was on
29 their way to Imperial. I do not know if they secured the engine. I did not
30 know about this conversation until when I was speaking to the ODO and Marines
31 about the missing aircraft.

32 I think (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is a decent crew chief.

33 I get the phone call, and, based on who was at Creech, the ODO and
34 other Marines started pulling out the mishap plan and started looking at the
35 lost aircraft recovery procedures. I have never heard of us using them before
36 because we always know why an aircraft is delayed. I was at the hotel and the
37 CO and XO were back at Miramar. I called the CO, who was asleep at home, and
38 let the CO know. I asked the CO the intent for reporting procedures. The CO

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1 asked what do they need to find them? I told the CO what they had. The CO
2 called the XO. The CO and the XO came into work. Then, talking to the
3 Marines, my big concern was do you have what you need to execute the plan,
4 and, do you need relief? At that point the ODO and Marines said there was no
5 benefit bringing anyone in, which is what I shared with the CO. I called the
6 XO. We decided it did not make a lot of sense for me to go to Creech just to
7 be there. Later in the night, I spoke to (b)(6).(b)(7)(c). The people on hand
8 worked it.

9 I came in contact [with them] around 0500 or 0600 when the Marines
10 working the plan at Creech returned. They had started coordinating with
11 external search agencies. We elected to have everyone muster as normal,
12 because we were supposed to muster for movement. We briefed all the Marines
13 and we quickly figured out who needed to stay with the aircraft to fly them
14 back. We spoke to those Marines who would stay back to fly the helicopters
15 about human factors and ORM. The CO's guidance was keep minimum crews, and
16 the crew chiefs wanted two in the back of the planes. We picked our senior
17 guys. We could not extend most rooms until 8 February 2024 because of the
18 Super Bowl. We moved to a hotel across the street. Around 1700 on Wednesday 7
19 February 2024, the CO said we would not fly back the next day and we would
20 drive. We cancelled the plan to fly. The next morning, we drove to Creech,
21 buttoned the planes up, and drove back on Thursday 8 February 2024.

22 I have a lot of confidence in the ASO and the ASO's investment in
23 running the [missing aircraft] process. I believe, but cannot confirm, that
24 the ASO was running the process at Creech.

25 HMM-465 had a presence at Yuma, Arizona. We discussed that they were
26 there, but there was no formal reach-out.

27 The typical stan-board members were the CO, XO, OPSO, AOPSO, PTO,
28 Aircrew Training Manager, AMO, DsS, and, since I have been here, there was no
29 separate ASO in the DOSS shop. We just sent a copilot to the ASO school. The
30 squadron did not have people available to send to ASO school before I arrived
31 at the unit. It has been monthly and ideally we do round tables, a human
32 factors council, and stand board over some logical flow over one or two days.
33 This requires a concerted flight schedule. This month, we did the HFC, then
34 the stand board, then all the round tables. We have been pretty good keeping
35 the stand board and HFC separate, which will be line-by-line, name by name.
36 At the stand board, we usually start with squadron-wide concerns. We end with
37 nominations. The DSS runs the stand board.

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1 For course rules from the East to the West, the return is Yuma course
2 rules. They actually do not extend past Pine Valley, and I will have to see
3 if Pine Valley is an official checkpoint. I think Lake Jennings is the last
4 one, going outbound. Coming back, typically, one would leave Imperial after
5 getting fuel. Back when I was first with the unit, there were hard and fast
6 altitudes for transitioning on the I-8 through El Centro's airspace. That
7 seems to have gone away. There is no El Centro course rules. It is more or
8 less the wild west, VFR operating launching from one of those airfields until
9 you are required to be established. I was used to 1500 feet along the I-8
10 until outside El Centro's airspace, then start a VFR climb. We would usually
11 point directly to Pine Valley. We do not have an IFR-rated GPS.

12 Typically, you point straight up Pine Valley and have a gradual ascent
13 to 6,500 feet. You would clear the ridge, and then start your descent. There
14 is a set of bravo shelves that are part of the San Diego Airport airspace.
15 That is, you climb 6,500 to 8,500 feet depending on environmental conditions
16 and then start descent to 3,500 feet.

17 I-8 course rules are not a thing. People will talk about following the
18 I-8. What that allows you to do is stay a little further south and know about
19 lower terrain. You usually take that to the vicinity to Alpine, and then you
20 should have sufficient cloud clearance and visibility to proceed from
21 Jennings. This route can possibly avoid cloud clearance and freezing layer.

22 I have only done this route a couple of times. I want to say the MSA is
23 7.2, but that is memory. I think there are couple schools of thought. You
24 will hear people say be a pilot and be an athlete: go out and execute
25 training. Also, the marine and cloud layers may preclude course rules. If I
26 am over the hill, and I start my climb up and I see I cannot see course
27 rules, I have to pick up an approach or figure out another way to figure out
28 VFR. Anything convective or any freezing layers will factor. I have not heard
29 of anyone taking this route since I returned to the unit. Another return
30 route is via Lake Henshaw. The most conservative way would be to go to
31 Banning pass and fly in via I-15 course rules.

32 Taking I-8, you are not in contact with anyone because you are outside
33 class bravo coverage area and you are too low to have good VFR flight
34 following and also, which is not a good reason, chances are that, if someone
35 is doing that, they did not want to pick up an approach and therefore do not
36 want to pick up a flight following.

37 The community is averse to talking to controlling agencies when they do
38 not have to.

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1 I offer that we had a conversation, I believe at an AOM, about VFR
2 flying in general and not restricting yourself to course rules and being
3 proficient about communicating your plan to controllers. We did not talk
4 about these routes to in your back pocket.

5 I did the I-8 here when we were flying over the hill and could see that
6 it would make sense to use. I think NATOPS has changed for icing limitations,
7 and my recollection from the pre-2019 procedures was if there was visible
8 moisture and a freezing layer, you were not going through it. That made
9 weather calls straightforward. If I have questions about the weather, I think
10 there is a general reticence to go IFR if you can help it. We do always, 98%
11 this time of the year, we have an IFR "bingo"-IFR continuation field-when we
12 launch from Imperial, which would allow us to go in and shoot an approach.

13 Again, Creech was originally planned UDT for about a month with six
14 aircraft. The two big things that affected that are lodging, and then the
15 funding source was different. That is, the people that controlled the line of
16 accounting said it would not be used for MAW. I had a new-ish FOPSO who was
17 not proactive on scheduling ranges, so we were behind requesting ranges with
18 the Air Force. We worked through those things together and worked a viable
19 training plan. In conjunction with reducing the Detachment, we cancelled the
20 MCCRE, which it was scheduled for.

21 External shapers, including the manpower shuffle, and tasking at
22 Miramar affected the det. At Miramar the frag cycle for rotary wing is about
23 a month and a half out. In late November 2023, we had a normal task load
24 going into the holidays. The first weekend of December 2023, we had day and
25 night operations scheduled, I want to say Wednesday and Thursday. We had the
26 Osprey Red Stripe and then POTUS support on the weekend of 8 December 2023 up
27 to Los Angeles, California. We ended up cancelling a cross-country to Tahoe
28 and working that weekend to support. Immediately following that, we got
29 tasked with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit ARGMEUEX offload. It was not a
30 huge lift, but unplanned for - then immediately the POTUS support. Coming out
31 of the holidays, we got tasked with either six or eight days of PMC for
32 COMPTUEX. Same thing, no Ospreys on the boat. That got split up with each HMH
33 taking two days of tasking for it. When we had that conversation, I think it
34 is worth capturing, the tasking and prioritization of that tasking by MAG has
35 been lackluster at best.

36 The monthly cross-country, I believe, is a MAW requirement. There was
37 no explicit conversation about seeking relief from higher [from additional
38 tasks]. We tried consolidating requirements, such as using the POTUS support

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1 for the cross-country. We called Steel Knight at the end of November 2023 our
2 cross-country for the month. Also, I would say, MAG has been explicit in
3 their support that these are things to be planned and executed based on
4 availability and readiness. There has been no pushback when we've had to
5 cancel or reduce. MAG has been accepting of if there is no external support
6 or complex training, we use what we have. For example, if we plan to launch
7 two aircraft on a Friday to return on a Monday, we only launch one aircraft
8 and will not bring in maintenance on Saturday; it's not a no-fail mission. We
9 had a Yuma cross-country that did not get out, one that did get out, and then
10 one to Las Vegas that did not get out. There has been no pushback, like "when
11 are you making it back up to us?" There is not pushback as long as we are
12 planning appropriately.

13 I would say we were in a position to do our training PTP. The MCCRE can
14 be involved or not involved in a det or exercise. Integrating with Steel
15 Knight made sense for 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, and it would have been
16 easy for Creech. The NSI checks were a consideration.

17 I would say that most people would know the routes I discussed earlier,
18 including using Lake Henshaw.

19 I never flew with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) or (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). Based on their
20 reputations and my interactions with them, I had a high degree of confidence
21 in their decision-making and skill. My impression of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) as the
22 aircraft commander is that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had a lot of tools in (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
23 toolkit and would have used them, but (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was risk-considerate in
24 decision-making cycle and style as an instructor.

25 I only flew once with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). My mind is at ease that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
26 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was vocal because of weather both in-and-out of the aircraft. Before
27 flying into bad weather, that is the time I will see crew chiefs speak up.
28 Weather and environmental conditions are the time when I have received the
29 questioning. I think (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was typical of that.

30 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had a great demeanor and was level-headed, unflappable
31 with stress of being a schedule writer. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had poise and good
32 humor.

33 Again, I cannot remember why the CO departed the day prior with
34 Sergeant Major.

35 On the night of 6 February 2024, what eventually became our mishap
36 board were running pretty independently from Creech. We were supported, but
37 not being "quarterbacked" from Miramar. The CO's primary concern was getting
38 positive confirmation from search agencies, and he CO was not concerned as

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 much with higher headquarters notifications, but rather personnel
2 notifications.

3 There were not River City Protocols explicitly implemented. When we
4 mustered with the Marines on 7 February 2024, we gave explicit guidance not
5 to call home, not to call your loved ones. Give time until we were able to
6 identify the status and pass the word. I believe our senior enlisted
7 represented was a master sergeant, who left with the bulk of the Marines on
8 the C-130.

9 There was no signed flight schedule for 8 February 2024 because we
10 stood down the plan to fly home.

11 During my second meeting with the Investigating Officer we discussed
12 the squadron's TEEP and the VMM red stripe impact. I provided details on
13 frag tasking, presidential support requirements (December and January 2024),
14 and PMC runs. I stated that these events caused the squadron to modify cross
15 countries (in both December and January 2024). The VMM red stripe forced the
16 squadron to manage material readiness by working limited weekends, holidays,
17 and truncating our SBTP. Short-fused, FOS planning requirements before the
18 Creech UTD also impacted the unit. Ultimately, HMH-361 experienced higher
19 than normal stress level due to the VMM red stripe.

20 I told the Investigating Officer I would provide the 7 February 2024
21 flight schedule.

22 I told the Investigating Officer I would provide various screenshots of
23 communication about TIGER 43 from on or around 6 February 2024, including
24 conversations with the ODO. I will confirm if there was a direct message with
25 TIGER 43.

26 I signed a Permissive Authorization for Search and Seizure. I provided
27 my cell phone number to the Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer
28 did not take physical possession of any of my personal property, such as a
29 cell phone.

30 I told the Investigating Officer I would see if there was a green ODO
31 binder for Creech to provide.

32 I was directed not to discuss my statement to the Investigating Officer
33 with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) with
34 certain exceptions.

35 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
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SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b) (6), (b) (3) (B)

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Service:.....U.S. Marine Corps
Unit:.....HMH-361
Date:.....29 February 2024

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On 29 February 2024, I met with the Investigating Officer in person. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview with me, to include the difference with a safety investigation. I understood my statement is not privileged. I swore or affirmed to tell the Investigation Officer the truth. I agreed to have my interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of my interview with the Investigating Officer:

I am the (b)(6), (b)(7) at HMH-361. Prior to that, I was the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) HMH-361. I was East Coast originally, and did various billets at HMH-461. I was the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then came out here and was (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MAG. I was (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for a year and then became (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 1 December 2023.

The (b)(6), (b)(7) to (b)(6), (b)(7) turnover was a very abrupt turnover. It was immediate. I had about two hours of turnover with the prior (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) because the previous (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) got "short-fuse" orders for the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. I was going to become (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) right after our Creech Det, and this shifted the timeline about two months to the left. The turnover for the incoming [successor] (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was much more deliberate and in-stride.

For ODO procedures, we require ODO training with a qualified ODO. It is typically one to two daytime observations and one to two at night. The training is going through the binder, how to build the ODO brief, the different points of contact (weather, base operations, etc.), the logbook, and the rollover email at night. It does not go on the qualification matrix for that individual. We have an ODO checklist, but there is no formal ODO training.

We usually have a one to two day, or night, training. We do have a mishap binder. We have had mishap drills. Not every ODO has gone through

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 mishap drills as the ODO. A significant number of pilots have been exposed to
2 the drill.

3 I flew a CH-53 to Creech. There were three aircraft the first day, and
4 fourth was delayed two to three days later. It was in FCF status. It was
5 aircraft 366. I do not remember what it was FCF'ing for. I came out with the
6 initial three. At Creech, we did not do a mishap drill when we first got out
7 there.

8 Generally, AM ODO shows up 30 minutes before the first brief. The PM
9 ODO will be there about 30 minutes after the last land time. It will flex
10 every now and then. They split it in half.

11 We have on paper business rules based on how many aircraft we have
12 reporting, how many aircraft are up, etc. It is an agreement between the OPSO
13 and the AMO. It has not always fully been adhered to because our readiness
14 has been pretty low and if we had strictly adhered to those business rules we
15 would have limited flying. We accepted flying and aircraft or two with only
16 five or six mission capable aircraft, which per the business rules we would
17 not do. During this interview, I do not have a copy of the business rules but
18 can provide a copy. We are currently editing the business rules.

19 (b) (3) (B)
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SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

(b) (3) (B)

It was originally planned to be a tow and half week Det in Creech for NSI checks and our MCCRE for the UDP. When the action officer (FOPSO) was trying to book hotel rooms and had difficulty, we came to the realization that the Super Bowl was in Las Vegas, Nevada. That was the reason we cut the Det down to a week, because of the lodging limitation, which is why we shifted to just NSI.

(b) (3) (B)

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

(b) (3) (B)

The schedule typically goes to the OPSO first, then maintenance, then safety, then XO, then CO. Sometimes if the OPSO is unavailable or AOPSO is unavailable, it would go to maintenance first. I am the primary signer for it. If I am unavailable, the double AMO can sign MMCO sign for it. Beyond that, I need to at least see it and at least give a concurrence.

After me, it goes to safety. It again goes to the XO as a catch-all. If unavailable, can bypass the XO and go the CO. Changes are recommended and we will ask the OPSO. If OPSO concurs, we will ask the CO. We change the master scheduled on the ODO desk. Usually the ODO will annotate the changes and there will be a line for each change for the CO to sign or initial. Sometimes if the CO is not physically located at the squadron, those changes will be made and a picture will be sent to the CO. The CO will digitally sign so there is an electronic copy of concurrence. Then, such as next day, the CO will come in and sign.

It is not common for there to be three flight schedule versions. If there are multiple changes, the CO prefers only a version two. For 6 February 2024, one of the changes was we were going to send a section home that night. Also, because of the NSI checks the previous night got incomplete for whether and I know they had to make changes to accommodate that. The different versions did not impact the maintenance department. Our plan going into 6 February 2024 was to launch all (b) (3) (B)

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(b) (3) (B)

The weather was not great while we were there in Creech. The first day I flew it was me and the ASO flying to re-certify the turf route we would be using. We cut part off, even thought it was probably workable, even with cloud clearances. For the most part, there were clouds. Just southwest of the airfield, north was fine. A couple of nights the southern part was not workable. The first night I flew out there, we had a delay because of a cell. The fifth, they cancelled NSI checks due to weather. The sixth was workable. I did not fly on 6 February 2024. I was originally going to be the dash two flying home that night.

On 6 February 2024, I saw the TIGER 43 crew in the ready room. I saw them doing there planning. I did talk with the aircraft commander, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), that day. In the afternoon, prior to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) flight brief, if weather was bad at Miramar if they should stay at Creech or continue to Imperial. The aircraft commander's original plan was to push to Imperial to get gas. The aircraft commander was not in flight gear. The aircraft commander asked stay in Creech, or push to Imperial to reevaluate to go to Miramar. I told the aircraft commander, I said if weather is good along the route, push to Imperial. From there, you have to options. If weather is good at Miramar, push to Miramar. If not, either stay at Imperial or HMH-465 is in Yuma-about 30 minutes-and could push there to have some sort of maintenance support. That was the only interaction I had with the aircraft commander with dialogue. I saw the aircraft commander throughout. I saw the aircraft commander and the crew chief come in-I think they were looking at weather again. I saw them again, gave them a fist bump, as they were heading out the door to go to Imperial.

(b) (3) (B)

The crew chief called one of our QARs, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) I was in the hotel lobby, walking by the table, as they were talking over the phone about it. From what I overheard, they were on the phone talking about what it

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 was and what they could look at to see and what was the issue with the
2 system.

3 (b) (3) (B)
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10 You land as soon as practical. We have a single and dual-landing
11 profile in our PCL. Some people follow that exactly, and we also train for
12 running landings. I do not know which TIGER 43 did at Imperial.

13 I heard the next day, I think, that they had shut down the flight. We
14 have a group chat for all the pilots. I did not see anything in that chat
15 from the flight, which we try to avoid in the group chat. I heard-did not
16 hear firsthand-that did secure. This is not firsthand.

17 (b) (3) (B)
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20 I still do not know what troubleshooting steps they executed to secure
21 that.

22 (b) (3) (B)
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30 Jennings, and then you follow the published course rules from there.

31 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did not mention specific weather when we spoke on 6
32 February 2024. I know, secondhand, the things that were talked about were
33 ceilings and icing. It was known that the freezing layer was, I think, at
34 5,000 feet that night. What we all, essentially, understood, was that (b)(6),(b)
35 (b)(6), would not be able to execute an IFR approach it because the AIRMET was
36 moderate icing (I do not remember off the top of my head). We knew there
37 would be icing conditions which would prohibit and instrument approach in.
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SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

(b) (3) (B)

On 6 February 2024, I was at work probably another 30 minutes to an hour. I walked through the lobby, saw those guys, went back to my room. Before I went to bed, I checked my phone. There was nothing in the group chat. I checked aviation weather out of curiosity for Miramar and say, if I remember, 5,000 foot ceilings. I remember METAR showing better than forecasted, but not by much. I thought, "maybe they'll be good" and get in.

The Commanding Officer was back at Miramar. I believe it departed the morning of 6 February 2024 by commercial air to go the commander's conference. I was the Det OIC. I believe on the D-30 brief I was designated as the Det OIC. We also were not sure if the CO would make it out there at the beginning. The CO had Marine Corps matters leading up to the Det. I believe the CO flew directly from Quantico, Virginia to Las Vegas, Nevada.

My TV woke me up at 0315 in the morning. I had two missed calls from the OPSO and a text saying that TIGER 43 had not made it back to Miramar and they did not know where it was. I immediately called the OPSO back and we talked about it. Most of the situation was being handled by the ASO, PTO at the ready room at Creech and I believe the CO and XO were on deck in Miramar already working through the missing aircraft procedures.

The 366 books were, as far as I know, have been quarantined at Creech. We had one maintenance controller over there on night shift and I believe they were set off to the side. When we got to Creech on 7 February 2024, I believe, I took possession of 366's ABB and gave it to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) The ASO asked me who would be the maintenance representative for the AMB and I told them (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), and I went ahead and gave the books to (b)(6),(b)(6),(b) so (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) could have possession.

For the AMB, we have a primary and secondary identified within the squadron. I know we have not always adhered to it, based on availability.

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1 We were in contingency mode, unfortunately. Our primary was VPN was
2 back to Miramar, and then ivante. But, the day before we went, ivante got cut
3 off. The alternate was to have the comm Marines set up satellite to get on
4 MCEN. The problem was the IP address did not work with UMA server. We could
5 have changed our UMA server, but then only we at the Detachment would see the
6 aircraft and no one back home could. The contingency was pushing information
7 to a Detachment server. I had to sit down with ALMS Marine the second day of
8 the Detachment when we were using paper books and that Marine was working
9 through an anti-virus issue. We thought on Friday that we would probably stay
10 with paper, as contractors were not working through weekend.

11 When we do mishap drills, the paper books always exist. I believe that
12 by the time I sent a text to the ASO if they had taken care back home, they
13 had already placed it in the mishap folder. We will do that and then secure
14 any logbooks for the aircraft, such as brown logbooks that maintenance data
15 has, the trends binder and QA, or the paper ADB that control has. We will
16 quarantine all those.

17 We primarily use Signal. We have one that is all officers and key staff
18 NCOs, such as Sergeant Major. That chat is the main one. There is a
19 department head chat as well that has the CO, XO, Sergeant Major, myself,
20 OPSO, DOSS, maintenance chief, and the flight doc. Right now, but not
21 normally in it, is our DRC.

22 In those chats, someone did start a "regular" text group chat about
23 TIGER 43. It initially started with the search and rescue efforts and who was
24 helping with it, such as border patrol, Sheriff Department. Then U.S. Forest
25 Service. That all started that morning. Then, it had a plan on the eighth how
26 to get everyone home if given green light. Responding, we had U.S. border
27 patrol, San Diego Sheriff (who, I believe, launched their aircraft but was
28 unable to proceed due to weather), and U.S. Forest Service. I have shared the
29 point of contact name and phone number for Border Patrol with the
30 Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer already had the U.S. Forest
31 Service point of contact. I shared the CalFire point of contact name and
32 contact information with the Investigating Officer. I shared a number for San
33 Diego Sheriff, which was not associated with a name, with the Investigating
34 Officer. I shared their case number.

35 The text chain discussed items such as CBRN requirement, ERT
36 requirements, and CACO requirements. Our primary ERT was (b)(6).(b)(7)(c), and
37 alternate was our corrosion chief, who is a staff sergeant. I believe that
38 staff sergeant was in Creech at the time, so I do not know who it was here. I

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 believe the XO was, without saying for certain, in charge of ERT. When they
2 went to the site, it was not the full ERT. They picked certain people that
3 they needed for certain things. The XO did not go to the site. MWSS arrived
4 at the site, I believe, on 7 February 2024 to help secure it.

5 There was no other communication between myself and TIGER 43. I know
6 TIGER 43 commander spoke to the OPSO. I only have hearsay, asking how
7 important was it to get the aircraft back to Miramar. The OPSO told me that
8 "it is not important at all, if it doesn't make it back, it doesn't make it
9 back." This is just what I heard after-the-fact. I believe the TIGER 43
10 aircraft commander talked to the CO while at Imperial, although I cannot
11 confirm that.

12 I do not think there were any additional trends with the TIGER 43
13 aircraft. I do not recall any utility hides with that aircraft.

14 I would describe (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) as a stellar pilot and instructor, one of
15 the best ones we have. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) showed great compassion with (b)(6),(b)
16 (b)(6), students. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was not somebody I would have even hesitated to
17 put in a decision and I have no doubt (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would have made a good
18 decision. I saw (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) as a conservative decision-maker, who was not
19 aggressive. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) accepted criticism.

20 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was the best co-pilot we had, from early on when (b)(6),(b)
21 (b)(6), checked in. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stick skills were phenomenal. (b)(6),(b)
22 (b)(6),(b) academics improved with studying and then was above (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
23 peers. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was a co-pilot for me on a flight that we ordinarily
24 would have someone more experienced doing. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was not a very
25 aggressive person at all.

26 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was one of our best crew chiefs, who was very
27 competent. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is one of the few who will speak up to someone and
28 say "that is a bad idea."

29 It is not typical for someone to safe the book and then go fly in the
30 same day. I cannot say it has been or has not been done before.

31 I was not aware of any human factors for the TIGER 43 aircraft within
32 the last several months. I know (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had previously been married
33 and that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had a child a few months prior. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) took some
34 but not all of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) leave due to a newborn. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) though was
35 eager to maintain currency and would come in to fly. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
36 witnessed a suicide at 29 Palms during the summer with HMLA. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
37 (b)(6), was observed due to that.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

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1 Nothing was discussed about personal reasons for getting home. (b)(6),(b)
2 (b)(6), came out late to the Detachment, and was already there a truncated time.
3 I had never seen (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) exhibit "get-home-itis."

4 The OPSO and I were on the phone, and the OPSO was in constant
5 communication with our ASO and the PTO that were running items at Creech. A
6 lot of it was being run from back home. The PCRs, OPREP, and flash reports
7 were completed. I took a shower around 0415 and went to the lobby to make
8 sure people did not check out of their hotel rooms. We had a 0530 muster to
9 keep people from check out. The 0530 muster was aircrew, pilots, and crew
10 chiefs that were flying out on 7 February 2024. Muster was 0630 for day crew.
11 It is about a 45-minute drive to Creech from the hotel.

12 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
13 (b)(3)(B). I think (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had been in the squadron about
14 two years. Some crew chiefs are more timid than others. I teach seek opinions
15 from the lowest rank first to avoid influencing opinions.

16 There were a couple days when crew days began at arrival at work
17 station, but we settled when we arrived a muster. This is based on
18 discussion. Crew day was 10 hours, and CO can extend to 12 hours.

19 I do not know if the CO gave a crew day waiver to TIGER 43.

20 The CO did not give any specific direction after learning about
21 TIGER 43. We took charge and it was understood we were not flying that day.
22 The decision I made and the CO supported was we could fly back home, but we
23 should not because people would be distracted. We created a plan to fly home
24 the next day. We identified who would need to stay behind to fly the aircraft
25 back. It was experienced pilots and senior crew chiefs and maintainers.

26 Leading up to Creech, it was high tempo with the tasking we were doing,
27 including in January 2024. We were reactive to the tasking that came up.
28 COMPTUEX came up, which required us to work over a 96 (long weekend). We cut
29 a lot of ULT to help mitigate. The week leading up to Creech, we pared it
30 down significantly because of our readiness statistics. There were flights
31 that had to be made to prepare for Creech.

32 I think that fatigue level seemed low. Typically, back here, we fly
33 six-hour flights. There, we flew four-hour flights. No one enjoys the 45-
34 minute commute to and from the hotel to work, but I did not see visible signs
35 of fatigue from maintenance or air crew.

36 Returning to the conversation about crew day, the OPSO and I, if I
37 recall, were the ones who spoke about crew days. I do not recall the CO being
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SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

part of the conversation. We do not put crew day starts "here" on the flight schedule.

I want to state that, me, personally, I felt the pressure from higher that was perceived to "get things done" with the tasking coming from higher. I tried to shield everyone I could. My personal opinion is that the Red Stripe (e.g. service-wide Osprey grounding) contributed to the mishap. This is not saying it caused the mishap. There was a perceived lack of reduction in tasking that was pushed from MEF and MAW. The reason we put on the flight schedule a flight home on 6 February 2024 was because they assigned us back-to-back fragmentary orders the day we were scheduled to return from Creech Detachment. This is why we worked weekends and 12-hour shifts in December 2023 was because of all the tasking that we knew was coming down.

I do not know if any relief from tasking was sought. I spoke with the OPSO and my impression was that MAG was trying to ease the burden as best they could. Timing is everything. One of the squadrons was deployed. One was supporting SLT. That left two to support anything in January 2023 that came our way.

The Investigating Officer did not take possession of any of my personal property, such as a cell phone. I provided my cell phone number to the Investigating Officer. I was directed not to discuss my statement to the Investigating Officer with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.

END OF STATEMENT

I, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) U.S. Marine Corps, have had an opportunity to review the above summary of my statement to the Investigating Officer for the Command Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter mishap that occurred on or about 6 February 2024. I agree that the summary accurately reflects my interview and swear or affirm that it is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Signature: _____ Date: 29 May 2024 (JST)

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Service:.....U.S. Marine Corps
Unit:.....HMH-361
Date:.....4 March 2024

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On 4 March 2024, the Investigating Officer met with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (the "Interviewee"). The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview to the Interviewee, to include the difference with a safety investigation. The Interviewee understood that the Interviewee's statement is not privileged. The Interviewee is a member of the AMB for the CH-53 mishap on or around 6 February 2024. The Interviewee swore or affirmed to tell the Investigation Officer the truth. The Interviewee agreed to have Interviewee's interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is an abridged summary and not a verbatim transcript of what the Interviewee told the Investigating Officer during the interview:

I checked in with HMH-361 in April 2021.

I deployed in May 2022 for UDP and was completing HAC syllabus.

I went to ASO school in September 2023.

I am currently ASO and DOS since around 1 December 2023 when current OPSO assumed OPSO position.

I am currently in the NSI syllabus.

There are two ASOs in the squadron, and we just sent one to ASO class. There has been a gap the past year and a lot of turnover. The other individual was with the 15th MEU.

I think the XO has been in that position long enough to speak to manpower.

It was tough to get a grasp on the safety culture because I was out and busy. Overall, it was good. I did not have any massive concerns. It was different from what I was used to. My previous command was more hesitant to make schedule changes and operational changes. This is more flexible than I was used to.

I had not seen three signed flight schedules (as on 6 February 2024) as a trend. One new flight schedule is not uncommon. Typically, if something was

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 identified the night prior, changes occur that same day. The schedule writers
2 are good at running the schedule through me. I generally see schedule
3 changes. I would not say there are the full routing process, such as with a
4 new RAW. It is more informal. Changes are not common but not uncommon.

5 I was the only DOS that could review flight schedules on 6 February
6 2024 (the other one was on the 15th MEU).

7 We have been in the big RAW form revision process for the past four
8 months. I was not a big fan to it. The new document will be similar but with
9 more columns. I discussed with the Investigating Officer we complete the RAW.

10 The first version of the flight schedule had a RAW. I do not believe -
11 I could be wrong - that I signed a second version because I was conducting
12 NSI checks. The reason for the third version was to make carrying PAX legal
13 (putting an NSQ co-pilot with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) - to carry HST).

14 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was NSQ and being accelerated based on people's opinion
15 of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) acumen. I further discussed with the Investigating Officer
16 why the pilots were placed as they were.

17 I likely reviewed version three [of the flight schedule].

18 Typically, for flight schedules, I screen the schedule. I will assess
19 all crews and instructors legal. I further discussed what I review with the
20 Investigating Officer. I will review crew days.

21 Crew days are defined as 10 hours for both daytime and nighttime per
22 the new SOP signed in August [2023]. It begins when you first show up for
23 work duties. At Creech, I believe they were planning it based off leaving
24 from the hotel. This is conservative based on arriving for work functions. I
25 do not think anyone thought it was when one went into the van.

26 I discussed TIGER 43's crew day with the Investigating Officer, and how
27 it would have been "bust" if crew defined started as muster. If we accepted
28 that it had started at the bus time, it would have been a tight window to
29 make the flight brief. I think they showed up ten hours and 15 minutes prior.
30 I think some of them went to go get food to mitigate that afterwards. I
31 cannot speak to exactly what happened.

32 In the squadron, our culture is we give our HACs a lot of
33 responsibility to form their own plan.

34 Typically, the section lead or division lead would not spell out for
35 the HAC in the flight brief the times.

36 I used to work in operations.

37 I discussed with the Investigating Officer what requires MAG CO or MEU
38 CO approval.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

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1 I have never - in my experience in operations or safety - seen someone
2 annotate weather in flight schedule. I cannot say for certain that it has not
3 happen. The operations tempo may dictate comments, but weather is not
4 included. In the ODO brief, if someone decides to weather cancel, they are
5 not going to have a hard time about it from anybody. It is not a part of our
6 culture.

7 The end of the crew day is rotor shut down. We debrief afterwards, and
8 that is not part of your crew day for planning purposes. That will go into
9 your crew rest, which starts when you leave your duties with the squadron.

10 The CO can extend crew days up to - I cannot recall what the MAG SOP
11 was, because that is a limitation - 12 hours. I am not aware of any extension
12 on 6 February 2024.

13 ASO school did not provide much training on flight schedule screening.
14 Part of it is that the represented communities are different. I spoke to
15 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) about what I do when I screen the schedule. I cannot recall an
16 ASO or DOS telling me about screening the schedule. I did not talk about my
17 training from ASO school with the CO. I further discussed the flight schedule
18 and RAWs with the Investigation Team, to include retention.

19 Weather is commonly put down on risk assessments. I further discussed
20 with the Investigation Team what is considered with risk assessments. I do
21 not remember discussing what to consider during roundtables, in a formal
22 setting. I discussed with the Investigation Team how this has come up as we
23 modify the documents. I have seen NATOPS brief away from the desk, where the
24 "half sheets" are, and then after the brief will go up to the desk and sign.
25 Now we say, get your crew.

26 Part of the HAC syllabus is making risk-based decisions and smart
27 decisions. It should be engrained in people and I felt I got that going
28 through my HAC syllabus. Nothing where you sit down with the CO and the CO is
29 saying, hey, look at these things when you fly.

30 For culture, there is no hard feelings if operations cannot get
31 completed. CH-53s do not always start up on time.

32 We do roundtables once a month, and typically with the stan board. I
33 have asked to do stan boards first. I am always concerned people are not
34 reading the stan board minutes. I discussed the roundtables with the
35 Investigation Team. Average times are 30 minutes to an hour. Since the
36 mishap, people were more hesitant to get back into flying. There were no
37 major red flags. I would say they are normal for what I would expect post-
38 mishap.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

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Overall, the HACs are receptive to criticism. The conversations are productive. I will be a screen when passing criticism. We have to be that moderator. It is not a very dismissive atmosphere - every so often you get someone who dismisses it.

I discussed the risk assessment for Creech with the Investigating Officer. We started with the previous unit's assessment. We identified the turf routes not being certified. I discussed the terrain concerns with the Investigating Officer.

We did not complete a mishap drill at Creech. I discussed with the Investigating Officer when we last conducted a mishap drill at Steel Knight. I discussed the mishap plan at Creech. The goal of mishap drill provisions was to make it applicable to where we would go. I hindsight, I would have included phone numbers for other airfields near Creech.

Creech was a fast-paced Det. Usually, Dets are not one week.

We had a Det mishap kit at Creech. It was more intact than one we had used in May [2023] for a Class A mishap, no fatalities. I discussed with the Investigation Team the documents we brought to Creech.

I discussed my experience on 6 February 2024 with the Investigating Officer. We all went into the van and went to Creech. I was in the front, working on my computer. There were a few conversations about the weather in transit. It was not the "talk of the van," - I believe it was Toby Keith had died, and that was the talk. The weather the day prior was not good and we were concerned for that night. There was going to be a little bit of a break to make it executable. I think everyone acknowledge that we were unlucky with weather. We joked, everything has gone wrong with this Det - it got reduced because of the Super Bowl, etc. That day I was not optimistic about flying, but it got better. Everyone was checking out the next day. There were no more contingency dates. I was looking at weather.

I get out of the van quickly. I start doing final preparation. The day flight was already line up. I was making changes to my brief and setting up the projector. I further discussed my preparation with the Investigating Officer. I discussed my brief and the ODO brief. I do remember some questions about Miramar stuff. The focus of the brief was on Creech. I do not think I had Miramar weather on there, only NOTAMS.

There were FPC-type things brought up about the TIGER 43 crew. I discussed these with the Investigating Officer. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) - was a pretty relaxed individual. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). I personally

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 talked to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had recovered well. We were
2 not worried about it [on 6 February 2024]. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
3 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was a go-
4 getter and no issues. The Investigating Officer reinforced to the Interviewee
5 not to share any privileged data from the AMB.

6 I discussed with the Investigating Officer what we were looking for
7 Miramar weather. The 1801s were discussed. Given that we were required to do
8 1801s, it made sense to complete for the whole flight plan.

9 I would have to check if (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was current for an EP exam. We
10 identified [system] issues. If someone logged an EP quiz today, it would
11 expire at the end of April. I discussed our policy with the Investigating
12 Officer. I told the Investigating Officer that I would look for the hard-copy
13 quizzes.

14 I discussed the tactical brief with the Investigating Officer. The
15 standard would have been for the entire TIGER 43 crew to be at the brief. The
16 three officers most certainly would have been present. I discussed NATOPS
17 briefs with the Investigating Officer. I want to say the TIGER 43 crew went
18 one space over from where I was.

19 I have flown with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) NATOPS briefs were
20 pretty standard - I know it is hard to give what that means. I discussed the
21 NATOPS briefs with the Investigating Officer. My brief had IIMC
22 considerations, loosely.

23 An outbrief with the ODO is standard and would have occurred on 6
24 February 2024.

25 I had spoken with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and another captain that day or the day
26 prior about icing and weather [the turf requirement] was accomplishable - it
27 was most likely about routes to the south.

28 I discussed why 366 had to return to Miramar. Loosely, it was for frag
29 requirements. I would not say there was pressure at the squadron level. We
30 were adjusting accommodate it - I can see how this could be perceived as
31 pressure. It is hard for me to explain. I am confident, within the squadron,
32 nobody would have come down on (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) for not bringing the aircraft
33 back despite there being a frag. No company-grade officer felt pressure to go
34 into bad weather or make bad decisions.

35 I discussed how others were interested in weather before the flight,
36 and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). My understanding is that weather looked good getting to
37 Imperial and, generally, good getting to Miramar.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

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1 I discussed with the Investigating Officer TIGER 43's flight plan and
2 how it was going to change. We had a revised plan. TIGER 43 took off first,
3 to complete HST and transition to LZ Peanut. I cannot think of any
4 communication other than standard radio calls. I do not remember if I heard
5 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) or (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) voice over the radio. Generally, an hour
6 after departing, we come back. We do section CALS. I discussed my flight that
7 night with the Investigating Officer - I did not meaningfully interact with
8 TIGER 43 and TIGER 43 had already departed when I returned. I landed around
9 2200 and we had an extension.

10 I do not recall a conversation with the ODO when I returned about
11 TIGER 43.

12 I discussed with the Investigating Officer how I learned about TIGER 43
13 not arriving on time. The ODO came in during my debrief and interrupted. I
14 was thinking of pulling out the mishap binder, but we were still in the
15 window. We step out - they are making phone calls and confirm have not heard
16 anything. At that point, we start the mishap checklist. I do not have the
17 notes in front of me and cannot confirm times. I discussed the general steps
18 we took for the mishap checklist. We called airfields where they could be.
19 None had heard from them except Imperial, so I knew they had gone there. We
20 could not necessarily confirm if they had taken off from Imperial. It is
21 unusual not to give an outbound text, but it is not unheard of. The SOP or
22 standard is to make them aware that you took off.

23 I continued to explain to the Investigating Officer what we did for the
24 mishap checklist. In my opinion, TIGER 43 executed a PEL. This is more-or-
25 less what the SOP and NATOPS say, too. They secured the number two engine in
26 flight and landed in Imperial - this is what the ODO told me. I discussed
27 what the ODO told me about what had happened. To my knowledge, the CO did not
28 speak to the MAG-16 CO.

29 We were calling reasonable agencies first to make sure no one had heard
30 anything and then called leadership. I went over the mishap checklist with
31 the Investigating Officer. I was "quarterbacking." I discussed what others
32 were doing, including the scribe. From my understanding, the Miramar ODO has
33 the authority to launch SAR. We were attempting to contact them. The Miramar
34 field closed at midnight. They still had not heard from TIGER 43, and the
35 base ODO went home. I contacted the 3d MAW CDO to see if they could contact
36 the Miramar ODO, they could not (it was a non-flyer). The Investigating
37 Officer went through the contacts in the log.

38 I discussed the mishap checklist timeline.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

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1 I discussed the attempt to launch [air] SAR. I was on the phone with
2 the Sheriff's office, initially. I discussed this with the Investigating
3 Officer. We had the ADS-B tracker at this point. I cannot put a time on it -
4 maybe 0100 or 0130. They could not make it within 10 miles of suspected sites
5 due to weather. Ground assets could not make it to the site due to weather.
6 We had three "pings" at this point: two were close to what was the site, and
7 one was away, south of the I-8.

8 I would say I had the support I needed at Creech for the mishap
9 checklist. Maybe a pilot or two more would have been helpful. I discussed
10 with the Investigating Officer how we asked people to leave, "less is more."
11 Either the ODO or myself reached out to base operations, not really about
12 launching SAR. I discussed with the Investigating Officer that we reached out
13 to Miramar ODO. I discussed with the Investigating Officer our conversations
14 with CalFire and the Coast Guard. At some point, they formed a unified
15 command. We then communicated with the unified command as opposed to the
16 individual agencies. I cannot remember which agency was the head of the
17 unified command - I think it was CalFire.

18 I discussed with the Investigating Officer our communications with
19 Border Patrol for SAR. This is more or less 0130 or 0200. The [mishap] notes
20 will reference that.

21 We headed back to the hotel. I think we made it back around 0415 or
22 0500. I discussed with the Investigating Officer conversations with the CO.
23 The CO and XO made it back to the squadron at Miramar. I had numerous updates
24 to update the CO [during the evening]. It was probably a total of three or
25 four conversations.

26 By the time we returned to the hotel, a message was already on the
27 officer chat to muster in the lobby at 0530, I believe. This was earlier than
28 what was expected. Nothing was made much of the mishap. I made announcements
29 that night for individuals not to communicate on their phones about the
30 mishap. I discussed with the Investigating Officer how the individuals in the
31 hotel were briefed. I was not sure I was going to be part of that meeting.
32 They discussed not using phones. Noone confiscated phones.

33 I think after the brief to everyone, around 0600, a CalFire
34 representative called me and provided me an update. We discussed radiation
35 considerations. I discussed with the Investigating Officer unified command
36 points of contact and phone call timelines. I discussed with the
37 Investigating Officer the phone numbers I did not save. Border Patrol and
38

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

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1 CalFire told me their plan to go out to the site at daylight. I returned home
2 on the C-130.

3 I had the [mishap] binder in my hand pretty much the whole time. I
4 discussed with the Investigating Officer the status of the checklist. I
5 contacted EOD.

6 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had a conversation with TIGER 43 about
7 they had on deck. The CO had a phone call with TIGER 43 - it
8 was not a text, as far as I was tracking. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had texts
9 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), who was sitting in the back of the aircraft at the
10 time. I discussed with the Investigating Officer the messages I believe
11 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had from TIGER 43.

12 I was not tracking any communication from the enlisted ranks.

13 I discussed with the Investigating Officer additional conversations
14 about the mishap checklist, including with the XO and about contacting PMO.

15 I discussed with the Investigating Officer the conversations about site
16 security, and conversations with PMO.

17 I discussed with the Investigating Officer what I did once I arrived
18 back on the C-130. I do not think a site had been identified at this point.
19 The Command Team pulled everyone in for a conversation about the situation. I
20 discussed with the Investigating Officer a phone call I had with a
21 representative from the Naval Safety Center.

22 I discussed with the Investigating Officer creating a timeline of my
23 phone log.

24 I went to my office to work. It was pretty close to noon at this point,
25 or 1100. At some point, before the C-130 flight at around 0830 (I cannot
26 fully remember the time), the CO told me to focus on ASO duties. The XO will
27 manage everything from that point. I think around that time, when I was
28 getting on the C-130, they made it to that site. We landed around 1100. I
29 left work probably around 1630 or 1700.

30 It was tricky to be the only ASO or DOSS. I was not overloaded or task
31 saturated.

32 I do not think there was a formal message from the Command that we
33 could talk to our families about the events. I was a little out-of-the-loop.
34 Once the notification of the missing individuals was complete, I was
35 comfortable talking to my family about the mishap. I discussed with the
36 Investigating Officer how people departed Miramar.

37 Before we flew on all, given that Imperial information was briefed, I
38 knew TIGER 43's primary COA was to go down to Imperial, get fuel, and go

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

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1 direct over the hill from there. I cannot confirm that they considered
2 Banning Pass as an option, theoretically. It was a less likely option. I
3 discussed with the Investigating Officer why this was a less likely option.
4 My main assumption was that they were going to go to Imperial. I learned from
5 the ODO that they did land at Imperial and took off from there. I do not for
6 certain if they were going to go VFR over the hill - common sense tells me
7 they would not go IFR because of the freezing layer. They would have
8 attempted to go over the clouds, assuming the weather allows them to do so.
9 And then, it seems, they went I-8 route, which was never discussed.

10 I discussed with the Investigating Officer how I-8 has been discussed
11 in the squadron, only as an option, and people making it very clear that it
12 is not course rules. I have never flown it and I have not necessarily looked
13 into its legality. It was presented to me in the squadron as legal and as an
14 option but [at the same time] also presented is not our primary way of
15 getting home and it is not course rules.

16 I do not remember (b)(6).(b)(7)(c) discussing the I-8 that night.
17 Previously, I cannot confirm from memory, I would not be surprised if (b)(6).(b)
18 (b) "threw it around" as an option, just as much as anyone else would have
19 thrown it around as an option to get over the hill. I do not have information
20 that (b)(6).(b)(7)(c) was more or less inclined than anyone else to use I-8.

21 I have flown with (b)(6).(b)(7)(c) when weather along the mountains has not
22 been the best, but had been suitable to climb over the top. Our typical
23 cursing altitudes are 7.5 going eastbound, 6.5. That is VFR cruising
24 altitudes, not course rules. But, if weather precluded that, it is not not
25 standard to climb above that or to deviate from that to get over the weather.
26 I discussed with the Investigating Officer getting below weather. What raises
27 people's hairs on the back of their neck the fact that people present I-8 as
28 an option when weather is poor. I would presume - and it is my personal
29 assessment - this is because of the terrain. I do not like hearing people
30 talking about it, even before the mishap, questioning why would you fly a
31 route you are not familiar with, for the first time, when weather is poor? We
32 have cursing altitudes for a reason and we have IFR for a reason.

33 I discussed with the Investigation Team if I-8 has come up on paper. I
34 would not be surprised if it had. People had heard about the I-8, but I think
35 there are very few people in this ready room who actually flew it. The only
36 context I have heard is to get underneath weather, day or night.

