

Billet Organization

M21821 - H&S CO 3D AA BN 1ST MARDIV														CHARGEABLE										NON-CHARGEABLE														Mapped		A S R	H/C A	M C C	F T N
Rec CD	BIC	Billet Description	Alpha Grade	BMOS ASD1 ASD2	P M O S	B R N	T Y P	S T A	M P R	Res Typ	S C	W P N	Billet SPN	Marine Active Off	Marine Active Enl	Marine Reserve Off	Marine Reserve Enl	Civ Off	Other Active Off	Other Active Enl	Other Reserve Off	Other Reserve Enl	Marine Active Off	Marine Active Enl	Marine Reserve Off	Marine Reserve Enl	Civ Off	Other Active Off	Other Active Enl	Other Reserve Off	Other Reserve Enl	MT/MF	UIC										
C	M2182100001	BATTALION HEADQUARTERS																																									
D	M2182100002	HEADQUARTERS SECTION																																									
E	M2182100003	COMMANDING OFFICER	LTCOL	1803	1803	M	O	A	A		T	C		1																			1	A-M415	19F								
E	M2182100004	EXECUTIVE OFFICER	MAJ	1803	1803	M	O	A	A		S	C		1																			1	A-M415	19F								
E	M2182100005	SERGEANT MAJOR	SGTMAJ	8999	8999	M	E	A	A		U	C			1																		1	A-M415	19F								
E	M3300105450	FRO - 3D AAV BN 1ST MARDIV (M21820)	NF 4	1101	1101			O	C		U	U														1						MF	M33001	0	H-G065	19F							
E	M2182100006	MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR	CPL	3531	3531	M	E	A	A		U	C			1																		1	A-M415	19F								
Section Total		C - BATTALION HEADQUARTERS												2	2													1															
C	M2182100007	ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION																																									
E	M2182100008	ADJUTANT	1STLT	0102	0102	M	O	A	A		S	C		1																			1	A-M415	19F								
E	M2182100009	ADMIN CHIEF	SSGT	0111	0111	M	E	A	A		U	C			1																		1	A-M415	19F								
E	M2182100536	ADMIN CHIEF	SSGT	0111	0111	M	E	A	A		U	C			1																		MT	M21825	1	A-M415	19E						
E	M2182100537	ADMIN CLERK	CPL	0111	0111	M	E	A	A		U	M			1																		MT	M21825	1	A-M415	19E						
E	M2182100538	ADMIN CLERK	LCPL	0111	0111	M	E	A	A		U	M			1																		MT	M21825	1	A-M415	19E						
E	M2182100010	CAREER PLANNER	SGT	4821	4821	M	E	A	A		U	C			1																			1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100011	ADMIN CLERK	SGT	0111	0111	M	E	A	A		U	M			1																			1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100012	ADMIN CLERK	LCPL	0111	0111	M	E	A	A		U	M			1																			1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100013	ADMIN CLERK	LCPL	0111	0111	M	E	A	A		U	M			1																			1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100015	ADMIN CLERK	PFC	0111	0111	M	E	A	A		U	M			1																			1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100523	ADMIN CLERK	PFC	0111	0111	M	E	A	A		U	M			1																			1	A-M415	19F							
Section Total		C - ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION												1	10																												
C	M2182100038	INTELLIGENCE SECTION																																									
E	M2182100039	INTELLIGENCE OFFICER	1STLT	0203	0203	M	O	A	A		I	C		1																				1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100040	INTELLIGENCE CHIEF	SGT	0231	0231	M	E	A	A		I	C			1																			1	A-M415	19F							
Section Total		C - INTELLIGENCE SECTION												1	1																												
C	M2182100041	OPERATIONS SECTION																																									
E	M2182100042	OPERATIONS OFFICER	MAJ	0577	1803	M	O	A	A		S	C		1																				1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100043	ASSISTANT OPERATIONS OFFICER	CAPT	1803	1803	M	O	A	A		S	C		1																				1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100044	CBRN OFFICER	CWO2	5702	5702	M	O	A	A		T	C		1																				1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100045	OPERATIONS CHIEF	MGYSGT	0577	1833	M	E	A	A		U	C			1																			1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100524	MASTER GUNNER	MSGT	1868 0577N	1833	M	E	A	A		U	C			1																			1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100046	CBRN RECONNAISSANCE TEAM LEADER	CPL	5711 8056D	5711	M	E	A	A		U	C			1																			1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100047	CBRN DEFENSE SPECIALIST	LCPL	5711	5711	M	E	A	A		U	M			1																			1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100048	INFANTRY OPERATIONS NCO	SGT	8711	1833	M	E	A	A		U	C			1																			1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100404	TRAINING CLERK	SGT	1833	1833	M	E	A	A		U	C			1																			1	A-M415	19F							
Section Total		C - OPERATIONS SECTION												3	6																												
C	M2182100049	LOGISTICS SECTION																																									
E	M2182100405	MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT OFFICER	MAJ	1803	1803	M	O	A	A		S	C		1																				1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100050	EMBARKATION OFFICER	1STLT	0402	0402	M	O	A	A		S	C		1																				1	A-M415	19F							
E	M2182100051	LANDING SUPPORT CHIEF	MGYSGT	1833	1833	M	E	A	A		U	C			1																			1	A-M415	19F							

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[The investigative interview commenced on 1425, 16 April 2021.]

[WIT: CWO4 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: CWO5/W-5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[CR: GySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Good afternoon. My name is Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) . I'm accompanied by Chief Warrant Officer 5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , and we are a part of the team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU and actions and decisions associated with the material conditioning, training, and personnel readiness thereof.

This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020. We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April '21, to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with

information relevant to the investigation.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed me to the investigating team and Chief Warrant Officer 5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} to the investigating team on 8 April '21, and we are talking to you in our investigatory capacity as representatives of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We are required provide General Thomas with a written report upon the completion of our investigation. And just here are the two documents, one that assigns him and me to this investigation and the other is the convening directive of the investigation itself.

The topics that we'd like to cover with you today may include the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU; training and material readiness surrounding the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU; and I MEF, Division, and battalion oversight of the 15th MEU.

This is an administrative investigation. However, due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing review, we are asking personnel we talk to as a part of this investigation not to share anything we discuss today with any other person.

So before we start, do you have any questions about our role in this or the investigation itself?

WIT: No, sir.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. If you could, state your name, your rank, and your current billet.

WIT: I am Chief Warrant Officer 4 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) . I'm the battalion maintenance officer at 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Thank you. And what was your billet on 30 July 2020?

WIT: I was the battalion maintenance officer at the time, sir.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. Thank you. Ideally, our conversation is going to be mainly focused on the forming and the compositing of the 15th MEU, as it relates to the material readiness.

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And so I'm kind of interested in what was your relationship, if any, with Division in terms of their interest, their mandates with respect to tracking the material readiness of the 15th MEU platoon from 3rd AA Battalion.

WIT: Well, myself and the Division OrdO, Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) -- he's currently up there now -- he and I communicate quite often on a routine basis on just generic conversations in regards to

readiness, both of personnel, T/O management and the equipment management as well. But there was no specific discussion in regards to the leading up to forming on the 15th MEU.

Obviously, when the findings come out from the MEF's inspection, that triggers some conversation, as you might imagine, from himself and from Chief Warrant Officer 4 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who's the Assistant Division Ordnance Officer up there about where they stood up to that point. No real interest in it, per se, because they assumed it was going to go smoothly. But as soon as it did not go as smooth as anticipated, that's when they were reaching out, sir.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): Okay. I'm going to ask you a very general question to begin with. Obviously, as you read the command investigation, a lot of attention was paid to the material readiness of the AAVs, both in the forming phase and at the time of composite, the overall state of the AAVs.

If you don't mind, just kind of walk me through January of 2020 when the platoon solidified and the actions -- and we're going to talk about the reorg in a minute as well, because I understand that played a role in it. But just from your perspective, what actually happened from January until the composite date?

WIT: An equipment set was identified for the 15th MEU to somewhat operate at the beginning of the calendar year. Throughout some of that, there were some sustainment issues, due to the nature of the vehicle and the age and supply support being limited in some cases for some of the components.

So it's pretty traditional, what we dealt with for the 15th MEU that we did with the entire battalion. Across the fleet here 3rd Tracks, it was a pretty difficult time to try to manage equipment readiness for the AAV overall.

Then up until April, I really wasn't understanding some of the decisions that were made in regards to the personnel moving or deploying forward while there was an RBE team, a remain behind element. Some of them were going to school. Some were trying to get their annual training completed while UAE was happening. But in equipment exchanges, we'll do the reorg, so I do see where there could be some confusion with equipment readiness and some of the decisions that were made at that time.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): So my understanding is originally the plan was to take the 11th MEU vehicles and just transition them over to the 15th?

WIT: It was. It was my understanding that the 11th MEU was told to hold on to that equipment set for an indefinite amount of

time. And so to us, we were now scrambling to find an equipment gear set comparable capital for deployment due to that decision of holding on to the 11th MEU. Keeping it fenced, both virtual and physical, we couldn't mess with that equipment set.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. So from my understanding, the decision was to build that platoon's vehicles from within H&S Company, the set of vehicles that were organic to H&S Company.

Did you build a complete set out of those originally? I'm trying to understand at what point the decision was to start pulling from the admin deadline.

WIT: To be honest, sir, I couldn't tell you. I wasn't there. I wasn't involved in any of their equipment exchange process and the decisions of pulling vehicles from which location. I wasn't aware of that.

I think a couple commanders took that upon themselves, with the battalion commander, to do the vehicle exchanges and pull the equipment from certain places. Really, I wasn't involved in that, sir. I was just trying to help sustain from a perspective of readiness, whatever decision they went with.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Well, then on that note, let's talk about the reorg for a second. The reorg decision, from my understanding, was made by the battalion commander around

November, December timeframe. And if I recall, it was sort of an immediate execution right before the Christmas exodus period. So that when everybody came back from the holiday period, they would be in their new seats. Is that a fair assessment of the execution of the reorg?

WIT: It was, sir. From my recollection, it was about the holiday schedule timeframe, right.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): So if I understand it correctly, the MEU platoons would now fall up under H&S Company and be supported and prepared for their forming and composite by the H&S Company Commander, who's an 1803 Amtracer, who should be certainly capable of doing that.

Where did that maintenance support come from?

WIT: So I checked in to the battalion in July of 2019. I was there for a few months and they had already had the MEUs underneath the H&S Company construct. We didn't have a dedicated MEU company like we've had in the past. So when I checked in, it was underneath H&S.

There was some issues with maintenance folks because, the battalion maintenance Marines, we have our own mission: a third and limited fourth echelon repair, commodity management across the battalion, internal inspection reviews and that

process with assistance with the MMO. And so to have a dedicated maintenance team was challenging at times, but we did have them lined out. So the company commander did have a staff sergeant or a gunny in charge of those equipment sets and that vehicle's resident to H&S Company as a whole.

IO (CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : So you're doing third and fourth as part of battalion maintenance stuff. What relationship did you have with 1st Maintenance Battalion and OMC, how often did you rely on them for external support?

WIT: So with 1st Maintenance Battalion, they do all the SECREP repairs stuff like that. We just float directly to the RIP. How the RIP exchanges that with them, I don't know. But to the battalion, there's a lot of third echelon maintenance that's conducted: all the engines, all the transmissions, PTOs, all the heavy stuff, per the technical manual, comes down to us to alleviate that requirement away from the letter companies.

IO (CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : I'm not talking about SECREPS. I'm talking about the actual conduct of repairs at Ordnance Maintenance Company in 1st Maintenance Battalion.

WIT: No, they don't work for me. I don't know what they do there.

IO (CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Realizing that they're with a different

battalion and they don't work for you, do you evac equipment to them?

WIT: No. It goes straight to the RIP underneath a SECREP exchange in GCSS. How the RIP either MRPs or sends it to GSM or OMC, that's up to them.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): I'm not talking about SECREPS at all. I'm talking about the actual vehicle.

WIT: No. No vehicles will go up to GSM for repair.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Or OMC?

WIT: Or OMC as well, no.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): It just makes me wonder, because there's 2141 up there.

WIT: There is, but they're rebuilding these identified secondary repairables for us.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Well, that's a GSM.

WIT: Yes.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): But OMC --

WIT: They had, at the point of recovery, a mission. They had R7s, 2141s, and they were doing whatever OMCs. However they divvy up the NINs on distribution of work is up to the rip and that OIC.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): I'm going to definitely looking to that.

WIT: But we will not evac, like, a Motor T asset. The Amtrac community doesn't evac the main PDI anywhere else for repair. We'll do an exchange with LAO Comm for a depo repair if need be.

IO (CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Right.

WIT: But that's it.

IO (CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): No maintenance support teams, either, coming in?

WIT: They can. LAO Comm produces a maintenance support team and GSM would help and OMC would help for overflow maintenance if requested.

IO (CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. In your time there, has that ever been requested?

WIT: No, sir.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So talk to me about the command climate, with respect to material readiness. And what I'm really looking at is: You've got a responsibility, the battalion has a responsibility to adequately form and equip this platoon for the 15th MEU. And so, what mechanisms, what processes, what command interest exists in ensuring that progression is made towards adequately equipping and manning that platoon?

WIT: There's a significant interest in ensuring that the

readiness is sustained or at a high enough level to where the MEUs will be successful. The problem, at the time, that I felt the stress was under was the field of modifications and the timing of that in conjunction with vehicle availability, due to RCCA and that process for mods only being applied to that variant of vehicle or that level of repaired vehicle.

So in some of my discussions I've had leading up to today and the first investigation, it was difficult to find an IROM vehicle comparable to a MEU environment. And I asked the battalion commander, "Do you think we're doing the right job or picking the right vehicles for the MEU?" And we were kind of painted into a corner, is how it was explained to me. And we needed to make sure that those RCCAs were made available for any mod fielding moving forward. So, virtually, we're hands off, is what the maintenance section was told.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. That's a question I had for you, to try to understand the dynamic or the impact on the battalions with the sequential nature of the mods themselves.

Obviously, there was a specified number of mods. The three mods, just for the record, the intercom modification, the remote weapons station modification, followed by the radio modification, the radio upgrade. Those were not happening at the

same time. They would be having sequentially over a period of three to five years with a desire to put those modifications on the RCCA vehicles, because those vehicles would be the last vehicles we would divest of in the Marine Corps.

So, on the premise that there is no more depot maintenance cycle for AAV after RCCA ends, the idea would be to take the latest depot cycle vehicles latest into the life of the platform. The guidance given was, "don't mandate that they go in RCCA vehicles." Just the preference is get them on as many RCCA vehicles as possible, recognizing that it was impossible to do a pure-fleet RCCA mod effort.

So if I understand correctly, the guidance or the direction you all went was just sequester all the RCCA vehicles and just make those available for mods.

WIT: Yes, sir. There was a point where we applied a 700I, which is a modification for the intercom system. We removed ICS, installed a new intercom system on an IROAN tractor. I think it was like 17 of them due to non-RCCA being available. But mods needed to be applied and I got an earful from that decision.

So we were under the guidance of RCCAs only that the mod should be applied to.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. So it definitely had an impact on

your ability to manage the fleet of vehicles. So the vehicles that were in, say Alpha, Bravo and Charlie, were they better vehicles in general than the vehicles that were in H&S or in the admin storage?

WIT: So, yes, I think across the battalion's fleet of AAVs that were in service, not the administrative deadlines section, were all the same. They're all virtually within the same condition as far as I was concerned. I was under the impression, since the ADL program had already been conceptualized and almost completed for introduction into of the program when I checked in in July, that could or better quarterly services or quarterly maintenance was required.

And then I was under the impression that they were midlife and newer, so they were some of the best tractors, considered IROAN, in the battalion's hands. And so with H&S company pulling vehicles out of ADL, they were under the pressure. When I say they, I mean the RO at the time and the battalion commander. They were told that those were code B or better, let's make that decision and move forward with that.

So I think that's where some of that happened with the H&S Company CO making the decision of withdrawing from ADL early because the program hadn't matured yet until just a few months

ago, sir.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. I'm going to circle back to a previous question. So January you started the effort to try to identify the vehicles that are going to go out on the MEU. Was there anything templated in the battalion to sort of brief the battalion commander, the 4, the XO on a routine basis as to the progress of the material readiness of that platoon?

WIT: There is. So every other week we have a material readiness brief that's provided to the battalion commander, the XO, and a LogO. I don't think the OpsO attends the MRB briefs. And that data's presented by the responsible officer. In this case, it would just be the company commanders.

There's no maintainer out on the ramp that owns any vehicles, and so they are presenting the data on their behalf. I remember the H&S Company CO would have a company slide, and then whatever MEUs broke out from his inventory of equipment would have its own dedicated slide that would present a level of readiness for the battalion commander to ingestion and make decisions based off of that information he's being provided.

IO (CW05 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Please back up to the modifications. Were you getting any guidance or instruction from Division or the MEF on what vehicles and modifications and were they requesting

any information as far as updates on modifications, or was it a; battalion communicating directly with SYSCOM on the application of those mods.

WIT: So Systems Command, like the colonel was saying, they just said, "Here you go. Here are the kits," the allotted fielding kit to your battalion. At the battalion level, through Colonel Brenize and then the LogO at the time, Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c), their decision was to do the RCCA only piece, so there was no Division or MEF influence with that.

And myself and Master Gunnery Sergeant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} who was the battalion maintenance chief at the time, we were left to look at a whiteboard and figure out utilizing the TEEP, who's most available for the modification application. So it was a pretty dynamic time trying to get all the vehicles fielded.

IO (CW05 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Did you have FSR support to apply those modifications?

WIT: Yes, we do. So vehicle availability is that is the hinge pin to that success, not necessarily personnel to do the application.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Talk about the op tempo and the impact of optimal on the ability to -- as I qualified earlier, when I grew up in the assault amphibian community, the calculus that we use

is seven hours of maintenance to every one hour of operation. And so, use that as your metric to see if you're getting the kind of maintenance time that you needed. So I don't know if that's still applicable, if that's still a common calculus that's used. But how did the op tempo impact or not impact the ability to maintain the equipment to include the MEU platoon?

WIT: So when I first checked July of '19, now Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c) was the OpsO at the time. He was my company commander when I was a company maintenance officer at 3rd Tracks. We deployed together. He and I had a great working relationship back then and it just carried into when we both checked in at the same time to 3rd tracks.

And I was able to utilize their TEEP and requirements based on the Division's expectations of what needs to be achieved. And anything that didn't meet any global requirement, we were able to wipe away and we were able to get some maintenance driven into ops. And to me, that's critical in a functioning battalion. If maintenance isn't a part of operations, then you might as well just call it a failure. So, Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} at the time and I worked well together.

He left and then Captain ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)} at the time, who's now a major-type, assumed the role as the OpsO and we carried the

same kind of tempo throughout. It's a balancing act making sure that, from my position as the battalion maintenance officer, that the battalion as a whole carves out time for maintenance, maintenance stand downs, whatever definition you want to throw at it. But it's challenging. We've got company commanders and company maintenance officers doing it the lowest level as well, trying to manage their TEEP and carve away time for maintenance.

I think we did a great job of managing both. I think readiness was not impacted by operations. And it's a fine line too. Because if you're not operating, the vehicles break as well. And so you've got to continually manage data and brief the commanders appropriately on it.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): How did COVID impact?

WIT: Huge. So COVID, going from a port-starboard construct at 3rd tracks, it was extremely challenging trying to manage the work force. Because I would be at home working from home, while Master Gunnery Sergeant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} was trying to steer the helm, and it would just go back and forth. Communicating through Teams with the command deck seemed to work fine. It was a functioning environment.

But I think at the turning-wrench level, that was significantly impacted. I mean, we're talking about losing

SECREPS and losing parts. I mean, you stop something to go home and you're gone for four or five days while another team is supposed to pick up what work you left behind, detailed emails left and right at the end of the work week of, "This is what I wasn't able to accomplish." So that COVID stuff, it was something else. It was challenging at the battalion.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): I have maybe three more questions. The first question is COVID related. So half the platoon goes away to Native Fury. Half the platoon stays back at 3rd AA Battalion to conduct maintenance and work on vehicles. But then half of those guys have to ROM --

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (CW05 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): -- or have to go home. And so you really have a quarter of the platoon trying to maintain 12 for 14 vehicles at this point. So is that a fair assessment?

WIT: It is, sir. And on top of that, I do remember rifle ranges, pistol ranges. I think the MEU maintenance chief attempted to get into the career course. There were things that were still trying to happen, prior to them to do the chop inspection, which was in April.

But you're right, sir. And then when they got back from Native Fury, 14 days of ROM and 2 days later, the MEF's on

deck to do the inspection with no pre-chop inspection by the ,
battalion commander, no battalion commander's inspection, no
joint LTIs on vehicles that were recently received had been
conducted because of the COVID environment. So the MEF shows up
and they were seeing the vehicle conditions the same way this
platoon was and I was. It happened to be at the MEF level and
that's where there was some serious discussions at the
command-deck level with regards to that.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)): So what was the guidance from the
battalion to personnel, regarding COVID requirements and
mitigation, what were the requirements? So Lance Corporal 2141,
what was their daily routine like during that time?

WIT: When a lance corporal was at home, they were just
doing a MarineNet classes, doing the low-level, in-the-weeds-type
work stuff that wasn't necessarily attached to an AAV maintenance
activity.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)
(7)(c)): Was there a percentage of personnel that
were allowed to be on the ramp, like, each company needed to only
have certain amounts, or was that prescribed from battalion?

WIT: It was, yes. It was a port-starboard, fifty percent.
So for my platoon at battalion maintenance, 50 percent of the
workforce was told to stay away, and it would rotate every four

or five business days. I don't remember at this point. I think Charlie Company, it was prepping for deployment at the time, so their whole company was in a restriction of movement environment as well. So the ramp was pretty dead for the most part. There wasn't a whole lot going on down on the ramp.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): So obviously the battalion's got this responsibility to prepare a platoon materially for the MEU and the chop date. You've got these constraints, both in half the platoon is at Native Fury, half the platoon is back turning wrenches. But half of that, that half is ROM-ing.

Was there any communication to the battalion commander that, "I don't know that we're going to make this," or, "We're at real risk here of not being able to chop a materially ready AAV platoon to the BLT"?

WIT: There was a handful of informal conversations about that. But I think that, leading up to that inspection in the first or second week of April, the information that I'm being provided is that they're at 92 percent readiness of that equipment set that was identified by the battalion commander and the company commanders. I don't know what else that I could have done to alleviate any of that.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): So they're not sending a demand signal?

WIT: There was no demand signal, correct, sir. With the COVID stuff, I would have been told with or without COVID being an issue. I was connected at home and free to everybody for reaching out to. And you're right, I had no concern leading up to that. I identified the best staff sergeant I had at the time to do the inspection on behalf of the MEF, knowing that he was going to be as picky as can be. I mean, all of that was a known fact, and we were prepared to receive the type of information we got.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): So you said there was no commander's inspection prior to the chop. Could you have done one?

WIT: I don't know if we could have, sir. I don't know the decisions to push them forward or what training was leading up to that. I'm not terribly privy to all those decisions.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): I guess my question is, what were Charlie, Bravo, and Alpha doing tempo-wise? Was there other resources on the ramp? Again, no demand signal is being highlighted. Was there other resources on the ramp to assemble a commander's inspection team or from your maintenance platoon or others that you could have said, "I got it. It's not ideal, but we're still going to do the commander's inspection prior to the chop"?

WIT: Definitely. Looking back at it now, yes, certainly there should have been a more of an emphasis on carving out the time to do that. Looking back at it, I can't negate that fact. However, we did have Charlie Company not on the ramp at all because they're going out on UDP, a company out on UDP, and one to a port and starboard, as well as everybody else. So it was a difficult and challenging environment, and just trying to stay ahead of it --

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Right.

WIT: -- with half the workforce or less is challenging to with 1400 Marines, much less 200.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So let's fast forward to the joint LTI for a second that goes in mid to late April timeframe. Were you able to be on hand for any sort of observation of those joint LTIs?

WIT: I was walking through the work spaces throughout. Again, I had Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) he was the appointed Marine for that inspection, and I had a lot of trust and confidence in his ability. Every other day or every day before the day was up, there would hot wash real quick. I asked of all of my Marines. If you're working something, let me know how that day's events took place. And I was tracking the LTI process and seeing these

discrepancies but no major maintenance was required. There was no engine replacement, no transmission replacements, no Major SECREPS, just the stuff that eats us at the ankles everyday out there on the ramp.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Were you satisfied with the composition of the joint LTI teams, the rank structures were right, the experience level is correct, no issues?

WIT: It wasn't any different than in the past. But I will tell you, we could probably do a better job on making sure it's just not homegrown Marines inspecting their own equipment, if we can have a little bit more involvement from an OIC that might have been attached to the ground ordnance section or whatever, a little more of a presence in that regard. That's why we choose certain staff NCOs to do the inspection, so you can see the most unbiased individual out there doing the work. That helps lend to a more productive result. I don't need to hear that they're one hundred percent. I want you to find everything you can, so that we're sending out good equipment.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): The joint part of that joint LTI, the MEU platoon was present for it, their mechanics?

WIT: Yes.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), was he an H&S

guy?

WIT: He was an H&S, battalion maintenance Marine that worked for me at the time.

IO (CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So essentially, he's in the same company as --

WIT: Correct.

IO (CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And so you don't have anybody from MLG or --

WIT: No, not that I'm aware of. There might have been some NCOs that came from other places. But the staff NCOIC for the ground ordnance section was a resident of 3rd Tracks to begin with in the same company.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): The Division got tasked with providing a staff sergeant 2141 for the joint LTI team.

WIT: Where do you get one in the Division? So maybe the MLG should be tasked in the future and some more outside eyes looking at stuff would be a little better.

IO (CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So after looking at the LTIs, did they pass the smell test for you?

WIT: Yes. A hundred percent. There was a lot of discrepancies. I mean, there's a lot of discrepancies out at any ramp, but there was a quick turn on repair.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): They're minor discrepancies.

WIT: Minor discrepancies, sir. On my first statement, I broke down a timeline of events of when reporting was happening and it crept back up to one hundred percent by the end of the month. So I was happy with that. And with Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) giving me a daily update after the chop inspection was completed, it was within days that readiness went from 10 to 80-something within a day or two. It was pretty quick turn.

But as you operate these tractors, because they pulled some out ADL and some from other sections that didn't operate at the same tempo as a letter company, stuff breaks so we just have to stay on top of it.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): When Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) received them, he deadlined 12 out of the 13, verbally. Were you aware of that, did Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) communicate that to you?

WIT: From my understanding from the situation and the timing of everything, he was reporting these all being deadlined at the same time the MEF inspector are reporting them as deadlined. That's the same event. There was no joint LTI process from one RO to another RO per the 4790. That didn't take place.

So no one knew what these vehicle conditions were when

they were received by the 15th MEU. I find hard to believe that he LTI'd those vehicles within two business days before the MEF showed up. But again, I'm just going off of memory at this point. I'm trying to remember, like, a year ago, April of '20.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So that's the joint LTIs that are in the investigation that we have copies of. Those joint LTI, you're telling me, supposedly took place in two days?

WIT: Those took place over a period of a week and some change from Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and his team.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay.

WIT: I don't know how Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) would have gotten his own LTIs completed prior to the 15th MEU, because of the ROM requirements come back from UAE and everything else. He had no Marines. He was the only maintainer that was the RBE team.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. So Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) made a declaration that 13 of the 14 vehicles were deadlined based on what?

WIT: The MEU's findings.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): The MEU's findings?

WIT: Yes. The MEF inspection's findings. He took those findings -- it sounds like -- to his own, like, "These are all

broken."

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Where are those findings?

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): What process did the MEF use to make the determination they were deadlined? Was it another LTI, was it based on Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 's word?

WIT: No. The LTIs in the first command investigation, that's in there as enclosures? To my understanding, those are the MEF inspection's LTIs. They're not Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 's LTIs.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): They're not. They're Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 's.

WIT: Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 's.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay.

WIT: So we need to find Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 's LTI, if he's saying he did that.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): When we walk through those, we find five or six. They didn't look too bad. The overall joint LTI didn't look too bad, five or six vehicles deadlined.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And then the NOTM came in June.

WIT: Correct. Which was the 14th tractor at that point.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Right. So if you're using that set of data that we looked at in the command investigation, I'm

struggling to determine how that correlates to 13 out of 14 vehicles deadlined.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Just an opinion-based question for you here. As a mechanic, if I'm getting equipment from you to me, I'm going to deadline it. Do you think maybe that had something to do with Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)'s decision?

WIT: Possibly. If I had to guess.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): That's fair.

WIT: We all know the business here.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): This is something we've struggled with between Chief Warrant Officer 5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I. And we may not bring clarity to it, but I think it's important as a part of the questioning and the investigation.

From the LTI, as we have taken both taken a hard look at, the vehicle platoon doesn't look in really bad shape. Yes, there's five or six vehicles deadline. But to your point earlier, they're relatively minor, easy fixes. They're not significant. To your point, we're not talking major deadlining items. These are items that can be fixed relatively quick, providing you get the parts and so on.

And so we have seen the declaration 13 out of 14 vehicles have been deadlined. And we have tried to put those

pieces together based on the information we have, and we can't connect those dots. And so that's why I continue to go down this line of questioning, because we're struggling to connect those dots. And so we don't have any material here that shows legitimately 13 out of 14 vehicles --

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): -- the demand signal.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): The demand signal or just the evidence that supports a 13-out-of-14-vehicle deadline. That's sort of the challenge he and I have been sort of working through.

WIT: And I can assist with that. All I know is that 92 percent or 97 percent rate, and that's prior to the inspection. The lowest it ever got was 56 maybe, which would be 7 tractors out of whatever. But when I was asked the question at the command investigation, the only question that was sent to me via email was, "Did you know 13 of 14 were deadlined?" I assume that data was pulled out of somewhere that was considered evidence or would have been founded factual.

At the time, I never knew that the entire platoon deadlined back in April. I do know, though, that a routine maintenance thing we'll do is we'll talk about all these things being broken, but they can be fixed on the spot as well. And if something didn't turn on in that moment, like a crew vent fan,

but then you plug it in, it was deadlined. And that's probably how it got brief, but it was already fixed before the end of the work day and maybe not even made it onto the LTI either.

So I can't connect the dots, but it's safe to assume that they were all there were all broken. We could LTI anything on this camp.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So the composition of that LTI team, Corporal (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , is he one of yours?

WIT: No. It doesn't sound familiar.

IO (CW05 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): I'll pull a manning docket to see maybe they did come from the MLG. That's a thread that I'm definitely going to pull.

And to be fair, the message from the MEF, it's not a joint LTI. It's an acceptance LTI team, right. To your point, a true joint LTI would be individuals from both units coming together. That's something that I need to look at.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Technically, in accordance with the policy and the orders, it's supposed to be a joint LTI, correct. We need to verify that.

WIT: So the decision to have the battalion maintenance personnel assist the MEU maintenance folks is that disinterested help to the MEF with Staff Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) . Because I have

Marines that go out there too, during that inspection to oversee and do some of the paperwork, the check-in-the-box piece.

IO (CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): The way I understand it is that any kind of conflict of interest, to avoid that, you would need members outside of the battalion.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Correct.

IO (CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Different commands, different RO chain, right, to be part of that team.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Well, historically, from my experience, there will be members from within the battalion, but they come from separate companies, right. Because obviously division participation can only come from one place, so we're always very mindful of making sure Delta Company mechanics, 33s, are coming over to inspect Alpha Company.

So, think I'm about done. I don't know about you,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): I just want to talk about your relationship or communication, if any, with CLB-15 and the R7 crew. Walk me through that.

WIT: Very challenging for this MEU, in regards to CLB support. I was the battalion maintenance officer at 3rd Tracks from '14 to '16, and now I'm back here again; I've chopped a

handful of MEUs. This CLB and I had a phone conversation with Chief Warrant Officer ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, who was the CLB maintenance officer. Not impressed. There was zero support. I supported and I saw some statements in there from the first CI. I did more support for 15th MEU than I ever did with any other MEU prior to this one, because of the lack of engineer support, all the welding work, all the SECREP exchange stuff, because of the ITOH transfer piece not going through. There was no ownership in GCSS, so it stayed at 3rd Tracks.

We did a lot. We did a significant amount of maintenance with them, and I was just disappointed that there was not a welder at CLB 15 supposedly. That was a story I got from Chief Warrant Officer ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}. There were no cross trained 2141s wants to become welders as part of R7 crew and to weld on AAVs, and I wasn't a fan of that either. And Staff Sergeant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} begged for some assistance, and we gave it to him based on the information we were getting from the lack of support from CLB 15.

And I was a little disappointed at that it didn't get talked about on the first one. But I think that now we can unpack that a little bit. It was just pretty disappointing with the 15th CLB.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Was the battalion ever able to register

that sort of displeasure with the BLT?

WIT: Yes. We did, but we did it through Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}, I think that's his name.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}
_{(7)(c)}): I we're going to talk to him later today.

WIT: I think he and I worked through these findings, these discrepancies and he was concerned about the CLB 15's lack of support and was happy to hear that their tracks was taking a good role in repairing those tractors on their behalf.

Again, this is after they've already done all of their chopping and composite. Everything was done. Even leading up to this ship-to-shore stuff at San Clemente, we were still working on their tractors, doing a lot of their maintenance. I think that's all I got on that one, sir.

IO (CW05 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Me understanding the mission of the CLB's role with the R7 and recovery and evac and all that, what's your opinion about relying on the R7 from the logistics battalion and not having it within the MEU platoon?

WIT: Well, it's been difficult over the decades. However, we are now supporting ourselves with our own R7s and teams now. CLB does not have a recovery mission as far as I understand in the AAV now, right. So moving forward, I think it's fixed.

I think training and education for the CLBs supporting

the MEUs has always been an issue because they're just not up to the same speed. We have MEUs chopping, playing varsity; these guys are playing JV. Trying to get them up to this level of third echelon repair, all the other training involved, it's been a challenge from the 31st MEU on down.

It's just difficult every time we try to get them on the ramp. We have these memorandums of agreement that allow their vehicles to be on our ramp down here, and they're down every once in awhile. But there are days where it's like pulling teeth to get them down here to do maintenance on their own vehicles and to support the platoon because they're the third and limited fourth, to support the MEU platoon. They're the SECREP folks. They're all of that stuff. And they're the liaison to that environment, and it just wasn't happening all that much.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}): All right. Do you have anything else you'd like to add?

WIT: No, sir.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}): Okay. I'll read the closing statement.

You are directed not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone other than members of the investigation team. If you're asked

about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify me, Chief Warrant Officer 5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, or your commanding officer.

[The investigative interview concluded at 1511, 16 April 2021.]

I, Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, attest that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of Chief Warrant Officer 4 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} held on 16 April 2021.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Col, USMC



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
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WASHINGTON DC 20350-3000

MCO 3120.13
POE
29 OCT 2015

MARINE CORPS ORDER 3120.13

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Distribution List

Subj: POLICY FOR MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNITS (MEU)

Ref: See Enclosure (1)

Encl: (1) References
(2) Baseline MEU Structure and Organization
(3) Notional Equipment/Principal End Items (For Baseline ARG/MEU)

1. Situation. This Order establishes United States Marine Corps policy for Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) per references (a) through (y), specifically when employed with Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs). It identifies the mission, MEU characteristics as well as the baseline structure and major end-item composition. Per reference (a), it further guides the development of MEU concepts, requirements, doctrine, and training programs and assigns appropriate responsibilities. This Order provides guidance for MEU certification, command relationships, development of the Predeployment Training Program (PTP), and post deployment requirements. Additionally, this Order outlines the interoperability relationship between the ARG/MEU and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) forces during the ARG/MEU Fleet Response Training Plan (FRTTP)/PTP and deployment.

2. Cancellation. MCO 3120.9C.

3. Mission. To provide policy guidance for the manning, training, equipping and organization of MEUs, when employed with an ARG.

4. Execution

a. Commander's Intent and Concept of Operations

(1) Commander's Intent. Ensure a common understanding within the United States Marine Corps (USMC), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Unified Combatant Commands when addressing ARG/MEU missions, characteristics, and capabilities. The desired end state is that, through guidance promulgated in this Order, the Marine Corps continues to provide certified, operationally flexible, sea-based forward presence in the form of MEUs.

(2) Concept of Operations. This Order provides guidance to Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), the operating forces, and supporting establishments regarding the composition and capabilities of the MEU. Additionally, this Order addresses the relationship between the ARG/MEU and Joint Special Operations Forces (JSOF), as well as addressing the unique requirements of the 31st MEU. Most importantly it directs all Deputy

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Commandants (DCs), their subordinate agencies, Marine Component Commands, Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), and MEUs to constantly assess the manner in which the Marine Corps conducts expeditionary operations to ensure the continued operational effectiveness of the MEU program.

b. Tasks

(1) Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations (DC PP&O)

(a) Act as service coordinator for all service policy and serve as the focal point at HQMC for Joint and interagency policy matters.

(b) Coordinate with Department of Navy (DON) for mutual naval advocacy issues affecting the ARG/MEU program per references (b) and (c).

(c) Act as the advocate for MEUs and conduct MEU Operational Advisory Groups (OAGs) in support of the MEU program.

(2) Deputy Commandant for Aviation (DC AVN)

(a) Coordinate Marine Corps aviation programs and plans in support of the MEU mission.

(b) In coordination with Deputy Commandant, Installation and Logistics (DC I&L), provide assistance to MEFs regarding aviation ground support equipment resourcing efforts in support of the MEU program.

(3) Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC M&RA). In accordance with references (d), (e), (f), and paragraph 4.c.(7) of this Order, assign Marines to the MEU Command Element (CE) and their Major Subordinate Elements (MSE) by rank, grade, and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in order to properly staff the MEUs and their subordinate elements.

(4) Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics (DC I&L)

(a) In accordance with reference (g), coordinate the development and implementation of Naval Logistics in support of the MEU program - afloat and ashore.

(b) Provide assistance to the MEFs regarding equipment resourcing efforts in support of the MEU program.

(5) Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (CO MCIA) Coordinate predeployment intelligence support to the ARG/MEU program.

(6) Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I)

(a) In accordance with references (a) and (h), coordinate the development of doctrine, organizational structure, and equipment issues.

(b) Serve as the service point of contact for the development and validation of unique MEU capabilities and low density equipment requirements.

(7) Commanding General, Training and Education Command (CG TECOM)

(a) Monitor training to ensure compliance with established Marine Corps standards.

(b) Coordinate external school, Joint, and interagency training support for predeployment training.

(c) Develop the Marine Corps training programs and standards relative to reference (i), MEU PTP. Upon publication of this Order, oversee the update of reference (i) in order to reflect changes in policy.

(d) Serve as the Marine Corps point of contact for training.

(8) Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command (COMMARCORSSYSCOM)

(a) Serve as the Marine Corps agent for research, development, and acquisition of all ground weapons systems and information technology systems, including low density/non-standard equipment items, necessary to ensure that each MEU possesses the capabilities required by this Order.

(b) Coordinate the development and monitor the implementation of an integrated logistic support system to support the acquisition and time-sensitive fielding of unique equipment items.

(9) Commander, U. S. Marine Corps Forces Command (COMMARFORCOM) and Commander, U. S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (COMMARFORPAC)

(a) Provide Unified Combatant Commanders (CCDRS) with organized, trained, and equipped forces in accordance with this Order.

(b) Coordinate the evaluation and certification of each MEU prior to deployment.

(c) Coordinate with DC CD&I, CG TECOM, and Marine Corps Installations Command/Assistant Deputy Commandant, I&L Facilities (MCICOM/ADC I&L (LF)) for validation of doctrine, organizational structure, training standards, equipment, and facilities to support MEUs.

(d) Ensure the MEF MSC and MSEs report, via stabilization rosters; no later than 210 days before embarkation (E-210) those personnel who will deploy with the CE, Ground Combat Element (GCE), Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and Logistics Combat Element (LCE). Manpower issues will be reported by the MEU to the parent MEF, who will develop internal sourcing actions or request global sourcing solutions via the Marine Forces (MARFOR).

(e) Certify each MEU as Ready for Deployment at the conclusion of the PTP and report certification to DC PP&O.

(f) MEUs shall report and provide rationale for significant deviations from baseline MEU structure and major end items outlined in this Order to their parent MEF no later than E-150. MEFs will notify MARFORs and appropriate Deputy Commandants of actions taken and any requested support.

(g) Per references (j) and (i), coordinate with Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (COMMARFORSOC) regarding the provision and interoperability training and evaluation with SOF for each east

and west coast sourced ARG/MEU prior to deployment. Such training should be separate and distinct from the Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE) enabled MEU exercises and should exploit the availability and capability of the MEU.

(h) Per references (j) and (i), coordinate with COMMARFORSOC regarding the provision of MEU forces/capabilities for integration into east and west coast Marine Special Operations Forces (MARSOFF) training prior to MARSOFF forward deployment. Such training should be separate and distinct from SOFLE-enabled MEU exercises and should exploit the availability and capability of the MARSOC unit preparing for deployment.

(i) Ensure each MEU has taken the actions necessary to appropriately accept and employ the ARG/MEU SOFLE (when directed). The ARG/MEU SOFLE is a team of experienced SOF operators/enablers sourced from across the SOF enterprise. The MEU will exchange a Liaison Officer (LNO) with the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) as it transits a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) in order to leverage the Global SOF network (GSN). The SOFLE, enabled by the TSOC provided LNO, affords the following specific capabilities to the ARG/MEU:

1. Provides insight on the capabilities, limitations, and requirements of the relevant GCCs' operational and theater SOF elements.

2. In conjunction with the TSOC LNO, advises the ARG/MEU command team on the respective TSOC's operations, activities and actions, and leads tactical level planning, resourcing, and execution of ARG/MEU and SOF combined operations.

3. Advises on the capabilities and limitations of the various SOF intelligence collection disciplines and the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources available in theater.

(10) Commander, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (COMMARFORSOC). Coordinate with the respective MEFs via COMMARFORCOM/COMMARFORPAC for the provision and interoperability training and evaluation with MARSOFF for east and west coast sourced MEUs and integration of east and west coast MARSOFF training opportunities prior to deployment. Such training should be separate and distinct from the SOFLE-enabled MEU exercises and should exploit the availability and capability of the MEU.

(11) Commander, Marine Corps Installations Command (COMMCICOM)/Assistant Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics (Facilities) [ADC I&L (LF)]

(a) Support MEF CGs with provision of training areas and ranges for MEU related PTP.

(b) Support MEF CGs with deployment support to and from Port of Embarkation/Debarcation.

(c) Serve as the Marine Corps point of contact for facilities support.

(12) Commander, Marine Forces Reserve (COMMARFORRES). Provide Reserve Component (RC) unit capabilities or individuals that cannot be sourced from assigned Active Component (AC) forces.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Definitions

(a) MEU. The term MEU is used to refer to a standing type of Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) consisting of a CE, GCE, ACE, and LCE per reference (k). Per reference (l), a MEU is optimized as a three ship ARG/MEU designed as a highly mobile, versatile, and self-contained crisis response force. Each MEU is organized, trained, and equipped to operate as a cohesive, single entity that is inherently mobile and operationally flexible. Supported by the Navy's combat logistics ships, it is largely self-sustaining.

(b) Aggregated Operations. Aggregated operations are those where all the elements of the ARG and MEU are operating within mutually supporting distances of one another. All the capabilities of the ARG and the MEU can be brought to bear on mission accomplishment.

(c) Split Operations. Per reference (l), Split Operations require elements of the ARG/MEU to function separately for various durations and distances with the ARG and MEU commanders retaining control of forces under the same GCC.

(d) Distributed Operations

1. Distributed Operations are those where subordinate elements increase physical separation to mitigate a threat or better support mission accomplishment while not maintaining mutual support through fire or maneuver. Dispersed elements remain under the command and control of their parent unit and their activities support its mission.

2. In ARG/MEU operations, elements of the ARG/MEU function separately for various durations and/or distances, beyond the range of mutual support, with the ARG/MEU commanders retaining control of all forces under the same GCC.

(e) Disaggregated Operations. Per reference (l), Disaggregated Operations require elements of the ARG/MEU to function separately and independently, regardless of time and distance, with elements under a command relationship that changes/limits the ARG and MEU commanders' control of their forces. The ARG/MEU may be disaggregated within a GCC's area of responsibility (AOR) or elements of the ARG/MEU may be assigned to a different GCC.

(2) MEU Mission. Provide a forward-deployed, flexible sea-based MAGTF capable of conducting amphibious operations, crisis response, and limited contingency operations, to include enabling the introduction of follow-on forces and designated special operations, in order to support the theater requirements of the GCC.

(3) Characteristics. A certified, versatile, and ready MAGTF is characterized by:

(a) Crisis Action Planning and Response. Each MEU, along with its associated Amphibious Squadron, conducts extensive training in the rapid response variant of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP), called the Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2). Through the use of R2P2, the MEU is

capable of planning and commencing execution of tactical operations within six hours of receipt of a mission.

(b) Expeditionary in Nature. The U.S. Marine Corps, as a service, is specifically organized for rapid deployment and conduct of operations; the MEU is its most agile and expeditionary unit. The expeditionary mindset is characterized by constant preparation for immediate employment in austere environments, arriving with the necessary organization and equipment to accomplish the mission. The ARG/MEU's ability to self-deploy, self-sustain, and rapidly task-organize typifies the expeditionary capabilities of the Navy/Marine Corps team and offers the GCC a force with greater flexibility to operate across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO).

(c) Sea-Based Forward Presence. As a sea-based force, the ARG/MEU remains independent of host nation ports and airfields, basing agreements, and, perhaps most importantly, the political sensitivities associated with land-based forces. This freedom of action and inherent force protection allow for unparalleled access to the littorals of the world and provide for a continuous presence and credible combat power poised for rapid employment. The ARG/MEU's presence signals U.S. commitment to a region and helps shape and promote regional stability. Sea-basing allows the ARG/MEU to remain on station, over the horizon of a potential adversary, in internationally recognized neutral territory retaining freedom of maneuver masking its exact destinations and/or intentions. The ARG/MEU buys time for U.S. political and diplomatic decision-making.

(d) Combined Arms Integration. Each MEU conducts extensive integrated supporting arms training. During the PTP, the ARG/MEU employs both assets organic from the ARG/MEU and those from external sources, such as Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) ships, and when available, Carrier Strike Group (CSG) aviation, undersea warfare (USW), and Joint assets. ARG/MEUs deploy with the ability to plan, coordinate, and control fires in the Joint and/or Combined environment.

(e) Interoperability. The nature of ARG/MEU operations empowers it to be an enabler for larger naval formations, particularly the MEB, and to be inherently Joint. Its capabilities complement those of Naval, Joint, Combined, and SOF. The ARG/MEU's robust Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) architecture allows it to function as part of a larger Joint Task Force (JTF). The ARG/MEU PTP mandates the requirement to train with SOF and other Joint forces in order to further develop this capability.

(4) Forward-deployed MEU Operations. Forward-deployed ARG/MEUs primarily conduct operations within the following three areas: Amphibious Operations; Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations; and Expeditionary Support to other Operations. The specific tasks associated with these areas are drawn from references (m) and (n), and the composition of the MEU Mission Essential Task List (METL) is in accordance with reference (o).

(a) Amphibious Operations

1. Conduct Amphibious Assault (MCT 1.12.1.3). The principal type of amphibious operation that involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

2. Conduct Amphibious Raid (MCT 1.12.1.2). Short-duration, small scale deliberate attacks, from the sea, involving a swift penetration of hostile or denied battlespace. Amphibious raids are conducted in order to secure information, to confuse the enemy, or to seize, destroy, neutralize, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated sea-based or shore-based targets. Amphibious raids end with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.

3. Conduct Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) (MCT 1.12.1.8). Operations contained in this task include Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS), seizure of a static maritime platform and selected maritime security missions. VBSS Operations (MCT 1.12.1.9) are designed to seize a ship, vessel, or maritime platform and establish positive control over critical systems in order to transition control to designated organizations. These operations may be conducted in order to counter piracy, enforce international agreements, enforce international resolutions or sanctions, confiscate contraband, or as directed in accordance with current execution orders. VBSS forces ensure the health, safety, and welfare of detained crew until turned over to appropriate legal authorities. The MEU, supported by the ARG, will be trained and equipped to execute complex synchronized VBSS missions.

4. Conduct Enabling Operations (MCT 1.12.6). Enabling actions refer to those preparatory actions taken by on-scene or initial deploying forces to facilitate the introduction and effective employment of follow-on forces. With the possible exception of expeditions of very limited scope and duration, the forces that can initially deploy and enter an area will rarely be sufficient to accomplish the mission. Usually, other forces will follow and the initial forces will undertake actions that are designed to set the stage for the eventual decisive actions. Enabling actions may include seizing a port or airfield to facilitate the secure introduction of follow-on forces. They may include establishing the necessary logistics and other support capabilities. In cases of disaster or disruption, enabling actions usually involve the initial restoration of order or stability. In the case of open warfare, enabling actions may involve operations to seize a lodgment area for follow-on forces or to capture key terrain necessary for the conduct of decisive operations.

(b) Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

1. Conduct Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) (MCT 1.13.2). Operations requested by the Department of State whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries to safe havens or to the U.S., as directed, when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster.

2. Facilitate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (MCT 1.15.1.2). Assistance to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Normally these operations are limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation, civil authorities, and/or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.

3. Integrate and Operate with Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Organizations (MCT 5.5.1). To integrate and coordinate Marine Corps units, capabilities, and efforts with combined forces and forces from other nations, intergovernmental and interagency organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and United Nations forces and capabilities, required to generate decisive joint combat power. Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) synchronize and integrate the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns and major operations. The goal of JIIM integration is to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force, not necessarily to involve all forces or to involve all forces equally. This task includes prepositioning operations.

4. Conduct Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) (MCT 6.2.1). This includes rescue or extraction, by surface or air, of downed aircraft and/or personnel and equipment, conduct aircraft sanitization, and provide advanced trauma life support in a benign or hostile environment.

5. Conduct Embassy Reinforcement (MCT 6.1.7). Conduct operations to reinforce internal security services of U.S. embassies, legations, and consulates to protect U.S. personnel and prevent the compromise of classified material. Take action to reestablish control of compromised facilities or compound, defeat an enemy attack, and conduct delaying actions to facilitate other operations (e.g., NEO).

6. Conduct Aviation Operations from Expeditionary Shore-Based Sites (MCT 1.3.3.3.2). The MAGTF's power-projection capability is based on its ability to move rapidly and operate freely within an objective area anywhere in the world. To provide responsiveness in austere expeditionary environments, Marine aviation units maintain the capability to operate from amphibious shipping, forward operating bases (FOBs), Expeditionary Airfields (EAFs), Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs), austere forward operating sites, tactical landing zones, etc., that are in line with platform and unit capabilities. Additionally, a MEU's ability to manage Expeditionary Aviation Operations ashore is a unique capability that can enable a Joint or coalition force.

7. Conduct/Support Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Activities (MCT 5.5.5.1). TSC activities are combined and multinational military non-combat activities conducted with other nations within a theater in order to create favorable military geographical balances of power, advance mutual defense or security arrangements, and build allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.

8. Conduct Airfield/Port Seizure Operations (MCT 1.12.1.10). Secure an airfield, port or other key facilities in order to support MAGTF missions, receive follow-on forces or enable the introduction of follow-on forces.

9. Conduct Expeditionary Strike (MCT 3.2.8). To conduct rapid intelligence, precision targeting, and weaponeering to attack assigned Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL) or CCDR AOR priority targets in support of the theater level objectives with kinetic and non-kinetic (lethal and non-lethal) fires from expeditionary forward bases, airfields, aircraft carriers, or amphibious platforms in order to achieve CCDRs desired effects.

(c) Additional Capabilities Associated with 31st MEU

1. The 31st MEU is the only permanently forward deployed MEU and has characteristics that are unique in mission and structure when compared to continental United States (CONUS)-based MEUs. Regional requirements in support of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) require the 31st MEU to maintain forces capable of conducting selected maritime contingency missions. The additional task listed below is specific to the 31st MEU and supports their regional requirements.

2. Conduct Small Boat Raid. This action could be performed in support of MCT 1.12.1.2 Conduct Amphibious Raid with small crafts (see paragraph 4.C.4.A.2 above).

(5) Predeployment Training

(a) Reference (i) provides training policy and guidance, and serves as the primary source document for the MEU PTP.

(b) The MEU commander is responsible for the training of the MEU CE and all subordinate elements in their assigned METs. Progressive improvement in individual and unit skills attained through enhanced training and the addition of specialized equipment allow a MEU to execute a broad range of missions across the spectrum of conflict and the ROMO. This is accomplished by means of a dedicated and intensive PTP which is focused, standardized, and follows a progressive building block approach to training. Close coordination with respective Navy commands will ensure that appropriate interoperability training among Navy and Marine Corps units is accomplished throughout the PTP cycle. The PTP must be well synchronized with the associated ARG FRTP to ensure maximum benefit to both ARG and MEU during limited at-sea opportunities. The PTP/FRTP is designed to integrate the ARG/MEU, as well as other designated U.S. Navy forces (e.g., Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) CE, NSFS ships, Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) when available, designated USSOCOM assets [e.g., Naval Special Warfare Task Unit (NSWTU) and MARSOB] to optimize their inherent capabilities. Interoperability training opportunities with Joint, SOF, MEB level exercises, and Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CRs) should be pursued at all levels. Due to the nature of specialized training, the MEU commander will often require assistance from his higher Headquarters and agencies external to the Marine Corps for the scheduling and coordination of activities outside of federal reservations (e.g., Realistic Military Training)). The Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) Training Assistance to the Marine Corps (TAMACOR) program, reference (p), was established for this purpose.

(c) The training environment and operational tempo of the 31st MEU present some unique situations that require specific training and equipment solutions outside of those prescribed for the standard (CONUS-based) MEU PTP.

(6) MEU Certification

(a) COMMARFORCOM/COMMARFORPAC will certify their respective MEUs as operationally ready to deploy and provide a certification message to PP&O. Certification authority may be delegated to the appropriate MEF Commander. MEUs that have successfully completed all certification events throughout their PTP will be designated as certified and deployment ready.

(b) All MEUs shall be capable of executing the full range of MET prescribed in this Order. Prior to deployment, each MEU will be evaluated and certified in accordance with reference (i) with the understanding that the certification/evaluation process is continuous in nature and encompasses training events throughout the entire PTP.

(c) The MEU evaluation may include events representative of conventional and, in the case of the 31st MEU, selected maritime contingency operations capabilities, which require the MEU to plan and conduct multiple missions simultaneously. In addition, the MEU/SOF interoperability will be assessed and reported on by the appropriate I MEF and II MEF evaluation teams assisted by a SOF representative.

(7) Manning and Staffing

(a) As an Operating Forces command, the MEU CE is manned and staffed at no lower than 95 percent of chargeable Table of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) by grade and MOS for officers and no lower than 97 percent of chargeable T/O&E for enlisted Marines, subject to inventory availability per references (d) and (e). The assignment goal is to staff MEU CE personnel no later than 210 days before embarkation (E-210), inventory levels permitting.

(b) All MEU MSEs are provided sufficient personnel to meet staffing requirements no later than E-180 and will not be staffed above staffing goal.

(c) Assigned infantry battalions, logistics battalions, and flying squadrons are categorized as Operating Forces Commands. Operating Forces Commands will be manned at 95 percent of chargeable T/O&E strength. They will be staffed at 100 percent of that manning level in total numbers. While the intent is to staff commands in this category at 95 percent of T/O&E, grade and MOS substitutions may occur due to inventory mismatches. For additional information, see references (e) and (f). Staffing is subject to modification by the Commandant's Planning Guidance and Prioritization of Staffing, Equipping, and Supplying messages.

(d) MSE key personnel will be available for coordination with the MEU CE no later than E-210. These key personnel include the Battalion, Squadron, and Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) Commanders, Executive Officers, Sergeants Major, Administrative Officers, Intelligence Officers, Operations Officers, Communications Officers, Logistics Officers, and Company/Battery Commanders. 31st MEU MSEs and detachments not stationed in Okinawa will be staffed/stabilized no later than 180 days prior to deployment in accordance with reference (q).

(e) All MEU augmentees from Higher Headquarters, not directly assigned by M&RA, should be transferred to the MEU Marine Command Code (MCC) no later than (NLT) E-180 (31st MEU 15 days prior to cycle turnover).

(f) NLT E-180 (or appropriate timeline for 31st MEU), Composite CE and MSEs will be joined to the MEU Reporting Unit Code (RUC) per Section 3 of Marine Corps Total Force System Personnel Reporting Instructions User Manual (MCTFS PRIUM) for Headquarters Marine Corps manpower management accountability. Unit diary reporting and Diary Feedback Report (DFR) management requirements remain the responsibility of the servicing Installation Personnel Administration Center (IPAC).

(8) Deployment of Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO) Detachments. Per reference (q), certain high demand/low density elements (KC-130s, Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), or other identified units) may not deploy with the MEU but, instead, be placed on a Service directed Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO). MEU forces/capabilities are identified in and approved for deployment via the Secretary of Defense Operations Book (SDOB) and ordered in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). A Service directed PTDO provides flexibility to Marine Forces to enable rapid employment, in accordance with reference (q), of those units which remain available as a force to the MEU when not forward deployed. Service directed MEU PTDO capabilities will remain in a ready to deploy status, enabling their deployment within the specified timeline (i.e., 96 hours from notification). The following paragraphs detail the process for requesting support or initiating the deployment of a PTDO force, as applicable.

(a) PTP. Units tasked to provide MEU PTDO forces will support the MEUs PTP. The supporting commander will establish a planning and coordination relationship with the MEU commanding officer at the MEU compositing date (~E-180) for planning and pre-deployment training. If a supporting command is unable to support pre-deployment training then the parent MEF shall provide message traffic notification to their parent MARFOR NLT E-210 days.

(b) Contingencies/Crisis Response. For emergent contingencies or crisis response requirements in which the MEU is tasked to support, in theater sourcing will be explored first for USMC and /or joint support. If USMC and /or joint support is not available, or the MEU is expected to support for extended periods, MEU PTDO forces may be called forward.

(c) GCC/MARFOR Exercises. MEU planners will coordinate pre-planned exercises through their parent MEF and future GCC operational chain prior to deployment. The requesting MEU will provide a detailed justification for desired capability, duration, location, and risk to mission if not sourced.

1. Forward-deployed assets (USMC or joint) are the preferred sourcing solution for pre-planned exercises.

2. A CONUS Detachment's inability to support pre-planned exercises should be communicated to the parent MEF, informing the parent MARFOR, and does not require HQMC message traffic.

3. Detachments deploying from CONUS for exercises will deploy with organic equipment to meet the METS required for operational employment.

(d) Call Forward Procedures. Deploying a CONUS MEU PTDO force requires coordination through the operational chain of command. The MEU requests support via naval Automated Message Handling System (AMHS) message through their operational chain of command, with the appropriate Marine Force component, Marine Forces Command, HQMC PP&O, and parent MEF as "information addressees." If the operational commander endorses the MEU request and theater capabilities cannot satisfy those requirements, the parent MEF will be the primary source to provide support; in the event the parent MEF cannot provide support, other CONUS based commands may be tasked to support. The parent MARFOR is the PTDO activation authority.

(9) Pre-Overseas Movement

(a) Predeployment National Capital Region (NCR) Interagency Coordination Trips. MEU Commanders and their select staff will conduct predeployment interagency coordination trips to the NCR to receive briefs from Department of State (DOS), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), HQMC, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) - Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Diplomatic Security Services (DSS) personnel. This allows the sharing of region-specific, interagency expertise with the deploying MEU. It also educates interagency partners on unique USMC capabilities and will play a significant role in future crisis response operations. Advocacy for the MEUs resides with Expeditionary Policies Branch (POE), PP&O per reference (r). These trips are coordinated by PP&O (POE-30), per reference (r), and are generally completed during the final third of a MEU's PTP.

(10) Post-Deployment

(a) MEU CEs will provide post-deployment briefs, as directed, to the respective MARFORs and CCDRS prior to re-deployment.

(b) Post-Deployment NCR Interagency Coordination Trips. MEU CE will also conduct NCR post-deployment briefs within 60 days of return from deployment per reference (r). These briefs are coordinated by PP&O (POE-30) and include Congress, senior USMC and USN leadership, and civilian study and analysis groups. The purpose of the Post-Deployment NCR visit is to convey a unified, synchronized, and well-delivered message with regard to the value of forward deployed and forward engaged Marine Corps expeditionary forces and the unique capabilities of a MEU.

5. Administration and Logistics

a. Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) and Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) are directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), via Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS), to execute the Global Naval Force Management Policy (GNFMP) (reference (s)) schedule (i.e., conduct predeployment training, deploy, and transfer rotational amphibious forces to designated GCC OPCON for exercises, contingency employment, anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) and redeployment).

b. The generation, collection or distribution of personally identifiable information (PII) and management of privacy sensitive information shall be in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, per references (w) and (x). Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited.

c. Records created as a result of this Order shall be managed according to National Archives and Records Administration approved dispositions per reference (y) to ensure proper maintenance, use, accessibility and preservation, regardless of format or medium.

6. Command and Signal

a. Command

(1) This Order is applicable to the Marine Corps Total Force.

(2) Prior to deployment, the MEF Commander exercises full command of his organic MEU. Command relationships of the MEUs once embarked will be as delineated by the GCC. Per reference (t), "While the full range of command relationship options as outlined in reference (v), are available in amphibious operations, Service component commanders normally retain OPCON of their respective forces. If the JFC organizes along functional lines, functional component commanders will normally exercise OPCON over their parent Services' forces and TACON over other Services' forces attached or made available for tasking."

