

WHO Director-General's statement on IHR Emergency Committee on Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)

30 January 2020



Good evening to everyone in the room, and to everyone online.

Over the past few weeks, we have witnessed the emergence of a previously unknown pathogen, which has escalated into an unprecedented outbreak, and which has been met by an unprecedented response.

As I have said repeatedly since my return from Beijing, the Chinese government is to be congratulated for the extraordinary measures it has taken to contain the outbreak, despite the severe social and economic impact those measures are having on the Chinese people.

We would have seen many more cases outside China by now – and probably deaths – if it were not for the government's efforts, and the progress they have made to protect their own people and the people of the world.

The speed with which China detected the outbreak, isolated the virus, sequenced the genome and shared it with WHO and the world are very impressive, and beyond words. So is China's commitment to transparency and to supporting other countries.

In many ways, China is actually setting a new standard for outbreak response. It's not an exaggeration.

I also offer my profound respect and thanks to the thousands of brave health professionals and all frontline responders, who in the midst of the Spring Festival, are working 24/7 to treat the sick, save lives and bring this outbreak under control.

Thanks to their efforts, the number of cases in the rest of the world so far has remained relatively small.

There are now 98 cases in 18 countries outside China, including 8 cases of human-to-human transmission in four countries: Germany, Japan, Viet Nam and the United States of America.

So far we have not seen any deaths outside China, for which we must all be grateful. Although these numbers are still relatively small compared to the number of cases in China, we must all act together now to limit further spread.

The vast majority of cases outside China have a travel history to Wuhan, or contact with someone with a travel history to Wuhan.

We don't know what sort of damage this virus could do if it were to spread in a country with a weaker health system.

We must act now to help countries prepare for that possibility.

For all of these reasons, I am declaring a public health emergency of international concern over the global outbreak of novel coronavirus.

The main reason for this declaration is not because of what is happening in China, but because of what is happening in other countries.

Our greatest concern is the potential for the virus to spread to countries with weaker health systems, and which are ill-prepared to deal with it.

Let me be clear: this declaration is not a vote of no confidence in China. On the contrary, WHO continues to have confidence in China's capacity to control the outbreak.

As you know, I was in China just a few days ago, where I met with President Xi Jinping. I left in absolutely no doubt about China's commitment to transparency, and to protecting the world's people.

To the people of China and to all of those around the world who have been affected by this outbreak, we want you to know that the world stands with you. We are working diligently with national and international public health partners to bring this outbreak under control as fast as possible.

In total, there are now 7834 confirmed cases, including 7736 in China, representing almost 99% of all reported cases worldwide. 170 people have lost their lives to this outbreak, all of them in China.

We must remember that these are people, not numbers.

More important than the declaration of a public health emergency are the committee's recommendations for preventing the spread of the virus and ensuring a measured and evidence-based response.

I would like to summarize those recommendations in seven key areas.

First, there is no reason for measures that unnecessarily interfere with international travel and trade. WHO doesn't recommend limiting trade and movement.

We call on all countries to implement decisions that are evidence-based and consistent. WHO stands ready to provide advice to any country that is considering which measures to take.

Second, we must support countries with weaker health systems.

Third, accelerate the development of vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics.

Fourth, combat the spread of rumours and misinformation.

Fifth, review preparedness plans, identify gaps and evaluate the resources needed to identify, isolate and care for cases, and prevent transmission.

Sixth, share data, knowledge and experience with WHO and the world.

And seventh, the only way we will defeat this outbreak is for all countries to work together in a spirit of solidarity and cooperation. We are all in this together, and we can only stop it together.

This is the time for facts, not fear.

This is the time for science, not rumours.

This is the time for solidarity, not stigma.

Thank you.





COVID-19

CDC's Response

Updated Feb. 12, 2021

Print

Since launching an agency-wide response to the COVID-19 pandemic on January 21, 2020, CDC has focused on learning about the disease–how it spreads and how it affects people and communities. Our work helps frontline healthcare workers, communities, and the public protect themselves and save lives.

Preparing first responders, healthcare providers, and health systems

- CDC is collecting information and offering recommendations about the vaccines that are being distributed in the United States after having received emergency use authorization from the Food and Drug Administration. Although CDC does not play a role in developing vaccines, we have been working closely with health departments and other partners to develop vaccination programs.
- CDC has developed the v-safe tool to increase our ability to rapidly detect any safety issues with COVID-19 vaccines. V-safe is a smartphone-based health checker for people who have received a COVID-19 vaccine.
- CDC is working to detect and characterize new variants of the virus that causes COVID-19. As CDC has learned new information about the variants, the agency has been providing updates to the public and our partners around the world.
- Persistent health disparities combined with historic housing patterns, work circumstances, and other factors have put members of some racial and ethnic minority populations at higher risk for infection, severe illness, and death from COVID-19. CDC is working to reduce those gaps by learning more about their causes and giving healthcare workers and other frontline employees the tools they need to close them.
- CDC is working to learn more about the short- and long-term health effects associated with COVID-19. As the pandemic has unfolded, we have learned that COVID-19 can affect many organs in addition to the lungs.
- CDC is investigating multisystem inflammatory syndrome in children (MIS-C), a rare but often serious complication seen in some children after they have become infected with the virus that causes COVID-19. This team has been learning more about this syndrome and quickly communicating that information to healthcare providers, parents, and caregivers, as well as to state, territorial, local, and tribal health departments.
- CDC has launched a nationwide initiative to help state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments address their staffing needs through innovative hiring mechanisms.
- CDC's global response provides emergency risk management (communications) resources to countries and vulnerable populations, provides international public health leadership, and fosters partner outreach to further the scientific and technical experience with COVID-19 in order to strengthen disease surveillance systems needed to detect and respond

to future outbreaks.

In addition, CDC

- Has published more than 180 guidance documents to advise healthcare providers on subjects like infection control, hospital preparedness assessments, personal protective equipment (PPE), supply planning, and clinical evaluation and management.
- Has identified groups of people who are more likely to become severely ill from this disease and offered steps they can take to keep from getting sick.
- Created COVID19Surge, a spreadsheet-based tool that hospital administrators and public health officials can use to predict demand for hospital-based services, including how many patients may need ventilator treatment or other treatment in an intensive-care unit. These data can help hospitals prepare for possible changes in caseload.

 Developed a range of respirator conservation strategies to make supplies last longer and increase the supply of disposable respirators.

Advising businesses, communities, and schools

CDC has provided advice that has evolved as we have learned more about COVID-19.

- CDC has released indicators to help school officials make decisions about in-person learning as local conditions have evolved during the pandemic. When coupled with local data about community spread, these guideposts helping local health officials, school administrators, and communities plan for and respond to COVID-19 outbreaks.
- CDC has published a list of tips on how to make, clean, and wear masks, which help stop the spread of COVID-19 when used properly.
- CDC has produced a series of toolkits that businesses, schools, retirement communities, and other institutions can use to communicate information people can use to protect themselves, their family and friends, and their communities.

In addition, CDC has

- Created business guidance to help the public and private sectors protect essential workers and to help others increase their workers' safety by adopting policies like teleworking and flexible sick leave.
- Developed guidance for childcare programs, K-12 schools, and colleges and universities to help school officials plan for and respond to any outbreaks of COVID-19 in their communities.
- Provided COVID-19 planning guides for use by households, community- and faith-based organizations, planners of mass gatherings, and public health communicators.

Sharing our knowledge

Since before March 2020, when the World Health Organization declared the outbreak a pandemic, CDC has been sharing with Americans and the rest of the world what we've learned about COVID-19.

- COVID Data Tracker contains a wealth of numbers and tools to analyze COVID-19 cases, deaths, and trends at the local, state, and national levels. Data Tracker tool contains total cases; average number of daily cases during the previous seven days; total number of deaths; and total number of vaccinations. The information, which is updated daily, is both big-picture (with national data) and granular (down to the county level).
- CDC's COVID-19 Science Update helps inform CDC's response to the pandemic and helps CDC staff stay up to date on the latest COVID-19 research. This series, published every Friday, provides brief summaries of new COVID-19-related studies on many topics, including epidemiology, clinical treatment and management, laboratory science, and modeling.
- The Household Pulse Survey, a joint effort by CDC and the U.S. Census Bureau, produces a near real-time snapshot of people's mental health and access to care during the pandemic. Each week since April 2020, tens of thousands of people have answered questions about their physical and mental health, as well as their job status, spending, and education. The result is a 50-state picture that can be broken down by geography, age, gender, race and ethnicity, and educational level.
- CDC is leading the SARS-CoV-2 Sequencing for Public Health Emergency Response, Epidemiology, and

Surveillance (SPHERES). This national genomics consortium is coordinating large-scale, rapid genomic sequencing of the virus that causes COVID-19. Public health experts are using it to monitor changes to the virus; learn more about how it spreads; and help identify new ways to diagnose and treat the disease.

- CDC has developed an rRT-PCR (Real-Time Reverse Transcription-Polymerase Chain Reaction) test to diagnose current COVID-19 infection and has helped equip state and local public health laboratories with the capacity to test for the virus.
- CDC is also offering interim guidance for antigen testing. These tests are not as accurate as rRT-PCR tests, but because they are faster, cheaper, and easier to use, they can be valuable tools in the fight against COVID-19.
- CDC has developed a laboratory serology (antibody) test to help estimate how many people in the United States have been infected with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19.
 - This test examines blood samples for proteins the body makes in response to an infection.
 - It's designed to estimate how much of the U.S. population has been infected with the virus and to learn how the body's immune system responds to the virus.

- COVID Data Tracker Weekly Review provides a weekly summary and interpretation of COVID-19 data.

In addition

• CDC's COVID-NET program collects data on laboratory-confirmed, COVID-19-associated hospitalizations among children and adults through a network of over 250 acute-care hospitals in 14 states.

CDC's *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report* (MMWR) publishes the results of COVID-19 outbreak investigations and guidance. MMWR is the agency's primary vehicle for scientific publication of timely, reliable, authoritative, accurate, objective, and useful public health information and recommendations. The data in MMWR are based on weekly reports to CDC by state health departments.

CDC's monthly journal *Emerging Infectious Diseases* has published dozens of studies by researchers studying COVID-19. The open-access, peer-reviewed journal promotes the recognition of new and reemerging infectious diseases around the world and improves the understanding of factors involved in disease.

Protecting the health of travelers and communities in a globally mobile world

CDC protects travelers and helps maintain public health security through activities that lessen the public health risk associated with rapid global travel. Those activities include issuing guidance; educating travelers; working with international, federal, state, local, and industry partners; and taking actions at U.S. borders.

Keeping travelers and destination communities healthy

- CDC has created a web page for travelers that gives advice on when and for how long to delay domestic or international travel to avoid spreading COVID-19.
- CDC provides public health guidance related to travel that is intended to limit new introductions of the virus that causes COVID-19 into U.S. communities.
- CDC provides guidance for travel during the COVID-19 pandemic and knowing your travel risk to keep international and domestic travelers healthy.
- CDC has issued after-you-travel guidance to encourage all travelers, both international and domestic, to be aware of the risk they may pose to family, friends, and home community as a result of possible COVID-19 exposure during travel.
- All international travelers arriving at U.S. airports or land border crossings receive a Travel Health Alert Notice [691 KB, 2 pages] containing information about how to safeguard their health and protect others during the 14 days after arrival, when travelers infected with the virus that causes COVID-19 may be contagious, even if they have no symptoms.
- In partnership with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and other port-of-entry partners, health information
 is posted on electronic message boards at specific airports,

seaports, and land borders where international travelers enter or leave the United States.

• CDC has posted a southern border toolkit for partners, including state and local health departments, governmental and non-governmental organizations, and community-outreach groups, to provide timely, effective, and culturally appropriate COVID-19 messaging to people who live, work, or travel along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Ensuring the health of individuals entering the United States to live and work

- CDC has posted a communication toolkit in different languages for use by people whose English-language skills may be limited.
- CDC recognizes that newly resettled refugees may experience living arrangements or working conditions that put them at increased risk of getting COVID-19.

- In response, CDC has posted information on COVID-19 in Newly Resettled Refugee Populations to offer ways that partner organizations can help protect refugees and their communities and slow the spread of COVID-19.
- CDC is working with refugee resettlement agencies, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) to educate refugees about COVID-19.
 - IOM disseminates to refugees CDC's "What refugees can do if they are at increased risk of severe illness from COVID-19" [3 MB, 1 page] and welcome booklets [3 MB, 8 pages]. Published in the refugees' native languages, these booklets are handed out during their overseas medical exam or pre-departure screening. They are intended to help refugees and their families stay healthy during the COVID-19 pandemic after arriving in the United States.
 - At U.S. ports of entry, IOM staff provide arrivals with a number of important supplies, including thermometers, hand sanitizer, and non-medical masks. Resettlement agency staff and local refugee health partners provide local and state COVID-19 information and contact information for healthcare providers.
- CDC works closely with community organizations and public health professionals to educate and meet the healthcare needs of essential workers traveling to the United States on temporary agricultural work visas (H-2A visas), as they may be at increased risk of getting COVID-19 while traveling and during their time in the United States.

Spreading the word

CDC has published a variety of communications resources that state and local governments and community organizations can use to support their own responses to the pandemic. They include

- Video messages from CDC scientists and others, including Academy Award Recipient Wes Studi (*The Last of the Mohicans, Avatar*).
- Audio public service announcements (PSAs) that can air on radio stations and in airports.
- A collection of more than three dozen flyers and posters, which can be downloaded for free and printed on standard office or commercial printers. The materials were developed to support COVID-19 recommendations.
- A social media toolkit of graphics and suggested messages to help communities spread their messages about COVID-19. All content on this page is in the public domain and free for anyone to use.

Last Updated Feb. 12, 2021

OSD and Joint Staff Guidance (1 of 5)

JOINT STAFF EXORD: DOD RESPONSE TO NOVEL CORONAVIRUS EXORD

Purpose: Directs USNORTHCOM to execute its pandemic plan 3551-13 and supporting Geographic Combatant Commanders execute their pandemic plans.

OSD P&R MEMO: Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 1)

Purpose: Directs DOD to take measures to stop the spread of COVID and further directs DOD to identify all service members returning from mainland China and place them under 14-day ROM.

OSD P&R MEMO: Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 2)

Purpose: Provides DOD guidance for military installation commanders' risk-based measured responses to COVID..

OSD P&R MEMO: Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 3) Rescinded; see Supplement 7

Purpose: Provides DOD guidance for the use of personal protective equipment and non-pharmaceutical interventions during the COVID-19 outbreak.

OSD P&R MEMO: Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 4) Replaced by Supplement 12

Purpose: Provides DOD guidance for personnel traveling during the COVID outbreak, to include screening, monitoring, and 14-day ROM for personnel who have traveled to, through, and from CDC THN levels 2 or 3 countries.

SEDCEF MEMO: TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FOR DOD COMPONENTS IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 Cancelled; see April 20 memo

Purpose: Directs stop movement for DOD uniformed personnel, civilian personnel, and family members traveling to, from, or through CDC THN Level 3 designated locations and screening and reception procedures for those that have traveled to these locations.

SECDEF-MEMO: STOP MOVEMENT FOR ALL DOMESTIC TRAVEL FOR DOD COMPONENTS IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 Cancelled; see April 20 memo Date: 13 MAR 20

Purpose: Directs stop movement for all DOD uniformed, civilian, and family members to include all funded travel and implements precautionary measure on hiring new DOD civilians. Also restricts leave for military members to the local area only.

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JOINT STAFF EXORD: REVISION 01 TO DOD RESPONSE TO CORNOAVIRUS-2019 EXORD

Purpose: Provides consolidated guidance for global COVID-19 mitigation and response activities across DoD.

JOINT STAFF EXORD: MOD 01 TO REVISION 01 TO DOD RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS-2019 EXORD

Purpose: Directs the DoD to immediately stop movement for international travel.

Date: 01 FEB 20

Date: 07 FEB 20

Date: 25 FEB 20

Date: 10 MAR 20

Date: 11 MAR 20

Date: 11 MAR 20

Date: 20 MAR 20

Date: 24 MAR 20

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OSD and Joint Staff Guidance (2 of 5)

ENADMIN DOD: IMPLEMENTS HPCON CHARLIE FOR COVID-19	Date: 25 MAR 20
 Purpose: Directs all DOD components to immediately implement at minimum HPCON "C". 	
OD PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE: COVID-19	Date: 27 MAR 20
 Purpose: Communicate the Secretary of Defense's goals of: 1) Protecting our people; 2) Maintaining mission readines government effort. 	s; and 3)Supporting the whole-of-
ECDEF MEMO	Date: 01 APR 20
 Purpose: Guidance for Commanders on the Implementation of the Risk-Based Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic 	
ECDEF MEMO	Date: 02 APR 20
– Purpose: Delegation of Authority for Passenger, Cargo, and Patient Movement During the COVID-19 Public Health Em	ergency
ECDEF MEMO	Date: 02 APR 20
 Purpose: Guidance on Activating the National Guard, Reserve, and IRR for COVID-19 Response 	
ECDEF MEMO	Date: 03 APR 20
 Purpose: Policy on Accessions and Accessions Training During the COVID-19 Outbreak 	
ECDEF MEMO	Date: 05 APR 20
 Purpose: DoD Guidance on the Use of Cloth Face Coverings 	
SD P&R MEMO: Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 5)	Date: 07 APR 20
 Purpose: Provide: (1) DoD medical personnel with best practices for the evaluation, treatment, and management of C other personnel with COVID-19 patient movement guidance to protect the transportation crew and other patients, as management of contaminated vehicles. 	
SD P&R MEMO: Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 6) Rescinded; see Supplement 10	Date: 07 APR 20
 Purpose: Provide DoD laboratory testing guidance to supplement FHP guidance for COVID-19 pandemic response. This CDC testing guidance for DoD use. DoD Components will comply with this guidance effective immediately. 	s FHP incorporates aspects of the
SD P&R MEMO: Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 7)	Date: 08 APR 20
 Purpose: Provide DoD laboratory testing guidance to supplement FHP guidance for COVID-19 pandemic response. This CDC testing guidance for DoD use. DoD Components will comply with this guidance effective immediately. 	s FHP incorporates aspects of the

Enclosure (25) Page 2 of 16



SUPER FIDELS

OSD and Joint Staff Guidance (3 of 5)

SECDEF MEMO	Date: 10 APR 20
 Purpose: Delegates authority for Reserve Component activation to Secretaries of the Military Departments during the Coronav response. 	rirus disease 2019
USD (P&R) MEMO: Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 8)	Date: 13 APR 20
 Purpose: DoD guidance for protecting personnel in workplaces. 	
USD (P&R) MEMO: Special Leave Accrual	Date: 16 APR 20
 Purpose: Authorizes the accumulation of annual leave in excess of 60 days (not to exceed 120 days), as shown on the end of m LES. 	onth September 2020
SECDEF MEMO: Modification and Reissuance of DoD Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019 Travel Restrictions Cancelled; see May 22 memo	Date: 20 APR 20
 Purpose: Modifies stop movement dates. 	
SECDEF MESSAGE TO THE FORCE	Date: 20 APR 20
 Purpose: Further explanation of stop movement exemptions and waivers. 	
SECDEF MEMO to CMDR EUCOM: DoD Humanitarian Assistance Support to the Italian Republic	Date: 20 APR 20
– Purpose: Authorizes Commander, EUCOM, to support USAID and DOS with the conduct of humanitarian assistance activities in	ı Italy.
DSD MEMO: DOD COVID-19 Task Force Laboratory Testing Line of Effort	Date: 24 APR 20
 Purpose: Establish LOEs for Tier 1 testing. 	
ASD MEMO: Nuclear Personnel Reliability Assurance Program and Weapons Security Policy Relief	Date: 27 APR 20
 Purpose: Request relief from COVID-19 mitigation measures in order to maintain nuclear force strength and operational require 	ements.
ASD MEMO: Extension of Department of Defense Public Health Emergency Declarations	Date: 27 APR 20
 Purpose: Waives 30-day renewal requirement. 	
SECDEF MEMO: Guidance for CMDRs on Risk-Based Changing of HPCON Levels during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic	Date: 19 MAY 20
 Purpose: Supplement to previous guidance for CMDRs to consider when making decisions to change HPCON levels, conditions t actions taken when changing HPCON levels. 	hat must be met, and
OSD(HA) MEMO: Resuming Elective Surgical, Invasive, and Dental Procedures in Military Medical and Dental Treatment Facilities – Purpose: Provide guidance on how Military Treatment Facilities and Dental Treatment Facilities may resume procedure	Date: 19 MAY 20 Cage 3 of 16

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3



OSD and Joint Staff Guidance (4 of 5)

CUI

SECDEF MEMO: Transition to Conditions-Based Phased Approach to COVID-19 Personnel Movement and Travel Restrictions	Date: 22 MAY 20
 Purpose: Provides update to previous guidance concerning travel restrictions depicting conditions to be met IOT execute White House Opening Up America Again. 	e travel and alignment with
USD (P&R) MEMO: Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 9)	Date: 26 MAY 20
 Purpose: Provides guidance for deployment and redeployment of individuals and units during the Novel Coronavirus Dis 	sease 2019 Pandemic.
Pentagon Reservation Plan for Resiliency and Aligning with the National Guidelines for Opening Up America Again	Date: 26 MAY 20
 Purpose: Delegates authority to CMO in changing Pentagon Reservation HPCON Levels, depicts a phased approach conc workforce and to work spaces, and action taken if there is a spread of COVID-19 resurgence. 	dition-based return the
SECDEF Memo: Supplement and Clarification to Delegation of Authority for Passenger, Cargo, and Patient Movement	Date: 27 MAY 20
 Purpose: Supplements and clarifies guidance in SECDEF Memo of 2 April 2020. 	
USD (P&R) MEMO: Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 10) Rescinded; see Supplement 13	Date: 11 JUN 20
 Purpose: Provide DoD clinical laboratory testing guidance to supplement FHP guidance for COVID-19 pandemic response 	е.
USD (P&R) MEMO : Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 11)	Date: 11 JUN 20
 Purpose: Provide DoD guidance for COVID-19 surveillance and screening with testing. 	
USD (CMO) MEMO: Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 10)	Date: 11 JUN 20
– Purpose: DoD guidance for Coronavirus Disease 2019 Clinical Laboratory Diagnostic Testing Services.	
USD (CMO) MEMO: Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 11)	Date: 11 JUN 20
 Purpose: DoD guidance for Coronavirus Disease 2019 Surveillance and Screening with Testing. 	
SECDEF Memo: Department of Defense Support of Operation Warp Speed	Date: 17 JUN 20
 Purpose: OWS is a joint Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and DoD project to accelerate development, to distribution of effective vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics to counter COVID-19. 	esting, supply, production, and
DoD TF Memo: Arsenal, Depot, and Shipyard COVID-19 Screening and Resiliency	Date: 22 JUN 20
 Directs services to develop plans for mitigating COVID-19 effects at arsenals, depots, and shipyards. 	
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Enclosure (25) Page 4 of 16

OSD and Joint Staff Guidance (5 of 5)

SECDEF Memo: Exemption of Authorized Leave for Military and Civilian Personnel from COVID-19 Personnel Movement Date: 29 JUN 20 and Travel Restrictions

Purpose: Promulgates guidance on approval of leave outside the local area by unit commanders.

SECDEF Memo: Assuring Allies and Partners Regarding U.S. Force Deployments in a Coronavirus Disease 2019 Environment

Purpose: Directs combatant commanders to engage with foreign counterparts and share U.S. policy guidance to secure their support to not apply any
host nation COVID-19 quarantine and testing requirements to arriving U.S. Forces and civilian personnel.

Enclosure (25) Page 5 of 16

5

Date: 06 JUL 20

Date: 12 MAR 20

Purpose: Provides guidance to Department of the Navy personnel and commands on COVID-19 outbreak and measures to prevent infections, handle travel, and handle personnel returning from OCONUS locations.

ALNAV 026/20

ALNAV 025/20

Purpose: Provides an update and guidance to Department of the Navy personnel and commands on the COVID-19 outbreak and domestic travel _ restrictions bases on the SECDEF Memorandum of 13 March 2020.

ALNAV 029/20

Purpose: Provides guidance to Department of the Navy (DON) Commanders and all personnel regarding state and local government executive _ orders and the DON Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) response.

ALNAV 044/20

Purpose: Provides an update and guidance to Department of the Navy personnel and commands on the COVID-19 outbreak and domestic travel _ restrictions based on the SECDEF Memorandum of 20 Apr 2020.

ALNAV 049/20

Purpose: Modification to ALNAV 044/20 Reissuance of Department of the Navy Travel Restrictions in Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019

NAVADMIN 147/20

Purpose: Provide additional guidance for commanders when making local decisions to adjust HPCON services on installations and provide _ reporting requirements for HPCON and installation services status.

NAVADMIN 155/20

Purpose: Defines key terms and standardizes COVID-19 guidance for pre-deployment and deployed operations.

DON MEMO: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE FOR DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OF INDIVIDUALS AND UNITS Date: 10 JUN 20 DURING THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC

Purpose: Directs implementation of the OSD force health protection deployment and redeployment guidance for service members and DoD civilians deploying CONUS and OCONUs during COVID-19

DON MEMO: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSITION TO CONDITIONS-BASED APPRAOCH TO Date: 12 JUN 20 CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PERSONNEL MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

Purpose: Directs a transition to a conditions-based, phased approach to personnel movement and travel and reissues travel restriction guidance for DoD components.

DoN Guidance (1 of 2)

CUI





Date: 14 MAR 20

Date: 23 MAR 20

Date: 22 APR 20

Date: 21 APR 20

Date: 20 MAY 20

Date: 27 MAY 20



DoN Guidance (2 of 2)

CUI

ALNAV 067/20	Date: 12 JUN 20
 Purpose: Cancellation of ALNAV 044/20 and ALNAV 049/20 	
DON MEMO: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL LABOARATORY TESTING, SURVEILLANCE, AND SCREENING DURING THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC	Date: 16 JUN 20

- Purpose: Directs updates to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) laboratory testing guidance.

Enclosure (25) Page 7 of 16

8

Service Guidance (1 of 5)

MCO 6220.2 DISEASE CONTAINMENT PLANNING GUIDANCE

Purpose: Provides guidance and aligns organizational roles and responsibilities within the Marine Corps for Disease Containment Planning (DCP) activities.

CUI

HOMC RESPONSE TO NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK EXORD

Purpose: Provides service-level guidance and direction to support CDRSNORTHCOM as the supported Command and DoD synchronizer in support of HSS.

MARADMIN 82/20: DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE

Purpose: Direct commanders to take specific actions to review and validate Disease Containment Plans to prepare for and respond to a potential occurrence of the 2019 Novel (New) Coronavirus.

FRAGO 01 TO MCO 6220.2 (UPDATED NOVEL CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (COVID-19)

Purpose: Outlines task and reporting requirements for Service components.

MARADMIN 150/20: UPDATE #1 DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE

Purpose: Provides a risk-based framework to guide planning, posture, and actions necessary to protect Marine Corps Personnel. Contains updated reporting instructions.

CMC White Letter 1-20 Purpose: Directs Commanders to closely scrutinize what travel is mission essential, assess need for large gatherings, and take all measures to protect Marines, Sailors, and families.

MARADMIN 162/20: UPDATE #2 DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE Date: 13 MAR 20

Purpose: Provides update on foreign travel restrictions and FHP guidance.

MARADMIN 167/20: UPDATE #3 DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE Date: 14 MAR 20

Purpose: Stop Movement. Provides an update on domestic travel restrictions. Does not supersede guidance in MARADMIN 150/20 and 162/20.





Date: 11 FEB 20

Date: 13 FEB 20

Date: 04 DEC 2017

Date: 03 MAR 20

Date: 07 MAR 20

Date: 12 MAR 20



Service Guidance (2 of 5)

MARADMIN 192/20: SUPPLEMENTAL PERSONNEL GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDERS (CANCELLED VIA MARADMIN 264/20) Date: 25 MAR 20

Purpose: (1) Applies to Marines and civilian employees, and their family members. (2) Provides supplemental military personnel guidance to commanders for the administration of personnel policies, pay, and benefits in the context of the response to limit the spread of COVID-19. (3) Provides clarification to MARADMINs 162/20 and 167/20, and updates to specific travel restrictions

MARADMIN 193/20: UPDATE #4: DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE

 Purpose: Provides supplemental guidance to MARADMINs 162/20 and 167/20 (references D and E) by updating SECDEF-ordered travel restrictions. This MARADMIN supersedes portions of the guidance and extends timelines set forth in those MARADMINs and should be closely reviewed.

MARADMIN 206/20: GUIDANCE FOR REPLACING COMMON ACCESS CARDS EXPIRING IN THE NEXT 60 DAYS Date: 02 APR 20 Purpose: Provides guidance to Marine Corps personnel who hold a CAC expiring on or before 31 May 2020. MARADMIN 213/20: EXTENSION OPTIONS IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 Date: 03 APR 20 Purpose: To provide guidance regarding extensions for Marines impacted by COVID 19 through the end of Fiscal Year 20. MARADMIN 218/20: UPDATE #5: DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE Date: 06 APR 20 Purpose: Promulgates initial guidance to the force for the use of individual face coverings. MARADMIN 228/20: MOTORCYCLE SAFETY UNDER COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS Date: 09 APR 20 Purpose: Clarifies guidance on licensing and motorcycle safety requirements during COVID-19 Restrictions MARADMIN 236/20: UPDATE #6: DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE Date: 15 APR 20 Purpose: UPDATE #6: Promulgates updated CMC guidance to the force regarding protection of personnel from disease transmission in Marine Corps workplaces. MARADMIN 254/20: UPDATE #7: DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE Date: 21 APR 20

 Purpose: Provides an update and guidance to Marine Corps personnel and commands on the COVID-19 outbreak and domestic travel restrictions based on the SECDEF Memorandum of 20 Apr 2020 and ALNAV 044/20.

Enclosure (25) Page 9 of 16

Date: 26 MAR 20

CUI



Service Guidance (3 of 5)

MARADMIN 260/20: PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST, COMBAT FITNESS, TEST, AND BODY COMPOSITION PROGRAM AVISORY 1-20 Date: 23 APR 20

– Purpose: To advise Marines and Commanders on changes to PFT, CFT, and BCP due to COVID-19 Pandemic

MARADMIN 261/20: UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR REPLACING CAC AND UNIFORMED SERVICES IDENTIFICATION CARDS Date: 23 APR 20

- Purpose: To provide updated guidance for Marine Corps personnel who old a CAC expiring on or before 30 Sept

MARADMIN 262/20: INTERIM MARINE CORPS INSTALLATION/SITE ACCESS CONTROL PROCEDURES DURING COVID-19 Date: 23 APR 20

– Purpose: To establish and reaffirm current Total Force access control procedures to Marine Corps installations during COVID-19 Pandemic

MARADMIN 264/20: UPDATE #1: COVID-19 SUPPLEMENTAL PERSONNEL GUIDANCE

- Purpose: To cancel and consolidate previous MARADMINS into one the encompasses the latest administrativeupdates

MARADMIN 267/20: COVID-19 SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE TO ACTIVE DUTY MARINE TRAVELERS TO SCHEDULED Date: 29 APR 20 ADVANCED FORMAL SCHOOL COURSES

 Purpose: Promulgates updated guidance to the active duty continental United States (CONUS)-based force for pre-formal school attendance travel health procedures in order to reduce the risk of further exposure to, or spread of COVID-19.

FRAGO 02 TO HQMC CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE EXORD: REPORTING

 Purpose: Refines and amplifies COVID-19 reporting requirements to ensure situational awareness and understanding senior leaders to inform decision-making across the institution.

MARADMIN 283/20: CLARIFYING GUIDANCE TO COVID-19 RELATED RESERVE COMPONENT EXTENSIONS AND INITIAL Date: 12 MAY 20 INCREMENTAL ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING

Purpose: To supplement and clarify particular paragraphs of MARADMIN 213/20, provide additional guidance to Reserve Component (RC) personnel seeking COVID-19 related extensions, and provide guidance for follow on training of Incremental Initial Active Duty Training (IIADT) Marines.

MARADMIN 284/20: HEALTH SAFETY SCREENING REQUIREMENTS TO PROTECT THE FORCE/INDUSTRY DURING RELOCATION Date: 12 MAY 20 PROCESS (HOUSEHOLD GOODS MOVES)

Purpose: To protect the health and safety of Marines, their families and TSP Representatives executing HHG operations and to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
 Enclosure (25) Page 10 of 16



Date: 27 APR 20

Date: 01 MAY 20



CUI Service Guidance (4 of 5)

MARADMIN 285/20: SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE TO PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION ASSIGNMENTS DUE TO COVID-19 Date: 12 MAY 20

Purpose: To outline MM/RAM actions that will affect the staffing levels of commands and PCS timelines for Marines in receipt of PCS orders for the remainder of 2020.

MARADMIN 291/20: CANCELATION OF ADDITIONAL STAFF NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER SCHOOL CLASSES Date: 18 MAY 20

Purpose: Announces the cancellation of additional PME school/courses offered through College of Enlisted Military Education.

MARADMIN 292/20: UPDATE TO FY20 CORNERSTONE: THE COMMANDANTS COMBINED COMMANDERSHIP COURSE Date: 18 MAY 20

Purpose: List the shift of original course date to 21 Sep 20, this course is reserved for those already registered.

MARADMIN 296/20: FY20 STAFF SERGEANT SELECTION BOARD

Purpose: Provides updated guidance and instructions pertaining to the submission of material for the board due to disruption scaused by COVID19.

FRAGO 020 TO MCICOM OPORD 02-20: Operating in a Persistent Pandemic Environment

Purpose: Provides initial planning guidance for Marine Corps Installations Command (MCICOM) to begin planning to operate in a persistent pandemic environment.

Date: 8 JUN 20 MARADMIN 333/20: TRANSITION TO CONDITIONS-BASED PHASED APPROACH TO CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PERSONNEL MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS UPDATE

Purpose: This MARADMIN modifies, and supplements published guidance, ensuring successful PCS season while protecting the force.

MARADMIN 353/20: GUIDANCE FOR DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OF INDIVIDUALS AND UNITS, SURVEILLANCE AND Date: 17 JUN 20 SCREENING AND TESTING, AS WELL AS LABORATORY DIAGNOSTIC TESTING DURING THE COVID 19 PANDEMIC

Purpose: To promulgate updated Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) guidance for deployment and redeployment of individuals and units, surveillance and screening and testing, as well as clinical laboratory diagnostic testing during the novel Coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic.



Date: 20 MAY 20

Date: 21 MAY 20

11



Service Guidance (5 of 5)

MARADMIN 365/20: CLARIFYING GUIDANCE TO RESERVE COMPONENT PERFORMANCE OF INACTIVE DUTY TRAINING, Date: 24 JUN 20 ANNUAL TRAINING AND INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE MUSTER IN PERSISTENT PANDEMIC ENVIRONMENT

 Purpose: Establishes follow on actions and medical processing procedures for Reserve Component personnel relating to COVID-19 exposure while in the line of duty.

MARADMIN 377/20: DOD POLICY CHANGE, COVID-19 MILITARY PERSONNEL MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS – Date: 1 JUL 20 LEAVE AND LIBERTY

Purpose: Provides amplifying guidance on personal, non-official leave, liberty and administrative absence outside of the local area/liberty limits and states approval will be at a level not lower than the requestor's unit commander (O5 or higher).

MARADMIN 396/20: REINFORCING GUIDANCE FOR MARINES REGARDING TRANSPORTATION, PETS, HOUSING, AND Date: 6 JUL 20 QUARANTINE-LEVEL - RESTRICTION OF MOVEMENT (ROM) ASSOCIATED WITH PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION MOVES TO JAPAN

- Purpose: Provides amplifying guidance on PCS moves to Japan, including mandatory travel via Patriot Express, pet transport guidelines, guidance for securing housing and details on details on mandatory 14-day restriction of movement (ROM) on arrival for everyone.

MARADMIN 402/20: COVID-19 CONVALESCENT PLASMA

Date: 15 JUL 20

- Purpose: Provides information on the voluntary COVID-19 convalescent plasma donation program.





MFP Policies

MARFORPAC Support to DOD Response to the Novel Coronavirus 19 Outbreak Execute Order - Initial MARFORPAC Execute Order for COVID response	- Dated:	4 Feb 20
EXORD MOD 001 - Adds BPT activate JTF HQ for evacuation and adds travel risk assessment requirement	- Dated:	11 Feb 20
EXORD MOD 002 - Provides direction and guidance for risk assessments and decision points for planned operations, activities, investments (OAI)	- Dated: and	20 Feb 20
EXORD REV 1 - Updates guidance IAW updated DOD travel restrictions and USINDOPACOM EXORD P-963, which establish phase pandemic and emerging infections disease plan.	- Dated: es a 5-	18 Mar 20
EXORD FRAGO 1 - Updates IAW USINDOPACOM directed transition to Phase III of CONPLAN 5003-18 - Updates IAW DOD directed immediate stop movement on international travel	- Dated:	27 Mar 20
EXORD FRAGO 2 to MOD 1 - Develop options for potential FHA operations in support of COVID-19 relief efforts	- Dated:	3 Apr 20
EXORD MOD 003 - Updates guidance IAW DOD conditions-based phased approach to COVID-19 personnel movement and trav restrictions	- Dated: vel	13 Jun 20
EXORD MOD 004 - Updates guidance IAW 06 Jul 20 OSD Memorandum for Assuring Allies and Partners Regarding Service Mer and Civilians Deploying Overseas		17 Jul 20
	Enclosure (25) Page 1	3 of 16

CUI



I MEF Guidance (1 of 3)

I MEF ORDER 1050.2 - I MEF COVID-19 LEAVE AND LIBERTY ORDER (30 MAR 21)

- All requests for leave where the leave destination was not the Marine's or Sailor's primary residence required approval by the first general officer in the chain of command.
- Marines and Sailors undergoing treatment for an infectious or contagious disease prohibited from taking leave. Exceptions required approval by first general officer in the chain of command with concurrence from a medical authority.

I MEF ORDER 1050.3 - I MEF COVID-19 LEAVE AND LIBERTY ORDER (25 JUN 21)

- Leave outside the local area required approval in writing by the first general officer in the chain of command.
- Marines and Sailors undergoing treatment for an infectious or contagious disease prohibited from taking leave. Exceptions required approval by first general officer in the chain of command with concurrence from a medical authority.

I MEF ORDER 1050.4 - I MEF COVID-19 LEAVE AND LIBERTY ORDER (9 JUL 21)

- Leave travel exempt from COVID-19-related travel restrictions, but leave taken in conjunction with an official travel itinerary
 required approval in writing by the first general officer in the chain of command.
- Marines and Sailors undergoing treatment for an infectious or contagious disease prohibited from taking leave. Exceptions required approval by first general officer in the chain of command with concurrence from a medical authority.

I MEF POLICY LETTER 7-20 - EXECUTION OF CEREMONIES DURING COVID-19 (17 JUL 20)

- Delegated authority to the commanding generals of I MEF MSCs to approve the conduct of ceremonies based on local conditions and the ability to mitigate the risk of spread of COVID-19. MSC commanding generals could delegate further.
- Deputy GC, I MEF is the ceremonial approval authority for the MEUs and I MIG and its associated units.
- Ceremonies in compliance with the guidance could be approved by O-5 level commanders and above, with exceptions to policy
 approved by the first general officer in the chain of command.





I MEF Policies (2 of 3)

IME	F OPORDER 20-001: I MEF COVID-19 Response to COVID-19	06 Apr 20
_	Purpose: Operations Order for combating COVID-19.	
IME	F FRAGO 001: 1st MLG to establish ward and ICU bed expansion.	15 April 20
_	Purpose: Operations guidance for combating COVID-19.	
IME	F FRAGO 002 MOD 1 to OPORDER 20-001 ID and Protection of High Risk Personnel	1 May 20
_	Purpose: Identify and protect all "High risk personnel" within I MEF.	
IME	F FRAGO 003 to OPORDER 20-001 Initial Directive ISO I MEF SPT Det MCRD	20 Apr 20
_	Purpose: I MEF medical support to MCRD for quarantine and isolation.	
IME	F FRAGO 004 MOD 2 to OPORDER 20-001 Sequester SPMAGTF-CR-CC 20.2	4 May 20
_	Purpose: sequester SPMAGTF Forces in preparation for deployment.	
IME	F FRAGO 006 MOD 1 to Appendix 8 of OPORDER 20-001 Decision Support Matrix	11 May 20
_	Purpose: Proved decision making matrix for certain scenarios.	
IME	F FRAGO 7 to OPORDER 20-001 I MEF-CG MCI-W MCB Camp Pendleton	22 May 20
_	Purpose: Clarify the relationship between the different entities.	
IME	F FRAGO 008 MOD 1 to OPORDER 20-001 Reviewed WO ISO MIOC	27 Jun 20
_	Purpose: Refines medical personnel needed to run the MIOC.	



I MEF Policies (3 of 3)

I MEF FRAGO 009 to OPORDER 20-001 Sequester TF Koa Moana, TF Ellis	29 May 20
 Purpose: Develops sequester plan for upcoming deployments. 	
I MEF FRAGO 010 to OPORDER 20-001 Consolidation of HHQ Guidance of COVID	29 June 20
 Purpose: Overall adjustment to keep I MEF in line with Higher Headquarters. 	
I MEF FRAGO 011 MOD 1 to OPORDER 20-001 Initiating Directive ISO TF MIOC	29 Jul 20
 Purpose: Extends the mission of the MIOC through to 31 Mar 21. 	



JAN 30 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Force Health Protection Guidance for the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak

This memorandum provides initial guidance to DoD personnel on the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) outbreak. DoD is coordinating closely with the interagency to align our increased preparedness posture.

The DoD will follow the regularly updated Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidance for this outbreak, found at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/index.html. A summary of the latest guidance from CDC is published via the Health Alert Network at: https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/index.asp. Related Military Health System (MHS) information and links to the CDC are at: https://www.health.mil/News/In-the-Spotlight/Coronavirus. The MHS is prepared to execute updated or additional guidance due to the fluidity of the situation. Due to the dynamic nature of this outbreak, individuals should frequently check the CDC 2019-nCoV website for additional updates.

Current Situation: The 2019-nCoV outbreak continues, with the CDC reporting several thousand cases worldwide, to include cases in the United States. CDC has published a warning to avoid all nonessential travel (Level 3) to China and advises that travelers to China should take enhanced precautions to prevent exposure to 2019-nCoV (https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices/warning/novel-coronavirus-china).

Risk to DoD Personnel: Per the CDC, identifying a person at risk, or Patients Under Investigation (PUI), is based on symptoms and exposure history; additional criteria are at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/clinical-criteria.html. The risk to DoD personnel who do not meet the PUI criteria is low.

• While the immediate risk of this new virus to the American public is believed to be low at this time, everyone can do their part to help us respond to this emerging public health threat: 1) Because it is currently influenza and respiratory disease season, CDC recommends getting an influenza vaccine, taking everyday preventive actions to help stop the spread of germs, and taking influenza antivirals if prescribed; 2) If you are a healthcare provider, be on the lookout for people with travel history to China and fever and respiratory symptoms; and 3) If you are a healthcare provider caring for a 2019-nCoV patient, please take care of yourself and follow recommended infection control procedures.

- Per CDC, the best way to prevent infection is to avoid being exposed to this virus. DoD personnel can reduce risk from respiratory viruses by: 1) appropriately washing hands with soap and water for at least 20 seconds, and if soap and water are unavailable, use an alcohol-based hand sanitizer that contains at least 60 percent alcohol; 2) avoiding touching their eyes, nose, and mouth with unwashed hands; 3) avoiding close contact with those who are sick; and 4) cleaning and disinfecting frequently touched objects and surfaces. Additional information from CDC can be found at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/about/prevention-treatment.html.
- If DoD personnel have recently returned from travel to China in the last 14 days or had close contact with someone infected with 2019-nCoV and feel sick with fever, cough, or difficulty breathing, CDC directs these individuals to: 1) seek medical care right away. Before going to a doctor's office or emergency room, call ahead and tell them about the recent travel and symptoms; 2) avoid contact with others; 3) not travel while sick; 4) cover the mouth and nose with a tissue or sleeve (not hands) when coughing or sneezing; and 5) wash hands often with soap and water for at least 20 seconds to avoid spreading the virus to others. Use an alcohol-based hand sanitizer that contains at least 60 percent alcohol if soap and water are unavailable.

The CDC has provided answers to frequently asked questions on 2019-nCoV that may be found at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/faq.html. A copy of these frequently asked questions as of January 27, 2020 is attached to this guidance.

Healthcare Guidance: DoD will follow CDC guidance for healthcare providers at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/clinical-criteria.html. Additional DoD reference material for personal protective equipment that may go beyond current CDC guidelines is available at: https://health.mil/Reference-Center/Policies/2018/09/25/Personal-Protective-Equipment-Policy-Guidance.

Patient Screening and Isolation: Screening of individuals potentially exposed to 2019-nCoV should be based on their risk of exposure, using CDC PUI criteria. **Per CDC, PUIs for 2019nCoV infection should be asked to wear a facemask as soon as they are identified and be evaluated in a private room with the door closed, ideally an airborne infection isolation room if available.** For updated CDC guidance please refer to: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/guidance-hcp.html. **Diagnosis:** As of January 27, 2020, diagnostic testing is only available by the CDC. Currently, testing for this virus must take place at CDC, but in the coming days and weeks, CDC will share these tests with domestic and international partners. Guidance for sample collection and laboratories is at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/guidance-laboratories.html.

Treatment: There are no specific treatments recommended for 2019-nCoV at this time. People infected with 2019-nCoV should receive supportive care to help relieve symptoms. For severe cases, treatment should include care to support vital organ functions.

Reportable Medical Events: Responsible medical authorities will report all PUIs for 2019nCoV infection to: 1) the MHS via the Disease Reporting System internet; 2) installation/local public health authorities using established reporting procedures; and 3) the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Division Alert and Response Operations at: dha.ncr.health-surv.list.ib-alertresponse@mail.mil.

Additional Considerations: The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs is working with the Joint Staff and others for any potential increased screening of DoD populations at ports of embarkation or debarkation.

My point of contact for this guidance is COL Jennifer M. Kishimori. COL Kishimori may be reached at (703) 681-8179 or jennifer.m.kishimori.mil@mail.mil.

Matther

Matthew P. Donovan Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

Attachment: As stated



🚺 💓 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CDC 24/7: Saving Lives, Protecting People™

2019 Novel Coronavirus, Wuhan, China

Frequently Asked Questions and Answers

Disease Basics

Q: What is 2019 Novel Coronavirus?

A: The 2019 Novel Coronavirus, or 2019-nCoV, is a new respiratory virus first identified in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China. Learn about 2019 Novel Coronavirus.

Q: What is a novel coronavirus?

A: A novel coronavirus (CoV) is a new coronavirus that has not been previously identified.

Q: What is the source of 2019-nCoV?

A: Public health officials and partners are working hard to identify the source of the 2019-nCoV. Coronaviruses are a large family of viruses, some causing illness in people and others that circulate among animals, including camels, cats and bats. Analysis of the genetic tree of this virus is ongoing to know the specific source of the virus. SARS, another coronavirus that emerged to infect people, came from civet cats, while MERS, another coronavirus that emerged to infect people, came from camels. More information about the source and spread of 2019-nCoV is available on the 2019-nCoV Situation Summary: Source and Spread of the Virus.

Q: How does the virus spread?

A: This virus probably originally emerged from an animal source but now seems to be spreading from person-to-person. It's important to note that person-to-person spread can happen on a continuum. Some viruses are highly contagious (like measles), while other viruses are less so. At this time, it's unclear how easily or sustainably this virus is spreading between people. Learn what is known about the spread of newly emerged coronaviruses.

Q: Is 2019-nCoV the same as the MERS-CoV or SARS virus?

A: No. Coronaviruses are a large family of viruses, some causing illness in people and others that circulate among animals, including camels, cats and bats. The recently emerged 2019-nCoV is not the same as the coronavirus that causes Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) or the coronavirus that causes Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). However, genetic analyses suggest this virus emerged from a virus related to SARS. There are ongoing investigations to learn more. This is a rapidly evolving situation and information will be updated as it becomes available.

Prevention

Q: How can I help protect myself?

A: Visit the 2019-nCoV Prevention and Treatment page to learn about how to protect yourself from respiratory illnesses, like 2019-nCoV.

Enclosure (26) Page 4 of 7

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/faq.html

Q: What should I do if I had close contact with someone who has 2019-nCoV?

A: There is information for people who have had close contact with a person confirmed to have, or being evaluated for, 2019-nCoV infection available online.

Medical Information

Q: What are the symptoms and complications that 2019-nCoV can cause?

A: Current symptoms reported for patients with 2019-nCoV have included mild to severe respiratory illness with fever¹, cough, and difficulty breathing. Read about 2019-nCoV Symptoms.

Q: Should I be tested for 2019-nCoV?

A: If you develop a fever¹ and symptoms of respiratory illness, such as cough or shortness of breath, within 14 days after travel from China, you should call ahead to a healthcare professional and mention your recent travel or close contact. If you have had close contact² with someone showing these symptoms who has recently traveled from this area, you should call ahead to a healthcare professional and mention your close contact and their recent travel. Your healthcare professional will work with your state's public health department and CDC to determine if you need to be tested for 2019-nCoV.

Q: How do you test a person for 2019-nCoV?

A: At this time, diagnostic testing for 2019-nCoV can be conducted only at CDC.

State and local health departments who have identified a person under investigation (PUI) should immediately notify CDC's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to report the PUI and determine whether testing for 2019-nCoV at CDC is indicated. The EOC will assist local/state health departments to collect, store, and ship specimens appropriately to CDC, including during afterhours or on weekends/holidays.

For more information on specimen collection see CDC Information for Laboratories.

Q: What should healthcare professionals and health departments do?

A: For recommendations and guidance on patients under investigation; infection control, including personal protective equipment guidance; home care and isolation; and case investigation, see Information for Healthcare Professionals. For information on specimen collection and shipment, see Information for Laboratories.

Public Health Response and Current Situation

Q: What is CDC doing about 2019-nCoV?

A: This is an emerging, rapidly evolving situation and CDC will continue to provide updated information as it becomes available. CDC works 24/7 to protect people's health. It is CDC's job to be concerned and move quickly whenever there is a potential public health problem. More information about CDC's response to 2019-nCoV is available online.

Q: Am I at risk for 2019-nCoV infection in the United States?

Enclosure (26) Page 5 of 7

A: This is a rapidly evolving situation and the risk assessment may change daily. The latest updates are available on CDC's 2019 Novel Coronavirus website.

Q: Has anyone in the United States gotten infected?

A: Yes. The first infection with 2019-nCoV in the United States was reported on January 21, 2020. See the current U.S. case count of infection with 2019-nCoV.

Q: Am I at risk for novel coronavirus from a package or products shipping from China?

There is still a lot that is unknown about the newly emerged 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) and how it spreads. Two other coronaviruses have emerged previously to cause severe illness in people (MERS and SARS). 2019-nCoV is more genetically related to SARS than MERS, but both are betacoronaviruses with their origins in bats. While we don't know for sure that this virus will behave the same way as SARS and MERS, we can use the information from both of these earlier coronaviruses to guide us. In general, because of poor survivability of these coronaviruses on surfaces, there is likely very low risk of spread from products or packaging that are shipped over a period of days or weeks at ambient temperatures. Coronaviruses are generally thought to be spread most often by respiratory droplets. Currently there is no evidence to support transmission of 2019-nCoV associated with imported goods and there have not been any cases of 2019-nCoV in the United States associated with imported goods. Information will be provided on the 2019 Novel Coronavirus website as it becomes available.

Travel

Q: Is it safe to travel to China or other countries where 2019-nCoV cases have occurred?

A: The situation is evolving. Stay up to date with CDC's travel health notices related to this outbreak. These notices will be updated as more information becomes available.

Q: What if I recently traveled to China and got sick?

A: If you were in China and feel sick with fever, cough, or difficulty breathing, within 14 days after you left, you should

- Seek medical care right away. Before you go to a doctor's office or emergency room, call ahead and tell them about your recent travel and your symptoms.
- Avoid contact with others.
- Not travel while sick.
- · Cover your mouth and nose with a tissue or your sleeve (not your hands) when coughing or sneezing.
- Wash hands often with soap and water for at least 20 seconds to avoid spreading the virus to others. Use an alcoholbased hand sanitizer if soap and water are not available.

CDC does have additional specific guidance for travelers available online.

2019-nCoV and Animals

Q: What about animals or animal products imported from China?

CDC does not have any evidence to suggest that animals or animal products imported from China pose a risk for spreading 2019-nCoV in the United States. This is a rapidly evolving situation and information will be updated as it becomes available. The United States Department of Agriculture regulates ^[2] the importation of animals and animal products, and CDC regulates the importation of animals and animal products capable of spreading human disease.

Enclosure (26) Page 6 of 7

Q: Should I be concerned about pets or other animals and 2019-nCoV?

While this virus seems to have emerged from an animal source, it is now spreading from person-to-person. CDC recommends that people traveling to China avoid animals both live and dead, but there is no reason to think that any animals or pets in the United States might be a source of infection with this new coronavirus.

Q: Should I avoid contact with pets or other animals if I am sick?

Do not handle pets or other animals while sick. Although there have not been reports of pets or other animals becoming sick with 2019-nCoV, several types of coronaviruses can cause illness in animals and spread between animals and people. Until we know more, avoid contact with animals and wear a facemask if you must be around animals or care for a pet.

Footnotes

¹Fever may not be present in some patients, such as those who are very young, elderly, immunosuppressed, or taking certain fever-lowering medications. Clinical judgment should be used to guide testing of patients in such situations.

