





MISSION SYSTEMS (MS)

DESCRIPTION: (b)(3), (b)(4) display management computer left (DMCL) and DMC right (DMCR) are the computers that perform processing and generate video to drive the head-down multi-function display unit (DU). The DU consists of the display surface and touch screen. Display management computer-helmet (DMCH) is the computer that performs processing and drives video to the helmet mounted display (HMD). The integrated core processor (ICP) provides MS general purpose processing, sensor processing, and network resources to support a variety of tactical functions.



OBSERVATION: The MS data transmitted to VS for CSMU recording is very limited. Due to the limited nature of MS data recorded on the CSMU, it is not possible to determine what the pilot saw on the head down DU or the HMD, but the operational state of the DMCs can be assessed. The following analysis focuses on the aircraft time period from approximately AC time 4752s to 4792s.

DMC LEFT (DMCL) AND DMC RIGHT (DMCR)






(b)(3), (b)(4)

CONCLUSION: Due to the limited nature of MS data recorded on the CSMU, it is not possible to determine what the MP saw on the HMD. Recorded CSMU data indicated the DMCs remained powered and were able to provide critical information such as ICAWS from AC time 4752s (17:32:06.5Z) to 4792s (17:32:46.5Z).

INTEGRATED CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM (ICAWS) DATA



(b)(3), (b)(4)






(b)(3), (b)(4)

CONCLUSION: Data indicates that ICAWS were functioning properly up to aircraft time of approximately AC time 4790s (17:32:44.5Z).

DMC - HELMET (DMCH) AND HMD




(b)(3), (b)(4)

CONCLUSION: Recorded CSMU data indicated the DMCH and HMD remained powered and displayed information to the pilot during the time period from approximately AC time 4752s to 4792s. Helmet pitch data during the last 24 seconds recorded several instances of significant downward head movement.

DATA COMPARISON TO OTHER FLIGHTS







(b)(3), (b)(4)

CONCLUSION: The data comparison on six additional flights with a common EPS event suggests DMCL, DMCR, and DMCH for the MA did not lose power during the transient electrical event.

STANDBY FLIGHT DISPLAY (SFD)

ANALYSIS: The SFD provides a source of aircraft flight parameters, independent of the DMCs. The SFD’s only reliance on Mission Systems is for the calculation of magnetic heading, which occurs on DMCR.

The SFD relies on an internal inertial measurement unit (IMU) for aircraft attitude information and the air data system for additional flight parameters.

(b)(3), (b)(4)


(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

CONCLUSION: The SFD provided valid flight reference data to the MP throughout the time period from AC time 4752s to 4792s



INTEGRATED CORE PROCESSOR (ICP)



(b)(3), (b)(4)

CONCLUSION: CSMU data recorded the ICP-A restarting at approximately AC time 4753s (17:32:07.5Z), while the ICP-B continued to operate normally during the time period from approximately AC time 4752s (17:32:06.5Z) to 4792s (17:32:46.5Z).

RECOMMENDATION: None.





FLIGHT CONTROL LAW APPLICATION (CLAW)

DESCRIPTION: Aircraft control is provided by execution of a defined set of control laws (CLAWs) that reside in VMC software, based on the flight mode of the aircraft. The F-35B control law (CLAW) application uses multiple feedback sensors and switches to stabilize the aircraft and provide desired handling qualities for pilot tasks in all regimes, including ground handling, power approach (PA), up and away (UA) modes. The F-35B aircraft may operate in CTOL mode or in STOVL mode. In flight, the F-35B has relaxed stability in the pitch and yaw axes making it impossible for the pilot to control the aircraft without stabilizing feedback loops.

CTOL Mode. The CTOL modes include PA for takeoff and landing, and UA when the landing gears are up. Aerial refueling (AR) is a submode of UA and PA and occurs when the probe is extended. Autopilot modes are provided and can be selected via hand on throttle and stick (HOTAS), pedals, or the PCID (b)(3), (b)(4)

The UA control laws provide maneuvering throughout the gear-up envelope, including the post-stall regime. The longitudinal control system is a pitch rate command system at low speeds, which switches to a normal load factor (Nz) command system at higher speeds (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

The roll axis is a stability axis roll rate command system. For small deflections, the lateral stick commands roll rate proportional to stick deflection, but as deflection increases the command becomes parabolic. The roll coordination is automatic, incorporating a slight amount of adverse sideslip during the roll, eliminating the need for coordination with pedal. The directional axis is a proportional sideslip command system at lower angle of attack, transitioning to a yaw rate command system at higher angle of attack (b)(3), (b)(4)

The PA CLAW provides precise control of glideslope, lineup, and speed/AOA during approach and landing. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

The pitch axis control law in PA uses a blended control approach to provide neutral speed stability at higher speeds and good speed stability at approach. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(7)e

(b)(3), (b)(4)



The AGCAS will generate an automatic flyup when the model predicts the potential for ground collision while in CTOL mode with the landing gear up (UA). Pitch, roll, and engine thrust are commanded as required to clear terrain (b)(3), (b)(4)

If terrain elevation data (TED) data, radar altimeter (RALT), and system altitude are unavailable, AGCAS coverage is not available. With a failed ICP B or a degraded OKM solution, the AGCAS function is not available. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

STOVL Mode. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4) The STOVL CLAWS control the aircraft after the propulsive lift system has been engaged. STOVL flight is comprised of two flight phases: semi-jet (SJ) and jetborne (JB). On ground modes include Taxi and Short Takeoff (STO) control law modes (b)(3), (b)(4)

Conversion. Conversion is the reconfiguration of the aircraft and propulsion system between conventional flight with the lift system disengaged and STOVL flight with the lift system engaged. At any time during a transition in normal operation, including conversion, it is possible to quickly and safely stop the maneuver and reverse its direction (b)(3), (b)(4). Conversion is initiated by the pressing of the conversion button when the aircraft is within the conversion flight envelope and in either Mode 1 (CTOL) or Mode 4 (STOVL).

(b)(3), (b)(4)

Conversion is conceptually broken into six top level modes for communication between the airframe and propulsion system (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4) Modes 1 and 4 are steady-state modes, representing aircraft and propulsion system configurations for CTOL and STOVL flight, respectively.

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)

During a conversion from a CTOL to a STOVL configuration, the aircraft proceeds through Modes 2 and 3, which encompass the opening of the STOVL doors, the reconfiguration of the propulsive system by clamping and locking the clutch, and the CLAW initiation closed-loop control over the propulsive effectors. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

During a conversion from a STOVL to a CTOL configuration, the aircraft proceeds through Modes 5 and 6, which encompass the closing of the STOVL doors and the unlocking of the clutch as the aircraft is reconfigured for conventional flight. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)


(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)

Landing in STOVL Mode. Landings in STOVL mode with the lift fan engaged can be performed at any speed from conventional landing speeds down to a zero forward speed vertical landing. Slow landings (SLs) are performed to a conventional airfield at speeds below conventional landing speeds


(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)

Autopilots. The autopilot (AP) has the following selectable modes: attitude hold, altitude hold, heading select, altitude select, and route hold. The auto throttle (AT) has the following modes: speed hold, speed select, and time-over-steerpoint. An approach power compensator (APC) is also available.

(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)




(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)




(b)(3), (b)(4)






(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)




(b)(3), (b)(4)




(b)(3), (b)(4)






(b)(3), (b)(4)






(b)(3), (b)(4)






(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)






(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)






(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)






(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4) following ejection the MA continued to fly for approximately 11 more minutes achieving a peak altitude of approximately 9,216 MSL before descending and accelerating to an airspeed of 552 KCAS prior to impacting the ground. Ground impact was at a calculated flight path angle of -12 degrees.

The control law response was nominal through all flight phases during this flight. A number of FCS system faults were observed starting at AC time 4751s (17:32:05.5Z). While these failure indications resulted in a loss of redundancy within the FCS (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4) locking of the LEFs (LEF L/R_FAIL), and possible impacts on TNS velocities (FCS_VEL_DEGD), none resulted in a degradation of aircraft control or impacted aircraft flying qualities. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)


CONCLUSION: The CLAW application performed as expected throughout the approach to landing, conversion from CTOL to STOVL mode, the waveoff, subsequent conversion from STOVL to CTOL mode and post ejection. Post ejection aircraft dynamics were consistent with expected response for an aircraft with a feedback control system.

RECOMMENDATION: None





PROPULSION SYSTEM



(b)(3), (b)(4)


The Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-600 engine (b)(3), (b)(4) is a low bypass, counter rotating, dual spool, augmented turbofan engine with a three-bearing swivel duct (3BSD) vectoring exhaust and a low observable axisymmetric nozzle. The low-pressure spool consists of a three-stage fan driven by a two-stage low pressure turbine that rotates counterclockwise (viewed from aft). A driveshaft connects the low-pressure spool via a hub at the front of the engine to a lift fan assembly. The lift fan assembly is only engaged for use during powered lift operations typically associated with take-offs and landings. The high-pressure spool of the engine consists of a six-stage high pressure compressor driven by a single high-pressure turbine which rotates clockwise (viewed from aft).

Variable inlet guide vanes on the fan and variable vanes on the high-pressure compressor enhances compressor stability. The strutless diffuser delivers flow to the high temperature rise combustor. (b)(3), (b)(4)




(b)(3), (b)(4)

The engine is controlled by two identical FADECs operating in tandem. The FADECs control all aspects of the engine operation by interfacing with fuelhydraulic actuators on the nozzle, fuel throttling valves, compression system variable geometry, and other functions. The two FADECs each have dual channel communication buses that communicate both with each other on an engine internal bus and to each of the three aircraft VMCs to make a multi-redundant system. If required, a single FADEC can independently fully control the engine if the other one fails. The FADECs also share the propulsion health area manager (PHAM) function and logic which determines engine health and identifies required maintenance actions (b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)





p

(b)(3), (b)(4)

ANALYSIS: The CSMU data recorded the aircraft completed a conversion to Mode 4 (STOVL) operations at AC time 4688.3s (17:31:02Z) and subsequently completed conversion to Mode 1 (CTOL) operations at AC time 4796.7s (17:32:51Z), approximately five seconds after ejection.

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4) The propulsion system responded as expected to both conversion sequences.

(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)

The CSMU data showed that the engine performance was nominal during flight as Engine Thrust Request (ETR) Feedback correctly responded to ETR command. However, engine inlet temperature and pressure presented a momentary spike at approximately AC time 4793s (17:32:47Z). The engine inlet temperature momentarily spiked (b)(3), (b)(4) (b)(3), (b)(4) an instantaneous 39-degree increase. Coincident with this temperature spike, the engine inlet pressure momentarily spiked (b)(3), (b)(4) an instantaneous 3.9 pounds per square inch (PSI) increase. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

CONCLUSION: CSMU data recorded the propulsion system operation was consistent with normal and expected operation.

RECOMMENDATION: None.



COM, NAV, AND IDENTIFICATION (CNI) SYSTEM

DESCRIPTION: The communication, navigation, and identification (CNI) system is an integrated subsystem designed to provide a broad spectrum of secure/anti-jam/covert voice and data communications, precision navigation and landing aids, self-identification, and beyond visual range target interrogation and identification.