(3) When deployed, all SOF, to include MARSOB, are under the operational control of the respective GCC; normally exercised through their TSOC. If/when SOF are directed to conduct operations with a MEU, the command relationship between SOF and the MEU will be determined by the GCC with input from his component commanders. USSOCOM retains OPCON of the SOFLE and delegates TACON to the MEU during PTP. During deployment, as the ARG/MEU transits a GCC's AOR, the respective TSOC gains OPCON of the SOFLE with the MEU retaining TACON.

b. Signal. This Order is effective the date signed.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

R. L. BAILEY
Deputy Commandant for
Plans, Policies, and Operations

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References

- (a) MCO 3900.15B
- (b) MCO 5311.6
- (c) MCO 3000.13
- (d) MCO 5311.1D
- (e) MCO 5320.12H
- (f) MCO 1300.8
- (g) SECNAVINST 4000.37A
- (h) 10 U.S.C. §5063
- (i) MCO 3502.3B
- (j) United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/MEU Policy Memorandum for Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE), May 13, 2014
- (k) CJCSM 3500.04F, "Universal Joint Task Manual," June 1, 2011
- (l) "Disaggregated ARG/MEU Concept of Employment (CONEMP)," August 22, 2014
- (m) OPNAVINST 3500.38B
- (n) MCO 3500.110
- (o) MCTFS PRIUM
- (p) "Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the USMC and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service," September 21, 2012
- (q) MCO 3120.12
- (r) Policy for (MEU) Pre-deployment and Post-deployment briefs in the National Capitol Region (NCR)
- (s) Global Naval Force Management Policy (NOTAL)
- (t) JP 3-02, "Amphibious Operations," July 18, 2014
- (u) JP 1-0, "Joint Personnel Support" October 24, 2011
- (v) JP 1, "Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States"
- (w) 5 U.S.C. §552a
- (x) SECNAVINST 5211.5E
- (y) SECNAV M-5210.1

Baseline MEU Structure and Organization

Element	COMMAND ELEMENT (CE)	GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT (GCE)	AVIATION COMBAT ELEMENT (ACE)	LOGISTICS COMBAT ELEMENT (LCE)
Personnel	MEU command and control is provided by the Command Element	The GCE is structured around a reinforced infantry battalion	The ACE is a composite/reinforced squadron structured around a Medium Lift Tilt-Rotor Squadron	The LCE is structured around a Combat Logistic Battalion (CLB)
	Approximately 250 personnel: USMC: 40 OFF and 206 ENL, USN: 1 OFF and 3 ENL	Approximately 1253 personnel: USMC: 65 OFF and 1121 ENL, USN: 4 OFF and 63 ENL	Approximately 557 personnel: USMC: 75 OFF and 475 ENL, USN: 2 OFF and 5 ENL	Approximately 301 personnel: USMC: 17 OFF and 245 ENL, USN: 7 OFF and 32 ENL
	MEU commander and staff	H&S Company	Medium Tilt-Rotor Squadron	Headquarters and Service Platoon
Comprised of	Intelligence Battalion Detachment	Rifle Company x3	Heavy Helicopter Squadron Detachment	Communications Platoon
	ANCLICO Detachment	Weapons Company	Light Attack Helicopter Squadron Detachment	Maintenance Platoon
	MCIOC Team	Tank Platoon	Marine Attack Squadron Detachment	Supply Platoon
	CEWCC Detachment	Artillery Battery	Marine Aerial Refueler/Transport Squadron Detachment	Transportation Support Platoon (Includes Landing Support & Motor Transportation)
	Radio Battalion Detachment	LAR Company	Marine Air Control Group Detachment	Health Services Platoon
	Communications Battalion Detachment	Shore Fire Control Party	Marine Wing Support Squadron Detachment	Engineer Platoon
	Force Reconnaissance Detachment	Combat Engineer Platoon	Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron Detachments	
	Law Enforcement Battalion Detachment	Division Reconnaissance Platoon	Marine Unmanned Aerial Squadron Detachment	
	Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE)	Assault Amphibian Vehicle Platoon (REIN)		

**NOTIONAL EQUIPMENT/ PRINCIPAL END ITEMS
(For Baseline MEU)**

CE		GCE		ACE		LCE	
(1)	MEWSS LAV	(22)	LAVs **	(12)	MV-22/B/C	(2)	TWPS
(18)	HMMWVs	(15)	AAVs	(4)	CH-53E	(5)	Sixcon Fuel storage
(1)	JTF Enabler	(7)	ITVs	(2)	KC-130		Module
(12)	CRRCs*	(4)	Tanks	(4)	AH-1Z	(1)	M88A2
(4)	M777A2	(3)	UH-1Y	(15)	MTVRs	(18)	HMMWVs
		(4)	M327 (EFSS)	(6)	AV-8B/F35B	(1)	AAVR7
		(20)	CRRCs	(5)	A-MANPADS	(1)	5k Forklift
		(2)	ACES	(5)	HMMWVs	(1)	EBFL Forklift
		(16)	MTVRs	(5)	MQ-21 UAS	(1)	MCT
		(8)	8 CLU			(2)	TRAM Forklift
		(8)	SABRE Launchers				
		(64)	HMMWVs				

* CONUS deploying MEUs embark (12) CRRCs

** The recommended ground LAR capability is (25) LAVs which provides the full capability of a company level armored reconnaissance force. A reduced number causes the MEU commander to accept risks in armored reconnaissance capability of conducting Advanced Force operations against an A2/AD threat, amphibious raids, Enabling Operations and Expeditionary Strike.

[The Investigative Interview commenced on 1529, 16 April 2021.]

[WIT: LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[CR: SSgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Good afternoon. My name is Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , and I'm part of a team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU and actions and decisions associated with the material conditioning, training, and personal readiness thereof.

This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020. We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April 2021, to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with information relevant to the investigation. And we can provide a

copy of that appointment letter, if you need it.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed me to investigating team on 8 April 2021, and I'm talking with you in my investigatory capacity as a representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas.

We are required to provide General Thomas a written report at the completion of our investigation. We also have a copy of that appointment letter, if you do so require.

I'm talking with you because the investigation team leaves you have information that may be relevant to the investigation. It's important for us to understand how the MEU was composited, any challenges or complications associated with that composition, and then any external factors that would be pertinent for you to bring up. So please inform us of anything you believe should be considered in this review.

The topics that I would like to cover with you today may include formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, training and material readiness surrounding the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, and the I MEF oversight of the 15th MEU.

This is an administrative investigation; however, due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing review, we are asking personnel we talk to as part of the investigation not to share

anything we discussed today with any other person.

So before we start, do you have any questions about my role or this investigation?

WIT: No, questions.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. Could you please state your name, rank, and your current billet?

WIT: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , Lieutenant Colonel, operations officer, 15th MEU.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And what was your billet on 30 July 2020?

WIT: Operations officer, 15th MEU.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. So first question, could you talk to us a little bit, paint a picture for us, of what the op tempo was like for the command element from, let's say, January 2020 up through July of 2020?

WIT: The op tempo from July -- from January to July? IO

(LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Please.

WIT: So starting in January, we were involved with Iron Fist-21, a bilateral exercise with the Japanese Defense Forces, through end of February, early March. At that point, transitioned to pre-composite training. So somewhat busy. Started to get augments trickling in prior to the composite or

partial composite in April. And then, about that time, we started to convene OPT with MEF for potential early deployment for 15th MEU. That turned out not to be required.

Then in April 20th, we composited a portion of the MEU. The BLT without the battery, and then CLB-15, and then not the ACE. We composited the rest of the MEU May 11th. And then, about that time, April-ish, between April and May, COVID-19 started to have significant impacts to PTP. So what was originally planned, we had to work with I MEF G-35, I MEF G-7, EOTG, ESG-3, and kind of rewrite the PTP major events, to include R2P2, RUT, PMIT, ARG MEUEX, COMPTUEX, all three of the at sea period all had to be shifted and moved due to COVID-19 impacts.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): And as you were dealing with these early taskings like Iron Fist, for example, where were you guys on personnel at that point?

WIT: We were -- during Iron Fist, we were still light at the command element. I think we were about 90, maybe a little less, total personnel.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. Within the 3 shop, how were you sitting at that point? Did you have, pretty much, all of your fire support officer, you're targeting officer, you air officers, assistant --

WIT: No, sir. During -- I had -- it was kind of a mix of people that had done the SPMAGTF, the prior deployment, that were kind of on their way out, and then some of the new team, to include myself on that had just checked in. So it was kind of half and half, but certainly not 100 percent of what the 3 shop rated. I couldn't give you an exact number, though.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. That's fair. And then, so we're talking about these external issues, you mentioned COVID and all of the additional planning that that required once, kind of, orders and directives came from higher, and then working with the Navy as well.

Are there other external issues that you feel impacted the 15th MEU that would be over and above what's normally expected of MEU command elements?

WIT: Based on -- I don't think it was above and beyond any other MEU. Obviously, MEU PTPs are essentially a deployment in and of themselves just due to the high op tempo, getting, you know, six months to get out the door as a MAGTF is a pretty strenuous PTP.

This MEU specifically compared to my previous two MEUs, there was a lot of initiatives based on the CG, General Osterman's guidance, getting after new proof of concept, the main

reconnaissance, formerly known as maritime raid force, getting after expeditionary advance basing, deploying JLTVs for the first time, HIMARs for the first time, F-35s for the second time, increased emphasis on cyber operations, IO. So quite a few initiatives were kind of added that I had not seen in my previous MEUs.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. And then, the next question kind of starting back to the beginning, this would have been -- this could have actually happened prior to your deployment. But the MEF LOI for the 15th MEU, references is at E-302, a report for planning. To the best of your recollection or knowledge, do you know if that actually happened?

WIT: I know we were in accordance with the MEF LOI, that report for planning essentially authorized durlock between us and our future major subordinate elements. So I had started to contact those OpsOs, but it wasn't until really after Iron Fist -- or I'm sorry -- Iron Fist. Because during Iron Fist, we're pretty busy with that exercise.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And then, stepping through the timeline again, looking at the next big presentation or coordination meeting between the MSCs, MEF, and the MEU at E-270, there was a trained, manned, and equip brief.

Do you remember there being any significant issues at that point from the MSCs where they were highlighting that they might not be ready for composite?

WIT: So I believe that was early March. I believe I recall the -- from the MEU side, some of the commander's comments -- I am pulling up the brief right now. So we talked about the advancing naval concept. So how are we, 15th MEU, is going to get after what the CG tasked us to do as far as advancing those; specifically, the EAB concept. I know we were, I think, personnel shortfalls were stressed, missing some of those low density MOS'. I'm trying to remember. I think, specifically, if we're talking the AAVs, I think there was a concern that that unit was coming back from Native Fury, or hadn't yet come back from Native Fury. And still, they hadn't been training with the BLT at that point.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. And then, how were those concerns addressed? Were they -- I've read through the brief, but were they specifically discussed between the MEU commander and the MEF CG, or was it you discussing these things prior to brief with the G-3 or G-3/5 or kind of a combination of all three?

WIT: Kind of a combination, obviously. Colonel Bronzi would discuss with the DCG, the CG, when he needed to. And then,

I typically would address concerns, if there was any, with MEF G-3/5, Expo Ops.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And then, moving forward on the timeline to the 240 brief, now you're getting closer to deployment. Things should start to come into a little bit clearer focus. Anything that you recall specifically standing out in that brief?

WIT: So those are the same brief, if I recall correctly. I think the 270 to 240 were consolidated into a single brief.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. I know that that's what the LOI said is supposed to happen, but it looked like there was two separate briefs from the briefs that we were given. So for that it would be the same thing. No significant warning signs or red flags at that point other than the AAV platoon still hadn't come back yet, and there was a concern that they hadn't time to do training with BLT?

WIT: Correct.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Anything on the equip side of the equation?

WIT: I do -- I do recall just the fact that the AAVs were not in a good state of condition. I know we were -- on my own I was stressing the noddam [ph], getting the AAV noddam variant for command control, reinforcing the BLT's request to have a noddam

variant, I should say.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. All right. So moving up to that to the composite brief at, and do you recall who you gave that brief to? Actually, if you could tell me --

WIT: I believe --

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): -- who did the 270 to 240, and then the composite brief all of those, who is the senior officer that was being briefed?

WIT: I couldn't say for sure. It was either General Osterman or General Savage.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. So kind of the same question for the composite brief. At that point, you're evidently preparing to composite what issues were brought up from the MEU's perspective as to concerns that they would have with what the MSCs are providing, either train, man, and equip?

WIT: The issues -- concerns we had at that time was getting a decision on tanks, because that's when we were hearing about tanks getting deactivated and getting a decision point on whether or not we were deploying with those, getting after our issues were the RIBS, forming a small boat company with the BLT, for one of the EAB constructs attempting to get impact TGRS. And then, again, like I mentioned earlier, this point is when COVID-19 had

started having significant impact to the PTP and working through those changes, and those were some of the items that were brought up.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Could you repeat that part about the TAGRS for the ADR? What are those?

WIT: So the MFAC and the TAGRS -- MFAC is expeditionary mobile fuel additization capability, and the TAGRS is the tactical air ground refueling system. These were like proof of concept systems that we were able to get from McGill to get after the FRP for sustainment EAB, which is part of the MAGTF design advancing future concepts.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Now, moving forward, kind of, the next big thing that stands out in my mind is a big consolidated effort between the MEU ops section and the BLT are the raid courses. At that point, were there any concerns, specifically talking about the mechanized company and the AAV platoon at that point?

WIT: No. So I believe the mech raid was the first week of May. The impact here was, originally, we were supposed to do R2P2 the last two weeks of April, and we were going to do our MEUEX over the top of the raid courses to provide a MEU C-2 structure for the raids to report to. Due to COVID-19, we had to move R2P2 during the raid courses. So we had to take a lot of the

leadership down to Coronado to attend the EWTG PAC R2P2 course. So we were unfortunately unable to execute MEUEX as originally designed.

So that said, the back brief we got from EOTG was that Bravo company, the mech company, did well during the mech raid course and the two-by full mission profile raids they did.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Prior to that raid course, I know there were some discussions about vehicle readiness and the status of the JLTIs for the AAVs coming over to join the BLT. Did that ever get elevated up to your level or to the MEU commander?

WIT: It did. You know, our S-4, Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, provided routine updates on the status of the AAVs, understanding that when we did composite, many of them did not pass the JLTI, did not meet condition code alpha criteria. And so, there was an emphasis and a surge to get those vehicles up. Those were briefed on a routine basis.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Briefed within the MEU or briefed from the MEU up to MEF, and, if to MEF, to who?

WIT: I personally did not brief it to MEF about the issue is being briefed through the logistics chain or logistics side.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. And then, experience carries a little bit on the R2P2 course that EWTG runs. Can you summarize

how that was -- was that just a planning exercise or was there any form of white cell on a notional execution?

WIT: It was no executions, just planning, two weeks of R2P2.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. So moving forward from there, the next major event that you had was RUT. Can you talk to about the events that you conducted during RUT?

WIT: During Rut, so again, COVID-19 impacts. So we had to change the plan on short notice. So instead deployed for training to 29 Palms where RUT was originally scheduled to go, we ended up staying at home station, Camp Pendleton. We executed a number of full mission profile raids, traps, RNS inserts, leveraging the ACE as well as BLT, and CLB provided general support, logistics, combat service support, and the MET company did play a role there as well in one of the raids.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So during the RUT period, was there any white space given to the BLT to conduct, for instance, for the AAVs to get out and do any waterborne training?

WIT: White space was provided to the MSCs if they were not directly required to support an event. That time was given back to the MSCs.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And for your RUT, did you EOTG play a

role in scripting that or evaluating?

WIT: EOTG did, yes.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And then, can you talk to us a little bit about your -- and I can't remember if it was mini PMINT or pre-PMINT training that you guys conducted?

WIT: Yeah. So following RUT, we identified training shortfalls, so we executed an additional trap iterations, ADR did VBSS, and then we executed some command post rehearsals at the MEU command element level.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Just trappin VBSS throughout that period?

WIT: I'm trying to pull up that training. I can't remember anything else beyond that.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. How long was that training event? WIT: It was about nine days.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And did EOTG play any role in assisting in that in any way, either scripting or safety architecture or evaluation?

WIT: No. That was all internal.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Do you have an LOI for that event that you can send us?

WIT: I can try to find it, yes.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Or a brief is fine to. WIT:

Yes, I'll send it.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. Appreciate it.

So up to this point, there's been a lot of -- up to this point, a lot of practice with R2P2 and starting to get some reps under your belt. With these reps full -- was that was the command element fully present at these? Did you have a fully functioning CoC setup, or was it more of a, really, rehearsals of -- I don't want to say actions, but not just actions on the objective, but more of a tactical, as opposed to from operational control perspective. Did you have a full CoC made at that time?

WIT: So during pre-PMINT, we set up our CoC adjacent to our CP in Del Mar and executed command and control from there. I wouldn't say it was a full CoC with all systems from a data standpoint. But it did have the necessary voice comms. During RUT, it was full COC with all systems to support that from the data and voice perspective.

Like I mentioned earlier, the MEUEX that was gonna be overtop, the raid courses had to be canceled due to the shift in R2P2. So we did not get a chance to execute C2 at the MEU command element level, but the companies executed it without that.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And so when you say that you had a full CoC setup, did you have it manned as you would in LFOC at that point with all of the different watch standers from the BLT, CLB, the ACE, the air officer, the assistant air officer, watch officers, was all of that stuff up and running 24/7 ops?

WIT: During RUT, yes. During the pre-PMINT exercise, it was only running when an event was going on.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): I've been in your shoes so I know how difficult it is to train watch officers. You don't get dedicated watch officers. So did you have any kind of training curriculum for your watch officers before or after RUT?

WIT: It was more like OJT. So our senior watch officer would train them and the ops chief would train them.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): But you had to pull from various entities within the 3 and probably from within the other staff sections as well?

WIT: No. Mainly the S-3 manned WatchO, watch chief responsibilities.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And then, starting to go forward a little bit now. When was the schedule of events for PMINT, when was that concept fully fleshed out?

WIT: That I think we started developing that as early as

February, March timeframe, when I assigned some action officers to start to put together a skeleton schedule. I think it was finalized in May, and then it was tweaked based on the shift in the PMINT date.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Do you recall if there was any tweaking that occurred based on the perceived or documented training shortfalls or equipment shortfalls?

WIT: I think the Fist EX and SAC EX on San Clemente Island was adjusted based on what we thought was going to be a serve-all shortfall, but that ended up actually being supported. But I can't recall anything else prior to.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. And so, what I learned through the schedule of events, I see that there are a lot of different events going on. Did you have any concerns at that point or were any concerns expressed by the MEU commander that you know that it was - - that there were so many events going on at the first at sea period.

WIT: People had expressed to me that it was an aggressive first at sea period schedule. We're both made clear was that we would cancel events if it started to become too overwhelming. But, yes, people had told me that, especially, like ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} at EOTG said it was an aggressive schedule.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. And what were your thoughts on it?

WIT: I thought it was doable.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And how would you -- so shifting gears just a little bit, but still thinking about that PMINT, early forming phase, first at sea period phase, how was the blue/green integration at that point?

WIT: It was still developing. We, as in the MEU, were further along in our ability to plan than they were.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): But on a, kind of, a deck plate level, the coordination between folks that needed to talk, everybody knew who they needed to talk to, and there were working relationship there that you felt comfortable with?

WIT: I think we knew who we needed to talk to. I mean, we knew the right points of contact with respect to either the PHIBRON battle watch captain or ships battle watch captains. So those linkages were developed. But like by name, who is who? Those were still being developed, like the personal relationships.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And on the day of the mishap, can you, kind of, paint a picture for us all of the different things that you had going on at that point, and where the key leadership in

the MEU was?

WIT: On the day of the mishap, I believe we had -- on San Clemente Island, we had the SAC EX -- which was kind of divorced from the PMINT scenario. We had, obviously, the mech raid, which was off the *Summerset*, and then I believe the *Makin Island* was conducting a RAS on Southwest and Gas Alley of San Clemente Island. And as far as MEU leadership, we were all on the *Makin Island*.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Okay. Do you have any that you want to add, sir?

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Yeah. Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) here. Just have a few questions for you. Were there -- did you, as the 3, have any operational concerns about employing the AAV platoon and the mech company?

WIT: No, sir.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : During the pre-PMINT training that was conducted, why was there no mechanized operations included in that additional training?

WIT: At the time, it wasn't -- the post-RUT assessment did not identify Bravo Company, the mech company, as deficient in training. So we prioritized that period of time on what we assessed to be shortfalls and where we thought units should have

been at that time.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): During that training, do you know what that mech company was doing while the rest of the unit was conducting pre-PMINT?

WIT: Off the top of head, sir, no.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. Would you know if it was whitespace training for them to stand down, conduct maintenance, or further their relationship with BLT?

WIT: It would have been whitespace, sir.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): The last question I have is training concerns that would be elevated to your level. And when I talk about training concerns, I'm not talking about at the operational level, I'm talking about at the enabling level.

For example, the underwater egress trainer, were you, as the 3, aware of the status of the Marines' qualifications to be in the AAV during waterborne operations?

WIT: So I was aware of the overall stats of the units, not at the individual -- when I say units, I mean, the MSCs. Like I see BLT 1/4 stats, ACE stats, CLB stats, command element stats, but not at the individual company or platoon level.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): With that, knowing what the stats are, was there any discussion of waivers?

WIT: I do recall discussions being had, but I don't know if it -- when that discussion happened in relationship to the incident.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So when I talk about waivers: Are you familiar with the MEF policy on waivers for HET training?

WIT: Yes.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And part of that policy delegates authority to grant a waiver down to the O-5 level. Are you familiar with that?

WIT: Yes.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Did the MEU command element delegate that down to the O-5 level, or did they hold it up at the O-6 level?

WIT: It was at the O-5 level pre-incident, and then post-incident, it was elevated to the O-6 level.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Waivers granted at the O-5 level, would you have any visibility on?

WIT: No.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Do you know who on the MEU staff would track that an O-5 commander granted a waiver for Marines to travel

in the AAV conducting waterborne operations while not being trained -- fully trained in the underwater egress trainer, who would see that? Would that stay at the O-5 level, or would that be briefed higher?

WIT: It would have stayed at the -- it did stay at the O-5 level. It was never briefed to me if a Marine that was untrained was getting it in either an aircraft or AAV.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Okay. Thank you. Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , that's all the questions I have. Thanks again for your time today.

I'll turn it back over to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for any comments or final questions.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : I think that's all I had. I'll just I'll throw it back to you now.

Is there anything that you think that we need to look into specifically? You know, hindsight being 20/20 at this point, when you look back on what you guys did and what wasn't done? Are there any things that you think should be brought forward for lessons learned or recommendations going forward for the service?

WIT: Absolutely. So I think the big thing is -- then again, I have a little bit of experience. This is my third MEU.

The first two was on a BLT staff versus a 3 alpha, and then as a BLT OpsO. And I think what's lost on a lot of people is that the BLT essentially needs to be a deployable unit when it composites. And they need to be protected, probably for six months prior to composite, so they can focus on mastery of their core METs and all of the other ancillary training requirements. So that way, when they composite, they essentially could deploy at that point as an infantry battalion or one of those attachments.

Because like I mentioned earlier, once you composite -- and, gentlemen, I think you know this -- once you composite you are essentially in a PTP deployment, and you don't have really a lot of time allocated within a MEU PTP to go back and readdress what should have been done prior to composite.

And unfortunately, I think some of the MSCs were given tasks during, what I would call that sweet spot of six months, you know, whether it was border security, whether it was *Mercy* security to support COVID-19 response, or other forces levied by their higher headquarters.

I think that that had an impact on their ability to train to standard per the requirements levied upon them by both division and MEF, if that makes sense.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): It makes perfect sense to me.

Anything else from your end?

WIT: So I sent the TEEP to you, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), to your NIPR. And then, I sent a product on SIPR, and then I owe you -- I sent that MAGTF design from General Osterman on SIPR, and then I owe you the pre-PMINT exercise con ops and confirmation brief; is that accurate?

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Yes. That would be great. I think that was all that I had written down that we wanted to get from you. So with that, if there's nothing else, I'll read you the closing admin statement, and you can get back to being busy doing important MEU stuff.

You are directed not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone other than members of the investigation team. If you're asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify me, the investigating officer, or your commanding officer.

[The investigative interview recessed at 1615, 16 April 2021.]

[END OF PAGE]

I, Lieutenant Colonel C. ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)} , attest that the preceding
transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the
interview of Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} held on 16 April
2021.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

LtCol, USMC

Encl (77) CG, I MEF's 15th MEU MAGTF Design Planning Guidance ISO 21-1 Deployment

The above-referenced enclosure is classified SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY and is available by contacting Judge Advocate Division.

Encl (78) Mod 002 to CG, I MEF Letter of Instruction for 15th MEU Deployment 21-1,
22 Jul 20

The above-referenced enclosure is classified SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY and is available by contacting Judge Advocate Division.

[The investigative interview commenced on 1904, 15 April 2021.]

[WIT: Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[CR: SSgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Good evening. My name is Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , and I am part of a team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU and actions and decisions associated with material conditioning, training, and personal readiness thereof. This investigation is associated with the amphibious assault vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020.

We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April 2021 to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with information relevant to the investigation. And we can send you a

copy of that appointment letter.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed me to the investigating team on 8 April 2021. And I'm talking with you and my investigatory capacity as a representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We are required to provide General Thomas with a written report upon completion of our investigation. We can also provide that appointment letter if required.

I'm talking to you because the investigation team believes you might have information that may be relevant to the investigation, specifically in your role as the operations officer for BLT 1/4 looking, looking into the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, the training and material readiness surrounding the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, and I Marine Expeditionary Forces oversight of the 15th MEU.

This is an administrative investigation; however, due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing review, we are asking personnel we talk to as part of the investigation not to share anything we discuss today with any other person.

Before we start, do you have any questions about my role or this investigation?

WIT: No questions, sir. I understand everything you said.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. So the first thing I wanted to talk about is before you became a BLT and you were just 1/4, can you talk to us a little bit about the operational tempo during the period from, let's say, January up through composite.

WIT: Yes, sir, of course. So in the month of January 1st Battalion, 4th Marines was in 29 palms for our ITX. Specifically we were the adversary force for that particular ITX. We completed that in early March and had just returned to Camp Pendleton. And also at that same time in the month of March, we were the Alert Battalion Task Force for 1st Marine Division. And if you all remember last year during -- and I guess that's kind of when those COVID pandemic really started to catch on. So at that time, the USNS Mercy on the west coast was tasked to provide support to basically the west coast to help relieve stress on the medical systems and the hospitals. So 1/4 as the ABTF, we were tasked with providing a security force to go up to the port of Long Beach and to provide security pier side for the USNS Mercy. So we came back from ITX, received that task from the Division. And then just before we actually conducted the change of operational posture to 15th MEU, we also conducted our logistics readiness evaluation with the blue diamond and a CGIP as well. All the week of chop and that same week -- I should say, the next

week we were basically heading down to Coronado for the rapid response planning process seminar with the MEU.

So, I mean, quite busy as a battalion. And then even before that, if we went to the summer, whenever I checked in, the unit had returned from 31st MEU and then went to the southwest border for a little over two months to battalion FXs and like I said, ITX and ABTF Mission, CGIP, and they were chopped to the MEU. And then at this point in April, you know, the pandemic is pretty widespread. And, you know, course cancellations, training venues reduced due to social distancing, and personal capacity and what not. But those were the months leading up to the chop, gentlemen.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): And can you expand just a little bit? So on the USNS Mercy security force, what size element did you send to that?

WIT: It was a platoon sized element, sir, and the platoon was sourced from Bravo Company. So the mechanized company or the company would become the mechanized company was the unit selected?

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): And were they -- it was the same platoon the entire time or did you rotate through?

WIT: It was the same platoon, sir.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And then same thing for the southwest border operations and tracking. That was kind of November timeframe?

WIT: So that was -- I think it was July through September, sir. And at that time, we recover in Arizona all the way to California. So was it a pretty big area to cover. And it did involve -- we pretty much committed to the entire battalion to the task at that time.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): All at once or piecemeal?

WIT: All at once, sir. All at once.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And then can you -- you said you started ITX in January, but you didn't return home until March.

WIT: That's right, sir. So the exercise began -- I'm trying to pull up my LOI that I wrote for that one.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Do you have a battalion TEEP for that time period?

WIT: We have our mid-range training plans are and we do have like an Excel spreadsheet version of the TEEP that I can absolutely provide if required, sir.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Yeah, I think that would be really useful.

WIT: I think it will help you provide a graphical picture.

But that ITX was 20 January to 12 March of 2020.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): You were the adversary force. But were you -- did you do the MCCRE certification during that?

WIT: We did.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay.

WIT: We sure did, sir. Yes, sir. As part of the maneuver warfare exercise. 1st Marine Regiment came out and fulfilled our MCCRE by observing. Yes, sir.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. That's just what I wanted to hear. Okay, so we've got ourselves working up through a very busy pre forming, pre composite timeframe. So when did the members of the BLT 1/4 staff start reaching out and doing at least informal coordination with the attachments that would soon be joining?

WIT: So for us, sir, the combat engineer platoon also happened to be with us at ITX. We got an opportunity to train with the combat engineer platoon. The Light Armored Reconnaissance Company was also aligned to our ITX. So we've got a chance to train with Bravo Company, 1st LAR.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}
_{(7)(c)}, you're coming in broken. I think the last thing I got was you got a chance to work with Bravo Company from LAR. Can you repeat everything after that,

please.

WIT: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. So we had a chance to do the ITX together with Bravo Company, 1st LAR and then we did not start talking to India Battery 1/12 until I think it was I think was probably about March. So when we returned from ITX and the artillery battery chopped later than our original April date because they were also completing their forming, their MCCRE and the AAV platoon, golly, sir. So I want to say they were at Native Fury about this same time and then they were assembled -- the platoon itself actually was sourced from, I think, the H&S Company of 3rd Tracks.

But we began talking to First Lieutenant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} and Gunnery Sergeant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, who was the platoon commander, platoon sergeant about the time of, I think about the time of ITX. So, probably February, March, we were exchanging emails, talking about the way ahead, and when we were going see them and start planning together. I think about February, March is when I remember us first starting to talk to at least the platoon commander, platoon sergeant.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): And at that time, in those early days of coordination, were there any hints that there were going to be problems with either maintenance or training being accomplished

to standard?

WIT: So what the platoon leadership brought up to us, sir, was again, the platoon was out supporting Native Fury 20. And kind of as they returned, there was some reorganization of personnel. And then I've actually got our composite AAR open right now. And in it the platoon did talk about maintenance readiness. So just as an example, I'm reading word for word. I'll send you this document too, sir, the composite AAR that we submitted to the MEU. The JLTI inspections were being conducted from 13 to 17 April. This only allowed two weeks of maintenance to be conducted before the JLTI and then no time after JLTI prior of chop and the JLTIs reveal that every vehicle was deadline, that a majority of the parent/child relations were incorrect. And then the recommendation for the platoon was, of course do things much earlier before the chop. The platoon should receive its gear 90 days before chop to allow for time and maintenance to be conducted.

So again, though, the Marines themselves were kind of cobbled together from H&S Company and then the gear set was in rough shape to begin with. I also have our maintenance readiness reports from that time as well as, sir, if those would assist in any data.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Yes, they absolutely would. That would be great if you could send me those as well, please.

WIT: Okay. Copy, sir. Yep. Got written down as well.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : And so we're getting so we're kind of getting close to chop now. I know there's a series of briefs that go on typically between the MSEs and Division. Do you recall -- were you part of any of those briefs to Division?

WIT: Specifically, sir. We did a -- I think we did a D-180 brief. I think, sir. And that brief -- yeah, that brief was done while we were in 29 Palms. I remember we went to the 7th Marines Regimental Conference room give that brief. So that was -- that brief was solely focused on -- I'm sorry. It was just focus on 1/4, sir, so that brief didn't include any of our attachments and their level of readiness.

And then after that, I know the MEU provided a couple of briefs to the MEF. But in it, I don't recall us highlighting any major shortfall with AAV platoon. We were focused on underwater egress training kind of across the whole BLT because that was one of things that COVID had a pretty big impact on. And then we were also in the process of converting from Humvees to JLTVs. So we were kind of -- the battalion was kind of focused on fielding that new piece of equipment and getting it up

and running.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): Okay. So the D-180 brief was conducted while you were at ITX?

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): Now, once you got home and you get closer to the chop date -- I know there was an E-211 brief. So I'm trying to kind of sync up those two timelines here. You had the MEF is referring to is the embarkation minus 211 days, but you conducted the D-180 back some time while you're at ITX. So January, February timeframe. What am I missing there. So D-180 I'm assuming is deployment minus 180, which would have been that would have been significantly after the E-211 brief when you actually compositing it at E-204.

WIT: Yes, I think I'm mistaken as I think it might have been a D-270 if I'm looking on my computer to see if I still have it on my hard drive. That may have been a 270 brief that we gave to the regiment and the Division, sir. I've seen it in my files. Think about it on our SharePoint.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): Okay. And so moving forward from there, you were talking about the UET training, the underwater egress training, and some of the problems that you were experiencing once you got back with getting everybody that needs to get

qualified. Can you talk to us a little bit more about that?

WIT: Yes. So as you are probably aware, there is the single modular amphibious egress training system that exists right there at Camp Horno, which is very convenient for us to walk to. But once the kind of the pandemic got going on and there were reductions in training facility capacity. So what we typically do when there's no COVID mitigation is we're able to basically conduct an academic portion where the UET instructors come and they'll come to like the gym and they'll execute a full on academic instruction where we can basically get like a whole company worth of Marines in at a time. During the pre chop and even after the chop, we were only able to send like 50 personnel at a time to receive that academic instruction, which kind of shrunk down the number of personnel we could send through it.

And then I know social distancing. I'm trying to remember how we did it because we had them come set the shallow water egress train or the SWET chairs up at the Pulgas pool just to kind of help us get caught up for throughput. But I know we had a reduction there for the UET on the amount of personnel we could that we could send through the other trainer. And the priority, of course, was the primary vertical assault company flying V-22s over water. Then it was the tactical recover

aircraft and personnel, the other trap force of which we had two units that were trained by EOTG to perform that mission. And then being a -- something unique about our BLT is we actually have a small boat company. So our Alpha company is our small boat company. So they're the best swimmers in the battalion. So we kind of had him lower on priority for UET and then it was the mechanized company.

So vertical assault trap mechanized company and the small boat company was kind of our prioritization for UET spots.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): What is your understanding of what is required for UET by Marine Corps order and by the MEF order as well?

WIT: It's supposed to be during the workup cycle, sir. So even though -- again, even though 1/4 had previously been a 31st MEU BLT and a lot of the Marines had done the helo dunker that exists in Okinawa out the way the order is written now, we're required to do it again in that particular workups cycle. So III MEF says three years, I MEF says two years. But, you know, the way the order is written, like, hey, you need to refresh it for this cycle. And then that was the goal we set before ourselves, was to get everyone back through that in the priority that I mentioned.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. And so the specific platform, though, as far as the requirements, what is it that you consider to make somebody UET complete?

WIT: Well, so for us and -- again, remember doing this over a decade ago on the 24th MEU, it was to do the full-on modular transfer like the dunker system itself. They move across the highway state. They drop it in the water and they have it roll over a couple of different times. There was another period of time where there was something I think, broken in the Camp Horno pool that, basically, like shut the full-on amphibious trainer down. That's when we utilized the shallow water egress trainer, the chair, the PVC pipe chair, where they, you know flip you upside down a couple of times and you work through the egress techniques in the IPA bottle.

The goal was to get everyone through the trainer, sir. But I know we have a lot of Marines that ended up just getting the SWET chair as far as there were -- in fact, my card is stamped with just the other chair. I didn't get a chance to go to full the trainer.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): So what I was getting at is the difference between the requirements in the Marine Corps Order and the MEF LOI with regard to platform specific. So the aviation

platforms and frequent flyers over water are required to do the MAET, whereas the track platoon is required to do the SVET, the submerged vehicle egress trainer. Was there a distinction made within BLT 1/4 with regard to this specific training venues?

WIT: So the training that's at Horno, sir, can be configured to either mimic that of the back of a V-22 or a 53 or kind of the back of an AAV. So we, I think when we put the Marines through it, it was probably configured for an assault support aircraft and that was the one that we were pressing for them to go through.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): As I've looked through the briefs, I see that the BLT was 49 percent UET complete and on the top it says -- it specifically says SVET, the submerged vehicle egress trainer. Do you recall if that was a misprint that it was actually the MAET that you had done or was that just kind of a general everybody has done -- we're considering 49 percent complete, whether that be SVET, MAET, or just SWET?

WIT: I know MCTIMS actually does break them out into those different categories, sir. And it's escaping me like kind of what report we would have run at that time to get that 49 percent number. I do know that now on hand we have an Excel spreadsheet that -- which we had even before PMINT just because of the packs

male cargo movement requirements for the MEU to fly over water, that basically you have to state whether the passenger has conducted the UET training. So unfortunately, sir, I can't speak to what report would have been pulled out of MCTIMS to get that percentage.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): So moving on now to the -- as we're at composite now and everything kind of happens at one point. There really was no formation of the BLT prior to composite. Everything just kind of happened on that E-204. But in the days shortly thereafter, do you recall any issues with either the training or the material readiness of the AAV platoon, anything that was brought up to you or the battalion commander?

WIT: Nothing that I recall in the month of April, sir. And so as soon we chop the very first event specific for the mechanized company, really all the companies, was EOTG raid leader course. And I know Company B the staff was there and Lieutenant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}
_{(7)(c)} that was there as well, the AAV platoon commander. So they did a week of raid leader course with EOTG and then the next week was raid planner.

And then the first week of May would have been -- I want to say that was whenever we had mech raid. Yep, yep. 4-8 May would have been that EOTG mechanized raid course, which is

actually all land based. There's actually no waterborne activities during that mech raid course.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): So I'm going to fast forward a little bit here and delve into. As you're working with the MEU OpsO and the MEU command element team, thinking about how PMINT is going to be conducted, to what extent was the BLT involved in the shaping of that schedule of events?

WIT: We had quite a bit of say so, sir, sort of. The big focus was to make sure that each of the companies had at least one opportunity to conduct a full mission profile. So the mech rate, the mechanized company would get one splash raid execution and recovery, small boats, primary vertical salt company, the trap force, and then a surface raid event for the Light Armored Reconnaissance Company or something in the amphibious assault at the end of the exercise, sir. But other than that, I mean, that was kind of the inputs that we provided.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): One quick question about that. What was the driving factor between having -- you guys were the first BLT in a longtime that had a CRRC company -- a small boat company. What was the driving factor behind that?

WIT: I think part of it, sir, so the MEU commander that time, Colonel Chris Bronzi, a former BLT 1/4 commander. He had

done something similar back when -- again, he was the BLT commander and he was able to source some CRRC capitalize on a lot of residual knowledge. Kind of a similar situation, like there were 31st MEU. He took the battalion and they were Westpac a MEU and they brought CRRCs on that deployment. I think part of it also is kind of related to our overall MAGTF design. 15th MEU was supposed to be kind of optimized for EABO activities within the Seventh Fleet. But obviously we've been everywhere else. We're only just now, you know, just passing through seventh Fleet. So I think a lot of it really came from MEU commander previous experience, sir. And then just some desires to expect you to do some EABO experimentation with small boats. We also have rigid haul inflatable boats that were sourced from I think one of the Navy special warfare units that the reconnaissance marines operate. So we've got Navy ribs that belong to the ships and then there's four ribs that the MEU actually controls and maintain. So some other unique items to the 15th MEU.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Was there any discussion of PMINT being the first time that the BLT is getting on the ships, the first time that the MEU staff is working and actually executing with their PHIBRON counterparts? Was there any discussion within the BLT about the amount of training objectives that we were trying

to put into the PMINT schedule of events?

WIT: Definitely, sir. At each of the planning conferences leading up to PMINT. We had strong representation from PHIBRON. And then typically, like ships lieutenants or ships ops would dial into the different beats or if they could physically come to Del Mar for the combined planning, we definitely had a lot of green/blue integration, sir, for those planning efforts. And I know the Somerset had previously worked with the AAV platoon to have the well deck crew practice kind of launch and recovery ops. Just got to make sure that the well deck crew was prepared to go through those procedures.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): When did that occur? Do you know?

WIT: I'm sorry, sir. Say that last you going came in broken.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): When did that training with the AAV platoon and the Somerset crew, when did that occur?

WIT: That would have been -- I have the email traffic in my garrison email. It may have been in the month of May. I want to say it was just before -- I want to say was before we did ourselves -- before we did realistic urban training aboard Camp Pendleton. So I think he may have been the month of May, sir. I don't have the right that email account in front of me right now

unfortunately.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): Was this just kind of the Somerset was doing a pass by and some training time was made available for the AAVs to splash and go out there and conduct well deck operations?

WIT: Correct, sir. Yeah. It was the Somerset combat cargo officer that we, you know, we were able to connect with to work that.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): Okay. And so, to the best of your ability, do you recall any training concerns that you had with the proficiency of the AAV platoon at any time either at chop? Realizing that they were listed in your brief or at least in the Division's portion of the brief as being trained, but not evaluated. Did you have any concerns as to their ability to conduct their core METS?

WIT: So on the land, sir, there was lots of interactions and integrations between the platoon and the company. But then my company command time with 1/5, I was the mechanized company commander. Just kind of thinking back to that work up that we did. You know, we did a lot more activities in the boat basin. And then I was one of the things I would always try and talk to at the time Captain (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) . I would tell (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that we need to find some time to get you all in the water so the Marines can be

in the water and do the troop transfer procedures, actually jump out the AAV and swim to the shore of the boat basin. Like I remember doing years ago when I was in 1/5. But, you know, it every time we tried to find time to do it seemed there was another requirement that came up. While we were conducting realistic urban training, which occurred in the month of June. That was 4 to 15 June, normally realistic urban training just involves the trap force, the vertical assault company, the command element, the MSC, you know, kind of staff and the reconnaissance Marines.

So we had all of the other companies out doing white space training and I don't know if they were going go to the boatbase and they were going to go to the beach and do like some surfpassage work together with the tracks. But it ended up being that in realistic urban training for the fourth raid, we ended upselecting a surface COA, which ended up pulling the mechanized company out of there. White space training, brought them up to Camp Delega, did some integrated planning and they did a raid on the old naval hospital there at Camp Pendleton.

So again, observed them on the land. And, you know, infantry mech integration was great on the land. But, you know, honestly, reflecting back on it, didn't see a whole lot from them

in the water and their integration's there, sir.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. Just taking some notes here. So we've covered the UET. We've covered your observation and your thoughts, your concerns with their lack of waterborne operations with the BLT embarked and the fact that they weren't ever able to really get out there and do anything prior to PMINT. Did that factor into any of the decisions as you looked -- so you'd come up with a plan for PMINT, you're hoping to get some more waterborne time it didn't happen. Did that ever come up as you started looking? You know, now we're getting ready to do PMINT. They still haven't done waterborne ops with the BLT, with the Bravo Company embarked. Was that ever discussion that was had?

WIT: We did definitely look at it, sir, and at that at the time Lieutenant Colonel Regner was really stressing that the company have time to conduct rehearsals prior to launching on their full mission profile. But I recall at the same time, that this mechanized raid was going to go ashore from the Somerset onto San Clemente Island that so that was the same time that they're supporting arms coordination exercise with the SAC X was they were concurrent events. And the Somerset has the UH and the AH-1s on board. So the rotor wing CAS is kind of another thing that was happening at the same time. And as we were executing

the mechanized raid, we were, of course, planning the next raid event. So we were already in the R2P2 process for the next event. Looking back at it now, sir, we should have built into the scheme of maneuver just a full on -- just rehearsal there's, no tactical scenario, there's no safety planning and a safety confirmation brief that's given. But again, give them a full day to let the well deck crews work with the trackers. And, of course, the trackers get the Marines in and out of the AAV into the water just do gator squares and then recover. But obviously that, of course, looking back in hindsight, it is clear now, sir, but that was something that was not factored into our PMINT sequence of events.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Right. And we're not trying to armchair quarterback at all. We're just, again, looking for those best practices or things that we could have done differently as a service instituted to prevent the mishap. So not at all trying to armchair quarterback.

On the day of the mishap. We're out at PMINT now and the raid force has gone ashore. They've conducted actions on the objective and there's -- can you talk kind of pick us up at that point and kind of talk us through what happened going forward up to the incident?

WIT: The company had gone down, executed their action objective -- and again. Be in San Clemente Island, it's pretty limited on the environmental. So the tactical skill maneuver is very, very simple and straightforward. Drive down to the objective, dismount the Marines, small objective, and then remount. At that time, I recall there was like one track that had a mechanical issue with one of the tracks so that vehicle was going to stay on the objective until it potentially get some parts and a mech to come down and repair it. The rest of the company consolidated at vicinity of west cove which is again where the LCAC pad is at, and typically very well. I think it's the only environmental location you can launch and recover the AAVs from.

So I know we were working some maintenance issues with one track that was left on the objective. That ended up getting remediated. They moved back up there all together and then at this time -- and again so while this is happening, sir, gentlemen, I'm in the BLT planning space here on the Macon Island. And we were again, we were planning the next event. I can't remember now if we were planning a small boat raid or if it was going be a vertical assault raid. But I remember we were literally on the dry erase board building a master mission

timeline while we have someone watching merc chat listening to the radios. But we're getting updates. They've got a downed track. Okay, hey, the down track has been fixed. They're consolidated at the beach. Okay. They're splashing and they're getting ready to recover aboard the Somerset. Okay, and like I said, we're still planning here on the ship. Comms were good, at least with the group that was ashore. But I know there were some challenges between the tracks as they were in the water with the ship. And then again, as I mentioned, the Somerset is launching and recovering rotor wing CAS to support the supporting arms coordination exercise. So the ships got of him make winds to launch and recover a helicopter. So.

I think it's probably that at that point that things kind of -- we started kind of raising eyebrows because we're looking at our time line and they still haven't been recovered yet. I think that's about the same time that we got -- it came over merc chat from the Somerset watch that an AAV had sunk and at that point, full stop. We're all now with the MEU in the landingforce operations center, how Makin Island staring at screens, getting on radios, and calling because we had a iridium phones that could call the shore to San Clemente Island.

So that at that point we were just trying to get

information on exactly what had happened, sir, for that point.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Kind of backing up a little bit, not specifically just talking about this day, but that is kind of the focus. But you feel for you expand this as well. I realize that the primary coordination with the ARG team is through the MEU staff; however, I also realize that there's a lot of informal coordination that goes on between the MSEs, both the ACE and the BLT with the ship's crew as well as the ARG staff. So how would you characterize the relationships that you had made and then any insight you can offer as to the relationship between the MEU staff and the ARG staff.

WIT: Being our first composited at sea events, sir, we were still kind of, you know, learning each other and I guess kind of go back a little bit in time. So I talked about the R2P2 course, which everyone all the SPMAGTFs, all the MEUs, you know, go do that. I will say that event in Coronado had a pretty good blue representation. We had the ships staffs and the FIBRON staff. And there's a follow-on event that I -- I remember going to this event. It's called the Warfare Commander Conference. And this one was -- the name of the other Navy base escapes me. But I remember going to that one and it was kind of a reverse, like there was lots of blue, but not a lot of green. MEU staff was

there, but we were a little bit light on our participation there. But otherwise, I thought really good integration. And I know. Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , who comes from EOTG, is, you know, a senior mentor, adviser, and evaluator. He sat in on all of our, you know, update briefs, our planning sessions, our confirmation brief. And he always stressed the necessity to be integrated. I do recall -- again, just because Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is B platoon commander, pretty big, strong personality being well received on the Somerset. He and the ship's lieutenant and you're probably the deck department division officer were pretty close. And very well tied in.

And so, it definitely -- I think even for it to be the first integrated event, you know, that I think the teams are definitely, you know, integrated as best they could be, sir. Even as the BLT OpsO -- like I would -- even in this first event, I was going to, you know, department head meetings and meeting the Macon Island ops folks and reps. And my assistant OpsO, 3 Alpha, he's actually on the Somerset. And Captain (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) he was doing the same thing during PMINT and everyone was getting to know everyone. But again, the first time were playing ball together, definitely not at max integration and efficiency, I'm sure.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): And so, during the confirmation brief for this specific mechanized raid, can you talk to us at all about the ORM and safety considerations?

WIT: Yes. So the Somerset was going to put her safety boats out in the water. So again, her of her rib boats to establish the boat lanes. And I remember we went very specifically through the timeline of when they were going to set condition one alpha to flood the deck and then all the different deck handlers that were going be down there splash the tracks. And again, safety boats are going to be there for their launch. But now that I think back on, the recovery of the force was not covered. And that high level of detail, you give it the confirmation brief, you know, very heavy on phase 3, you know, actions on the objective. So a lot of detailed slides showing, you know, we're going land here, the tracks will get into this formation there, we're going travel down the one row that you candrive on back about the island, and this is the objective. We'regoing to destroy this and then recover. And, and so, then phase 4, you know, withdrawal I think didn't have a whole lot of detail. And then phase 5 reconstitution, we're all back on ship or doing post action maintenance.

So a lot of focus on the launch and the actions on but

not a lot on the recovery, sir, from that confirmation brief that I remember.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): And do you have any specific, I guess, best practices or, you know, kind of recommendations on those specific aspects going forward?

WIT: Yes. So I think particularly for PMINT -- again the first integrated at sea period, each of the units, you know, without any kind of, you know, tactical scenario and kind of the R2P2 planning process being laid on top, you know, should be provided an opportunity to conduct a launch and recovery of whatever their platform is. And then for the next one, then you can lay on the scenario and the R2P2 planning. And then, you know, the confirmation brief for this first one -- you just have a little more detail on the recovery procedures for the forces.

We eventually got to that level, as you can imagine, I think by the ARG MEU X, you know, where we're at a second time, we're seeing we've had all this feedback and coaching from EOTG where you'd see a very detailed reception plan in phase 4, you know. Basically, the same thing but in reverse order to include like we'd even have -- we even got to the point the off -- the Navy officer that was going to be like the deck officer would be present for that confirmation brief. But we were definitely not

there during PMINT. But we grew to that level. And I was, you know, again, with coaching and constant observation from the EOTG and CSG. I think it was what whichever CSG comes aboard to basically mentor and coach the other blue side.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): At this point, Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c), do everything that you want to ask.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): Just a handful of quick questions if that's good. Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}, this is a Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c). Got a few questions here for you. Can you hear me?

WIT: Yes, I can hear you fine.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): Okay, I'll try to make them quick. And remember, again, these aren't gotcha questions. These are with an eye of improving future orders, policies for the institution with regards to MEU composition going forward.

First question just to confirm: ITX you actually participated in was January to March. That was ITX 1-20, right?

WIT: Yes.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): Off the top of your head, do you know what AAV platoon supported you for that?

WIT: We were hoping that it was gonna be the same one that we would eventually composite with for the MEU because just about everything else fell into place. But unfortunately, I do not.

And in truth, that platoon did more work for 5th Marines and kind of the exercise force. We only got to work with them during the actual force on force, the MWX. But yeah, I can't remember now.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): I can track that down. So you talk about establishing informal lines of communications with the different attachments. So just out of curiosity, how did that occur with the AAV platoon? Specifically, did their battalion staff reach out to you? Did you reach out to their battalion staff? Did this lieutenant just roll up and hit up your mech company commander? To the best of your knowledge and recollection, how did that line of communication be established?

WIT: If I remember correctly, I want to say it was Gunnery Sergeant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}, the AAV platoon sergeant, who reached out to Master Guns ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}, our battalion ops chief, and established com that way. And I also want to say, again, because of the way Native Fury went down, I want to say it was because the majority of Marines had made it out to the UAE but Gunny ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)} missed it because, again, of COVID or something with the flights. So Gunny ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)} was back and the platoon going out to Native Fury and he checking with Master Guns ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}. I then got in contact with, with Gunny ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)} and, basically, it's like, hey, Gunny, great to meet you. I look forward to working with you, we're heading up

to 29 Palms. We'll be back in March. Was kind of a -- I think that's about how that first email went. But, no, I don't remember tracks or the Division putting us in informal contact.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): Was that kind of typical of your informal lines of communication with the rest the attachments? Did any of their battalion staffs reach out to you or you guys to them?

WIT: [Inaudible].

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): You're coming in choppy on our end.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): We got you clear now.

WIT: Okay. Good deal. Ship might have been turning. I would say a lot of our initial coordination informal was almost kind of, you know, hey, we were planning sessions. Again, we worked with the engineers before because we went to ITX together. They were also and an ABTF unit that we had met previously. We worked with LAR at ITX and then, as mentioned, the way Gunny ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)} reached out to us. And I would say that the staff like the highlander's and [Inaudible].

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): You still there?

WIT: Yes, gentlemen. Can you still hear me?

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): Copy all. Was all kind of small unit, informal communication. Got it.

Last question. At any point in time, to your recollection, did you receive any sort of brief from that AAV platoon or from that Tracker battalion staff regarding the training or and or material readiness of that platoon? Did you or to your recollection, your 4, XO, or CO, did any of you receive some sort of brief from that battalion prior to chop?

WIT: It came in a bit broken. I think I heard you say like, did we ever receive kind of a -- I guess, a pre composite brief from 3rd Tracks or else the platoon. And I do not remember us receiving a brief from them specifically. Like I said, I have some maintenance statistics, but I believe those were all assembled by our maintenance management officer working with the respective maintenance management commodities from the different units. But again, that's kind of what I member and again, it was a very busy month of April. Like I said, with the LRE, the CGIP and then EOTG courses that we had already started on.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay, Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, we appreciate you taking the time. I know you're very busy out there. So with that in unless you have -- do you have anything else that you want to add to the investigation?

WIT: Yes, sir. Just one thing. So obviously, after the event occurred and we returned home and we were trying to, you

know, kind of piece the pieces back together and say like, well, what should we have done before we did PMINT. And I actually worked with Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , who I believe is still the OpsO at first EOTG and, you know, when he was a student at the Naval Postgraduate School had done and a AAV study. We went back and studied -- reviewed that study and we put together a, you know, we call it a back in the saddle training program. We executed the first week of that program. And then, you know, after the moratorium on waterborne activities for the AAVs was not lifted for us.

And then, of course, the decision was made for us to convert the mechanized company to a motorized company. So we never did execute this program. But I remember sharing it with the Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and he said he would consider it going forward for EOTG. But if you don't mind, sir, I'd like to send you a copy. But again, as you said, you for consideration and an EOTG had also done basically some analysis and they looked through the publications and the requirements and, you know, they found that there was nothing in writing that said that, you know, the mechanized company must do integrated waterborne training prior to the first composited at sea period, which 100 percent they absolutely should.

But I know we did when I was a company commander years ago in 1/5 and. Even whenever I was on BLT 1/9 over a decade ago, our mech company, you know, doing stuff right off Onslow beach before. Yeah, before we got on board with the 24th MEU. So if you don't mind, I'd like to send that to you for the services consideration. Again, it was like two guys in an office that put it together. So his last name escapes me right now. But yeah, we had talked about looked at it and I never imagined that he even saying, like, man, we should do this.

So I'd like to give that to all gentlemen and yeah, if we can do anything with it that would be great. But that's all I have, sir. And I appreciate your taking the time as well.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay, thank you. So we'll close here with the admin statement here.

You were directed not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone other than members of the investigation team. If you are asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify me, the investigating officer, or your commanding officer.

[The investigative interview closed at 2008, 15 April 2021.]

I, LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6),
(b)(7)(c) , attest that the preceding transcript is a true
and accurate verbatim account of the interview of Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)
(c)
held on 15 April 2021.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

LtCol, USMC

[The Investigative Interview commenced on 1800, 15 April 2021.]

[WIT: LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[CR: SSgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Good afternoon. My name is Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , and I am part of a team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU, and actions and decisions associated with the material conditioning, training and personal readiness thereof. This investigation is associated with the amphibious assault vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020.

We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April of 2021 to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with

information relevant to the investigation. We can provide a copy of that to you if you desire.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed me and the other members of the investigation team on 8 April 2021. And I'm talking with you and my investigatory capacity as a representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We are required to provide General Thomas with a written report upon the completion of our investigation. We also have those appointment letters if you desire to see that.

I'm talking with you because the investigation team believes you might have information that may be relevant to the investigation. It's important that you understand what we're looking to to get out of this is primarily the events that happened prior to composition and formation of the 15th MEU. Please inform us of anything that you believe should be considered in this review.

The topics I would like to cover with you today may include formation in compositing and 15 MEU, training and material readiness surrounding the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, and I MEF oversight of the 15th MEU.

This is an administrative investigation. However, due

to the sensitive nature of the ongoing review, we are asking personnel we talk to as part of the investigation not to share anything we discussed today with any other person. So before we start. Do you have any questions about my role or this investigation?

WIT: No. Yeah, I understand. Yeah. So I won't disclose anything in terms of the content or the questions in this interview. And if I was to kind of restate would I assume the goals of this investigation are so that future MEUs, east coast, west coast, 31st MEU as an institution, as a service, we can understand by order, by doctrine, and then, you know, by MSC contributions the sort of institutional mindset where we maybe could improve in terms of the formation of MEU to avoid some the pitfalls that contributed to this mishap.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Yeah.

WIT: Is that about right?

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): I think that's a pretty accurate represents. So again, I'm working off the script here, so I know we already went over this. But if you could just state your name, rank, and current bill one more time.

WIT: Lieutenant colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, Executive Officer, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And then what was your billet on 30 July 2020?

WIT: Executive officer, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. And can you also tell us your MOS, please?

WIT: Yeah. 7565, Cobra helicopter pilot.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay, so can you talk to us a little about the op tempo for the command element from January of 20 up to the chop? Were there significant events that you had that kind of outside the normal command element responsibilities before Chop?

WIT: Well, outside of the command element -- I don't know if I would characterize our op tempo as being outside of typical things that a command element is expected to do. It was very busy. We took on our primary staff off cycle. So a lot of our staff primaries were joining around January, February of 2020. During that time, the command element was supporting exercise Iron Fist. I'm sure you're aware of that, which I think that's generally, what O-6 decomposed MEU would be expected to do.

But that that was a busy, busy time for us. So on top of building up the staff, setting expectations, learning to work together as a staff. We're supporting that exercise. I think

there was some value in doing Iron Fist. It was a good rep to kind of cut our teeth as a staff. But it was absolutely busy. And to some extent, I'm sure the time we spent working on Iron Fist was time we were not looking at our voyage plan, our potential loadout, things like that. So does that answer the question for the January, February timeframe?

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): It does, yeah. Is there anything else of substance you were tasked to do other than Iron Fist?

WIT: Yeah. As we were building up the staff, for myself personally, I viewed my role as being an adviser to Colonel Bronzi on specifically compositing the ACE. So we did spend a lot of time during that period getting down to 3d MAW, MAG-16, MAG-39, meeting with MAG-13 leadership to discuss how that process would happen. Because there are I've done two MEUs prior to this with the eighth, so I just wanted to make sure that Colonel Bronzi's expectations -- had well-founded expectations for how that process would go. So there is a lot of that.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay, yeah, that's fair. And do you know if there were visits similar to the ones you had with the MAG, with the GCE and LCE side of the house?

WIT: So I know Colonel Bronzi had an office call with Brigadier General Shea. Don't remember the date. I believe he

also had an office call with General Castellvi, but I'm not certain on that. I wasn't present for those. I did accompany him with -- we went to go meet Colonel Corporan from a MACG-38, MAG-16 CO. So I went with him to all of the visits to wing unit. Colonel Marghani from 11th Marines did come down with his team to brief early on December time frame when we were figuring out the composition of what the battery would look like. It was nonstandard in that we brought HIMARS and embarked them on the MEU, which hadn't been done before, reduced our M777 loadout to four cannons. But just trying to figure out the command relationships, how we would command control the HIMARS embarkation sustainment, things like that.

So we did have pretty good dialogue with 11th Marines. We also went up to to visit them up at Pulgas. I think Colonel Bronzi had a pretty solid relationship with the 1st Marines Commander at that point. So I imagine they had healthy dialogue that I wasn't privy to and unaware of. Any dialogue from the command back to the AAV battalion LAR anything like that. We did have a lot of early engagement with Reconnaissance Battalion with regard to the formation of all the main Reconnaissance detachment. That was early and often throughout the formation of the MEU.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Some of these questions are going to be more focused on operations. Speaking of which, we were supposed to get on the phone about an hour ago with Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) . We called several times, but we weren't able to get through to him. So if there's any way we can set that up, either later tonight or at some other point. We still would like to speak with him.

WIT: Yeah, I mean, if this line's working, he can use this office. He's right next door. I can go see if he's having issues with SVoIP. Connectivity on Macon Island is not great.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So in the I MEF LOI for the compositing of the 15th MEU or the deployment of the 15th MEU, there was a specific part in there where it referenced at E-302 that there was a direction for report for planning. Can you describe if that happened and, if so, how it occurred?

WIT: Did you say -- what was the number you referenced?
I'm sorry, I missed that.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Embarkation minus 302. WIT:

[Inaudible]

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Let's see probably, December, January but sometime in January.

WIT: Directed to I. I'm sorry, I just.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): You still there?