²Close contact is defined as—

- a. being within approximately 6 feet (2 meters), or within the room or care area, of a novel coronavirus case for a prolonged period of time while not wearing recommended personal protective equipment or PPE (e.g., gowns, gloves, NIOSH-certified disposable N95 respirator, eye protection); close contact can include caring for, living with, visiting, or sharing a health care waiting area or room with a novel coronavirus case. *or* –
- b. having direct contact with infectious secretions of a novel coronavirus case (e.g., being coughed on) while not wearing recommended personal protective equipment.

See CDC's Interim Healthcare Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients Under Investigation for 2019 Novel Coronavirus

Data to inform the definition of close contact are limited. Considerations when assessing close contact include the duration of exposure (e.g., longer exposure time likely increases exposure risk) and the clinical symptoms of the person with novel coronavirus (e.g., coughing likely increases exposure risk as does exposure to a severely ill patient). Special consideration should be given to those exposed in health care settings.

Page last reviewed: January 27, 2020 Content source: National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), Division of Viral Diseases



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

FEB - 7 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 1) - Department of Defense Guidance for Monitoring Personnel Returning from China During the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak

The World Health Organization declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern for the 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) outbreak on January 30, 2020. On January 31, 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services declared a Public Health Emergency in the United States and announced new measures to prevent the spread of 2019-nCoV. The current epidemic in mainland China has demonstrated the capacity of the 2019-nCoV to spread globally.

The DoD must immediately take measures to prevent the spread of this disease within our population and communities. In keeping with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommendations, this memorandum provides guidance pertaining to Service members, DoD civilian employees and contractor personnel, and family members returning from China to protect public health, and will be updated as necessary.

Effective immediately, DoD Components must identify all **Service members** returning from mainland China after February 2, 2020, and place the Service member under a 14-day restriction of movement (ROM). During the 14-day ROM:

- Service members will be restricted to their residence for a 14-day ROM period, starting from the day of departure from mainland China.
- Service members will be assessed by cognizant medical staff (by phone consultation or in person), as soon as possible within the first 24 hours of arrival to home station or their final destination, for the development of fever or symptoms of 2019-nCoV.
- For all in-person assessments of Service members (including asymptomatic Service members), medical personnel should wear appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) (e.g., facemask, eye protection, gloves).
- Service members living in open-bay settings, or rooms with shared bathrooms and/or kitchens facilities, will be placed in separate lodging to span the 14-day ROM period.

The DoD Component to which the Service member is assigned will arrange for the separate lodging.

- Service members will be assessed daily for fever and symptoms by cognizant medical staff (by phone consultation or in person). For all in-person assessments of Service members (including an asymptomatic Service member) medical personnel should wear appropriate PPE (e.g., facemask, eye protection, gloves).
- Service members will separate themselves from other people in the home/dwelling if residing with roommates/family members and avoid sharing personal items, to the extent possible pursuant to DoD Component guidance.
- Service members may not travel, visit public/crowded areas, or use public transportation and should avoid interaction with pets or other animals, to the extent possible.
- Medical evaluation and care will be immediately arranged if the Service member displays fever and symptoms consistent with 2019-nCoV, as per CDC guidance.
 - The Service member will call ahead before going to a medical treatment facility, informing them of his/her symptoms and travel history.
 - Medical staff should follow CDC guidance when assessing individuals displaying fever and symptoms consistent with 2019-nCoV.
 - If an individual is identified as a patient under investigation, per previously published Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness guidance "Force Health Protection Guidance for the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak," dated January 30, 2020, appropriate reporting will be initiated.

Until further notice, DoD recommends that **DoD civilian employees and contractor personnel, and family members** returning from China follow existing CDC guidance. Key aspects include voluntarily: remaining at home, avoiding congregate settings, limiting close contact with people and pets or other animals to the extent possible, not traveling, selfmonitoring, and seeking medical care if symptoms develop.

The DoD will continue to follow the CDC guidance and comply with local public health authorities during this outbreak. The most updated guidance from the CDC should be checked daily and can be found at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html.

My point of contact for this guidance is COL Jennifer M. Kishimori, who may be reached at (703) 681-8179 or jennifer.m.kishimori.mil@mail.mil.

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Matthew P. Donovan Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

U.S. MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS

Date Signed: 2/12/2020 | MARADMINS Number: 082/20

MARADMINS: 082/20

R 112111Z FEB 20 MARADMIN 082/20 MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC PPO PS SUBJ/U.S. MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (2019 nCoV)// REF/A/MSGID:DOC/YMD: 20190115// REF/B/MSGID:DOC/YMD: 20190328// REF/C/CONGRESS// REF/D/CONGRESS// REF/E/MSGID:DOC/YMD:20200207// REF/F/MSGID:DOC/YMD:20171204// REF/G/MSGID:DOC/YMD: 20190612// REF/H/MSGID:GENADMIN/OSD/042146ZFEB20// REF/I/MSGID:DOC/DOD GCP 3551-13/YMD: 20130226// REF/J/MSGID:DOC/YMD: 20161122// REF/K/MSGID:GENADMIN/HOMC PP&O EXORD//YMD:030003ZFEB20// REF/L/MSGID:DOC/YMD: 20130807// NARR/REF A IS THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES' NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY STRATEGY 2019-2022 WHICH DISCUSSES STRATEGY TO PREVENT, DETECT, ASSESS, PREPARE FOR, MITIGATE, RESPOND TO, AND RECOVER FROM HEALTH SECURITY THREATS. REF B IS DOD INSTRUCTION 6200.03 PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE DOD, WHICH PROVIDES DIRECTION TO ENSURE MISSION ASSURANCE AND READINESS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES. REF C IS TITLE 42, U.S.C. SECTIONS 243, 249 AND 264, 265, AND 271. REF D IS TITLE 42, CFR PART 70 AND 71. REFS C AND D CONTAIN REGULATIONS FOR COOPERATION AND PREVENTING THE INTRODUCTION, TRANSMISSION AND SPREAD OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES AND/OR OTHER HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES INTO THE UNITED STATES. REF E IS UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMORANDUM; FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION SUPPLEMENT 1 - DOD GUIDANCE FOR MONITORING

PERSONNEL RETURNING FROM CHINA DURING THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK, WHICH PROVIDES DISEASE CONTAINMENT RESTRICTION OF MOVEMENT GUIDANCE FOR ALL SERVICE MEMBERS RETURNING FROM MAINLAND CHINA. REF F IS MCO 6220.2 DISEASE CONTAINMENT PLANNING WHICH PROVIDES GUIDANCE TO RESPOND TO AND MITIGATE BIOLOGICAL EVENTS WITH PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY IMPLICATIONS AND ALIGNS ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE MARINE CORPS FOR DISEASE CONTAINMENT PLANNING (DCP) ACTIVITIES. REF G IS DOD INSTRUCTION 6055.17 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, WHICH OUTLINES REOUIREMENTS TO MANAGE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES IAW THE PROVISIONS OF THE INSTRUCTION. REF H IS OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE WHICH CONTAINS OVERARCHING INFORMATION ON THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS. REF I IS GLOBAL CAMPAIGN PLAN 3551, WHICH DIRECTS USNORTHCOM TO EXECUTE ITS PANDEMIC PLAN AND SUPPORTING GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS TO EXECUTE THEIR PANDEMIC PLANS IN RESPONSE TO THE NCOV OUTBREAK. REF J IS MCO 3440.8A, INSTALLATION CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR AND HIGH YIELD EXPLOSIVE (CBRNE) PREPAREDNESS, WHICH PROVIDES ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON THE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF BIOLOGICAL THREATS. REF K IS HOMC RESPONSE TO NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK EXORD WHICH PROVIDES AMPLIFYING COORDINATION INFORMATION. REF L IS MCO 3504.2A, OPERATIONS EVENT INCIDENT REPORT (OPREP-3) REPORTING. POC/CHRISTOPHER BURCH/CIV/UNIT: PP&O PS PSP IP/TEL: (703) 692-4491/NIPR E-MAIL: CHRISTOPHER.BURCH1@USMC.MIL//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. Situation.

1.A. General.

1.A.1. Commanders will take specific actions to review and validate Disease Containment Plans to prepare for and respond to a potential occurrence of the 2019 Novel (New) Coronavirus (2019-nCoV).

1.A.2. The current threat of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus has raised concern that this virus could result in a pandemic disease. In such a scenario, nCoV could spread, infecting U.S. personnel, and threaten the operational readiness of the U.S. Marine Corps.

1.A.3. The Marine Corps' response to a pandemic outbreak focuses on five major areas: 1) Force Health Protection (FHP); 2) Disease Containment Planning (DCP) and Readiness; 3) Continuity of Operations (COOP); 4) Defense Support of Civilian Authorities (DSCA); and 5) Support to U.S. Government response efforts. 1.B. Background.

1.B.1. An outbreak of a new (novel) coronavirus is rapidly evolving, but currently poses a LOW RISK to personnel located in CONUS. The 2019-nCoV is a viral respiratory disease related to Middle-East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS-CoV) and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). Symptoms of 2019-nCoV may include fever, cough, and shortness of breath.

1.B.2. Chinese health authorities identified 2019-nCoV as the cause of the pneumonia outbreak in Wuhan, China. There are confirmed cases in over 20 countries, including the United States, with validated cases in Arizona, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Washington State, and Wisconsin, with one

reported death of an American citizen in China.

1.B.3. The U.S. State Department issued a LEVEL 4 DO NOT TRAVEL advisory to China on 30 January 2020. The World Health Organization (WHO) has categorized risk as VERY HIGH for China, and HIGH globally, and declared that nCoV constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). 1.B.4. Although the United States Government, in conjunction with private industry, is conducting research to identify protocols that may treat the 2019nCoV disease, there are no U.S. Food and Drug Administration-approved treatments at this time. Standard treatment for 2019-nCoV includes prompt implementation of recommended infection prevention and control measures and supportive management of complications. Per the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), a person under investigation for 2019-nCoV infection should be isolated, and healthcare professionals, and local or state health departments, should be notified immediately.

1.B.5. Presently, the U.S. Marine Corps is planning, conducting routine surveillance, and commencing engagement activities, to assure and solidify collaborative relationships, and inform all personnel, to be prepared for disease containment operations and support.

1.B.6. This MARADMIN aligns with validating Disease Containment and Installation CBRNE Protection Plans IAW references F and J.

2. Mission. The U.S. Marine Corps will prepare for potential outbreaks of 2019-nCoV. If an outbreak occurs, the Marine Corps mitigates, responds, and recovers from the effects in order to maintain force readiness.

3. Execution.

3.A. Commander's Intent.

3.A.1. Method.

3.A.1.A. Plan, and take preparatory and precautionary actions to ensure that an outbreak of 2019-nCoV does not incapacitate Marine Corps forces, installations, and facilities. If 2019-nCoV is introduced on USMC installations and facilities, or within the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), execute plans and procedures to improve Force Health Protection (FHP) and readiness.
3.A.1.B. Planning will address protection of all Marines, government civilian, contract workforce personnel, and military family members.
3.A.1.C. Planning will address FHP, both in garrison and during deployment. Per reference E, the following prescriptive measures must be adhered to:
3.A.1.C.1. Identify all Marines returning from mainland China after 2 February 2020 and place service members under a 14-day restriction of movement (ROM).
3.A.1.C.2. During the 14-day ROM:
3.A.1.C.2.A. Restrict Marines to their residence for a 14-day ROM period,

starting from the day of departure from mainland China.

3.A.1.C.2.B. Marines will be assessed by cognizant medical staff (by phone consultation or in person), as soon as possible, within the first 24 hours of arrival to home station or their final destination, for the development of fever

or symptoms of 2019-nCoV.

3.A.1.C.2.C. Marines living in open-bay settings, or rooms with shared bathrooms and/or kitchen facilities, will be placed in separate lodging to span the 14-day ROM period. The command to which the Marine is assigned will arrange for the separate lodging.

3.A.1.C.2.D. Marines will be assessed daily for fever and symptoms by cognizant medical staff (by phone consultation or in person). For all in-person assessments of members, (including those which are asymptomatic), medical personnel should wear appropriate PPE.

3.A.1.C.2.E. Marines will separate themselves from other people in the home/dwelling if residing with roommates/family members to avoid sharing personal items, to the extent possible pursuant to existing guidance.

3.A.1.C.2.F. Marines may not travel, visit public/crowded areas, or use public transportation and should avoid interaction with pets or other animals, to the greatest extent possible.

3.A.1.C.2.G. Medical evaluation and care will be immediately arranged if the Marine displays fever and symptoms consistent with the 2019-nCoV, as per CDC guidance.

3.A.1.C.2.G.1. The Marine will call ahead before going to a medical treatment facility (MTF), informing the MTF of his/her symptoms and travel history. 3.A.1.C.2.G.2. MTF staff should follow CDC guidance when assessing Marines who display fever and symptoms consistent with 2019-nCoV.

3.A.1.C.2.G.3. If a Marine or Sailor is identified as a patient, per previously published guidance, appropriate reporting will be initiated.

3.A.1.C.3. Until further notice, it is recommended that civilian employees and contractor personnel, and family members returning from China follow existing CDC guidance. Key aspects include voluntarily: remaining at home, avoiding congregate settings, limiting close contact with people and pets/other animals to the greatest extent possible, avoiding travel, self-monitoring, and seeking immediate medical care if symptoms develop.

3.A.1.C.4. Potentially affected personnel will be identified in coordination with Federal, State, and local medical planners, healthcare providers, and Public Health Emergency Officers (PHEOs). Actions will mitigate the spread of 2019-nCoV to unaffected personnel.

3.B. End State. The U.S. Marine Corps is postured to mitigate, contain, respond to, and recover from the effects of a public health crisis, and is capable of conducting assigned missions in a pandemic environment.

3.C. Concept of Operations. The concept of operations in response to a viral disease crisis retains the phased approach structure outlined in NORTHCOM CONPLAN 3551, IAW reference I.

3.D. Tasks.

3.D.1. Commanders will:

3.D.1.A. Review, update, and validate existing disease containment plans and

policies in order to implement procedures for response, isolation, quarantine, restriction of movement, and community-based intervention.

3.D.1.B. Restrict travel and movement of personnel to areas experiencing 2019nCoV outbreaks. Provide appropriate medical and non-medical screening of, and protection for, personnel returning from affected areas. Monitoring and screening of individuals potentially exposed to 2019-nCoV should be based on the guidance set forth in reference E.

3.D.1.C. Develop measures to contain and treat U.S. service members DOD employees, contract employees, and family members exposed to, or possibly exposed to 2019-nCoV.

3.D.1.D. Interim guidance and recommendations for reporting, testing and specimen collection can be found at the CDC website:

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/HCP/clinical-criteria.html.

3.D.1.E. IAW reference K, report suspected cases of Marines and Sailors meeting the CDC's definition of a patient or confirmed cases of 2019-nCoV through service and combatant command reporting channels, and to COMMARFORNORTH for tracking and reporting to CDRUSNORTHCOM. OPREP-3 and/or SIR formatting guidance is contained in reference L.

3.D.1.F. Ensure DCP is incorporated into COOP plans, including continuity of essential services.

3.D.1.G. Coordinate with MTFs in development and execution of DCP responses. 3.D.1.H. Commanders will protect personally identifiable information and protected health information, as applicable, in accordance with U.S Law and DoD regulations and policies.

3.D.1.I. Coordinate with Navy Regional Medical Command to request PHEO support. 3.D.1.J. Become familiar with authority to declare a public health emergency, restrict movement, quarantine and isolate. Coordinate with Federal, State, local, and military treatment facilities and public health emergency officials outlined in Section 3 of reference B.

3.D.1.K. Validate Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Disease Containment Response Plans for 2019-nCoV that incorporate the requirements of this MARADMIN.3.D.2. Coordinating Instructions.

3.D.2.A. The U.S. Marine Corps will follow CDC guidance for healthcare providers at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/clinical-criteria.html. Additional reference material for protective equipment that may go beyond current CDC guidelines are available at: https://health.mil/Reference-Center/Policies/2018/09/25/Personal-Protective-Equipment-Policy-Guidance. Due to the dynamic nature of this outbreak, individuals should frequently check the CDC 2019-nCoV website for additional updates at:

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html.

4. Administration and Logistics. This MARADMIN has been coordinated with HQMC Operations Division, HQMC, Health Services – Preventive Medicine, and HQMC Judge Advocate.

 Command and Signal. A. Command. This MARADMIN applies to the Total Force. B. Signal. This MARADMIN is effective immediately.
 Release authorized by SES Randy R. Smith, Assistant Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies and Operations (Security).//

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-4000



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PERSONNEL AND READINESS

> MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

> SUBJECT: Force Health Protection (Supplement 2) - Department of Defense Guidance for Military Installation Commanders' Risk-Based Measured Responses to the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak

Novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) continues to spread and is an increasing force health protection (FHP) threat in areas where Department of Defense (DoD) personnel live and work. As the leading U.S. Government public health agency, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) continues to assess the risk of COVID-19 and provide guidance for those residing in the United States and traveling abroad. Some CDC COVID-19 guidance may have limited applicability for military installation commanders (hereafter "military commanders"), particularly those outside the United States, because CDC guidance is principally directed toward persons residing in the United States and does not apply to other sovereign nations. While the DoD continues to follow CDC's lead, additional military specific measures are authorized by current policy when needed to mitigate risk to U.S. forces stationed around the world and to protect Service members, DoD civilian employees and contractor personnel, and family members.

DoD Instruction (DoDI) 6200.03 "Public Health Emergency Management Within the DoD," dated March 28, 2019, provides military commanders with policy applicable to an outbreak of this kind. This memorandum serves as a COVID-19 specific supplement to the DoDI 6200.03 and outlines a risk-based framework to guide planning, posture, and actions under DoDI 6200.03 needed to protect DoD personnel and support mission assurance.

A risk-based framework for geographic areas with COVID-19 transmission is organized by areas exhibiting the following characteristics: (a) Community transmission beginning, (b) Increased community transmission, (c) Sustained community transmission, and (d) Widespread community transmission. DoD commanders may use this risk-based framework to help guide their response to COVID-19. This outbreak is dynamic and manifests differently by location, setting, population, and individual. As a result, responses to COVID-19 will need to be flexible, tailored, and incremental.

Military commanders outside the United States have unique geographic constraints and operational considerations for FHP. They must act in accordance with relevant host nation (HN) and allied forces standards as applicable. CDC country specific Travel Health Notice (THN) levels for COVID-19 may be found at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/index.html.

Consistent with DoDI 6200.03, the following risk-based measures may be considered by military commanders in consultation with CDC and with consideration of THNs, Department of State Travel Advisories, and applicable HN disease mitigation actions:

- Prior to community transmission.
 - a. Review and update the installation health protection condition (HPCON) framework per DoDI 6200.03 and align with appropriate response measures below.
 - b. Maximize proportion of workforce that can perform their duties via telework.
 - c. Identify mission essential personnel who must report to duty during an outbreak.
- Community transmission beginning.
 - a. Re-emphasize avoiding contact with sick people, practicing proper hand hygiene, and cough/sneeze etiquette.
 - b. Communicate to personnel how and when to report illness and seek care for potential influenza-like illness.
- Increased community transmission.
 - a. Continue all measures from previous risk level, and consider adding the following:
 - b. Restrict Service member travel to affected communities and advise civilian employees and family members of risk.
 - c. Re-scope or modify exercises in affected areas to limit risk to DoD personnel.
 - d. Institute clearly defined personal protective equipment (PPE) posture for high risk personnel.
- Sustained community transmission.
 - a. Continue all measures from previous risk level, and consider adding the following:
 - b. Consider declaring a local Public Health Emergency.
 - c. Consider limiting access to the installation.
 - d. Consider cancelling large public gathering events on the installation.
 - e. Re-scope, modify, or potentially cancel exercises.
 - f. Approve leave and travel to this area on a case-by-case basis.
 - g. If outside the United States and considering authorized and ordered departure actions, coordinate through their respective Combatant Command (CCMD) or Military Department headquarters, and the Joint Staff and OSD to align with Department of State (DoS), which is the approval authority.

- Widespread community transmission.
 - a. Continue all measures from previous risk level, and consider adding the following:
 - b. Strongly consider declaring a local Public Health Emergency.
 - c. Consider restriction of movement consistent with DoDI 6200.03 (potentially to include quarantine, isolation, canceling public gatherings, avoiding congregate settings, and practicing social distancing)
 - d. Consider limiting access to the installation.
 - e. Distribute PPE as appropriate.
 - f. Cancel non-mission essential activities.
 - g. Re-scope, modify, or potentially cancel exercises.
 - h. Maximize telework.
 - i. Cancel all non-essential leave and travel to this area.
 - j. Coordinate authorized and ordered departure actions through their respective CCMD or Military Department headquarters, and the Joint Staff and OSD to align with the DoS.
 - k. Implement quarantine, consistent with applicable procedures, for persons/units returning from this area to a lower risk area.
 - 1. Consider other restrictions of movement for persons critical to national security functions.

These potential military commander response measures are included in the attached Table 1. My point of contact for this guidance is COL Jennifer M. Kishimori who may be reached at (703) 681-8179 or jennifer.m.kishimori.mil@mail.mil.

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Matthew P. Donovan Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

Attachment: As stated

Level	Description		Recommended Military Commander Response Measures
Routine	Prior to community transmission.	p, a	Review and update the installation HPCON framework per DoDI 6200.03 and align with appropriate response measures below. Maximize proportion of workforce that can perform their duties via telework.
Limited	Community transmission beginning. There are instances of people who have been infected, including some who may not be sure how or where they became infected	p a	Re-emphasize avoiding contact with sick people, practicing proper hand hygiene, and cough/sneeze etiquette. Communicate to personnel how and when to report illness and seek care for potential influenza-
Moderate	Increased community transmission. People have been infected with the virus in more than one location, but how or where they became infected may not be known.	de c. p.a.	Continue all measures from previous risk level, and consider adding the following: Restrict Service member travel to affected communities and advise DoD civilian employees and contractor personnel, and family members of risk. Re-scope or modify exercises in affected areas to limit risk to U.S. personnel.
Substantial	Sustained community transmission. People have been infected with the virus, but how or where they became infected may not be known, and the spread is ongoing.	شاب ت ب م	Continue all measures from previous risk level, and consider adding the following: Consider declaring a local Public Health Emergency. Consider limiting access to the installation. Consider limiting access to the installation. Consider cancelling large public gathering events on the installation. Re-scope, modify, or potentially cancel exercises. Approve leave and travel to this area on a case-by-case basis. If outside the United States and considering authorized and ordered departure actions, coordinate through their respective CCMD or Military Department headquarters, and the Joint Staff and OSD to align with the DoS, which is the approval authority.
Enclosure (29) Page 4 of 4	Widespread community transmission. People have been infected with the virus, but how or where they became infected may not be known; the spread is ongoing and includes the majority of regions.	ھتى تى مەھىنى مەت تە تە	Continue all measures from previous risk level, and consider adding the following: Strongly consider declaring a local Public Health Emergency. Consider restriction of movement consistent with DoDI 6200.03 (potentially to include quarantine, isolation, canceling public gatherings, avoiding congregate settings, practicing social distancing). Consider limiting access to the installation. Distribute PPE as appropriate. Cancel non-mission essential activities. Re-scope, modify, or potentially cancel exercises. Maximize telework. Coordinate authorized and ordered departure actions through their respective CCMD or Military Department headquarters, and the Joint Staff and OSD to align with the DoS. Implement quarantine, consistent with applicable procedures, for persons/units returning from this area to a lower risk area.



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

3/11/2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Travel Restrictions for DoD Components in Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019

- References: (a) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, "Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 4) – "Department of Defense Guidance for Personnel Traveling During the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak" March 11, 2020
 - (b) DoD Instruction 6200.03, "Public Health Emergency Management within the DoD," March 28, 2019

This memorandum applies to all DoD uniformed and civilian personnel and their sponsored family members not under the responsibility of a U.S. Chief of Mission.

Effective March 13, 2020, all DoD uniformed personnel, civilian personnel and family members traveling to, from, or through Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Travel Health Notices Level 3 (COVID-19) designated locations, will stop movement for the next 60 days. This includes all forms of official travel, including Permanent Change of Station, Temporary Duty, and government-funded leave. For DoD uniformed personnel, this also includes personal leave and other non-official travel. DoD travelers should carefully plan travel to ensure their scheduled flights do not transit through or originate in Level 3 designated locations. Authorized Departures are delayed until appropriate transportation and reception procedures are in place for their intended route of travel as prescribed in this memorandum.

Effective March 13, 2020, and for the 60 days thereafter, concurrent official travel for family members of DoD uniformed personnel and civilian personnel is denied to CDC Travel Health Notices Level 2 (COVID-19) designated locations. Additionally, until the travel restrictions prescribed above are lifted, DoD civilian personnel hiring actions for positions in Level 2 and Level 3 designated locations are postponed for non-essential civilian personnel who have not yet begun travel.

Also effective March 13, 2020, DoD Components must determine whether official travel by DoD personnel to locations other than CDC Travel Health Notices Level 3 designated locations is mission essential and must defer non-mission essential travel. Mission-essential travel refers to work that must be performed to ensure the continued operations of missionessential functions, as determined by the DoD Component.

Exceptions may be granted in writing to the guidance contained herein for compelling cases where the travel is: (1) determined to be mission essential; (2) necessary for humanitarian reasons; (3) warranted due to extreme hardship. Approval authority for these exceptions belongs to the Combatant Commander if the individual is assigned to a combatant command. The Secretary of the Military Department concerned and the Chief Management Officer in the case of Defense Field Activities and Field Agencies retain the authority for all other individuals. This

authority may be delegated in writing no lower than the first general or flag officer or member of the Senior Executive Service in the traveler's chain of command or supervision. These exceptions are to be done on a case by case basis, shall be limited in number, and shall be coordinated between the gaining and losing organizations. Individuals pending retirement or separation within the next 60 days are exempt. Individuals traveling under an exception or exemption, including those traveling as part of a Department of State-issued Authorized Departure, are subject to travel screening protocols as provided in reference (a).

These actions give preeminence to the safety and security of our personnel and their families. During the next 60 days, the Department will take several measures to enhance traveler safety. Each of your organizations, as applicable, shall take immediate action to:

- Establish pre- and post- travel screening and reception procedures for all travelers as provided in reference (a), to include providing members or civilian employees information regarding prescribed actions for them and their family members given their particular circumstances;
- Establish a means of communication with all personnel throughout the reception process until they are allowed to resume their normal duties;
- Transition to military or DoD contracted aircraft for DoD sponsored travelers coming from or going to CDC Level 3 or Level 2 designated areas, to the greatest extent practical; and
- Inform all travelers of their responsibility to contact their gaining organization in advance of travel and to keep the organization updated on their travel itinerary.

Refer to the latest Force Health Protection Supplement for all areas not specifically addressed by this guidance (https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Spotlight/Coronavirus/).

Our understanding of COVID-19 is rapidly evolving, and this guidance will be continuously evaluated as conditions warrant. Component heads should ensure this guidance is clearly communicated to those affected by these changes to travel policy.

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ROUTINE

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SUBJ/VECTOR 15 FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE FOR DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY//

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REF/C/MEMO/OSD/25FEB20//

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REF/L/MARADMIN/082-20//

REF/M/MARADMIN/150-20//

NARR/REF A IS MEMO FROM UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS PROVIDING FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL RETURNING FROM CHINA DURING THE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) OUTBREAK. REF B IS SUPPLEMENT 1 TO REF A. REF C IS SUPPLEMENT 2 TO REF A. REF D IS SUPPLEMENT 4 TO REF A AND REF E. REF E IS MEMO FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SECDEF) PROVIDING GUIDANCE TO TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) COMPONENTS IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19. REF F IS A MEMO FROM DIRECTOR OF JOINT STAFF TO JOINT STAFF PERSONNEL. REF G IS THE JOINT STAFF GENERAL ADMIN ON THE COVID-19. REF H IS THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (OPM) PRELIMINARY GUIDANCE TO AGENCIES DURING COVID-19. REF I IS NAVADMIN 033/20, WHICH IS THE OPNAV REPORTING GUIDANCE SUPPORTING DOD RESPONSE TO COVID-19 OUTBREAK. REF J IS NAVADMIN 058/20 IS AN UPDATED NAVY GUIDANCE DURING THE COVID-19 OUTBREAK. REF K IS NAVADMIN 039/20 AN UPDATED DOD GUIDANCE FOR MONITORING PERSONNEL RETURNING FROM CHINA DURING THE COVID-19 OUTBREAK. REF L IS MARADMIN 082/20 THE U.S. MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR

Enclosure (31) Page 1 of 4

COVID-19. REF M IS MARADMIN 150/20 THE U.S. MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR COVID-19; COMMANDERS RISK-BASED MEASURED RESPONSES.

RMKS/1. This ALNAV provides guidance to Department of the Navy (DON) personnel and commands on the COVID-19 outbreak and is subject to additional guidance provided by the SECDEF. Anticipate modifications to this policy over the next several weeks as more information becomes available. The COVID-19 outbreak continues, with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reporting over 100,000 cases worldwide, to include over 1,000 cases in the United States.

2. Effective 13 March 2020, all DON personnel, including, active, reserve, civilian, and foreign military under DON authority, shall comply with this guidance to mitigate the risk of further transmission of COVID-19. Our priority is to ensure the welfare and safety of DON personnel and their families, and to ensure mission readiness and success.

3. Individual and Workplace Preventative Measures. During the COVID-19 outbreak, the DoD will continue to protect and preserve the operational effectiveness of forces worldwide in accordance with utilizing Force Health Protection Guidance (FHPG) from the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness provided in references (a) through (e), FHPG for the Joint Staff references (f) and (g), and preliminary Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance to agencies during COVID-19 reference (h).

In accordance with references (a) and (d), the following guidelines will help minimize the spread of COVID-19:

a. Appropriately wash hands with soap and water for at least 20 seconds. If soap and water are unavailable, use an alcohol-based hand sanitizer that contains at least 60 percent alcohol.

b. Avoid touching eyes, nose, and mouth.

c. Avoid close contact with those who are sick.

d. Cover your cough or sneeze with a tissue or sleeve.

e. Clean and disinfect frequently touched objects and surfaces using an appropriate disinfectant cleaning solution.

f. Minimize large group meetings or gatherings and implement social distancing, by maintaining six feet or two meter distance from others when possible.

g. Personnel who have symptoms of acute respiratory illness shall remain home until they are free of fever (100.4of or 37.8oc or greater using an oral thermometer) without the use of medication.

h. Personnel who arrive at work and appear to have acute respiratory illness symptoms will be separated from other employees and sent home. DON military and civilian employees should be placed on sick leave or annual leave or if able, allowed to telework if the employee is telework ready.

4. Official and Personal Travel:

a. Official Travel: Effective immediately travel to, from, or through Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) CDC Travel Health Notice (THN) level 3 locations is prohibited. Mission essential travel to locations other than CDC THN level 3 locations is permitted. Defer non-mission essential travel to all locations until further notice.

b. Authority to Waive Policy: Waiver authority of the policies delineated in this guidance, when mission critical, is delegated to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and/or their designees but not below the level of General Officer, Flag Officer, or Senior Executive Service for approval.

c. Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) and Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Travel: All military and civilian personnel on TAD and PCS orders to, from, or through OCONUS CDC THN level 3 locations are on hold until further notice. Gaining and detaching commands should use authorities such as delay travel or temporary duty travel on a case-by-case basis in order to decrease the financial impact to Service Members delayed due to this policy. Service Members should be placed in a telework, sick-in-quarters, or other nonchargeable leave status for the duration of the hold. d. DON Military Personnel: Personal or government-funded leave with

travel to, from, or through OCONUS CDC THN level 3 locations is not authorized. Waiver authority designees may approve exceptions for personal travel to, from, or through OCONUS CDC THN level 3 locations.

e. DON Civilian Employees: Official travel to, from, or through OCONUS CDC THN level 3 locations is not authorized for DoD civilian employees. DON civilian employees with approved leave to OCONUS CDC THN level 1, 2, or 3 may continue to travel to their desired locations but should be advised of the health risk they may assume and requirements outlined in paragraph 5. Upon return from approved leave, DON civilian employees who are telework ready may be asked to telework for 14 days or more in order to ensure they have not been exposed to the virus. Civilian personnel hiring actions for positions in CDC THN level 2 and level 3 designated locations are postponed for nonessential civilian personnel until restrictions are lifted.

f. Family Members: Concurrent official travel for family members of Service Members and civilian personnel is denied to CDC THN level 2 and 3 locations for the next 60 days. Early return of dependent request process and approval authority remain consistent with current policies.

g. Retiring or Separating Service Members Within the Next 60 Days: These restrictions do not apply to retiring or separating Service Members unless there is a need for self-quarantine per CDC guidelines.

h. Waivers or Exemption: Individuals traveling under a waiver or exemption remain subject to travel screening protocols. Waivers may be granted, by waiver authority, for compelling cases where the travel is: (1) determined to be mission essential; (2) necessary for humanitarian reasons; and (3) warranted due to extreme hardship. Waivers are to be done on a caseby-case basis, shall be limited in number, and shall be coordinated between the gaining and losing organizations.

i. DON travelers should carefully plan travel to ensure their scheduled flights do not transit through or originate in OCONUS CDC THN level 2 or 3 locations. Travel on military aircraft shall ensure a screening of personnel is conducted at the point of embarkation. At a minimum:

(1) Questionnaire to assess risk of exposure;

- (2) Temperature check; and
- (3) Visual check for signs and symptoms of COVID-19.

j. DON personnel traveling to or from a non-CDC THN level 2 or 3 location will inform their immediate supervisor of their travel itinerary and a history of all locations traveled through and visited.

k. Transition to military or DoD contracted aircraft for DoD sponsored travelers coming from or going to CDC level 2 or 3 designated areas, to the greatest extent practical.

5. DON military and civilian personnel who have returned in the past 14 days from countries or areas identified as OCONUS CDC THN level 2 or 3 locations, or who have had close contact with someone with a confirmed infection of COVID-19, will immediately notify their supervisor following service specific guidelines: Navy see references (i) through (k) and Marine Corps see references (l) through (m). Minimum self-quarantine procedures must follow CDC issued guidelines at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov. Civilians subject to quarantine who are telework ready may be asked to telework. Employees who are not telework ready may be granted weather and safety leave in accordance with OPM guidance.

6. Pursuant to DoD and service regulations and policies, commands will maximize the proportion of the workforce who may be eligible to perform their duties via telework by ensuring appropriate personnel have a completed telework agreement in place in accordance with command policy. Leadership will identify and inform all military and civilian personnel designated as mission essential who must report to duty during an outbreak.

7. Foreign Visits: Consistent with Joint Chiefs of Staff policy, all foreign visits are cancelled until further notice. Exceptions may be granted by CMC, CNO, and/or their designated representative(s).

https://www.mynavyhr.navy.mil/Portals/55/Messages/ALNAV/ALN2020/ALN20025.txt

8. All daily reporting requirements outlined in the above references will be followed unless modified or cancelled by the appropriate organization.

9. Released by the Honorable Thomas B. Modly, Acting Secretary of the Navy.// $\!\!\!$

BT #0001 NNNN UNCLASSIFIED//

UPDATE #2: U.S MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19); TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS AND PERSONNEL GUIDANCE FOR TRAVEL

Date Signed: 3/12/2020 | MARADMINS Number: 162/20

MARADMINS : 162/20

130130Z MAR 20 MARADMIN 162/20 MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC PPO// SUBJ/UPDATE #2: U.S MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19); TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS AND PERSONNEL GUIDANCE FOR TRAVEL// REF/A/MSGID: MEMO: SECDEF: 20200311// REF/B/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20200307// REF/C/MSGID: DOC: OUSD(P&R): 20200310 FHP#3// REF/D/MSGID: DOC: OUSD(P&R): 20200311 FHP#4// REF/E/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20200211// REF/F/MSGID: MSG/YMD: 20200225// REF/G/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20190328// REF/H/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20130807// REF/I/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 051908Z MAR 20 REF/J/MSGID: DOC/DTG: 030003ZFEB20// REF/K/MSGID: DOC/DTG: 132345ZFEB20// REF/L/MSGID: DOC/6220.2/20171204// REF/M/MSGID: DOC:OUSD(P&R): 20200308// REF/N/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20180905// REF/O/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20200312//

NARR/REF A OUTLINES TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FOR DOD COMPONENTS IN RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019. REF B IS MARADMIN 150/20, UPDATE #1 U.S. MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS. REF C IS OUSD (P&R) FORCE HEATLH PROTECTION GUIDANCE (SUPPLEMENT 3) DOD GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT. REF D IS OUSD (P&R) FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE (SUPPLEMENT 4) DOD GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL TRAVEL DURING THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK. REF E IS MARADMIN 082/20, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS. REF F IS UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS) MEMORANDUM ON FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION (FHP) SUPPLEMENT 2, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE FOR MILITARY INSTALLATION COMMANDERS' RISK-BASED MEASURED RESPONSES TO THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK. REF G IS DOD INSTRUCTION 6200.03, PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE DOD. REF H IS MCO 3504.2A, OPERATIONS EVENT INCIDENT REPORT (OPREP-3) REPORTING. REF I IS JOINT STAFF MESSAGE FOR DOD COVID-19 PASSENGER SCREENING GUIDELINES FOR OVERSEAS MILITARY TRANSPORTATION TERMINALS. REF J IS HOMC CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE EXORD. REF K IS FRAGO 001 TO HOMC RESPONSE TO NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK EXORD. REF L IS MCO 6220.2 DISEASE CONTAINMENT PLANNING GUIDANCE. REF M IS OUSD (P&R) MEMO ON CIVILIAN PERSONNEL GUIDANCE FOR DOD COMPONENTS IN RESPONDING TO CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019. REF N IS MCO 12271.1 MARINE TELEWORK POLICY FOR CIVILIAN MARINES. REF M IS ALNAV 025/20 VECTOR 15 FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE FOR DON.

POC1/JAMES CARTER/LTCOL/UNIT: PP&O POC/F/TEL: (703) 571-1015/NIPR EMAIL: <u>JAMES.L.CARTER@USMC.MIL//</u> POC2/HQMC Watch Officer/TEL: (703) 695-5454/NIPR E-MAIL: <u>HQMC.MCC2@USMC.MIL//</u>

GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. This MARADMIN provides supplemental COVID-19 guidance to MARADMINs 082/20 and 150/20, by providing an update on travel restrictions and force health protection guidance.

1.A. Background.

1.A.1. Per reference B, the continuing spread of COVID-19 is an increasing Force Health Protection (FHP) threat in regions where DoD personnel live and work U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) continues to assess the risk of COVID-19 and provide guidance for those residing in the United States and traveling abroad. Per reference A and D, DOD has updated travel restrictions for all personnel traveling into and out of CDC Threat Health Notice (THN) Level 3 and 2 areas. Reference D also includes and provided preand post-travel health guidance to the force to enable mission assurance FHP. Travel updates can be found at https:(slash)(slash)wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices. 2. Mission. No Change. All commands will take specific actions to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 worldwide and adhere to the reporting instructions contained in this MARADMIN.

3. Execution.

3.A. Commander's Intent.

3.A.1. Purpose. Promulgate updated CMC guidance to the force for travel

restrictions and pre- and post-travel health procedures in order to reduce the risk of further exposure to, or spread of, COVID-19.

3.A.2. Method. No Change

3.A.3. End State. No Change

3.B. Concept of Operations. The Marine Corps will institute the guidance contained in this MARADMIN, and comply with the travel, permanent change of station (PCS), temporary duty (TDY), leave, and professional military education restrictions contained herein. This MARADMIN applies to all Marines and their sponsored family members not under the responsibility of a U.S. Chief of Mission. Guidance for rotational deployments and redeployments will be addressed SEPCOR.

3.C. Tasks. Commanders will:

3.C.1. Review and comply with tasks outlined in reference A, B, C, D and E.
3.C.2. Institute the following travel restrictions and screening guidance:
3.C.2.A. Effective 13 March 2020, all Marines and their family members
traveling to, from, or through CDC THN Level 3 (COVID 19) designated locations
will stop movement for the next 60 days. This includes all forms of official
travel, including permanent change of station (PCS), temporary duty (TDY), and
government-funded leave. For Marines, this also includes personal leave and
other non-official travel. Marines should carefully plan travel to ensure their
scheduled flights do not transit through or originate in THN Level 3 designated

3.C.2.B. Effective 13 March 2020, and for the next 60 days, concurrent official travel for family members of Marines is denied into CDC THN Level 2 (COVID 19) designated locations.

3.C.2.C. Inform Marines who travel that they are responsible to contact their gaining organization in advance of travel and to keep the organization updated on their travel itinerary. Detaching and gaining commands shall make every effort to contact affected members en-route to and from their command to advise them of this message. In both cases, affected Marines shall report their status and contact information to their respective assignment monitor.

3.C.2.D. Effective immediately, determine whether official travel by Marines to locations other than CDC THN Level 3 locations is mission essential and defer all non-mission essential travel. Mission-essential travel refers to work that must be performed to ensure the continued operations of mission-essential functions, as determined by the first General Officer or SES in the chain of command.

3.C.2.E. Civilian personnel hiring actions for positions in CDC THN Level 2 or 3 designated locations are postponed for non-essential civilian personnel who have not yet begun travel until the travel restrictions described above are lifted.

3.C.2.F. Review leave and liberty plans to ensure Marines are not traveling to Level CDC THN Level 2 or 3 locations. Marines assigned to commands within a CDC

THN Level 3 country will defer travel within that country until further notice, unless an exception is granted by an appropriate authority per para 3.C.2.H.1. and 3.C.2.H.2 below. 3.C.2.G. Exemptions. Marines pending retirement or separation within the next 60 days may proceed in accordance with their official orders. 3.C.2.H. Exceptions. Exceptions may be granted to these restrictions for compelling cases where the travel is: (1) determined to be mission essential; (2) necessary for humanitarian reasons; (3) warranted due to extreme hardship. 3.C.2.H.1. Approval authority for these exceptions belongs to the Combatant Commander if the Marinel is assigned to a combatant command. 3.C.2.H.2. For service retained personnel, approval authority for these exceptions is delegated from the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the first General Officer or member of the Senior Executive Service (SES) in the Marine's chain of command. 3.C.2.H.3. Exceptions are to be done on a case-by-case basis, shall be limited in number, and shall be coordinated between the gaining and losing organizations. 3.C.2.H.4. Individuals traveling under an exception or exemption, including those traveling as part of a Department of State-issued authorized departure, are subject to travel screening protocols as provided in reference D. 3.C.2.H.5. Department of State-issued authorized departures from CDC THN Level 3 locations are delayed until appropriate transportation and reception procedures are in place as prescribed in reference A. **3.C.2.H.6.** Requests for waivers not included in this message must be submitted to DC M&RA (MMOA/MMEA/RAM) via the Marine's first General Officer or SES in their operational chain of command. 3.C.2.I. Screening and Reception Procedures: Ensure Installation and Marine Corps Air Station Commanders, in conjunction with tenant commanders, establish pre- and post-travel screening and reception procedures for all travelers traveling to and from a location designated by a CDC THN Level 2 or higher, to include providing the member or civilian employee information regarding prescribed actions for them and their family members given their particular circumstances. At a minimum this shall consist of a questionnaire to assess risk of exposure, temperature check (greater than 100.4F or 38C), and visual check for signs and symptoms of fever, coughing or shortness of breath, per CDC guidelines. A secondary medical evaluation by a health professional may be warranted. Commanders shall also be prepared to appropriately manage a patient under investigation if such a determination is made, to include referral to the appropriate medical authority. Guidance to support questionnaire development can be found at https:(slash)(slash)www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/riskassessment.html. 3.C.2.I.1. Ensure compliance with pre- and post- travel screening and reception procedures for all travelers within their command who are traveling to and from

a CDC THN Level 2 or higher location.

3.C.2.I.2. Ensure procedures include travel by military or commercial means as well as private conveyance and includes all forms of travel to include unit deployments and redeployments, permanent change of station, temporary duty, and leave.

3.C.2.I.3 Establish communication protocols with all personnel throughout the reception process until they are allowed to resume their normal duties.

3.C.2.I.4. Transition to military or DoD contracted aircraft for DoD sponsored travelers coming or going to CDC THN Level 2 or Level 3 areas to the greatest extent practical.

3.C.2.I.5. Screening and restriction of movement guidelines detailed in coordinating instructions.

3.C.2.J. Professional Military Education (PME).

3.C.2.J.1. Ensure Marines stationed in CDC THN Level 2 countries who are scheduled to attend CONUS Professional Military Education (PME) for six (6) months or less, in a training status, postpone PME travel plans until further notice.

3.C.2.J.2. Ensure Marines stationed in countries with a CDC THN Level 2 who are scheduled to attend CONUS PME for six (6) months or longer, arrive fourteen (14) days early for screening and appropriate restriction of movement.

3.C.2.J.3. Ensure foreign military personnel from CDC THN Level 2 countries who are scheduled to attend, but have not yet arrived for, PME in CONUS for six (6) months less, postpone travel until further notice.

3.C.2.J.4. Ensure foreign military personnel from CDC THN Level 2 countries, who are scheduled to attend PME in CONUS for six(6) months or longer, but have not yet arrived for, PME in CONUS for six (6) months or longer, arrive fourteen (14) days early to the Training and Education Command for screening and restriction of movement.

3.C.2.J.5. Ensure foreign military personnel under DoD authorities from countries with a CDC THN Level 2 for COVID-19, scheduled to arrive, but who have not yet arrived pursuant to a professional exchange program(PEP) or foreign liaison program (LnO) arrive 14 days early to their assigned unit for screening and restriction of movement.

3.C.2.K. Commanders must closely scrutinize what large gatherings such as school graduations should be curtailed or modified.

3.D. Coordinating Instructions.

3.D.1. Pre- and Post-Screening Procedures. The following are the minimal standards for screening and restriction of movement for Marines and Sailors returning to CONUS or OCONUS bases and installations.

3.D.1.A. Actions prior to departure/exit screening:

3.D.1.A.1. Commanders shall emphasize each individual's responsibility to avoid travel when sick. Commanders will monitor Marines scheduled for travel and cancel or delay travel if the Marine display symptoms of COVID 19.

3.D.1.A.2. Commanders will consider the risk profile of the traveler (e.g., older individuals or those with underlying health conditions). They will also limit travel to those individuals to those who are healthy to the greatest extent possible. For civilian personnel, these considerations must be consistent with the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended. 3.D.1.A.3. For travel on military aircraft, commanders will follow installation guidelines and guidelines defined in reference I.

3.D.1.A.4. Travel on commercial air carriers may not include exit screening of travelers. Consequently, commanders will plan for the appropriate action to ensure appropriate screening is completed.

3.D.1.B. Actions upon arrival from a CDC THN Level 2 or Level 3 location: 3.D.1.B.1. Effective 13 March 2020, commanders must identify all Marines and their dependents who travel or have traveled in the previous 14 days to or through a CDC THN Level 2 or higher country. This includes travel by military or commercial means as well as private conveyance, and includes all forms of travel, such as permanent change of station, temporary duty, and leave. Commanders must place these Marines under a 14-day restriction of movement (ROM). Dependents will also be encouraged to restrict their movement for 14 days. During the ROM (starting from the day of departure from the CDC THN Level 2 or higher country):

3.D.1.B.2. Marines will be restricted to their residence or other appropriate domicile for 14 days and avoid prolonged close contact (within 6 feet) with others.

3.D.1.B.3. Marines will self-monitor for the development of fever or symptoms of COVID-19 as described by CDC.

3.D.1.B.4. Marines living in open-bay settings, or rooms with shared bathrooms and/or kitchen facilities, will be placed in separate lodging to span the 14-day ROM period. Commanders will arrange and fund separate lodging if needed. 3.D.1.B.5. Marines will separate themselves from other people in the home or dwelling if residing in non-government provided quarters with roommates or family members and avoid sharing personal items. Personnel should adhere to force health protection (FHP) guidance to the maximum extent practicable (wash hands regularly for at least 20 seconds, utilize hand sanitizer, avoid sharing cups and utensils, cough/sneeze into a tissue and then dispose of it, maintain as safe a distance as is practicable).

3.D.1.B.6. Marines will not travel, visit public or crowded areas, or use public transportation and should avoid interaction with pets or other animals. 3.D.1.B.7. For any in-person assessments of Marines (including asymptomatic service members), medical personnel shall apply CDC guidance to include wearing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE). Medical evaluation and care should be immediately arranged if the Marine displays fever and symptoms consistent with COVID-19, as per CDC guidance.

3.D.1.B.8. The Marine will call ahead before going to a medical treatment

facility, informing them of symptoms and travel history.

3.D.1.B.9. Medical staff shall follow CDC guidance when assessing individuals displaying fever and symptoms consistent with COVID-19.

3.D.1.C. Actions upon arrival from a non-CDC THN Level 2 or higher CONUS or OCONUS location:

3.D.1.C.1. Effective 13 March 2020, commanders shall identify and track all Marines who have traveled beyond normal local limits, either CONUS or OCONUS in the previous 14 days. This includes travel by military or commercial means as well private conveyance and includes all forms of travel to include Permanent Change of Station, Temporary Duty, and leave. Commanders shall ensure that these Service members take the following actions for the next 14 days: 3.D.1.C.2. All Marines shall implement self-observation, i.e., remain alert for fever, cough, or difficulty breathing.

3.D.1.C.3. To the extent possible implement social distancing, i.e., remain out of congregate settings, avoid mass gatherings, and maintain 6 feet distance from others when possible.

3.D.1.C.4. Immediately self-isolate, limit contact with others, and seek advice by telephone from the appropriate healthcare provider to determine whether medical evaluation is required, if individuals feel feverish or develop measured fever, cough, or difficulty breathing.

3.D.2. Actions for DoD civilian employees, contractor personnel, and dependents: It is strongly recommended that Marine civilian employees, contractor personnel, and dependents who travel to, through, and from countries with a CDC THN Level 2 or higher locations follow this guidance. Commanders shall restrict workplace access for 14 days for Marine civilian employees and contractor personnel whose travel has included CDC THN Level 2 and Level 3 locations. For all other travel, commanders will encourage self-observation and accommodate social distancing. To restrict access from the workplace and maximize telework options, commanders shall implement telework options per reference M and N. For contractor personnel, commanders shall implement measures in consultation with the appropriate contracting office.

3.D.3. Reserve Component: All RC Marines on AT orders at any OCONUS CDC THN Level 2 or 3 location must immediately contact their respective chain of command to initiate appropriate actions.

4. Administration and Logistics.

4.A. Terms and Definitions.

4.A.1. CDC Threat Health Notice (CDC THN) Level 3: Widespread sustained (ongoing) transmission. Avoid non-essential travel to the destination. The outbreak is of high risk to travelers and no precautions are available to protect against the identified increased risk.

4.A.2. CDC THN Level 2: Sustained (ongoing) community transmission. Practice enhanced precautions for this destination. The Travel Health Notice describes additional precautions added, or defines a specific at-risk population.

4.A.3. CDC THN Level 1: Risk of limited community transmission.

Practice usual precautions for this destination, as described in the Travel Health Notice and/or on the destination page. This includes being up-to-date on all recommended vaccines and practicing appropriate mosquito avoidance. 4.A.4. Confirmed positive case of COVID-19: Individual who has tested positive for the virus that causes COVID-19 in at least one respiratory specimen at the CDC laboratory.

4.A.5. Presumptive positive case of COVID-19: Individual who has tested positive for the virus that causes COVID-19 in at least one respiratory specimen, but testing was conducted at the local or state level. Requires CDC confirmation.

4.A.6. Self-monitoring: Personnel monitor themselves for fever by taking their temperatures twice a day and remain alert for cough or difficulty breathing. If they feel feverish or develop a fever, cough, or difficulty breathing during the self-monitoring period, they should self-isolate, limit contact with others, and seek advice by telephone from the appropriate healthcare provider to determine whether medical evaluation is needed.

4.A.7. Mission essential travel is defined as work that must be performed to ensure the continued operations of mission essential functions, as determined by the first General Officer or SES in the chain of command.

4.A.8. Foreign military personnel under DoD authority: all foreign military (uniformed) or defense (civilian employee) personnel visiting or assigned to USMC units or installations under an international agreement, invitational travel orders, or a foreign visit request. This includes, but is not limited to, members of the Foreign Personnel Exchange Program (PEP), international military students (IMS), foreign liaison officers (LnO), and visiting foreign military units and personnel, whether participating in training or site visits.4.B. Commanders will capture and report cost incurred for the additional screening and restriction activities.

4.C. This MARADMIN has been coordinated with HQMC, Health Services – Preventive Medicine, HQMC Judge Advocate Division, DC M&RA, DC I&L, DC P&R, DC I, DC CD&I, Marine Corps Installations Command, Communication Directorate and the Office of Legislative Affairs.

5. Command and Signal.

5.A. Command. This MARADMIN applies to the Total Force.

5.B. Signal. This MARADMIN is effective upon release. Ensure widest dissemination of ref (A, C and D).

6. This message is approved for release by LtGen G. W. Smith, Jr. Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations.//



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

CMC 12 Mar 20

WHITE LETTER 1-20

From:	Commandant of the Marine Corps
то:	All Commanding Generals
	All Commanding Officers
	All Officers in Charge
	All Senior Enlisted Leaders

Subj: PRESERVE THE FORCE; CONTINUE THE MISSION

- Ref: (a) MARADMIN 82/20
 - (b) MARADMIN 150/20
 - (c) MARADMIN 162/20

1. As the Nation's naval expeditionary force-in-readiness, the Marine Corps has a special responsibility to adapt and overcome, no matter the circumstances. Marines operate in uncertain conditions, and Marine leaders make intent-based decisions. This is what we do.