The CNI system is composed of two racks, CNI-A and CNI-B, that contain line replaceable modules used for creating various CNI waveforms, to include ultra-high frequency/very high frequency (UHF/VHF) voice with secure and anti-jam waveforms, data links such as Link 16 and multifunction advanced data link (MADL), and navigation and landing aids such as the tactical air navigation (TACAN), Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), and instrument landing system (ILS). The CNI system also includes separate line replaceable units such as Audio Control Electronics (ACE) and UHF clear voice Backup Radio (BUR) that are available to the pilot during CNI emergency mode where neither rack is functioning and power is available to the CNI.

OBSERVATION: The LM Aeronautics CNI IPT reviewed the data for any anomalies. CSMU data reviewed contained 21 minutes of data, approximately AC time 4200s to 5473s. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

ANALYSIS: There are a few signals captured in the CSMU data related to the BUR, COM, Radar Altimeter, and TACAN messaging. There are no signals from IFF or PHM messaging. With no IFF data, it is not possible to determine whether the EMERGENCY button on the IFF settings page was selected or if the IFF transponder was squawking the emergency mode 3 code of 7700.

The CSMU data indicated the CNI system operated as designed until approximately AC time 4750.6s (17:32:05.1Z) at which point waveforms (recorded parameters) froze or became invalid.

The following ICAWS were related to a CNI rack and waveform failures.

CNI RACK FAIL A	4755.36676
CNI FAIL IFF	4759.30572
CNI FAIL TACAN	4759.30572
CNI FAIL RALT	4759.30572
CNI FAIL L16	4759.30572

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

the BUR with COM UnitID set to 4 which corresponds to a COM-C assignment and a radio state that remains at 1 indicating no activity.



(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)


the COM waveform assigned to COM-A was initially tuned to 379.925MHz and then briefly to 239.000MHz before waveform data froze at AC time 4750.6s (17:32:05.1Z) and then became invalid at AC time 4757.6s (17:32:12.1Z).




(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4) the COM waveform assigned to COM-B was tuned to 326.700MHz and a transmission occurred at AC time 4604s (17:29:38.5Z). The time on the COM waveform froze AC time 4751.7s (17:32:06.2Z).




(b)(3), (b)(4) the Radar Altimeter froze at approximately the same time as the COM





(b)(3), (b)(4) the TACAN was initially set to Channel 30 and then changed to Channel 82 with the data freezing at AC time 4750s (17:32:04.5Z).



CONCLUSION: The CNI rack and waveforms associated with the CNI rack operated as designed until approximately AC time 4750.6s (17:32:05.1Z) at which point waveforms froze or became invalid due to the transient electrical event. The ACE and BUR continued to be available until AC time 4792.4s (17:32:46.9Z).

RECOMMENDATION: None.





FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM (FCS)

DESCRIPTION: The FCS is a fly-by-wire system consisting of three redundant flight control channels (b)(3), (b)(4). The FCS receives inputs from the following relevant systems to generate FCS surface, engine thrust requests, pilot display feedback, and weapon bay door commands:

- Tactical navigation system (TNS)
- Stores management system (SMS)
- Electro-hydrostatic actuation (EHA) system
- Active inceptor system (AIS)
- Vehicle systems built-in-test (VS BIT)

FCS surface commands are generated by the VMCs and sent to the EHA system.

Tactical Navigation System. Six inertial measurement unit (IMU) devices are located on the aircraft. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

measure

pitch, yaw, and roll rates and linear acceleration about the IMU sensor axes (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)



Stores Management System (SMS). The FCS fire control and stores selector/monitor (FCSSM) selects and monitors the stores and mass properties information reported by the mission systems SMS software. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

To

compensate for the need to return the aircraft to a clean stores state, the capability to emergency jettison External or All stores is still provided in (b)(3), (b)(4) failure configuration (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

Electro-Hydrostatic Actuation System. The flight control surfaces consist of horizontal stabilizers (referred to as stabs or HTs), flaperons (referred to as flaps or trailing edge flaps - TEFs), dual rudders, and LEFs. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)



Each of the primary flight control surfaces is separately controlled by an EHA system. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

Active Inceptor System (AIS). The AIS consists of the inceptor control unit (ICU), active side stick controller assembly (ASSCA) and the active throttle quadrant assembly (ATQA). (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

The ASSCA is an active side stick controller that provides pitch and roll inputs to the VMCs. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

The ATQA is an active controller which provides thrust commands to the FADECs via the VMCs in CTOL mode and acceleration/deceleration commands to the FCS in STOVL mode.

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

Vehicle Systems Built-In-Test. VS BIT is an intrusive on-aircraft manual IBIT intended to detect latent failures within vehicle systems on a properly maintained aircraft. VS BIT tests for additional failures that may not be detected through start-up BIT (SBIT), periodic-BIT (PBIT), or through redundancy management. (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)






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(b)(3), (b)(4)




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(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)

CONCLUSION: Due to the transient electrical event, the following were observed.

1. LEF Lock and ICU faults asserted as expected due to transient power loss (b)(3), (b)(4) (b)(3), (b)(4) Loss of redundancies would not have affected flying qualities in the current operating envelope.
2. INS, GPS, and Autopilot data exhibited failures resulting in degraded TNS velocity and attitude outputs to control laws and the loss of certain autopilot modes.
3. ICU C and dual cockpit IMU failures occurred post ejection. IMU communication continued however, a pitch rate spike is seen in TNS B recorded data (b)(3), (b)(4) pitch rate was not affected by these failures. ICU C failed due to communication loss and caused a loss of redundancy. Some HOTAS switches on ICU C would be non-operational.
4. AGCAS was never engaged throughout the entire flight (power cycle).

RECOMMENDATION: None.



FUEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (FMS)

DESCRIPTION: The F-35B fuel system (b)(3), (b)(4) consists of 11 integral fuel tanks and several subsystem components relating to various sub-functions including feed, transfer, refueling, gauging, pressurization and venting, and on-board inert gas generation system (OBIGGS).



Fuel weight is derived from (b)(3), (b)(4) capacitance probe measurements in each tank. Indications of fuel weight are provided to the pilot, fuel software, and flight controls. The pilot sees Usable Minimum Weight to the lower nearest (b)(3), (b)(4) or each tank and the lower nearest (b)(3), (b)(4) for total weight. The fuel system and flight controls use minimum and maximum fuel weights in their calculations.

Engine feed is provided by (b)(3), (b)(4) boost pumps (BP). (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

The fuel transfer subsystem maintains a distribution that ensures CG position is within limits and ensures the feed box is full. (b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

The fuel engine feed line passes through a main feed shut-off valve (MFSOV) which allows fuel to the engine to be shut-off during maintenance and emergencies.

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

The STOVL fuel system architecture allows all tanks to dump except the feed tanks. Dump is achieved by opening a dump valve that connects the transfer manifold to a dump outlet on the underside of the left wing.


Internal fuel tanks are pressurized with Nitrogen Enriched Air (NEA) by the OBIGGS.

(b)(3), (b)(4)

OBSERVATION: The LM Aeronautics Fuel Management System (FMS) IPT reviewed the CSMU data for any anomalies. Key data points and charts are presented in the analysis below.

ANALYSIS: There were no FUEL system ICAWS observed prior to ejection (b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)

CONCLUSIONS: The fuel system provided sufficient fuel flow to the engine and performed as expected for the duration of the flight.

RECOMMENDATION: None.



HYDRAULICS AND UTILITIES ACTUATION (HUA) SYSTEM

DESCRIPTION: The F-35B STOVL aircraft hydraulic system consists of components and equipment necessary to provide power to two independent hydraulic systems designated as system A and system B. Each system is further defined as being composed of a hydraulic power generation system (HPGS), utility actuators and control valves (UACV) system, LG, and STOVL doors. Figure 21 below shows the overall STOVL hydraulic system and each hydraulic function provided by system A and/or system B.




Figure 21. STOVL Hydraulic System Operation

Hydraulic Power Generation System (HPGS). The HPGS is defined as the set of hydraulic components which are required for the generation and control of all hydraulic power on the aircraft, including those required for fluid storage, fluid conditioning, and system monitoring. The HPGS is designed to deliver a maximum flow of (b)(3), (b)(4) at a nominal pressure of (b)(3), (b)(4) to each of the two isolated and



independent hydraulic power circuits on the aircraft. The return pressure of each system is nominally (b)(3), (b)(4). The two separate hydraulic systems provide redundant hydraulic power for operations of selected utility and safety critical functions.

(b)(3), (b)(4)

Additionally, each HPGS contains a landing gear shutoff valve (LGSOV) that isolates the associated system's landing gear hydraulic circuit after the landing gear has been successfully stowed in-flight. (b)(3), (b)(4)


(b)(3), (b)(4)

Each HPGS also contains a gas charged accumulator which provides stored hydraulic power to the bootstrap reservoir for EDP boost pressure and supplemental power for metered braking and the parking brake. The accumulator stored power is achieved via a check valve that isolates the accumulator from the rest of the hydraulic system preventing power draw except through the reservoir and brakes.

Utility Actuators and Control Valves (UACV). Hydraulic system A and hydraulic system B provide hydraulic power for various utility actuators and control valves. The primary flight controls are not powered by the hydraulic system. Some key actuators and control valves are listed below.

- *STOVL Door Actuation Hardware:* The auxiliary air inlet (AAI) doors, lift fan nozzle (LFN), and roll post (RP) doors receive power from system B. The lift fan inlet (LFI) door and three-bearing swivel nozzle (3BSN) doors receive power from system A.
- *Weapons Bay (WB) doors:* The left WB doors receive power to open/close from system A, while system B powers the right-side door set on the aircraft.
- *Countermeasure (CM) doors:* The mission system equipment (MSE) and infrared-countermeasure (IRCM) doors receive power from system B. Additionally, the IRCM doors are provided redundant power from system A when power from system B is not available.
- *Aerial Refuel Probe and door:* The aerial refuel subsystem consists of a double acting actuator that uses system B power for normal extension and retraction, and system A for emergency extension.

Landing Gear (LG). The landing gear subsystem consists of the NLG, NLG door, nose wheel steering (NWS), left and right main landing gear (LMLG, RMLG), left and right main landing gear forward doors (LMLG Fwd Door, RMLG Fwd Door), left and right MLG wheel brakes and associated door locks. Electrical and mechanical components are included to provide control and indicate status during LG operations. During normal operations, the LG circuit is powered by hydraulic system B. Emergency extend power capability is provided by hydraulic system A.



(b)(3), (b)(4)




(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)

All STOVL door transitions during the conversions were nominal.

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

the health (or validity) of a switch.

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)

CONCLUSION: Based on a review of the CSMU data, the hydraulic system performed nominally throughout the flight up until of the end of data recording.

RECOMMENDATION: None.



CREW SYSTEMS

DESCRIPTION: The Crew Systems Integrated Product Team (IPT) encompasses the major systems and subsystems of Ejection Seat, Life Support System (LSS), Pilot Flight & Survival Equipment (PFE) and Transparency Removal Systems (TRS). Crew Systems is a sub-tier IPT within Vehicle Systems.