WIT: Yeah, I'm sorry. Yeah, I just had a question. The E minus 302. Who is that directed to?

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): In the I MEF LOI and it's, it's part of the coordinating instructions, I believe, or I think it was actually in a couple of different places. But there's also just a section in there that lays out the timeline from I think E-302 is kind of the first thing within but then it steps through all of the E-270, E-240, E-211, composite, and then it has everything is well to the right from all of the EOTG individual courses, raid courses ARG MEU Staff Planning Course all of that stuff going all the way up and giving embarkation.

WIT: Yeah. So I'm just trying to think through the report for planing. Who does it direct to report? Is that the MSC commander?

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Correct. That is MEF directing a report for planning which typically looks something like the the MSCs will come and give a brief to the MEU command element. The MEU command element will start off with kind of an opening brief this is --

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Yeah. We're here.

WIT: I don't want to give you an incorrect answer or

incomplete answer, so I'm just looking back through -- you said that would have been around December time frame?

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Yeah. Just doing my math for Marines. It should be E-365 would have been November. So 330 would have been December 10th. So 302 would have been around the beginning of January.

WIT: Yeah. I don't recall it. Honestly, January, like -- the biggest thing that's standing out in my mind is Iron Fist. I can probably look back into my emails and see if that happened. I just can't place it right now.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. Let me back up a little bit too because I actually skipped when the questions that I had that I think is pretty important here is: Can you talk to us about some of the external issues? So not things that the MEU's command element was tasked to do, but some of the external issues that impacted the 15th MEU, as you look forward to two compositing. One example of that would be the COVID environment.

WIT: Yeah. It was a nightmare. I mean, I'm sure you guys lived it, right. Like going through PCS season. And, yeah, we had -- if I remember -- and this was DoD wide, so not specifically like levied on the 15th MUE, but like three star approval from the in and receiving and the sending commands from

every PCS that we had to execute like, you know, people that want to take emergency leave like that required GO approval. Not to mention, we had to split our staff into port, starboard as a mitigation measure. So yeah, we were working basically Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday for staff primaries and the CO and then Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and the office for myself and the Alphas and kind of split the teams that way.

Battled track and report in COVID close contacts like ROM'S due to travel, ROM due to flu like symptoms. Yeah, that was absolutely a time suck. I'd say that probably took 40 to 50 percent of my day to day time, like volumes of emails sent and received were basically directly COVID related. As we went into PMINT. We had a COVID spike. I think probably due to embarkation on ship, close quarters, coupled with the 4th of July 96. After that we had double digit COVID cases, close contact going into ROM approaching 200 if memory serves. 200 people within the MEU like total population about 2,800 of that. So like not to like tracking all of those people, but then care feed-In, you know, delivering food to all these people. We didn't, you know, rewrite the PTP. So we had a consolidated second and third at sea period that rolled into the deployment. But that wasn't just a unilateral decision that required brief up

to Admiral Aquilina to approve that. So you can imagine the numbers of revisions that had to go through the one star and the three star level to get to that point where we had consensus on a plan.

You know, the ROM requirements leading up to the deployment, which it wasn't really possible to put everybody into Rom for 21 days prior to embarkation with a fly off of 33 aircraft -- really, 27 aircraft, I guess.

In conjunction with the embarkation, we couldn't put all of the maintainers and pilots in ROM for 21 days and have them not go to work. So all of that was kind of offshoot of COVID and the planning requirements that went into it. It goes on and on, but those are some of the high points that stick out. If I look at one thing that really consumed the staff time, it was COVID mitigation.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Yeah. I think that that's what we're trying to get is any kind of external issue that, you know, would consume the bandwidth outside of a normal MEU that's compositing. So if there's anything --

WIT: Else I mean, Colonel Bronzi. Colonel Bronzi was in close contact for, you know, following PMINT. I mean, he was not allowed to come into the office for some period of time. And

that that affected a lot of our key staff.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)): Anything other than COVID that stands out
in your mind?

WIT: That was external to what in my mind would have been
expected through the normal composite process.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)): Yeah.

WIT: I think MEUs probably deal with this, but yeah, we
started our planning based on a voyage plan that was limited to
INDOPACOM. Pretty late in the game, that was changed to a CENTCOM
deployment. That's something I think we all kind of expected. And
really, I think that's something MEUs -- I think we're all used to
it. I would say that is cost of doing business for a MEU in 2021.
But yeah, that was a curveball. Certainly one of our staff was able
to deal with though. Beyond that, I think there was no major set of
events that was a wild deviation from what a normal MEU command
element and the MSCs would have to work with prior to the mishap.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)): Okay, and so moving on from that, I know
that commanders use XOs in a wide variety of different ways, but one
of the typical functions of the XO is to be in constant
communication, in touch with the various shops, the 4, the 6, to
make sure that everything is on track. Can you talk at all about

your understanding of the material readiness of the MEU just prior to chop and then at chop?

WIT: So my frame of reference coming into this job was having done two MEUs use as a CH-46 pilot. And you have been with the Corps Squadron that received detachments. And granted during that period of time my experience was operations primarily. So my -- then following that, being a force provider, the maintenance officer HMLA-469 and being out of detachment for the 13th MEU. With that said, from my frame of reference the expectation that I've always had for SoCal MEUs is that you preload maintenance on the aircraft and you send your best instructor pilots and your most promising co-pilot up and coming pilots to their progression, like to the so a priority of effort you know. So in terms of like training readiness, material readiness, like you do everything you can to make sure that not only are you within the letter of the law of the MEF at chop date for pilot qualifications and condition codes on the aircraft and required modifications, but you're setting them up for success with the understanding they're going to go into a very challenging pre deployment training program. And they're kind of most likely to get employed for contingency response.

So aviation maintenance being the background, my

understanding of the maintenance readiness, I was working under the assumption that the MEF LOI said gear will be transferred condition code alpha by a certain date. I worked under the assumption that it was.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. And there was no indications, nothing brought up to you from the S-4 that that might not be the case?

WIT: I don't recall any. And I think Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) . He might be a good person to talk to give you some more context and to know exactly what we're seeing -- just -- this is just working off a memory, like going back to like material readiness boards. I do recall significant issues coming up with BLT major end items.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Do you remember anything specifically about the AAVs and delayed timeline for conducting the JLTI in issues with those AAVs?

WIT: No. I was tracking the JLTI schedule and how that was going to be supported by the contact team provided by the MEF de conflicted and where those were those inspections are going to happened by time and by location. That was the extent of the level of detail that I remember from the JLTI process.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay.

WIT: So I do not. Yeah, I don't recall -- I'm aware now after the fact that at the time of the mishap those vehicles had not been transferred in GCSS. But I was not aware of that prior to the mishap. I assumed that those transfers occurred in accordance with the LOI.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay, so moving on to maybe a more operational question, but still as a MEU XO. You might have some good visibility on this. Can you talk to me about how the schedule events for PMINT was developed?

WIT: Yeah, so I think that was a collaborative effort between our action officers and EOTG. I think there's a couple of things that you got and you've got to do during PMINT. One of the things that was pretty high visibility for me was supporting the COM install and test in DGCA, I think that's the acronym for that. It was a priority of work for the S-6.

Now going into PMINT, my expectations were the things that have to happen. Are DG set. You need to get ACE day/night CQ'd to the best of your ability. And I think SAC X was one of the high priority items and the things that we populated the rest of the schedule with were items that were deemed to be operational priority to get a rep out before we went into ARG MEU X.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And so, I guess, given those priorities, all of the other events that were occurring at the surface raid some of the all domain reconnaissance actions, other flight operations that happened, I believe there were some VBSS stuff that was going on. Do you recall --

WIT: Yeah. On the day of --

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Yeah. Go ahead.

WIT: Yeah. On the day of the mishap, I think we were either going to or just come in from the VBSS confirmation brief when the mishap occurred. And we're supporting SAC X on San Clemente Island that day as well.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So you all were in a brief when it actually -- getting ready to either coming or going when the actual mishap occurred?

WIT: When I got the first word of the mishap, I was coming from dinner. So I it think was around 16 or 1700. And if I remember right, I was on the way to VBSS confirmation brief. But I may have already received it. It's a little fuzzy.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay.

WIT: But there was a few missions in various phases of the briefing and execution at the time of the mishap.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So this is your first at sea period.

You've got a couple of different confirmation briefs going. Obviously a very dynamic period. Do you recall any changes to the SOE over time that -- to account for things like maintenance readiness or perceived shortfalls in training prior to the PMINT exercise?

WIT: Yeah, not -- I can't recall anything that was -- the high points that stick out to me prior to PMINT we had RUT, which was a pretty heavy duty exercise. I think if I was to try to think back, you were kind of on an assumption that between right and PMINT there's gonna be some dedicated time for maintenance. That's an assumption. I have to look at a calendar and see if there's anything that was specifically directed. We had our ARG MEU staff planning workshop. I think I was the day after the composite with the LCE and GCE on April 20. And then -- the MEU X sort of command and control exercise that was omitted from our PTP. We internally supported a basic field exercise in the 21 area to op check our C2 systems against our deployable VSAT large internet services.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. So kind of keeping along the lines as PMINT in blue/green integration. How would you characterize your integration with the FIBRON prior to PMINT and then actually on PMINT on the day of the mishap?

WIT: So the integration was -- the events that we had done with the FIBRON staff prior to PMINT to work integration was ARG MEU staff planning workshop. We had the wharf, WCC one. I think it's warfare commanders conference one down in Point Loma and TTCG really into the conference. We sent a significant portion of our staff to that myself, MEU CO. I think that was in March. Then WCC two was around May time frame. So those were the high points for FIBRON MEU integration, like dedicated calendar events. But certainly a lot of crosstalk and a lot of, you know, pertaining to the embarkation plan, what major end items we're going gonna put on what ships, which aircraft we're going to embark on, on what ships or computability Plan B. Operationally that that would have been the extent of it prior to PMINT -- actually, and not the FIBRON staff, but HSA DHC that MH-60 Cierra Squadron they participated in our right. So I think if any, all the elements of the FIBRON, the HSC detachment were the most integrated with and continue to be.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): I guess so on PMINT, though, I'm assuming that your schedule of events you had worked closely, you developed it closely with the FIBRON prior to PMINT?

WIT: So you're pretty broken on that last one. But I understand that question as how closely integrated were we with

the FIBRON prior to PMINT?

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): So the follow on question was in the development of the schedule of events for PMINT. I'm assuming that you had since you had such a dynamic schedule of events that that you had buy in. And there was a good understanding of supporting supported relationships between the blue/green team for PMINT?

WIT: Yeah, I mean, I think generally speaking, the primary is on both staffs understood, generally speaking, during which missions which phases of which missions how the supported relationship would work.

I don't know if that answers the question.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Yeah, I'm also looking for a characterization of that. So would you say it was a good working relationship with the blue side was responsive and doing what they needed to do to support your training objectives and then vice versa?

WIT: Yeah, the working relationship, yeah, I think you would find different staff factions would probably have -- would probably express a different characterization of the working relationship between the MEU staff and the FIBRON staff. And I don't think that's necessarily -- it I don't think that's

necessarily different for any MEU. I think there is always growing pains and there's always personality conflicts. And this one was no different. There was certainly friction between our staffs without a doubt. I would also say the FIBRON staff also had their things to take care of. I think they got tasks for the support to the USS Kidd when they had their COVID break out. And if I remember correctly, that preceded the ARG MEU staff planning workshop. And if I'm remembering that right, I think that's what caused the postponement of ARG MEU staff planning workshop. Then they also got tasked with supporting the com stocks -- or maybe was in the com stock or that a Buick or whatever ship went out with either task force Alice or KOA Mwuana. They got tasked with supporting the ROM life support requirements for that ship, which was significant. And the FIBRON staff is not big. So they also had their own stuff to do. So they were busy. I think we found ways to get solutions that worked. We were able to reach consensus on the high points that a MEU and a FIBRON staff have to come to consensus on I think.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Yeah, I mean, that's really the first time for you to actually do execution together on PMINT. So that -- to me that that's an interesting point to bring up in the larger service level context is the -- how did that integration

go and what was the -- that's what We're trying to get after if there were any significant issues or personality conflicts or just anything that would provide some context into that. Even on the day of the mishap itself.

WIT: Yeah. So, I mean -- just being frank, we showed up to - - I don't remember what the event was. I think it was like an operational planning team for PMINT planning. And Colonel Bronzi wasn't present because he had some other commitment to the MEF or otherwise. So I was there representing them MEU and there's a significant portion of the MEU staff. At that brief the Commodore kind of said in front of the entire auditorium, and it was really awkward, was like 300 people there, that his concept for how the command relationship should work between the FIBRON on the MEU is that we would have an integrated staff and the MEU would be like subordinate to -- Colonel Bronzi would be his deputy on this integrated staff. And I didn't know if I should just stand up and leave or what. It was real weird.

There had been no discussion with Colonel Bronzi prior to him, like dropping that into the mix. And that was sort of the getting to know you moment with the FIBRON staff and with the Commodore. That moment certainly made it weird. I think those two men found a way to work together, but it was just a weird

thing to say. I don't necessarily think that has a lot to do with how our staffs work together, like our N2 and S-2 work great together at the medical departments or great together operations finds a way to make it work we've had the same types of struggles that I think most MEUs have with, you know, some the air planners and our ACE.

But fundamentally, how can other MEUs do this better? Yeah, I don't know if there is any event in our composite that you have besides both staff being pretty busy prior to part of the chop date. That was a barrier to us being able to work effectively together.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. I think you gave us some interesting points there, because what I would say with the Marine Corps Order says about PMINT is know this is the first time that the ARG and the MEU staffs really get together and they execute. And you guys had a very dynamic set of operations going on, having confirmation briefs going on while other operations are actually being conducted. I'm intimately familiar with the -- VBSS is a very tricky operation because the supported supporting roles change back and forth between the FIBRON and the MEU depending on which phase it is. So to have all of that going out at one time is certainly -- that's certainly a challenge to

work through under the best of circumstances. So if there is any tension, that's kind of all I was trying to get to with that. If I could just back up a little bit and look at these. Were you at all involved or present at any of the E-270, 240, or 211 briefs?

WIT: Yeah, I was.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): And do you recall any of the issues being brought up with regard to training of the AAV platoon? In the briefs that I've looked at, they were listed as being trained but not assessed. So also looking at the UET, the underwater egress training, stats for both the AAV platoon in the BLT writ large to see if there was any comments from either division or MEF with regard to that? I'll let you answer those and then I'll add one more thing.

WIT: Yeah. So I don't recall any shortfalls coming out in those briefs, which is not specific to the AAV platoon or really for any of the MSC contributions to the MEUs formation. That's not to say that they weren't brought out. I just don't remember any. I will say just working through getting command element personnel through the egress training was challenging both due to the pool going down for maintenance issues and then the pool going down again for COVID. That was difficult. My personal opinion, I think the MEF policy on underwater egress training

leaves a little bit too much room for interpretation and doesn't necessarily -- it's not really reconciled with the realities of the training venues available, at least in our case. I think so. To get back to the original question, was there anything that came out at the E-270 brief or the other formation briefs regarding material readiness shortfalls or underwater egress training. I don't remember that being anything that was talked about at those briefs.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): And then staying on the UET for a minute. Do you remember any waivers that the MEU gave for UET for the BLT or the AAV platoon?

WIT: No. I don't. Just thinking back to what I knew at the time. I don't remember that question ever being raised as being a request for waivers for that training. Again, not to say that it didn't happen, I just don't remember that.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. I think at this point I'll ask if any of the other folks in the room have any questions that they would like to ask you.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}
_{(7)(c)}): Yeah, I've got two. Hey, ^{(b)(3),}
_{(b)(6),} , Colonel ^{(b)(7)(c)}
_{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} here. First, I know how busy you are out on float right now. So I truly appreciate the time you're spending with us right now. It's important and very helpful. So thank you for

that.

After composite, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), and I know your job is the XO, you're the great staff synchronizer and running all over the place. So after composite, do you know in your conversations or perhaps meetings you've attended with the MEU Commander, if material readiness specific to the platoon was raised to his level at any time between chop and PMINT?

WIT: Material readiness with regard to AAV specifically or this material readiness in general?

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Well, it's AAV specifically since that's where we're focused.

WIT: So I spent a lot of time with Colonel Bronzi and I think I had a very good idea what concerned him. I don't remember at any point concerns being raised to him about the material readiness of the AAV platoon. From what I recall, the only thing that I can think back and remember at the time was that the general sense was that the evaluations that we got for the Bravo Company in the or really the AAV platoons through the EOTG as a training package was generally positive. I'm confident, Colonel Bronzi was a perfectionist, but he didn't let shit go. And if there was an issue with material readiness that was brought to him, I think he would have pulled the string and I

don't think he would have been hesitant to call Division or the MEF G-4 if he was aware of those issues. I just don't think those issues were ever brought to his level.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. Thank you. That's very helpful. Then the next question I have, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , is along the same lines, but I'll switch gears over the training and the UET training requirement, the underwater egress training requirement for those Marines that are traveling over water or on waterborne vessels, again, specific to the AAV and Bravo Company 1/4. To your knowledge, were you in any meetings in which a concern was raised over Marines that we're not trained in the underwater egress requirement?

WIT: I don't explicitly recall issues being raised prior to PMINT about throughput for the track company getting through training. If they were, I honestly can't recall that ever coming up as a concern in any meeting. Again, not say that it didn't happen, but I can't recall that. Obviously after the fact there was a very deep dive and a lot of scrutiny put on water survival training and egress training for Company B, and that was based on the assumption that we would continue the deployment with AAVs embarked. So we developed a get well plan that includes a

significant amount of pool training to get after that. But prior to, I don't remember that being raised to the MEU.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. And thank you for that. And then the last question and you may have already answered it as part of Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}'s question, but I just want to revisit the waivers very quickly. During PMINT and during the raid on San Clemente Island with Bravo 1/4 in the back of the Amtrak's, were you aware of - and, granted, the waiver authority is delegated down to the O-5 level. But were you aware of any waivers being granted to the Marines of Bravo 1/4 to conduct that Waterborne transit in support of that Mech raid?

WIT: No. I think I would have been. And perhaps this is from an aviation background and just looking at most likely thing that's going to get a Marine killed. I was pretty focused on helicopter egress training. You look back at previous MEUs, that tends to be something that comes up every couple of years. An aircraft goes down and people die because they haven't taken that training. I was in 165 when we put a 46 in the Haditha Dam and people died as a result of inadequate training.

So that was something I was focused on. I understood that the waiver authority resided at the O-5 level. For movement over water via MEU aircraft, we actually withheld that authority

at the O-6 level and all those movements -- and they continue to, movements for personnel that are not helo egress trained. That comes across my desk. And I would have conversations with Colonel Bronzi about it. This is the operational impact versus the risk. The flight is this far, twenty miles over water but this is the one guy that can perform this maintenance action. So we need to cross deck him and this is the smartest way to do it. Recommend we approve it. And that's how we went through those.

We were very deliberate about any waivers for helo movements for untrained personnel. Admittedly, I never put that much thought into it. I didn't not put as much thought into amphibious vehicle egress training just because it was not my background. I had less experience and it and wasn't something that I was more sighted on. You know, hindsight being 20/20 absolutely would have. That is a long way of answering the question that -- I understood where the waiver authority resided. And if there was a waiver requested, I would have been privy to it. And I can say confidently that there wasn't one, or at least there wasn't one that crossed my desk.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , thank you for that. I appreciate your candor and very helpful. That's all the questions I have.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , before we conclude, is there

anything else that you have that you would like to offer up to us, given the scope of the investigation that we're doing in the service, you know, the service level impacts that we're trying to do kind of to discover, I guess. Is there anything that you want to add?

WIT: Yeah, I think if the end result of this investigation is to develop changes to policy that are going to give MEUs a better chance to go and get out in front of issues like this, I think the logical desire from the service would be to push the composite date earlier. I would just say that's a double edged sword, like the quality of the detachments that you get chopped is probably a function of how long the Wing, the Division, and the MLG have to man, train, and equip those formations. So, undoubtedly there will be pushback from the MSCs to have that full period of time to do the force generation. I think that's a valid point. But yeah, without a doubt, having more time with the MSCs would have helped us work through our integration get better as a team.

But conversely, taking that time away from Division to get the AAV platoon ready, we would have maybe gotten even worse product than what we did get from the Division. I think at the end of the day, it's, in my opinion, the sending unit is

responsible to make sure that they are complying with the governing policy for the material condition for what they're chopping to the MEU and the level training for the personnel that they send. And my experience there is no -- after OIF/OEF drawdown, there is no higher priority than the SoCal MEU. I just feel like that needs to be emphasized. Maybe that's a weird way of saying that, but I just really couldn't believe some of the things that I saw on the investigation from the maintenance chief at the AAV platoon or AAV battalion that. This was not my experience or my frame of reference for how people and things would be chopped to to a SoCal MEU. So I think just some top down enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance, is probably the best thing that the service can do to make sure MEUs are going out manned, trained, and equipped to give them the best probability of success for a tough PTP and tough deployment. I think that's about how I would summarize my thoughts on a gentleman.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}) : ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} , thank you very much. Appreciate your time and I appreciate your comments there at the end. I got one last line that I got to read to you here in closing.


You are directed not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone


other than members of the investigation team. If you're asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify me, the investigating officer, or your commanding officer. [The investigative interview closed at 1857, 15 April 2021.]

I, Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, attest that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} held on 15 April 2021.


(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Col, USMC






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







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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

BATTALION LANDING TEAM 1/4
15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
BOX 555365
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5365

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5000
S-3

From: Operations Officer, Battalion Landing Team 1/4
To: S-3, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit

Subj: BATTALION LANDING TEAM 1/4, 15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT COMPOSITION
AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR WESTPAC 21-1

Ref: (a) CG, I MEF LOI for 15th MEU Deployment 21-1
(b) Campaign Plan for 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit's WESTPAC
21-1 Deployment
(c) Operations Order 01-20 (Pre-Deployment Training 21-1)
(d) MCO 3504.1 Marine Corps Lessons Learned Program (MCLLP) and the
Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL)

1. Purpose. This after action report (AAR) covers composition actions taken
by Battalion Landing Team 1/4 and its attachments.

2. After Action Review Points:

a. Topic. Pre-CHOP Staffing/Training Requirements

(1) Discussion. The BLT was not staffed and many individuals had not
achieved their MOS or Billet individual training requirements prior to CHOP.
This appears to be a systemic problem emanating from the confluence of
personnel stabilization and limited formal training center capacity. As a
result of this deficiency the BLT had to continue sending Marines and Sailors
to individual training throughout composite and forecasts sending them to
training during the MEU workup cycle.

(2) Recommendation. There are many potential alleviating solutions.
CHOP to the MEU Earlier to conduct an individual training phase. Stabilize the
BLT personnel earlier. Afford stabilized BLT members priority on school seats.
Increase capacity at schools. Assign inbound Marines and Sailors who are PME-
incomplete to training in route to the unit.

b. Topic. Battery/HIMARS CHOP to V14

(1) Discussion. BLT 1/4 CHOP'd to the 15th MEU on 20 Apr 2020 along
with most of its respective attachments. However, the artillery battery and
HIMARS detachment did not CHOP until 11 May. During this time, the BLT was
creating the Equipment Density List (EDL) for the assignment-to-shipping for
the MEU, along with other requirements. The time between compositing with the
MEU and the battery joining the BLT caused friction in submitting
requirements. The delay in building the command relationships caused friction
and integrating the battery into the BLT training plan.

(2) Recommendation. All attachments should CHOP to the BLT at the
same time to reduce the friction of building the command relationship.

c. Topic. Receiving Command Element SOPs Prior to CHOP

(1) Discussion. Every command has different standard operating
procedures and requirements for submission of reports. It took the BLT

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logistics section a little over a month to learn the throughput process of the command element and begin to adhere to the requirements.

(2) Recommendation. The Command Element should send out their standard operating procedures for submission of logistical requests prior to CHOP so the BLT can adhere to their requirements. Without this information, it becomes increasingly difficult to adhere to guidelines for logistical requirements. Having a product for each respective function of logistics, along with templates for submissions would ease the transition from what the BLT is accustomed to doing and what is required by a new command. A letter of instruction with enclosures that include SOPs and a POA&M would allow the BLT to plan more efficiently.

d. Topic. HIMARS Command Relationships

(1) Discussion. Prior to CHOP, it was identified that a HIMARS Detachment would deploy with the 15th MEU during the WESTPAC 21-1 patrol. This is the first time a WESTPAC patrol has deployed with this asset, and led to numerous discussions between BLT 1/4, the 15th MEU, 1/11, 5/11, and 11th Marines concerning the most suitable command relationship for a non-standard formation to operate in the most effective and efficient manner possible. The final decision was for the HIMARS Detachment to be OPCON to the MEU CE, and ADCON to the cannon battery, which is attached to the BLT. This decision was not finalized until a week prior to CHOP, leading both the cannon battery and HIMARS detachment to scramble in an effort to integrate both administrative and logistical requirements without ever having worked together before.

(2) Recommendation. The 31st MEU has already experimented with the addition of HIMARS elements into the MEU; however, the detachment was attached directly to the MEU CE. It is too soon to say which construct will prove more effective, but it is clear that the command relationship, specifically for HIMARS, should be decided upon well in advance of the actual CHOP date. This would allow both HIMARS and cannon elements to better understand expectations, and their respective roles well in advance.

e. Topic. Consolidated Memorandum Receipt (CMR) creation for HIMARS

(1) Discussion. During the preparation for the Change of Operational Control (CHOP) the CMR was not officially created for the HIMARS detachment until a week before the actual CHOP date. Equipment was signed over via Equipment Custody Record (ECR) cards for all training leading up to the CHOP. This gave little time in consolidating and signing for all the CMR items and identifying discrepancies once the CMR was created.

(2) Recommendation. Identify and create the CMR for detachments at least three months in advance to give time to identify equipment set and signing for all items. This also gives time for the unit to train with the equipment they will deploy with prior to CHOP date.

f. Topic. AAV Platoon Personnel shortfalls

(1) Discussion. The creation of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Platoon from H&S Company, 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion (3d AABn) was challenging. The platoon was originally assembled to support Exercise Native Fury 20 (NF 20). The shortfalls from NF 20 to the 15th MEU included all of the platoon's sergeants and assistant maintenance chief, this created a shortfall in leadership and experience prior to the extremely short window the platoon had between NF 20 and the CHOP to BLT 1/4.

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(2) Recommendation. The MEU platoon personnel from 3d AABn should be established no later than (NLT) 120 days before CHOP. This will allow the platoon time to establish crews and validate administrative requirements prior to CHOP.

g. Topic. AAV Platoon Pre-CHOP Requirements

(1) Discussion. The 15th MEU platoon from 3d AABn was tasked with supporting NF 20 under 1st Marine Regiment in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Starting January 13th the platoon had to begin the PTP for NF 20. This consisted mostly of provisional infantry training as opposed to amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) specific training. The platoon then deployed in the beginning of March to support NF 20 by conducting an MPF offload and supporting 1st Marine Regiment. The platoon then arrived back in the first week of April and was put into a restriction of movement (ROM) status until April 13th. This greatly affected the AAV Platoon's ability to qualify crew and section gunnery as well as conduct its basic amphibious package prior to CHOP.

(2) Recommendation. The AAV MEU platoon should not support any training exercises outside of Camp Pendleton or 29 Palms 120 days prior to chop. If the MEU platoon must support an exercise they should support one that will prepare them for the MEU. For example, Iron Fist was being conducted around the same time. The 15th MEU command element was in charge of the exercise. This would have been a great opportunity for the platoon to test their gear set, enhance their amphibious capabilities, and start a working relationship with their future command element.

h. Topic. AAV Readiness

(1) Discussion. The creation of the gear set the 15th MEU Platoon received from H&S Company, 3d AABn was challenging. The platoon received its gear set April 1st 2020 with a chop date established on April 20 2020. When the platoon received its vehicles, half of the platoon was in UAE for NF 20. This included the platoon commander and all of the mechanics minus the maintenance chief. The platoon staff that was left behind was not given an opportunity to select or request a set of vehicles. The remaining platoon staff identified an abnormally high amount of deadlining criteria amongst all the vehicles. The joint limited technical inspections JLTIs were being conducted from 13-17 April 2020. This only allowed two weeks of maintenance to be conducted before the JLTIs and no time after the JLTIs prior to chop. The JLTIs revealed that every vehicle was deadlined and a majority of the parent child relations were incorrect.

(2) Recommendation. The MEU platoon from 3d AABn should be allowed to walk through multiple gear sets of vehicles and make recommendations on what gear set to receive. This should be done NLT 120 days before CHOP. The platoon then should receive its gear set 90 days before CHOP in order to allow time for maintenance to be conducted.

i. Topic. Pre-CHOP Commitments

(1) Discussion. In the 45 days prior to CHOP, V14 was scheduled to complete ITX 02-20 (20 January - 12 March), remain assigned as the CONUS Alert Battalion Task Force (ABTF) for 1MARDIV (1 January - 20 April), conduct a Logistics Readiness Evaluation (LRE) (6-10 April) and receive a Commanding Generals Readiness Inspection (CGRI) (13-17 April). Due to COVID-19, the CGRI

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was rescheduled Post-CHOP 11-15 May, however, the LRE was conducted from 6-10 April and a security platoon was deployed to support the USNS Mercy as part of the ABTF 20 March - 20 April. The battalion was successful in completing all requirements concurrent to pre-CHOP activities, however, greater focus and attention could have been applied to CHOP had scheduling permitted.

(2) Recommendation. Although not always feasible given the current operational tempo and requirements levied on 1MARDIV, seek to afford units a period of 45 days for pre-CHOP focus and activities. Seek to complete all required inspections, Service Level Training Events and ABTF assignments prior to the 45 day pre-CHOP mark to enable proper focus and attention for transition.

3. Point of Contact. The point of contact for this report is the BLT 1/4 Operations Officer, Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) or (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c).

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Encl (83) 15th MEU E-270/240 Man, Train and Equip Brief, 11 Mar 20

The above-referenced enclosure is classified SECRET//NOFORN and is available by contacting Judge Advocate Division.

Encl (84) 15th MEU E-211 Forming and PTP Brief, 13 Apr 20

The above-referenced enclosure is classified SECRET//NOFORN and is available by contacting Judge Advocate Division.

Encl (85) Mod 001 to CG, I MEF Letter of Instruction for 15th MEU Deployment 21-1,
12 Jul 20

The above-referenced enclosure is classified SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY and is available by contacting Judge Advocate Division.

[The investigative interview commenced on 1157, 15 April 2021.]

[WIT: Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[CR: SSgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : My name is Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), and I'm part of a team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU, and actions and decisions associated with the material conditioning, training, and personal readiness thereof. This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020.

We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April 2021 to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with information relevant to this investigation.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed me to the investigating team on 8 April 2021. And I'm talking to you in my investigatory capacity as a representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We are required to provide General Thomas with a written report upon completion of this investigation.

I'm talking with you because the investigating team believes that you might have information that may be relevant to the investigation. Some of the topics that we'd like to cover with you today may include the formation and composition of the 15th MEU, training in material readiness surrounding the formation and composition of the 15th MEU, and then the I Marine Expeditionary Force oversight of the 15th MEU. Now, taken into context that you're at II MEF. The majority of the topics we're going to discuss with you are all the topics we're going to discuss with you are based on your experience as the EOTG rep from II MEF and kind of do a compare and contrast of processes and practices as you train the MEU for deployment.

This is an administrative investigation. However, due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing review, we're asking personnel we talk to as part of the investigation not to share anything we discussed today with any other person.

So before we start, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), do you have any questions about my role in this investigation?

WIT: I do not.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Okay. We're going to start with some background questions for you. Could you please state your name, rank, and current billet?

WIT: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) . I am a colonel, and officer in charge at 2nd EOTG.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : And how long have you been in that billet?

WIT: I arrived in that billet on 10 June 2019.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Thank you. I am going to turn it over to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for his subject matter expertise on this topic.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Good morning, sir. Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) here. Just had a few questions as Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) alluded to. We're primarily looking to see what some of the differences are between I and II MEF. I've gone through a couple of times the MEU PTP and just some things have stood out differently here on the West Coast. And we just want to get some clarification on.

First of all, sir, assuming that you've had quite a lot

of new experience since you were appointed as the OIC. Can you tell me how many MEUs you've been a part of, both as the OIC and then previously been on?

WIT: Yes, sir. I think I'm a little bit unique in that. Prior to arriving to this billet, I had MEU experience in the actions of actually being on a MEU. I have a staff time on fleet staffs, 7th fleet and 6th fleet. But prior to arriving to here at EOTG, I had no background in ever deploying or being part of a MEU.

When I arrived in June 2019, 26 MEU was just going into their rut so I completed their entire PTP with them and then I was able to work alongside Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} [sic] and support the training of 24 MEU and our recent certification. And now we're kicking off 22 MEU with Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} [sic].

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay, sir. And what's your MOS, sir.

WIT: I am a 5803 by trade, military policeman.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): And sir, could you just give us a little bit of insight as to EOTG's role in training east coast MEUs for deployment at II MEF?

WIT: I sure can. So I would say the scope of a 2nd EOTG's responsibility, we are treated as a subordinate unit. MSC right alongside the MEUs or the MIG or any other unit. So although

within written orders, EOTG is considered special staff. I would say the organization is almost treated like a command. And again, we brief when the commander's brief. So that is how EOTG is looked at and treated at II MEF. I believe on the west coast, the O-6 actually sits up as the G-37 or G-7. I'm not sure. But, you know, like I said, I feel the capacity of OIC for EOTG and sit alongside the MEU commanders and any briefs to the CG.

MEU obviously the supporting command and EOTG is supporting. Scope of our possibilities is individual and collective skills courses -- providing those courses to the MEU and other organizations throughout the MEF and MARFORCOM. And then I would say besides the training of individual and collective skills conducting those courses, I would say our other responsibility is exercise design, and exercise execution pertaining to the MEU RUT, ARG MEU X, and C2 X. And we work alongside CSG-4. They are our counterparts in putting together ARG MEU X and C2 X. Of course, they're not involved in a RUT.

And then additional responsibility that has ended here in this past year was -- we also supported the training a certification of special purpose MAGTF and Task Force Southwest. However, like I said in 2020, those missions pretty much all ended.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay, sir, thank you. You pretty much answered this. But I do want to just -- one question the characterization. When you say that you sit kind of next to the MEUs, would you describe your relationship with the MEF CG as kind of -- do you have a tasking to be sort of a directed telescope to kind of report back to him regularly throughout the PTP on the progress or any concerns that you might have since eventually you would be making the recommendation for certification?

WIT: Yes, I do that through the venues of bimonthly SITREPS. So every two weeks, all the commanders across II MEF, O-6 or general officer commanders -- I should say, MSC and EOTG every two weeks in a bimonthly we would let the CG know what's going on. And then on those opposite weeks, we sit in a cub with CG and provide him a status of what's going on. So, yes, I give my status. If I run into issues of, I need C-130s from the wing, apparently the MEU is not a priority, but I need your direction of whether, you know, EOTG the MEU can get these C-130s and get supported and he directs it to happen if it's a priority.

So, yes, I do provide that feedback to the CG. So there should never be any surprises by the time we get to ARG MEU X and C2 X concerning the proficiency of the MEU. I would say

that I -- and any time that I am communicating to the CG I am aligned with that seated MEU commander that I'm supporting to ensure that I am not shooting on his target.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Yes, sir. And so kind of in that same vein, what is your role in PMINT?

WIT: Zero.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): There is no VBSS or at least consultation with the MEU on where -- what it is that they're trying to get out of it?

WIT: No, we have no role. EOTG has no role in PMINT. We offered services, but, you know, I feel at least with these three MEUs that I've worked with thus far, that is their time to develop their R2P2 flush out their SOPs, and, again, get ready for ARG MEU X and Comp2 X.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Are you at least CCd on what their training schedule is or they're con ops for the PMINT brief?

WIT: I have not been privy to what they're doing during PMINT.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Could you characterize what typically does happen on PMINT, sir?

WIT: I think I would be speculating, but, I've heard they do everything from just focus on the command element and getting

there R2P2 down alongside the FIBRON staff on the basic one end of the spectrum shift familiarization and then on -- farther the end of the spectrum, depending on how aggressive the new commander is, they start trying to do a full profile missions.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And, sir, with regard to the courses that you all conduct, does your 'mech raid course conduct waterborne operations?

WIT: We do not. Like actually splashing from a ship?

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): No, just from the beach at the Onslow beach area?

WIT: No, we do not.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Sir, could you -- in your experience, the 22nd MEU being the third one that you're seeing, how would you characterize all of the MSCs readiness? I mean, in other words, when they come to you ready to begin these raid courses, typically do you find that they are well trained, organized, and equipped and ready to begin the courses or do you find that there have been either material or training readiness issues that have prevented you from conducting the full scope of the course?

WIT: I would characterize that there is a stressor that exists in the training of MEUs and it really boils down to force generation friction between 2nd Marine Division and the MEU/EOTG.

And so that results in forces that may or may not be ready to train depending on that E date. And so we all know that the MEU is supposed to composite that 180. However, unfortunately, a lot of those EOTG courses, for us to be able to fit in everything we're asked to do alongside all of the exercises and everything else, the MEU is trying to get conducted with EWTG LANT in other organizations. That pushes that E date out to -- next month, we're kicking off a CCT SAFE course with 2nd Recon forces that will composite with 22 MEU eventually. But there's courses starting at E-305. And so again, as the appetite for training from EOTG or training as part of the MEU as that grows the E minus moves farther to the left.

And so that obviously creates friction with 2nd Marine Division, as there are also trying to provide a force and get him through MCCRE. And so when I first arrived to EOTG I know there is a lot of frustration where EOTG would like to provide advanced training, but that is really difficult to do when a BLT gets their SOI drop days before the EOTG course begins. And, you know, there's a lot of our contributors to this. I think have the EOTG training has definitely grown throughout the years. And that, again, like I said, I don't your experience but GS-7 employees in the organization, full bird colonels are non-MEU

commanders that were once BLT commanders. All those EOTG courses started at E-180. For some reason they have grown left significantly and now starting at E-305.

So again, that increases the stress on the division, particularly with the manpower manning model and then getting a Marine for four years and being able to outfit a BLT and have a fully trained in the basics, MCCRED before they come over to EOTG, and we try to start that advanced training.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay, sir. And could you just kind of give us some insight into how COVID impacted your training and the training of the BLT in -- all of the MSCs really starting kind of, you know, I guess February of last year, were there significant degradations or extra steps that needed to be taken?

WIT: In the individual and collective skills courses, I don't think COVID really impacted them all that much in the fact that -- when it came to executing those courses, I gave specific instructions to my branch OICs that safely running of those courses take place priority over COVID. And so whether it's sliding down a rope and, you know, mask -- a COVID mask is gonna be on the way. All right. To take the COVID masks off. When it comes to conducting a class and you just can't do with it COVID mask or yet you have to break that 6-foot bubble in order to

ensure safe training. Again, the conducting of safe training always took priority over COVID.

As we went on, to do for MEUs PTP watching from afar, there appeared to be significant stressors on the MEU commander and the desire by the Navy to roll up our MEU X and Comp2 X all into to one exercise. So again, I felt like there some working on the green side to ensure they kept three separate at sea periods, which we were able to conduct. I could only speculate that there was stressors on Marines and their families having to be in bubbles and almost starting their deployment well before they left here recently. I guess that's I can provide on that.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) here.

One, thank you for that. Your last commentary is very helpful. The only question I think I have is: Does EOTG have any touch points with the BLT's AAV platoon?

WIT: They attend the race course.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Beyond that, is there any EOTG evaluation of their waterborne proficiency?

WIT: So EOTG will conduct those individual and collective skills courses and evaluate during those courses. Other than that, EOTG's charter is to look at the overall MEU's 11 METS now and grade them against those 11 METS vice the BLT or CLB or

squadron various METS.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): And one last question for me. And then I think that will complete any queries I have. Do you have on your staff any 1803, 1833, or 2141s? And what they are is an Amtrak officer, Amtrak crewman, or an Amtrak mechanic.

WIT: I believe we have one young enlisted Marine, but he is not on our TO to fill those responsibilities. He's just a augment over to the EOTG.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay, great. Thank you. I appreciate your time there.

WIT: So, yeah. I mean, there is a number of capabilities that MEUs desire that unless the MEF outfits an EOTG with those capabilities then we really can't provide training or exercise designed in those capabilities. You know, just as an example, because operations in the information environment is such a hot topic. You know, EOTGs are not outfitted with that capability. So if the MEUs want training in that capability, they want measles injects, they want to be evaluated, well, then someone needs to provide EOTG that capability, which again, last year the CG and the MIG provided us a major who is a OIE officer.

So there's a lot of demands for EOTG to do different things. But, you know, unless we have the manning on our staff,

I'm less capability. Yeah, we can provide that.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): That's very helpful actually. Thank you for that comment.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Sir, I just have one more question kind of in that same safety vein, understanding that you don't participate in PMINT. But in the mech raid course, for instance, or in ARG MEU X or Comp2 X, to what extent are your evaluators looking at the safety aspect of things? So looking at PCCs, PCIs and, you know, prelaunch checks, vehicle checks, understanding you don't have a specific AAV officer or crewman or chief dedicated to you, but kind of on a pickle type sheet, is there something where the evaluator is looking at it and saying, yes, the platoon sergeant is conducting his AAV crew brief? It's obvious that they're doing something with regard to checking the vehicles before they splash. Is that part of your evaluation or is it mainly focused on the tactical side?

WIT: Yeah. I mean, we do ORMs for all of our courses and for ARG MEU X, Comp2 X, for RUT, we own the ORMs. We conduct confirmation briefs before all those courses and exercises to evaluate safety aspects. For ARG MEU X, Comp2 X we do MEU read ins. But just getting back to those individual courses, again, we're there to teach a raids course. And so there is an

assumption that that unit is already coming with the basic skills required and that they've already been MCCREd by 2nd Marine Division. And therefore we shouldn't be focusing our limited manpower on looking at the basics.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): Thank you, sir. I appreciate that. That's all the questions that I have.

WIT: However, I would say, as I said a little bit earlier, I do hear from my instructors that, again, just that force generation friction and everyone trying to do the right thing. The MEU EOTG wants to provide training. 2nd Marine Division, you know, wants to get these there's BLT and the race on deck. Up to snuff in the basics, MCCRE them before they send them over to the MEU and EOTG. Again, we just run out of days that entire force generation continuum.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): Well, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)), thank you very much for your time and your input to this investigation. It has been very helpful. I've got one administrative paragraph that I must read to you before we sign off, but I just want to express my thanks for you giving time out of your busy schedule to be with us today.

You are directed not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during this interview with anyone

other than a member of the investigation team. If you are asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify me, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , or your commanding officer. This concludes our portion of the interview.

[The Investigative Interview closed at 1244, 15 April 2021.]

I, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , attest that the preceding transcript is a

true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) held on 15 April 2021.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Col, USMC

[The investigative interview commenced on 1650, 16 April 2021.]

[WIT: CIV (b)(3), (b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)]

[IO: Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)
(7)(c)]

[IO: LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)
(7)(c)]

[CR: SSgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)
(7)(c)]

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)
(7)(c)): Good afternoon. My name is Colonel (b)(3), (b)
(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). I'm here with Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)
(7)(c) and we are part of a team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU, and actions and decisions associated with the material conditioning, training and personal readiness thereof. This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 20.

We're not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigate from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented as part of the incident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April 2021 to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with information relevant to the

investigation. In front of you, you have a copy of the convening order.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed us to the investigation team on 8 April. And we are talking to you in our investigatory capacity as representatives of General Mundy and General Thomas. We are required to provide General Thomas a written report upon the completion of our investigation.

We're talking to you because the investigation team believes that you might have information that may be relevant to the investigation. The topics that we would like to cover with you today may include the forming and compositing of the 15th MEU, training and material readiness surrounding the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, and I MEF oversight of the 15th MEU.

This is an administrative investigation. However, due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing review, we're asking personnel we talk to as part of the investigation not to share anything we discuss today with any other person.

So before we start do have any questions about our role or the investigation itself?

WIT: None whatsoever.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): If you would, could you please state your

name and current billet?

WIT: Name is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) am a I MEF contractor. I was hired to mentor MEUs for forward deployment and their training.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And can you tell me what your billet was on 30 July 2020?

WIT: I was a mentor representing I MEF out there on during PMINT and aboard ship on the *Makin Island*.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , can you tell us a little bit about your background?

WIT: Served thirty-two plus years in the Marine Corps as an infantry officer. Primarily in a wide range of assignments, everything from infantry battalions through the special ops community and then a back and forth association. Also include overseas assignments in an advisory.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. Thank you in your current role within EOTG. Can you describe for me what your role is in relationship to the forming and compositing of a Marine Expeditionary Unit?

WIT: None whatsoever. I don't do a mission analysis on how they're formed. Have you been in touch with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , colonel, retired.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): I don't believe we have.

WIT: He just retired out of there. He runs the LOI order the MEF order for forming MEUs. My part in their forming is when they begin their pre deployment training planning or PTP. I start with them down at the Coronado EWTG PAC and I walk them through the R2P2 course. And this focuses on the command element and the MSC leadership, as well as the blue side of the organization. So it's really when I come together as a team and start the planning process for the Marine Corps.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): So what was your first evaluation of the composited MEU?

WIT: Well, again, I seem in the classroom. Okay. You know, a talented bunch. You know, one as they come together and learn this new kind of rapid process planning. But the attention to detail oriented, hardworking, meticulous in meeting deadlines to the point of which -- I mean only in the most laudatory manner, Colonel Chris Bronzi a team player in all regards, fostered a very positive command climate always an overwatch of his a MSC commander's making sure that everything's postured as it should be. Nothing but the A's for everyone in that regard.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Do you, in your capacity, participate in any of the raid packages?

WIT: No. That's done over here across the street at EWTG and I was the G-7 three different times in my career. Okay, once as a lieutenant colonel, when I returned from a double deployment, briefly I went to command. I came back and I ran the EOTG for almost three years. And then I went over to a SOCOM command. Then I went to OIF 1 and 2 and then I came back here and I finished up as the G-7 for another two plus three years.

So I'm very familiar with those raid packages. And, you know, generally company level type training, small unit type training to where they bring it together so that they're ready to begin their integrated training phase. Generally conducted during the BLT forming phase so that, you know, the company commanders have the time to not only learn, but to shape their companies and their personnel, so they're ready to take the next step to where they're going to be integrated as part of the MEU. That's generally pre chop type.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : As you take on the POI of teaching and training this MEU staff, do you have occasion to assess the operational tempo of the MEF and the impact there of on the units as they come into your training curriculum?

WIT: I'm going to give you a bigger picture. Since 2004, the Marine Corps has been a very busy organization. One of which

we've had multiple types of tasking. Now in my frame of reference, I started off an infantry battalion here at 2/1 in the seventies. Really the only thing going with whatever training Camp Pendleton, they were just starting the UDP process in the MCRESS, and the MCCRE, and the first CAX, it was called Palm Tree is those days. They were just starting to kick that off. But the resident staffing of those units all your first term Marines were there for their enlistment. Some would catch a year over to Okinawa before the UDP. And in the 80s, when I was at the start of it, when the MEU SOC program came on, General Gray became Commandant. He recognized if you want to do high in complex training, it's all about staffing and manning those units. Now, what they did very, very good in those days my time, particularly at the company level, was those units were staffed at the right time where I, as a company commander, had them for 12 months before we did battalion training. And by the time we maybe 15 or 16 months later when we did the battalion MCRESS as a BLT, that certified us ready. Now, I will tell you that the staffing, the manning and the equipping and the formation, that unit was the absolute right way to do it. And those Marines were good for at least two deployments in that cycle.

So you were building this very big corporate base where

the next rotation, you may only had a 50 turnover, but you had a kadry within there that could mentor, guide, and lead the younger guys. There was no more than 50 percent turnover in the officers, staff NCOs likewise. So you had a training model there that allowed you to go to a higher level of complexity and be more dynamic in your training and get to that higher level of excellence in execution. 2004 rolls around, okay. Marine Corps gets busy with a OIF. And again, I watch it here. We're forming units. Okay, the first are always the best. And they go for two iterations. But then you saw a kind of a deterioration, you know, falling off in proficiency. The units, they started to train just for OIF or maybe Afghanistan. But what you saw is a lot of core competencies that, I won't say didn't touch them, but they weren't as we were emphasized, for the high-end conflict, peer to peer stuff like that.

Then special MAGTF, Darwin rotation, guarding the border. So what you have our decisions made at the higher level. Okay, that sets priorities. Okay. Now a little bit smaller within those priorities comes risk because you don't have the staffing of these Marines. We're all about our doctrine is centralized planning, centralized briefing, decentralized execution. And that decentralized execution, we're looking for our junior leaders, subordinates to make the difference on the objective. And in my mind and I was always taught by my predecessors is, hey, get it right because your most junior man on an objective, may be your most senior man. At the end of the

day, though, was always the emphasis that small unit leader squad's crew served weapons, fire support coordination. You know, we were very bulletproof on it, much like, for example, 8th and I there in the parade season. They don't join people in the middle of a parade season. They don't join people at the end of the parade season. You know, they have a mission and they know how to get that level of excellence is you start in the forming phase and you take it all the way through and reinforce those basics and fundamentals through reps and sets.

We kind of lost that model here with all these taskings. 1/1 the battalion commander, I think I was just out there superb. And I asked, what did you do for your pre deployment training? Oh I was guarding the border. And then he had a compressed time to get all these new people together to get them kind of ready for integrated training. What you see in the model here today in particularly in the MEU is you see a lot of that core competency training at a -- what should be standalone unit training is being folded into integrated training between the MEU PTP. Okay, I understand the demands of the Marine Corps. We don't say no to tasking. But that the calculus is catching up with pay. And then we used to have regiments aligned to missions getting. 1st Marines always had to BLT mission for the MEUs.

You know, we were pretty good, but especially at the company level and as they say, get company to the X, Gameover.

Okay, so the current manning and staffing joining entry level Marines bring PTP during these at sea periods is an F. You're not going to be able to screen assess those skills swim quals don't get that there is trying to get it right. They're trying to get out the door but. What we've done is we've moved the risk as an institution onto the commanders. Commanders do a magnificent job. I think all the MEU commanders on this job for 12 years. But in all my previous ones, they've all been the right guys in the right place at the right time. But now more than ever, with the demands from the Marine Corps and the tasking and the way we're staffing so on, and so, forth, we've moving that risk on the commander now pull it off. They pull it off. But every once in a while, it gets exposed. When I was in command, I had 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. I'm very familiar the water. I ran Amphib recon school. I had a boat company I did a tour 1st Force Recon Battalion. Screen slated this first force. We had a helicopter accident MEU VBSS. And prior to that, I had written an ONS about way the way we were dressed in those helicopters for those missions and it was accepted by the Marine Corps process. It was ranked 144 out of 150 priorities in the Marine Corps and generally many fund you get to the top three or four things. When that accident happened, the next day that move to number one. And they got

everything dressed for an amphibious environment. Still, it persists today. They did have it once upon a time -- and as a result of that accident, they look at the AAV. The first Marines were addressed the same stuff of thing.

So, again, the institution addressed the risks there. We didn't have it right. But right now, in the current state of things, as an institution, as the MEF, on a task, and so, on, so forth, the decisions of manning, planning, and equipment are in not sync with the risk that's being calculated. If that makes sense.

So every commander, in my opinion, is the Marine Corps right now, he has a lot more risk that has been traditionally placed on commanders of the past. The way with our manpower, modeling, staffing, and so, on, and so, forth. We just can't get to the perfect model because of border patrols, guarding, SPMAGTFs, IA in Iraq or Afghanistan. I mean, it's all pulls on the force. You just don't have the ability to make it perfect for units. And a lesser extent, standing missions. If you -- in my day to it wasn't those demands and it was simple. If the commandant said my number one priority is MEUs, that's the crown jewel of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps aligned against that and you could see the results. And there was some have nots on that. But that was the priority set as General Gray saw that is a global crisis response force. We wanted to make sure that they could be legitimately used and be an answer to a requirement from the National Command Authority. And that's when we're when

hostage rescue and things like that. They also very successfully align the Navy against that.

Here in most recent times, too, and again, I don't the institution, we're kind of rediscovering some of our amphibiousness. When I first came in the Marine Corps, everything is centered around and for amphibiousness. We wouldn't buy a piece of gear unless it go through a well deck and the flight. That was kind of the mentality. And we had lots of well decks and flight decks kind of OIF of came along the ten-year period, rightfully so, kind of shifted our interest elsewhere. But now as we're trying to reset, but also at the same the Navy got out of that business as well. You know, they used to have a closed community that kind of threw their own officers in that old sea dogs who knew that business. They knew about PCS guide boats that go with the tracks, and so, on, so forth.

So a lot of that as an institution is kind of atrophied or has been forgotten. And again, we move that risk onto the commanding officers to make this work. And they do. And they do. But every once in a while, something falls off the wheel.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : So within that context and with your experience and in your current role, let's talk about PMINT for the 15th MEU. I mean, my understanding is you were aboard?

WIT: I was. I got out there a couple days late -- there was something going on with my family. So I flew out and I got there The night before or the morning off. So I missed the briefing

sequence on that the Cat one Cat two confirmation brief that was done on that particular event.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): And just clarify, when you say the morning of, you're talking 30 July 2020.

WIT: The date of the accident. So was either the night before or the day. I did not see the -- they were already on San Clemente Island. They were already set there. So we were going through the briefing consequences for other events and that MEU had a very good battle rhythm. It was disciplined. They did things with good order. They had everything well in hand. They were battle tracking. They were very composed MEU. Particularly at this point here you're starting to put all the team together, but there was nothing done, no shortcuts. They were doing it by the book.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): So did you have occasion to see the entire training plan for PMINT?

WIT: I just look at the layout of the at sea periods for PMINT. And I look at that. I know the BLT did a CACs and when we were doing RUT, which is where the MEU command element takes the ACE and certain elements the BLT wouldn't fully participate in that because they had other things that they had to do. Again, their staffing and manning wasn't such that they could do that during what would be traditionally a BLT time to do those things. They came -- in one case they had like a track platoon commander join his track platoon the day we were executing this as a MEU. That's an F.

So that said all the requirements were very well set. But if the officers aren't there -- So now what does the battalion commander have to do? Does he take -- Rob something else to pay something else? You know, again, incurring the risk. Now, I used just use that as a track platoon commander. That was a separate event done at a RUT here aboard the base. That first standing missions, what we do is during RUT, the command element gets used to controlling and operating as a MAGTF. It takes certain elements of the MEU and uses them as maneuver elements. In this case, the trap tactical recovery of aircraft type that's generally a platoon sized organization. It's placed with an air element and those deep and with all the objective area diagram organization about how to do that properly.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Using that as an example, a brand new second lieutenant joining his trap platoon on the day they're conducting a trap mission.

WIT: He missed the trap course over here.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): So are you privy to the briefs that went into the prelude to that mission?

WIT: I sat in on the pre brief he briefed. But where it was apparent was during execution.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Prior to execution, was there any discussion about risk and accepting risk?

WIT: Oh, yes.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Can you talk a little bit?

WIT: If they go, they go through it and do the full ORM.

Chris Bronzi was all over that to make sure -- and, of course, the EOTG provides a backstop. Okay, so at this point in training, everything's backstopped on the thing there. So the risk really for the execution if the airplane falls out of the sky, you know, everything's backstopped. You have lane walkers everywhere to make sure that this doesn't go off the reservation.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): So let's take that that same concept and fast forward to PMINT. You arrived the day of the incident. What is EOTG's role during PMINT?

WIT: They'll do exercise support. Meaning though they'll take certain venues. It's kind of a handshake between the MEU and the EITG. So that they will set up venues, training venues, whether San Clemente Island here at Camp Pendleton, mostly very Camp Pendleton centric. They don't open up the real mission of PMINT is FIBRON MEU integration, meaning what you want to come out of that is the Marine gets from his rack, to his weapon, to the well deck, to the vehicle. And generally, what's emphasized is ship to shore movement, meaning he becomes very familiar with the track movement. If he's going by LCACC, he's going by air.

So you're reinforcing all that ship to shore movement with the documentation's landing plan, and so, on, and so, forth. So the Marines -- that's a big gap because nobody's been -- these Marines -- used to be in my day who's been on a ship before two-thirds. You form a unit today, who's been on the ship before. Onesies and twosies.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): What did you observe as part of pre action?

WIT: Yeah. Again, they were already on San Clemente Island when I got there. So I missed that planned brief part exercise when I got there. The track company was already on San Clemente Island executing. That particular thing was already executed when I joined them too.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): You had no observation of any risk discussions?

WIT: No. None whatsoever. That was already executed. So -- and then they were going through the withdrawal phase and I went to the effect is what I really focused on with the MEU staff. The ARG staff is at that point the importance of battle tracking. Okay, we have a unit and movement and are they battle tracking and within the Alpha? Well, the right things were going on. They had the phase leg, they're called the beach. They would call the stuff as it was moving off the beach. Per the X checklist. They do that by checklist.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): Yep. Got it. Previous to that, you

talked about EOTG providing a backstop during training as a way to mitigate risk.

WIT: They do certain mission profiles for example, VBSS. They will take that. That's a course they teach and module they teach and certify. So they have the backstop for that one traditionally. So they'll look at the safety boat in the water and, you know, instructors all around on the vessel, on the shouldering ship. You know, all over the place there. But this particular thing on a track company, I've never seen that in my time. We didn't do it because the VBSS and the tracks were so, in and how we do things in SOP. They've been around forever and so that -- I won't say it's routine but I will tell you that there's associated risk with that operationally. It just never was looked at as something that it's something we've done for a long time, much like we do helicopters off of flight decks. And appropriately it was discussed. I'm sure between a FIBRON staff and setting up the tables and things like that.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay, now, when you say it's something that are you talking from your position in EOTG or are you talking --

WIT: I'm talking from a career of doing this in the business. I was never in a track company. But they run a mechanized course that they go to as a company. So EOTG has a module where that company will ride to an objective in tracks here on land and get out unfold and do what rifle companies do.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Is there any waterborne evaluation.

WIT: No. We've never had to go there, you know, because again, that was a very traditional skill that had been resident in the Marine Corps forever.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Let's jump to back to PMINT. But instead of just focusing on that mech raid. I'd like to get your assessment of the operational tempo and what was going on the ship as far as MEU staff as far as BVL staff?

WIT: Yeah, I can say that everybody was fully engaged and doing what they were doing. There was no casual approach to anything. Watches were manned. The various diagrams were posted. I go to tack log to make sure the ship to shore movement thing is on the wall there. So everything, if you had a checklist, every check would have been checked off.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : So everything -- you referred to, everyone was doing what they were doing. Always doing what they were supposed to be doing.

WIT: That's right.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Was that the only mission going on at that time?

WIT: Well, at the time, I was in the LFAC that was the mission that was being executed. Meaning that was the thing. And now there were other planning processes going on, but that was not going on during that movement.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): In your experience, who would have been in the Lfog during a mechanized raid from -- would BLT leadership being the LFAC?

WIT: Yeah, I would say, you know, he's in there looking at the X check or his opso. So certainly the MEU ops. So sometimes the MEU CO or MEU XO. More than likely Chris Bronzi with anything was going on. He was there. You know, he was very much, as you say, his presence was felt everywhere. So, you know, what you have there is a seven warfighting functions represented on the table there. You have a common operational picture then also what you have next to it is a job which is the Navy equivalent of the FIBRON staff. That's kind of a one for one thing. And they're going, I hate it. There's a steel wall between them, but you walk between each one to make sure that you're in sync with what they see and what is thing and you go back and forth. So there's commonality of that picture and we're aligned of what's going on.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}
_{(7)(c)}): Was the staff at that point, and in your opinion, proficient enough at operational command to control?

WIT: Yeah. That the MEU staff -- after RUT no question that the operational side their ability to do shape time and space seven more finding functions, they got it. So they do it on paper, at R2P2 course, and then they moved to RUT, which is really how they bring the MAGTF together. Now you got to make the cartoons with real troops on them over the realistic distances. So absolutely. I didn't see any -- they were

noteworthy in most cases, though, fires, maneuver, com, there was nothing deficient that I saw at that particular point in time. But the complexity of what they were executing, they were well aligned against that.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)_(c)): Do you think that they were ready to execute at that complexity level.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)_(c)): At that time in permit, given the fact that it's not just them it's also the blue team who may not be at that level?

WIT: Well, again, I can only talk to the on staff on the ship I'm on. The LPD was at Somerset -- I'd have to go over there and watch if he's the guy boat in the water wave and stuff like that. That's when he's designated that you should that there's a OPNAV tasking that the Navy has a document that designates them, that they have a kind of a checklist do that.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)_(c)): Which ship were you on?

WIT: *Makin Island*.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)_(c)): How far away was that from the *Somerset*?

WIT: The *Somerset* was just off of the beach there off to the north. So *Makin Island* was down there. So it wasn't that that far you could probably say 20 miles maybe if that. But certainly, within range of radios or anything, there was no com difficulty there.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): I'd be interested in your assessment of the training objectives laid out for the PMINT evolution. Did you find them ambitious - was that standard, was it normal?