2. The response to the COVID-19 outbreak is in its early stages. Information is coming from myriad sources; guidance continues to develop; and directives cannot account for every potential circumstance. If this were a tactical situation, it would be a movement to contact - as such, we'll want to make contact with limited forces, preserve decision space and combat power, and retain our ability to react to rapidly changing circumstances.

3. Commanders must closely scrutinize what travel is mission essential, what large gatherings such as school graduations should be curtailed or modified, and take all measures to protect our Marines, Sailors and families to the greatest extent possible - commensurate with current guidance and the situation on the ground. I expect commanders and leaders at all levels to act with the preservation of their force at the forefront of their decision-making, while applying the fullest risk mitigation in continuing the mission. In this dynamic environment, it is imperative that you keep your chain of command informed and communicate regularly with your Marines, Sailors and families.

4. Expect additional guidance over the next days and weeks; this situation will take some time to resolve. Until it does, take decisive action to protect the force while continuing the mission of the Corps. We must remain always ready to respond when the Nation calls on her Corps of Marines.

David H. Berger



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

MAR 1 3 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

> SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR OF COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES DIRECTORS OF DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

- SUBJECT: Stop Movement for all Domestic Travel for DoD Components in Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019
- References: (a) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Travel Restrictions for DoD Components in Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019" March 11, 2020
 - (b) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, "Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 4) – "Department of Defense Guidance for Personnel Traveling During the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak" March 11, 2020
 - (c) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, "Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 2) – "Department of Defense Guidance for Military Installation Commander' Risk-Based Measured Responses to the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak" February 25, 2020
 - (d) DoD Instruction 6200.03, "Public Health Emergency Management within the DoD," March 28, 2019

The continuing spread of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) necessitates immediate implementation of travel restrictions for domestic Department of Defense (DoD) travel. These restrictions are necessary to preserve force readiness, limit the continuing spread of





the virus, and preserve the health and welfare of Service members, DoD civilian employees, their families, and the local communities in which we live.

This memorandum applies to all DoD military and civilian personnel and their families assigned to DoD installations, facilities, and surrounding areas in the United States and its territories. All DoD military personnel will stop movement while this memorandum is in effect. In addition, DoD civilian personnel and DoD family members, whose transportation is government-funded, will also stop movement. This policy applies to Permanent Change of Station (PCS) and Temporary Duty. Additionally, until the domestic travel restrictions prescribed above are lifted, DoD Components may only onboard civilian employees within the local commuting area, and military members are only authorized local leave in accordance with Service policies.

A travel exception may be granted in writing to the guidance contained herein for compelling cases where the travel is: (1) determined to be mission-essential; (2) necessary for humanitarian reasons; or (3) warranted due to extreme hardship. Mission-essential travel refers to work that must be performed to ensure the continued operations of mission-essential functions, as determined by the DoD Component. Approval authority for these exceptions belongs to the Combatant Commander if the individual is assigned to a combatant command; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if the individual is assigned to the Joint Staff; the Secretary of the Military Department concerned for personnel under his or her jurisdiction; or the Chief Management Officer for the Office of the Secretary for Defense, Defense Field Activities and Agencies. This authority may be delegated in writing to a level no lower than the first general officer, flag officer, or member of the Senior Executive Service in the traveler's chain of command or supervision. These exceptions are to be done on a case by case basis, shall be limited in number, and shall be coordinated between the gaining and losing organizations, as appropriate.

Travel by patients and medical providers for the purpose of medical treatment for DoD personnel and their family members is authorized. Individuals who have already initiated travel (including intermediate stops) are authorized to continue to their final destination. Individuals whose TDY ends while this memorandum is in effect are authorized to return to their home station. Individuals pending retirement or separation during this period are exempt. Authorized travelers will adhere to the Force Health Protection guidelines in reference (b) and later guidance, if any.

Our understanding of COVID-19 is rapidly evolving, and this guidance will be continuously evaluated as conditions warrant. Component heads should ensure this stop movement guidance is clearly communicated. For overseas travel, refer to the Travel Restrictions for DoD Components in Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019 memorandum dated March 11, 2020. This guidance is effective March 16, 2020, and expires May 11, 2020. The expiration aligns with the expiration date of reference (a), the Secretary of Defense memorandum published on March 11, 2020.

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ROUTINE

R 142035Z MAR 20 MID110000470109U

FM SECNAV WASHINGTON DC

TO ALNAV

INFO SECNAV WASHINGTON DC CNO WASHINGTON DC CMC WASHINGTON DC

BT UNCLAS

ALNAV 026/20

MSGID/GENADMIN/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC/-/MAR//

SUBJ/ OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL DOMESTIC TRAVEL FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE FOR DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (CONUS TRAVEL GUIDANCE)//

REF/A/MEMO/OSD/13MAR20//

REF/B/MEMO/OPM/03MAR20//

REF/C/NAVADMIN/OPNAV/033-20//

REF/D/NAVADMIN/OPNAV/058-20//

REF/E/NAVADMIN/OPNAV/039-20//

REF/F/MARADMIN/082-20//

REF/G/MARADMIN/150-20//

NARR/REF A IS MEMO FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (DEPSECDEF) PROVIDING FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL WITHIN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (CONUS) DURING THE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) OUTBREAK. REF B IS THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (OPM) PRELIMINARY GUIDANCE TO AGENCIES DURING COVID-19. REF C IS NAVADMIN 033/20, WHICH IS THE OPNAV REPORTING GUIDANCE SUPPORTING DOD RESPONSE TO COVID-19 OUTBREAK. REF D IS NAVADMIN 058/20 IS AN UPDATED NAVY GUIDANCE DURING THE COVID-19 OUTBREAK. REF E IS NAVADMIN 039/20 AN UPDATED DOD GUIDANCE FOR MONITORING PERSONNEL RETURNING FROM CHINA DURING THE COVID-19 OUTBREAK. REF F IS MARADMIN 082/20 THE U.S. MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR COVID-19. REF G IS MARADMIN 150/20 THE U.S. MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR COVID-19; COMMANDERS RISK-BASED MEASURED RESPONSES.

RMKS/1. This ALNAV provides an update and guidance to Department of the Navy (DON) personnel and commands on the COVID-19 outbreak on domestic travel restrictions and is subject to additional guidance provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) regarding continental United States and its territories. Anticipate modifications to this policy over the next several weeks as additional information becomes available. The COVID-19 outbreak continues, with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reporting sustained community spread in the United States.

2. Effective 16 March 2020 through 11 May 2020, all DON personnel and their families, including, active, reserve, civilian, and foreign military under DON authority assigned to Department of Defense (DoD) installations,

facilities, and surrounding areas in the United States and its territories shall comply with this guidance to mitigate the risk of further transmission of COVID-19. Our priority is to ensure the welfare and safety of DON personnel and their families, and to ensure mission readiness and success.

3. Official and Personal Travel:

a. DON Military Personnel: All DON military personnel will stop movement until 11 May 2020. Stop movement means to hold in place, this includes Permanent Change of Station (PCS) and Temporary Duty (TAD/TDY). Only local leave is authorized. Local leave for military members will be in accordance with Service policy, which may be informed by local community conditions.

b. DON Civilian Employees: All DON civilian employees, whose transportation is government-funded, will stop movement. DON civilian employees are strongly encouraged to avoid personal leave outside the local area. Upon return from approved leave outside the local area, DON civilian employees may be asked to telework or exercise leave options as appropriate. DON may continue hiring actions, but may only onboard civilian employees in the local commuting area.

c. DON Family Members: All DON family members, whose transportation is government-funded, will stop movement.

d. Authority to Waive Policy: Waiver authority of the policies delineated in this guidance, when mission critical, is delegated to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), or their designees but not below the level of General Officer, Flag Officer, or Senior Executive Service member for approval.

e. Retiring or Separating Service Members: These restrictions do not apply to retiring or separating Service Members who are exempt from this policy.

f. Exceptions: Travel by patients and medical providers for the purpose of medical treatment for DON personnel and their family members is authorized. Individuals who have already initiated travel (including intermediate stops) are authorized to continue to their final destination.

Individuals whose TAD or TDY ends while this guidance is in effect are authorized to return to their home station.

g. Waivers: Waivers may be granted, by waiver authority, for compelling cases where the travel is: (1) determined to be mission essential; (2) necessary for humanitarian reasons; and (3) warranted due to extreme hardship. Waivers are to be done on a case-by-case basis, shall be limited in number, and shall be coordinated between the gaining and losing organizations.

4. Released by the Honorable Thomas B. Modly, Acting Secretary of the Navy.//

BT #0001 NNNN UNCLASSIFIED//

UPDATE #3: U.S MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19); STOP MOVEMENT

Date Signed: 3/14/2020 | MARADMINS Number: 167/20

MARADMINS: 167/20

R 140450Z MAR 20 MARADMIN 167/20 MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC PPO// SUBJ/UPDATE #3: U.S MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19); STOP MOVEMENT// REF/A/MSGID: MEMO: SECDEF: 20200311// REF/B/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20200307// REF/C/MSGID: DOC: OUSD (P&R): 20200310 FHP#3// REF/D/MSGID: DOC: OUSD (P&R): 20200311 FHP#4// REF/E/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20200211// REF/F/MSGID: MSG/YMD: 20200225// REF/G/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20190328// REF/H/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20130807// REF/I/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20200305// REF/J/MSGID: DOC/DTG: 030003ZFEB20// REF/K/MSGID: DOC/DTG: 132345ZFEB20// REF/L/MSGID: DOC/6220.2/20171204// REF/M/MSGID: DOC: OUSD (P&R): 20200308// REF/N/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20180905// REF/O/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20200312// REF/P/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20200313// REF/Q/MSGID: DOC/YMD: 20200312// NARR/REF A OUTLINES TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FOR DOD COMPONENTS IN RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019. REF B IS MARADMIN 150/20, UPDATE #1 U.S. MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS.

REF C IS OUSD (P&R) FORCE HEATLH PROTECTION GUIDANCE (SUPPLEMENT 3) DOD GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT. REF D IS OUSD (P&R) FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE (SUPPLEMENT 4) DOD GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL TRAVELING DURING THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK. REF E IS MARADMIN 082/20, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS. REF F IS UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS) MEMORANDUM ON FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION (FHP) SUPPLEMENT 2, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE FOR MILITARY INSTALLATION COMMANDERS' RISK-BASED MEASURED RESPONSES TO THE NOVELCORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK. REF G IS DOD INSTRUCTION 6200.03, PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE DOD. REF H IS MCO 3504.2A, OPERATIONS EVENT INCIDENT REPORT (OPREP-3) REPORTING. REF I IS JOINT STAFF MESSAGE FOR DOD COVID-19 PASSENGER SCREENING GUIDELINES FOR OVERSEAS MILITARY TRANSPORTATION TERMINALS. REF J IS HOMC CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE EXORD. REF K IS FRAGO 001 TO HOMC RESPONSE TO NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK EXORD. REF L IS MCO 6220.2 DISEASE CONTAINMENT PLANNING GUIDANCE. REF M IS OUSD (P&R) MEMO ON CIVILIAN PERSONNEL GUIDANCE FOR DOD COMPONENTS IN RESPONDING TO CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019. REF N IS MCO 12271.1 MARINE TELEWORK POLICY FOR CIVILIAN MARINES. REF M IS ALNAV 025/20 VECTOR 15 FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE FOR DON. REF O IS MARADMIN 162/20 UPDATE #2 US MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19); TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS AND PERSONNEL GUIDANCE FOR TRAVEL. REF P IS OSD MEMORANDUM DIRECTING STOP MOVEMENT FOR ALL DOMESTIC TRAVELFOR DOD COMPONENTS IN RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019. REF Q IS THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS WHITE LETTER.//

POC1/JAMES CARTER/LTCOL/UNIT: PP&O POC/F/TEL: (703) 571-1015/NIPR EMAIL: JAMES.L.CARTER@USMC.MIL//

POC2/HQMC Watch Officer/TEL: (703) 695-5454/NIPR E-MAIL: HQMC.MCC2@USMC.MIL// GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. This MARADMIN provides supplemental guidance to MARADMINs 082/20, 150/20 and 162/20, by providing an update on domestic travel restrictions. This MARADMIN does not supersede guidance set forth in MARADMIN 150/20 or 162/20. As circumstances and information develop, DC M&RA will provide clarifying guidance via SEPCOR.

1.A. Background.

1.A.1. Reference P is OSD direction to stop movement in order to preserve force readiness, limit the continuing spread of the virus and preserve the health and welfare of Service members, DOD civilians, their families and local communities in which they live.

2. Mission. The Marine Corps will implement the guidance provided in reference P to protect the force while continuing the mission of the Corps.

3. Execution.

3.A. Commander's Intent.

3.A.1. Purpose. Promulgate updated CMC guidance to the force for domestic travel restrictions in order to reduce the risk of further exposure to, or spread of, COVID-19.

3.A.2. Method. No Change. 3.A.3. End State. No Change. 3.B. Concept of Operations. The Marine Corps will institute the guidance contained in this MARADMIN, and comply with the domestic travel, permanent change of station (PCS), temporary duty (TDY), and leave restrictions contained herein. 3.C. Tasks. Commanders will: 3.C.1. Review and comply with tasks outlined in reference P. 3.C.2. Institute the following domestic travel restrictions: 3.C.2.A. Effective 16 March to 11 May 2020, all Marines will stop movement. This includes PCS and TDY. 3.C.2.B. Effective 16 March to 11 May 2020, USMC civilian personnel and family members, whose transportation is government funded, will stop movement. This includes PCS and TDY. 3.C.2.B.1. Until the travel restrictions described above are lifted, commands may only onboard civilian employees within the local commuting area. 3.C.2.C. Marines are only authorized local leave and liberty. 3.C.2.D. Reserve Component: Orders for currently activated RC Marines will be modified or extended as appropriate and funding will be provided in order to facilitate actions IAW guidance in this message. Commanders with COVID-19 related reserve component manpower issues, orders administration, funding, and policy waivers (i.e. telework) should contact DC M&RA, Reserve Affairs at rap@usmc.mil or 703-784-9138. 3.C.2.E. Exemptions: 3.C.2.E.1. Marines pending retirement or separation during this period may proceed in accordance with their official orders. 3.C.2.E.2. Travel by patients and medical providers for the purpose of medical treatment for Marines and their family members is authorized. 3.C.2.E.3. Individuals who have already initiated travel (including intermediate stops) are authorized to continue to their final destination. 3.C.2.E.4. Individuals whose TDY ends while this memorandum is in effect are authorized to return to their homes. 3.C.2.E.5. Authorized travelers will adhere to the Force Health Protection guidelines in reference D and later guidance, if any. 3.C.2.F. Exceptions. Exceptions may be granted in writing to these restrictions for compelling cases where the travel is: (1) determined to be mission essential; (2) necessary for humanitarian reasons; (3) warranted due to extreme hardship. 3.C.2.F.1. For Marines assigned to a combatant command, approval authority for these exceptions belongs to the Combatant Commander. 3.C.2.F.2. For service retained personnel, approval authority for these exceptions is delegated from the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the first

General Officer or member of the Senior Executive Service (SES) in the Marine's

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chain of command.

3.C.2.F.3. Exceptions shall be granted on a case-by-case basis, shall be limited in number, and coordinated between the gaining and losing organizations.4. Administration and Logistics.

4.A. Reference: Force Health Protection Supplement guidance can be found at https:(slash)(slash)www.defense.gov/Explore/Spotlight/Coronavirus/.

4.B. Commanders will capture and report costs incurred due to guidance contained in this MARADMIN.

4.C. This MARADMIN has been coordinated with HQMC, Health Services-Preventive Medicine, HQMC Judge Advocate Division, DC M&RA, DC I&L, DC P&R, DC I, DC CD&I, Marine Corps Installations Command, Communication Directorate and the Office of Legislative Affairs.

5. Command and Signal.

5.A. Command. This MARADMIN applies to the Total Force.

5.B. Signal. This MARADMIN is effective 16 March 2020 and expires 11 May 2020. Ensure widest dissemination.

6. This message is approved for release by LtGen G. W. Smith, Jr. Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations.//

PAGE 1 OF 4

I MEF EXORD ISO SECURITY FORCES DEPLOYMENT ISO USNS MERCY DSCA

Originator: CG I MEF G THREE//EXPO OPS// TOR: 03/27/2020 02:45:06 DTG: 270244Z Mar 20 Prec: Routine DAC: General To: CG FIRST MARDIV G ONE, CG FIRST MARDIV G THREE, CG FIRST MARDIV G FOUR

CC: COMMARFORPAC & ONE, COMMARFORPAC & THREE, COMMARFORPAC & FOUR, CO I MEF & ONE, CO I MEF & THREE, CO I MEF & FOUR, I MEF INFO & GRP

RAAUZYUW RUIIAAA2613 0870244-UUUU--RUIIAAA. ZNR WUWUU ZDH ZUI RUEOMCJ5140 0870245 R 270244Z MAR 20 FM CG I MEF G THREE//EXPO OPS// TO RUJDAAA/CG FIRST MARDIV G ONE RUJDAAA/CG FIRST MARDIV G THREE RUJDAAA/CG FIRST MARDIV G FOUR INFO RUJDAAA/COMMARFORPAC G ONE RUJDAAA/COMMARFORPAC G THREE RUJDAAA/COMMARFORPAC G FOUR RUJDAAA/CG I MEF G ONE RUJDAAA/CG I MEF G THREE RUJDAAA/CG I MEF G FOUR RUJDAAA/I MEF INFO GRP 8T UNCLAS SUBJ/I MEF EXORD ISO SECURITY FORCES DEPLOYMENT ISO USNS MERCY DSCA MISSION REF/A/MSG/COMMARFORCOM G THREE G FIVE G SEVEN /181439Z Mar 20// REF/B/MSG/MARFORPAC/DRAFT// REF/C/MSG/I MEF WARNO/212218Z MAR 20// REF/D/MSG/ COMMARFORPAC G THREE/252215Z MAR 20// NARR/REF A IS FEASIBILITY OF SUPPORT FOR SECURITY FORCES ISO USNS MERCY AND USNS COMFORT. REF B IS MARFORPAC RESPONSE TO FEASIBILITY OF SUPPORT FOR SECURITY FORCES ISO USNS MERCY AND USNS COMFORT. REF C IS I MEF WARNO ISO SECURITY FORCES DEPLOYMENT ISO USNS MERCY DSCA MISSION. REF D IS COMMARFORPAC SECURITY FORCES ISO USNS MERCY DEPLOYMENT ORDER.// (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

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1. (U) General Situation: Maritime Command Element-East (MCE-E) and Maritime Command Element- West (MCE-W) employ maritime forces inside



PAGE 2 OF 4

the United States by Presidential Order NLT 23 MAR 20 for USNS MERCY and NLT 2 APR 20 for USNS COMFORT IOT accommodate and medically treat non-COVID-19 patients to decompress land based civilian hospitals. On 22 March, NCA determined USNS MERCY will support DSCA activities for the State of California. California determined priority of support is the city of Los Angeles. 2. (U) Mission: 0/0 I MEF deploys security forces ISO of MCE-W (C3F) to enable DSCA mission support. 3. (U) Execution 3.a. (U) Commander's Intent 3.a.1. (U) Purpose: In order to satisfy MCE-W requirement to provide pier side security of USNS MERCY, CG I MEF directs the preparation and deployment of USMC forces capable of providing the required support to MCE-W. 3.a.2. (U) Method 3.a.2.a. (U) Establish and maintain pier side security in coordination with CTG130.1 (DESRON-21), NECC, USCG, local law enforcement, and emergency responders. 3.a.2.b. (U) Local area threat briefs provided to Marines prior to commencing mission. 3.a.Z.c. (U) Provide safe environment for transiting patients aboard USNS MERCY. 3.a.2.d. (U) Recognize, respect, and observe laws while accomplishing mission tasking. 3.a.3. (U) Method. The desired endstate is USNS MERCY pier-side secure for duration of the mission, threats deterred from taking actions against USNS MERCY, and units safely redeployed. 3.b. (U) Concept of Operations 3.b.1. (U) Scheme of Maneuver. I MEF provides security forces in order to provide pier-side security for the USNS MERCY at Pier 93, San Pedro, city of Los Angeles. The mission will be executed in four phases. 3.b.1.a. (U) Phase 1: Embark and Deploy / Preparation 3.b.1.b. (U) Phase 2: Establish Sea Base / Deployment 3.b.1.c. (U) Phase 3: Medical Operations / Security Operations 3.b.1.d. (U) Phase 4: Redeployment / Retrograde 3.c. (U) Tasks 3.c.1. (U) CG, 1stMarDiv 3.c.1.a. (U) Deploy a security force (SECFOR) detachment capable of providing 24-hour pier-side security between the brow and foot of the pier of the USNS MERCY when pier-side. 3.c.1.b. (U) Report to DESRON-21 for deployment/RSO&I/employment planning upon release of this message. 3.c.1.c. (U) Report arrival of forces to USNS MERCY pier-side. 3.c.1.d. (U) Provide assessment and recommendations for optimization of future rotations to CG, I MEF within 30 days of deployment. 3.d. (U) Coordinating Instructions 3.d.1. (U) Timeline 3.d.1.a. (U) 23 March: USNS MERCY Underway 3.d.1.b. (U) 23 March: ESG-3 ADVON arrival in Sacramento / LA 3.d.1.c. (U) 26 March: SECFOR deploy to LA 3.d.1.d. (U) 27 March: USNS MERCY arrives 3.d.1.e. (U) 28 March: USNS MERCY receives patients 3.d.1.f. (U) TBD: USNS MERCY Underway 3.d.1.g. (U) TBD: SECFOR retrograde 3.d.2. (U) Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF)/Weapons Posture 3.d.2.a. (U) Per CJCSI 3121.018 and DSCA EXORD, Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) apply.

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PAGE 3 OF 4

3.d.2.b. (U) De-escalation is required. Deadly force is only authorized when lesser means have been exhausted or cannot reasonably be employed. 3.d.2.c. (U) Counter-UAS procedures governed by DEPSECDEF policy memo 16-003 3.d.2.d. (U) USMC SECFOR are designated security in support of ship security and fall under ship security authorities. 3.d.3. (U) Weapons posture and conditions IAW consolidated integrated security plan (via SEPCOR). 3.d.4. (U) Risk Mitigation 3.d.4.a. (U) COVID-19 3.d.4.a.1. (U) Medical PPE on hand prior to deployment 3.d.4.a.2. (U) Actions for COVID-19 symptomatic Marine. Isolate Marine immediately; report to higher headquarters to seek current medical treatment protocols. 3.d.4.a.3. (U) All Marines deploying as part of or to supplement the pier-side security platoon will be screened for COVID-19 prior to departure. 3.d.4.a.4. (U) All Marines participating in the mission will screen for COVID-19 daily. 3.d.4.b. (U) Negligent Discharge (ND) 3.d.4.b.1. (U) SECFOR personnel participated in SPMAGTF-CBP and returned from that mission in October. SECFOR will conduct a pistol qualification on 25 March. SECFOR leadership will implement guard mount and personnel relief procedures to reduce risk of NDs. 3.d.5. (U) CCIRs in accordance with I MEF guidance. 4. (U) Admin & Logistics 4.a. (U) Administration 4.a.1. (U) 1stMarDiv retains administrative control. 4.b. (U) Logistics 4.b.1. (U) Units will use unit funds for all requirements and submit requests for reimbursement to I MEF G-8. 4.b.2. (U) USMC SECFOR is planned to billet and mess in town at a designated hotel. 4.b.3. (U) USMC SECFOR contracted for rental vehicles (3x 15-pax vans and 1x SUV). 4.b.4. (U) Transportation 4.b.4.1. (U) The use of JOPES is directed. PID will be directed VIA SEPCOR. 4.b.4.2. (U) All JOPES coordination will be via MARFORPAC newsgroup; server 205.53.122.199 (port 563), newsgroup marforpac.operations.pacom. Processes and movement validations will be IAW MARFORPAC TPFDD LOI TBD, and USINDOPACOM supplemental guidance to JOPES vol III. 5. (U) Command & Signal 5.a. (U) Command 5.a.1. (U) Command Relationship 5.a.1.a. (U) C3F is designated as MCE-W 5.a.1.b. (U) DESRON-21 is designated as CTG130.1 5.a.1.c.1. (U) I MEF relinquishes TACON of USMC SECFOR for final delegation to CTG130.1 (DESRON-21). 5.a.1.c.2. (U) 1stMarDiv retains ADCON of USMC SECFOR. 5.a.1.d. (U) ESG-3 is tasked to conduct ADVON actions through Phase 1 and 2, then turnover responsibilities to CTG130.1. 5.b. (U) Signal 5.b.1. (U) Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) is released via SEPCOR. 5.b.1.a. (U) MCE-W retains release authority. USMC SECFOR will submit all products to CTG130.1 for review and follow-on action. 5.b.1. (U) Communication guidance 5.b.1.a. (U) I MEF Operations Center: DSN 312-365-3047 or COMM 760-725-3047.

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PAGE 4 OF 4

5.b.1.b. (U) Submit daily SITREP to I MEF Senior Watch Officer at NIPR: swo.imef.fct@usmc.mil or SIPR: imefmccswo@usmc.smil.mil//

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NNNN Received from AUTODIN 270245Z Mar 20

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Enclosure (37) Page 4 of 4



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE U. S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFIC BOX 5553000 CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5300

> I MEFO 1050.2 G-1/ADJ MAR 30 2020

I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ORDER 1050.2

From: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force To: Distribution List

Subj: I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 LEAVE AND LIBERTY ORDER

Encl: (1) Leave/TAD Request Form

1. <u>Situation</u>. This Order issues direction regarding the execution of leave, liberty and temporary additional duty (TAD) for I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) personnel during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Leaders at all levels are charged with the responsibility to ensure the welfare of their Marines and Sailors and mission are addressed accordingly. This Order is a punitive lawful general order.

2. <u>Mission</u>. To publish policy and direction for leave, liberty and TAD for all Major Subordinate Commands and Major Subordinate Elements that comprise I MEF. Ensure Marines and Sailors at every level understand the requirements outlined in this Order and properly use the enclosure. Establish necessary policies to ensure the safety and health of the force.

3. Execution

a. Commander's Intent and Concept of Operations

(1) <u>Commander's Intent</u>. I MEF will observe the following procedures until the Commanding General, I MEF issues the order to return to normal operating procedures. As of 19 March 2020, the state of California instituted a "Shelter in Place" order, CA Executive Order N-33-20. The order directs all individuals to remain at home or place of residence, except as needed in limited circumstances. The order does not restrict federal employees from conducting mission essential activities, therefore all I MEF personnel will continue to report for duty as directed. However, when not in a duty status all I MEF personnel will restrict their leave and liberty in accordance with this order, to include those not in California, in order to mitigate coronavirus exposure and to preserve the force.

(2) Concept of Operations

(a) Leave and Liberty

1. All requests for leave where the leave destination is the Marine or Sailor's primary residence will be approved by the first 05 in the chain of command. All requests for leave where the leave destination is not the Marine or Sailors primary residence must be approved by the first general officer in the chain of command utilizing enclosure (1).

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2. All I MEF Personnel will curtail their off-duty activities to abide by restrictions imposed by executive order N-33-20 and other local public health orders. Travel while on leave or liberty is only authorized to conduct essential services such as: medical needs, groceries, banking, exercise, and gas stations. While in a leave or liberty status, and while traveling to conduct essential services, all I MEF personnel shall limit travel to within a 30-mile radius of their residence. Exceptions for leave or liberty travel outside the 30-mile radius can be granted for those with emergency situations by their O5 or above commanding officer.

<u>3</u>. All I MEF personnel must have a heightened awareness regarding the spread of this infectious disease. While in a leave and liberty status, personnel shall continue to conduct themselves as responsible citizens. Strict adherence to all local orders including but not limited to restricting gatherings or dictating occupancy is mandated. I MEF personnel will observe state and CDC guidance regarding social distancing. It is everyone's responsibility to be aware of the health status and orders of the area they reside in or visit.

(b) <u>Medical Treatment</u>. Marines and Sailors undergoing treatment for an infectious or contagious disease shall not be granted leave. Exceptions may be granted by the first general officer in the chain of command. General officers shall receive concurrence from a medical authority prior to granting exceptions under this paragraph.

4. <u>Administration and Logistics</u>. Violations of this order are punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I MEF personnel who violate the Order may be subject to appropriate administrative or judicial action. The I MEF G-1 is responsible for ensuring the review and update of this Order. This Order will be updated as required.

5. Command and Signal.

a. <u>Command</u>. This Order is applicable to the I MEF Total Force. All personnel should be aware that operational requirements may supersede authorized leave and liberty.

b. <u>Signal</u>. This Order is effective as of the date signed and supersedes all previously issued I MEF orders and bulletins regarding leave and liberty.

OSTERMAN

DISTRIBUTION: I, II



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

APR 2 0 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR OF COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM **EVALUATION** INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES DIRECTORS OF DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

- SUBJECT: Modification and Reissuance of DoD Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019 Travel Restrictions
- References: (a) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Travel Restrictions for DoD Components in Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019," March 11, 2020 (hereby cancelled)
 - (b) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Stop Movement for all Domestic Travel for DoD Components in Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019," March 13, 2020 (hereby cancelled)
 - (c) MOD 1 TO REVISION 01 TO DOD RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS-2019 EXORD, March 24, 2020 (hereby cancelled)
 - (d) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum,
 "Modifications for Authorized Departures and Ordered Departures Related to COVID-19," April 3, 2020
 - (e) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, "Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 4) – Department of Defense Guidance for Personnel Traveling During the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak," March 11, 2020

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) continues to present significant risk to our forces as the DoD considers domestic and overseas personnel travel. These movements present



the threat of spreading COVID-19 within our ranks and communities. My priorities remain – protecting our Service members, DoD civilians, and families; safeguarding our national security capabilities; and supporting the whole-of-nation response.

Effective immediately, this memorandum cancels references (a), (b), and (c) and reissues travel restriction guidance for DoD Components that will remain in effect until June 30, 2020.

Travel Restrictions

All DoD Service members will stop movement, both internationally and domestically, while this memorandum is in effect. All DoD civilian personnel, and dependents of DoD Service members and DoD civilian personnel, whose travel is Government-funded will stop movement, both internationally and domestically, while this memorandum is in effect.

Except as provided below, this stop movement applies to all official travel, including temporary duty (TDY) travel; Government-funded leave travel; permanent duty travel, including Permanent Change of Station (PCS) travel; and travel related to Authorized and Ordered Departures issued by the Department of State. For DoD Service members, it also includes personal leave outside the local area and non-official travel outside the local area. DoD Components may onboard civilian employees within the local commuting area only, and civilian employees whose travel to the local commuting area is not government-funded.

Exemptions

The following circumstances are exempt from these travel restrictions:

- a. Travel associated with uniformed personnel recruiting and accessions activities, to include accessions, basic training, advanced individual training, and follow-on travel to the first duty station. The Military Departments will notify me prior to reducing or suspending recruiting, accessions, basic training, or advanced individual training.
- b. Travel by patients, as well as their authorized escorts and attendants, for purposes of medical treatment. Travel by medical providers for the purposes of medical treatment for DoD personnel and their families is also authorized.
- c. Travel for Global Force Management (GFM) activities (defined as deployments/redeployments ordered in the GFM Allocation Plan and Combatant Command Assigned Force Demand tasking, including Service internal rotations to support, and TDY used to source ordered capabilities). Such travel to execute Operations, Activities, and Investments or Service-related training will be coordinated between the Combatant Command, the Joint Staff, and the appropriate Military Department. All GFM-scheduled deployments/redeployments of U.S. Navy vessels and embarked units and personnel is authorized, provided they are in-transit and have met the 14-day restriction of movement provided for under reference (e), and any applicable subsequent guidance.

- d. Travel by authorized travelers who departed their permanent duty station and are "awaiting transportation," and by authorized travelers who have already initiated travel (including intermediate stops). Such travelers are authorized to continue travel to their final destination on approved orders.
- e. Travel by authorized travelers whose TDY ends while this directive is in effect. Such travelers are authorized to return to their permanent duty station.
- f. Travel authorized by the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), to continue execution of the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise as required to project and sustain the Joint Force globally. This includes forces (aircrews, vessel crews, and mission essential personnel) ordered on prepareto-deploy orders alert status, air refueling, global patient movement, mortuary affairs support, inland surface, sea and air sustainment missions, support to other U.S. Agencies (as approved by me), and moves of personnel and equipment that support USTRANSCOM's global posture requirements.
- g. Travel by individuals pending retirement or separation.
- h. Travel by those under authority of a Chief of Mission and authorized by that Chief of Mission.

Waivers

As set forth below, waivers to this directive may be granted in writing in cases where the travel is: (1) determined to be mission-essential; (2) necessary for humanitarian reasons; or (3) warranted due to extreme hardship. These waivers are to be executed on a case-by-case basis, must be determined to be in the best interest of the U.S. Government, and shall be coordinated between the gaining and losing organizations. Mission-essential travel refers to work that must be performed to ensure the continued operations of mission-essential functions, including positions that are deemed key and essential, as determined by the responsible DoD Component.

Approval authority for waivers belongs to:

- The Combatant Commander if the individual is assigned or allocated to a Combatant Command;
- b. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if the individual is assigned to the Joint Staff;
- c. The Secretary of the Military Department concerned for personnel under his/her jurisdiction;
- d. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) for all personnel assigned, attached, or allocated to the NGB and, for travel using Federal funds, all travel by title 32 and title 5 personnel assigned throughout the National Guard; and

e. The Chief Management Officer for personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Agencies, DoD Field Activities, and any other DoD entities not listed above.

This authority to approve waivers may be delegated in writing no lower than the first general or flag officer or member of the Senior Executive Service or equivalent in the traveler's chain of command or supervision. Delegations previously authorized under references (a) through (c) remain in effect until those delegations are rescinded or superseded. References in prior delegations to "member of the Senior Executive Service" are deemed to include equivalent personnel.

Additional Guidance

The restrictions above give preeminence to the safety and security of our personnel, their families, and our communities. During this period of travel restriction, the Department will take several measures to enhance traveler safety, lessen the burden on DoD personnel and their families, and ensure continued operations. Each of your organizations, as applicable, will take immediate action to:

- a. Clearly communicate the contents of this directive to those individuals affected by these travel restrictions;
- Establish pre- and post-travel screening and reception procedures for all authorized travelers as provided in reference (e) and any applicable subsequent guidance, to include establishing a means of communication with all personnel throughout the preand post-travel screening and reception process and providing information regarding prescribed actions for their particular circumstances;
- c. Use military- or DoD-contracted end-to-end travel using aircraft or other conveyance for DoD-sponsored travelers to the greatest extent practical;
- d. Inform all travelers of their responsibility to contact their gaining organization in advance of travel and to keep the organization updated on their travel itinerary;
- e. Document within travel orders the exemption or waiver under which the travel is authorized; and
- f. When practicable within operational requirements, consider either in-place assignment extensions or the applicability of waivers for PCS moves for uniformed personnel with school-age dependents in order to minimize school year disruption and education costs.

The Department will maintain a continuous conditions-based assessment of the COVID-19 pandemic, to include the ability of Force Providers, Combatant Commands, and USTRANSCOM to meet travel restriction requirements; host nation policy considerations regarding DoD force deployments; and COVID-19-related infrastructure at forward deployed locations. Based on this assessment, I will review this policy every 15 days to determine if travel can resume earlier than June 30, 2020. As we continue to monitor the rapidly evolving COVID-19 outbreak, this guidance will be updated, as warranted, consistent with the priorities outlined in the first paragraph of this memorandum.

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I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OPERATIONS ORDER 20-001 DTG: 061930ZAPR20 SUBJ: I MEF COVID-19 RESPONSE

(11)	J) References:			
(0)			OPNAVINST on Pandemic Influenza Outbreak	
	• •	• •	USMC Order for Pandemic Influenza Response Plan dtd 06 Nov 09	
			DoD Global Campaign Plan for Pandemic Influenza and Infectious Disease 3531-13	
	(6)	(0)		
		· \	dtd 15 Oct 13	
			USINDOPACOM Pandemic and Emerging Diseases CONPLAN dtd Oct 18	
	(e)	(U)	DoD Instruction 6200.03 Public Health Emergency Management Within the DoD dtd 28 Mar 19	
	(f)	(U)	SECDEF Force Health Protection Guidance for the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak dtd	
			31 Jan 20	
	(g)	(U)	SECDEF EXORD that directs COCOMs to execute Pandemic Plan 3531-13 in response	
			to Novel Coronavirus-19 (COVID-19) Outbreak dtd 01 Feb 20	
			HQMC Response to COVID-19 EXORD dtd 03 Feb 20	
	(i)	(U)	MARFORPAC EXORD in response to COVID-19 dtd 04 Feb 20	
	(j)	(U)	I MEF EXORD in response to COVID-19 Outbreak dtd 06 Feb 20	
	(k)	(U)	SECDEF Supplement #1 to Force Health Protection Guidance for the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak dtd 8 Feb 20	
	(1)	(U)	MARADMIN 082/20 U.S. Marine Corps Disease Containment Preparedness Planning	
	(-)	(-)	Guidance for 2019 Novel Coronavirus dtd 11 Feb 20	
	(m)	(11)	Mod 001 to I MEF EXORD in response to COVID-19 Outbreak dtd 21 Feb 20	
			SECDEF Supplement #1 to Force Health Protection Guidance for the Novel	
	(11)	(0)	Coronavirus Outbreak dtd 26 Feb 20	
	(0)	(U)	MARADMIN 150/20 U.S. Marine Corps Disease Containment Preparedness Planning	
			Guidance for COVID-19; Commanders' Risk-Based Measured Responses dtd 7 Mar 20	
	(ŋ)	(U)	SECDEF Supplement #3 to Force Health Protection Guidance for the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak dtd 10 Mar 20	
	(q)	(U)	SECDEF Supplement #4 to Force Health Protection Guidance for the Novel	
	· 1/	(=)	Coronavirus Outbreak dtd 11 Mar 20	
	(\mathbf{r})	(11)	ALNAV 025/20 Force Health Protection Guidance dtd 12 Mar 20	
	• •	• •	MARADMIN 162/20 Update #2 to U.S. Marine Corps Disease Containment	
	(2)	(0)	Preparedness Planning Guidance for COVID-19; Travel Restrictions and Personnel	
			Guidance for Travel dtd 12 Mar 20	
	(+)	(17)	MARADMIN 162/20 U.S. Marine Corps Disease Containment Preparedness Planning	
	()	(0)	Guidance for COVID-19; Travel Restrictions and Personnel Guidance for Travel	
			dtd 13 Mar 20	
	()	(
			ALNAV 026/20 CONUS Travel Guidance dtd 13 Mar 20	
	(v)	(0)	MARADMIN 167/20 Update #3 to U.S. Marine Corps Disease Containment	
		· \	Preparedness Planning Guidance for COVID-19; Stop Movement dtd 14 Mar 20	
	(w)	(U)	MARADMIN 170/20 U,S, Marine Corps Enterprise Network Remote Access	
			Preparedness Planning Guidance dtd 17 Mar 20	
	(x)	(U)	I MEF / MCIWEST FRAGO 007-20 Mitigate the Outbreak and Spread of COVID-19 dtd	
			20 Mar 20	
	(Y)	(U)	COMMCICOM FRAGO 05-20 TO MCICOM OPORD 02-20; Additional COVID-19 Reporting	
			Requirements and Change to Baseline Health Protection Condition to HPCON C for	
			MCICOM dtd 26 Mar 20	
	(z)	(U)	MCIWEST FRAGO 10-20, Change of Health Protection Condition dtd 26 Mar 20	
	(aa)	(U)	MARADMIN 192/20 COVID-19 Supplemental Personnel Guidance for Commanders dtd 26	
			Mar 20	
	(bb)	(U)	MARADMIN 193/20 Update #4 to U.S. Marine Corps Disease Containment	
			Preparedness Planning Guidance for COVID-19; DoD OCONUS Stop Movement dtd 26	
			Mar 20	
	(cc)	(U)	I MEF ORDER 1050.2 COVID-19 Leave and Liberty Order dtd 30 Mar 20	

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(b) (U) Implement habits of action (social distancing, avoid touching face, disinfect surfaces, wash hands, teleworking)

(c) (U) Planning and preparation

(2) (U) Phase II: MFP: Mitigate (MCI-West: Contain) limits the spread of COVID-19 while minimizing impacts to operational requirements. This phase began on 18 March 2020 via MARFORPAC direction. Phase II ended when the outbreak spread beyond established containment areas necessitating the need to transition to phase III. Key actions during this phase are:

(a) (U) Posture to fill medical shortfalls: Establish MIOC

- (b) (U) Maintain sufficient supplies to support I MEF forces
- (c) (U) Maintaining continuity of operations
- (d) (U) Maintain readiness and capability to conduct assigned missions
- (e) (U) Identify and safeguard at-risk populations

(3) (U) <u>Phase III: MFP: Respond (MCI-West: Interdict)</u> supports efforts to minimize the further spread of COVID-19. I MEF is in phase III. This phase began on 26 March for MCI-West via MARFORNORTH direction and 28 March via MARFORPAC direction, respectively. During this phase, I MEF will posture in a "fighting stance". I MEF preserves combat power through concurrent actions to fill potential medical shortfalls, sequester (see definition in Annex C) key units, preserve command and control, adjust training, and prepare to manage consequences of further spread of COVID-19 both on and off military installations. Phase III ends when the pandemic has subsided or intervention efforts are successful in controlling the spread of the virus. Key actions during this phase are:

NHCP

(a) (U) Posture to fill medical shortfalls: Establish stabilization ward at

(b) (U) Sequester key units: I MEF sets conditions to sequester Alert Battalion Task Force (ABTF), Immediate Response Forces (IRF) and crisis response medical capabilities

(c) (U) Preserve command and control

(d) (U) Adjust training TTPs to manage COVID-19 hazard: See Annex C for training guidance

(e) (U) Prepare to mitigate impacts of COVID-19 through the development of four activities:

1) prepare to augment MIOC via unit level local isolation

2) prepare to separate units from high risk populations and areas

3) prepare to segregate infected units from $\frac{1}{2}$ of the prevent spread

4) prepare to restrict personnel to installations

(f) (U) Stockpile appropriate medical equipment and supplies

(g) (U) Prepare I MEF personnel and families to face potential hardships: death, illness, loss of wages, and stress

The San Diego Union-Tribune

MILITARY

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Marines establish Camp Pendleton task force, coronavirus isolation center



An isolation room at the new Task Force Medical Isolation and Observation Center Camp Pendleton, where service members affected by COVID-19 will be housed by the Marine Corps. (Lance Cpl. Kevin Seidensticker/ Marine Corps)

Personnel who test positive will be housed in a new isolation center monitored by medical staff; local military cases climb to 26

Enclosure (41) Page 1 of 4 https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/military/story/2020-03-25/marines-establish-camp-pendleton-task-force-coronavirus-isolation-center

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By ANDREW DYER

MARCH 25, 2020 3:28 PM PT

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CAMP PENDLETON — Marines at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton have established a task force and an isolation center to monitor and respond to the spread of COVID-19 among Marines on the West Coast, the Corps announced Tuesday.

The isolation center — officially called the Task Force Medical Isolation and Observation Center Camp Pendleton — can house up to 200 Marines and sailors affected by COVID-19.

No one is currently isolated at the facility, according to Gunnery Sgt. Warren Peace, a Marine Corps spokesman, but it is ready to do so if needed.

More than 42,000 active-duty military personnel work on the base, which covers more than 125,000 acres sandwiched between Oceanside and Orange County. It is the largest Marine Corps base on the West Coast.

ADVERTISEMENT

The task force is a joint effort of I Marine Expeditionary Force, which is based at Camp Pendleton, and Marine Corps Installations West. Marines establish Camp Pendleton task force, coronavirus isolation center - The San Diego Union-Tribune



U.S. Marines and Sailors prepare a Medical Isolation and Observation Center (MIOC) for service members aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton. (Lance Cpl. Kevin Seidensticker/ Marine Corps)

The isolation center is comprised of single-occupancy dorm rooms and will house service members who have either tested positive for COVID-19 or been diagnosed as such by medical authorities, a Marine Corps statement said.

"All personnel housed at the MIOC aboard Camp Pendleton will be monitored daily by trained medical personnel and provided food, water and appropriate living accommodations until they are no longer symptomatic and their restriction of movement period ends," a I MEF statement said. "The measures are both precautionary and preventative in nature."

One Marine at Camp Pendleton has so far tested positive for the virus while a second was quarantined after traveling to Washington state with a Marine based at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar who tested positive.

That Marine was the first service member in the county to test positive, on March 12. Since then, 26 more active-duty military members have tested positive. On Friday, the Navy announced it would stop naming individual ships with positive cases.

Since Sunday, the Navy has announced 20 additional San Diego sailors have tested positive for COVID-19, including 2 Naval Special Warfare Command sailors from Naval Base Coronado and 6 from unnamed ships. A Navy spokesman declined to say whether the two Special Warfare sailors are Navy SEALs.

Four other local sailors, assigned to unnamed San Diego-based shore commands, have also tested positive, the Navy announced late Wednesday.

Here is the Union-Tribune's running tally of positive cases among local military members:

- 12 sailors on unnamed ships
- 4 sailors on unnamed shore commands
- 3 sailors from a Naval Base San Diego schoolhouse
- 3 sailors at Naval Medical Center San Diego
- 3 Marines at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar
- 2 sailors assigned to the USS Boxer
- 2 sailors at Naval Special Warfare Command at Naval Base Coronado
- 1 sailor assigned to the USS Coronado
- 1 sailor assigned to Naval Air Forces at naval Air Station North Island
- 1 Marine at Camp Pendleton
- 1 sailor assigned to an unnamed squadron in San Diego

With 33 of the county's 297 cases of COVID-19, the military accounts for about 11 percent of all cases countywide according the latest available numbers Wednesday.

Amphibious ship on lockdown



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY 2 2 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

> SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR OF COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT

DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES

DIRECTORS OF DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

- SUBJECT: Transition to Conditions-based Phased Approach to Coronavirus Disease 2019 Personnel Movement and Travel Restrictions
- References: (a) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Modification and Reissuance of DoD Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019 – Travel Restrictions," April 20, 2020 (hereby cancelled)
 - (b) White House, "Guidelines Opening Up America Again (PDF slides)," April 16, 2020
 - (c) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, "Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 1) – Department of Defense Guidance for Monitoring Personnel Returning from China During the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak," February 11, 2020
 - (d) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, "Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 4) – Department of Defense Guidance for Personnel Traveling During the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak," March 11, 2020
 - (e) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Guidance for Commanders on Risk-Based Changing of Health Protection Condition Levels During the COVID-19 Pandemic," May 19, 2020

While the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic still presents risk to DoD Service members, civilians, and their families, improving conditions warrant a transition in our approach to domestic and overseas personnel travel to a conditions-based, phased approach to



*Corrected copy: "Stage 2:" was removed from the section header on page 3.

personnel movement and travel. While we make this transition, my priorities remain – protecting our Service members, DoD civilian employees, and families; safeguarding our national security capabilities; and supporting the whole-of-nation response.

Effective immediately, this memorandum cancels reference (a) and reissues travel restriction guidance for DoD components that will remain in effect until further notice.

Travel Restrictions

All DoD Service members will stop movement, both internationally and domestically, while this memorandum is in effect, unless the conditions listed below are met. All DoD civilian personnel and dependents of DoD Service members and DoD personnel whose travel is Government-funded will stop movement, both internationally and domestically, while this memorandum is in effect, unless the conditions listed below are met.

Except as provided below, this stop movement applies to all official travel, including temporary duty (TDY) travel; Government-funded leave travel; permanent duty travel, including Permanent Change of Station (PCS) travel; and travel related to Authorized and Ordered Departures issued by the Department of State. For DoD Service members, it also includes personal leave outside the local area and non-official travel outside the local area. DoD Components may continue to onboard civilian employees within the local commuting area and civilian employees whose travel to the local commuting area is not government-funded.

Conditions for Unrestricted Travel

Conditions to resume unrestricted travel rest on two overarching factors: 1) state and/or regional criteria based on the White House's Opening Up America Again guidelines (reference (b)), and 2) installation-level criteria based on conditions in and surrounding DoD installations, facilities, and locations.

U.S. States and Territories, and Host Nations

Using the White House's Opening Up America Again guidelines as a baseline, along with data and guidance from the Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and inputs from the Services and Combatant Commands, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) will continuously assess each U.S. state, district, or territory and nations that host greater than 1,000 permanently assigned DoD personnel, for:

- · Removal of shelter-in-place orders or other travel restrictions
- 14-day downward trajectory of flu-like and COVID-19-like symptoms; and
- 14-day downward trajectory of new COVID-19 cases or positive tests.

Any state, district, territory, or host nation that meets all three criteria shall be considered to permit movement to/from these areas.

DoD Installations, Facilities, and Locations

The Secretaries of the Military Departments. Commanders of the Combatant Commands, and the Chief Management Officer will continuously assess each DoD installation, facility, or location under their purview for the feasibility of lifting travel restrictions. Decisions resulting from these assessments will be made in consultation with the Services who have installations in the local surrounding areas and will take into account the areas where installation personnel reside. Whether or not an installation is restricted for travel will be reported to the COVID-19 Task Force weekly, for placement into the ADVANA environment. There are four factors that need to be reported:

- · Removal of local travel restrictions;
- Availability of essential services (e.g., schools, childcare, moving services);
- · Quality control/assurance capability for household goods packing and moving; and
- Favorable Health Protection Conditions (below HPCON C)
 - o Sufficient Medical Treatment Facility capacity
 - Testing capability and capacity in accordance with the Department's tiered priority framework to include sentinel surveillance and for at-risk healthcare workers
 - The capacity to quarantine and/or isolate individuals returning from high exposure locations

Any installation, facility, or location that meets all of the criteria above shall be considered to permit movement to or from these areas.

Assessment Process

Once a U.S. state or territory or country meets the factors described indicating criteria have been met to resume unrestricted travel, the Office of the USD(P&R) will publish the change in status. Any subsequent significant change in factors due to temporary localized breakouts will be assessed for travel restrictions being reinstated at the state, territory, or host nation level.

Installations/Facilities within a 50- mile commuting distance will coordinate their assessments and plans.

Unrestricted travel and normal civilian hiring activities may resume between installations when the criteria for states, territories, and host nations are met as published for both the gaining and losing U.S. state or territory or host nation, and subject to installation conditions as determined by the Chief Management Officer, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands.

Exemptions

The following circumstances are exempt from these travel restrictions:

- a. Travel associated with uniformed personnel recruiting and accessions activities, to include accessions, basic training, advanced military individual training, and followon travel to the first duty station. The Military Departments will notify me prior to reducing or suspending recruiting, accessions, basic training, or advanced individual training.
- b. Travel by patients, as well as their authorized escorts and attendants, for purposes of medical treatment. Travel by medical providers for the purposes of medical treatment for DoD personnel and their families is also authorized.
- c. Travel for Global Force Management (GFM) activities (defined as deployments/redeployments ordered in the GFM Allocation Plan and Combatant Command Assigned Force Demand tasking, including Service internal rotations to support, and TDY used to source ordered capabilities). Such travel to execute Operations, Activities, and Investments or Service-related training will be coordinated between the Combatant Command, the Joint Staff, and the appropriate Military Department. All GFM-scheduled deployments/redeployments of U.S. Navy vessels and embarked units and personnel are authorized, provided they are in-transit and have met the 14-day restriction of movement provided under reference (c), and any applicable subsequent guidance.
- d. Travel by authorized travelers who departed their permanent duty station and are "awaiting transportation," and by authorized travelers who have already initiated travel (including intermediate stops). Such travelers are authorized to continue travel to their final destination on approved orders.
- e. Travel by authorized travelers whose TDY ends while this directive is in effect. Such travelers are authorized to return/proceed to their permanent duty station.
- f. Travel authorized by the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), to continue execution of the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise as required to project and sustain the Joint Force globally. This includes forces (aircrews, vessel crews, and mission essential personnel) ordered on prepareto-deploy orders alert status, air refueling, global patient movement, mortuary affairs support, inland surface, sea and air sustainment missions, support to other U.S. Agencies (as approved by me), and moves of personnel and equipment that support USTRANSCOM's global posture requirements.
- g. Travel by military and civilian personnel pending retirement or separation. Specific to Service members, travel is authorized to take transition leave. All other leave not associated with transition leave is governed by existing travel restrictions.
- h. Travel by those under authority of a Chief of Mission and authorized by that Chief of Mission; travel from locations where the Department of State has issued an Ordered Departure; and return travel from safe havens when the Department of State has terminated an Ordered or Authorized Departure.
- i. Travel to and from Professional Military Education programs.

- Travel associated with formal, entry-level civilian accession programs, such as government-funded internships and fellowships.
 - k. Travel by civilian employees complying with overseas tour rotation agreement requirements.

Waivers

As set forth below, waivers to the travel restrictions in this directive may be granted in writing in cases where the travel is: (1) determined to be mission-essential; (2) necessary for humanitarian reasons; or (3) warranted due to extreme hardship. These waivers are to be executed on a case-by-case basis, must be determined to be in the best interest of the U.S. Government, and shall be coordinated between the gaining and losing organizations. Mission-essential travel refers to work that must be performed to ensure the continued operations of mission-essential functions, including positions that are deemed key and essential, as determined by the responsible DoD Component.

Approval authority for waivers belongs to:

- The Combatant Commander if the individual is assigned or allocated to a Combatant Command;
- b. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if the individual is assigned to the Joint Staff;
- The Secretary of the Military Department concerned for personnel under his/her jurisdiction;
- d. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) for all personnel assigned, attached, or allocated to the NGB and, for travel using Federal funds, all travel by title 32 and title 5 personnel assigned throughout the National Guard; and
- e. The Chief Management Officer for personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Agencies, DoD Field Activities, and any other DoD entities not listed above.