The Helmet Mounted Display System (HMDS) IPT is a sub-tier IPT within Mission Systems, which includes the Oxygen Mask.

These integrated systems and subsystems provide the pilot the necessary requirements to sustain life during all aircraft operating environments, provide safe escape from the Air Vehicle in the event of an emergency, and provide pilot protection during the seat-aircraft and seat-man separation sequences. The Escape System is the combination of multiple systems and subsystems across Vehicle Systems and Mission Systems that operate together to provide safe escape of the F-35 pilot. Crew Systems has the primary responsibility of integrating across the various IPTs and hardware disciplines to provide the F-35 Escape System.

EJECTION SEAT


DESCRIPTION: The US16E ejection seat is a fully automatic, electronically controlled ejection seat. The ejection seat consists of main assemblies; Rail Assembly Tilt Mechanism, Combined Twin Catapult/Main Beams Assembly, Seat Bucket Assembly, Parachute Container & Martin Baker Generation 5 (MG5) Integrated Harness Assembly, and Seat Survival Kit. The US16E seat bucket is attached to the twin catapult assembly. The parachute container is attached between the top caps of each catapult tube. The MG5 harness is attached to the ballistically released locks on the upper front of the twin catapult assembly and to lower locks on the seat bucket. The US16E escape system also has a rail assembly tilt mechanism which includes the guide rails that are attached to the aircraft cockpit structure.

(b)(3), (b)(4)

(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)

CONCLUSION: A Mode 2 ejection occurred.

RECOMMENDATION: None

LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM (LSS)

DESCRIPTION: The primary function of the LSS is to provide concentrated oxygen, anti-G functionality, Pressure Breathing for G's (PBG), and Pressure Breathing for Altitude (PBA) protection according to the cabin pressure and G schedule. The three main components of the LSS are the On-Board Oxygen Generation System (OBOGS), Seat Portion Assembly (SPA), and

(b)(3), (b)(4)




Backup Oxygen System (BOS). Both the OBOGS and the BOS provide breathing gas to the SPA which then regulates the pressure and flow depending on the pilot demand. The F-35 LSS architecture is designed such that the BOS is automatically selected during failure events to protect the pilot from any adverse effects that degrade the system's ability to provide the appropriate amount of oxygen.

(b)(3), (b)(4)




(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)

CONCLUSION: The Life Support System operated as designed for the entire flight event.

RECOMMENDATION: None.



PILOT FLIGHT EQUIPMENT (PFE)

DESCRIPTION: The PFE suite is a combination of garments that are designed to provide physiological protection to the pilot during all operational environments and during emergency escape. Each pilot is measured for specific anthropometry and each specific garment is sized, fit, adjusted, and tailored. This unique fit ensures the best fit of each garment and proper integration of pilot and equipment to the cockpit systems.

To provide maximum protection of the pilot, the PFE incorporates an Arm Restraint System that is integrated into the Flight Jacket Sleeved and Light Weight Coverall. This system links to the MG5 harness via Arm Restrain Extension Lines (AREL). During an ejection, the operation of the ejection seat pulls down on the ARELs and acts as a retention system of the arms to prevent arm flail.

(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)

ANALYSIS: Analysis of PFE functionality could not be accomplished since no data for this system is recorded in the CSMU.

CONCLUSION: None.

RECOMMENDATIONS: None

TRANSPARENCY REMOVAL SYSTEM (TRS)

DESCRIPTION: The TRS is a non-electrical energetic system to remove the transparency of the F-35 aircraft and provide a quick escape path from the cockpit in the event of an emergency. The primary function is tied to the ejection seat through the Aircraft Interface Disconnect Unit (AIDU) gas system. When the pilot activates the Ejection Seat by pulling its ejection handle, a sequence of events is started culminating in transparency removal and the seat riding up the rails. Seat rocket ignition then powers the seat away from the aircraft at which time the parachutes are deployed and the pilot descends safely to the ground.

The secondary function of the TRS is to allow the pilot to remove the transparency, without seat ejection, in the event of an emergency.

(b)(3), (b)(4)



(b)(3), (b)(4)





(b)(3), (b)(4)

ANALYSIS: Analysis of TRS functionality could not be accomplished since no data for this system is recorded in the CSMU.

CONCLUSION: None

RECOMMENDATIONS: None

HELMET MOUNTED DISPLAY (HMD) SYSTEM

DESCRIPTION: The Helmet Mounted Display System is comprised of hardware that is aircraft mounted and pilot worn. This review, description and investigation is strictly for pilot worn Helmet Mounted Display and Oxygen Mask components.

Helmet Mounted Display (b)(3), (b)(4) is comprised of (2) major subsystems; Helmet Display Unit (HDU) & Helmet Assembly Unit (HAU). The HDU/HAU provides a binocular display to the pilot and hosts the clear display and tinted external visors for the baseline Gen III HMDS. The Gen III HMD provides the connections and interfaces for the Active Noise Reduction (ANR) Headset, Helmet Communications Interface (HCI) Cable and mounting of the receivers for the Oxygen Mask. the Gen III HMD is connected to the Display Management Computer/Helmet through a specialized aircraft cable assembly, with a Helmet Vehicle Interface (HVI) which is designed for quick disconnect. The HVI interface connects to the ejection seat on the right hand side and is mechanically disconnected during the ejection sequence.





(b)(3), (b)(4)

ANALYSIS: Analysis of HMD functionality could not be accomplished since no data for this system is recorded in the CSMU.

CONCLUSIONS: None

RECOMMENDATIONS: None



CONCLUSION SUMMARY


1. The configured MA (b)(3), (b)(4) CG was within the defined (Landing Gear UP) aircraft limitations.
2. The ejection sequence was initiated on short final while in heavy rain conditions and the MA continued flying unmanned before coming to a rest in a low angle/high speed trajectory approximately 64 miles northeast of Joint Base Charleston.
3. The MA CSMU was functioning and operating normally.
4. The nacelle fan tripped its electrical power contactor. The electrical fault drove a power transient to half of the non-battery backed buses until the fault was isolated by the tripped contactor. PTMS performed in accordance with its design for the given nacelle fan fault condition.
5. Based on a review of the CSMU data, the ADS performed as designed.
6. The EDU (b)(3), (b)(4) contactor output to the Nacelle Fan tripped at AC time 4751.01s (17:32:05.5Z) due to an overcurrent event causing a transient voltage drop on the ICC1 voltage output.
7. Due to the limited nature of MS data recorded on the CSMU, it is not possible to determine what the MP saw on the HMD. Recorded CSMU data indicated the DMCs remained powered and were able to provide critical information such as ICAWS from AC time 4752s (17:32:06.5Z) to 4792s (17:32:46.5Z).
8. Data indicates that ICAWS were functioning properly up to aircraft time of approximately AC time 4790s (17:32:44.5Z).
9. Recorded CSMU data indicated the DMCH and HMD remained powered and displayed information to the pilot during the time period from approximately AC time 4752s to 4792s. Helmet pitch data during the last 24 seconds recorded several instances of significant downward head movement..
10. The data comparison on six additional flights with a common EPS event suggests DMCL, DMCR, and DMCH for the MA did not lose power during the transient electrical event.
11. The SFD provided valid flight reference data to the MP throughout the time period from AC time 4752s to 4792s.
12. CSMU data recorded the ICP-A restarting at approximately AC time 4753s (17:32:07.5Z), while the ICP-B continued to operate normally during the time period from approximately AC time 4752s (17:32:06.5Z) to 4792s (17:32:46.5Z).
13. The CLAW application performed as expected throughout the approach to landing, conversion from CTOL to STOV mode, the waveoff, subsequent conversion from STOV to CTOL mode and post ejection. Post ejection aircraft dynamics were consistent with expected response for an aircraft with a feedback control system.
14. CSMU data recorded the propulsion system operation was consistent with normal and expected operation.
15. The CNI rack and waveforms associated with the CNI rack operated as designed until approximately AC time 4750.6s (17:32:05.1Z) at which point waveforms froze or became invalid due to the transient electrical event. The ACE and BUR continued to be available until AC time 4792.4s (17:32:46.9Z).
16. LEF Lock and ICU faults asserted as expected due to transient power loss (b)(3), (b)(4) (b)(3), (b)(4) Loss of redundancies would not have affected flying qualities in the current operating envelope.



17. INS, GPS, and Autopilot data exhibited failures resulting in degraded TNS velocity and attitude outputs to control laws and the loss of certain autopilot modes.
18. ICU C and dual cockpit IMU failures occurred post ejection. IMU communication continued however, a pitch rate spike is seen in TNS B recorded data (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(7)(C). Pitch rate was not affected by these failures. ICU C failed due to communication loss and caused a loss of redundancy. Some HOTAS switches on ICU C would be non-operational
19. AGCAS was never engaged throughout the entire flight (power cycle).
20. The fuel system provided sufficient fuel flow to the engine and performed as expected for the duration of the flight.
21. Based on a review of the CSMU data, the hydraulic system performed nominally throughout the flight up until of the end of data recording.
22. A Mode 2 ejection occurred.
23. The Life Support System operated as designed for the entire flight event.



RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY



(b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(5)





GLOSSARY

3BSD	Three-bearing swivel duct	BOS	Backup oxygen system
3BSN	Three-bearing swivel nozzle	BP	Boost pump
AAI	Auxiliary air inlet	BUNO	Bureau Number
AB	Afterburner	BUR	Backup radio
AC	Aircraft	C	Celsius/Centigrade
ACE	Audio control electronics	CCA	Circuit card assembly
ADA	Air data application	CCDL	Cross channel data link
ADS	Air data system	CE	Control electronic
AFI	Arm-fire initiator	CG	Center of gravity
AFSAS	Air Force Safety Automated System	CLAW	Control law
AGCAS	Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System	CNI	Communication, navigation, and identification
AIDU	Aircraft interface disconnect unit	CPM	Crash-protected memory
AIM	Air intercept missile	C/R	Converter regulator
AIS	Active inceptor system	CSMU	Crash survivable memory unit
AMB	Aircraft Mishap Board	CTOL	Conventional takeoff and landing
AMD	Aircraft memory device	CVL	Creeping vertical landings
AMRAAM	Advanced medium range air to air missile	dc or DC	Direct current
AMS	Aircraft memory system	DDL	Design Development Lab
AOA	Angle of attack	deg	Degrees
AOS	Angle of sideslip	DEGD	Degrade
AP	Autopilot	DMC	Display management computer
APC	Approach power compensator	DMCH	DMC helmet
APU	Auxiliary Power Unit	DMCL	DMC left
AR	Aerial refueling or action request	DMCR	DMC right
AREL	Arm restraint extension lines	DU	Display unit
ASRAAM	Advanced short-range air to air missile	ECS	Environmental Control System
ASSCA	active side stick controller assembly	EDP	Engine-drive pump
AT	Auto throttle	EDTC	Enhanced data transfer cartridge
ATQA	Active throttle quadrant assembly	EDTCR	Enhanced data transfer cartridge receptacle
BATT	Battery	EDU	Electrical distribution unit
BCCU	Battery charger control unit	EHA	Electro-hydrostatic actuator
BIT	Built-in test	EIR	Engineering Investigation Report