WIT: Very much standard for all MEUs about that time. Now, I did not see the rifle companies at the raid courses. Now, when I was director, you know, I would go out and watch them, you know, and I didn't focus so much, but I would focus on them on the MEU staff when I was on active duty. And again, that's what I do now. But the rifle companies proficiency their courses, the MET course that they ran there, I don't know. Again, not having seen them. But when I retired and seen the trends of what staffing or lack thereof, the question is, was all the Marines present at that raid course. That mech raid course as company that went to San Clemente Island and I read all the investigation or anything, but I suspect not because they were joining people in the BLT during PMINT or prior to getting on ship payment. And during the process that was the manpower. You know, I don't have all of it. I just kind of looked at it. Case in point, we do debrief in their cycle. Here's what a MEU staff cycle is. It's plan, brief, execute, debrief. You know, just repeat, rinse it. And, you know, you do that over and over. And so, when we went to the trap and RUT and the execution just didn't match the briefing. And so, we're bringing in, you know, leave the Eagles at the door, you know, and the platoon commander just struggled. You know, he's forgot to bring antenna's, he didn't detail the inspection and I, of course,

look that was taught at the course. Well, I wasn't -- I didn't attend the course so there's kind of a disconnect on it. So I don't know if that can be said the same for that rifle company on those tracks. But to your question, what they did at San Clemente Island during PMINT is probably been standard for 40 years. You know, it wasn't anything that should have been absolutely above thing, mitigating maybe if they had time. Now they drove the tracks onto the ships here at Camp Pendleton offload. There was no apparent leaking of the vehicles. You know, that company loaded them here at Del Mar and swam out to the ships and got on their ships. You know, so if you want to count that as a first-time rehearsal, yeah, that probably could do that. So, yeah, I don't know what that company's experience as far as what wet well and track on the integration began. But at PMINT it's about ship to shore connectors. That there wasn't anything out of the ordinary at all.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So in the conduct of their training, for example, a mechanized raid that conducts waterborne operations - my understanding is EOTG is from feet dry on.

WIT: That's correct.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): But is there a movement inclusive of that? And going back to your analogy of providing a backstop, would EOTG be aware of the training status of the Marines conducting this? Would there be a question: Are all of you Marines underwater egressed trained, as a safety checklist?

WIT: What you have is -- two ways to look at that. And you have an LOI conference with the battalion before there. And each course is outlining what they should show up with. Since there's not a water-borne movement on that. Probably doesn't address that side of the story. I ran the Amphib recon school serve pack at the time we fell under and their rule was, if you're a Marine in an Amphib from recon school and you're in the search zone in the ocean, you had to be a certified first class swimmer to begin day one. So that we made that part of the MOS. Much like the trackers have in MOS, they have to have a certain swimming proficient to have that.

Okay, when I have the boat company, we had the Boston whalers thing and on it -- to be a passenger on that, go through the open ocean thing, you had to be a third class swimmer. If you're a scout swimmer, or a coxswain, you got to be a first class swimmer. But what we did is we understood that requirement. And I had the time as a company commander to go to the pool before I went to those courses, of course, that was taught down it, then LFTC pack, now EOTG back the first night and date next day. They put us all in the pool and they verified those swim results.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): So understand that certain requirements are a necessity to do certain tasks. What I'm asking is in your capacity as EOTG, would you have visibility over any of them or

would that be a concern to you in the conduct of one of your training evolutions?

WIT: No because we always -- the tracks started from the high water line. I mean, they're gonna go out to papa three area. The company will martial with them and then they'll go to line departure from there. So we never went in the water because of the objectives.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : So how about for a trap that it comes off grey ships to conduct a trap inland? Would you be concerned and from a safety perspective, would that be one of the questions before this happened? Is everyone trained to fly over water?

WIT: Yeah. So they get a MEF LOI for putting a MEU together.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : I'm familiar with the LOI. I'm just wondering if that would be something that EOTG even looks at?

WIT: I can't tell you that. I will tell you in our day we did all that land-based training. So we never had to address that requirement. But the trap always flew, well, you know, LZ here, LZ there. And I guess maybe a bad assumption was because the next time Waterborne training was going to happen was during PMINT. And that's where the MEU really has the operational design in partnership with the EOTG.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , do you have any questions?

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): No, I think pretty much everything was answered that I had a question about. So I don't really have anything.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): We do have another administrative statement that we make towards the end. Before I go to that, is there anything relevant to this particular incident that you would like to add?

WIT: We have to train. We have to train. And we have to do this. But, of course, one injury, one death, it's too many. But we somehow have to figure this out. And the risk of that has to be held by the institution. If the commanding officer is going to exercise the authorities, he needs to execute this safely. We need -- and again, I understand we are in more demand and tasking the Marine Corps than we've ever been. You know, I look at it, I scratch my head and it's a miracle. But at some point in time, we need to reset the force, understanding that we're gonna have to do this. But what's going to be the pipeline in the training, manning, and equipping to make sure. The other sad part, like I said, we're not getting two pumps out of these kids anymore because of the deployment cycle, but we heavily invest in them, get them through a deployment, and they're out after four years.

Now, that that might be because of the Navy Amphib shipping the demands and deployment stuff. But again, in my day, I did 2 deployments with basically the same guys and some extended to make sure. So the unit cohesion was absolutely, you

know, built on it. And and a lot of ways we policies when these MEUs are at the best is the day that they all get home. And then we push them and I get it. We have the good of the Marine Corps and we understand that. But somehow the institution just needs to examine that. And there's going to -- when you have decisions that is that priorities are made on, there's always going to be associated risk. And we as an institution just got to make sure that we haven't immediately moved that to the commander. The things that he doesn't have control over. If the people aren't there on a certain day to do it and if you're joining them, I always -- again, when I was commander, when a guy showed up, there was a cut off. I'd rather go with less. But everybody that was fully trained and try to, you walk somebody up to speed during the execution. But that's not the way.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , one I want to thank you for your insights. Very informative. Very helpful.

WIT: No, this is important to me. I mean, this is what we do as a Marine Corps. We need to keep continue to do it. I'm not advocating that we get rid of all this because the risk is this, that we need to just get rid of it. That's not the answer.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): I do have an administrative closing statement that I must read to you.

You are requested not to discuss this interview with anyone or discuss anything that was discussed during this interview with anyone other than members of the investigation team. If you are asked about the investigation, please do not

answer any questions and immediately notify me, Lieutenant
Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), one of the investigating
officers, or your chain of command.

[The investigative interview closed at 1732, 16 April 2021.]

I, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), attest that the preceding transcript
is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of
Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) held on 16 April 2021.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Col, USMC

[The investigative interview commenced on 1405, 15 April 2021.]

[WIT: Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[CR: GySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. So witness is major -- what's your first name?

WIT: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) .

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) .

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): What's a good phone number for you?

WIT: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) .

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And your e-mail?

WIT: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) .

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And your current billet?

WIT: I'm the Amphibious Raids Branch OIC for I MEF, EOTG.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. And my name is Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) . I'm an infantry officer by trade, and I've been appointed as part of this investigation team.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Master Gunnery Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) . I am assault amphibian vehicle specialist for PP&O, 1833 by trade, and I have also been appointed by the ACMC for this

investigation.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): And we are doing this in the EOTG trailer.

Okay. There's some administrative stuff that I got to read, and then we'll get into the questions.

WIT: Okay.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Good afternoon. My name is Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, and I'm part of the team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation the 15th MEU and actions and decisions associated with the material conditioning, training, and personnel readiness thereof.

This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020. We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April '21, to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with

information relevant to the investigation.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed me to the investigation team on 8 April 2021, and I'm talking with you in my investigatory capacity as representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We are required to provide General Thomas with a written report upon completion of our investigation. These are the two designation letters right there.

I'm talking with you because the investigating team believes you might have information that might be relevant to investigation. It's important for us to understand, basically, the scope of the training and any detailed information you can give us on the training of Bravo Company and the attached AAV platoon in -- during the PTP of the 15th MEU. So please inform us if anything you believe would be -- should be considered in this review.

The topics I'd like to cover with you today may include the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, training and material readiness surrounding information in compositing of the 15th MEU, and I MEF oversight of the 15th MEU.

This is an administrative investigation; however, due to the sensitive nature of ongoing review, we are asking

personnel we talked to as part of investigation not to share anything we discuss today with any other person.

So before we start, do you have any questions about my role or this investigation?

WIT: No.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. Could you, please, just state your name, rank, and current billet?

WIT: Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, and then I'm the Amphibious Raids Branch OIC for I MEF, EOTG.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): And what was your billet on 30 July 2020?

WIT: The Amphibious Raiders Branch OIC for I MEF, EOTG.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. So there's some generic questions we want to get to first. Can you talk about the command climate or the general climate of training within EOTG, let's say, from January to the mishap in June?

WIT: So are you saying like, how is the command climate in EOTG?

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Yeah. So, I don't mean just command climate, did people enjoy showing up to work. I'm talking about, you know, a little bit deeper. You know, what were the some of the institutional issues that you saw, not only in EOTG, but

really more focused on the training units that you were seeing at that time coming through. Were there trends, external or internal factors that were, you know, out of the ordinary that the MSEs were having to contend with?

WIT: So, kind of, a two-part question, and I'll try to answer it in two parts. So the first one is maybe institutional issues with EOTG, or maybe not issues, but things that make us unique are that we are not a TECOM school.

So there's not really -- I mean, the MEU and the BLTs and MSEs have their METS that they need to accomplish, but really the -- I guess, the criteria for accomplishing those METS and what judges them as either trained or untrained is really just the personal opinions of the people that work here.

So going off the T&R Manual, which is in large part, you know, what the rest of that Marine Corps does. But I think that leaves a lot of subjectivity to it. And that is also something that is very freeing to us that allows us to keep up to date with current TTPs overseas and what guys are doing.

So it's good in one respect that we're not associated with TECOM, but in another respect, it's basically the quality of the training, the quality of the courses, are going to be a direct reflection of the people who hold the billets at the time.

So there's a huge ebb and flow depending on, Hey, is this billet being filled by the right MOS? Is it being filled by a TAD officer or SNCO, or is it someone on permanent orders who wanted to come here?

So, kind of, internally in EOTG, that's the flavor of who we are. I think from that period from really January to June, really solid team on our side, kind of, across the board. So the branch OICs, as well as the operation section and the director of EOTG, all very solid in my estimation. Officers and, excuse me, and SNCOs, all guys, who in large part, are here because they have MEU experience and have participated in EOTG POIs in the past.

And then, what was the second part of your question, sir? It was more kind of like the battalion itself, or?

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Well, just, I guess, external factors. So thinking back on that time, you know, as you see these units come in to train, would you say that there is anything externally; COVID, GFM, anything like that you noticed a difference in their preparedness to execute the POI.

WIT: So COVID was definitely -- I mean, it just started ramping up when they came through the POI, specifically their through mech company. We tried to mitigate as best we could, but

we're one of the few units their required to go through to conduct a deployment. So we did as much as you can socially distance. Obviously, you get in the back of the track, and, you know, you're not socially distancing that much. So that was a moderate factor.

Really, I think, not so much, and this isn't a 1/4, 15th MEU, specific thing, mechanised companies. This is the way it has been -- I've been here a little over a year and a half, and then my several predecessors, the mech company showed up and the day they met their guys was the first day of our amphibious raids course.

So when I say, "they met their guys," so the first time the company commander met his AAV unit that he was going to operate with was day one of the mech course. That is not unique to 1/4. So that is pretty typical. And when I say "typical," I actually haven't seen it any other way.

The best I've seen is 3/5 just came through the curriculum, and they had the opportunity to meet their AAV platoon, and then they went to ITX. They operated with a separate AAV platoon, and then they came back, and they're able to operate with a platoon that they'd be going forward with.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Is that due to PTP requirements or GFM

requirements from, you know, between AAV Battalion and the division?

WIT: So my understanding is it has to do with the composite. So they typically -- my courses, as well as special training branch -- they're the ones who train reconnaissance -- we are typically the first things that they do upon composite.

So we'll even start our courses maybe a week or two prior to composite, and then all the MSEs and the CE come together composite. They'll start leaning into my courses as well as EWTG PAC, like R2P2. But typically, you have the AAV platoon is going through their PTP, They're MCCRE'ing on their own, and then you have the BLT doing their PTP, their MCCRE. In this case, I believe -- I can't remember what they're doing specifically right before it, but there was this something that precluded them from really compositing and working together prior to our course.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. And then, just backup for a second here, can you talk to me about your MOS and your experience with MEUs and amphibious raids?

WIT: So I'm an infantry man by trade. I did the 31st MEU as a helicopter company commander on the *Bonhomme Richard*, and I did that in summer of 2016.

Then, after that, I went to Expeditionary Warfare School, went back to an infantry battalion, did another company command tour as H&S Company, and deployed on the MRF-D. So while I was on the MRF-D, I took the detachment LFCARAT. I was the OIC of that, and we embarked and did pseudo amphibious operations for about three to four months.

So I would say I have average to above average coming in to EOTG amphibious and MEU experience. And now, I'm probably more experienced than most just given my billet.

I have trained the 15th and the 11th, and I believe I just did my fourth 31st MEU, in terms of PTPs, and a handful SPMAGTFs, but that's not amphibious in nature.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): So when you -- for 3/5, you mentioned that they met their -- briefly met the platoon with ITX and trained with the different platoon. Were you referring to, they went to ITX and trained with a different platoon at ITX?

WIT: Yes. So, and also, there's a little bit of nuance to 3/5. So when 3/5 came through our curriculum, the return to water had not been approved. The 31st MEU was unsure if they were going to embark tracks. That having been said, 3/5 did not want to give up the opportunity to work with tracks. So in -- I guess, I am trying to think, as cheesy as it sounds, they utilize

the tracks to simulate helicopters as an alternate Helo company.

So as you would like, 7 tons, in the case the air falls out, they utilize the tracks for that. It's still required amount of command and control, and then, you know, actually manipulating, VCing, TCing the tracks themselves. So they got a little bit of training and value out of it.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}): Okay. So kind of delving into the more detailed stuff. So I know that you don't do waterborne operations during the EOTG course --

WIT: We do -- so we have not done it during my amphibious raids course in the sense -- in my tenure. My understanding is I think beyond a decade ago they did, but it has since, kind of, gone away. And we transition to they start the actual, no kidding, splash portion of their training once they hit PMINT. And then, then that's when they integrate with the ARG and CSU-15, and then they do amphibious splashes, so ship to shore, shore to shore, and the subsequent exercises, of which we run the site control for. So we're essentially ex-con and evaluation for those events.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}): Do you know why they stopped doing waterborne operations?

WIT: I'm not sure to be completely honest with you.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): In your opinion, would it make sense to do, in a controlled environment, like a raid course, to do some sort of waterborne operations, even if it's not, you know, obviously, it's not going to be possible to get a ship involved, but just to do simple splashes in the boat basin or off the beach?

WIT: Yes. One hundred percent, sir. And so, 1/5 is scheduled to come through our training curriculum in August, and we're talking to 3rd Tracks, and we are working on a memorandum of agreement to have them facilitate our safety structure to do waterborne operations and in all subsequent raid courses.

I think one of the things that specifically sets my school house aside from what a battalion or maybe even ITX can provide the training unit is kind of that early and late phase of operation. So at ITX, you can't splash, or if you're going through a MCCRE or battalion PTP, aviation is limited, CRRCs are limited, but when you come to my school house, everything's available to you. And so, I think it makes sense. That's even just one thing that sets us apart and validates our existence is doing the actual movement from and to objective.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): To delve into the specifics of BLT 1/4, is there anything that stands out in your mind when they did -- I

mean, you mentioned the fact that they had just met their platoon that day, but when it comes to just basic evaluation of their core METs, anything that stood out to you?

WIT: So there were actually a really good company relatively, sir -- relative to the rest of the MEF. I still have the PECL and the right up on them. I can provide you after this, sir.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Please do.

WIT: Okay. So we do a full PECL for conducting an amphibious raid, kind of, company level leadership is good. Obviously, I know I'm saying that knowing that there is investigation that occurred that identified that they weren't doing everything the way they should. But in terms of morale of the unit and conducting, kind of, like 1 to 5000 level infantry tasks, not integrated infantry tasks, but just pure infantry tasks, they did well.

Same thing with the BLT. BLT commander was out there nearly every raid supervising the guys. As was the MEU commander was out there for at least 50 percent of the raids that we ran, observing and the training that was conducted.

So in terms of just, if you're not putting the amphibious aspect into it, they were well above average.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): And can you speak at all about the kind of the safety culture. Was it something that was notable or -- notable either way that they were focused on making sure that they did PCCs, PCIs, vehicle checks, vehicle briefs, that kind of stuff? Does any of that --

WIT: So I'm out there for a lot of it. I was not observing specifically PCCs or crew chiefs going over, Hey, in the case of this happening, this is what you guys do. I did not observe that. Did it not happen, I'm not sure. I've read the investigation where it definitely points to it did not happen. But in terms of the squad leaders PCCing, PCIing and their guys about the mission, writ large, that did happen.

So but kind of -- in my estimation, a lot of, kind of, and this might be going beyond the scope of what you're talking about, but if you look at the AAV T&R Manual and the Infantry T&R Manual, it has them trained to a lot of crucial tasks, but doesn't have them training together to a lot of crucial tasks. So I think a lot of what happened, or again, perhaps, beyond the scope of this, is the AAV crewmen had all the knowledge in the world, but the infantrymen in the back had not gone through those, probably what would be, 1 to 3000 level tasks with them.

And I think a lot of that was taken for granted.

Because when the first time you meet your tracks is going through my course, all my courses are a company to battalion level course. There is not -- our focus is not the 1 at 3000 level tasks.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): So what is a typical -- as you and your team go out there to do a full mission profile with them on the raid course, what's a typical compliment look like? You have --

WIT: In terms of my instructors, sir?

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}): Right.

WIT: So my school house -- so at my school house, there's essentially what we've called "raids proper." And then, I have the ropes detachment that falls under me, too, so the guys that do HRST and solo climbers. But if you're looking at raids proper, I have anywhere from 14 to 15 instructors, and when we do an amphibious raid course, every single one of them is out there.

The exact troop to task is I will be paired up with the command element, my deputy be paired up with our fires, then we have an evaluator with each one of their assault support security sections. Typically, tracks, for the mechanized companies, will send out maybe their Ops0 or somebody from -- the company commander from 3rd Tracks to come out and observe it.

I believe that they did for at least one of our runs

out there. I couldn't be for certain. I would have to look through my emails and see if that did occur. I can't remember specifically.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): If you could confirm that, sir, and send us -- provide us that that would be great --

WIT: Okay.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): -- and specifically, if that did occur, who it was?

WIT: Okay. It's -- the guy I normally talk to is the OpsO. So for them, it would have been to OpsO prior to Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). His name is escaping, but again, I could --

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

WIT: Yeah. And I've worked with him quite a bit in the past.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Of the -- so before you move on, on the construct of that your team, is that 14 and 15 instructors; is at permanent structure?

WIT: So it's all permanent. And then, I have one contractor, so he is -- but, he is -- everyone's a safety officer, so he's a safety officer. But he is not actually built into what we would consider a part of our safety structure that we rely on. There is redundancy over where he is located, and

that the specific individuals normally located with the R&S element.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Of that permanent structure, what is the composition, you know, as far as like rank and MOS mix?

WIT: So my --

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): I don't need you to list each one of them. I would like to get a copy of your actual T/O.

WIT: Okay. I'll have to -- if you don't mind, I want to write down a couple of these -- a couple of the do-outs. But I can talk as I am doing that.

So of the 14 to 15, I have about seven staff sergeants, a handful of gunny's, a master sergeant, two captains, and my contractor. So we're fairly, as far as looking at, kind of, like MEF level schools, a fairly senior crew.

There are certainly guys that just luck into orders coming out here. But a lot of it is, kind of, like a back door recruitment process. So for myself, I knew the previous OIC of raids branch. We both came from 1/1.

Same thing with a lot of my instructors. So my lead instructor for what is our mech week, he's a staff sergeant who's been in a mechanized company. He is an infantryman by trade.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And are there any AAV MOSs is in the

mix, either officer or enlisted?

WIT: There are none. That is a deficiency that we have, and it's part of what we've built into the memorandum of agreement with 3rd Tracks is that we will, obviously, need to get in with those personnel very early. Because I can develop what would be a safety plan out there, understanding that I'm an infantryman. And so, there's probably gaps, and I would need 3rd Tracks to cover down and help me identify where the gaps are.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So based off of that comment, I mean, in your assessment, is the ability to evaluate the AAV platoon, as well as the integration of that platoon and infantry company into a mechanized company, a gap?

WIT: So for land based operations, between my instructors and myself, I'm comfortable with doing motorized and mechanized operations. I think I probably misspoke in the fact that where we would really have a gap would be when we reintroduce the waterborne operations.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So --

WIT: It would certainly be an augment, and it would, I think, be responsible to give us the one that was a tracker by trade for even the curriculum as we had it back then. But we're just going off of what we would consider experience, Hey,

motorized and mechanized operations as grunts and developing training for that.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Because you're evaluating based off the employment, right?

WIT: Yes.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): But there's nobody in the construct from your staff that is able to look on a technical aspect that's wrong or right?

WIT: No.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Its more of like --

WIT: No there is not.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): -- doctoral employment of a unit, you know, in that kind of capacity. That's kind of where I'm looking at. Like, your staff's ability to understand employment, and then understand the safety construct, and then understand the -- you see an infantryman handling his weapon wrong, you know that's wrong. But you see an AAV crewman handling his AAV wrong, you may not know it is wrong.

WIT: We might miss it. No. I completely agree with you. I think safe aspect wise, I can mitigate them running over each other. But in terms of evaluation, there's so much technical aspect to the MOS. I know -- I'm a grunt and I like to think I

can do everything, but the reality of it is, is that I can't. I didn't spend 20 years in the field. I would not be able to evaluate them, and am not able to evaluate them as much as I could if I had one on staff.

Previously, this is something that myself and Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, our OpsO, over a year ago, I would say maybe hit the very draft level process of requesting a FAP from 3rd Tracks. There's some e-mail traffic on it -- well before the 1/4 incident occurred.

So this is something that we have identified that, Hey, if we want to professionalize the course, we need a by-MOS guy as part of our cadre.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Switching gears a little bit on you, but, so, again, specific to this raid course with 1/4, the mechanized raid course for 1/4, do you remember there being any material readiness issues that hindered the course?

WIT: I can't say for sure. I know, typically, they'll have at least a handful of AAVs go out -- go down throughout the week, which is a little bit of the reason why we'll typically do for the two raids -- I say, when I say "we'll do," what we've done in the past, what we're moving to in the future is slightly different, as I've told you. We will have them, for one raid --

they'll conduct two raids in a week. They will start and end at BLS, the beach landing site. The second one, they will start and end at Firebase Gloria, just simply due to it's an additional probably seven to ten kilometers, making that extra leg of the journey. And the vehicles will simply attrite by then due to maintenance. So just to cut off a little bit that we can for that last portion.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): That's a pretty significant trend?

WIT: It is. I wouldn't even -- I would say it's the standard.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. That's pretty insightful.

WIT: Yeah.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): And that's the second mission of the week?

WIT: Yes.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): And so, I think the -- really the last question I'll ask is, you mentioned that EOTG does training and evaluations for, not just MEUs, but also for special purpose MAGTFs, and other units that are deployed?

WIT: So we're kind of the catch all. Our primary mission is the SoCal MEUs, the 11th, 13th, 15th, followed by the 31st MEU, SPMAGTF, a lot of the, kind of, ancillary missions, like

Task Force Ellis. When things like that come up -- you know, we're assisting EWS this very week with their spring OFAC, but the primary mission are the SoCal MEUs.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. And I guess I have one more question, specifically about PMINT.

I know that you don't participate in PMINT. That's purely a PHIBRON, MEU integration exercise. But do you all have any kind of feedback on what they're doing? So as you're supposed to be evaluating throughout the course of this PTP, I'm envisioning that there's this two- or three-week period where they're going to go off and they're going to do very substantive training to that PTP, which you need to be able to build on the next phase, MEUEX. So were you able to do -- do you typically see or know what the MEUs are planning to do on PMINT?

WIT: I am familiar with it. I do not see feedback or output from that, Hey, they performed to this level in this category.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Right. But, I guess, you see -- EOTG knows what they're doing at least?

WIT: Yes. Yes. And it's because we're integrated with a PHIBRON and CSG-15.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): And in your experience, you've seen

quite a few different MEUs. Was this PMINT any different than any other in terms of the things that they wanted to accomplish?

WIT: I think I'm probably speaking a little bit outside of what I'd be comfortable, you know, my just level of knowledge on it, but with the 15th MEU, to me, there is nothing exceptional about them.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): For follow on evaluation throughout the PTP, are you guys -- is your staff involved in the other at sea periods and the rest of the --

WIT: We are. So obviously, we do our raid courses, and then we are not involved in PMINT. Usually, we'll have, perhaps, the 31st MEU or an SPMAGTF in that gap, and then we'll come right back during RUT, and then during ARG MEUEX and COMPTUEX.

So we run -- just since I've been here, we have run every BLT objective during all those subsequent at sea periods or RUT as well.

And that is -- it'll be purely my guys with the some argument site support, or not augmented role players, augmented OIC, but really we provide the safety structure for all that stuff.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): At objective?

WIT: At objective.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): So there's no body on deck. So ship to shore --

WIT: So we have -- my personnel are not on ship. That would be one of the other branches, exercise branch.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): Okay.

WIT: But what they're doing on ship is really working with and evaluating command element and white celling the command element. There is not, per se, a BLT specific representative on ship. So that is something we would like to do if we could. I would probably be the one to do that.

That having been said, I typically -- my branch will run anywhere from nine to about 12 sites on the shoreside. So it just makes more sense for me to be on the shore side.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): It's a capacity issue?

WIT: Yes.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): When a battalion does support you all, what does that -- what do they actually provide you outside of someone just sitting there observing? Do they provide you any sort of evaluation output?

WIT: So what we do is, we'll -- there are several evaluations throughout what would be their amphibious raid week. So they'll do a rehearsal of concepts brief and combined arms

rehearsal on either the Monday or Tuesday of that week. And we will provide them an out brief from that on, just like, Hey, here are the wickets that you hit, the wickets that you need to tease out a little bit more on the information that as we communicated.

Again, there's nothing formalized with 3rd AA Battalion, and they will send people if they can, and they're aware that the training is going on. And I'll typically coordinate with their OpsO ahead of time. But they like to be at the rock in combined arms rehearsal, and then normally, they'll be at, you know, perhaps, one of the raids.

And after the raids, we bring everybody in and we do a complete debrief immediately following the raid. So they get back, get off the tracks, get accountability, and then their squad leaders will receive a debrief from us.

And there is not -- they do not factor into the PECL that we provide back. So the PECL we'll take -- Hey, you know, Captain Howley, if that point was critical, makes sense to include in the overall PECL, I will compile that. But they're not providing an AAV evaluation to the MEU or tests that I'm aware of.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): How many MEUs a year do you support roughly?

WIT: So we support two 31st a year, and we send out a SoCal MEU, I think about every one-and-a-half years. So we train one -- I said that wrong. Basically, we'll do one to two SoCal MEUs a year and just depending on how the year falls.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): So it could be anywhere between three and four times a year, and is the PTP for 31st MEU pretty much the same?

WIT: The PTP in terms of what we train is very similar. The difference is, typically, like the ACE supporting them is going to be a different ACE. Sometimes, we can get the same ACE to support the 31st MEU, but since they haven't composited, they are not always able to train with the unit that they're going to deploy with.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Does that apply to the attachments as well, so in this case, like the AA platoon.

WIT: So the AA platoon, I believe it is typically the same one. So again, 3/5 just came through the package, it was their AA platoon that they're going to deploy with.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. So as part of this MOA that you're working to do waterborne operations, is there any talk of having -- including in that MOA somebody from the AA Battalion.

WIT: So we --

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): -- to be, basically, a ship rider, even if they're not part, but to to assist in the supervision of the AA platoon?

WIT: No, not currently. So for the memorandum of agreement, it's only for my course right now. And it's just for O-2 to O-3 and E-6 to E-7 to come and facilitate, and then we have a time line requirement for periodic planning meetings ahead of the course to help develop the training and safety structure. But there is not, as part of that -- unless EOTG, unbeknownst to me, added something to the MOA, which I don't believe they have at this time.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): I don't have any more questions.

Master Guns?

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): To kind of follow up on that point, in your opinion, what would be the best case scenario for you from, as in a permanent structured type of thing, from an AA perspective?

WIT: I think, honestly, it's kind of -- in the MOA that we request in o-2 to O-3 and E-6 to E-7 to come facilitate working on staff. I mean, it's a third of the BLT's combat power is mech. It's probably -- I mean, if you actually qualify it, it's probably more than that. It makes sense that we would have that

to, obviously, develop safety, but for the evaluation and ensure we're providing these guys with the right PTPs to go forward with.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): From an institutional perspective, so we have three EOTG, right? I have a follow-up question on the third EOTG, but what's the commonality between the two? So you're not TECOM units, right? No TECOM POIs kind of stuff. It's very MEF based. Do you all have like a joint thing that you do as EOTGs to try and build some sort of commonality in those training plans?

WIT: This has been something we've identified as a shortfall, but there is not anything that -- the only thing that would link us is, so I'm one of a handful of majors that works there. One of the other majors went through II MEF EOTG as a company commander. That's the commonality that we have. So all of our curriculums are very different. The way we train are very different.

III MEF EOTG is almost a totally different mission set from us. So I think what you're getting at is, absolutely, it is a deficiency and we need to do a better job of tying in with them.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Obviously, you know, each MEF and the

MEU cycles coming from each of those MEFs have very different missions. That's, you know, potentially -- so there is some difference there but. I was curious about, like, where things would have commonality. But that is a deficiency that you guys see.

And the follow-up with the third EOTG, what's your relationship with them, given the fact that you are doing -- the way I understand it, you're doing PTP training with the BLT prior to them departing for Okinawa, pre-composite to the 31st MEU. Well, what's the link and file to that?

WIT: So we actually just dove into this, and we've got the document. I can push it to you.

I can't remember if it's the 31st memorandum of agreement or if it's the 31st MEU SOP. I can't read which document it is, but actually in the document that is signed, we are supposed to provide 31st MEU with an out brief for performance. It has not happened up until 3/5.

And so, what we do or what we have done -- I don't want to what we do, because it's going to change or it is in the process of changing and it has changed. Each company that comes through gets a PECL. Like I said, it's kind of a sterile PECL and has, you know, several paragraphs of remarks under the

subsections. And then, I essentially write up like a report card for each company that comes through.

And up to this point, that has gone to the BLT only for the 31st MEU. When we have a SoCal MEU coming through, it goes through to the command element. So I try to, in large part, only communicate with the command element, and then they sub-task the MSCs.

For Victor 3/5 and we just set it up as an enduring thing, we actually reached out to you Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, with the 31st MEU and his team and we provided them, hey, here's the debrief of Victor 3/5 through the amphibious raids package.

And we were able to talk, at least in a general sense, on the performance of each company and what their deficiencies are and, kind of, where they are heading. That is something that Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} is definitely identified that he wants to continue it pursuing in the future. As well as, they are already planning, kind of, continuum for that. I think we're going to talk to them via SVTC --

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): That's a direct link to 31st MEU, not --

WIT: The 31st MEU.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Not EOTG?

WIT: Not III MEF out there. So III MEF was on this last video teleconference call, but again, they're was not -- the primary audience was the 31st MEU, not through III MEF EOTG.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. You got anything else, Master Guns?

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): No, sir.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): I just got one more, kind of, admin paragraph here.

WIT: I think probably after we turn this off, I have a comment I would definitely bring up with you.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): You are directed not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone other than members of the investigation team.

If you're asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify me, the investigating officer, or your commanding officer.

WIT: Okay. Understood.

[The investigative interview closed at 1443, 15 April 2021.]

[The investigative interview resumed at 1444 on 15 April 2021.]

WIT: So generally, what I was bringing up is, again, this was not necessarily prompted by a question, but I just wanted to make sure -- it was with the you all, gentleman, is that, in my

estimation, it is an extremely common practice in the MEF; specifically, 1st Marine Division, to waive UET and SVET requirements for units conducting a splash.

I've got two examples, one of which would be Victor 1/4, but I think, potentially, even a more catastrophic example would be, so when I was part of Victor 1/1 came back from the MRF-D in October of, I believe it was either, '19 or 2020. It was the last MRF-D rotation they did.

They were assigned is the exercise Steel Knight unit that was going to land from a float. We identified I was the lead planner for that for Victor 1/1, and then from the 1st Marine Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} was the lead planner from the regiment. We identified that Victor 1/1 was not going to be prepared with the ability to conduct UET or SVET training, to conduct that splash.

And we registered the RFI, basically, up to the regiment, up to division, Hey, this is not something that we'll be prepared to do. It was pushed back down to us. The policy, at least at the time, that the UET and SVET waiver could be, kind of, all the way directed down to the O-5 commander and the chain of command. So 1/1 specifically was told you will do this training. It put Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} in a position where

he had to assume the responsibility for that. And the entire unit conducted an amphibious splash without anyone having an active qualification for underwater egress trainer.

That was extremely common practice back then, and the reason I can generalize and say that is in talking to Captain (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), he was the one that provided me with the policy. Hey, this is the, no kidding, policy saying what the rank requirement is to assume this risk. And he said it was common policy for units conducting training with them to, basically, not do the UET for the Marines go through.

So that was the case for the entirety of Victor 1/1 and exercise Steel Knight when conducted the swash. They were not UET qualified. And so, kind of, reading through the investigation with Victor 1/4, Hey, not all these guys who received the training the was required, that certainly is not on a company commander, Lieutenant Colonel Regner, or, perhaps, even Colonel Bronzie. I think it would be more of a MEF, even an institutional problem.

So, again, that's in my limited scope as, you know, a major. But often, it's guys like me who are the ones that are kind of at the level of conduct of this training, and we see this is a huge issue.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): That is helpful. I appreciate your candor on that, sir. That's definitely helpful.

WIT: We were definitely very uncomfortable in 1/1 doing that, so.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): That generates a thought in my mind. Does EOTG, when you guys start out raid week, you know, doing the mech course, do you guys verify any of the training data? You know, are these guys swim qualified, have they done UET training?

Is that part of the scope of what you guys look at prior to the training?

WIT: So we haven't in the past because we have the water aspect --

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): I'm sure in the future you will be, but I am referring to like in the past --

WIT: In the past, we have not. So either -- so we haven't done that for my courses, and we haven't validated it, as far as I know, for exercises.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): It's on the unit.

WIT: So in the LOIs that we published for the unit to conduct their training is validate your service member's qualifications to conduct the training.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. Certainly, like Master Guns said,

certainly appreciate you bringing that up. That's an important part of this investigation, but I don't have any more questions. We've already read the administrative closing comments. Thank you again. Appreciate your time.

WIT: Okay. Thank you, sir.

[The investigative interview closed at 1448, 15 April 2021.]

I, Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, attest that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} held on 15 April 2021.

^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

LtCol, USMC

04 May 21

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: SUMMARY OF EMAIL EXCHANGE WITH THE OPERATION OFFICERS AND
OPERATION CHIEFS OF 2D AND 3D ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN BATTALIONS

Name: Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Position/Title: Operations Officer, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion (2d AA Bn)

Name: MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Position/Title: Operations Chief, 2d AA Bn

Name: Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Position/Title: Operations Officer, 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion (3d AA Bn)

Name: MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Position/Title: Operations Chief, 3d AA Bn

Date: 14 April 2021

Time: 1538 PST

Location: Email Exchange

Investigation Team Member(s):

-Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

-MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Background: Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) are assigned to 2d AA Bn, 2d Marine Division. Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) are assigned to 3d AA Bn, 1st Marine Division. The investigation team submitted a Request for Information (RFI) to the aforementioned individuals via email on 14 April 2021. Specifically, the investigation team inquired whether either AA Battalion had a battalion level policy letter or order that specifically addresses, or provides guidance on how an Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAV) platoon prepares (man, train, equip) in anticipation of being attached to a Battalion Landing Team (BLT), Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and their associated pre-deployment training program (PTP).

Initial Response Both 2d AA Bn and 3d AA Bn replied via email that neither of their battalions had a current AAV platoon / MEU preparation policy letter or order. Both utilized higher headquarter (Division, MEF) orders and documents to prepare their AAV platoons. 3d AA Bn stated that they are in the process of drafting a MEU preparation policy letter that will be Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) centric.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERIM SERVICE LEVEL UNDERWATER EGRESS TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Date Signed: 5/25/2018 | MARADMINs Number: 293/18

MARADMINs : 293/18

R 251350Z MAY 18

MARADMIN 293/18

MSGID/GENADMIN/CG MCCDC QUANTICO VA//

SUBJ/ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERIM SERVICE LEVEL UNDERWATER EGRESS TRAINING
REQUIREMENTS//

REF/A/USCENTCOM MSG 142002Z MARCH 2016//

REF/B/MROC DECISION MEMORANDUM 42-2011 DTD AUGUST 2011//

REF/C/DC, CDI DOC DTD 2007//

REF/D/OPNAVINST 3710.7U//

REF/E/ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN SCHOOL ORDER P3000.11//

REF/F/ASSISTANT SECDEF MEMO DTD 1 APRIL 2008//

REF/G/U.S. NAVY DIVING MANUAL//

REF/H/NAVMED P5010-4//

REF/I/MCO 1500.52D//

NARR/REFERENCE (REF) A IS THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND MESSAGE (MSG) ON
VEHICLE EGRESS TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. REF B IS THE MARINE CORPS
REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL DECISION MEMORANDUM ON URGENT
UNIVERSAL NEEDS STATEMENT FOR MINE-RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED
(MRAP)/MRAP ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLES ROLLOVER TRAINER. REF C IS DEPUTY
COMMANDANT COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION URGENT STATEMENT OF
NEED FOR HIGH-MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLE (HMMWV) EGRESS
ASSISTANCE TRAINERS AND OTHER TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLE EGRESS TRAINERS.
REF D IS THE NAVAL AIR TRAINING AND OPERATING PROCEDURES STANDARDIZATION
(NATOPS). REF E IS THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) FOR ASSAULT
AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE (AAV) OPERATIONS. REF F IS THE UPDATE TO CLINICAL POLICY
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SMALLPOX VACCINATION PROGRAM. REF G IS THE
UNITED STATES NAVY DIVING MANUAL. REF H IS THE MANUAL OF NAVAL PREVENTIVE
MEDICINE. REF I IS THE WATER SURVIVAL TRAINING PROGRAM.//

POC/MR. VICTOR SZALANKIEWICZ/MTSB FET REQUIREMENTS SPONSOR

GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. Purpose. Based on the risks associated with a demanding operational tempo, the requirement for the service-level policy for Underwater Egress Training (UET) has become evident. Per refs A through C, this MARADMIN publishes interim UET guidance until formal policy can be developed.

2. Background.

2.A. UET presents significant risk to participants, so prior preparation by training units is required.

2.B. TECOM has updated the Range Facility Management Support System (RFMSS) to include all UET training prerequisites.

3. Action. The following are interim Marine Corps service-level UET requirements:

3.A. Personnel undergoing military occupational specialty (MOS) Training associated with rotary wing/tilt-rotor aircraft operations over water and/or AAV waterborne operations must complete UET training prior to receiving their MOS. Aircrew shall adhere to NATOPS UET requirements per ref D. AAV crewmen should adhere to SOP for AAV operations per ref E.

3.B. Other personnel may complete UET dependent on priority and availability of facility. Unit training priorities are the responsibility of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commander.

3.C. Units required to conduct UET to qualify personnel prior To deployment shall schedule training events and meet training prerequisites, reporting, and unit support requirements identified below.

3.D. All units shall use RFMSS as the sole source for scheduling Training. Detailed UET RFMSS scheduling procedures and unit requirements are contained on each installation's RFMSS site. Units should contact the local training facility to review pre-training requirements outlined in RFMSS.

3.E. Per refs F through H, units are required to conduct appropriate medical screening for each trainee and provide the current medical screening form with medical personnel signatures to the trainers at the UET training facility prior to receiving training. Detailed instructions on the required medical forms are on the RFMSS site.

3.F. Units shall provide a corpsman during all phases of UET per ref I. Units shall designate a staff noncommissioned officer/officer to coordinate with on-site contractor training Staff and supervise unit personnel during all phases of UET.

3.G. Units shall report training completion via the Marine Corps training information management system.

4. Exceptions. In the event personnel are unable to complete UET prior to participating in rotary wing/tilt-rotor aircraft operations over water and/or AAV waterborne operations, commanders shall adhere to the guidance listed below. These exceptions shall not be used to circumvent interim UET service-level training requirements.

4.A. Personnel unable to complete UET prior to participating in rotary wing/tilt-rotor aircraft flight operations over water shall be briefed on the use of the supplemental emergency breathing device and procedures for underwater egress. Aircraft commanders are responsible for ensuring all untrained personnel are fully briefed prior to flight.

4.B. Personnel that are unable to complete UET prior to conducting AAV waterborne operations shall be briefed on the procedures for underwater egress. AAV commanders are responsible for ensuring all untrained personnel are fully briefed prior to splash.

5. Sustainment training interval. Currency for aircrew and AAV personnel is four years from date of

training completion, as outlined in refs D and E. Other personnel who complete UET are also current for four years.

6. Site specific UET details will be coordinated by the local installations and their tenant MEF.

7. TECOM will host a UET operational planning team with Marine Corps Forces Command, MEF, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Army representatives to review UET requirements and develop service-level policy. The UET meeting will be held at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, the week of 11 June 2018. Details provided in separate correspondence.

8. Release authorized by Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command.//



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

NAVMC 3500.2C
C 466
14 Mar 2017

NAVMC 3500.2C w/CH1

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Distribution List

Subj: ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE TRAINING AND READINESS MANUAL

Ref: (a) MCO P3500.72A
(b) MCO 1553.3B
(c) MCTP 8-10A
(d) MCTP 8-10B
(e) MCO 1553.2C

Encl: (1) AAV T&R Manual

1. Purpose. Per reference (a), this Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual, contained in enclosure (1), establishes training standards, regulations, and policies regarding the training of Marines and assigned Navy personnel in the Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) occupational field.

2. Cancellation. NAVMC 3500.2B

3. Scope

a. Per reference (b), commanders will conduct an internal assessment of the unit's ability to execute its mission and develop long-, mid-, and short-range training plans to sustain proficiency and correct deficiencies. Training plans will incorporate these events to standardize training and provide objective assessment of progress toward attaining combat readiness. Commanders will keep records at the unit and individual levels to record training achievements, identify training gaps and document objective assessments of readiness associated with training Marines and assigned Navy personnel. References (c) and (d) provide amplifying information for effective planning and management of training within the unit.

b. Formal school and training detachment commanders will use references (a) and (e) to ensure programs of instruction meet skill training requirements established in this manual and provides career-progression training in the events designated for initial training in the formal school environment.

4. Information. Commanding General (CG), Training and Education Command (TECOM) will update this T&R Manual as necessary to provide current and relevant training standards to commanders. All questions pertaining to the Marine Corps Ground T&R Program and Unit Training Management should be directed to: CG, TECOM, Marine Air Ground Task Force Training and Education Standards Division (C 466), 1019 Elliot Road, Quantico, Virginia 22134.

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Enclosure (91) Page 1 of 2

4005. PLATOON LEVEL COLLECTIVE EVENTS

AAV-AMPH-5001: Prepare for Amphibious Operations

SUPPORTED MET(S): MCT 1.12.1

EVALUATION-CODED: NO

SUSTAINMENT INTERVAL: 6 months

DESCRIPTION: This is an all-encompassing event designed to highlight major tasks that an AAV platoon must accomplish before entering the water, not necessarily while operating with infantry or amphibious shipping.

CONDITION: Given an AAV platoon and operation order or warning order.

STANDARD: To complete of all required certifications and tasks prior to conducting water operations.

EVENT COMPONENTS:

1. Ensure AA personnel are Water Survival, Surf Survival, and Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer (SVET) qualified.
2. Conduct mission analysis.
3. Task-organize.
4. Conduct planning.
5. Coordinate with Navy and Marine planning staffs as required.
6. Develop concept of support and load plans as required.
7. Produce necessary documents.
8. Integrate plans with supported and adjacent units.
9. Complete pre-water operations checks and inspections.

REFERENCES:

1. AASBn Order 3000.1 Common SOP for AAV Operations
2. JP 3-02.1 Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation
3. JP 3-02.2 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation
4. MCTP 13-10E Ship-to-Shore Movement
5. MCTP 3-10C Employment of Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs)
6. TM 09674A-10/3D Operator's Manual, Assault Amphibious Vehicle 7A1 Family of Vehicles (With Special Mission Kits)

INTERNAL SUPPORTING EVENTS:

1803-AMPH-1002	1833-AMPH-1002	1833-AMPH-2001
AAV-AMPH-3001	AAV-AMPH-4002	

INTERNAL SUPPORTED EVENTS:

AAV-AMPH-6002	AAV-AMPH-6003
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SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS:

ORDNANCE:

<u>DODIC</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
L311 Sig, Illum Red Para M126A1	1 signal per AAV
L312 Sig, Illum White Star Para M127	1 signal per AAV

RANGE/TRAINING AREA:

Facility Code 17411 Maneuver/Training Area, Amphibious Forces



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFIC
BOX 555300
CAMP PENDLETON CA 92055-5300

3502
G-37

MAR 23 2020

POLICY LETTER 1-20

From: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
To: Distribution List

Subj: I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE POLICY CONCERNING UNDERWATER EGRESS
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Ref: (a) MARADMIN 293/18
(b) MCO 3502.3C
(c) MARFORPACO 3710.4B
(d) CNAF M-3710.7
(e) MCO 3500.2B Ch 2

1. Purpose. To establish the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) policy concerning Underwater Egress Trainer (UET) requirements for the conduct of over-water flights in tilt-rotor/rotary wing aircraft and waterborne operations in amphibious vehicles.

2. Background. The UET variants explained below prepare Service members to safely egress from submerged vehicles and aircraft. One underwater egress facility is available to train all I MEF (non-aircrew) personnel including those at Twenty-nine Palms, California and the students going through Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) School. This facility has one Mobile Amphibious Egress Trainer (MAET), one Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer (SVET), and the Shallow Water Egress Trainer (SWET). Reference (a), MARADMIN 293/18, requires UET training for all Marines at least once every four years. Reference (b), Marine Core Order 3502.3C Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Predeployment Training Program Order mandates UET training once every two years for personnel designated in the high risk category (Ground forces and non-aircrew personnel whose normal mission profile entails flying over or operating in close proximity to water). Reference (c) Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MarForPac) order 3710.4B (MarForPac Policy on Supplemental Emergency Breathing Devices (SEBD) and Helo Egress Systems for Passengers (HESP)) mandates UET training for personnel who "anticipate overwater flight", which further clarifies this requirement to a single MEU cycle, before refresher training is required.

3. UET Trainer Description and Definitions

a. MEU Cycle. For UET training a MEU cycle begins with training conducted prior to composite through deployment until de-composite.

b. MAET. The MAET is an underwater egress trainer with a generic fuselage section representing aircraft amphibious vessels cockpit and respective cabin emergency escape exits. The MAET device functions closely to the general characteristics of a ditched aircraft. Students are able to practice escaping the trainer with the fuselage submerged in an upright position, an inverted position, or any position between upright and inverted. Successful completion of the MAET is required for over-water flight qualification.

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c. SVET. The SVET is a full-featured device for training egress from submerged vehicles. Successful completion of the SVET is required prior to waterborne operations for amphibious vehicle crew and passengers. Reference (e) directs the requirements for AAV crew members to conduct UET training. For passengers, the SVET may be substituted by MAET for UET qualification.

d. SWET. The SWET has a specially-designed frame fitted with buoyancy pods that allows it to be easily handled and inverted by instructors for students to practice egress procedures while turned upside down in a shallow and controlled training environment. The SWET is a prerequisite for MAET or SVET. In the event that the MAET is down for unscheduled maintenance, the SWET can be used as substitute for MAET UET qualification.

e. Over-water flight. For rotary wing aircraft, those flights which take place beyond auto-rotational distance to land. For tilt-rotor aircraft, those flights where the aircraft enters Vertical Take Off and Landing (VTOL), defined as 85 Nacelle or greater per the Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization manual, over water or any ship board operations.

f. Passenger. An individual who is not part of the aircrew traveling in an aircraft designed or normally configured for passenger (non-aircrew) carrying capability on a point-to-point flight.

g. SEBD/HESP. Supplemental Emergency Breathing Device/Helicopter Egress System for Passengers or similar underwater breathing devices/floatation devices which provide supplemental oxygen and a floatation device to passengers or aircrew in the event of a forced water landing.

h. Unit Commander. Commanding officers of battalion/squadron level commands or higher.

4. Training Requirements

a. Unit commanders are responsible for ensuring assigned personnel who fly as passengers overwater aboard rotary wing or tilt-rotor aircraft receive applicable UET in the MAET and SEBD/HESP training prior to being issued SEBD/HESP. This training is valid for a four-year period before refresher training is required. Seats for the MAET/SVET will be allocated in accordance with the MEF priority list (see paragraph 5).

(1) Ensure MEU personnel who anticipate overwater flight aboard rotary wing or tilt-rotor aircraft receive applicable UET in the MAET and SEBD/HESP training during the PTP cycle.

(2) Ensure personnel assigned to the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) who anticipate overwater flight aboard rotary wing or tilt-rotor aircraft receive applicable UET in the MAET and SEBD/HESP training prior to deployment.

b. Additionally, reference (c) directs all units deploying in support of Western Pacific MEUs, 31st MEU, and UDP to report (to MARFORPAC G-3, and info copy III MEF G-3) UET status 90 days and 30 days prior to deployment.

c. In accordance with reference (c), in the rare event a passenger (aircraft and AAV) is unable to attend appropriate training before overwater flight (e.g., late notice overwater flight not anticipated by the unit), this Order does not prevent the passenger from flying overwater aboard rotary wing

or tilt-rotor aircraft or waterborne operations. In this instance, the first O-5 level commander in the chain of command may issue a waiver to participate in the flight or waterborne operations. Aircrew are authorized to provide a SEBD/HESP to the untrained passenger provided this passenger is briefed prior to flight on the proper use and associated dangers of SEBD/HESP and rotary wing or tilt-rotor underwater egress. In the event the passenger attended but failed to complete UET, the waiver authority shall be the first O-6 commander in the chain of command. A separate waiver for each overwater flight or waterborne operation is required. This exception shall not eliminate the PTP requirement for MEU and UDP personnel, nor shall it be used to circumvent the intent of this order.

d. Ensure Plane Team Commanders or Stick Leaders identify untrained passengers to the aircrew.

e. Rotary Wing/Tilt-Rotor Squadron Commanders

(1) Ensure the appropriate number of Ready for Issue SEBD/HESP are provided to passengers for overwater flights.

(2) Ensure Squadron aircrew are performing pre-flight and post-flight inspections of SEBD/HESP and provide abbreviated SEBD/HESP instructions as part of the passenger safety brief. Exceptions to passenger briefing requirements are provided in reference (d). If aircraft passengers have not received SEBD/HESP training, aircrew shall, prior to flight, brief the untrained passengers on the proper use and associated dangers of SEBD/HESP, underwater egress, and provide priority seating. The brief should be approved locally by an Aero Medical Safety Officer.

f. Ensure the scheduling and tracking of initial and refresher UET and SEBD/HESP training. Training shall be tracked locally and documented in the individual's training jacket by their respective unit training managers using Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS), Unit Training Management (UTM) and Marine Corps Total Force System. Table 1-1 below outlines the UET codes to be used.

Training Code	UET Training	Definition
EA	Marine Corps Amphibious Egress Training (UNQUAL)	Marine has not undergone UET but requires it for upcoming operation, exercise, or training.
EB	Marine Corps Amphibious Egress Training (QUAL)	Marine participated and successfully completed the required training, SWET then MAET.
EF	Marine Corps Amphibious Egress Training (FAIL)	Marine attended and either failed to complete or dropped on request (DOR) and/or refuses to be recycled.
EC	Shallow Water Egress Training (UNQUAL)	Marine participated and unsuccessfully completed the required training in the SWET and cannot move on to the MAET.
ED	Shallow Water Egress Training (QUAL)	Marine participated and successfully completed the required training in the SWET

		and can move on to the MAET.
EF	Shallow Water Egress Training (FAIL)	Marine attended and either failed to complete or DOR and/or refuses to be recycled.
EE	Helo Egress Training (UNQUAL)	Marine participated in either SWET or MAET but has not achieved mastery and will be recycled.
EH	Helo Egress Training (QUAL)	Marine participated and successfully completed either SWET or MAET and commander.
EF	HELO EGRESS TRAINING (FAIL)	Marine attended and either failed to complete or DOR and/or refuses to be recycled.

Table 1-1.--UET Codes and Definitions.

g. Units that fail to show for training as scheduled will be reported to the I MEF G-3 and MSC G-3s for non-compliance.

h. Deployment late joins; service members that fail UET training; and non-aircrew personnel whose normal mission profile does not entail flying over or operating in close proximity to water, may conduct UET training at III MEF's UET facility in Okinawa, Japan.

5. Training Priorities. MSCs will attend the I MEF G-37 Quarterly Training Service Requirements Working Group to schedule and coordinate training based on the below priorities. The Camp Pendleton UET can support 240 students per training week, with a maximum capacity of 10,272 seats annually.

a. Unit priority for MAET

1. MEUS (Including 31 MEU MSEs)

- a. Maritime Raid Force
- b. Air Assault Company
- c. Trap Force (Air)
- d. Command Element Enablers
- e. Explosive Ordinance Disposal Platoon
- f. Evacuation Control Center personnel
- g. Remaining MEU personnel

2. UDP Units

3. Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force and other deployments

4. Exercises

Note: Marine Corps Air Station Miramar is the primary location for aircrew UET training as governed by reference (d), and is not suitable or available for passenger training.

b. Unit priority for SVET:

1. AAV/ACV crew,
2. MEU Mech Company

6. Certification. Successful training completion will be recorded in MCTIMS and maintained by each Major Subordinate Commanders/Elements per paragraph 4b. UET completion numbers will be reported to I MEF G-37 Training, at the conclusion of training.

7. Coordination. Points of contact at I MEF G-37 Training regarding UET scheduling are the Training Officer at (760) 763-2608, or the Training Chief at (760) 725-5947.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Distribution: I/II

[The investigative interview commenced on 1303, 14 April 2021.]

[WIT: Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[CR: SSgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Good afternoon. My name is Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). I'm part of a team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU, and actions and decisions associated with the material conditioning, training, and personnel readiness thereof. This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente and on 30 July 2020.

We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April 21 to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with information relevant to the investigation. You have a copy of

that front of you.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed me to the investigation team on 8 April 21. And I'm talking with you and my investigatory capacity as a representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We're required to provide General Thomas with a written report upon completion of our investigation. You have that one as well in front of you. I'm talking to you because the investigation team believes you might have information that may be relevant to the investigation. It's important for us to understand what role you would have had in understanding where the training was and how the BLT was composited prior to chopping to the 15th MEU.

So that's the primary things we don't talk about formation in compositing the 15th MEU; the training in material readiness, as you would understand it; and then oversight from one MEF's side of things with regard to the composite. So this is administrative investigation. However, due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing review, we are asking personnel we talk to as part of the investigation not to share anything we discussed today with any other person.

So before we start, do you have any questions about my role or this investigation?

WIT: No.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Also, with me is Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). So part of the thing is we have to have two folks in the room for the interview going on. And we also, since we have different roles in investigating different people, some of us have different questions that we've asked different people. And we just want to kind of try to get a level set on that. So, sir, I know you have an interview at 1400 so you can start.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Yeah, I think I've got some time. So why don't you go and I think it probably naturally lead into my questions.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. So what was your billet on July 30, 2020?

WIT: 1st Marine Division G-3 training officer.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And then -- so can you just explain to us a little bit what is your role in the forming of a BLT for chopping -- actually, first, let me start with this. What -- how does a BLT normally get formed in preparation for chopping to the MEU?

WIT: The infantry battalion that makes up the GC of the BLT goes through the same required training that any other deploying unit goes through. Marine Corps service level training

requirements, Division level training requirements, and MEF level training requirements per various orders from MEF orders, Division orders, and Marine Corps service level orders. And once they are complete with that training along the appropriate timeline, then they chop to I MEF -- to the MEU command element to then become part of the MEU. So essentially, roughly, give or take six-months prior to the MEU deploying, they chop to the MEU to then conduct MEU specific training and the MEU training plan whatever that may be.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): And what is your role in that as G-3 training officer for the 1st Marine Division?

WIT: I would schedule and -- schedule training for units for service level training exercises, primarily. I would promulgate and distribute training requirements, support and enable battalion operations officers and operation sections to plan and execute training. And the support for executing training is largely administrative. I wouldn't actually go to the field and train with them. And then I would validate their training at the -- we had multiple D minus briefs, we called them deployment briefs. One would be D minus 270 days from deployment, the D minus 270 brief, D minus 180, D minus 90, D minus 30, and then a R plus 30. So that would be a return 30

days after they returned back to the Division.

So my role was to assist the G-3 in ensuring that those units had met all the requirements from the combatant command or the theater entry requirements MEF, Division, and then also Marine Corps Service requirements.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : So in your role in all of this, and I'm sure you did a couple different iterations of other MEUs prior to this. Is that correct?

WIT: Correct.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : So is there anything that stands out in your mind with regard to the forming of the BLT 1/4? Was there anything that stands out that you can share with us as far as their training timeline, their material readiness of different -- I guess, material readiness prior to the compositing. Is anything that stands out, any external factors that we could be aware of?

WIT: The 15th MEU requested a small boat capability, which is not organic to Southern California MEUs coming out of I MEF. At that time, the only MEU that was required to maintain that capability was the 31st MEU, which tied to material readiness training and personnel readiness for that matter. This new requirement created an additional element that needed to be

trained to. An additional requirement that required back planning with equipment and personnel and then training, which added a small level of complexity.

Also not tied to 1/4, but tied to the unit because I'm sure we'll get there -- are tied to facilities at that time. And historically speaking, the underwater egress trainer facility on Camp Pendleton was experiencing periods of non-operability tied with COVID-19 outbreaks where the staff were not able to be there to perform their role, and then an extremely competitive environment for the available training time. One training facility on the entire base that's required to support anybody that transitions over the water, schoolhouses. So that's boat companies, that's AAV schoolhouse, that's anybody flying over the water. So there is a high demand for that facility. COVID combined with facility maintenance issues, like, for example, if the boilers go down, the water temperature needs to be maintained at a certain temperature. Otherwise they can't do training and that would happen frequently.

And then training, would get bumped and people will get pushed and then higher prioritized units would take the available training. So that was something 1/4 was competing with, along with other units trying to participate in MEU training, in

addition to other task force and unit training that needed to happen.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): What other units would have taken priority over a BLT getting ready to deploy for a MEU?

WIT: Off of my memory, I won't say -- don't quote me on this, because that's what this is a quote. But I believe AAV schoolhouse, the amphibious assault school, I think anything within the training command entry level training pipeline and I vaguely recall the prioritized order from MEF listing -- I think the -- I think command element units, MEU command element units that were already -- the command element was composited, not the entire MEU, but the MEU command element I believe took priority over the BLT because a BLT was not part of the MEU yet. So the BLT battalion was with us and we experienced that on several occasions where we were trying to train and prepare the infantry battalion. So we hand off a fully trained, ready unit and we were getting bumped by MEF level units. Whether it's a MEU or EOTG or other TECOM schoolhouses outside of the MEF.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Is there any documentation that set that priority from the MEF?

WIT: There was an order from MEF. I can't remember the number. And then -- what we had done a Division historically.

We took that order, referenced it within the division training guidance. And then in that division training guidance, not only was a MEF order referenced, but the prioritization of units for training facilities was also referenced in there I believe.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): I'm going to shift gears here real quick. So what is your understanding of the requirement for attachment specifically -- or detachments from the Division to conduct a MCCRE?

WIT: Division units conducting a MCCRE? They are required to conduct a MCCRE -- our internal requirement was prior to deployment or prior to chop. The Marine Corps requirement at the time, I believe, was every either 18 months or 24 months. I know at the time Headquarters Marine Corps PP&O was contemplating redrafting the MCCRE order and I suggested just take the 1st Marine Division because we're the only ones actually doing MCCREs in the Marine Corps to a standard.

And I think that was -- there was talk about revamping the MCCRE program. So Headquarters Marine Corps had been kind of stagnant on that for quite a while. And we were at, I want to say, near mid 80s compliance on MCTIMS alone. So then that set us apart from the other divisions and other Marine Corps units, because we were not only doing the MCCREs, but also documenting

it properly but --

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): For the battalion itself, I've read the order and it specifies that the battalions will do it. But what about the attachments? So, for instance, specifically, who would be responsible for doing the evaluation of the platoon from -- the AAV platoon that was set to form with 1/4?

WIT: That's 3rd Tracks. That's their responsibility. So the units are responsible for their Marines until they chop or administratively move or attach. And then 1/4 is responsible for that. So same thing with combat engineers, same thing with tanks, same thing with all of our independent battalions, so --

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): But Division -- as the owner of 3rd AAV Battalion, does Division have any role in making sure that evaluation was conducted prior to handing them off to the 15th MEU?

WIT: Yes. That should be documented not only on MCTIMS, but also the 3rd AAV Battalion is required to -- they are also required to do a deployment brief when they send detachments. But I believe that would -- that did not go to the General. That one went to the chief of staff.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Would this be like the D minus 270?