This authority to approve waivers may be delegated in writing no lower than the first general or flag officer or member of the Senior Executive Service or equivalent in the traveler's chain of command or supervision. Delegations previously authorized under reference (a) remain in effect until those delegations are rescinded or superseded. References in prior delegations to "member of the Senior Executive Service" are deemed to include equivalent personnel. Waivers submitted and approved under previous guidance (reference (a)) remain valid.

Additional Guidance

This conditions-based, phased approach prioritizes the safety and security of our personnel, their families, and our communities, while balancing the need to advance Service members' career opportunities, unit rotational deployments, and other imperatives. During this period of transition to unrestricted travel, the Department will take measures to enhance travel

safety, lessen the burden on DoD personnel and their families, and ensure continued operations. Each of your organizations, as applicable, will take immediate action to:

- a. Clearly communicate the contents of this directive to those individuals affected by this travel guidance;
- Establish pre- and post-travel screening and reception procedures for all authorized travelers as provided in reference (d) and any subsequent guidance, to include establishing a means of communication with all personnel throughout the pre- and post-travel screening and reception process and providing information regarding prescribed actions for their particular circumstances;
- Use military- or DoD-contracted end-to-end travel using aircraft or other conveyance for DoD-sponsored travelers to the greatest extent practicable, unless between areas designated for unrestricted travel;
- d. Inform all travelers of their responsibility to contact their gaining organization in advance of travel and to keep the organization updated on their travel itinerary;
- e. Document the exemption or waiver under which the travel is authorized, unless between areas designated for unrestricted travel; and
- f. When practicable within operational requirements, consider either in-place assignment extensions or the applicability of waivers for PCS moves for uniformed personnel with school-age dependents in order to minimize school year disruption and education costs.



TRANSITION TO CONDITIONS-BASED PHASED APPROACH TO CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PERSONNEL MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS UPDATE

Date Signed: 6/8/2020 | MARADMINS Number: 333/20

MARADMINS: 333/20

R 052305Z JUN 20 **MARADMIN 333/20** MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC MRA MM// SUBJ/TRANSITION TO CONDITIONS-BASED PHASED APPROACH TO CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PERSONNEL MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS UPDATE// REF/A/MSGID: MEMO: SECDEF/10APR20// REF/B/MSGID: MEMO: SECDEF/19MAY20// REF/C/MSGID: MEMO: SECDEF/22MAY20// REF/D/MSGID: MEMO: OUSD(PR)/13APR20// REF/E/MSGID: MEMO: OUSD(PR)/21MAY20// REF/F/MSGID: MEMO: OUSD(PR)/26MAY20// REF/G/MSGID: MEMO: SECNAV/22APR20// REF/H/MSGID: MEMO: CMC/6MAY20// REF/I/MSGID: MSG: CMC WASHINGTON DC PPO/R212257APR20// REF/J/MSGID: MSG: CMC WASHINGTON DC MRA/R262107ZAPR20// REF/K/MSGID: MSG: CMC L WASHINGTON DC/R111949ZMAY20// REF/L/MSGID: MSG: CMC WASHINGTON DC MRA/MM/R112120ZMAY20// REF/M/MSGID: MSG: CMC WASHINGTON DC MRA/MM/R291744ZMAY20// REF/N/MSGID: MSG: CMC L WASHINGTON DC/LP/R 111815Z MAR 20// REF/O/MSGID: MSG: CMC L WASHINGTON DC/LP/ R 301758Z MAR 20// REF/P/DOC/ USTC ADVISORY 0058F-20 UPDATE// REF/Q/MSGID: MSG: CG TECOM/R291747ZAPR20// REF/R/MSGID: MSG: CNO WASHINGTON DC/O201856ZMAY20// REF/S/MSGID: MSG: OPNAVN3/N5/R262253ZMAY20// REF/T/MSGID: WEBSITE/HTTPS://WWW.CDC.GOV/CORONAVIRUS/2019-NCOV// REF/U/DOC: MCO 1320.11G/20 OCT 2016// REF/V/DOC: DOD PER DIEM, TRAVEL, AND TRANSPORTATION ALLOWANCE

COMMITTEE/JUNE 2020//

REF/W/ MSGID: MSG: CMC WASHINGTON DC MRA DAG SEC/R032133ZAPR20// REF/X/ MSGID: MSG: COMMCICOM/132122ZMAR20// REF/Y/ MSGID: MSG: COMMCICOM/212024ZMAY20// REF/Z/ MSGID: MEMO: OUSD(PR)/11MAR20// REF/AA/MSGID: MEMO: WHITE HOUSE/MAY 20//

REF/AB/DOC: DODI6200.03/MAR 19//

NARR/ REF A IS OSD MEMORANDUM. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR RESERVE COMPONENT ACTIVATION AUTHORITIES DURING THE COVID-19 RESPONSE. REF B IS GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDERS ON RISK-BASED CHANGING OF HEALTH PROTECTION CONDITION (HPCON) LEVELS DURING THE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC. REF C IS OSD MEMO. TRANSITION TO CONDITIONS-BASED PHASED APPROACH TO CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PERSONNEL MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS. REF D IS OUSD(PR) MEMORANDUM, FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE (SUPPLEMENT 8) - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE FOR PROTECTING PERSONNEL IN WORKPLACES DURING THE RESPONSE TO THE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC. REF E IS OUSD(PR) MEMORANDUM, AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE FOR INDIVIDUALS AT HIGHER RISK FROM COVID-19 - TERMINATION OF DEPARTURE AUTHORITY. REF F IS OUSD (PR) FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE (SUPPLEMENT 9) - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE FOR DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OF INDIVIDUALS AND UNITS DURING THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC. REF G IS ALNAV 049/20. MODIFICATION TO ALNAV 044/20 REISSUANCE OF DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS IN RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019. REF H IS CMC WHITE LETTER 03-20 PRESERVING THE FORCE AND EXECUTING PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION MOVES. REF I IS MARADMIN 254/20. UPDATE 7: U.S. MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19): MODIFICATION AND REISSUANCE OF DOD **RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 - TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS. REF J IS** MARADMIN 264/20 UPDATE 1: COVID-19 SUPPLEMENTAL PERSONNEL GUIDANCE. REF K IS MARADMIN 284/20 HEALTH SAFETY SCREENING REQUIREMENTS TO PROTECT THE FORCE/INDUSTRY DURING RELOCATION PROCESS (HOUSEHOLD GOODS MOVES). REF L IS MARADMIN 285/20 SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE TO PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION ASSIGNMENTS DUE TO 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19). REF M IS MARADMIN 320/20 BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR HOUSING WAIVERS IN CONJUNCTION WITH DELAY DEPENDENT TRAVEL (DDT) AND OVERSEAS TOUR EXTENSION INCENTIVE PROGRAM AUTHORIZATIONS DUE TO 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS, REF N IS MARADMIN 159/20 2020 PEAK MOVING SEASON PREPARATIONS. REF O IS MARADMIN 198/20 UPDATE TO 2020 PEAK MOVING SEASON PREPARATIONS. REF P IS COMMANDER. US TRANSPORTATION COMMAND CUSTOMER ADVISORY 0058F-20 UPDATE: IMPLEMENTING STOP MOVEMENT ORDER DATED 20 APRIL 2020 WITH 1) UPDATED MARINE CORPS GUIDANCE 2) MANDATORY REMARKS FOR SHIPMENTS. REF Q IS MARADMIN 267/20 COVID19 SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE TO ACTIVE DUTY MARINE TRAVELERS TO SCHEDULED ADVANCED FORMAL SCHOOL COURSES. REF R IS NAVADMIN 147/20 GUIDANCE TO

COMMANDERS ON ADJUSTING HEALTH PROTECTION CONDITIONS AND BASE SERVICES. REF S IS NAVADMIN 155/20 U.S. NAVY COVID-19 STANDARDIZED OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE. REF T IS THE CDC WEBSITE FOR COVID INFORMATION. REF U IS MARINE CORPS SPONSORSHIP PROGRAM, REF V IS THE JOINT TRAVEL REGULATIONS, REF W IS EXTENSION OPTIONS IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19, REF X IS MCICOM OPORD 02-20 INSTALLATIONS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE PLANNING AND RESPONSE. REF Y IS MCICOM FRAGO 020 TO MCICOM OPORD 02-20. REF Z IS FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE (SUPPLEMENT 4) – DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL TRAVELING DURING THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK. REF AA IS GUIDELINES FOR OPENING AMERICA UP AGAIN. REF AB IS PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (PHEM) WITHIN THE DOD.// AMPN/REMARKS/ REFS (A) AND (B) REMAIN ACTIVE. REF (C) CANCELS PREVIOUS OSD MEMO DATED 20 APRIL 2020. REF (D) PROVIDES FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION (FHP) GUIDANCE FOR PROTECTING PERSONNEL. REF (E) TERMINATES AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE AUTHORITY UNDER PREVIOUS OSD MEMO DATED 20 MARCH 2020. REF (F) PROVIDES FHP DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT GUIDANCE FOR SERVICE MEMBERS (INCLUDING RESERVE COMPONENT (RC) AND DOD CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES DEPLOYING WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC. REF (G) REMAINS ACTIVE UNTIL CANCELLED BY SECNAV. REF (H) REMAIN ACTIVE. REF (I) IS MODIFIED BY ADDING THREE CATEGORIES TO EXCLUSIONS FROM TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS. REF (J) IS MODIFIED ONLY WHERE SPECIFICALLY NOTED IN THIS UPDATE. REF (K) REMAINS ACTIVE. REF (L) IS UPDATED WITH REF (M) AND MODIFIED ONLY WHERE SPECIFICALLY NOTED IN THIS UPDATE. REF (M) UPDATED REF (L) TO ALLOW ONLY SIX MONTHS OF DDT. REFS (N), (O), (P) AND (Q) REMAIN ACTIVE. REF (R) IS A NAVADMIN ISSUANCE THAT SERVES AS A REFERENCE FOR THE MARINE CORPS SPECIFIC TO MEDICAL INFORMATION AND COMMON NAVAL PRACTICES STEMMING FROM REF (B) BY PROVIDING ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDERS WHEN MAKING LOCAL DECISIONS TO ADJUST HPCON SERVICES ON INSTALLATIONS. REF (S) IS A NAVADMIN ISSUANCE THAT SERVES AS A REFERENCE FOR THE MARINE CORPS SPECIFIC TO MEDICAL INFORMATION AND COMMON NAVAL PRACTICES STEMMING FROM REF (D). REF (T) REMAINS A RESOURCE FOR ALL MARINES TRAVELING. REFS (U) AND (V) REMAIN ACTIVE. REF (W) IS MODIFIED BY THIS MARADMIN. REFS (X) (Y) (Z) (AA) AND (AB) REMAIN IN EFFECT. HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS REVIEWED A DRAFT OF SECRETARY OF THE NAVY GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM CONCURRENT WITH PLANS TO RELEASE THIS MARADMIN.// POC/SEE PARAGRAPH 8//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. Background.

1.a. Ref (c) – Transition to Conditions-Based Phased Approach to Coronavirus Disease 2019 Personnel Movement and Travel Restrictions, dated 22 May 2020; cancelled the 20 April 2020 OSD Stop Movement Guidance. Two overarching factors determine conditions to resume unrestricted travel: 1) state and/or regional criteria based on the White House's Opening America Again guidelines, and 2) installation level criteria based on the conditions in and surrounding Marine Corps Installations, facilities, and locations. 1.b. Peak moving season will extend through the end of October 2020. Additional adjustments to previously published guidance is provided to ensure Marines, Civilian Marines, and their families have options for the shipment/storage of their personal property.

1.c. The pandemic is dynamic and manifests differently by location, setting, population, and individual. As a result, responses to FHPwill need to remain flexible, tailored, and incremental. 2. Purpose. This MARADMIN modifies, and supplements published guidance in accordance with the references. It also supplements refs (i), (j) and (l). To the greatest extent possible, this issuance provides only necessary updates based on the release of ref (c). This message is a consolidated Headquarters Marine Corps stakeholder response released by Manpower and Reserve Affairs due to the nature and timing of the release.

3. Method.

3.a. This headquarters directs continuous assessment and publication of each installation condition under Marine Corps purview for the feasibility of lifting travel restrictions. Installation Commanders shall set HPCON Conditions in accordance with refs (x) and (y). Decisions resulting from these assessments will determine whether or not an installation is restricted for travel and appropriately reported. The Department of Defense will determine states, territories and host nations that meet the White House's Opening Up America guidelines per ref (c). If the state, territory or host nation meets these criteria, then the Service may certify installations under control within that state, region or territory as open for unrestricted movement using the criteria from ref (y) and the following criteria as reported by Installation Commanders in accordance with Marine Corps Installation Command (MCICOM) refs (x) and (y) and the below:

3.a.1. Removal of local travel restrictions;

3.a.2. Availability of essential services;

3.a.3. Favorable Health Protection Conditions below HPCON CHARLIE.

3.b. Regardless of whether the state, territory or host nation meetsthe White House's criteria, MCICOM shall report, the status of each installation, against the criteria above. MCICOM will maintain flexibility to increase or decrease HPCON based on emerging conditions on the ground locally. MCICOM shall report Installation HPCONs to the DC, PP&O COVID 19 Marine Corps Crisis Action Team (MCCAT) for Service level situational awareness.

3.c. DC, M&RA (MM)(RAM) will monitor changes in HPCONs and Installation Status Reported in the Advana environment (when the Service gains access), but will write orders in standard order generation timelines that will presume favorable conditions at the time of execution. Should conditions deteriorate, MM/RAM shall make amendments/modifications of orders to support a later arrival if pandemic conditions do not appear favorable at the ordered location for the foreseeable future where a modification is warranted or upon request for review. Marines traveling under an exemption or an exception to policy will execute orders as directed by DC, M&RA (MM) (RAM). 3.d. The Tiered framework for Permanent Change of Station (PCS) execution published in ref (I) remains with potential review of execution in the month of June to support flattening the July movement spike where able.

3.e. Ref (f) is a baseline for Fleet Marine Force (FMF) deployment/redeployment execution; further details will be updated through the Force Synchronization venue and in concert with supported Marine Force Commanders relative to requirements for entry by country.

3.f. Unrestricted movement will resume when the conditions in refs (c) and (aa) are met. The

Marine Corps will continue with direction from senior headquarters relative to FHP, but will execute the new normal steady state with these provisions established.

4. Additional and Clarifying Travel Restriction Guidance.

4.a. Travel.

4.a.1. In accordance with ref (c) all Marines will stop movement unless the conditions provided in ref (c) and this MARADMIN are met. Except as provided below, this stop movement applies to all official travel, including temporary duty (TAD) travel; Government-funded leave travel; permanent duty travel, including PCS travel; and travel related to Authorized and Ordered Departures issued by the Department of State. For DoD Service members, it also includes personal leave outside the local area and non-official travel outside the local area.

4.b. Exemptions and Waivers - Exceptions to Policy (ETP)

4.b.1. Ref (c) adds the following items to the travel restriction exemptions:

4.b.2. Travel to and from Professional Military Education programs.

4.b.3. Travel associated with formal, entry-level civilian accession programs, such as governmentfunded internships and fellowships.

4.b.4. Travel by civilian employees complying with overseas tour rotation agreement requirements. 4.b.5 All other previous waivers in the references remain current.

4.c. Ref (I) (para 3.a.2.b) is modified. As set forth in ref (c), waivers to travel restrictions, which also includes leave outside the local area (to include leave connected to PCS requirements) and non-official travel outside the local area, may be granted in writing by the first GO/SES in traveler's chain of command. Waiver determinations shall informed by the priorities provided in ref (c): to prioritize the safety and security of our personnel, their families, and our communities; to lessen the burden to personnel and their families; to ensure continued operations.

5. Permanent Change of Station.

5.a. Reporting.

5.a.1. Per ref (b), Installation Commanders will establish local HPCON levels and risk based assessments that may require Restriction of Movement (ROM) for Marines executing PCS orders. In accordance with ref (ab) restriction of movement is defined as limiting movement of an individual or group to prevent or diminish the transmission of a communicable disease, including limiting ingress and egress to, from, or on a military installation; isolation; quarantine; and conditional release. Ref (s) as a matter of naval reference states ROM is the term for limiting personal interaction to reduce risk to the health, safety, and welfare of a broader cohort. ROM is used to minimize risk of individuals encountering COVID-19 contagious individuals, and to prevent personnel who have been in a higher risk area from potentially infecting others. Per ref (i), ROM must be established by Commanding Officers in accordance with ref (z), and authorized travelers must adhere to the most current ROM guidelines found at https:(slash)

(slash)www.defense.gov/explore/spotlight/ coronavirus. This guidance is consistent with ref (c). In accordance with ref (z), Service members who travel to, through, or from Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Travel Health Notice (THN) Level 3 or Level 2 locations should be placed under 14-day ROM upon arrival at their destination (i.e., gaining Permanent Duty Station, installation, facility).

5.a.2. In accordance with refs (I) and (u), Marines executing PCS orders are required to contact their gaining command assigned sponsor in advance of their travel and provide their travel plans

prior to arrival. Marines (and dependents if applicable) will be accounted for by the gaining command upon arrival in the vicinity of the new Permanent Duty Station (PDS). Gaining commands will direct the Marine (and dependents if applicable) via the command sponsors into any ROM as prescribed by refs (d) (i) (z) and risk based screening in the vicinity of their destination. The Marine (and dependents if applicable) will remain in a travel status (awaiting transportation) and will continue to be entitled to travel allowances per ref (j) (paragraph 4.K), and ref (v) (i.e., paragraph 050603, Isolation or Quarantine is Required after Arrival at the New PDS and before Temporary Living Expenses (TLE) begins). The Marine (and dependents, if applicable) will not be considered as having been joined to the command until the day following completion of ROM. Upon completion of the required ROM period the local PAC/reporting unit will join the member and start appropriate station allowances.

5.a.3. Gaining commands are hereby authorized to modify the basic order via the reporting endorsement when the ROM completion date exceeds the report not later than (NLT) date. Gaining commands will provide a reporting endorsement that includes the directed ROM period to the local PAC/reporting unit.

5.a.4. Marines will be required to submit the following items to their Finance Officer/Disbursing Office for reimbursement: (1) DD Form 1351-2 travel claim; (2) All Authorization Letters to travel during the stop movement order as applicable), and receipts for lodging incurred while in a ROM or TLE status; and (3), Command endorsement directing ROM in the vicinity of the gaining PDS. The Command endorsement will include a modified report date that includes the completion of ROM, if applicable.

6. Other Updates.

6.a. Ref (w) permitted a career designated officer that is not retirement eligible with a mandatory separation date to request to have their EAS deferred due to COVID-19; see paragraph 4.b.2.a of ref (w). This update rescinds the availability to request this opportunity. The

smb.manpower.mmsr2O@usmc.mil mailbox will no longer be accepting requests under paragraph 4.b.2.a. of ref (w).

6.b. Reference (c) will impact FY20 and FY21 Force Design unit activations and deactivations. Plan for a shift right of personnel arrivals and departures for non-key leaders. Key leaders may arrive (unit activations) in phase I as planned with an approved ETP waiver. Other personnel will arrive at activating units as conditions permit and IAW this MARADMIN.

6.c. The effective date for Hardship Duty Pay (ROM) and Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) II described in reference (j) (paragraph 4.K.4) is 26 March 2020. The effective date for concurrent receipt of BAS and government meals at no cost described in of reference (j) (paragraph 4.K.6) is 26 April 2020.

7. Logistics (Household Goods/Patriot Express).

7.a. Below paragraphs summarize recent changes to policy and actions required for Marines to successfully execute a PCS move. In general, Marines and Civilian Marines must perform counseling in the Defense Personal Property System (DPS) as soon as orders are issued and must submit their shipment/storage applications as soon as possible regardless of when they plan to execute a Household Goods move. Marines are encouraged to consider executing a Personally Procured Move. This will provide them greater flexibility, reduce overall demand on HHG move providers, and recent changes make this option potentially more financially beneficial. In addition,

Marines with PCS Orders to or from Japan must contact the Distribution Management Office Passenger Travel Office immediately to request their flight dates regardless of when they plan to execute their travel.

7.b. Personally Procured Move (PPM) changes

7.b.1. PPM Monetary Incentive Rate. Effective 26 May 2020, the monetary incentive rate for PPMs conducted between 26 May and 31 December 2020 is now 100 percent of what it would cost the Government to make a move with the same weight (increased from 95 percent). Questions can be directed to the local Distribution Management Office Personal Property Office or the Transportation Voucher Certification Branch (TVCB) at https:(slash)

(slash)www.logcom.marines.mil/Capabilities/Personally-Procured-Move/.

7.b.1.a Empty Weight Ticket Elimination. Effective immediately, when conducting a PPM using a rental truck only a full weight ticket is required. When moving multiple loads, a full weight ticket is required for each load. TVCB maintains a library of rental equipment specifications and will coordinate with rental companies to acquire specifications on new equipment. However, if conducting a PPM via a POV or personally owned trailer and the vehicle/trailer registration DOES NOT reflect the empty or tare weight, an empty weight ticket IS required. If the tare weight is reflected on the registration, there is no requirement for an empty weight ticket. Additional information is available at the link in the preceding paragraph.

7.c. Household Goods Move Scheduling. All Household goods moves should be scheduled at the earliest opportunity, regardless of departure date, in order to appropriately register the demand. 7.c.1. Estimated Departure Date (EDD) of 1 July or earlier. If not already completed,

Marines/families with CONUS to CONUS PCS orders must schedule a HHG shipment immediately. 7.c.2. Estimated Departure Date (EDD) of 1 July or later. Marines/families are authorized to schedule a HHG shipment, Unaccompanied Baggage (UB) Shipment and Non-temporary Storage shipment (as applicable) with a pickup date of up to 45 days earlier than EDD for CONUS to CONUS moves or with a pickup date up to 60 days earlier than the EDD for CONUS to OCONUS, OCONUS to OCONUS and OCONUS to CONUS PCS orders.

7.c.3. Exceptions. Marines who desire to have their HHG, UB shipped/stored earlier than the 45 day CONUS or 60 day OCONUS limitations will require an Exception to Policy approved by the first O5 in the Marine's chain of command.

7.d. Patriot Express (PE).

7.d.1. Based on current projections, anticipated PE demand will exceed currently scheduled lift capacity. Air Mobility Command (AMC) has already added one additional flight in June based on booked reservations. Before AMC continues to increase available capacity, confirmed Patriot Express reservations must exceed available lift. Therefore, Marines must immediately develop their travel plans (regardless of planned travel dates) and place a reservation by visiting the local Distribution Management Passenger Travel Office (PTO) or the local Installation Passenger Travel Office when not aboard a Marine Corps installation.

8. Points of Contact (POC). All Marines shall use their chain of command for queries and requests for information. The following POCs should be used after all other resources have been queried specific to personnel policy, pays, and benefits. The POCs are available to assist Marines with problems that they may encounter in order to not become "frustrated" travelers.

8.a. Active Duty Military Manpower Management

- 8.a.1. Integration Branch: smb.manpower.mmib1@usmc.mil
- 8.a.2. Officer Assignments: smb_mmoa-1@usmc.mil
- 8.a.3. Enlisted Assignments: mmea23@usmc.mil
- 8.a.4. Enlisted Retention: mmea1@usmc.mil
- 8.b. Separations and Retirements Branch
- 8.b.1. Active Duty Officer: smb.manpower.mmsr2o@usmc.mil
- 8.b.2. Active Duty Enlisted: smb.manpower.mmsr2e@usmc.mil
- 8.b.3. Inactive Reserve: smb.manpower.mmsr5@usmc.mil
- 8.b.4. Disability Separations, Retirement and Limited Duty: smb.manpower.mmsr4@usmc.mil
- 8.b.5. Retired Services and Pay: smb.manpower.mmsr6@usmc.mil
- 8.c. Active Reserve and Selected Reserve Marines: 703-784-0528/9100; joinar@usmc.mil.
- 8.d. Manpower Military Personnel Policy: 703-784-9386/9387/9388; mpo@usmc.mil
- 8.e. Civilian Employees: 703-784-9385/703-432-9428; michelle.delmedico@usmc.mil;

frances.burt@usmc.mil

- 8.f. Marine and Family Programs:
- 8.f.1. EFMP: hqmc.efmp@usmc.mil
- 8.f.2. Child and Youth Programs: hqmccyp@usmc.mil
- 8.f.3. Transition Readiness Seminar: joline.miller@usmc.mil
- 8.f.4. Skillbridge and Credentialing: deon.boyce@usmc.mil
- 8.g. Secretariat/Manpower Information: dc.mra.secretariat.office@usmc.mil
- 8.h. Programs and Resources (RFF): paul.w.evans@usmc.mil
- 8.i. LP Division (DC, I&L (LP): usmcpersonalproperty@usmc.mil or call (703) 483-0820.
- 9. This MARADMIN applies to the Total Force.
- 10. This message is coordinated with the Deputy Commandants for Installations and Logistics and the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations and approved for release by

Lieutenant General M. A. Rocco, Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.//



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE U. S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFIC BOX 5553000 CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5300

> I MEFO 1050.3 G-1

JUN 2 5 2020

I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ORDER 1050.3

- From: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force To: Distribution List
- Subj: I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 LEAVE AND LIBERTY ORDER
- Ref: (a) I MEFO 1050.1J Leave and Liberty Regulations (28 Feb 2018)
 (b) COVID-19 Small Unit Leader Leave and Liberty Guide
 - (c) MOD 003 to Marine Forces Pacific Support to COVID-19 Outbreak EXORD; 130048Z Jun 20
 - (d) SECDEF Memorandum-Transition to Conditions-based Phased Approach to Coronavirus Disease 2019 Personnel Movement and Travel Restrictions; 22 May 20

Encl: (1) I MEF Leave and Liberty Limit Graphics

1. <u>Situation</u>. This order updates the I MEF Leave and Liberty order for I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) personnel during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

2. Cancellation. I MEFO 1050.2 CH 2 is cancelled.

3. <u>Mission</u>. I MEF will conduct leave and liberty in accordance with this order.

4. Execution

a. Effective immediately, liberty limits will revert to those designated by reference (a) and depicted in enclosure (1). Reference (b) contains the list of restricted areas as well as restricted activities due to COVID-19. Enclosure (b) can be found at:

https://eis.usmc.mil/sites/imef/G3/COPS/default.aspx?RootFolder=%2Fsites%2Fim ef%2FG3%2FCOPS%2FCoronavirus%20documents%2F5%5FReferences%2FCOVID%2D19%20Upda ted%20References%2025%20June&FolderCTID=0x0120000F29B3DC5619AB40BEB9C8A967D6D F77&View=%7B7572368E%2DB782%2D4E8B%2D99A6%2DFC44280F728C%7D.

The chain of command is directed to review and brief this order weekly, to include updates, during each liberty safety brief.

(1) For I MEF personnel assigned to Camp Pendleton, MCAS Miramar and

- Yuma:
- (a) Overnight liberty-100 mile radius
- (b) 48 hour liberty-200 mile radius
- (c) 72 hour liberty-300 mile radius
- (d) 96 hour liberty-400 mile radius

(2) For I MEF personnel assigned to MCAGCC, Twentynine Palms

- (a) Overnight liberty-85 mile radius
- (b) 48 hour liberty-150 mile radius
- (c) 72 hour liberty-300 mile radius
- (d) 96 hour liberty-450 mile radius

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b. Liberty within a restricted area requires written approval by the 0-5 commander. Personnel may transit through restricted areas without requiring 0-5 commander approval. I MEF personnel who maintain their primary residence within a restricted area do not require written approval. I MEF personnel are required to comply with local municipal COVID-19 mitigation regulations during the execution of liberty.

c. Per reference (c), personal leave remains restricted to the local area. The local area is defined as the 96 hour liberty limit around the military installation where the service member is assigned. The restrictions identified in reference (b) and enclosure (1) apply to local leave. Local leave within a restricted area requires written approval by the O-5 commander. I MEF personnel are required to comply with local municipal COVID-19 mitigation regulations during the execution of leave.

d. Waivers for exception to policy for leave outside the local area can be submitted for the following: 1) determined to be mission-essential, 2) humanitarian reasons, 3) warranted due to extreme hardship. Waivers must be approved in writing by the first general officer in the chain of command.

e. Commanders will take into consideration local, city, state, and I MEF COVID-19 policies when applying COVID-19 mitigations to leave and liberty procedures in order to stay in step with their local community. The following link provide CDC travel guidance: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/travel-in-the-us.html

f. Marines and Sailors undergoing treatment for an infectious or contagious disease will not be granted leave. The first general officer in the chain of command may grant exceptions to this policy. General officers are required to consult a competent medical authority when considering granting an exception under this paragraph.

5. Administration and Logistics

a. Violations of this order are punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I MEF personnel who violate this order may be subject to appropriate administrative or judicial action. The I MEF G-1 is responsible for the review and update of this order.

b. Per reference (c), leave restrictions will be incrementally lifted as conditions at point of origin and destination meet DoD defined standards. As guidance from the Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, HQMC, USINDOPACOM, and the COVID-19 situation changes, this order will continue to be updated as required. Travelers and commanders should consult the most recent travel guidance prior to the execution of leave and liberty.

6. Command and Signal. This order is applicable to the I MEF Total Force.

DISTRIBUTION: I, II

Copy to: COMMARFORPAC CG MCI-WEST/MCB CAMPEN CG MCAGCC

2



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE U. S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFIC BOX 5553000 CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5300

Subj: COVID-19 Small Unit Leader Leave & Liberty Guide

Ref: I Marine Expeditionary Force Coronavirus Disease 2019 Leave And Liberty Order

<u>Purpose</u>: Empower the judgement and risk decision making of I MEF's small unit leaders to protect the force during leave and liberty during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Endstate: I MEF conducts leave and liberty in accordance with DoD and Service policies/orders as well as state and local regulations while remaining responsible neighbors of the local civilian community.

Restricted Areas:

-City limits of Los Angeles -City limits of San Diego (Access to activities at Coronado Island and Balboa Park are permitted) -City limits of Las Vegas -City limits of Yuma (limited to stops for essential services only) -Per the reference, liberty within a restricted area requires written approval by the O-5 commander. Personnel may transit through restricted areas without requiring O-5 commander approval. I MEF personnel who maintain their primary residence within a restricted area do not require written approval. I MEF personnel are required to comply with local municipal COVID-19 mitigation regulations during the execution of liberty.

High Risk Activities that Require Small Unit Judgement:

-Service members are expected to leave an area or facility if large crowds prevent social distancing. This will require a constant assessment of the situation.

-Examples of high-risk locations and activities include but are not limited to: casinos, tattoo parlors, public fire-works shows, public beach/park parties, and concerts.

Required Individual Continuing Actions:

-Compliance with local COVID-19 mitigation regulations. -Maintain 6 feet social distancing when in a public setting. -Wear face coverings in accordance with local regulations. -Frequent hand-sanitation.

18 June California Face Covering Guidance

(https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/CDPH%20Document%20Library/COVID-19/Guidance-for-Face-Coverings_06-18-2020.pdf)

People in California must wear face coverings when they are in the high-risk situations listed below:

- Inside of, or in line to enter, any indoor public space;
- Obtaining services from the healthcare sector in settings including, but not limited to, a hospital, pharmacy, medical clinic, laboratory, physician or dental office, veterinary clinic, or blood bank;
- Waiting for or riding on public transportation or paratransit or while in a taxi, private car service, or ride-sharing vehicle;
- Engaged in work, whether at the workplace or performing work off-site, when:
 - o Interacting in-person with any member of the public;


- Working in any space visited by members of the public, regardless of whether anyone from the public is present at the time;
- Working in any space where food is prepared or packaged for sale or distribution to others;
- Working in or walking through common areas, such as hallways, stairways, elevators, and parking facilities;
- In any room or enclosed area where other people (except for members of the person's own household or residence) are present when unable to physically distance.
- Driving or operating any public transportation or paratransit vehicle, taxi, or private car service or ride-sharing vehicle when passengers are present. When no passengers are present, face coverings are strongly recommended.
- While outdoors in public spaces when maintaining a physical distance of 6 feet from persons who are not members of the same household or residence is not feasible.

23 June Arizona Face Coverings Guidance


(https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/about-facecoverings.html)

- People older than 2 years of age in public settings where social distancing measures are difficult to maintain should wear face coverings.
- Residents are recommended to wear cloth face coverings worn in public place where physical distancing is difficult to maintain.


2



Enclosure (44) Page 5 of 7



Enclosure (44) Page 6 of 7



Enclosure (44) Page 7 of 7



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 29 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

> SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR OF COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM

EVALUATION

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT

DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES

DIRECTORS OF DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

- SUBJECT: Exemption of Authorized Leave for Department of Defense Service Members from Coronavirus Disease 2019 Personnel Movement and Travel Restrictions
- References: (a) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Transition to Conditions-based Phased Approach to COVID-19 Personnel Movement and Travel Restrictions," May 22, 2020 (hereby modified)
 - (b) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, "Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 4) – Department of Defense Guidance for Personnel Traveling During the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak," March 11, 2020

Effective immediately, leave travel for DoD Service members is exempt from the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) travel restrictions in reference (a). Authorized leave outside the local area will be approved at a level no lower than the unit commander or equivalent.

Additional Guidance

 Commanders and supervisors will conduct a risk assessment of the health status and travel itinerary for Service members requesting leave. Service members should not travel if they display a fever or other symptoms consistent with COVID-19 or if they



have had close contact with someone who has tested positive for COVID-19 within the past 14 days. DoD personnel will comply with any DoD, Federal, State, and local restrictions while in a leave status.

- Commanders and supervisors will follow the procedures in reference (b) for all Service members traveling on leave. Commanders and supervisors will establish a means of communication with all Service members throughout the period of leave and the post-travel process, as well as prescribing actions for their particular circumstances.
- All other guidance contained in reference (a) remains in effect until further notice.

Matt. Spa

I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FRAGMENTARY ORDER 010 TO OPERATIONS ORDER 20-001: I MEF COVID-19 RESPONSE DTG: 29 2300 Z JUN 20 SUBJ: I MEF CONSOLIDATION OF PUBLISHED HIGHER HEADQUARTERS GUIDANCE FOR COVID-19 RESPONSE (U) References: (a) (U) OSD Memo - Guidance for Commanders on Risk-Based Changing of Health Protection Condition Levels During the COVID Pandemic, dtd: 19 May 20. (b) (U) OSD Memo - Transition to Conditions-based Phased Approach to COVID Personnel Movement and Travel Restrictions, dtd: 22 May 20. (c) (U) MARADMIN 333/20 - Transition to Conditions-Based Phased Approach to COVID Personnel Movement and Travel Restrictions Update, dtd: 05 Jun 20. (d) (U) FHPG Supplement 10 - (Guidance for Screening and Testing), dtd: 11 Jun 20. (e) (U) FHPG Supplement 11 - (Guidance for Clinical Laboratory Diagnostic Testing), dtd: 11 Jun 20. (f) (U) NAVADMIN 155/20 - Navy Mitigation Measures in Response to COVID outbreak update 5, dtd: 12 Jun 20. (g) (U) MOD 003 to MFP COVID EXORD, dtd: 13 Jun 20. (h) (U) MARADMIN 353/20 USMC guidance for deployment and redeployment of individuals and units, surveillance and screening and testing, dtd: 18 Jun 20. (i) (U) MARADMIN 236/20 Update #6: U.S. Marine Corps Disease Containment Preparedness Planning Guidance for 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19): Protecting Personnel in Workplaces (U) SITUATION. Multiple higher headquarters have published additional guidance 1. relative to COVID-19 response. In most cases, I MEF is already in line with new guidance. However, some adjustments are necessary to propagate new definitions, set conditions to comply with new testing requirements and travel restriction waiver policies, and optimize I MEF response and readiness. (U) MISSION. No change from base order. 2. 3. (U) EXECUTION (U) Commander's Intent. To provide updated guidance to the force on COVID-19 a. policies in order to ensure compliance and optimize I MEF COVID-19 response. (U) Concept of Operations. No change. b. (U) Tasks. None С. Commands and Staff Tasks d. (U) Coordinating Instructions (1) (U) Testing (a) (U) Asymptomatic Testing for Operational Risk Reduction. Per ref (g), all units deploying and re-deploying will conduct 100% COVID-19 testing upon completing restriction of movement (ROM) in accordance with tiered testing priorities. When and where test kit inventory is not available, I MEF will not conduct testing for redeploying personnel, and units are expected to exercise practical screening and mitigation measures to offset testing capability shortfalls. The requirement to request tests through the

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Enclosure (46) Page 1 of 6

applicable Medical Treatment Facility (MTF), acquire, and conduct tests resides with the force provider. Additional I MEF guidance on requesting tests for this purpose will be distributed separately. Redeploying units do not need to request tests from supporting MTFs until more guidance and testing supplies are available. All individuals and units embarking U.S. Navy vessels shall comply with the requirements contained in reference (f) and as published by applicable numbered fleet.

(b) (U) Sentinel Surveillance Testing. Per ref (g), units will conduct COVID-19 surveillance testing for 1% of personnel in a non-medical environment and 10% of personnel in a medical environment and in a congregate setting every 14 days. I MEF will conduct sentinel surveillance testing upon testing resources becoming available in sufficient quantity. Procedures for sentinel surveillance testing will be published in a subsequent FRAGO.

(c) (U) Contact Tracing. Per ref (d) and (h), contact tracing is required on all COVID-19 cases identified via screening and surveillance activities. Follow-on quarantine or isolation measures will be implemented based on the results of screening and/or surveillance activities. Asymptomatic close contacts will be managed in accordance with reference (d).

(2) (U) Conditions-based phased approach to COVID-19 personnel movement and travel restrictions.

(a) (U) DoD has developed a phased approach for resumption of unrestricted travel. In general, two requirements must be met for travel restrictions to be lifted for travel outside of the local area. First the region (a U.S. state, U.S. territory, or host nation) must meet regional criteria and be designated by DoD as a "green" location. Second, the DoD installation must meet installation-based criteria. OSD "green"

1 (U) Removal of shelter-in-place orders or other travel restrictions.

2 (U) 14-day downward trajectory of flu-like and COVID-19 like symptoms.

3 (U) 14-day downward trajectory of new COVID-19 cases or positive tests.

(b) (U) Installation-based criteria for unrestricted travel are:

1 (U) Removal of local travel restrictions.

2 (U) Availability of essential services.

 $\underline{3}$ (U) Quality control/assurance capability for household goods packing and

moving.

in ref (a).

 $\underline{4}$ (U) Favorable health protection conditions (HPCON A or B) as established).

(c) (U) Official travel and personal leave remain restricted to the local area for regions not designated by OSD as "green." The local area is defined by CG, I MEF as the 96 hour liberty limit. Once a region is designated as "green," and the region's installation command establishes an HPCON below C, travel and personal leave outside the local area may resume to locations that are also designated as "green." Commanders must scrutinize all travel and personal leave plans prior to approval to ensure compliance with this guidance. Travel and leave plans that do not conform to this guidance must be submitted to the appropriate authority as a request for an exception to policy. (d) (U) Region and installation designations can be found at https://www.mnp.navy.mil/group/don-covid-19-travel-tracker.

(e) (U) Travel Restriction Exemptions. The below travel restriction exemptions do not require any additional waiver or exception to policy in order to execute.

 $\underline{1}$ (U) Travel associated with uniformed personnel recruiting and accessions activities, to include accessions, basic training, advanced military individual training, and follow on travel to the first duty station.

2 (U) Travel by patients, as well as their authorized escorts and attendants, for purposes of medical treatment. Travel by medical providers for the purposes of medical treatment for DoD personnel and their families is also authorized.

<u>3</u> (U) Travel for Global Force Management (GFM) activities (defined as deployments/redeployments ordered in the GFM Allocation Plan and Combatant Command Assigned Force Demand tasking, including Service internal rotations to support, and TDY used to source ordered capabilities). Such travel to execute Operations, Activities, and Investments or Service-related training will be coordinated between the Combatant Command, the Joint Staff, and the appropriate Military Department. All GFM scheduled deployments/redeployments of U.S. Navy vessels and embarked units and personnel are authorized, provided they are in-transit and have met the 14-day restriction of movement provided under reference (c), and any applicable subsequent guidance.

4 (U) Travel by authorized travelers who departed their permanent duty station and are "awaiting transportation," and by authorized travelers who have already initiated travel (including intermediate stops). Such travelers are authorized to continue travel to their final destination on approved orders.

5 (U) Travel by authorized travelers whose TDY ends while this directive is in effect. Such travelers are authorized to return/proceed to their permanent duty station.

<u>6</u> (U) Travel authorized by the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), to continue execution of the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise as required to project and sustain the Joint Force globally. This includes forces (aircrews, vessel crews, and mission essential personnel) ordered on prepare to-deploy orders alert status, air refueling, global patient movement, mortuary affairs support, inland surface, sea and air sustainment missions, support to other U.S. Agencies, and moves of personnel and equipment that support USTRANSCOM's global posture requirements.

 $\underline{7}$ (U) Travel by military and civilian personnel pending retirement or separation. Specific to service members, travel is authorized to take transition leave. All other leave not associated with transition leave is governed by existing travel restrictions.

<u>8</u> (U) Travel by those under authority of a Chief of Mission and authorized by that Chief of Mission; travel from locations where the Department of State has issued an Ordered Departure; and return travel from safe havens when the Department of State has terminated an ordered or authorized departure.

9 (U) Travel to and from Professional Military Education programs.

10 (U) Travel associated with formal, entry-level civilian accession programs, such as government-funded internships and fellowships.

 $\underline{11}$ (U) Travel by civilian employees complying with overseas tour rotation agreement requirements.

(f) (U) Service members, civilians, and contractors traveling from or through areas not designated as "green" (both domestic and international) will be required to ROM for 14 days. ROM requirements after travel will be coordinated with the destination command.

(g) (U) Per ref (i), in cases of mission essential activities, asymptomatic personnel who otherwise would be required to ROM may be granted an exception to continue to work provided they remain asymptomatic and comply with the following key practices for 14 days after the last exposure: daily pre-screening with temperature checks; selfmonitoring with employer supervision; wearing a face covering, and not sharing headsets or other objects used near the face; continuing to social distance at least 6 feet from others as much as possible; and cleaning and disinfecting their workspace daily. This exception may be granted by the first general officer or member of the senior executive service (or equivalent) in the chain of command/chain of supervision.

(h) (U) DoD civilian employees and contractors that do not ROM-sequester prior to deployment may not travel with the deploying force.

(3) (U) Waivers and exceptions to policy. As set forth in refs (b), (c), and (g) waivers to travel restrictions may be granted. In I MEF the waiver authority for all official and non-official travel outside the local area is the first general officer in the chain of command. This equates to the commanding generals of the major subordinate commands for their units and the Deputy Commanding General, I MEF for the command element and the major subordinate elements (I MIG, MEUs, SPMAGTFs, etc). This authority may not be delegated further. Pertinent comments on references delineating waiver authority for specific travel restrictions appear below.

(a) (U) DOD and USMC guidance. Ref (c) delegates to the first GO/SES in the traveler's chain of command the authority to grant, in writing, waivers to travel restrictions for leave outside the local area (to include leave connected to PCS requirements) and non-official travel outside the local area. Waivers shall be informed by the priorities provided in ref (b): to prioritize the safety and security of our personnel, their families, and our communities; to lessen the burden to personnel and their families; and to ensure continued operations.

(b) (U) INDOPACOM and MARFORPAC guidance. Ref (g) delegates to CG, I MEF the authority to grant exemptions to the stop movement order and to delegate this authority. CG, I MEF delegates waiver authority to the first general officer in the chain of command. Waivers must be granted in writing. Requests for waivers to exception to policy can be submitted to conduct travel for the following: 1) Determined to be mission essential, 2) Humanitarian reasons, or 3) Warranted due to extreme hardship. This authority applies to service and component-directed training requirements such as MOS skill-progression training, deployments-for-training, and planning events.

(4) (U) Definitions. All previous definitions remain the same with the below exceptions.

(a) (U) COVID-19 Case: A member designated by a medical provider by one of two methods: 1) a positive COVID-19 laboratory test, or 2) assessed as presumed positive per the council of state and territorial epidemiologists criteria for a probable case.

(b) (U) Patient (or person) under investigation (PUI): An individual with signs or symptoms of COVID-19 who has a test result pending, or would have been tested had a test been available. Members are no longer a PUI when they: a) receive a negative COVID-19 lab test result; or, b) have met all criteria for return-to-work. Asymptomatic individuals quarantined due to close contact with a COVID positive member are not classified PUI. Asymptomatic individuals being tested for COVID-19 are not considered PUI while awaiting test results.

(c) (U) High-risk personnel: Those individuals, designated by a medical provider, that meet the CDC high-risk criteria available at: <u>https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higherrisk.html</u>. This list evolves as knowledge of COVID-19 grows and should be checked frequently.

(d) (U) Close contact: Defined as being within approximately 6 feet (2 meters) of a COVID-19 case for > 15 minutes without proper personal protective equipment. Close contact can occur while caring for, living with, visiting, working with, or sharing a densely populated space with a COVID-19 case. Close contact can also be established via direct contact (e.g., being coughed or sneezed upon by a COVID-19 case). Determination of close contact presumes the interaction transpired during the COVID-19 cases potentially infectious period currently defined as 48 hours prior to symptom onset (or positive test if asymptomatic) to the time the COVID-19 case is placed in isolation.

(e) (U) Medical screening: COVID-19 medical screening should include evaluation for both typical and atypical symptoms. Typical symptoms of COVID-19 include: cough, shortness of breath or difficulty breathing, fever, chills, muscle pain, gastrointestinal distress, and recent loss of taste or smell. Atypical symptoms of COVID-19 include, but are not limited to: sore throat, rhinorrhea (runny nose), nasal congestion, nausea, diarrhea, headache, increased confusion, dizziness, and malaise. A complete list of COVID-19 symptoms can be found at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/symptoms-testing/symptoms.html.

(f) (U) Self-monitoring: Per the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), self-monitoring includes assessing onset of fever by taking ones temperature twice a day and remaining alert for the onset of cough or breathing difficulty. CDC defines fever as temperature greater than or equal to 100.4 f (38c) degrees. Individuals that develop fever, cough, or breathing difficulty should immediately self-isolate, limit contact with others, and seek advice by telephone from a healthcare provider to determine if further medical evaluation is required.

(g) (U) Restriction of movement (ROM): General DoD term for limiting personal interaction to reduce risk to the health, safety, and welfare of a broader cohort. ROM is used to minimize risk of individuals encountering COVID-19 contagious individuals, and to prevent personnel who have been in a higher risk area from potentially infecting others. ROM includes isolation, quarantine, and ROM-sequester.

(h) (U) Congregate setting: A congregate setting is an environment where a number of people reside, meet, or gather in close proximity for either a limited or extended period of time.

(i) (U) ROM-sequester: U.S. Navy term for preemptive separation of forces to reduce risk of infection while establishing a COVID-free bubble. ROM-sequester can be conducted onboard ship, in contracted facilities, or in personal residence dependent on

Unit-specific scenarios. During ROM-sequester, interaction with individuals traveling outside of the ROM-sequester location must be minimized. Interaction within ROM-sequester location is restricted to basic necessities such as food delivery.

(j) (U) Bubble: U.S. Navy term for individuals, units or installations that have established low probability of COVID-19 infection. A crew that has been underway, or ROM-sequestered at the pier, for greater than 14 days without COVID-19 positive personnel and no COVID-19 symptoms is within a bubble.

(k) (U) Bubble-to-bubble transfer: U.S. Navy term for movement of units or personnel from one bubble to another via controlled means. A wide variety of modes/means of transportation can be used for bubble-to-bubble transfer. The key factor is that the evolution is closely controlled to minimize risk of COVID-19 exposure.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. (U) Command. No change.

 b.
 (U) Signal. Point of contact (POC). POC for this order is Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 / commercial: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

 (b)(7)(c)
 / commercial: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

J. L. OSTERMAN Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Commanding General

OFFICIAL: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Col, USMC / AC/S G-3, I MEF

DOD POLICY CHANGE, COVID-19 MILITARY PERSONNEL MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS - LEAVE AND LIBERTY

Date Signed: 7/1/2020 | MARADMINS Number: 377/20

MARADMINS: 377/20

R 011115Z JUL 20 MARADMIN 377/20 MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC MRA MP// SUBJ/DOD POLICY CHANGE, COVID-19 MILITARY PERSONNEL MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS - LEAVE AND LIBERTY// REF/A/MSGID: DOC: SECDEF/29JUN20// REF/B/MSGID: DOC: SECDEF/22MAY20// REF/C/MSGIG: DOC: MCO 1050.3J/19MAY09// REF/D/MSGID: DOC: USD(PR)/11MAR20// REF/E/MSGID: DOC: CMC WASHINGTON DC MRA PPO/212257ZAPR20// REF/F/MSGID: DOC: CMC WASHINGTON DC MRA MP/262107ZAPR20// REF/G/MSGID: DOC: PAA 04-20/07MAY20// NARR/REF A IS SECDEF MEMO, EXEMPTION OF AUTHORIZED LEAVE FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SERVICE MEMBERS FROM CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PERSONNEL MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS. REF B IS SECDEF MEMO, TRANSITION TO CONDITIONS-BASED PHASED APPROACH TO COVID-19 PERSONNEL MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS (MODIFIED BY REF A). REF C IS MCO 1050.3J, REGULATIONS FOR LEAVE, LIBERTY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE ABSENCE. REF D IS USD(PR) MEMO, FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE (SUPPLEMENT 4), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL TRAVELING DURING THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK. REF E IS MARADMIN 254/20, UPDATE 7, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19): MODIFICATION AND REISSUANCE OF DOD RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019, TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS COVID-19 SUPPLEMENTAL PERSONNEL GUIDANCE. REF F IS MARADMIN 264/20, UPDATE 1, COVID-19 SUPPLEMENTAL PERSONNEL GUIDANCE. REF G IS PAA 04-20, SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE IN THE REPORTING OF COVID-19 PERSONNEL STATUS.//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. Purpose. This message provides notice of a change to

Department of Defense (DoD) policy regarding travel restrictions. 2. DoD Policy Change. Per ref (a), ref (b) is modified as follows: leave travel for DoD Service members is exempt from COVID-19-related travel restrictions. All other guidance contained in ref (b) remains in effect until further notice, to include DoD Priorities: protecting DoD members and families; safeguarding our national security capabilities; and supporting the whole-ofnation response.

3. Applicability. This MARADMIN applies to non-official leave, liberty, and administrative absence outside of the local area and/or liberty limits (as applicable). Travel restriction and waiver guidance contained in ref (b) still applies to leave taken in conjunction with an official travel itinerary (e.g., leave taken in conjunction with Government-funded travel, Permanent Change of Station travel, Temporary Duty travel) to ensure that gaining and receiving commanders (i.e., GO/SES-level commanders who approve travel restriction waivers) have full transparency of members' travel itineraries to conduct their risk assessments.

4. Coordinating Instructions

4.A. Authorized non-official travel outside of the local area and/or liberty limits may be approved, but at a level not lower than the requestor's unit commander, as established in ref (c). This authority may not be delegated below the unit commander. Higher-level commanders may provide guidance that is more restrictive.

4.B. Commanders and supervisors will conduct a risk assessment of the health status and travel itinerary for Marines requesting leave, liberty, or administrative absence outside of the local area and/or liberty limits (as applicable). Commanders should incorporate the following into their assessment: On 27 March 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a Global COVID-19 Pandemic Notice that advises travelers to avoid all nonessential international travel, and recommends that all international travelers stay home for 14 days upon return from travel.

4.B.1. Requests may not be approved for Marines who have had symptoms of, or exposure to, COVID-19 within the 14-day period just prior to the requested departure date.

4.B.2. Commanders and supervisors are advised that travel to, through, or from "RED" locations risks the absence of a Marine from their assigned workspace. For example, a Marine who, upon return from leave, is subsequently diagnosed positive for COVID-19 and ordered into isolation or a restriction of movement (ROM) status; the Marine may be unable to be physically present at their assigned workspace.

4.B.3. RED and GREEN locations are provided by the Marine Corps Crisis Action Team (MCCAT) at the following SharePoint site: https:(slash) (slash)eis.usmc.mil/sites/hqmcppo/MCCAT/SitePages/Home.aspx.

4.B.4. Commanders and supervisors will establish pre- and post-travel screening

Enclosure (47) Page 2 of 3

and reception procedures for all authorized travelers as provided in refs (d), (e), and subsequent force health protection (FHP) guidance. These procedures will include guidance for establishing a means of communication with all Marines throughout the pre- and post-travel screening and reception process as well as information regarding prescribed actions for their particular circumstances, including ROM or isolation if required.