EPS	Electrical Power System	IBIT	Initiated built-in test
EPU	Emergency Power Unit	ICAW	Integrated Caution Advisory or Warning
ESG	Engine starter/generator	ICC	Inverter converter controller
ETR	Engine thrust request	ICP	Integrated core processor
ETR_FB	Engine thrust request feedback	ICU	Inceptor control unit
EU	Electronics unit	IEU	Inertial electronic unit
FADEC	Full Authority Digital Engine Control	IFF	Identification Friend or Foe
FCRM	Flight control redundancy management	ILS	Instrument landing system
FCS	Flight control system	IMU	Inertial measurement unit
FCRM	Flight Controls Redundancy Management	INS	Inertial Navigation System
FCSSM	Fire control and stores selector/monitor	IPP	Integrated Power Package
FDHX	Fan duct heat exchanger	IPT	Integrated Product Team
FDRM	Flight data recorder manager	JB	Jetborne
FHQ	Fault history queue	JDL	JSF data library
FLSCA	Flexible linear shaped charge assembly	JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
FMS	Fuel management system	KGS	Knots ground speed
FPM	Flush port module	KCAS	Knots calibrated airspeed
FPS	Fire protection system	LAGS	Landing gear system
FSD	Flight series data	LEF	Leading edge flap
FSOV	Firewall shutoff valve	LG	Landing gear
gpm	Gallons per minute	LGSOV	Landing gear shutoff valve
GPS	Global Positioning System	LFN	Lift fan nozzle
HAU	Helmet assembly unit	LMLG	Left main landing gear
HCI	Helmet communications interface	LM	Lockheed Martin
HDU	Helmet display unit	LRC	Line replaceable components
HE	High energy	LRU	Line Replaceable Unit
HGI	Hot gas ingestion/initiators	LS	Lift system
HIC	Health indicator code	LSS	Life support system
HMD	Helmet mounted display	LVDT	Linear variable differential transducer
HOTAS	Hands on throttle and stick	MA	Mishap Aircraft
HPGS	Hydraulic power generation system	MAC	Mean aerodynamic chord
HRC	Health report code	MADL	Multifunction advanced data link
HT	Horizontal tails	MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
HUA	Hydraulics & utilities actuation	MCV	Main control valve
HVI	Helmet vehicle interface	METAR	METEorological Aerodrome Report
		MFP	Multi-function probe
		MFSOV	Main feed shut-off valve
		MG5	Martin Baker Generation 5
		MIST	Mishap Inv Support Team



MP	Mishap Pilot	RALT	Radar altimeter
ms	Milliseconds	RDCTL	Rapid deflagrating transfer lines
MS	Mission Systems	RMLG	Right main landing gear
MSL	Mean Sea Level	RIO	Remote input/output
MWB	Main weapons bay	RP	Roll post
NAVAIR	Naval Air Systems Command	RPM	Revolutions per minute
NEA	Nitrogen enriched air	RVL	Rolling vertical landings
NLG	Nose landing gear	S	Seconds
NWS	Nose wheel steering	SFD	Standby flight display
Nz	Vertical G-load	S/G	Starter generator
OBIGGS	On-board inert gas generation system	S/W	Software
OBOGS	On-board oxygen generation system	S/N	Serial number
OFP	Operational Flight Program	SBIT	Start-up BIT
OMS	Offboard mission support	SJ	Semi-jetborne
PA	Powered approach	SL	Slow landing
PAO	Polyalphaolefin	SMS	Stores management system
PBA	Pressure breathing for altitude	SPA	Seat portion assembly
PBG	Pressure breathing for G's	STOVL	Short takeoff and vertical landing
PBIT	Periodic BIT	T	True
PCD	Panoramic cockpit display	TACAN	Tactical air navigation
PDC	Power distribution centers	TED	Terrain elevation data
PDE	Power drive electronics	TEF	Trailing edge flaps
PFE	Pilot flight and survival equipment	TFAT	Total free air temperature
PHAM	Propulsion health area manager	TNS	Tactical Navigation System
PHM	Prognostics and health management	TP	Transfer pump(s)
PMD	Portable memory device	TRS	Transparency removal system
PMG	Permanent magnet generator	TT2	Total temperature probe
P/N	Part number	UA	Up-and-away
Prop	Propulsion	UACV	Utility actuators and control valves
psi	Pounds per square inch	UHF	Ultra-high frequency
psia	Pounds per square inch absolute	UTC	Universal Time Coordinated
psig	Pounds per square inch gauge	UTIL	Utility
PTMS	Power and thermal management system	V	Volts
PVCV	Pressure and vent control valve	Vdc	Volt direct current
		VEL	Velocity
		VHF	Very high frequency
		VL	Vertical landing
		VMC	Vehicle management computer




VMHL	Vehicle Management Hardware Labe	WB	Weapons bay
VMS	Vehicle management system	WonW	Weight On Wheels
VS	Vehicle system	WVWF	Wild voltage wild frequency
		Z	Zulu (time)





ATTACHMENTS



(b)(3), (b)(4)

Attch 1 - 169591 (BF-66) MCAS Beaufort Class A 20230917 Select Recorded CSMU Data.xlsx

Attch 2 - 169591 (BF-66) MCAS Beaufort Class A 20230917 CSMU Data Overview.xlsx



18 Jan 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: SUMMARY HISTORY AND MAINTENANCE DATA REGARDING MISHAP AIRCRAFT

1. The F-35B involved in a mishap on 17 September 2023 was Bureau Number (BUNO) 169591 (BF-66). This aircraft was accepted by VMFAT-501 on 3 October 2018 and flew a total of 1267.1 hours. This is near the average amount of flight hours for the aircraft assigned to VMFAT-501. The mishap aircraft flew 40.6 hours in 90 days, 18.4 hours in the last 60 Days, and 18.4 hours in the last 30 days leading up to the mishap. Of note, the aircraft was down from 10 July 2023 to 11 September 2023 for multiple maintenance requirements including a high-time IPP, damaged IPP drop link bushings, ladder door latches, and the incorporation of HMOD-40 (an Electro-Hydraulic Actuator upgrade).

2. The point of contact for this matter is (b)(6), (b)(7)c at (b)(6), (b)(7)c or (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(24) MA ALIS Screenshot of Hotseat Part A (A-Sheet)

http://... UNCLASSIFIED Release - Internet Explorer

MAINTENANCE SEARCH MORE EXTERNAL AV Release

Back

LD01

Qualification	Name	Date/Time	Disclaimer
Plane Captain	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	15SEP23 04:08	I have personally inspected this aircraft IAW applicable JTD DMCs/checklists. Any discrepancies noted have been entered on the POS, BOS, IOS, or have a work order initiated against the air vehicle.
Release	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	15SEP23 18:27	I UNDERSTAND MY RESPONSIBILITY AS SET FORTH HEREIN: WHEN PERFORMING INSPECTIONS, I AM CONSIDERED TO BE THE DIRECT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER FOR ENSURING SAFETY OF FLIGHT OF THE ITEM CONCERNED. I WILL NOT PERMIT FACTORS, SUCH AS OPERATIONAL DESIRES, MAINTENANCE CONSIDERATION, PERSONAL RELATIONS OR THE APPROACH OF LIBERTY TO MODIFY MY JUDGMENT. BY SIGNING AN INSPECTION REPORT, I AM CERTIFYING UPON MY OWN INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY THAT THE WORK INVOLVED HAS BEEN PERSONALLY INSPECTED BY ME; THAT IT HAS BEEN PROPERLY COMPLETED AND IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS AND DIRECTIVES; THAT IT IS SATISFACTORY; THAT ANY RELATED PARTS OR COMPONENTS WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN REMOVED BY THE WORK ARE PROPERLY REPLACED AND ALL PARTS ARE SECURE, AND THAT THE WORK HAS BEEN PERFORMED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THE ITEMS COMPLETELY SAFE FOR FLIGHT OR USE." THIS IS CERTIFICATION OF SAFE FOR FLIGHT CONDITION BY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER TO RELEASE AIRCRAFT SAFE FOR FLIGHT.

(24) MA ALIS Screenshot of Hotseat Part A (A-Sheet)

Pilot Flight Equipment

Part Number	Serial Number	CAGE Code
HMD		
PIC		

PMD

Select the serial number for the PMD the pilot is carrying:

Serial Number:

Qualification	Name	Date/Time	Disclaimer
Accept	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	15SEP23 17:22	I have reviewed the discrepancy reports of the 10 previous flights, insured proper filing of weight and balance data, and accept this aircraft for flight. I also affirm that I performed a pre-flight inspection on my aircrew PPE and shall perform a post flight inspection my return IAW OPNAVINST 3710-7U and all applicable JTD modules. Additionally, I shall verify all applicable emergency radio pre and post flight inspections are complied with IAW NAVY NAVAIR 16-30PRQ7-1 table 4-2, NAVAIR 16-30PRC149-1 manuals. I understand my oxygen mask life preserver retainer shall be secured upon my person during flight operations. I have checked out LEP as required for mission requirements.

UNCLASSIFIED

(27) MA ALIS Screenshots of Pilot Display MAFs

[Search](#)
[Screen Config](#)
[Reports](#)
[Assign Maintainers](#)
[Work Order Alert Info](#)
[View All MA Details](#)
[ME Details](#)
[Export WO COP](#)
[Assign PMA](#)

JCN: Description: Assigned to Me ☐

Asset: State: Severity: Work Center:

















Select All Non-AV 66
 Select All Deselect All

Active ☐ All ☒ Custom ☐

Select All Deselect All

Primary ☐ Secondary ☐ All ☒

Page 1 of 3

Details	Asset	Description	PRI W/C	SEC W/C	State	JCN	HRC	Date Completed
	169591	HMDS - Pilot Flight Equipment - Fault Isolation - Helmet HAMRU Failure(Category 2)	200	-	COMPLETE	FE323187S000000087	4232001102807	04AUG23 21:19
	169591	HMDS Fault Isolation - LOSIC Failure(Category 2)	200	-	COMPLETE	FE323138S000000085	4232001102802	05JUN23 15:59
	169591	HMDS - Pilot Flight Equipment - Fault Isolation - Helmet HAMRU Failure(Category 2)	200	-	COMPLETE	FE323137S000000108	4232001102807	05JUN23 17:00
	169591	HMDS - Pilot Flight Equipment - Fault Isolation - Helmet System Failure(Category 2)	200	-	COMPLETE	FE322243S000000036	4232001102809	11SEP22 15:28
	169591	HMDS - Pilot Flight Equipment - Fault Isolation - Helmet Camera Failure(Category 2)	200	-	COMPLETE	FE322133S000000043	4232001102808	29MAY22 14:17
	169591	HMDS Fault Isolation - HDP Failure(Category 2)	200	-	COMPLETE	FE322133S000000042	4232001102801	29MAY22 14:14
	169591	HMDS - Pilot Flight Equipment - Fault Isolation - Helmet Camera Failure	200	-	COMPLETE	FE322083S000000117	4232001102808	04APR22 16:13
	169591	HMDS GP Fail, IBIT	200	-	COMPLETE	FE321341S000000097	4232001202811	10DEC21 16:53
	169591	HMDS - Pilot Flight Equipment - Fault Isolation - Helmet System Failure	200	-	COMPLETE	FE321341S000000079	4232001102809	07DEC21 12:42
	169591	HMD flickering	200	-	COMPLETE	FE321340S000000062	-	07DEC21 11:21
	169591	HMDS Fault Isolation - LOSIC Failure	200	-	COMPLETE	FE321245S000000128	4232001102802	05NOV21 13:14
	169591	HMDS - Pilot Flight Equipment - Fault Isolation - Helmet Camera Failure	13A	-	COMPLETE	FE321210S000000115	4232001102808	30JUL21 07:57
	169591	HMDS - Pilot Flight Equipment - Fault Isolation - Helmet Camera Failure	13A	-	COMPLETE	FE321125S000000118	4232001102808	05MAY21 22:09
	169591	HMDS - Pilot Flight Equipment - Fault Isolation - Helmet System Failure	13A	-	COMPLETE	FE321119S000000105	4232001102809	05MAY21 22:09
	169591	HMDS - Pilot Flight Equipment - Fault Isolation - Helmet System Failure	13A	-	COMPLETE	FE321111S000000029	4232001102809	21APR21 04:50
	169591	HMDS - Pilot Flight Equipment - Fault Isolation - Helmet Camera Failure	13A	-	COMPLETE	FE321105S000000072	4232001102808	15APR21 04:18