37 We teach as instructors, start with the lower comfort level. Start with
38 the opinions of crew chiefs regarding safety. That is standard and considered

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

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1 the norm. Some crew chiefs are more involved in that, and others will "feed
2 off" the HAC's energy. I discussed with the Investigation Team how this was
3 an experienced crew. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was very experienced and the most vocal
4 crew chief we have. Of the experienced individuals, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was one
5 of the most conservative. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had pilot experience. I flew with
6 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) much in Okinawa. Once, when there was bad weather and I was a
7 co-pilot, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was very vocal. That experience and others, with
8 the summer weather in Okinawa, showed me (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was conversative.
9 There were instances when pilots would experience vertigo and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
10 would already be at the jump seat to assist because (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
11 anticipated it.

12 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was, by more nature, reserved and quiet. I would
13 believe (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would speak up about an issue if in the back of
14 an aircraft.

15 I discussed with the Investigating Officer who else to speak to for the
16 Investigation.

17 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) I would say, was an extremely experienced pilot and a
18 very level-headed and calm person. That is how (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) acted in the
19 aircraft. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had sound judgment and decision-making, based off what
20 I have seen and what others said. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) liked to train a lot,
21 accomplishing what (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) could on the flight schedule. This was not at
22 all to the detriment of safety, but more operations-focused than others.
23 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is one of the better night pilots and pilots, generally, in the
24 squadron.

25 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was considered an extremely competent co-pilot. It was
26 recommended and getting set up to "fast track" (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) to the next peer
27 group. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had a lot of energy and was enthusiastic. I have not
28 flown with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) enough to speak to crew comfort level. I flew with
29 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) the Friday prior to the mishap. We did encounter something.
30 Weather was bad. We had HST in zone set up from the day crew. We discussed as
31 a crew if we felt comfortable picking up HST. I think (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and the
32 crew chiefs said they were okay with it. I made the decision not to go. The
33 other crew did - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did, I believe. It was
34 torrential downpour and we were seeing lightning. That was a concern leaving
35 them in the zone, but also us flying into it. I know that does not provide a
36 lot of context. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) lack of experience may have contributed to
37 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) ORM, but we also had two very experienced crew chiefs in the
38 back that were okay with it.

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1 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was conservative and "average" on the conservative side -
2 I am trying to compare (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) with our current ready room. Overall,
3 compared to all pilots, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is conservative. There have been times
4 where I have flown with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and expressed more conservative intent
5 than (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is comfortable with, but (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had nearly 200 more
6 hours and experience than me.

7 I discussed with the Investigating Officer a hypothetical low-light
8 scenario if I were to transit from Imperial to Miramar.

9 I discussed with the Investigating Officer providing non-personal
10 documents, written timelines, and other non-personal items.

11 I was directed not to discuss my statement to the Investigating Officer
12 with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) with
13 certain exceptions.

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15 END OF STATEMENT
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SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b) (6)

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....(b)(6),(b)
Service:.....U.S. Marine Corps
Unit:.....HMH-361
Date:.....27 February 2024

NOTICE

DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THE CONTENTS
OF THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT PROPER
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE

On 27 February 2024, I met with the Investigating Officer in person. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview with me, to include the difference with a safety investigation. I understood my statement is not privileged. I swore or affirmed to tell the Investigating Officer the truth. I agreed to have my interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of my interview with the Investigating Officer:

I am a schedule writer with HMH-361.

The check-in process went pretty well when I joined. I wanted to go HMH-361. I had a couple of weeks to find a house, and then started around Thanksgiving 2023. I think the tempo was good and I did not feel much pressure.

When I checked in, I was introduced to everyone. I sat down with the XO. I received a little bit of layout. I was with our OPSO previously and the OPSO had explained what it would be like.

The check in with the safety department went well. Right when I checked in, the OPSO was starting that role. The DOSS had just taken over.

I was flying about two times a week, which I thought was pretty good. I checked in with another captain. There were other squadrons were, I heard, they were just flying nights.

Originally, the goal was set to be ready for deployment in May 2024. The priority is to get everyone warmed up and then turn to nights.

I like being a schedule writer. It is making me learn the trade. I feel like I am in operations and have a better idea what is going on in the squadron. If I am not writing a schedule, I have a little more freedom. I can go down the line and study.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 For schedule writing business rules, we work 0700 to 1600 and will
2 schedule a main schedule writer and have a "48" schedule writer. We like to
3 have it the schedule reviewed for grammar and spacing and then a weekly
4 writer will review. We prefer to have the AOPSO review. Then, we will have
5 OPSO sign and then will go to maintenance. From maintenance, we will go to
6 safety for the ASO. That was (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) who was very thorough. We as
7 daily writers like to have every validation explained or the ASO. Then, it
8 will go from XO to CO.

9 In operations, we have four, I think, total writers, after the mishap.
10 We have one weekly "in training." We have one for COPS and FOPS. We have one
11 person writing the weekly, and the PTO has been assisting. Sometimes we will
12 give input on the weekly.

13 We have someone in a meeting for operations. We have tried to get our
14 operations clerks how to write a schedule and to have them understand the
15 process and the RAW. They help. Our staff sergeant has been trying to get
16 them involved in writing the schedules.

17 The schedule binder basically will have that day's schedule, the
18 current weekly, and then it will have T&R codes, and standard coding sheet to
19 have as a reference. We have the basic coding, such as for high light and low
20 light. We have mission codes. For the RAW, we have a risk assessment coding
21 guide.

22 When the schedule goes to the binder, the daily schedule writer brings
23 the binder and briefs the CO. We are pretty much doing "wet" signatures
24 unless we work later or the CO is unavailable.

25 At Creech, this process was pretty similar because the OPSO, AMO, and
26 safety were there. We pretty much had every daily writer there. We had to use
27 wifi so we could not download off teams, which created version control.
28 However, it was the same process because everyone was there.

29 The CO may not have access to everything for afterhours approval, but
30 we will send the CO PDF copies of the validations, RAW, and schedule. I do
31 not know if the CO has a copy of the binder.

32 We will pen and ink validations. Sometimes M-SHARP is not reading the
33 proper prerequisite, so we will write it or if a paper is in routing.

34 I do not remember who was the schedule writer on 4 February 2024, for 5
35 February 2024 and 6 February 2024. We all basically worked on it because of
36 the night flights and rain. I remember I worked on it heavily.

37 Nothing that I know was out-of-the-normal for that schedule writing
38 process. Everyone saw validation reports.

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1 Normally, for schedule changes, we will talk to the OPSO or AOPSO. The
2 XO will frequently have input. The ODO will start working the pen and ink
3 changes. Then, we will take it to the CO for approval, or send a picture if
4 unavailable in person.

5 I do not think I have ever seen three versions of a flying schedule. It
6 is unusual. From what I remember, we had to make some changes. I believe we
7 had "frags" for 366 to return back to Miramar on 6 February 2024. From what I
8 remember, the NSI checks fell out because weather was bad. I actually flew
9 that day and we were only able to get one hour for calibrations. You could
10 not even get to the turf. I believe we had two good aircraft at Miramar and
11 we had a bigger frag the next week.

12 We execute our flight briefs by showing up an hour before. The co-
13 pilots work first. ODO will handle the ODO brief at first, which will include
14 briefing weather. The next person will come up and give their section or
15 tactical brief. NATOPS will be discussed. Normally, the HAC conducts the
16 NATOPS. I have seen some of the "older" copilots give the NATOPS brief.

17 At Creech, we had a small ready room and ODO desk, with a podium and
18 projector. It was a tight space. We would close the door because it was noisy
19 outside. The ODO will remain for the entire brief, at the desk which is right
20 there.

21 Often, NATOPS briefs are by exception only because the ODO brief will
22 cover material, such as weather. We cover as a crew to put us on the same
23 page to set expectations, such as power margins. For example, what if we have
24 to cut of an engine? We will discuss vertigo and emergency procedures. We
25 talk about landing possibilities.

26 I have seen emergency procedures briefed in detail, as practice. You
27 discuss engine failures in weight and power portion. I do not think it is we
28 will say the EPs every time - that is more HAC discretion.

29 Up at Creech, for my experience, we briefed "try our best" not to enter
30 the clouds because the freezing layer was low. We knew that it was pretty
31 heavy moisture. It was raining the whole time. We were close to home field.
32 It was not great instrument conditions. Most of it was, like, we had on every
33 come cards every MSA listed and we had every approach listed and tower
34 frequencies. It was known, but, if clouds are not good, as soon as we pick
35 up, you should head back.

36 For the schedule, I could be wrong, I remember the different versions
37 were due to line and crew changes because we did not get the NSI check done
38

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1 the night before and what we wanted to get done as a whole group. We
2 reallocated crews to fix that.

3 I do not exactly know what (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
4 were moved because, I thought, their experience. I think, we put together a
5 "senior" crew flying in questionable, obviously, conditions to back home.
6 This was my guess. I do not know if it was correct. I think it was a
7 discussion that was had, from what I know. Normally those conversations are
8 held at the training officer level. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was only on version three
9 because, should anything come up with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) getting an "X", (b)(6),(b)
10 (b)(6), would be there. That is my guess.

11 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was working both days and nights. I think (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
12 then transitioned to nights. I believe (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) I believe, transitioned
13 to nights, but I am not sure. It was a normal conversation with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
14 to see if could be on TIGER 43. That is my guess.

15 I was at Creech on 4 February 2024 or 5 February 2024 pretty much
16 during the day. On Sunday 4 February 2024, that Monday, I had dinner with
17 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) that night at the hotel - I am pretty sure it was that day,
18 because all the copilots went out. This would have been around 2100. On 5
19 February 2024, I think (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would have been around. I was not with
20 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) but I saw (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) at the hotel, I believe, the night of
21 5 February 2024. I did not have a conversation with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) on 5
22 February 2024 about (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) flying the next day.

23 I was the schedule writer on 6 February 2024. The ODO desk was in the
24 ready room. We had two desks and we pretty much shared with the weekly
25 writer, with three or four computers. Behind us were the jumps computers.
26 That is where the officers would be there planning, so we were close.

27 For 6 February 2024, discussions about weather were ongoing throughout
28 the week. I do not remember a day that weather was that good. It was low
29 cloud layer, low freezing and raining that week. For that day, we had an
30 internet issue and could not get onto teams. Through personal computers, we
31 could access .mil through browsers. I could build the brief that way. We used
32 both Miramar and Creech maxes. I was pretty involved with the weather
33 discussion and had a good idea what it was like. We had messages in group
34 chats and signal. Everyone was close and could overhear each other.

35 The ODO brief is on Microsoft Teams. It would not let us download
36 because we were using the Creech wifi. The brief will still be saved on
37 Teams. I can download it and send the brief to the Investigating Officer.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

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1 I know the weather was better Wednesday [sic] night than the last two
2 nights in the local area. I was pretty confident we were going to get the NSI
3 checks done. I was still in the building when TIGER 43 landed. I remember
4 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) coming in. They checked
5 weather again with the ODO. The ODO, I am pretty sure, was talking to
6 Miramar. I remember (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) saying, like "we are going to go." I do not
7 know, actually, if (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) came in because someone would have had to
8 stay in the aircraft. They asked about Havesu weather, Imperial, and at
9 Miramar. The writers left the spaces pretty much after they left because we
10 were done. I know, over the phone-using WhatsApp and Signal-they were asking
11 for weather updates. I do not know if they were in the air. I have copies on
12 my phone, to include a company-grade (e.g. captain's) chat.

13 Flying from Imperial to Miramar, to the course rules do not cover the
14 whole way. We use Plaster City as a point, and then use the I-8. We come in
15 from Imperial coming into San Diego, at 1,000 feet and then climb to 7,500
16 feet, and then down to 3,500. The 7,500 is to get over the hill. I think the
17 course rules for going out to Imperial end at 3,500 around Plaster City.

18 If it was IMC, I know that you can contact SoCal approach and pick up
19 clearance and PAR. You could also cut north, over Ramona, and come down the
20 I-15.

21 I know that do not go into a freezing layer, and cannot fly more than
22 30 minutes which is NATOPS best case. Given how heavy it was raining, you do
23 not want to go into it.

24 I know we have talked after the mishap, maybe TIGER 43 could have gone
25 north and turned around. But we were thinking it was normal course rules.

26 We use the I-8 for navigation pretty heavily going in and out of there.

27 I have never heard of using the I-8 for going low to avoid clouds. You
28 stay at the altitudes and do not deviate. If you get lower than you should,
29 you can get into other airspaces that you should not go into.

30 I have never flown the I-8 when there are heavy clouds. There have been
31 scattered layers, but I have never had any issues. Normally, it is just pick
32 up an approach into Miramar if able.

33 We did not complete an exact mishap drill at Creech. We met as a group
34 and talked about it. I feel like we had a pretty good idea what to do. We
35 reviewed the binder. I do not know if we pretended to walk through anything.
36 We discussed this on the first day.

37 ODO training is one day and one night. You follow someone along,
38 preferably on a flight day. Pretty much everything is covered: get there one

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1 hour early, we walk to maintenance and how to ask for the information, going
2 through the PowerPoint and the links to pull the information. It is step-by-
3 step. To be honest, I did not run through the mishap checklist through my
4 training. We opened the binder. I have looked through a couple of pages on my
5 own.

6 The squadron runs mishap drills, maybe once since I had been here. I
7 was not present. I was either flying or at a symposium, something like that.

8 During our meetings before a flight, we will talk about how everyone is
9 doing and how comfortable you are. I do not think it matters who it is in the
10 cockpit. We are pretty good working as a team and talking it through. I do
11 not think rank has any place in talking through comfortability.

12 Since I checked in, in November 2023, I think the operation tempo has
13 been pretty good. I was moving through pretty well and I think most people
14 were. We were getting a lot done and the only reason we would not have been
15 doing something is because the bird would not have been working. These
16 aircraft are old and delicate. They have issues just like everything else,
17 not necessarily maintenance.

18 I flew out to Creech, riding in the back. I was originally supposed to
19 get a code, but as we got there, we had a hydraulic leak on 518. I think
20 three left, maybe, the first day, and the fourth came later that day or the
21 next morning. I cannot remember.

22 On WhatsApp, at 2120, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) asked for a freezing level at KNKX,
23 and it was provided. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) asked for the cross-section to see if there
24 are clouds about 5,000 feet. A response was provided. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) asked for
25 the base frequency at Yuma hangar 220. Additional base weather information
26 was sent to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). About 40 minutes later, the frequency was sent. I
27 am willing to send a screenshot of the group conversation to the
28 Investigating Officer.

29 In the chat that includes the CO and the XO, for administrative items,
30 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) at 2100 asked for an extension. At 2116, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) says
31 landed at Imperial and reevaluating weather toward home field. That was
32 "thumbs up" by the ODO.

33 For flight schedules, we would carbon copy personals along with the
34 military email. That night, some of the personal emails did not receive it,
35 so we sent it over a chat to the captains. We have a co-pilot chats and it
36 was requested on 4 February 2024 for 5 February 2024 and 6 February 2024. It
37 did make it to the military emails. The flight schedule changes would be sent
38 as pictures, sometimes, if it is red-inked. On Monday 5 February 2024,

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1 version three for 6 February 2024 was sent by chat at 2248. The assumption is
2 that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would receive that chat at 2248.

3 There should be a complete big RAW. I am sure one is saved somewhere.
4 Normally, we do the hard copies, the ODO gets the stamped version, and we
5 will print the electronic one. I do not remember if we had a stamp at Creech,
6 but that was what we did. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had the schedule binder on (b)(6),(b)
7 (b)(6),(b) and I would guess they would be in there.

8 We have a Signal group with all the officers, Sergeant Majors, and some
9 maintenance, for official business. The co-pilot WhatsApp group is called "B-
10 List Celebrities." "Okatraz" is the company-grade chat on WhatsApp.

11 I texted (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) until around 1945, it is nothing about
12 weather. It was just about the schedule on 7 February 2024 that I could work
13 on as much as I could.

14 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had the physical master copy flight schedule on (b)(6),(b)
15 (b)(6),(b)(7) person.

16 I think the aircraft, I heard, had a faulty light on the aircraft for
17 the number two engine overheat. I think I first heard about this after-the-
18 fact. Some people were asking, "do you think that was a factor?" I trust our
19 maintenance team.

20 The signed flight schedule is sent by .mil and personal emails. It is
21 not usually distributed during chat. It may be if someone did not get it, or
22 if there is a large red ink change.

23 I do not know of anyone else who communicated with TIGER 43 while they
24 were in the plane. I would guess the ODO.

25 We got a text from OPSO around 0500 and 0530 about meeting in the lobby
26 the next day on 7 February 2024 and to not check out of their rooms. (b)(6),(b)
27 (b)(6), and individuals like that were still in their flight suits. The OPSO
28 pulled everyone into the conference room at the hotel and told us that TIGER
29 43 did not make it home and search and rescue efforts were ongoing. We were
30 told not to use our phones.

31 The crew day is 10 hours, starting the moment you step into the
32 squadron and ends when you leave the spaces. At Creech, I think it was when
33 we arrived at Creech. It was a 45-minute drive.

34 Sometimes we handle the debrief the next day if we depart. I have seen
35 those occur the next morning. The assumption as a writer is that there is
36 more crew day when someone lands. I believe the crew day should be in the
37 SOP.
38

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 Typically, during briefs, the HACs discuss RAWs by different ways. I do
2 not think there is a standard. They will ask personally how are you doing,
3 like sleep. If anyone says anything, like they flew late the day prior, it is
4 talked about. It is very conversational.

5 Again, I have never heard going lower than the altitude standards for
6 the I-8.

7 The safety culture in the squadron is pretty good. When I checked in,
8 again, I had a good sit down and we discussed why it was important to look
9 for certain things. That was a good introduction. I have a good idea of the
10 RAWs and the purpose of that. We have had ORM classes. Culture overall is
11 positive.

12 I feel the most junior member would be comfortable voicing concerns.
13 For example, to weeks ago, I was the lowest comfortable crew member with
14 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) for a cross-country due to weather. We ended
15 up not flying the cross-country and did an hour instead.

16 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would go through procedures during briefs. We were having
17 good discussions about the flights. "Do we need to?" was asked. Inadvertent
18 IMC diverts were discussed, such as going to North Island. During the NATOPS
19 brief, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) discussed here and North Island.

20 I would characterize (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) as pretty awesome as an aircraft
21 commander. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was a good instructor. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would let you fly
22 and then talk to you about your corrections. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) knew everything
23 I was about to do before I did that. I thought they were two of the better
24 individuals I flew with.

25 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) were very comfortable talking openly
26 to everyone. They asked me, as the young co-pilot, what I thought. I do not
27 think they cared much about being higher rank or more experience.

28 No one on the TIGER 43 crew was overbearing. They had the character to
29 discuss options or go different courses of actions.

30 In November 2023, we did 12 hours on, and 12 hours off. This was the
31 entire squadron, including the S shops. It was my first week. I believe it
32 was for maintenance. With the Ospreys going down, there was small talk and
33 discussions about us picking things up. I do not think we ever talked about
34 it being too much.

35 On average, at Creech, we tried to adhere to the 0700 to 1600 day.

36 On 6 February 2024, I was not aware of any human factors that could
37 have affected that crew.

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1 I signed a Permissive Authorization for Search and Seizure to provide
2 screen shots to Investigating Officer. I will also provide the brief I built
3 to the Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer did not take
4 possession of any of my personal property, such as a cell phone. I provided
5 my cell phone number to the Investigating Officer. I was directed not to
6 discuss my statement to the Investigating Officer with others per the Manual
7 of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.

8
9 END OF STATEMENT

10
11 I, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), U.S. Marine Corps, have had an opportunity to
12 review the above summary of my statement to the Investigating Officer for the
13 Command Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the CH-53E
14 Super Stallion Helicopter mishap that occurred on or about 6 February 2024. I
15 agree that the summary accurately reflects my interview and swear or affirm
16 that it is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

17
18
19 Signature: _____ Date: _____
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From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
To:
Subject: RE: CUI: Interview Summary
Date: Thursday, May 30, 2024 7:28:25 PM

Sir,

Apologies for the late reply, I have been battling computer access issues out in Okinawa.

Approved.

V/R,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) USMC.

S-3 ACOPSO

(b) (6)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2024 8:44 AM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: CUI: Interview Summary

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Attached is a summary of our discussion together. If you would like the audio records please advise.

If no changes are required, please reply with "Approved".

If you have like to modify, please do so with track changes enable.

S/F,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Office: 858-307-4549/5077

BB: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Cell:

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Name:..... (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:..... (b)(6),(b)(7)
Service:..... U.S. Marine Corps
Unit:..... HMH-361
Date:..... 27 February 2024

NOTICE

DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THE CONTENTS
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AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE

On 26 February 2024, the Investigating Officer conducted an interview with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), HMH-361 Weekly Schedule Writer. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview, to include the difference with a safety investigation. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) affirmed he understood his statement was not privileged. He swore or affirmed to tell the Investigating Officer the truth. He agreed to have the interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of my interview with the Investigating Officer:

In August 2021, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) checked into HMH-361 initially holding the S-5/S-6 and Digital Interoperability Officer billets. He's deployed as a copilot with the squadron to Okinawa, Japan, in support of the Unit Deployment Program. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) currently works in the Operations Department as the Future Operations Officer and was designated a Helicopter Aircraft Commander (HAC) this past fall. Regarding the HMH-361 check-in process; he found it to be standardized, noting that the Safety Department stressed the differences between HMHT-302 (FRS) and the fleet, stating the squadron expected copilots to be a contributing crewmember as a designated Helicopter Second Pilot (H2P). Additionally, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) sat down with the operations & training department in which he was briefed expectations and syllabus progression.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) completed the LLL NSQ syllabus within one year, and earned his HAC designation the year following, which he stated was longer than the squadron average of 18 months.

Regarding schedule writing tasking and responsibilities, and who primarily writes the Daily Schedule; (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated the Aviation Operations Clerks primarily focus on ground training tasks, and typically write the schedule as an alternate, or on a low hours fly day/Functional

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 Check Flight (FCF) days, being that HMH-361 had six officers fulfilling the
2 schedule writer billet leading up to the mishap.

3 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that two-day schedules are only written if the
4 primary signers are unavailable the following day due to competing
5 responsibilities, and their department aims to write schedules that have
6 redundancy built in, vice if Monday's codes are not completed it will require
7 the rest of the Weekly schedule to be re-written. As the Future Operations
8 Officer, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) focuses on the Monthly schedule and scheduling
9 outside of two weeks.

10 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated the schedule is traditionally routed from the
11 Daily Schedule writer, screened by the COPSO, then PTO, followed by the OPSO
12 for signature, then the AMO or AAMO's signature, Safety, XO, and finally the
13 CO. To the best of his knowledge, documents routed with the schedule are the
14 Risk Assessment Worksheet, the weekly Qual/Des Matrix, hot boards and
15 validations from MSHARP (with the appropriate justifications written in), as
16 well as the Weekly and Monthly schedules.

17 Regarding the Weekly Schedule, he stated it is typically 90% accurate,
18 but with the V-22 reds-tripe it has become less consistent due to short
19 notice tasking.

20 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated schedule change standard practice is to bring the
21 schedule to the OPSO, then the CO for signature; he was uncertain if the
22 Safety Department screens all schedule changes. Most times, the schedule
23 change is discussed in parallel within squadron messaging forums. He stated
24 that the CO is the only one authorized to sign off on schedule changes, in
25 cases that the CO is unavailable or on Crew Rest, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was unaware
26 of who is authorized to sign the schedule or what the process is to obtain
27 the appropriate authorized signature. As far as how often schedule changes
28 happen at HMH-361, he stated they receive the scrutiny they deserve and are
29 not done often. However, if a schedule is changed, it is screened & annotated
30 appropriately, and the weekly is adjusted appropriately to maximize training.

31 Regarding the flight schedule publication and distribution, it was
32 typically done in garrison between 1600-1700. During the Creech UTD, it was
33 typically released later in the evening due to connectivity and printer
34 issues at Creech AFB.

35 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated, there is no written ODO UT syllabus, but they
36 typically have all pilots new to the squadron conduct two "under training" AM
37 and two PM ODO shifts, before acting as the official ODO. ODO briefs are
38 tailored from a PowerPoint template. When asked of the contents of the ODO

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1 binder on the Creech UTD, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was unaware of its contents being
2 that he did not stand ODO while on the detachment.

3 Regarding individual cockpit NATOPS briefs, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated they
4 are tailored for each mission, and that the Emergency Procedure section (EP)
5 is performed differently by each pilot, and that he personally briefs every
6 EP listed in the section. He further stated, if pilots and aircrew are
7 rushed, the section will not be briefed in detail and will be briefed
8 stating, "All EPs will be handled in accordance with NATOPS." HACs typically
9 conduct the NATOPS brief, however, Copilots will sometimes brief it for
10 proficiency. Following the NATOPS brief, the specific mission briefs will be
11 covered IAW the Tactical Pocket Guide. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had flown with the
12 Mishap Aircraft Commander (MAC) multiple times and characterized the MAC's
13 NATOPS briefs as "in depth."

14 For ODO brief contents, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) said the weather, NOTAMS, TFRs,
15 the ambient minimums and maximums, freezing level, cloud layers, radar
16 snapshots (no radar videos/progressions - unless asked for specifically by
17 the crew, at which time the ODO fulfills their request). While on the Creech
18 UTD, he stated due to the time of year and elevation, the freezing level was
19 briefed in detail.

20 Regarding the filing of flight plans while on the Creech UTD, it was a
21 requirement due to the Creech airfield being an Air Force Base. For IFR
22 flights, the squadron will file with Base Operations via a "Hotel-8-A" and
23 while at Creech, flight plans were filed via DD-1801s with Creech AFB
24 regardless if it was IFR or VFR. It is common practice to receive the "Dash
25 One" from the weather briefer when filing an IFR flight plan.

26 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated Crew Day for HMH-361 is 10 hours day and night.
27 It starts when, "you first show up to work and ends with the engine or rotor
28 stop." During the Creech UTD, he stated the Crew Day for aircrew began from
29 the transit in to work.

30 Regarding the planning leading up to the Creech UTD, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
31 stated the det was thought o be "on the chopping block" multiple times, due
32 to range space and a demanding op-tempo back at MCAS Miramar. Since the V-22
33 was red-striped and HMH-465 was supporting SLTE, it left only HMH-361 and
34 HMH-462 to provide all assault support for the MAW. Following the mishap,
35 during aircrew roundtables, many aircrew felt there was a higher than normal
36 op-tempo leading up to the mishap, however everyone was still willing to
37 execute the mission.
38

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1 Regarding 3d MAW guidance for how often UTDs shall be conducted by
2 units, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated it is a quarterly requirement, but did not know
3 why it is a quarterly requirement. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated mishap drills are
4 typically run on a quarterly basis, and he characterized them as realistic,
5 and all pilots participate. He was unsure if maintenance is involved in the
6 mishap drills. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated mishap drills are normally done when the
7 squadron goes on detachment.

8 Regarding aircraft deployment timeline to Creech UTD, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
9 stated a section of aircraft launched and arrived to Creech initially, and
10 due to maintenance issues, a single "straggler aircraft" arrived later that
11 day, for a total of three aircraft. Additionally, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was crewing
12 the straggler aircraft.

13 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated the "Read and Initials" process is currently in
14 transition, formerly being done on ITS and is now done on MSHARP. EP quizzes
15 are currently done via physical paper EP quizzes and done on the last week of
16 the month. Everyone shall be done prior to the first day of the month, and if
17 you are delinquent on your EP quiz, you will be pointed out via a slide in
18 the ODO brief, you will be called out by the ODO and you, "shall not go fly."

19 Regarding the ODO brief, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated all pilots attend the
20 ODO brief, only one aircrewman is required to attend. Following the ODO
21 brief, individual cockpit briefs are completed, then the HAC goes up to the
22 ODO to hand in and sign the RAWs. It is standard to check out with the ODO
23 prior to stepping to the aircraft. He characterized the Ready Rooms' view of
24 the RAW process as, "above a check in the box."

25 When asked if there is a "checks and balances" process applied to the
26 HAC's determination of risk level on the RAW, if the ODO determines the HACs
27 characterization of risk as unsafe, the ODO will speak up.

28 When asked what comments the CO typically provides on the "big RAW",
29 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he usually inputs, "Concur with Ops and or DOSS
30 comments." In (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) experience he has never seen further
31 clarification or guidance on the big RAW from the CO.

32 When asked how he would execute a rotary wing flight returning from
33 KIPL (Imperial Airfield) to KNKX (MCAS Miramar), (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated
34 following takeoff from KIPL, you follow the I-8, west at 1,000' or 1,500',
35 talk to El Centro Tower, pass through their airspace, kiss off with El Centro
36 Tower once clear of their airspace, then head to Plaster City, then utilize
37 GPS to navigate to Pine Valley, he noted there are intermediate ground visual
38 checkpoints to assist in navigation to Pine Valley, such as a wind farm,

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1 which you stay north of. En route to Pine Valley you climb to 6500' MSL for
2 VFR cruising altitudes westbound and terrain clearance, and dependent on
3 weather, if it is windy, he typically will climb earlier to obtain a PIREP of
4 weather conditions. After Pine Valley, you proceed to Lake Jennings, descend
5 to 3,000' to stay out of Gillespie Airfields airspace. Then proceed to Santee
6 Lakes, calling KNKX Tower to request entry to their airspace, and he stated
7 this procedure does not change at night.

8 When asked if there was a hypothetical moderate freezing layer
9 preventing you from climbing to 6500' MSL westbound from Plaster City to
10 KNKX, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated as a junior HAC, he would not fly through a
11 moderate icing layer.

12 When asked if HMH-361 is in the habit of going VFR below and utilizing
13 the I-8 for navigation to Pine Valley, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated its dependent on
14 Aircraft Commanders and that there are two schools of thought in the
15 squadron; with one school briefing, "I-8 as course rules", and the other
16 school who believe that if Yuma Course rules are closed due to weather, you
17 should not be attempting to enter Yuma Course rules VFR. He further stated,
18 at the same time if you maintain your VFR cloud clearances, you are legal to
19 fly in Bravo airspace.

20 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) explained further that some squadron aircrew view the I-
21 8 as a tool to see how weather is, "a little farther in", but they are
22 cognizant that by doing that they do run the risk of boxing themselves in.

23 When asked if squadron aircrew are worried when conducting VFR below
24 flight IVO the I-8 with the aircraft operating below the typical westbound
25 VFR cruising altitude of 6500' MSL, or if they deliberately adjust their
26 airspeed to provide more reaction time, he was unable to confirm the
27 aforementioned aircrews' opinion of the situation without making assumptions.

28 Making an educated guess, if he was part of one of those aircrews, he
29 would expect the NATOPS brief to include some sort of a slow down if there
30 was anticipated bad weather. He further stated, if there was bad weather and
31 the crew desired to "poke and prod" to see if there is in fact "bad weather"
32 they would slow down and go lower, but it would be a very deliberate action
33 so everyone was aware.

34 When asked if flight hour distribution had been well balanced in light
35 of the perceived high op-tempo, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated they are appropriately
36 spread-loaded based on where specific aircrew are at in their respective
37 syllabi.

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1 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) then provided a timeline of his day on 6 February 2024,
2 stating he mustered at the hotel, drove to Creech AFB, which took 30-40
3 minutes, assembled his products for the day flight, the mission was day
4 tactics for the younger copilots. Further, they were going to conduct
5 external operations and section Confined Area Landings.

6 Recalling the weather that day, there were cloud layers around the
7 mountains, and a relatively lower freezing layer of around 5500' MSL. Upon
8 takeoff, the crew was aware the weather was questionable to execute the
9 planned training. His Section Lead was the OPSO, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
10 was the wingman HAC. He stated they had a discussion of the game plan, they
11 planned to do a "recce" of the working area to give a good PIREP to the night
12 flight. Upon arriving to the working area, they determined the weather was
13 questionable and they determined they could not do their training as planned
14 in any of the mountainous area and they could not conduct the planned Terrain
15 Flight (TERF) route. So the section returned to Creech AFB, executed section
16 CALs, picked up HST, inserted them into the External zone so that the HST
17 could set up, they then proceeded to the section CAL zone to further practice
18 CALs.

19 During the practice CALs, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) aircraft experienced an
20 Airspeed Indication and Fuel transfer issue so they RTB'd while (b)(6),
21 (b)(6),(b)(7) aircraft conducted externals. After (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) aircraft was
22 fixed, they returned to the working area and conducted more section CALs with
23 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) aircraft.

24 They then hot-seated the aircraft to the night flights. Due to no hot-
25 gas being available at Creech AFB, they shutdown to receive gas. (b)(6),(b)
26 (b)(6), hot-seated to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). He could not recall who (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
27 hot-seated to.

28 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he then went inside, passing (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) who was
29 on his way out to his aircraft, which was a cold-go. In passing, (b)(6),(b)
30 (b)(6), stated to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), "Good luck, have fun." (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) crew
31 then conducted a debrief.

32 When asked if weather conditions discussions were had after his flight,
33 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated the only discussion he was a part of, "if (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
34 did not depart Creech to RTB to Miramar, the aircraft was still there the
35 next day, there was potential I was going to fly the aircraft the next day.
36 Take the aircraft home." He then asked how probable that scenario was, and
37 what the limiting factor was, it was stated that the weather would be the
38

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1 limiting factor, and that the schedule was still in routing. If (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
2 did not RTB, the plan was to return the following day as a four-ship.

3 When asked if anything stood out regarding TIGER 43's aircrew on 6
4 February, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he saw (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) in
5 the planning spaces speaking separately to individuals. In that time, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
6 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was speaking to the AMO, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). The only thing (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was
7 able to hear regarding their discussion was about the aircraft
8 troubleshooting a utility hydraulics leak around the left main landing gear
9 that ultimately got resolved. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he had experienced
10 it a week or so prior on that same aircraft and wrote a MAF on it, and he
11 characterized it as an aggressive leak associated with the brake system.
12 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) leak the week prior, was rapid enough to shutdown on deck in
13 MCAS Yuma, requiring them to conduct a patch job, before flying back to KNKX
14 during which they experienced no further leak.

15 When asked if (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was aware of any human factors that may
16 have been affecting TIGER 43's crew, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was unaware of any human
17 factors concerns or issues.

18 After debriefing his flight, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) returned to the hotel, ate
19 dinner, and retired for the evening. On the morning of 7 February, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
20 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was slated to return to Miramar via C-130. He awoke around 0630-0700,
21 and stated he saw a first alert on his phone of a helicopter crash. He then
22 checked his squadron messaging apps, that informed him there was an all hands
23 meeting that morning to pass word. Due to the "cryptic" nature of the
24 message, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) called another pilot to ask what the meeting was
25 about to which he was informed of the mishap. He then proceeded to the all
26 hands meeting in which the department heads informed the detachment personnel
27 of the mishap.

28 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) then sat down with the ASO, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), who was also
29 returning to Miramar via C-130, to run through the mishap binder and
30 checklist once more to ensure they did not miss anything.

31 When asked if anything was passed over the squadron's messaging apps
32 regarding TIGER 43's flight on 6 February, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that TIGER
33 43 messaged Safe On Deck at KIPL, and while on deck (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) messaged
34 asking if Yuma was open, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) replied with the closure time, and
35 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) provided the MCAS Yuma base frequency. Additionally at 2120
36 local, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) asked the ODO if he could get him the freezing level at
37 Miramar, the ODO replied, "5.5k per base weather." At 2141, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) then
38 asked for the cross section to see if there are clouds above 5k. The ODO then

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1 messaged the TAF line for Miramar, which included a broken layer at 020, and
2 the freezing layer (exact screenshots of this conversation are included the
3 investigation enclosures).

4 When asked if there is a designated ODO chat at HMH-361, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
5 stated no, however the messaging chat labeled as, "Cat Facts", serves a lot
6 of the similar purposes of an ODO chat.

7 When asked if there is anyone else the IO should speak to or if (b)(6),(b)
8 (b)(6), was aware of any other information that would contribute to the
9 investigation, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated it would be important to obtain how the
10 flights ODO brief went, specifically what weather was briefed or considered.

11 Regarding multiple versions of the 6 February schedule being
12 distributed, with the final version being released after 2300 on 5 February,
13 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated all the night aircrew on 6 February were aware they
14 were on the flight schedule the next day, even if they weren't on Version 2
15 (which was released late in the evening), and were added to the final
16 version, Version 3.

17 When asked about the recent op-tempo leading up to the Creech UTD,
18 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated they worked "12-on-12-off"-meaning they worked 12 hour
19 shifts, one day shift, one night shift back to back - for a six day period
20 when the Ospreys were first grounded, due to tasking that their squadron now
21 had to pick up. Leading up to the UTD, the squadron had two aircraft ready to
22 launch, but the other two aircraft were still having inspections and MAFs
23 closed out the morning of 31 January. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that (b)(6),(b)
24 (b)(6),(b) crew flew the Mishap Aircraft (MA) up to Creech UTD on 31 January, but
25 was that aircraft was not yet FCF complete.

26 Regarding the Safety culture at HMH-361 from his check-in to leading up
27 to the mishap, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that following the recent UDP, they had
28 an, "adequate at best", ASO, and that the Safety department was trending
29 negatively. But after they sent (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) to ASO school,
30 the Safety department and culture improved, specifically after SLTE 5-23.

31 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated his understanding as to why TIGER 43 was required
32 to return the MA to KNKX on 6 February, it was to support a FRAG later that
33 week.

34 When asked how he would characterize (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) as a HAC, (b)(6),(b)
35 (b)(6), stated he was very knowledgeable, and he learned a great deal doing
36 his night HAC review with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), he was a mentor in the squadron,
37 people looked up to him. When he flew he was very calculated, and had a well-
38 thought out approach.

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1 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) characterized (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) CRM approach as calm, cool
2 and collected. Furthermore, when (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) encountered issues, he was open
3 to hearing "whatever" and never showed anger to other crewmembers regarding
4 their opinions.

5 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) signed a Permissive Authorization for Search and Seizure
6 to provide screen shots to Investigating Officer. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was directed
7 not to discuss his statement to the Investigating Officer with others per the
8 Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b) (6)

Name:..... (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....
Service:.....U.S. Marine Corps
Unit:.....HMH-361
Date:.....28 February 2024

NOTICE

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On 28 February 2024, the Investigating Officer met with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (the "Interviewee"). The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview to the Interviewee, to include the difference with a safety investigation. The Interviewee understood that the Interviewee's statement is not privileged. The Interviewee swore or affirmed to tell the Investigation Officer the truth. The Interviewee agreed to have Interviewee's interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is an abridged summary and not a verbatim transcript of what the Interviewee told the Investigating Officer during the interview:

I told the Investigating Officer where I was from and where and when I went to college. I commissioned [as an Officer in the Marine Corps] in the summer of 2019 and then went to The Basic School. I went to flight school at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Then, I completed my completed my aviation training.

I joined the squadron, HMH-361, in June 2023. The check in process was pretty good. The conversations you will have with the XO or CO will discuss "we are not here to crush you" and "we know you have families." I was encouraged to make time to go to the gym, which I appreciated. The hardest issue was probably getting computer access, which is the same for everyone. Otherwise, no problems with the check-in process.

Check-in with training officers, at the time, "Nuke" was the PTO. Nuke started us off by telling us about how, for Nuke, everything was a mystery. "Now, we want you more involved in your training." "We are going to ask you to do things. If you genuinely do not want to do something, it will not be held against you." We did get "ambush university" which is a bunch of prerequisites. Your introduction to higher level codes is through publications, which is also the eye-opener for tactics. We were also all bound for SLTE. So, the ambush university set the expectation of what is

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1 expected of you as co-pilot and then you will get the HAC syllabus. I have
2 not completed the HLL syllabus. I was a couple of flights away before [the]
3 Creech [Detachment in February 2024]. It was all low-light there. The mishap
4 put my training on hold.

5 Check-in with safety - it was were I was going - was with a lot of
6 changeover. As I came in, the DOSS was leaving. When I returned from PTAD,
7 there was a new DOSS. I was going to be NATOPS officer. I was told I would be
8 the GSO, but there was no course. I am currently the NATOPS officer and the
9 GSO. I remember that I received all the initial training that all the check-
10 ins receive now, with a check-in sheet they sign, with a check-in binder. It
11 goes over the CO's safety policy, such as hearing protection, emergency exit
12 plans. They sign it. Then, we tell them how to report safety concerns,
13 including anonymously. That is what the process looked like with me. I picked
14 up NATOPS at SLTE. There was some "hand-holding" at the beginning, but it
15 became easier. I do not have a call sign yet.

16 My initial ODO training was a nighttime one, but not a daytime one. I
17 believe they are pretty much the same thing. I do not remember who I was on
18 the desk with. The ODO that night (or day) usually starts with the ODO brief.
19 They are building it to give to the crews that are about to fly. They start,
20 for example, pulling whether. At training, you learn the process how that is
21 supposed to go, but at least how we do it here at HMH-361. It is like what I
22 had at 302, but now there is no ADO or someone to report to. You will prepare
23 NOTAMS, weather, the schedule, and you have the aircraft, Safe for Flight,
24 flight notes that pertain to that particular crew, those are the first
25 things. You go through the weather, METAR, TAFS, and you go through that
26 line-by-line. With NOTAMS, it is the same thing. You point out the most
27 significant ones, that are more recent. Ones that have been there a while,
28 you can go over them again, but for the most part, people know them. We also
29 use SKYVECTOR for TFRs for weather. I executed my training right before we
30 left for SLTE in around July 2023. It was "this is how we do it at HMH-361."
31 You usually have a daytime and a nighttime, but I only receive one training -
32 I do not remember which one.

33 For mishap checklist execution, the training is "you have all these
34 numbers to call" and who to call first, determining what to tell them. We
35 have the mishap binder. There are also instructions in the ODO binder. The
36 mishap binder was a training I mostly got at SLTE. Anyone standing ODO, we
37 went through a simulated mishap similar. The person running the binder starts
38 to delegate. You push those tasks out to other people and have a runner.

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1 People will make calls and tell you what happened or go around base and bring
2 you information. "You go with questions, they come back with answers kind of
3 thing." You have a scribe who is always writing everything down. We really
4 only practiced this once. It was a big, squadron effort. It was kind of like
5 everyone to the ready room, and simulated. The person on ODO started the
6 checklist. The ADO is there supervising.

7 We did not do a mishap drill at Creech. The mishap binder was out there
8 at Creech. When I did my mishap training, I did not practice a mishap drill.
9 I was told, "this is the mishap binder" and included "this is the checklist"
10 and "this is how you would begin tackling this mishap." Things like RMI and
11 IRS that we used at 3d MAW were in there, too, "hey, if we have a flash
12 report . . . this is where you could go to find that information." At the
13 time (of training), I did not have IRS access. We made sure that we then had
14 it.

15 Before 6 February 2024, I probably viewed the mishap binder a couple of
16 times. We had the mishap drill. After that, I went through it on my own and
17 to refresh. And, then, another time when I was on ODO because I wanted to
18 look at it again. My ODO training was similar to my peers receiving the
19 training. I cannot say there was a drastic difference at the time.

20 I was not part of building the training binder at [the] Creech
21 [Detachment]. All I can speak to is (b)(6), was new to the safety shop. (b)(6),
22 took over and had just returned from ASO school. (b)(6), wanted to revamp a
23 couple of things and started going through everything to update everything.

24 I know there are two Risk Analysis Worksheets. I know the big one that
25 tells you things like flight hours, last time you flew, low light, high
26 light, and the risks associated with those: high, medium, and low. The small
27 risk analysis worksheet basis off the big worksheet. The big worksheet has to
28 be signed with the schedule, and the small worksheet is signed with the
29 aircraft commander and ODO. I looked at the "big" RAW and "mini" RAW (which
30 is a half-sheet of paper) for 6 February 2024.

31 On 6 February 2024, I knew I was coming in at night with a 1230 muster
32 time. I woke up late because it was going to be a busy night. I was going to
33 be ODO for back in Miramar as well, and the schedule told me that I would
34 have to get all the information for flights at Creech and at home to report.
35 I had a late breakfast - I would not even call it breakfast, I guess. I
36 showed up at the hotel café around 1150. I saw a few guys leaving. In that
37 group, I for sure saw (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). I am not
38 sure of everyone who was in the group. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) asked me, "are you going

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1 to eat here?" I said, "yeh." He said, "cool. I'm going to try to find
2 something at the deli or some other place." I sit down, I am alone, and think
3 I am not going to have enough time to sit here and wait for the food, change,
4 and make muster. I ask for food to go. I see (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) walking back fast,
5 and I am thinking "that is the right decision" because we are just going to
6 make muster at 1230. I go back to my room, change, and meet everyone at the
7 lobby for muster at 1230.

8 We get into the van. I am in the very back seat. A captain was to my
9 left, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was in front of me, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was in front of the
10 captain to my left. It is a 40 minute to one hour drive. We did not hit
11 traffic. We listened to [country music artist] Toby Keith because Toby Keith
12 had recently passed away. We were laughing and joking about the music. There
13 were conversations going on, but I was listening to the music. We arrived at
14 Creech around 1315 to 1330 and as I walked into the building, it was hectic.
15 The ODO before me was coordinating the retrograde.

16 For crew day, we have a ten-hour workday. For the ODO, it is the same
17 as the aircrew. My training was that the crew day mirrors that of the
18 aircrew. For example, if I am supposed to be ODO in the morning and there are
19 obligations that do not necessarily require flying, I come in earlier than
20 the crews. However, it is around their timeline and brief time. I believe, if
21 I remember correctly, that ten hours is extendable by the CO. I do not
22 remember at this time who else can extend. It begins when I arrive at work.
23 It ends at the debrief. You brief when you get into work, and then, ten hours
24 later, "you're a potato" with exception.

25 In all three versions of the flight schedule, I was the "PM" ODO. You
26 usually coordinate with the AM ODO when to start, obviously not to interfere
27 with your rest. Depending on that overlap, will discuss when the PM ODO can
28 come in. That way, I will still have a couple hours not to disrupt my crew
29 rest. For me, I was going to start as soon as I got there, in the special
30 situation where I am going in with the night crews. Also, there is a van plan
31 to adhere. I did not have a discussion with the AM ODO at that point - it was
32 more like, "when I get there, I'll start getting the turnover from you" and
33 then take over. At Miramar, there is coordination the night before and day
34 of. For example, if I am PM ODO, I will text the AM ODO the night before or
35 the morning of, "when do you want me to take over?" "Cool." It is a fluid
36 turnover with implied crew day limitations on 6 January 2024.