4.B.5. In the event a Marine returns from leave, liberty, or administrative absence and is subsequently diagnosed positive for COVID-19 by a competent medical authority, or ordered into a ROM status, commands are obligated to report this information as announced in refs (f) and (g). A COVID-19 Manpower Tracking Application enables Commanders and supporting staff to report the personnel status of Marines, Sailors, civilian employees, contractors, dependents, and other Service personnel impacted by COVID-19. To ensure accountability and the accurate categorization of personnel, Commanders and supporting staff shall review these publications and, if necessary, request assistance through the Secretariat point of contact listed in paragraph 5.
4.C. Marines will comply with all DoD, Federal, State and local restrictions, along with command guidance, while on leave, liberty, or administrative absence.
5. Points of Contact (POC)

5.A. Manpower Military Personnel Policy: 703-784-9386/9387/9388; mpo@usmc.mil5.B. Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Secretariat:

dc.mra.secretariat.office@usmc.mil

5.C. Marine Corps Crisis Action Team (MCCAT): 703-692-4302;

smb_hqmc_mccat@usmc.mil

6. This MARADMIN has been coordinated with the DC PPO, and is approved for release by (SES) Michael R. Strobl, Director, Manpower Plans and Policy, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (Acting).//



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE U. S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFIC BOX 5553000 CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5300

> I MEFO 1050.4 G-1 09 JUL 2020

I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ORDER 1050.4

From: Deputy Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force To: Distribution List

Subj: I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 LEAVE AND LIBERTY ORDER

Ref:

- (a) I MEFO 1050.1J Leave and Liberty Regulations (28 Feb 2018)
 - (b) COVID-19 Small Unit Leader Leave and Liberty Guide
 - (c) MOD 003 to Marine Forces Pacific Support to COVID-19 Outbreak EXORD; 130048Z Jun 20
 - (d) SECDEF Memorandum-Transition to Conditions-based Phased Approach to Coronavirus Disease 2019 Personnel Movement and Travel Restrictions; 22 May 20
 - (e) MARADMIN 377/20

Encl: (1) I MEF Leave and Liberty Limit Graphics

1. <u>Situation</u>. This order updates the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) Liberty order for I MEF personnel during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

2. Cancellation. I MEFO 1050 3 is cancelled.

3. <u>Mission</u>. I MEF will conduct leave and liberty in accordance with this order.

4. Execution

a. Effective immediately, liberty limits will revert to those designated by reference (a) and depicted in enclosure (1). Reference (b) contains the list of restricted areas as well as restricted activities due to COVID-19. Reference (b) can be found at:

https://eis.usmc.mil/sites/imef/G3/COPS/default.aspx?RootFolder=%2Fsites%2Fim ef%2FG3%2FCOPS%2FCoronavirus%20documents%2F5%5FReferences%2FCOVID%2D19%20Upda ted%20References%2025%20June&FolderCTID=0x0120000F29B3DC5619AB40BEB9C8A967D6D F77&View=%7B7572368E%2DB782%2D4E8B%2D99A6%2DFC44280F728C%7D.

The chain of command is directed to review and brief this order weekly, to include updates, during each liberty safety brief.

(1) For I MEF personnel assigned to Camp Pendleton, MCAS Miramar and

Yuma:

(a) Overnight liberty-100 mile radius

- (b) 48 hour liberty-200 mile radius
- (c) 72 hour liberty-300 mile radius
- (d) 96 hour liberty-400 mile radius

(2) For I MEF personnel assigned to MCAGCC, Twentynine Palms(a) Overnight liberty-85 mile radius

- (b) 48 hour liberty-150 mile radius
- (c) 72 hour liberty-300 mile radius

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Enclosure (48) Page 1 of 5

(d) 96 hour liberty-450 mile radius

b. Liberty within a restricted area requires written approval by the O-5 commander. Personnel may transit through restricted areas without requiring O-5 commander approval. I MEF personnel who maintain their primary residence within a restricted area do not require written approval. I MEF personnel are required to comply with local municipal COVID-19 mitigation regulations during the execution of liberty.

c. Per reference (e), leave travel for DoD service members is exempt from COVID-19-related travel restrictions. This applies to non-official leave (including emergency leave), liberty, and administrative absence outside of the local area and/or liberty limits. This DOES NOT apply to leave taken in conjunction with an official travel itinerary (See para 4.d). Authorized non-official travel outside of the local area and/or liberty limits may be approved by the O-5 unit commander. This authority may not be delegated below the O-5 unit commander.

(1) Commanders and supervisors will conduct a risk assessment of the health status and travel itinerary for service members requesting leave, liberty, or administrative absence outside of the local area and/or liberty limits. Commanders should incorporate the following into their assessment: On 27 March 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a Global COVID-19 Pandemic Notice that advises travelers to avoid all nonessential international travel, and recommends that all international travelers stay home for 14 days upon return from travel.

(2) Requests may not be approved for service members who have had symptoms of, or exposure to, COVID-19 within the 14-day period just prior to the requested departure date.

(3) Commanders and supervisors will establish pre- and post-travel screening and reception procedures for all authorized travelers as provided in force health protection (FHP) guidance. These procedures will include guidance for establishing a means of communication with all service members throughout the pre- and post-travel screening and reception process as well as information regarding prescribed actions for their particular circumstances, including ROM or isolation if required.

d. Travel restriction and waiver guidance contained in reference (d) still applies to leave taken in conjunction with an official travel itinerary (e.g. leave taken in conjunction with government-funded travel, permanent change of station travel, temporary duty travel) to ensure that gaining and receiving commanders (i.e. GO/SES-level commanders who approve travel restriction waivers) have full transparency of members' travel itineraries to conduct their risk assessments. Waivers for exception to policy for leave taken in conjunction with an official travel itinerary must be approved in writing by the first general officer in the chain of command.

e. Commanders will take into consideration local, city, state, and I MEF COVID-19 policies when applying COVID-19 mitigations to leave and liberty procedures in order to stay in step with their local community. The following link provide CDC travel guidance: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/travel-in-the-us.html

f. Marines and Sailors undergoing treatment for an infectious or contagious disease will not be granted leave. The first general officer in the chain of command may grant exceptions to this policy. General officers are required to consult a competent medical authority when considering granting an exception under this paragraph.

5. Administration and Logistics

a. Violations of this order are punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I MEF personnel who violate this order may be subject to appropriate administrative or judicial action. The I MEF G-1 is responsible for the review and update of this order.

b. Per reference (c), leave restrictions will be incrementally lifted as conditions at point of origin and destination meet DoD defined standards. As guidance from the Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, HQMC, USINDOPACOM, and the COVID-19 situation changes, this order will continue to be updated as required. Travelers and commanders should consult the most recent travel guidance prior to the execution of leave and liberty.


6. Command and Signal. This order is applicable to the I MEF Total Force.


B. SAVAGE

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Enclosure (48) Page 5 of 5



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCE, PACIFIC BOX 555300 CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA 92055-5300

> 5060 G-1 17 JUL 2020

POLICY LETTER 7-20

From: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force To: Distribution List

Subj: EXECUTION OF CEREMONIES DURING THE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) PANDEMIC

Ref: (a) U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific Policy Ltr 04-20 Ch 2

1. <u>Purpose</u>. To establish policy for I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) conduct ceremonies during the COVID-19 pandemic.

2. Cancellation. Policy Letter 6-20

3. Information. Per the reference, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, rescinded the policy temporarily prohibiting ceremonies during the COVID-19 pandemic. I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) will continue to set the example in all areas to include the responsible conduct of ceremonies, which shall include COVID-19 risk mitigation controls. In order to slow the spread of COVID-19 and preserve the health and safety of the force, this policy provides direction for, but is not limited to, the conduct of changes of command, reliefs and appointments, retirements, reenlistments, promotions, and award ceremonies.

2. <u>Mission</u>. I MEF, in coordination with Marine Corps Installations-West (MCI-West) and other partners, enables the appropriate recognition of individual and unit milestones while mitigating the effects of COVID-19 in order to remain postured as a globally responsive, expeditionary, and fully scalable MAGTF.

a. <u>Commander's Intent</u>

(1) <u>Purpose</u>. Enable the appropriate recognition of individual and unit milestones while protecting the force and families.

(2) <u>Method</u>. The scale and scope of each ceremony will be adjusted depending on the location of the event. Outdoor venues will enable greater participation as opposed to indoor venues. The number of supporting personnel will be reduced to the greatest extent possible in order to maximize the number of family members, close friends, and colleagues who may attend the event. Social distancing, face masks, and temperature screening shall be implemented.

(3) <u>Delegation of Authority</u>. Commanding Generals of I MEF Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs), are delegated the authority to approve the conduct of ceremonies based on local conditions and the ability to mitigate risk of spread of COVID-19. MSC's Commanding General may delegate further. The Deputy Commanding General I MEF is the ceremonial approval authority for the Marine Expeditionary Units and the I MEF Information Group and its associated units. Ceremonies in compliance with the guidance listed in this policy may be approved by O-5 level commanders and above. Exceptions to this policy must be approved by the first general officer in the chain of command.

(4) <u>Endstate</u>. I MEF commanders execute professional military ceremonies while minimizing the risk of spread of COVID-19.

b. Concept of Operations

(1) Conduct of Ceremonies

(a) Ceremonies should be conducted utilizing traditional sequences of events whenever possible. Deviations from the normal sequencing may be necessary in order to comply with physical distancing. The passing of colors, movement by color guards, and "Pass in Review" is prohibited due to distance and physical contact. Pinning of rank by family members is authorized.

(b) If ceremonies are conducted outside, the maximum number of attendees (to include guests and ceremony participants) is 50 adults (not inclusive of children under 18 years of age), provided six feet of separation can be maintained. Families and members of the same household may be seated together within six feet.

(c) Ceremonies conducted indoors shall be limited to the number of personnel for which social distancing can be maintained. All attendees must undergo a temperature screening prior to entry.

(d) Face coverings or masks must be worn at all times throughout the ceremony. Commanding Generals, Commanding Officers, Sergeants Major, First Sergeants and personnel being retired or otherwise recognized may remove their face coverings when posted as ceremony participants if six feet of separation is maintained.

(e) Any personnel exhibiting symptoms of COVID-19 or feeling ill shall not attend a ceremony.

(2) <u>Receptions</u>. Conduct of receptions following ceremonies will adhere to the same precautionary measures provided in the conduct of ceremonies.

4. <u>Scope</u>. This policy will be revised as required to comply with evolving Department, Service, higher headquarters or Government directives.

5. <u>Certification</u>. This Policy Letter is effective the date signed, and is applicable to all I MEF commands, to include those units assigned under the operational control of I MEF.

J. L. OSTERMAN

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[The investigative interview commenced on 1056, 16 April 2021.] [WIT: MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}]

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[IO: MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

[IO: Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

[CR: GvSqt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

IO (Maj (b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)): Good afternoon. My name is Major (b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) and I'm a part of a team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU and actions and discussions associated with the material conditioning, training, and personnel readiness thereof. This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020.

We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April 2021 to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with information relevant to the investigation.

Here in front of you is a copy of the convening order, as well as the letter that shows that Master Gunnery Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and myself are part of the investigating team. You can review these when you'd like.

WIT: Will these be available to me later upon request?

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$: Yes, they will and we can get you a copy before you leave.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed me to the investigating team on 8 April 2021, and I'm talking to you in my investigatory capacity as a representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We are required to provide General Thomas with a written report upon the completion of our investigation.

I'm talking with you because the investigating team believes you might have information that may be relevant to the investigation. It is important for us to understand the decision making process involved in the forming, composition training, and material equipping readiness of the assault amphibian vehicle platoon identified for the 15th MEU. So please inform us of anything you believe should be considered in this review.

The topics that I will cover with you today include but aren't limited to the formation and composition of the AAV

platoon for the 15th MEU, training and material readiness surrounding the formation and compositing of AAV platoon for the 15th MEU, as well as 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, 1st Marine Division and/or I Marine Expeditionary Force oversight of the 15th MEU.

This is an administrative investigation. However, due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing review, we are asking personnel we talk to as part of the investigation not to share anything we discuss today with any other person. So before we start, do you have any questions about my role or Master Gunnery Sergeant's role in this investigation?

WIT: I do not.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)}): For the purposes of this conversation, please state your name, rank, and current billet.

WIT: ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} , master gunnery sergeant,

Academics Chief, Assault Amphibian Schools Battalion.

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): Roger. Please confirm your cell phone number.

WIT: ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} .
IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Your email address?
WIT: Official, or?
IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Official.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) $\label{eq:WIT:} \end{tabular}$

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): What was your billet on 30 July 2020, the day of the incident?

WIT: I was the academics chief of AAS Battalion.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)}): Okay. What was your billet and your dates of billet the last time you were at 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion?

WIT: I was at 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion in various capacities from 2017, May 26th --

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Sorry. Let me rephrase the question. From November 2019 up until the day you left, when did you leave 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion for the schoolhouse.

WIT: 2020, so I was the operations chief for 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, November 2019.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) : Up until when.

WIT: Until May 1st.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Of 2020?

WIT: Correct.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): And who took over for you at that point? WIT: Master Gunnery Sergeant $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$.

IO $(Maj_{(c)}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)})$: Okay. And describe your duties and responsibilities, broadly speaking, as an operations chief for

3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion. What was your job?

WIT: My job was to advise the operations officer and operations training and communicated with the Division ops chief.

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Did you have any interactions at all with the MEF Ops Chief?

WIT: No.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)): Did you have any interactions at all with any of the other ops chiefs within Division, independent battalions or infantry regiments or infantry battalions?

WIT: No.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Describe the command environment and what you were experiencing on and before the time of the mishap on 30 July 2020. So during this time period, broadly speaking, when did you become ops chief with 3rd Tracks?

WIT: The summer of 2019.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}): Summer 2019 to May 2020. Just walk us through the command environment. What were some of the challenges that were going on, what was it like, who was in command, who were you working with, what was it like?

WIT: We were going through operations officers at a cyclic rate. The general sense on the command deck is whoever sat in front of Colonel Brenize last got what they were looking for,

especially dealing with company commanders; multiple times senior enlisted weren't consulted unless it was as an afterthought; our Sergeant Major was a lame duck.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Okay. Sounds doesn't sound like a great environment. You mentioned whoever sat in front of him last would get what they wanted, for example, company commander. What does that mean?

WIT: So in past experiences, working with $Colonel (c)^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): For the purposes of this, who is Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) in this capacity?

WIT: That previous battalion commander for 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion --

IO (Maj (c)): -- prior to Lieutenant Colonel Brenize?

WIT: Correct. The standard was company commanders would come into the 3 shop, talk to the OpsO, talk to the ops chief. They would form COAS, work through the problems, present it to Colonel $^{(b)(3),\;(b)(6),\;(b)}_{(7)(c)}$, and then we would march out smartly as of a battalion.

And Colonel Brenize came in. He wanted to answer every question that came before him. There didn't seem to be a lot of -- including other staff. So if the staff wanted something,

we'd hurry up and get in there and we'd get our way. If the company commanders wanted something, they would get in there first and they would get what they wanted.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. And did you communicate this --WIT: Yes.

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$): -- perceived issue to anyone, who did you talk to?

WIT: Spoke to the XO, Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at the time, and then spoke to Major (6),(6),(7), spoke to the Colonel himself, spoke to the sergeant major.

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}$): Okay. So the battalion executive officer, you mentioned Major $^{(b)(3), (b)}_{(6), (b)(7)(c)}$ at the time, and then the sergeant major. Who is the sergeant major?

WIT: ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

IO (Maj $\overset{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}{(c)}$): Sergeant Major $\overset{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}{(c)}$. And give me an example, what did you say, what you just told us.

WIT: Right. I would just say that having conversation with company commanders, they would blatantly say that there's no reason to stop into the 3 and talk to the master guns or talk to the OpsO because they have a commander-to-commander relationship and they could get the answers they needed from the battalion commander.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. And what was the response you received, generally speaking, from the XO or the sergeant major at the time when you voiced these thoughts?

WIT: Understanding. Said they recognized it. Even Colonel Brenize was very forthcoming about it. He recognized that as an oversight on his part and he would make changes and attempt to include the staff. But his natural inclination would catch up to him over time. And you would have to go back in and remind him we need have a staff discussion. Don't allow the staff, including myself, to go in there and say, "This is a great idea and we need to do this," without consulting your commanders and vice versa. So at no point was I blameless in taking advantage of this peculiarity.

IO (Maj $\overset{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}{(c)}$): Okay. Well, we might circle back to that, but thank you for your candor.

During this time period when you were the operations chief, what were the major challenges at the unit level -- at the 3rd Track's level or Division level -- because that's what you said you interacted with -- that you were facing during this time period that you were the operations chief? And by that I mean operational tasking, op tempo, COVID, etc.

WIT: So COVID, task saturation, Division passing down

last-minute operations. We got a task on a Friday for a ship op on a Saturday.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3).(b)(6).(b)(7)(c)}): Do you remember the name of the ship or the time period, specifically?

WIT: I don't.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Okay. Do you happen to have email traffic you might be able to go back in time to find that kind of an example?

WIT: No. But I know that Major $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$ would.

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: Major $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$, who's that?

WIT: He was the acting OpsO at that time.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Okay. So COVID, how did COVID affect the battalion, how did it affect the operations?

WIT: Initially, there wasn't a lot of impact. And then finally the Marine Corps decided we're going to start being more restrictive, going to port and starboard. It just made it more cumbersome to operate in regards to --

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Define port and starboard. What do you mean by port and starboard?

WIT: We created an A and B team. So you had the OpsO with the assistant ops chief. You had the assistant OpsO, which was a captain, with myself.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Got it. So one team would work X amount of days, the other team would work X amount of days. So the whole team doesn't go down if COVID occurs.

WIT: Correct.

IO (Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): And so you were in a telework status during this period, like one team would be in a telework status, the other team would show up?

WIT: Correct.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. And was this common for the rest of the staff, this A/B team?

WIT: Yes.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. And is that common for the line companies, the line units, were they undergoing that as well?

WIT: The companies themselves were slightly segregated, so they were expected to work out as best they could with the operational commitments that were coming down on top of them. So they were trying to keep their platoons cohesively separated from the other platoons. But because they had to work closely anyways, you can't split a platoon and go 50/50.

IO (Maj (b)(3). (b)(6). (b)(7)(c) : So they tried to --

WIT: They tried to minimize it by keeping one platoon from another platoon.

10

Enclosure (50) Page 10 of 41

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Okay.

WIT: So that way the platoons themselves would be cohesive. IO (MGySgt (0) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)): At any time during that period, did

you guys cease operations on the ramp?

WIT: No.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : So just continued through?

WIT: Yes.

IO (Maj $\overset{(b)(3),\ (b)(6),\ (b)(7)(c)}{}$: What is your sense of COVID impacts to the rest of the Division?

WIT: I didn't have any.

(b)(3).(b)(6).(b)(7)(c) : If you don't have any, that's fine. IO (Maj We're going to move on here, because it sounds like there's a lot of task saturation, maybe some last-minute tasking, which, on occasion, we deal with as Marines. COVID impact seems to have played a role. Anything else from the Division side of the house, institutionally, that was a challenge that you could think of?

WIT: No. Nothing.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Okay.

WIT: I mean, it's standard Marine Corps.

IO (Maj $\overset{(b)(3),\;(b)(6),\;(b)(7)(c)}{}$: These next few questions are going to hone in a little bit more on this AAV platoon. So describe to me

the battalion layout at this time period, i.e. you have line companies where the MEU platoons being sourced from, what company do they reside in, that kind of stuff.

WIT: We had been going through a transition within the battalion previously.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) : At what time period is this, ballpark?

WIT: Through the summer of '19 through the fall. I think Major Patridge at the time was responsible for the reorganization of moving assets mainly, previous to Colonel Brenize. The MEUs platoons were tended and cared for by H&S Company.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: This was a pre-Colonel Brenize?

WIT: Right.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Okay.

WIT: And during Colonel Brenize, there was a move to create and structure the battalion to focus on the Division commander's primary mission, which was Fight Tonight versus GFM requirements if that makes sense. So Fight Tonight, we provide said company to support said battalion.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Got it.

WIT: GFM, a company is expected to provide a UDP and a MEU. That company goes UDP, the MEU cycles usually off. Therefore, that platoon belongs to that company that's currently UDP.

That's how we were set up for GFM, so that way H&S company tendered the MEU platoons, managed the MEU platoons, because there was no oversight if we had setup for Fight Tonight.

IO (Maj $^{\rm (b)(3),\,\,(b)(6),\,\,(b)(7)(c)}$: Got it. So on this new construct, H&S Company staff --

WIT: -- was not supposed to have the MEU platoons. So we were transitioning away from that.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Okay. I think I misunderstood you. So you said, before Colonel Brenize --

WIT: -- we were setup for GFM.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Okay.

WIT: A GFM consisted of providing UDP companies and MEU platoons.

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: And a MEU platoon would come out of a line company?

WIT: No. You're thinking about H&S. H&S had GS structure. They had vehicles and then we would give them the personnel to form and prepare the incoming and the outgoing MEU.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Okay.

WIT: That was set for GFM. The Division commander, from Colonel Brenize's point of view, the first mission should be for whatever the general officer's primary concern is, which was

13

Enclosure (50) Page 13 of 41

Fight Tonight.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay.

WIT: So we were in the process of retooling the battalion with Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} as a responsible action officer to move equipment and move personnel back to their companies, so that Company C will go UDP. Company C will also have the MEU platoon.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. So what happened then? Because it appears to me that, in January 2020 -- so you said the reorganization started in 2019 -- by January 2020, this hasn't taken into effect because that MEU platoon is still underneath H&S; is that an accurate statement?

WIT: That is.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Okay. So during this time period, who is providing oversight to that AAV platoon?

WIT: 15th MEU had been turned on and turned off, multiple times.

IO (Maj $(c)^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Okay.

WIT: We couldn't get a clear line from Division or MEF. I speak on MEF as hearsay.

(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) IO (Maj): Okay.

WIT: I have heard conversation with Division. The Division playbook just shows that it's on and off, on and off.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Okay.

WIT: Got word in the winter of '19, that they were going to stand up the 15th MEU. We had 15th MEU working at Lieutenant (b)(3),(b)(6),(b), Gunny (b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7) were all part of that. And then they timed out because they only had so much time. When the MEU was supposed to depart, they wouldn't have enough time to go all the way through the deployment because they were due for orders. They were due for rotation as such. And we didn't have a firm date the MEU was going to go.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} : Okay.

WIT: So come November, December, we got word they're standing up the MEU in the beginning of January.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} : Come November, December, you got word -WIT: We got where they were going to stand up the MEU.
IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Where did you get this word from?
WIT: Division.

IO $(Maj_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)})$: Division. Division G-3?

WIT: Division G-3? It came through the OpsO.

IO (Maj (b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)): Okay. And some of this we'll probably circle back to. Broadly speaking, we're talking about passing of word, so what kind of guidance -- whether verbal orders, policy -- to your recollection, did you receive from 3rd

15

Enclosure (50) Page 15 of 41

Battalion leadership or higher headquarters, Division, regarding sourcing, forming and compositing of the AAV platoons in support of MEUs. So let's start with Division. What kind of guidance, in the form policies or orders or verbal, do you recollect being available or do you recollect receiving from Division --

WIT: I recollect receiving a Division order from the operations chief, Master Guns ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}$. He sent out an email about chopping units for deployment.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay.

WIT: I would say that was all we received from Division, specifically.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Okay. What about from 3rd Tracks?
WIT: 3rd Tracks, I don't recollect anything at this time.
IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Okay.

WIT: Policy wise, I don't recollect anything.

IO (MGySgt $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$): What was the battalion's guidance on how platoons would be trained and prepped to be formed, to then chop to the BLT, to an infantry battalion.

WIT: The UDP companies, the final event was that they had to be MCCREE'd. I don't recall anything for the platoons themselves, because we hadn't put out a MEU platoon in forever.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Okay. So a long time since you've done

16

Enclosure (50) Page 16 of 41

a MEU platoon.

WIT: The 13th MEU hadn't gone out there. Their command went out on their own. They didn't actually send out the MEU. So we hadn't sent out a MEU, except for $Gunny^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$ s MEU.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) : Which MEU was that?

WIT: I think it was the 11th, so one prior to the 13th, I believe.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Are you aware of any orders or policies or anything like that from MEF, regarding MEU composition?

WIT: No.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): So when was the AAV platoon formed and stabilized, to your recollection?

WIT: There was a lot of gnashing and consternation of who was going to be the platoon sergeant and who was going to be the platoon commander during November, December 2019.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. You say gnashing and stuff --

WIT: Who's going to do it. There was a lot of hemming and hawing about which lieutenant they were going to take. It was a very intense interviewing process where they were trying to figure out which lieutenant was going to go.

Once we figured out which lieutenant, which gunny could we find that was going to best support that lieutenant, maxing

personalities and matching availability, matching experience and such.

IO (Maj : Okay. Who's involved in the selection of a lieutenant for a MEU platoon?

WIT: That was the OpsO, XO, and Bravo Company's CO, which is now $Major_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$ and the CO. CO had a big hand in all personnel.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): Okay. And then who's involved in the selection of a MEU platoon sergeant?

WIT: That was initially Master Guns (b)(3). (b)(6). (b)(7)(c) and I. We outlined the best possible options, and we advocated for the person we thought was the best choice.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: By personnel, are we talking down to the individual Marine, like lance corporal level, or are we talking section leader?

WIT: No. We did platoon sergeant, section leaders, and then we gave ${\rm Gunny}\,_{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),}$ the --

IO (Maj $\stackrel{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}{(c)}$): And for the purpose of investigation, who is Gunny $\stackrel{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(6), (b)(7)}{(b)(7)(c)}$

WIT: Gunny $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}$ is the one we selected to be the platoon sergeant.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) : Okay. You and Master Guns (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

were initially the ones that did that. Did something change?

WIT: So in the past, it was usually the master guns that would select the platoon sergeant. Colonel Brenize, he had a heavy hand in selecting the personnel, sometimes overriding our recommendations to suit what he -- his right as a commander and such.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) : In the selection of the section

leaders and the platoon sergeant for the 15th MEU, were those the people that you and Master Guns Chouinard selected?

WIT: Yes. Those are the ones that we recommended.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Okay.

IO (MGySgt^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)}): So you weren't overridden in this case?

WIT: We were not.

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: That was the case in other examples, but not in this one.

WIT: Yes.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : So was the forming and composing of the AAV MEU platoon, in this scenario, different from other forming and compositions, to your knowledge?

WIT: I don't believe so.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): No.

WIT: Pretty standard.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay.

WIT: So we looked at $Gunny_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}$. He was coming back off a successful UDP. Talked to his company commander, spoke volumes about him, said he was good to go. His is previous lieutenant spoke volumes about him. He had the UDP experience, and that's the normal step from a successful UDP, to give him an opportunity to take out a MEU. You prove yourself on a UDP, get a shot at a MEU.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IO (Maj): What about training timeline and equipment? Is a standard timeline for people to be given this equipment set this much prior to chop, is this what a normal AAV MEU platoon would go through pre-chop for training?

WIT: No. This is the least standard experience I've had with a MEU platoon.

IO $(Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: Okay. What does that mean exactly are you saying this is more time than necessary, is this less?

WIT: Less time. From composite to chop with major exercises in between, having the support directed by Division, it hampered.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) : Composite? You mean the forming --WIT: -- the forming of the platoon.

(b)(3). (b)(6). (b)(7)(c) IO (MGySgt): -- within the battalion? WIT: So formed it in January. IO (Maj^{(b)(3). (b)(6). (b)(7)}): Within the battalion?

WIT: Within the battalion. We were directed to send it to a UAE to do Native Fury. Half the platoon got there, COVID hit harder, so they stopped all movement. Everyone had to stay. So half the platoon is in a UAE.

IO (Maj Because of COVID, the other half didn't make it?

WIT: The other half didn't make it. IO (Maj^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)}: Okay.

WIT: And then they didn't come back until late April, mid-April.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Okay.

IO (MGySgt $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)(c)}$: So Division directed --

WIT: -- that platoon.

IO (Maj $\overset{(b)(3),\ (b)(6),\ (b)(7)}{^{(c)}}$: -- that specific platoon?

IO (MGySgt $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: But that was not a battalion

commander decision?

WIT: I can't speak to that.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Okay.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : But you were tasked with a platoon,

but we don't know who specifically --

WIT: We were tasked with a platoon and the conversation was that this platoon and this infantry battalion were going to be working together on a MEU, so it's another opportunity for them to foster their relationship.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)

): Okay. I understand the battalion commander is the authority, that he gives a thumbs up. It's the operations officer, however, that tasks that platoon. Does he task platoons to go, does he task companies to provide a platoon, how does that work?

WIT: Standard is we'll get a task from Division. The operations officer will task companies to provide.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)): Okay.

IO (MGySgt $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$): Who is the operations officer during that January timeframe. When these decisions were being made?

WIT: That was Major $\overset{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}{(7)(c)}$

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: When were you tasked with the Native Fury tasker?

WIT: So during the summer, somebody came up to me and said we got this great opportunity. We're going to put forth this whizzbing operation in a UAE and --

IO (Maj : This is summer '2019?

WIT: 2019. It was an off-the-cuff, after a Division op syncs meeting, no names given, like, "Would you be interested in playing?" I was like, "Well, let's see what we have available." They couldn't give me dates, they couldn't give me anything. It was just an engineer concept of being able to do breaches. They were mainly looking for the MARK-154 capability.

And then over time, it grew into this monstrosity because the NPF off-load started rolling into it. And then it got to a point around November, December timeframe, we started pushing back. Major $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$ started pushing back and saying this is too much. We're task saturated. And it fell on deaf ears at Division.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : How does 3rd Assault Amphibious Battalion assess the readiness of AAV platoons while they're forming for MEUs? So you mentioned your companies get MCCRE'd.

WIT: Yes. So my experience has been that the battalion staff will MCCREE the companies, and then the companies would assess and evaluate their platoons.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)}): So is there any play by any battalion staff for the battalion commander in assessing platoons, prior to platoons executing independent deployments?

WIT: I would say that the MCCREE for the company is setup

in their TEEP and coordinated with the battalion staff, so that we can go out there and evaluate it. So they notify us when they're ready to be MCCRE'd.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : For a company MCCRE?

WIT: For a company. For the platoon, I would say that there's cursory oversight going out as a battalion commander, as the OpsO, as the ops chief, checking on their training, seeing how they're doing, acting as a validation of what the companies

are doing.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (MGySgt : So, specifically, to this platoon for the 15th MEU, who would have been at that company level, who would have been the oversight for that assessment and to conduct a MCCREE?

WIT: The company commander and the company ops chief.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : For H&S Company?

WIT: For H&S Company.

IO (Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$: Was that spelled out anywhere, to your recollection, in any kind of order or policy or verbal direction given?

WIT: I can't recall.

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: Was there any kind of brief received at the battalion or, to your recollection, that the battalion had to

give to, either 1st Marine Division, I Marine Expeditionary Force, or BLT 1/4, regarding the status of that AAV MEU platoon training, equipment readiness, manning prior or at chop?

WIT: I don't recollect.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}$): Okay. So nothing received internally at the battalion staff?

WIT: I was not privy to a lot of the operations briefed to the colonel.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Why not? Is that a standard thing, is that typical of how an AA battalion operates here in your experience?

WIT: No. There was a "officers are officers" and, therefore, they will pass the information.

IO (Maj $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}{(c)}$: So if a company was going to deploy UDP, the officers would gather in a room and the company commanders would brief the battalion commander.

WIT: With their company staff.

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: With their company staff. Would the battalion staff officers be present for that brief?

WIT: Staff officers, correct.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Maj) : Would any of the staff NCOs from the battalion staff be present?

WIT: If their respective officer wasn't available.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): But otherwise, typically, no.

WIT: It wasn't that you weren't allowed, you weren't invited. You weren't told not to, you weren't told to. But it was directly meant to specifically for the officers.

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: And then, was there any briefs, to your recollection, that you were mandated to provide I Marine Division or BLT 1/4 regarding training status, manning, equipment readiness?

WIT: For UDP companies, yes.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) : For UDP companies, yes. But not for independent AAV platoons or this MEU platoon.

WIT: Correct. When we go to Twentynine Palms and we provide platoons for the training up there, there's no MCCREE. There's no evaluation process of the independent battalions that provide support to the infantry regiments and the infantry battalions.

IO (Maj $\overset{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)(c)}{}$): Okay. That's fair. What would you say was the stated focus of effort of priorities of that 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion's commander, during your tour as the operations chief?

WIT: Personal development.

IO (Maj

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): What do you mean personal development? WIT: Developing the Marine's sense of integrity, taking a knee. A conversation I've had with the battalion commander, after going through the vehicles, he was like, "There's a lot of rust all over the vehicles." But you can't have good vehicles and time off. One has to give. So one conversation I had with the battalion commander was he was particularly upset with the state of those vehicles, the readiness of the vehicles.

> I said, "Well, we need to work Saturday." He says, "Okay. That's great."

I say, "But we can't give them Monday off."

And then he was like, "I don't want to take time away from Marines and their families." So there was this conversation: Work hard, do the right thing, do whatever it takes to get ready. But then there was always hampered effort, balanced with taking care of the Marines and making sure they had a good family environment.

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: So from an operational sense, what was his priority? Was it service level training exercises? Was it UDP deployments? Was it the MEU? From an operational sense, what was his priority from your perspective?

WIT: From an operational perspective, what was his

priority? Let's assume he had a priority for operations.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Could you, please, clarify your statement?

WIT: I don't believe -- except for the general's priority of Fight Tonight, the overall operational priorities was the closest alligator to the boat.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IO (Maj : Do you remember what the pre-chop training plan for that AAV platoon was?

WIT: I do not.

(b)(3).(b)(6).(b)(7)(c) : To your knowledge, were there any IO (Mai training challenges or shortfalls experienced by the AAV platoon in preparing to composite with the 15th MEU prior to April '20?

WIT: Prior to, there was the UAE op that cut in the middle. They had to do a quick range, gateway to live fire exercise. They went through the whole process, went out the range and shot. They did some minor water operations, just to check the vehicles themselves.

And then it became apparent that were going to do an NPF, although they weren't going to use their vehicles. Other than that, I don't recollect anything else. The main challenge was that there was a major operation right in the middle of their workup.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): So if there is a major operation exercise in the middle of your pre-chop workup, your answer --

WIT: My impression is that Division was notified and it fell on deaf ears.

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)(c)}$: Notified that the platoon would not be ready for chop?

WIT: That this operation would affect their training cycle. IO $(Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: And then who was this communicated to?

WIT: This is conversations that I had with Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}. He would come into my office and vent about how he's trying to push back with Division about this platoon, participate in UAE and how he wasn't getting any traction.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} : Did you have this conversation or did anyone, to your recollection, have this conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Brenize?

WIT: I wasn't privy to it, but I am fairly certain that Major $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$ went down and expressed his concerns to the battalion commander.

IO (Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): Okay. What specific impacts did COVID policies have on your ability to train your unit from January to May 2020, in your case.

WIT: Specific impacts. We couldn't do PFTs. I think we

had some issues with maintenance. Maintenance was on left seat/right seat, team A/team B. From a material readiness, I'm not aware of any real difficulties. Training, I don't recall anything that was --

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: Platoons were still going to the field? WIT: Yes.

IO (Maj $^{^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)(c)}}$: Okay. They were still supporting exercises?

WIT: There wasn't any exercise to support during that time, especially after they shut down UAE.

IO (Maj $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)(c)}$: Okay. Was this battalion vehicle reorganization plan, just give us a wave top, what was that and what was the intent?

WIT: So during Colonel (c) the battalion was formed to support GFM. When you do your DRRS, it makes it difficult to match it up with how DRRS is reported, and then GFM doesn't match up with the Fight Tonight division commander's number one priority. So the thought process was to take the vehicles that were in H&S Company, put them back in their respective line companies to have the 4 platoon, 3 platoon companies.

IO (Maj $\overset{(b)(3),\ (b)(6),\ (b)(7)(c)}{}$: Did all the different staff sections have an ability to influence this plan, were they aware of it?

30

Enclosure (50) Page 30 of 41

WIT: Yes. We were all very well aware of it. From an organization and a large, big picture point of view, it made great sense. From day-to-day, everyday business and doing what we actually do, which was GFM mission which was a consistent requirement, it made it more difficult.

IO (MGySgt^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : What impacts did that have on manpower management?

WIT: It just made it difficult to staff everybody, all the positions.

IO (MGySgt^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : What impact did it have on stability within the company, y platoon level, manpower wise?

WIT: We had to do a lot of switching around as people would get hurt or sick or weren't able to go for one reason, like they made HSST list or something like that. So we spent a lot of time moving people around to shore up -- to support the closest alligator to the boat. So stealing from Peter to pay Paul.

IO (MGySgt^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : To support the reorganization thing. Did this cause a ghost structure effect? When I say that, I mean by doing a reorganization, were you essentially creating structure that didn't exist within the T/O and E.?

WIT: Correct. So it was there in the T/O and E. We just

didn't have the Marines to fill that structure.

IO (MGySqt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : I got it.

WIT: So Bravo Company would come back. We would screen all those Marines that had time to go for another UDP, and then we would cut them all. So you'd have Bravo Company that just got off UDP. They would get any available Marine to go on UDP or MEU would be chopped, BSO'd over to there, and then those that were left in Bravo Company were just the sick, lame, and lazy or the ones that are getting ready to EAS and didn't have enough time to qo.

IO (MGySgt : I get what you're saying.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : This reorganization plan, was it well

received by the staff, was there any resistance to it?

WIT: There was a lot of resistance to it, but there's always resistance to changing the way you do business.

IO (Maj): Okay. How was that resistance overcome or was it?

WIT: I think we all had our opportunity to say our piece, and then the decision was made.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: How was 1st Marine Division made aware of any training or equipment deficiencies at the 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion level?

WIT: Email.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Okay. So give me an example. Is that an email from the battalion commander, is that an email from the operations officer?

WIT: From the operations officer to the G-3, assistance operations officer; and then the 4 officer to the G-4.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: To your knowledge, are there any standard meetings that occur or are there any standard briefings, either for a unit about to deploy or just part of the regular battle rhythm?

WIT: For UDPs, there's a brief to the CG. For platoons, there is none I'm aware of.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Okay. And so if you don't have enough rifle quotas or you're not going to meet 100 percent on the rifle range or UET, how are those issues communicated?

WIT: From the OpsO to the G-3.

IO (Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : It's all via email?

WIT: Or phone conversation.

IO (Maj $^{\rm (b)(3),\ (b)(6),\ (b)(7)(c)}$: To your knowledge.

WIT: To my knowledge, mostly it's email and phone conversations.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Okay.

IO (MGySgt $\overset{\mbox{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}}{\mbox{: For ITX $1-20$ -- and you may not know}}$ this off the top your head -- but who is the platoon that supported that ITX, do you remember?

WIT: I don't.

IO (MGySgt $\overset{\mbox{\tiny (b)(3),\ (b)(6),\ (b)(7)(c)}}{\ \ \, }$: We can find that out. What was the standard in the battalion for reporting training requirements, both 1500 and T&R related. So getting into the MCTIMS, UTM process, what was the standard in the battalion? What was required, expected?

WIT: MCTIMS was the standard.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : So, example being, 2nd platoon, Bravo Company goes out and does a gunnery training event and maybe that's up to Table 6 qualification. They come back, they do their after actions, they do their assessment piece. The expectation would be then, that is recorded in MCTIMS.

WIT: And then their after action was to be briefed to the OpsO.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): And how was that enforced?

WIT: I don't know that it was. Enforced in the sense that we, as in the 3, would have to validate and review the MCTIMS entries and such. The after action brief to the OpsO, I'm not aware of how that would be enforced.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): What was Division's expectation for the battalion in that same regard.

WIT: I don't think there was any expectation, sir.

IO (MGySgt (b)(3). (b)(6). (b)(7)(c) : They never came down and looked?

WIT: I took over and we had multiple company MCCREEs that weren't completed in a timely fashion and I had to play catch up. They got completed, but there was very little communication from Division about, "Your MCCREE is late."

IO (MGySgt): While you were there was there a battalion MEU policy, a written policy, order?

WIT: There was a battalion MEU order. (b)(3).(b)(6).(b)(7)(c) IO (Maj : There was?

WIT: Was in draft. I believe, and had been in draft since 2012 from my recollection, as well as the UDP order that was also in draft, constantly being updated. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IO (MGySgt : So there wasn't an official signed one. There was a draft that --

WIT: -- we worked off of for the most part. IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: From roughly 2012?

WIT: As I recollect.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : RCCA and Mods. From your perspective as the Ops chief, what impact did higher headquarters guidance

have on the battalion on how the vehicles were selected for deployments.

WIT: So vehicles were selected, in the past before mods and and RCCA, it was the best vehicle, usually the RCCA vehicles would go to the MEU because. With the mods --

IO (MGySgt $\overset{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)(c)}{}$: For the record, RCCA being depot level, return to condition code alpha.

WIT: So the idea was that we had to balance what was going to be on in the yard on the ramp when the mods came down, which there was no specific schedule on when the mods were going to come. So we found that we ended up having to keep our RCCA vehicles available for the mods. So the MEU vehicles, unless they already had the mods, then they wouldn't go to the MEU platoon. But if they hadn't gone to RCCA, then they were going to go to the MEU platoon because the RCCA vehicles needed to stay on the ramp, so when the mods came down, they would be available to get the mods. So it limited us in the ability to put the absolute best vehicles we had.

IO (MGySgt $^{^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)(c)}}$: And who made the decision at the battalion level that that was going to be the policy?

WIT: That was a joint conversation between the maintenance officer and the 4 officer and the battalion commander.

IO (Maj Skalicky): Talk to us again, please, about the command climate. Let's go by billets, right, because what you said the beginning was a little bit interesting as far as whoever gets in there first or whoever talks to him -- him being the battalion commander -- gets their way. Can you just walk us through, if you wouldn't mind, some of the personalities involved by billet. So are we talking day-to-day operations? Just paint the picture for us.

WIT: So the idea is that you model action and behavior that you expect from your subordinates. The battalion commander didn't come down to the 3 shop, to the 4 shop, to the staff positions to elicit information, to elicit perspective or insight. So therefore, what was modeled for the company commanders was that they didn't need to stop in at the 3 and the 4 and the staff sections. They could go directly to the commander, then they would walk out of the battalion commander's office with a decision made.

They would then filter that decision up to the staff sections. The staff sections were left trying to do damage control, trying to make things happen to support what the companies had been blessed off on by the battalion commander. And it was vice versa. Once the method of getting what you want

done was established, the staff section would go in there, submit their recommendations and their issues, so it's very stove-piped.

So I found that, when I became the ops chief, I would hang around at the end of the day. I would wait until everyone else had gone home. And then I would go talk to the battalion commander to see what he had already allowed the company commanders to do -- because we all form and shape the narrative to our desires -- and that's what he got from both sides.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): How would you qualify the unity of effort and staff synchronization within the battalion, based off what you just said?

WIT: I would say it was staff sections against companies and vice versa.

IO (MGySgt : Would it be fair to assess that there is zero synchronization and unity of effort within the battalion?

WIT: I would say there is very little. I mean, we had the change from GFM organization. That was a high priority to the colonel. So there was a lot of synchronization because you got he got a lot of pushback. So that forced people to come to the table and for him to be engaged in that regard.

Smaller things that didn't make it to his desk, there wasn't any need for synchronization because he had already made a

decision for that staff section or for that company commander's wish.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: To your knowledge, was anyone external to the battalion aware of this climate, i.e. higher headquarters adjacent units?

WIT: I think we had multiple climate surveys that were less than lackluster.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) : And you said you addressed this with the battalion leadership?

WIT: I did.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Specifically, who?
WIT: Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),} (b)(7)(c) Sergeant Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}
IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Okay.

WIT: And the battalion commander himself. I even joked about writing a yellow sticky:

Staff section arrives, asks for something, operational pause, call company commanders.

Company commanders come in, ask for something operational pause, call staff sections.

I never wrote it down, but that was a joke. IO (Maj (3,)(c) (3,)(c) (6),(b) (3,)(c) (6),(c) (5) (6),(c) (6),(c) (7) (6),(c) (7),(c) (7),(c

should interview?

WIT: No.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): What documents you recommend the investigation team review?

WIT: Command climate surveys?

IO (Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): Okay. Are there any policies or documents pushed out by the 3 shop, to your knowledge, to the companies that talk about training or T&R standards or anything along those lines, anything specific to 3rd Tracks?

WIT: Not that I'm aware of.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Do you have any additional comments or information relevant to the investigation, anything you want to say on the record?

WIT: Not at this time.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Okay. So just quick closing comment here. You are directed to not discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone other than members of the investigation team. If you're asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify myself, the investigating officer, or your commanding officer. [The investigative interview closed at 1153, 16 April 2021.]

40

Enclosure (50) Page 40 of 41

I, Major $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$ attest that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of Master Gunnery Sergeant $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$ held on 16 April 2021.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Maj, USMC



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE U. S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFIC BOX 555300 CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5300

> IN REFLY REFER TO I MEFO 3120.9A G-3 NOV 0 7 2017

I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ORDER 3120.9A

- From: Commanding General To: Distribution List
- Subj: STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNITS (SHORT TITLE: I MEF MEU SOP)
- Ref: (a) Joint Pub 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
 - (b) MCO 3120.13, Policy for Marine Expeditionary Units
 - (c) MCO 3502.3B, MEU Pre-Deployment Training Program
 - (d) MCO 1553.3B, Unit Training Management
 - (e) COMTHIRDFLTINST/I MEFO 3502.1 I MEF/THIRD Fleet ARG/ MEU FRTP/PTP LOI
 - (f) MCO 3000.13, Marine Corps Readiness Reporting SOP
 - (g) CMC DC PPO POE message 101948Z Jun 13, Policy for MEU pre-deployment and post-deployment briefs in the National Capital Region (NCR)
 - (h) MCBUL 3120 (current FY and MOD)
 - (i) MARFORPACO 3120.11 Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
 - (j) MCO 3000.2J, Operational Reporting
 - (k) MCO 3504.1, Marine Corps Lessons Learned Program (MCLLP) and the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL)
 - (1) MCO 3040.4, Marine Corps Casualty Assistance Program (Short Title: MARCORCASASTPRO)
 - (m) MCO 3504.2A, Operations Event/Incident Report (OPREP-3) Reporting
 - (n) I MEFO 3040.2 Casualty and Serious Incident Reporting Procedures
 - (o) MARFORCOM/PACO 4000.10J, Landing Force Operational Reserve Material (LFORM) Aboard Amphibious Ships of the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets
 - (p) MCO 4400.150 Consumer-Level Supply Policy
 - (q) Joint Policy Letter, I MEF III MEF Coordinated Training Plan for 31 MEU and Sourcing Units dtd 20 October 2017
 - (r) COMNAVSURFORINST 4621.1A, Standard Amphibious

I MEFO 3120.9A

proficient in the core competencies for the unit. The I MEF AC/S G-3 shall coordinate the efforts of the MEU, the MEF CE and all others in developing and executing the MEU's PTP. The I MEF AC/S G-7/EOTG shall have primary responsibility for support, development, coordination and execution of the MEU PTP. Per references (b), (c), and (e) the PTP shall be standardized for each MEU to the maximum extent possible and incorporate a systematic approach to training.

(e) Embarkation Day (E-Day) for planning and standardization is the date as assigned by the GFMAP for the deployment of the ARG from homeport. That date may not coincide with the date the ARG actually sails, but the use of E-Day is central to planning and execution of the MEU life-cycle and shall not be changed in any governing documents except by an update to the GFMAP. Upon deployment the MEU will report OPCON to the applicable Naval/Maritime component commander (normally COMTHIRDLFT), per the GFMAP and reference (s).

(f) For planning and standardization, the Return to Home Port (RTHP)/Return from Deployment Day (R-Day) is the date as assigned in the GFMAP for the return of the ARG to homeport. The MEU will decomposite on or about R+30. This 30 day period will ensure the MEU can fulfill assigned Global Response Force (GRF) duties while remaining a deployable MAGTF able to support planned and emergent requirements. This also provides time to conduct post-deploymnet inspections and ensure an orderly retun of the MEU MSEs and detachments to the parent MSC/E.

(g) Upon decomposite, the MEU CE shall be prepared to assume the duties of a MAGTF Command Element for any potential crisis response task force sourced from I MEF. The MEU CE shall also be prepared to augment the 1st MEB Command Element as needed. The MEU CE shall also perform assigned tasks per the guidance in Chapter 5, paragraph 5008. Concurrently, the I MEF AC/S G-3, AC/S G-7/EOTG and the MEU CE staff shall begin to coordinate for the next iteration of the MEU.

b. Tasks

(1) Deputy Commanding General (DCG), I MEF

(a) Act as CG I MEF's executive agent for oversight of MEU manning, equipping, forming, training, certifying and deploying I MEF MEUs.

I MEFO 3120.9A

(b) Serve as the Joint Exercise Controller (JEC) (senior officer) of the I MEF/THIRD Fleet Joint Exercise Control Group (JECG), as practical. Recommend other I MEF Marine General Officers to serve in this capacity, if required.

(2) CGs, 1st MarDiv, 3D MAW, 1st MLG and CO I MIG

(a) CG 1st MARDIV.

<u>1</u>. When directed, designate, organize and equip a Battalion Landing Team (BLT) as the GCE of the MEU, provide a Reconnaissance/Force Reconnaissance capability to the MEU CE and provide CE Augmentation per the standardized MEU Troop List, CE augmentation list, UER, this SOP and CG I MEF LOI for MEU Deployment. When directed, attach the designated BLT to the MEU Commander. Conduct a Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evalution (MCCRE) of the GCE prior to composite of the MEU.

<u>2</u>. When directed, designate, organize and equip a reinforced Infantry Battalion, per this order and reference (r), as the GCE of 31 MEU. When directed deploy and attach the designated battalion to III MEF. (See Chapter 13)

(b) CG, 3D MAW

<u>1</u>. When directed, designate, organize and equip a reinforced squadron, normally a Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) (Reinforced) as ACE of the MEU and provide CE Augmentation per the standardized MEU Troop List, CE augmentation list, UER, this SOP and CG I MEF LOI for MEU Deployment. When directed, attach the designated ACE to the MEU Commander. Conduct a MCCRE of the ACE prior to composite of the MEU.

2. When directed, designate, organize and equip a Marine Light Attack Helicopter (HMLA) detachment and a Marine Heavy Helicopter (HMH) detachment, per this order and reference (q), as detachments of the ACE of 31 MEU. When directed attach the designated detachments to III MEF. (See Chapter 13)

(c) <u>CG, 1st MLG</u>. When directed, designate, organize and equip a Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB), as the Logistics Combat Element (LCE) of the MEU and provide CE augmentation per the standardized MEU Troop List, CE augmentation list, UER, this SOP and CG I MEF LOI for MEU Deployment. When directed, attach the designated CLB to the MEU Commander. Conduct a MCCRE of the LCE prior to CHOP.



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NATIVE FURY 20 / JLOTS 20



Final Planning Conference 27-30 Oct 2019 Out Brief

THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION IS: UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



Introduction



- NATIVE FURY is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed, USCENTCOM-sponsored, USMARCENT-executed exercise Maritime Pre-positioning Force, (MPF) exercise in the CENTCOM AOR. JLOTS is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed, USTRANSCOMsponsored, USMARCENT led for planning Joint Logistics Over the Shore exercise in the CENTCOM AOR in 2020.
- With NATIVE FURY/JLOTS, MARCENT conducts a premier, biennial, OPLAN informed MPF exercise linked with JLOTS in the CENTCOM AOR (UAE in 2020) to demonstrate the combat power and responsiveness of USMC MPF forces as well as Army Watercraft assets in support of Contingency Operations.



UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



IN REPLY REFER TO: 3500 G35 22 Nov 19

From:	Chief of Staff	
To:	Distribution L	ist

- Subj: NATIVE FURY 20 (NF 20) COMMAND ELEMENT (CE) 2-5 DECEMBER TRAINING LETTER OF INSTRUCTION (LOI) SHORT TITLE: NF 20 CE DECEMBER TRAINING LOI
- Encl: (1) Schedule, NF 20 CE December Training
 - (2) Battle Simulation Center Layout, NF 20 CE December Training
 - (3) Roster, NF 20 Forward Command Element
 - (4) Roster, NF 20 Arrival and Assembly Operations Group
 - (5) Roster, NF 20 MEF(FWD)

1. <u>Situation</u>. I MEF executes Native Fury 2020 (NF 20) 5 Feb to 5 May 20 in the United Arab Emirates. In support of this exercise, I MEF will composite and employ an 07-led command element to exercise command and control of all I MEF forces participating in NF 20. In order to prepare for NF 20, the command element will conduct training at the I MEF Operations Center (MOC) Auditorium and Battle Simulation Center (BSC) 2-5 Dec 19. This training will enable participants to test systems and processes, complete training requirements, and develop a tasking order (TASKORD) for the execution of NF 20.

2. <u>Mission</u>. 2-5 December 19, I MEF trains the NF 20 CE and develops a tasking order at the Camp Pendleton BSC IOT deploy to the USCENTCOM AOR and command and control I MEF forces participating in NF 20.

3. Execution

a. Commander's Intent:

(1) Purpose: Familiarize staff with the exercise's concept of operations, rehearse battle rhythm, and align C4I requirements with operations.

(2) Method:

(a) CE staff training and practical application exercises.

(b) TASKORD development.

(c) Commander's Update Brief (CUB) and training outbrief to the I MEF Deputy Commanding General.

(3) Endstate:

(a) NF 20 CE participants familiar with exercise timeline, location, and pre-deployment training requirements.

(b) Watch floor trained.

(c) System access and familiarity verified.

(d) Demonstrated understanding of MEF and MARCENT CCIRs, CSNE, and other reporting requirements.

(e) TASKORD released for staffing.

(f) Forward Command Element (FCE) activated for NF 20.

b. Concept of Operations. This operation has three phases:

(1) <u>Phase I - Preparation (6-27 Nov 19)</u>. In preparation for this training, the staff will complete planning for the occupation of the BSC and the execution of the training. This phase will include staff coordination, identification of participants, a brief to the Chief of Staff (Cos), BSC setup, and guard force preparations. It concludes with the communications infrastructure complete, except for classified hardware and materials, and sections prepared to support the training. The BSC will remain secured during the Thanksgiving 96 and participants will be prepared to execute training on Mon 2 Dec 19.

(2) Phase II -- Execution (2-5 Dec 19). During Phase II, the training audience listed in Encl (3) will complete the schedule detailed in Encl (1). This training will include individual requirements to enter the theater, watch floor training, and rehearsals of key battle rhythm events.