(27) MA ALIS Screenshots of Pilot Display MAFs

Search

Screen Config

Reports

Assign Maintainers

Work Order Alert Info

View All MA Details

ME Details

Export WO COP

Assign PMA

JCN:

Description:

Assigned to Me ☐

Quick Search

Clear All Filters

Asset

Select All Non-AV 66

Select All Deselect All

State

NEW
INW
CURE
AWM

Active ☐ All ☒ Custom ☐

Severity















None
/
-
X

Select All Deselect All

Work Center

None
020 - 020
021D TCTD - 021 Depot TCTD
030 - 030

Primary ☐ Secondary ☐ All ☒

Details	Asset	Description	PRI W/C	SEC W/C	State	JCN	HRC	Date Completed
 	169591	CANN PCD-EU LCN: A4236020 FROM AC 30/169591 to AC 06/168062	200	-	COMPLETE	FE320108S000000109	-	13MAY20 06:16
 	169591	Test and Check PCD-EU For Use in VM06/168062	200	-	COMPLETE	FE320108S000000090	-	17APR20 12:26
 	169591	PCD-R is red	200	-	COMPLETE	FE320071S000000014	4200001980004	19MAR20 01:07
 	169591	CANN PCD-EU from VM30/169591 to VM25/169025	200	-	COMPLETE	FE320067S000000022	-	11MAR20 15:27
	169591	Test and Check PCD-EU for VM25	200	-	COMPLETE	FE320067S000000010	-	07MAR20 22:57
 	169591	CANN PCD EU LCN A4236020 from A/C 30/169591 to A/C 33/169594	200	-	COMPLETE	FE320056S000000068	-	26FEB20 00:08
	169591	Test and Check PCD EU LCN A4236020 from VM30/169591 for use in VM33/169594	200	-	COMPLETE	FE320056S000000009	-	25FEB20 19:09
 	169591	PCD screen display failed	200	-	COMPLETE	FE319173S000000016	4220000980004	22JUN19 12:56

Last updated: Tue Dec 05 2023 15:53:18 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)

(27) MA ALIS Screenshots of Pilot Display MAFs

Search

Screen Config

Reports

Assign Maintainers

Work Order Alert Info

View All MA Details

ME Details

Export WO COP

Assign PMA

JCN:

Description: SFD

Assigned to Me ☐

Quick Search

Clear All Filters

Asset

State

Severity

Work Center

Select All Non-AV 66

Select All Deselect All

NEW

INW

CURE

AWM

None

/

-

X

None

020 - 020










021D TCTD - 021 Depot TCTD

030 - 030

Active ☐ All ☒ Custom ☐













Select All Deselect All

Primary ☐ Secondary ☐ All ☒

Details	Asset	Description	PRI W/C	SEC W/C	State	JCN	HRC	Date Completed
	169591	CANN SFD, LCN: A4234010 for VM08/168309	200	-	COMPLETE	FE320108S0000000067	-	13MAY20 10:58
	169591	SFD YAW ERR DATA Fail	-	-	COMPLETE	FE319346S0000000023	4234010100018	18DEC19 04:04
	169591	SFD PITCH ERR DATA Fail	-	-	COMPLETE	FE319346S0000000022	4234010100016	18DEC19 04:10
	169591	SFD YAW ERR DATA Fail	-	-	COMPLETE	FE319339S0000000095	4234010100018	11DEC19 00:10
	169591	SFD PITCH ERR DATA Fail	-	-	COMPLETE	FE319339S0000000094	4234010100016	11DEC19 00:09
	169591	SFD YAW ERR DATA Fail	-	-	COMPLETE	FE319105S0000000142	4234010100018	18APR19 02:14
	169591	SFD PITCH ERR DATA Fail	-	-	COMPLETE	FE319105S0000000141	4234010100016	18APR19 02:14
	169591	SFD YAW ERR DATA Fail	-	-	COMPLETE	FE318332S0000000050	4234010100018	04DEC18 05:30
	169591	SFD PITCH ERR DATA Fail	-	-	COMPLETE	FE318332S0000000049	4234010100016	04DEC18 05:41

Last updated: Tue Dec 05 2023 15:52:32 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)

(28) MA ALIS Screenshots of Nacelle Fan MAFs

Details	Asset	Description	PRI W/C	SEC W/C	State	JCN	HRC	Date Completed
	169591	Test and Check Nacelle Fan LCN: A2121010 to A/C 14	200	-	COMPLETE	FE323068S000000060	-	23MAR23 09:12
	169591	Cann Nacelle Vent Fan LCN A2121010 to AC11 1698062	200	-	COMPLETE	FE322348S000000048	-	25JAN23 22:31
	169591	Test and check Nacelle Fan LCN: A2121010 to BF11/ 168062	200	-	COMPLETE	FE322347S000000087	-	14DEC22 23:18
	169591	Nacelle ventilation fan stuck on fault (Boolean)(Category 1)	200	-	COMPLETE	FE322307S000000023	2100000100080	01DEC22 04:18
	169591	CANN Nacelle fan A2121010 from A/C 66 169591 to A/C 35 168838	200	-	COMPLETE	FE322195S000000007	-	14JUL22 04:31
	169591	Nacelle ventilation fan stuck on fault (Boolean)(Category 1)	200	-	COMPLETE	FE322181S000000102	2100000100080	15JUL22 02:33
	169591	Nacelle ventilation fan controller reported discrete fault (Boolean)	200	-	COMPLETE	FE321279S000000019	2100000100091	06OCT21 22:23
	169591	Nacelle ventilation fan stuck off fault (Boolean)	200	-	COMPLETE	FE321279S000000018	2100000100081	06OCT21 13:54
	169591	POTENTIAL FOD FROM MISSING BOLT FOR NACELLE DIVERTER SHIELD UNDER PANEL 3112	040	-	COMPLETE	FE320248S000000058	-	04SEP20 23:12
	169591	Nacelle ventilation fan controller reported discrete fault (Boolean)	200	-	COMPLETE	FE320216S000000055	2100000100091	06AUG20 03:23
	169591	Nacelle ventilation fan stuck off fault (Boolean)	200	-	COMPLETE	FE320216S000000054	2100000100081	06AUG20 03:22
	169591	Nacelle ventilation fan stuck on fault (Boolean)	13B	-	COMPLETE	FE319260S000000069	2100000100080	30SEP19 22:14

Last updated: Sun Oct 15 2023 20:14:46 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)

(28) MA ALIS Screenshots of Nacelle Fan MAFs

	Cann Nacelle Vent Fan LCN A2121010 to AC11 169806Z (N/A) Severity: Z LO Impact: N	JCN FE322348S000000048	Type CANN	State COMPLETE	Sched Start Date N/A	Backstop Date N/A	MI
--	---	----------------------------------	---	--	--	---	----

☐ **Software/Data File Upload Requirements (FURS)**

File Upload Requirement	New File	Compatibility Check	File Preparation	File Loaded to AV
No records found.				

☐ **Deferrals**

☐ **Limitations**

☐ **Work Orders**

Related Work Orders	Type
FE322331S000000009	Cannibalization
FE322347S000000087	System X-Ref

☐ **Occurrence Data**

Occurrence Timestamp	
14DEC22 11:48	

☐ **Action Requests**

☐ **Cautions and Warnings**

☐ **Attachments**

Name / Description	Date Added
No records found.	

☐ **MVI Data Stream**

☐ **Comments**

WORK ORDER PAUSED - PAUSE_AWM - "AVI(200) OOW // Performed LP Ground Cart Operational Test. Test passed. ATAF Area FDD and corrosion free."	25JAN23 21:47
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	
(AVI(200) INW// CNV - "PMAA 10598 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)"	25JAN23 20:56
WORK ORDER PAUSED - PAUSE_AWM - "AVI OOW// Removed Nacelle Fan (SN:0070) and installed Nacelle Fan (SN:0806) IAW JTD with NDN. AWM for nut plate to be replaced and PTMSG needs to be installed before completing follow-ons. ATAF.AFF.ACFF.PMAA 10558. [More...]"	30DEC22 17:05
AVI INW// CNV - "PMAA 10558 TB (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)"	30DEC22 12:57
WORK ORDER PAUSED - PAUSE_AWM - "AVI OWW// Slaved in Nacelle fan SN:0070 for MOD Team to perform follow ons. Next step is remove slaved in nacelle fan and replace when new nacelle fan is received. ATAF.AFF.ACFF.PMAA 12126"	20DEC22 17:56
AVI INW// CNV - "TB 3-6 PMAA 12126 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)"	20DEC22 14:16
WORK ORDER PAUSED - PAUSE_AWP - "	14DEC22 12:05
Work Order Created (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	14DEC22 11:51

☐ **Requisitions**

Requisition ID (Status)	Part Name	Part #	Serial Number	Promise Date	Alerts
ID01-115718 (Closed)	FAN, VENTILATION- N	645338-6	0606	22NOV22 20:22	

(28) MA ALIS Screenshots of Nacelle Fan MAFs

Can Nacelle Vent Fan LCN A2121010 to AC11 1698062 (N/A)
 Severity: **Z** LO Impact: **N** JCN: **FE322348500000048** Type: **CANN** State: **COMPLETE**
 Sched Start Date: **N/A** Backstop Date: **N/A** MI:

Corrective Actions

Corrective Action: Nacelle Fan was removed for use in A/C 11. Installed new nacelle fan IAW F35-AAB-A2121010000-720A-A. LP Ground Cart Operational Test Passed. ATAF. Area FOD and corrosion free. PMA 10598

Added By: (b)(6), (b)(7)c 25JAN23 21:56

Work Order Sign Offs

Qualification

Corrected By

Inspected By

Supervisor

Qualification

Maintenance Control

Maintenance Action Summary -- Webpage Dialog

Skip Reason Added by Rank (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Config Changes: 1/1

Signatures: 0/0

17. Fan (Ventilation, Nacelle) - Installation

Notes: Witnessed installation of Nacelle Fan (SN 0606) IAW JTD F35-AAB-A2121010000-720A-A. Witnessed torque of three bolts to 40 lbf-in and two nuts to 40 lbf-in. NDN. ATAF. AFF. ACF.