37 As stated, it was a little chaotic arriving at Creech. The AM ODO
38 ["(b)(6),"] was busy because there were two or three (I want to say two)

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1 aircraft out. I will describe where is the ODO. It is in the ready room.
2 There is a door with a window, and in front of it is a desk for the ODO.
3 There is internet coming into that computer from the window. On 6 January
4 2024, the internet was down. What I do is use my assigned work laptop, which
5 needs a hard line. Creech [Air Force Base] had a public wifi network, so I
6 could not connect my work laptop. During the interview, I drew a diagram for
7 the Investigating Officer to accompany this statement. That diagram says "ODO
8 Desk" in the top left-hand corner. The diagram is a drawing of the ready room
9 at Creech, to the best of my memory. I think it was five seats on each side,
10 but I do not remember exactly. The projector hung down from the ceiling. We
11 would enter the room by one of the two doorways noted on the diagram. The
12 room fits about 20 or 30 chairs on each side. The windows were blacked out,
13 and even if you could see outside in the direction of the flightline-which
14 was outside that wall-I think there were bushes blocking the view. It was a
15 single-story building. The door goes directly outside and then to the
16 flightline. The door lacks a window. They were also running a cord through
17 the window for the radio.

18 If you walked past the planning spaces, it would take you to another
19 area where there was a consolidated staff section space. You would continue
20 further to get to the maintenance through the first three. Eventually, you
21 would branch off into a hallway that could take you straight to flight-e, and
22 further down that hallway was a conference room where airframes would be.
23 That would then take you to maintenance; that is where control was.

24 Going back to the internet, the wifi was public and could not be used
25 with government laptops. I did not bring my personal laptop. The hard line
26 was down. I do not remember if it was down for the previous ODO. I had my
27 personal cell phone and my personal iPad, connecting to the internet wifi.
28 Air Force assets were not available to me.

29 We keep our ODO briefs on Microsoft Teams and updated them every day.
30 Usually, the PM ODO builds the ODO brief by making a skeleton for the next
31 day's ODOs. It will have space for weather, such as a slide for weather at
32 specific airports. Here, it would be for Miramar and Creech. The problem was
33 I was unable to get on Teams. I asked another Marine to build the brief on
34 that Marine's personal computer.

35 I am aware that, as far as I can remember, one flight schedule came out
36 on 6 February 2024. I do not remember when it was distributed. I learned I
37 had PM ODO on 5 February 2024, when I was looking at the schedule, and I may
38 have seen it on the weekly. I try to look the day before to see what I am

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1 going to be on the schedule for and then I look for changes. Usually PM ODO
2 does not change, so that is likely why I do not remember when it came back.

3 I rode with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) to the air station. I remember asking (b)(6),(b)
4 (b)(6), either the night or day before, or a couple of days before, "are you
5 all going? That is, meaning going back to Miramar, because we knew the
6 weather was kind of poor. It was really cold. We had some weather a couple of
7 nights before, when (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) crew was coming in. We just knew that -
8 well, I knew - that there were tornado watches back in Miramar at the time.

9 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) worked in operations. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had, in my head, got
10 promoted. Our last weekly writer went to flightline so someone needed to fill
11 that position. While at Creech, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had filled that position and
12 was in the know. This is why I asked (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) about the flight returning
13 to Miramar and I knew (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was going to be on crew as well. I do not
14 know why the airplane had to return on 6 February 2024 and that is a question
15 I have.

16 During the car ride to Creech, I do not remember a conversation about
17 the third flight schedule or when it was disseminated. The only conversations
18 I heard, before I turned on music, was about Toby Keith. There was nothing
19 about the schedule. Individuals were talking the weather and around that
20 third aircraft leaving to return, things like "this is kind of weird."

21 It was going back-and-forth between being day crew and night crew at
22 Creech. I was ODO twice while we were out there: the nights of, and a few
23 nights before (both were PM). I was on for a day flight either the day before
24 or a couple of days before. I am not sure what the looked like for
25 maintainers. I am certain it was for the crews, like pilots and crew chiefs.
26 On Monday 5 February 2024 they could not complete the NSI check because of
27 weather. I was on for a flight that day. Right before the night crews went,
28 the AMO and I went and started the aircraft, kind of like a hotseat.

29 On 5 February 2024, we went out at our scheduled time (1200) to try to
30 make the takeoff time. I was not in the seat. The AMO and OPSO were both in
31 the seat. I was going to be the hotseat later on in the flight. We got out
32 there and there were problems, I believe, something with the main gearbox. I
33 do not remember. I think it had to do with the number three engine. We shut
34 it down, drained it. A bunch of flight liners and maintainers were out there.
35 We got back in the aircraft. They were like, "okay, we will do a thirty-
36 minute ground guarantee to see if it will come back on." It was a light. I
37 was up by ICS in the back of the cabin. I do not remember which aircraft it
38 was - was the aircraft for the day flight that did not go.

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1 Again, we did not go due to weather and partly due to maintenance. Two
2 of those aircraft went out. It was not us. It was not 366, because I would
3 remember if it was 366.

4 I was only on ODO one other time at Creech. I will say that the NSI
5 crews were all the same at Creech because they tried to keep it the same from
6 Monday to Tuesday. We hot seated that aircraft to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) on 5 February
7 2024. Then, I went home and it did not end up going. Then we came in for
8 Tuesday.

9 On 6 February 2024, I showed up around 1315, 1320ish. I started getting
10 a passdown from the AM ODO, who, again, was running around. I took a picture
11 of the AM ODO's scratch pad. I really got the aircraft from the day from the
12 AM ODO. The main thing I got was which aircraft was going to each crew. I
13 feel comfortable sharing copies of my notes about the day with the
14 Investigating Officer, including the notes. I voluntarily give permission for
15 my notes to be reviewed. I voluntarily give permission for screenshots of
16 chats and other messages about the mishap to be reviewed. I can share
17 relevant screenshots from the mishap, although I do not know if the person
18 from the other end would be comfortable. From that night, one conversation
19 was with the OPSO, one was with Jabba (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), and one was with the
20 XO. They touched on TIGER 43 and operations at large. I would want to treat
21 this as showing a conversation between friends and do not know how they would
22 feel about me sharing the messages. I do not mind sharing any conversations
23 with the mishap crew. I signed the Permissive Authorization for Search and
24 Seizure with the Investigating Officer.

25 The AM ODO's notepad has notes from 6 February 2024. The ODO passdown
26 usually involves reviewing the logbook and notes of items not in the logbook.
27 The thing I mostly took a picture of was which aircraft was going to which
28 crew. Four one was going to have 518, four two was going to have 366, and
29 four three was 387. Obviously, that changed. That was mostly what I wanted so
30 I could brief to the crews. I wanted any problems from the day crews to
31 brief. The turnover was pretty quick, because the AM ODO was running around
32 doing other stuff. It ended with this picture and the AM ODO asking me if I
33 needed anything else. I began to prepare the brief. This was around 1330. We
34 discussed which aircraft were airborne. We briefly discussed weather. I had
35 seen the weather coming in. I think the AM ODO told me an aircraft was at a
36 zone that was "doable" that was previously not because of weather. I think
37 this was how they did the NSI check - if we could get to certain areas. We
38

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1 discussed the lineup of the aircraft out and then those aircraft would
2 hotseat to the night.

3 The ODO logbook is a long "green monster." At Creech, we called it a
4 Det ODO logbook. I do not know where the logbook is from 6 February 2024. The
5 AM ODO opens it, and the PM ODO closes it out. You put departures and
6 arrivals with airfields. Once everyone is back, safe on deck, close it out. I
7 usually put the lines and have the page setup for the next day. I do not have
8 a copy of the ODO log from that night from the logbook. The turnover was
9 probably five, seven minutes. It was not that long. They usually are not
10 long. The longest ones I have been in are when there are maintenance issues,
11 maybe 10 minutes. The AM ODO was walking around. The photo of the notes I
12 took was by the printer. You would be unable to hear a radio call from one of
13 the helicopters that was out. The radio was week (a PRC). I clip it to my
14 collar. There was no way either of us could hear radio calls while we were
15 talking and walking. I do not know if the AM ODO had someone manning the
16 radio.

17 On ODO, we have a clipboard that usually has the original schedule and
18 RAW beneath it. I do not believe we had a clipboard at Creech. I think it was
19 just sitting at the ODO desk. I do not remember if it had the original stamp.
20 I reviewed the three schedule versions with the Investigating Officer. When I
21 took the duty desk, the squadron was operating off version three of the
22 schedule. I do not remember the original stamp. Again, the schedule and RAW
23 are usually in a clipboard, not in a binder. Big RAW 3.3 looks like what was
24 at the desk in Creech. When the crews were filling wing powers, I think I was
25 still trying to get the big RAW - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) came up to me and was asking for
26 it. What ended up happening was they found it, or another one was printed. I
27 think (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) found it while I was continuing to work, or it was printed.
28 I did not make any notes on the big RAW. I do not remember seeing any notes
29 from the CO or DODS in the righthand column.

30 When I took the desk, I believe (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was on a flight per the
31 schedule. The AMO was around, I do not remember exactly where the AMO was. I
32 do not remember if the AMO was designated nights. The XO was back a Miramar.
33 I do not remember where the CO was. I believe the CO was around because the
34 AMO and OPSO left at the same time, and had the CO with them. I did not see
35 the CO. I did not see the CO later when the mishap occurred.

36 After I got the turnover from the AM ODO, I called KNKX [ICAO code for
37 Miramar Air Station] for the maxes from base weather (temperature, etc.), for
38 the maxes at Creech. They told me that they were busy and that there was

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1 inclement weather down at Miramar. They were fielding requests that they
2 would usually do during their day-to-day. When we call for weather for bases
3 outside of the usual airfields (like Creech), it takes a while. I tried
4 calling first and they gave me a callback number and could not provide them
5 at the time. I called base weather at Creech for the Creech maxes. I wrote
6 them down. Temp: 5 PA: 33 61 DA 3218 Freezing Level: 5,522. I got the maxes
7 there for Creech. At 1400 I believe the ODO brief began. So, TIGERs 421, 442,
8 and 443 were all there in the room. I reviewed the 6 February 2024 brief with
9 the Investigating Officer. Along with internet being down and me being unable
10 to get on teams, I asked (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) for assistance building the
11 brief. I believe he and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) were working on something schedule-
12 wise. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was assisting (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). They looked kind of
13 stressed, too. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was able to get on Teams but there was no
14 current brief built for the sixth, which the AM ODO traditionally would have
15 built. I asked the AM ODO what the AM ODO used to brief and I asked the PM
16 ODO the night before what was used. The AM ODO said it must not have saved.
17 It was tense between the previous PM ODO and I because the previous PM ODO
18 was busy time was running short. When I started getting maxes, it was 1330,
19 so we only had 30 minutes to prepare the brief. I remember feeling like I was
20 in a rush. I remember feeling that it was ridiculous that there was no brief
21 for me to fill in and use. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) started building the brief while
22 I was figuring out weather. I tried getting a dash one for them. By 1400, the
23 brief was made and had things that I knew I was going to need upfront:
24 NOTAMs, weather, and crews. I gave the brief. I made a timeline of the events
25 and am willing to share them, to include cell phone call log information and
26 messages.

27 The ODO brief lasted about 15 minutes. They then gave the tactics
28 brief, going on behind me. One of the last things I asked was if "there were
29 any taskers for me?" (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) wanted a dash one from Miramar for
30 Creech. We could get a dash one from Creech at Creech, but the weather was
31 not super accurate the night before, so (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) wanted one from Miramar
32 as well. All of TIGER 41 through 43 crew, including enlisted aircrew, were
33 present for the brief. The ODO brief went, and will always go, first. I
34 reviewed the brief with Investigating Officer.

35 Reviewing the ODO brief, I briefed the crews the airborne flights. The
36 circle is Safe for Flight. I believe there was maintenance going on - but it
37 was Safe for Flight, as far as I could remember, because there were two
38 flights outbound. I do not remember why (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and the crew took 366.

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1 Looking at my notes from that night, I wrote "387 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and crew
2 hotseat from us had to return with no airspeed indication." That is, 387
3 returned to Creech because no airspeed indication. I believe they rectified
4 the problem and went back outbound. I do not remember when the switch
5 happened or why the switch happened.

6 I do not remember exactly when the switch could have happened. By the
7 time they had walked, it had changed after the ODO brief. It was between the
8 ODO brief at 1400 time and takeoff time at 1700 (those three hours). I
9 remember the switch happening after the tactics brief, which went pretty
10 long. It can take an hour, if not longer, because this was an NSI check. I
11 did not find out about the switch until after the tactics brief was over. I
12 believe I spoke with control about the switch to find out. For allocation, I
13 would go to maintenance and, if I have not gotten already what I needed from
14 the ODO, I will call them to back up what I said. That night - that day - I
15 do not believe I did. I believe (b)(6), (b)(7) told me those two aircraft were
16 outbound, 387 was ready to go, and there were no problems already at that
17 time. I believe it was three to make three (that is, no spare). My notes
18 show, I believe, the last aircraft was FCF status - 784 was not ready to go.

19 For the brief, the podium was in front of the screen, and I was
20 briefing the room. The OPSO was flying. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) may have been sitting
21 at the desk, because (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was going to get up for (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
22 brief.

23 TIGER 43 took off, supported the NSI check, and returned to Creech. It
24 is common that there was no flight note that TIGER 43 stopped at Imperial,
25 since it said they would go from Creech to Miramar. The flight plan would not
26 list a stopover. The plan would come from the crew. I am not sure if it is
27 signed off by the CO or anyone else, but usually that crew comes up with that
28 plan and they are obviously going to talk about it with others before
29 executing it. I believe there were a couple plans "thrown around" for
30 TIGER 43, such as going from Creech to Havasu [in Nevada], and then going to
31 either Yuma because 465 was there or go to Imperial, and, if needed, to back
32 to Yuma. Or, Havasu to Imperial, then back to Miramar. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) told me
33 their plan was Havasu via Bull City. I got a safe on deck. They skipped over
34 Havasu and went straight to Imperial.

35 Going through the ODO presentation, the slide deck includes day and
36 night maxes. The brief includes "holdover" for weather. I honestly think that
37 slide was (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) doing. I started briefing KINS [Creech Airfield]
38 and I made it to Las Vegas (LAS). Then the crew wanted to review it on their

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own. The weather was pulled collectively by me, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c).

I remember thinking, going through the slide deck, that Miramar weather is not on here. I do not remember discussing the weather with a member of TIGER 43. At the end of the brief, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) asked for the dash one from Miramar for Creech and asked for maxes as well because they thought the weather was not as good. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) wanted to know about the NOTAMs at Havasu. I believe my first time asked about it I looked at it on my own. I do not remember the exact first time. I know for sure, when they landed again from supporting the NSI check, before they left, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) all came inside. I believe they were still spinning and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was in the seat. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did not come in, as far as I know.

HII [Havasú] had an applicable NOTAMs about the apron closed; parking (the very first one). There was a NOTAM about Havasu. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) wanted to know more about that and I texted (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) about when they expected to arrive. I looked it up and it was an irrelevant NOTAM from the seventh.

I do not remember, as stated, the first time I discussed weather with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). I remember they came inside and we talked about weather. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) came in and sat next to me and asked "how is the weather?" I was still using my iPad and cell phone. I had SKYVECTOR and the TAFs and METARS up on my iPad. I said, "it is fine" and "you will at least make it to Imperial." I may have said or thought that, including "you will at least make it to Miramar." (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was behind me, and my back was to the rest of the room. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), I believe, had a conversation with the AMO. I am telling (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) about the weather, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) comes up to my right side and looks at the weather too. On SKYVECTOR there were layers to select such as icing, which was pulled up. It was pretty big. The icing layer covered a very large area. Freezing layer, I kept getting all night, was 5,523. I got that from KINS for the freezing level there. Miramar told me 5,580. Later on, when I called Miramar base weather to get the Miramar maxes, it was 5.5 as well - or I got those maxes from the AM ODO from Miramar. There was not necessarily going to be a PM ODO for Miramar - I was going to be it for both places.

When TIGER 43 was arriving back at Miramar, there was no ODO at Miramar. I remember when looking for TIGER 43, I called the ODO at Yuma, Arizona, because they may have landed there or Yuma knows something. As far as maintenance, I do not know if we had a maintenance footprint at Miramar. I

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1 called Miramar and our SDO picked up and that is who I was talking to back at
2 Miramar.

3 In the brief, the EP quiz on MSHARP showed that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was
4 delinquent. I cannot confirm that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was not delinquent. I remember
5 seeing that before we left for Creech, we made everyone do an EP quiz.
6 Someone back home helped me put those in MSHARP. There were some
7 delinquencies when we got to Creech. I did not check. I do not if they
8 checked. I was still briefing this part. No one spoke up to say something
9 along of the lines that this is incorrect.

10 The RAP cycle is factual data in the brief.

11 Again, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) wanted an 1801 dash one for the flight originating
12 and ending in Creech, and the maxes. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had asked me before the
13 brief, and wanted the maxes from Creech to Miramar. That is, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
14 wanted Marine Corps weather forecasters providing the data. Maxes discuss
15 temperature, pressure altitude, density altitude, and the freezing level.

16 My brief was about 15 minutes. TIGER 41 through TIGER 43 did not ask me
17 anything else notable that was not already discussed, except that I was going
18 to write the flight plan for them - the 1801 submissions. The single
19 destination is Creech.

20 I completed my ODO brief, and they transition into the tactics portion
21 led by (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). All commanders, all copilots, and majority of aircrew
22 TIGER 41 through 43 were there. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was there. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
23 was flying that night. I believe (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was in the seat for the
24 first leg - the NSI certification - was (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c).
25 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was still out there. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) come in
26 to talk. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) go out, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) gets in
27 the back. I do not know who was sitting in which seat. It is not standardized
28 where the HAC was sitting - it depends on preference and mission. Every other
29 time I was sitting with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) I was in the right seat.

30 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is awesome to fly with. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is very proficient.
31 My best flights are with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). They way (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) instructed and
32 broke things down made sense. I once asked (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) what (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
33 degree was, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) responded something like Oceanography. (b)(6),(b)
34 (b) talked like a physicist. Again, my best flight tours were with (b)(6),(b)
35 (b)(6). That was just the kind of guy (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was to fly with.

36 They go into their tactics brief. About after an hour, there is the
37 change to 366. Then, they break off to individual NATOPS briefs in different
38 places. I remember leaving the ready room, I do remember exactly what I was

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1 doing. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) crew was briefing in the hallway. I do
2 not remember if they were all there yet, as they were gathering to begin the
3 brief. I believe (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) crew stayed in the ready
4 room. I remember (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) briefing. I did not hear any of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
5 briefs.

6 In my experience, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) NATOPS briefings are like everyone
7 else's. The brief starts by going through the look-out doctrine, seat
8 assignment, NOTAMS to point out, weather, and emergencies. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
9 briefs landing criteria, no fights in the cockpit. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) says go
10 through everything "cookbook" style, which means reading everything line-by-
11 line. We then brief landing criteria. I think (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) goes into
12 pertinent pieces in detail and what are (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) expectations. Then
13 they discuss TPG. They will discuss night-vision goggles.

14 That evening, they were using night-vision goggles. The only reason why
15 I believe slap data was briefed - I cannot confirm it was covered - but I
16 believe it was covered because it was an NSI check and we usually brief slap
17 data for any night flight. There was a separate slide, I believe, for the
18 data. However, I do not remember hearing anything specifically, although I
19 was back to writing flight plans for submission.

20 Mountainous and non-mountainous was not per se traditionally covered. A
21 couple of days before, or a night before, the OPSO gave us a class on
22 mountainous operations and what to expect for airflow, turfing, being in a
23 section, and all those types of things. Going back to think about this, this
24 is ironic. The inadvertent IMC procedures are briefed in the tactics brief.
25 Inadvertent IMC procedures are discussed twice - how the section or division
26 are going to execute IMC. For a single, we usually brief - we suspect we will
27 go IMC - we will circumnavigate to remain VMC however if we go inadvertent
28 IMC, we will fly straight level, level the wings, level the nose, center the
29 ball, squawk 770 and fly up to our MSA. The MSA was funny because usually
30 here we have a set number that we are ready to brief. Out there, it changed,
31 because the mountains were higher and I think we were set higher. I do not
32 remember what the MSA was set out of Creech.

33 We dial up approach and look for a PAR back at the home field. So, for
34 Creech, I forget what we were going to brief.

35 Turning back to the crew connecting their NATOPS brief, afterwards,
36 they did not receive an outbrief from me. At that point, there was no
37 discussion of weather specific in Miramar or any of the divers such as Camp
38 Pendleton, North Island, or other locations in the vicinity, and field hours

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1 at Yuma before the crews walk for the NSI check. I do not believe any
2 discussion was given to Yuma hours at that time, but it comes up later in
3 text messages.

4 I wrote the flight plans for TIGER 41, TIGER 42, and TIGER 43. They
5 were three separate documents. I placed them in (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) hands and
6 asked (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) to walk them over to base operations.

7 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) submitted them and said there were no issues. I reviewed
8 the flight plans with the Investigating Officer and noted the only one that
9 would change would be TIGER 43. I wrote destination airfield KNKX. The
10 remarks would be to operate as a flight with TIGER 41 and TIGER 42, but then
11 to break off to go to KNKX. I took a picture of one of the flight plans to
12 get the dash one. It was one a stopover flight plan. I did not write in a
13 separate airfield because I would have wrote it in. Again, the flight plan
14 was given to Creech base operations. I had not seen the document since
15 handing over to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). Later that night, I was regretting not
16 taking pictures of all the documents because I usually would take a picture.

17 Creech requires 1801s before taking off. A couple of nights before, we
18 did file a flight on just one, and they "screamed" at us. They said they
19 needed plans for every single plane.

20 I received a dash one from Creech and one from Miramar. I used
21 TIGER 41's, so that is why it will only say KINS [ICAO code for Creech
22 airfield] to KINS. As far as I am aware, any type of professionally
23 forecasted weather from Creech to Miramar was not provided. Only TIGER 41 was
24 submitted to Miramar and Miramar provided the 1801. I only used TIGER 41's
25 flight plan to get that. None of the 1801s covered Miramar or weather in
26 route to Miramar.

27 I am not aware of any other flight plans filed for TIGER 43 after they
28 landed in Creech when they went to Imperial, and then Imperial back home.
29 That is, no flight plan for the stopover. I personally did not write one and
30 I do not know if the crew did. I did not discuss this with them.

31 In the ODO log, I logged their takeoff time and land time. TIGER 43
32 took off before the other two aircraft, around 1733. They were going to
33 insert HST into the zone. Then, the other two aircraft would leave. 1752,
34 TIGER 41 and TIGER 42 go outbound.

35 I do not remember TIGER 43 relaying anything noteworthy to me during
36 the NSI certification, from Creech to Creech. At 2100 there was an extension
37 requested by (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) for a 30-minute extension of the flight time for
38 TIGER 41. This was for externals. They had a problem with the sling - I think

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1 TIGER 41 was the only one that came back for the sling. I do not have a copy
2 of TIGER 41's division brief. I think TIGER 43 had already come back inside
3 at this time. There is an officer's chat, in essence. I believe (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
4 called me over the radio and I was the one that sent the request in the
5 message. That is, I put the thirty-minute extension request over the chat.
6 The OPSO approved it. The OPSO had already departed for the day.

7 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and crew came inside around 1900. They were outbound for
8 Miramar around 1923. Again, they took off around 1723 to execute the insert.
9 They then returned and landed around 1900. As previously discussed,
10 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) came in, and so did (b)(6),(b)(7)(c).
11 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) are outside. This is where they
12 asked me about weather. I do not remember what the then conversation with
13 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) [the AMO] was about. I remember hearing (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) say something
14 to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) along the lines of, "if you think you can make it, go." This
15 is not verbatim. It was almost like (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was asking, "should I go?"

16 There was never a conversation about the aircraft's hydraulics, or
17 warnings, cautions, or advisories with the aircraft at this point, prior to
18 them leaving. I flew 366 a month earlier in Yuma and we had a plethora of
19 problems with it, to include a number two engine overheat, hydraulics, and
20 main gear box. The utility hydraulics had a leak - it was not a little leak.
21 That crew was me, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), a sergeant, a corporal, and a lance
22 corporal. There was not conversation at that point that I heard between
23 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) about any maintenance issues with the aircraft.

24 Again, I admire (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) aviation acumen. I knew that
25 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is usually the one that has the plan and is pretty confident. A
26 lot of people will character (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) as "friend (b)(6), " and then
27 "instructor (b)(6), " or "planning (b)(6), " because (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is the one who
28 delegates or tasks. Going back to that conversation with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), it felt
29 like (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was looking for corroboration for what (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was
30 about to do. I have not thought about it this way until now. Just from what I
31 overheard, it sounded like (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) wanted someone to tell (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
32 it way "okay" to go. I do not know if this is speculation, but when I was ODO
33 a few nights before and when (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) crew was coming into Creech, the
34 weather that night was pretty bad. There were a lot of things going on. It
35 started hailing, rain, and thunderstorms. There were two aircraft on deck. I
36 asked if they could get HST, they were unable. We still sent one of our two
37 aircraft to go. The field is about to go IFR, which means the aircraft would
38 not be able to go. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) walks in, after landing, and after making it

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1 there, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) reaction, when asked "are you alright?" was "I
2 don't know if I was going to make it." I bring this up because if I look at
3 the conversation with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) taking that risk again given that
4 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had just come back from a flight with bad weather, and I
5 consider (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) a very proficient pilot about to go to advance
6 schooling, who you feel very comfortable flying with. I do not see
7 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) taking another chance, so the "okay" would be from someone else
8 higher than (b)(6),(b)(7)(c).

9 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is, sometimes I feel, dismissive, when I am a copilot. For
10 people like (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), and other pilots, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is
11 very open. I am not saying (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is a bad person. Co-pilots and young
12 Captains speak with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), is what I am saying. The higher qualified
13 guys get a little more than we do. We still joke around and things like that.

14 Again, I do not recall why the aircraft had to return to Miramar. Right
15 after (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) says, "do you think you can make it go," (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
16 comes into the ready room and says 465 is at Yuma and "we can go there if we
17 need to" or something along those line. Someone said we could do DNTs as
18 well, that is, with 465. So, the implication I take from that is that they
19 will have the necessary materials and tools they need. And someone mentioned,
20 "yeah, and there will be a Q there [in Yuma]." That is, support would be in
21 Yuma if departed that night.

22 In summary, it seemed that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was seeking someone more senior
23 them (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) to make the call based on the weather. The OPSO was
24 present, but I do not know if the OPSO had any input into the weather.
25 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) came over, looked at skyvector, and the airmet - giant, light
26 blue - and there was a SIGMET over Miramar - it was read. You could see the
27 actual clouds. It looked like the weather was moving north then east.
28 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) looked at the METARS. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) looked at Miramar for sure. I
29 do not remember if (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) looked at Miramar or Havasu. I do not think
30 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) looked at North Island, Ramona, or Pendleton.

31 TIGER 43 called outbound 1923. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had to say it twice,
32 because the radio was not good and I had to ask the aircraft to repeat
33 itself. At that point, weather conditions were really cold. I do not believe
34 it was raining because the night before it was raining really bad. I remember
35 the weather I had given them was that it had broken up. They were going to
36 depart VFR. I do not know if they had discussed a VFR flight following.

37 Between Creech and Imperial, I did not speak with the crew. I called
38 down to Imperial to get them a fuel hit around 2115 - I had been asked to do

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1 that by the crew. They called safe on deck around 2116, which was in the
2 chat. Before they went outbound from Creech, I was texting both
3 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) in a group message, before they went
4 outbound from Creech because I had not heard anything. I asked, "are you guys
5 outbound yet" or "are you still around?" The only reason I know (b)(6),(b)
6 (b)(6),(b) was in the seat was because (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) answered. So, the one that
7 answered me was not in the seat. I had texted them both waiting for a
8 response from either one.

9 Backing up, at 1822, I asked, are you all out, or still helping out and
10 then leaving? (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) said sitting on deck somewhere. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
11 then texted "I will let you know more when you are out." I said, "cool." 2115
12 I texted them at Imperial. I texted them something along the lines what is
13 going on - I heard you all shut down. I believe I heard about the shutdown
14 from maintenance. This is unusual because you usually leave the aircraft
15 spinning for "hot" fuel and then take off again. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) texted me
16 back, "I don't know" and in the back, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) will update. Then,
17 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) messages safe on deck in Imperial in CATFACTs. I message (b)(6),(b)
18 (b)(6),(b) I saw the message. At 2116, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) states safe on deck, getting
19 fuel, and reevaluating weather toward NKX [Miramar]. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) then says
20 "TIGER 43." At 2120, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) texts in our company-grade chat, can you
21 get freezing level at NKX. "5.5 per base weather." And that was, I believe,
22 from the data from Miramar for Miramar. At that point, it was old. (b)(6),(b)
23 (b)(6) asks, can you look at the cross-section and see if there are clouds
24 above 5K. This is when I pull up METARS and TAFS (b)(6). Clouds layer is low
25 right about now from the TAF, METARS says otherwise. I like, still, a MCEN
26 computer to go into the SharePoint to get a cross-section. Right after that,
27 another pilot recommends calling base weather and asking for that. I called
28 base weather again at Miramar. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) also asks about the frequency for
29 the hangar at Yuma. A couple minutes after I call base weather at Miramar
30 asking specifically for a cross-section, the ceilings were at 7.5K, cloud
31 tops were at 17K, and the freezing level was still at 5.5K. Base weather told
32 me between 2200 and 2300. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) says "copy." (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) asks what
33 are Yuma's field hours. Another captain responds with "2300 Yuma time" based
34 on last cross-countries but will double-check and do not have any packages
35 saved on desktop and cannot verify at this time. There are no additional
36 conversations at that point. I have a screenshot of the weather I sent
37 TIGER 43.
38

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

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1 After that, I was talking to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) who gave me mostly
2 everything I needed. At 2158, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) texted me from the back of the
3 aircraft, Nava fill you in, or no? I said, "no." "How many NVGs did you take"
4 for the flight - one of the sergeants from the flight-E was asking about how
5 many night-vision goggles. Everyone is packing up. Then, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) says
6 number two engine overheat inflight, secure engine, no issues there. Landed
7 in Imperial. Shut down to just four hot to check - the APU. Then, went cold
8 to discuss.

9 Then in another paragraph, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated the light was false,
10 no issue with the engine at all. Stated that number two overheat sensor can
11 implode. They had loose wires in housing and taped the wires so would not
12 erroneously give warning. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated got permission from CO to
13 launch and spoke to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) at length. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated
14 bird is fine and then gave me the night-vision goggle amount, and would
15 confirm when could - it was seven total.

16 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated, the plan is to head home VFR. Stated, if light
17 before Pine Valley, back to Pine Valley or Imperial. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) messaged
18 after, Pine Valley but before clouds, will discuss, but likely continue.
19 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) messaged, in clouds but after Pine Valley, will continue.
20 That conversation ended at 2209. I will provide this chat. That was my last
21 contact with anyone from TIGER 43, which was with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) when they
22 were pretty much starting.

23 I get a call from the GDO before 2330. I was able at this point able to
24 use another captain's laptop, who had returned from flying, to keep an eye on
25 the weather. That is why a captain could respond to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (callsign:
26 "Sloth") when (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) asked for a base frequency at Yuma. I start
27 packing up the radio to move into the planning spaces because there was no
28 one really left to talk to. At 2304, the OPSO asked me about operations and
29 where was TIGER 43. This is where I try to figure out where they were.

30 I did not learn about the Interstate 8 until after learning about the
31 conversation (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had in the backseat with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). As far as I
32 know, they had said they were 500 feet over I-8, going back along I-8 to
33 Miramar. The significance of this was that 500 feet is pretty low and I-8 is
34 further south than what we usually travel for course rules. It would be
35 considered a deviation from course rules. It is, like, parallel to our course
36 rules, but we do not usually fly right over I-8. At some point, you will fly
37 over I-8, but I do not know where they were. The 500 feet stuck out to me
38 because it was pretty low and they were usually flying 1,000 to 1,500 feet.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 When the OPSO asked about TIGER 43, that is when I began looking for
2 them. The GDO also called around that time asking about flight operations
3 being complete. Around that time, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) debrief was about to
4 happen. I decided I wanted to sit in because it was the first time I was in
5 an NSI debrief and I could learn. In the back of my head, I was unable to
6 find TIGER 43. I have called a few people at this point. At 2306, I sent the
7 OPSO my last update about the crew. I had never received an outbound text or
8 call from the TIGER 43 crew when they were outbound. Apparently, the
9 conversation between (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (which I learned
10 about days later) was apparently after they took off from Imperial and they
11 were in flight.

12 At 2306, I asked (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) if the crew had taken off. At 2329, I
13 called the Imperial FBO for the status of TIGER 43. I wanted to know if they
14 were still there or had taken off. The person who picked up the phone is
15 essentially a duty. I woke this person up, whoever it was - afterhours, it
16 goes to a cell phone and that duty picks up the phone. I asked, "hey,
17 TIGER 43" and the duty said that the duty believes they took off around 2230
18 - but for that duty, this was also word of mouth. So, at the time that I
19 called that duty, that is all I got. That is what I went with. Later I would
20 call back twice, and then I would learn that it was someone else who said and
21 told that duty they took off at 2230.

22 Continuing through the timeline, 2329, I called Imperial. At 2335, I
23 received another call from the GDO about flight operations and the rollup. I
24 called our SDO at Miramar for any update. A staff sergeant answers and
25 believes another aircraft has not returned. The SDO is sitting in the ODO
26 seat at Miramar, and may or may not hear a radio call back from them. The SDO
27 does not necessarily have to be sitting there, where the base radio is, but
28 the SDO can forward the phone to their cell phone. At this time, I call 465
29 and I ask about any update from their operations out there and if they have
30 seen TIGER 43. This was at 2345. At 2349, I attempted to call Yuma tower. At
31 2350, I attempted to call Miramar base ODO and get in contact with the tower,
32 which reported they had no contact with TIGER 43. Then, around 2352 is when I
33 broke it to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6), because of the debrief occurring. At
34 first, I was thinking, how am I going to break this? I interrupted and told
35 them it was 20 minutes past TIGER 43's land time. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) continues the
36 debrief. (b)(6), goes out the room and we start making calls. Throughout this
37 as well, I am also calling (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c).
38 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) go straight to voicemail. (b)(6),(b)

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1 (b)(6), rings about twice and then goes to voicemail. At 2356, I attempted to
2 call Yuma tower again. I do not believe they picked up.

3 Between 0005 and 0011 on 7 February 2024, I attempted to call them all
4 again on their cell phones. This is then when I call Imperial again - the
5 second time - to confirm that they took up. This is when I learned that the
6 duty had it word-of-mouth, and I told that duty to go in and confirm.

7 Before I called the Miramar tower, I had already called Imperial and
8 spoken with the ODO. I am not exactly sure when I spoke with the ODO, to try
9 and get in contact with the tower to see if they had contact with TIGER 43.
10 Tower said they did not. When I contacted the Miramar ODO, I had known at
11 that time that TIGER 43 had taken off from Imperial. I did not relay that. I
12 was confirming - again, at 2350 - that they had landed. After that, I called
13 the FBO again. I tried the crew members a second time. At 0030, I attempted
14 to call El Centro. I attempted calling Pendleton. At 1241, that is when I
15 contacted the Public Affairs Officer. At this point, I was already executing
16 the mishap checklist. I had taken out the mishap binder before telling
17 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),.

18 When (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) came out of the debrief, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was leading
19 the process. We were all making calls between (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), me, (b)(6), (b)(6),
20 (b), (b)(6),(b)(7). It reaches a point where (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) told me to call the
21 PAO. We were calling the San Diego Police Department, Coast Guard, and Air
22 Force, trying to get a SAR in the air. I remember it being hard to get that
23 to happen. When I called the Miramar base ODO, there was someone there, and
24 we tried to call them later to go through mishap plans. There was no
25 response. I guess everyone had just gone home. I was confused, should not
26 they be around until our aircraft returned? We were also confused why it was
27 so difficult to contact the base ODO because our assumption was that they
28 facilitate SAR. I told the PAO the aircraft was overdue.

29 Throughout the rest of the night, it was the same making calls. The
30 Imperial duty calls me back and confirms they were getting gas at 2115,
31 because has the gas receipt and sends me a screenshot. Tomorrow, my boss will
32 be here tomorrow and confirm when they took off. That duty told me they lack
33 a log. The next day, the boss calls me and that does not really know when
34 they took off, but has ring footage of them taxiing, getting fuel, and
35 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) walking inside to use the restroom. The footage has them taxiing
36 away, and the next thing the footage shows is, around 2230-ish, the
37 silhouette is gone. I still to this day do not know exactly when they take
38 off.

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1 We ended up leaving Creech around 0400 on 7 February 2024. At the
2 beginning of the night, I remember a crew chief walking in and asking, "who
3 has a van?" I remember telling that crew chief, "we're trying to find an
4 aircraft." I remember we were in the planning spaces room. The crew chief did
5 not pass anything. The feeling was, from some of them, we want to go home -
6 but they did not know the mishap was going on. The team working the mishap
7 binder was quiet, and I remember telling myself I am not going to think
8 anything bad so I can focus on the calls I need to make. We did have other
9 people around who were not doing anything and we kicked them out. It was not
10 to be rude. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was our scribe and writing notes, such as calls
11 made and who picked up. At some point, I sit down and write a preliminary
12 timeline. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is helping us out making calls. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) actually
13 found then on the ADSB tracker, and it said TIGER 11 but we knew that was
14 them because it was the only aircraft we had in that vicinity. That is what
15 we started passing to various agencies to see if they could get SAR to go
16 find them. I want to say (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) left the debrief around 0000, 0015.
17 This is when (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) starts initiating things. By the time I call the
18 0041 call to the PAO, that is why we got to that step in the book.

19 I feel like (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) executed the mishap binder more organized
20 than we had done at SLTE. That said, there were more people there. The five
21 or six of us made it feel more contained. I felt (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) knew what
22 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was doing. Again, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), (b)(6),(b)(7)(c),
23 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) were in the
24 room. They were making calls. I personally tried calling Yuma tower, which
25 was not open, El Centro, Imperial, Pendleton. I tried calling the ODO
26 multiple times and told the GDO.

27 The AMO, OPSO, and CO do not come back to Creech. Calls were made to
28 them. First, it was the OPSO, that I remember. I do not remember exactly when
29 that call was made. I think it was around the time I was calling the PAO, and
30 then, I want to say, 20 minutes later, we called the CO.

31 We left pretty late. The last thing I knew was going to happen was that
32 Air Force SAR was not going to go. Coast Guard SAR said the weather was not
33 good enough to go. San Diego County Police [Sheriff] was going to try and
34 then determined could not make it. I do not remember if they tried.
35 (b)(6) had a contact with the civil air patrol that said aware of the
36 situation but was not going to go that night. This was 0030. The morning crew
37 was going to try to make their way up there. This was the last thing I had.
38 Again, we left for the hotel around 0400 and the sun is about to come up.

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1 Looking at the mishap checklist, I believe the checkmarks are from
2 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) who was managing the checklist. They were constructing the
3 OPREP-3 message and flash report. I do not remember anything past the PAO
4 call [item 11] being checked off. I do remember seeing this sheet. I could
5 not speak to the next-of-kin notification. The only thing I can state about
6 that, is that we do not know enough to notify next of kin. The checklist the
7 Investigating Officer during my interview is what it looked like when we
8 left.

9 The first time I saw the OPSO and AMO were at hotel when I walked in.
10 The plan that morning was for everyone to arrive early to check out. The OPSO
11 walked right up to us. I believe the OPSO stops to talk to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and
12 go to rooms. I believe they were going to meet with everyone and the OPSO
13 tells us to go back to room, start packing up, shower, and get breakfast.

14 I do not remember when I learned they found the mishap site for
15 TIGER 43. We retrograded via C-130 [military transport aircraft] to Miramar.
16 That is when I may have learned they found the mishap site.

17 I know for a fact (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) usually had an iPad. I do not know how
18 much (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) used it during flight. Both of our iPads lack cellular. It
19 was four flight capable. Every pilot is issued MAGTAB [Marine Air-Ground
20 Tablet]. I do not remember whose MAGTABs they found, but there were various
21 iPads that were found that were smashed. At least one of them had to be
22 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) I believe they found a MAGTAB for (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) I do not
23 know if they found one for (b)(6),(b)(7)(c).

24 I do not know of any human factors that are relevant for TIGER 43.

25 I was told this after-the-fact: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was in the ready
26 room that could speak to the conversations between (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and
27 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) or anything when the crew came back inside.

28 Out of my class there were five of us. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was likely the
29 best out of all of us. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was lowlight qualified. I have been in
30 the simulator with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) a few times and is one of the most confident
31 people I have met in my life. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) just knew what to do in the
32 simulator. I think that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) confidence plays a large part into
33 how (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) flew. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was confident outside and inside the
34 cockpit.

35 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was probably the one I knew the least out of the
36 TIGER 43 crew. I actually flew with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) up to Creech.
37 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was highly respected. On the flight itself, nothing notable
38 from the crew chief. When we landed, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was all over a

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 maintenance issue we had. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) knew where to look and was on the
2 aircraft when we shutdown looking for the issue, before maintenance arrived.
3 It gave you a confidence that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) knew what (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was
4 doing. In short, from what I had seen and what I had heard, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
5 was well-versed, respected, and a crew chief you would want.

6 I will voluntarily provide my timeline notes from the interview and
7 screenshots of relevant chats, and any other relevant non-privileged photos
8 or items. As previously stated, I signed a Permissive Authorization for
9 Search and Seizure. The Investigating Officer did not take possession of any
10 of my personal property, such as a cell phone. I provided the Investigating
11 Officer my telephone number. I was directed not to discuss my statement to
12 the investigating officer with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate
13 General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.

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15 END OF STATEMENT
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SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b) (6)

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Service:.....U.S. Marine Corps
Unit:.....HMH-361
Date:.....26 February 2024

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On 26 February 2024, the Investigating Officer conducted an interview with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), HMH-361 Staff Non-Commissioned Officer (SNCO) and Maintenance Control Chief. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview, to include the difference with a safety investigation. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) affirmed he understood his statement was not privileged. He swore or affirmed to tell the Investigating Officer the truth. He agreed to have the interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) interview with the Investigating Officer:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) provided his background, stating his MOS as a CH-53E Flight Line Mechanic and Aircrewman, beginning his career in flight line, then Quality Assurance. Upon checking into HMH-361, he was slated into Maintenance Control (MC), where he acted as a Maintenance Controller/Safe For Flight (SFF) for one year, prior to being promoted to Maintenance Control Chief due to the previous Chief departing the unit. Prior to the mishap he acted as the Maintenance Control Chief. He stated the check-in process seemed rushed which was a byproduct of the lack of manpower and deployment requirements across West Coast HMH units.

His SFF syllabus was common and IAW the NAMP, additionally he was provided on the job training commensurate with his experience level, which took him approximately nine months to complete. Once promoted to Maintenance Control Chief, he stated he updated the squadron's SFF syllabus to last for a minimum of six months (instead of rushing to make qualifications) to improve upon a perceived "gap of knowledge" amongst his SFF candidates. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) has made one SFF since running the syllabus. He stated his unit currently has four SFFs, with four more in the syllabus, expecting three of those to attain the qualification within 90 days. He further stated

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1 HMH units typically have 6-8 SFFs. Lastly, he stated the HMH-361 Maintenance
2 Chief is overall responsible for the unit's maintenance training, not the
3 AAMO.

4 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b) (6) stated the Maintenance Control Division is
5 currently staffed with eight controllers, himself, three Staff Sergeants and
6 four Sergeants. Regarding the QA and MC relationship, he characterized it as
7 dynamic, while he believes they are striving for the same end state, he is of
8 the opinion that they have competing interests, with MC striving for
9 productivity over quality. As of this date, he believes the relationship has
10 been improving since he joined the unit, and that, "they are at least able to
11 communicate", due to previous personality conflicts that resulted in an
12 unprofessional environment. An example being, a QAR calling a job "bad" due
13 to them perceiving the worker to be incompetent, not due to improper
14 maintenance.

15 Regarding the relationship between the squadron's Maintenance and
16 Operations Departments; he stated it has been growing. They understand there
17 is a job to do on both sides and the squadron balances the demands of both.
18 Due to the aging nature of the CH-53E airframe, maintenance man hours and
19 discrepancies have increased while the parts available have decreased, making
20 readiness challenging, thereby negatively impacting overall flight hours
21 across the squadron and CH-53E fleet.

22 On 5 February 2024, three signed schedules were sent out, with the
23 final revised schedule being released near midnight. When asked if that was
24 common and if he was aware a third schedule was released that day, (b)(6),(b)
25 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) replied, "No" to both. Regarding the usual procedure for
26 schedule changes in the squadron, he stated they typically conduct "Red Pen"
27 changes the day of, routed through the CoC to the CO for signature. When
28 asked if that day's updated schedule versions were routed through MC, he
29 stated each change was emailed out - but did not confirm if it was sent
30 through MC for screening purposes. When asked if there was any electronic
31 messaging platform to pass word through maintenance, he stated MC does not
32 use it, as it was reported to be "compromised" during their previous
33 deployment.

34 Regarding the squadron's TEEP and tempo, he stated deployment workups
35 are inherently busy, and that the squadron passed its maintenance inspection
36 cycle, but he believes there was room to improve. Further he believes that
37 most of their senior leadership positions are filled with youthful or
38

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1 inexperienced personnel but described that as normal with the life cycle of
2 the squadron.

3 For MC staffing during the Creech UTD, MC had two SFFs, with one SFF in
4 the syllabus, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) acting as the Day Crew SFF,
5 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (Avionics Marine by trade) acting as Night Crew SFF, acting
6 as a HMH-361 SFF for about one year, and will be departing the unit in April
7 for Recruiting Orders.