(3) Phase III -- Retrograde and After Action Review (5-11 Dec 19). At the conclusion of the CUB to the FCE CoS, G-6 completes the final breakdown of technical systems, G-2 conducts a security sweep, and the guard force deactivates. The MEF(FWD) CE will meet in Cell 10 to conduct a hotwash before returning to their sections. This ends the use of the BSC as classified planning spaces. Sections will submit AAR inputs to the G-35 NLT 11 Dec 19.

c. Tasks

(1) Tasks common to all Assistant Chiefs of Staff:

(a) Provide I MIG with watch standers for the BSC guard force IAW I MIG requirements.

(b) IAW enclosures 1, 3, and 5, provide all personnel assigned to the FCE and MEF(FWD) for training 2-5 Dec 19. Ensure all personnel are eligible for a secret clearance and have completed the following MCBUL 1500 directed training prior to 2 Dec 19:

- (1) Operational Security (OPSEC)
- (2) Antiterrorism Level 1
- (3) Combating Trafficking in Persons
- (4) Cyber Security Awareness
- (c) Confirm the following for all NF 20 FCE participants:

(1) Service-member maintains an official passport with an expiration date not earlier than 31 Jan 21.

(2) Service-member maintains a visa to the United Arab Emirates that is valid through 31 Jan 21 and in the service-member's official passport.

(3) Service-member maintains a valid government travel charge card (GTCC) and US driver's license.

(d) If service-members assigned to the FCE are missing any items in para 3.c.l.c, coordinate with I MEF G-1 to ensure they submit for an official

Subj: NF 20 CE DECEMBER TRAINING LOI

passport NLT 2 Dec 19, a UAE visa NLT 8 Jan 20, a GTCC NLT 8 Jan 20, and a US driver's license NLT 8 Jan.

(e) NLT 11 Dec 19, submit AAR comments to the FCE G-3.

(2) NF 20 Command Element

(a) On 2 Dec 19, activate the NF 20 Command Element for planning, forming, and deployment.

(b) IAW Encl (1), provide assigned training.

(c) NLT 20 Dec 19, compile all AAR comments and produce a consolidated AAR. (G-35)

(3) I MEF G-1

(a) NLT 15 Nov 19, source the manning documents for the FCE, AAOG, and MEF(FWD), IAW enclosures (3-5). Provide copies of this sourced document to G-6 and the I MEF Surgeon to assist in preparation for this training.

(b) Track and report the readiness of the NF 20 CE to deploy.

(c) Coordinate the application for official passports for all members of the FCE.

(4) I MEF G-2

(a) IAW Encl (1), coordinate and deliver a Counterintelligence Annual Refresher (CIAR) Brief.

(b) IAW Encl (1), coordinate and deliver a NF 20 area of operations threat brief.

(c) Conduct security sweep of BSC spaces to ensure all classified material is removed and secured properly at the conclusion of Phase II.

(5) I MEF G-3

(a) ICW the I MEF Security Manger, develop and publish classified material handling procedures (storage, transport, destruction, etc.) for the BSC during the training. (G-35)

(b) Coordinate touchpoints with MARCENT G-3 for 2-5 Dec 19 to support early interaction between headquarters elements and synchronize battle rhythm events. (G-37)

(c) NLT 25 Nov 19, develop and deliver a confirmation brief to the I MEF CoS. (G-35)

(d) NLT 25 Nov 19, develop a commander's update brief (CUB) template. (G-33)

(6) I MEF G-6

(a) NLT 22 Nov 19, develop quick-reference guides and provide any administrative forms necessary for planning personnel to access NIPR and SIPR services.

(b) Establish and break down the technical network/computer systems within the BSC in accordance with IAW enclosure (1). Configure systems to mimic exercise limitations IOT develop effective information exchange processes in a C2 denied or degraded environment.

(c) Provide help-desk services at the BSC 2-5 Dec 19.

(d) IAW Encl (1), provide a brief to the NF 20 CE on the use of Information Management System-Rapid Force Deployment (IMS-RFD) to track the readiness of NF 20 CE personnel.

(e) Properly secure all network equipment and computer systems at the conclusion training.

(7) I MEF Surgeon

(a) IAW Encl (1), provide a brief to the NF 20 CE on the medical requirements to participate in NF 20.

(b) IAW Encl (1), provide a brief to the NF 20 CE to satisfy Traumatic Brain Injury Program annual training requirements.

(8) I MEF Security Manager

(a) Assist G-35 in developing classified material handling procedures (storage, transport, destruction, etc.) for the BSC.

(b) NLT 26 Nov 19, provide a security clearance roster (based on JPAS Visit Request submissions) to ECP watch standers. Conduct additional JPAS security clearance procedures as may be required for personnel that did not submit JPAS Visit requests.

(c) Provide a smart pack for ECP watch standers that identifies templates of security badges of the MSCs and/or organizations with which the MEF exercises reciprocity.

(d) Prepare 20 event security badges to be issued at the BSC ECP.

(9) I MEF Information Group

(a) 2-5 Dec 19, provide physical security at the BSC IAW Encl (1).

(b) IAW Encl (1), coordinate and deliver Code of Conduct/SERE training.

(c) Provide medical readiness stand-down IOT prepare CE personnel for NF 20. Determine and coordinate necessary immunizations and screenings IAW CENTCOM force health protection guidance. Coordinate with I MEF Surgeon POC for scheduling and guidance.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Timeline:

(a) 7 Nov 19: NF20 CE Planning meeting (1000-1130, MOC OPT Room).
(b) 15 Nov 19: G-1 reports sourced manning documents (enclosures (3-5)) to G-3.
(c) 25 Nov 19: Confirmation brief to I MEF Chief of Staff.
(d) 27 Nov 19: BSC configured for training (without classified material).

(e) 2 Dec 19: BSC guard force in place. (f) 5 Dec 19: Training complete, classified material removed, guard force disestablished. (g) 11 Dec 19: AAR inputs submitted to FCE G-3 for consolidation.

(h) 20 Dec 19: FCE G-3 submits consolidated AAR.

(2) After Action Review: NLT 5 Dec 19, FCE G-3 will release a template for AAR feedback.

4. Admin and Logistics. Omitted.

5. Command and Signal

- a. Command. Omitted.
- b. Signal. Points of contact:
 - (1) I MEF G-35 NF 20 CE Lead Planner LtCol ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$
 - (2) I MEF G-35 NF 20 CE Deputy Planner Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 - (3) I MEF G-6 POC LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 - (4) I MEF Surgeon POC LT (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 - (5) I MEF Information Group Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 - (6) I MEF Security Manager Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 - (7) I MEF NF 20 Exercise Planners: Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} Mr. ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}
 - (8) Battle Simulation Center POC Mr. ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

052000Z DEC 19

FM CG FIRST MARDIV G THREE//COPS// TO FIRST CEB FIRST MAR FIFTH MAR SEVENTH MAR ELEVENTH MAR FIRST LAR BN THIRD LAR BN FIRST RECON BN THIRD AA BN HQBN FIRST MARDIV INFO CG FIRST MARDIV G THREE CG I MEF G THREE

BT

UNCLAS

SUBJ/CG 1ST MARDIV WARNO IN SUPPORT OF EXERCISE NATIVE FURY-20/

REF/A/DOC/I MEF/I MEF FY20-22 CAMPAIGN PLAN/20 OCT 19/ REF/B/MSG/1ST MARDIV/1ST MARDIV CAMPAIGN PLAN/ REF/C/DOC/MARCENT/NATIVE FURY-20 POST-PDSS FPC OUTBRIEF/30 OCT 19/ REF/D/DOC/I MEF/I MEF RAPID FORCE DEPLOYMENT (RFD) ORDER/22 JUN 19/ REF/E/DOC/1ST MARDIV/DIVISION ORDER 3501.2/09 JAN 18//

POC	1/LTCOL/(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	1ST MARDIV G-3/PLANS OFFICER/(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
POC	2/CWO2/(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	1ST MARDIV G-3 NGLO/FOPS/(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
POC	3 / MAJ / (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	1ST MARDIV G-4/LOG PLANNER/(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
POC	4/GYSGT/(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	1ST MARDIV G-3/PLANS CHIEF/(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
POC	5/MAJ/(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	1ST MARREG S-3/FOPS/7(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1. Situation. Per Ref A, 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) provides forces in support of (ISO) Exercise Native Fury-20 (NF2O). NF2O is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)-directed, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)-sponsored, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command (USMARCENT)executed Maritime Pre-Positioning Force (MPF) exercise in the USCENTCOM Area of Operations (AOR).//

2. Mission. From 16 Feb-23 Apr 2020, 1st Marine Division provides an infantry regiment (Minus)(Rein) to conduct a Maritime Prepositioning Force offload and joint training exercise with the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates in order to increase readiness and interoperability between Emirati and U.S. Marine Corps forces.//

3. Execution
3.A. Commander's Intent
3.A.1. Purpose: Demonstrate Navy and Marine Corps MPF capability, conduct
MAGTF operations, and enhance U.S. and UAE interoperability as a Crisis
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Response Force Package (CFRP) exercise supporting I MEF Rapid Force Deployment (RFD) in the USCENTCOM AOR. 3.A.2. Method 3.A.2.A. Plan and execute MPF operations. 3.A.2.B. Enhance coordination between MARCENT, U.S. Army Central Command (USARCENT), U.S. Navy Central Command (NAVCENT), Commander, Task Force 51/5 (CTF 51/5), I MEF, Expeditionary Strike Group 3 (ESG-3), and 7th Transportation Brigade (TBX). 3.A.2.C. Execute I MEF RFD order, per Ref D. 3.A.2.D. Conduct field training exercise (FTX) operations in support of (ISO) OPLAN preparedness and host nation training goals. 3.A.2.E. Conduct an After Action Report (AAR) and refine orders and plans. 3.A.3. Endstate. I MEF (FWD) strategically deployed/redeployed, MPF operations executed, and interoperability with UAE armed forces exercised. 3.B. Concept of Operations. O/A 16 Feb 2020, the Offload Preparation Party (OPP) will depart to NSF Diego Garcia and will begin preparation of Maritime Prepositioning supplies and equipment while aboard Maritime Prepositioning ships. Units outlined in para 3.C. will follow as the main body and will conduct an MPF offload and a joint training exercise. Detailed force closure plan will be provided via SEPCOR. 3.C. Tasks 3.C.1. Headquarters Battalion 3.C.1.A. Be prepared to (BPT) provide 1 x Motor Transport platoon ISO 1st Marines during the execution of NF20. 3.C.1.B. BPT provide MPF enablers ISO NF20 in accordance with (IAW) Ref D. 3.C.1.C. BPT provide personnel to support the NF20 Camp Commandant (personnel will be sourced from the 1st MarDiv AAOE). 3.C.2. AC/S G-1 3.C.2.A. BPT source MPF enablers IAW Ref D. 3.C.2.B. Provide I MEF G-1 with an exercise manning document for NF20 as required. 3.C.3. AC/S G-3 3.C.3.A. Lead the planning and coordination effort IOT facilitate 1st MarDiv participation in NF20. 3.C.3.B. BPT provide MPF enablers ISO NF20 IAW Ref D. 3.C.4. AC/S G-4. BPT provide MPF enablers ISO NF20 IAW Ref D. 3.C.5. AC/S G-6. Provide communication capabilities to the 1st MarDiv AAOE IOT fulfill communication requirements for arrival and assembly operations ISO NF20. 3.C.6. AC/S G-8. Coordinate required funding through and with HQBN and 1st Marines for NF20. 3.C.7. 1st Marine Regiment 3.C.7.A. Provide 1 x regimental headquarters to integrate with U.S. Army mechanized forces and UAE armed forces IOT enhance interoperability between UAE forces and USMC forces. 3.C.7.B. Provide 1 x infantry battalion (-) to integrate with UAE armed forces IOT enhance interoperability between UAE forces and USMC forces. UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)

3.C.7.C. BPT provide security force (SECFOR) augments to I MEF Information Group (MIG). 3.C.7.D. BPT provide personnel to support the NF20 Camp Commandant. 3.C.7.E. BPT provide MPF enablers ISO of Native Fury 20 IAW Ref D. 3.C.8. 5th Marine Regiment. BPT provide MPF enablers ISO of NF20 IAW Ref D. 3.C.9. 7th Marine Regiment. BPT provide MPF enablers ISO of NF20 IAW Ref D. 3.C.10. 11th Marine Regiment 3.C.10.A. BPT provide 1 x artillery battery to integrate with UAE armed forces IOT enhance interoperability between UAE forces and USMC forces. 3.C.10.B. BPT provide personnel to support the NF20 Camp Commandant. 3.C.10.C. BPT provide MPF enablers ISO NF20 IAW Ref D. 3.C.11. 1st Reconnaissance Battalion 3.C.11.A. BPT provide 1 x reconnaissance squad (-)(Rein) to integrate with UAE armed forces IOT enhance interoperability between UAE forces and USMC forces. 3.C.11.B. BPT provide MPF enablers ISO NF20 IAW Ref D. 3.C.12. 1st Tank Battalion 3.C.12.A. BPT provide 1 x tank company to integrate with UAE armed forces IOT enhance interoperability between UAE forces and USMC forces. 3.C.12.B. BPT provide personnel to support the NF20 Camp Commandant. 3.C.12.C. BPT provide MPF enablers ISO of NF20 IAW Ref D. 3.C.13. 1st Combat Engineer Battalion 3.C.13.A. BPT provide 1 x engineer company to integrate with UAE armed forces during the execution of NF20 IOT enhance interoperability between UAE armed forces and USMC forces. 3.C.13.B. BPT provide personnel to support the NF20 Camp Commandant. 3.C.13.C. BPT provide MPF enablers ISO NF20 IAW Ref D. 3.C.14. 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion 3.C.14.A. BPT provide 1 x assault amphibian vehicle (AAV) platoon to integrate with UAE armed forces during the execution of NF20 IOT enhance interoperability between UAE forces and USMC forces. 3.C.14.B. BPT provide personnel to support the NF20 Camp Commandant. 3.C.14.C. BPT provide MPF enablers ISO NF20 IAW Ref D. 3.C.15. 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. BPT provide MPF enablers ISO NF20 IAW Ref D. 3.C.16. 3rd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. BPT provide MPF enablers ISO NF20 IAW Ref D. 3.D. Coordinating Instructions 3.D.1. Exercise Dates: 16 Feb-23 Apr 2020. 3.D.1.A. Forces identified in para 3.C. will begin redeployment on/about 29 Mar 2020, directly following the end of exercise. Detailed redeployment plan will be provided via SEPCOR. 3.D.1.B. All participating units must provide a unit planner to all NF20 planning events as required. 3.D.1.C. All cargo identified as sealift in the NF20 Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) (not MPF equipment) will be staged at Camp Pendleton UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)

33 Area NLT 1630, 18 Dec 2019. Embarkation inspection will begin at 0800, 19 Dec 2019. 3.D.1.D. All cargo identified as airlift in the NF20 TPFDD will be staged at Camp Pendleton 33 Area (if originating unit is aboard Camp Pendleton) or 1st Tank Bn unit marshaling area (if originating unit is aboard Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center [MCAGCC] Twentynine Palms) NLT 1630, 14 Feb 2020. Airlift cargo STRATMOBEX will begin at 0800, 15 Feb 2020. 3.D.1.E. Embarkation inspections/strategic mobility exercises will be conducted on 19 Dec 2019 for all sealift cargo and 15 Feb 2020 for all airlift cargo. Further details regarding these inspections will be released via SEPCOR. 3.D.1.F. Key Dates will be distributed via SEPCOR on SIPR.// 4. Administration and Logistics 4.A. Administration 4.A.1. Reporting Instructions 4.A.1.A. Units tasked to execute the FTX will follow 1st Marines reporting instructions, provided via SEPCOR. 4.A.1.B. Personnel tasked as SECFOR will report to I MIG (Law Enforcement Bn) no earlier than (NET) 18 Dec 2019, details provided via SEPCOR. 4.A.1.C. Personnel tasked to augment the NF20 Camp Commandant will report to 1st MLG (CLB-13) NET 02 Feb 2020 and no later than 18 Feb 2020, details provided via SEPCOR. 4.A.2. FDP&E. Use of JOPES is directed. Amplifying guidance will be published via SEPCOR. 4.A.3. All participating units will notify 1st MarDiv G-3 of resource and/or capability shortfalls NLT 18 Dec 2019. 4.B. Logistics 4.B.1. Transportation 4.B.1.A. MARCENT will provide transportation, supplies, lodging, and sustenance to participating USMC personnel from arrival at UAE until departure. 4.B.1.B. Commercial air is not authorized for deployment and redeployment of forces. 4.B.1.C. Transportation requests of personnel/things to aerial/sea ports of embarkation (A/SPOE) and from aerial/sea ports of debarkation (A/SPOD) upon redeployment shall be submitted NLT 18 Dec 2019 for NF20. 4.B.2. Supply 4.B.2.A. Requisition authority. Utilize provisional Department of Defense Activity Address Code (DODAACS) established via SEPCOR for units supporting NF20. 4.B.2.B. Requirements for fly-in echelon (FIE) equipment, materials, and supplies were submitted to I MEF on 30 Oct 2019. Changes to the FIE equipment, materials, and supplies for NF20 require 1st MarDiv G-4 approval. 4.B.3. Services 4.B.3.A. Billeting. Personnel augmenting NF20 Camp Commandant, SECFOR, FTX, and MPF enablers shall remain in parent command billeting where practical. It is the responsibility of the receiving command to provide billeting as required for Marines stationed at MCAGCC Twentynine Palms. 4.B.3.B. Fiscal. Fiscal Letter of Instruction will be provided via SEPCOR.//

Command and Signal
 S.A. USMARCENT is the lead MARFOR for NF20 planning and execution.

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5.B. Units/personnel supporting: NF20 Camp Commandant, SECFOR, FTX, and MPF enablers will be attached NET 08 Jan 2020, details provided via SEPCOR.
5.C. DIRLAUTH between supporting and supported units is authorized to ensure detailed coordination and execution.
5.D. Contact 1st MarDiv G-3 COPS for approval prior to executing any tasks beyond of the scope of this order or its references.//

6. Approved released by Col (0(3), (0)(6), (0)(7)(6) , 1st MarDiv AC/S G-3.//

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 $\mathsf{Major}^{{}^{(b)(3), {}^{(b)(6), {}^{(b)(7)(c)}}}}$

- 1) Can you verify that the BLT was short by 4 rifle platoon commanders? When did the 2d Platoon Commander, B Company, join?
 - As of 6 May 2020 (16 days post chop) BLT was short by 5 rifle platoon commanders
 o 5 reported in July 2020 (4) Active Duty, (1) Reservist
 - The 2nd Platoon Commander, B Company checked in prior to chop on 6 April 2020.

Very Respectfully,

Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

Executive Officer 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit Embarked – USS Makin Island (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

From: ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Sent: Wednesday, April 21, 2021 1:44 AM To: ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Cc: ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Subject: FW: INVESTIGATION

; $L^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$

Sir,

Can you please review the following question and provide a response?

1) Can you verify that the BLT was short by 4 rifle platoon commanders? When did the 2d Platoon Commander, B Company, join?

I MEF, G1 Operations Office Phone: ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Will do. Two questions:

- 1) Can you guys send us the two previous MEU PMINT briefs?
- 2) Can you verify that the BLT was short by 4 rifle platoon commanders? When did the 2d Platoon Commander, B Company, join?

Thanks SF (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC 20350-3000

MCO 3502.3C C 466 13 SEP 2019

MARINE CORPS ORDER 3502.3C

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps To: Distribution List

- Subj: MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (MEU) PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING PROGRAM (PTP)
- Ref: See enclosure (1)
- Encl: (1) References
 - (2) Command Element (CE) Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP) Guidance
 - (3) Ground Combat Element (CGE) Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP) Guidance
 - (4) Aviation Combat Element (ACE) Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP) Guidance
 - (5) Logistics Combat Element (LCE) Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP) Guidance
 - (6) Maritime Raid Force (MRF) Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP) Guidance
 - (7) Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE) Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP) Guidance
 - (8) Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 26-Week Baseline Training Plan
 - (9) 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 26-Week Baseline Training Plan
 - (10) Recommended Schools and Courses List
 - (11) Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Specialized Skills Training and Certification Guidance

1. <u>Situation</u>. This Order establishes USMC training policy and guidance per references (a) through (s) in enclosure (1) for readying Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) forces, amplifies the training guidance established in reference (a), and serves as the primary reference for general matters pertaining to the MEU Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP). This Order is in accordance with references (a) through (y).

2. Cancellation. MCO 3502.3B

3. <u>Mission</u>. Define MEU pre-deployment training and certification authorities, in combination with references (a) and (g), in order to deploy MEUs in support of allocated Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements.

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4. Execution

a. Commander's Intent and Concept of Operations

(1) Commander's Intent

(a) The end state of the MEU PTP is the systematic attainment of the MEU's Mission Essential Task List (METL), reference (a), for certification and deployment of operationally ready forces able to execute Mission Essential Tasks (METs) in support of a CCDR.

(b) The MEU PTP must allow sufficient time for the planning, execution, assessment, and remediation of all major training events. MEU training and operations are inherently dangerous; adherence to established safety procedures per reference (r) and risk management (RM) principles, per reference (b), at all leadership levels and at all times, is an absolute requirement.

(c) The MEU executes the MEU PTP and the Navy's Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) executes the Fleet Response Training Plan (FRTP), to build and enhance their combined conventional maritime capabilities. The ARG FRTP and MEU PTP reinforce the primacy of the Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) and MEU team through the following cornerstones:

1. Integration and interoperability of the ARG/MEU team as often as feasible.

 $\underline{2}$. Stabilization of personnel and equipment with sufficient time to train.

<u>3</u>. Standardization of doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and procedures.

(2) Concept of Operations

(a) Responsibility for implementing the MEU PTP resides with the Commander, Marine Corps Forces Command (COMMARFORCOM) and the Commander, Marine Corps Forces Pacific (COMMARFORPAC). MEU training is framed within a 26-week period, the MEU PTP provides for the efficient use of time, resources, and assets, with limited flexibility to adjust for additional external requirements. Successful MEU operations rely upon adhering to fundamental Marine Corps doctrine, and require a high degree of standardization and cohesiveness within the MEU, which demands the MEU elements train together as frequently as possible during the MEU PTP. Training is standardized to ensure CCDRs receive similar capabilities, regardless of a MEU's home station. This Order and references (a) through (s) are the core documents providing guidance concerning the assembly and standardization of the MEU PTP.

(b) The MEU PTP is a focused training program that incrementally builds the core MET capabilities of the MEU Command Element (CE) and its three Major Subordinate Elements (MSE). The MEU PTP corresponds to Phase III of the Force Generation Process and roughly corresponds to Block I through IV training, from reference (c).

<u>1</u>. The MEU PTP is executed in three stages: initial, intermediate, and final. Each stage incorporates Individual Training Events (ITE) and Collective Training Environments (CTE), defined in reference (d), which are arranged to build incrementally upon unit and individual core MET training.

2. Reference (a) requires units to composite to the MEU no later than 180 days before deployment (E-180). Prior to composite, MSEs, attaching units, and individual augments will complete all non-MEU specific core MET training In Accordance With (IAW) reference (c) and the applicable Training and Readiness (T&R) manuals. Establishing a solid training base prior to composite allows the MEU to increase its emphasis on unit training, specialized skills, and integration earlier in the MEU PTP timeline. Additionally, completing non-MEU specific core plus MET training will enhance PTP training by allowing the MEU to execute more difficult mission sets prior to deployment (e.g. afloat training in low visibility conditions).

<u>3</u>. Enclosures (1) through (6) provide specific guidance for the MEU CE and its attachments, the MEU MSE, and the Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE). Enclosures (7) and (8) are baseline PTP plans; deviations from these baseline training plans may be necessary to accommodate different training locations and United States Navy shipping availability. Enclosure (9) is a collection of recommended schools and courses. Enclosure (10) provides detailed information on USMC requirements for some of the specialized skills training programs incorporated in the MEU PTP. Additionally, this enclosure identifies billets, certification requirements, and authorized training locations for MEU specialized skills training.

b. Subordinate Element Missions

(1) <u>Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies and Operations (DC PP&O)</u>. Act as coordinator for service policies, plans, and programs in support of the MEU PTP.

(2) <u>Deputy Commandant, Aviation (DC AVN)</u>. Coordinate all Marine Corps aviation policies, plans, and programs in support of the MEU PTP.

(3) Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC M&RA)

(a) Coordinate for MEU and MSE manning and staffing, IAW reference (a), to support the MEU PTP course timelines and composite dates.

(b) Track and manage personnel to be assigned as key billet holders based on Primary Military Occupational Specialty (PMOS) and grade requirements.

(4) Deputy Commandant, Installation and Logistics (DC I&L)

(a) Serve as service coordinator for all Service and Joint matters relating to transportation, distribution, supply, maintenance, and sustainment support of the MEU.

(b) Coordinate unique installations and logistics support, including support for the acquisition of low density items unique to the MEU.

(5) <u>Director, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4)</u>. Serve as service coordinator for all Service and Joint matters relating to command,

3

control, communications, computers, collaboration systems, and intelligence (C5I) requirements.

(6) Director, Intelligence (INTEL)

(a) Serve as service coordinator for all Service and Joint matters relating to intelligence and direct Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) to:

(b) Coordinate intelligence support to the MEUs during the MEU PTP. This will include providing intelligence to support Marine Corps Systems Command's (MARCORSYSCOM) research, development, and acquisition of MEU weapons and equipment.

(c) Coordinate national level intelligence requirements for MEUs.

(d) Provide the deployment intelligence forecast for the ARG/MEU Staff Planning Workshop and other events as requested.

(7) Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I)

(a) Per reference (a), coordinate the development of doctrine, organizational structure, training, equipment, and facility support issues.

(b) Serve as the service point of contact for the development and validation of unique MEU capabilities and low-density equipment requirements.

(8) <u>Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (CG</u> MCCDC)

(a) Serve as the Marine Corps sponsor for training and training facility support.

(b) Coordinate with Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I) and MARCORSYSCOM in the development of concepts, requirements, doctrine, structure, and training unique to MEU organizations and the MEU PTP.

(c) Assist in the coordination of MEU PTP support provided by commands and agencies external to the Marine Corps. Provide initial coordination between respective Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) and Department of State (DoS) for support to each MEU PTP.

(d) Develop, publish, and review, as appropriate, T&R manuals and Marine Corps training policy and standards related to the MEU PTP.

(e) Direct, coordinate, and supervise the development of course descriptive data and Programs Of Instruction (POI) in support of MEU PTP. Assign POI lead agencies and oversee the regular Course Content Review Board (CCRB) schedule IAW reference (i).

(f) Resource Expeditionary Warfare Training Group's (EWTG) formal training in support of the MEU PTP.

(g) Coordinate with appropriate EWTGs to:

1. Provide instruction pertaining to the staff planning, Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2), and Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC) training for the PHIBRONs/MEUs.

2. Support EWTG Pacific as the Marine Corps proponent for the MEU PTP small boat training program.

(h) Coordinate the synchronization of Assault Climber POIs with the Mountain Warfare Training Center (MWTC) and serve as the proponent for all Marine Corps climbing programs.

(i) Review this Order bi-annually and revise and republish as necessary.

(9) <u>Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command</u>. Serve as the Marine Corps agent for research, development, and acquisition of all systems and equipment, including low density/non-standard equipment items, necessary for the MEU PTP to ensure that each MEU possesses the capabilities required by this Order.

(10) <u>Commanding Generals (CGs)</u>, <u>Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM)</u> and <u>Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC)</u>

(a) Per reference (a), provide CCDRs with MEUs that are organized, trained, equipped, and certified to deploy in support of CCDR requirements.

(b) Coordinate the MEU evaluation, assessment, and certification processes.

(c) Coordinate with DC CD&I and Commanding Generals (CGs), Training and Education Command (TECOM) for validation of doctrine, training standards, equipment, and facilities to support MEUs.

(d) Provide direction and resources to the MEF CG to facilitate specialized skills training and standardization of the MEU PTP as addressed in enclosure (10) of this Order.

(e) Coordinate with Plans, Policies and Operations-Special Operations Directorate (PO-SOD) to assist respective MEFs in identifying and scheduling MEU PTP training opportunities that exercise integration, interoperability, interdependence (I3) with United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

(f) Coordinate with and ensure the MEF(s):

<u>1</u>. Provides the MEU commander with core MET trained units prepared to execute the MEU PTP no later than E-180.

 $\underline{2}.$ Provides ongoing formal and informal evaluation and assessment of the MEU.

 $\underline{3}$. Develops and coordinates specialized skills training course descriptive data and POIs, per enclosure (10), in support of the MEU PTP.

 $\underline{4}$. Directs the coordination, support, and evaluation of MEU related courses and MEU PTP events.

5. Provides resident expertise on all MEU specialized skills training and operational concerns.

<u>6</u>. NLT E-365, directs sourcing and coordination with the appropriate Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and Navy Components IOT shape the PTP in preparation for deployment to include creation of the MEU Organization for Embarkation and Assignment to Shipping (OEA&S), and identification of deployed exercise funding.

(11) <u>Commanding Generals (CGs) of Marine Forces, Supporting</u> Establishment Commands, and Commanders of Separate Organizations Not Commanded by a General Officer

(a) When required, establish certification and sustainment programs as described herein.

(b) IAW reference (d), record qualifications and certifications in the individual management module in the Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS).

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) <u>Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Pre-Deployment Training Program</u> (PTP) Fundamentals. The MEU PTP is structured upon three distinct but complementary tenets.

(a) <u>Capabilities based</u>. Paragraph 4.C.4 in reference (a) lists the core METs for a MEU. A MEU's individual training plan is developed to meet supported CCDR operational requirements, based on the MEU commander's mission analysis, within the framework of this Order, as well as guidance received regarding unique theater-specific requirements from a CCDR, Theater Fleet Commander, Theater Marine Component Commander and the parent MEF. The MEU METL, in reference (a), and MEU T&R tasks, in reference (g), are used to systematically develop, evaluate, and assess the integrated capabilities of the ARG/MEU. Exercises incorporated into the MEU PTP will emphasize the following: Command and Control (C2), Communications, Computers, Intelligence (C4I), interoperability; amphibious operations, security cooperation, and humanitarian assistance; as well as administrative and logistical requirements.

(b) <u>Integration/Interoperability</u>. The MEU PTP will facilitate integrated training throughout the six-month training period. MEU PTP planners will seek opportunities to integrate and enhance interoperability between the MEU and PHIBRON as well as other Naval; Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Organizations to enable the ARG/MEU to fully realize its inherent combat power. IAW reference (a), MEU commanders and select staff members receive briefs from JIIM Organizations during pre-deployment interagency coordination trips to the National Capital Region (NCR). The MEU commander will ensure MSE commanders and MEU staffs are aware of the capabilities, communications channels, and employment concepts of applicable JIIM agencies, and know the CCDR's plans for employing the MEU in conjunction with other forces. During the MEU PTP, integrated training enhances: <u>1</u>. <u>Rapid decision making</u>. The PHIBRON and MEU staffs develop a cohesive capability to conduct R2P2 in a time constrained environment. All elements of the MEU will be proficient in the deliberate Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) prior to composite.

2. Joint Task Force and Naval Fleet operations. The MEU staff should integrate throughout the work-up period with the PHIBRON staff as often as is feasible. The MEU staff will be familiar with the Joint Planning Process and be prepared to operate in a joint environment. Additionally, the MEU staff will be familiar with the Navy Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) construct and be prepared to coordinate MEU actions in support of CWC.

<u>3. Understanding of, and interoperability with, Interagency</u> and Intergovernmental Organizations. Personnel from the DoS, Country/Embassy Teams, Disaster Assistance personnel, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, SOCOM, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and applicable Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) should be incorporated into selected MEU exercises when possible and feasible. Normally the DoS supports two major MEU exercises during the PTP. Support will initially be coordinated via the designated TECOM representative who will provide direct liaison authorized between DoS and the respective MEF for detailed planning.

(c) <u>Split/Distributed/Disaggregated Operations</u>. Operating in split, distributed, and disaggregated constructs is necessary in order to fulfill operational requirements. Although the MEU PTP focuses on aggregated training, it provides a solid foundation to build off of for other ARG/MEU configurations and operations. IAW reference (j), training for other-thanaggregate operations is best accomplished in response to a component commander's clearly stated requirements which are identified well in advance of the start of the unit's training program. When feasible, commanders should incorporate other-than-aggregate constructs into the MEU PTP.

(2) <u>Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Mission Essential Task List</u> (METL) Evaluation and Assessment

(a) Evaluations are a determination by a commander or trainer regarding an individual's or unit's proficiency in the tasks, conditions, and standards articulated in the T&R manual and determined by the training and evaluation criteria. Two types of evaluations, defined in reference (d), will be incorporated into the MEU PTP in accordance with the following guidance:

<u>1</u>. Informal evaluations are constant throughout the PTP, during all stages of training, at every level of command, to ensure proper tactics, techniques, and procedures have been instructed and learned. Informal evaluations may also be conducted for additional capabilities, as required by the MEF commander or the operational commander who will employ the MEU.

2. Formal evaluations are often scenario-based, focused on the MEU's METs, and use collective training standards as the criteria to assess unit proficiency. Formal evaluations, coordinated by the Marine Force (MARFOR) Commander or a designated executive agent, are primarily conducted during the final training stage of the MEU PTP. R2P2 proficiency will be evaluated in addition to full mission profiles for selected missions. Although scheduling conflicts may require some capabilities be formally evaluated before the Certification Exercise (CERTEX) in the final training stage, all evaluations culminate during the final at sea period. The 31st MEU will, at a minimum, be informally evaluated prior to deployment from Okinawa if operational requirements do not permit formal evaluation. If some of the MEU METL capabilities are not included in the final at sea period, the MEU PTP training plan will be built to establish a firm foundation to successfully certify and complete those tasks.

(b) Assessments are informal judgments made by a commander or trainer in order to determine the training proficiency or readiness of a unit in relation to a MET. Assessments also utilize completed evaluations to compare the MEU's level of proficiency to the desired level of warfighting proficiency, defined by the MET, in order to inform the MARFOR commander's certification of the MEU. Note: The SOFLE is formally evaluated by designated SOCOM representatives, but the MARFOR/MEF evaluation team will assess the interoperability between the MEU and the SOFLE and/or and other organizations as required.

(c) MEU commanders may request deviations or exceptions from training and evaluation of a portion of the METL. Requests must be submitted by the MEU to the MARFOR via the MEF.

(3) <u>Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Pre-Deployment Training Program</u> (PTP) Stages

(a) <u>Pre-composite Training Requirements</u>. For the MEU to gain the maximum benefit from the MEU PTP, it is essential that the CE and its MSEs possess certain capabilities before composite. Enclosures (1) through (6) provide specific guidance concerning prerequisites. Enclosure (9) provides a list of schools that support the development of a prerequisite training plan.

(b) <u>Pre-deployment Visits</u>. Normally, prior to composite, the MEU commander, and designated staff, will visit the appropriate Marine component command, forward Navy fleet commands, and other Navy/joint supporting commands for the applicable area of operations. Commanders are encouraged to visit Theatre SOCOMs as well. The MEU commander and the MEU staff will be able to receive input and guidance from the future higher headquarters and special operations partners to inform their PTP planning. Visits will also allow the MEU staffs to begin planning any prospective Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events occurring during deployment. If feasible, these visits should include the PHIBRON commander and key members of the PHIBRON staff.

(c) <u>Initial Training Stage</u>. At composite, MSEs will arrive core MET trained, based on their community's T&R manual. The initial training stage marks the start of the MEU PTP and consists of specialized training courses and core MEU MET training. The initial training stage begins with ITE and advances to unit-level tactical combat drills and CTE that support the MEU METL. The following forms the baseline for the initial stage:

1. EWTG ARG/MEU Staff Planning and R2P2 Courses

2. Individual Skill Courses:

<u>a</u>. Methods of Entry (MOE) (Weapons Training Battalion (WTBN) Quantico or III MEF Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG))

Member Course

b. EOTG Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Team

<u>c</u>. EOTG Sniper Course

d. EOTG Assault Climbers Course

e. EOTG Close Quarters Tactics (CQT) Team Member Course

f. CQT Enabler Course

g. EOTG Helicopter Rope Suspension Technique (HRST) and/or Fast Rope Master Course (FRMC)

h. Enhanced-Chemical Biological and Radiological Courses

<u>i</u>. EWTG Pacific (EWTGPAC)/III MEF EOTG Scout Swimmer (31st MEU requirement)

j. EWTGPAC/III MEF EOTG Coxswain Skills Course (31st MEU requirement)

k. EWTGPAC Maritime Navigation (31st MEU requirement)

1. PMA-263/TALSA SUAS Course

m. EWTG SACC Course

3. EOTG Small Unit Training:

a. EOTG Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) (air and surface)

b. EOTG Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW)

- c. EOTG Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS)
- d. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

(FHA/DR)

e. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)

f. Mass Casualty response training

4. EWTGPAC Infantry Company Small Boat Raid

5. EOTG Company Raid Training

6. <u>Amphibious Readiness Group/ Marine Expeditionary Unit</u> (MEU) Fire Support Coordination (FSC) Training. This training includes classroom instruction by the appropriate EWTG supporting arms section as well as unit sponsored Fire Support Coordination (FSC) exercises. Units will incorporate this classroom training and a minimum of one field exercise/livefire training event. Battalions supporting the 31st MEU will conduct at least one live-fire exercise with the supporting battery prior to deployment. 7. Synthetic Training Exercises (STX). Designated ARG/MEU STX are included throughout the ARG FRTP/MEU PTP, beginning at the initial training stage, by PTP planners to reinforce learned skills and provide transition training between ITEs and CTEs. STX events are conducted in various environments, including classroom/computer war-gaming environments, to exercise the ARG/MEU Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), and the MEU's operations and contingency plans. The various synthetic training opportunities made available by the respective EWTGs, Tactical Training Groups, and Battle Simulation Centers lay a foundation for more effective Navy/Marine Corps staff integration during at-sea periods and deployment.

8. <u>Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Exercises</u>. The MEU may conduct training exercises, involving all elements of the MEU, in order to conduct training for certain METs. These exercises may be referred to as MEUEX and are normally conducted following the completion of the initial stage EOTG courses.

9. Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training (SWATT). A Navy driven, multi-ship, multi-platform, multi-warfare event focused on ARG advanced tactical training at both the unit and integrated levels. The Navy's Surface and Mine Warfare Development Center (SMWDC) is the executive agent for the Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training (SWATT) program and coordinates training resources with the providers. Specific MEU elements may be asked to participate. Coordination between MEU and PHIBRON staffs is crucial to determine the MEU's involvement to support the Navy's training objectives. This is a Navy training event for the ARG and PHIBRON and does not normally provide the MEU with any significant training opportunities except Aviation Combat Element (ACE) qualifications and ship C4I grooming. The MEU should make every effort to obtain Carrier Qualification (CQ)/Deck Landing Qualification (DLQ) opportunities when available as well as provide Green In Support Of Blue (GISOB) resources (normally aviation assets) to the ARG during SWATT events whenever possible.

10. Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) / Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)/Special Operations Forces (SOF) Workshop. MEU/PHIBRON commanders and their designated staff will attend a one week, SOCOM sponsored, training session/Table Top Exercise (TTX) at Fort Bragg and Tampa (can also include visit to Dam Neck, VA) in order to provide key personnel an orientation on SOCOM capabilities and employment considerations while also discussing ARG/MEU ability to augment, support, and enable Special Operations Forces (SOF) operations. SOFLE members participate in the Tampa portion.

<u>11.</u> <u>Underwater Egress Training</u>. The Underwater Egress Training program is established to enhance the survivability of ground forces and non-aircrew personnel in aquatic mishaps involving aircraft, wheeled or tracked vehicles. Commanders shall designate personnel to appropriate risk categories and determine their unit's egress training requirements following the risk category matrix as follows:

<u>a. Category A (High Risk)</u>. Personnel whose normal mission profile entails flying over or operating in close proximity to water. Category A training will be met by utilizing the one day Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer (MAET) for vertical lift air platforms or one day Submerged Vehicle Egress Training (SVET) for wheeled or tracked vehicles. MAET or SVET training, if successfully completed, is good for two years, if a passenger requires remediation training, Shallow Water Egress Trainer (SWET) will meet the training requirement. <u>b.</u> <u>Category B (Low Risk)</u>. Personnel that are not in Category A, and have no mission profile entailing flying over or operating in close proximity to water. SWET training is recommended but left to unit commander's discretion. Category B personnel that only attend SWET training will not be considered Category A until the training for category A has been successfully accomplished.

(d) Intermediate Training Stage. The MEU's goal during the intermediate training stage is to conduct MEU-level CTEs that build and integrate unit capabilities in addition to shipboard interoperability with the ARG during at sea periods. Exercises will increase in complexity throughout the intermediate stage and emphasize live-fire and night operations over extended distances. The MEU commander, guided by evaluations from the initial stage, will provide training guidance to improve and sustain the MEU's required capabilities. This systematic approach ensures capabilities are identified and deficiencies remedied. The following establishes the baseline of intermediate stage events:

<u>1</u>. <u>Maritime Raid Force (MRF) Interoperability Training</u>. The purpose of this training is to integrate all elements of the Maritime Raid Force (MRF) and then develop interoperability between the MRF, the MEU, and the PHIBRON. MRF interoperability training will be conducted over multiple exercises.

2. Realistic Urban Training Exercise (RUTEX). The primary focus of the Realistic Urban Training Exercise (RUTEX) is to provide the MEU the opportunity to conduct advanced, complex Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations focused on MET CTEs in unfamiliar environments, to include areas off Department of Defense (DoD) installations. RUTEX is critical to force readiness and typically incorporates training venues in urban, suburban, rural areas as well as maritime platforms. These environments are complex and may be difficult to emulate on DoD installations or preestablished training areas. If conducted off of DoD installations, exercises will be in compliance with reference (k). RUTEX includes high-intensity, close-quarter battle training and typically includes the use of live or nonlethal fires, demolitions, and military aircraft in civilian settings. Emphasis for RUTEX is placed on conducting full mission profile, long range night raids. RUTEX provides an opportunity to incorporate the specialized individual and small unit skills of the MRF and other MEU assets with the MEU's increased proficiency in the R2P2 process. Coordination for this event is the joint responsibility of the MEF, MEU, and the NCIS Special Agent assigned to the MEF EOTG per reference (1).

<u>3</u>. First At-Sea Period. The first at-sea period allows the PHIBRON and MEU the opportunity to embark the entire force for training while underway. The purpose is to begin integrating the ARG and MEU, at sea, and to conduct shipboard familiarization training. It is the first of three at-sea periods embarking the entire PHIBRON/MEU.

4. Second At-Sea Period. The purpose of the second at-sea period is for the ARG/MEU to practice their core capabilities while integrated and underway. The primary focus of the second at-sea period is to exercise the unit SOP's and the MEU's R2P2 in conjunction with the PHIBRON and ARG by utilizing full mission profiles with increasingly challenging locations and scenarios. For the MEU, the second at-sea period occurs prior to the final stage of PTP training. The ARG/MEU may be evaluated and assessed on select core METs in support of final certification during this at-sea period.

5. <u>Maintenance Stand-down</u>. A maintenance stand-down is best scheduled during the intermediate stage to prepare for upcoming training deployments. The maintenance stand-down will include all units of the MEU. Given the impact of a maintenance stand-down on equipment availability, the staff must be ready to de-conflict, coordinate, and prioritize missions.

(e) <u>Final Training Stage</u>. Focus for the final training stage is on certification of the ARG/MEU, completion of any remaining training requirements, and pre-deployment embarkation requirements. The focus for final preparations prior to deployment is personnel and equipment readiness. Training and operational deficiencies noted will be corrected by the end of the final stage, as required.

1. Third At-Sea Period. The primary focus for the third atsea period is completing the evaluations and assessments necessary for certification and deployment of the ARG/MEU. The third at-sea period involves the execution of selected full mission profiles involving the MEU and the PHIBRON and is the culmination of all pre-deployment training activities. The third at-sea period completes Block IV training for the MEU CE and MSEs. See paragraph 4.c. (5) for further guidance regarding MEU certification.

2. National Capital Region Interagency Coordination Trips. In accordance with reference (a), MEU commanders and select MEU staff members will conduct pre-deployment interagency coordination trips to the NCR to receive briefs from various joint, interagency, and intergovernmental organizations. This allows the sharing of region-specific, interagency expertise with the deploying MEU. Pre-deployment NCR visits also serve to educate interagency partners on unique Marine Corps capabilities and will play a significant role in future crisis response operations. Advocacy for the MEUs resides with Expeditionary Policies Branch (POE-30), Plans Policies and Operations (PP&O). These trips are coordinated by POE-30 and are generally completed following the third at sea period.

(4) Documenting Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Pre and Postdeployment Training Lessons Learned. Due to the unique nature of the MEU PTP, the timely documentation and distribution of lessons learned is essential to the progressive enhancement of the program. This documentation is beneficial to the entire Marine Corps, particularly, future MEU and MSE commanders, and supporting training establishments (e.g. EOTG, EWTG, etc.). The intent is to document successes and challenges associated with the MEU PTP. The primary methods to accomplish this are the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS), After Action Reports (AAR), and post deployment briefings IAW reference (a).

(a) MCLLS reports and AARs for the PTP will be submitted by the MEU within 30 days of completion of the MEU PTP. AARs will be submitted to DC PP&O via the appropriate chain of command. A copy will be sent to TECOM G3/5/7.

(b) MEU commanders and PHIBRON commodores provide post deployment briefs to Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), in addition to the applicable MARFORs, Naval Forces (NAVFOR), and CCDRs IAW reference (a). These briefs should address the applicability of the ARG FRTP/MEU PTP and operations conducted during the deployment. Maximum effort should be taken to have appropriate representatives from the GCC J-3, NAVFOR/MARFOR, HQMC/OPNAV, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), TECOM, MCIA and MARCORSYSCOM attend the briefings. Post-deployment NCR visits are coordinated by POE-30.

(5) Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Certification. Certification is the validation, thorough evaluation, and assessment, that a unit successfully completed a defined set of training events to standard. Under the cognizance of the MEF commander, the current MEU METL, in reference (a), is successfully accomplished and evaluated before the MEU is certified as deployment ready. Enclosures (1) through (6) contain specific guidance for the CE and MSEs to aid commanders and planners in the development of the MEU's training, evaluation, and assessment programs. The certification process is the responsibility of the MARFOR commander. This responsibility may be delegated to the respective MEF commander as the MARFOR's executive agent. A recommendation for certification is provided to the MEF commanders by the designated senior Marine evaluator assigned to the Joint Exercise Control Group, the Tactical Exercise Control Group (TECG), or MEF EOTG. If the senior evaluator concludes the MEU is not-mission capable in any area, they will recommend to the MEF commander that the MEU be re-evaluated in that MET. Once the MEF commander approves the recommendation for MEU certification, the MEF commander will coordinate with their respective Navy fleet commander to release a coordinated message. The message will serve as the primary certifying document and will be sent to:

(a) Appropriate GCC

(b) Appropriate Navy Fleet Commanders, NAVFORS, and MARFORS

(c) Appropriate Expeditionary Strike Group Commanders/ Amphibious Force Commanders

- (d) OPNAV
- (e) DC PP&O
- (f) DC CD&I
- (g) DC I&L
- (h) DC AVN
- (i) CG TECOM

5. <u>Administration and Logistics</u>. Commander United States Fleet Forces Command (COMUSFLTFORCOM) with support of Commander United States Pacific Fleet (CPF), has the authority to generate and communicate Navy global force management solutions concerning general purpose forces and ad hoc forces retained by the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG). The SECNAV, is directed by the Secretary of Defense, via Commander, Joint Chiefs of Staff, IAW Global Force Management Guidance, to execute the GFMIG, and the force generation schedule (e.g. conduct pre-deployment training, deploy, and transfer rotational amphibious forces to designated Geographic CCDR Operational Control (OPCON) for exercises, contingency employment, anti-terrorism/force protection and redeployment). The Computer Network Operations (CNO) has delegated to COMUSFLTFORCOM authority to generate and communicate Navy global force management solutions concerning general purpose forces and ad hoc forces retained by the SECNAV per the GFMIG IAW OPNAVINST 5440.77B.

a. <u>Records Management</u>. Records created as a result of this Order shall be managed according to National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) approved dispositions per references (u) and (v) to ensure proper maintenance, use, accessibility and preservation, regardless of format or medium. Refer to reference (w) for Marine Corps records management policy and procedures.

b. <u>Privacy Act</u>. Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) may result in both civil and criminal penalties. The Department of the Navy (DON) recognizes that the privacy of an individual is a personal and fundamental right that shall be respected and protected. The DON's need to collect, use, maintain, or disseminate PII about individuals for purposes of discharging its statutory responsibilities shall be balanced against the individuals' right to be protected against unwarranted invasion of privacy. All collection, use, maintenance, or dissemination of PII shall be in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended (reference (x)) and implemented per reference (y).

6. Command and Signal

a. Command

(1) This Order is not applicable to the Marine Corps Reserve.

(2) Prior to deployment, the MEF commander maintains OPCON of their organic MEU. Once deployed, the ARG/MEU is OPCON to their respective NAVFOR, or as directed by the GCC.

(3) At E-365, each MEU CE shall report for planning to their respective Component Commander in order to facilitate deployment planning IAW reference (a). This relationship will be for deployment planning purposes only.

b. Signal. This Order is effective the date signed.

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Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

DISTRIBUTION: PCN 10203366600

References

- (a) MCO 3120.13
- (b) MCO 3500.27C
- (c) MCO 3502.6A
- (d) MCO 1553.3B
- (e) MCO P3500.72A
- (f) NAVMC 3500.14C
- (g) NAVMC 3500.116A
- (h) NAVMC 1553.1A
- (h) The Systems Approach to Training (SAT) Manual, June 2004
- (i) MCO 1553.2C
- (j) Disaggregated Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/MEU Concept of Employment (CONEMP), 22 Aug, 2014
- (k) DoDI 1322.28 CH-2 "Realistic Military Training," 13 May, 2014
- Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Sep 2016
- (m) United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), "ARG/MEU Policy Memorandum for Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE)," 13 May 2014
- (n) MCO 3120.12
- (o) MCO 3120.11A
- (p) MCO 3150.4A
- (g) OPNAVINST 1500.75C
- (r) MCO 5100.29B
- (s) CINCPACFLT/CINCLANTFLT 4720.4B, "Deploying Group Systems Integration Testing Process," 14 Oct 2008
- (u) SECNAV Notice 5210
- (v) SECNAV M-5210.1 CH-1
- (w) MCO 5210.11F
- (x) 5 U.S.C. 552a
- (y) SECNAVINST 5211.5F

Enclosure (1)

Command Element (CE) Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP) Guidance

1. MEU PTP training plans are based on the MEU METL and applicable T&R standards. CE training will ensure the CE possesses the requisite C2 capabilities to properly plan and effectively integrate all assets of the MEU to successfully accomplish the assigned mission(s). Equally important is the CE's ability to demonstrate interoperability with the PHIBRON during the ARG SWATT/ARG Fleet Readiness Training Program (FRTP). When available, interoperability should be exercised with interagency groups, Joint Forces, and SOF due to the potential for employment with these elements. Evaluations and assessments, IAW reference (d), applicable T&R standards, and this Order, are the mechanisms by which the MEU commander evaluates the readiness of the CE and are based on the appropriate T&R core Mission Essential Training standards.

2. Prerequisite Focus

a. Time management is paramount to successfully completing the requirements of the PTP. MEU planners should begin planning with the appropriate training authorities as early as possible.

b. Observation of another MEU's training evolutions can be highly beneficial.

c. In addition to routinely attended courses, the following courses are recommended for appropriate personnel within the CE prior to composite:

- (1) East/West Coast Media Symposia (Commanding Officer (CO))
- (2) Aviation Safety Commander's Course
- (3) Foreign Disclosure Officer Course
- (4) DoS Course (State Dept 101)
- (5) Joint Humanitarian Operations Course
- (6) R2P2 Primer Course
- (7) Collection Managers Course
- (8) Intelligence Analysis Management Course
- (9) Joint Psychological Operations Course
- (10) Joint C2 Warfare Staff Officers Course
- (11) Civil Affairs Course
- (12) Information Operations Course
- (13) Anti-terrorism/Force Protection Level 3 Course
- (14) EWTG Targeting Information Officer Course
- (15) Joint Targeting School

Enclosure (2)

MCO 3502.3C 13 SEP 2019

(16) Consequence Management Course

(17) Regional Customs Courses

(18) Expeditionary Logistics (EXLOG) Continuum

(19) MAGTF Logistics Automated Information System Training -Including Expeditionary Support Systems training, Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC), and GCSS-MC Staff and Leadership Course

(20) EWTG Expeditionary Deployment System Course

(21) EWTG Maritime Prepositioning Force Course

(22) Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-One, Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) for MEU Fire Support Officer

(23) MWTC C2 Communications Course

(24) Regional Language Familiarization Training

(25) Air Officer Course for Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) Instructors

(26) Ground Safety for Marines

(27) Mishap Investigation Course

(28) Security Cooperation Planners Course (SCPC)

3. Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Command Element (CE) Structure Guidance

a. Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Intelligence Section (S-2)

(1) The MEU Intelligence Section (S-2) section will be task organized to provide intelligence support to MEU missions with the intent that the same section is capable of providing like support to all MEU METs afloat and ashore.

(2) <u>Radio Battalion Detachment</u>. The Radio Battalion (RADBN) Detachment will be task organized to conduct Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Electronic Warfare (EW), limited cyberspace operations and Special Intelligence (SI) communications in general support of the MEU. Additionally, the RADBN Detachment will possess, as a prerequisite, the following:

(a) Select Marine(s) trained and qualified as CNO planners and EW planners.

(b) Select Marine(s) certified by the intelligence community for access to national databases and SIGINT analytical tools, Precision Geolocation (PGL) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE).