Part Number Serial Number Action

645338-6 0606 INSTALL

Status: **CLOSED**

Severity: **N/A**

Labor: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Config Changes: 1/1

Signatures: 0/0

Skip Reason Added by Rank

Config Changes: 1/1

Signatures: 0/0

Time Sign Off

25JAN23 21:57 ✓

25JAN23 21:57 ✓

25JAN23 21:57 ✓

Time Final Sign Off

25JAN23 22:31 ✓

(28) MA ALIS Screenshots of Nacelle Fan MAFs

Details Execution Complete Solutions ME Details LD01

Test and Check Nacelle Fan LCN: A2121010 to A/C 14 (N/A)

Severity 2 LO Impact N

ICN FE323068S000000060

Type MISC

State COMPLETE

Sched Start Date N/A

Backstop Date N/A

MI

WDC O

TMC U

Software/Data File Upload Requirements (FURs)

Deferrals

Limitations

Work Orders

Related Work Orders

FE323055S000000107

Type System X-Ref

Occurrence Data

Occurrence Timestamp 09MAR23 14:08

Action Requests

Cautions and Warnings

Attachments

No records found.

MVI Data Stream

Comments

WORK ORDER PAUSED - PAUSE_AWM - "AVI OOW/ Fully installed panel 3110 IAW JTD. ATAF AFF ACF NDN. PMA: 10560. TB: 1-1	(b)(6), (b)(7)C	23MAR23 08:37
AVI IW/CD (b)(6), (b)(7)C	(b)(6), (b)(7)C	23MAR23 04:24
AVI IW/CD (b)(6), (b)(7)C	(b)(6), (b)(7)C	22MAR23 23:39
WORK ORDER PAUSED - PAUSE_AWM - (b)(6), (b)(7)C	(b)(6), (b)(7)C	22MAR23 11:29
AVI OOW/ Attempted to install panel 3110, upon install dis-bonded nutplate. Upon removal, 2 more nutplates were dis-bonded. All 3 nutplates have been recovered and discarded. WO has been cut for nutplates. PMA: 10570. TB: 1-1. ATAF AFF ACF	(b)(6), (b)(7)C	22MAR23 11:28
AVI IW/CD (b)(6), (b)(7)C	(b)(6), (b)(7)C	22MAR23 09:56
WORK ORDER PAUSED - PAUSE_AWM (b)(6), (b)(7)C	(b)(6), (b)(7)C	21MAR23 16:50
AVI OOW/ Performed LP Ground Cart Operational test. Test passed with NDN, next step is to install panel 3110 when nutplates are cured. Cure check is at 0200 20230322 ATAF AFF ACF	(b)(6), (b)(7)C	21MAR23 16:49
AVI IW/CD (b)(6), (b)(7)C	(b)(6), (b)(7)C	21MAR23 13:28
WORK ORDER PAUSED - PAUSE_AWM - "FULLY INSTALLED NACELLE FAN (0606) IAW F35-AAB-A2121010000-720A-A WITH NDN. 3 BOLTS AND TWO NUTS WERE TORQUED TO 35LB-FIN. WITH NDN. WIRE MESH AND HAZARD	(b)(6), (b)(7)C	20MAR23 17:57
APPLIED WHERE SPECIFIED IN F35-AAB-A2121010000-720A-A. NEXT [More ...]	(b)(6), (b)(7)C	20MAR23 17:29
AVI IW/CD (b)(6), (b)(7)C	(b)(6), (b)(7)C	09MAR23 20:20
WORK ORDER PAUSED - PAUSE_AWM - "AVI OOW/Removed 3110 and removed Nacelle fan (SN-0606) IAW JTD. While removing 3110 discovered a disbonded nutplate. W/O already cut and nutplate was given to AF. Nacelle fan currently installed in A/C 14 for a [More ...]	(b)(6), (b)(7)C	09MAR23 14:48
AVI IW/CD (b)(6), (b)(7)C	(b)(6), (b)(7)C	09MAR23 14:08

(28) MA ALIS Screenshots of Nacelle Fan MAFs

Details Execution **Complete** Solutions View All MA Details

169391
200

Test and Check Nacelle Fan LCN: A2121010 to A/C 14 (N/A)

Severity **Z** LO Impact **N**

JCN
FE3230685000000060

Type
MISC

State
COMPLETE

Sched Start Date
Backstop Date

MI

Corrective Actions

Corrective Action	Added By
Removed Nacelle fan (SN:0608) IAW F35-AAB-A2121010000-52DA-A As well as removed panel 3110.	Bowling, T Cpl 09MAR23 20:33

Work Order Sign Offs

Qualification	Time	Sign Off
Corrected By	23MAR23 09:01	✓
Inspected By	23MAR23 09:02	✓
Supervisor	23MAR23 09:02	✓

Qualification	Time	Final Sign Off
Maintenance Control	23MAR23 09:12	✓

Maintenance Action Summary -- Webpage Dialog

Labor: 1/1
 (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 Config Changes: 0/0
 Signatures: 1/1
 Collateral Duty: 200 duty %
 20 Insp (b)(6), (b)(7)c

16. Cover 3110 (270v Battery (Ctr Bay)) - Installation

Notes: Installed panel 3110 IAW JTD F35-AAB-A5233110000-720A-A. torqued fasteners to 90 lb-in. Pre-closure and Final torques witnessed by (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 ATAF.AFF.ACF.NDN.

Part Number	Serial Number	Action
2CSH00181-3013	AAD0059042	INSTALL

Skip Reason Added by Rank

Status: **CLOSED**
 Severity: **N/A**
 Labor: 2/2
 (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 Config Changes: 1/1
 Signatures: 2/2
 Collateral Duty Inspector: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Close

Solution: Post Operation Servicing - 501

1. BOS/POS/IOS Work Center QAI Verification

Notes: Screened work order for requirements for correct torque callouts including any run on torques. Screened the SOF list and 4790 35C to ensure that the appropriate level of qualification is met for the task. Reviewed the VMFAT-501 Maintenance Action Work Order Documentation LCP and verified a signature is required for any configuration changes.

Skip Reason	Added by	Rank
-------------	----------	------

Status: **CLOSED**

Severity: **N/A**

Labor:

1/1

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Config Changes:

0/0

Signatures:

1 /1

Collateral Duty Inspector:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

2. 120 - POS

Notes: Verified post operations servicing OML inspection IAW F35-AAB-A1321030000-281B-A. All discrepancies discovered during this inspection will be uploaded into LODEM. All transparencies will be kept until LODEM has been synced to the SOU. AFF, ACF, ATAF

Skip Reason	Added by	Rank
-------------	----------	------

Status: **CLOSED**

Severity: **N/A**

Labor:

2/2

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Config Changes:

Config Changes:

0/0

Signatures:

2 /2

Collateral Duty Inspector:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Corrected by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

3. 11B - POS

Notes: Performed Post Operations Servicing (POS) - Inspection STEPS: 1 and 2 IAW F35-AAB-A1321030000-281A-A and ALL STEPS of Ejection Seat Post Operations Servicing (POS) - Inspection IAW F35-AAB-A1310040000-281B-A. AFF, ATAF, ACF, NDN.

Skip Reason	Added by	Rank
-------------	----------	------

Status: **CLOSED**

Severity: **N/A**

Labor:

1/1

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Config Changes:

0/0

Signatures:

1 /1

Corrected by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

4. 200 - POS

Notes: Performed STEPS: 1.2, 3.7, 3.8, 4.2 through 4.6, 4.10, 4.11, 4.17, 4.18, 4.22, 4.23, 14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 15.13, 15.14, 16.12, & 16.13 of Post Operations Servicing (POS) - Inspection IAW F35-AAB-A1321030000-281A-A.

Skip Reason	Added by	Rank
-------------	----------	------

Status: **CLOSED**

Severity: **N/A**

Labor:

Skip Reason	Added by	Rank	Labor: 1/1 (b)(6), (b)(7)c	Config Changes: 0/0	Signatures: 1/1 Corrected%20By (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c
5. 300 - POS					
Notes: POS COMPLETED IAW JTD MODULE F35-AAB-A1321030000-281A-A. ATAF. AF/CF.			Status: CLOSED		
Skip Reason	Added by	Rank	Severity: N/A	Labor: 1/1 (b)(6), (b)(7)c	Config Changes: 0/0
				Signatures: 1/1 Plane Captain (b)(6), (b)(7)c	
6. 300 - Engine POS					
Notes: ENGINE POS COMPLETED IAW JTD MODULE F35-AAB-P7200010000-281C-A. ATAF. AF/CF.			Status: CLOSED		
Skip Reason	Added by	Rank	Severity: N/A	Labor: 1/1 (b)(6), (b)(7)c	Config Changes: 0/0
				Signatures: 1/1 Plane Captain (b)(6), (b)(7)c	
7. 300-Lift System POS					
Notes: LIFT SYSTEM POS COMPLETED IAW JTD MODULE F35-AAB-C8610100000-281B-A. ATAF. AF/CF.			Status: CLOSED		
Skip Reason	Added by	Rank	Severity: N/A	Labor: 1/1 (b)(6), (b)(7)c	Config Changes: 0/0
				Signatures: 1/1 Plane Captain (b)(6), (b)(7)c	
8. Post Operation Servicing - 501					
Notes:			Status: CLOSED		

Notes:				Status: CLOSED
Skip Reason	Added by	Rank		Severity: N/A
				Labor: 0/0
				Config Changes: 0/0
				Signatures: 0/0

(30) MA ALIS Screenshot of AV Status Page

Servicing Levels			
Consumable (Type)	Source	Amount	Last Updated
BOS (N/A)	System	284 liter (NTP)	15Sep23 18:14
Engine Oil (23699)	System	8.02 quart	15Sep23 18:14
Fan Oil (MIL-PRF-85734)	System	17.18 quart	15Sep23 18:14
Fuel (JP-5)	System	12800 pounds	15Sep23 18:14
Generator Oil (23699)	System	OK	15Sep23 18:14
Hydraulics A (83282)	System	391.78 inches cubed	15Sep23 18:14
Hydraulics B (83282)	System	523.21 inches cubed	15Sep23 18:14
IPP Oil (23699)	System	OK	15Sep23 18:14
PAO Coolant (N/A)	System	4 inch	15Sep23 18:14

AV Release and Acceptance		
Qualification	Name	Date/Time
Plane Captain	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	15SEP23 04:08
Release	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	15SEP23 18:27
Accept	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	15SEP23 17:22

Limitations (2)	
No stores allowed on aircraft until SMS Caution gripe is resolved	
TVE: 025 // HMODS: 9,11,12,15,26,28,29,30,40,41,45,48 // SPEED/MACH: 630/1.6 // AOA: GEAR UP CLAW LIMIT / GEAR DOWN 0 TO CLAW LIMIT	