WIT: Correct. It's a typical deployment brief. LAR would

do the same thing.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): But this is strictly within Division. This isn't Division telling MEF that what you're talking about right now; is that correct?

WIT: That was a Division requirement to then send units to MEF for whatever deployment they're going on. Independent battalions and infantry battalions -- or infantry regiments, all of the MSCs were required to conduct MCCREs for their Marines. And then not only document that on MCTIMS, but prior to deploying -- like a platoon deploying from 3rd Tracks or LAR, they would be required to at least prepare a brief and then either present to the chief of staff or if the chief of staff took a paper brief, that was up to him.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Were you at all involved in -- so what you're talking about now is internal to the Division?

WIT: Correct.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): But the Division is also required to be part of the E 270, E 240, and E 211 briefs to MEF saying, you know, kind of this is the final handoff where they say we are providing this, the training equipment, and manning. This is what we are giving to the 15th MEU. Were you involved in any of that -- the oversight in any of that?

WIT: No. I think there was talk at a time for G-3 training to send a message to MEF stating -- I think it was o SIPR. We would send a message typically from COPS, current operations, prior to the unit detaching saying they've conducted their MCCRE, they've conducted their SLTE, and they are prepared for deployment. I only saw one of those. However, at the time when I was there, that was something that current operations was handling.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : How long have you -- were you in that billet for? How long were you the G-3 training officer?

WIT: April 2019 until shortly after this occurred. I began my turnover with Major D'Urso[sic] I'd say in August of 2020.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Sir, do you want to --

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Yes. I'm Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) . I'm also part of the investigation team.

You mentioned one of your jobs was to validate and verify, training requirements. How would you do that? Would you do it simply by looking in DRRS? Would you look at a briefing from a major subordinate element? How would you verify that training was completed?

WIT: A couple of different ways. MCTIMS was one. DRRS was the second one. At the time, trying to synchronize DRRS and

MCTIMS was difficult, but MCTIMS was one of our initiatives that we were trying to get the units better on. And I think we were doing a pretty good job at the time of just at least awareness and training with MCTIMS. So MCTIMS briefs, the D minus briefs, deployment briefs was another facet, and then also my day to day communication with the OpsOs, whether that's a regimental OpsOs or in cases like I had to communicate often with Major Lejeune, the OpsO for 1/4 at the time, on a lot of different things just because they were the next one in the shoot. So I always try to go out of my way to not just talk to the regimental OpsOs because sometimes that communication was disjointed a little bit. So verbally and through our tracking systems.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): As you're tracking, validating, and seeing what training requirements are being met and or not met, at what point does a flag get raised? Whether this be training for the BLT, whether this be MCCRE for the AAV detachment, at what point does the flag get raised? We're saying, hey, we've got a problem here, they're not trained and we're about to chop them. Where does that fall?

WIT: That would start in G-3 training. In theory, it should start at their regimental command element. Oftentimes that was my team doing that. My team doing daily scrubs. My

team tracking underwater egress trainers down. Who does this affect? How do we get them and how do we internally prioritize and shuffle? Same thing with SLTE. Same thing with non-lethal weapons training. When that MOS went away that largely supported that, another example. And then what I would do and my team would do is we would elevate it to the G-3, and then from the G-3 it would be briefed to chief of staff or the General. At the time, we didn't have a deputy Commander.

And then there were also times where it would just I would let the G-3 know and then in the plan or huddles with General Castellvi, I would bring up problems I foresee and then potential solutions to that. To then get his decision on what to do and then the delegated authority to then go carry it out.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And I'm assuming a large part of this is based off the unit identifying, problems doing this or need help doing MAT, or perhaps they're saying this training isn't a priority. When you talk about UET training. Do you remember any flags being raised saying, hey, only 54 percent of the battalion is complete with the underwater egress training. Do you remember a flag like that ever being raised?

WIT: I think across the entire MEF, there was a flag raised from not only myself, but starting at those units. This is not

just 1/4 this is the entire Division. When underwater egress trainer was down and COVID was playing a role in limiting throughput capacity, we have to get these guys trained. What do we do? My team was -- it was trying to liaise with MEF G-37. They were working closely with us to can we bus them to Miramar to use their facility? What can we do to get this training completed or how close can we get to that? That was the data that we analyzed and provided that to the G-3 -- the G-3s, both of them, and then eventually to the generals on this is the problem.

What ended up happening is we weren't able to get underwater egress training done for a large portion of the Division in that period of time. And it wasn't just them 3/1 was trying to get training done. It was pretty tough for everybody to include every other unit, schoolhouse, and all the prioritized units. And then MEF provided a waiver to waive the underwater egress training -- or delegate the ability to waive that to the O-5 commander or higher.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): Was that written anywhere? Was that a policy letter?

WIT: It was written. I don't recall the letter number. It was written that it could be waived because that was part of --

also again, part of my shop is all training waivers. We were very, very strict with training waivers because General Castellvi said there will be no waivers. And then, of course, circumstances changed. MEF, the three star, put out guidance that they'll delegate that authority to O-5 commanders. Not the battalion commander, but it I think O-5 and above commanders that are part of the MEU. So, you know, random SPMAGTF unit that just wanted to do the training for annual training purposes. I don't think they had the authority. But for example, like 1/4's CO. There was a period time where he had the authority to waive that training for overwater transport.

We considered AAV and overwater flights, tilt rotor or rotary wing all the same. Anytime you go over water or through water, you need to do the training. And then after that I MEF provided another waiver to substitute the underwater egress training for AAVs and I believe also helo as well or just the SWET chair, because the SWET chair could -- you have a much higher throughput capacity. So we either get some Marines trained, other Marines not trained at all, or more Marines partially trained. And I think that was the perspective that drove that waiver. But that's just me speculating.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): Was this a different set of guidance

coming from MEF than as written in the MEU LOI that MEF published?

WIT: I couldn't tell you that from memory. I want to say the MEU LOI from the 15th MEU is like pretty thick.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): The MEU LOI very clearly called out that everyone will be UET trained prior to chop. Given the circumstances, the throughput, the volume of units that you were putting out as per the GFM cycle at that time and coupled with COVID definitely ran into capacity issues.

My question would be if there was a policy letter that came from MEF in addition to the MEU LOI that waived that authority or delegated that authority down to the O-5 level?

WIT: My perspective on that, sir, and what I recall is even if the MEU CO provided an LOI signed by him, if Lieutenant General Osterman had a waiver in place that supersedes the MEU's -- MEU commander's requirement. So we were always trying to get to that most strict and detailed level of training. We did in some cases with very creative work by my staff NCOs literally like having units lined up outside for a no show and getting guys in ten at a time. But, yes.

So I believe those are two separate documents, two separate policies. MEU LOI signed by O-6 level MEU Commander,

MEF level policy that waives the UET and in place authorized a sweat chair in the absence of UET training.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)_(c)): As the MEF said, okay, I am going to delegate this authority to waive down to an O-5 level commander that is prepping for chop to a MEU. Did division staff say wait a second. I don't know if I want that delegated to a O-5 level commander. I'll retain that up at the chief of staff level, that Division CG level, the regimental level. Do you remember any discussion like that?

WIT: I don't recall specific discussion on that. And that particular O-5 delegation -- the part that I don't remember as clearly as is it was delegated to the MEU commander or the O-5 commander while they're on the MEU or part of the MEF deploying unit corps host chop.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)_(c)): So it could have been post chop?

WIT: Yes. So we never allowed a battalion commander to waive that training. That was not his or her decision.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)_{(7)(c)}): That's helpful.

WIT: General Castellvi and G-3 chief of staff, they never allowed the battalion commander to come in and just say, well, we just decide not to do that. Because I would see the briefs before they came. I would request to help them because I sat in

on a lot of those. And you see very quickly, like, don't bring this up. You need to fix this in the next day. Like, this is -- a get yelled that thing. And oftentimes I would catch things like that and I would highlight it and give it back to their OpsO and say you guys need to fix this right now. If you obviously can't get into the pool, you can't get into the rifle range, you can't get this training done in the next five days. But you can have a plan and brief that plan to the General and then follow through on that plan.

Because the only brief where it's too late for any of that is a D minus 30. But I have seen other times where General Castellvi was not satisfied with the training and those Marines were training until single digit days before they got on their flights. Leave was canceled because they weren't trained.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Given everything you just said, when it comes to the chop date, when division hands this trained unit to the MEU and some of the requirements have not been met, how is that highlighted? We're giving you this. However, this, this, this has not been accomplished at this time. And this is the plan to mitigate. How would that take place?

WIT: I believe -- and I was not part of that handoff, I believe that was typically at the G-3 -- probably not the chief,

but the O-6 level was, I think, typically the ones kind of liaising with each other like, hey, we're handing these guys off. I would informally be in touch with Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}. I'm sure you're going to talk to him; ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, and the MEF G-37. Every week we were talking to -- we were synchronized fairly well to back up that O-6 through three star communication chain, because ultimately we were the ones trying to make sure that it was as good as we can get it or perfect.

So informally, oftentimes I would be discussing the matter with MEF G-37 staff, not the G-37 himself, but the training staff and so, would my staff NCOs. And at the O-6 level, I believe there is some communication, but I was not privy to that.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. And I don't want to put words in your mouth here, but -- any training requirements not being met per the MEU LOI would be highlighted to the MEF G-37 at the informal level? And then at the O-6 and two star level? Is there an assumption that it was addressed at that level, and then a waiver issued?

WIT: Correct.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. You're not qualified per the MEU LOI, but we're gonna give you a waiver in order to continue. Is

it a temporary waiver? Is that a waiver throughout the entire float?

WIT: And that's where I think there is a disconnect because from our perspective, we always tried to have reach back with those units, because they're still part of 1stMarDiv no matter where they're at. But what happens once they chop. We have very little control over and we would send units trained or as trained as we could get them. And ideally they're able to deploy and we don't have situations like this. But I don't know -- beyond the chop, I don't know if there was any follow up. I think oftentimes it's just well, they're here, we're going as is. This is what it is. And then they just move on because -- and this is Joe Best's perspective. This is not scientific in a manner.

I think a lot of times it's just: There here, we're going where; they're here, we're moving on with the MEU PTP; we're sending them to EOTG. We're going through all the training and I don't think there's a lot of follow up on, well, there's still like a hundred guys and need to go in the rifle range. There's still some swim qual that needs to happen. I think that that's more of the small unit level, but I think at the O-6 MEU level, I suspect that is not something that's followed up on.

And I don't want to speculate. That's just my

experience. And I've seen it in other places too. They're deploying. That's happening. Nothing's going to stop that. We just have to accept it. And people focus on what's next. Not what still needs to be done.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): There was a gap between the 11th MEU in the 15th MEU compositing. I think it was almost a year, a year plus.

WIT: I remember -- I vaguely recall there was a slip. They were heel to toe for a while. And then it was like back to back.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): In your capacity as the G-3 training officer, was the work up -- to chop to the 15th MEU, was that the first training evolution for a MEU as a G-3 training after that you've done.

WIT: No.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Not that there would be substantially different from another deployment.

WIT: The only thing that was different was the small boat requirement. That was the main difference because it was just there was -- a great focus on, well, we got to get boats and we have to go. Well, how do we maintain these boats? Well, we don't have maintainers, so it was almost like the shiny object. And there was a period of time that -- the difference is we had

to kind of reign in 1/4 a little bit from, you know, like, hey, you guys, you have DIRLAUTH, but you don't really have DIRLAUTH, like, stop taking orders from the 15th MEU. You're not chopped yet.

And there is times where the 15th MEU was communicating directly with 1/4. And then 1/4 -- I recall one deployment brief D minus brief. They brought something up that they were working on independently with 15th MEU to -- I think they were suggesting to just take 1st Recon's small boats. And that stirred up a hornet's nest because the G-3 -- I mean, 1st Recon for that matter, the G-3 and everybody else had not been involved in that to include the General and it was colonels running out of the brief to go get on the phone and coming back with, out of breath with a red face saying, no, we've got to take care of that happening.

So there was a little bit of friction. So that was a difference between this MEU and other MEUs. Other MEUs were a little bit more seamless. It was a little bit more status quo for lack of better terms. A little bit more kind of routine. But then again, you've got the COVID variable and the ripple effect from around the Marine Corps and the training environment of how do we get these guys trained. You cancel one SLTE, it

doesn't just affect three to four battalions going in a regimental command. It affects the entire Marine Corps near instantly.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): I've just got one last question, then I'll turn it back over to you. Do you recall any flags being raised? And I know I realize you're at the Division level and I'm asking you to look all the way down to an attachment level platoon. But do you remember or recall any flags being raised over the AAV platoon that was going to support 1/4 -- that was going to attach to 1/4 in the context of: The platoon is notified in December, they go to Native Fury, two weeks after Native Fury, two weeks in ROM, straight into JLTIs, and then they chopped to the MEU. Do you recall or have any training concerns with that kind of path towards the formation of AAV platoon in support of 1/4?

WIT: Yes. Several those things. Concern, yes, I had concern. I know the AAV operations officer at the time had concern. I know this was routine -- the entire time I was at Division G-3, 3rd Tracks was constantly to back exercises, missions. A lot of the focus would shift to Delta Company in 29 Palms with the ACV transition and there was -- there's often maintenance concerns being raised. I don't know what a -- well,

I saw a lot of the SITREPS going to the General. For some reason Lieutenant Colonel Bernize would put me on there a lot. Not every time, but sometimes. I know that there is often times they were kind of, you know, not necessarily airing the dirty laundry.

There were some concerns on there he would highlight with maintenance. But when you would talk to the OpsO who was a captain at the time. But when you talk to the people that were in the weeds trying to plan and organize this training, they were constantly trying to say, no more requirements. We cannot handle one more thing. And I would often try and advocate for 3rd Tracks to the G-3 and indirectly, in a passive manner, to the CG. I don't recommend we support this. To compound that problem. 2ndMarDiv. They would habitually drop out of SLTEs with their independent battalions and their enablers to include 2nd Tracks and that capability from 3rdMarDiv. That would put the requirement on 1stMarDiv.

Service level training was top tier top priority. That's a service requirement. That meant we would have to have AAV platoons have to backfill, along with LAR, artillery, all of our independent battalions, Recon too. Nobody wants to go do recon things in the desert. We would have to backfill the other divisions -- minus 4thMarDiv. They have their own SLTE in the

summer -- we'd have to backfill those enablers where we're not getting a lot of training value out of it, but it consumes that organic capacity we have that we need for things like the MEU. We need it for things like sustainment training, maintenance. You can only check out so many AAVs from 29 Palms. Since we're just down the road they TT your stuff there. And our stuff gets used and abused and then reimbursed later. That doesn't get time back, that doesn't get wrenches back into the tool boxes. So that was a continuous problem my entire time there. 3rd Tracks and other independent battalions were getting overused and stressed to the max because of a multitude of requirements from the service all the way down.

So we were constantly trying to find ways to provide that relief. We're not worried about their training going out to 29 Palms to drive people around and maybe do some fire and movement. That's not the real value for people like 3rd Tracks and they need that time back. So whenever we could provide relief, we would. And I would raise my hand whenever I could to advocate for them.

So concerned, yes. At the field grade officer level, kind of major down to company grade officer level, absolutely. Concerned. I'm confident that some of the operation officers

from 3rd Tracks over time brought their concerns to their command. What was translated from there to the CG I think was a little more watered down, a little bit more mild of, yeah, we're at 80 percent maintenance, but, yeah, we're all gonna fight through it.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Beyond the maintenance, how about just that platoon level training?

WIT: Platoon level training, I think that that's another casualty of the schedule, another casualty of that capacity strain. And I'm not there. I wasn't there doing the platoon day to day training. But from my perspective, if they're going to an SLTE coming back two months later, going to another SLTE coming back. We're constantly playing Jenga with these units in these companies. And then the companies are supporting certifications for ships out at sea and they're trying to double dip with their training. And I think that they're often not able to -- I mean, whitespace training was almost non-existent. It was what's the next requirement? What's alligator closest to the boat? We got to squash that just to get through.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Thank you. That's been very helpful. I'll turn it back over to you now.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. I guess the only thing I want to

kind of circle back to is the idea of providing all attachments and battalions with the MCCRE certification done. And in this case, when the AAV Platoon checked in at chop -- and actually the E-270 all the way through E-211 and chop brief, they said they were trained but not evaluated. But then you've kind of mentioned the D minus. You guys are tracking them all the way up to D-30 when really E minus 204 in this case, as when they were supposed to chop to the MEU. So I guess my question, I think one of the questions that the Colonel was trying to get at is, what kind of flags went up when they say that the platoon says they're trained? How do we know that they're actually trained and then, why weren't they evaluated? The order says they're supposed to be evaluated. How high -- and I know that you only you pass it but can you give us kind of an idea to what was the overall sentiment at that time?

WIT: If my guys didn't catch it, it probably slipped through the cracks. There was really for situations like that with 3rd Tracks, an independent battalion, they had a lot of turnover with some of their staff they had a little bit of friction internally.

I think if my guys didn't catch it, or I wasn't constantly babysitting that unit, they might say they were

trained, but they didn't report it properly. And if they form kind of a hodgepodge unit, which sometimes they have to do along with other LAR unit already, whatever, I mean, typically they're pretty strict to sticking organic.

But if you form kind of an adhoc unit, what do we call them? How do they get reported? They go do training. Then I'm doing quotation fingers. But if they're not a letter to company, if they're not part of the organic task organization, how do we track it? If they're tracked, it doesn't tell us they've got a problem.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}): So I guess that's -- I don't expect that anybody from Division is going to be out there actually certifying a platoon going through this training. But assuming that the battalion commander, the 3rd AAV Battalion Commander, knew that was part of one of your D minus briefs, I'm assuming that the Division rep will sit there with the MEU rep in front of the MEF staff and they'll say this is where they are on training wise and this is where all of our attachments are for equipment, readiness, everything. And somebody on the MEU side of the staff will say, yeah, we know JLTII for the equipment and we believe the commander.

But did that take place to the best of your knowledge?

Did that AAV Battalion Commander sit down in front of the G-3 or the general in preparation for this chop and say they are trained, but we did not I did not evaluate them for whatever reason?

WIT: I don't believe that happened.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): Can you recall back thinking, that was a red flag for this? Was it something that your shop knew about the fact that they had not been evaluated?

WIT: If they had not been evaluated, we would have brought it up. So I think we just didn't know.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): Okay. Just for clarification, too, there's been some discussion and confusion as to who is required to do -- and I don't think I've read the Division MCCRE order, but I've read that the Marine Corps and the MEF one. Who, from your G-3 training officer, who is required to conduct a MCCRE?

WIT: Well, I think oftentimes my name will get put on it as a G-3 train officer but --

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): What I'm asking is who actually needs to conduct a MCCRE?

WIT: The hands on conduct?

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): What units?

WIT: Oh, that should be everybody.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): To include down to attachment level? It doesn't just stop at the battalion level?

WIT: I like to use combat engineers as an example because they'll do platoon MCCREs, because those platoons are gonna go deploy and attach to other units. AAVs, the same thing. I think there were times where they would do company MCCREs or detachment MCCREs, first Recon Platoon, MCCREs. Arty was a little bit different. So attachment at the appropriate attachment level would conduct a MCCRE. So there was never going to be a Combat Engineer Battalion MCCRE because they don't fight that way.

And then they would document that on MCTIMS and provide that in the D minus brief. And oftentimes -- that stimulated memory. Oftentimes that battalion commander would incorporate the attachments into his D minus brief. And there were times where that battalion commander --

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}): I'm sorry. Which battalion commander?

WIT: I couldn't name one.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Are you talking about the BLTs --

WIT: Infantry battalion.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}): Okay, yeah.

WIT: So like if it --

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}): 1/4 would incorporate --

WIT: 3/1 had a fantastic -- so did 2/5 was one of the best briefs I've seen. He brought in his attachments with him to brief the General and he encompassed everybody, Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}. And that was one of the ones where I saved it and I put two stars next to it as an example that I would send out to other units. And other battalion commanders did that as well. But if his battalion commanders chose not to include the attachments within their deployment brief, the independent battalion leadership was also required and responsible to make sure that brief and that they were fully trained, that was communicated effectively, and if the chief or the CG didn't want to brief, then that was communicated via electronic tracking system. And then with that DIRLAUTH directly to the gaining unit.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}): Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c), do you have anything specifically in the AAV training and MCCRE lane because you speak better about that?

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Do you have a copy of the D minus 30 that an independent battalion commander would have given you or to your section or the three in general?

WIT: I'm sure there's some that go back.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c)): I'd be interested in seeing V 2/5 D

minus 30 brief or an independent battalion.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : So D minus 130 is --

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : That's to your chief of staff

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Same thing as the E minus 30?

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Yeah.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : You guys just use deployment as opposed
embarkation.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Correct.

WIT: And so the battalion level the five battalion command level, that would always go to the CG. So if it was a victor unit going to CG. The independent battalions, they would go to the chief of staff. And I'm confident that G-3 training could probably dig up an all old independent battalion brief. I stopped going to those when I announced my retirement get kind of sidelined in the corner. LAR is a good example too. They did a lot of good briefs. And 5/11 too.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : So the individual -- there's two separate briefs, the individual battalions -- so in this case, that's -- just to be very specific, the AAV platoon, the AA Battalion Commander, would have briefed the chief of staff on the readiness and the training equipment and manning of that platoon. The BLT commander would have briefed the Division CG. The BLT

commander would not have had all of his individual attachments or wasn't required to have all an individual attachments included in his brief to the CG?

WIT: Close. The AAV battalion commander, he wasn't always the one giving the brief. It typically was the company commander he would be there to support. They would brief the chief of staff. And then the victor unit, that's the gaining command for the attachments, they would brief the CG.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): After that brief?

WIT: Scheduling. Sometimes before, sometimes after. I mean, I don't think it was always synchronized. But that's just going off of off memory of the calendar. I think a lot of it had to do with when can they get on a calendar with the CG and/or the chief of staff through the staff sec's office. And is the staff sec's office effectively managing the requirements of here's who's coming up and deploying and here's who needs to get a brief with the CG and the chief.

Sometimes, I think it could be backwards, but I don't recall specific events. And the battalion commander, I think the ones that are typically more prepared, would bring their attachments or the leadership of the attachments with them to the brief. And other times they would not.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): You weren't part of any of those briefs, right?

WIT: I would assist the Division G-3 and reviewing the briefs, if they would actually send it ahead of time.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): But you wouldn't be there present in the brief?

WIT: Oftentimes, I was.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Do you recall by chance this or BLT 1/4 and how they did it?

WIT: I don't recall if they had attachments there because I was definitely at that brief. And the biggest thing I remember is the surprise about the boats, small boats, which caused a little bit of friction at the brief with the G-3, the deputy G-3 because that wasn't prepared beforehand.

Outside of that, I don't remember a lot of that brief. It wasn't significant beyond the boats.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): I have not seen that brief. I've seen the E-211 brief, which I believe is that is the one that's to the MEF CG. And I know that those things --

WIT: That one should have gone to the chief. If, at the time, they wanted to do it that way. But that was typically how it would. So E-211 that would have gone to the chief because it

wasn't like a bad time. They would often be there.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Be there at the E-211 brief?

WIT: Correct.

Those battery briefs were often just to the chief, but in unique circumstances like 5/11 deploying to Afghanistan, there HIMARS capability. That was a big deal. General Castellvi took that one.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : I think that the last question just overall kind of -- you alluded to it, but I kind of want to have you talk about one more time about the overall kind of climate within the G-3 and the Division when it comes to training and the prioritization of what is the priority for training? And then just kind of tied in with that, what was the command climate for safety?

WIT: I'll start with training. It was clear from the CG and the G-3 at the time, Colonel Folsom, we were not going to entertain waivers unless it was -- we were not going to authorize waivers unless it was extremely unique circumstances. And then it had to be properly vetted by the CG. So we were strict on that. And I recall oftentimes I would come to Colonel Folsom with: Sir, 7th Marines wants to do this. They want to get a waiver of 100 people for the rifle range. That seems like a

fairly benign topic, but it was not benign to us. Rifle range was often one of those topics or swim qual or things like that.

And we'd say, no, or underwater egress training with 7 Marines units. Another good example, because they have to transport from 29 Palms to Camp Pendleton and there is oftentimes no shows. And that was one of 7th Marine unit was one of those ones that was training until like single digit days before they deployed. Because we would not let them go without doing the proper training. And underwater egress trainer was often a point of friction, not just for 7th Marines, but other units where we have to get them in, even if it's ten at a time. Even if we have Ops chiefs lining guys up at defense waiting for people to not show up because we would track who typically shows up and who doesn't outside of Division. And we would actually have guys on standby in 1st Marines typically was the best at it because they just walk right over there.

I would say it was really firm to get the training done unless we had specific guidance from the general officer level saying otherwise. In particular with a UET waivers, that was clear. Our position is not to question General Osterman or General Castellvi. And I think that it was -- my perspective on the climate was General Castellvi was not going to question

General Osterman. Our MEF CG gave guidance. That's it.

We meet those requirements. If we can do better, great. But those are the minimum requirements we need to meet. And that was the focus. I don't think there is a lot of beyond normal turmoil or friction. I think some units were better at conducting and document training than other units largely based on key personnel and key billets, commanders temperaments. Some commanders were keen on painting a rosy picture to the CG. When I'm sitting in the briefs thinking that's not true. That's not true. That's not true. But it's not my place to -- in the middle of the brief stand up and call bullshit. What I would do is I communicate that to the G-3 and let him handle his level and trying to avoid that altogether.

I think the underwater egress trainer training situation I think -- I guess I can kind of summarize everything in my thoughts on this if you want me to. From my perspective, we have a choke point. If we're talking Lean Six Sigma, if we're talking just effective planning, we have a choke point and we have so many requirements for these units to go through. Some of these requirements are more important than others. In this particular case, underwater egress or a BLT is way more important than administrative staff on the MEU bumping Victor units out of

the training tank because of priority or EOTG training courses or -- it's every everybody's got their own perspective. But I think that was we've got a choke point and the problem has not been solved.

The argument from MCI West and training tank staff was, well, we have X amount of percentage on seats every month because people don't show up. The capacity in theory was there. But the scheduling and getting people to show up on time at the right place with the right equipment was not happening, which then translates to units like 1/4 and other Victor units getting put into a position where they run out of time because there's, no, white space. There's there was literally no time for a battalion commander to be a battalion commander and lead. It was just got to do this, got to do this, got to do this, got to do this.

And that's ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}'s perspective, never having been a full time Victor unit battalion commander. But I think there is a compact this was the result of a compounding issue that it was results from facilities. We just didn't have the right facilities with the right throughput and the right prioritization. And then the acceptance of -- at higher levels of just not doing it. I think there's lots of other training that could have been bumped and we don't have to protect that MEU

PTP with white gloves if we don't even have the guys properly trained to go. And I ran into that a lot of can't touch the MEU PTP, can't touch that. It's so hard line their top priority what are you doing in those six months that you can't get somebody into UET training over those six months. You know that they're not fully trained.

And another battalion we had issues with timing because SLTE program is a little bit flawed with timing. It's not, you know -- nothing can be perfect. But we had we were trying to figure out how do we get them to an SLTE before the MEU chop. And even just trying to shift MEU you chop a couple of weeks, looking at their scheduled training within the PTP, we could do that. We could get the JLTI done, but we ran into roadblocks from Division advocating to MEF or this battalion saying we need to slide this chop date so we can get them to an SLTE and get them better trained. Nope, not gonna happen. Hard line. No, from MEF.

And I don't know all the details, but when I look at the EOTG training schedule, when I look at the SLTE schedule, when I look at the average throughput of a JLTI, I think that we had a little more willingness to be flexible, we could have gotten that particular battalion trained and I think the same

thing can apply with 1/4 in situation.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): And then just quickly, if you could -- I think we need to wrap this up pretty quickly. The safety aspect, the command climate on safety. You mentioned that -- I can remember exactly how you put it, but something to the effect of like there is other stuff that was prioritized doing some of the higher end training as opposed to getting some of the basics done.

WIT: There were times where I think that there -- I wouldn't say safety was an afterthought at all. I think that was largely on the tactical small unit level with eyes and boots on the ground. They did a fairly decent job from my perspective. We saw a lot of the high risk training requests come through the G-3 primarily for 1st Recon and the requirement for them to prove to the 3 how, not only from start to finish, but how are they going to maintain some sort of safety in this. With Colonel Folsom, it was pretty strict. I think he was oftentimes a hard line where he would just tell people, no, you need to do better, come back in a week. And I think that permeated to the rest of the staff. Don't take shortcuts. Do it right, whether it's planning all the way through safety.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Between April 2019 and August 2020 was

there an assistant division commander in 1stMarDiv?

WIT: No.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Okay. And then is there an expectation from Division G-3 for regiments to provide oversight to training?

WIT: Yes, MCCREs is the best example and regiments are required to provide that oversight with all of the training. In the MCCRE order, it requires them to form that evaluation.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Let me just read you the standard thing here.

You are directed not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone other than members of the investigation team. If you are asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify me, the investigating officer, or your commanding officer.

[The investigative interview closed at 1406, 14 April 2021.]

I, Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c), attest that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of Maj Best held on 14 April 2020.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Col, USMC
[END OF PAGE]

[The investigative interview commenced on 20 April 2021.]

[WIT: Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[IO: LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

[CR: SSgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Good morning. My name is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) along with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). We are part of the team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU and the actions and decisions associated with material conditioning, training, and personnel training thereof.

This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island 30 July 2020. We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April 2021 to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with information relevant to the investigation. If need be, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), we can send you a copy of the convening order.

WIT: I don't think that's required.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. Thanks. The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed us to the investigating team on 8 April 2021. We are talking to you today in our investigatory capacity as a representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We are required to provide General Thomas with a written report upon completion of our investigation.

We are talking with you because the investigating team believes you may have information that may be relevant to the investigation. It is important for us to understand your knowledge of the events of the incident, as well as what you're doing to prepare your MEU for deployment on the East Coast.

The topics that we would like to cover with you today may include: Formation and compositing of the 15th MEU; training in material readiness surrounding the formation and compositing in the 15th MEU; and, First Marine Expeditionary Force oversight of the 15th MEU. The understanding that you do not have any direct knowledge -- you may not have any direct knowledge of those very specific topics.

This is an administrative investigation; however, due to the sensitive nature, the ongoing review, we are asking personnel we talk to as part of the investigation not to share anything we discussed today with any other person.

So before we start, do you have any questions about our role or this investigation?

WIT: No questions.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. Thank you. Please state your name, rank, and current billet.

WIT: Sure. First name is ^{(b)(3), (b)}
_{(6), (b)(7)} , ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}
_{(7)(c)} . Last name is ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)} , ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}
_{(b)(7)(c)} . Rank is Colonel. Current billet is Commanding Officer, 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. First question, ^{(b)(3), (b)}
_{(6), (b)(7)} , is where are you in your pre-deployment training for the 22nd MEU? What stage of training are you in?

WIT: Yes. We're in the pre-PTP phase of the MEU life cycle. So we formally composite the MEU MAGTF right after Labor Day in early September. Not that our MEU is unique, but we're going to form, sort of, like the reinforced command element in early June which will take us from approximately, maybe, 100 people to 200, 250 people. Because in August, there is a naval large scale exercise which the *Kearsarge* ARG is currently slated to support. So we're going to go out there and support the exercise with them. But it's pre-MEU PTP. So it's probably just going to be, you know, the command element, the PHIBRON, the ships, and maybe various elements of a composite MAGTF.

But really, it's just an opportunity to get on the boat a little bit earlier than normal. So that's, kind of, where we're at. So again, we composite the MAGTF in September.

We're going to composite the rest of the command element in early June. So we're pre-PTP, pre-workup right now, if that makes any sense.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Yes, it sure does. Thanks for that, ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}. So this naval large scale exercise, if I termed that correctly, that will be your first opportunity to test some of your command and control and staff practices within your command element; is that correct?

WIT: That's what we hope to do out there, exactly. Kind of just -- kind of exercise the command element, work with the PHIBRON, work with the ships, test our C2 systems, work on battle rhythm, staff planning, stuff like that.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. That makes sense. Have you had an opportunity to meet the commanders of the MSEs that will eventually form and composite with your MEU?

WIT: I have met, kind of, one of them formally. I've met with the CLB commander. I've met with the -- who will be -- the gentleman who will be the ACE commander. He takes over in a couple of weeks. And I have met, in passing, the BLT commander, but I haven't sat down one-on-one with the BLT commander just yet.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. Have you had an opportunity to discuss expectations for the 22nd MEU, if appropriate, with the MEF commanding officer or the MEF deputy commanding officer -- the commanding general? Excuse me.

WIT: No, I have not.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. So have you had an opportunity to this point to observe other MEUs as they have formed and composited on the East Coast? And a follow-up question, what is your MEU experience to this point? Have you served on a BLT or the MEU staff or something like that?

WIT: Sure. I'll answer the second one first, if that's okay. MEU experience, I was in 81's platoon commander on an East Coast MEU back in 1999. So we fulfilled the role, sort of, the MEU's primary TRAP force. 2003-2004, I was with the 22nd MEU. I was the helo company commander, Charlie Company 1/6 -- or BLT 1/6. And then, 2013-2014, I was the BLT commander for BLT 1/6, the GCE for the 22nd MEU. So that's my -- that's my past MEU experience prior to my current billet right now.

What I've been able to observe since I checked in and took command in August 2019, is essentially, when I got here, the 26th MEU was going through their PTP. And what I was tasked with doing was going out and, basically, supporting EOTG's evaluation and certification recommendation of the 26th MEU during their certification exercise. So when I had an opportunity to go out sea for about a month with the 26th MEU, and I had part of my team as it existed back then, part of my staff, we went out there, I think that was November-December 2019.

And then, the following year, we just got done doing the same thing for the 24th MEU. So we went out there and supported again, supported EOTG, as the 24th MEU went through ARG MEUEX and their certification exercise. So we went out there for two separate exercises with the 24th MEU. And again, kind of, focusing on watching them and observing them and evaluating them during their at sea periods.

And I think that's pretty much it. So that's kind of what we were able to, kind of, watch and observe from the last two MEU PTPs.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. Yeah, that makes sense. ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_(c), would you mind just discussing over the years that you've been associated with the MEU program, as you illustrated, you know, from platoon commander, company commander, BLT, and also your recent experience that you just detailed. Do you see any major issues or trends as far as training deficiencies or any aspects of readiness, whether it be material or personnel that you've seen either improve or degrade from the time you were a lieutenant until now?

WIT: Oh, man.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): I know that's a big question.

WIT: No. Yeah. It is a big question, but I'd say that's a good question. I try not to speculate too much here. I guess, just personal opinions.

Obviously, one thing that's changed from the time that

I was a lieutenant until the time to now, you know, twenty-five years later or so is I think the United States Navy has half the amphibious ships that it used to.

So, you know, when I was a lieutenant, there was an East Coast MEU going out every six months, and there was a West Coast MEU going out every six months. So, you know, I don't even think we're putting, you know, over the course of each -- if you said five years, how many MEUs are being put out by the East Coast and West Coast? The numbers are not even or are not even close as they would have been in 1999.

So I just think one thing that's changed is there's just a -- there's just less people familiar with -- with MEU operations, with amphibious operations. And because there's less AMPHIBS on each coast, there's less things like TCAT. So, you know, the TCATs are like when a ship or two, but normally one ship, comes down from Norfolk and a bunch of Marines jump on and get some things done for just a few days. That doesn't happen too much anymore from my perspective. Sometimes we go months, I think, down here without a single TCAT happening.

So I think just because of the size of the AMPHIB fleet, there's just a lot of -- there's a lot less amphibious operations that occur. So there's a lot less familiarity at many, many, levels with, kind of, what it takes.

Whether it's, you know, kind of like the nuances of surface operations and getting drivers and vehicles on and off

LCUs on and off LCACs, you know, how much it takes to get a squadron qualified to land on various amphibious shipping. Obviously, AAV operations could be -- could be something that we do a lot less on the ship to shore aspect of it, depending on AMPHIB availability. So I don't know if that's -- I don't know if that equates to deficiencies. Because I think probably it's, you know, it's -- that can be a bit subjective.

And then, I guess, it's something else I, kind of, seen over the years. But again, this is just, you know, on a limited sample size, based on my own personal experiences, is that sometimes -- sometimes the higher headquarters are more involved in composite and sometimes they're less involved in composite. And I think that has more to do with, maybe, competing requirements and priorities at the time as well as, you know, kind of, personalities of different -- of different commanding generals or commanding officers and just kind of how they, you know -- what their own personal experiences are and all -- as well as some key staff members and what their personal experiences are and level of expertise and how they look at, you know, the composition process and the PTP process, et cetera.

So I don't know. I don't know if that scratches the itch on that question. It was a big question, I don't want to -- I don't want to speculate too much.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): It, no does, ^{(b)(3), (b)}_{(6), (b)(7)} . And I appreciate your response. From what I get from you is availability of

amphibious ships, and then just to institutional, my words, gap of knowledge were, perhaps, you know, your subordinate commanders on the new staff probably just doesn't have as much new background as perhaps, you know, 25 years ago, or even ten or 20 years ago.

Do you think that's a fair characterization?

WIT: I think that's a pretty fair characterization. I mean, I just kind of going out there and watching the last two MEUs, and, you know, I was watching and just going. How would I. How the hell would I do this if I hadn't done a MEU several times in my career? Because it's complicated stuff.

You know, there's a time compressed environment. The at-sea periods are incredibly fast-paced. There's a lot of stuff stuffed into this. You've got the Navy out there and their evaluation. You got Marine operations that are trying to get done; there's a lot of stuff going on. And if I didn't have, what I consider a pretty good background in MEU ops, I don't know how the hell I would get a staff ready and a team ready and a MAGTF ready to do this.

So I think I'm fortunate that I've done three MEUs, but I don't know if everybody's got that same -- that same background. Not that I'm -- not that I consider myself the most prepared MEU Commander, but I'm lucky that I've done three MEUs before as a MEU commander. Because I think I've got some background and some experiences that I can -- that I can look back on and utilize. Some people may not have that. So I think -- to me it matters.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): Yeah. That totally makes sense, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) .
One last question and I'll turn you over to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) .
How do you share and gain lessons learned on MEU operations with either prospective or current MEU commanders? Is there good email communication back and forth or is it through the MEU operational advisory group or what do you -- what do you see as the best venue to share trends and issues and lessons learned?

WIT: I think right now it's -- that's actually a pretty good question. I think right now it's just kind of informal. You know, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 's, you know, experience is something that he thinks is interesting or noteworthy, he sends it out. And -- or (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) might have done this a couple of years ago when the 26th MEU was out there. Hey, guys, this is what we're dealing with COVID out here, you know, here's some information. So, you know, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) out there in the 31st MEU does the same thing all the time. So right now, it's I think it's just, kind of, informal. People are just sending things out to the guys that they know are in MEUs and it's not something that happens regularly. It probably happens maybe once every month or two.

But I'll get an email sooner, you know, once in a while from a guy that's in the seat with things that are going on. Chris Bronzi, would send out his first hundred days AAR. So just every so often you'll get an email from a sitting MEU commander about something or other that they ran into or experienced or that they might think that the -- that the group thinks is noteworthy. Regarding the MEU OAGs, I -- to be honest, I haven't found that form to be incredibly helpful.

The agenda, I just think, has not really been supportive of what you described. I think it could be that, but it hasn't been that. So I think a MEU OAG would be a good forum for that kind of stuff. But the agenda topics so far have not -- have not really lent itself to that kind of stuff. So what has worked, if anything, has just been sort of the informal, you know, email chain type stuff, occasional phone calls.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Yes. That make sense, ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}. Thanks for that.

Over to ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} for any questions you have, ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, and then ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}.

^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Hey ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} here. I'm looking to I'm looking at this through the lens of material readiness. And so, my first question is: As you get ready to enter into, you know, the more robust stages of the forming and, ultimately, the compositing pieces of the MEU, what are your expectations as the MEU commander with respect

to maintaining or gaining situational awareness on the involvement and readiness of the material that's going to be issued you when you composite? Over.

WIT: Well, I think my expectation is -- is what I hope to -- what I hope to experience is that -- I don't have any reason to believe that this won't occur. But I expect the, kind of, MEF to kind of oversee the composition of the MAGTF -- of the MEU MAGTF.

Right now, the II MEF MEU SOP is under revision. And it's my understanding that some of the potential changes have a little bit to do with, kind of, the logistical material readiness aspect of the SOP. And so, that kind of stuff has got my interest because if changes are made in that area, it may -- it could potentially impact the level or type of MEF oversight that goes into, you know, compositing the MEU MAGTF.

But for obvious reasons, you know, the material readiness of the MEU MAGTF, as units come to the 22nd MEU, has obviously got my full, undivided attention right now. Or it will when as we get closer to that date. II MEF actually just put out, published last week on SIPR, an initiating directive that goes that talks about the composition of the 22nd MEU MAGTF. So that's on the high side. I'd refer you to that -- I refer you to that for, kind of, some specifics.

I also will state that this -- I've heard the II MEF CG stated on a couple of occasions that he expects all equipment to

be, you know, fully functional or fully operational on the day that the MEU MAGTF is formed. So, you know, I'm expecting, you know, equipment to come to us in a high state of -- high state of material readiness. I understand that that's, you know, kind of a moving target sometimes.

You know, you as you fly aircraft, you break aircraft, and you maintain aircraft. And my biggest -- my biggest probably thing that I'm can -- I'm not concerned about, but I'm interested in is what is going to -- what is the MEF oversight going to look like, exactly. You know, they're going to be a SLAP inspection? Is there going to be a composite brief where the MEF CG takes a brief from MSC commanders? That occurred, to the best of my knowledge, for the 24th MEU. I don't know if that occurred with the 26th MEU. But that's the kind of stuff that I'm kind of interested in and expecting to see as the 22nd MEU is formed. Because I think that's kind of what -- that's what kind of good oversight at the MEF level looks like, in my humble opinion.

So I don't know if that answers your question, ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): No, it does. It does. And I appreciate the answer. I mean, it's kind of what I was driving at is -- is you as the MEU Commander. You know, obviously, you don't want to get to the joint LTI phase of this and find out that you've got a problem. And so, my question was sort of geared towards, you know, what touch points, whether formal or informal, do you have an

expectation of prior to that date so that when you get to that point of compositing, when you're going through the joint LTI, that you're pretty confident you're not going to get surprised. Over.

WIT: Yeah. I think this, kind of, goes back to, you know, what joint LTI are we talking about? You know, are we talking about the joint LTI that happens within the division prior to, you know, prior to the BLT being composited, or are we talking about a second JLTIs that maybe happens prior to the BLT joining the MEU?

So I think the division does an LRAV inspection where, you know, where -- in my case, 2/6, as they become BLT 2/6, the division is putting together a BLT, and there are some JLTIs that are occurring as part of a LRAV inspection. And then, historically, I think in most cases, there is a second set of JLTIs, kind of, done by the same people.

Because I think the, probably, division and the MEF are probably leveraging the same small pool of SMEs. But now, this is a kind of a MEF run SLAP inspection, so that -- this is what I'm interested in, wondering if this is going to be part of the change that may occur with the MEF MEU SOP revision.

Because this is the kind of, you know, not that -- not that a second set of JLTIs needs to happen a couple of weeks after the first set. But if that's not going to occur, what is the means of MEF oversight to ensure that there are no surprises?

As far as things that I'm doing right now, what kind of sight picture do I have right now? I don't think I have, I would say, much of a sight picture on the material readiness of the units that are coming to the 22nd MEU.

The one thing I am probably paying close attention to is where we're at with return to water operations in the AAVs. Because right now, I think that's still sort of, obviously, kind of a hanging chad on whether, you know, the 22nd MEU is going to have AAVs in the BLT or not. We're assuming we are, but we're kind of focusing on, you know, what's their training certification vice the material readiness of that platoon.

Because right now, from our perspective, the division is fairly, you know, interested in that and involved in that. And we're kind of satisfied with what we're watching in that regards.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): I mean, that's a great point. That's, kind of, leads me to another question real quick is, you know, that -- when the BLT forms and they do their own JLTIs in terms of prepping the BLT for chop over to the MEU, if they have ample time between their -- their JLTIs and their -- and their compositing. And when they composite to the MEU, it sounds like it wouldn't be as big an issue because they'd have time to address any issues that they find. But what we found in some cases is that chop date or that composite date of the BLT is literally on the

heels, if not, you know, separated by a day or two of the composite of the MEU. Which could can raise some concerns if that's -- materially, if that's the case.

I mean, so sort of what is the standard or what is your expectation or what do you believe the standard is, at least in II MEF, with the schedule with compositing the BLT, and then how long after that do you composite the MEU?

WIT: Yeah. Great question. And I'm not entirely sure that I know the right answer. But it's my understanding right now that the BLT is going to form in early August, which is a month before the MEU composites.

So it's my understanding -- I'm fairly certain that the division is MCCREing 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines at the end of July. And then, right after that, there is the BLT composite. But the BLT composite is not like a day, it's like a process. And I think it probably goes throughout the month of August which is probably the right way to do it.

However, at the same time, there's a bunch of EOTG MEU related courses that are ongoing. So, you know, if you -- if you've ever done a MEU, you know, kind of before the PTP even begins, you know, sometimes one or two, maybe even three months, there's a bunch of MEU-related courses, raid courses, TRAP courses, non-lethal weapons courses, assault climber's courses, R&S course, VBSS course.

There's a million courses that are all going and they

all occur -- I don't say that they don't all occur, but a lot of them occur before the MAGTF even forms. So there's -- you've got this 180-day MEU PTP which is, in reality, a bit longer than 180 days. We've tried to work with the division and EOTG to kind of get this thing scoped down just a bit because the division needed up until the end of July to kind of build this battalion from a personnel and training perspective. And so the division has, kind of, got them kind of fenced off to the end of July.

And then in August, they're putting the BLT together. But also occurring during the month of August is probably a couple raid courses, a TRAP course, our MEU staff planning conference is going up in Little Creek, we're probably going to take 50-60 people, all key leaders up to that. So that's going on in August that as, you know -- and while that's going on, we're trying to work out and trying to figure out when you're kind of watching how they're putting 2/6 together into BLT 2/6.

Because obviously, if there isn't going to be a full SLAP inspection and there's going to be something different, then we -- then the MEF -- then the 22nd MEU and the MEF has got to be extremely interested in how the division puts the BLT together.

Because we just -- we're just not going to -- we're not going to take an entirely -- we may not take an entirely fresh second look the next month, if that makes any sense.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): No, it does. I appreciate the answer. And -- thank you, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) . I appreciate it. Now, I'll turn it over to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) .

WIT: Let me out -- let me talk about the rest of the MAGTF really quick. I don't have any major concerns with how the CLB is putting together, because it CLB kind of gets built probably even earlier than the BLT. And they I think they've got a lot less, I think, a lot less going on. So they're able to kind of focus on compositing the CLB. In our case, we're going to take CLB-26. They're kind of put together a little bit earlier from my perspective, and they've got a lot less competing requirements. But I think they're not -- the other element of the MAGTF that I'm concerned -- that I'm not concerned about, but I'm watching pretty closely, is obviously the ACE.

Because I don't think it's my understanding that the ACE comes together at the same time the MEU comes together. So we come together in the -- in early September. I think it's going to be September 7th or September 8th. And I think the ACE comes together at the exact same time. I don't think they put the ACE together before they put the MAGTF together, if that makes any sense.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): I get it. And I appreciate that. Thank you.

WIT: Okay. That's the end of my answer for that.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Hey, sir. Good morning, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) here.

WIT: Hey, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). How you doing? Good to hear from you.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Great. Great to hear from you too, sir. Hey, so I just have a couple of questions. That drawing from both your experiences as a BLT commander and your current experience now as a MEU commander. So we talked about it a little bit, but the -- I think there's something really important about the formation of all of the MSE and the MSC's role in doing that. And looking through as we're trying to find things that we could change from a service perspective or best practices. You know the MEU PTP or the Marine Corps Order on it doesn't reference anything other than E minus 180.

All of these different units come together, they join, and they composite, and it's, you know, this seamless process. But, you know, listening to you and listening to everybody that doesn't seem like a reasonable timeline. And I'm just wondering if you think that that's something that should be formalized. It is something that should come from the service level, or are we getting too far into the weeds of the MEFs and the MSEs?

WIT: Yeah. Great question. I don't know if it needs

to be service directed or if it could be handled at the MEF, at the various MEFs. I'm not sure about that.

But what is a bit of a moving target, is this period before the E minus 180. When you may have anywhere between 30 and 90 days of pre-MEU PTP, MEU related training courses. I think right now, anything is supportable if it's completely understood by everybody and the MSCs to have enough lead time to generate the forces in order to be ready for these dates.

So, you know, the unit that's most of impacted by this is the reconnaissance detachment, because they're -- they literally start MEU related training courses with EOTG. They start for us -- they start next month and about a month from now in May. So that's that is that's a -- that's like three and a half months before E minus 180. Is when, you know, our reconnaissance detachment for the 22nd MEU actually starts its MEU work up from for lack of a better term. A little -- it's a -- so it's kind of a moving target because I think there's just a little bit of -- there's a little bit of flexibility, kind of, given to the MEU commanders to, kind of, figure this out. Plus things change and observations and experiences and lessons learned. And, you know -- so -- again, I think it could be -- I think it could be it can be handled at the MEF level. I don't know if that answers the question. I'm trying to think of something else here, but like, I got something on the tip of my tongue.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Sir, I think -- I mean, really what I think needs to be -- I just want to draw that that thread that the MSEs need time to -- they need time to form prior to the MEU's composite. And without doing that, you're -- you're rushing through hoops, whether it's the, you know, joining all of the gear and equipment through, you know, GCCS or moving from individual disparate track platoon, arty battery, infantry battalion into this composite unit without really having accomplished any, you know, T&R events together or at least, you know, with an understanding across each other.

So whether that's at the MEF or that's at the -- at the service level. That's one of the things that I think I'm pushing forward to figure out a good way to write that as a recommendation.

WIT: Yeah. I mean, the MEF has their own MEU SOP. So, you know, I think you're using, you know the Marine Corps order as a baseline, it's a good start, I think it does that. The other document that's pretty -- that's pretty helpful is, is the U.S. Fleet Forces FMF LANT instruction on the ARG FRTP and the MEU PTP. It's a -- it's a joint instruction or a combined instruction that, kind of, lays out in pretty good detail -- probably the most important, most detailed, helpful reference that

I, kind of, use on a weekly basis on just every step of the MEU process, MEU PTP process. There's good -- there's good detail in there and it kind of addresses all these things that we're talking about. But it's only good if you use it. It's only good if you know the instruction kind of inside and out. Sometimes I don't think it's as well understood as maybe it needs to be. Anyway, I think that's all I got on that, over.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): A second question kind of dovetails into that, and this is based on all of your experience and what you've seen so far, could you characterize what happens on PMINT? I know it's kind of a broad question, but what are your expectations and what is your experience with what is supposed to be happening during PMINT and, specifically, the phase in the PTP that it's in?

WIT: Yeah. Great question. So PMINT is sort of the crawl-walk phase of the ARG MEU PTP. It's the first -- I -- you know, generally speaking, it's the first at sea period. So, you know, you're doing it -- again, I kind of go back to the instruction I just referenced. You know, it gives a sort of here's a recommended things that you should do during PMINT. And, you know, when -- I just kind of reread this in the last -- I reread the whole thing in the last three or four days. But it talks about, hey, you want this is where you're going to do your like, you know, your call-away drills.

And this is when you're going to do your man overboard drills. And this is where you're going to learn, you know -- you know, where all the different ships spaces are. And it's very, very, very -- it's kind of like grass week at the rifle range and, you know, you're not trying to get ahead of yourself. You know, the ACE has got to get a lot of CQs done during PMINT or they're kind of chasing it the rest of the MEU work up. So it is -- I think it takes a little bit of discipline to keep PMINT at what PMINT is, kind of, designed to be doctrinally.

Because I think generally there is a net -- there's a -- it's been my experience that there's a desire to, kind of, like, start jogging, and I get it. Because you're out there for 11 days or 12 days and you want to get some crap done. But I think, you know, PMINT is where you're trying to build a really, really, good foundation for ARG MEUEX and COMPTUEX. And if you go by the letter of the instruction, it's kind of laid out that way. It's very, very, fundamental type stuff that's occurring. Maybe one full mission profile, maybe one stab at a week of an integrated VBSS mission, but not a lot -- not a lot of missions.

More planning, less execution, if that makes any sense.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Absolutely. Yes, sir. That's exactly what I was trying to get at. And then, sir,

specifically, we've talked about the EOTG courses, one question is just are you aware that the EOTG raid course does not do any waterborne operations anymore?

WIT: I'm aware that the 15th MEU mech. raid course didn't do any water operations, just from reading the investigation. I think back to, you know, when I was a BLT Commander, Charlie Company got in the water during their mech. raid course. So I don't know if it's -- if it's -- I don't know if that's -- I couldn't tell you if that's actually in the II MEF EOTG mech. raid LOI, but it would be personally -- it would be my personal opinion that if we're going to have a mech. raid course for a MEU, AAVs are getting in the water, that company is getting in the water, they've got to be ready to do that, That would be part of -- that would be part of the course, or at least my expectation of the course.

And, you know, the so what there is that you've got to make sure that that rifle company and that AAV platoon are ready to do that kind of stuff at the mech. raid course with EOTG. so, you know, from our -- what we've tried to do is push that mech. raid course as far to the right as possible so that that rifle company and that AAV platoon, if we are going to take AAVs, have as much time to work together before they're expected to get in the water together for the mech. raid course. So I did -- did --

(b)(3), (b)(6),
(b)(7)(c) , did that answer your question?

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Yes, sir. And so we did speak to both EOTG OICs from both coasts. And it's something that I understand -- because we actually have Master Guns ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}
_(c) is one of the guys on our team who is the platoon sergeant for your BLT. And I thought I remembered it as well. So we know that it used to be the case that they did waterborne operations. But now for both of -- both East and West Coast, it's not.

And it has to do -- I think it has to do with some of the compressed timeline, but also the, maybe, structure that they have there. So it, kind of, just wanted to, I guess, make you aware of that, but also get it, you know, kind of record that you this used to happen. It stopped happening.

WIT: Yeah. I mean, I'm not surprised to hear that that's in there -- that's in their order or LOI, but they're, you know, that's kind of like a -- personally, that kind of point -- is a good start point for negotiations.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Yes, sir.

WIT: Okay.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): So one last question. This one -- have you noticed, understanding, obviously, what a MEU commander is, it's the first time that you really are a MAGTF commander, and so we've discussed that there are challenges with the -- possibly the forming of the MSEs. There's a lot of training that has to happen in a very tight

timeline. Have you seen any problems in keeping the main thing, the main thing, and focusing on the core mets of a MEU as opposed to, you know, testing out some new concepts or doing something that is revolutionary? That it is somebody is trying to advance a Marine Corps concept and kind of losing sight of those basic core METs.

WIT: I think there's always a ton of things going on. There's always competing priorities for a MEU commander or for any commander of at this level. I think it's easy to get -- it's easy to get overwhelmed by a lot of new ideas and emerging capabilities. What we've tried to do is - if we think there's something out there that we think is going to make us can, really, make us better and it's not going to, you know, overwhelm the amount of bandwidth we have, then we jump into it. If we don't, we don't jump into it.

Just to give a personal example, you know, we're watching what other MEUs are doing with small UASs, the stalker and the VBAT instead of the RQ21. And the Marine Corps is now divesting from the RQ21. So we're trying to take the stalker and the VBAT out. And we're -- so we're in the process of trying to leverage that kind of future capability. We've also watched a couple MEUs try to kind, you know, do some stuff -- new stuff with the RHIBs and the small boats. And, you know, whether it's their own boats or drive the boats, instead of the Navy. But

personally, that one was, I felt, a bridge too far for us and we didn't try to. So we're not trying to do that. So we tried to pick and choose what kind of, I guess, you know, shiny good ideas that we want to be involved in. No one's really pressing us on any us with anything. These are all kind of things that either, you know, we've either decided to get involved in or not get involved in.

And, you know, we kind of make that determination based on how good of an idea do we think it is? How much effort is it going to take? And just kind of a cost -- a cost-risk benefit analysis and we kind of move on from there. Is it -- but is it hard to keep the main thing? Absolutely. Just -- and I think that's just normal. You know, I think it's easy to come up with priorities, it's a lot harder to leverage priorities. Anybody can now number priorities one, two, three, four, five. The hard thing to do at any level is, no kidding, you know, picking winners and losers within the MAGTF or winners and losers in the staff or winners and losers within, you know, the list of good ideas and priorities that are either exist or being put upon you. I think that's, you know, that's kind of the art of command, I guess, to some extent, over.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): Thank you, sir. I appreciate the responses and best of luck in the workups and on deployment.

WIT: Thanks, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c).

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))): Hey, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) here again.

Keeping in line with the theme of the questions that you've heard so far and our discussion. Is there anything else you'd like to add? Are you still there?

WIT: Yeah. I was just thinking.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Sorry.

WIT: Yeah. Not really, ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}. I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you guys.

You know, I think one thing that we're watching and we have, you know, some insight with some elements of the MAGTF and not other elements of the future MAGTF is there -- is their own kind of unique -- each element of the MAGTF has their own force generation issues. And I'm not sure, like -- I don't have -- I don't have any insight into, like, the elements of the future elements that I'm going to get, I don't have a lot of insight into, like, their own sort of separate like build paths. Like, how -- why is BLT 2/6 growing at the pace and on this on the timeline that they're growing on. Why is that the pace? Why does it look like that? I'm sure there are good reasons why, but I don't know what the reasons are. And I don't know if anybody at the MEF would know or if they're interested. I think it's, you know -- but it becomes a MEF issue and a MEU issue at composition. And, you know, so I don't -- I just think there's not a lot of before composition involvement or interaction, at least not formally, if that makes any sense. I think to me that would be, like, the one thing that -- if I could, you know -- we have been planning with 2/6, VMM-263, their separate detachments,

and CLB-26. We've been planning with them for probably three months now. Because we need their input into -- you know, into the PTP. We need their input into the EOTG courses that go, kind of, on the front end of the work up, if not a little bit before the workup. We need their input for something like RUT which hopefully takes place up for us up at Fort Pickett. So there's a lot of things that we need their input on. And so, we're kind of like, you know, we're learning about these organizations, you know, through this kind of, you know, this sort of informal, you know, pre-MEU PTP planning. And so we get some insight into their own sort of their own sort of force generation process, but we don't really have it. Well, we really don't have -- is a lot of kind of, like, there's not, like, a lot of, from my perspective -- like there's not gates that the MEF has set where there's, kind of, like, there's kind of, like, a common understanding of, like, this is where -- this is where the BLT is at.

This is where the ACE is at. This is where the CLBs at. I'm not even sure that would be completely, you know, helpful for the MEF CG. It would be helpful for a future MEU commander, to kind of understand, kind of, formally why things are the way they are for different elements of the MAGTF

as they go through their own, kind of, force generation, if that makes any sense. So it's kind of a long, rambling, answer there.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}): No. That does make sense, ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(6), (b)(7)(c)}. As you're talking, I thought of another question. So when you were a BLT commander and you were gathering and planning with your attachments from the, you know, the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion or 2nd Tracks or 2nd RECON, what involvement did your regimental commander have in that process or were you working directly with division, indirectly with the sourcing units, whether it was the artillery regiment or battalion or, again, combat engineer battalion, recon battalion? So could you, kind of, walk us through the experiences as a BLT Commander?

Because I mean that I know as an enabler from an enabler MOS, that can be kind of a challenge to make sure that you get folks that are trained and ready and they got the right people and they've got good gear, and you may or may not have that expertise on the BLT or even the MEU. So if you could, kind of, talk us to your experiences as the BLT commander and then what your expectations are. You alluded to it earlier, but, you know, by planning with your future MSEs, what are your expectations for the regimental commanders and division and MLG and group commanders at the wing, over.

WIT: Yeah. I'm happy to talk about that. My experience as a BLT commander, and not to sound overly

critical, because -- and it's in my recollection is now eight years ago for when we formed the BLT in summer of 2013. From what I remember, there wasn't a lot of regimental or division oversight. Now, if I would have asked for regimental involvement, I probably would have gotten it. But I -- I don't remember there being a lot of it. So I think there were things that, you know -- I think there was a lot of things that I figured out later, you know, that I didn't know at the time. Like, you know, when we were forming the BLT, it was, kind of, like we didn't know what we didn't know.

And so, I, kind of, felt like I was almost in the -- I had to negotiate with independent battalion commanders. I had to -- or if I had to negotiate with 10th Marines. And I just didn't, you know, it didn't -- I don't remember there being a lot of regiment or division involvement. There weren't a lot of issues either then or later.

So, you know, it seems things seemed to work okay. I didn't have a lot of issues with how things went. You know, there was maybe like one independent battalion that I think, you know, maybe, kind of, try to pull a fast one on us a little bit, in hindsight? At least we felt that way, kind of, on deployment.