8 Regarding HMH-361's readiness, he stated since November it has been,
9 "consistently below 75%". He stated the DCA and therefore MAW/MAG have been
10 the key drivers for this "75%" readiness standard. He feels this standard is
11 unachievable with an aging airframe, and no proportional decrease in DRRS T-
12 Rating demands. The squadron maintains the phase tree to the best of their
13 ability, but due to the turnover of key personnel the squadron is unable to
14 maintain consistency in long-term planning/phase tree management. Further, on
15 top of deployments, mandatory exercises such as SLTE and WTI further deplete
16 aircraft longevity. As an example of how this strains maintenance, he stated
17 there was one point in time that he had nine down aircraft due to the same
18 component, MALS didn't have the ability to repair it, and supply didn't have
19 the part on the shelf, causing the squadron to resort to part
20 cannibalization. As to whether cannibalization is commonplace in the squadron
21 he stated, "we try to keep it as low as possible, because it is double
22 maintenance." They generally only cannibalize if the component is not
23 expected to be available for months. Further, regarding the recent Creech UTD
24 aircraft requirements and cannibalizing parts, he stated they must meet
25 operational requirements regardless of the cost.

26 Regarding the schedule of the maintenance department, he stated they
27 typically work 10-hour days, and only work 12-hour days if it is deliberately
28 planned and briefed. He stated there are no officially established
29 maintenance working hours, but rather understood "business rules". In his
30 experience, working 12 hours on and 12 hours off schedules are uncommon at
31 the squadron.

32 Regarding desk sergeants and shop pass down, as MC Chief, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
33 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) works with the divisions' leadership to maintain
34 consistency in the desk sergeant position and pass down is done through
35 Microsoft Teams. Additionally, for redundancy, the shops keep physical duty
36 binders. However, there is not a specific format across the unit, it is not
37 standardized. Pass down during the Creech UTD was conducted via verbal and
38

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1 written means between Day Crew and Night Crew, sometimes it was passed via
2 Signal chat between the maintenance controllers.

3 The Creech UTD Roster underwent a normal number of changes leading up
4 to the UTD, with a normal operational tempo. The UTD was planned to be
5 supported by four aircraft, however two aircraft were late due to
6 maintenance. The mishap aircraft BUNO 164366 was late to Creech AFB, arriving
7 on 1 February 2024, as it was conducting FCF. He was unable to recall the
8 specifics or who was the FCF crew that tested the aircraft up. He noted no
9 abnormal "push" or requirement to give extra attention to A/C 366 to get it
10 to an "up" mission capable status, and it had been a solid performing
11 aircraft. From a maintenance perspective, the UTD was planned for
12 appropriately to include manpower, parts supply, and logistical support.

13 Discussing (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) review and "safing" of BUNO
14 164366's Aircraft Discrepancy Book (ADB) on 6 February 2024, nothing
15 noteworthy was found, and he screened the ADB IAW official guidance and
16 publications, finding the aircraft to be safe for Tiger 43's mission that
17 evening. The only abnormality found was due to a lack of wireless and
18 hardline internet ports, the unit resorted to utilizing OOMA in "contingency
19 mode" and tracking/screening ADBs on paper.

20 On 6 February, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) flew as an aircrewman on
21 the day flights, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was the primary maintenance controller
22 that day. He characterized the day flights as "preparatory" to identify any
23 issues with the aircraft prior to that evening's NSI checks. During his
24 flight on Aircraft 387, they encountered RADALT and Pitot Static instrument
25 issues, which were all resolved prior to hot-seating the aircraft to the
26 night flights. He did note that "there was some weather rolling in" as they
27 returned for the hot-seat.

28 On the morning of 7 February 2024, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was
29 informed the ADB and Logbook from BUNO 164366 had been collected by the
30 Safety Department as the aircraft was missing and may have been involved in a
31 mishap. The squadron detachment personnel we're gathered and informed that
32 the aircraft was overdue and missing - with personnel in a DUSTWUN status.

33 When asked if he was aware of any communications from TIGER 43 on 6
34 February 2024 to squadron members, he was informed well after the mishap that
35 TR 43's crew did call back to a Quality Assurance Representative, Staff
36 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), while shutdown on deck at Imperial Airfield (KIPL), to
37 discuss a No. 2 Engine Overheat caution light. However, he was unaware of the
38 details of that conversation. He had secondhand knowledge of the conversation

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1 which included what could have been causing the issue, possible secondary
2 indications, if the system was inoperative - what the risks were if they
3 continued the mission, as well as if the benefits outweighed the risks.

4 When asked if there is anyone he recommended the IO speak to, he
5 recommended (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) to ascertain the details of the
6 aforementioned phone conversation.

7 Regarding return routing from KIPL to KNKX (MCAS Miramar), he stated
8 it's common to pick up an IFR approach if weather is not permissible, or to
9 enter KNKX VFR below via I-15 course rules. He was unaware of a culture in
10 the squadron of going VFR below and utilizing the I-8 as a navigational
11 feature to MCAS Miramar. He stated that the KNKX ATIS tended to be delayed,
12 and as far as an ORM process he would not accept that risk as a senior
13 aircrewman.

14 When asked if there is a perceived pressure or culture to rush
15 maintenance or engage in any malpractice within the squadron or community, he
16 stated no, especially as an individual that flies on the airframe as crew.

17 From a maintenance perspective, and as the MC Chief, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
18 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would have preferred if three aircraft returned on the evening of
19 6 February, to execute the FRAG they had that Friday, 9 February. This would
20 have provided sufficient redundancy and time to conduct Daily and Turnaround
21 maintenance. However, he did not communicate this outside of maintenance and
22 it was decided to only support with TIGER 43's aircraft. No further topics of
23 note were discussed.

24 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was directed not to discuss his statement
25 to the Investigating Officer with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate
26 General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]

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Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Service:.....Quality Assurance Chief
Unit:.....HMH-361
Date:.....1 March 2024

On 1 March 2024, the Investigating Officer conducted an interview with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), HMH-361 Quality Assurance Chief, in-person. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview, to include the difference with a safety investigation. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) affirmed he understood his statement was not privileged. He swore or affirmed to tell the Investigating Officer the truth. He agreed to have the interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b) 1 March 2024 interview with the Investigating Officer:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he knew a member of the Command Investigative Team in both a personal and professional capacity. This relationship did not impact (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) statement or comfortability during the interview. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) provided his professional military background and recalled his time within HMH-361's maintenance control and quality assurance divisions. He became the unit's Quality Assurance Chief in July 2023. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stood three different maintenance inspections while serving in the billet to include the unit's successful January 2024 CNAF inspection.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) addressed the relationship between HMH-361's maintenance control and quality assurance divisions from both the perspective of a maintenance controller and that of a quality assurance representative (QAR). (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) highlighted an environment of professional communication, clear pathways, and mutual efficiency.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was not present at Creech AFB and he identified (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) as the UTD's senior QAR. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was described as a well-respected, experienced, all-systems QAR. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was further characterized as a professional, safe, and technically proficient QAR who possessed an avionics MOS background.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 No adverse trends were identified or tracked regarding BuNO 164366. It
2 was deemed "above all, a good plane". (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) discussed the
3 FCF that occurred on BuNO 164366 prior to the aircraft's departure to Creech
4 AFB. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he had no idea why BuNO 164366 was brought
5 back to MCAS Miramar when it was and why it was operating as a single-ship.

6 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) commented on an efficient aircraft phase tree.
7 He stated that RBE maintenance was a "little rough" and that maintenance
8 officer manning within the maintenance control division was experiencing a
9 period of transition.

10 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated the first time he spoke to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
11 (b)(6),(b) regarding BuNO 164366 was on the morning of 7 February 2024
12 (approximately at 0615). The conversation was short and only addressed (b)(6),
13 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) safety status. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was aware of the
14 mishap prior to this conversation as he had been assigned as (b)(6),(b)(7)
15 (b)(6),(b) CACO. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did not speak to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
16 regarding his conversation with TIGER 43 on the evening of 6 February 2024.

17 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated a maintenance action would be triggered
18 when a maintenance procedure exists to address an issue. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
19 (b)(6), stated the caution light that TIGER 43 experienced prior to its
20 landing at Imperial County would have require a maintenance action to remedy;
21 however, he was not personally familiar with the procedure and avionics is
22 not his specific area of expertise. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he was not
23 aware of anyone else who spoke to the crew of TIGER 43 that evening.

24 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) identified (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) as a Flightline CDQAR
25 (the highest maintenance qualification one could attain within the
26 workcenter). With this qualification he would be able to inspect flight
27 critical components at any time and, in the case of TIGER 43, he would be the
28 senior maintenance representative. In this role, he would be empowered to
29 make certain maintenance decisions or advise the Pilot-in-Command regarding
30 maintenance actions. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was described as a rounded, senior, and
31 top tier flightline CDQAR. He was also characterized as a humble individual
32 especially when faced with challenging or uncomfortable scenarios.

33 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was described as a junior, confident, and
34 qualified plane captain. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was unable to speak to his
35 overall maintenance acumen in-depth.

36 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) highlighted a squadron that was busy and that the
37 unit's successful CNAF "was a big win". (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated
38 maintenance personnel did not work over the Christmas and New Year's 96-hour

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

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1 liberty periods. QAR's were always engaged and vigilant to monitor fatigue,
2 work order documentation, and to cultivate an environment of learning. (b)(6),

3 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated communication regarding the Creech UTD was clear.

4 Minus date shifts, marines understood the aircraft, maintenance, and
5 administrative requirements well in advance.

6 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) addressed a period of 12-on/12-off maintenance.
7 This only occurred once (in early December). The metrics and goals were
8 clearly established, and the desired end state was articulated.

9 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) discussed VMM's red strip impact. He stated
10 normal working hours were executed. However, a "couple of weekends in both
11 December and January" required that the entire maintenance department worked.
12 Clear goals were established during each weekend work period.

13 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was directed not to discuss his statement to the
14 Investigating Officer with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate
15 General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b)(6)

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Service:.....U.S. Marine Corps
Unit:.....HMH-361
Date:.....28 February 2024

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On 28 February 2024, I met with the Investigating Officer in person. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview with me, to include the difference with a safety investigation. I understood my statement is not privileged. I swore or affirmed to tell the Investigation Officer the truth. I agreed to have my interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of my interview with the Investigating Officer:

I am an avionics quality assurance representative. I am also a flightline and airframe Quality Assurance Representative. I am an aerial observer. I picked up my NSI last July [2023]. I wanted to do everything I could do with the CH-53. I love working on it and flying on it. I do not consider it a job. It is a hobby and passion.

Going in every single day, it is usually something new and something is broken. "How do we fix it?" Or, something happens in-flight that is broken. I feel good. I know pretty much everything about the helicopter - it is either going to be a fix, or it is a landing because I need, this, this, and this.

There were three Quality Assurance Representatives on Det in Creech. There was a day crew and night crew. I was pretty much working the flight schedule. I could support as a Quality Assurance Representative and flight chief/aerial observer.

On the night of 6 February 2024, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) texted me that they received the number two engine overheat light and asked for troubleshooting tips. I gave them troubleshooting tips. This was when I was at the hotel - we had just left work. One of the other crew chiefs volunteered to get food. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) texted me around 2102, about right when I returned to the hotel. I showered and changed over. I went downstairs to wait for the food. That is when (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) called me from (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) phone at around

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

2132. I spoke to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). The phone call lasted about six minutes. I will send text message screenshots to the Investigating Officer.

I read the text message exchange to the Investigating Officer. The initial text messages from (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) said, first at 2101, was about a number two engine overheat and troubleshoot. I replied with a troubleshooting tip. By punching it (jokingly), but sometimes just tapping it will make stuck relays unstick. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) replied that they shut down the engines at Imperial for (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) sake and that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) will take a look. I gave additional instructions. If a loop turns off the light, may be a bad loop. If the light stays on with both unplugged, it is a bad overheat switch. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) sent me a picture of the cannon plug with a back shell with a lot of wear grease on it. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) sent me another picture. I answered jokingly about the wear grease. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) said the light went off. I said, that is a downer for the light to be on but it did turn off once they plugged everything back in. The only argument made is that they had another loop. Once they unplugged the bad one, that will let them know if there was an overheat compartment and fly home. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) acknowledged. After our text messages is when (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) called me.

The conversation that was had was with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) though a wire was touching the back shell and caused the light to turn on. This kind of made sense. It is just a ground. If the loops melt, it grounds out the system. If one of those loops melt from the compartment itself overheating-not the exhaust-that is when you will get the light that the compartment is overheating.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) said that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) inspected the forward side, the aft side, the inboard side, the cowing itself, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) saw no evidence of anything overheating or getting hot. It was just a normal hot compartment with the number two engine light. There was nothing crazy inspection-wise. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) started talking, saying, "right now, I assume that they got the light to turn off." (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) said, "hey, probably, what is going to happen, is when we fly out through the clouds and we get that number two overheat engine light, I am going to be very hesitant about pulling that engine off until we get out of the clouds." I said, "okay, sounds good, just make sure that light does not come back on." (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did not say much, other than that. I used to have this memorized in my head. Essentially, all it was, if (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) got the light in-flight, in the

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

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1 clouds, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was going to be hesitant to pull it back and I said
2 "good to go." (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) said, "talk to you later" and then hung up.

3 They did not say if they shut down the number two engine in flight. I
4 assume they did and then landed in Imperial. I look at "we shut down the
5 engine" for (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) "sake." I am not sure what time they landed in
6 Imperial. From 2101, to four minutes later, is when they said "we shut down
7 the message." It could have been prior, or then. They did not give me the
8 specifics of when they shut the engine down.

9 They did not discuss executing a PEL into Imperial.

10 For the aircraft 366, I do not think this is a repeat issue because
11 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and I tested that aircraft on the initial test on Thursday 1
12 February 2024. That is when the other three aircraft left. We were on the
13 test aircraft to get it tested fly there. The only issues we had was one of
14 the items we landed, we received a number two generator engine light. We re-
15 set it and it did not come back. And then there was a little bit of a leak
16 for the engine start system. Once we do the start, no more leaking. We
17 service it up.

18 During the days we tested the aircraft on Wednesday 31 January 2024,
19 Thursday 1 February 2024, and Friday 2 February 2024, signed off on the FCF,
20 and then flew the aircraft to Creech, there was nothing to do with the number
21 two engine overheat. The whole time we were at Creech no one talked about the
22 number two engine light. It was a FCF D Card for drive trains, rotors, and
23 flight controls.

24 The aircraft, for the FCF, they were changing out a number five damper
25 and then found a damaged horizontal hinge pin (the bonded washer was no
26 longer bounded). We had to take off the sleeve and spindle that the blade
27 attaches to. It is just an IPS verification. We were going to test *en route*
28 because, in theory, all the vibes should be just fine. All we did was, in
29 essence, take off the sleeve and spindle and then put on sleeve and spindle.
30 It is just an IPS verification of just one. There is no special note in the
31 book saying for removal and reinstallation. We abided by it and we FCF'd it.
32 On Wednesday 31 January 2024, as soon as well did the hover regime , it
33 failed at point four and change. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and I discussed how we will
34 come back and put adjustments in and not test *en route* because the vibes were
35 bad. That was the initial test day.

36 We flew the aircraft 366 to Creech on 2 February 2024. On Wednesday 31
37 January 2024, we got stuck because the vibes did not pass. We were testing *en*
38 *route* because IPPs verification. Test-and-go needs CO approval and was

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1 received. We inspected and then done for the day. I do not remember if we did
2 another run that day. The next day Thursday 1 February 2024, we tested it
3 again, it failed by a little bit, we put adjustments in. We tested another
4 bird. On Friday 2 February 2024, aircraft 366 was identified as ready to go.
5 I did not go on the test flight that day. We screened the card and all the
6 vibes were awesome. We loaded the aircraft up, loaded up on gas at Imperial,
7 and flew to Creech. I was on the operational flight for aircraft 366 to
8 Creech.

9 Returning to the text messages, at 2122, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) texted me
10 roger, roger. At 2131-ten minutes later-is when (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) called me.
11 There was verification that they executed the troubleshooting that I had
12 passed by text. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) never said that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) actually
13 stated that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) "unplugged them," but from the messages I will
14 assume (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did. "Try to find the issue." Do you have an element
15 that is burnt out, or something that just needs to be reset like everything
16 on the aircraft? After my dinner, when they called, I am going to assume they
17 fixed it or else they would not be calling me about flying. They unplugged
18 some things, they plugged it back in, no more light. If the loop was messed
19 up, the light would have turned back on because you cannot "unmelt" a loop -
20 once it is melted, you have to change it out. So, if the light goes away, it
21 is just something that wants to go on. What I got from (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
22 calling me back is that it is fixed, and what to do if the light comes on
23 again.

24 I am assuming that they called me, they fixed it-otherwise I would have
25 received a call or message to the contrary-they unplugged everything, plugged
26 it back in, and the light is off. At this point, it was them letting me know
27 what they were doing. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) saying I am going to be hesitant to pull
28 the number two engine light off, especially if clouds. I am unsure, again, if
29 the engine was shut off in flight or on deck. I am unsure if they executed
30 the PEL. I am unsure if the troubleshooting worked, but it is an assumption
31 based on the follow-up conversation. They did not ask for parts. They did not
32 say that the troubleshooting did not work, otherwise, they would have
33 continued to ask what to do and we would have continued down the troubleshoot
34 tree.

35 At this point, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did not mention any conversations with the
36 Commanding Officer.

37 I have troubleshoot that quite a bit, and it is a relatively easy
38 system, where you have a messed up control unit in the back or a loop that

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

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1 has, like, started to melt, and there is literally no damage to it. Most of
2 the time it is a wire has rubbed up against a part of the airframe on the
3 back wall and all it needs to do is touch a ground. It is not going to pop a
4 circuit breaker, but will make the light turn on. Or the belt that it is on
5 starts to sag a little bit, and now that loop element is in the exhaust and
6 will definitely melt and will turn the light on. My comfortability with that
7 exact situation is that I do not think I would have done anything else
8 differently. Like anything else on the aircraft, what are the procedures?
9 Pull a circuit breaker, leave it out, push it back in. If the light goes
10 away, continue flight. If the light stays on, land as soon as practicable,
11 possible, or immediately. That system does not really affect me, not like
12 other systems that are "actual and factual." This one is there for a
13 precaution because the number two engine is isolated from the wind flow. If I
14 am on an aircraft and I get a number two engine overheat light, okay, cool.
15 All the EPs, I can go in the back and test which loop it actually is and
16 respond.

17 They did not state [regarding the light] it was intermittent. The whole
18 time they were talking, they said they got the light, tested both loops, and
19 the light stayed on. They would have stated intermittent-I do not think they
20 would have shut down the engine, but would have landed in Imperial. That they
21 shut down the engine makes me think the light was not intermittent.

22 The troubleshooting steps, even though unplugging and plugging
23 something in, and even though very small, I would consider a maintenance
24 step. For me, resetting a canon plug, you can argue is a maintenance action.
25 If it were removed and installed (remove and install the canon plug), then
26 by-the-book, it is performing maintenance. I do not agree with it, but by-
27 the-book, yes, it is maintenance.

28 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did not put anything in the
29 flyer group chat. I assume (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was listening to the phone call on
30 speaker. No one else from TIGER 43 talked to me during that time period.

31 In sum, aircraft 366 is a good, solid bird. We did shut down in
32 Imperial when going to Creech because of a loose line. We tightened it and
33 there were not issues. Flew it then the hour and forty-five minute flight
34 without issue. The engine was good and the vibes were amazing because we had
35 just adjusted it. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and the copilot to Creech and the crew did not
36 once complain of the aircraft. It is a good helicopter to me. Tuesday 6
37 February 2024 was just a normal operating day. The TIGER 43 crew looked good
38

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 and normal. I saw nothing wrong with them and was not tracking anything wrong
2 with the aircraft after flying for three days straight.

3 I will provide screenshots of the conversation with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) to
4 the Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer did not take physical
5 possession of any of my personal property, such as a cell phone. I provided
6 my cell phone number to the Investigating Officer. I was directed not to
7 discuss my statement to the Investigating Officer with others per the Manual
8 of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.

9
10 END OF STATEMENT

11
12 I, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), U.S. Marine Corps, have had an opportunity
13 to review the above summary of my statement to the Investigating Officer for
14 the Command Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the
15 CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter mishap that occurred on or about 6 February
16 2024. I agree that the summary accurately reflects my interview and swear or
17 affirm that it is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

18
19
20 Signature: _____ Date: _____

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From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
To:
Subject: RE: CUI: Interview Summary
Date: Sunday, June 2, 2024 3:57:52 PM

Apologies sir,

“Approved”

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Saturday, June 1, 2024 3:36 AM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: CUI: Interview Summary

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Just circling back.

S/F,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Office: 858-307-4549/5077

BB: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Cell:

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2024 9:26 AM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: CUI: Interview Summary

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Thank you for corrections. I saved your edited word doc with track changes not shown as a PDF.

Please sign or email “approved”.

S/F,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Office: 858-307-4549/5077

BB: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Cell:

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Tuesday, May 28, 2024 6:57 PM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: RE: CUI: Interview Summary

Good Morning Sir,

Attached is the word document with track change enabled and a pdf with the edits and my signature. If there is anything else required of me please let me know. Thank you Sir.

R/S

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Quality Assurance Representative

Heavy Marine Helicopter Squadron 361

MCAS Futenma, Okinawa

Work: 636-5626

Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2024 8:48 AM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: CUI: Interview Summary

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Attached is a summary of our discussion together. If you would like the audio records please advise.

If no changes are required, please reply with "Approved".

If you have like to modify, please do so with track changes enable.

V/R,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Office: 858-307-4549/5077

BB: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Cell:

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....
Service:.....U.S. Marine Corps
Unit:.....HMH-361
Date:.....6 March 2024

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On 6 March 2024, I met with the Investigating Officer in person. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview with me, to include the difference with a safety investigation. I understood my statement is not privileged. I swore or affirmed to tell the Investigation Officer the truth. I agreed to have my interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of my interview with the Investigating Officer:

I am a (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) with HMH-361. I have been with the unit for about a year and a half. I just picked up my TERFI. The crew chief syllabus it not too bad. It is difficult enough to make you think. A lot of good instructors at 302 and here. It has been fun.

I was at Creech. I was crew to fly to Creech and returned with the main body. I do not remember exactly which day I went up. We were - number three - out of four. We were later in the day, but the same day as those other two.

We have "361 flyers" group chat with crew chiefs and aerial observers. I do not think any pilots are in the chat. On 6 February 2024, nothing was passed from TIGER-43, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), or (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) in that chat.

The night of 6 February 2024 we had the NSI plane and my plane, which was TIGER 42. When TIGER 43 went to Miramar, we were still flying to do NSI checks. When we landed, after we debriefed, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) told us trying to get ahold of TIGER-43 and asked, if you have a way to find them - like snapchat or locate my iPhone - to try. I sent one singular message to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), like "how is it going?" It was emphasized to otherwise not talk to anyone else outside of the building. We were sitting there, waiting a while, as the pilots were making their contacts.

I was in the ODO brief and tactical brief. I do not remember if Miramar weather was talked about. I know that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) were

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 both on their phones and other means of checking weather. They were talking
2 back-and-forth with about the conditions at Miramar and right at the hill.
3 This was a little bit before the brief. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was loading the plane
4 up and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was at the brief. I cannot say for sure, but I
5 can imagine they talked about it after the brief.

6 I had flown with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) several times. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
7 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), it was by-the-book. It was (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) passion.
8 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was not going to cut corners. That was (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
9 (b)(6), thing and what (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) enjoyed doing. Same with (b)(6),(b)(7)
10 (b)(6), who gave me a lot of my gouge when I first joined the fleet. (b)(6),(b)
11 (b)(6), formed me into the crew chief I am now. I speak very highly about
12 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) ability to safely crew the aircraft.
13 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was vocal. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) always maintained that the
14 junior guy was always going to speak up in the crew. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would
15 also then say (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) piece.

16 I flew with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) It was very professional. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did
17 not like to take risks. We would take the flight and have fun doing it. But,
18 we would never sacrifice safety doing the right thing. That is why the whole
19 thing confuses me. The three Marines (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),
20 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) all had instructor qualifications and were professional and
21 did things safely. I have been racking my brain on that piece.

22 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) NATOPS briefs per the NATOPS, and had it in hand.
23 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would brief it all per the checklist and not skip over
24 something. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would go through all the EPs step-by-step, even if
25 boring. We had not doubt what we were supposed to be doing at that time. We
26 discussed double IMC procedures. They always brief lower and slower,
27 circumnavigate. No lower than 200 feet and no slower than 60 knots. Crew
28 chief in the back jump up in the jump seat to monitor gauges and assist the
29 pilots, if have vertigo. Talk them onto the "meatball" - the attitude
30 indicator (talking back to wings level). "Hit the bar out" if necessary,
31 which will hold the altitude. What I said would be expected as crew chief. If
32 both the pilots say that they have vertigo, or if I notice, and I call out,
33 then I will say that I will hit the bar out and take them back to wings
34 level.

35 I have not heard "I-8 course rules." I have heard Yuma course rules. I
36 cannot accurately remember if I have heard someone brief anyone using the
37 Interstate Eight to bypass weather that is high, such as freezing layers. I
38

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1 would say, if that is our last effort to navigate, then we will use to
2 navigate.

3 I flew with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) As a junior copilot, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was
4 really good. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) made it easy to talk to. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was good
5 with crew coordination and being personable. I was not afraid to correct on
6 actions, and vice-versa. I did not have a chance to fly with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) a
7 whole lot, and mostly on FCF lines. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was a good person.

8 I am about right in the middle in terms of seniority. In our shop,
9 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would be the most senior. In the squadron, a couple
10 other gunnery sergeants would be the most senior. I have not done a
11 deployment yet. I did the SLTE detachment. I did the Creech detachment. I did
12 the WTI detachment. I went to El Centro around (b)(6),(b)(7)(c).

13 I would have night vision goggles at night. Legally, we cannot fly with
14 less than two crew chiefs in the back. One has right side, one has left side
15 (twelve to six). You are actually looking outside the aircraft-you are
16 holding onto your goggles, feeling the slipstream of the aircraft. The
17 visibility is about as good as it can get with goggles. If you know where to
18 stand by your window to get out of the wind, you can still see forward. It is
19 unobstructed all the way to the tail. Looking below, as far you can look
20 down, you can see pretty far down. You cannot see directly under the aircraft
21 unless going to land or hover and you can actually stick your body outside
22 the window. But, otherwise, pretty much straight down.

23 Hypothetically, if flying at night, and there is an overcast layer and
24 cannot fly VFR, at 500 feet, and are navigating the Interstate 8, in the back
25 we always discuss keep a good scan, and we preach "out, forward, and down" to
26 help prevent you from messing up because you can get disoriented quickly.
27 This prevents missing other aircraft. Forward makes sure there is nothing in
28 front of us, like windmills and power lines. For every two scans, you peek in
29 and check instruments and gauges. You step in and can look in at the cockpit.
30 You can tilt the goggles and look to see the cockpit. If we are at 500 feet,
31 I personally would not feel comfortable "smoking and joking." I would treat
32 it as we are turfing and give call-outs. 200 feet and below is considered
33 turfing. It depends - because you are in the mountains-you are still 200 feet
34 (laterally) within the terrain. Especially, on goggles at lowlight I would
35 only be making the same standardized calls. If I were to stop seeing the
36 ground reference, such as a fog layer while navigating the Interstate 8, I
37 would say "hey Sir, got a little fog, lost my ground reference." We would ask
38 about the other crews' ground reference. We would then discuss how to get out

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 of the situation. You absolutely voice it up, anytime you use reference. You
2 are unsure what is going on. I would expect to hear a call from up front
3 about a lost ground reference, from the pilots. If we all concurred and lost
4 reference, I would say, with my comfortability, can we turn around and just
5 land. I will sleep in the desert - crazier things have happened. I would not
6 be comfortable seeing the ground below me or sky above me.

7 Regarding any "human factor" concerns with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) on 6
8 February 2024. When were at SLTE, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) witnessed on the
9 flightline the Marine who walked into the tail rotor and said that "messed
10 with" (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). One of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) good friend from the
11 VMM committed suicide. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was (b)(6),(b)(7)(c),
12 best friend. I provided the Investigating Officer (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
13 telephone number.

14 I do not know of any "human factors" with any of the other TIGER-43
15 crew. From prior of the flight brief, through the tactical brief, into the
16 individual NATOPS briefs, what stood out was (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) displayed a
17 little bit of that "get-home-itis" as we like to call it. There were three
18 different versions of the flight schedule. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
19 (b)(6), were added to the crew late. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did text me before,
20 because I was on the flight, and "hey, don't pack" and something to the
21 effect of "they are going to change crews." I feel like that was (b)(6),(b)(7)
22 (b)(6),(b) feeling rushed to get home. I also base this on how (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
23 was acting before the flight. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was displaying that "I want to
24 get home now" attitude, and definitely wanted to leave. It may have been
25 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 100% wanted to get home. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did say would stay
26 in Imperial or Havasu if needed. It did not make sense to me why it had to be
27 right then and there, a day early. I personally thought this was odd. It was
28 not out of character for (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). I do not think it is not the best
29 way to think when going into an aircraft, especially a low-light flight.
30 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) had the tendency to think get this done, let us get home.

31 I have pre-deployment leave coming up in March 2024. The Investigating
32 Officer did not take possession of any of my personal property, such as a
33 cell phone. I provided my cell phone number to the Investigating Officer. I
34 was directed not to discuss my statement to the Investigating Officer with
35 others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) with certain
36 exceptions.

37
38 END OF STATEMENT

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 I, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), U.S. Marine Corps, have had an opportunity
2 to review the above summary of my statement to the Investigating Officer for
3 the Command Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the
4 CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter mishap that occurred on or about 6 February
5 2024. I agree that the summary accurately reflects my interview and swear or
6 affirm that it is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

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9 Signature: _____ Date: _____
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From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: CUI: Interview Summary
Date: Tuesday, June 4, 2024 8:12:41 PM

Good afternoon sir,

I apologize for the delay in correspondence.
Approved.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2024 8:50 AM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: CUI: Interview Summary

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c),

Attached is a summary of our discussion together. If you would like the audio records, please advise.

If no changes are required, please reply with "Approved".

If you have like to modify, please do so with track changes enable.

S/F,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Office: 858-307-4549/5077

BB: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Cell:

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b) (6)

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Name:..... (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....
Service:.....U.S. Government
Unit:.....MCAS Miramar (Airfield ODO)
Date:.....5 March 2024

On 5 March 2024, the Investigating Officer conducted an interview with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), the assigned Airfield ODO on the evening 6 February 2024, in person. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview, to include the difference with a safety investigation. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) affirmed he understood his statement was not privileged. He swore or affirmed to tell the Investigating Officer the truth. He agreed to have the interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a complete verbatim transcript of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) interview with the Investigating Officer:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) provided his background as a 22-year METOC Marine. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was the MCAS Miramar METOC Chief from 2005-2008. After his retirement, he took a position as a MCAS Miramar Airfield ODO and had operated in that role for the past 15-years. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) recalled his familiarity, ODO, airfield, and on-the-job training. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) total training lasted for approximately two months and that he deemed the training to be sufficient.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) served as the Airfield ODO in support of the 2008 VMFAT-101 F/A-18 mishap. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he had actively participated in at least two additional mishaps during his 15-year career.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) spoke on generic overdue aircraft procedures stating he would look to determine if ATC or Flight Planning "had any strips on them". He would then contact Miramar Tower, and possibly SoCal TRACON, to determine if they had any awareness regarding an overdue aircraft. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated his actions would then cease at this point as it is the "squadron's responsibility to find their aircraft".

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he would have to speak to his supervisor (MCAS Miramar Airfield Manager, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)) regarding follow-on actions to support an off-base SAR or mishap. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that current mishap checklist

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 procedures only address Miramar Tower's control radius. Outside of that
2 area, an Airfield ODO "wouldn't have much control of it". (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
3 discussed the Emergency Operations Center and gave a brief overview of the
4 agency to the Investigating Officer.

5 At 2350, 10 minutes before field closure, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) received a call
6 from HMH-361 asking if TIGER 43 had landed. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) spoke to the
7 Miramar Tower Supervisor. The Tower Supervisor passed that no aircraft had
8 landed for two-three hours and that no information regarding TIGER 43 was
9 available. MCAS Miramar Flight Planning stated the same. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
10 relayed both entities' lack of information.

11 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) clarified his 2350 logbook entry which stated the HMH-361
12 ODO could not confirm that TIGER 43 had departed. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
13 clarification verbatim below:

14 "I don't remember the wording exactly but the way I took it from [our]
15 conversation after was that he wasn't sure if the aircraft was in flight from
16 its last location. He couldn't confirm that, or he didn't want to confirm
17 that I really couldn't tell and I didn't really inquire too much about it
18 because the weather was really bad that night. We were going in and out of
19 IFR conditions."

20 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that the HMH-361 ODO was indecisive "as to whether
21 the bird was actually enroute" or not. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated the HMH-361 ODO
22 did not say anything specific and that his logbook entry was based off his
23 demeanor. Neither the HMH-361 ODO, or (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) asked or directly
24 confirmed if TIGER 43 had taken off.

25 At 2358, another officer called from HMH-361. The HMH-361 officer
26 again asked if any information or contact had been made with TIGER 43. (b)(6)
27 (b)(6),(b)(7) confirmed with Miramar Tower and Flight Planning a second time and
28 relayed that no information regarding TIGER 43 was known. The HMH-361 asked
29 if the Airfield ODO had the capability to track aircraft inflight. (b)(6)
30 (b)(6),(b)(7) stated no but SOCAL TRACON likely could. The HMH-361 asked for and
31 received SOCAL TRACON's telephone number. The phone call then ended.

32 At 2400, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) closed the airfield and immediately departed.
33 The Airfield ODO phone was not forwarded, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was not aware of
34 any additional incoming phone calls made prior to his departure.

35 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) acknowledged he had reviewed HMH-361's flight schedule,
36 that he was aware of TIGER 43's mission and its destination of MCAS Miramar.
37 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) acknowledged that he was aware that a VFR aircraft would not
38 have an ATC generated "strip".

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) did not speak to anyone else regarding TIGER 43 until the
2 next morning when he received a phone call from (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
3 acknowledged it was uncommon to receive an overdue aircraft notification from
4 an ODO, specifically that in the last 15-years it could be quantified is a
5 "very rare" instance.

6 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he traditionally receives phone calls from ODO's
7 stating that inbound aircraft would be late. During these circumstances he
8 would either extend the airfield hours or, if weather permitted, would
9 approve closed field operations. However, these options would only be
10 exercised if it was confirmed that the late aircraft was airborne and
11 enroute. If the late aircraft did not meet these requirements, they would
12 have to divert.

13 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was directed not to discuss his statement to the
14 Investigating Officer with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate
15 General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

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Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....
Service:.....U.S. Government
Unit:.....MCAS Miramar (Airfield ODO)
Date:.....5 March 2024

On 5 March 2024, the Investigating Officer conducted an interview with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), the assigned Airfield ODO on the morning of 7 February 2024, in person. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview, to include the difference with a safety investigation. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) affirmed he understood his statement was not privileged. He swore or affirmed to tell the Investigating Officer the truth. He agreed to have the interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a complete verbatim transcript of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) interview with the Investigating Officer:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) provided his background as a 20-year Logistics Distribution Marine. After his retirement, he took a position as a MCAS Miramar Airfield ODO and operated in that role for the past 15-years. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) discussed new ODO training in-depth. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that a new ODO's training lasts approximately three to four months. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) deemed the training to be sufficient as new ODOs are then placed on a "swing shift" to enable continued learning and on-the-job training for the next 12 months.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he has actively worked four to five mishaps in the last 15 years. One of those mishaps dealt directly with an overdue aircraft.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was asked what his follow-on actions would be if faced with an overdue aircraft. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he would contact Flight Planning then the squadron owning the aircraft to determine if the aircraft had indeed taken off or diverted. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would also reach out to MCAS Miramar Tower personnel and SOCAL TRACON for information. If those efforts were exhausted, he would have reached out to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (the MCAS Miramar Airfield Manager). (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he would contact USCG or CALFIRE to alert SAR; however, he would default to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (or the Station and Airfield Operations Officers) to make the final call if in contact with them.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 On the morning of 7 February 2024, when (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) arrived at work, he
2 began to receive continuous phone calls from multiple entities (e.g., local
3 units, news organizations, civilians). After reviewing the logbook for 6
4 February 2024, he contacted (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) at approximately 0645-0700. (b)(6),(b)(7)
5 confirmed an aircraft was missing.

6 Shortly after the phone conversation with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
7 received a call from a (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) at the AFRCC. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he was
8 unfamiliar of the AFRCC and was confused as to why he was receiving so many
9 calls about TIGER 43. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) passed TIGER 43's route of flight, last
10 known location, time, and elevation. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) relayed this information to
11 (b)(6),(b)(7) as the MCAS Miramar EOC was being stood up.

12 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was directed not to discuss his statement to the
13 Investigating Officer with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate
14 General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.
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SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

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Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Rank:.....

Service:.....U.S. Government

Unit:.....MCAS Miramar (Airfield Manager)

Date:.....5 March 2024

On 5 March 2024, the Investigating Officer conducted an interview with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) in person. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview, to include the difference with a safety investigation. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) affirmed he understood his statement was not privileged. He swore or affirmed to tell the Investigating Officer the truth. He agreed to have the interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a complete verbatim transcript of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) interview with the Investigating Officer:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he did not receive a phone call on the evening of 6 February 2024 regarding TIGER 43. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) initial notification of an overdue aircraft bound for MCAS Miramar was via the morning news. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he immediately contacted, and spoke with, both the Station and Airfield Operations Officers. At approximately 0645, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) received a phone call of the on-duty Airfield ODO (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) asking if he knew anything about an overdue aircraft. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) confirmed that he did as he was just recently informed.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was asked what his follow actions would be if faced with an overdue aircraft and all efforts to locate the aircraft had been exhausted. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he would extend the airfield out to the maximum allowable crew day of ATC personnel. If ATC personnel reached their maximum crew day a waiver would be requested from the MCAS Miramar Commanding Officer. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he would have departed his home and proceeded into work to help coordinate the effort and would have contacted both the Airfield Operations Officer and the Station Operations Officer. Once at MCAS Miramar, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would have synced with the on-duty Airfield ODO and then contacted (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) MCAS Miramar's Mission Assurance Officer. A limited stand up of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) would have occurred. If a mishap was

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 confirmed, (b)(6),(b)(7) stated that a full standup of the EOC would have been
2 actioned, the airfield would have remained open, and the EOC would have been
3 fully integrated into San Diego County's EOC. (b)(6),(b)(7) stated he would have
4 been extremely proactive in determining the status of the overdue aircraft,
5 but at a minimum the airfield would have been kept open when that
6 determination was being made. Once (b)(6),(b)(7) had spoken with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) or
7 the two Operations Officers, USCG or CALFIRE SAR assets would have been
8 alerted.


9 It was acknowledged that the procedures discussed by (b)(6),(b)(7), while
10 incredible, were not clearly defined or written. It was also noted that a
11 proactive ODO would be able to achieve the same result even without plainly
12 articulated procedural steps. (b)(6),(b)(7) then reviewed enclosure (39) and
13 discussed EOC interactions, procedures, and data inputs and outputs.

14 (b)(6),(b)(7) stated that MCAS Miramar previously had access to SAR
15 personnel in Yuma, AZ; however, that capability no longer exists.


16 (b)(6),(b)(7) stated he would provide the telephone numbers to the USCG,
17 FACSFAC, MCAS Miramar Fire, and would reach out to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) regarding
18 written EOC SOPs.

19 (b)(6),(b)(7) was directed not to discuss his statement to the
20 Investigating Officer with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate
21 General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.


(b) (2)




(b) (2)




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
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
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
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
(b) (2)




(b) (2)



(b) (2)



(b) (2)



From:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

To:

Cc:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject:

RE: JAGMAN Investigation

Date:

Thursday, February 22, 2024 3:25:15 PM

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

No Mishap Checklist was done since we had no known information on the flight, declared emergency, or confirmed Mishap that night before the airfield closed. ODO logbook entries are below for 6-7 Feb:

(b) (3) (B)

V/R

(b)(6),

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

ACE, C.M., C.A.E

Airfield Manager/Asst. OPSO | MCAS Miramar

S-3 Dept. Bldg. 9211 | Airfield Operations Division



(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
To (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Cc (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Signed By (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Aircraft Mishap checklist 2022-08-15.docx
.docx File

Blank Daily Checklist.docx
.docx File

MCAS MIRAMAR DAILY ODO OPERATIONS LOG		Airfield Hours 0654 - 0000L
		2/7/2024
CO	(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)	
XO		
OPSO		
ODO		
ODO	(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)	
TIME	(b) (3) (B)	

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Wednesday, May 8, 2024 11:01 AM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Cc:
Subject: TIGER 43 JAGMAN INVESTIGATION
Signed By: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Regarding EOC activation, we alluded to a five-mile ring around the installation where we actively employ the EOC to monitor the situation and collect information for the CO. It would probably extend a bit farther to reach the La Jolla coast and down to I-8 Mission Valley. There is no doctrinal publication that I am aware of which specifies when and where an EOC would activate WRT distance from the incident to the installation..

If we look back the 2008 FA-18 University City Mishap, my Fire Chief (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) rolled up to the scene as an Engine Captain at the same time as SDFD arrived. They worked together and the Incident Command Post turned into a Unified Command with SDFD as the lead because the site was not on military property. Our EOC was working with the IC and the San Diego County Office of Emergency Services. We worked the response because my CO has the foresight to understand this incident was going to impact the entire installation at a time when we were fighting a ballot initiative to turn Miramar into a joint-use facility.

During the TIGER 43 incident, I reached out to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) San Diego OES, for assistance contacting the Unified Command to get information on the mishap site location and the response plan. They did not stand up their EOC as the incident was localized and did not have mass casualties beyond the aircrew. If an incident occurred within the county that had impact on residents or presented a major media situation, then they would stand up.

Hope this provides the clarification you need. I cc'd (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) in the event you have any follow-on questions for them.

(b) (3) (B)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Director, Mission Assurance-Installation Protection

MCAS Miramar


Comm: 858.307.8530 DSN 307

Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

NIPR: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

SIPR:

SVOIP: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)



StaO 3440.9
DEC 04 2020

CHAPTER 7

INCIDENT RESPONSE-RECOVERY

7000. INCIDENT RESPONSE. This phase is characterized by the occurrence of an incident or incidents requiring immediate actions by one or more First Responders in order to protect and save lives, property, and/or critical infrastructure.

1. NIMS classifies incidents into five different levels of complexity ranging from minor/routine accidents (Level 1) to significant natural disasters (Level 5) requiring outside resources to control and contain the incident. Each category impacts the installation differently and requires a different level of support from the staff and tenant units.

2. All First Responders and other supporting agencies utilize applicable safety protocols and follow established SOP during any response to an emergency situation.

3. First Responders utilize ICS when responding to any incident. The IC establishes an ICP and manages the incident until the situation is contained and mitigated. The criteria for assuming IC is dependent upon the type of incident and complexity.

a. The PMO Watch Commander or senior Military Policeman (MP) on scene assumes IC for all law enforcement centric incidents.

b. The ARFF Section Chief (Station Captain and up) assumes IC for all aviation related incidents on base.

c. The Miramar Fire Department (Fire Captain and up) assumes IC for all other types of incidents, including mass casualty and HAZMAT.

4. Depending on the type of incident and responding agencies involved, a Unified Command may be established between the IC and representatives from PMO, Fire, ARFF, and other agencies as needed.

5. The IC assesses the situation and requests additional resources depending on the size and scope of the incident. If required, request additional resources via mutual aid.

6. The IC assumes sole responsibility for the on-scene management to include operational employment of all resources used to stabilize/contain and/or mitigate and/or resolve the incident. The focus of incident response is to gain control, assess the situation, treat and evacuate injured/threatened personnel, contain the incident, and mitigate the impact.

7. Depending on the type of event, the IC notifies the command via the ECC. The IC also coordinates with PMO Operations and/or the EOC in order to alert MCAS Miramar personnel an event has occurred and to commence immediate response actions.

8. The IC may direct and/or take appropriate action throughout the response phase to any situation with potential to result in loss of life and destruction to government property and/or critical infrastructure. This may entail the use of deadly force, evacuation, extraction, mass casualty/mass fatality response, and any other action deemed necessary to mitigate the incident.

Additionally, during an active shooter event or an act of violence, PMO/Miramar Fire may initiate a Rescue Task Force (RTF) to provide medical aid to victims before the entire scene has been cleared.

9. The IC tasks PMO to isolate the affected area using roadblocks and alerts from the "Giant Voice" and "AtHOC" MNS to isolate areas defined in Chapter 1.

10. At the CO's discretion, or at the request of the IC, the EOC may be activated. The EOC provides situation updates to the CO and higher headquarters; coordinates with the San Diego County EOC and the San Diego County Medical Operations Center (MOC); coordinates logistical support for the IC; and develops courses of action for CO approval.

11. Should an incident appear beyond the scope of on-station resources to manage and mitigate, ICS provides the mechanisms (to include mutual aid agreements and/or activation of County/State/Federal emergency response plans) to acquire local, State and/or Federal resources and a commensurate level of incident command. In such cases (e.g. very large/threatening wildland fire), the IC may be a State or Federal representative. If PMO suspects the incident is terrorism related and occurs on the installation, they will notify NCIS. The Miramar NCIS Supervisory Special Agent or Duty Agent will notify the FBI for response. NCIS and FBI will therein determine which federal law enforcement agency will assume IC. NCIS is the only authorized agent for contacting the FBI. The Miramar IC retains control of the incident site until the time a senior Federal agency assumes IC.

a. Emergency requests for external civilian fire, emergency medical, and medical evacuation services is coordinated through the ECC.

b. The MCAS Miramar NBHC and the MCAS Miramar NBDC can provide assistance to the IC during a mass casualty/mass fatality response. Additionally, the MCAS Miramar Chaplains are available to provide religious support during crisis operations.

12. Unified Command is established in situations where jurisdiction is shared by a state or federal agency. At no time shall military personnel be placed under operational control or tactical control of a civilian agency.

13. The EOC provides initial reporting to MCIWEST-MCB CAMPEN for significant incidents impacting installation operations, and Operation Reports (OPREP)/Serious Incident Reports (SIR) for incidents falling in established reporting criteria.