Remarks (3)	
RM S/N: 1735 1736	
KOV 34 SN: 0245	
AERO Reported values: Left Hook 5 Gap: 0.398 ; Right Hook 5 Gap: 0.408	

Work Orders (70) L	
WO Count by State	AV(Component)
NEW	1
INW	0
AWP	9
AWM	37 (7)
CURE	0
AWS	0
DEFER	13 (3)

WQ Severity/EOC Count		See All
1	1	
14	14	
10 (1)	10 (1)	

TCTD (36)	
TCTD Status	AV(Component)
Not Incorporated/Unknown	26 (19)
ROUTINE	26 (19)

Cautions and Warnings (0)	
FMR (0)	
Next Flight	

AV Configuration		
Holes	0	
Inconsistencies	0	
EEL Alerts	0	
Unserviceable Part	0	
SDL	2BDF02360-7041	
TDL	2RWJ00005-0011	
TVE	2BF-0066	

Usage		
AV Usage Parameters	Value	Last Updated
Flight Hours	1267.11	15SEP23 19:10
Flights	1191	15SEP23 19:10
Conventional Takeoffs	1163	15SEP23 19:10
Landings	813	15SEP23 19:10
Vertical Takeoffs	6	15SEP23 19:09
Vertical Landings	294	15SEP23 19:09

Engine Usage Parameters		
Value	Last Updated	
PW_EOT_RPT_HRS	2348.72	
PW_EFT_RPT_HRS	1153.33	
PW_TAC	3643.22	

Lift Fan Usage Parameter		
Value	Last Updated	
PW_PLT_RPT_HRS	31.65	

IPP Usage Parameters		
Value	Last Updated	
IPP Cycles	5272.80	
IPP Operating Hours	2184.98	

HRC Summary	
Not Submitted	3
New HRCs (at WO)	22
Repeat HRCs (at WO)	0

1. BOS/POS/IOS Work Center QAI Verification

Notes: Screened WO for inspection requirements per the F-35 Standardized SOF list and 4790.35C.

Skip Reason	Added by	Rank
-------------	----------	------

Status: **CLOSED**

Severity: **N/A**

Labor:

1/1

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Config Changes:

0/0

Signatures:

1 /1

Collateral%20Duty%

20Inspector: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

2. 13B - BOS

Notes: Performed Before Operations Servicing (BOS) - Inspection STEPS: 6-11 IAW F35-AAB-A1321010000-281A-A and ALL STEPS of Ejection Seat Before Operations Servicing (BOS) - Inspection IAW F35-AAB-A1310040000-281A-A. ACF, ATAF, AFF, NDN.

Skip Reason	Added by	Rank
-------------	----------	------

Status: **CLOSED**

Severity: **N/A**

Labor:

1/1

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Config Changes:

0/0

Signatures:

1 /1

3. 300 -- BOS

Notes: BOS COMPLETED IAW JTD MODULE F35-AAB-A1321010000-281A-A. LMLG TIRE PRESSURE 230. RMLG TIRE PRESSURE 230 AND NLG TIRE AT 260. ATAF, AF/CF.

Skip Reason	Added by	Rank
-------------	----------	------

Status: **CLOSED**

Severity: **N/A**

Labor:

1/1

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Config Changes:

0/0

Signatures:

1 /1

Plane Captain: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

4. Engine/Lift System BOS

Notes: PERFORMED ENGINE BOS IAW F35-AAB-P7200010000-281B-A AND PERFORMED LIFT SYSTEM BOS IAW F35-AAB-C8610100000-281A-A. ATAF, AF/CF.

Skip Reason	Added by	Rank
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Status: **CLOSED**

Severity: **N/A**

Labor:

1/1

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Config Changes:

0/0

Signatures:

1 /1

Plane Captain: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

5. Fuel Samples

Notes: INSPECTED FUEL SAMPLES FROM F1, F2L, F2R, F3L, F3R, F4L, F4R, LH WING, RH WING, F5R AND F5L FOR CONTAMINANTS IAW NAVAIR 01-1A-35, NATOPS REFUELING MANUAL 00-80T-109 AND JTD MODULE F35-AAB-A1221010000-221A-A. NO CONTAMINATES FOUND. ATAF. AFF. ACF.

Skip Reason	Added by	Rank
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Status: CLOSED

Severity: N/A

Labor:

2/2

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Config Changes:

0/0

Signatures:

2 /2

Collateral Duty Inspector:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Corrected By: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

6. 120-BOS

Notes: Performed MVI NLG X dimension checks IAW F35-AAB-A1215010000-362B-A, checks good. Performed MVI MLG X dimension checks IAW F35-AAB-A1215020000-362B-A, checks good. Verified hydraulic servicing level for system A and for system B Checks good. Area FOD free at time of inspection. AFF, NDN. ATAF

Skip Reason	Added by	Rank
-------------	----------	------

Status: CLOSED

Severity: N/A

Labor:

2/2

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Config Changes:

0/0

Signatures:

2 /2

Collateral Duty Inspector:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Corrected By: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

7. Before Operation Servicing - 501

Notes:

Skip Reason	Added by	Rank
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Status: CLOSED

Severity: N/A

Labor:

1/0

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Config Changes:

0/0

Signatures:

0 /0

**SUBJ: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE F-35 MISHAP OF
MAG-31, VMFAT-501 ON 17 SEPTEMBER 2023**

The following enclosures have been withheld in their entirety under FOIA Exemption (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. § 130e.

Enclosure (32) 15 September Aviation Maintenance Supply Readiness Report, pages 397-405

Enclosure (33) MA ALIS Screenshot of Ordnance Loadout Configuration, page 406



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK TRAINING SQUADRON 501
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 31
2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
POST OFFICE BOX 66051
MCAS BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA 29904-6051

Friday, September 15, 2023 (23258)

DUTIES				AIRFIELD HOURS: 0700-1900		SBTP REPORT		
ODO:	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	0720-1030	WW:	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	0950-1100	SBTP	SCHEDULED	FLOWN
ODO:	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	1030-1200	WW:	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	1230-1345		SRTS / HRS	SRTS / HRS
ODO:	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	1200-LPOD				FY	4430 / 5157.4	3986 / 4767.9
						QTR	881 / 1050.7	758 / 871.7
						MONTHLY	176 / 208.2	128 / 155.4
						DAILY SCHEDULED:	16 / 16.8	
BMNT: 0613	SR / SS: 0707/1929		MR / MS: 0730/2000		ILLUM: 0.1%	EENT: 2023	LLL: 2036-0601*	HLL: 0600-0613, 2023-2036

FLIGHTS:
4 HP/HS 10 Taxi 2

EVENT	PRI	TMS	C/S	BRF/ETD/ETA	ICAO	CREW	T&R	TMR	MSN	SBTP	FLIGHT PLAN	TAC	CONFIGURATION	AIRSPACE	NOTES
1-1	1	F-35B	Swede11	0735/0950/1100	KNBC/KNBC	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	1102	1E1	FAM	1/1.2	N/A	1	1	N/A	HP/HS
1-2			Swede12					2L5		1/1.2			1		
2-1	2	F-35B	Swede21	0735/0950/1100	KNBC/KNBC		1102	1E1	FAM	1/1.2	N/A	2	1	N/A	HP
2-2			Swede22					2L5		1/1.2			1		
3-1	2	F-35B	Helct31	1015/1200/1310	KNBC/KNBC		1319	2L5	TI	1/1.2	NBC-12	1	1	W-137-139B: 1100-1300	Red Air: ATAC (Double Cycle)
3-2			Helct32					1E6		1/1.2			1		POC: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
4-1	3	F-35B	Helct41	1015/1200/1310	KNBC/KNBC		1319	2L5	TI	1/1.2	NBC-12	3	1	W-137-139B: 1100-1300	Red Air: ATAC (Double Cycle)
4-2			Helct42					1E6		1/1.2			1		POC: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
5-1	4	F-35B	Swede51	0735/1230/1340	KNBC/KNBC		1103	1E2	INST	1/1.2	DD-1801	2	1	N/A	AIC: MACS-2 228-7088, HP/HS
5-2			Swede52					2L5		1/1.2			1		
6-1	1	F-35B	Swede11	1015/1230/1340	KNBC/KCHS		2103	1A1	FAM	1/1.2	NBC-11	355.025	1	W-137-139A: 1100-1300	(b)(6), (b)(7)c over
6-2			Swede12				2103	1A1		1/1.2			1		
6-3			Swede13				2103	1A1		1/1.2					
6-4			Swede14				2103	1A1		1/1.2					
7-1	1	F-35B	Swede71	1015/1400/1500	KNBC/KNBC		1100	1E1	TAXI	1/0.0	N/A	WW	1	N/A	IP: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
8-1	2	F-35B	Swede81	1015/1400/1500	KNBC/KNBC		1100	1E1	TAXI	1/0.0	N/A	WW	1	N/A	IP: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

SIMULATORS:

EVENT	DEVICE	BRF/ETD/ETA	CREW	T&R	TMR	MSN	SBTP	INSTRUCTOR
SIM	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 1 KNBC - F-35B - FMS 2	0700/0800/0940	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	0171	2L5 1A1	AAR	1/1.7 1/1.7	(b)(6), (b)(7)c
SIM	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 7	0700/0800/0940		0110	1E1	EP	1/1.7	(b)(6), (b)(7)c
SIM	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 8	0700/0800/0940		5003, 5004	1B1	FAM	1/1.7	(b)(6), (b)(7)c
SIM	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 5	0745/0815/0955		2101	1F1	EP	1/1.7	(b)(6), (b)(7)c
SIM	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 2	0900/1000/1140		0107	1A1	FAM	1/1.7	(b)(6), (b)(7)c
SIM	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 7	0900/1000/1140		0110	1E1	EP	1/1.7	(b)(6), (b)(7)c
SIM	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 8	0930/1000/1140		0103	1E2	INST	1/1.7	(b)(6), (b)(7)c
SIM								Practice Sim

SIM	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 5	0945/1015/1155			2101	1F1	EP	1/1.7		
SIM	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 1	1100/1200/1340			0308	1E6	BT TI	1/1.7		
SIM	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 2	1100/1200/1340			0107	1E1	FAM	1/1.7		
SIM	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 7	1100/1200/1340		(b)(6), (b)(7)c	0301	1E7	BT TCT	1/1.7		(b)(6), (b)(7)c
SIM	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 8	1100/1200/1340			0105	1E1	EP	1/1.7		
SIM	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 5	1145/1215/1355			2101	1F1	EP	1/1.7		
SIM	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 5	1315/1415/1555				2L5		1/1.7		
	KNBC - F-35B - FMS 6				0320	1A6	TI	1/1.7		

ACADEMICS / BRIEFS:

START	END	SUBJECT	T&R	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	PERSONNEL	NOTES
0800	1000	Power and Thermal Management System (PTMS)	0022	PTC EML Classroom 1		(b)(6), (b)(7)c	
0800	1030	Day Visual/Non-Visual Formation Procedures	0067	PTC EML Classroom 4	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		
0830	1100	Night Lab	0066	Night Lab, 1st Deck, Base Education Bldg/ Library			Bring NATOPS Jacket
1000	1200	Hydraulic System	0027	PTC EML Classroom 1			
1030	1230	CAT I Debrief	0266	501 SAPF	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		
1100	1200	Night Systems and Operations	0065	PTC EML Classroom 2	Self-Paced		
1200	1300	At Stage Brief	0991	501 SAPF	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		
1200	1300	Night Formation	0069	PTC EML Classroom 2	Self-Paced		
1300	1400	Night Air To Ground Employment	0218	501 SAPF	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		
1300	1400	Landing Gear Systems	0028	PTC EML Classroom 1	Self-Paced		
1300	1500	Strike Tactics	0295	501 SAPF	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		
1400	1500	Canopy System	0029	PTC EML Classroom 1	Self-Paced		
1400	1530	Night Air-to-Air Employment	0264	PTC EML Classroom 2	Self-Paced		
1500	1600	Life Support System	0031	PTC EML Classroom 1	Self-Paced		
1500	1800	Advanced Route Planning / OMS Review	0297	501 SAPF	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		

GENERAL NOTES:

- 0600: Remedial PT, Tail Fin (Required Personnel)
- 0645-0845: Day Crew Safety Standown (All Day Crew Personnel)
- 0845: FOD Walk (All Available Personnel)
- 0845: Maint Meeting, Maint Training Classroom (Required Personnel)
- 1100: Safety Stand Down, Ready Rm (All Pilots)
- 1300-1330: Promotions, Ready Room (CO, (b)(6), (b)(7)c available Officers)
- 1300: UMAPIT Training, Maint Training Classroom (Required Personnel)
- 1630: Maint Meeting, Maint Training Classroom (Required Personnel)

QUESTIONS OF THE DAY:

EPOD: Q: CABIN PRESS
FSD QOD: Q: How long will the accumulators provide pressure for the parking brake?
THREAT: Q: J-16

OPS x MX x DSS x SgtMaj x

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

By Direction



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK TRAINING SQUADRON 501
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 31
2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
POST OFFICE BOX 66051
MCAS BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA 29904-6051
Saturday, September 16, 2023 (23259)

DUTIES				AIRFIELD HOURS: CLOSED				SBTP REPORT							
SDO: (b)(6), (b)(7)c				SBTP				SCHEDULED				FLOWN			
ASDO: (b)(6), (b)(7)c				FY				SRTS / HRS				SRTS / HRS			
GDO:				QTR				897 / 1067.5				758 / 871.7			
				MONTHLY				192 / 225.0				128 / 155.4			
DAILY SCHEDULED:				8 / 9.6											
BMNT: 0614		SR / SS: 0707/1928		MR / MS: 0825/2024		ILLUM: 0.8%		EENT: 2021		LLL: 2035-0602*		HLL: 0601-0614, 2021-2035			

4 XC 4															
EVENT	PRI	TMS	C/S	BRF/ETD/ETA	ICAO	CREW	T&R	TMR	MSN	SBTP	FLIGHT PLAN	TAC	CONFIGURATION	AIRSPACE	NOTES
1-1	1	F-35B	Swede11	0845/1100/1210	KCHS/KCHS	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	5028, 3202	1B7	SCAR	1/1.2	SCAR	1	1	W-122 15-19; 1100-1300	
1-2			3202				1A7	1/1.2		1					
1-3			3202				1A7	1/1.2		1					
1-4			3202				1A7	1/1.2		1					
2-1	1	F-35B	Swede11	1145/1400/1510	KCHS/KCHS	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	2404	1A6	TI	1/1.2	DD-1801	1	1	W-122 15-19; 1500-1700	
2-2			2404				1A6	1/1.2		1					
3-1	2	F-35B	Swede21	1145/1400/1510	KCHS/KCHS	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		2K4	RED AIR	1/1.2	DD-1801	2	1	W-122 15-19; 1500-1700	
3-2							2K4	1/1.2		1					
SIMULATORS:															

SIMULATORS:
No Simulators Scheduled
ACADEMICS / BRIEFS:
No Academics / Briefs Scheduled

GENERAL NOTES:

QUESTIONS OF THE DAY:

EPOD: Q: CANOPY DELAM
FSD QOD: Q: How long can fire and bleed leak ICAWS remain after return to normal temps?
THREAT: Q: J-10

OPS X MX X DSS X SgtMaj X

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

By Direction



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK TRAINING SQUADRON 501
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 31
2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
POST OFFICE BOX 66051
MCAS BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA 29904-6051
Sunday, September 17, 2023 (23260)

DUTIES			AIRFIELD HOURS: 1500-1700		SBTP REPORT			
			SDO:	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	SBTP	SCHEDULED	FLOWN	
			ASDO:			SRTS / HRS	SRTS / HRS	
			GDO:					
					FY	5132	4454 / 5183.8	3986 / 4767.9
					QTR	1348	905 / 1077.1	758 / 871.7
					MONTHLY	415	200 / 234.6	128 / 155.4
					DAILY SCHEDULED:		8 / 9.6	
BMNT: 0614	SR / SS: 0707 / 1928	MR / MS: 0825 / 2024	ILLUM: 0.8%	EENT: 2021	LLL:2035-0602*	HLL:0601-0614, 2021-2035		

FLIGHTS: 4 XC 4															
EVENT	PRI	TMS	C/S	BRF/ETD/ETA	ICAO	CREW	T&R	TMR	MSN	SBTP	FLIGHT PLAN	TAC	CONFIGURATION	AIRSPACE	NOTES
1-1	1	F-35B	Swede11	0845/1100/1210	KCHS/KCHS	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	2404	1A6	TI	1/1.2	DD-1801	1	1	W-122 15-19; 1100-1300	
1-2			2404				1A6	1/1.2							
2-1	2	F-35B	Swede21	0845/1100/1210	KCHS/KCHS			2K4	RED AIR	1/1.2	DD-1801	2	1	W-122 15-19; 1100-1300	
2-2							2K4	1/1.2							
3-1	1	F-35B	Swede11	1145/1400/1510	KCHS/KNBC		2103	1A1	FAM	1/1.2	DD-1801	1	1	N/A	
3-2							Swede12	2103		1A1					
4-1	2	F-35B	Swede21	1145/1400/1510	KCHS/KNBC		2103	1A1	FAM	1/1.2	DD-1801	2	1	N/A	
4-2							Swede22	2103		1A1					

SIMULATORS:
No Simulators Scheduled
ACADEMICS / BRIEFS:
No Academics / Briefs Scheduled

GENERAL NOTES:
1. 1630: Maint Meeting, Maint Training Classroom (Required Personnel)

QUESTIONS OF THE DAY:
EPOD: Q: CANOPY LOSS
FSD QOD: Q:How long will it take the IPP to transition to burn mode after a FLAMEOUT?
BREVITY: Q: J-11

OPS (b)(6), (b)(7)c MX X DSS (b)(6), (b)(7)c SgtMaj (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

By Direction

(35) VMFAT-501 Corrected Flight Schedule for 15 September

Corrected Flight Schedule 20230915 - Copy - Saved

FileHomeInsertDrawPage LayoutFormulasDataReviewViewHelpOpen in Desktop App

Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF)

Valid Time:	ICAO:	Location:	Observation Data:
17, Sep 2023 05:33Z	KCHS	CHARLESTON AFB INTL	TAF KCHS 170533Z 1706/1806 00000KT P6SM FEW100 BKN250 FM171400 14005KT P6SM SCT040 BKN150 FM171900 17009KT 6SM SHRA VCTS BKN035CB FM180200 VRB03KT P6SM BKN070
17, Sep 2023 11:25Z	KCHS	CHARLESTON AFB INTL	TAF KCHS 171125Z 1712/1812 14005KT P6SM BKN080 FM171900 17009KT 6SM SHRA VCTS BKN035CB TEMPO 1721/1723 3SM TSRA BKN025CB FM180000 VRB03KT P6SM BKN070
17, Sep 2023 14:39Z	KCHS	CHARLESTON AFB INTL	TAF AMO KCHS 171439Z 1715/1812 14005KT P6SM BKN080 TEMPO 1715/1716 4SM SHRA BKN030 FM171900 17009KT 6SM SHRA VCTS BKN035CB TEMPO 1721/1723 3SM TSRA BKN025CB FM180000 VRB03KT P6SM BKN070
17, Sep 2023 16:46Z	KCHS	CHARLESTON AFB INTL	TAF AMO KCHS 171646Z 1717/1812 15007KT P6SM RA SCT035 BKN070 FM171800 17009KT 6SM SHRA VCTS BKN035CB TEMPO 1721/1723 3SM TSRA BKN025CB
17, Sep 2023 17:12Z	KCHS	CHARLESTON AFB INTL	TAF AMO KCHS 171712Z 1717/1812 15007KT 5SM RA BKN025 FM171730 15011G18KT 4SM +RA BKN025 FM171800 17009KT 6SM SHRA VCTS BKN035CB TEMPO 1721/1723 3SM TSRA BKN025CB FM180000 VRB03KT P6SM BKN070
17, Sep	KCHS	CHARLESTON AFB INTL	TAF KCHS 171731Z 1718/1818 15010KT 4SM RA VCTS SCT025CB BKN050

https://26ows.us.af.mil/tech_ref/data_save/packages/3087/index.html

9/19/23, 10:09 AM

HISTORICAL AIRCRAFT

2023
17:31Z

FM172000 16010G16KT 3SM TSRA BKN025CB
FM172300 27006KT P6SM SCT025 BKN050
FM180000 VRB03KT P6SM BKN070

17,
Sep
2023
18:07Z

KCHS CHARLESTON
AFB INTL

TAF AMD KCHS 171807Z 1718/1818 15010KT 4SM RA VCTS
SCT025CB BKN050

TEMPO 1718/1719 BKN008CB
FM172000 16010G16KT 3SM TSRA BKN025CB
FM172300 27006KT P6SM SCT025 BKN050
FM180000 VRB03KT P6SM BKN070

17,
Sep
2023
19:22Z

KCHS CHARLESTON
AFB INTL

TAF AMD KCHS 171922Z 1719/1818 16010KT P6SM SCT025
BKN050

FM172100 16010G16KT 3SM TSRA BKN025CB
FM172300 27006KT P6SM SCT025 BKN050
FM180000 VRB03KT P6SM BKN070

17,
Sep
2023
20:19Z

KCHS CHARLESTON
AFB INTL

TAF AMD KCHS 172019Z 1720/1818 16010KT P6SM SCT025
BKN050

FM172045 16010G16KT 3SM TSRA BKN025CB
FM172300 27006KT P6SM SCT025 BKN050
FM180000 VRB03KT P6SM BKN070

17,
Sep
2023
20:32Z

KCHS CHARLESTON
AFB INTL

TAF AMD KCHS 172032Z 1721/1818 28015G30KT 2SM TSRA
SCT010 OVC015CB

FM172200 27006KT P6SM VCSH SCT025 BKN050
FM180000 VRB03KT P6SM BKN070