But it wasn't anything, like, catastrophically bad, but it was just, like, this kind of makes sense now in retrospect. But at the time when we were forming the BLT, we just, kind of,

figured we were doing it the right way and there wasn't anybody really checking our math on anything, if I remember correctly. My expectations this time are a bit different. I'm, you know -- I'm -- I'm communicating with O-6 commanders, my staffs are communicating with, you know, O-6 staff -- O-6 level staffs. And, you know, I think everybody's just -- I think just, kind of, naturally, this time around, everybody's a lot more interested in how the MEU is formed, for obvious reasons, over.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Yeah. Thanks for that ^{(b)(3), (b)}
_{(6), (b)(7)(c)}. That that makes a lot of sense, and no further questions on my end. That's all I have. I'll ask ^{(b)(3), (b)}
_{(6), (b)(7)(c)} and ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)} if they have any follow up questions. Over to you ^{(b)(3), (b)}
_{(6), (b)(7)(c)} and ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}
_{(7)(c)}): I don't have any others, ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}.
Thank you.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}? You know, maybe ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)} dropped off the line.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Sorry, sir. I've been talking here for the last 45 seconds on mute, but it was all really great stuff. But I'll summarize it just by asking you, sir, are there other than the LSE that you mentioned, is there -- are there any other detractors from the 22nd MEU command element up to composite?

WIT: Detractors? I don't know if I would say LSE.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}
_{(b)(7)(c)}): Like special purpose MAGTF, I guess, any other tasking that is not strictly focused on the

MEU and the composite?

WIT: So, you know, we did a special purpose MAGTF deployment sort of off cycle. So, you know, I found that, you know, frankly, personally, helpful. Because we've got to be a, you know -- I got to be a MAGTF commander. Now, obviously, not the same -- not the same scale as a standard MEU MAGTF. But, you know, I had an ACE. I had a small GCE. I had a CLB. So, you know, working with, you know, various elements of the MAGTF. Especially, working with an ACE on a day to day basis, I think for me and some of my staff proved incredibly helpful.

You know, I was just talking with some of my staff this week about just, you know, looking back on that deployment to Spain for a special purpose MAGTF, crisis response Africa -- you know, that in hindsight was, I think, more helpful than we thought it would be, as we approach kind of MEU composition and the MEU PTP. So that was something that was occurring for some MEU command elements off cycle. I don't think it's going to be the -- we're kind of divesting of that mission.

So I don't think that'll be something in the future, although there are other ways for MEU command elements off cycle to, kind of, you know, maintain some command element readiness and get some reps. LSE, I think, potentially, is the opposite of a detractor and almost as an enhancer. We're kind of looking at it, like, you know, a PMINT before PMINT. Now I don't know if

it's going to turn out that way because it's part of a tactical exercise, although, you know, for us, there aren't any really. There's -- it's almost like a -- it's almost like a TEWT, there's no troops involved.

We're trying to get some elements of the ace out there to get some CQs done early, so that we're a little farther along and we when we get a PMINT. And, kind of, going back to the question about PMINT, you know, if we get some stuff done at LSE, we may be able to walk a little bit sooner at PMINT and maybe crawl a little bit less at PMINT. At the very least, I think for the command element of the 22nd MEU, LSE is going to be -- is going to enhance the command elements ability to command and control the plan. And I think we're going to be better prepared for PMINT and the rest of the MEU PTP.

For one, we're going to have a much, much, closer tighter relationship with the PHIBRON and the ships and their staffs and their commanders. And we've already gone up to Norfolk and visited with them just to, kind of, open up the lines of communication. We've been -- again, we've been talking with the Navy for several months now about things that are coming up. So I don't think there's a lot of -- I don't think there's other detractors out there, you know, you've got to do a CGRI and you got to eventually got to do a FSMAO. And those are just, kind of, part of, you know, life cycles.

I think for -- one thing, that's -- you know, one thing

that is challenging the 22nd MEU a bit, this year, is that, you know, we composite in September, but, you know -- large scale exercise is in August. You know, summer moves are, you know, going on about the, you know, 30, 60, 90 days before that. So I'm having a fair amount of staff turnover in the command element.

And in the two or three months immediately before -- immediately before MEU PTP. And that's just kind of how, you know, that's just sort of the challenge of kind of linking up, you know, our own force generation with the MEU team down here at 2MEF. You know the last time MEU got back from a MEU deployment was the summer of 2019, and that's when I checked in. And that's when -- that's when my whole staff term checked in. There was a complete staff turnover. Well, two years later, a lot of that staff is starting to turn over again, hopefully I'm not going anywhere, but a lot of my staff is turning over.

So we're kind of -- we're kind of rebuilding the staff immediately before the MEU PTP which is a little bit of a challenge, but nothing that, you know, again, not a detractor -- but God, it sure would have been nice to keep the whole team together as we -- as we go into a MEU PTP and new deployment.

But, you know, some people get promoted, they picked up on boards or they just come up on orders. So there's some of them -- some of the -- kind of -- you know, the manpower model, not that it's at odds with the MEU PTP, but our new life cycle.

But right now, kind of, going back to, you know, how often a MEU

goes out the door, you know, the MEU life cycle right now is not, you know, six months out, twelve months back, six months out or it's not six months out. It's, like, you do a MEU and then you you might do a MEU, you know, two or three years later.

So it's kind of hard -- it's hard -- it's hard to kind of build a team and keep that team together for the entirety of a MEU life cycle. I think it's probably impossible to do. People just get promoted or they EAS or they retire or they get picked up on school or command. So that is just kind of, you know, plugging people in and the staff and, kind of, you're almost, kind of, constantly rebuilding the team a little bit throughout the entire life cycle of that, if that makes any sense.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Yes, sir. Absolutely. Again, appreciate the response, sir.

WIT: Yeah. Thanks, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c).

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : That's all I have.

WIT: Good talking to you.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : Hey, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) here again. I don't have any questions and I really appreciate -- we all really appreciate your time today, and I know you got plenty to do. But this has been very helpful to the team and all of us. So I've got a required statement I need to read to you, and then we'll be done with the interview.

WIT: Okay.

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) : You are directed not to discuss the

interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone other than members of the investigation team. If you are asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions immediately notify me, the investigating officer or your commanding general. All right. Thank you and great luck on your deployment.

WIT: Thanks fellas, appreciate it. If you need anything else, just let me know. Out here.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Thanks.

[The investigative interview closed on 20 April 2021.]

I, Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, attest that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} held on 20 April 2021.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Col, USMC

Encl (95) 13th MEU E-180 Brief

The above-referenced enclosure is classified SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY and is available by contacting Judge Advocate Division.

Encl (96) 11th MEU E-254 Forming and PTP Brief, 23 Nov 2020

The above-referenced enclosure is classified SECRET//NOFORN and is available by contacting Judge Advocate Division.

FISCAL YEAR 2020

DATE	UNIT	UNIT SPECIFIC	UNIT LATE	UNIT NO SHOW	#SHOW	#MQ	#STAY	#RECALL	#WED	# FUGIBLE	# DOB	# DMC	# NO RET	# REMOVED	#PASS	# SWET	# SVET	# SUET	CLASS CANCEL
1-Oct	3RD AAV	3RD AAV	NO	NO	5	0	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	5	0
2-Oct	3RD AAV	3RD AAV	NO	NO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3-Oct	3RD AAV	3RD AAV	NO	NO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4-Oct	AAS BN	AAS BN	NO	YES	23	0	23	0	23	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	0	23	0
5-Oct	AAS BN	AAS BN	NO	YES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6-Oct	AAS BN	AAS BN	NO	YES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7-Oct	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8-Oct	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9-Oct	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10-Oct	MAINTENANCE	MAINTENANCE			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11-Oct	MAINTENANCE	MAINTENANCE			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12-Oct	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	39	0	39	0	39	1	18	1	0	0	0	17	17	0	0
13-Oct	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	13	0	13	0	13	0	13	0	0	0	0	13	13	0	0
14-Oct	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	48	0	48	0	48	1	0	0	0	0	0	47	47	0	0
15-Oct	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	23	0	23	0	23	0	23	0	0	0	0	22	22	0	0
16-Oct	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	25	0	25	0	25	0	25	0	0	0	0	25	25	0	0
17-Oct	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	24	0	24	0	24	0	24	0	0	0	0	24	24	0	0
18-Oct	5TH MAR	1/5	NO	NO	25	0	25	0	25	0	25	0	0	0	0	23	23	0	0
19-Oct	5TH MAR	1/5	NO	NO	24	0	24	0	24	2	22	1	0	0	0	21	21	0	0
20-Oct	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21-Oct	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22-Oct	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
23-Oct	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24-Oct	MAINTENANCE	MAINTENANCE			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25-Oct	MAINTENANCE	MAINTENANCE			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26-Oct	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	24	0	24	0	24	3	0	0	0	0	0	21	0	0	21
27-Oct	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	23	0	23	0	23	3	0	0	0	0	0	19	0	0	19
28-Oct	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	21	0	21	0	21	1	0	0	0	0	0	20	0	0	20
29-Oct	AVTB	AVTB	NO	NO	16	0	16	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	16	0
30-Oct	5TH MAR	1/5	NO	NO	39	0	39	2	1	16	3	0	0	0	0	13	0	0	13
31-Oct	5TH MAR	1/5	NO	NO	14	0	14	0	14	0	13	0	0	0	0	13	0	0	13
1-Nov	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2-Nov	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3-Nov	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4-Nov	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5-Nov	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	16	0	16	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	0	16
6-Nov	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	7	0	7	0	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	6
7-Nov	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	2	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
8-Nov	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
9-Nov	13TH MEU	13TH MEU	NO	NO	14	0	14	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	0	0	14
10-Nov	13TH MEU	13TH MEU	NO	NO	11	0	11	0	11	0	1	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	10
11-Nov	11TH MAR	1/21	NO	NO	24	0	24	0	1	23	3	2	0	0	0	18	0	0	18
12-Nov	11TH MAR	1/21	NO	NO	24	0	24	0	24	3	1	0	0	0	0	20	0	0	20
13-Nov	11TH MAR	1/21	NO	NO	24	0	24	0	1	23	4	0	0	0	0	19	0	0	19
1-Nov	7TH MAR	3/4	NO	NO	21	0	21	0	0	21	4	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	17
2-Nov	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3-Nov	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4-Nov	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5-Nov	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6-Nov	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	16	0	16	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	0	16
7-Nov	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	7	0	7	0	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	6
8-Nov	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	2	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
9-Nov	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
10-Nov	13TH MEU	13TH MEU	NO	NO	14	0	14	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	0	0	14
11-Nov	13TH MEU	13TH MEU	NO	NO	11	0	11	0	11	0	1	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	10
12-Nov	AAS BN	AAS BN	NO	NO	24	0	24	0	24	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	0	24	0
13-Nov	AAS BN	AAS BN	NO	NO	21	0	21	0	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	0	21	0
14-Nov	AAS BN	AAS BN	NO	NO	14	0	14	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	0	14	0
15-Nov	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16-Nov	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17-Nov	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18-Nov	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19-Nov	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	1	0	0	0	0	23	0	0	23
20-Nov	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	23	0	23	0	0	23	0	0	0	0	0	23	0	0	23
21-Nov	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	23	0	23	0	0	23	0	0	0	0	0	23	0	0	23
22-Nov	5TH MAR	2/5	NO	NO	23	0	23	0	0	23	0	0	0	0	0	23	0	0	23
23-Nov	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24-Nov	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25-Nov	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26-Nov	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
27-Nov	15T MUG	CLB - 15	NO	NO	23	1	23	0	0	23	4	0	0	0	0	18	0	0	18
28-Nov	15T MUG	CLB - 15	NO	NO	23	1	23	0	0	23	4	0	0	0	0	18	0	0	18
29-Nov	15T MUG	CLB - 15	NO	NO	23	1	23	0	0	23	4	0	0	0	0	18	0	0	18
30-Nov	15T MUG	CLB - 15	NO	NO	23	1	23	0	0	23	4	0	0	0	0	18	0	0	18
1-Dec	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2-Dec	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3-Dec	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4-Dec	4TH RECON	RECON RESERVE IL0C	NO	NO	24	0	24	1	0	23	0	0	0	0	0	23	0	0	23
5-Dec	4TH RECON	RECON RESERVE IL0C	NO	NO	24	0	24	1	0	23	0	0	0	0	0	23	0	0	23
6-Dec	4TH RECON	RECON RESERVE IL0C	NO	NO	24	0	24	1	0	23	0	0	0	0	0	23	0	0	23
7-Dec	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8-Dec	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9-Dec	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10-Dec	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11-Dec	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12-Dec	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13-Dec	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14-Dec	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15-Dec	SATURDAY	SATURDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16-Dec	SUNDAY	SUNDAY			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17-Dec	5TH MAR	2/4	NO	NO	24	0	24	1	1	22	1	0	0	0	0	21	0	0	21
18-Dec	5TH MAR	2/4	NO	NO	24	0	24	1	1	22	1	0	0	0	0	21	0	0	21
19-Dec	5TH MAR	2/4	NO	NO	24	0	24	1	1	22	1	0	0	0	0	21	0	0	21
20-Dec	5TH MAR	2/4	NO	NO	24	0	24	1	1	22	1	0	0	0	0	21	0	0	21
2																			

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[illegible]

	3/4	3/4	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	0	2	0	0	22	22	0	0	
29-Aug	SATURDAY	SATURDAY																	
30-Aug	SUNDAY	SUNDAY																	
31-Aug	SUNDAY	SUNDAY																	
1-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	YES	13	0	13	0	0	13	2	0	0	0	11	11	0	0	0
2-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	YES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	YES	22	0	22	0	0	22	3	0	0	0	19	19	0	0	0
4-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	YES	22	0	22	0	1	21	2	0	0	0	19	19	0	0	0
5-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	1	24	4	0	0	0	20	20	0	0	0
6-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	1	23	1	1	0	0	21	21	0	0	0
7-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	3	21	4	3	0	0	14	14	0	0	0
8-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	2	1	0	0	21	21	0	0	0
9-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	YES	19	0	19	0	0	19	0	0	0	0	19	19	0	0	0
10-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	YES	21	0	21	0	0	21	0	0	0	0	21	21	0	0	0
11-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	1	23	0	0	0	0	23	23	0	0	0
12-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	YES	22	0	22	0	1	21	2	0	0	0	19	19	0	0	0
13-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	1	0	0	0	21	21	0	0	0
14-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	1	0	0	0	23	23	0	0	0
15-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	1	0	0	0	23	23	0	0	0
16-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	3	21	4	0	0	0	17	17	0	0	0
17-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	2	22	6	0	0	0	16	16	0	0	0
18-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	YES	30	0	30	0	1	19	1	0	0	0	18	18	0	0	0
19-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	YES	24	0	24	0	1	23	1	0	0	0	22	22	0	0	0
20-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	24	24	0	0	0
21-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	24	24	0	0	0
22-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	24	24	0	0	0
23-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	24	24	0	0	0
24-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	24	24	0	0	0
25-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	24	24	0	0	0
26-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	24	24	0	0	0
27-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	24	24	0	0	0
28-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	24	24	0	0	0
29-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	24	24	0	0	0
30-Sep	15TH MEU	15th MEU	0	NO	24	0	24	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	24	24	0	0	0



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
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MCO 3501.1E
PP&O
25 FEB 2019

MARINE CORPS ORDER 3501.1E

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Distribution List

Subj: MARINE CORPS COMBAT READINESS EVALUATION (MCCRE)

Ref: (a) MCO 3502.6A
(b) MCO 3500.110
(c) MCO 3502.3B
(d) NAVMC 3500.14C
(e) MCO P3500.72A
(f) MCO 1553.3B
(g) NAVMC 1553.1A
(h) MCO 3000.13A
(i) SECNAV M-5214.1
(j) 5 U.S.C. 552a
(k) SECNAVINST 5211.5E
(l) TECOMO 3502.1 (NOTAL)
(m) SECNAV Notice 5210
(n) SECNAV M-5210.1
(o) MCO 5210.11F

Encl: (1) Conduct of a Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation
(MCCRE)

Report Required: Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE)
Report (Report Control Symbol Exempt), par. 4.b.
(2), par. 4.b.(3)(i), and encl (1)

1. Situation. This Order establishes policy for the evaluation of units in accordance with references (a) through (o). As a Service, we require the formal evaluation of units based on approved Marine Corps Training and Readiness (T&R) tasks, conditions, and standards derived from core and/or assigned Mission Essential Tasks (METs) to ensure standardization and combat readiness in preparation for operational deployments.

2. Cancellation. MCO 3501.1D

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distribution is unlimited.

3. Mission. Operating Force Commanders formally evaluate their units' core and/or assigned METs through the conduct of a Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE) in order to ensure Service standardization and combat readiness.

4. Execution

a. Commander's Intent and Concept of Operations

(1) Commander's Intent. Commanders will review and approve the MET List (METL), supervise training, and formally evaluate combat readiness through the conduct of a MCCRE to ensure Service standardization and that units are adequately prepared for deployment in concert with reference (a).

(2) Concept of Operations

(a) Infantry and logistics regiments, Marine Air Groups (MAG), and all battalions, squadrons, aviation detachments, deployable companies and other independently deployable organizations will conduct a MCCRE of a unit's core and/or assigned METs at least once every two (2) years, based on a biennial fiscal year requirement, or once per deployment cycle - whichever is more frequent for the active component. For example, a unit deploying for a six (6) month deployment every 18 months will conduct a MCCRE at least once during the 18 month cycle.

(b) A MCCRE will be conducted as part of the Pre-deployment Training Program (normally within six (6) months of deployment and post-activation for reserve units) as the minimum requirement for a unit to deploy in order to ensure combat readiness of the unit's core and/or assigned METs, for both active and reserve components.

(c) Unit commanders are responsible for analyzing their Training Exercise and Employment Plan (TEEP) and determining the appropriate venue for MCCRE execution.

(d) Unit commanders will make every effort to implement force on force into the MCCRE exercise.

(e) When a MCCRE is conducted in conjunction with a Service Level Training Event (SLTE), the MCCRE may be conducted after the SLTE or during the SLTE. If the MCCRE is conducted following a SLTE, those T&R events evaluated as trained by the Service, and still within their respective sustainment period,

may be waived by the Exercise Commander (EC) during the subsequent evaluation of the MCCRE. A MCCRE may be conducted during the SLTE with approval and prior coordination with Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command (MAGTFTC), provided the unit's higher headquarters provides the MCCRE evaluator staff and the MCCRE does not interfere with the conduct of the SLTE.

(f) The MCCRE will be conducted prior to the deployment or Change of Operational Control (CHOP) of a subordinate unit to a task-organized unit, including units preparing to conduct a CHOP to a Marine Expeditionary Unit. Units deploying separately for Unit Deployment Program or similar deployments will conduct the MCCRE after the conclusion of the core training period and no later than 30 days prior to deployment.

(g) The results of a MCCRE will assist the unit commander in identifying unit strengths and weaknesses in relation to the unit METL and focus training and remediation in preparation for the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commander's unit deployment readiness certification in accordance with reference (a).

(h) The results of the units most recent MCCRE will serve as the foundation of its training assessment in DRRS-MC, including the assessment of whether tasks were observed.

b. Subordinate Element Tasks

(1) Inspector General of the Marine Corps will coordinate with Training and Education Command (TECOM) in order to obtain subject matter expert support, and incorporate the MCCRE program into the appropriate Functional Area Checklists to ensure compliance with this Order by identifying, measuring, and correcting potential deficiencies in the program.

(2) Commander, Marine Corps Forces Command; Commander, Marine Corps Forces Pacific; and Commander, Marine Forces Reserve will ensure completion and tracking of the MCCRE through the Force Generation Process. Internal reporting requirements will be established by the respective Marine Force (MARFOR). This reporting requirement is exempt from reports control according to reference (i), part IV, paragraph 7k.

(3) MEF Commanding Generals, and Commander, Marine Forces Reserve:

(a) Ensure infantry and logistics regiments, MAGs, and all battalions, squadrons, aviation detachments, deployable companies and other independently deployable organizations (company-level and above, at a minimum) are trained to meet the requirements of their METL and formally evaluated through a MCCRE to execute core and/or assigned METs, as outlined in this Order.

(b) Ensure training plans are based on the unit commander's mission analysis and training resources in order to conduct training and evaluation of their respective unit in accordance with references (f) and (g).

(c) Utilize only approved T&R manual standards, as posted in Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS) T&R Module or Marine Corps Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (M-SHARP), for the conduct of a MCCRE, per enclosure (1).

(d) Use Operations and Tactics Instructors, Intelligence and Tactics Instructors, Weapons and Tactics Instructors, and Expeditionary Logistics Instructors in the development and evaluation of a MCCRE where applicable.

(e) Remediate, as required, to correct any deficiencies identified during the MCCRE, followed by selective follow on evaluation.

(f) Provide T&R improvement recommendations, in accordance with references (d) and (e) to ensure the T&R standards evaluated during the MCCRE are accurate and up to date.

(g) Use MCTIMS Unit Training Management (UTM) and MCCRE modules to develop training and evaluation plans in support of Ground Combat Element (GCE) and Logistics Combat Element (LCE) unit's METL.

(h) Use M-SHARP and MCTIMS Task Master Database to identify required training for Aviation Combat Element (ACE) unit commanders.

(i) Publish all MCCRE results in MCTIMS MCCRE Module NLT 45 days after exercise completion. Use MCCRE results to support DRRS-MC Training Readiness assessments and MEF deployment certification reporting for force generation. This reporting requirement is exempt from reports control according to reference (i), part IV, paragraph 7k.

(4) Commanding General, Training and Education Command (TECOM):

(a) Ensure instruction on the use and application of the MCTIMS MCCRE Module is provided at applicable courses.

(b) Maintain approved T&R Standards in MCTIMS T&R Module.

(c) Maintain the functionality within MCTIMS MCCRE Module to develop, report, and archive all MCCREs results based on the unit's METL and T&R events evaluated.

(d) Conduct trend analysis utilizing MCCRE reports.

(e) Ensure Training Support Center Branch provides requested training support for MCCREs, when applicable, in accordance with reference (1).

(f) Ensure Force on Force training systems are available to support the conduct of the MCCRE.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) GCE and LCE MCCREs will be conducted utilizing the following steps/systems:

(a) A unit METL will be developed in MCTIMS UTM. If a core and/or assigned METL exists in MCTIMS Task Master Database for a given unit type, such METL will be initially populated as the default METL. Based on the unit commander's mission analysis, the unit METL may be modified as required. The unit's METL must be submitted to their higher headquarters for approval.

(b) Based on the unit's METL, commanders must develop a corresponding training plan. E-coded, prerequisite, and supporting T&R events will be linked to each MET within MCTIMS UTM. Based on the commander's mission analysis, T&R events may be added to this initial list. E-coded, prerequisite, and supporting T&R events may be waived only if the individual or unit has satisfactorily completed and evaluated those events during the current training cycle.

1. Load bearing units (Infantry Regiments, Infantry Battalions, Reconnaissance Battalions and Force Reconnaissance Companies, or units assigned a Provisional Infantry Battalion mission/METL, will incorporate execution of T&R event

INF-COND-7001 or INF-COND-8001 "Conduct a forced march" (as applicable) into the MCCRE within the following parameters:

a. Forced march will be conducted as an integral part of the MCCRE, not as a stand-alone event. Design of the integration shall be directed by the Marine Division Commander.

b. Forced march will culminate and transition directly into an evaluated tactical event such as an offensive or defensive exercise, NBC exercise, patrolling exercise, or related events that supports the unit's METL, and tests the unit's ability to execute an extended foot movement under load and remain combat effective.

c. Elements of non-load bearing units who are attached to Infantry units (specifically Combat Engineer Line Companies/Platoons, Fire Support Teams and Forward Observers) will execute the respective Infantry T&R event with the Infantry unit (Regiment or Battalion) to which they are attached.

d. Reconnaissance Battalions and Force Reconnaissance Companies will conduct a forced march as a load bearing unit as part of their unit MCCRE in accordance with paragraph 4.a.(2)(a). Due to the unique nature of these units, the Battalion and Force Company forced marches may be conducted as a stand-alone event if those units are not scheduled for a deployment. However, deploying Reconnaissance Battalion Companies or Platoons, and Force Company Platoons will conduct their forced march as an integral part of their pre-deployment MCCRE, not as a stand-alone event, culminating and transitioning directly into an evaluated tactical event.

2. Non-Load bearing units (Division Headquarters Battalion, Artillery Regiments, Artillery Battalions, Assault Amphibian Battalions, Combat Engineer Battalions, Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalions, Tank Battalions, Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies, and Low Altitude Air Defense Battalions) will incorporate execution of MCCS-COND-1003 "Conduct a forced march" into the MCCRE within the following parameters: Forced march will be integrated as part of the MCCRE, but may be executed as a stand-alone event. Design of the integration shall be directed by the Marine Division or Marine Air Wing Commander (as applicable).

(c) Based on the unit's METL and training plan identified in the previous step, commanders must develop a corresponding evaluation plan. The evaluation plan will contain

all E-Coded T&R events and all supporting 6000 level and above, as outlined by the unit's METL. The evaluation plan will also contain the corresponding level E-coded and supporting T&R events for any attachments, which fall under the attachments' respective unit's METL. By exception, those T&R events that are unsupportable during the evaluation, due to geographical constraints or lack of resources, may be waived by the first General Officer in the chain of command.

(d) The MCTIMS UTM and MCCRE Modules will be utilized to generate the training tasks in support of the training plan and the Performance Evaluation Check List (PECL) in support of the evaluation plan.

(e) Record the training completion in MCTIMS UTM Module.

(f) Record the evaluation results on the PECLs for each T&R event evaluated; and utilizing the results of the evaluated T&R events, determine if the unit is "Trained," "Partially Trained," or "Untrained" to execute each MET contained in the unit's core and/or assigned METL. Results will then be published via the MCCRE EC in the MCTIMS MCCRE Module NLT forty five days after completion of the MCCRE. Enclosure (1) provides further detail on the evaluator reporting responsibilities within MCTIMS.

(g) Conduct remediation in order to correct any deficiencies identified during the MCCRE.

(h) Reporting of unit readiness via Defense Readiness Reporting System - Marine Corps (DRRS-MC) will continue to be in accordance with reference (h).

(2) An ACE MCCRE will be conducted utilizing the following steps/systems:

(a) Aviation core and assigned METLs are housed in MCTIMS Task Master and are listed in each specific unit T&R Manual. Commanding Officers are expected to train their units to a level that at least meets the minimum standards for MET capability in all core and assigned METs for their unit. In addition, they have the responsibility to train their personnel to a level that maintains a long-term capability in their unit outside of specific deployments or TEEP.

(b) The Marine Aviation T&R Program Manual, reference

(d), describes how units utilize their T&R Manual for the generation, tracking and reporting of readiness to deploy through the use of the M-SHARP and DRRS-MC. For the MCCRE, the unit T&R Manuals themselves provide the specific unit-level codes that represent MET capability. Reference (h) provides the guidance for the application and reporting of the unit-level codes and the unit-specific T&R Manuals provide the actual codes and events each unit is to train to and be assessed upon during a MCCRE.

(c) Utilizing the training plan developed to meet the requirements of the TEEP and manning levels, each unit is to conduct training in accordance with reference (d).

(d) Assessing units for their capability to meet MET requirements is the responsibility of the Marine Aviation Wing (MAW). The MAW Flight Leadership Standardization and Evaluation (FLSE) cadre are the resource used to assess Type/Model/Series units, and Weapons Tactics Instructors are the resource used for aviation ground units for MET capability in accordance with reference (e).

(e) Recording T&R events associated with unit evaluations will be done through the use of M-SHARP, which already records all other Marine Aviation T&R events. Results will then be published via the MCCRE EC in the MCTIMS MCCRE Module NLT 45 days after completion of the MCCRE. Enclosure (1) provides further detail on the evaluator reporting responsibilities within MCTIMS.

(f) Reporting of unit Readiness via DRRS-MC will continue to be in accordance with reference (h).

(g) Low Altitude Air Defense Battalions will incorporate movement under load requirements of paragraph 4.c.(1)(b)2. into execution of their MCCRE.

5. Administration and Logistics

a. There are two (2) essential aspects associated with the effective use of the MCCRE as a UTM tool.

(1) T&R Standards must accurately reflect core and assigned missions and their essential tasks to reflect the Marine Corps' minimum accepted standards of performance.

(2) Evaluators must be qualified in accordance with enclosure (1).

b. Recommendations concerning the contents of this Order are encouraged. Such recommendations will be forwarded to CG TECOM, G-3/5/7, 1019 Elliot Road, Quantico, VA 22134, via the appropriate chain of command. TECOM G-3/5/7 will exercise staff cognizance and is responsible for periodic review of this Order.

c. Records Management. Records created as a result of this Order shall be managed according to National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) approved dispositions per references (m) and (n) to ensure proper maintenance, use, accessibility and preservation, regardless of format or medium. Refer to reference (o) for Marine Corps records management policy and procedures.

d. Privacy Act. Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) may result in both civil and criminal penalties. The Department of the Navy (DON) recognizes that the privacy of an individual is a personal and fundamental right that shall be respected and protected. The DON's need to collect, use, maintain, or disseminate PII about individuals for purposes of discharging its statutory responsibilities shall be balanced against the individuals' right to be protected against unwarranted invasion of privacy. All collection, use, maintenance, or dissemination of PII shall be in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended (reference (j)) and implemented per reference (k).

6. Command and Signal

a. Command. This Order is applicable to the Marine Corps Total Force.

b. Signal. This Order is effective the date signed.



B. D. Beaudreault
Deputy Commandant
Plans, Policies and Operations

Distribution: PCN 10203361200

Conduct of a Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE)

1. General. The MCCRE personnel structure outlined below is general guidelines (examples) and can be modified based on the type and size of the unit for a formal MCCRE. The initiation of the MCCRE and assignment of the EC will be the responsibility of the MCCRE Manager as determined by the MEF CG or Commander Marine Forces Reserves (COMMARFORRES).

2. The Evaluation Structure. The following are the key staffs charged with implementing a MCCRE.

- a. Exercise Commander (EC).
- b. Exercise Director (ED).
- c. Tactical Exercise Commander (TEC).
- d. Tactical Exercise Control Group (TECG).
- e. Senior Evaluator.
- f. Evaluators.

3. Exercise Commander (EC). The EC is responsible for the conduct of a formal MCCRE. Responsibilities and functions of the EC include:

- a. Establishing schedules and providing resources.
- b. Designating the ED.
- c. Reviewing and publishing the MCCRE results in the MCTIMS MCCRE Module. This reporting requirement is exempt from reports control according to reference (i), part IV, paragraph 7k.
- d. Instilling quality control over the MCCRE, to ensure the exercises of subordinate units are reported per this Order.

4. Exercise Director (ED). The ED is designated by the EC to prepare for, ensure the conduct of, and report all evaluations. Responsibilities and functions of the ED include:

- a. Publishing a letter of instruction (LOI) delineating the T&R events per the unit's METL to be evaluated, timeframe of the exercise, and responsibilities of various elements participating in the exercise, remediation, follow-on evaluations, and coordinating instructions. A copy of the exercise LOI will be

provided to the EC 15 days prior to the MCCRE date.

b. Designating the TEC to operate as the central control agency for the exercise.

c. Assigning evaluators, to include the senior evaluator, and ensuring evaluator training is planned for and conducted.

d. Prescribing the general exercise scenario, taking into account any objectives/scenario events prescribed by the EC.

e. Ensuring the evaluated scenario reflects the evaluated unit commander's training program goals and objectives.

f. Arranging for training areas, airspace, aggressor forces, and other required support.

g. Supervising the evaluation as required, compiling and analyzing the data, and submitting the MCCRE report to the EC.

h. Keeping the EC apprised of the evaluation.

i. Prescribing exercise objectives and desired scenarios, tasks, or events.

j. Coordinating with external commands or agencies to support the evaluation, when required.

k. Evaluate the execution of exercises based on the appropriate T&R Manual.

l. Affect corrective action for deficiencies identified during the exercise, which are beyond the subordinate commander's capability to resolve.

5. Tactical Exercise Commander (TEC). The TEC is responsible to the ED for ensuring the MCCRE is conducted following the instructions contained in this Order, the T&R events, and in support of the unit's METL and any other directions prescribed by the ED. Based on a review/analysis of information/data provided by the senior evaluator, the TEC identifies trends, strengths, and weaknesses of the unit's performance; and provides the MCCRE report to the ED and unit commander per instructions.

6. Tactical Exercise Control Group (TECG). The ED will establish a nucleus TECG to provide continuity for evaluations across the command. The responsibilities and functions of the TECG include:

- a. Developing a detailed exercise scenario to include objectives and events prescribed by the EC/ED and LOI.
- b. Conducting evaluator training.
- c. Coordinating and controlling actor/agent input and aggressor response to unit action or inaction in support of the exercise scenario.
- d. Compiling and analyzing data submitted by individual evaluators, and submitting required evaluation information to the ED.
- e. Preparing and conducting a detailed exercise debrief for the unit being evaluated and the ED.

7. Senior Evaluator. The senior evaluator coordinates and supervises all evaluators' activity during the exercise and debrief, and must be aware of the overall effectiveness of the evaluation, to include scenario effectiveness and the unit's performance in the exercise. The senior evaluator compiles the data sheets from all evaluators at the end of the exercise and conducts the post exercise debrief. Due to the fact that tactical scenarios are used at different levels of a unit's organization at different phases of an exercise, some T&R events may be scored more than once. In these instances where a single T&R event is evaluated multiple times and when calculating the rating for a given MET, the senior evaluator will follow the steps outlined in figure 1-1.

8. Evaluators. During the formal MCCRE, evaluators must be prepared to perform the following functions:

- a. Ensure the evaluation proceeds as planned. The evaluators will use a combination of prescribed, pre-planned, and inserted events to control and maintain the flow of the exercise evaluation while ensuring the unit is evaluated in a meaningful manner against all designated T&R events. They increase or decrease the tempo of operations and maneuver rates through the use of aggressor maneuver/actions, by inserting actors/agents and by passing intelligence input to cause changes in the plan. They provide necessary information from the scene of action by voice, radio or other means when applicable.

- b. Resolve any disagreement between the evaluated force and aggressor forces. They make a determination of, and assess, casualties by analyzing the relative combat power of the forces involved through their own judgment and experience or by utilizing

external assets.

c. Apply the prescribed standards to the unit's performance and evaluate the level of performance as outlined in figure 1-2. Evaluators must possess a complete and thorough understanding of the T&R events that are undertaken in the exercise. Evaluators must review in detail the tasks and standards of the T&R for which they are responsible and must be aware of when and where in the scenario these standards and tasks are to be evaluated. They must then determine whether the activity or performance observed fulfills the performance criteria as stated in the standard. When this determination is made, evaluators simply indicate on the Performance Evaluation Checklist (PECL) "YES", a performance step was met, "NO", a performance step was not met, or "N/A", a performance step was not applicable. "N/A" marks will require explanation when it was originally anticipated that those areas would be accomplished. At the same time the evaluators are observing what is happening, they must also be alert to scheduled events that do not occur, tasks and standards not attempted, and the reasons why. In assigning "YES" or "NO" or "N/A" marks, evaluators must be closely attuned to the tactical play of the exercise and scheduled scenario events. The evaluators will evaluate overall performance against the task, condition, and event components by indicating "Trained", "Partially Trained", "Untrained", or "N/A". All "Untrained" marks will require an explanation in the MCCRE report to highlight later corrective action. All "N/A" marks will require an explanation in the comments section annotating why the event was not evaluated. All events annotated a "N/A" will not be calculated into the units overall rating for a given MET. Evaluator remarks must be geared toward assisting the unit in building training programs in the future. Evaluators record their notes on the PECLs, as necessary, to support the exercise. Evaluators continue this process throughout the exercise. At the conclusion of the exercise, evaluators review their data and supporting notes to ensure they are a true reflection of the performance they have observed. A PECL example is provided in figure 1-3.

9. Evaluator Training. Training must be provided to ensure a complete understanding of evaluator functions after identification and selection of the most qualified Marines available. Participants will include all evaluators, the ED's representative, the TEC or appropriate representative, key TECG staff members, officer in charge of the aggressor force, and representatives from all units participating in the evaluation. Listed below are those key items which should be covered:

a. It is recommended that the Evaluators are Operations and

Tactics Instructors, Intelligence and Tactics Instructors, Weapons and Tactics Instructors, and Expeditionary Logistics Instructors to ensure the evaluator is qualified to conduct the evaluation.

- b. Brief/verification of exercise support requirements.
- c. Specific assignment of evaluators to units.
- d. Detailed brief of exercise scenario to include all major TEGC driven events and planned aggressor force actions.
- e. Detailed brief of planned aggressor force actions.
- f. Detailed brief of T&R events to be evaluated and how they relate to the exercise scenario, TEGC (higher headquarters input), and aggressor actions.
- g. Specific evaluator responsibilities.
- h. EC, TEC, and senior evaluator instructions/guidance.
- i. Brief on the roles all evaluators must fill.
- j. Administrative instructions pertaining to the conclusion of the evaluation and the constructive requirements of the debrief/critique.

10. Exercise Debrief. One of the most important elements of the MCCRE is the debrief and the training feedback that is provided to the unit commander. How the ED organizes and conducts the required debrief may vary by type command. The debrief may be conducted in conjunction with the senior evaluator's debrief or the ED may choose to conduct it as a subsequent event. Notwithstanding the organization and the timing of the debrief, the following should be included in all debriefs:

- a. Participation/attendance of the following personnel:
 - (1) ED or appropriate representative.
 - (2) TEC and key TEGC staff members.
 - (3) All evaluators.
 - (4) The evaluated unit commander, key staff members and subordinate commanders, and attached unit commanders/noncommissioned officers in charge.

(5) Aggressor force commander.

b. Detailed debrief by the senior evaluator, and other evaluators, as required, of each T&R event as it occurred in the exercise scenario.

c. Detailed comments on positive and negative trends.

d. Detailed comments on tasks and standards that were scheduled, but were not evaluated, to include reasons why.

e. Detailed debrief by the TEC, or representative, concerning TECG support, support/interaction with the evaluated unit, and aggressor forces control/support.

f. The unit commander's general comments concerning the validity and effectiveness of the evaluation.

g. TEC's comments concerning the validity and effectiveness of the evaluation.

11. Evaluator Staffing

a. The ED is responsible for the selection and training of evaluators. The number of evaluators is not prescribed and varies with the size and type of unit and the T&R events to be tested. It is desirable that evaluators be obtained from commands not directly related to the organization(s) being evaluated. Recommend that when possible, evaluators be a post-command/post-billet holder as appropriate to the element being evaluated.

b. Evaluator staffing will be determined by the ED based on the unit type being evaluated. For general guidance and not a set requirement, examples of possible evaluator staffing assignments for selected ground, aviation, and logistics components are listed below:

(1) Evaluator Staffing for a GCE:

Evaluator Type	Officer	Enlisted
Senior Evaluator	1 LtCol	5 SNCOs
Command & Control Evaluator	1 Maj	
Fire Support Coordination Evaluator	1 Maj	1 SNCO
Rifle Company Evaluator	4 Cpts	4 SNCOs
H&S Company Evaluator	1 Capt	
Artillery Evaluator	1 Capt	2 SNCOs*
Target Acquisition, MET, Survey	1 CWO3/4	

Evaluator		
Reconnaissance Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO (0326)
Communications Evaluator		1 SNCO
Cannoneer Evaluator		1 SNCO
Fire Direction Evaluator	2 Cpts	2 SNCOs
Engineer Evaluator	1 Capt	
Tank Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO or NCO (AMOS: 1867)**
Electronic Warfare Evaluator	1 Lt	
Assault Amphibian Evaluator	1 Capt	1 MGySgt
Nuclear Biological Chemical Evaluator	1 CWO	
Rifle Platoon Evaluators		9 SNCOs
81 Mortar Platoon Evaluator	1 Lt	

* MGySgt (Battalion FAC) to evaluate a Rocket Battery and a MSgt (Bn FAC) to evaluate a Cannon Battery.

** Recommended if conducting tank live fire during evaluation.

(2) Evaluator Staffing for ACE Units:

Evaluator Type	Officer	Enlisted
Senior Evaluator	1 LtCol*	
Flight Evaluator (per T/M/S)	1 WTI/FLSE*	
ACE Ground Evaluator	1 WTI	
Aviation C2 Evaluators	1 Maj**	1 MSgt
Maintenance Evaluators	1 MMCO***	1 MSgt
NBC Evaluator	1 CWO	

*Pilot/naval flight officer:

- Weapons and Tactics Instructor.

- Flight evaluator shall be current and qualified in the aircraft type for unit being evaluated.

** 7277 Military Occupational Specialty preferred.

*** Maintenance Training Instructor.

(3) Evaluator Staffing for a LCE:

Evaluator Type	Officer	Enlisted
Senior Evaluator	1 LtCol	
Supply Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO
Maintenance Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO
Logistics Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO
Engineer Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO
Services Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO
Transportation Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO
Medical Evaluator	1 LT USN	1 HM

12. Duration of Formal Evaluation. The EC will ensure the MCCRE is completed in a timely manner. Evaluations will be of sufficient length to allow for a realistic scenario with sufficient time for the evaluated unit to act and react to higher headquarters orders, to follow the troop leading steps, to develop orders and to execute orders and plans, and to adequately be evaluated on all T&R events designated by the ED. Logistics support for the tactical exercise should be an integral part of the exercise and should not exercise disproportionate influence in determining the length of the MCCRE. It is recognized, however, that constraints beyond the unit's control (weather, range non-availability, lack of ordnance, lack of transportation, safety, etc.) may require flexibility.

13. Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS)

a. The EC will via MCTIMS MCCRE Module:

(1) Initiate the MCCRE and assign a start date for the evaluated unit.

(2) Import and approve the appropriate METs and T&R Events to be evaluated. Aviation units will utilize M-SHARP for generating appropriate T&R Events and then upload supporting documentation in the documents section of MCTIMS MCCRE Module to identify standards evaluated.

(3) Provide comments for and publish the MCCRE Mission Statement.

(4) Assign the ED.

(5) Publish the MCCRE NLT 45 days after exercise completions.

b. The ED will via MCTIMS MCCRE Module:

(1) Assign the TEC, Senior Evaluator, and Evaluators.

(2) Upload the LOI and all pertinent documentation.

(3) Provide comments for the overall conduct of the MCCRE.

(4) Forward the MCCRE report/results with all comments to the EC.

c. The TEC will via MCTIMS MCCRE Module:

(1) Assign T&R Events to appropriate Evaluators. Aviation units will utilize M-SHARP for generating appropriate T&R Events and then upload supporting documentation in the documents section of MCTIMS MCCRE Module to identify standards evaluated.

(2) Provide comments for the overall conduct of the MCCRE.

(3) Forward the MCCRE report/results with all comments to the ED.

d. The Senior Evaluator will via MCTIMS MCCRE:

(1) Review and validate all PECLs submitted by Evaluators. Aviation units will utilize M-SHARP for generating appropriate T&R Events and then upload supporting documentation in the documents section of MCTIMS MCCRE Module to identify standards evaluated.

(2) Conduct Evaluator duties as required.

(3) Upon review and validation of all PECLs, forward MCCRE results to the TEC.

e. The Evaluators will via MCTIMS MCCRE:

(1) Complete all PECLs.

(2) Forward PECLS to the Senior Evaluator for approval.

In order to determine the "Trained", "Partially Trained", or "Untrained" rating for the same T&R Event evaluated multiple times, or when calculating the rating for a given MET, a "Summative" scale will be utilized as outlined below:

1. Assign the following numerical value for each T&R event evaluated:
 - o "Trained" = 100
 - o "Partially Trained" = 50
 - o "Untrained" = 0
2. Divide the sum of all assigned values by the total number of T&R events evaluated.
3. Use the following scale to determine the rating:
 - o "Trained" = 67 - 100 percentile
 - o "Partially Trained" = 35 - 66 percentile
 - o "Untrained" = 0 - 34 percentile

Example 1:

T&R event 1 has been evaluated on (10) separate occasions resulting in (4) "Untrained"; (2) "Partially Trained"; and (4) "Trained" therefore utilizing the above numerical scale:




- "Untrained" would be calculated as $4 \times 0 = 0$
- "Partially Trained" would be calculated as $2 \times 50 = 100$
- "Trained" would be calculated as $4 \times 100 = 400$
 - o The sum of the above would be $0 + 100 + 400 = 500$
- Since the total number of events evaluated is (10), the corresponding percentile would be $500 / 10 = 50$ percentile
- Utilizing the above rating scale the T&R event would be rated as "Partially Trained"

Example 2:




MET 1 has (2) T&R events evaluated as "Untrained"; (2) T&R events evaluated as "Partially Trained"; and (6) T&R events evaluated as "Trained" therefore utilizing the above numerical scale:

- "Untrained" would be calculated as $2 \times 0 = 0$
- "Partially Trained" would be calculated as $2 \times 50 = 100$
- "Trained" would be calculated as $6 \times 100 = 600$
 - o The sum of the above would be $0 + 100 + 600 = 700$
- Since the total number of events evaluated is (10), the corresponding percentile would be $700 / 10 = 70$ percentile
- Utilizing the above rating scale MET 1 would be rated as "Trained"

Figure 1-1.--Calculating Ratings





 = Untrained  = Partially Trained  = Trained

Mission Essential Task List

Type	Title	Readiness
C	Conduct Amphibious Ops	
C	Conduct Defensive Ops	
A	Conduct Humanitarian Assistance	

Conduct Amphibious Ops

E-Coded T&R Events

INF-INT-7001	Conduct Intelligence Support Planning	
INF-FSPT-7001	Conduct Fire Support Coordination	
INF-CSS-7002	Conduct Combat Service Support	
INF-C2-7005	Conduct Planning	
INF-C2-7010	Execute Command and Control (C2) of an Operation	

INF-C2-7005 Conduct Planning

Event Components	Yes	No	N/A
1. Conduct problem framing.	X		
2. Determine the planning process.		X	
3. Establish a timeline for planning and preparation.			X
4. Issue warning order.		X	
5. Create Orders.	X		
6. Issue Orders.	X		
7. Implement feedback mechanisms.		X	
8. Coordinate planning with higher, adjacent, and supporting units.		X	
9. Supervise.	X		

Evaluator Comments (Required): **Evaluator Assesses T&R Event based on Performance**

Check Box: ☐ Trained ☒ Partially Training ☐ Untrained ☐ N/A

Figure 1-2.--Evaluation Process

<p>Performance Evaluation Checklist</p> <p>MCT 1.1.2 Provide Task Organized Forces</p> <p>T&R Event: AAV-CMDC-7XXX</p> <p>TASK: Provide Assault Amphibian Unit(s) In Support of Expeditionary Operations.</p> <p>CONDITION: Given a higher headquarters' operation order and commander's guidance.</p> <p>STANDARD: to provide the commander with mechanized, amphibious capability.</p> <p>PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST (EVENT COMPONENTS)</p> <p>1. Conduct mission analysis YES / NO / NA</p> <p>2. Task organize YES / NO / NA</p> <p>3. CHOP control / command AA Unit to supported command YES / NO / NA</p> <p>Evaluator Comments (Required):</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>Evaluated</p> <p>as: Check Box</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Trained</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Partially Trained</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Untrained</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> N/A</p> <p>Evaluator Name/Rank: _____</p>

Figure 1-3.--Performance Evaluation Checklist (PECL) Example

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sgt

To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: Investigation RFIs

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2021 1:09 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Subject: RE: Investigation RFIs

Sir,

Just received additional (and final) input. I think this is the final time I will answer this RFI unless you have additional questions at a later date. I believe this new information provided by 1st MarDiv will fully clarify who the evaluators were. An officer who had PCS'd to II MEF was able to find a V14 MCCRE brief that contained a detailed explanation of who served as evaluators, and who the senior evaluator was (Col Clark, CO, 1st Marines).

I have attached that brief as a potential enclosure for you, as well as I have made a final edit to the previous enclosure our MEF Training Officer built with input from DIV and our other MSCs.

Please let me know if you need anything else. Have a great week sir.

Semper Fidelis,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Lieutenant Colonel, USMC
Deputy, G-37 - Force Development
I Marine Expeditionary Force, G-3
COMM
DSN
VOSIP
MOBILE

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
JWICS: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2021 11:25 AM

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Friday, May 7, 2021 8:44 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Subject: RE: Investigation RFIs

Good evening Sir,

I MEF has been able to discuss these details with 1st MarDiv, and conducted a more thorough review of MCTIMS. We have been able to answer all of your questions fully except for one. The question that we still need 1st MarDiv to answer is was the MGySgt in-fact the senior evaluator. This is challenged by 1st MarDiv and all three regiments are currently in the field as part of MWX 3-21. We will get you a better answer once 1st MarDiv is able to provide it.

For the discrepancies in our enclosure versus the MCTIMS application, it was explained to me that there was both a typo, and a mis-reading of the cumbersome program of record that resulted in the wrong dates being typed into the enclosure by reading the wrong column of information. We apologize for the lack of oversight, and the inaccuracy of the product we submitted. This information was rushed based on delivery timelines, and in no way was intended to be inaccurate. Thank you for letting us know of the discrepancies so we could run down the right answers.

Investigation RFI 1: Specifically, the attached enclosure states that Co B, 1st RECON executed their MCCRE from 3-20 Dec 20; MCTIMS states it occurred 3-13 Dec 2019;

RFI 1: Answer: 1st MarDiv confirmed the correct dates for Co B, 1st Recon MCCRE execution is: 3-13 Dec 2019.

Investigation RFI 2: the enclosure states that 4th Plt, Co A, 1st CEB completed their MCCRE from 20 - 24 Jun 20, but MCTIMS states that it occurred from 30 March – 3 April 2020.

RFI 2: Answer: 1st MarDiv confirmed the correct dates for 4th Plt, Co A, 1st CEB MCCRE execution is: 30 Mar – 3 Apr 2020.

Investigation RFI 3: Also, under V14, the senior evaluator is listed as MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), Ops Chief, V14. Please confirm that he was in fact the senior evaluator, and ask 1st Mar Div if representatives from 1st Marine Regiment or 1st Mar Div HQs helped with the evaluation of V14.

RFI 3: Answer: Without doubt, V14's MCCRE had representatives evaluating/certifying them from 1st Marine Regiment and 1st MarDiv. MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the Ops Chief of 1st Marine Regiment, and the enclosure was typed to indicate he evaluated V14 (not from V14), and could be easily misconstrued as if he was the V14 Ops Chief, but he was NOT, and was in-fact an evaluator from 1st Marine Regiment. Informally, I am told that regiment and division had field grade officers present for evaluation of the MCCRE and utilized TTECG personnel as well. We are unable at this time to confirm the name of the true "senior evaluator." Indirectly, I was told that Col Clark was present for portions, LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who had just arrived as the regimental OpsO was present for at a minimum portions of the MCCRE. It appears that the MGySgt may have had MCTIMS access, and filled out the module as you have seen it with his name, without identifying the senior officer. We are awaiting a more detailed response from 1st MarDiv, but their current participation in MWX 3-21 is preventing

our communication, and their access to the best information to provide a reply. Similar note below under the LAR RFI.

Investigation RFI 4: Did Co B, 1st LAR conduct their MCCRE in concert with V14 during SLTE, specifically MWX 2-20, or did B Co, 1st LAR do a stand-alone MCCRE?

RFI 4: Answer: 1st MarDiv confirmed that Co B, 1st LAR conducted their MCCRE as a “stand-alone” event, and NOT directly as a part of V14’s MCCRE although both were conducted during their participation in MWX 2-20. My interpretation of this is that there were two separate teams evaluating LAR and V14 separately, but both during the SLTE: MWX 2-20. Specifically, the LAR Co. was evaluated by 1st LAR (their HHQs), and V14 was evaluated by members of 1st Marine Regiment, and others from across 1st MarDiv. Since both of these occurred at the same time and location as part of MWX 2-20, I have been advised that both of these MCCRE evaluations occurred with the assistance of TTECG personnel.

Semper Fidelis,

(b)(3), (b)
(6), (b)(7)
(c)

Respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Lieutenant Colonel, USMC
Deputy, G-37 - Force Development
I Marine Expeditionary Force, G-3
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) COMM
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) DSN
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) VOSIP
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MOBILE

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

JWICS: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Friday, May 7, 2021 2:05 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Subject: RE: Investigation RFIs

(b)(3),
(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

Thanks again for your help.

As the investigation team cross-referenced the information in the CI enclosures with systems of record, in this case MCTIMS, we noticed that there were some differences in the MCCRE completion dates of specific 1st Mar Div units.

Specifically, the attached enclosure states that Co B, 1st RECON executed their MCCRE from 3-20 Dec 20; MCTIMS states it occurred 3-13 Dec 2019; likewise, the enclosure states that 4th Plt, Co A, 1st CEB completed their MCCRE from 20 - 24 Jun 20, but MCTIMS states that it occurred from 30 March – 3 April 2020.

If your MCTIMS research aligns with ours, please update the attached Excel spreadsheet and return it to me.

Also, under V14, the senior evaluator is listed as MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), Ops Chief, V14. Please confirm that he was in fact the senior evaluator, and ask 1st Mar Div if representatives from 1st Marine Regiment or 1st Mar Div HQs helped with the evaluation of V14.

Did Co B, 1st LAR conduct their MCCRE in concert with V14 during SLTE, specifically MWX 2-20, or did B Co, 1st LAR do a stand-alone MCCRE?

Please provide this information by 0800 EST Monday morning, 10 May.

Thanks,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Director, Policy and Standards Division

Training and Education Command

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (cell)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Thursday, April 22, 2021 8:48 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Subject: RE: Investigation RFI
(c)

Good afternoon Sir,

Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and his team worked with the major subordinate commands to thoroughly review the accuracy of the initial RFI response that you requested additional detail for upon review. The questions that are better addressed based on follow up questions from your (2) emails are below. The attachment provides a more detailed response to each item below and amends billets, names, parent unit, etc. as you requested. There was a change in the MCCRE status for the VMFA as described below and in the attachment. 3d MAW believes this new information is now accurate.

Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) RFI:

-Does G-7/EOTG have a F-35B pilot on staff, or did the MEF source expertise from 3d MAW or MAWTS-1 for the Det, VMFA-122 MCCRE?

Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) appears to have discovered via a miscommunication that there was not an actual MCCRE conducted, and that the person who verbally provided information on the last RFI response had misunderstood the MEU PTP as being a MCCRE. More details in the attachment.

-Also, for the VMU det, was "Unable to complete due to lack of resources and time available" derived from a MCTIMS entry or from input by an MSC training officer?

Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has worked with 3d MAW to provide a detailed reply to this RFI from the CO of VMU-1.

-Please include in the amended response exactly what billet the senior evaluator held at their parent unit, and the unit they were assigned to when they evaluated the MCCRE, e.g. what billet did MSgt Boone hold from CLR-17?

This was addressed in more detail in the attachment.

-Also, I believe CLB-15 conducted their MCCRE at Camp Pendleton and Yuma. Please confirm with 1st MLG.

You are correct sir. This was addressed in more detail in the attachment.

-Did any other units conduct their MCCRE in conjunction or during an SLTE? I believe V14 did.

You are correct sir. V14 did this during MWX 2-20, and this was addressed in more detail in the attachment.

-For MACG, was the SLTE an ITX, MTX, or WTI?

MWX 1-21. This was addressed in more detail in the attachment.

Have a great evening Sir,

Semper Fidelis,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Lieutenant Colonel, USMC
Deputy, G-37 - Force Development
I Marine Expeditionary Force, G-3
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) COMM
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) DSN
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) VOSIP
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MOBILE

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

JWICS: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Wednesday, April 21, 2021 9:18 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>

Lieutenant Colonel, USMC
Deputy, G-37 - Force Development
I Marine Expeditionary Force, G-3
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) COMM
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) DSN
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) VOSIP
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MOBILE

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
JWICS: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Tuesday, April 20, 2021 1:21 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Subject: RE: Investigation RPIs
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Please include in the amended response exactly what billet the senior evaluator held at their parent unit, and the unit they were assigned to when they evaluated the MCCRE, e.g. what billet did MSgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) hold from CLR-17?

Also, I believe CLB-15 conducted their MCCRE at Camp Pendleton and Yuma. Please confirm with 1st MLG.

Did any other units conduct their MCCRE in conjunction or during an SLTE? I believe V14 did.

For MACG, was the SLTE an ITX, MTX, or WTI?

If you need more time to gain this information, that is fine.

Semper Fi, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Director, Policy and Standards Division
Training and Education Command
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (cell)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Tuesday, April 20, 2021 4:07 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>

MOBILE

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

JWICS: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2021 6:54 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Subject: RE: Investigation RFI
(c)
Thanks (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) .
(c)

I appreciate the follow-up. MSHARP is somewhat analogous to MCTIMS for aviation training.

Semper Fi, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Director, Policy and Standards Division

Training and Education Command

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(cell)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2021 9:34 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Subject: RE: Investigation RFI
(c)
Good evening Sir,

Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is reaching back out tonight to better answer these (2) RFIs. I would anticipate we may be able to get answers to these questions during the business day tomorrow.

Our current answer regarding "F35 B and the I MEF G-7 / EOTG" is that we need further information from 3d MAW or G-7 to determine what source of subject matter expertise was provided.

With regards to the VMU det., Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) received that information from 3d MAW COPS today. To be specific, it was verbal or typed input from a Marine at the MAW COPS section today, and was NOT a MCTIMS

entry. Verbally I was informed that there is a system called MSHARP (acronym uncertain) that the MAW has access to, but our training and readiness personnel currently do not. We will follow up, but it is my current estimate that the individual from the MAW G-3 referenced MSHARP and entered that comment into the Excel spreadsheet. I feel we also need to answer this RFI better, Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) will reach out for more information, and we will provide more thorough responses for those (2) RFIs at the earliest opportunity.

Have a great evening Sir,

Semper Fidelis,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)
(c)

Respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Lieutenant Colonel, USMC
Deputy, G-37 - Force Development
I Marine Expeditionary Force, G-3

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) COMM
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) DSN
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) VOSIP
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MOBILE

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

JWICS: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2021 6:10 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Subject: RE: Investigation RFIs
(c)
(b)(3),
(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

Thanks for the timely info.

Does G-7/EOTG have a F-35B pilot on staff, or did the MEF source expertise from 3d MAW or MAWTS-1 for the Det, VMFA-122 MCCRE?

Also, for the VMU det, was "Unable to complete due to lack of resources and time available" derived from a MCTIMS entry or from input by an MSC training officer?

Semper Fi, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Colone (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(c)

Director, Policy and Standards Division

Training and Education Command

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (cell)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2021 8:38 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Subject: RE: Investigation RFI
(c)

Good afternoon Sir,

BLUF: To answer the MCCRE RFI, I have attached an Excel spreadsheet that contains information on MCCRE completion for the 15th MEU's subordinate commands and elements.

Background: This information was compiled by the I MEF Training Officer (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)), and obtained from various sources including the MCCRE module in MCTIMS, I MEF MSC training officer inputs, and 15th MEU's E-211 Forming / PTP Brief dtd 13 Apr 20.

Additional RFI: The DRRS-MC RFIs for the MEF CE and MEF MAGTF reports was answered today on SIPR, and the Readiness Team continues to work on the other units you specified.

Please let us know if you need anything else. Have a great week Sir.

Semper Fidelis,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Lieutenant Colonel, USMC

Deputy, G-37 - Force Development

I Marine Expeditionary Force, G-3

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

COMM

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

DSN

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

VOSIP

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

MOBILE

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

JWICS: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2021 9:10 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
<(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)> >
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)> >
<(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)> >
<(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)> >
<(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)> >
Subject: RE: Investigation RFI

(b)(3),
(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

Please provide the MEF DRRS info by noon Tuesday (EST). Also, please provide the same info for 3d MAW, 1st MLG, V14, and 3rd AA Bn by noon Wednesday.

Also, was the inclusion of COVID-19 impacts into reports a I MEF or HQMC requirement?

Thank you for your assistance.

Semper Fi, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2021 11:14 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)> >
<(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)> >
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)> >
<(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)> >
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)> >
<(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)> >
<(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)> >
Subject: RE: Investigation RFI

(b)(3),
(b)(6),
(b)(7)(c)

Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is tracking and running with the ball on NIPR MCCREs RFI. LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) are now in receipt of the SIPR DRRS RFI as cited below. Based on a separate email, I am tracking a desired delivery date for the MCCRE RFI as COB today. Is it the same requested delivery timeline for the DRRS COVID RFI?

Semper Fidelis,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Lieutenant Colonel, USMC
Deputy, G-37 - Force Development
I Marine Expeditionary Force, G-3
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) COMM
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) DSN
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) VOSIP
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MOBILE

JWICS: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

From: Evans LtCol Jacob O <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)>

Sent: Monday, April 19, 2021 8:05 AM

To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) < (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) **Col** (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) **<** (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

< (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) >; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) M

< (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) >: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CIV (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Subject: Investigation RFIs

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ,

originator of these RFIS is Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) .
(c)

- Reply via SIPR, Core mission commander summary comments and commander top concerns comments from I MEF DRRS reports (March 20 – August 20) regarding COVID-19 impact to readiness. Please also include if the P, R, S, T and C rating increased or decreased from the previous report.
- Reply via NIPR, Location and completion date of MCCREs by units that comprise the 15th MEU. The list should include subunits of the 15th MEU MSEs that are required to conduct a MCCRE before they composited with the MEU, e.g. artillery battery, VMFA det., combat engineer plt. Please also provide details on what organization conducted the evaluation.

Thank you.