7001. Incident Recovery. There is no clear cut distinction as to where the Respond Phase ends and Recovery Phase begins. As the incident response transitions from an emergency response, focused on saving lives and mitigating the impact of the incident to a more planned long term response, focused on recovery and reconstitution, the Recovery Phase has begun. The plans for the Recovery Phase are normally made during the Respond Phase.

1. The IC initiates planning for de-mobilization and retrograde of response assets shortly after commencement of any response. This includes accounting for all responders involved in the response; identifying any injured personnel; identifying equipment damaged during the response; re-stocking consumable items; conducting incident hotwash de-briefs; and preparing formal after-action reports and lessons learned.

2. The EOC and IC determine if any other areas have been impacted by the event. Those areas are not affected may continue normal operations. The EOC then determines the impact on critical assets and METs within the affected area. The EOC makes an assessment as to whether these METs can be conducted elsewhere depending on the duration of the event.

3. The Recovery Phase focuses on reconstituting MCAS Miramar and tenant unit capabilities; conducting damage assessments and recovery planning; incident documentation; contracting to repair or restore facilities; and request for reimbursement of funds expended. Short-term recovery returns vital life support systems to minimum operating standards. Long-term recovery may go on for years until the entire disaster area is completely redeveloped, either as it was previously or in a new less disaster prone configuration.

a. The MAWG establishes a task organized RWG to lead all recovery actions aboard the installation. The RWG includes LNOs from tenant units to ensure their mission requirements are captured in restoration plans and prioritization efforts.

b. The RWG prioritizes damage assessment schedules, restoration of base support services and utility infrastructure, voice and data infrastructure. The RWG assesses the safety of on-base housing and coordinate with the resettlement of any personnel evacuated from their residences.

c. Public Works Department (PWD) sends out engineers to conduct damage assessments on installation facilities and infrastructure with assistance from NAVFAC as required.

d. The RWG prioritizes and coordinates contract support for debris removal and/or HAZMAT cleanup and disposal.

e. Following a catastrophic emergency impacting MCAS Miramar personnel, the EOC coordinate with MCCS to stand up the EFAC and FICC to provide support services. EFAC capabilities and services are detailed in Chapter 8.

7002. Incident Type Complexity. Figure 7-1 describes the different levels of support required based on incident categories/complexity.

Figure 7-1.--Incident Categories

Type 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most complex type of incident, multiple operational periods • Requires national resources for safe and effective management • ICS branches established, EOC activated (Level III) • Written IAP for each operational period • Emergency Response priorities established • Briefings to the CO and/or his designee • Requires support from all staff sections • High impact on installation, tenant units, and surrounding city and county agencies • Utilization of MNS • Ex: Severe earthquake 7.0+, Wildland Fire
Type 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complex incident, multiple operational periods • May require response resources from outside local area for safe and effective management and operation • Most ICS branches established • Written IAP for each operational period • EOC activated (Level II), Utilization of MNS • Briefings to CO or his designee • Ex: Aircraft mishap in urban area surrounding the installation.
Type 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incident needs exceed response capabilities, additional resources requested via Mutual Aid until containment/control is achieved and operations transition from response to recovery; multiple operational periods • ICS positions activated to match complexity of incident • Written IAP may be required for each operational period • EOC activated (Level II), Utilization of MNS • Briefings to CO or his designee • Ex: Active shooter, mass casualty/fatality, aircraft mishap
Type 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incident requires several resources, including a task force or strike team; typically a single operational period • ICS positions activated as needed • Written IAP not required • Documented operational briefing completed for all incoming resources. • EOC may be activated (Level I) • Utilization of MNS may be required. • Briefings to CO or his designee • Ex: isolated HAZMAT release, severe weather warnings, structure fire, etc.
Type 5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Routine incident handled with one or two single resources with up to six personnel; handled within a single operational period • ICS positions other than IC not activated • Written IAP not required • EOC activation not required • MNS not required • Examples include a vehicle fire, an injured person, or a police traffic stop

7003. Aircraft Mishap Response/Recovery

1. Incident Action Plan Objectives

- a. Respond to the mishap site and mitigate the hazard.
- b. Identify the location, aircraft involved, status of aircrew/passengers, personnel on the ground, and any damage to property.
- c. If the mishap aircraft is a F-35, use reference (j) to identify security requirements and protect critical aircraft components and technology from unauthorized disclosure or exposure.
- d. Provide support to the Aircraft Mishap Board (AMB), to include coordinating perimeter security and logistics.
- e. Coordinate and develop a media strategy and keep the public informed with critical information as it becomes available.
- f. Upon completion of the investigation, restore the site to its original condition and mitigate all environmental hazards.

2. Resources and Departments involved: ECC, ARFF, Miramar F&ES, PMO, EOD, ODO, ATC, Miramar RMC, CommStrat, SJA, Counsel, Environmental, Miramar NBHC, and the F-35 Program Field Office. If the mishap aircraft is from a 3d MAW squadron, the SWO will request a 3d MAW LNO to coordinate the response, assign resources as appropriate, provide support to the AMB, and de-conflict actions taken to avoid duplication of effort.

3. Actions. The following checklist is used by the IC and EOC to monitor the response.

Figure 7-2.--Aircraft Mishap Response/Recovery Checklist

ITEM	TASKS/ACTION	OPR	STATUS
	RESPONSE PHASE		
1	Upon notification of the Tower crash alert, all responders deploy to the incident site. First responders shall follow SOP during the response.	All responders	
2	Establish ICP upwind of the mishap site. ARFF has the lead and Miramar Fire is to assume a supporting role during the response.	IC	
3	Assess the situation and request additional resources as required.	IC	
4	Form a Unified Command when all responding agencies are on site.	IC	
5	Establish accountability procedures for all responding personnel.	IC	
6	Depending on type of aircraft and number of aircrew/passengers, IC should be prepared to request additional medical resources to transport victims/casualties to area hospitals and execute mass casualty/fatality procedures as required.	IC	

ITEM	TASKS/ACTION	OPR	STATUS
7	Provide CommStrat with basic information so a press release can be prepared.	IC	
8	The IC shall retain control of the mishap site until all potential hazards are satisfactorily mitigated (flash fires, composite material, etc.).	IC	
9	The IC secures the "Mishap" once the entire scene is determined to be safe enough to turn over to the Aircraft Mishap Board.	IC	
10	Determine status of crew and passengers and any civilians injured on the ground.	AirOps	
11	(F-35) Evaluate on-scene security, define perimeter, establish Entry Control Points. Establish security patrols, verify authorized surveillance being performed. Develop daily access register.	IC PMO Squadron SAF	
12	(F-35) Consider establishing a National Defense Area to manage site access, control crowds, etc.	IC F-35 Prog Office	
13	(F-35) Control photography, limit mobile phone usage to essential personnel for emergency communications. Any and all photographs should be treated as classified until determined otherwise by program security.	PMO Squadron SAF	
14	Duty spokesperson is responsible for gathering and releasing information concerning the mishap site to civilian sources.	CommStrat	
15	CommStrat dispatches a duty photographer to the mishap site, reporting to the Senior Member of the AMB or ARFF IC, if the senior member of the AMB is unavailable.	CommStrat	
16	(F-35) Coordinate additional security for the mishap site along with logistical support as required. Coordinate with PMO and local law enforcement depending on location.	PMO	
17	Request Chaplain provide religious support and/or pastoral care as required.	Chaplain	
18	Assist ODO with phone notifications as required. Issue Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) if airfield needs inbound aircraft to divert.	EOC ODO	
19	Conduct damage assessment if the mishap occurs on the installation off the airfield	S-4	
20	Evaluate the mishap site for environmental damage and be prepared to contract clean-up crews to mitigate the hazard.	EMD Safety	
21	Provide support to the AMB as required.	EOC	
22	Coordinate logistical support to mishap to include food, water, shelter, port-a-johns, light carts, etc.	S-4	
23	Ensure security sentries have been briefed on the Rules on Use of Force when guarding the site.	PMO SJA	

ITEM	TASKS/ACTION	OPR	STATUS
24	Determine if ordnance or classified material is present on the aircraft.	EOC	
25	Submit Flash Report and make notifications to MCIWEST-MCB CAMPEN and prepare OPREP-3/SIR reports as required.	EOC	
26	Coordinate use of heavy equipment to clear and/or repair runways/taxiways as required.	S-4	
27	Make determination as to when airfield operations can resume based on recommendations from ARFF OIC/SNCOIC.	AirOps	
28	Obtain copy of mishap report checklist from ODO.	AirOps	
29	Obtain status of airfield and any aircraft diverted to alternate airfields.	ATC	
30	Obtain bearing and distance to the site via Navigational Aids, or using GPS/LatLong coordinates.	ATC	
31	Collect Aircraft Mishap Weather Observations at time of incident.	RMC	
32	Prepare talking points for CO and CommStrat rep on scene.	CommStrat	
33	Establish a hotline for the command to answer questions from the media and public. Hotline needs to have established hours. No voice mail.	S-6 CommStrat EOC	
34	Provide phone lines and operating hours for general questions; legal claim information; counseling information, etc.	S-6 EFAC FICC	
35	Prepare a press release regarding the mishap. Initial reps should express condolences.	CommStrat	
36	BPT provide immediate assistance to families of the mishap crew as well any civilian families impacted by the mishap.	S-1 SJA	
37	Immediately request EEE funds via the chain of command where appropriate. If there a potential for major claims, request assistance from Code 15.	SJA S-8	
38	BPT create information pamphlets with all pertinent information, including installation hotline number.	CommStrat	
39	Assign Marines to walk pamphlets door to door as required.	H&HS	
40	Generate SITREP 2x/day to MCIWEST-MCB CAMPEN regarding situation and any updates.	EOC	
41	Keep the public informed as to what is going on and how it affects them.	CommStrat CP&L	
	RECOVERY PHASE		
42	(F-35) Protect recovered classified components. Identify a storage location and arrange secure transportation.	Squadron AMB	

ITEM	TASKS/ACTION	OPR	STATUS
43	Contract the site clean-up, characterization and testing. Ensure the lawful disposal of hazardous waste at State permitted treatment, storage or disposal facilities.	EMD	
44	Contact NAVFACSW to initiate the Blanket Purchase Agreement for pre-determined contractors that contractually must respond in 3 hours or less.	S-4 EMD	
45	Capture all costs associated with mishap response and recovery efforts.	S-8	
46	Assign a liaison and claim team. If there are fatalities, assign one team to interface with families, and another team to interface with families who suffered property damage.	SJA	
47	Contact and engage local regulators for guidance. San Diego County Department of Environmental Health and San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board provide primary third-party oversight needed public acceptance on clean-up. Request Voluntary Assistance Program funds.	EMD	
48	Establish the EFAC and provide grief counseling.	MCCS EFAC	
49	Provide talking points to CO for use during community outreach meetings.	CommStrat CP&L	
50	BPT provide immediate assistance with funeral expenses subject to approval and receipt of EEE. This is a significant expense and can include providing clothing to families who have lost everything.	S-1 S-8 SJA	
51	If civilians from foreign countries are involved, contact HQMC Office of Legislative Affairs via the chain of command to determine if contact needs to be made to the respective foreign consulate.	ADJ CP&L	
52	Prepare letter to the community addressing overall findings of the investigation. Need to address condolences, health concerns, clean-up process, home access, claims, and offers of counseling.	CP&L	
53	Submit a Naval Aviation Hazard Report for potential hazardous conditions that could cause death or injury or loss of an aircraft.	H&HS Aviation Safety Officer	
54	Prepare final community update to explain all actions taken to mitigate the damage once the property is fully remediated.	CommStrat CP&L	
55	Determine if need arises to move shrines erected at the mishap site once it is ready for remediation. Contact local families to determine the best solution and not disrespect the families involved.	Chaplain CommStrat	
56	BPT provide pastoral care and moral support to families and first responders.	Chaplain	
57	Contact MCIWEST-MCB CAMPEN for any lessons learned from previous mishaps.	S-3	

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)
Rank:.....(b)(6),
Service:.....U.S. Marine Corps
Unit:.....MAWTS-1
Date:.....19 March 2024

NOTICE

DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THE CONTENTS
OF THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT PROPER
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE

On 19 March 2024, the Investigating Officer conducted an interview with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), MAWTS-1 Instructor Pilot, via telephone. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview, to include the difference with a safety investigation. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) affirmed he understood his statement was not privileged. He swore or affirmed to tell the Investigating Officer the truth. He agreed to have the interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) interview with the Investigating Officer:

On the evening of 6 February 2024, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he was debriefing the TIGER 41 Prospective NSI certification flight when (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) knocked on the door and interrupted. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he had not heard anything from TIGER 43 and that they were expected back 30 minutes ago. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), who was in the debrief as well, stood up, said something along the lines of "Sir, finish up the debrief. I'll work with the ODO". (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) then departed the room.

After approximately 10 minutes, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) finished the debrief and that both then proceeded to the ODO desk to see if there was any update. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) took charge of the situation and began executing the squadron's mishap plan, specifically the overdue aircraft procedures section at approximately 1200.

The members present in the ready room then began calling all air traffic control agencies from LA Center to SoCal Approach and various airfields to include Imperial County and Gillespie.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated the last time someone had spoken to TIGER 43 they were getting ready to depart Imperial after a maintenance issue with the No.2 Fire Light that was erroneous. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) also stated that the crew had spoken with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and had been given approval for a "one

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 shot" back to MCAS Miramar. (b)(6),(b)(7) stated he did not have an in-depth
2 understanding of TIGER 43's request for launch approval or the aircrew's
3 troubleshooting on-deck at Imperial County as his focus was on determining
4 where TIGER 43 was at the time.

5 Upon reaching the step that directed those working the mishap checklist
6 to initiate airborne SAR procedures multiple attempts to contact MCAS Miramar
7 Base Operations were made but were unsuccessful. (b)(6),(b)(7) then contacted
8 the U.S. Coast Guard at approximately 1230-1250. During his conversation
9 with one of two of the duty officers, (b)(6),(b)(7) stated he passed a brief
10 narrative of TIGER 43 and the helicopter's BuNO. (b)(6),(b)(7) completed the
11 call and was called back shortly after. The U.S. Coast Guard duty officer
12 stated that the weather was too bad for Coast Guard aviation assets and was
13 advised that they were not the primary overland SAR agency and that it would
14 be the Air Force. (b)(6),(b)(7) stated that that may have been the last time he
15 spoke with the U.S. Coast Guard.

16 (b)(6),(b)(7) stated that the mishap checklist members were also in
17 contact with the San Diego County Sheriff's Department. (b)(6),(b)(7) stated
18 that the Sheriff's Departments helpfulness exceeded that of any other agency
19 contacted that evening. San Diego County Sheriff launched ground-based SAR
20 but weather prohibited aviation-based SAR from reaching the mishap site.

21 (b)(6),(b)(7) then received a phone call from the AFRCC (a SSgt).
22 Multiple items were discussed with the AFRCC representative who was in
23 Florida. (b)(6),(b)(7) stated he assumed the AFRCC had received his telephone
24 number from the U.S. Coast Guard duty officer. (b)(6),(b)(7) was given the
25 impression that the AFRCC didn't have UAS or C-130 assets on alert if needed.
26 (b)(6),(b)(7) stated that this individual provided the last known ADS-B location
27 of TIGER 43 and the open-source website where the information could be found.
28 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) forwarded the mishap crew's cell phone numbers for CAP National
29 Headquarters forensics analysis. At 0226, the AFRCC representative forwarded
30 an email from the CAP Radar Analysis Team that stated terrain impact had been
31 likely.

32 At approximately 0400, (b)(6),(b)(7) was notified, via his own CAP unit
33 group chat, that AZ CAP had been authorized to launch prior to daybreak in
34 support of the TIGER 43 search effort.

35 At approximately 0430-0500, it was determined that no additional
36 efforts by those executing the squadron specific mishap checklist would be
37 beneficial. Shortly before his departure (b)(6),(b)(7) stated he received a
38 call from (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), a BORSTAR representative. (b)(6),(b)(7) asked if BORSTAR

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 support was needed. (b)(6),(b)(7) confirmed it was. Shortly after, (b)(6),(b)(7)
2 called back and confirmed BORSTAR had accepted the tasking and that they were
3 mobilizing.

4 (b)(6),(b)(7) stated he would provide the Investigating Officer a brief he
5 had created for his local CAP unit highlighting the open-source information
6 from a lessons learned prospective.

7 (b)(6),(b)(7) was directed not to discuss his statement to the
8 Investigating Officer with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate
9 General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.

INCIDENT NAME	DATE & TIME ON SCENE	ICP LOCATION
KITCHEN CASDU003404	02/07/2024 02:45	USFS 3766 Kitchen Creek Rd. Pine Valley, Ca. 91962

INCIDENT COMMANDER CHECKLIST

DIRECT PROTECTION

<input type="checkbox"/> BLM/BIA -CF DPA	<input type="checkbox"/> SRA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FRA	<input type="checkbox"/> LRA
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JURISDICTION / LAND OWNERSHIP

<input type="checkbox"/> Local:	AREP:
<input type="checkbox"/> State:	AREP:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Federal:	AREP:
<input type="checkbox"/> BIA:	AREP:
<input type="checkbox"/> BLM:	AREP:
<input type="checkbox"/> Parks:	AREP:
<input type="checkbox"/> US Fish & Wildlife:	AREP:

UNIFIED ORDERING POINT (UOP)

San Diego County Fire/CALFIRE

UNIFIED COMMAND

	IN	OUT
AGENCY SDCF/CALFIRE NAME (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 1 DATE/TIME: 02/07/2024 02:22		
AGENCY USFS NAME (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) DATE/TIME: 02/07/2024 02:48		
AGENCY CBP BORESTAR NAME (b)(6), DATE/TIME: 02/07/2024 04:19		
AGENCY SD Co. Sheriff Search & Rescue NAME (b)(6),(b) DATE/TIME: 02/07/2024 05:42		
AGENCY Ca. Civil Air Patrol NAME (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) DATE/TIME: 02/07/2024 06:00		

OR Management Action Points identified for when you would go into Unified Command:

CBP BORESTAR (b)(6), 02/07/2024 05:00	SD Co. Sheriff Search & Rescue (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 02/07/2024 05:30
USFS (b)(6), 02/07/2024 02:31	Ca. Civil Air Patrol (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 02/07/2024 06:30
USFS (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 02/07/2024 02	Ca. Civil Air Patrol (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 02/07/2024 06:00

COOPERATING AGENCIES

<input type="checkbox"/> USAF, Ca. Civil Air Patrol Liaison: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Liaison:
<input type="checkbox"/> CALFIRE Liaison: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Liaison:
<input type="checkbox"/> USFS Liaison: (b)(6),(b)(7)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Liaison:
<input type="checkbox"/> CBP BORSTAR Liaison: (b)(6),(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Liaison:
<input type="checkbox"/> San Diego Sheriff Liaison: (b)(6),(b)(7)	<input type="checkbox"/> Liaison:
<input type="checkbox"/> USMC Miramar Liaison: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Liaison:
<input type="checkbox"/> USMC Liaison: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Liaison:
<input type="checkbox"/> USCG Liaison: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Liaison:
<input type="checkbox"/> Liaison:	<input type="checkbox"/> Liaison:

INCIDENT MAP

<input type="checkbox"/> Incident Map (perimeter with DPA)	Date /Time requested:
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PIO / MEDIA / NEW RELEASES

Unified IC's will all agree and approve all news and social media information releases via Incident PIO.

IC's ALL INTITIAL:	X	X	X	X	X	X
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IMMEDIATE THREAT (Life, consider NO DIVERT for Air Tankers, Property, Community, Critical Infrastructure)

STRATEGY / POTENTIAL

☐ Initial attack:

The fire can be contained by the resources first dispatched, without substantial augmentation*, within two hours of the report time.

☐ Extended attack:

The fire can be contained within the first burning period, but requires substantial augmentation of the first-dispatched suppression resources

☐ Major:

The fire CANNOT be contained within the first burning period, even with substantial augmentation of resources*; long-term resource commitment and logistical support will be required.

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAM

Request Date: _____ Time: _____ Type: _____

Transition Date: _____ Time: _____ Location: _____

IMT's may be utilized when the emergency incident cannot be mitigated: With substantial augmentation of resources during the first operational period. When long-term resource commitment and logistical support will be required. During multi-agency multi-branch incident. When the scope of the planning is long-term and complex

RESOURCE ORDERS

- ☐ All Unified ICs will track initial resources orders w/ a single collection point of the lead IC or designee.
- ☐ Placing orders to UOP, identify the mission and payment mechanism (Local, State, Federal/Local Agreement, MMA, CFAA, CFMA, ABH).
 - ☐ Identify Type/Kind/Immediate/Planned need. **ALL ORDERS WILL GO THROUGH THE UOP**
 - ☐ Request/implement a Resource UL position early for expanding incident.
DIVS/GRPS will track resource effort and accountability.

ANY ORDERS NOT PLACED PROPERLY THROUGH THE IDENTIFIED **UOP**
WILL BE CHARGED TO THE AGENCY THAT IMPROPERLY ORDERED THE RESOURCE.

COST SHARE (multi-jurisdiction) METHODOLOGY

	IA*	YOYP**	BA***	CA****
Local				
State				
Federal				

*IA = Cost share agreement may be needed if incident goes beyond the initial response goes beyond 12 hours

**YOU ORDER YOU PAY = Each agency is fiscally responsible for their ordered resources regardless of where they are used.

***BURNED ACRES = Costs shared based on acres burned percentage within agencies DPA. Used when responsibilities, objectives and suppression costs are similar.

****COST APPORTION = Costs are shared based on the suppression effort expended to protect each agencies DPA including threat.

EXHAUSTION (Local Government and Operational Area resource)

	AGENCY	LEVEL	DATE	TIME	IC's Initial				
Local		Y / N							
Remarks									
Local		Y / N							
Remarks									
Local		Y / N							
Remarks									
OpArea		Y / N							
Remarks									

INCIDENT BRIEFING (ICS 201)

1. Incident Name: Kitchen	2. Incident Number: 2024CASDU003404	3. Date/Time Initiated: Date: 02/07/2024 Time: 02:45 hours
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(b) (3) (B)

equipment, warn people of the hazard) to protect responders from those hazards.

6. Prepared by: Name: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)	Position/Title: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)	Signature: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
ICS 201, Page 1		Date/Time: 02/27/2024 13:00 hours

INCIDENT BRIEFING (ICS 201)

1. Incident Name: Kitchen	2. Incident Number: 2024CASDU003404	3. Date/Time Initiated: Date: 02/07/2024 Time: 02:45 hours																												
7. Current and Planned Objectives: Life safety Search and Rescue Secure Scene																														
8. Current and Planned Actions, Strategies, and Tactics: <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 15%;">Time:</th> <th style="width: 85%;">Actions:</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td>02/07/2024 - 02:20:02 [TC]Location Comment: USCG REPORTING POSS DOWNED AIRCRAFT</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>(b)(6),(b)(7) LAST PINGED LOC FOR THE AIRCRAFT - HASNT BEEN HEARD OF SINCE 2330 AND IS NOW MISSING. CH53E HELICOPTER SUPERSTALLION - 5 SOULS WERE ON BOARD.</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>02/07/2024 - 02:22:00 (b)(6),(b)(7) ASTREA AND 2 GROUND UNITS ENR TO ASSIST THE AREA</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>02/07/2024 - 02:47:08 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) MIRAMAR BASE CONFIRMED THE AIRCRAFT IS 3 HOURS OVERDUE WITH NO COMMUNICATIONS SINCE 2330 HRS.</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>02/07/2024 - 03:26:10 (b)(6),(b)(7) HEAVY SNOWFALL - B4 IN THE AREA SEARCHING THE AREA. VERY REMOTE ACCESS</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>02/07/2024 - 03:36:16 (b)(6),(b)(7) REQ FROM B4 TO SEE IF BORSTAR CAN ASSIST</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>02/07/2024 - 03:44:07 (b)(6),(b)(7) ICP WILL BE AT THE KITCHEN CREEK HELIBASE</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>02/07/2024 - 03:49:04 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) B4 ADVISING HE WILL CONT SEARCHING THE AREA - CXL E3374 AND E3384 FOR NOW</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>02/07/2024 - 03:57:05 (b)(6),(b)(7) AFRCC 800-851-3051 IS RUNNING THE INCIDENT AT THIS TIME SINCE THEY ARE 5-6 HRS OVERDUE //(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) IS THE (b)(6), FOR THE THAT MARINE AIR FORCE SQUADRON. THE SQUADRON IS FROM NEVADA AIR FORCE BASE.</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>02/07/2024 - 04:52:47 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) - MARINE CAPTAIN IN CHARGE OF THIS SQUADRON - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) IS THE MAIN POINT OF CONTACT</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>02/07/2024 - 05:29:46 (b)(6),(b) B4 ICP AT KITCHEN CREEK HELIBASE</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>02/07/2024 - 05:42:08 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) SDSO SEARCH AND RESCUE GROUND UNITS ARE ENR TO THE CALL AND HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE ICP LOCATION - NO ETA GIVEN BY SDSO</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>02/07/2024 - 05:45:00 (b)(6),(b) B4 REQ AREP FROM USMC TO ICP//SPOKE WITH (b)(6),(b)(7) AND MIRAMR PROVOST MARSHAL, THEY WILL BE REQ AREP FROM THE AIRCRAFT'S UNIT TO THE ICP</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			Time:	Actions:		02/07/2024 - 02:20:02 [TC]Location Comment: USCG REPORTING POSS DOWNED AIRCRAFT		(b)(6),(b)(7) LAST PINGED LOC FOR THE AIRCRAFT - HASNT BEEN HEARD OF SINCE 2330 AND IS NOW MISSING. CH53E HELICOPTER SUPERSTALLION - 5 SOULS WERE ON BOARD.		02/07/2024 - 02:22:00 (b)(6),(b)(7) ASTREA AND 2 GROUND UNITS ENR TO ASSIST THE AREA		02/07/2024 - 02:47:08 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) MIRAMAR BASE CONFIRMED THE AIRCRAFT IS 3 HOURS OVERDUE WITH NO COMMUNICATIONS SINCE 2330 HRS.		02/07/2024 - 03:26:10 (b)(6),(b)(7) HEAVY SNOWFALL - B4 IN THE AREA SEARCHING THE AREA. VERY REMOTE ACCESS		02/07/2024 - 03:36:16 (b)(6),(b)(7) REQ FROM B4 TO SEE IF BORSTAR CAN ASSIST		02/07/2024 - 03:44:07 (b)(6),(b)(7) ICP WILL BE AT THE KITCHEN CREEK HELIBASE		02/07/2024 - 03:49:04 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) B4 ADVISING HE WILL CONT SEARCHING THE AREA - CXL E3374 AND E3384 FOR NOW		02/07/2024 - 03:57:05 (b)(6),(b)(7) AFRCC 800-851-3051 IS RUNNING THE INCIDENT AT THIS TIME SINCE THEY ARE 5-6 HRS OVERDUE //(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) IS THE (b)(6), FOR THE THAT MARINE AIR FORCE SQUADRON. THE SQUADRON IS FROM NEVADA AIR FORCE BASE.		02/07/2024 - 04:52:47 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) - MARINE CAPTAIN IN CHARGE OF THIS SQUADRON - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) IS THE MAIN POINT OF CONTACT		02/07/2024 - 05:29:46 (b)(6),(b) B4 ICP AT KITCHEN CREEK HELIBASE		02/07/2024 - 05:42:08 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) SDSO SEARCH AND RESCUE GROUND UNITS ARE ENR TO THE CALL AND HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE ICP LOCATION - NO ETA GIVEN BY SDSO		02/07/2024 - 05:45:00 (b)(6),(b) B4 REQ AREP FROM USMC TO ICP//SPOKE WITH (b)(6),(b)(7) AND MIRAMR PROVOST MARSHAL, THEY WILL BE REQ AREP FROM THE AIRCRAFT'S UNIT TO THE ICP
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6. Prepared by: Name: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Position/Title: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Signature: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)																														
ICS 201, Page 2		Date/Time: 02/07/2024 13:00 hours																												

INCIDENT BRIEFING (ICS 201)

1. Incident Name: Kitchen	2. Incident Number: 2024CASDU003404	3. Date/Time Initiated: Date: 02/07/2024 Time: 02:45 hours
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9. Current Organization (fill in additional organization as appropriate):

Incident Commander(s)
Calfire- (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
USFS- (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
CBP BORESTAR (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
SD Sheriff S&R- (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
USAF/ Ca Air Patrol- (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
USMC- (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
USMC- (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Liaison Officer

Safety Officer

Public Information Officer
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Operations Section Chief
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Planning Section Chief
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Logistics Section Chief

Finance/Admin Section Chief

02/07/2024 - 05:47:25 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 760-685-3381 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) WITH THE SDSO SEARCH AND RESCUE HEADING TO THE ICP FROM GILLESPIE. ALL HIS UNITS AND EQUIP WILL BE STAGED AT THE USFS STATION CAMERON AREA BUT THE (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) WILL BE ENR TO THE KITCHEN CREEK ICP

02/07/2024 - 06:05:42 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) CIVIL AIR PATROL CALLED AND THEY ARE SENDING GROUND PERSONNEL TO ICP//CAP CONACT IS (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

02/07/2024 - 0615 UNIFIED COMMANDERS establish Search Group BORSTAR intial team begin search in snow weather.

02/07/2024 - 07:51:31 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) FROM USCG CALLED AND ADV THAT THEIR COPTERS CAN ACCEPT THE MISSION//B4 ADVISED//B4 TO TALK WITH CAP AND UNIFIED COMMANDERS. Cancelled do to Weather condition

02/07/2024 - 08:32:01 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 3RD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING CONTACT - WATCH FLOOR 858-307-5128

02/07/2024 - 08:41:19 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) BORSTAR HAS VISUAL ON CRASH SITE (b)(3)(B)

02/07/2024 - 08:54:56 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) B4 ADV BORSTAR GROUND RESOURCES AT THE CRASH SITE TRYING TO MAKE ACCESS// DIFFICULT ACCESS DUE TO HEAVY BRUSH, MUD, AND SNOW

02/07/2024 - 09:54:39 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) UPDATE FROM B4 - 11-44 x5 AT CRASH SITE

02/07/2024 - 11:46:46 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) OES CALLED ASKING OF "UNMET NEEDS" PER D3304 NO NEEDS NEEDED. OES ADVISED WILL CALL WITH ONE MORE UPDATE

02/07/2024 - 11:46:46 B4 turnover to D3304.3304 assume lc from B4 and B4 on R &R available.at 16:00 hours

6. Prepared by: Name: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)	Position/Title: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)	Signature: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
ICS 201, Page 3		Date/Time: 02/07/2024 13:00 hours

INCIDENT BRIEFING (ICS 201)

1. Incident Name: Kitchen		2. Incident Number: 2024CASDU003404		3. Date/Time Initiated: Date: 02/07/2024 Time: 02:45 hours	
10. Resource Summary:					
Resource	Resource Identifier	Date/Time Ordered	ETA	Arrived	Notes (location/assignment/status)
Calfire	B4, E44, RA 42	02/07/2024 02:21		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Incident Command Post USFS Kitchen Creek Helibase
USFS	D4, B41, B42	02/07/2024 02:21		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	3766 Kitchen Creek Rd. Pine Valley, Ca. 91962
Customs Border Patrol (CBP)	BORESTAR	02/07/2024 03:36		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
San Diego Sherrif	Search & Rescue	02/07/2024 03:49		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
USAF, Ca. Air Patrol	IC & Overhead	02/07/2024 06:05		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
USMC, Miramar	IC & Overhead	02/07/2024 02:21		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
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				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
6. Prepared by: Name: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Position/Title: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Signature: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)					
ICS 201, Page 4		Date/Time: 02/07/2024 13:00 hours			

ICS 201

Incident Briefing

Purpose. The Incident Briefing (ICS 201) provides the Incident Commander (and the Command and General Staffs) with basic information regarding the incident situation and the resources allocated to the incident. In addition to a briefing document, the ICS 201 also serves as an initial action worksheet. It serves as a permanent record of the initial response to the incident.

Preparation. The briefing form is prepared by the Incident Commander for presentation to the incoming Incident Commander along with a more detailed oral briefing.

Distribution. Ideally, the ICS 201 is duplicated and distributed before the initial briefing of the Command and General Staffs or other responders as appropriate. The "Map/Sketch" and "Current and Planned Actions, Strategies, and Tactics" sections (pages 1–2) of the briefing form are given to the Situation Unit, while the "Current Organization" and "Resource Summary" sections (pages 3–4) are given to the Resources Unit.

Notes:

- The ICS 201 can serve as part of the initial Incident Action Plan (IAP).
- If additional pages are needed for any form page, use a blank ICS 201 and repaginate as needed.

Block Number	Block Title	Instructions
1	Incident Name	Enter the name assigned to the incident.
2	Incident Number	Enter the number assigned to the incident.
3	Date/Time Initiated <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Date, Time 	Enter date initiated (month/day/year) and time initiated (using the 24-hour clock).
4	Map/Sketch (include sketch, showing the total area of operations, the incident site/area, impacted and threatened areas, overflight results, trajectories, impacted shorelines, or other graphics depicting situational status and resource assignment)	<p>Show perimeter and other graphics depicting situational status, resource assignments, incident facilities, and other special information on a map/sketch or with attached maps. Utilize commonly accepted ICS map symbology.</p> <p>If specific geospatial reference points are needed about the incident's location or area outside the ICS organization at the incident, that information should be submitted on the Incident Status Summary (ICS 209).</p> <p>North should be at the top of page unless noted otherwise.</p>
5	Situation Summary and Health and Safety Briefing (for briefings or transfer of command): Recognize potential incident Health and Safety Hazards and develop necessary measures (remove hazard, provide personal protective equipment, warn people of the hazard) to protect responders from those hazards.	Self-explanatory.
6	Prepared by <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Name • Position/Title • Signature • Date/Time 	Enter the name, ICS position/title, and signature of the person preparing the form. Enter date (month/day/year) and time prepared (24-hour clock).
7	Current and Planned Objectives	Enter the objectives used on the incident and note any specific problem areas.

Block Number	Block Title	Instructions
8	Current and Planned Actions, Strategies, and Tactics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Time Actions 	Enter the current and planned actions, strategies, and tactics and time they may or did occur to attain the objectives. If additional pages are needed, use a blank sheet or another ICS 201 (Page 2), and adjust page numbers accordingly.
9	Current Organization (fill in additional organization as appropriate) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incident Commander(s) Liaison Officer Safety Officer Public Information Officer Planning Section Chief Operations Section Chief Finance/Administration Section Chief Logistics Section Chief 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enter on the organization chart the names of the individuals assigned to each position. Modify the chart as necessary, and add any lines/spaces needed for Command Staff Assistants, Agency Representatives, and the organization of each of the General Staff Sections. If Unified Command is being used, split the Incident Commander box. Indicate agency for each of the Incident Commanders listed if Unified Command is being used.
10	Resource Summary	Enter the following information about the resources allocated to the incident. If additional pages are needed, use a blank sheet or another ICS 201 (Page 4), and adjust page numbers accordingly.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resource 	Enter the number and appropriate category, kind, or type of resource ordered.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resource Identifier 	Enter the relevant agency designator and/or resource designator (if any).
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Date/Time Ordered 	Enter the date (month/day/year) and time (24-hour clock) the resource was ordered.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ETA 	Enter the estimated time of arrival (ETA) to the incident (use 24-hour clock).
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arrived 	Enter an "X" or a checkmark upon arrival to the incident.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Notes (location/assignment/status) 	Enter notes such as the assigned location of the resource and/or the actual assignment and status.

Incident:

CASDU003404

Incident Number:24003449

Report Number:

Incident: CASDU003404

Call Type:FIRE, AIRCRAFT

Incident Name:CANYON 6

Common Place Name:USCG REPORTING POSS DOWNED AIRCRAFT

Location Comment:USCG REPORTING POSS DOWNED AIRCRAFT

Agency:SDF

Start Time:02:20:02, February 07 2024

Modified Time:13:10:45, February 07 2024

Address:=L [REDACTED], LAKE_MORENA CA

Caller Number:619-278-7031

Radio Channels:

Cmd: 11CTac: 11DTACTICAL-2: 11E

Aircraft Fire

Units

10

Unit	DSP	RSP	STG	ONS	TR	AH	AVL	P
B4	02:22:02 02/07/2024	02:27:14 02/07/2024	06:01:32 02/07/2024	06:01:17 02/07/2024			10:00:00 02/07/2024	B
M44	02:22:02 02/07/2024						02:25:44 02/07/2024	FA FR
E3384	02:22:02 02/07/2024	02:27:27 02/07/2024	02:55:27 02/07/2024				04:27:38 02/07/2024	FR M C FR
E44	02:22:02 02/07/2024	02:26:16 02/07/2024	04:29:51 02/07/2024				05:43:55 02/07/2024	FA

Unit	DSP	RSP	STG	ONS	TR	AH	AVL	P
E3374	02:22:02 02/07/2024	02:27:38 02/07/2024	02:55:12 02/07/2024				04:19:51 02/07/2024	FA JA FR FA G
PIO3328	02:22:02 02/07/2024		06:01:49 02/07/2024	05:36:48 02/07/2024			13:10:44 02/07/2024	CH C
RA42	02:25:50 02/07/2024	02:38:31 02/07/2024	02:55:59 02/07/2024				05:38:19 02/07/2024	FR FR
CNFB41	02:48:18 02/07/2024	02:48:18 02/07/2024	06:01:40 02/07/2024	06:01:17 02/07/2024				
D3304	07:48:19 02/07/2024	07:48:19 02/07/2024	09:39:47 02/07/2024	09:39:43 02/07/2024				D
CNFE343	11:24:30 02/07/2024			11:24:30 02/07/2024				

Comments

53

- 02/07/2024 - 11:46:46 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) OES CALLED ASKING OF "UNMET NEEDS" PER D3304 NO NEEDS NEEDED. OES ADVISED WILL CALL WITH ONE MORE UPDATE
- 02/07/2024 - 11:46:00 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) ES CALLED INQUIRING OF
- 02/07/2024 - 09:54:39 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) UPDATE FROM B4 - 11-44 x5 AT CRASH SITE
- 02/07/2024 - 09:02:52 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) STA 44 HAD RP CALL TO ADV THAT SHE HEARD A COPTER 'LATE LAST NIGT/EARLY THIS MORNING'//RP - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
- 02/07/2024 - 08:54:56 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) B4 ADV BORSTAR GROUND RESOURCES AT THE CRASH SITE TRYING TO MAKE ACCESS//DIFFICULT ACCESS DUE TO HEAVY BRUSH, MUD, AND SNOW
- 02/07/2024 - 08:41:19 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) BORSTAR HAS VISUAL ON CRASH SITE (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
- 02/07/2024 - 08:32:01 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) BRD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING CONTACT - WATCH FLOOR 858-307-5128
- 02/07/2024 - 08:25:5 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) RP CALLED TO SAY HE HEARD AIRCRAFT OVER THE AREA AROUND 0200 HRS. THINKS IT COULD BE IN THE AREA OF BEAR MOUNTAIN OR CORTE MADERA. HIS CALL BACK NUMBER IS (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) . (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
- 02/07/2024 - 08:23:4 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) COUNTY (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) CONTACT IF ANY RESOURCES NEEDED
- 02/07/2024 - 07:55:35 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) USCG CONATCT IS (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
- 02/07/2024 - 07:54:54 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) USMC (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) CALLED AND ADV THAT THE USAF IS OFFERING UAV FOR SEARCH//B4 ADVISED
- 02/07/2024 - 07:51:3 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) FROM USCG CALLED AND ADV THAT THEIR COPTERS CAN ACCEPT THE MISSION//B4 ADVISED//B4 TO TALK WITH CAP AND UNIFIED COMMANDERS

- 02/07/2024 - 07:01:01 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ICP/ USFS FRED CANYON RD IS 4X4 ONLY
- 02/07/2024 - 07:00:15 (b)(6) Command Name: CANYON 6
- 02/07/2024 - 06:05:42 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIVIL AIR PATROL CALLED AND THEY ARE SENDING GROUND PERSONNEL TO ICP//CAP CONTACT IS (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- 02/07/2024 - 05:47:22 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) WITH THE SDSO SEARCH AND RESCUE HEADING TO THE ICP FROM GILLESPIE. ALL HIS UNITS AND EQUIP WILL BE STAGED AT THE USFS STATION CAMERON AREA BUT THE SGT WILL BE ENR TO THE KITCHEN CREEK ICP
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- 02/07/2024 - 05:29:46 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) B4 ICP AT KITCHEN CREEK HELIBASE
- 02/07/2024 - 05:04:38 [Hazard] Hazard Status: ACTIVE AIRCRAFT HAZARDS RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
- 02/07/2024 - 05:02:37 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) SPOKE WITH USMC (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ADV OF AIRCRAFT HAZARDS - IBIF DETECTOR IS RADIOACTIVE WITH INJECTION HAZARD, SUGGESTED PPE IF APPROACHED//ADD HAZARD AUX FUEL TANKS WITH DISCHARGE CARTRIDGES
- 02/07/2024 - 04:59:42 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) DUTY CHIEF ADV AND BRIEFED//DUTY TO CALL B4 ON HIS CELL
- 02/07/2024 - 04:55:42 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) HALF OF THE SQUADRON IS STILL IN IMPERIAL COUNTY AND WAS DUE TO HEAD TO MIRAMAR TOMORROW, WITH THE OTHER HALF HEADING TO MIRAMAR 1 DAY EARLY (DUE 2/6/2024 AT 2330 HRS).
- 02/07/2024 - 04:54:19 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ADVISED THE SQUADRON IS OUT OF CREECH AIR FORCE BASE IN NEVADA AND WENT TO IMPERIAL COUNTY FOR TRAINING. THE AIRCRAFT LEFT IMPERIAL COUNTY AFTER GETTING FUEL, AND WAS DUE BACK AT MIRAMAR BASE AT 2330 HRS. DID NOT SHOW UP AND HAS NOT BEEN HEARD FROM SINCE LEAVING IMPERIAL COUNTY. LAT/LONG PROVIDED WAS FROM ATSB TRACKING
- 02/07/2024 - 04:52:42 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) - (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IN CHARGE OF THIS SQUADRON - (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IS THE MAIN POINT OF CONTACT
- 02/07/2024 - 04:38:10 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BP REP ENRT
- 02/07/2024 - 04:36:27 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) NO COAST GUARD RESPONSE AS OF RIGHT NOW
- 02/07/2024 - 04:28:49 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LAST KNOWN ALTITUDE WAS AROUND 5525FT WITH A HEADING OF 325 DEGREES
- 02/07/2024 - 04:28:16 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) FROM BP COPIES THE REQUEST FOR A REP TO MEET AT KITCHEN CREEK HELIBASE // WILL WORK ON IT BUT MAY TAKE SOME TIME
- 02/07/2024 - 04:25:42 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) B4 REQ THE DUTY CHIEF TO BE NOTIFIED AND TO CALL HIS CELL
- 02/07/2024 - 04:24:47 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) REQ BP TO SEND A REP TO KITCHEN CREEK ICP
- 02/07/2024 - 04:19:06 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BORSTAR IS ABLE TO ACCEPT THE MISSION
- 02/07/2024 - 03:57:05 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AFRCC 800-851-3051 IS RUNNING THE INCIDENT AT THIS TIME SINCE THEY ARE 5-6 HRS OVERDUE // (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IS THE (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) FOR THE THAT MARINE AIR FORCE SQUADRON. THE SQUADRON IS FROM NEVADA AIR FORCE BASE.
- 02/07/2024 - 03:49:04 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) B4 ADVISING HE WILL CONT SEARCHING THE AREA - CXL E3374 AND E3384 FOR NOW
- 02/07/2024 - 03:44:07 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ICP WILL BE AT THE KITCHEN CREEK HELIBASE

- 02/07/2024 - 03:36:16 (b)(6),(b)(7) REQ FROM B4 TO SEE IF BORSTAR CAN ASSIST US TO FLY OVERHEAD. CALLED USBP AND SPOKE WITH (b)(6), - GAVE HIM THE INFO WE HAD AND HE WILL CALL BACK TO LET US KNOW IF THEY CAN ACCEPT THE MISSION
- 02/07/2024 - 03:26:11 (b)(6),(b)(7) HEAVY SNOWFALL - B4 IN THE AREA SEARCHING THE AREA. VERY REMOTE ACCESS
- 02/07/2024 - 03:05:17 (b)(6),(b)(7) CNF DIVISION 4 ALSO RESPONDING
- 02/07/2024 - 02:54:43 (b)(6),(b)(7) ALL UNITS TO STAGE AT CIBBETS FLATS CAMPGROUND. SNOW ON THE GROUND AND THE TRUCK TRAIL IS DIFFICULT TO ACCESS
- 02/07/2024 - 02:48:35 (b)(6),(b)(7) CNF BATTALION CHIEF 41 IS ENR
- 02/07/2024 - 02:48:03 (b)(6),(b)(7) CNF NOTIFIED AND HAS A BATTALION CHIEF ENR
- 02/07/2024 - 02:47:54 (b)(6),(b)(7) ASTREA CXLLD ENR TO THE LAT/LONG DUE TO WEATHER
- 02/07/2024 - 02:47:08 (b)(6),(b)(7) MIRAMAR BASE CONFIRMED THE AIRCRAFT IS 3 HOURS OVERDUE WITH NO COMMUNICATIONS SINCE 2330 HRS.
- 02/07/2024 - 02:39:49 (b)(6),(b)(7) SDU ECC DUTY CAPTAINS NOTIFIED
- 02/07/2024 - 02:39:39 (b)(6),(b)(7) ASTREA IS ENR AND WILL COME UP ON 10G
- 02/07/2024 - 02:26:58 (b)(6),(b)(7) M44 CAN CANCEL // RA 42 TO HANDLE
- 02/07/2024 - 02:22:03 [TC]Command Name: B4R6F 31
- 02/07/2024 - 02:22:02 [Segment]TRNS G/SDU
- 02/07/2024 - 02:22:00 (b)(6),(b)(7) ASTREA AND 2 GROUND UNITS ENR TO ASSIST THE AREA
- 02/07/2024 - 02:20:02 (b)(6),(b)(7) LAST PINGED LOC FOR THE AIRCRAFT - HASNT BEEN HEARD OF SINCE 2330 AND IS NOW MISSING. CH53E HELICOPTER SUPERSTALLION - 5 SOULS WERE ON BOARD.
- 02/07/2024 - 02:20:02 [TC]Address: =L([REDACTED], LAKE_MORENA CA
- 02/07/2024 - 02:20:02 [TC]TC Incident Number: 24003449
- 02/07/2024 - 02:20:02 [TC]Location Comment: USCG REPORTING POSS DOWNED AIRCRAFT

b4@sd CFD.com

Incident:

CASDU003404

Incident Number:

24003449

Report Number:

Incident: CASDU003404

Call Type:

FIRE, AIRCRAFT

Incident Name:

CANYON 6

Common Place Name:

USCG REPORTING POSS DOWNED AIRCRAFT

Location Comment:

USCG REPORTING POSS DOWNED AIRCRAFT

Agency:

SDF

Start Time:

02:20:02, February 07 2024

Modified Time:

13:10:45, February 07 2024

Address:

=L [REDACTED], LAKE_MORENA CA

Caller Number:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Radio Channels:

Cmd: 11C

Tac: 11D

TACTICAL-2: 11E

Aircraft Fire

Units

10

Unit	DSP	RSP	STG	ONS	TR	AH	AVL	Personnel
------	-----	-----	-----	-----	----	----	-----	-----------

B4

02:22:02

02/07/2024

02:27:14

02/07/2024

06:01:32

02/07/2024

06:01:17

02/07/2024

10:00:00

02/07/2024

BAT - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

M44

02:22:02

02/07/2024

02:25:44

02/07/2024

FAE - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

FFP - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

E3384

02:22:02

02/07/2024

02:27:27

02/07/2024

02:55:27

02/07/2024

04:27:38

02/07/2024

FF1 - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

CPT - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

FF1 - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

E44

02:22:02

02/07/2024

02:26:16

02/07/2024

04:29:51

02/07/2024

05:43:55

02/07/2024

FAP - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

FAE - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

FFP - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

FAP - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

E3374

02:22:02

02/07/2024

02:27:38

02/07/2024

02:55:12

02/07/2024

04:19:51

02/07/2024

FF1 - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

FF1 - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

FAE - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

PIO3328

02:22:02

02/07/2024

06:01:49

02/07/2024

05:36:48

02/07/2024

13:10:44

02/07/2024

CPT - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

RA42

02:25:50

02/07/2024

02:38:31

02/07/2024

02:55:59

02/07/2024

05:38:19

02/07/2024

FF2 - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

FFP - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

CNFB41

02:48:18

02/07/2024

02:48:18

02/07/2024

06:01:40

02/07/2024

06:01:17

02/07/2024

D3304

07:48:19

02/07/2024

07:48:19

02/07/2024

09:39:47

02/07/2024

09:39:43

02/07/2024

DIC - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

CNFE343

11:24:30

02/07/2024

11:24:30

02/07/2024

Comments

53

02/07/2024 - 11:46:46 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) OES CALLED ASKING OF "UNMET NEEDS" PER D3304 NO NEEDS
NEEDED. OES ADVISED WILL CALL WITH ONE MORE UPDATE

02/07/2024 - 11:46:00 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) OES CALLED INQUIRING OF

02/07/2024 - 09:54:39 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) UPDATE FROM B4 - 11-44 x5 AT CRASH SITE

02/07/2024 - 09:02:52 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) STA 44 HAD RP CALL TO ADV THAT SHE HEARD A COPTER 'LATE LAST NIGT/EARLY THIS MORNING'//RP - (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 3757 LA POSTA TRUCK TRAIL, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

02/07/2024 - 08:54:56 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) B4 ADV BORSTAR GROUND RESOURCES AT THE CRASH SITE TRYING TO MAKE ACCESS//DIFFICULT ACCESS DUE TO HEAVY BRUSH, MUD, AND SNOW

02/07/2024 - 08:41:19 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) BORSTAR HAS VISUAL ON CRASH SITE (b)(3)(B)

02/07/2024 - 08:32:01 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 3RD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING CONTACT - WATCH FLOOR (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

02/07/2024 - 08:25:54 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) RP CALLED TO SAY HE HEARD AIRCRAFT OVER THE AREA AROUND 0200 HRS. THINKS IT COULD BE IN THE AREA OF BEAR MOUNTAIN OR CORTE MADERA. HIS CALL BACK NUMBER IS (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) LIVES AT 28819 DEER CREEK TRL.