(c) Select Marine(s) will possess scores no lower than 2/2 on the annual Defense Language Proficiency Test and have additive linguist training focused on those languages and dialects spoken in the areas of operation to which the MEU is expected to deploy.

Enclosure (2)

Enclosure (56) Page 17 of 48

(d) Radio Reconnaissance Team Marines will be trained and qualified to support advance force missions and designated to serve in Urban R&S team billets as part of the MRF.

(3) <u>Intelligence Battalion Detachment</u>. The intelligence battalion detachment provides trained and equipped task-organized forces to plan, direct, and execute intelligence operations and Counter Intelligence (CI) support functions, including the collection, processing, production, and dissemination of intelligence information.

(a) <u>Counter Intelligence/Human Intelligence Detachment (CHD)</u>. The mission of the Counter Intelligence/Human Intelligence Detachment (CHD) is to provide tailored CI/Human Intelligence in general support of the MEU. The CHD is task organized to support MEU subordinate unit training evolutions IOT establish familiarity and intelligence interoperability within the MEU and with external agencies.

1. Select Marine(s) will be trained and qualified to support advance force missions and designated to support the MRF as required.

 $\underline{2}$. A minimum of one Marine will complete the Defense Strategic Debriefing Course.

<u>3</u>. The following courses are recommended for at least one Marine within the detachment: Joint Personnel Recovery for Commanders and Staffs, Reintegration Team Responsibilities, Joint Personnel Recovery Debriefer, Defense Advanced Tradecraft Course, and CI Functional Services Course.

(b) <u>Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Team</u>. The Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) team is task organized to collect, exploit, analyze, and distribute GEOINT and products.

<u>1</u>. Marine Occupational Specialty (MOS) 0241 personnel will attain certified training in the following courses: GEOINT Information Management Service Course or its replacement; the Navy Collection Manager's Course or equivalent; a Full Motion Video exploitation course; and the Global Broadcast Systems User Course.

<u>2</u>. MOS 0261 personnel will complete the Basic Geographic Intelligence Course. A minimum of one MOS 0261 Marine should be a graduate of the Advanced Terrain Analysis Course, Advanced Topographic Analysis Course, or the Intermediate Geographic Intelligence Specialist Course.

(c) <u>Battlefield Surveillance Team</u>. This detachment will provide the capability for remote sensor employment in amphibious operations and for the monitoring of remote sensors to provide indications and warnings of enemy movement or activities. Additionally, the team will serve as Small Unmanned Aircraft System (SUAS) operators. At a minimum, all personnel will have completed the MAGTF Remote Sensor Operators Course and possess current certification for operation of the SUAS currently in use by the MEU CE.

(d) <u>Meteorological Intelligence Team</u>. This detachment will provide meteorological intelligence and assessments of impacts to MEU operations. A minimum of one Marine in the team must be a SNCO possessing MOS 6842 and qualified as a Master Forecaster.

Enclosure (2)

Enclosure (56) Page 18 of 48

b. Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Operations Section (S-3)

(1) <u>Combat Camera Detachment</u>. This detachment will consist of two trained and equipped combat photographers. The combat camera detachment provides the MEU the capabilities to capture videography and photography, develop and process film, and cross train and provide technical assistance to the intelligence detachments.

(2) <u>Ground Reconnaissance Detachment</u>. The platoons will be trained and equipped to conduct advance force missions and be capable of surface, subsurface, and parachute insertion. Each platoon will possess the following:

- (a) Two military freefall jump masters
- (b) Three static line jump masters
- (c) One open/closed circuit dive supervisor
- (d) Two scout sniper teams
- (e) One HRST Master per team

(f) Two parachute riggers qualified in static line and ram-air packing procedures

(g) Three Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC), one per team

(3) <u>Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) Detachment</u>. The Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) detachment will be trained, equipped and qualified to plan, coordinate, and conduct terminal control of joint, allied, and coalition fires. The detachment will possess the following:

- (a) One HRST master per team
- (b) One JTAC per team
- (c) One joint fires observer per team
- (d) One mensuration system instructor
- (e) One joint collateral damage estimate instructor
- (f) One joint fires and targeting instructor
- (g) One designated marksman per team
- (h) One WTI air officer

(4) Law Enforcement (LE) Battalion Detachment. The LE detachment will be task organized to conduct policing operations, in general support of the MEU, including detention operations, expeditionary biometric/forensics analysis, and interoperability operations with external Law Enforcement (LE) agencies/services. The detachment will possess the following at a minimum;

(a) One military police squad

Enclosure (2)

Enclosure (56) Page 19 of 48

- (b) One corrections specialist
- (c) One criminal investigator
- (d) One military working dog team
- (e) Four expeditionary analysis center-lite operators/analysts

(5) <u>Personnel Recovery (PR) Training</u>. Resources and PR structure exist at the national and theater level to assist in the recovery of isolated personnel. The MEU's ability to understand this structure will enable efficient PR operations, specifically TRAP operations. The following courses are critical and may be CCDR requirements for any given MEU:

(a) <u>Personnel Recovery 102 - Fundamentals of Personnel Recovery</u>. PR 102 is an online course that includes an overview of the DoD PR system, C2, roles and responsibilities, PR preparation and planning, Service component capabilities and PR execution. All CE personnel who are or may be assigned to support PR, and those who need to be familiar with the DoD PR system, should complete this course.

(b) <u>Personnel Recovery 301- PR Planning and Operations</u>. PR 301 is a residence course primarily focused at the joint, operational level of warfare. The MEU CE should possess at least one PR 301 trained operations planner. PR 301 trained personnel will enable the MEU to integrate TRAP operations into the Joint environment and will allow for integration into national and theater assets when conducting MEU TRAP operations.

c. <u>Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Logistics Section (S-4)</u>. MEU Commanders are encouraged to participate in the MAGTF EXLOG Continuum courses provided by the Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group (MCLOG), in concert with DC I&L. For the MEUs, the continuum consists of three separate workshops provided at E-270 (MAGTF Logistics Orientation), E-180 (Naval Logistics Operations), and E-90 (Theater Logistics training). MEU logistics training planners will coordinate with the MEF DC I&L liaison, MCLOG, and the MSE's S-4s to establish training plan.

d. <u>Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Communications Section (S-6)</u>. The MEU S-6 section will provide communications support to MEU training evolutions throughout the MEU PTP. The Communications Detachment provided by the Communications Battalion will be task organized, trained, and equipped to install, operate, maintain, and defend MEU command, control, and communications systems afloat and ashore.

4. Initial-Training Stage

a. <u>Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) / Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Staff</u> <u>Planning Course</u>. Attendees consist of the PHIBRON commander and designated staff, ship CO's and designated staff, MEU commander and designated staff, and MSE commanders and designated personnel. This workshop is conducted by the EWTG with the intent of familiarizing PHIBRON and MEU personnel with:

(1) R2P2 training to include multiple planning exercises with confirmation briefs by the PHIBRON and MEU.

(2) Law of land warfare.

(3) Introduction to the DOC functions of NGO and other government agencies.

(4) Issues related to NEO planning.

(5) Exercises designed to exercise the staff planning capabilities of the raid force, utilizing selected training scenarios as a vehicle to enhance staff training and efficiency with the R2P2.

b. <u>Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) / Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Fire</u> <u>Support Coordination (FSC) Training</u>. ARG/MEU FSC training consists of classroom and underway exercises that focus on increasing the capability of the PHIBRON and MEU, and their elements, to successfully coordinate fires. Objectives include:

(1) C2 of supporting arms

(2) Fire-support planning and targeting

(3) Live-fire training for all indirect fire weapon systems and Offensive Air Support (OAS)

(4) Integration of multiple supporting arms to include mortars, artillery, Close Air Support (CAS) and naval surface fire support

c. <u>Off-Site Training</u>. Off-Site training consists of a variety of field exercises directed by the MEU commander. Emphasis is on the MEU's ability to rapidly plan and execute designated MEU mission sets selected by the MEU commander. Adhering to the systematic approach to training, Off-site training is evaluated and critiqued assessing both strengths and weaknesses.

d. <u>Initial Training Stage Evaluations and Assessments</u>. The following are recommended areas of evaluation and assessment during the initial training stage:

(1) ARG/MEU Staff Planning Course

(2) Intelligence/CI support to exercises, to include integration of raid force and R&S team enablers

(3) Planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling supporting arms

(4) Conducting integrated C4I2 operations

5. Intermediate Training Stage

a. <u>Maintenance Stand Down</u>. A maintenance stand down is best scheduled during the intermediate stage to prepare for upcoming training deployments. The maintenance stand down will include all units of the MEU. Given the impact of a maintenance stand down on equipment availability, the staff must be ready to de-conflict/coordinate/prioritize missions.

b. <u>Maritime Raid Force (MRF) Interoperability Training</u>. Utilizing its MRF, the MEU trains for designated missions with increasing integration of Marine enablers ACE, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), CHD, radio reconnaissance, battlefield surveillance, scout snipers and Navy enablers

Enclosure (2)

(e.g., Boarding Team, Ship Control Team, Rigid-Hulled Inflatable Boat (RHIB) crews).

c. <u>First At-Sea Period</u>. The intent of the first at-sea period is to provide an opportunity for the MEU CE and MSEs to conduct basic shipboard training and familiarization. The following are the baseline training objectives for the first at-sea period:

(1) Initial integration of the Navy/Marine Corps Team

(2) Embarkation/debarkation training

(3) C2 training

(4) Familiarization with shipboard C2 and interoperability systems

- (5) Flight deck operations
- (6) Well-deck operations
- (7) Day and night CQ

(8) Small boat/Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) launch, recovery and navigation

(9) Full mission profile exercises for designated MEU missions

(10) EWTG Supporting Arms Coordination Exercise (SACEX)

(11) Additionally, MEU elements may conduct Final Integration Testing (FIT) of afloat C4I systems in accordance with reference (s)

d. <u>Realistic Urban Training Exercise (RUTEX)</u>. The MEU CE and designated MEU elements (MRF, ACE, Ground Combat Elements (GCE), and Logistics Combat Element (LCE)) hone MET capabilities through a group of exercises practicing selected mission sets in unfamiliar environments. MEU elements may also conduct MAGTF Integration Testing (MIT) of ashore C4I systems in accordance with reference (s).

e. <u>Second At-Sea Period</u>. This is the second at-sea period in which the MEU operates from aboard ARG ships to reinforce previously conducted training and to develop and integrate Navy and Marine SOP. It will include an evaluated expeditionary fires exercise. Additionally, MEU elements may conduct FIT of afloat C4I systems in accordance with reference (s) if not already conducted during the first at-sea period.

f. Intermediate Training Stage Evaluations and Assessments. Evaluations and assessments will continue as described in the initial stage, and will include informal evaluations during the STXs, off-site training, RUTEX, first at-sea period, and second at-sea period. The following are recommended areas of evaluation and assessment during this stage:

(1) Amphibious Raids (Including Boat Raid for 31st MEU)

- (2) VBSS NEO, FHA, TSC, and TRAP
- (3) Employment of NLW

Enclosure (2)

- (4) Intelligence collection/R&S/tactical site exploitation
- (5) Forward Arming and Refueling Points Operations
- (6) Static Maritime Platform
- (7) Marine Corps Planning Process R2P2
- (8) Forward CE operations
- (9) Standing Missions
- (10) ARG/MEU Integration of staff planning and shipboard operations

(11) SOFLE and SOF integration (ICW support provided by MARSOC G-7) if not scheduled for final at-sea period

6. <u>Final Training Stage</u>. The MEU's certification occurs during the third at sea period and is conducted in conjunction with the ARG evaluation and certification. It will consist of events that represent the spectrum of the MEU METL contained in reference (a) and include SOFLE and SOF integration supported by MARSOC G-7 if not already conducted in second at-sea period. A MEF team of evaluators will conduct a formal evaluation and assessment of the MEU's ability to execute selected MEU METs and the MEU's ability to effectively integrate and operate with the SOFLE, the PHIBRON staff, and the individual ships. The final evaluation and assessment will incorporate the training standards established in references (e) and (f).

Ground Combat Element (GCE) Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP) Guidance

1. MEU PTP training plans are based on the MEU METL and applicable T&R standards. GCE training will ensure the GCE possesses the requisite combat capabilities to conduct or support MEU missions. Evaluations and assessments, IAW reference (d) and this Order, are the mechanisms by which the MEU commander evaluates the readiness of the GCE and are based on the appropriate T&R core MET standards.

2. Prerequisite Focus

a. For the GCE to be prepared to composite to the MEU, the infantry battalion and attachments must have a well-developed pre-composite T&R plan. This plan must maximize all of the GCE's resources while preparing for the deployment. Enclosure (9) of this Order provides a list of prerequisite courses to help formulate the prerequisite training plan. The GCE should take advantage of applicable EWTG courses prior to composite (e.g. R2P2 Primer, Amphibious Warfare Indoctrination, Expeditionary Warfare Staff Planning Course, and Team Embark Officer Courses).

b. In the months prior to composite, the battalion and its projected attachments should train together whenever possible during their conventional training period. This will allow concentrated individual and small unit training while integrating the GCE.

c. The division is responsible for conducting pre-composite evaluations of the battalion and its attachments. The core MET T&R standards serve as the tool to determine the level of training needed prior to composite. On the composite date, each GCE element needs to be capable of executing platoon and company/battery level T&R standards. The GCE will have to conduct sustainment training on individual and small unit skills, but the majority of the core MET training should be accomplished prior to composite. The division will send an Automated Message Handling System (AMHS) Message to the MEF, informing the respective MEU, describing the level of training, personnel readiness, equipment status, and any shortfalls/concerns with the GCE.

d. Every effort should be made during pre-composite training to integrate and conduct training with other elements being assigned to the MEU.

e. At E-180 the GCE personnel will be Block-I and II complete per reference (c), and proficient in the deliberate-planning process through staff training focusing on the R2P2 staff functioning, mission analysis, the staff estimate process, and course of action development.

3. <u>Initial Training Stage Key Events/Focus</u>. Training for the GCE during this stage will focus on enhanced individual, unit collective and staff skills. The training is designed to bring the GCE to an advanced level of tactical skill necessary to prepare for the intermediate training stage.

a. The GCE will participate in the key events contained in this Order.

b. The GCE will complete squad, section, platoon, company and battalion level training. Training will focus on those measures necessary to ensure the highest combat skills among all Marines relative to the MEU METL. Additionally, the GCE will integrate its attachments throughout the training plan.

Enclosure (3)

c. 31st MEU GCE will ensure adequate numbers of personnel complete the Scout Swimmer Course, Small Boat Coxswain Skills Course, Maritime Navigation Course, Combat Rubber Raiding Craft Repair Course, Outboard Motor Course (1, 2, and 3), Assault Climber Course, and Boat Raid Courses.

d. At a minimum, each rifle company will complete Company Raid Training. Every effort should be made to include appropriate attachments Engineers, Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR), Tank, AAV, EOD, combat camera, etc. LAR and/or Weapons Company may complete Company Raid Training. This course builds upon conventional infantry skills and increases the company's raiding capability to a higher level of proficiency.

e. All individuals who have not completed underwater egress training, who will be involved in frequent over-water flights, will complete the required training.

f. Amphibious driver training to include loading and unloading Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)/Landing Craft Utility (LCU).

g. Assist MEU CE in determining assignment to shipping and appoint respective team embarkation officers.

4. <u>Intermediate Training Stage Key Events/Focus</u>. The goal during this stage is to integrate with all elements of the ARG/MEU in order to accomplish full day/night mission profiles and sustained qualifications during sea-based operations.

5. <u>Final Training Stage</u>. During this stage the GCE participates in the third at-sea period and prepares for deployment. The GCE must demonstrate the capability to successfully execute all MEU assigned missions, capabilities, and skills contained in reference (a).

Enclosure (56) Page 25 of 48

MCO 3502.3C 13 SEP 2019

Aviation Combat Element (ACE) Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP) Guidance

1. MEU PTP training plans are based on the MEU METL and applicable T&R standards. ACE training will ensure the ACE possesses the requisite aviation capabilities to conduct or support the MEU missions. Evaluations and assessments, IAW reference (d) and this Order, are the mechanisms by which the MEU commander evaluates the readiness of the ACE and are based on the appropriate T&R core MET standards.

2. <u>Prerequisite Focus</u>. There are prerequisite aviation training shipboard requirements that must be fulfilled before MEU training in a shipboard environment can occur. The ACE commander must adhere to established guidelines as set forth in applicable publications for each Type/Model/Series (T/M/S). The ACE prerequisites are based upon the standards set forth in the T&R manuals for each T/M/S. Each aviation unit or detachment will composite to the MEU at E-180 having achieved the highest degree of individual and collective aircrew training possible. Based on logistical and operational constraints, VMA/VMFA detachments (with their enablers) may chop to the ACE at E-90. The Marine Air Wing (MAW) is responsible for conducting precomposite evaluations of the ACE and will send an AMHS Message to the MEF, informing the respective MEU, describing the level of training, personnel readiness, equipment status, and any shortfalls/concerns with the ACE.

a. For the ACE to be prepared to composite to the MEU, the aviation units and attachments must have a well-developed pre-composite training plan. This plan must maximize all of the ACE resources while preparing for the composite.

b. In the period before MEU composite, projected MEU ACE squadrons and detachments are encouraged to participate in a Service Level Training Event (SLTE) exercise (e.g. Integrated Training Exercise). They may also participate in another squadron's deployments-for-training to the MWTC or other major training venues (AP Hill, Ft Pickett, WTI course, Fort Irwin, etc.).

c. <u>Basic Training</u>. Detachments will composite to the ACE Block I and II complete per reference (c), and shipboard fire-fighting training complete.

d. <u>Instructor Requirements</u>. At a minimum, each T/M/S unit or detachment will be manned with at least one instructor fully qualified to instruct all T&R syllabus events. Additionally, at least one WTI shall be assigned for each T/M/S. The WTI is that community's expert for the tactical employment of his respective T/M/S aircraft as a weapons system. As such, the WTI is a critical participant in all MEU tactical mission planning evolutions.

e. At E-180, the ACE should have sufficiently qualified aircrews, personnel, and organic aviation assets to conduct a land-based, day and night (high light level and low light level), single-wave company reinforced troop lift, utilizing airborne C2, aerial refueling, rapid ground refueling, fixedwing and rotary-wing OAS and anti-air warfare.

f. At E-180 the ACE should be proficient in the deliberate planning process through staff training focusing on the R2P2 staff functioning, mission analysis, the staff estimate process, and course of action development.

3. <u>Initial Training Stage Key Events/Focus</u>. Training of the ACE during the initial training stage will focus on continued development of individual aircrews (T&R directed), collective skills (Section - Division - Flight Tactics) and staff planning skills required to participate in MEU integrated training. The following baseline events should occur:

a. Helicopter Rope Suspension Training/Fast Rope Masters Course Support to Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). This training provides the ACE an opportunity to conduct insertion and extraction syllabus training, both on land and at sea, while supporting concurrent GCE training.

b. <u>Surface Warfare Advance Tactical Training (SWATT)</u>. During this period ACE aircrews may be afforded the opportunity to conduct basic day/night CQ and DLQ training during specific periods when allowed by the Navy on a not-to-interfere basis with the Navy's required training events. Night Vision Goggle (NVG) training may be an option depending on the level of training of both the ACE aircrew and ships' flight deck crew at that time. The ACE and the various ships' air, aviation supply, and aviation intermediate maintenance departments should conduct requisite interface before this period. It should be noted that this at-sea period is not an embarked event for the MEU or ACE, although some aircraft may be embarked for a short period of time to provide air department deck handling and safetyrelated training. Accomplishment of CQ/DLQ and NVG qualifications for as many aircrew as possible during this period can contribute to MEU operations during the MEU's first at-sea period when the entire MEU is present.

c. <u>Company Raid Courses</u>. These evolutions provide the GCE, ACE, and LCE with interoperability training. Training should focus on tactical mission planning and the exercise and refinement of SOP. These periods should integrate fixed-wing and rotary-wing CAS.

d. <u>Fire Support Coordination (FSC) Exercise</u>. This exercise allows the ACE to focus its CAS assets on integrated fire support in conjunction with the GCE and CE, as well as Forward Air Controller (Airborne) training. Consideration should be given to the exercise of resident aviation C2 assets with the inclusion and utilization of the Marine Air Control Group (MACG) detachment.

e. <u>Aviation Support and Command and Control (C2) Training</u>. The following types of aviation training should take place during this period:

(1) Marine Wing Support Squadron Detachment Training

- (2) MACG Detachment Training
 - (a) Marine Air Traffic Control Mobile Team Training
 - (b) Air Support Element Training
 - (c) Low Altitude Air Defense Training

(3) Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Non-Traditional Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (NISR)

f. Establish relationships with PHIBRON/ship counterparts.

g. Assist MEU CE in determining assignment to shipping and appoint respective team embarkation officers.

4. <u>Intermediate Training Stage Key Events/Focus</u>. The ACE goal during this stage is to integrate with all elements of the MEU/ARG in order to accomplish full day/night mission profiles and sustained qualifications during sea-based operations while maintaining currency/proficiency.

5. <u>Final Training Stage</u>. During this stage the ACE participates in the third at-sea period and prepares for embarkation. The ACE must demonstrate the capability to successfully execute all MEU assigned missions, capabilities, and skills contained in reference (a).

Logistics Combat Element (LCE) Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP) Guidance

1. MEU PTP training plans are based on the MEU METL and applicable T&R standards. LCE training will ensure the LCE possesses the requisite Combat Service Support (CSS) capabilities to conduct and support the MEU missions. Evaluations and assessments, IAW reference (d) and this Order, are the mechanisms by which the MEU commander evaluates the readiness of the LCE and are based on the appropriate T&R core MET standards.

2. Prerequisite Focus

a. The LCE must possess the requisite personnel, capabilities, equipment and EXLOG training and education to provide all six functional areas of CSS to the MEU. Particular emphasis must be placed on sustaining the MEU while operating in expeditionary JIIM environments. Additionally, the LCE should conduct training on MEU missions NEO, FHA, mass casualty/casualty evacuation to develop an understanding of how to interact with other agencies, such as USAID.

b. For the LCE to be prepared to composite to the MEU, the battalion must have a well-developed pre-composite training plan. Enclosure (9) of this Order provides a list of recommended courses to help guide prerequisite training at composite. At E-180 the LCE should be proficient in the deliberate planning process through staff training focusing on the R2P2, staff functioning, mission analysis, the staff estimate process, and course of action development.

c. The Marine Logistics Group (MLG) is responsible for conducting an evaluation of the combat logistics battalion prior to composite using T&R standards to serve as an analytical tool to determine the level of training attained by composite. On the composite date, applicable LCE elements need to be capable of meeting appropriate level T&R standards. The MLG will send an AMHS Message to the MEF, informing the respective MEU, describing the level of training, personnel readiness, equipment status, and any shortfalls/concerns with the LCE.

d. Prior to composite the LCE should take advantage of applicable EWTG courses (R2P2 Primer, Amphibious Warfare Indoctrination, Expeditionary Warfare Staff Planning Course, Team Embark Officer Course, etc.) and Navy Supply Corps School courses (e.g. EXLOG, and senior department head courses.)

e. At the E-180 composite, personnel will be core MET training complete to the maximum extent possible and the LCE should be capable of the following:

(1) <u>Supply and Distribution</u>. Capability to conduct deployed Class I, III (P) and, IX support to include cargo expediting, intermediate supply, cargo tracking/tracing, and perform In-Transit Visibility (ITV) functions for all distribution efforts.

(2) <u>Maintenance</u>. The ability to provide intermediate ground maintenance support to the MEU.

(3) <u>Transportation</u>. Helicopter support team operations to include establishment and operation of landing zone support area, Landing Force Support Party (LFSP) operations, to include the establishment and operation of a Beach Support Area (BSA), limited airfield operations, limited port

Enclosure (5)

terminal operations, motor transport operations, convoy operations, air delivery operations, cargo expediting, cargo tracking/tracing, and support of ITV functions for all distribution efforts.

(4) <u>General Engineering</u>. The LCE should be capable of water production, storage, and distribution; bulk fuel storage and distribution; utilities production and distribution; limited demolition support; limited horizontal/vertical construction; and material handling support.

(5) <u>Health Services</u>. Medical and dental to support the MEU missions (e.g. mass casualty response team, shock trauma platoon, operate a beach or airfield evacuate station, etc.).

(6) <u>Services</u>. Hazardous material/hazardous waste handling and postal.

(7) <u>Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)</u>. Organize and equip an initial response team or humanitarian assistance survey team capable of coordinating logistics and engineering operations in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations.

(8) <u>Support to Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)</u>. Organize and equip an Evacuation Control Center (ECC) team/reception control center in support of NEO.

(9) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Support. The EOD section will be trained and equipped to support the MEU by locating, accessing, identifying, rendering safe, neutralizing, and disposing of hazards from foreign and domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Unexploded Explosive Ordnance, Improvised Explosive Devices, and Weapons of Mass Destruction that present a threat to operations, installations, personnel, or material. EOD personnel may conduct direct support operations as members of raid force assault elements. EOD personnel should meet all applicable non-MEU specific EOD T&R standards prior to composite and should meet all MEU specific T&R standards prior to the third at-sea period.

3. <u>Initial Training Stage Key Events/Focus</u>. Training for the LCE during the initial training stage will focus on mastering their METs. Additionally, the early establishment of working relationships with the ARG and MEU logisticians during the ARG/MEU Staff Planning Course is key to coordinating a successful training plan and will enhance integration during the deployment. Key events for the initial training stage are:

a. Continuous MET sustainment training and the tactical skills required to support and conduct all MEU missions.

b. Rear area security operations training focused on security procedures at BSA, CSS area, NEO ECC, convoy operations, and FHA.

c. NEO ECC procedures to include the functions of the headquarters section, the processing unit, the medical unit, the screening unit, the transportation unit and the security unit.

d. Recommended training events during this stage are:

(1) ARG/MEU Staff Planning Course

Enclosure (5)

(2) Amphibious training (centered on LFSP operations, driver training (LCAC/ LCU, establishment of a BSA, CSS Area, and conduct of CSS operations).

(3) LCE field exercises (centered on Logistics Operations Center (LOC) training, and support to NEO and FHA)

(4) LOC training with relevant MEU MSEs where possible

e. Assist MEU CE in determining assignment to shipping and appoint respective team embarkation officers.

4. <u>Intermediate Training Stage Key Events/Focus</u>. The goal during this stage is to integrate with all elements of the ARG/MEU in order to accomplish full day/night mission profiles and sustained qualifications during sea-based operations.

5. <u>Final Training Stage</u>. During this stage the LCE participates in the CERTEX and prepares for deployment. The LCE must demonstrate the capability to successfully execute all MEU assigned missions, capabilities and skills contained in reference (a).

6. <u>Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Expeditionary Logistics (EXLOG)</u> <u>Continuum</u>. Appropriate personnel should attend the MAGTF EXLOG courses provided by the MCLOG as schedules permit.

Enclosure (56) Page 31 of 48

Maritime Raid Force (MRF) Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP) Guidance

1. MEU PTP training plans are based on the MEU METL and applicable T&R standards. The MRF is a task organized unit drawn from elements across the MEU when executing VBSS operations and other designated MEU missions. The MRF is normally built around the reconnaissance detachment and assigned to the CE. The MEU commander is responsible for determining how best to build this capability within the MEU. MRF training will ensure the MRF possesses the requisite capabilities to conduct or support MEU missions. Evaluations and assessments, IAW reference (d) and this Order, are the mechanisms by which the MEU commander evaluates the readiness of the MRF.

2. <u>Pre-requisite Focus</u>. The following events for personnel assigned to the MRF should occur before E-180 in to order facilitate the aggressive and time constrained training associated with the MRF during the PTP itself.

a. Underwater Egress training

b. Water Survival qualification

c. Security clearances (minimum Secret, select personnel require Top Secret)

3. <u>Initial Training Stage Key Events/Focus</u>. During the initial training stage, the MRF receives instruction in the special skills necessary to conduct the missions associated with the MEU program. Training and evaluation during this stage will focus on individual and small-unit skills. Instruction provided and/or coordinated by the EOTG includes:

a. <u>Helicopter Rope Suspension/Fast Rope Training Support to Maritime</u> <u>Raid Force (MRF)</u>. This training provides the MRF an opportunity to conduct insertion and extraction syllabus training, both on land and at sea, while supporting concurrent MRF training.

b. Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG) Sniper Course. This course provides training for qualified 0317 Scout Snipers. Course material will include: sniper initiated assault, urban sniping techniques, night and airborne live fire engagement, urban movement, counter sniper operations, rapid/multiple threat engagement, VBSS support, and covering force operations. Only snipers that have successfully completed this course are eligible to participate in live-fire MRF STX during VBSS, Realistic Urban Training, and at-sea periods.

c. Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG) Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Team Member Course. A course designed to train personnel from the reconnaissance elements, the GCE Scout Sniper Platoon, ANGLICO team members (if attached), and the composite MEU S-2 section RADBN) and Intelligence Battalion Detachments) in the conduct of R&S. At a minimum, the course will cover: an introduction to R&S, intelligence considerations, R&S planning, urban route planning and movement, surveillance and reconnaissance center operations, escape and evasion techniques, surveillance/counter surveillance techniques and equipment, reporting and urban communication procedures. The training will focus on reconnaissance in support of missions with specific emphasis on operating in an urban environment.

Enclosure (6)

d. Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG), Close Quarters Tactics (CQT) Team Member Course. This course is for the assault element of the MRF with a focus on advanced tactics, marksmanship skills, and site exploitation.

e. <u>Close Quarters Tactics (CQT)-Enabler Course</u>. This course is designed for a platoon-sized element. It develops the skills necessary for the security element to function in support of the MRF assault element. The training of this platoon will include advanced marksmanship skills, basic room clearing techniques, internal and external security, personnel handling procedures and other capabilities required to support the assault element.

4. <u>Intermediate Training Stage Key Events/Focus</u>. The MRF's goal during this training stage is to integrate all elements of the MRF in order to conduct operations with the MEU's major subordinate elements and the PHIBRON. Training will focus on special skills and capabilities.

a. <u>Maritime Raid Force (MRF) Interoperability Training</u>. The purpose of this training is to integrate all elements of the MRF following completion of individual and collective training. This may be conducted off-site or locally. Navy elements (11m RHIB) crews, MH-60 crews, planners, etc.) should be incorporated in appropriate portions of this training.

b. <u>Realistic Urban Training</u>. RUTEX provides the MEU the opportunity to exercise C2 of the MRF while integrating all elements of the MRF with the MEU. RUTEX challenges the MEU to execute assigned METs, in unfamiliar urban environments, while integrating unique individual and small unit skills in conjunction with the MEU's increased proficiency in R2P2.

c. Visit Board Search Seize (VBSS)/Gas and Oil Platform Maritime <u>Training</u>. VBSS/Gas and Oil Platform (GOPLAT) training provides an opportunity for the MRF to apply its special skills on target platforms. Training will incorporate appropriate insertion methods onto a target vessel or platform utilizing ACE and Navy resources.

d. <u>At-sea periods</u>. Provide opportunities to conduct full mission profiles while integrated with the MEU and PHIBRON.

5. <u>Final Training Stage</u>. During this stage the MRF participates in the final at-sea period and prepares for deployment. The MRF must demonstrate the capability to successfully execute all MEU assigned missions, capabilities, and skills contained in reference (a).

Enclosure (6)

<u>Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE) Pre-Deployment Training</u> <u>Program (PTP) Guidance</u>

1. The SOFLE program belongs to United States SOCOM and is administered by the Marine Corps SOCOM G-7. SOCOM directives specify the events which the SOFLE will be made available for ARG/ MEU evolutions prior to deployment.

2. The ARG/MEU and the SOFLE will conduct interoperability training during the MEU PTP. Interoperability includes SOFLE personnel attending the Tampa, FL portion of the ARG/MEU/SOF Workshop, the SOFLE leadership accompanying the MEU Commander on his Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS), and SOFLE participation in at least one of the final two at-sea periods. Therefore, it is critical for MEF EOTG to coordinate with MARSOC G-7 early and often to ensure maximum training opportunities involving the SOFLE and/or SOF units.

3. Given limited resources and joint training opportunities, MEU CE, MEF EOTGs, and the SOFLE need to focus on replicating overseas ARG/MEU/SOF operations. The primary focus of these opportunities should be Command Relations (COMMREL); C2 Interoperability; Joint Planning; and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) Development.

MCO 3502.3C 13 SEP 2019

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 26-Week Baseline Training Plan

The following baseline training plan is a template of major training events occurring during the PTP. Deviations are common due to ship schedules, range scheduling, and other events. The 1st at-sea period may occur before RUT and the order of EOTG courses may vary between MEUs.

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Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 26-Week Baseline Training Plan (Cont.)

MCO 3502.3C 13 SEP 2019

Stage			INITIAL		INTERMEDIATE	FINAL
MEU CE						
GCE	i					
ACE	Gear Turnover	EWIG MIT R2P2	EOTG Courses	Exercises/RUTEX	1st at-Sea Period/CERTEX	Deployment
LCE						

31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 26-Week Baseline Training Plan

Notes:

1. The infantry battalion and artillery battery conducted the PTP training at home station prior to arrival at Okinawa.

2. RUTEX is normally conducted on Guam.

The 31st MEU is continuously forward operating. MEU training evolutions may be incorporated into TSC exercises. . .

The 31st MEU only has (1) at-sea period in which PMINT/CERTEX are conducted before, during, or after TSC exercises or as operations allow. 4.

Operational requirements will dictate intermediate and final training. ເດ ເ

9-1

Enclosure (9)

Recommended Schools and Courses List

The purpose of this enclosure is to provide information to commanders in the development of a required and/or enhanced schools plan. The intent of the schools plan is to train those individuals that will remain for the deployment, for key billets, or as instructions for use prior to or during the PTP. Quotas are purely suggestions. Courses are as follows:

COURSE	LOCATION	LENGTH	QUOTA
Combat Cargo/Team Embark Officer	L	4 weeks	01
Indoctrination Course	L	1 week	As Req
Psychological Operations	A	2 weeks	01
Civil Military Officer Course	MC	1 week	01
SERE	P	2 weeks	30
MDSS II/CAEMS ICODES	P	2 weeks	02
Advance Load Plan Air Movement	L	1 week	01
HAZMAT Officer	P	3 days	01
HAZMAT Handler	P	4 days	08
Outboard Motor Maintenance	L	1 week	03
Outboard Motors	L	1 week	04
Foreign Weapons Instructor	MC	3 weeks	03
Small Craft Mechanic	P	6 weeks	03
CRRC	L	10 days	As Req
Tactical Combat Casualty Care	L	1 week	20
Tactical Air Control Party	L	3 weeks	05
CMO	MC	1 week	10
Attack the Network Planning	MC	1 week	10
COC Battle Staff Training	P	1 week	05
Animal Packing	MC	2 weeks	05
Mountain Operations Staff Planner		1 week	02
Basic Embark	L	3 weeks	06
FSCC	L	2 weeks	04
Personnel Recovery 102	N	3 days	02
Personnel Recovery 103	N	10 days	02
DRRS-MC Officer/NCO	P	2 weeks	02
Advance Medical Combat Skills	P	3 weeks	Corpsman
NBC Monitor, Survey, Decon	P	1 week	02
NBC/COC	P	1 week	01
Combat Trauma Management	A	3 weeks	15 No. Doc
Helo Egress Training	N L	1 day	As Req 06
Expeditionary Warfare Intel JSIPS-N	N	2 weeks	02
Effects Management Tool (EMT)	P	4 weeks	
FBCB2 BFT Unit Level Maintenance	P	5 days 2 days	As Req As Req
Commander's C2 System Overview	P	4 days	As Req
BAT Operator Course	P	3 days	As Req
C2PC Operator Course	P	3 days	As Req
FBCB2 BFT Operator Course	P	4 days	As Req
JADOCS Operator Course	P	4 days	As Req
AFATDS Operator Course	P	5 days	As Req
CPOF Operator Course	P	o days	As Req
SharePoint Operator Course	P	3 days	As Req
IOS V1 COP Manager and System Adm			The start
	P	3 days	As Req
JADOCS System Administration	P	3 days	As Req
Watch Officer/Watch Chief Course	P	2 days	As Req

Enclosrue (10)

MCO 3502.3C 13 SEP 2019

Amphibious Warfare Indoctrination (AWI)	
L	1 week As Req
Expeditionary Warfare Staff Planning (E	WSP)
L	1 week As Req
R2P2 Staff Primer L	1 week As Req
Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (J	HOC)
L	2 days As Req
Aviation Safety Officer Course N	4 weeks 1
Aviation Safety Commanders Course N	1 week 2
Ground Safety for Marines P	2 weeks As Req
Mishap Investigation Course N	1 week As Req
Expeditionary Logistics (EL) N	2 weeks As Req
Senior Department Head Officers Course	(SDHOC)
N	4 weeks As Req
Expeditionary Logistics Training Contin	uum
P/L	3 weeks As Req
	(3 x 1 week increments)
Marine Advisors Course N	4 weeks 15
Security Cooperation Planners Course (S	CPC)
N	1 week 03
CREW Systems Operators Course P	2 days As Req
CREW Leader/Trainer Course P	2 days As Req
CREW Officer Course (CREWO) P	1 week As Req
Foreign Disclosure Officer Course P	3 days As Req
SOCOM Integrated Survey Program A	3 days As Req

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Codes	Location
MC	Marine Corps School off-base
\mathbf{L}	EWTG
P	Camp Pendleton/Camp Lejeune
N or A	Other Service Schools

Enclosure (56) Page 39 of 48

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Specialized Skills Training and Certification Guidance

1. <u>Purpose</u>. To identify minimum qualification, certification, and sustainment standards for MEU special skills.

2. Situation

a. Certain personnel and elements within the MEU require training in specialized skills, not necessarily associated with their established MOS, to enable the MEU to execute its METL), established in reference (a) of this Order. Specialized skills, both in training and execution, are usually categorized as high-risk events, per references (b) and (c). Therefore, it is necessary to identify the standard progression to ensure that Marines performing specialized skills, or serving in supervisory billets, are properly trained, technically competent, and authorized to perform or supervise specialized skills events. This enclosure designates specialized skills for the MEU and identifies the organizations authorized to conduct designated specialized skills training to standardize requirements and to establish frequency of sustainment training.

b. References (e) and (g), along with other community T&R manuals, establish the training standards for the MEU Specialized Skills Program. T&R standards provide a common base of training for all Marines who perform these specialized skills. If a specialized skill task or course is not yet codified in a T&R manual, the school house retains the Program of Instruction (POI). Specialized skills training events follow the Systems Approach to Training (SAT) Manual, reference (h). The SAT is to be used by institutional and unit commanders to maintain a progressive and systematic method to analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate the individual and collective training events. Any requests to achieve special skill certifications or accomplish high risk training requirements from non-DoD training entities require approvals from subordinate commands and respective EOTGs.

c. References (o) and (p) establish policy and assign responsibility for the conduct of the Marine Corps parachuting and diving programs to include operations, training, supply, maintenance, safety, and administration. It provides the amplified guidance necessary to implement the certification program described herein for jumpmasters and diving supervisors.

3. Definitions

a. <u>Qualification</u>. Qualification is the basic or supervisory special skill level attained through instruction at a Marine Corps approved formal school or authorized training organization.

b. <u>Certification</u>. Certification is the written authority from a unit commander, or other designated individual, to a specified individual authorizing the Marine to participate in a designated specialized skill. For instance, the EOTG Officer in Charge (OIC) will authorize certain personnel to serve in specialized skills billets during the MEU PTP and the MEU Commander will designate certain personnel to serve in specialized skills billets for deployment. In the case of supervisory personnel, certification is the unit commander's means to delegate command authority in writing to conduct sustainment training for other authorized personnel and to lead and direct others in the appropriate specialized skill. Certification remains in

Enclosure (11)

effect until withdrawn by the unit commander or until a lapse occurs in the sustainment period for a particular skill or task within the skill.

c. <u>Sustainment Period</u>. Sustainment period is the prescribed time during which a certified individual must perform any or all specific tasks in a specialized skill to maintain certification. Training is conducted to ensure the continued competence in the basic or supervisory skill. A failure to perform a specific task successfully within the sustainment period does not constitute loss of overall certification, only that the specific task must be retrained and demonstrated under qualified, certified supervisory personnel before it is performed independently. Paragraphs 2.b and 2.c of this enclosure list the references that contain the sustainment periods for specialized skills tasks.

d. <u>Academic Lead Agency</u>. IAW reference (i), Academic Lead Agency designation identifies the organization having responsibility for:

(1) Coordinating the drafting and staffing of POIs for designated courses with other authorized training organizations and TECOM.

(2) Conducting course content review boards every three years or as required to include, at a minimum, reviewing:

(a) Internal and external evaluations (lessons learned, AARs, user input)

(b) Higher headquarters policy changes which impact instructions

(c) Recommended lesson modifications, additions, and deletions

(d) Appropriate doctrinal publications, training standards, and task lists

(3) Maintaining current and relevant POI content.

(4) Responsible for instructor certification requirements.

e. <u>Authorized Training Organizations</u>. Authorized training organizations are Marine Corps approved installations that provide qualification training for designated specialized skills.

4. Guidance for Special Skills Training

a. The specific requirements for qualification and certification come from the applicable POIs and T&R manuals. As such, the T&R standards are used to develop checklists for certification. Simple and straight-forward checklists allow commanders maximum flexibility and latitude to develop training programs to support the qualification and certification process. Checklists are to be used by authorized training locations, lead agencies, and unit commanders to evaluate and certify the combat readiness of their individual Marines and units. MEU specialized skills are of such a nature that a high degree of proficiency and standardization are required to ensure operations are conducted safely and with the lowest possible risk to personnel per reference (q).

b. <u>Specialized Skills Certification requirements</u>. The following certification requirements are used by the commanding officer to determine if

11-2

Enclosure (11)

an individual meets all the necessary prerequisites to safely execute, or supervise, a specialized skill. Certification requirements must be met before certification is granted and entered into the MCTIMS. Upon completion of the specialized skills courses, team members will be designated in writing by the MEU commanding officer. A sample designation letter is included on page 10-6.

(1) <u>Breacher</u>. Serve in a breacher billet as a corporal or above, complete the WTBN or III MEF EOTG MOE Course, and hold a secret security clearance.

(2) <u>Helicopter Rope Suspension Training Master</u>. Serve in a HRST Training Master billet as a corporal or above, and complete the EOTG HRST Master Course.

(3) Fast Rope Master. Serve in a Fast Rope Master (FRM) billet as a corporal or above, and complete the EOTG FRM Course.

(4) <u>Close Quarters Tactics (CQT) Team Member</u>. Serve on a CQT Team as a lance corporal or above, complete the EOTG CQT Course, and hold a secret security clearance.

(5) <u>Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG) Sniper</u>. Serve in a sniper billet as a private first class or above, complete an EOTG Sniper Course, and hold a secret security clearance.

(6) <u>Maritime Navigator</u>. Serve in a maritime navigator billet as a corporal or above, and complete the EWTGPAC Maritime Navigator Course.

(7) <u>Scout Swimmer</u>. Serve in a scout swimmer billet, complete the EWTGPAC Scout Swimmer Course and at minimum, hold water survivor-advanced swimmer status.

(8) <u>Security Element Member</u>. Serve in a security element billet, complete the EOTG CQT-Enabler course, and hold a secret security clearance.

(9) <u>Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Team Member</u>. Serve in an R&S team billet as a private first class or above, complete the EOTG R&S Course, and hold a secret security clearance.

c. <u>Instructor Qualifications</u>. To be certified as a specialized skills instructor, an individual must meet the prerequisites of the academic lead agency's POI and be assigned in writing by the EOTG OIC or unit commanding officer.

d. Sustainment training is always the responsibility of the unit commander. The sustainment period is the prescribed time during which a certified individual must demonstrate any or all specific tasks in a specialized skill to maintain certification. Training is conducted to ensure continued competence in a basic or supervisory skill. Specific tasks with their sustainment periods are listed in the associated T&R manual listed in the following Specialized Skills Matrix. Unit commanders will identify and implement appropriate sustainment training programs.

e. Specialized Skills Matrix, page 10-5, lists the designated MEU specialized skills, authorized training locations, academic lead agencies, billet titles, and applicable T&R manuals.

Enclosure (11)

MCO 3502.3C 13 SEP 2019

Specialized Skills Matrix

Specialized Skill Courses	Auth Training Location	Academic Lead Agency	Specialized Skills Billet	Applicable Reference
MOE	WTBN Quantico/ III MEF EOTG	WTBN MCCDC	Breacher	NAVMC 3500.66B
MOE Supervisor	WTBN MCCDC	WTBN MCCDC	Breacher	NAVMC 3500.66B
Assault Climbing (AC)	MCMWTC/EOTG3	MCMWTC	Assault Climber	NAVMC 3500.70A
Summer Mtn Ldr	MCMWTC	MCMWTC		
HRST Course	EOTGS	II MEF EOTG	HRST Master	NAVMC 3500.70A
FRMC Course	EOTGS	II MEF EOTG	FRMC Master	NAVMC 3500.70A
CQT Team Member	EOTGS	I MEF EOTG	CQT Team Member	NAVMC 3500.55C
EOTG Sniper Course	EOTGS	II MEF EOTG	Urban Sniper	NAVMC 3500.55C
Coxswains Course	EWTGPAC/EOTG	EWTGPAC		NAVMC 3500.55C
Maritime Navigator	EWTGPAC	EWTGPAC	Maritime Navigator	NAVMC 3500.55C
Scout Swimmer	EWTGPAC	EWTGPAC	Scout Swimmer	NAVMC 3500.55C
R&S Team Member	EOTGS	II MEF EOTG	Urban R&S Team Member	NAVMC 3500.55C
CQT Enabler	EOTGS	II MEF EOTG	Security Element Member	NAVMC 3500.55C
Mass Casualty	EOTGS	II MEF EOTG	NA	NA
NEO	EOTGS	II MEF EOTG	NA	NA
TRAP	EOTGS	II MEF EOTG	NA	NA
NLW	EOTGS	II MEF EOTG	NA	NA
FHA/DA	EOTGs/EWTG	II MEF EOTG	NA	NA
Maritime Interdiction Training/ VBSS	EOTGS	II MEF EOTG	NA	NA

Sample Designation Letter

Unit Letter Head

From: Commanding Officer To:

Subj: DESIGNATION AS A XXXX TEAM MEMBER

Ref: (a) MCO XXXX.XX (b) MCO XXXX.XX

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1. Per reference (a), you are hereby certified as a XXXX Team Member. You are to carry out duties in accordance with the references and perform the missions associated with XXXX.

2. Reference (b) delineates your responsibilities with regard to knowledge, skill, and proficiency. It also delineates the time intervals in which you need to demonstrate proficiency in the tasks making up your specialized skill. You are ultimately responsible for maintaining a certified status.

3. This certification is granted in recognition of your professional ability and reflects my confidence in your judgment.

4. Congratulations on a job well done.

I. A. MARINE

Enclosure (10)

APPENDIX A

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

AAR	After Action Report
AAV	Amphibious Assault Vehicle
ACE	Aviation Combat Element
AMHS	Automated Message Handling System
ANGLICO	Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
BSA	Beach Support Area
C2	Command and Control
CAS	Close Air Support
CD&I	Combat Development and Integration
CE	Command Element
CERTEX	Certification Exercise
CG	Commanding General
CHD	CI/Human Intelligence Detachment
CI	Counter Intelligence
CNE	Computer Network Exploitation
CNO	Computer Network Operations
COMMARFORCOM	Commander, Marine Corps Forces Command
COMMARFORPAC	Commander, Marine Corps Forces Pacific
COMMREL	Command Relations
CQ	Carrier Qualification
CQT	Close Quarters Tactics
CSS	Combat Service Support
CTE	Collective Training Environments
DC	Deputy Commandant
DLQ	Deck Landing Qualification
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
ECC	Evacuation Control Center
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOTG	Expeditionary Operations Training Group
EW	Electronic Warfare
EWTG	Expeditionary Warfare Training Group
EXLOG	Expeditionary Logistics
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FIT	Final Integration Testing
FRMC	Fast Rope Master Course
FSC	Fire Support Coordination

GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
GCE	Ground Combat Element
GCSS-MC	Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps
GEOINT	Geospatial Intelligence
HQMC	Headquarters Marine Corps
HRST	Helicopter Rope Suspension Techniques
ISR	Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ITE	Individual Training Event
ITV	In-Transit Visibility
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational
JTAC	Joint Terminal Attack Controller
LAR	Light Armored Reconnaissance
LCAC	Landing Craft Air Cushion
LCE	Logistics Combat Element
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LE	Law Enforcement
LFSP	Landing Force Support Party
LOC	Logistics Operations Center
MAET	Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer
MAGTE	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MAW	Marine Air Wing
MCIA	Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
MCLLS	Marine Corps Lessons Learned System
MCLOG	Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group
мсо	Marine Corps Order
MCTIMS	Marine Corps Training Information Management System
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MIT	MAGTF Integration Testing
MLG	Marine Logistics Group
MOS	Marine Occupational Specialty
MRF	Maritime Raid Force
MWTC	Mountain Warfare Training Center
NEO	Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NISR	Non-traditional Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
NLW	Non-Lethal Weapon
OAS	Offensive Air Support
OEA&S	Organization for Embarkation and Assignment to Shipping
PDSS	Pre-Deployment Site Survey

PGL	Precision Geolocation
PHIBRON	Amphibious Squadron
PO-SOD	Plans, Policies and Operations-Special Operations Directorate
PR	Personnel Recovery
PTP	Pre-Deployment Training Program
R&S	Reconnaissance and Surveillance
R2P2	Rapid Response Planning Process
RADBN	The Radio Battalion
RHIB	Rigid-Hulled Inflatable Boat
RUTEX	Realistic Urban Training Exercise
S-2	Intelligence Section
S-3	Operations Section
S-4	Logistics Section
S-6	Communications Section
SACEX	Supporting Arms Coordination Exercise
SCPC	Security Cooperation Planners Course
SECNAV	Secretary of the Navy
SECNAVINST	Secretary of the Navy Instruction
SI	Special Intelligence
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SLTE	Service Level Training Event
SMWDC	Navy's Surface and Mine Warfare Development Center
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOF	Special Operations Force
SOFLE	Special Operations Forces Liaison Element
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
STX	Synthetic Training Exercise
SWATT	Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training
SWET	Shallow Water Egress Trainer
T&R	Training and Readiness
T/M/S	Type/Model/Series
TECG	Tactical Exercise Control Group
TECOM	Training and Education Command
TRAP	Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel
TSC	Theater Security Cooperation
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VBSS	Visit Board Search and Seize
WTI	Weapons Tactics Instructor

Enclosure (56) Page 48 of 48

[The investigative interview was called to order at 1205, 16 April 2021.]

[WIT: LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

[IO:LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}]

[IO: Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

[CR: SSqt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

IO (LtCol $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$): Good afternoon. My name is Lieutenant Colonel $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$, and I am part of a team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU, and actions and decisions associated with the material conditioning, training and personal readiness thereof.

This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020. We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should not have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April 2021, to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with

information relevant to the investigation. And I can send you a copy of that if you want that.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed me to the investigating team on 8 April 2021, and I am talking to you and my investigatory capacity as a representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We are required to provide General Thomas with a written report upon completion of our investigation. And we can provide that letter to you as well, if desired.

I'm talking with you because the investigation team believes you might have information that may be relevant to the investigation. It's important for us to understand how a typical MEU is formed and the role of EOTG in the formation and training of that MEU. And so, please inform us of anything you believe should be considered in this interview.

The topics that I would like to cover with you today may include the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, training and material readiness surrounding the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, and I MEF oversight of the 15th MEU.

This is an administrative investigation; however, due to the sense of nature of the ongoing review, we are asking personnel we talk to as part of the investigation not to share

anything we discuss today with any other person.

So before we start, do you have any questions about my role in this investigation?

WIT: No.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Roger. So, ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} can you talk to us a little bit about -- oh, hold on. I got to read the background questions here.

Can you please state your name, rank, and current billet.

WIT: LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} operations officer for the I MEF, G-7, Expeditionary Operations Training Group.

IO (LtCol ** And can you tell us what was your billet on 30 July 2020?

WIT: The same.

IO (LtCol : talk to us a little bit about EOTG's role in training a West Coast MEU. What are the parts that you're involved, where are the parts you're not involved, and any courses specific to the BLT that you're involved in?

WIT: EOTG works with 3rd Fleet to schedule the ARG MEU FRTP-PTP integrated phase based on deployment date. We sit with them in a scheduling conference, and we establish, based on that deployment date, the three at sea periods; PMINT ARG MEUEX and

COMPTUEX.

The way it goes is PMINT is usually the first thing after the deployment date that is scheduled to afford a highlight level period that trains the ACE. From that, we build the rest of the schedule to the left and to the right of that first at sea period to make sure that to the left of it we have enough time for the EOTG courses; a realistic urban training exercise, some of the other courses that work -- that go with EWTG PAC and raid group.

And then, to the right of PMINT, the second and third at sea periods that include the certification, and then enough time for a pre-deployment leave block, which could also be used as another at sea period, should the MEU fail -- the ARG MEU fail its certification on the third at sea period.

We have to fit into roughly a 180-day timeframe. It's close to 179 training days, based on holidays and time of year, we sometimes have to tag that. So it can go anywhere from 180 to to 200, 200 plus, and that pretty much gives us the composite day.

Once we have that composite day, that message then gets approved by the MEF CG after it's been arbitrated by the MSC commanders. And then, we basically establish it and build the

TEEP. That composite day transmits the demand signal to the MSCs that they have to have there and their MSEs core complete and MCCRE'd by the time that they composite, so that EOTG can begin working on the assigned METs and METLs, building them towards certification.