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Deputy COPS G-33

I Marine Expeditionary Force

Camp Del Mar

Camp Pendleton, CA

Commercial:

Mobile: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

DSN: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN)

BOX 555380

CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3501.1

G3

30 Apr 15

DIVISION ORDER 3501.1D

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: MARINE CORPS COMBAT READINESS EVALUATION (MCCRE)

Ref: (a) MCO 3501.1D
(b) I MEFO 3501.2

Encl: (1) Infantry Regiment, MCCRE Mission Essential Task List
(2) Artillery Regiment, MCCRE Mission Essential Task List
(3) Infantry Battalion, MCCRE Mission Essential Task List
(4) Artillery Battalion, MCCRE Mission Essential Task List
(5) Tank Battalion, MCCRE Mission Essential Task List
(6) Assault Amphibian Battalion, MCCRE Mission Essential Task List
(7) Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, MCCRE Mission Essential

Task List

- (8) Reconnaissance Battalion, MCCRE Mission Essential Task List
- (9) Combat Engineer Battalion, MCCRE Mission Essential Task List
- (10) Truck Platoon, MCCRE Mission Essential Task List
- (11) Certification Letter Template
- (12) MCCRE Unit Evaluator Matrix
- (13) Example After Action Report Template
- (14) Example Performance Evaluation Checklist Handbook
- (15) D-30 MCCRE Brief Template

1. Situation. The 1st Marine Division provides forces in support of Geographic Combatant Commander requirements and must always ensure the combat readiness of these units prior to their assignment. The MCCRE enables 1st Marine Division to evaluate and certify a unit's preparedness at every level based on core Mission Essential Task List (METL) assessments.

2. Cancellation. DivO 3501.1C.

3. Mission. On order, 1st Marine Division conducts MCCREs to standardize the training and evaluation of company through regimental-level units in core and/or assigned METs in order to ensure unit preparation for operational deployments.

4. Execution

a. Commander's Intent

(1) Purpose. The MCCRE provides a Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual standards-based evaluation on the combat readiness and proficiency of a unit. It enables the Division to take a close look at a unit prior to Change of Operational Control (CHOP) / deployment.

(2) Method. Evaluations will be conducted by Division, Regimental or Battalion headquarters utilizing MCCRE standards outline in the enclosures.

(3) Endstate. All 1st Marine Division units will be evaluated and certified prior to CHOP/deployment or every two years and Geographic Combatant Commanders receive capable, ready units. A unit will receive a MCCRE no more than once every twelve months, unless otherwise directed.

b. Concept of Operations. The MCCRE is the culminating training event for units prior to CHOP/deployment. It is a physically challenging, 96 to 120 hour scenario during which units will be evaluated on specific events as well as continuing actions. The final training day of the MCCRE will be utilized for remediation as determined by the Senior Evaluator. The training design of each MCCRE will focus only on appropriate Training and Readiness coded tasks. Units will operate in a tactical manner throughout the evaluation, conducting both day and night operations. Regiments and independent battalions will serve as their evaluated unit's higher headquarters and evaluate units utilizing Trained, Partially Trained, and Untrained as their evaluation metric. For regimental and independent battalion MCCREs, the unit should attempt to be assessed during a large scale training exercise or another training activity as approved by the A/CS G3.

(1) Tasks

(a) Commanding Officers

1. Conduct and schedule MCCREs of subordinate units in accordance with this Division Order.

2. Formally assign a Tactical Exercise Control Officer-In-Charge (TEC OIC) and create a subordinate Tactical Exercise Control Group (TECG) to coordinate and liaise with Division staff and supporting agencies. Ensure the TEC OIC coordinates with the G-3 Training Officer no later than 30 days before the MCCRE.

3. Provide, organize and train evaluators and Opposing Forces (OPFOR) from the TECG to assist in the evaluation and conduct of the MCCRE.

4. Develop and disseminate a detailed "Road to War", exercise scenario, and evaluation program for each unit conducting a MCCRE.

5. Conduct an After Action review of each unit's MCCRE and enter the results via the Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS). If MCCRE data enter is not available for your unit via MCTIMS, the Commanding Officer will provide a Certification Letter to the Commanding General via the G-3 Training Officer, Enclosure 11, no later than ten days after the conclusion of the MCCRE.

(b) Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

1. Serve as the Exercise Director (ED) for the 1st Marine Division MCCRE program.

(c) G-3 Training Officer

1. Serve as the Division MCCRE Officer.

2. Include the schedule of MCCREs in the Division TEEP and Division Campaign Plan. Ensure division units are evaluated at least once every two years.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) The MCCRE will be the culmination of training for units prior to CHOP in support of West Coast Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), units supporting SPMAGTF-CC-CR, and the last major tactical field exercise for units about to deploy on the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) or the 31st MEU. For units that do not fall in the above deployment categories; they will conduct a MCCRE no earlier than twelve months after their last MCCRE and no later than twenty-four months after their last MCCRE.

(2) Units may choose to utilize attachments or enablers during their MCCRE. These attachments will not be formally evaluated unless their higher headquarters are involved and evaluators provided.

(3) Attachment and enablers will conduct a MCCRE in which they evaluate all of their assigned Mission Essential Tasks (METs) prior to supporting a MCCRE of a unit they are deploying in support of. It is encouraged that attachment and enablers participate in the MCCRE of the unit they are deploying in support of.

(4) Regiments will conduct a MCCRE of subordinate battalions and may delegate the responsibility for conducting a MCCRE of a Company/Battery (or smaller unit) to subordinate battalions. Independent battalions without a regimental headquarters will conduct a MCCRE of subordinate units.

(5) MCCRE PECLs should be developed utilizing the MCTIMS UTM module and the Training and Readiness Manual and are used for the evaluation of T&R tasks and performance steps, reference enclosure 14.

(6) The MCCRE design will focus on core METs and assigned METs, not on core plus METs.

(7) Units will attempt to incorporate aviation, amphibious shipping/connectors, as well as UAS into their MCCRE design focusing on employing it in realistic manner. The evaluating unit is responsible for all coordination prior to the exercise. All efforts to train with these enablers should be made for Monday through Friday, in order to maximize their participation.

(8) Units should conduct amphibious operations planning in conjunction with available amphibious shipping and or amphibious connectors.

(9) The MCCRE will evaluate all of a unit's functional areas in a tactical setting, to include their ability to conduct logistics in the field and operate in a CBRN environment.

(10) Units will ensure the following activities are executed and evaluated during the MCCRE: deliberate defense, vehicle maintenance and recovery operations, field mess, supply, administration, casualty recovery, care, movement and tracking, counter-IED, and monitor/survey CBRN operations.

(11) Unless otherwise directed, or if not an assigned MET, Stability Operations may be an evaluated event if a unit chooses.

(12) During the execution of the MCCRE, the "Alpha Command" will be removed from the exercise and the unit's "Bravo Command" will take tactical control for a period of time to be directed by the Senior Evaluator.

(13) All personnel in an evaluated unit will take part in the exercise in its entirety.

(14) Regimental or separate battalion headquarters may add additional evaluation events as deemed necessary, based on the assigned unit's mission. The order of specific events will be determined by the evaluating unit.

(15) The tactical order for the first MCCRE event will not be delivered to the evaluated unit more than 96 to 120 hours before execution in order to facilitate rapid planning of the unit being evaluated.

(16) Units determined to be "untrained" will receive remedial training and be re-evaluated before they CHOP/deploy. A synopsis of the failed training standards and remediation plan must be provided in the MCCRE Certification Letter, enclosure 10.

(17) Independent battalions and battalions with deployed regimental headquarters will have a "senior mentor" assigned to serve as Senior Division Evaluator. Units should coordinate with the G-3 Training Officer no later than 90 days prior to the MCCRE to identify the need for a senior mentor.

(18) All units conducting a MCCRE will provide a unit specific D-30 MCCRE Brief, email only, to the A/CS G-3, no later than 30 days prior to the MCCRE, see enclosure 13.

(19) All battalions and regiments that conduct a MCCRE will provide MCCRE After Action Review (AAR) to the Commanding General, enclosure 11. Units will coordinate with the G-3 Training Officer to schedule this brief

(20) The MCCRE complements but does not replace table gunnery qualifications. Gunnery qualifications will not be an event during the MCCRE scenario.

5. Administration and Logistics

a. MCCRE results will be submitted to the MCCRE Officer no later than ten days after the conclusion of the evaluation, enclosures (11), if MCTIMS is not functional at the time of the MCCRE, and (13). G3 Training will release an AMHS message stating the completion of each MCCRE.

b. MCCRE AARs of battalion units and higher will be conducted with Commanding General, 1st Marine Division no later than 30 days after conclusion. Provide AAR dates of all units to G3 Training prior to the MCCRE

(1) Battalion and high unit AARs attendees will include:

(a) Evaluated unit commander, SgtMaj, Company/Battery Commanders Gunner, and principle staff.

(b) Evaluated unit Higher Headquarter Commanding Officer, Operation Officer, SgtMaj and Gunner.

(c) Division primary staff / deputy and Gunner.

(d) TEC OIC, EXCON OIC, Division Schools OIC, and Principle evaluator staff.

c. Waivers for evaluation of T&R events require I MEF Commanding General approval and are due to the 1st Marine Division G3 Training Office NLT 45 days prior to unit MCCRE execution.

6. Command and Signal

a. Command. This order is applicable to all 1st Marine Division units.

b. Signal. This order is effective the date signed.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

A/CS G-3 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

DISTRUBUTION: A

Marine Corps Order
(MCO) 4790.2
Field-Level
Maintenance Management Policy



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e. Review the CPAC database for CCC 5 assets and coordinates/initiates disposition.

f. Coordinate and schedule with Corrosion Service Team (CST) for corrosion related services.

8. **Deferred Maintenance Programs**

a. **Administrative Storage Program (ASP).** ASP is a method of deferring maintenance that allows commanders to preserve resources when operational conditions allow. Major Commands (MajCom) or Major Subordinate Command (MSC) Commanders are authorized to authorize, establish or operate an ASP. Unit Commanders inducting/operating an ASP will ensure equipment inducted into the ASP meets the following criteria:

- (1) Stored no less than 18 months and no more than 36 months.
- (2) Maintained and reported in a mission capable status.
- (3) Equipment is current on all scheduled PMCS prior to induction into the program.
- (4) Visually inspected quarterly.
- (5) Exercised semi-annually.
- (6) Scheduled PMCS conducted/validated upon removal.
- (7) Current CPAC assessment and servicing.
- (8) Corrosion Category Code Condition (CCC) 3 or better.

b. **Administrative Deadline (ADL) Program.** The ADL program is a method of deferring maintenance that allows unit Commanders to preserve resources when operational conditions allow. Commanding Officers may; authorize, establish and operate an ADL program. When authorized, equipment inducted into the ADL program will meet the following criteria:

- (1) Stored less than 18 months.
- (2) Maintained and reported in a mission capable status.
- (3) Equipment is current on all required scheduled PMCS prior to induction into the program.

- (4) Visually inspected quarterly.
- (5) Exercised semi-annually.
- (6) Scheduled PMCS validated/conducted prior to removal.
- (7) Current CPAC assessment and servicing.
- (8) Corrosion Category Code Condition (CCC) 3 or better.

c. **Equipment Used as Training Aides.** Individual training command formal learning centers may defer maintenance for equipment maintained as training aides. Applicable equipment will not be dispatched, operated outside of the maintenance bays/classrooms, or returned to the Operational Forces until required scheduled PMCS have been completed.

(1) Individual Training Command (TrngCmd) formal learning centers will create and maintain a complete list, by TAMCN, NSN and serial number, of each type 1 and 2 allowance training aid.

(2) TrngCmd is required to maintain a compiled list, by school, TAMCN, NSN and serial number, of each type 1 and 2 allowance training aide.

9. **Enterprise Lifecycle Maintenance Program (ELMP).** In accordance with reference (aa), ELMP is managed by Marine Corps Logistics Command. In support of ELMP the MMO must ensure equipment is properly accounted for, reported and equipment returns are processed and monitored within the MAIS.

10. **Warranty Program.** Establish warranty procedures within the unit that identifies equipment under warranty and ensures induction and recording procedures for proper execution of warrantied maintenance in accordance with references (v), (w) and (y).

11. **Inventory (Tool) Control Program.** Tools, test and maintenance support equipment are key enablers to effective execution of maintenance production. The MMO will establish procedures in accordance with reference (b) to ensure effective inventory control and management measures are implemented to ensure.

a. Inventory periodicity requirements are established to increase accountability and reduce losses.

AAC	TAMCN	SER_NBR	NOMEN	Service Request_ID	OP_STAT	Date
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	DEADLINED	4/1/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29854648	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/1/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/1/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29844202	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/1/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29796648	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	DEADLINED	4/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29854648	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/8/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/8/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29844202	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29796648	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	DEADLINED	4/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29854648	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/9/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/9/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29844202	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29796648	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	DEADLINED	4/10/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29854648	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/10/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/10/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916826	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29844202	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/10/2020

M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/10/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29796648	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/10/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29854648	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/11/2020
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M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/11/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/11/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/12/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/13/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/13/2020

M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/13/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/13/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29844202	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/13/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921948	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29796648	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	DEADLINED	4/14/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/14/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/14/2020
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M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/14/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921948	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29796648	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	DEADLINED	4/15/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29854648	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/15/2020
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M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/15/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	DEADLINED	4/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/16/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/16/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940556	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/16/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29796648	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	DEADLINED	4/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940556	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/17/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/17/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	DEADLINED	4/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/18/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/18/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940556	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/18/2020

M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/18/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940556	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/19/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/19/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/19/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/20/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/20/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29796648	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	DEADLINED	4/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	DEADLINED	4/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/21/2020

M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940556	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/21/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29796648	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	DEADLINED	4/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	DEADLINED	4/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921670	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940556	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/22/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29796648	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	DEADLINED	4/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29822022	DEADLINED	4/23/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	DEADLINED	4/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29965486	DEADLINED	4/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921670	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921618	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/23/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/23/2020

M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/23/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	DEADLINED	4/24/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29822022	DEADLINED	4/24/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	DEADLINED	4/24/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29965486	DEADLINED	4/24/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921670	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/24/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/24/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921618	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/24/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/24/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/24/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/24/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/24/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/24/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/24/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	DEADLINED	4/25/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29822022	DEADLINED	4/25/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	DEADLINED	4/25/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29965486	DEADLINED	4/25/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/25/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/25/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921618	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/25/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/25/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/25/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/25/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/25/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/25/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/25/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	DEADLINED	4/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29822022	DEADLINED	4/26/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	DEADLINED	4/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29965486	DEADLINED	4/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/26/2020

M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921618	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/26/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/26/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	DEADLINED	4/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29822022	DEADLINED	4/27/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29965486	DEADLINED	4/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29983846	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921618	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/27/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/27/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/27/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29984958	DEADLINED	4/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	DEADLINED	4/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29822022	DEADLINED	4/28/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	DEADLINED	4/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29965486	DEADLINED	4/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29983846	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29991122	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921618	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916532	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/28/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/28/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29984958	DEADLINED	4/29/2020

M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	DEADLINED	4/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29822022	DEADLINED	4/29/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	DEADLINED	4/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29965486	DEADLINED	4/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29983846	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29991122	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921618	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/29/2020
M11230	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29994456	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/29/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/29/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29984958	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29983846	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29991122	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/30/2020
M11230	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29994456	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	4/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/30/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	4/30/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29984958	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29983846	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29991122	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/1/2020

M11230	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29994456	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/1/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/1/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29984958	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29991122	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/2/2020
M11230	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29994456	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/2/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/2/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29984958	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29991122	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/3/2020
M11230	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29994456	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/3/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30020436	DEADLINED	5/4/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29984958	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29991122	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/4/2020

M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/4/2020
M11230	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29994456	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/4/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30020436	DEADLINED	5/5/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29984958	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29991122	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/5/2020
M11230	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29994456	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/5/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/5/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29984958	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29991122	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/6/2020
M11230	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29994456	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/6/2020

M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/6/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29984958	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29991122	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/7/2020
M11230	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29994456	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/7/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/7/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29984958	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30049180	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29991122	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/8/2020
M11230	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29994456	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/8/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/8/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29984958	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30049180	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29991122	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/9/2020

M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/9/2020
M11230	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29994456	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/9/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/9/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29984958	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30049180	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29991122	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940796	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29940628	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/10/2020
M11230	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29994456	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/10/2020
M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29916748	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/10/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29984958	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30049180	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921670	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29991122	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921618	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/11/2020

M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30049180	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921670	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921618	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/12/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29679512	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30049180	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921670	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921618	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/13/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	29454380	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30049180	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921670	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/14/2020

M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921618	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921992	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/14/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30070740	SUPPLY OR SERVICE	5/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30049180	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/15/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30070740	SUPPLY OR SERVICE	5/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30049180	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/16/2020

M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/16/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30070740	SUPPLY OR SERVICE	5/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30049180	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/17/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30070740	SUPPLY OR SERVICE	5/17/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30049180	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085608	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29454250	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/18/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/19/2020

M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30049180	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28099082	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085608	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	5/20/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30049180	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28099082	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085608	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	5/21/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28099082	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/21/2020

M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085608	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	5/22/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28099082	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085608	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	5/23/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28099082	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085608	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/23/2020

M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	5/24/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/24/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/24/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/24/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28099082	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/24/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/24/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	5/25/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/25/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/25/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/25/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/25/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/25/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/25/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	5/26/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/26/2020

M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/26/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/26/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	5/27/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/27/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30063736	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28099082	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085608	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/27/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	5/28/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28099082	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085608	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/28/2020

M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/28/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	5/29/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085608	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/29/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	5/30/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085608	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/30/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	5/31/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/31/2020

M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085608	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	5/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	5/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	6/1/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29734722	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085608	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054868	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/1/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	6/2/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28803052	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085608	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/2/2020

M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	6/3/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085316	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054820	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30085608	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	6/4/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29837378	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/4/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	6/5/2020

M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/5/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	6/6/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/6/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	6/7/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/7/2020

M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/7/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	6/8/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/8/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	6/9/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/9/2020

M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/9/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	6/10/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/10/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/10/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/10/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	DEADLINED	6/11/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/11/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/11/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30140130	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/12/2020

M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921708	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/12/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/12/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	DEADLINED	6/13/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30085926	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30140130	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921734	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29921818	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/13/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/13/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	DEADLINED	6/14/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30140130	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201830	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201852	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/14/2020

M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/14/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/14/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30070740	SUPPLY OR SERVICE	6/14/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	DEADLINED	6/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30140130	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/15/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201852	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/15/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/15/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30070740	SUPPLY OR SERVICE	6/15/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	DEADLINED	6/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30140130	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201830	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201852	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/16/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/16/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/16/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30070740	SUPPLY OR SERVICE	6/16/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	DEADLINED	6/17/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/17/2020

M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30140130	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201830	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/17/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201852	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/17/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30070740	SUPPLY OR SERVICE	6/17/2020
M11230	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29876112	DEADLINED	6/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30140130	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201830	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201852	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/18/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/18/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/18/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30070740	SUPPLY OR SERVICE	6/18/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201830	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201852	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/19/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201826	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/19/2020

M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/19/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30070740	SUPPLY OR SERVICE	6/19/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201830	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201852	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201826	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/20/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30070740	SUPPLY OR SERVICE	6/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201830	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201852	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201826	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	28707986	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29132002	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/21/2020
M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30070740	SUPPLY OR SERVICE	6/21/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/22/2020

M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201830	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/22/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	523311	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201826	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/22/2020
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M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30070740	SUPPLY OR SERVICE	6/22/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/23/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522677	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30201830	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/23/2020
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M21820	E07967K	522288	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, COMMAND	30070740	SUPPLY OR SERVICE	6/23/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30151198	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	6/24/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	6/26/2020
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M21820	E08467K	523612	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079564	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	7/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30058198	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	7/2/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079594	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	7/2/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522499	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29871696	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	7/3/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	7/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	523100	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29747720	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	7/3/2020
M21820	E08467K	523195	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	29843974	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	7/3/2020
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M11230	E08467K	523519	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30146108	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	7/3/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079594	DEADLINED	7/17/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522656	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30094332	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	7/17/2020
M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	7/17/2020
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M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30058198	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	7/20/2020
M21820	E08467K	522932	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30079594	DEADLINED	7/21/2020


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M21820	E08467K	522768	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30161552	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	7/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	523445	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30054692	OPERATIONAL - DEGRADED	7/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	522449	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30038736	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	7/31/2020
M21820	E08467K	522681	ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, PERSONNEL	30330776	OPERATIONAL - MINOR	7/31/2020

12 Month Readiness Timeline of the 14 AAVs that Embarked with 15 MEU Sep 2019 – Sep 2020



Four deadline Service Requests 23 April

AAV Serial #	Deadline Defect
523311	BATTERIES
522932	CRACK IN HULL
522768	PLENUMS AND HYDRAULIC BYPASS VALVE
523612	HYDRAULIC PUMP

Six deadline Service Requests 23 July

AAV Serial #	Deadline Defect
523519	HYDRAULIC SYSTEM INOP AND DOES NOT SPIN THE PUMP. PTO REQUIRES REPLACEMENT. Requisition for PTO was submitted 23 July and receipted for the same day. SDN M2182002050059
522932	ENGINE REPLACEMENT
523612	RECEIVER-TRANSMITTER
522288	RECEIVER-TRANSMITTER
523311	RECEIVER-TRANSMITTER
523195	RECEIVER-TRANSMITTER



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-3000

MCO 3000.13B
PP&O (POR)
14 JUL 2020

MARINE CORPS ORDER 3000.13B

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Distribution List

Subj: MARINE CORPS READINESS REPORTING

Ref: (a) CJCSI 3401.02B, "Force Readiness Reporting," 31 May, 2011
(b) CJCSM 3150.02B, "Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)," 25 March, 2011
(c) DoDD 7730.65 CH-1, "Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)," 31 May, 2018
(d) JP 1-02, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," 15 December, 2016
(e) MCO 5311.1E
(f) MCO 3400.3H
(g) MCO 3000.11E
(h) MCO 1553.10
(i) MCO 3500.26A W/ERRATUM
(j) MCO 3500.110
(k) MCO 3125.1B
(l) NAVMC 3500.14
(m) MCO 3500.18A
(n) SECNAV M-5210.1
(o) OPNAVINST 5442.3
(p) OPNAVINST 4790.2J
(q) MCO 1001.61A
(r) SECNAVINST 5300.30F
(s) BUMEDINST 6110.14 CH-3
(t) Title 5 U.S.C. 552a
(u) SECNAVINST 5211.5F
(v) DoDI 1332.45, "Retention Determination for Non-Deployable Service Members," 30 July, 2018
(w) COMNAVFORINST 4790.2C
(x) Title 10, U.S.C.
(y) MCO 5210.11F
(z) SECNAV M-5214.1

Encl: (1) Marine Corps Readiness Reporting Guidance

Reports Required: I. Defense Readiness Reporting System-Marine Corps (Report Control Symbol EXEMPT), par. 4.a.(2)

1. Situation. To promulgate policies and procedures for reporting readiness on Marine Corps organizations. This Order amplifies the policies, procedures, and reporting requirements delineated in references (a) through (z).

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2. Cancellation. MCO 3000.13A

3. Mission. This Order provides policy and procedures to units, selected installations, and other organizations in the Marine Corps on reporting readiness in accordance with references (a) through (z) in order to meet service and Department of Defense (DoD) reporting requirements.

4. Execution

a. Commander's Intent and Concept of Operations. In 1952, while deliberating on role of the Marine Corps, the 82nd Congress stated:

"The nation's shock troops must be the most ready when the nation is least ready...to provide a balanced force in readiness for a naval campaign and, at the same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale war."

In 2016, the 114th Congress re-affirmed the importance of the readiness of the Marine Corps to the national defense.

(1) Commander's Intent. Pursuant to reference (x), the Marine Corps reports readiness in order to meet service and DoD reporting requirements.

(2) Concept of Operations. The Marine Corps will establish a readiness reporting architecture that integrates Marine Corps Authoritative Data Source (ADS) systems and informs elements of readiness reporting implementation. Using ADS system data, the Marine Corps will maintain the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Marine Corps (DRRS-MC) as a single, uniform system for the preparation, approval, and maintenance of readiness reporting. Through interaction with Deputy Commandants and Marine Corps Component Commanders, the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations (DC PP&O) integrates service-wide readiness activities and advocates Marine Corps readiness equities to Congress, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders (CCDR), and sister services. This reporting requirement is exempt from reports control per reference (z), part IV, paragraph 7.h. which provides mandatory standards for administrative orders and directives development, format, and staffing within the Department of the Navy. Future enhancements to DRRS-MC in support of evolving readiness requirements will be captured in subsequent changes to this Order.

b. Subordinate Element Missions

(1) Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies and Operations (DC PP&O)

(a) Establish service policy, procedures, training, and guidance on unit readiness reporting.

(b) Maintain DRRS-MC per DoD, Joint, SECNAV, and Marine Corps directives.

(c) Coordinate proposed service readiness policies and procedures with other services, Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).

(d) Participate in the Mission Essential Task List (METL) development, review, and approval process per reference (j).

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(e) Register units, organizations, and installations that are required to report readiness in DRRS-MC. Audit DRRS-MC at least annually to ensure that 100% of its Unit Identification Codes (UICs) are validated per reference (a).

(f) Assign provisional UICs to task-organized units required to report readiness in DRRS-MC.

(g) Integrate service-directed readiness initiatives and serve as the functional advocate for DRRS-MC.

(h) Coordinate the activation, deactivation, relocation, and reassignment of Marine Corps units with the Deputy Commandant, Combat Development & Integration (CD&I), Total Force Structure Division and DC M&RA as directed in the associated MCBUL 5400 messages.

(i) Post and maintain an updated DRRS-MC User's Guide in DRRS-MC.

(j) Maintain supporting documentation of units authorized to report level '6' for personnel, equipment and supplies, and equipment condition.

(k) Coordinate with Deputy Commandants (DCs) in maintaining synchronization, alignment, and interface of ADS systems in support of an enterprise-wide readiness reporting process.

(l) Coordinate and approve critical military occupational specialties/critical skills, mission essential equipment and the unit of employment (UE) by unit type for GCE units.

(2) Deputy Commandant, Manpower & Reserve Affairs (DC M&RA)

(a) With regards to manpower capacity and personnel readiness, assist DCs, advocates, and Marine Corps component commanders (MARFORs) with: establishing service policy, procedures, and guidance; refining standards; and making assessments (e.g., staffing, deployability, risk, trend analysis) to meet human resource demands.

(b) Maintain the Marine Corps Total Force System as the service ADS for individual and unit personnel data and information by which manpower capacity and personnel readiness is determined.

(c) Provide oversight of the administration, maintenance, and validation of data provided via ADS interface with DRRS-MC.

(d) Monitor manpower capacity and personnel readiness of individuals and units in collaboration with DC PP&O; Commander, Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (COMMARFORPAC); Commander, Marine Corps Forces Command, (COMMARFORCOM); Commander, Marine Forces, Special Operations Command (COMMARFORSOC); Commander, Marine Forces, Cyberspace Command (COMMARFORCYBER); and Commander, Marine Corps Forces, Reserve (COMMARFORRES).

(e) Support DRRS-MC development, initiatives, testing, and training.

(3) Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics (DC I&L)

(a) Coordinate with DC PP&O to establish service policy, procedures, and guidance on installation and logistic combat element (LCE) unit readiness reporting in DRRS-MC.

(b) Coordinate with DC PP&O and DC CD&I the designation, registration, and training of selected installations to report in DRRS-MC.

(c) Integrate Marine Corps readiness initiatives relative to installations.

(d) Participate in the METL development, review, and approval process per reference (j).

(e) Identify the readiness reportable ground Principal End Items (PEI) and Mission Essential Equipment (MEE) selected for readiness reporting. In coordination with other DCs and advocates, identify MEE by unit type.

(f) Monitor installation readiness data for accuracy, timeliness, and quality. If necessary, initiate corrective actions.

(g) Provide oversight of the administration, maintenance, and validation of data provided via ADS interface with DRRS-MC.

(h) Coordinate and approve critical military occupational specialties/critical skills, mission essential equipment and the UE by unit type for LCE units.

(4) Deputy Commandant, Aviation (DC AVN)

(a) Coordinate with DC PP&O on policy, procedures, and guidance for aviation unit readiness reporting.

(b) Participate in the METL development, review, and approval process per reference (j).

(c) Identify the readiness reportable ground PEI and MEE selected for readiness reporting applicable to aviation units.

(d) Provide oversight of the administration, maintenance, and validation of data provided via ADS interface with DRRS-MC.

(e) Coordinate and approve critical military occupational specialties/critical skills, mission essential equipment, and the UE by unit type for ACE units.

(5) Deputy Commandant, Combat Development & Integration (DC CD&I)

(a) Manage, coordinate, maintain, and serve as the primary review authority of the Marine Corps Task List (MCTL) and update it as required. Provide periodic examination of the MCTL to reflect installation METLs, unit core METs, named operation METLs, and top priority plans (CONPLAN/OPLAN) METs. Define doctrinal tasks and support operational reporting requirements. Maintain the MCTL and task library within the ADS database repository and system of record for MCTs, the Marine Corps Training Information Management

System (MCTIMS). Maintain current iterations of MCTL, and program support products accessibility within the MCCDC/CD&I website:

<http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Units/Marine-Corps-Task-List/>

(b) Coordinate the activation, deactivation, relocation, and reassignment of Marine Corps units and installations with DC PP&O, DC I&L, and DC M&RA.

(c) Coordinate with DC PP&O on policy, procedures, and guidance for command element (CE) unit readiness reporting.

(d) Participate in the METL development, review, and approval process per reference (j).

(e) Assist Deputy Commandants, advocates, and the Marine Corps Component Commanders (MARFORs) in the development of core METLs, with conditions and standards, for all units and installations per references (i) and (j).

(f) Maintain MCTIMS as the service ADS for unit METs and associated standards.

(g) Provide oversight of the administration, maintenance, and validation of data provided via MCTIMS interface with DRRS-MC.

(h) In accordance with reference (e), support DC PP&O in the appropriate use of unit naming conventions, unit organizational constructs and the management of unit, billet (active, reserve, USN), equipment requirements and documented force structure tables of organizations and equipment (T/O&E) data which are maintained within the Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS).

(i) Incorporate standardized unit core METs and associated training standards in Ground and Aviation Training and Readiness (T&R) Manuals.

(j) Support DRRS-MC development, initiatives, testing and training.

(k) Coordinate and approve critical military occupational specialties/critical skills, mission essential equipment and the UE by unit type for CE units.

(6) Deputy Commandant, Information (DC I)

(a) Coordinate with DC PP&O on policy, procedures, and guidance for Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) unit readiness reporting.

(b) Participate in the METL development, review, and approval process per reference (j).

(c) Identify the readiness reportable ground PEI and MEE selected for readiness reporting applicable to OIE units.

(d) Coordinate and approve critical military occupational specialties/critical skills, mission essential equipment, and the UE by unit type for OIE units.

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(7) Commander, Marine Forces Command (COMMARFORCOM)

(a) In coordination with DC CD&I, load core METs and associated standards for like-type conventional units and installations into the service organizational MET database.

(b) Maintain templates for unit named operations and top priority plan METLs.

(c) Integrate named operation and top priority plan METL development into force sourcing actions.

(d) Support the development and periodic review of METs and associated conditions and standards for units and installations. Chair, host, and/or facilitate workshops as required.

(e) With DC CD&I and MCCDC/TECOM, serve as a functional area manager for the authoritative service organizational MET database.

(f) Assist in the development and refinement of joint/Marine Corps readiness standards in collaboration with DC PP&O, DC CD&I, DC M&RA, MARFORs and other appropriate Marine Corps organizations.

(g) Provide recommendations to DC PP&O regarding the readiness/certification of operational forces allocated to satisfy validated CCDR requirements.

(h) Monitor the readiness of Marine Corps operating forces in collaboration with DC PP&O, DC M&RA, COMMARFORPAC, COMMARFORSOC, COMMARFORCYBER, and COMMARFORRES.

(i) In collaboration with DC PP&O, conduct unit readiness assessments (e.g., manpower, training, equipment, etc.), including trend analysis, of the service's capacity to execute current, emergent, and future contingency requirements.

(8) Marine Corps Component Commanders (MARFORs)

(a) Establish procedures to monitor the readiness reporting of subordinate units for completeness, accuracy, and timeliness in accordance with the policies established in this Order. Direct corrective actions as required within five days of subordinate unit reports being submitted in DRRS-MC.

(b) Inform the supporting MARFOR when OPLAN/CONPLAN assessments require units to develop and report top priority plan METs and/or Joint Missions Essential Task (JMETs). Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARFORSOC) is the exception when providing forces to Theater Special Operations Commands.

(c) Support subordinate units' development of named operation and top priority plan METs and/or JMETs. Inform DC PP&O, DC CD&I, and MARFORCOM if such METLs need to become the focus of resourcing and training efforts instead of Core Unit METLs.

(d) Integrate named operation and top priority plan METLs and/or JMETs into unit deployment orders.

(e) Support DRRS-MC development and testing; conduct training as required.

(f) Coordinate with DC PP&O on policy, procedures, and guidance for evolving requirements and new unit readiness reporting.

(g) Coordinate with DC CD&I and COMMARFORCOM to load core METs and associated conditions and standards for all like-type units into MCTIMS.

(9) Reporting Units, Organizations and Installations

(a) Assess organizations in DRRS-MC as outlined in this Order.

(b) Submit complete, accurate, and timely reports to DRRS-MC.

(c) Train and identify organizational readiness representatives as established in Chapter 1.

(d) Intermediate commands will verify in DRRS-MC, within five days of submission, the completeness and accuracy of reports submitted by subordinate reporting organizations. If required, return the report with comment to the subordinate organizations to re-submit a corrected report when computation or administrative errors are discovered. The timelines for report submission will not be exceeded for this review. Detailed status of reports reviewed, submitted late, not reviewed, or not corrected are displayed in DRRS-MC.

5. Administration and Logistics

a. Recommendations concerning the contents of this Order may be forwarded to DC PP&O (POR) via the chain-of-command.

b. Records Management. Records created as a result of this Order shall be managed according to National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)-approved dispositions per reference (n) to ensure proper maintenance, use, accessibility and preservation, regardless of format or medium. Records disposition schedules are located on the Department of Navy/Assistant for Administration (DON/AA), Directives and Records Management Division (DRMD) portal page at: <https://portal.secnav.navy.mil/orgs/DUSNM/DONAA/DRM/Records-and-Information-Management/Approved%20Record%20Schedules/Forms/AllItems.aspx>. Refer to reference (y) for Marine Corps records management policy and procedures.

c. P Privacy Act. Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) may result in both civil and criminal penalties. The Department of the Navy (DON) recognizes that the privacy of an individual is a personal and fundamental right that shall be respected and protected. The DON's need to collect, use, maintain, or disseminate PII about individuals for purposes of discharging its statutory responsibilities shall be balanced against the individuals' right to be protected against unwarranted invasion of privacy. All collection, use, maintenance, or dissemination of PII shall be in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended (reference (t)) and implemented per reference (u).

6. Command and Signal

- a. Command. This Order is applicable to the Marine Corps Total Force.
- b. Signal. This Order is effective the date signed.



G. W. SMITH JR.
Deputy Commandant for
Plans, Policies and Operations

DISTRIBUTION: PCN 10203045300

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Marine Corps Readiness Reporting Guidance

Chapter 1

Readiness Overview

1. Purpose. This Chapter outlines general policy for operational readiness reporting. It includes information on which organizations report, reporting occasions, reporting channels, security, and the release of readiness data outside of the Marine Corps.

2. Policy. Reference (a) contains the general provisions, detailed instructions, and formats to submit readiness data in support of joint requirements. Supplemental instructions are provided by this Order. This Order is the governing authority for all Marine Corps readiness reporting requirements. DRRS-MC is the ADS for readiness reporting. All Marine Corps reporting organizations will use DRRS-MC to create and submit readiness reports.

3. Background

a. Readiness. Per reference (d), readiness is defined as the ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy (NMS). Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels.

(1) Unit Readiness. The ability to provide capabilities required by the CCDRs to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. Unit readiness is reported by the military services.

(2) Joint Readiness. This is the CCDR's or joint task force commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute assigned missions. Accurate and timely unit readiness reports are essential for joint readiness reporting and force sourcing.

b. Legal Requirement To Report Readiness. Title 10, section 153(a)(3)(D), United States Code (U.S.C.), directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans. Title 10, section 117(a), U.S.C., directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a comprehensive readiness reporting system that would measure in an objective, accurate, and timely manner the capability of the U.S. military to carry out the National Security Strategy, Defense Planning Guidance, and the NMS. Title 10, section 5042(b)(2), U.S.C., directs Headquarters, Marine Corps, to investigate and report upon the efficiency and preparation to support military operations by CCDR.

c. Marine Corps Institutional Readiness. The institutional readiness of the Marine Corps is dependent upon the proper balance between five pillars of readiness. DRRS-MC data directly reports on the unit readiness and capability and capacity to meet requirements pillars while supporting analysis on the remaining pillars. The five pillars of institutional readiness are:

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(1) Unit Readiness. This pillar is the result of the aggregate of the investment in personnel, training, and equipment to ensure that units are prepared to perform missions at any given time.

(2) Capability and Capacity to Meet Requirements. This pillar involves force-sizing to meet geographic CCDR requirements with the right mix of capacity and capability.

(3) High Quality People. Recruiting and retaining high quality people results in higher performance and plays a key role in maintaining the Marine Corps high state of readiness.

(4) Infrastructure Sustainment. Adequately resourcing the sustainment of bases and stations is essential to readiness, because they provide the platforms at which units train and from which they deploy.

(5) Equipment Modernization. Ground and aviation equipment must meet the needs of the current and evolving security environment.

d. Uses. Readiness information supports in priority order: crisis response planning, deliberate or peacetime planning, and management responsibilities to organize, train, and equip combat-ready forces for the combatant commands. Readiness reporting information is also used in: service testimony, reports to Congress, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's Readiness System, and other venues. DRRS-MC also provides data for use by joint automated systems (e.g., Global Transportation Network (GTN), Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, and Joint Planning and Execution Services) in support of the joint planning process.

4. Scope. This Order applies to all Marine Corps readiness reporting organizations.

5. Reporting Organizations. Only organizations designated by DC PP&O (POR) will submit readiness reports. Requests for organizations to report in DRRS-MC will be forwarded with justification to PP&O (POR) through the chain of command.

a. Organizations Required to Report. Designated GCE, ACE, LCE, and CE units of the Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), MARFORs, and designated organizations and installations will report their readiness. Each type of organization is deployable, designed for warfighting, or provides support to the warfighting Marine. These will include designated task organized units. Designated task organized units without an existing unit identification code (UIC) will receive a provisional UIC from HQMC, DC PP&O (POR), in coordination with DC M&RA and DC CD&I, for reporting.

b. Organizations Not Under Marine Corps Operational Control (OPCON). Marine Corps organizations transferred to a non-Marine Corps command and under the operational control (OPCON) of that command will submit their reports through DRRS-MC. This applies to deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), units in contingency operations, and aviation squadrons participating in Navy carrier integration.

c. Non-Marine Corps Organizations OPCON to Marine Organizations. Those organizations will report their readiness per their channels, not in DRRS-MC. Exceptions may be requested of DC PP&O (POR) through the chain of command.

6. Core and Assigned Readiness Assessments. DRRS-MC allows commanders of reporting organizations to uniformly assess and accurately report their core and assigned missions in a single report. Commanders capture their ability to accomplish their core mission, the mission for which the organization was designed, via a C-level and core mission capability assessment. When applicable, commanders will also capture their organizations' ability to accomplish assigned missions via the Assigned Level (A-level) and an assigned mission capability assessment. An assigned mission is an operational requirement that a unit is formally assigned to plan for, prepare for, or to execute. Units may have more than one assigned mission at a particular time. In cases where units have more than one assigned mission, higher headquarters will provide guidance on which assigned mission is reported as the current focus.

a. C-level and A-level Assessments. Both indicate the degree to which a unit has achieved prescribed levels of fill for personnel and equipment, the materiel condition of available equipment, and the training proficiency status of the unit. C-level and A-level are discussed in Chapter 7. A unit is prohibited from subjectively overriding the calculated C-level without a waiver granted by a general officer in the chain of command.

b. Core and Assigned Mission Capability Assessments. One of the most significant aspects of readiness reporting is the requirement for commanders to assess their organizations' capabilities to accomplish the Mission Essential Tasks (METs) to specified conditions and standards. Those MET assessments are then used by commanders to assess their organizations' capabilities to accomplish their core and assigned missions. MET assessments are discussed in Chapter 4. Capability mission assessments are described in Chapter 7.

7. Reporting Channels. Readiness reports are the responsibility of the organization commander and must reflect the commander's experience and best judgment regarding the organization's readiness. Organizations must submit their reports using the Network Unit Status Report - Marine Corps (NETUSR-MC) module. Coordination of readiness issues with higher, supported, and supporting commands ensures a shared understanding of unit capabilities and any support that may be required. Commanders and staffs must avoid actions which may impair the submission of timely, accurate, and complete readiness assessments by subordinate organizations. Higher headquarters will not require higher level review of reports prior to submission or direct levels of reported readiness. Establish a process for the request and granting of waivers at each MEF and MARFOR that have readiness reporting units that report an overall readiness rating (C-Level). The process must provide for a general officer in the chain of command of the reporting unit to receive, consider, and report waivers allowing a subjective override (upgrade or downgrade) of the C-Level. This process must not impinge on the timeliness of reporting.

8. Training Requirements. All personnel involved in the readiness management process will receive and document training related to readiness policy, reporting procedures and systems.

a. Reporting unit commanders, authorized agents and points of contact must complete the MarineNet DRRS-MC policy course within 30 days of appointment.

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b. Unit readiness officers/SNCOs will complete the MarineNet DRRS-MC policy course and the NETUSR web-based training within 30 days of appointment. They must also receive formal training from a DRRS-MC trainer that is approved by their respective MARFOR within 90 days of appointment.

9. Appointment. Unit commanders will appoint in writing authorized agents and readiness officers/SNCOs.

10. Unit Readiness Boards. Reporting units will use a board process to prepare readiness reports. The structure of the readiness board will be as directed by the commander establishing the board. When the following personnel are available to the reporting organization, it is recommended the board include the staff principals, CBRN defense officer and medical officer. The result of the board is the completed readiness report, which only the commander or an authorized agent may submit into DRRS-MC. Units must maintain a record of the board meeting used for each report for a period of 12 months.

11. Report Verification. Reporting organizations at all levels must develop a program to audit their readiness data to ensure data accuracy and fidelity. MARFORs and major subordinate commands (MSCs) will develop procedures that enable subordinate intermediate commands to verify subordinate unit reports within five days of submission. Higher headquarters are not authorized to change the readiness reports of subordinate organizations. When policy, computation or administrative errors are discovered, higher headquarters will return the report with comment in DRRS-MC directing submission of a corrected report within 24 hours. Units submitting a report with a subjective override to the overall readiness level (C-level) without the required waiver information listed in paragraph 13.c will be considered an erroneous report and returned. The unit will submit a corrected report within 24 hours of notification of the error.

a. Review of DRRS-MC Data. Resource data and mission and MET assessments can be accessed through DRRS-MC with the Marine Corps Readiness Analysis Tool (MCRAT). All MARFORs, MSCs, and intermediate level commands will have access to MCRAT to allow them to quickly aggregate and analyze subordinate unit readiness data.

b. Edit of Reports. Report originators will be notified of errors detected. Erroneous reports will be corrected and resubmitted within 24 hours of notification.

12. Commander's Standing Notification Events (CSNEs). Commands will create and employ CSNEs appropriate to their organizations to aid in notifying the commander of events that could impact the unit's readiness.

13. Reporting Occasions. Reports will be submitted within 24 hours of the occasions listed in Table 1-1 for the organizations specified. Units will continue to report when deployed for training, deployed in response to a crisis, deployed in execution of a top priority plan or named operation, and in combat.

a. Increased Reporting Frequency. Higher headquarters may direct increased reporting frequency and more detailed remarks to provide updated information for crisis planning.

b. Cyclical Reporting. To align reporting processes in support of higher headquarters readiness reporting and service level planning, MARFORs may establish cyclical submission timelines for subordinate units. Reporting occasions established in Table 1-1 take precedence over any cyclical submission timeline.

c. Waivers. Units and installations requesting waivers of reporting requirements will submit the request through the chain of command to DC PP&O (POR). Units requesting a waiver to the prohibition on subjective override will submit their request through their chain of command to first general officer in the chain for consideration. If granted, the unit must include the date issued, name, rank, and command of the general officer in the commander's remarks. Given The distinct battle rhythms across the force, a conditional waiver can be granted based on the anticipated circumstances in the next reporting period. For example, a division readiness board may consider waivers for specific battalions for the next month. Waivers may remain in force for as long as the general officer waiver authority considers the waiver appropriate in the circumstances (e.g., unit resource levels, mission assessment, and justification are unchanged).

14. Security Classification. The classification of readiness data will be based on the highest classified item in the report. Top secret information will not be reported. Units will classify readiness reports according to the following guidelines:

a. Battalion, squadron, and company reports with no assigned mission will indicate on the basic unit information (BUI) page that their Defense Readiness Reporting System-Marine Corps (DRRS-MC) reports are confidential. This classification applies to the C-level, top concerns, core mission assessment, associated comments, core MET assessments, and other text fields that would reveal unit capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.

b. Battalion, squadron, and company reports with an assigned mission will indicate on the BUI page that their DRRS-MC reports are secret. This applies to the A-level, assigned mission assessment, associated comments, assigned MET assessments, and other text fields that would reveal unit capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities associated with an OPLAN or planned deployment.

c. Units above the battalion or squadron level will indicate on the BUI page that the DRRS-MC reports are secret. This classification applies to the C-level, A-level, top concerns, mission assessments, associated comments, MET assessments, and other text fields that would reveal unit capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.

d. Data reported in DRRS-MC that were derived from unclassified sources (MCTFS, GCSS-MC, MCTIMS) remain unclassified (normally for official use only). Examples include personnel, supply, maintenance, and training. Data reported must be derived from authoritative data sources per Table A-4, Appendix A, Page A-3.

15. Release and Access to Reports. Marine Corps readiness information will not be released outside the DoD without the written approval of DC PP&O (POR). Outside agencies with a valid need-to-know and the appropriate clearance should submit requests to DC PP&O (POR).

Occasion	Unit	MARFOR	Installation	A-Level
Every calendar month with no more than 35 days since last report	X	X		X
90 days since last report			X	
Activation or deactivation	X	X	X	X
Change in C-level or A-level	X			X
Change in Core or Assigned Mission Assessment (Yes, Qualified Yes, No)	X	X	X	X
On all forecasted changes to C-level, A-level, core mission capability assessment or assigned mission capability assessment dates of the prior report	X			X
Change in administrative control or operational control (OPCON)	X		X	X
Change of location of unit or CE	X		X	X
Change of geographic location of unit's personnel or equipment (e.g. mobilized reserve unit's arrival at site of initial activation, a unit's arrival at Integrated Training Exercise , or arrival overseas)	X		X	X
Employed in support of an in-lieu of mission (one that does not match the core mission)	X		X	X
Assignment to named operations (e.g. Operation Inherent Resolve) or operational plan/concept plan (TOP PRIORITY) by D-90	X	X	X	X
Receipt of an order to execute any of these missions: homeland defense, homeland security, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, consequence management, counter-drug, civil disturbance, natural disaster relief (including wildfire fighting), or execution of immediate response authority	X		X	X
Receipt of an alert, formal warning, or execute order for deployment or NLT 60 days prior to deployment/be prepared to deploy date, whichever comes first	X			X
12 months prior to a reserve unit's planned activation	X			X
Mobilization of reserve unit	X			X
Significant new encroachment concerns or environmental impacts			X	
Natural disasters affecting installation operations			X	
Legislative changes significantly impacting training capability			X	

Table 1-1.--Reporting Occasions

Chapter 2

Personnel

1. Purpose. This Chapter outlines policy, procedures, reason codes, and mandatory remarks for personnel reporting.
2. Policy. A personnel-level (P-level) is based on the unit's ability to provide deployable, military occupational specialty (MOS) qualified personnel and DoD civilians to accomplish its missions. Contractors are not considered when determining P-levels. It is one of the four measured areas that are factors in determining a unit's C- and/or A-level. Reportable personnel will be accounted for by only one organization at a time. P-levels may also be used as part of the validation for standards being assessed as resourced in an organization's METs.
3. Scope. This section applies to Marine Corps readiness reporting units which report a C or A-level, not installations or MARFORs. Installations and MARFORs may include personnel readiness as resource standards within their MET assessments as needed. Intermediate level commands will provide a subjective assessment of personnel resource level based upon the resource levels of subordinate units.
4. Reporting Requirements. Personnel information should be consolidated by the G-1/S-1 and provided to the authorized agent or point of contact assembling the readiness report in DRRS-MC on behalf of the commanding officer (CO).

a. P-Level. The P-level is based on the lower percentage of the personnel strength or Critical MOS calculations. Figure 2-1 depicts the formulas for calculating these percentages. Task organized units and units detaching personnel to task organized units will comply with paragraph 5 of this Chapter when calculating personnel percentages. Table 2-1 depicts how the percentages determine the P-level. The P-level will be calculated on the present state (see glossary for definition) of the unit and will not be a future projection. P-levels that are not 1 require a reason code and mandatory remarks in the personnel resource area per paragraphs 7 and 8 of this Chapter. On rare occasion, only PP&O (POR) may direct an organization to report its personnel level as a P-6 - not measured.

<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Personnel Strength Percentage</u></p> $= \frac{(\text{Assigned Strength} + \text{Attached}) - (\text{Detached} + \text{Non-Deployables} + \text{IA/JIA})}{\text{Structure Strength}} \times 100$ <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Critical MOS Percentage</u></p> $= \frac{(\text{Critical MOS Assigned} + \text{Attached}) - (\text{Detached} + \text{Non-Deployables} + \text{IA/JIA})}{\text{Critical MOS Structure Strength}} \times 100$
--

Figure 2-1.--Personnel Percentages

Rule	P1	P2	P3	P4
Personnel Strength	≥90%	80-89%	70-79%	<70%
Critical MOS	≥85%	75-84%	65-74%	<65%

Table 2-1.--P-Levels

b. Structure Strength

(1) Core Mission Structure Requirements. The Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS) is the authoritative source for obtaining a unit's table of organization (T/O) structure strength data to calculate its P-level. Unit personnel structure is automatically populated into a unit's readiness report in DRRS-MC from TFSMS. A unit's personnel structure may change when the authorized strength report is updated in TFSMS. Units will validate the personnel structure for each type personnel (Marine Officer (MO) Marine enlisted, etc.) resident in DRRS-MC. To validate the unit's personnel structure in DRRS-MC, only account for chargeable billets. Individual mobilization augmentation (IMA) billets and unfilled Navy billets identified with an "M" code (medical billets to be augmented by the hospital staff) will not be counted. Billets designated as "Mapped From" (MF) on a unit's T/O are part of the parent unit structure in TFSMS, but are not part of the parent unit's structure for DRRS-MC reporting (parent units will identify these as "Mapped To" billets on their T/O). Billets designated as MT on a unit's T/O are subtracted from the parent unit's structure in TFSMS and are a part of the receiving unit's structure for DRRS-MC reporting. Non-integrated site support personnel will not be counted in reserve units. Occasionally, the majority of a unit will deploy, but still retain personnel at the home station. The unit will continue to account for these personnel at the home station in its readiness reports, unless the personnel are detached to another reporting unit. Reserve units activated and deployed will not count the Marines not activated with the unit (left at home station) upon deployment.

(2) Assigned Mission Structure Strength (Manning Document). Units that are task-organized for an assigned mission will use an approved manning document for their structure strength since TFSMS does not capture personnel requirements for task organized units. In DRRS-MC, units will either import or manually enter the personnel requirement from the manning document into DRRS-MC for the assigned mission by type personnel if they are different from the core mission.

c. Assigned Strength. The Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) is the authoritative source for units' personnel status and is used to determine the assigned personnel strength for the core mission. The administration section/S-1 should provide the total numbers of personnel assigned to the unit for each category listed on the personnel page in DRRS-MC. Personnel attached from another unit to support the assigned mission are not listed in the assigned field; instead, enter these personnel under the attached field. Personnel information will be entered on the personnel page for each type personnel as follows:

(1) Assigned. Reporting units will list their entire assigned personnel quantities staffed to the unit in the assigned field. Do not include Individual Mobilization Augment (IMA) or medical billets augmented by the hospital staff. Reservists individually activated to support Individual

Augment (IA) or Joint Individual Augment (JIA) requirements are not counted as assigned to their parent unit. Upon activation reserve units will report in accordance with the above instruction.

(2) Attached. Enter the quantity of personnel the unit gained and/or received under the attached column (ASGND and MOSFL). This includes any IA or JIA personnel attached to the unit. Coordination must occur between the task organized and providing units to avoid double counting of personnel. Not applicable (N/A) to reserve units prior to activation.

(3) Detached. Enter the quantity of personnel detached (ASGND and MOSFL) under the detached column that the unit provided to other units. These detached personnel are attached to another unit and are not available to the unit for deployment. Coordination must occur between the unit providing the personnel to the unit receiving the personnel (task organized unit) to avoid double counting of personnel.

(4) Individual Augment (IA) and Joint Individual Augment (JIA) Billets Detached from the Unit. Enter the personnel quantities assigned as an IA or JIA billet external to the unit under the IA/JIA column by type personnel. IAs are distinguished from detachments per reference (q).

(5) Non-deployable Personnel Quantities. Non-deployable personnel data is to be pulled directly from MCTFS data using the criteria for deployable and non-deployable status depicted in Tables A-1 and A-2 in accordance with references (r) and (s). Enter the total non-deployable personnel quantities, by category, under the non-deployable column. Significant discrepancies with MCTFS data should be described in personnel comments.

d. Critical MOS/Critical Skill. Units will report on the most important MOS/skills, military or civilian, that have the largest effect on the unit's ability to accomplish its core and assigned missions. For designated unit types, a standard list of approved critical MOS/critical skills will appear in DRRS-MC; reporting organizations will report the assigned strength for each of these pre-selected critical MOS/critical skills. Critical MOS may be either a Billet MOS or a Primary MOS and does not double count if it appears in both columns. Billet MOS is counted first. It must be manually calculated as a valid BIC fill with a qualified individual. A valid BIC fill is an individual that is qualified for the Billet MOS and is plus or minus one grade. Personnel may not fill multiple BICs. DRRS-MC will provide a list of BICs to facilitate calculation. Commanders may report additional critical MOS/critical skills not identified by DRRS-MC for their unit type in the commander's comments. The Critical MOS list by unit type will be reviewed and revised as necessary as part of unit METL reviews conducted per reference (j).

5. Task-Organization. Task-organized units gaining personnel and the units providing personnel will adjust their personnel quantities as described in paragraph 4.c. Coordination must occur between the task-organized and providing units to avoid double counting of personnel. Remarks explaining the personnel adjustments will remain in the task organized and providing units' reports until the detachments are returned to the providing units or transferred elsewhere. Figure 2-2 provides an example of these adjustments with an artillery battalion providing a battery to form a battalion landing team for an assigned mission. Task-organized units use a manning document

for structure strength, since task organized units do not have structure in TFSMS.

Prior to Task Organization			
<u>Artillery Battalion</u>		<u>Infantry Battalion</u>	
550	=	<u>Assigned + Attached - Detached</u>	= 748
600 (per T/O)		Structured Strength	760 (per T/O)
After Task Organization			
A battery of 134 Marines and Sailors detached to the battalion landing team			
<u>Artillery Battalion</u>		<u>Landing Team</u>	
416	=	<u>Assigned + Attached - Detached</u>	= 882
600 (per T/O)		Structured Strength	894 (manning document)

Figure 2-2.—Personnel Task Organization Adjustments

6. Personnel Remaining Behind From Deployment. When an active duty unit deploys and has personnel that still belong to the unit remaining behind, the commander will still account for those personnel at the home location and will consider them in the core P-level calculation, C-level and mission capability assessment. They will not be considered in A-level, assigned P-level, or assigned mission capability assessments.

7. Reason Codes

a. Personnel Reason Codes. Enter the personnel reason codes resident in DRRS-MC to explain the unit's status when the P-level is less than 1.

b. Employed/Deployed Codes. When five percent (5%) or more of a unit's personnel are detached to deploy with another unit, the providing unit will use the employed/deployed codes resident in DRRS-MC to report the percentage deployed.

c. Personnel Location. Personnel assigned to the unit, but located at temporary locations other than the present location will be reflected under the personnel at location field using standard geographical location codes or naval ship UIC for personnel embarked aboard ships. When personnel are located at temporary locations, they still belong to the unit, (e.g., FAP, training, etc.). Do not list such personnel as detached and do not list detached personnel in this field. Reserve units will reflect subordinate elements geographic location for all elements not collocated with CE.

8. Mandatory Personnel Remarks. Mandatory remarks and examples are:

a. Personnel Strength. Identify changes due to assigned strength. Example remarks of unit providing personnel: "Personnel strength decreased by detaching B Battery to BLT 1/2; 7/125/0/2 MC/ME/NC/NE. Estimated return 2 Jun."

b. P-Level is Not 1. List pertinent quantities of assigned strength, detachments, non-deployables, MOSs, and unit structure/manning document; explain problem causes if known; identify assistance already requested; and highlight further actions required. Use the following format to briefly describe the concern: Bottom Line Up-Front (BLUF), actions taken, results. An example is provided below.

"BLUF: Shortage of (MOS) and (MOS) makes unit incapable of conducting MET(s) A and B.

Actions Taken: Coordinated with OccField sponsor, HHQ, and M&RA to fill vacancies.

Results: Vacancies expected to be filled in early FYXX."

c. Employed/Deployed Personnel. State the percentage of personnel employed or deployed when five percent (5%) or more of a unit's personnel are detached to another unit and the impact on the unit's ability to execute its mission. See Table A-3.

d. Reserve Specific Reporting. Reserve units will adjust assigned and MOS fill numbers upon activation of subordinate elements. Do not use the attached, detached, or IA/JIA columns prior to activation. Commander's personnel remarks will reflect the loss and mission of those elements of the command that are activated. Upon unit activation, the rules for reporting as an active component unit apply.

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Chapter 3

Equipment

1. Purpose. This Chapter outlines policy, procedures, reason codes, and mandatory remarks for both equipment and supplies possessed (S-level), and equipment condition (R-level). The S-level is a materiel measurement of an organization's possessed equipment or in-reporting status aircraft quantity against its designed requirement. The R-level indicates the materiel condition of the organization's possessed equipment or in-reporting aircraft.

2. Policy. Reporting on equipment to determine an S-level and an R-level is based on the unit's ability to provide the quantities and quality of equipment to accomplish its missions. The S and R-levels are two of the four measured areas that are factors in determining a unit's C and A-levels. S and R-levels may also be used as part of the validation for equipment standards being assessed as resourced in an organization's METs. Equipment will be accounted for by only one organization at a time, and the present state of materiel status (see glossary for definition), not future projections, will be used. Active and reserve units will compute their S and R-levels in the same way.

3. Scope. This section applies to Marine Corps readiness reporting units that report a C or A-level. It does not apply to installations or MARFORs. Installations and MARFORs may include equipment readiness as resource standards within their MET assessments as needed. Intermediate level commands will provide a subjective assessment of their equipment levels based upon their subordinate units' S and R-levels.

4. Reporting Requirements. Equipment information should be consolidated by the logistics office (G-4/S-4) with the support of the supply and maintenance officers. Equipment identified in a unit's Table of Equipment (T/E) as readiness reportable will automatically be populated for the unit in DRRS-MC as either MEE or PEI.

5. Reportable Equipment. Selected pieces of equipment are designated to accurately capture the equipment readiness of Marine Corps units. The selected equipment is reported as either MEE or PEI.

a. Ground Equipment. Reference (g) defines MEE and PEI for ground equipment and sets forth the procedures for updating them. Updated MEE and PEI are published annually in the Marine Corps Bulletin 3000, identifying MEE by unit type and PEI for all units by Table of Authorized Materiel Control Number (TAMCN). The MCBUL 3000 also identifies groups of TAMCNs that are equivalent items for reporting. Reporting units will only report on equipment identified by this bulletin against the quantities listed on the individual units' table of equipment for the core mission.

b. Aircraft and Aviation Support Equipment. Flying squadrons, to include MEU (ACE) designated squadrons, will consider their aircraft as MEE when calculating their S and R-levels. Flying squadrons will not calculate aviation support equipment as PEI. Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons (MALS) will nominate MEE to the Aviation Logistics and Support Branch, DC Aviation for approval and retention. The approved MEE List by aircraft type-model-series and MALS is then updated in DRRS-MC. MALS will specify the requirement, on hand, and mission capable amounts from their Individual

Material Readiness List (IMRL) to calculate S and R-levels. The remainder of the IMRL will be reported cumulatively as PEI.

c. Non-Standard Mission Essential Equipment (MEE). Some unit types have externally provided MEE that does not have a TAMCN. Unit type advocacy will nominate, approve and maintain a list of MEE equipment. This equipment can be associated with specific units in DRRS-MC. Since this equipment may not be in TFSMS, the unit must specify the requirement from an authoritative source.

d. Mission Essential Equipment (MEE) Location. Units will report the quantities and associated location of all possessed MEE using standard Geographical Location (GEOLOC) codes or ship UICs for embarked equipment on the equipment page of DRRS-MC.