02/07/2024 - 08:23:44 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) COUNTY OES EDWIN (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) CONTACT IF ANY RESOURCES NEEDED

02/07/2024 - 07:55:35 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) USCG CONATCT IS LTJG ENGLISH AT (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

02/07/2024 - 07:54:54 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) USMC (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) CALLED AND ADV THAT THE USAF IS OFFERING UAV FOR SEARCH//B4 ADVISED

02/07/2024 - 07:51:31 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) FROM USCG CALLED AND ADV THAT THEIR COPTERS CAN ACCEPT THE MISSION//B4 ADVISED//B4 TO TALK WITH CAP AND UNIFIED COMMANDERS

02/07/2024 - 07:01:01 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) P/ USFS FRED CANYON RD IS 4X4 ONLY

02/07/2024 - 07:00:15 [TC]Command Name: CANYON 6

02/07/2024 - 06:05:42 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) CIVIL AIR PATROL CALLED AND THEY ARE SENDING GROUND PERSONNEL TO ICP//CAP CONACT IS LARAMIE UHLES 661-381-3935

02/07/2024 - 05:47:25 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)]760-685-3381 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) WITH THE SDSO SEARCH AND RESCUE HEADING TO THE ICP FROM GILLESPIE. ALL HIS UNITS AND EQUIP WILL BE STAGED AT THE USFS STATION CAMERON AREA BUT THE SGT WILL BE ENR TO THE KITCHEN CREEK ICP

02/07/2024 - 05:45:00 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) B4 REQ AREP FROM USMC TO ICP//SPOKE WITH (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) AND MIRAMR PROVOST MARSHAL, THEY WILL BE REQ AREP FROM THE AIRCRAFT'S UNIT TO THE ICP

02/07/2024 - 05:42:08 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)]SDSO SEARCH AND RESCUE GROUND UNITS ARE ENR TO THE CALL AND HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE ICP LOCATION - NO ETA GIVEN BY SDSO

02/07/2024 - 05:29:46 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) B4 ICP AT KITCHEN CREEK HELIBASE

02/07/2024 - 05:04:38 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Hazard Status:ACTIVE AIRCRAFT HAZARDS RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

02/07/2024 - 05:02:37 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) SPOKE WITH USMC (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) ADV OF AIRCRAFT HAZARDS - IBIF DETECTOR IS RADIOACTIVE WITH INJECTION HAZARD, SUGGESTED PPE IF APPROACHED//ADD HAZARD AUX FUEL TANKS WITH DISCHARGE CARTRIDGES

02/07/2024 - 04:59:42 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) DUTY CHIEF ADV AND BRIEFED//DUTY TO CALL B4 ON HIS CELL

02/07/2024 - 04:55:49 (b)(6),(b)(7) HALF OF THE SQUADRON IS STILL IN IMPERIAL COUNTY AND WAS DUE TO HEAD TO MIRAMAR TOMORROW, WITH THE OTHER HALF HEADING TO MIRAMAR 1 DAY EARLY (DUE 2/6/2024 AT 2330 HRS).

02/07/2024 - 04:54:19 (b)(6),(b)(7) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) ADVISED THE SQUADRON IS OUT OF CREECH AIR FORCE BASE IN NEVADA AND WENT TO IMPERIAL COUNTY FOR TRAINING. THE AIRCRAFT LEFT IMPERIAL COUNTY AFTER GETTING FUEL, AND WAS DUE BACK AT MIRAMAR BASE AT 2330 HRS. DID NOT SHOW UP AND HAS NOT BEEN HEARD FROM SINCE LEAVING IMPERIAL COUNTY. LAT/LONG PROVIDED WAS FROM ATSB TRACKING

02/07/2024 - 04:52:47 (b)(6),(b)(7) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) - MARINE CAPTAIN IN CHARGE OF THIS SQUADRON (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) IS THE MAIN POINT OF CONTACT

02/07/2024 - 04:38:10 (b)(6), BP REP ENRT

02/07/2024 - 04:36:27 (b)(6),(b)(7) NO COAST GUARD RESPONSE AS OF RIGHT NOW

02/07/2024 - 04:28:49 (b)(6),(b)(7)] LAST KNOWN ALTITUDE WAS AROUND 5525FT WITH A HEADING OF 325 DEGREES

02/07/2024 - 04:28:16 (b)(6), (b)(6) FROM BP COPIES THE REQUEST FOR A REP TO MEET AT KITCHEN CREEK HELIBASE // WILL WORK ON IT BUT MAY TAKE SOME TIME

02/07/2024 - 04:25:42 (b)(6),(b)(7) B4 REQ THE DUTY CHIEF TO BE NOTIFIED AND TO CALL HIS CELL

02/07/2024 - 04:24:47 (b)(6),(b)(7) REQ BP TO SEND A REP TO KITCHEN CREEK ICP

02/07/2024 - 04:19:06 (b)(6),(b)(7) BORSTAR IS ABLE TO ACCEPT THE MISSION

02/07/2024 - 03:57:05 (b)(6),(b)(7) AFRCC 800-851-3051 IS RUNNING THE INCIDENT AT THIS TIME SINCE THEY ARE 5-6 HRS OVERDUE // (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) IS THE MAJOR FOR THE THAT MARINE AIR FORCE SQUADRON. THE SQUADRON IS FROM NEVADA AIR FORCE BASE.

02/07/2024 - 03:49:04 (b)(6),(b)(7) B4 ADVISING HE WILL CONT SEARCHING THE AREA - CXL E3374 AND E3384 FOR NOW

02/07/2024 - 03:44:07 (b)(6),(b)(7) ICP WILL BE AT THE KITCHEN CREEK HELIBASE

02/07/2024 - 03:36:16 (b)(6),(b)(7) REQ FROM B4 TO SEE IF BORSTAR CAN ASSIST US TO FLY OVERHEAD. CALLED USBP AND SPOKE WITH (b)(6), - GAVE HIM THE INFO WE HAD AND HE WILL CALL BACK TO LET US KNOW IF THEY CAN ACCEPT THE MISSION

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02/07/2024 - 03:05:17 (b)(6),(b)(7) CNF DIVISION 4 ALSO RESPONDING

02/07/2024 - 02:54:43 (b)(6),(b)(7) ALL UNITS TO STAGE AT CIBBETS FLATS CAMPGROUND. SNOW ON THE GROUND AND THE TRUCK TRAIL IS DIFFICULT TO ACCESS

02/07/2024 - 02:48:35 (b)(6),(b)(7) CNF BATTALION CHIEF 41 IS ENR

02/07/2024 - 02:48:03 (b)(6),(b)(7) CNF NOTIFIED AND HAS A BATTALION CHIEF ENR

02/07/2024 - 02:47:54 (b)(6),(b)(7) (b)(6), CXLLD ENR TO THE LAT/LONG DUE TO WEATHER

02/07/2024 - 02:47:08 (b)(6),(b)(7) MIRAMAR BASE CONFIRMED THE AIRCRAFT IS 3 HOURS OVERDUE WITH NO COMMUNICATIONS SINCE 2330 HRS.

02/07/2024 - 02:39:49 (b)(6),(b)(7) SDU ECC DUTY CAPTAINS NOTIFIED

02/07/2024 - 02:39:39 (b)(6),(b)(7) (b)(6), IS ENR AND WILL COME UP ON 10G

02/07/2024 - 02:26:58 (b)(6),]M44 CAN CANCEL // RA 42 TO HANDLE

02/07/2024 - 02:22:03 (b) Command Name: B4R6F 31

02/07/2024 - 02:22:02 [Segment]TRNS G/SDU

02/07/2024 - 02:22:00 (b)(6),(b)(7) (b)(6), AND 2 GROUND UNITS ENR TO ASSIST THE AREA

02/07/2024 - 02:20:02 (b)(6),(b)(7)]LAST PINGED LOC FOR THE AIRCRAFT - HASNT BEEN HEARD OF SINCE 2330 AND IS NOW MISSING. CH53E HELICOPTER SUPERSTALLION - 5 SOULS WERE ON BOARD.

02/07/2024 - 02:20:02 [TC]Address: =L [REDACTED], LAKE_MORENA CA

02/07/2024 - 02:20:02 [TC]TC Incident Number: 24003449

02/07/2024 - 02:20:02 [TC]Location Comment: USCG REPORTING POSS DOWNED AIRCRAFT

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)



SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b) (6)

NOTICE

DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THE CONTENTS
OF THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT PROPER
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE

Name:..... (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Rank:.....

Service:.....N/A

Unit:.....California Department of Forestry
and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE)

Date:.....12 March 2024 and 30 April 2024

On 12 March 2024, the Investigating Officer conducted an interview with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) via telephone. The Investigating Officer failed to properly advise (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) of the purpose, scope, and his understanding of the differences between the JAGMAN and safety investigations. On 30 April 2024, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was re-contacted by the Investigating Officer and advised of the purpose, scope, and the investigation differences. No privileged or incriminating information was discussed during the initial interview. (b)(6), (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) elected not to change or modify his initial statement when (b)(7)(c) retroactively contacted and advised. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) affirmed he understood his statement was not privileged.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
12 March 2024 interview with the Investigating Officer:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that at 0220 CALFIRE received a call from their dispatch center. In San Diego County, incoming calls go to what is called "Station X" and then "Station X" determines what government agency the call would go too. ["Station X" is the actual name]. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that the situation was unique in that the land is managed by the USFS but isn't staffed for 24 hour operations.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that San Diego County Fire is responsible for all accidents to include aircraft and military aircraft. San Diego County then contracts with CALFIRE to be the San Diego County Fire Department in various locations. On the morning of 7 February 2024, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he was State of California employee but was working on behalf of San Diego County.

CALFIRE responded at approximately 0222 with himself leading several fire engines to the site. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he was part of the 2009 UH-1 incident and was familiar with the area. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 the notes within his Incident Checklist were not all-encompassing of what
2 occurred on the radio. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) advised the Investigating Officer on
3 how to request dispatch recordings if required.

4 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) again stated he was familiar with the terrain and was
5 familiar with current weather. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) with two CALFIRE Paramedics,
6 and San Diego Sheriff were able to make general access to the site. (b)(6),(b)
7 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that the access road was difficult to transverse and that
8 "white out" conditions were present with visibility of less than 25 feet.

9 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that based upon last known location data, the initial
10 response team was in vicinity of the mishap site but topography, vegetation,
11 weather, and visibility prevented them from seeing anything. The last known
12 location data was provided by dispatch personnel. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) wasn't
13 sure how dispatch had received that information.

14 At approximately 0330, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) then requested BORSTAR and San
15 Diego County SAR. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that San Diego County SAR is a
16 volunteer organization that requires time to mobilize. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
17 stated that BORSTAR was U.S. Customs and Border Protection's SAR team and
18 that they help San Diego County as needed. However, BORSTAR is not staffed
19 at night and were required to recall their members to proceed to the site.
20 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated this call for additional SAR assets coincided
21 with his arrival back to Kitchen Creek Helibase. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated USFS
22 was responding as well.

23 At 0344, the Incident Command Post (ICP) at Kitchen Creek was
24 established. Cell phone service was prohibitive on the mountain but was
25 permissible at the ICP.

26 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he waited for SAR ground units to form. (b)(6),
27 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) also stated he received calls from the U.S. Coast Guard. Upon
28 speaking with the U.S. Coast Guard's pilot in charge ((b)(6),(b)(7)(c)), a weather
29 report was provided, and it was determined that the current weather was
30 prohibitive to U.S. Coast Guard aviation assets.

31 During this time, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he also received multiple
32 phone calls from military personnel ((b)(6),(b)(7)(c)) and another
33 individual who discussed a UAS response option), BORSTAR, and an update from
34 San Diego Sherriff County regarding the SAR team's estimated arrival time of
35 0530-0600.

36 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) then addressed all the Unified Command members listed
37 within enclosure (44). (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that all members synced and
38 determined the need for a priority of effort due to site access. (b)(6),
(b)(7)

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 (b)(6),(b)(7) deferred to BORSTAR and San Diego County Sheriff's SAR teams as the
2 technical experts in ground-based SAR. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he believe San
3 Diego County Sheriff would be the primary SAR, based upon governance, and
4 that BORSTAR would be an assisting agency. It was decided that a single team
5 would proceed to the general mishap site, determine what was needed based
6 upon weather and road conditions.

7 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) then stated he received a phone call regarding the CA
8 CAP. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he never heard or worked with CA CAP
9 before. He was informed that CA CAP was prepping a specialized SAR aircraft
10 from Yuma or northern CA. When the CA CAP supervisor arrived at the ICP he
11 was incorporated into the Unified Command. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he
12 did not work directly with the AFRCC but the CA CAP supervisor very well may
13 have. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that the CA CAP supervisor's direct boss was
14 coming from somewhere far away but was enroute.

15 At 0925, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he had confirmation that five
16 souls in the crash had been located and that he worked with the military
17 police and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). At approximately 0935-1000, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
18 transferred with responsibilities to another CALFIRE Chief and departed to
19 write his report.

20 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) distilled acronyms, shorthand, processes, and how to
21 read the documents within enclosure (44). (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he was
22 the Unified Commander.

23 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) provided the Investigating Officer on how to request
24 dispatch records.

Koepke LtCol John J

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: 12:28 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: JAGMAN Discussion
Signed By: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Good afternoon sir,

Here is my clarifying statement of the events regarding Tiger 43:

On this 20th of May, 2024, I, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) confirm the accuracy of my recollection regarding the events detailed in my logbook entry dated February 6th, 2024. Providing additional context for the entry at 0510, I received a call from (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) during which he inquired whether I had informed anyone else in the chain of command, as he had not responded to my text or call. I responded in the negative. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) conveyed that this was the first he had heard of the matter. I got the impression neither the Commanding General nor the Chief of Staff had been made aware of the incident until that moment. I have no recollection of any further communication between Group Duty and myself between 0116 and 0600. Additionally, I cannot recall any direct communication with the squadron during that time.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Assistant Operations Officer, G-6

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

NIPR: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

SIPR:

Comm: 8 (b) (6)

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From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Monday, May 20, 2024 12:05 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: JAGMAN Discussion

(b) (6) ,

As discussed.

V/R,

37 MAR CPO

LOGBOOK

6 FEB 2024

COMMUNICATING GENERAL

CHIEF OF STAFF

SGTMAJ

SENIOR WATCH OFFICER

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



B	N	CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST: AFRCC DO/ADO WILL DETERMINE IF THE AIR FORCE CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON OFFICE (DSN 227-3783/7384 OR COMM 703-865-3783/7384) NEEDS TO BE CONTACTED.
C	X	NEWS MEDIA INITIATE (CY-03 NEWS RELEASE):
		1. CONTACT PUBLIC AFFAIRS: DUTY HOURS: 283-8080 AFTER-DUTY 1 AF/PA DIRECTOR
D	N	IMAGERY SUPPORT: ONLY IF THE SEARCH AREA IS MINIMIZED, CONTACT SIDO (INTEL PERSONNEL ON THE OPS FLOOR AT DSN 523-5875). ALSO CONSIDER HIGH PRIORITY OR MILITARY ASSET SEARCHED (EX. IF THEY REQUIRE STAFF NOTIFICATION)
E	N	JAG ASSISTANCE REQUIRED:
		1. CONTACT ON-DUTY JAG OR REP IN BATTLE CAB. THE ON-DUTY JAG WILL BE ON CREW REST FROM 2200-0600L. NOTIFY THE CCO TO HAVE THE JAG RECALLED DURING THIS PERIOD. 2. DRAFT EMAIL TO 801 AOC/JA OMB BOX AND ON-DUTY JAG WITH THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: - TITLE EMAIL AFRCC LEGAL REVIEW REQUEST - REQUESTOR (YOUR RANK/NAME, NUMBER) - MISSION NUMBER/LOCATION - WHO IS REQUESTING? STATE AGENCY OR LEA - ASSET REQUESTED - BACKGROUND/LEGAL ISSUE
15	X	TRACK DAILY RESOURCES AND ACTIVITY:
A	X	PARTICIPATING SRU(S) SORTIE/122 DATA
B	X	DOCUMENT AREA(S) SEARCHED (i.e. GRIDS SEARCHED BY CAP) NOTE: MILITARY SRUs DON'T TYPICALLY USE GRID SEARCHES, SO OBTAIN THEIR GENERAL SEARCH AREA(S) FOR THE DAY.
C	N	DETERMINE SEARCH PLAN FOR THE NEXT DAY (TIME THEY WILL CONVENE IN THE MORNING, WHICH ASSETS THEY PLAN TO USE, ETC.)
D	X	ENSURE ALL SECTIONS OF THE LOG ARE UPDATED (ALERTS POPULATED, CALLS/EMAILS LOGGED, PRODUCTS SAVED, ETC.)
E	X	COMPLETE SHIFT SUMMARY: SUMMARIZE THE INCIDENT/MISSION, INCLUDE DAILY ACTIVITIES AND REMAINING REQUIRED ACTIONS. FULLY BRIEF THE ONCOMING SHIFT OF THE SAR PLAN AND AVAILABLE RESOURCES.
F	X	FILE SUPPORTING HARD COPIES (SORTIE/122 DATA, WEATHER, CONTACTS, ATTACHMENTS, ETC.) IN THE MISSION FOLDER, IF APPLICABLE.
16	N	MISSION SUSPENSION:
		NOTES: 1. AGENCY IN CHARGE HAS RECOMMENDED MISSION SUSPENSION. 2. ALL PODS ARE AT ACCEPTABLE LEVELS. 3. ALL LEADS MUST HAVE BEEN PROSECUTED WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. 4. IF THE AFRCC IS NOT THE OVERALL RESPONSIBLE AGENCY AND THE AIRCRAFT HAS NOT BEEN LOCATED, AFRCC IS TO SUSPEND, NOT CLOSE REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE RESPONSIBLE SAR AGENCY DOES.
A	N	REQUIRES AFRCC/CC APPROVAL
B	N	IF APPROVED, INITIATE (CB-11 SUSPENSION).
17	X	MISSION CLOSING:
		NOTES: 1. NOTE: REMIND ISSUING ARTCC/ HUB TO NOTIFY NTSB OF AN ACFT CRASH/ ACCIDENT. 2. INITIATE (CB-06 MSN CLS) WHEN:
A	X	AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN LOCATED.
B	X	REQUESTING AGENCY NO LONGER REQUIRES SUPPORT.
18	X	CONTACT NTSB:
A	X	ASK IF ACFT CRASH WILL BE MOVED, IF NOT, E-MAIL APPLICABLE INFO TO CRASH LOCATOR DATABASE MONITOR TO MAKE THE UPDATE.
B	N	REQUEST NTSB PERSONNEL SILENCE BEACON IF ACTIVE.
19	X	ENSURE ALL TABS (OBJECTIVES, LEADS, ETC.) HAVE BEEN UPDATED (REFERENCE (CY-04 QC MATRIX)).
20	X	ENSURE ALL ACTIONS HAVE BEEN LOGGED (PHONE CALLS, EMAIL TRANSMISSIONS, ETC.), CONFIRM CHECKLIST COMPLETE
		DECODE DATA:
		AA = ALTERNATE DESTINATION AD = DESTINATION AE = REQUESTED ALTITUDE AI = AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION AT = NUMBER AND TYPE OF ACFT CP = ADDRESSES/CLOSURE POINT NB = NUMBER OF PEOPLE ON BOARD OP = ARTCC ADDRESS PD = PILOT DATA RM = REMARKS RT = ROUTE OF FLIGHT TE = TIME EN ROUTE TM = DEPARTURE TIME TS = TRUE AIRSPEED OR MACH NUMBER TA = ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL

Type	Note
Time	07/1926Z
Message Number	ALLEY

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Log Book for (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 1/1/2017 - 2/7/2024

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(b) (3) (B)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Enclosure (48)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



Log Book for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1/1/2017 - 2/7/2024

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
To: [Redacted]
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FW: Information request TIGER43 2/6/2024
Date: Tuesday, March 5, 2024 10:48:48 AM
Attachments: image001.png

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

The unofficial data you requested as provided by the FAA is in the thread below, for an official document (should it become necessary), a FOIA request will need submitted.

- Was an IFR flight plan filed and/or activated for TIGER 43 (CH-53E) on 6 Feb 2024? A: **Leidos Flight Services and 3rd party vendors utilizing the LFS system had no IFR or VFR flight plans filed and/or activated for TIGER43 on 6 Feb 2024.**
- Was an IFR handling beacon code ever issued to TIGER 43 (CH-53E) on 6 Feb 2024? A: **According to a report we received, an IFR flight plan was filed but the aircraft departed VFR without services.**
- Was a VFR flight plan ever filed and/or activated for TIGER 43 (CH-53E) on 6 Feb 2024? A: **Not to our knowledge but Leidos can confirm.**
- Was VFR Flight Following ever provided to TIGER 43 (CH-53E) on 6 Feb 2024? A: **No flight following.**
- Was an emergency beacon ever reported on Guard (b) (3) (B) from 2243PST (0643Z) on 6 Feb 2024 onward IVO (b) (3) (B)? A: **No emergency beacon was reported on any frequency.**

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Department of the Navy Representative (NAVREP)
Federal Aviation Administration Western Service Area (ANM-903)
2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA, 98198-6547
COMM (206) 231-2503
DSN (322)322-5205

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: R-FFSP-QA <r-ffsp-qa@leidos.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 5, 2024 10:32 AM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) >
Cc: R-FFSP-QA <R-FFSP-QA@leidos.com>
Subject: Information request TIGER43 2/6/2024

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FOUO

Good afternoon,

Leidos Flight Services and 3rd party vendors utilizing the LFS system had no IFR or VFR flight plans

Enclosure (49)

filed and/or activated for TIGER43 on 6 Feb 2024.

Sincerely,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Quality Specialist, FFSP
Health & Civil Sector

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

www.leidos.com

+1 (703) 726-4448 O

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From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Tuesday, March 5, 2024 12:29 PM

To: R-FFSP-QA <r-ffsp-qa@leidos.com>

Subject: EXTERNAL: FW: Phone Call Follow-Up IRT TIGER 43

Sir/Ma'am,

Based on the below RFI's I am looking for some information surrounding TIGER43 and the recent mishap in February. The specific information I am hoping to receive is as follows:

-Was an IFR flight plan filed and/or activated for TIGER 43 (CH-53E) on 6 Feb 2024?

Anything provided is helpful, thanks.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Department of the Navy Representative (NAVREP)
Federal Aviation Administration Western Service Area (ANM-903)
2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA, 98198-6547
COMM (206) 231-2503
DSN (322)322-5205

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Tuesday, March 5, 2024 7:40 AM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c); 'AJV-W-QCG-Accident-Litigation <AJV-W-QCG-Accident-Litigation@faa.gov>

Subject: RE: Phone Call Follow-Up IRT TIGER 43

Morning Sir,

Please see responses below.

Enclosure (49)

Regards,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Management and Program Analyst
Accident and Litigation Team
Quality Control Group, AJV-W14
Western Service Center
Office: 206-231-2374
AJV-W-QCG-ACCIDENT-LITIGATION
[KSN Aircraft Info Page](#)



From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) >
Sent: Monday, March 4, 2024 3:39 PM
To: 'AJV-W-QCG-Accident-Litigation' <AJV-W-QCG-Accident-Litigation@faa.gov>
Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) <(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)>
Subject: FW: Phone Call Follow-Up IRT TIGER 43

Sir/Ma'am,

I recall there were two very similar requests a couple of weeks back to support investigations by the USMC surrounding the TIGER43 mishap last month. The USMC is requesting response to the following RFI's:

- Was an IFR flight plan filed and/or activated for TIGER 43 (CH-53E) on 6 Feb 2024? **For historic flight plans please contact Leidos at r-ffsp-qa@leidos.com.**
- Was an IFR handling beacon code ever issued to TIGER 43 (CH-53E) on 6 Feb 2024? **According to a report we received, an IFR flight plan was filed but the aircraft departed VFR without services.**
- Was a VFR flight plan ever filed and/or activated for TIGER 43 (CH-53E) on 6 Feb 2024? **Not to our knowledge but Leidos can confirm.**
- Was VFR Flight Following ever provided to TIGER 43 (CH-53E) on 6 Feb 2024? **No flight following.**
- Was an emergency beacon ever reported on Guard (b) (3) (B) from 2243PST (0643Z) on 6 Feb 2024 onward IVO (b) (3) (B) ? **No emergency beacon was reported on any frequency.**

Thank you for the assistance.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

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Federal Aviation Administration Western Service Area (ANM-903)
2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA, 98198-6547
COMM (206) 231-2503

DSN (322)322-5205

Cell (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024 10:50 AM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) <(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)>

Subject: FW: Phone Call Follow-Up IRT TIGER 43

(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

The below information is being requested by the USMC for the investigation surrounding Tiger43. I realize you may not be the best POC to route this through so would appreciate a point in the right direction.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Department of the Navy Representative (NAVREP)
Federal Aviation Administration Western Service Area (ANM-903)
2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA, 98198-6547
COMM (206) 231-2503
DSN (322)322-5205

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024 9:23 AM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: Phone Call Follow-Up IRT TIGER 43

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Good morning. As discussed a few moments ago, I've been assigned as the IO for the TIGER 43 JAGMAN investigation. A few RFIs are listed below. Thank you so much for your help.

- Was an IFR flight plan filed and/or activated for TIGER 43 (CH-53E) on 6 Feb 2024?
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V/R,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

F-35 Pilot Training Center OIC

Enclosure (49)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
To:
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FW: Information request TIGER43 2/6/2024
Date: Tuesday, March 5, 2024 10:48:48 AM
Attachments: image001.png

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

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Cell (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

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Cc: R-FFSP-QA <R-FFSP-QA@leidos.com>
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Good afternoon,

Leidos Flight Services and 3rd party vendors utilizing the LFS system had no IFR or VFR flight plans

Enclosure (49)

filed and/or activated for TIGER43 on 6 Feb 2024.

Sincerely,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Leidos
Quality Specialist, FFSP
Health & Civil Sector

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) | www.leidos.com
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) ○

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(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Department of the Navy Representative (NAVREP)
Federal Aviation Administration Western Service Area (ANM-903)
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Cell (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

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To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c); 'AJV-W-QCG-Accident-Litigation <AJV-W-QCG-Accident-Litigation@faa.gov>
Subject: RE: Phone Call Follow-Up IRT TIGER 43

Morning Sir,

Please see responses below.

Regards,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Management and Program Analyst
Accident and Litigation Team
Quality Control Group, AJV-W14
Western Service Center
Office: 206-231-2374
AJV-W-QCG-ACCIDENT-LITIGATION
[KSN Aircraft Info Page](#)



From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) <(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Monday, March 4, 2024 3:39 PM
To: 'AJV-W-QCG-Accident-Litigation' <AJV-W-QCG-Accident-Litigation@faa.gov>
Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) <(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)>
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Thank you for the assistance.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

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Federal Aviation Administration Western Service Area (ANM-903)
2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA, 98198-6547
COMM (206) 231-2503

DSN (322)322-5205

Cell (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA)

Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024 10:50 AM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) <(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)>

Subject: FW: Phone Call Follow-Up IRT TIGER 43

(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

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(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

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Federal Aviation Administration Western Service Area (ANM-903)
2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA, 98198-6547
COMM (206) 231-2503
DSN (322)322-5205
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) >

Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024 9:23 AM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) <(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)>

Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) >

Subject: Phone Call Follow-Up IRT TIGER 43

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

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- Was an emergency beacon ever reported on Guard (b) (3) (B) from 2243PST (0643Z) on 6 Feb 2024 onward IVO (b) (3) (B) ?

V/R,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

F-35 Pilot Training Center OIC

Enclosure (49)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FW: CH-53E Mishap RFI - 2
Date: Wednesday, May 8, 2024 2:09:40 PM
Attachments: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

I presented your RFI to both NAVAIR and the FAA and got a response from NAVAIR first. Below is the thread, hopefully it answers the mail for your analysis, if you want more info feel free to contact the PMA-209 office directly as they can likely expand further.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Department of the Navy Representative (NAVREP)
Federal Aviation Administration Western Service Area (ANM-903)
2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA, 98198-6547
COMM (206) 231-2503
DSN (322)322-5205

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (PMA209) CIV USN COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PAX (USA)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Wednesday, May 8, 2024 1:15 PM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (USA) <(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)>

Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) CIV USN DCNO N9 (USA) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c); (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

USMC USN CNO (USA) <(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)>; (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (USA)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c); (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) <(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)>; (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (USA) <(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)> (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (USA) <(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)>; (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(USA) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c); (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: RE: CH-53E Mishap RFI - 2

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

The CH-53E is fully certified for ADS-B (out). The platform is responsible for equipage and maintaining the Fleet.

Respectfully,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

PMA-209 Air Combat Electronics

DPM Airspace Integration, Navigation and Safety
Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD)
47123 Buse Rd, Bldg. 2272 Rm.351, Patuxent River, MD 20670
NIPR: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
SIPR: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

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Controlled by: Department of the Navy
Controlled by: NAWCAD Comptroller Group
CUI Category: PRVCY
Distribution/Dissemination Control: FEDCON

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (USA) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) >
Sent: Wednesday, May 8, 2024 4:11 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (USA)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) USA) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c); (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) <(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)>; (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: RE: CH-53E Mishap RFI - 2

Specifically the mishap AC.

s/f

(b)
(6)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) CTR (USA)
Sent: Wednesday, May 8, 2024 4:08 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) >

Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c); (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c); (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) A)
A)
A)

Subject: RE: CH-53E Mishap RFI - 2

And the CH-53E fleet is all ADS-B(out) complete – Correct?

s/f

(b)
(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Wednesday, May 8, 2024 3:56 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: RE: CH-53E Mishap RFI - 2

(b)
(c)

Here is the response to your RFIs provided by (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b) (3) (B) The ADC is usually a DAL A device and used for airspeed and altitude. However, their accuracy, resolution, and response are not good for very low altitude flight in IMC.

- What is the FAA's known margin of error IRT ADS-B altitude returns? ADS-B reports Mode C altitude from the aircraft, so it is the same margin of error. It is dependent on the resolution of the ADC.
- What is the average (within 1 SD) of these errors? Not sure. It depends on the baro altimeter pressure setting.
- Does the margin of error average change when referencing low-altitude aircraft (e.g. Helicopter at approximately 1000-1500 AGL in mountain terrain)? If so, do this data points still fall within the average."? If the ADC and pitot static system is properly maintained, margin of error should not vary in a low altitude environment, especially for a helicopter which normally operates below 10k' MSL. In the weather conditions of this mishap, the main concern would have been icing of the pitot static sensors, so the pilots would have been using pitot heat.

Please let us know if you have any questions. Have a great day.

Respectfully,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

PMA-209 Air Combat Electronics
DPM Airspace Integration, Navigation and Safety
Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD)
47123 Buse Rd, Bldg. 2272 Rm.351, Patuxent River, MD 20670
NIPR: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
SIPR: [REDACTED]
Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

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Controlled by: Department of the Navy
Controlled by: NAWCAD Comptroller Group
CUI Category: PRVCY
Distribution/Dissemination Control: FEDCON

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Wednesday, May 8, 2024 2:22 PM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: FW: CH-53E Mishap RFI - 2

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Any progress/update on this?

s/f

(b)(6),
(b)(7)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Friday, May 3, 2024 3:53 PM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: CH-53E Mishap RFI - 2

All,

Sorry to clobber your in-box on a Friday. Additional info and investigators version of the RFI's below.

V/r

(b)(6),
(b)(7)

(b) (6)

Naval Airspace and Air Traffic Control
Standards and Evaluation Agency (NAATSEA)
OPNAV N980A

Air Warfare Division, N98

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Office (703)614-2635

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Chat with me on Teams



From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Friday, May 3, 2024 3:42 PM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FW: Request for radar tapes

(b)(6),
(b)(7)

The thread provided below is an email from the FAA QA folks a while back. It was provided to the AMB for TIGER43 (the CH-53 that crashed 6 Feb in SoCal), I believe the BuNo on this airframe is 164366. Looking at the explanation and the 3 attachments it appears the CH-53 was broadcasting

(b) (3) (B)

VFR. The investigating officer for the JAGMAN has reached out

looking for some answers to RFI's that have come up, I am hoping you have a contact with an individual at NAVAIR who may be able to assist providing some background and data. Some context from (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and his RFI's (addressed to the FAA but I believe NAVAIR may be a better source for answers) are provided below, thanks in advance:

(b) (6), (b) (3) (B)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

RFIs:

- What is the FAA's known margin of error IRT ADS-B altitude returns?
- What is the average (within 1 SD) of these errors?
- Does the margin of error average change when referencing low-altitude aircraft (e.g. Helicopter at approximately 1000-1500 AGL in mountain terrain)? If so, do this data points still fall within the average."

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Department of the Navy Representative (NAVREP)
Federal Aviation Administration Western Service Area (ANM-903)
2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA, 98198-6547
COMM (206) 231-2503
DSN (322)322-5205
Cell (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) >

Sent: Tuesday, February 13, 2024 2:09 PM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (FAA) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) >

Cc: 'AJV-W-QCG-Accident-Litigation' <AJV-W-QCG-Accident-Litigation@faa.gov>

Subject: RE: Request for radar tapes


As discussed, I have attached a Google Earth kmz with Falcon and ADS-B data.

*Please note: The call sign TIGER43 was not matching up in our systems. I found the flight using (b) (3) (B).

Falcon track data (airplane icon and folder labelled Falcon).

ADS-B (arrow icon and folder labelled with Date_ICAO_Operation ID). The arrows may appear green or red, red indicates there was a failure in the plot NOT that there was a violation.

To view the **Mean Sea Level (MSL) Altitude** in the ADS-B data, expand the folder as shown below and select the radio button for UAT 3D BaroAlt [100ft Offset] (purple arrow).



PLEASE NOTE – There are important differences between Falcon and ADS-B:


Falcon

1. Only available if ERAM or STARS (En Route systems) tracked the aircraft. Poor radar coverage means no plot.
2. Contains corrected altitude which is updated at 100 foot increments.
3. Updates in 6-10 second increments.
4. Contains speed.

ADS-B

1. Sensors can be anywhere on the ground, increasing the likelihood of plots.
2. Altitude is NOT corrected which means it is in smaller increments 25 feet or less depending on amount and type of sensors in the area.
3. Updates in 1 second increments.

To see individual plot information select either icon and an information bubble will pop up. Examples below:



To calculate the Above Ground Level Altitude, determine the elevation of the place in question and subtract it from BAlt, a.k.a. MSL.

W-ROC: MILITARY ACC/INC @ PINE VALLEY, CA

CORRECTION: MILITARY REGISTRATION NUMBER IS N164366.. W-ROC/KC

USMC, TIGER 43, N64366, H53, 5POB/FATAL, SUBJECT OF ALNOT, CRASHED
UNKN CIRCUMSTANCES, (b) (3) (B)
NO ATC SVCS ZLA... W-ROC/KC

Published on: 02/07/2024 14:53:19 (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada) By: Kimberly Carlson.

Sent By: Federal Aviation Administration

Regards,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Management and Program Analyst
Accident and Litigation Team
Quality Control Group, AJV-W14
Western Service Center
Office: 206-231-2374
AJV-W-QCG-ACCIDENT-LITIGATION
[KSN Aircraft Info Page](#)



(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

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(b) (3) (B)

Marine Aircraft Group 16 was formed March 1, 1952 at Santa Ana, California.

Colonel Mitchner was MAG-16's first commanding officer. Eight units made up the newly formed MAG: Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 16, Marine Airbase 16, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadrons 161, 163 and 164, Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 and 363, and Marine Helicopter Training Squadron 301. Through the years, many other helicopter squadrons have made MAG-16 their home.

Units of MAG-16 have participated in numerous exercises and operations including: Combined Arms Exercises, Weapons and Tactics "Instruction Courses", Kernel Blitz, Desert Fire Exercises, Desert Punch, Seahorse Wind, Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and many other missions, including Operation Iraqi Freedom.

MAG-16 has provided support in Somalia to include rescue operations in many other locations. MAG-16 maintains a high standard of combat readiness and is capable of supporting any assigned mission or reaction to any operational contingency.

MAG-16 deploys its units aboard the fleet of the United States Navy to maintain a high state of awareness overseas and abroad. MAG-16 and its units have provided aircraft support and transportation for visiting U.S. dignitaries and celebrities from the President of the United States, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, Commandant of the Marine Corps and movie legend Audrey Hepburn.

MAG-16 participates in community relations by providing support to the local community with static displays, raising money for the unfortunate, visiting the sick, and providing food and medical care for victims of natural disasters. MAG-16 also provides aircraft and personnel for the MCAS Miramar Air Show.

Today, MAG-16 is made up of 12 units: Headquarters Squadron, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16, Marine Wing Support Squadron 374, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadrons 161, 163, 165, 166, 363, and Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadrons 361, 462, 465, and 466.


MAG-16 celebrated its 65th birthday on March 1, 2017. MAG-16 continues to perform its assigned mission of transportation and re-supply for Marine air and ground units in an exemplary manner, maintaining the highest regards and traditions of the United States Marine Corps.



NATOPS EVALUATION REPORT

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)




(b) (3) (B)

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(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)

WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

Enclosure (61)



HMH-361
Marine Aircraft Group 16
3D Marine Aircraft Wing

6 FEBRUARY 2024




AM ODO (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
PM ODO (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)



6 Feb 2024


(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



MAXES





WEATHER



(b) (3) (B)

KINS NOTAMS



(b) (3) (B)

KINS NOTAMS



(b) (3) (B)

KLAS NOTAMS



(b) (3) (B)

KLAS NOTAMS



(b) (3) (B)

KLAS NOTAMS



(b) (3) (B)

KHII NOTAMS



(b) (3) (B)

KIPL NOTAMS



(b) (3) (B)

TFRs



(b) (3) (B)

ADMIN



- **CURRENT COMM CARD: v1.0**
- **DIRCM CARD FROM AVI, MAF IF THERE ARE ISSUES**
 - ⌞ **Training Cards now available**
- **PRINT NAVFLIR FOR ODO AND MX CONTROL BEFORE DEBRIEF**
- **ENSURE KYS ARE SECURED AFTER EACH FLIGHT**
- **EP QUIZ:**
 - ⌞ **PILOTS: NONE.**
 - ⌞ **CC'S: NONE.**
 - ⌞ **AO'S: NONE.**

(b) (3) (B)

PRINTING AND PUBLICATIONS MANAGEMENT TEAM



AERO APP CYCLE:

21 FEB 2024

EP / NATOPS / Tactics



COVER IN YOUR COCKPIT BRIEFS



Remember That No Mission Is So Important
That It Must Be Flown At The Expense Of Safe
And Sound Operating Procedures



■ QUESTIONS/TASKS FOR ODO?

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: FW: Overheat Questions
Date: Monday, March 18, 2024 5:06:40 PM
Attachments: [Overheat.pdf](#)

Good evening, sir,

Attached and below are the details for the requested items. Individuals sought were an AVI CDQAR who is now a SFF in maintenance control, and a current flight line QAR in our QA shop.

Let me know if you have further questions or information requirements.

Semper,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Monday, March 18, 2024 4:40 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: Overheat Questions

Good afternoon,

Attached is the PDF for troubleshooting the Overheat system on the #2 Engine. Included in this email will be the references and explanations for the following words: Maintenance, Troubleshooting, and Maintenance Action.

Reference: CNAF 4790.2D

Maintenance: **The function of retaining material in or restoring it to a serviceable condition. Maintenance includes servicing, repair, modification, modernization ,overhaul, rebuild, test ,reclamation ,inspection, and condition determination.**

Maintenance Action: **Any one of a number of types of specific maintenance operations necessary to retain an item in or restore it to a specified condition.**

Troubleshooting: **This code is used when the time expended in location a discrepancy is great enough to warrant separating troubleshooting time from repair time. Use of this code necessitates completion of two separate documents, one for the troubleshooting phase and one for the repair phase. When recording the troubleshooting time separately from the repair time, the total time taken to isolate the primary cause of the discrepancy is recorded on a separate MAF, using the system, subsystem, or assembly WUC (as appropriate).**

Quality Assurance recommendation for #2 Engine Overheat based off the NAMP and IETMS troubleshooting procedures, would be to document the discrepancy appropriately as it is a

Maintenance Function per the NAMP definition. The troubleshooting PDF attached provides ample directions on how to locate the issue within the Overheat System, the directions specifically lay out each step-in detail.

Respectfully,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

HMH-462

Quality Assurance Representative

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)




Weather Brief Graphics

UNCLASSIFIED



GALWEM Time-Phased Vertical Cross-Section
Model Forecast VT: 06Z Feb 06 2024



Temperature (+/-°C)
Flight Level Winds (kts)*
Relative Humidity (>70%)
Tropopause Height (FL)

*NOTE: Wind direction is relative to a compass (barbs to left indicate westerly wind), not relative to route of flight. Start point is always on left side of cross-section, endpoint on right-hand side. Model terrain is drawn per route of flight.



UNCLASSIFIED

CROSS SECTION.


PART V - BRIEFING RECORD

36. WX BRIEFED TIME 07/0053	37. FLIMSY BRIEFING NO. Z KNKX 0224-00032	38. BRIEFER'S INITIALS (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	39. NAME OF PERSON RECEIVING BRIEFING (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
40. VOID TIME 07/0200	41. EXTENDED TO/INITIALS Z	42. WX REBRIEF TIME/INITIALS	43. WX DEBRIEF TIME/INITIALS Z

Weather Brief Graphics

G-AIRMET

VALID: 0000 UTC WED 7 FEB 2024



ISSUED: 2153 UTC TUE 6 FEB 2024

IFR.


PART V - BRIEFING RECORD

36. WX BRIEFED TIME 07/0053	37. FLIMSY BRIEFING NO. Z KKKX 0224-00032	38. BRIEFER'S INITIALS (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)	39. NAME OF PERSON RECEIVING BRIEFING (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
40. VOID TIME 07/0200	41. EXTENDED TO/INITIALS	42. WX REBRIEF TIME/INITIALS	43. WX DEBRIEF TIME/INITIALS Z

Weather Brief Graphics

G-AIRMET

VALID: 0000 UTC WED 7 FEB 2024



ISSUED: 2045 UTC TUE 6 FEB 2024

G-AIRMET.