6. S-Level: Equipment and Supplies. Units will use DRRS-MC to calculate an S-level as of the time of the report and report the lowest S-level between the MEE and PEI calculations. Task organized units and units detaching equipment to task organized units will comply with paragraph 8 of this chapter when calculating S-levels. Table 3-1 depicts the criteria for S-level calculations. All units not reporting S-1 must provide mandatory remarks and reason code, per paragraph 11 of this Chapter. Only PP&O (POR) may direct an organization to report its S-Level as S-6 - not measured.

Rule	S1	S2	S3	S4
1. <u>Mission Essential Equipment</u>				
GROUND: Total service-selected mission essential equipment possessed (minus excess) divided by prescribed wartime requirements [T/E]	≥90%	80-89%	65-79%	<65%
AVIATION: Total in reporting (IR) status aircraft possessed divided by the primary mission aircraft authorized (PMAA)	≥90%	80-89%	60-79%	<60%
2. <u>Support Equipment (PEI)</u>				
Total service-selected principal end-items possessed (minus excess) divided by prescribed wartime requirement (T/E)	≥90%	80-89%	65-79%	<65%

Table 3-1.--Equipment and Supplies (S-level)

a. Prescribed Wartime Requirement

(1) Core Mission. TFSMS is the authoritative source for a ground unit's core mission prescribed wartime requirement. The prescribed wartime requirement appears on a unit's table of equipment under the T/E column. The Primary Mission Aircraft Authorization (PMAA) requirement by type/model/series (T/M/S), are the prescribed wartime requirement for tactical aviation flying units. The PMAA is maintained in DRRS-MC by T/M/S and automatically populated and/or updated for a unit's wartime requirement.

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DC AVN (APP) advises DC PP&O (POR) if changes to a T/M/S requirement are needed in DRRS-MC. The prescribed wartime requirement for aviation support equipment comes from the Support Equipment Resources Management Information System (SERMIS). Units' core mission prescribed wartime requirements are automatically pre-populated in DRRS-MC. Units will use the DRRS-MC equipment page to account for equipment, both ground and aviation.

(2) Assigned Mission. Task organized units will use their approved Equipment Density List (EDL) for their assigned mission prescribed wartime requirement.

b. Possessed Equipment. Ground and aviation supply regulations determine the possessed status of equipment. Excess possessed equipment (quantities above the prescribed PEI and MEE wartime requirement) does not change a unit's structure. Equipment possessed quantities are listed in a unit's accounting documentation and include all MEE and PEI possessed by the unit; this includes excess. Equipment above the T/E quantities are reflected in DRRS-MC as excess. Excess equipment for flying squadrons is determined by adjustments to their primary mission aircraft inventory by DC Aviation. Excess equipment will be identified by each respective item type and it will not be used to calculate total S-levels.

c. Intermediate Level Commands. Intermediate commands subjectively assess their S-levels. They should consider the impact of any excess equipment in their subordinate units when making a subjective S-level assessment.

7. R-Level: Equipment Condition. Units will use DRRS-MC to calculate an R-level as of the time of the report. R-Levels will report the lower of the MEE and PEI calculations described in this paragraph. Applicable maintenance directives and references (g), (o) and (p) determine a mission capable status. Excess possessed equipment (quantities above the prescribed wartime requirement) will be included in determining R-levels. Total possessed quantity will include excess equipment per item type. Each item type and aircraft T/M/S will be calculated individually and have an R-level.

a. Deadline Quantity. Of the total possessed/IR equipment, enter the total quantity of deadlined equipment in the deadlined field.

b. Flying squadrons will report both the number of aircraft that are Mission Capable (MC) and Full Mission Capable (FMC) in equipment condition (R-level) calculations. Squadrons will identify the number of MC aircraft and then further identify the number of MC aircraft that are FMC.

c. Table 3-2 depicts the criteria for the R-level calculations. Units not reporting R-1 must provide mandatory remarks and reason code, per paragraph 9 and 10 of this Chapter. On rare occasion, PP&O (POR) may direct an organization to report its R-Level as R-6 - not measured.

Rule	R1	R2	R3	R4
1. <u>Mission Essential Equipment (MEE)</u> GROUND: Total service-selected mission essential equipment possessed and "mission capable" divided by total quantity possessed	≥90%	70-89%	60-69%	<60%

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AVIATION: Total MC (including FMC) aircraft possessed divided by total aircraft in reporting status	>75%	60-74%	50-59%	<50%
2. <u>Principal End Item (PEI)</u>				
Total service-selected principal end-items possessed and mission capable divided by the total quantity possessed	>90%	70-89%	60-69%	<60%

Table 3-2.--Equipment Condition (R-level)

8. Equipment Remaining Behind From Deployment. When an active component unit deploys and has equipment that still belongs to that unit remaining behind, the commander will still include that equipment in the S and R-level calculations for the C-level, core MET, and core capability assessment unless possession is transferred to another DRRS-MC reporting unit. They will not be considered in A-level and assigned MET and assigned mission assessments. This policy is N/A to Reserve units, because remain behind equipment is transferred to another unit when they deploy.

9. Reason Codes

a. Equipment Reason Codes. Enter the equipment reason codes to explain the unit's status when the S and/or R-level are not 1. Reason codes are resident in DRRS-MC.

b. Employed/Deployed Codes. When five percent (5%) or more of a unit's equipment is detached to deploy with another unit, the providing unit will use the employed/deployed codes to report the percentage deployed. Reason codes are resident in DRRS-MC.

10. Mandatory Equipment Remarks. Mandatory remarks and examples are:

a. S and/or R-Level Not 1. List equipment types with problems; state quantities for possessed, prescribed wartime requirement, available, and in reporting status; explain problem causes if known; identify assistance already requested; and highlight further actions required. Example: "8 of a PMAA of 12 aircraft are in-reporting status. 3 of the 8 are not mission capable for structural repair and awaiting depot level maintenance. 4 aircraft out of reporting status are awaiting PMI induction at depot. No further actions required."

b. Aircraft Out of Reporting Status. State the quantities and status. Example: "2 aircraft awaiting in-service repair with an estimated completion date greater than 120 days; 1 aircraft awaiting depot induction."

c. Reserve Units' Training Allowances (T/A). Marine Corps Reserve units will state in the S-level remarks the percentage of the unit T/A that is possessed. This calculation is not the same as the S-level.

d. Previous Month's Average Used. State if the previous month's average mission capable aircraft as calculated in the Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity (OOMA) rounded to the nearest whole aircraft.

Chapter 4

Mission Essential Task (MET) Assessments

1. Purpose. This Chapter outlines policy and procedures for assessing METs.

2. Policy. METs will be developed per references (i), (j), and (q). Core METs are published within training and readiness (T&R) manuals and form the foundation for a community's T&R standards. A METL contains the list of a command's essential tasks with appropriate conditions and performance standards to assure successful mission accomplishment. The assessment of METs will be based on the organization's present state, not a future projection.

3. Scope. All readiness reporting units including intermediate commands, installations, and MARFORs will assess their METs.

4. Reporting Requirements. MET assessment information should be consolidated by those personnel who comprise the Unit readiness board, as described in Chapter 1, and others as deemed necessary by the commander to provide resource information regarding MET conditions and standards.

5. Mission Essential Task (MET) Assessment

a. General. A MET is an externally focused action, process, or activity (task) that is deemed critical to mission accomplishment. All readiness reporting Marine Corps organizations will have a METL per references (a), (c), and (i). Assessments at all levels will include evaluations of the resources available and training readiness to perform METs to prescribed standards. The assessments will assist the commander in determining the organization's ability to execute core and assigned missions.

b. Types of Mission Essential Task (MET) Assessments. Commanders will assess METs for core and assigned missions. Top priority plans and assigned named operations are the principal types of assigned missions, but higher headquarters may also direct other types of assigned missions.

(1) Core Mission Essential Task (METs). Core METs define the designed capabilities of a unit and are developed using tasks documented in the MCTL, reference (i). The MCTL contains Marine Corps tasks developed and sanctioned by advocates, and approved by Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and DC CD&I. Core METs are reflected in the T&R manuals and provide the foundation for a community's T&R standards. The events by which core METs are measured are only valid for specified periods of time as identified in a community's T&R manual. The conditions and standards for training to core METs are reflected by evaluation coded (E-coded) collective events, which serve as the measures to gauge readiness against the performance of the task. Core METs and associated standards are standardized by unit type, developed by each community, approved by the associated advocate, and loaded by MARFORCOM into the MCTIMS Taskmaster database.

(2) Assigned Mission Essential Task (METs)

(a) Top Priority Plan Mission Essential Task (METs). Top priority plans are OPLANs or CONPLANs designated in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. When such plans drive unique training or resourcing requirements and specific units are apportioned to the plan, DC PP&O may

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direct assessment in DRRS-MC. METs and associated standards are developed and approved through a process established by the supported Marine Forces component commanders. The supported Marine Corps component commanders are the approving authorities for top priority plan specific METs for their major subordinate units and will ensure unit METs support CCDR capability requirements.

(b) Named Operation Mission Essential Task (METs). Assigned missions reported in DRRS-MC are specific unit deployments, named operations, or alert missions (e.g., Unit Deployment Program, Tactical Aircraft Integration, Special Purpose MAGTF, and Incident Response Force). Assigned named operation METs are developed and approved through a process established by the supported Marine component commander, who ensures that the METs meet the requirements of the supported CCDR, assisted by COMMARFORCOM, and loaded into DRRS-MC. Assigned mission task sets may also be developed to meet local capability requirements. For example, a unit's higher headquarters may direct certain units to maintain proficiency in selected core plus tasks to broaden the aggregate capability spectrum.

(c) Reserve Component Assigned METs. COMMARFORRES may develop and coordinate with COMMARFORCOM to create an assigned mission for reserve component units to capture the capability and ability to activate reserve component units, selected sub-set of core mission tasks to focus the limited training days, and to track the quantity and condition of the unit's training allowance.

6. Mission Essential Task (MET) Assessment Definitions. The commander will assess their METs as yes, qualified yes, or no. The definitions for those assessments are below.

a. Yes "Y" Assessment. Unit can accomplish the task to established standards and conditions. For units with established baseline and advance standards, the unit is able to perform the MET at the advanced level of capability.

b. Qualified Yes "Q" Assessment. Unit can accomplish all or most tasks to standard under most conditions. For units with established baseline and advanced standards, the unit is able to perform the MET at the baseline level of capability. The specific standards and conditions that cannot be met will be clearly addressed in the MET remarks.

c. No "N" Assessment. Unit unable to accomplish the task to prescribed standards and conditions at this time. For units with established baseline and advanced standards, the unit is not able to perform the MET at the baseline level of capability.

7. Mandatory Mission Essential Task (MET) Remarks. If any METs are assessed as "Q" or "N", explain the capability shortfall, as well as the training or resources required to mitigate the shortfall. Address any standards and conditions assessed as not meeting required criteria. Example: "80% trained to standard, not able to train to actions requiring embarkation until DEC when amphib ships are available."

8. Standards Based, Calculated Mission Essential Task (MET) Assessment. DRRS-MC uses a standards based, calculated MET assessment. A calculated assessment will be determined based on the achievement of the performance standards. The commander will have the ability to subjectively override the

calculated assessment by overriding individual performance standards. The subjective assessment will apply the same business rules as the calculated assessment with the standards overridden treated as achieved. Both the calculated and subjective assessment will be displayed, as well as which standards were achieved and which standards were overridden. Any standard that is overridden must have justification provided in the MET Assessment Remarks. As many performance standards as possible will be automated from an ADS. Automated data feeds will be read-only and a separate field is provided for corrections, if the data feed has an error. If a data correction is provided, the circumstances must be explained in the MET Assessment Remarks. If a data correction is entered and achieves the standard, the standard is considered achieved for the calculated assessment. The following definitions and business rules are used for the MET assessment and determining if the MET is trained for determining the T-level. For Marine Corps Tasks, all standards will be identified as Baseline or Advanced. The Baseline and Advanced designation allows for a standardization of which standards must be achieved to assess a MET as a Qualified Yes. Baseline standards reflect the minimum standards required to be considered MET capable. Units that are sufficiently resourced are expected to meet and sustain baseline standards through core training at home station without external support. Advanced standards reflect a higher level of capability required by specific units expected to perform a critical role in a mission or OPLAN. Units normally require broader Service or MAGTF support and training exercises to achieve advance standards.

a. Mission Essential Task (MET) With Baseline And Advanced Performance Standards. Baseline and Advanced standards and definitions will be displayed in DRRS-MC. If all Baseline standards are achieved, then the calculated MET assessment will be a "Qualified Yes." If any Baseline Standards are not achieved, the calculated MET assessment will be a "No." If all Baseline and Advanced Standards are achieved, then the calculated MET assessment will be a "Yes." If all Baseline training standards are achieved, or are overridden to achieved, the MET is considered "Trained" for the T-level calculation.

b. Mission Essential Task (MET) Without Baseline Or Advanced Standards. A MET without Baseline and Advanced standards in the system will be calculated as a "Yes" if all performance standards are achieved; a "Qualified Yes" if all the output standards are achieved and any other standards are not achieved; and "No" if any output standards are not achieved. If all training standards are achieved, or are overridden to indicate achieved, the MET is considered "Trained" for the T-level calculation.

c. Mission Essential Task (MET) With Output Standards Only And None Designated As Baseline Or Advanced. If a MET only has output standards, the system will calculate a "Yes" if all standards are achieved and "No" if any standards are not achieved. If all standards are achieved, or are overridden to achieved, the MET is considered "Trained" for the T-level calculation. If any standards are overridden to achieved, the subjective assessment will be a "Qualified Yes."

Chapter 5

Training

1. Purpose. This Chapter outlines policy for reporting training (T-level) for core and assigned missions.
2. Policy. The T-level is one of the four measured areas that are factors in determining a unit's C- and/or A-level. The determination of a T-level will be based on the unit's present state, not a future projection.
3. Scope. T-levels will be calculated only by regular and intermediate reporting level units, not by installations or MARFORs.
4. Reporting Requirements. Training information should be consolidated by the training office (G-3/S-3) and provided to the authorized agent or point of contact assembling the readiness report on behalf of the CO. The use of MCTIMS as the ADS is required prior to starting the report.
5. Training (T-Level). The T-level is an assessment of the unit's training to accomplish its mission.
 - a. Regular and intermediate level reporting units will base their T-level on the percentage of METs trained to standard using Table 5-1 as a reference. For example, if a battalion was trained to standard and current in four of its five METs, it would have a T-level of T-2 (80%).

Rule	T1	T2	T3	T4
Percentage of Core METs Trained to Standard	≥85%	70-84%	55-69%	<55%

Table 5-1.—T-level Calculation

- b. Aviation Units. Squadrons with aircraft have additional considerations when determining a T-level.

(1) For aviation units guided by references (k) and (l), the T-level reported will be the lower of either the combat leadership assessment or the T-level calculation. Combat leadership is an integral component to defining the capability of aviation units to fully conduct the METL. Combat leadership consists of advanced, highly-specialized flight leadership qualifications that enable a unit to fully conduct and manage all aspects of aviation operations during a mission. Similar to aircrew Core Model Minimum Requirement (CMMR), each aviation community has an objective flight leadership CMMR standard established for both full squadron and squadron (-) configurations as outlined in their respective T&R manuals. Combat leadership is calculated per reference (l), by first pulling T&R event completion data from Marine Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (MSHARP). Combat leadership qualified aircrew will be totaled per combat leadership category per the squadron's status as either a full unit or squadron (-). Similar to the METL calculation, a squadron will then divide combat leadership categories trained to standard by the total number of combat leadership categories for the unit. The resulting percentage will be compared to Table 7-4 in the respective T&R program manual to assess the final rating.

(2) Squadron (-). This subparagraph pertains only to the T-levels of flying squadrons that have transferred detachments of personnel and aircraft to another operational, task organized unit and have squadron (-) standards resident in their T&R manuals. This subparagraph also applies to reserve unit established as a squadron (-) with appropriate standards resident in the T&R manual.

(a) Squadron (-) Training Standards. These are defined in applicable T&R manuals, reference (k), and are based on the number of MET-capable crews and combat leaders for a squadron (-) sized unit.

(b) Squadron (-) Training Level. When directed, the commander will assess the T-level to squadron (-) training standards using the mission MET assessment page in DRRS-MC. There are mandatory training remarks, per paragraph 7 of this Chapter, when assessing to squadron (-) training standards.

(c) Other Squadron (-) Assessments and Calculations. All other levels (P, S, R, and CBRN) will be calculated per the requirements of a full squadron. The C-level will be assessed against the core mission of a full squadron using full squadron P, S, and R-levels and a squadron (-) T-level.

6. Reason Codes. Enter the training reason codes to explain the unit's T-level when it is not T-1. Reason codes are resident in DRRS-MC.

7. Mandatory Training Remarks

a. METS Not Trained to Standard. Comment on the METs not trained to standard and their impact on readiness. Provide amplifying remarks outlining the support needed to improve training (training areas available, lack of simulations, lack of host installation support, lack of personnel or supply resources, etc.). Example: "80% trained to standard, not able to train to deck landing qualifications until Dec when amphibious ships are available."

b. Squadron (-) Training Remarks. When assessing T-levels as a squadron (-), commanders will make the following T-level comments: "Unit is squadron (-). Training and output standards assessed against squadron (-) T&R standards."

Chapter 6

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Readiness

1. Purpose. This Chapter outlines policy, procedures, reason codes, and mandatory remarks for reporting CBRN readiness.
2. Policy. Reference (a) requires a unit commander to provide a subjective assessment of the unit's readiness to accomplish its mission under CBRN conditions. The CBRN assessment is a separate assessment based on the reported levels of CBRN equipment and training. As a separate reporting requirement, the CBRN assessment does not directly influence or contribute to a unit's overall C-level calculations; however, a commander may subjectively change the unit's overall reported core or assigned mission assessment when a CBRN deficiency or asset directly impacts the unit's ability to carry out its mission. CBRN will be assessed in each readiness report.
3. Scope. Installations and MARFORs will not report CBRN readiness on the CBRN tab of DRRS-MC. Installation and MARFORs can capture CBRN readiness in the standards and conditions of their MET assessments. All other units reporting in DRRS-MC will use this policy when reporting CBRN readiness.
4. Reporting Requirements. CBRN defense information should be consolidated by the unit CBRN defense officer/chief (G-3/S-3) or command identified subject matter expert and provided to the authorized agent or point of contact assembling the readiness report on behalf of the CO. The use of the CBRN calculator and MCTIMS as the ADS is required.

a. Overall Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Level. Units will determine the overall CBRN level based on calculated levels of CBRN defense equipment and CBRN training. The reported CBRN level equates to the lowest of the levels for CBRN defense equipment and CBRN training. When the individual preparing the report believes the calculated levels do not accurately reflect the unit's CBRN equipment readiness, subjective levels should be assessed for CBRN sense, CBRN shape, CBRN shield, CBRN sustain, CBRN medical, and the CBRN equipment S-level. The unit commander will be informed and decide whether to report the calculated or subjective levels.

b. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Equipment (S-Level)

(1) When determining the CBRN S-level, units in possession of their own CBRN equipment, including deployed units and those units within 30 days of deployment, are to use the equipment tab of the CBRN calculator.

(2) Non-deployed units that do not possess CBRN equipment or those units whose CBRN equipment is maintained and stored in a supporting consolidated storage facility will report a CBRN Defense Equipment level of S-6. When the S-6 is selected, the reason code of SNM (equipment not measured) will be automatically populated in the unit's report in DRRS-MC with a pre-populated comment.

(3) MEF intermediate level reports are to report on the status and capabilities of all regionally consolidated storage facilities. MEFs will coordinate with the regional consolidated storage facilities to conduct joint inventories and equipment inspections as needed to facilitate an accurate

roll-up report on the availability of CBRN Defense equipment in support of MEF readiness reporting.

Rule	S1	S2	S3	S4
Aggregate average of total serviceable selected CBRN equipment possessed divided by total required quantity	90-100%	80-89%	65-79%	0-65%

Table 6-1.--CBRN Defense Equipment S-level

d. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Training (T-Level). CBRN training requirements are per references (f), and (i). The CBRN T-level is an assessment of the unit's training to accomplish its designed mission under CBRN conditions. All units will base their CBRN T-level on the percentage of their core METs trained to standard under CBRN conditions within the past 12 months. Determine the CBRN T-level using the CBRN readiness calculator and Table 6-2. Identify exactly which METs have been trained to under CBRN conditions for greater clarification.

(1) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Readiness Calculator. A CBRN readiness calculator is maintained by DC PP&O (PS), and is available at:
<http://gccsportal.mcw.ad.usmc.smil.mil/sites/ppo/ps/CBRN%20Readiness/Pages/Default.aspx> (use the DOD EMAIL digital certificate when prompted).

(2) The calculator will be used to provide the commander with a recommended T-rating based on individual, team, and unit level CBRN defense readiness training.

Rule	T1	T2	T3	T4
Percentage of METs trained to standard under CBRN conditions in the past 12 months	≥85%	70-84%	55-69%	≤55%

Table 6-2.--CBRN Defense Training T-level

5. Reason Codes. Provide a reason code when the overall CBRN level is not CBRN-1. Reason codes are resident in DRRS-MC.

6. Mandatory Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Remarks. The commander will state in the remarks a forecasted improvement/downturn date when the overall CBRN level is less than CBRN-1 and briefly explain what is required to return the unit to CBRN-1. When determining an improvement/downturn date is not possible, state so, and provide the reason why.

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Chapter 7

Unit of Employment

1. Purpose. This Chapter outlines policy, procedures, guidance and mandatory remarks for the UE reporting within a commander's readiness assessment of the organization.
2. Scope. Reporting units with subordinate elements with (UICs) and/or units identified in the UE table hosted at the DRRS-MC Portal (<https://www.drrsmc.hqmc.usmc.smil.mil>) will report on their UE on the Subordinate Unit Page of DRRS-MC.
3. Subordinate Unit Page. UE is the level at which a unit most often generates forces for deployment, normally the building blocks of standard task-organization. Each UE will be assessed on manning, equipping, training and status of deployment on the Subordinate Unit Page of DRRS-MC. Manned is equivalent to P-levels of 1 or 2, or 80% or more manned with deployable, MOS qualified personnel. Equipped is equivalent to both S and R-levels of 1 or 2, or the UE is adequately equipped to perform its mission. Trained is equivalent to T-levels of 1 or 2 or the element is assessed as trained against its mission. Deployed is checked if the element is deployed apart from the parent unit, e.g. an artillery battery that is deployed on UDP from its home battalion. Elements that are deployed must still be assessed if they are Manned, Equipped, and Trained. Deployed UEs, if task organized on the Task Organized Structure Page in DRRS-MC, are assessed by the gaining regular reporting unit, otherwise the owning regular reporting unit continues to assess the deployed UE. Reserve units will not assess UE that have been activated apart from their unit. Subordinate Units are color coded as Green or "Ready" when Manned, Equipped, and Trained are all checked; Yellow or "Partially Ready" when any two of the three are checked; and Red or "Not Ready" if one or none of the three are checked.
4. Subordinate Unit Remarks
 - a. Deployed. If a UE is marked as deployed, indicate with what unit, where the UE is deployed and its anticipated return date. Example: "'BTY L is UDP to 3/12 and is expected to return by 15 Sept 2018."
 - b. Non-standard Unit of Employment (UE). Where standard units of employment are not quantifiable, units may use an estimated percentage of capability. Example remarks: "15% of capability deployed in support of 22 MEU, 85% of structured unit remains. Residual capacity is staffed at 75% strength, providing capability to support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade; MEF-level support requires augmentation of 50 personnel."
 - c. Partially or Not Ready Unit of Employment (UE). Indicate details of why a UE is partially or not ready, the shortfall, and anticipated or required corrective action. Example: "3RD PLT is short 2 LAV-25s due to NMCS and anticipated parts delivery and repairs will be completed by 21 Sept 2018 at which time the platoon will be green".
5. Impact on Resourcing or Mission Assessments. UE reporting does not impact resourcing and training level calculations or MET assessments of the parent unit.

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6. UE Identification. The UE table for various unit types is maintained by DC PP&O (POR), and is available at <https://www.drrsmc.hqmc.usmc.smil.mil>. UE will be designated and reviewed as part of unit METL reviews conducted per reference (j).

Chapter 8

Commander's Assessments

1. Purpose. This Chapter outlines policy, procedures, guidance, reason codes, and mandatory remarks for the commander's readiness assessment of an organization.
2. Policy. The commander's assessments encompass the C-level and capability assessments for the organization's core mission, as well as the A-level and capability assessments for any assigned mission(s). The commander's assessments will be based on the organization's present state, not a future projection. Remarks will provide additional information, such as projected changes in readiness.
3. Scope. C- and A-levels will be calculated by all DRRS-MC regular and intermediate level reporting units. All Marine Corps readiness reporting organization commanders will make capability assessments of their core and assigned missions.
4. Reporting Requirements. Policy, guidance, reason codes, and mandatory remarks regarding the commander's assessments are explained in this Chapter. The operational readiness of Marine Corps organizations is directly impacted by their capabilities, resourcing, and training. Accurate, uninflated assessments by commanders are essential for helping the Marine Corps, combatant commands, and the DoD understand the capability to accomplish tactical, operational, and strategic goals.

a. C-level Assessment

(1) The C-level reflects the status of the selected unit resources measured against the resources required to undertake the core mission for which the unit is task organized or designed. The C-level also reflects the condition of available equipment, personnel, and unit training status. The determination of a C-level will be based on the unit's present state, not a future projection. C-levels, by themselves, do not project a unit's combat performance once committed to combat. C-levels are not a report card on the unit and they should not be inflated. The five C-levels and their definitions are listed in Table 8-1.

C-level	Definition
C-1	The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the <u>full</u> wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed. The resource and training area status will neither limit flexibility in methods for mission accomplishment nor increase vulnerability of unit personnel and equipment. The unit does not require any compensation for deficiencies.
C-2	The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake <u>most</u> of the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed. The resource and training area status may cause isolated decreases in flexibility in methods for mission accomplishment, but will not increase vulnerability of the unit under most envisioned operational scenarios. The unit would require little, if any, compensation for deficiencies.
C-3	The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake <u>many</u> , but not all, portions of the wartime mission(s)

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	for which it is organized or designed. The resource or training area status will result in significant decreases in flexibility for mission accomplishment and will increase vulnerability of the unit under many, but not all, envisioned operational scenarios. The unit would require significant compensation for deficiencies.
C-4	The unit <u>requires additional resources</u> or training to undertake its wartime mission(s), but it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission(s) with resources on hand.
C-5	The unit is undertaking a Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)-directed resource action and is not prepared, at this time, to undertake the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed. A level of C-5 does not prevent the deployment of ready detachments from the unit. The unit may be capable of undertaking non-traditional, non-design related missions.

Table 8-1.--C-level Definitions

(2) The calculated C-level will equate to the lowest level of the unit's individually measured resource and training levels (P, R, S or T). Levels measured as a "6" will not be used in this calculation. The C-level for VMA (-), HMH(-), and HMLA(-) squadrons will be assessed against the core mission of a full squadron using full squadron P, S, and R-levels and a squadron(-) T-level. Reserve units established as a squadron (-) will report against originating structure and equipment levels of a squadron (-). Chapter 5, paragraph 4.b.(2) contains directions for reporting squadron(-) T-levels.

(3) C-5 Level

(a) C-5 is used for units undergoing CMC directed resource actions or placement in cadre status. Units will not report C-5, unless directed to do so by DC PP&O (POR) or a Marine Corps Bulletin (MCBUL) 5400. Changes in the resource and training levels (P, S, R, and T) of C-5 units will be tracked by using the appropriate numeric levels of 1 through 4.

(b) Units reporting C-5 will remain C-5 until all levels (P, S, R, and T) are 3 or higher, unless directed otherwise by DC PP&O (POR) or a MCBul 5400.

(4) Subjective C-level Changes

(a) Subjective changes of C-levels are prohibited unless a waiver is provided by a general officer in the chain of command. The general officer considering such a waiver should exercise cautious scrutiny to prevent an elevated and unjustified assessment of unit readiness, however the appropriate use of the subjective override is important for more accurate reporting. To provide full visibility of potential readiness degraders while accurately assessing its capability to accomplish the mission, the commander will determine the C-level definition in Table 8-1 that best describes the unit's current capabilities and deficiencies. If this is different from the calculated C-level the commander should request a waiver. Appendix A-5 provides amplifying guidance to commanders requesting and general officers considering waiver requests, but should not constrain the exercise of their best judgement of specific circumstances.

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(b) A subjective change of the C-level does not permit a change to the resource and training levels (P, R, S and T). Resource and training levels will be reported without adjustment.

(c) A subjective change of the C-level results in the mandatory requirements to submit a reason code (Table 8-3) and a remark, per paragraph 5 of this Chapter.

(d) The reported C-level must correlate with capability assessments of core mission as depicted in Table 8-5.

(5) Forecast C-level and Date. The commander will report a rolling twelve month forecast of the unit's C-level. If there unit is not C-1, there must be a change in C-level in the next twelve months. If the unit does not anticipate a change, the unit shall forecast a change on the twelfth month. The unit shall provide mandatory remarks concerning the forecast in the Commander's Remarks per paragraph 5 of this chapter.

(6) C-level Reason Codes. A C-level reason code is mandatory when the level is not 1 or when the commander subjectively changes the level per their judgment. The "X" code for a Subjective C-level change has precedence over the other codes and should be used first.

CODE	DEFINITION
X	Commander's Subjective Judgment (Explanatory remarks are required)
P	Personnel
S	Equipment and Supplies On-hand
R	Equipment Condition
T	Training
N	Not Available (CMC directed)

Table 8-2.--C-level Reason Codes

b. A-level Assessment

(1) A-levels are calculated in the same manner as C-levels. Chapter 2 addresses personnel levels, Chapter 3 addresses equipment levels, and Chapter 5 addresses training levels. A-levels and their definitions are contained in Table 8-3. There is no A-level of 5. The commander may subjectively upgrade or downgrade their calculated A-level without a waiver.

(2) The policy for subjective A-level changes is the same as for C-level changes, as stated in paragraph 4.a.(4) of this Chapter. In determining the need for a subjective upgrade or downgrade of the A-level, the commander will determine the A-level definition in Table 8-3 that best describes the unit's current capabilities and deficiencies. Subjective changes of A-levels demand cautious scrutiny by the commander submitting the report.

A-level	A-level Definitions
1	Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the assigned mission.
2	Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake most of the assigned mission.

3	Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake many, but not all, portions of the assigned mission.
4	Unit requires additional resources or training to undertake the assigned mission, however, the unit may be directed to undertake portions of the mission with resources on hand.

Table 8-3.--A-level Definitions

(3) A commander's evaluation of the unit's ability to perform the assigned mission should not be based solely on P, S, R, and T-levels. The cumulative effect of these measured areas, with other important factors, could have a positive or negative impact on the unit's ability to execute its assigned mission. For the commander to assess the unit's current military capability to respond to the full spectrum of designated mission requirements, the commander must consider additional factors. Although not all inclusive, other factors for the commander's consideration are: personnel turnover, availability of ranges and training areas, installation support, operational tempo, exercises, and leadership. Enclosure C of reference (a) contains additional factors.

(4) If the unit has more than one assigned mission, then the assigned mission the unit is focusing on for training and execution will be the basis for the A-level assessment.

(5) The A-level assessment will not necessarily be the same as the unit's overall C-level, because the missions are different. For instance, if an infantry battalion is assigned a humanitarian assistance mission, the A-level will capture an assessment against the humanitarian assistance mission while the overall C-level will assess the unit's ability to execute its core mission.

(6) A-level Reason Codes. An A-level reason code is mandatory when the level is not 1 or when the commander subjectively changes the level per their judgment. Use paragraph 4.a.(6) of this Chapter for reference.

(7) The reported A-level will correlate with capability assessments for assigned missions as depicted in Table 8-5.

c. Core and Assigned Mission Capability Assessments

(1) Commanders will assess the capability of their organizations to execute their core and assigned (top priority plans and named operation) missions using a yes (Y), qualified yes (Q), and no (N) criteria based on their assessed METs for those missions. The mission assessments will consider resourcing reflected in P, S, R and T levels, the missions as a whole and should reflect the commander's experience and judgment on all the tasks and factors that affect the organization's ability to meet mission objectives. Table 8-4 contains the definitions and guidelines for the Y, Q, and N mission assessment criteria.

Assessment	Definition	Guidance
Yes (Y)	The organization can accomplish the mission to standards and prescribed conditions.	The majority (51% or greater) of the METs are assessed as "Yes" and the remaining METs are assessed as "Qualified Yes".

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Qualified Yes (Q)	The organization can accomplish the mission to standards under most conditions.	The majority (51% or greater) of the METs are assessed as "Qualified Yes" and the remaining METs are assessed as "Yes".
No (N)	The organization cannot accomplish the mission to standards and conditions prescribed.	Any MET assessed as no causes the Mission Assessment to default to a "No".

Table 8-4.—Mission Capability Assessments

(2) If a MET is assessed as "No", the commander must make a determination whether or not the unit can perform its principal tasks (e.g., maneuver, support, etc.) under anticipated operating conditions, to include combat operations where appropriate. If the commander makes a subjective change of "No" to "Qualified yes" the commander must clearly explain the justification for such a change, to include the shortfall, effect on the overall mission and any workarounds or mitigation actions that will be taken.

(3) C/A-level and Core/Assigned Mission Capability Assessments.
These assessments will correlate per Table 8-5.

C/A-level	Core/Assigned Mission Capability Assessment
1	Y or Q
2	Y or Q
3	N
4	N
5	N

Table 8-5.--Assessment Correlation

5. Mandatory Remarks

a. General remarks are required of all C-level, A-level, core, and assigned mission capability assessments to help higher headquarters understand the organization's mission, readiness, and capabilities.

(1) All DRRS-MC reporting units are to explain, in succinct and easily understood terms, the "bottom line" assessment of organization's capability to carry out its missions. Include the commander's top readiness concerns to help higher headquarters understand the organization's status. This is especially important for intermediate commands, which must not simply repeat data and remarks from subordinate units.

(2) Identify changes to the unit's tasking, organization, or renaming of the unit due to operational requirements. Example: "Regt redesignated as SPMAGTF A."

(3) Describe readiness shortfalls in sufficient detail to support corrective action and prioritization of resources. Key information needed from each commander are the resources and capabilities needed for the unit to report C-1 or a "Y" mission assessment and the length of time required to train to the unit's METs once the resources are on hand.

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(a) Critical Shortfall: Shortfall drives the unit to C-4 or A-4, potentially negating capability to support an OPLAN, the unit's core mission or assigned mission(s).

(b) Major Shortfall: Shortfall drives the unit to C-3/4 or A-3/4, potentially reducing capability to support an OPLAN, the unit's core mission or assigned mission(s).

(c) Significant Shortfall: Shortfall drives the unit to C-3, limiting capability to deploy and conduct operations. Reserve component unit is below its equipment training allowance.

(d) Minor Shortfall: Shortfall drives the unit to a reduced C/A-level (e.g., C-2 to C-3). Corrective action is required to achieve optimized or expected levels of readiness.

(4) Intermediate level units will highlight subordinate unit issues, shortfalls, and state actions taken to assist them.

(5) All DRRS-MC reporting organizations will comment on their UE as outlined in Chapter 7 of this Order.

b. Mandatory C/A-level and Capability Assessment Remarks

(1) When the C-level/A-level Is Other Than 1. Clarify the impact the resource and training levels have on the ability of the unit to carry out its core and assigned missions.

(2) Forecast C-level/A-level Changes. State the dates when the C-level and/or A-level are anticipated to change, why, and the predicted level (1-5). Explain why, if a forecasted change or date is not possible. When units have an assigned mission with a start and end date, the forecast will not extend beyond the completion date of the mission. For example, a MEU is assigned a Immediate Response Force (IRF) mission for which it is reporting A-1/Y. The commander is aware of the end of that mission assignment on a future date. GRF forecasts will not extend beyond that end date.

(3) C-5 Units. State why the unit is C-5. Example: "VMA-211 is transitioning to VMFA-211, ref MCBUL XXXX directing C-5 status with anticipated IOC date of X June XX and FOC date of X April XX."

(4) Subjective Change in C or A-level. Identify the reasons and provide supporting comments. For a subjective change to the C-level the name, rank, command, justification, and date of waiver to the prohibition must be included. Example: "Changed to C-2, when S-level is S-3, because host nation support is providing engineer equipment and contracted maintenance in support of the battalion's mission. MajGen I. B. Marine, CG 1ST MARDIV, granted waiver on 15 Sept 2020. "

6. Guided Remarks. If not stated in other remarks, commanders should provide amplifying remarks for these instances to assist with resourcing, training, and force management decisions:

a. Explain any changes in C/A-level, P/S/R/T levels, and CBRN levels since last report.

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- b. Explain any changes in mission assessments since the last report. OPLAN supportability, if applicable, with a "fight tonight" perspective.
- c. State what actions are being taken to mitigate readiness degraders and what assistance is needed from higher headquarters.
- d. Identify key readiness degraders within each section of the report (personnel, equipment, training, CBRN, etc).
- e. Fully explain any overrides (upgrades or downgrades).
- f. Address any METs assessed as "no." Explain why the unit is not capable of performing the task. Identify resources or training required.
- g. Highlight instances where P/R/S-levels are not accurate indicators of unit readiness (e.g., P-levels that fail to capture shortfalls in specific MOS, S-levels that reflect non-essential T/E equipment).
- h. Discuss residual capabilities after detaching personnel or equipment for task-organization and describe capacity at the UE level. See Chapter 7 for detailed instructions regarding UE reporting.
- i. Distinguish between structure (T/O) issues/shortfalls and the effects of detaching personnel to other organizations/units.
- j. Distinguish between equipping (T/E) issues/shortfalls, maintenance shortfalls, effects of distribution or detaching equipment to other organizations/units.
- k. Recommend improvements to assigned missions / METs (tasks and standards).
- l. Link budget shortfalls to current/future readiness.
- m. Spell out acronyms and write for someone unfamiliar with your organization.

APPENDIX A

Amplifying Guidance

Deployable Personnel
On duty in a billet that serves the overall mission of the command, to include personnel attending local command schools
Temporary Additional Duty (TAD)
Fleet Assistance Program (FAP)
Terminal leave voluntary request to transfer FMCR (not at Service limit)
Annual leave
Restricted as result of nonjudicial punishment
Assigned, but not departed for next duty station (PCS)
Insufficient security clearance
Exceptional family member
Request retirement
Retirement approved (voluntary request, not at Service limits)
Request transfer to FMCR
Transfer to FMCR approved (voluntary request, not at service limits)
Request resignation
Resignation approved
Dental Class 3 and 4
Overdue PHA

Table A-1.--Deployable Personnel

Per Ref (v)
Medical
Not medically ready personnel
Limited duty / temporary limited duty personnel
Administrative
End of active service (EAS) within 7 days
Home awaiting orders (PEB)
Mandatory retirement within 90 days
Awaiting administrative separation disposition by separation authority other than for expiration of enlistment or fulfillment of service obligation
Unauthorized absence
Absentee or deserter
Captured or prisoner of war
Missing in action
Sole surviving son or daughter
Hazardous area restrictions
Undergoing primary MOS training/school
Transfer or temporary additional duty for humanitarian purposes
Hardship discharge approved
Legal
Confined awaiting action by higher authority *
Confined awaiting trial by general court martial
Confined serving sentence from general court martial
Involuntary hold beyond EAS as a court martial prisoner
On leave awaiting results of appellate review
In the hands of civilian authorities
* See MCTFS PRIUM, paragraph 7-70506

Table A-2.—Non-Deployable Personnel

CODE	PERCENT	DEFINITION
D	5-15	Percentage of personnel and/or equipment unavailable due to detachments assigned to other unit(s) (e.g., MEU)
E	16-25	
F	26-35	
G	36-75	

Table A-3.—Percentage Employed/Deployed

Reporting Data Requirement	Mission	Authoritative Source
Personnel Structure	Core	Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS)
Personnel Structure	Assigned	Approved Manning Document
Personnel On Hand and Status	Both	Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS)
Ground Unit Mission Essential Equipment (MEE)	Core	TFSMS based on current MCBUL 3000
Ground Unit Principal End Items (PEI)	Core	TFSMS based on current MCBUL 3000
MEE and PEI for all unit types	Assigned	Approved Equipment Density List (EDL)
Mission Capable (MC) and Full Mission Capable (FMC) Aircraft	Both	Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity (OOMA) per COMNAVAIRFOR INST (CNAFI) 4790.02C
Possessed Ground Equipment	Both	Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC)
Ground Equipment Condition	Both	GCSS-MC
Possessed Aviation Support Equipment for Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons (MALS)	Both	Support Equipment Resources Management Information System (SERMIS)
Aviation Support Equipment Condition for MALS	Both	SERMIS
MEE Aircraft for flying squadrons	Both	Primary Mission Aircraft Availability (PMAA) from the Aircraft Procurement Data File (ADPF)
Mission Essential Task List (METL)	Both	Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS) in the Task Master module
Training Event Data in MET performance standards	Both	MCTIMS Unit Training Management (UTM) Module
Aviation Training Data in MET performance standards	Both	Marine Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (MSHARP)
Aviation Combat Leadership	Both	MSHARP
MC Aircraft to Mission Essential Task (MET)	Both	Mission Essential Subsystem Matrix (MESM) by Type-Model-Series, see CNAFI 4790.02C
Assigned Missions	Assigned	MCBUL 3120

Table A-4.--Authoritative Data Sources

Circumstances where a waiver to the prohibition of subjective change to the C-level should be considered

Unit Type	Conditions	Waiver
Employment as BN/SQDN, while concurrently providing subordinate units or DET(s) such as: AAV, ARTY, CEB, DENTAL, ESB, HIMARS, LAAD, LAR, LE BN, MACS, MAINT, MASS, MEDICAL, MTACS, MWCS, RECON, SUPPLY, TSB, LSB, TRANS, VMU	1. Unit reports against full TO&E, resulting in functional BN/SQDN with a calculated C3 due to P3 and/or S3. 2. Unit has a core mission assessment of Yes or Qualified Yes. 3. In comments, distinguish between general resource shortfalls and task organization effects. Provide detailed comments regarding the readiness and availability of subordinate units at the UE or detachment level.	Override to C2 should be considered to reflect unit capability to execute its core mission.
Unit of Employment (UE) and/or DETs below BN/SQDN: ANGLICO, CAG, CBIRF, COMM BN, INTEL BN, MCSF REGT, RADIO BN, RAIDER BN, RAIDER SG, VMGR	1. Unit reports against full TO&E, resulting in functional units of employment or detachments with a calculated C3 due to P3 and/or S3. 2. Unit has a core mission assessment of Yes or Qualified Yes. 3. In comments, distinguish between general resource shortfalls and task organization effects. Provide detailed comments regarding the readiness and availability of subordinate units at the UE or detachment level.	Override to C2 should be considered to reflect unit capability to execute its core mission.
Aggregated unit(s); structure varies based on requirements of supported command: MALS	1. Unit reports against full TO&E, resulting in functional unit(s) with a calculated C3 due to P3 and/or S3. 2. Unit has a core mission assessment of Yes or Qualified Yes. 3. In comments, distinguish between staffing shortfalls and task organization effects.	Override to C2 should be considered to reflect unit capability to sustain the operational requirements of the supported MAG.
All Unit Types	1. Incorrect or inaccurate data from an Authoritative Data Source (ADS) resulting in a calculated C3 or C4. 2. Verifiable data can be referenced and manually recalculated to a C1 or C2. 3. Unit has a core mission assessment of Yes or Qualified Yes. 3. In comments, explain the error and provide the details of the manual recalculation.	Override to C2 or C1 should be considered based on the manual recalculation to reflect unit capability to execute its core mission.

All Unit Types	<p>1. Unit has equivalent or better equipment than the TO&E, but not the matching items, such as Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) or new equipment fielding. The missing items result in a calculated C3 or C4 due to S3 or S4.</p> <p>2. Verifiable data can be referenced and manually recalculated to a C1 or C2.</p> <p>3. Units is sufficiently trained and resourced units to be MET-capable with a core mission assessment of Yes or Qualified Yes.</p> <p>3. In comments, provide the quantities of equipment possessed and provide the details of the manual recalculation.</p>	Override to C2 or C1 should be considered based on the manual recalculation to reflect unit capability to execute its core mission.
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Table A-5.-- Circumstances to Consider a Waiver

Circumstances where a waiver is not required

Unit Type	Conditions	Waiver
All Unit Types where the immediate commander is a general officer	Any conditions consistent with policy	Not required
All Unit Types with a MCBUL5400 or AMHS message authorizing override to C5	Unit has conditions covered in the MCBUL5400 or AMHS message authorizing override to C5	Not required

Table A-6.-- Circumstances Where a Waiver Is Not Required

Circumstances where a waiver should NOT be considered

Unit Type	Conditions	Waiver
All Unit Types	Unit has degraded readiness with a calculated C3 or C4 due to R or T levels with correct calculations.	Should not be considered
All Unit Types	Unit has degraded readiness with a calculated C4 due to P4 or S4 levels with correct calculations.	Should not be considered
All Unit Types	Forward looking, "will be C2 once ITX is completed."	Submit a new report after readiness is improved
All Unit Types	Unit has degraded readiness with a calculated C3 or C4 due to S level and equipment shortfall is in Long Term Storage (LTS) or otherwise not possessed by the unit.	Should not be considered

All Unit Types	Unit can accomplish mission with lesser improvisations or with external support.	Should not be considered
All Unit Types	Unit has a calculated C3 and wants to downgrade to C4 or unit as a calculated C4 and wants to upgrade to C3.	Should not be considered

Table A-7.--Circumstances to Not Consider a Waiver

APPENDIX B

Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations

A-level	Assigned Level
ACE	Aviation Combat Element
ADS	Authoritative Data Source
BIC	Billet Identification Code
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CD&I	Combat Development & Integration
CE	Command Element
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
CMMR	Core Model Minimum Requirement
CO	Commanding Officer
COMMARFORCOM	Commander Marine Forces Command
COMMARFORCYBER	Commander Marine Forces Cyber Command
COMMARFOR	Commander Marine Forces
COMMARFORFORES	Commander Marine Forces Reserve
COMMARFORPAC	Commander Marine Forces Pacific
COMMARFORSOC	Commander Marine Forces Special Operations Command
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
CS	Combat Support
CSERV	Combatant Command or Service Command
CSNE	Commander's Standing Notification Event
CSS	Combat Service Support
DEPLOY	Deployment Status
DoD	Department of Defense
DRRS	Defense Readiness Reporting System
EDL	Equipment Density List
FAP	Fleet Assistance Program
FORECAST	Forecasted Category Level
GCE	Ground Combat Element
GEOFILE	Geo-Location Code File
GEOLOC	Geographic Location Code
HQMC	Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
IA	Individual Augment
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augment
IMRL	Individual Material Readiness List
IR	In Reporting
JIA	Joint Individual Augment
JMET	Joint Mission Essential Task
LCE	Logistics Combat Element
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MARFOR	Marine Forces
MARFORCOM	Marine Forces Command
MARFORRES	Marine Forces Reserve
MCBUL	Marine Corps Bulletin
MCCDC	Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCO	Marine Corps Order
MCRAT	Marine Corps Readiness Analysis Tool
MCTFS	Marine Corps Total Force System
MCTIMS	Marine Corps Training Information Management System
MCTL	Marine Corps Task List
MEE	Mission Essential Equipment

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MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MET	Mission Essential Task
METL	Mission Essential Task List
METs	Mission Essential Task(s)
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MEU(SOC)	Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MOSFL	MOS Fill
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
N/A	Not Applicable
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operation Plan
P-Level	Personnel Level
PCTEF	Percent Effective
PEI	Principal End Items
PMAA	Primary Mission Aircraft Authorization
R-Level	Equipment Condition Level
RECON	Reconnaissance
RBE	Remain Behind Element
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
S-Level	Equipment and Supplies-On-Hand Level
T/A	Training Allowance
T/E	Table of Equipment
TECOM	Training and Education Command
TFSMS	Total Force Structure Management System
T/M/S	Type/Model/Series
T/O	Table of Organization
T&R	Training and Readiness
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
UE	Unit of Employment
UIC	Unit Identification Code
U.S.C.	United States Code

APPENDIX C

Definitions

A-Level. Commander's assessment of the unit's ability to execute its currently assigned mission. It is referred to as the PCTEF in Joint Staff directives.

Assigned. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent.

Assigned Mission. An assigned mission is an operational requirement that a unit is formally assigned to plan for, prepare for, or to execute. Units may have more than one assigned mission.

Assigned Mission Essential Tasks. The METL tasks developed by supported MARFOR ICW MARFORCOM based on the mission that the unit has been directed to plan for or undertake.

Assigned Mission Capability/Readiness Assessment. A commander's evaluation on the unit's ability to accomplish the mission(s) for which it was assigned to plan for, or to execute.

Assigned Strength. The number of personnel assigned to the organization, whether they are present or not, including personnel for temporary duty, FAP, etc.

Ad Hoc Unit. A unit formed to perform a particular mission in support of specific operation without consideration of wider service application.

Attachment. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty.

Authorized Agent. An individual appointed in writing that is authorized to submit readiness reports in DRRS-MC on behalf of the unit's CO.

Authoritative Data Source (ADS). A recognized or official data production with a designated mission statement or source/product to publish reliable and accurate data for subsequent use by customers. Note: an ADS may be the functional combination of multiple, separate data sources.

Aviation Support Equipment. All equipment required to make an aeronautical system, command and control system, support system, subsystem or end item of equipment operational in its intended environment.

C-Level. The C-level reflects the status of the selected unit resources measured against the resources required to undertake the wartime missions for which the unit is organized or designed. The C-level also reflects the condition of available equipment, personnel, and unit training status. C-levels, by themselves, do not project a unit's combat performance once committed to combat.

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Combatant Command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments. The organization is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command.

Combat-Essential Equipment. The primary weapon system(s) or service-designated items of gear assigned to a unit to accomplish its core or assigned mission.

Combat Leadership. Tactical leaders who provide the commander the leadership skills and qualities required to execute the unit METL and project combat power. Note: Combat Leadership assessment is applicable to the entire unit T-level assessment and is not tied specifically to individual METs.

Combat Support Unit. Those elements that primarily provide CS to the combat forces and that are a part, or prepared to become a part, of a theater, command, or task force formed for combat operations.

Combat Service Support Unit. Those elements whose primary missions are to provide service support to combat forces and which are part, or prepared to become a part, of a theater, command, or task force formed for combat operations. See also operating forces, service troops, troops.

Commander's Assessment. An evaluation by COs on the unit's ability to execute the currently mission.

Composite Report. A report submitted by a major unit providing an overall assessment based on condition of subordinate measured units and their ability to operate together.

Core Mission. Fundamental mission for which a unit was designed or organized. Core, designed, and wartime missions are the same thing.

Core Mission Essential Tasks (METs). The basic capabilities which an organization was organized or designed to perform. They draw from tasks published in MCO 3500.26_, Marine Corps Task List (MCTL), which serves as the authoritative Marine Corps publication on Marine Corps tasks.

Core Mission Essential Task List (METL). A standardized approved list of specified tasks a unit is designed or organized to perform. Selected tasks are drawn from the Marine Corps Task List (MCTL) and are standardized by type unit. A unit's Core METL is resident in the MCTIMS Task Master Module.

Core Plus Mission Essential Task. Valid task that may be required of a unit in addition to core METs, but which is not required by all units of the same type. It is uniquely tailored to specific situations that are not required in core METs. Core plus METs reflect additional capabilities to support missions or plans which are limited in scope, theater-specific, or have a lower probability of execution. They include the non-core METs found in assigned missions.

Critical Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs). Those specialties that directly affect the unit's ability to accomplish its mission.

Critical Skill. A skill that is essential to accomplish a unit's METs is identified with an applicable SMC code on the units T/O.

Deploy. The relocation of forces, personnel, or equipment from home station to meet operational requirements.

Designed Mission. Fundamental mission for which a unit was designed or organized. Core, wartime, and designed missions are the same thing.

Detachment. 1. A part of a unit separated from its main organization for duty elsewhere. 2. A temporary military or naval unit formed from other units or parts of units.

Employment. The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces.

Enlisted Leader. An enlisted individual that is essential for a unit to accomplish its METs and is identified with an applicable SMC code on the units T/O.

End-Item. A final combination of end products, component parts, and/or materials that is ready for its intended use; e.g., ship, tank, mobile machine shop, aircraft.

Equipment Condition Level (R-level). A level which indicates the materiel condition of the organization's on-hand equipment.

Equipment Density List (EDL). A unit's approved list of combat, CS, and combat service support equipment authorized/required for operations.

Equipment and Supplies On Hand Level (S-Level). A level based on a materiel measurement of an organization's on-hand posture against its equipment requirement.

Force Structured Strength. Force structure represents the total requirement in terms of units, billets, and items of equipment necessary to accomplish USMC Core METs.

Flying Squadron. Colloquialism for organizational level- squadrons (MCWP 3-2) that operate aircraft.

Individual Material Readiness List (IMRL). A consolidated list showing items and quantities of certain aviation support equipment required for material readiness of the activity to which the list applies.

Individual Augment. An individual member selected to fulfill military billets external to the MAGTF that are not available to their parent unit for deployment.

In-Lieu Of Mission. A mission that is different from the designed (core/wartime) mission. An example is a tank battalion executing as a MAGTF headquarters. The in-lieu of mission is the same as an assigned mission.

In Reporting Status. Aircraft is in the inventory system and it requires subsystem capability impact reporting (SCIR) documentation. In reporting aircraft does not include those waiting on flight line depot level maintenance.

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Installations. A grouping of facilities, located in the same vicinity, which support particular functions. Installations may be elements of a base.

Intermediate Level Commands. They include Marine Expeditionary Forces, Marine Expeditionary Brigades (when deployed), Marine Expeditionary Units, Marine Divisions, Marine Aircraft Wings, Marine Logistics Groups, Regiments, Marine Aircraft Groups, Marine Expeditionary Force Information Groups, and applicable installation commands.

Joint Manning Document. An individual selected to fill a joint military duty billet external to the MAGTF and is not available to the parent unit for deployment.

Joint Readiness. The CCDRs or Joint Task Force Commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat, and support forces to conduct assigned missions.

Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS). The authoritative source for unit personnel status, and used to determine Assigned Strength. It also records, processes, and maintains personnel and pay data for all active, reserve, and retired personnel.

Medically Indeterminate. Individuals with an overdue PHA, PDHRA (Navy), or in a Dental Class 4 status.

Measured Unit. Combat, CS, and combat service support units of the operating forces, including Active, National Guard, Reserve and provisional units, apportioned to or deployed in support of an OPLAN, a CONPLAN, a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), a service war-planning document, or assigned in the 'Forces For Unified Commands' document are designated as measured units. Provisional, task-organized and "ad hoc" combat, CS, and combat service support units of each service, combatant command are also designated as measured units as designated by HQMC, PP&O (POR) on a case-by-case basis.

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). The grouping of duty positions requiring similar qualifications and the performance of closely related duties.

Mission. 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task.

Mission Capability Assessment. The commander's assessment of his organization's ability to accomplish its mission.

Mission Capable Aircraft. Aircraft that is/are able to perform at least one and potentially all of its missions.

Mission Essential Equipment (MEE). MEE are items of equipment whose availability is essential and indispensable for the execution of the mission of the unit in support of a CCDR. Items designated as MEE are of such importance that they are subject to continuous monitoring throughout the DoD.

Mission Essential Task (MET). An externally focused activity (task) selected by a commander, deemed critical to mission accomplishment. Essential is defined as absolutely necessary, indispensable, or critical.

Mission Essential Task List (METL). The command's list of METs (tasks, conditions, and standards) considered essential for accomplishment of the unit's missions.

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Fill. The number of personnel matched against the T/O BIC by MOS (using the primary or secondary MOS but not both).

Named Operations. Named operations are those operations designated as such by the President, Secretary of Defense, or Joint Chiefs of Staff; e.g., Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The METs for Named Operations are also known as assigned mission METLs.

Non-Deployable Personnel. Personnel assigned to a reporting unit that are detached, or are restricted from deploying or employing with the unit as defined by Table A-2 of this Order. Note: non-deployable service members degrade a unit's personnel strength (personnel strength is not synonymous with assigned strength). Non-deployable personnel are identified by the types of personnel using non-deployable codes.

Out of Reporting (OOR) Status. Aircraft is in the inventory reporting system, but does not require subsystem capability impact reporting documentation.

Partial Unit Deployment. An element that deploys separately from its parent unit. It is applicable when a unit deploys only a part or portion of its mission capability to support an operation. It applies to small unit elements that are not registered in GSORTS separately from their parent unit.

Percent Effective (PCTEF). The current percent of effectiveness of the organization. Commander's subjective assessment of the unit's ability to execute its currently assigned mission. Note: It is referred to as the A-level in DRRS-MC.

Personnel Available. Personnel are considered available if they are assigned to a reporting unit, are physically present or can be present within the prescribed response time, and are not restricted from deploying or employing with the unit for any reason.

Personnel Level (P-Level). A personnel resource level determined by the lowest percentage between personnel strength and MOSFL.

Point of Contact. An individual identified by a command to answer questions related to the command's readiness report.

Present State. Obtained from a daily closeout of an authoritative data source within 24 hours of the submission of a report. Personnel and equipment systems have daily closeout processes. These should be used by the commander so the reported data filters out the daily fluctuation of personnel and maintenance processing. Daily closeouts allow for data to be audited and are consistent with other reporting systems. For example, flying squadrons report aircraft readiness daily to the MAG and the MAGs roll it up and report it to the MAW, this daily process data is the present state of that squadron. Flying squadrons, due to the high maintenance volatility and the low density

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of aircraft, may use the higher of the daily closeout number of mission capable (MC) aircraft or the 30 day average number (rounded to the nearest whole number) of MC aircraft from the previous month as calculated in OOMA. Indicate if the previous month's 30 day average was used in the R-level comments.

Principal End Items (PEIs). Ground equipment that has been nominated by either DC I&L, MARFORS, HQMC advocates, Operational Advisory Groups, or supporting commands; i.e., LOGCOM, SYSCOM as reportable in DRRS-MC. PEIs are equipment whose serviceability/operational capability do not undergo frequent inspection or cannot be readily replaced by the unit's first source of supply. PEIs have been designated as combat essential in the Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS), and are of sufficient range to provide an adequate measure of overall equipment status or capability for MARFORS.

R-Level. A level which indicates the materiel condition of the organization's on-hand equipment.

Readiness. The ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels.

Readiness Officer/SNCO. An individual who assists the CO and authorized agents in assessing and reporting a unit's readiness in DRRS-MC.

Registered Unit. Forces designated to report readiness in DRRS-MC using a TFSMS-issued UIC. These include all units that have the potential to support, by deployment or otherwise, a CJCS/combatant command directed OPLAN, CONPLAN, or contingency operation.

Remain Behind Personnel (RBP)/Equipment (RBE). Personnel that remain behind; may or may not be in a non-deployable status. RBE may or may not impact a unit's ability to carry out its designed mission.

Resource Levels. Three criteria on personnel and materiel resources (P, S, and R levels) used by reporting units to help determine an overall readiness level.

S-Level. The equipment and supplies resource level used by reporting units to help determine an overall readiness level.

Standard Depot Level Maintenance. Aircraft or equipment that are enroute to, awaiting, or undergoing repair at a depot.

Structured Strength. The wartime manpower requirements for an organization shown on the unit's TO&E service documents contained in TFSMS.

Subordinate Unit Standards. Those criteria that reflect capabilities required by subordinate organizations in order for the higher level unit to perform specific tasks.

Table of Organization and Equipment. A TFSMS document that prescribes the wartime (core) mission, capabilities, organizational structure, and equipment and personnel requirements for military organizations.

Table of Equipment Requirement. Equipment required by T/E to provide designed capabilities.

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Tasked. Assignment to perform a specific mission or task allotted by higher component.

Task Organized Unit. A service or CCDR directed temporary assembly of personnel and equipment organized for a limited period of time for accomplishment of a specific mission. Task organized units will receive a provisional UIC assigned by DC PP&O (PO) (POR), in coordination with DC M&RA and DC CD&I, for reporting in DRRS-MC.

Task-Organizing. The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistic package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to: training, experience, equipage, sustainability, operating environment, enemy threat, and mobility.

Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS). Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS) is an enterprise system that combines manpower and equipment data for the purpose of managing the Total Force. The primary mission of TFSMS is to serve as the primary data source and business process engine for the activities defined in Marine Corps Order 5311.1E.

Training Allowance. A reduced portion of a Reserve unit's T/E needed to conduct home station training.

Training Level (T-Level). A level based on the percentage of METs trained to standard.

Unit Identification Code (UIC). A code that uniquely identifies each Active, Reserve, and National Guard unit of the Armed Forces.

Unit Of Employment. The level at which a unit most often generates forces for deployment, normally the building blocks of standard task-organization.

Unit Readiness. The ability to provide capabilities required by the CCDRs to execute their assigned missions. It is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed.

Unit T/E Requirement. Wartime (core) requirement at the Unit Identification Code (UIC) level for a specific TAMCN. Formerly called the unit approved acquisition objective in the Total Force Structure Management System.

Wartime Mission. The fundamental mission for which a unit was designed or organized. Wartime, core, and designed missions are the same.

Wartime Resources. Personnel, equipment and organic supply assets required to accomplish a unit's wartime mission.

Wartime Requirements. Doctrinally established requirements needed by type units to fully perform as designed and as part of the total force.