PART V - BRIEFING RECORD

36. WX BRIEFED TIME 07/0053 Z	37. FLIMSY BRIEFING NO. KNKX 0224-00032	38. BRIEFER'S INITIALS (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)	39. NAME OF PERSON RECEIVING BRIEFING (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
40. VOID TIME 07/0200 Z	41. EXTENDED TO/INITIALS	42. WX REBRIEF TIME/INITIALS	43. WX DEBRIEF TIME/INITIALS Z

Weather Brief Graphics

12-HR FCST OF FRONTS/PRESSURE AND WEATHER

VALID: 0000 UTC WED 07 FEB 2024



DOC/NOAA/NWS/NCEP/WPC

ISSUED: 1442 UTC TUE 06 FEB 2024


PROG CHART.

PART V - BRIEFING RECORD

36. WX BRIEFED TIME 07/0053	37. FLIMSY BRIEFING NO. Z KNKXX 0224-00032	38. BRIEFER'S INITIALS (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)	39. NAME OF PERSON RECEIVING BRIEFING (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
40. VOID TIME 07/0200	41. EXTENDED TO/INITIALS Z	42. WX REBRIEF TIME/INITIALS	43. WX DEBRIEF TIME/INITIALS Z

FLIGHT WEATHER BRIEFING																	
PART I - TAKEOFF DATA																	
1. DATE (YYYY-MM-DD) 2024-02-06		2. ACFT TYPE/NO CH53E		3. DEP PT/ETD KINS 0130 Z		4. RWY TEMP 7 °C 45 °F		5. DEWPOINT 5 °C 40 °F		6. TEMP DEV -2 °C 28 °F		7. PRES ALT 3434 FT		8. DENSITY ALT 3463 FT		ALTIMETER 29.59 INS	
9. SFC WIND 28012KT		10. CLIMB WINDS 24010KT				11. LOCAL WEATHER WATCH/WARNING/ADVISORY NA						12. RSC/RCR					
13. REMARKS/TAKEOFF ALTN FCST LIGHT SHOWERS, SCT006 OVC030, ICING ABV 020																	
PART II - ENROUTE & MISSION DATA																	
14. FLT LEVEL/WINDS/TEMP 23010KT, 02C				X		SEE ATTACHED		15. SPACE WEATHER AFWA SPACE WX 06 FEB 1800Z				16. SOLAR/LUNAR		LOCATION KINS			
								NO IMPACT		MARGINAL		SEVERE		BMNT 1342 Z			
FREQ								X				SR 1439 Z		MR 1314 Z			
GPS								X				SS 114 Z		MS 2235 Z			
RAD						X						EENT 211 Z		ILLUM 12 %			
17. CLOUDS AT FLT LEVEL						18. OBSTRUCTIONS AT FLT LEVEL RESTRICTING VISIBILITY											
X YES NO X IN AND OUT						X YES NO TYPE CLOUDS											
19. MINIMUM CEILING - LOCATION 010, ENTIRE ROUTE FT AGL						20. MAXIMUM CLOUD TOPS - LOCATION 250, ENTIRE ROUTE FT MSL						21. MINIMUM FREEZING LEVEL - LOCATION 055 FT MSL					
22. THUNDERSTORMS				23. TURBULENCE				24. ICING				25. PRECIPITATION					
CHART BIFROST FITL CHARTS				CHART BIFROST FITL CHARTS				CHART BIFROST FITL CHARTS				CHART BIFROST FITL CHARTS					
X NONE AREA LINE				X NONE IN CLEAR IN CLOUD				NONE RIME MIXED CLEAR				NONE DRIZZLE RAIN SNOW PELLET					
ISOLATED 1 - 2% MT				LIGHT				TRACE				LIGHT X					
FEW 3 - 15% MT				MODERATE				LIGHT X				MODERATE					
SCATTERED 16 - 45% MT				SEVERE				MODERATE				HEAVY					
NUMEROUS - MORE THAN 45% MT				EXTREME				SEVERE				SHOWERS					
HAIL, SEVERE TURBULENCE & ICING, HEAVY PRECIPITATION, LIGHTNING & WIND SHEAR EXPECTED IN AND NEAR THUNDERSTORMS.				LEVELS SEE REMARKS AND ATTACHED				LEVELS 040-120				FREEZING LOCATION ENTIRE ROUTE					
LOCATION				LOCATION				LOCATION ENTIRE ROUTE									
PART III - AERODROME FORECASTS																	
26. DEST/ALT		27. VALID TIME		28. SFC WIND		29. VSBY/WEA		30. CLOUD LAYERS		31. ALTIMETER		RWY TEMP		PRES ALT			
DEST 0530 Z		TO 0430 Z		VRB06 KT T		-SHRA		OVC040		29.62 INS		6 °C		3407 FT			
KINS		6030 Z		KT								43 °F					
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
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				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS		°F		FT			
				KT						INS		°C		FT			
				KT						INS							

1. Figure 1 depicts the mishap site, MA ABS-B derived flight path data (green arrows), and the nearest six airfields in which aviation weather data was available (black pointers outlined in white). Chart 1 depicts the associated distances.



Weather Reporting Station	Distance to Mishap Site (Approximate)
Gillespie Field (KSEE)	27 nautical miles
Borrego Vally (L08)	29 nautical miles
Brown Field (KSDM)	30 nautical miles
MCAS Miramar (KNKX)	36 nautical miles
NAF El Centro (KNJK)	38 nautical miles
Imperial Municipal (KIPL)	42 nautical miles

Chart 1. Distances from Mishap Site to Weather Reporting Stations.

1. Figures 3 through 9 are both raw and decoded Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAF) and Aviation Routine Weather Reports (METAR) for the six different weather reporting stations to include MCAS Yuma for overall divert situational awareness (50 nautical miles east of KIPL). Additionally, expanded aviation weather data is also provided later within enclosure (25) to address weather conditions well before and after the mishap.

MCAS Miramar (KNKX) TAF

Approximately 36 nautical miles NW of Mishap Site

```
TAF AMD KNKX 0621/0721 21008KT 2800 RA VCTS BR BKN010 BKN020 OVC070 650609 650608 541004 521409 522309 523205 QNH2966INS

BECMG 0700/0702 20007KT 4800 -SHRA VCTS BR BKN010 650602 640809 540503 520809 QNH2970INS

TEMPO 0708/0712 1600 RA BR OVC007

FM071430 15006KT 6000 -SHRA BR BKN015 650602 640809 540503 520809 QNH2987INS T12/0621Z T08/0715Z AMD 2111

TAF KNKX 0621/0721 21008KT 2800 RA VCTS BR SCT010 BKN040 OVC060 650609 650608 541004 521409 522309 523205 QNH2966INS

BECMG 0700/0702 20007KT 4800 -SHRA VCTS BR BKN015 650602 640809 540503 520809 QNH2970INS

TEMPO 0708/0712 1600 RA BR OVC007

TAF KNKX 0703/0803 25010KT 9999 -SHRA SCT15 BKN020 650602 QNH2974INS
BECMG 0703/0705 BKN010 650602 QNH2974INS
TEMPO 0705/0711 4800 RA BR BKN008
FM071330 15007KT 9999 -SHRA SCT010 BKN025 650602 QNH2985INS
BECMG 0715/0717 26010KT 9000 -SHRA BKN015 650602 QNH2989INS
TEMPO 0720/0802 27015G25KT T07/0714Z T13/0721Z
```

Figure 2. KNKX TAF.

MCAS Miramar (KNKX) METARs

```
METAR KNKX 070655Z 20007KT 10SM FEW025 SCT044 BKN070 09/08 A2979 RMK AO2 RAE12B41E51 SLP086 P0001 T00890083=

METAR KNKX 070555Z 00000KT 8SM -RA FEW034 BKN070 OVC110 09/09 A2978 RMK AO2 RAE29B51 SLP084 P0000 60005 T00940094 10128 20094 51016=

SPECI KNKX 070532Z 00000KT 10SM FEW019 SCT027 BKN036 09/09 A2978 RMK AO2 RAE29 P0000 T00940089=
```

Figure 3. KNKX METAR.

Imperial County (KIPL) TAF and METAR

Approximately 42 nautical miles E of Mishap Site

```
TAF KIPL 070520Z 0706/0806 25009KT P6SM FEW060 BKN100

METAR KIPL 070553Z AUTO 23013G18KT 10SM FEW095 13/06 A2972 RMK AO2 SLP065 T01280061 10150 20122 53024 PWIND $=
```

Figure 5. KIPL TAF and METAR.

Gillespie Field (KSEE) METARs

KSEE utilizes KNKX TAFs
Approximately 27 nautical miles NW of Mishap Site

```
METAR KSEE 070655Z AUTO 16005KT 10SM FEW022 SCT029 OVC060 11/09 A2980 RMK AO2 P0001=
METAR KSEE 070635Z AUTO VRB04KT 5SM -RA BKN023 BKN042 OVC075 11/09 A2980 RMK AO2=
METAR KSEE 070615Z AUTO 21004KT 10SM SCT023 OVC048 11/09 A2980 RMK AO2=
METAR KSEE 070555Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM FEW025 BKN050 OVC080 11/09 A2979 RMK AO2=
METAR KSEE 070535Z AUTO 22003KT 10SM SCT024 BKN035 OVC075 11/09 A2978 RMK AO2=
```

Figure 6. KSEE METARs.

NAF El Centro (KNJK) TAF

Approximately 38 nautical miles NW of Mishap Site

```
TAF KNJK 0707/0807 24020G35KT 9999 FEW050 SCT070 BKN150 510009 510909 QNH2972INS
TEMPO 0711/0717 24015KT
FM072200 26018G25KT 9999 SCT050 510009 510906 521503 QNH2984INS
TEMPO 0802/0807 26015KT AUTOMATED SENSOR METWATCH 0707 TIL 0714 TX19/0722Z TN08/0712Z FS30202
TAF AMD KNJK 0705/0723 23020G35KT 9999 FEW050 SCT070 BKN100 530009 QNH2970INS
TEMPO 0707/0712 23012G23KT
```

NAF El Centro (KNJK) METARs

```
METAR KNJK 070556Z COR 24021G34KT 10SM FEW050 SCT070 BKN150 14/06 A2974 RMK AO2 PK WND 23036/0508 SLP086
T01390056 10156 20133 53022 $=
METAR KNJK 070456Z 21018G27KT 10SM FEW050 BKN070 BKN150 14/06 A2971 RMK AO2 PK WND 21027/0447 SLP077
T01440061 $=
```

Borrego Valley (L08) METARs

Approximately 29 nautical miles NW of Mishap Site

Valid Time/Date: 2215 PST 6 February 2024
Visibility: 10 statute miles
Ceilings (AGL): Few 2200 feet, Scattered 3900 feet, Broken 4900 feet
Temperature / Dewpoint: 13 and 4 degrees Celsius

Valid Time/Date: 2235 PST 6 February 2024
Visibility: 10 statute miles
Ceilings (AGL): Scattered 4600 feet, Broken 6000 feet, Overcast 7000 feet
Temperature / Dewpoint: 12 and 5 degrees Celsius

Valid Time/Date: 2255 PST 6 February 2024
Visibility: 10 statute miles
Ceilings (AGL): Few 4600 feet, Broken 5500 feet, Overcast 6500 feet
Temperature / Dewpoint: 12 and 5 degrees Celsius

Figure 8. L08 METAR only. TAF not recorded.

Brown Field (KSDM) METAR

Approximately 30 nautical miles NW of Mishap Site

U.S. Department of Commerce
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration
National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service

Local Climatological Data Hourly Observations February 2024

National Centers for Environmental Information
151 Patton Avenue
Asheville, North Carolina 28801

Current Location: Elev: 521 ft. Lat: 32.5758° N Lon: 116.9939° W

Generated on 03/04/2024

Station: SAN DIEGO BROWN FIELD, CA US WBAN:03178 (ICAO:KSDM)

Date	Time (LST)	Station Type	Sky Conditions	Visibility	Weather Type (see documentation)	Dry Bulb Temp		Wet Bulb Temp		Dew Point Temp		Rel Hum %	Wind Speed (MPH)	Wind Dir (Deg)	Wind Gusts (MPH)	Station Press (inHg)	Press Tend	Net 3-Hr Change (inHg)	Sea Level Press (inHg)	Report Type	Precip Total (in)	Alti-meter Setting (inHg)
					AU AW MW	(F)	(C)	(F)	(C)	(F)	(C)											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
07	0551	6	SCT:04 15 BKN:07 50 BKN:07 75	10.00		48	8.9	47	8.3	45	7.2	87	9	190		29.31				FM-16		29.87
07	0553	7	SCT:04 15 BKN:07 50 BKN:07 75	10.00		48	8.9	47	8.3	45	7.2	89	8	190		29.32			29.87	FM-15	0.05	29.88
07	0653	7	FEW:02 17 SCT:04 24 OVC:08 50	10.00		49	9.4	48	8.9	46	7.8	90	9	150		29.33	3	-0.04	29.89	FM-15	0.01	29.89

Decoded

Valid Time/Date: 2151 PST and 2153 PST 6 February 2024

Wind Direction and speed: 190 degrees (true), 8-9 knots

Visibility: 10 statute miles

Ceilings (AGL): Scattered 1500 feet, Broken 5000 feet, Broken 7500 feet

Temperature / Dewpoint: 8.9 and 7.8 degrees Celsius

Valid Time/Date: 2253 PST 6 February 2024

Wind Direction and speed: 150 degrees (true), 9 knots

Visibility: 10 statute miles

Ceilings (AGL): Few 1700 feet, Scattered 2400 feet, Overcast 5000 feet

Temperature / Dewpoint: 9.4 and 7.8 degrees Celsius

Figure 9. KSDM METAR. TAF not available during IO data collection.

MCAS Yuma (KNYL) TAF and METAR

TAF KNYL 0703/0803 18005KT 9999 FEW080 SCT100 650809 651703 642005 QNH2968INS

METAR KNYL 070557Z AUTO 14009KT 7SM FEW060 FEW085 BKN100 13/11 A2973 RMK AO2 SLP066 LAST T01280106 10133 20122 51017=

Figure 11. KNYL TAF and METAR for divert situation awareness purposes.

3. Figures 9-14 are NASA produced infrared satellite images from taken at 2200 PST, 2230 PST, and 2300 PST on 6 February 2024. Cloud bases along the mishap route of flight ranged from approximately 1650 to 6500 feet AGL. Cloud thicknesses along the mishap route of flight ranged from approximately 3200 to 23000 feet AGL.




Figure 12. Infrared satellite depicting Cloud Bases (kft) at 2200.





Figure 13. Infrared satellite depicting Cloud Thickness (km) at 2200.





Figure 14. Infrared satellite depicting Cloud Bases (kft) at 2230.





Figure 15. Infrared satellite depicting Cloud Thickness (km) at 2230.





Figure 16. Infrared satellite depicting Cloud Bases (kft) at 2300.





Figure 17. Infrared satellite depicting Cloud Thickness (km) at 2300.

4. Figures 14 through 16 are NOAA produced Multi-Radar/Multi-Sensor System (MRMS) 3-Dimensional (3D) Radar Mosaic images taken at 2200 PST, 2230 PST, and 2300 PST on 6 February 2024 at approximately 6500 feet MSL. Lower tilt angles are invalid due to radar line of issues with terrain. Radar mosaics are unable to detect the presents of clouds (or cloud bases) but rather speak to the intensity of precipitation in decibels (dBZ) as radio energy strikes moisture. "Light" precipitation is defined as less than 26 dBZs. "Moderate" precipitation is defined as 26-40dBz. Beginning approximately 15 nautical miles east of the mishap site areas of light to moderate precipitation are observed. *NOTE: MA's approximate route of flight is depicted via a dashed red line through Figures 14 through 16.*







Figure 19. 3D Reflectivity at approximately 6500 feet MSL at 2230.



5. Three Airman's Meteorological (AIRMET) advisories were active and were a factor to MA's (b) (3) (B) flight leg. AIRMETs advise of weather conditions that maybe hazardous specifically to single engine, light aircraft, and VFR pilots. AIRMETs also may impact operators of large aircraft as well.

6. AIRMET Sierra, SFOS WA 070444 AMD Update 1 IFR, was valid from 2044PST to 0100PST advising of ceilings less than 1000 feet AGL and/or visibility less than 3 miles affecting over 50% of the outlined area in Figure 17 and Figure 18. MA's route of flight from approximately 2212 to 2243 resides within this AIRMET. SFOS WA 070444 AMD Update 1 IFR textual data is listed within Figure 29.




Figure 21. AIRMET Sierra, SFOS WA 070444 Graphical Overview (IFR).

7. AIRMET Sierra, SFOS WA 070444 AMD Update 1 Mountain Obscuration, was valid from 2044PST to 0100PST advising of extensive mountain obscuration outlined area in Figure 18. Mountain obscuration is a condition in which mountains or ridges are obscured due to clouds, precipitation, smoke, or other obscurations. MA's entire route of flight from 2209 to 2243 resides within this AIRMET. SFOS WA 070444 AMD Update 1 Mountain Obscuration textual data is listed within Figure 29.




Figure 22. AIRMET Sierra, SFOS WA 070444 Graphical Overview (Mountain Obscuration).

8. AIRMET Zulu, SFOZ WA 070245, was valid from 1845 to 0200 advising of moderate icing and freezing levels as outlined in Figure 19. Moderate icing accretion rate is 1 to 3 inches per hour. SFOZ WA 070245 captured moderate icing from the freeze level to Flight Level 250 and the freeze level between the surface and 7000 feet AGL. MA's entire route of flight from 2209 to 2243 resides within this AIRMET. SFOZ WA 070245 textual data is listed within Figure 29.




Figure 23. AIRMET Sierra, SFOS WA 070245 Graphical Overview (Moderate Icing).

9. MRMS Freezing Height snapshots within Figures 20 and 21 reinforce SFOZ WA 070245 (Figure 19) forecast depicting Freeze Heights at approximately 5400 feet MSL (1.645 kilometers) from 2200 to 2300. MA's approximate route of flight is depicted via a dashed red line.




Figure 24. Freezing Height (km MSL) at 2200.




Figure 25. Freezing Height (km MSL) at 2300.

10. MRMS Supercooled Liquid Water snapshots within Figures 22 and 23 also reinforces SFOZ WA 070245's forecast depicting Supercooled Liquid Water between approximately the surface and 6500-8200 feet MSL (2.0-2.5 kilometers MSL) from 2200 to 2300. MA's approximate route of flight is overlaid via a dashed red line.




Figure 26. Supercooled Liquid Water (km) at 2200.




Figure 27. Supercooled Liquid Water (km) at 2300.

11. One Convective Significant Meteorological (SIGMET) advisory was active but was not a factor to the MA as the MA route of flight and mishap location laterally outside the Convective SIGMET. Convective SIGMETs are weather advisories that pertain to convective weather conditions that significantly affect the safety of all aircraft. Convective SIGMETs are issued for the following sever weather events: tornadoes, lines of thunderstorms, embedded thunderstorms, areas of thunderstorms with more than 40% of coverage, and/or hail with a diameter of 3/4 inch or greater.

12. Convective SIGMET 11W was valid from 2055 to 2255 as outlined by Figure 24. MA's approximate route of flight is depicted via a dashed red line. Convective SIGMET 11W textual data is listed within Figure 29. **MA did not enter the Convective SIGMET 11W.**




Figure 28. Convective SIGMET 11W Graphical Overview

13. (b) (3) (B)

. The distance between the two points is 13.65 kilometers. "MRMS North Point" is approximately 4.68 kilometers northwest of the mishap site.




Figure 29. ADS-B Flight and MRMS South / MRMS North Points.

14. MRMS 3D Beta Radar Mosaic Cross Section snapshots within Figures 26 through 28 depict precipitation and corresponding altitude values along the MA's route of flight at 2240, 2242, and 2244. 3D Radar Mosaics are radar products that combine multiple returns within a 200-mile radius. NOAA's 3D Beta Radar Mosaic Cross Section allows these multiple returns to be layered in MSL altitude. The solid, vertical red line is representative of the mishap site. The solid, red dot depicted is representative of MA ownership at the depicted time. *NOTE: NOAA's Beta MRMS software was required as it enabled the Investigating Team to minimize the impact of mountainous terrain and the impact of radar line of sight in vicinity of the mishap site. MRMS 3D Beta Radar Mosaic Cross Section modeling limitations enable only "point and click" functionality (i.e., exactly latitude / longitude inputs are not enabled).*



Figure 30. 3D Mosaic Cross Section at 2240.
MA located within "light" precepitation. (b) (3) (B)



Figure 31. 3D Mosaic Cross Section at 2242.
MA located within "moderate" precepitation 10 km prior to the mishap site. (b) (3) (B)



Figure 32. 3D Mosaic Cross Section at 2244. Ownship located within "moderate" precepitation at the mishap site. (b) (3) (B)

15. United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP), via the United States Border Patrol, maintains an Interstate 8 security checkpoint (with video surveillance) at N32.795925 W116.495750. The security checkpoint is approximately 3.63 miles northwest of the mishap site. Figure 29 depicts a video surveillance footage screenshot taken at 2243:39PST approximately 15 seconds after the last ADS-B data point. Rainfall at the surface is visible, however the rate and precipitation are not discernable within the video. The road sign in background can clearly be seen at an approximate distance of 0.1 miles. The security checkpoint elevation is 3783 feet MSL, approximately 1300 feet lower than the mishap site.




Figure 29. CBP Interstate 8 Security Checkpoint Video 3.63 miles from the mishap site at 2243 captures active rain fall.

200
 WAUS46 KKC1 070444 AAA
 WA6S
 -SFOS WA 070444 AMD
 AIRMET SIERRA UPDT 1 FOR IFR AND MTN OBSCN VALID UNTIL 070900
 .
 AIRMET IFR...CA AND CSTL WTRS...UPDT
 FROM 40SSW FMG TO EED TO 40WSW EED TO 20ESE HEC TO 50WSW BZA TO
 30S MZB TO 40SE LAX TO 30SW RZS TO 80WNW RZS TO 40SSW FMG
 CIG BLW 010/VIS BLW 3SM PCPN/BR. CONDS DVLPG BY 06Z. CONDS CONTG
 BYD 09Z THRU 15Z.

200
 WAUS46 KKC1 070444 AAA
 WA6S
 -SFOS WA 070444 AMD
 AIRMET SIERRA UPDT 1 FOR IFR AND MTN OBSCN VALID UNTIL 070900
 .
 AIRMET MTN OBSCN...CA
 FROM 30WSW SAC TO 30W EHF TO 20NNW EHF TO 40SSW EED TO 40WSW BZA
 TO 40S MZB TO 30SSE LAX TO 50W RZS TO 20SW OAK TO 30WSW SAC
 MTNS OBSC BY CLDS/PCPN/BR/FG. CONDS CONTG BYD 09Z THRU 15Z.

069
 WAUS46 KKC1 070245
 WA6Z
 -SFOZ WA 070245
 AIRMET ZULU FOR ICE AND FRZLVL VALID UNTIL 070900
 .
 AIRMET ICE...OR CA ID MT WY NV UT CO AZ AND CSTL WTRS
 FROM 30ESE DLN TO 20W BOY TO 50E OCS TO 20ENE SLC TO 80SSE ILC TO
 30N LAS TO 20SSE BZA TO 30SE MZB TO 220SW MZB TO 130WSW SNS TO
 100SW PYE TO 20NNE ENI TO 70SSW LKV TO 20SW DNJ TO 30ESE DLN
 MOD ICE BTN FRZLVL AND FL250. FRZLVL SFC-070. CONDS CONTG BYD 09Z
 THRU 15Z.

595
 WSUS33 KKC1 070455
 SIGW
 -MKCW WST 070455
 CONVECTIVE SIGMET 10W
 VALID UNTIL 0655Z
 AZ
 FROM 40NE DRK-20S INW-50SW TUS-30SSE BZA-40NE DRK
 AREA TS MOV FROM 22035KT. TOPS TO FL340.
 CONVECTIVE SIGMET 11W
 VALID UNTIL 0655Z
 CA AND CSTL WTRS
 FROM 50NNE CZQ-50S TRM-20SW MZB-20SE MOD-50NNE CZQ
 AREA EMBD TS MOV FROM 35015KT. TOPS TO FL290.

Figure 33. Textual AIRMET and Convective SIGMET Data

Maximum Solar/Lunar Illumination Summary (Daily)

Location: TIGER

(b) (3) (B)

Start Date: 2024-02-06

Offset from Universal Time (UTC): -0800

Lunar Percent Illumination: 16 %

Hour (hhmm)	Solar Altitude (deg)	Solar Azimuth (deg)	Solar Illuminance (lux)	Lunar Altitude (deg)	Lunar Azimuth (deg)	Lunar Illuminance (lux)
2200	-57.8	295.4	0.0	-81.4	59.6	0.0000
2210	-59.5	298.0	0.0	-79.8	65.7	0.0000
2220	-61.4	301.2	0.0	-78.0	70.7	0.0000
2230	-63.1	304.7	0.0	-76.1	74.5	0.0000
2240	-64.8	308.6	0.0	-74.2	77.6	0.0000
2250	-66.4	313.0	0.0	-72.2	80.1	0.0000
2300	-67.9	317.9	0.0	-70.2	82.3	0.0000

Solar / Lunar Site Summary Table

Location: TIGER

(b) (3) (B)

Start Date: 2024-02-06

Offset from Universal Time (UTC): -0800

Solar Data :

Sunrise: 0637

Sunset: 1723

Begin Civil Twilight: 0611

End Civil Twilight: 1748

Begin Nautical Twilight: 0542

End Nautical Twilight: 1818

Longitudinal Passage Time: 1200

Longitudinal Passage Altitude: 41.7

Hours of Daylight: 1046

Lunar Data :

Moonrise: 0403

Moonset: 1343

Longitudinal Passage Time: 0853

Longitudinal Passage Altitude: 28.1

% Illumination 16

Figure 34. Solar / Lunar Illumination Summary and Summary Table

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

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
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(b) (3) (B)

06 FEB 2024

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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(b) (3) (B)




(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)





Connecting...



Outfront for night riyers 12:32

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

<https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2023-how-to-beat-roulette-gambler-figures-it-out/?embedded-checkout=true>

12:39

(b) (3) (B)



(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Anyone getting food 15:44


(b) (3) (B)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Can someone run out my magtab to 518 please. It's in the black Osprey backpack

17:10





09:26

LTE 62


< (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) >

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Wendell can you get me a freezing level
at (b)(3)(B) 21:20




5.5K per base wx 21:21 ✓


(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Can you look at the cross section and
see if there's clouds above 5k? 21:41





Cloud layers low right about now
from the TAF. METAR says
otherwise. 21:50 ✓

+ [Attachment icon] [Camera icon] [Microphone icon]









(Update 28 JAN 2024)

HMH-361



AVIATION MISHAP PLAN

Action Steps

(b) (2)

(b) (2)

(b) (2)

(b) (2)

(b) (2)

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(b) (3) (B)

TEAR OUT AND HAND TO THE DESIGNATED SCRIBE

CHRONOLOGICAL LOG

The Duty Officer, or designated person, shall maintain a log of all events as they occur. All telephone conversations, message releases, receipts, events, and any unusual problems encountered shall be logged. Use the log below instead of the SDO log.


(b) (3) (B)




(b) (3) (B)

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(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)

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
(b) (3) (B)




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


(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)



1:48

LTE

(b) (3) (B)

< 13

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

All the pilots other than the ones flying are otw back to the hotel

7:35 PM

Seems to be rolling just fine

7:35 PM

Tue, Feb 6 at 10:33 PM

Yall staying in Yuma?

10:33 PM

That's as a back up. Flying now picking our way over the hill

10:35 PM

I have fail in yall

10:36 PM

Faith

10:36 PM

Faith in yall

10:36 PM

(b) (3) (B)

10:37 PM

10:38 PM

10:42 PM

Who said he failed?

10:43 PM

Or is this a diabolical joke

10:51 PM



Text Message



14:00

5G

(b) (3) (B)



(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Tue, Feb 6 at 21:01

(b) (3) (B)

Can he hold the light on with the test switch?



iMessage



14:00

5G





(b) (6)



(b) (6)

(b) (3) (B)




(b) (3) (B)



iMessage





 USA wind farms file

General data

Map

Generalities



- Wind farm name: Golden Acorn Casino
- Country: [USA](#)
- County / Zone: [California](#)

Details

- City: San Diego
- Commissioning: 2014/07
- 1 turbine: [GE Energy 1.85-82.5](#) (power 1 850 kW, diameter 82.5 m)
- Hub height: 80 m
- Total nominal power: 1,850 kW
- Operational
- Onshore wind farm
- Developer: [Foundation Windpower](#)
- Operator: [Foundation Windpower](#)
- Owner: [Foundation Windpower](#)
- Source: <http://www.foundationwindpower.com/p-golden-acorn-campo.html>

Localisation

- Latitude: 32° 42' 5.1"
- Longitude: -116° 21' 5.9"
- Geodetic system: WGS84
- Precise location: yes
- [Google Maps view](#)

Golden Acorn Casino (USA)

Main data

Continent: North America
Country: USA
Area: California
Onshore
Status: Operational
Total power: 1,850 kW

Details

City: San Diego
Commissioning: 2014/07
1 turbine
Manufacturer: GE Energy
Turbine: 1.85-82.5
Developer: Foundation Windpower
Operator: Foundation Windpower
Owner: Foundation Windpower
Location (WGS84):
- North: 32.70142
- West: 116.35166

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF BORDER PATROL (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

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Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....Border Patrol Agent
Service:.....N/A
Unit:.....U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Date:.....9 April 2024 and 1 May 2024

On 9 April 2024, the Investigating Officer conducted an interview with Border Patrol (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) via telephone. The Investigating Officer failed to properly advise (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) of the purpose, scope, and his understanding of the differences between the JAGMAN and safety investigations. On 1 May 2024, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was re-contacted by the Investigating Officer and advised of the purpose, scope, and the investigation differences. No privileged or incriminating information was discussed during the initial interview. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) elected not to change or modify his initial statement when retroactively contacted and advised. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) affirmed he understood his statement was not privileged.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 9 April 2024 interview with the Investigating Officer:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated when he arrived at work [at the Campo Border Patrol Station] on the morning of 7 February 2024, he overheard the need from a temporary supervisor that agent support was needed to search for a lost aircraft in the vicinity of Mount Laguna, CA. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he was familiar with the area and requested to be dispatched to aid in the search after muster.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) transited to the Kitchen Creek Helibase, checked in with the Unified Command, and was assigned to a search party with a USFS member. Both (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), and the USFS member, proceeded from the Helibase north along Fred Canyon Road. During their transit, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that an additional set of coordinates were passed via radio. After approximately 25 minutes, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) located another SAR team that was in the area. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) departed the USFS vehicle and proceeded to discuss the new coordinates with the second SAR team that was led by BORSTAR personnel. After a brief discussion, it was decided that the BORSTAR team would proceed to one set of coordinates in a canyon area and that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) would

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 proceed to the new set of coordinates. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) departed as a single-
2 man team due to the USFS member's lack of cold weather gear.

3 After approximately 30 minutes of foot travel, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he
4 smelled what he thought was jet fuel and passed that information to the
5 Incident Command Post (ICP) via a common frequency. The BORSTAR team stated
6 that their grid coordinate search was unsuccessful, and they would be
7 proceeding to the second coordinate site.

8 After an additional 15 minutes, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was able to see smoke at
9 150 yards. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) passed the information on the common frequency.
10 Once (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), had traversed the 150 yards he discovered that TIGER 43
11 was actively on fire and that it looked like the aircraft had just fallen out
12 of the sky, burst, as there was wreckage everywhere. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated
13 that it was actively snowing and most of the aircraft was covered.

14 At 0847, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he reached the fuselage and was careful
15 not to touch or disturb the site. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) then passed his exact
16 coordinates over the common frequency. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he was visually
17 able to identify four of the five mishap aircrew. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) called out
18 multiple times but did not hear any replies. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he did not
19 wear PPE at the mishap site but was wearing a balaclava face mask.

20 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) remained on-site and waited for follow-on SAR personnel
21 to arrive. After approximately 40 minutes, BORSTAR and CA CAP personnel
22 reached the mishap site, and a grid search was executed. At approximately
23 1000, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) departed due to cold weather fatigue and exposure to
24 hazardous material/fumes. No other SAR members were witnessed by (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
25 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) prior to his departure.

26 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was advised by the Investigating Officer to ensure the
27 exposure event was documented within his medical record.

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2024 12:43 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: 20240320 Phone Con Follow-Up

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c),

Thank you very much.

S/F,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
3d Marine Aircraft Wing
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Office: 858-307-5077
Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2024 12:31 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) >
Subject: RE: 20240320 Phone Con Follow-Up

Sir,

(b) (6)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
LCDR, MC (FS), USN
HMH-361 Flight Surgeon

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) >
Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2024 3:35 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: 20240320 Phone Con Follow-Up

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c),

I would like to follow up:

(b) (6)

V/R,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Office: 858-307-5077

Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2024 4:04 PM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: RE: 20240320 Phone Con Follow-Up

Sir,

Apologies for the delay.

There were five marines involved in the Tiger 43 mishap:

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Very respectfully,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

LT, MC (FS), USN

HMH-361 Flight Surgeon

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF

(b) (6)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Rank.....Hospital Corpsman Second Class

Service:.....U.S. Navy

Unit:.....MWSS-371

Date:.....29 April 2024

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On 29 April 2024, the Investigating Officer conducted an interview with Hospital Corpsman (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), MWSS-371's assigned Hospital Corpsman, via telephone. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview, to include the difference with a safety investigation. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) affirmed he understood his statement was not privileged. He swore or affirmed to tell the Investigating Officer the truth. He agreed to have the interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) interview with the Investigating Officer:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that from approximately 0700-0730, he was alerted by his supervisor that MWSS-371 assets were required at Kitchen Creek Helibase and that additional details were not readily available. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that the MWSS-371 contingent [Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting] and himself departed MCAS Yuma, Az at approximately 0830-0910 after professional required gear and equipment were retained. After an hour and a half transit, the group arrived at Kitchen Creek Helibase. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that MWSS-371 personnel coordinated with Unified Command members and during his period he was informed that TIGER 43 had been located and all crew members had been pronounced deceased.

Following this notification, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), and the MWSS-371 contingent began to transit to the mishap site; however, due to vehicle maintenance issues he was delayed by approximately an hour and a half. Once repairs were complete, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) arrived at the mishap site at approximately 1330-1345. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated his immediate job was to locate all the mishap aircrew and declare them deceased as a military medical authority. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he first located MCC2. MCC2 was entangled in brush and equipment, and it was clear he had been killed. HM2 stated that a USFS member pointed him to MP1

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 and MP2. MP1 and MP2 were still in their seats, face down, and it was clear
2 that both had been killed. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) then transited to the main area of the
3 mishap site and located MCC1. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he was only able to see one
4 of MCC1's legs as he was completely entangled in wires and crushed by
5 aircraft wreckage. After a bit of time, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was able to confirm that
6 MCC1 had been killed. MP3 was the final member declared deceased as he was
7 found in a burning pool of jet fuel and his body had been completely burned.
8 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that in his opinion that the deaths of MP1-3 and MCC1-
9 2, due to the extreme nature of the injuries sustained, would have been
10 instantaneous.

11 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he did not provide a time of death, rather he
12 simply confirmed the time of death passed earlier that morning as a
13 Department of Defense member. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he was able to clearly
14 identify that USFS, California CAP, and MWSS-371 personnel were on-site with
15 him during his determination. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated the aircraft's "black box"
16 was empty and that MWSS-371 personnel were confused on who had taken
17 possession of it.

18 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was directed not to discuss his statement to the
19 Investigating Officer with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate
20 General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.
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SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....(b) (6)
Service:.....U.S. Marine Corps
Unit:.....MWSS-371
Date:.....30 April 2024

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On 30 April 2024, the Investigating Officer conducted an interview with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), Staff Non-Commissioned Officer-in-Charge (SNCOIC) of MWSS-371's 7 February 2024 response contingent, via telephone. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview, to include the difference with a safety investigation. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) affirmed he understood his statement was not privileged. He swore or affirmed to tell the Investigating Officer the truth. He agreed to have the interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)s interview with the Investigating Officer:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he received a phone call from the MWSS-371 Operations Department at approximately 0630 on 7 February 2024. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was made aware of a possible rescue mission and proceeded directly from his place of residence to Kitchen Creek Helibase at 0700. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) desire to leave immediately was to ensure advance party coordination was complete prior to additional MWSS-371 personnel arrival.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) arrived at Kitchen Creek Helibase at approximately 0930 and began to coordinate with on-site Unified Command (i.e., CALFIRE, San Diego County Sheriff, USFS, CA CAP) and 3d MAW personnel (i.e., (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)). The coordination with 3d MAW personnel was conducted via voice and signal group messaging. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that a media presents at Kitchen Creek had already started massing (20+ personnel). Upon entering the Incident Command Post (ICP),

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that it was chaotic as a centralized effort was lacking (i.e., differing priorities, no access control). Prior to 1000, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was informed by a BORSTAR representative

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 that TIGER 43 had been located and that all five aircrew had been confirmed
2 deceased.

3 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) quickly refocused the Unified Command,
4 ensured the mishap site was properly cordoned, and updated enroute MWSS-371
5 personnel that the mission had shifted from a rescue effort to an aircraft
6 and personnel recovery operation.

7 Once the entire MWSS-371 team arrived at Kitchen Creek (at
8 approximately 1200-1230), all members began to transit to the mishap site but
9 were delayed due to vehicle maintenance issues. After a one-hour delay,

10 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and his team arrived in the approximate
11 vicinity of the mishap site. USFS personnel remained on the access road as
12 MWSS-371 team transited on foot. Upon arrival at the mishap site, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

13 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated the only other individuals present were CA CAP
14 personnel. MWSS-371 team did not wear any type of Personal Protective
15 Equipment and did not initially have cold weather gear. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

16 stated that the team were aware of the hazards.

17 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that the weather conditions at the
18 mishap site were extreme with below freezing temperatures, 8-10 inches of
19 active snow fall, winds between 30 to 40 miles per hour, with visibility of
20 10-15 feet. These conditions remained static and grew worst that evening.

21 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) confirmed (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 1345 (plus or minus
22 15 minutes) time of death concurrence. The MWSS-371 team remained on the
23 site for approximately one hour then transited back to the ICP arriving at
24 1445-1500.

25 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he provided (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) the
26 names of the CA CAP personnel on-site during MWSS-371's initial site arrival.

27 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he possessed additional information
28 regarding follow-on events post 1445-1500, if needed (i.e., site transfer,
29 handover, Unified Command standdown, and additional 3d MAW personnel
30 arrival).

31 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he would provide the Investigating
32 Officer his phone screenshots regarding the TIGER 43 Signal group. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

33 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) signed a Permissive Authorization for Search and
34 Seizure.

35 (b)(6) stated that the MWSS-371 team and himself
36 completed and submitted hazardous exposure forms to military medical
37 authorities.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was directed not to discuss his statement
2 to the Investigating Officer with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate
3 General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.
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SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Rank:.....(b)(6),(b)(3)(B)
Service:.....U.S. Marine Corps
Unit:.....3d MAW
Date:.....1 May 2024

NOTICE

DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THE CONTENTS
OF THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT PROPER
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE

On 1 May 2024, the Investigating Officer conducted an interview with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), 3d MAW Current Operations, via telephone. The Investigating Officer explained the purpose and scope of the interview, to include the difference with a safety investigation. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) affirmed he understood his statement was not privileged. He swore or affirmed to tell the Investigating Officer the truth. He agreed to have the interview with the Investigating Officer audio recorded.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) interview with the Investigating Officer:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that at approximately 0630 on 7 February 2024 he received a group text message from (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, 3d MAW) to proceed into work and to activate the Wing Operations Command Center (WOCC) as an aircraft was overdue.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he was the first uniform member, outside the 3d MAW Command Duty Officer (CDO), to arrive at the WOCC at approximately 0700. Shortly after speaking with the CDO, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (3d MAW Operations Chief), and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (3d MAW Assistant G-3) then arrived. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that no later than 0800, the WOCC was fully functional and senior 3d MAW leadership was present.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he contacted MAG-16 and was passed the last known grid location that HMH-361 had for TIGER 43. WOCC members spoke and coordinated with CALFIRE ((b)(6),(b)(7)(c)), CA CAP (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), and USFS (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), who were all members of the Unified Command and were located at Kitchen Creech Helibase. The WOCC's initial focus was to determine TIGER 43's location, the status of the aircrew, and to support the Unified Command's search efforts.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated the WOCC also began to coordinate an airborne SAR
2 response with Coast Guard Sector San Diego aviation assets and organic
3 aircraft from HMLA-169, VMM-165, and VMFA-323 (T-34C) as situational
4 awareness and weather allowed. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that to best of his
5 knowledge no direct coordination with the AFRCC was made by WOCC personnel
6 and that all coordination was made directly with the established Unified
7 Command. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) noted that multiple other efforts within the WOCC
8 were occurring simultaneously, however his notes and account address only his
9 prospective of events.

10 At 0806, USFS (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) passed to the WOCC that a foot of snow had
11 fallen, USFS and US Border Patrol were conducting a foot search, that weather
12 was prohibitive to airborne SAR assets, and that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was now the
13 Incident Commander. Following this notification, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that
14 WOCC personnel pivoted and began UAS coordination.

15 From 0837 to 0844, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) spoke with MWSS-371. During this
16 time, he was passed MWSS-371 points of contact and was informed that the
17 senior member was enroute (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)).

18 At 0846, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) spoke with the VMM-165 Operations Officer
19 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)) and discussed SAR specifics and frequency coordination
20 requirements.

21 At 0858, the WOCC received a report from the Unified Command that SAR
22 personnel had visually located TIGER 43.

23 At 0905, the WOCC received a report from (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) that SAR
24 personnel were physically on-site and then spoke directly with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

25 At 0918, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that UAS airspace was actively being
26 coordinated.

27 At 0927, the WOCC received updated information that personnel from
28 MWSS-371 were enroute.

29 At 0933, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that VMM-165 was poised to support at an
30 Alert+15 status.

31 At 0940, HMLA-169, VMM-165, and VMFA-323 (T-34C) alert lines were stood
32 down.

33 At 0951, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) passed to the WOCC that the remains of the TIGER
34 43 crew had been located, however they did not know the full disposition.
35 Senior Leadership then passed priorities of work indicating that the recovery
36 of the crews remains were the top priority, followed by investigation
37 efforts, and environmental concerns. According to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), detailed
38

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 discussions regarding site transfer between CA CAP and USMC and the required
2 follow-on actions then occurred.

3 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he would provide the Investigating Officer his
4 notes from 7 February 2024.

5 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was directed not to discuss his statement to the
6 Investigating Officer with others per the Manual of the Judge Advocate
7 General (JAGMAN) with certain exceptions.



CONR-1AF (AFNORTH)



Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC)

Mission Brief



(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Commander

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Director of Operations

This briefing is: **UNCLASSIFIED**

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Mission Statements

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Tasked Mission

“The AFRCC supports domestic civil authorities by coordinating federal civil search and rescue (SAR) services.

These services are provided to the fullest extent practical on a non-interference basis with primary duties of the requested unit.”

Unit Mission Statement

*The AFRCC **saves lives** by providing expert coordination capability while fostering cooperation and providing first responder education in support of the National Search and Rescue Plan.*

AFRCC priorities


- 1 - Those in distress**
- 2 - Those executing the mission**
- 3 - Our fellow SAR controllers**

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US Civil SAR Architecture

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US Civil SAR Architecture

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CDR USNORTHCOM – SAR Coordinator (Inland)
Peterson AFB, CO

- Strategic Responsibilities
- Policy, Guidance, Interagency Coord
- Federal ESF-9



AFNORTH/CC – SAR Coordinator (CONUS)
Tyndall AFB, FL

- Operational Responsibilities
- Advocate for OT&E



AFRCC (Air Force Rescue Coordination Center)
Tyndall AFB, FL

- Routine SAR for Aeronautical SRR (Langley)
- Coordinate between SRRs (maritime, Mexico, Canada)
- Mass Rescue Operations (MRO)



CDR USCG – SAR Coordinator
Washington DC

- Strategic Responsibilities
- Policy, Guidance, Interagency Coord
- Operational Responsibilities



Coast Guard Districts (RCC'S)
Various Locations



- Routine SAR for Aeronautical & Maritime SRRs
- Coordinate between SRRs (inland, Mexico, Canada)
- Mass Rescue Operations (MRO)
- Catastrophic Incident SAR (CISAR)



United States Coast Guard
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

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Delineation of Authorities

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International Treaty Compliance

Chicago Conventions of 1944 (9th ed 2006) – Created ICAO

- International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual

Federal Policies

National SAR Plan (NSP)

National SAR Supplement (NSS)

- Multiple Addendums: CISAR, Land SAR, etc

DoD Guidance

DoDI 3003.01 *DoD Support to Civil SAR*


United States Air Force Guidance

AFPD 10-45 *Air Force Support to Civil SAR*

NORTHCOM OPORD 01-21

Catastrophic Incident Search And Rescue (CISAR)

DoDD 3025.18 *Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)*



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DoD Methods for Executing SAR

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DoD Planning / Complexity Increases

- **Immediate Response Authority** (*DoDD 3025.18*)
 - Member of community requests
 - Resources remain under control of installation commander
 - MUST re-evaluate every 72 hours (max)
- **AFRCC Mission Number** (*DoDI 3003.01*)
 - Requests come through appropriate channels outlined in MOU
 - “Ask not task” federal units to support Local/Incident Commander
- **Federal Tasking** (*DoDD 3025.18 / DSCA EXORD*)
 - Declared event(s)
 - National Response Framework (FEMA)
 - ESF #9 – Search and Rescue

SAR-OCE / JPRC

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SAR Responsibilities

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- **AFRCC is an “ask not task” agency**
 - Responsible for 48 contiguous states (CONUS) and for assistance to Canada and Mexico
 - Coordinates routine SAR missions as requested (ex: lost hiker, missing aircraft)
 - No forces assigned
 - **We do not have a radio**
- **Funding is addressed in each MOA**
 - The state requesting assistance is not billed
 - Agency providing support funds their own activities



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AFRCC Notifications & Execution

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Notification

Validation / Coordination

Execution

SAR Points of Contact (SPOC)

Tribal Affairs

Other Rescue Coordination Centers (RCC)

State Emergency Mang

Distress Beacons / Cospas-Sarsat Programme

Family Members

Park Service

Hospitals / Medical

Military Units

FBOs


Aircraft / Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Alert Notification (ALNOT)

STTIA and Local Authorities / First Responders

Non-Aircraft / Missing Person(s) Report

FSSs

Validate Request / Determine Authority / Identify Federal Support (As Needed)



Coordinate Support ("Ask Not Task")

Monitor Incident / Mission Until Resolved




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EMERGENCY BEACONS

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SAR Resources: Federal Assets

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Army



Navy



Air Force



USCGC




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SAR Resources: Civil Air Patrol (CAP)

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CIVIL AIR PATROL
U.S. AIR FORCE AUXILIARY

USAF Aux Capability

- 550 Aircraft
- 57,015 Total Members
- 34,679 Adult Members

TACON to 1AF (AFRCC)

- Search and Rescue
- Aerial Imaging/Damage Assessment
- Disaster Relief



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
Unique Tools for Searches

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
Radar Forensics

- Sources – FAA, & NHQ CAP (*volunteers*)
 - Last Known Position (LKP)
 - Heading, Altitude, & Speed
 - Maneuvers



Cell Phone Forensics

- Source – NHQ CAP (*volunteers*)
 - Recent Activity
 - Last Known Position (LKP)



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


Workload Growth

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Incidents / Month



Manning

~35 Total Personnel

Active-Duty Military

Government Civilians

Air Force Reservists

Contractor

24/7/365 Ops

2-6 Controllers on
the Floor at a time

2023 was consistently above previous years on a month-by-month basis, led to a 6.7% increase from 2022, we expect that to continue into 2024.

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Additional Responsibilities

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- National Search and Rescue School (Inland SAR)
- Basic Inland Search and Rescue Course (BISC)
- USAF advisor to OSD/DPMO (DoD) on NSARC
- NSARC Working Groups
- ICAO-IMO Joint SAR Working Group
- Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) support
- National Crash Locator Database
- Support to foreign RCCs and COCOM JPRCs/PRCCs
- SARSAT Program Steering Group & Joint Working Gp
 - ❖ One of three primary funding agencies w/NOAA & USCG
- Federal interface lead for annual state/NASAR/CAP conference(s)
- United States Personal Locator Beacon (PLB) Program
- Distress Alerting Satellite System (DASS) Program
- Human Space Flight Support (HSFS)



The Air Force Rescue Coordination Center Presents:

ELIMINATING FALSE ALERTS AND COMMON BEACON TESTING ERRORS

Testing your 406 MHz ELTs at the top of the hour is **NOT** authorized and will initiate an emergency response. **

Is Your Beacon Registered?



Scan this QR Code to Register your Beacon



Antiquated Equipment

As of 2009, the COSPAS-SARSAT system terminated the monitoring and reception of the 121.5 MHz and 243.0 MHz frequencies. The 121.5 MHz ELTs are still found on many private aircraft. However, COSPAS-SARSAT Satellites are not equipped to detect a 121.5 MHz ELT signal. Users must rely on an over flying aircraft within range of the crash site and listening to 121.5 MHz ELT to receive the signal. In addition, as of 2019, the manufacture, importation, or sale of 121.5 MHz ELTs became prohibited in the United States per a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) final rule.



What are false alerts?

A false alert is the transmission of an emergency distress signal by an activated COSPAS-SARSAT beacon when a distress situation does not exist. False alerts can occur through accidental activation and/or user error.

IN THE CASE OF A FALSE ALERT: For an ELT or PLB, call the AFRCC at 1-800-851-3051 or 850-283-5955

** In the U.S., it is a violation to intentionally transmit a false alert. Doing so could result in fines or jail time. Repeated false alerts, although not intentional, could also result in penalties. For beacon activation using a "test-coded" beacon or an operational beacon test, approval must be validated by a national sponsor and approved by submitting a test request form.



AFRCC Website

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July 27, Hiker Rescue

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NAS Whidbey Island

July 28 at 3:07 PM · 🌐

NAS Whidbey Island SAR Assists with Rescue at Mount St. Helens

A Search and Rescue (SAR) team from Naval Air Station Whidbey Island assisted in the rescue of an injured hiker off Mount St. Helens on July 27, 2023.

Late Wednesday night, July 26, the SAR team received a request for assistance for a 63-year-old hiker who broke his ankle while trekking on the southern rim of Mount St. Helens at an altitude over 7'500 ft. Mount St. Helen's Volcano Rescue Team (VRT) made the request for aerial transport to a lower elevation recovery area due to the steep rocky terrain and high altitude.

The SAR team launched just after midnight on July 27 and arrived on scene about shortly after 1 a.m. Upon arrival, the SAR crew immediately spotted lights used by the VRT who had reached the patient's location.

After making a visual inspection of the area to determine the best course of action, the crew conducted a one-wheel landing on a mountain-side shoulder to insert two SAR team members with a litter.

While the SAR team was working to assist the

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OPR: A-Dir OCR: P-Staff CAO: 20220605

54

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11 Nov, Injured Climber

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


Garfield County Search & Rescue

1d · 🌐

GCSAR was notified of a fallen climber at 2:00 pm on Saturday 11/11, near Grizzly Creek in Glenwood Springs. Due to the injuries, time of day, access to the patient and scale of the rescue, we requested aid from the HAATS with the Air National Guard, Aspen Mountain Rescue and Vail Mountain Rescue. The HAATS Blackhawk was able to perform a hoist operation in tandem with Mountain Rescue Aspen and retrieve the injured party and his climbing partner.

Thanks to Glenwood Springs Fire for running incident command and transport to hospital, and to CDOT for closing down some ramp for helicopter landing zones near i70. (Photo credit: GCSAR member Mike Cavanaugh)



👍 7

1 ➦

👍 Like

💬 Comment

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PostINDEPENDENT

Serving Glenwood Springs and Garfield County, CO

News ▾ Opinion ▾ Sports ▾ Entertainment ▾ Photos Announcements ▾ Rifle Classifieds ▾

Glenwood Springs climber rescued after fall

News [FOLLOW NEWS](#) | Nov 13, 2023



Staff Report

[FOLLOW](#)



A climber rescued from Grizzly Creek trailhead after falling 40 feet.

Grizzly Creek Rescue 11.11.23 (1)

Around 1:30 p.m. on Saturday, the Glenwood Springs Fire Department responded to a report of a climber who had fallen approximately 40 feet while on a multipitch climb called “Mudflap Girl” on the Grizzly Creek trailhead, according to a news release from the city of Glenwood Springs.

The climb is over 700 feet tall, and the approximate location of the injured party was about 400-500 feet up the climb. The incident lasted approximately four and a half hours from dispatch time to the last unit cleared, according to the release.

“The Garfield County Search and Rescue Team, Mountain Rescue Aspen and Vail

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INJURED MERCHANT SAILOR

AFRCC MSN 23-M-0324A

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Summary: At 31JUL22/1800Z US Coast Guard District 11 (USCGD 11) requested support for a long-range medical support for an international (EST) sailor experiencing a heart attack 400 miles off the coast of California. At 31/1826 the 129th RQW and 563rd RQG accepted the mission. At 31/2216 the 129th launched 2xHH60 and 1xHC-130. At 31/2316Z the 563rd launched 1xHC-130 2316Z. From 01/0018Z until 01/0155Z the HH60s and HC130s conducted three refuelings. At 01/0250 HH60 hoisted the patient. At 01/0539Z patient was transferred to Scripps Memorial Hospital, La Jolla, CA.

Mission Highlights:

Objective: 48 y/o Estonian male experiencing chest pain on 738ft tanker vessel "Commander" 400NM SW of San Diego)

- USCG made request to AFRCC for support 31/1800Z
- 129 RQW/563 RQG confirms mission support 31/1826Z
- 2xHH-60 and 1xHC-130 (129RQW) Launched 31/2215Z
- HC-130 (563RQG) Launched 31/2316Z
- 2xHC-130/2xHH60 conducted HAAR/0018Z-0155Z
- Patient hoisted to HH60 01/0250
- HC-130 landed NAS North Island (KNZY) 01/0456Z
- HH60 completed patient transfer 01/0539
- RON at KNZY, San Diego, CA
- 2 Aug all units RTB to KNUQ and KDMA

Assets involved:

- HH60x2 & HC-130x1 (129 RQW)
- HC-130x1 (563 RQG)
- PJs x 4 (129 RQW)



Mission Status: Mission Complete/1 Saved

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57

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Enclosure (84)




2023 Mission Activity

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Busiest RCC in the World!!

**~95% SOLVED
WITHOUT
FEDERAL RESOURCES
COMMITTED**



**35
INCIDENTS
per DAY**

~7% increase from 2022

**~.75 LIVES SAVED
EVERY DAY**

**1.5 MISSIONS
per DAY**

**19,000+ SAVES SINCE
ACTIVATION IN 1974**

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Points of Contact

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
AFRCC Console (24/7 ops for civil SAR)

- Commercial: (800) 851-3051 or (850) 283-5955
- DSN: 523-5955

<http://www.1af.acc.af.mil/units/afrcc/>

Commander: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Director of Operations: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



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(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)



FOR MISSION USE ONLY

2024-02-07 06:43:33Z

24-M-0031



CAP - National Radar Analysis Team (NRAT)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2024 2:25 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: HMH-361 AMSRR data

Sir,

Attached as requested.

R/

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2024 1:35 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: HMH-361 AMSRR data

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

If able, could I please have the exact same data for HMH-462 and HMH-465 during the discussed period?

S/F,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
3d Marine Aircraft Wing

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Office: 858-307-5077

Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2024 11:52 AM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: HMH-361 AMSRR data

Sir,




(b) (3) (B)

Respectfully,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

MALS-16 AAMO
CH53 TMS Action Officer
MAG-16 ARC MMCO
W: (858)307-4307

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

	Below MCAR
	Below, but within 75% of MCAR
	Met or exceeded MCAR

(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)





CUI



84 RADES Data Reduction

2024-02-07 NSC (MH-53E)

13 February 2024

Requested by:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) USN, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Provided By: 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron/RESA

Please refer any questions to:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies, Administrative/Operation Use, Vulnerability, **13Feb2024**. Other requests for document must be referred to 84 RADES/RES at 7976 Aspen Ave, BLDG 1283, Hill AFB, UT 84056-5846.

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Controlled by: 84 RADES/RESA

CUI Categories: CTI, EXPT

Distribution Statement B

POC: Flight Chief, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Enclosure (87)

CUI



84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES) Analysis (RESA)



DOD/DHS LONG RANGE RADAR JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS AIR COMBAT COMMAND
205 DODD BLVD, SUITE 101
JOINT BASE LANGLEY-EUSTIS, VA 23665



March 13, 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR: HQ ACC/A6XP (FOIA)
180 Benedict Avenue, Suite 210
Joint Base Langley-Eustis VA 23665-1993

FROM: DoD/DHS Long Range Radar Joint Program Office (LRR JPO)

SUBJECT: Processing of FOIA Radar Data Requests

1. Request any FOIA requests for radar data be sent to this office for possible inter-Departmental staffing. Currently, the 84th RADES at Hill AFB, UT directly receives FOIA requests for radar data, however, the radar data is owned jointly by the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Aviation Administration. FOIA requests for radar data will follow these rules and assumptions.

- 84th RADES is never the owner of the radar data therefore they are not authorized to release it or process FOIA requests for radar data.
- FOIA requests are not required to be processed if a record must be created. All radar data requests require a trained radar technician to perform a data extraction and parsing of radar data to create a usable product. (IAW DoD 5400.7-R, DoD Freedom of Information Act Program Section C1.4.3.3: "There is no obligation to create, compile or obtain a record to satisfy a FOIA request.")
- Radar data requests from foreign countries or foreign citizens will not be provided based on the sensitive military nature of the radar data and DHS's law enforcement mission.

2. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

DOD LRR JPO Program Manager

Cc:
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
FAA NDP, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
HQ ACC/JAC, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
84th RADES/CC
HQ ACC/A3CI

Enclosure (87)



84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES) Analysis (RESA)



Release of all provided data pursuant to the following:

AFI 91-204 (27Apr18) Safety Investigations and Hazard Reporting; p 4.3, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3

4.3. Identifying Privileged Safety Information. Privileged safety information refers to information that is exempt by case law from disclosure outside the DoD Safety Community. The DoD Safety Community consists of DoD personnel and certain DoD contractors with a specific need to know particular information exclusively for the prevention of DoD mishaps. The military safety privilege is judicially recognized and protects the investigative process and promises of confidentiality. The AF treats this information as limited use/limited access. Safety privilege assures commanders obtain critical information expeditiously during a safety investigation and ensures that completed final reports are protected, thereby proactively promoting safety, and preserving combat readiness and mission accomplishment. Privileged safety information includes:

4.3.1. Analysis, findings, conclusions, causes, recommendations, other findings and recommendations of significance, and the deliberative process of safety investigators. Diagrams and exhibits are privileged if they contain information which depicts the analysis of safety investigators. This includes draft versions of the above material and notes (see paragraph 4.2 for exceptions).

4.3.2. Information given to safety investigators pursuant to a promise of confidentiality and any information derived from that information to include direct or indirect references to that information (see paragraph 4.5 for promise of confidentiality).

4.3.3. Computer-generated animations, simulations, or simulator reenactments in which safety investigator analysis or confidential witness statements are incorporated. Animations made exclusively from recorder data (including Military Flight Operations Quality Assurance data) are not privileged. Although not privileged, actual intra-cockpit voice communication has legal protection as private communication and any request for access must be coordinated through legal channels. Requests to any safety office for intra-cockpit voice communications should be directed to the AFSEC/JA.

AFI 91-204 (27Apr18) Safety Investigations and Hazard Reporting; p 4.8, 4.8.4.3

4.8. Authorized Use and Release of Privileged Safety Reports and Information. In order to ensure courts honor the assertion of privilege, and DoD personnel maintain confidence in the limited use of privileged safety information, the rules described in this paragraph must be followed meticulously.

4.8.4.3. Historical Safety Reports. The AFSEC/CC or AFSEC/CV may release the findings portion only (not analysis, conclusions, recommendations, or witness statements, etc.) of a Safety Board, contained in historical safety reports prepared in accordance with DoDI 6055.07 (or its predecessors), provided no national defense or safety interest exists.



84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES) Analysis (RESA)

Release of all provided data pursuant to the following (cont):

AFI 91-204 (27Apr18) Safety Investigations and Hazard Reporting; p 6.7.2.1, 6.7.2.1, 6.7.3.1.1

6.7.2.1. Technical experts supporting an investigation are bound to follow Safety Investigation Board President and the Single Investigating Officer guidance while directly working and serving the Safety Investigation Board. This applies to DoD military and civilian personnel as well as contractor representatives. The Safety Investigation Board President or Single Investigating Officer should involve technical experts as early in the investigation as possible, ideally at the start of the investigation with the Interim Safety Board hand-off brief. The Safety Investigation Board President or Single Investigating Officer should also include technical experts in deliberations to formulate valid findings and viable recommendations.

6.7.2.2. Upon completion of their investigations, technical experts must provide a written report detailing results of their work.

6.7.2.3. Safety Investigation Board Presidents and Single Investigating Officers must ensure a **Non-Disclosure Agreement-Safety Investigation or Non-Disclosure Agreement – Contractor Reps Serving as Tech Experts to SIBs** (as applicable) on protection of privileged data is prepared and endorsed by all non-AF Safety Investigation Board personnel (e.g. contractors, National Transportation Safety Board) offered a promise of confidentiality or provided access to privileged safety information. Use the templates located in the AF Safety Automated System Pubs & Refs section

AFI 91-204 (27Apr18) Safety Investigations and Hazard Reporting; p 6.10.10, 6.14

6.10.10. Do not include people's names, [call signs](#), DoD Human Factors Analysis and Classification System codes, names of AF bases or companies in the findings. Use terms such as "the mishap aircraft," "the mishap vehicle operator," "the mishap pilot," "the mishap maintainer," etc.

6.14. Releasing Investigative Information During an Active Safety Investigation. It is AF policy to keep the public informed of AF events and safety investigations and to release non-privileged safety information, both favorable and unfavorable. AF policy complies with the requirements of Title 10, United States Code, Section 2254(b) regarding the public disclosure of certain non-privileged aircraft accident investigation information. The Safety Investigation Board President approves the release of all information (including electronic/digital media, photographs, etc.) from the Safety Investigation Board to the Accident Investigation Board or other legal investigation, but will not communicate directly with the media or other members of the public. The release of non-privileged safety information to news media, relatives, and other agencies is through the Accident Investigation Board President, Survivor Assistance Program point of contact, Family Liaison Officer, or Public Affairs representative as appropriate.



84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES) Analysis (RESA)

Release of all provided data pursuant to the following (cont):

AFI 91-204 (27Apr18) Safety Investigations and Hazard Reporting; p 9.2.7

9.2.7. AF/SE is the releasing authority for Class A Memorandums of Final Evaluation. AFSEC/CV is the releasing authority for Class B Memorandums of Final Evaluation. The AF Safety Center will release the Memorandum of Final Evaluation via the Air Force Safety Automated System. When transmitted, the Memorandum of Final Evaluation becomes the official AF position on findings, recommendations, and DoD Human Factors Analysis and Classification System codes.

AF Man 91-223 (14Sep18) Aviation Safety Investigations and Reports; p 6.5.4.3, 6.5.5, 6.5.5.4.1

6.5.4.3. The CA approves the release of any photographs or videos to the public IAW AFI 91-204.

6.5.5. Recorded Data. Collect and analyze data from on-board and off-board sources. Numerous data sources and collection devices are available for use in investigations including Crash Survivable Flight Data Recorders, Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVR), Flight Control Seat Data Recorders, Head Up Displays, Advanced Data Transfer Cartridges, Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System Log files, and Personal Computer Debriefing System files. Additionally, secure data recorded by other off-board recording systems such as wingman CVRs. Contact AFSEC Technical Assistance prior to downloading data recorders.

6.5.5.4.1. AFSEC/MAAF will be the primary source for animations intended to represent the actual mishap sequence. If AFSEC/MAAF cannot produce a specific mishap animation, or if additional animations are produced, SIBs will submit externally-generated mishap animations to the AFSEC/MAAF for review. (T-1) AFSEC/MAAF will analyze the externally-generated animation for any shortfalls, inadequacies, or inaccuracies that may impact accurate SIB deliberations or CA conclusions. If it is not used, they will not enter the animation into the formal report Tabs. (T-1)

All animation products must be appropriately marked to indicate whether or not they are privileged. **(T-1)**



84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES) Analysis (RESA)



Release of all provided data pursuant to the following (cont):

DoDI 6055.07 (06Jun11) Mishap Notification, Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping;

Encl 4 para 4.b.(2), Enclosure 5 para 2.b.(4), Encl 5 para 4.b, Encl 5 para 4.e

Encl 4 p 4. AVIATION SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING CIVIL AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT

b. Mishaps Involving Only DoD Aircraft

(2) In all other mishaps involving only military aircraft, the DoD Components shall provide the Department of Transportation or the NTSB information determined by the DoD Components as contributing to the promotion of air safety. Privileged safety information shall be protected as required by Enclosure 5.

Encl 5 p 2. IDENTIFYING PRIVILEGED SAFETY INFORMATION. DoD Components protect privileged safety information to ensure commanders quickly obtain accurate mishap information. For a safety investigation, privileged safety information includes:

b. Products of deliberative processes of safety investigators, including:

(4) Photographs, films, and videotapes that are staged, reconstructed, or simulated reenactments of possible or probable scenarios developed by or for the analysis of the safety investigator. However, photographs depicting a measuring device or object contrasted against mishap evidence for the sole purpose of demonstrating the size or scale of the evidence are not considered privileged safety information and may be released.

Encl 5 p 4. USE, SHARING, AND RELEASE OF SAFETY INFORMATION

e. Privileged safety information that has been sanitized shall no longer be treated as privileged. Only a DoD Component safety center is authorized to sanitize and release a privileged safety report.

(1) To sanitize a document, remove identifying information including:

- (a) The date and location of the mishap.
 - (b) Materiel identification number.
 - (c) Names, social security numbers, and other personal identifying information of participants, witnesses, and investigators.
 - (d) Information given to a safety investigator pursuant to a promise of confidentiality and any information derived from that information or direct or indirect references to that information.
 - (e) Any other detail that directly, indirectly, or in aggregate identifies the mishap or any individual who has given information pursuant to a promise of confidentiality.
- (2) Some mishaps, due to widespread publicity or other unique circumstances, cannot be adequately sanitized. Under such circumstances, removal of this information may be inadequate since the identity of the mishap is disclosed by the unique mishap sequence. This information is not sanitized and shall not be released.

(3) When privileged safety information is sanitized, the findings, conclusions, causes, recommendations, opinions, analyses, and other indications of the deliberative processes of safety investigators, safety investigation boards, endorsers, and reviewers are no longer considered privileged.



CUI

84 RADES Data Reduction: 2024-02-07 NSC (MH-53E)



(b) (3) (B)

CUI



(b) (3) (B)



84 RADES Data Reduction: 2024-02-07 NSC (MH-53E)



(b) (3) (B)



84 RADES Data Reduction: 2024-02-07 NSC (MH-53E)

(b) (3) (B)



32 CFR 250.9 - NOTICE TO ACCOMPANY THE DISSEMINATION OF EXPORT-CONTROLLED TECHNICAL DATA - DODD 5230.25, ENCLOSURE 5:

Export of information contained herein, which includes, in some circumstances, release to foreign nationals within the United States, without first obtaining approval or license from the Department of State for items controlled by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), or the Department of Commerce for items controlled by the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), may constitute a violation of law.

Under 22 U.S.C. 2778 the penalty for unlawful export of items or information controlled under the ITAR is up to 2 years imprisonment, or a fine of \$100,000, or both. Under 50 U.S.C., appendix 2410, the penalty for unlawful export of items or information controlled under the EAR is a fine of up to \$1,000,000, or five times the value of the exports, whichever is greater; or for an individual, imprisonment of up to 10 years, or a fine of up to \$250,000, or both.

In accordance with your certification that establishes you as a "qualified U.S. contractor," unauthorized dissemination of this information is prohibited and may result in disqualification as a qualified U.S. contractor, and may be considered in determining your eligibility for future contracts with the Department of Defense.

The U.S. Government assumes no liability for direct patent infringement, or contributory patent infringement or misuse of technical data.

The U.S. Government does not warrant the adequacy, accuracy, currency, or completeness of the technical data.

The U.S. Government assumes no liability for loss, damage, or injury resulting from manufacture or use for any purpose of any product, article, system, or material involving reliance upon any or all technical data furnished in response to the request for technical data.

If the technical data furnished by the Government will be used for commercial manufacturing or other profit potential, a license for such use may be necessary. Any payments made in support of the request for data do not include or involve any license rights.

A copy of this notice shall be provided with any partial or complete reproduction of these data that are provided to qualified U.S. contractors.

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
Buno 164366 Mishap Investigation – Rotor Systems

(b) (3) (B)




Main Rotor Blades (MRBs)

(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



Main Rotor Head (MRH)

(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



Tail Rotor Head (TRH) and Tail Rotor Blades (TRBs)

(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



Overall Summary

(b) (3) (B)

BuNo 164366 Mishap Investigation Engine Information

(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)



164366 Drive System Mishap Findings

POC: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Date: 16FEB2024, UPDATED 29FEB2024

(b) (3) (B)

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Aircraft Systems Overview

(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)

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(b) (3) (B)



ASIST

Aeromechanics Safety Investigation Support Team Report

Engineering Analysis and Supporting Data
Report

CH-53E; BuNo: 164366

Class A – Mishap

Mishap Date (06-FEB-2024)

JAG Version – NO PSI

ASIST Report # 2024-02-06-164366-JAG

Submitted

04-APR-2024



CUI

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
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
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
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Table 1: GPWS Data

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(b) (3) (B)



CUI

(b) (3) (B)



From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: Radiation CH-53 Mishap
Date: Monday, April 29, 2024 11:51:45 AM

Radiation exposure and radioisotope source recovery IRT CH 53 mishap.

(b) (3) (B)

Respectfully,
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
CBRN Officer

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: FW: Costing Estimate IRT HMH-361 CH-53E Aviation Mishap
Date: Tuesday, April 23, 2024 12:31:41 PM

Sir,

Below are the responses in red. Can you see these?

Regards,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) USMC
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff G-8
3d Marine Aircraft Wing
Desk: (858) 307-6017
Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2024 5:02 PM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: CUI: Costing Estimate IRT HMH-361 CH-53E Aviation Mishap

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c),

I'm the Investigating Officer into the facts and circumstances surrounding the HMH-361 CH-53E aviation mishap on 6 Feb 2024 (appointment letter attached). I was hoping to determine the following:

- Estimated replacement cost for CH-53E BUNO 164366? \$71.8 Million
- Estimated cost personnel on temporary duty orders to address various matters relating to the BUNO 164366 mishap? \$6,066.75 MAG-16 Hq (Port-o-johns, bleachers, keypad)
- Estimated transport costs of BUNO 164366 from the mishap site to MCAS Miramar? \$9.8K in fuel from MWSS 371
- Estimated storage costs of BUNO 164366 on MCAS Miramar (if applicable). TBD, no requests to station at this time. East Miramar is the historical open-air storage area; currently no closed-storage is being asked by 3d MAW. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) is helping to confirm if station will charge if asked to support closed-storage options.
- Estimated environmental and hazardous waste clean-up charges to California are \$500,000.

S/F,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
3d Marine Aircraft Wing
(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Office: 858-307-5077

Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)


CUI//PRIVACY SENSITIVE This e-mail contains information that is privileged, attorney work product, privacy sensitive or that is otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure of privacy sensitive information may result in civil and criminal penalties. If you have received this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s), please immediately notify the sender and delete this e-mail message from your computer.

(b) (3) (B)



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(b) (3) (B)



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(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)



From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: DEOCS - HMH
Date: Friday, May 3, 2024 2:57:49 PM
Attachments: [HMH DEOCS Comparative Analysis - \(b\)\(6\),\(b\)\(7\)\(c\)](#)

Good afternoon Sir,

(b) (2)

(b) (2)

V/r

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

3d MAW EOA

(b) (6)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Tuesday, April 30, 2024 8:16 AM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: RE: DEOCS - HMH

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Thank you for the touch point. Friday sounds great.

S/F,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Office: 858-307-5077

Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Sent: Tuesday, April 30, 2024 8:15 AM

To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Subject: DEOCS - HMM

Good morning sir,

Respectfully requesting an extension to compile the DEOCS information. There was an influx in complaints last week but I can likely finish it all up by this week Friday!

I apologize for the delay Sir.

Very Respectfully

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

3d MAW EOA

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)



(b) (3) (B)



3D Marine Aircraft Wing
FIX – FLY – FIGHT

HMH-361 31JAN-15FEB UTD BRIEF

Creech AFB, Nevada / KINS

22 Dec 2023

Action Officer: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

CO: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

SgtMaj: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


Enclosure (96)

Marine Aircraft Group 16
“60 Years of Assault Support Excellence”





HMH-361 KINS UTD CONOPS




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


KINS Climatology Summary



February




Statistics (days)	
Rain	4.5
Snow	1.0
Fz Rain	0.0
Dust	0.0
Thunder	0.2
Fog	1.2
>= 90F	0
<= 32F	13.0
Max Mean RH	59%
Min Mean RH	16%






Orientation



(b) (3) (B)



Orientation



(b) (3) (B)

Enclosure (96)

UNCLASSIFIED // CUI

Slide 8




Execution: Week 1



(b) (3) (B)



Execution: Week 2



(b) (3) (B)



RBE Summary



▪ RBE Manpower

- Total personnel: (b) (3) (B)

- [REDACTED]

- RBE OIC: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

- RBE SNCOIC: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

▪ RBE Operations

- (b) (3) (B)

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

▪ RBE Maintenance Goals

- WTI prep/packup



Administration / Logistics



- **Resupply Plan:**

- Primary: Ground MARLOG. Alternate: CH-53 MARLOG.
Tertiary: None.

(b) (3) (B)

- **Cargo / Personnel Transportation:**

- TT for transportation of tools and GSE approved.
- All other cargo/pax movement will go via ground or air MARLOG internal to HMM-361.

- **Maintenance:**

(b) (3) (B)

- **Ordnance:**

- None.



Administration / Logistics



- **Public Affairs:**

- Creech AFB regularly hosts training. No expected media impact.
- 3d MAW COMMSTRAT participation pending.

- **Medical:**

- Hunters Medical Clinic (Creech), 1033 Viper Road Creech Air Force Base, NV 89018; 702-404-1142; Monday – Friday 7:30 a.m. - 4:30 p.m.
- Embedded corpsman support
- Primary medical support: Role 1 / sick call and triage in hangar.
- Primary local medical facility: Hunters Medical Clinic.
- Emergency Room: Mike O'Callaghan Federal Medical Center at Nellis AFB.

- **Force Protection:**

- (b) (3) (B) [REDACTED] .



Administration / Logistics



- **DTS:**
 - DTS authorizations complete NLT 20 Jan 2024.

- **Billeting:**

(b) (3) (B)

- **Vehicles:**

- (b) (3) (B)

- **Per Diem:**

- Commercial Meal Rate (CMR)

- **Total Cost:** \$210,745.44 Blue

- Lodging \$65,664.00
- M&IE \$79,695.00
- Vehicles \$32,879.00
- Airline Tickets \$1,790.60
- Gas (Rentals) \$7,308.84
- Range & Training \$74,069.00

Enclosure (96)



Liberty



- Liberty off-base will be permitted for Marines to get food in town after base facilities close
- 40-mile radius covers urban area
- Liberty will secure at 0100L
- Groups of 2 or more, check out / in with NCO on duty in person at JW Marriott
- Will adhere to Air Force off-limits areas list

Enclosure (96)



KINS Aviation Safety ORM



(b) (3) (B)



Command and Signal



- **Det OIC is** (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
 - Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
 - AOIC is (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c))
- **Senior Enlisted on Det is** (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
- **RBE OIC is** (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
 - Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
- **Senior Enlisted on RBE is** (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
 - Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

QUESTIONS/GUIDANCE

Enclosure (96)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 361
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 16
3D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING FMF
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION MIRAMAR
PO BOX 452060
SAN DIEGO CA 92145-2060

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3500
S-3
22 Jan 24

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361
To: All Hands

Subj: LETTER OF INSTRUCTION FOR CREECH DETATCHMENT FOR TRAINING 31 JAN - 7
FEB 2024

Encl: (1) Schedule of Events
(2) Training Plan
(3) Parking Diagram
(4) Gear List

1. Situation. Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMH-361) will execute training at Creech Air Force Base (CAFB) in support of the squadron's Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP). CAFB is located approximately 230 nautical miles northeast of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar. (b) (3) (B)

. CAFB also provides a base of operations in close proximity to several training areas that include multiple Confined Area Landing sites (CAL) and Terrain Flight (TERF) routes.

2. Mission. On 31 January 2024, HMH-361 will deploy (b) (3) (B) CH-53E aircraft and associated personnel to CAFB in order to conduct training in support of the squadron's PTP. On 7 February 2024, HMH-361 retrogrades four CH-53E aircraft and personnel back to MCAS Miramar.

3. Execution

a. Commander's Intent and Concept of Operations

(1) Commander's Intent

(b) (3) (B)

(2) Concept of Operations. HMH-361 will conduct the detachment in a (b) (3) (B) plan. See enclosure (1) for schedule of events.

b. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Coordination with CAFB has been made. The point of contact (POC) is Technical (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6).

(2) CAFB ramp and Bldg 91 has been reserved. Parking at the hangar will be per enclosure (3).

(3) Department heads will ensure each Marine has access to this Letter of Instruction (LOI).

(4) The Action Officer is (b)(6); forward all questions and concerns to him regarding this LOI at (b)(6) or via phone: (b)(6).

(5) All Marines are responsible for bringing the required gear to CAFB per the enclosure (5).

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Transportation of personnel and equipment pack-up will be conducted via (b)(3)(B) CH-53E aircraft and contracted tractor trailers for equipment and C-130 for personnel with 12 rental vans as contingency ground transportation.

b. All shops will identify necessary gear by 20 January 2024 and coordinate with S-4 to ensure all assets are staged by 28 January 2024.

c. The squadron is authorized the Commercial Meal Rate. All Marines regardless of ownership of meal cards will be required to pay cash for all meals. Variation in Defense Travel System (DTS) itinerary will only be authorized by the S-1 DTS Approving Officials.

d. The squadron detachment will be billeted at (b)(3)(B) in Las Vegas, Nevada.

e. Questions concerning administrative matters should be addressed to the S-1 Officer in Charge (OIC), (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) o, at (b)(6),(b)(7)(c).

f. Questions concerning logistics should be addressed to the S-4 OIC, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), at (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) o.

5. Command and Signal

a. Command. This LOI applies to all Marines deploying to CAFB, Indian Springs, NV. The Detachment OIC is the Aircraft Maintenance Officer, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), at (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). The Operations POC is (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) at (b)(6),(b)(7)(c). The Detachment Staff Non-Commissioned OIC is (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) (b)(6),(b)(7)(c).

b. Signal. The primary means of communication is phone and email. The action officer can be reached at (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), or (b)(6),(b)(7)(c).

Distribution: All Hands
Copy to: S-3 Files

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

Date

Event

(b) (3) (B)

Execution: Week 1

(b) (3) (B)

Execution: Week 2

(b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (B)

GEAR LIST CREECH 2024

REQUIRED ITEMS:

Cold weather gear
 -Windproof outer layer
 -Appropriate base layers
 -Gloves
2 Green flight suits (Aircrew)
2 Coveralls (Aircrew/Maintainers)
1 Woodland MARPAT utilities w/ cover and insignia
1 Pair combat, safety, or flight boots
1 Camelback w/ bladder
1 Set of military identification tags
1 Military ID card
5 Pair brown/black socks
5 Pair underwear
5 Green T-shirts
1 Sea bag or parachute bag
1 Cranial w/ goggles
1 Helmet (Aircrew) and earplugs
2 Set appropriate civilian attire
1 Valid Government Charge Card

RECOMMENDED ITEMS:

Sunscreen
Sunglasses, military style
Flashlight
Camp chair
Civilian PT gear, gym shoes

PROHIBITED ITEMS

Large knives
Firearms

(b) (6)



(b) (3) (B)



(b) (3) (B)

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
(b) (3) (B)

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Enclosure (99)

BIOGRAPHY



HIGH RES PHOTO

Commanding Officer, Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was born in Tampa, Florida, grew up in Oak Harbor, Washington, earned a Business Degree from Eastern Washington University and was selected to attend Officer Candidate School in 2004. In December of 2004 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was commissioned a (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) through Officers Candidate Course 1

[Skip to main content \(Press Enter\).](#)

followed by The Basic School. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) reported to MATSG-21 Pensacola, Florida and was designated a Naval Aviator on 10 August 2007.



In May 2008, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) joined Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465 (HMH) and deployed to Japan as in support of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), completed an individual augment billet with Special Operations Command Central, and deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). While at HMH-465, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) served in the operations department, as the Intel Officer, and as the Flightline Officer in Charge (OIC).

After returning from Afghanistan in 2011 Captain Harvey volunteered for a Forward Air Controller tour in 29 Palms, California. He served as the Assistant Air Officer to 3rd LAR and 7th Marine Regiment. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) reported to HMH-462 in 2012, where he served as the Future Operations Officer and a Night Systems Instructor. During this period he again deployed to Afghanistan in support of OEF. While deployed (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was selected by the Commandant's Career Level Education Board to attend Expeditionary Warfare School in Quantico in 2014.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) served as the Executive Officer of the Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 aboard Camp Pendleton. He deployed in 2015 in support of Operation Inherent Resolve with the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response-Central Command (SPMAGTF-CR-CC) 16.1, and again in 2017 for the SPMAGTF-CR-CC 17.2 rotation.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) relocated to Hawaii in 2017 and joined HMH-463. He deployed with 55 Marines as the 31st MEU Detachment OIC in 2019. While in the squadron he assumed the billets of Aircraft Maintenance Officer and Executive Officer. In July, 2020, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was frocked to (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and served as the MAG-24 Executive Officer.

On 12 January, 2023, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) assumed his current billet as the Commanding Officer of Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361, the "Flying Tigers". (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) aircraft designations and qualifications are Assault Flight Leader, Night Systems Instructor, Terrain Flight Instructor, Functional Check Pilot, Crew Resource Management Instructor, Assistant NATOPS Instructor, and Instrument Instructor. His personal decorations include the Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal with Strike/Flight Numeral 6, Joint Commendation Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal 2nd award, and the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal 3rd award.

 PRINT  SHARE

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

NOTICE

DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THE CONTENTS
OF THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT PROPER
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE

Name:.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

Rank:.....N/A

Service:.....Supervisor

Unit:.....California Civil Air Patrol

Date:.....27 March 2024 and 30 April 2024

On 27 March 2024, the Investigating Officer conducted an interview with (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) via telephone. The Investigating Officer failed to properly advise (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) of the purpose, scope, and his understanding of the differences between the JAGMAN and safety investigations. On 30 April 2024, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was re-contacted by the Investigating Officer and advised of the purpose, scope, and the investigation differences. No privileged or incriminating information was discussed during the initial interview. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) elected not to change or modify his initial statement when retroactively contacted and advised. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) affirmed he understood his statement was not privileged.

The following is a summary and not a verbatim transcript of (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 27 March 2024 interview with the Investigating Officer:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) provided a general overview and hierarchical structure of the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) and addressed its auxiliary relationship with the USAF, its National Headquarters (NHQ) location, and its regional distribution throughout CONUS and OCONUS. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that each wing (or region/state) has an on-call, 24-hour a day Wing Mission Alerting Officer that the USAF can contact regarding mission tasking. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) addressed how California (CA) CAP enables mass communication via automation and web processes.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that once a phone call is received the Mission Alerting Officer will coordinate for a qualified Incident Commander based upon their rating, location, and mission requirements. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated it typically takes a few minutes for an Incident Commander to be identified. Once identified, the Wing Mission Alerting Officer then passes AFRCC data, points of contact, and mission specifics. The Wing Mission Alerting Officer then steps back from the problem-set and the designated Incident Commander then takes the SAR lead and works directly with the AFRCC.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

1 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he received a call early in the morning of
2 7 February 2024 from the individual who had been identified as the Incident
3 Commander. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated the Incident Commander was coordinating
4 personnel for a ground-based SAR as current weather prohibited an aviation-
5 based SAR response. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated ground-based SAR personnel were
6 dispatched from the Southern California area. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) was asked to
7 operate as a liaison officer to the Unified Command as the designated
8 Incident Commander was enroute from Northern CA. Due to the CAP being a
9 volunteer force, the Northern CA-based Incident Commander was selected
10 because he replied first. The reason why (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) didn't take the
11 Incident Commander role was due to his qualification being lapsed.

12 At approximately 0900, (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) arrived at the ICP at Kitchen
13 Creek Helibase with multiple CA CAP members. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that the
14 Unified Command elements were already executing individual searches. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
15 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) provided the Unified Command a second last known location that
16 was generated by the NHQ CAP Radar team. NHQ CAP Cell Phone data was not
17 received but (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that it would not have been as accurate
18 as the radar data in his opinion. The last known radar data location was
19 unknown by the Unified Command until that point. The location was passed via
20 common frequency and CA CAP ground-based SAR personnel pushed forwarded to
21 aid in the search effort. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated the weather at the ICP was
22 cold (50 degrees F), winds were consistent at 15-20+ miles per hour, with a
23 low overcast ceiling, and visibility of 8-10 miles. At the mishap site,
24 weather conditions were reported as active snow fall, winds at 50+ miles per
25 hour, and near "white out" conditions.

26 (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated a turnover between CALFIRE and himself occurred
27 at this time. Although "loose" it was sufficient. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he
28 spoke to multiple 3d MAW individuals (Squadron Commander, WOCC) to ensure the
29 most updated information was being provided. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated it was
30 his job to find TIGER 43 but he didn't want to stand in the way of Marines
31 taking care of their own.

32 Less than an hour later, there was a report that a SAR member had
33 visually located TIGER 43. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that the mishap site was
34 within 300 feet of the passed NHQ CAP radar data. Over the next 45-60
35 minutes, additional Unified Command SAR members arrived on-site and the
36 mishap crew was accounted for. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he directed CA CAP to
37 maintain site security as USMC personnel were less than an hour away from the
38 ICP. Once MWSS-371 personnel arrived they transited to the mishap site.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

After a period, MWSS-371 personnel arrived at the site, completed a 15-minute examination, and then returned to the ICP.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated additional USMC security personnel then arrived, search teams were released, and the site was transitioned to USMC personnel.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated that he would provide the location products generated by the NHQ CAP Radar Analysis Team.

Log Book for Sgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 1/1/2017 - 2/7/2024

(b) (3) (B)

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3D MAW CPO
LOGBOOK

6 FEB 2024

COMMUNO DUC GENERAL

CHIEF OF STAFF

SUMMIT

SENIOR WATCH OFFICER

STAFF DATE OFFICER

(b) (3) (B)

Co

x0

SCOTMAJ

CoDo

GDC

MAG 16 EPO
Logbook

(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)

(b) (3) (B)

Monsieur
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S. H. H. H. H.

(b) (3) (B)

Select Acronyms and Abbreviations

3d MAW.....3rd Marine Aircraft Wing

AFB.....Air Force Base

AFRCC.....Air Force Rescue Coordination Center

ADS-B.....Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast

AGL.....Actual Ground Level

AMB.....Aviation Mishap Board

BORSTAR.....Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue

CAP.....Civil Air Patrol

CBP.....U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CALFIRE.....California Department of Forestry and Fire
Protection

CH-53E.....CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter

CDO.....Command Duty Officer

CDQAR.....Collateral Duty Quality Assurance Representative

CFIT.....Controlled Flight into Terrain

CG.....Coast Guard (United States Coast Guard)

CG SEC SD.....Coast Guard Sector San Diego

CI.....Command Investigation

CRM.....Crew Resource Management

DEOCS.....Defense Organization Climate Survey

GDO.....Group Duty Officer

HAC.....Helicopter Aircraft Commander

HMH-361.....Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361

ICP.....Incident Command Post

IFR.....Instrument Flight Rules

IIMC.....Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Conditions

IMC.....Instrument Meteorological Conditions

IO.....Investigating Officer

LLL.....Low Light Level
MA.....Mishap Aircraft
MCAS.....Marine Corps Air Station
MCC.....Mishap Crew Chief
METAR.....Meteorological Terminal Air Report
MS.....Mishap Squadron
MSL.....Mean Sea Level
NAF.....Naval Air Facility
NAS.....Naval Air Station
NHQ.....National Headquarters
MP.....Mishap Pilot
PEL.....Precautionary Emergency Landing
PMC.....Parts, Mail, and Cargo
PST.....Pacific Standard Time
PTP.....Pre-Deployment Training Program
ODO.....Operations Duty Officer
QARQuality Assurance Representative
RAW.....Risk Assessment Worksheet
SAR.....Search and Rescue
SDO.....Squadron Duty Officer
SDCS.....San Diego County Sheriff
SDPD.....San Diego Police Department
SFF.....Safe For Flight
SLTE.....Service Level Training Exercise
SRR.....Search and Rescue Region
UCMJ.....Uniform Code of Military Justice
TAF.....Terminal Aerodrome Forecast
UTD.....Unit Deployment for Training

UTC.....Coordinated Universal Time
VMC.....Visual Meteorological Conditions
VFR.....Visual Flight Rules
WTI.....Weapons and Tactics Instructor

TITLE	RANK	NAME	UNIT / ORGANIZATION
Investigating Officer	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		3d MAW, G-3
Command Investigation Team			Cival and Adminstrative Law Branch - Reserve, Detachment A
			HMH-462, MAG-16, 3d MAW
			HMH-465, MAG-16, 3d MAW
			HMH-462, MAG-16, 3d MAW
AMB Senior Member			MAG-16, 3d MAW
MAG-16 Commanding Officer			MAG-16, 3d MAW
Commanding Officer			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
Executive Officer			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
Operations Officer			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
Aviation Maintenance Officer			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
Director of Standardization and Safety Aviation			
Safety Officer			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
Daily Schedule Writer			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
Weekly Schedule Writer			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
Operations Duty Officer			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
AM ODO			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
MS SDO			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
Safe for Flight Maintenance Controller			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
Quality Assurance Chief			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
Quality Assurance Representative			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
TIGER 42 Crew Chief			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
MCAS Miramar PM Airfield ODO			MCAS Miramar
MCAS Miramar AM Airfield ODO			MCAS Miramar
MCAS Miramar Airfield Manager			MCAS Miramar
MCAS Miramar Mission Assurance Officer			MCAS Miramar
MAWTS-1 Instructor Pilot			MCAS Miramar
CAL FIRE Chief			CAL FIRE
3d MAW Current Operations Officer			3d MAW, G-3
3d MAW Command Duty Officer (CDO)			3d MAW, G-6
MAG-16 Group Duty Officer			VMM-163, MAG-16, 3d MAW
MCAS Miramar CDO			MCAS Miramar
3d MAW Staff Secretary (SSEC)			3d MAW, Protocol
AFRCC Representative			AFRCC
USCG Representative			USCG San Diego Sector
CBP Border Patrol Agent			US Border Patrol - Campo Station
Flight Surgeon			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
MWSS-371 Corpsman			MWSS-371, MACG-38, 3d MAW
MWSS-371 Senior SNCO			MWSS-371, MACG-38, 3d MAW
Pilot Training Officer			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
Mishap Squadron Company Grade Pilot			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
California Civil Air Patrol Representative			California Civil Air Patrol
Mishap Checklist Team			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
			MCAS Miramar
			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW
			HMH-361, MAG-16, 3d MAW