I like to say that EOTG is kind of like a finishing school sometimes. Also, in there is the implied task to the MSCs that they have conducted their, not only their MCCREs, but all their joint limited technical inspections and all of those accounts have been transferred and readied in an acceptable level for the MEU commander to sign. And that is basically how we -- and then, in addition to that, that they have all of their manning available prior to composite so that when the MEU commander enter -composites and enters into his PTP, he has been fully manned, trained, and equipped for deployment and made core proficient up to the MSC level. Over.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Thank you for that. And so, as you're going through this, what's the first time that EOTG will sit down with the MEU command element staff to talk about his MAGTF design and how EOTG can or cannot support some of the different things that he wants to do?

WIT: So the MEU deployment, being a non-standard event

based on different global concerns in the GFM process, as well as ships maintenance, which you have as a non -- you have a non-standard deployment cycle. And so, being able to sit down with the MEU staff depends on very much where they are in the formation of that staff. Is it the old staff? Is that the new staff? Is there enough of the MEU staff there to do it? Are they even back from deployment? And so, it is it's kind of hard to give a, this is the standard.

However, EOTG will start locking on sites in anticipation of the PTP about a year from composite. So, for instance, 11th MEU just conducted their RUT in Yuma in -- at the end of February, and we requested Yuma one year previous to that.

So at about the 365-day mark from composite, we began locking on ranges, we are working with the Navy to understand when they are locking on their different courses that are going to be run through actually run through [inaudible] PAC, EWTG PAC, and SMDIC. We build a planning continuum for those at sea periods, and RUT -- so RUT at the second and third at sea period. PMINT, the first at sea period, even though we work very hard to schedule that and build the whole PTP off of it, is a MEU run event, and while we can provide life support and SME assistance, you know, that is a MEU run event.

To get to your original question -- sorry if I'm talking too much -- to get to your original question, MEF G-3/5 through Expo Ops will get a -- what I've seen, will get a guidance letter from the CG, and the MEU commander will work with his team, whether it's the outgoing or the incoming, to start to to run that operational planning team, as far as MAGTF design.

The EOTG will watch closely and and try to influence based on keeping it in adherence with the mission essential task lists that they'll ultimately be certified against. And that is where we're working, not only with MEF, but also to the MEU OAGs and the METL conferences to make sure that we are aligning that METL and that MAGTF design.

When that actually happens is pre-composite, but a lot of it is based on the formation of the actual deploying command element, when they're available and other competing requirements. So clear as mud?

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: No, I got it, and you're not talking too much. No. It's helpful just in helping us paint the picture, because there are -- obviously, we've spoken to a lot of other folks, and we're just kind of trying to get the different angles in whose role in what doing what.

So kind of getting a little bit more specific here, but

can you recall -- you talked about the fact that it's the MSCs responsibility to make sure that their MSCs come to the MEU and come to the PTP at chop ready to train both personnel wise, material readiness wise, and training wise. Do you recall, kind of, in the very beginning of the mech raid or any of the company raid, issues that you had with regard to any one of those three things?

WIT: The 15th MEU specifically?

IO (LtCol^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Yeah.

WIT: I have to go back. I have to go back in my emails. I remember a lot of problems with the overall formation of the command element, as well as the PTP, which is where I was mostly focused; specifically, to these raid courses. I oversee the raids branch. But on a day-to-day basis, I was not -- I mean, I reviewed the LOIs for approval. They were pretty standard for what I could tell from looking back at previous raids packages.

This one -- this 15th MEU was my first as, you know, the EOTG OpsO. But from what I can tell pretty standard. But as far as the day to day, like, how did they look when they were showing up, I'd have to defer to Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} and his team out there.

I did show up for several of the STEXs. I was able to

observe actions on the objective. But, no, I can't really give great amount of specifics.

IO (LtCol^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Okay. But I guess, so I mean, the fact that nothing, nothing significant stands out either material readiness or training readiness? In other words, they came and they were able to execute the training. There was nothing that precluded the training from happening or reaching full objectives that you remember?

WIT: There has become a new norm. It has become a new accepted norm. And this is where somebody like Mr. Driggers would be very helpful to talk to, to understand what MEUs to be and what they have become.

We understood that 1/4 had order mission, had an SLTE, had -- I think, they had Iron Fist. I don't remember. Maybe that was previous. I do remember that there were issues with the UET. It was malfunctioning at one point, and we had to discuss waivers to allow them only the SWET chairs. I understood that they had manning issues; as in, they were receiving manpower pretty close to their composite date.

All of these things were going to translate to -- you know, we're looking at the other MSCs as well. The ACE, for instance, it's -- they're trying -- we know that the MAW is

trying to get all of their pilots up to a certain P rating in order to just -- and to get that ACE composite. They're competing with WTI. I'm trying to remember the time of year.

We knew that by the time they get to our raids courses that you're going to see, based on what old timers would tell you, not very good actions on the objective. Because they're just all kind of coming together, and there's a lot of new folks there. So but, like I said, that's kind of been the way things have deteriorated over the years. And so, it's become -- I don't want to talk to generically, but we kind of understand that there's going to be -- after composite, there's going to be a lot of learning in some of our courses that -- from what we would hope, would have already been -- there would be a certain level of proficiency prior to.

We understand that. And that is almost accepted because we understand that that's how the manpower model works, number one. And number two, specifically to the BLT, we understand how many competing priorities the Division has.

So I hope I'm not beating around the bush on that question.

IO (LtCol^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} No. I'm tracking all. So talking specifically about PMINT, can you talk to us -- what was your

EOTG's role in a normal PMINT, and then in 15th MEU's PMINT?

WIT: Besides the scheduling piece, EOTG, upon request, will provide planners for exercise branch, along with Mr.^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} to sit in their planning conferences for PMINT. The only thing that we actually fully engage with the MEU on, and that is by request and that's kind of an optional thing. The only thing that we fully engage the MEU with on PMINT is special training branch; specifically, our VBSS SMEs, who work with the ADR and the MEU to schedule the VBSS, schedule when the target ship is going to be there, and then actually go aboard, watch the planning, and then we have folks, both with the assault force and on the target ship, to include our air officer, who can provide safety structure as well as coaching and mentorship throughout that.

Other than the VBSS mission profiles, full mission profiles there in PMINT, we do not -- EOTG does not have any control over PMINT, nor does CSG-15. That is in ESG-3 and really delegated to the PHIBRON/MEU event.

And per the Marine Corps order on MEU PTPs, that's how it's designed. This is a chance for them to get out there and start to work some of the different well deck, flight deck operations just to get used to moving to and from the sea base.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) : Yeah. So that leads -- that dovetails

right into my next question. So understand that other than the VBSS portion, you guys were not intimately involved in the execution. But certainly, since you do need to build the VBSS scheduling of the ship and all of that stuff that goes into that, you, certainly, had a chance to see the schedule of events that they were planning during that. And if I could just kind of get EOTG's perspective on the training that occurred for the 15th MEU's PMINT?

WIT: So, again, going back to the beginning of scheduling PMINT is primarily an ACE driven event. The thought process on that is that you take RUT and you take an ACE and a command element and you put them together so that the MAGTF can form around and understand how to incorporate in aviation. You move into PMINT, okay, and you take that a step further and making sure that the pilots are qualified to work from that sea base.

To a lesser extent, you're doing that with the BLT and the ADR to make sure that they are proficient, they have the time to gain some proficiency in the various well deck operations.

We show them and we're in the planning process at that time of what the second and third at sea periods will look like. So they understand that they have PMINT to gain proficiency currency going into ARG MEUEX in which, now, we're going to apply

a scenario and specific FRAGs directing them to do these full mission profiles. And then, COMPTUEX is basically a repeat of that in which, now, it's the certification event.

Does that make sense?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (LtCol : Yeah, absolutely. So I guess one of the -- digging a little bit deeper into that PMINT role, with all of the different events that they had planned and the overall intent, by Marine Corps order, all of the events that they had going on, against what they really were actually required to do, those basic building blocks, was there any discussion on that that, Hey, this is par for the course. This is about right. This is aggressive. Anything like that? Do you recall?

WIT: Par for the course is what I was when I understood. 15th MEU did a pre-PMINT training package. I would get my hands on that LOI.

And let me be quite frank, there is so many things that the commander of the MEU, as well as the MSCs, there are so many things across the risk spectrum that they're trying to plan for that it is -- to get it all in, especially when you know that the MSCs are not -- the MSCs are not able to do a lot of this stuff just because of the availability of L-class shipping, or the fact that, I mean, how often can AAVs splash? How often can our boat

companies use boats? How often is recon actually able to do all of their different insert methods?

I mean, we really don't have a lot of the facilities. We don't have availability od L-class ships. Our SLTEs have only grown in number of days. So the PMINT looks right to us. The fact that they've did a pre-PMINT. Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} advised Colonel Bronzi, I think that's how that went down. And Colonel Bronzi, he put together a two-week package, and we got them six VBSS reps. And I'm trying -- they built a CoC right there on the parade deck. I'm trying to remember what else they did.

But the fact that they -- he carved out two extra weeks before they even went out to PMINT. They did a boat raid. They were putting a lot of due diligence into getting reps at some of these different waterborne operations. There was not a mech company rep in there, but again, the commander looking across his full spectrum of risk, I saw the 15th MEU make an outstanding effort to do to try to hedge against a lot of those different forms of waterborne insert during their pre-PMINT training package. Which, again, is very unique for this MEU.

IO (LtCol^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} And that was separate from RUT? Not the same thing?

WIT: That is not RUT. No. RUT was at Camp Telega. They

did pre-MINT right there from Del Mar.

IO (LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) : Okay.

WIT: And for the record -- I don't know why I said that.

The entire MEU PTP had to be rescheduled. Usually, these things are locked in through the 3rd Fleet long look, two years in advance. We had to redo the entire schedule in March and April based on COVID. SLTE 3-20 that got cancelled ended up creating a SLTE 5-20. We lost Camp Wilson as the RUT hub. We had to adjust RUT. Okay. We were able to maintain PMINT, and then we combined the second and third at sea periods.

So there was an incredible amount of additional stress; as in, we had to start over. EOTG, for instance, could not use any of its non-DoD's installation bases -- or locations. We had to go to all DoD bases and stations. So we had to redo a lot. The MEU was scrambling, trying to figure out COVID policy, how to do clean bubbles, testing, etc. There was massive amounts of uncertainty at that time. Jumbled the whole TEEP up. They still were able -- We were still able to get them RUT out of camp Telega. Not ideal, but a good -- we hit the wickets there.

We were able -- they were able to do a pre-PMINT twopackage, in which they had a lot of the VBSS reps, a boat company rep. Although, I remember it not being -- it was a little ugly.

We got a EWTG PAC there to support that with safety structure. We supported with safety structure. I'm not sure what else they did other than CPEX out there on the parade deck.

And then they went into PMINT. And from what I can understand, we're getting hit pretty hard with COVID close contacts and whatnot, which continued into the combined at sea periods, and we went out there with, so.

I mean, the MEU PTP -- I believe that the MEU operations officer is probably one of the hardest positions in the Marine Corps. And we just made that much more difficult with the entire COVID situation. I'm sure you've heard that many times. But just to try to provide a little context as to what was going on, and they still found time to do two additional weeks of training on insert methods. Just the one that that bit them was the AAVs.

Which, in my estimation, probably is where you could have assumed risk. Now, this is where I'll put my analyst hat on. The AAVP-7, which was the LDTP-7 that went into service in 1971. A lot of people don't know that that vehicle is actually 50 years in service, okay? In my literature review, you can read, it's my chapter two, it went very extensively into this. That 50 years in service, a highly seaworthy vehicle, very, very

low amount of incidents. Most of them were a procedural error. For instance, 2011, the drowning in the boat basin. They didn't put the trim vane up, they had the hatches open, they turned to hard, pushed enough water in it, that it made it nose down. Four survived, one drowned. And we think it's because he got -- hit his head in the back. Regardless, highly seaworthy vehicle.

Had I been in the same situation looking cross my spectrum of rest, I probably would have assumed some risk with AAVs as well, just based on the precedence of nearly 50 years of almost no -- no incidents, in which you have a whole bunch of other insured platforms where you have a much higher probability.

Interesting comment that you just made regarding the history of tracks. Why would they have had to take risk? And when you say "take risk," were you referring to there not being a mechanized portion of the pre-PMINT period?

WIT: Yeah. If I -- I'm sorry. Did you say Colonel (b)(3).(b)(6).(b)(7)(c) sir?

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} Yes.
WIT:^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} right. Yes. Now that's me putting myself in
their minds. I don't know what they were -- what those complete

line builds towards the pre-PMINT training was other than they -you know, that they needed -- they felt they needed to get more repetitions at certain insertion methods prior to PMINT because with the weather and probably the COVID situation, they wanted to save that for -- save as many days towards their ACE as possible.

As far as accept risk, when you look at the training continuum for a mech company up to this point, the baseline standard for the amphibious operations MET for an infantry battalion only requires them to do a planning exercise. And I'm pretty sure that they don't even do that in the MCCRE. And so, when you look at the T&R standards for 1803, 1833, AAV officers and crewmen, they don't actually have to MCCRE up to the 6000 level with embarked troops. They have to know what to do, but they don't actually have to embark troops.

Then move over to the EOTG raids course, I don't have any 18XXs in my -- in the EOTG. I have 03s over there. We work from the water -- basically, feet dry to the objective. We are teaching them how to understand how to do an op from a sea base, how to do a raid. But we're helping that AAV platoon and infantry company come together and work on the land only portion. Part of that is because I'm not structured to do anything.

And so going into PMINT, which has happened, from my

understanding, many times, to include the 31st MEU BLTs, which will literally meet -- the AAV platoon and the infantry company will meet on day one of our raids package, more often than not, and then not splash until they get to Okinawa, okay? That is the PMINT, or that first at sea period, in the case of the 31st MEU BLTs, is the first opportunity they have to do a splash.

And that's part of what we're working on right now. When we try to do shore-to-shore movements, have them come out to Red Beach, have them push out turnaround, come back in. We're working on that with 1/5 and 3rd Tracks right now, so that we are building more towards a full mission profile.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: Okay.

WIT: Does that answer your question, sir?

IO (Col^{(b)(3).(b)(6).(b)(7)(c)}: You did. And just a point of clarification if you would, from chop until PMINT, I think I heard you say that PMINT was the first time that the BLT would have the opportunity to splash with packs in the back of the vehicle; is that correct?

WIT: That is based on all of the policy, all of the doctrine that I looked at, sir.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\;(b)(6),\;(b)(7)(c)}$ Okay. Thank you.

WIT: That is the first time that it is suggested. There

19

Enclosure (57) Page 19 of 33

are opportunities. For instance, in EOTG's raid package; however, up to now, and this is where Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) an help what's been done historically, but for the last several years, that PMINT has been the first time that the AAV platoon has splashed with the infantry company. Yes, sir.

IO (Col $\overset{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)(c)}{:}$ Okay. Thank you. And one more point regarding the pre-PMINT training, that two-week package, was that at the suggestion of EOTG or was that at the desires of the MEU commander?

WIT: That was very much the desires of the MEU commander. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I believe, because we had Colonel a former MEU commander, as the G-7. In his discussions with Colonel Bronzi, sharing experience what not, I believe that Colonel (b)(3). (b)(6). (b)(7)(c) may have oriented him towards that, but that was very much Colonel Bronzi's. If I were to give credit, it would be to Colonel Bronzi.

IO (Col Col And my understanding from your comments is that the focus of effort during PMINT was boat and VBSS type operations with no mechanized operations involved or planned?

WIT: From EOTG's perspective only. The -- I believe the -- and you'll have to forgive me, I have a very loose -- I put -- I have a very loose observation over PMINT, and it's just because

I'm juggling a lot of different things.

We usually have Warren go over. But again, that it is a MEU run event. Now, my recollection of 15th MEU is, Yes, they had AAV operations planned. As far as the focus on VBSS, that is my specific focus for PMINT just because that's my guys involved, and that's how we build them towards the second and third at sea periods. Because I have, basically, the pool SMEs. Whereas the MEU has, like I said, they have the 1803s, 1833s. I don't have any.

They have, you know, an entire ACE with WTIs. I have just a small air shop. So whereas, I have a full special training branch for 0321s. So that is why we are involved in PMINT, kind of that crawl phase in all of these different methods of insert.

Does that make sense, sir?

IO (Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: It does and thank you. And I'd like to ask you a hypothetical. If the MEU decided that they wanted to add a mechanized portion to pre-PMINT, would they have had the bandwidth to do so within that two-week period? Or were your evaluators focused solely on VBSS and boat ops without any band width to assess or assist in the training of a mechanized operation or exercise?

WIT: I have to look at the TEEP, sir, and what was going on at that time. It was I believe they did a trap, too. I believe they did a one or two trap profiles because during RUT, we had hit them pretty hard. They're their primary trap commander was not very good.

And so, we supported -- SDD supported with VBSS; raids Branch supported trap; raids branch, SDD, and EWTG PAC supported the boat raid.

To answer your question, sir, if they had asked for mech Company as well, that would have been, Okay, we can do feet-dry portion. You may want 3rd Tracks involved. Because we, you know, from ship to shore, we don't have structure. We can provide open water safety craft maybe, but we don't really have structure and more expertise. So we would have said, yes, because the EOTG will work very hard to accommodate the MEU.

As you can see, we would do -- this pre-PMINT training was a non-standard event. And we surged different SMEs to those events. I called you EWTG PAC and said, I really would like you guys to support. I believe, Angelo Willis and SCB, they were able to get the atlas. I think, to the MEU paid for it, but we were able to work our connection.

I mean, we supported it and I sat confirmation briefs

and listened to the different things to try to make sure everything was aligned. So it was EOTG definitely in support of the MEU.

To answer your question, if they had asked for a mech package where they did something like a shore-to-shore op, we would have said, yes. We'll support; however, we're going to need 3rd Tracks in there. And then, also to answer your question, would there have been the Bandwidth? Probably would have suggested an either or. Okay, well, maybe you don't want to do this or that.

I remember that -- I don't ever remember that being a discussion. However, I do remember there was concern that the boat company did not have enough reps. And because -- because they got crammed into an unscheduled non-standard EWTG PAC boat course; in which, we were not able to do a boat raid course after, like we do for the 31st MEU BLTs. We had only given them an alternate Helo course.

So this was a way for us to help make up for that. And that that was kind of where the focus was because those guys needed some more reps. And we were worried about them getting to the surf zone and actually, you know, navigating over there.

And for my standing, they did not do very well doing

that pre-PMINT. So that, you know, another rep was definitely needed again. Where the commander is doing his risk analysis and he had it on that boat company.

Long winded, sir, did I answer all your questions? IO (Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Yes. You did very thoroughly. Thank you.

IO (LtCol^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(1})</sup> just got two more questions for you. One of them probably a little bit longer than the other one. But, I've been on the other end of EOTG's red pen, and so I know that they keep -- that you guys are kind of masters of the major trends that you see.

Can you talk about some of the big trends that you see -- the negative trends, that you see during ARG MEUEX? What are the things that cause an ARG MEU team to not do well that you've seen or that you've heard about anecdotally from some of the experience it at EOTG?

WIT: Well, to be very blunt, Marines, we are very self-critical. We look at ourselves, we beat ourselves up, but I mean, with who we're partnered with out here, we send our best to the MEUs. I can't say the same about the Navy. And we do the best we can to build good relationships and work together, but I'm shocked on many different levels what we experience when we

get out here; what I see from a focus, from a mission orientation, from the general awareness and attitude, how they man some key leadership positions, etc. I could go on for a while on that.

But the biggest trend I see getting out to ARG MEUEX is who we're partnered with and how prepared they are and, really, what their attitude is. Going back specifically to green side, if the command element has formed and gotten through enough planning reps to where they can plan effectively, brief the commanders, understand all the different nuances, all the inter-connectivity of their operations with what the ships are doing, then they will, instead of fighting the scenario, they will work to figure out the naval geometries to, basically, execute launch hours on time.

If they are -- and again, that's a commander -- that's largely on the commander and the operations officer bringing that MEU staff together, getting that LFOC right, getting those planning processes right, integrating with the Navy, and then just keeping a pulse on it at all times.

And I'll say this, the 15th MEU, okay, amazing job they did during the combine at sea period. When you added -- the personality mix -- the personality mix out here right now for the

11th MEU that they're working with on the blue side, very -- pretty good from my estimation.

What the 15th MEU had to deal with, I was just -- I was shocked many times. And then, you add in COVID on top of that. I mean, it was incredible what the 15th MEU was able to do. The patience and perseverance that they had throughout the entire period. The focus on finding ways to get to the training with as many MRF-Disms that got thrown at them based on COVID and, quite frankly, some personality type things. Over.

IO (LtCol : Roger. Appreciate that.

And then, I guess, the last one I have is, just talk to me about the -- so understanding we're shifting from PMINT to ARG MEUEX, because you guys don't play a role in the safety and the white cell aspect in PMINT. But in ARG MEUEX, can you talk to me about the safety architecture that you provide? What is the standard for doing small boat -- or I'm sorry -- for doing a mechanized -- amphibious mechanized raids? Is that something you guys do?

WIT: So I can talk generically about any of our raids. EOTG has an exercise control operation center, both afloat and we have one ashore. We're dropping the frags here. We're watching them through the planning process. We're briefing them on the

limitations, otherwise known as constraints, restraints, just little training parameters they have to work within. We have an exercise operations center there at the EOTG building, which is linked to all of the different site support teams we have.

So on any given site, say if it were a mech company doing a splash, we're here watching the planning. The plan goes down to the company commander in the well decks. I'm not manned to watch that portion of it. They splash, they land. When they land on Red Beach, I have RSOs and site support team there. As they move inland to an objective, I have RSOs and site support teams there.

At any time, land wise, there's a problem, and this goes for all my raids, I have somebody that can call timeout, call 911, and take over that real world casualty situation.

On ship here, I'm watching the command element. I'm watching their planning. So from the time the plan leaves O-2 level to the time they actually hit the beach in mech company type scenario, you can see that I don't -- there's a gap in which we rely on the MEU, the BLT, the mech company, the AAV platoon, and down to the vehicle commanders to do what it is that they do. Similar to expecting the ACE, the pilots, the crew chiefs, etc. to do what they do.

Does that that makes sense?

IO (LtCol : Absolutely. Yeah. That's good insight.

Sir, do you have anything else?

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) : I do. I have one last question, Lieutenant Colonel If I could bring you back to the beginning of our (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) interview, Lieutenant Colonel asked you about any issues that you may have observed, and you commented about a waiver discussion for the underwater egress trainer.

I'd like to ask, who was involved in that discussion, and to your knowledge, were waivers granted?

WIT: So G-37, sits over MEF training. At the time, it was Colonel $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$, Mr. $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$, Mgjor , and Mr. $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$ were -- are still there. They run the TSRWG, the Training Support Resource Working Group. It's usually a quarterly -- and I'm trying to recall this from memory. I remember that the -- there was the UET was broken for a period of time, in which the -- all of the three pre-composited 11th MEU -- excuse me --15th MEU units had priority. And this was creating a logjam in them getting through their UET. And then, when you project out the fact that they're going to composite soon, be in raids courses, go through a RUT. Which at the time, we thought was going to be at Camp Wilson, and then turn around, come back,

possibly have to do a ROM going into PMINT.

There was like, what are we going to do? How do we get all these hundreds of bodies through? And so, it was, Well, we need to high-pri movers. And I think it went to the Helo company and went to anyone who had been on the previous 31st MEU for 1/4 who had UET. Let's move them to the back of the line. Let's, you know, let's get the Helo company up front. Let's get certain flyers up front. We know the mech -- we know the AAV platoon has their standards. They usually come to the composite with that already, as in the SVET. And then, we'll just try to keep getting as much -we'll get everybody, but it may not be -- we may not get them all before PMINT.

But then, that's what I think the wet share waiver was authorized so they could start getting closer to that goal.

IO (Col : Okay. Thank you. And so, just for my clarification, that training support -- is it Training Support Resource Working Group?

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: That resides in the MEF G-37?

WIT: Specifically, in the MEF training cell. So under the MEF G-37.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IO (Col And waivers are granted by that working

group?

WIT: No. Waivers are submitted.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col : Okay. Great. Thank you. Waivers are submitted. Thank you. That's very helpful. I appreciate that information.

WIT: Yes. I want to say something though. I'll get you my slide show that I -- or my little mech company training continuum PowerPoint, and I can talk a little about my study.

I just want to make very clear, submerged vehicle egress training, underwater egress training, based on my analysis, would not have been relevant in a -- in where the AAV sunk. It was a deep water transit. And I say the word "deep water." And I scoured for a doctoral definition. So what I basically defined it as, as something greater than one atmosphere or more than 30 feet, and I'll tell you why I use that.

But in this case, you know, how --(b)(3).(b)(6).(b)(7)(c) IO (Col : Hold on just for a moment, please. We're

running into a recording issue.

IO (LtCol ^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)} : Okay. You can pick back up again, Jay. WIT: Okay. My analysis -- do you need me to go back at all?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col : No.

WIT: Okay. A deep water transit would -- renders the underwater egress training -- it renders it null as applicable. The HES bottle will not work past a certain level. The pressure in the cabin or in the back of the AAV does not allow for the doors to be opened until it's equalized.

In the 2011 case when the AAV sunk in the boat basin, the water rushed in and everybody in until it hit the bottom. And then, they swam out of the VC hatch, drivers hatch, troop commanders hatch, one other Marine, I think, was able to go up through the troop commander's hatch. The one Marine in the back had turned around to shut off the valve, most likely was not wearing his helmet, hit his head, and got stuck down there because it was dark and all the water kind of held him in until it it equalized, okay?

So the submerged vehicle egress training, the underwater egress training, that HES bottle would not have made a difference on July 30th. In fact, it could have actually caused them to focus on the wrong thing. In my estimation, the right thing would have been just egress training, just, Hey, we've hit a certain level. We need to get out. And I can expand on that if you want as well. I got some opinions based on my analysis.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (LtCol : I do not have any more questions, but Jay, it would be great if you would send us the mechanize training continuum PTP, or PowerPoint, that you have. I think that would be good, as we do look to try to kind of find best practices, and then suggest some recommendations from Lieutenant General Mundy to make in his investigation.

WIT: I can. I got to figure out how to get it off my laptop here and onto my shipboard computer. But I'll get to it.

IO (LtCol : All right. If there's nothing else, I just have the closing administrative remark to have to read.

You are directed not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone other than members of the investigation team. If you're asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify me, the investigating officer, or your commanding officer.

[The investigative interview recessed at 1305, 16 April 2021.]

[END OF PAGE]

I, Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, attest that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} held on 16 April 2021.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

LtCol, USMC

[The investigative interview commenced on 14, April 2021.] [WIT: Col

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Good afternoon. My name is Colonel^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I'm part of a team reviewing the facts and

circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU, and actions and decisions associated with the material conditioning, training, and personal readiness thereof.

This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020. We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April 2021 to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with information relevant to the investigation.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed me to the investigating team on 8 April 2021. And I'm talking to you in my investigatory capacity as a representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We are required to provide General Thomas a written report upon the completion of our investigation.

I'm talking to you because the investigation team believes you may have some information that may be relevant to this investigation. Some of the topics that I'd like to cover with you today are:

One, the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU;

Two, training and material readiness surrounding the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU;

And, three, I MEF Expeditionary Force oversight of the 15th MEU. And, of course, we will talk to that in the context of your role at that time in Expeditionary Ops Training Group, EOTG.

This is an administrative investigation. However, due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing review, we're asking personnel that we talk to as part of this investigation not to share anything that we discuss today with any other person.

So before we start, do you have any questions about my role in the investigation?

WIT: No. Do I have questions on everything you just covered or just --

IO $(Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: Yes, anything that I just covered?

WIT: Yes. I think -- you know, I was going to ask what -at the end of the investigation, what is success?

IO (Col^{(0)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)} Yes. So at the end of the investigation, success would be defined by -- as we look at authorities, as we look at oversight, as we look at actions taken in the composite of a force -- and it doesn't necessarily have to be a MEU -- that we're making sure we're getting it right; that the proper authorities are in place; the proper oversight is in place; and the proper policies are, one, understood and, two, relevant to what the organization is trying to do.

So, really, it's about oversight, it's about authorities, and it's about getting the policy right.

Does that answer your question?

WIT: Okay.

IO (Col So if you could for me, please state your name and your current occupation.

WIT: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I'm a contractor. My job title is the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab to I MEF.

IO (Col $\overset{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)(c)}{:}$ Okay. And what was your billet on

30 July 2020?

WIT: I was the I MEF G-7/EOTG director. IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c): Okay. Great. Thank you.

So, ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} how I envision the remainder of this interview taking place is I've got a few questions, and then I'm going to hand it over to Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} He's got some experience as an S-3 A on a MEU.

Before we get right into the questions. First, to kind to create a context, can you tell me or talk to me about what was the command climate that MEF was currently experiencing on or before the time of the mishap? And when I talk about command climate, what I'm talking about is everything from any pressures from the operational tempo, any major challenges that the institution has created at the unit level that were influencing actions and decisions during the time, essentially, from January through July 30th. I'm trying to paint a picture of what the overall atmosphere was.

WIT: Well, I'll tell you that CG I MEF -- at the time Lieutenant General Osterman -- is one of the finest generals I've ever worked with. And the command climate was outstanding, as far as leadership from the top. We had engaged leadership from the CG; the DCG, Brigadier General Savage; and the MEF staff that

I worked with. So, yes. The command climate was outstanding based on, in my opinion, the leadership from General Osterman.

IO (Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: And thanks for that. So in your capacity as the G-7, when is the first time in the composite of a MEU that EOTG is involved with the BLT, is it after chop or any involvement prior to chop?

WIT: It's at chop. There may be -- depends on -- which is all outlined in this particular MEU, the 15th MEU, LOI that I MEF G-3 develops and publishes for the CG, I MEF. EOTG starts going heavy right at composite.

There are some -- you know, EOTG has individual courses, you know, mid-manager courses, like company raids, and then for integrated MAGTF training venues, like at-sea period or a RUT. So I think for the 15th we had a couple of reconnaissance courses/MRF courses that was executing before composite. But other than that, the majority body of work the EOTG provides training venues for the MEU takes place from composite to certification and deployment.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col : Thank you for that. So when you start after composite, what is EOTG's role in preparing the MEU and the MEU's MSEs for deployment?

WIT: Like I said, EOTG is a I MEF asset and it has

individual SME courses that gain proficiency in individual SME courses: sniper course or aerial sniper, for example, is an individual course; mid-level courses, such as the HALO-borne raid course, is a week long; and then fully integrated training venues, like a RUT or realistic urban training course and two of the three at-sea periods, ARG/MEU Ex and COMPTUEX. At those two at-sea periods, I MEF EOTG works hand-in-hand with CSG 15 to establish those training venues.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col During that time after chop, I noticed in some of the statements, EOTG had the opportunity to run I think it was a raid package. And EOTG was very complimentary of Bravo Company's performance and, assumingly, the associated track platoon with it. Do you recall that exercise or that portion of the training at all?

WIT: No. I had a major that ran my raid branch, and he ran those courses.

IO (Col All right. So there was nothing from that that he would have reported out to you that indicated a certain level of proficiency or a lack thereof or anything like that?

WIT: I'm sure he reported. He runs raid course, mechanized raid course, HALO-borne raid course, and another raid courses

that he reports to me. I don't have the documents in front of me that he briefed me on how they did.

IO (Col^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)}: Okay. During the course of training up the MEU, do you work with the AAVs on the amphibious raid, the waterborne side of it all or is it all land based?

WIT: The mechanized raid course that you just asked me about is land based. Is that what you asked me?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col : Yes. That's part of it. But beyond just that course, does EOTG do any training with the tracks in the water?

WIT: The second and third -- so there's three at-sea periods. There's PMINT, which is the first at-sea period. The second at-sea period is ARG/MEU Ex. The third at-sea period is COMPTUEX. So we run the training venue in conjunction with CSG 15 for both the MEU and ARG/MEU Ex and COMPTUEX.

So during those courses, we provide opportunities for the new commander to select the mechanized raid course, for example, from a plan, brief, execute, and recover forces from a sea-based MAGTF.

IO (Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: If we can jump to the PMINT portion of the MEU. And you may have just said this and I missed it, but does EOTG have anything to do with the planning of the PMINT, the

first at-sea period?

WIT: No. The PMINT is a MEU commander and commodore of the PHIBRON. It's the first time that they're at the full blue-green ARG/MEU team at sea. So it's a SOE or schedule of events that's developed by the commodore and the MEU CO.

IO (Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Okay. In your capacity as a former MEU CO, what was your impression of what's to be accomplished at a PMINT? Is it relatively benign or is it a relatively aggressive training schedule?

WIT: Well, you have three at-sea periods to have the full complement of the ARG/MEU team out there. So obviously, if you're looking at three different opportunities, it would be the slowest tempo. What you want to do on PMINT is to get the Marines and sailors to understand how to live aboard ship. So I may have already answered that question.

IO (Col $\overset{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)(c)}{:}$ Kind of a crawl, walk, run type of training.

WIT: So it's a balance of not just to get out there and lay around the ship for the entire time. You have to plan, brief, execute missions at the pace that's appropriate for the first time at sea.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} All right. That's very helpful. And

frankly, a lot of this was just it was an education for me to try to put everything in perspective and context as I'm looking at this investigation holistically.

What I'd like to do now is turn it over to Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Colonel and allow him to ask some of his subject-matter expertise questions.

IO (LtCol Sir, good afternoon. This is Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Colonel I guess one of the questions that I would have is how many different new work-up cycles have you seen, not only in your capacity as that EOTG OIC, but also previously?

WIT: I was a BLT XO, I was the 13th MEU OpsO, I was 11th MEU CO, and I was the director of EOTG, so I'd say about a half a dozen or more.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (LtCol : And sir, in all of those different MEUs that you saw -- my experience with MEUs is primarily on the East Coast, so there some key differences, I know, between how the East Coast EOTG does things and how the West Coast does.

So in your experience, was the 15th MEU PMINT plan more aggressive or would you say it's pretty much in line with the other MEUs that you had seen?

WIT: I don't have that on hand to look at. But when looking at it, it was not more aggressive than I was used to for

a PMINT. And the MEU CO and the commodore own that training venue, so they can increase the tempo or slow down the tempo as they see fit based on understanding how things are going with all factors.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (LtCol And, sir, going back to the question (b)(3). (b)(6). (b)(7)(c) Colonel asked about waterborne ops during the mechanized raid course, is that also something typical that, typically, there are not any amphibious operations that happen during that raid course?

WIT: For the mechanized raid course? (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IO (LtCol : Yes, sir.

WIT: That's correct.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (LtCol : And is that equipment or training related? Is that decision based on that or is that the focus, the priority is on land based?

WIT: Again, it's crawl, walk, run. So, that's the first time that -- just as we do the HALO-borne company, we start from a land base. You're not starting from a ship. So you're focused on a plan, brief, execute raid profile.

So the planning and then execution, doing the movement all on land. And then you move to the next level, which would be the same sea-based madcap platform that you had planned, brief,

execute, recover forces. So, it's a crawl, walk, run. I think we get two to three full reps in one week during a company-level raid week.

IO (LtCol^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Thank you. And was there anything that stands out in your mind going back? I know that you don't specifically remember the evaluation of the mech raid force. But is there anything that stands out from a safety or just, I guess, attention to detail from all of the different raid courses that you did? Was there anything that stands out that was different that you noticed?

WIT: Nothing stood out that triggered me to recall the 15th MEU across the different companies.

IO (LtCol^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} Sir, again, coming from the East Coast perspective, what is the relationship that you had as the EOTG OIC with the MEU commander and then with the MEF staff?

So anecdotally, I guess, on the East Coast, we always felt like EOTG was -- they were the spies on us and they were always reporting where we were and what we were doing and every little thing that we did wrong up to MEF. And, of course, that's not really the way it is.

But I guess my question is more along the lines of the communication that you had with either G-3 or the CG himself on

the things that you saw during everything from chop, all of the different courses that you did. What was that communication like?

WIT: So, a little bit different on the East Coast than the West Coast. East Coast I think has a G-7 and a separate EOTG director. West Coast has a G-7/EOTG director, so I have a direct link to the G-3. I'm a AC/S, so I have direct communication with the DCG who runs -- there's oversight for the CG of all the naval integration efforts, so clear communication with the staff. And 15th MEU is right next to my building when I was EOTG. So I had good communications with the MEU CO, talked with him. During the RUT, I'm at all of his planning, briefing, and executing. At the at-sea periods, I was with him at the ARG/MEU Ex.

And they were a little bit different because the ARG/MEU Ex and the COMPTUEX were combined based on COVID, which we haven't talked about. So instead of three separate at-sea periods, there was two at-sea periods. There was PMINT and then there was a large, 40-day combined ARG/MEU Ex and COMPTUEX, which I was afloat for that whole 40 days. I don't know if that answered your question.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (LtCol It does, sir. That's kind of what I wanted to understand better was if there were direct lines -- so

if you had conversations with the MEU CO. I know that we've spoken to other folks that talked about how the 15th MEU was going to have the additional capability of having a small boat company and kind of -- basically trying to get a better understanding of all of the things that were in the MEU commander's pack at that time and all of the different training events that had to to occur and who is helping and assisting to train that.

WIT: So, how it works in the West Coast -- if you're familiar with the documents and the references that we use -- but as I stated, you have the I MEF MEU SOP, then you have the 15th MEU LOI that talks about and tasks from the MSEs to the G-7 to the MEU and different war fighting functions across the MEF, personnel, equipment, and training, everything. It lays the whole plan out from pre-composite to through composite to the deployment. So that's the document that is the guiding document for everybody involved with form, train, and equipping a MEU to make sure that the tasks are spelled out there. The G-3 for I MEF develops that and publishes that for CG, I MEF.

Are you familiar with that document? (b)(3). (b)(6). (b)(7)(c) IO (LtCol : Yes, sir. WIT: Okay.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (LtCol : Yes, sir. The thing that the document doesn't tell us is what actually happened. So we know what was tasked to happen, but what we don't know is what actually happened, who received the briefs. We have a number --

WIT: This is at the PMINT. You're asking about the specific mishap?

IO (LtCol : No, sir. We're looking at it kind of from significantly back to E-270 and actually E-302, that report for planning going forward. So we're familiar with all of those documents that were briefed: the 270, 240, E-211, the composite brief, as well as the MEF LOI.

So again, we know what the brief said, but we're trying to dig in a little bit more when we see things like the reported training and supply levels of the AAV platoon at chop and that there was no evaluation. They were trained, but they weren't evaluated.

WIT: Now, who's that a question for? I mean, if you have a question on that, who are you going to ask about that?

IO (LtCol : We asked that of Division mainly, sir.

WIT: Right.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (LtCol Again, from EOTG's perspective, looking to see if you did have any additional insight into either the MEU

and what they had scheduled and their goals for accomplishment of PMINT, and then also not only the company but the AAV platoon as they went through the raid force. But if you don't remember anything specific from that mech raid course, then could you give us the name, sir, of the raid branch OIC?

WIT: What you just kind of described, what your questions are, it's probably laid out in the MEU CO's mission training plan. He probably briefed his MSC commanders the E-270 or at composite or somewhere in between there that lays out training objectives and prioritization across the different training venues.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (LtCol : Yes, sir. We'll look for that. I mean, I've seen the LOI for PMINT, as well as their overall MEU PTP order, but I don't think I've seen a specific --

WIT: 15th MEU mission training plan.

IO (LtCol : Okay. We'll see if we can get that. And what was the raid branch's name, sir?

WIT: What's that? (b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) IO (LtCol : The raid branch?

WIT: Yes. He's currently there in the G-7 as the raid branch, so he works for the current G-7. IO (LtCol : Do you know his name?

WIT: What's, that?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (LtCol : Do you know the major's name?

WIT: Yes. I'm spacing out on it. You have to excuse me. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IO (LtCol : That's all right.

WIT: I'll come back to it when I recall it. Go ahead with the follow-on question. I'll recall it in a second.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (LtCol : And one of the things that you mentioned, you said we haven't talked about COVID yet. Can you talk to me about some of the impacts that COVID had on your training plan and the 15th MEU in particular?

WIT: Yes. I mean, we all know that at -- what timeframe? (b)(3). (b)(6). (b)(7)(c) IO (LtCol : Just up to July 30th.

WIT: Yes. Well, I mean, I'm going to the state the obvious here that we all know that this was coming into full effect here what February, March timeframe of '20, so right through composite, through initial training. Our direction from CG I MEF is continue to train with putting mitigation measures in place, which we did. And we continued to train our courses and and conduct the PTP with appropriate mitigation. During the RUT, where we normally did a lot of off-base objective sites, we kept them to military installations and the like. So on gathering folks, we kept no larger than 50 and so and so forth, whatever

the policy was at that time.

So I guess the point is we continued to train with putting the mitigation of COVID in place, but I don't have to sit here and describe how COVID and the reporting and the newness across the world was a factor in everybody's life.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col : Yes. I guess one of the points of interest would be if COVID affected your ability as the EOTG to interact with the MEU and its subordinate elements at any time. That would be a point of interest.

WIT: Well, when I was on ship, we had major -- beyond the mishap, when we were out on ship for the combined ARG/MEU Ex and COMPTUEX, for example, we couldn't cross-check between ships and the like. But if you're trying to focus on pre-composite up to the mishap, we had the mitigation measures in place. We had masks if there were positives, just the same things that were happening across the service. So, but I had communication with the MEU CO, I had communication with the DCG, and I had communication across the MEF staff. The one-on-ones, sometimes, were VTC or phone calls because of the COVID situation.

IO (Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Okay. It sounds relatively standard to what we've been hearing across the board.

WIT: I just want to reinforce it was General Osterman's

direction. It wasn't, "We're going to skip or cancel courses or anything like that because of COVID." We continued to execute the scheduled training things.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col : So prior to PMINT -- or I guess up until PMINT and specifically up to 30 July, it sounds like EOTG's involvement in training the MEU really ramps up after PMINT. Is that a fair statement?

WIT: No, it's through. Again, individual courses. At the beginning, you got sniper courses. You're starting to have company-level courses with the reconnaissance, plus the MRF, the Maritime Raid Force, where you have a ground interop and you have a maritime interop with the MRF. Then you have the company level raid courses. And then we have a training venue called RUT for the command element and the ACE and other aspects that are all land based. So we can start from plan, brief, execute an exercise the MEU to plan, brief, execute aspects of the force. And then once RUT is complete, the next event is PMINT, which is again, as I stated, MEU CO and a commodore of the PHIBRON first at-sea period.

IO (LtCol : Sir, I know that you weren't doing a formal evaluation or involved in the planning for PMINT, but was there any member of your team that either did go out on PMINT or

was there for the PMINT brief to I believe it was the deputy CG I MEF?

WIT: I can't recall if I was at the DCG'S PMINT brief with him or not. But we do support PMINT on VBSS role because of the uniqueness of that. So we provide the target ship for VBSS and, and so there is some support to PMINT usually it's two different VBSS reps during PMINT that is scheduled. I can't recall off the top of my head if they were executed based on the mishap or not. And we had a contractor adviser for the staff and the commanders that goes up to PMINT, Mr.^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} and he goes out to all three of at-sea periods with the staff.

IO	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	Do	you have any other questions?
IO	(LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) :	I	don't think so, sir.
IO	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	Is	there anything else that you would

like to add that you think maybe we should know or maybe any other witnesses that we should talk to as part of this investigation?

WIT: I'm just trying to get an understanding of your baseline and I don't have a good feel for if you have a full understanding of how you view the actions that happened prior to composite and the actions that happened after composite.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$ We're very much building that picture.

But our point, our intent of asking you to join us on the phone today and ask some questions was to really get a sense of, in your capacity of EOTG, of running EOTG up until the mishap date of 30 July, what EOTG's involvement was with the MEU and with the MSCs. We wanted to get a feel for your opinions of the force, if there was anything that seemed odd, anything that was different, or if everything was going on as per any other MEU that might be forming or standing up or any other unit that might be preparing to deploy. So we're trying to get a feel for what EOTG's involvement was. And then in the context of the mishap, was there anything there that you, in that capacity, may have noticed about one the MSCs that stood out.

WIT: Well, you've got to go back to the 365 briefs. So, the I MEF G-3, under the 3/5's expo-ops develops standard briefs that MUEs will generate. So you've got a 365 brief, an E-270 brief, a composite brief, and different briefs for the major training venues.

So that's an important aspect of how the MEU command element and MSEs via MSCs are generated through personnel, equipment, and training. Because you have a deployment date backed up to a composite date and you're working across your personnel, equipment, and training backwards plan to get to those

milestones, right. You've got to understand that kind of framework which is briefed at the MEF level. And I'm not going to sit here and say, Here it is my opinion of this, that. I don't know what -- I mean, I'm trying to help.

IO (LtCol ^{(NON.(NONC)}: I think one of the things, sir, that we're trying to do is we're trying to identify best practices or lessons learned. And one of the things, the question was: Given the MEU order on what the first at-sea period -- or the recorder on what the first at-sea period is and those building block training events that we have leading up to it, was there, you know, is this something that we should look at institutionally? Was there too much going on at that time? And understanding that that's a commander's call, commander-to-commander, but to the extent that the service does want to kind of level the playing field, somebody with your experience is in a good position to give us kind of insight as to things that we could institute to make this process better without -- making it more safe without reducing the value quality of the training.

WIT: Well, I'll tell you about the West Coast and I've never been stationed in II MEF, so I couldn't tell you the difference between East Coast and West Coast generating ARG/MEUs. But on the West Coast, from my experience, we've been doing this

for quite some time in the crawl, walk, run fashion and using generally the same timeline and generally the same training venues to develop MEUs. What I would offer is you talked about the MEU LOI kind of spells out what is responsible across MLG, the Division, the wing, the MEU and the MEF staff, right. Deliver this across personnel, equipment, and training at this time to this unit. And so there's stuff that if we want to fix something at the server.

This is nothing new for when does MEU or units that are compositing to a MEU get the personnel that is slated for that deployment, which is they can make an EAS cutoff date, right. So, when is MMOA/MMEA delivering that -- we'll put it a "go team." When do they deliver those "go people" to those units? I'm asking you guys. Do you know roughly when that is?

IO (LtCol : They're supposed to be I believe stabilized at around I think it's E-270. And I know that, specific to this case, the BLT and the AAV platoon were both at between 98 and a hundred percent for manpower.

WIT: Now, you've got to make sure you don't look at the DRRS. If you're reporting DRRS, DRRS is what I have on hand now. DRRS doesn't necessarily reflect the folks that meet the EAS cutoff for that next deployment.

IO (LtCol : No, sir. Those numbers were from E-270, E-240 brief, which specifically said, "This is not inclusive of folks that will not make the deployment."

WIT: I'm sorry. I was talking generally. What can we do as we look at it as a service? And I was saying the trend is units getting folks later than they should. So I think we can improve things by getting folks to units in an earlier timeline than -- I think they use six months before deployment is their goal in the manpower. Though, six months before deployment is at right at composite for a MEU. So what you're doing before composite may or may not be with the majority of folks that's going to go through that integrated training and deploy with you.

I don't know if I was clear on that, but I was just commenting on what the service may look at to improve in the future based on my experience. And that's been a trend -getting folks on time -- for quite some time, a decade or more.

IO (Col : And that's a point well taken. And it's certainly a point of discussion, not only as relevant to this investigation, but Marine Corps enterprise wide. The manpower model is certainly a topic for discussion.

> I don't have any more questions. Do you have any questions of us?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

WIT: No. I want to help. I feel like -- I don't know how helpful this was for you.

IO (Col : No, we certainly appreciate your time. And we've got some leads that we've got to pull some threads on that you gave us. You gave us a couple more people that might be worth talking to. But we do certainly appreciate your time.

And if you'll just indulge me for about another 30 seconds or so, there's a closing statement that we'll make for you.

WIT: Yes.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col You are requested not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone other than members of the investigation team. If you are asked about the investigation, please do not answer any questions and immediately notify either me or any of the other investigating officers.

And with that, we certainly thank you for your time this afternoon. It's much appreciated.

[The investigative interview concluded at 1645, 14 April 2021.]

I, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) attest that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Retired held on 14 April 2021.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Col, USMC

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Source: Published	United States Marine Corps	Report Fiscal Year:	2021				
Structure Data current as of: 03/20/2021	Total Force Structure Management System	Manning Precedence Level:	PRI				
Equipment Data Current as of: Apr 28, 2021 10:23:43 PM	Unit TO&E Report	Military Unit Level Code:	GRP				
	EOTG I MEF	Unit Descriptor Code:	D				
	BOX 555300	Unit Type Code:	TYGAA				
		SASSY AAC:	LONG TERM STORAGE DATA CONVERSION INITIAL ACCOUNT				
			SASSY M20371				
	CAMP PENDLETON, CA 920555300	MEF Code:	А				
	Country: US UIC: M20363	Type Support Code:	A				
	Mission Statement:						
28 Jan 2016							

UNIT IDENTIFICATION EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS TRAINING GROUP CODE...SEE ENCL (1) MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Subj: MISSION STATEMENT

1. Promulgation Statement. This is the Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG), Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Mission Statement. This Mission Statement defines the unit?s role and responsibilities in support of the Marine air ground task force and supporting establishment, and prescribes the unit?s organization structure and capabilities in accordance with its tasks that manifest in the unit?s table of organization and equipment.

2. Organization

Special Operations Training Group									
Headquarters									
S-1 Section									
S-2 Section									
S-3 Section									
Small Boats Section									
Aviation Section									
Communication Section									
Intelligence Section									
Support Branch									
Supply Section									
Ordnance Section									

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Recap by MOS

M20363 - EOTG I MEF

			O10 E9	O9 E8	08 E7 SES2	O7 E6 SES1	O6 E5 C15	O5 E4 C14	O4 E3 C13	O3 E2 C12	O2 E1 C11		W3 C7	W2	W1					
	BMOS	SES5	SES4	SES3										C6	C5	C4	C3	C2	C1	Total
1 CHARGEABLE 1 MARINE 5 ENLSTED	8014						1													1
1 CHARGEABLE 1 MARINE 5 ENLSTED			1	4	19	24	9	11	1											69
1 CHARGEABLE 2 NAVY 5 ENLSTED	L02A				1															1
	L03A						4													4
1 CHARGEABLE 2 NAVY 5 ENLSTED					1		4													5
3 COLLATERAL DUTY 1 MARINE 1 OFFICER	0302									2										2
3 COLLATERAL DUTY 1 MARINE 1 OFFICER										2										2
3 COLLATERAL DUTY 1 MARINE 5	0231						1													1
ENLSTED	0311						4	4												8
	0313							1												1
	0317						2	1												3
	0321					3														3
	0331							1												1
	0341						1	2												3
	0369					1														1
	0411					1														1
	0531					1														1
	1833					1														1

Apr 29, 2021

9:42:21 PM GMT

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	
	Col		

From: Sent: To: Subject: Attachments: Signed By:

Mundy LtGen Carl E III Friday, April 23, 2021 7:14 PM (b)(3), (b)(7)(0) Col FW: ADCs Copy of ADC_AWC_CY11toCY21.pdf (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Feed this into the FoFs.

From: Ottignon LtGen David A (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Sent: Friday, April 23, 2021 3:50 PM To: Mundy LtGen Carl E III (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Cc: Borgschulte BGen Michael J (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Subject: RE: ADCs

Sam –

Last ADC at 1st MarDiv was BGen Dan Yoo (2015). In the last 10 years - 1st MarDiv has had (2): (MajGen Berger) 2011-2012 and then Dan (2014-2015).

Attached matrix captures all the ADCs and AWCs across the FMF for context.

Sf/ Dave

LtGen David Ottignon Deputy Commandant, Manpower & Reserve Affairs (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

From: Mundy LtGen Carl E III <carl.mundy@usmc.mil>
Sent: Friday, April 23, 2021 1:57 PM
To: Ottignon LtGen David A <david.ottignon@usmc.mil>
Subject: RE: ADCs

Dave -

When was the last time a GO was assigned to the 1st MARDIV ADC billet and who was he? Over the last 10 years, how many BGens have been assigned as the ADC?

Thanks Sam

Sent with BlackBerry Work (www.blackberry.com)

From: Ottignon LtGen David A (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Date: Thursday, Apr 22, 2021, 11:10 AM **To:** Mundy LtGen Carl E III (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) **Subject:** RE: ADCs

Available to chat if you need . . .

LtGen David Ottignon Deputy Commandant, Manpower & Reserve Affairs (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Sam –

How are Colonel ADCs assigned when no GO is available to fill?

 MMOA does not intentionally assign Colonels to Assistant Division Commander (ADC) or Assistant Wing Commanders (AWC) billets – doing so (overstaff) would create a shortage somewhere else in inventory.

Is this a decision typically left up to MEF or Division CGs? I.e. are these Generals free to shuffle their Colonels?

There is a long (albeit uneven) history of having Col's in ADC billets. It is the Division CG's decision whether to reshuffle his pool of Colonels from his Staffing Goal (S/G) to make an ADC. A MEF CG can also provide from their S/G of Colonels to support an ADC or AWC. I MEF is a current example of this, where they agreed last year to a gap at the MEF in order to assign one of their Col's to the ADC billet at 1st Division (Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}). MMOA is agnostic here and supports the CGs authority to place his Colonels where he/she wants.

What if any role does M&RA play in this decision?

- Manpower Policy generates the staffing S/G and staff commands accordingly ICW references below. The Commandant assigns General Officers.

Is any of this stipulated in a formal order or policy?

- MCO 5250.1 Human Resource Development Process is the overarching order that directs the Marine Corps manning of formations.
- MCO 5320.12H provides the Precedence Levels for Manning.
- MCO 1300.8 provides guidance for Assignments
- MCO 5311.1E provides guidance for Total Force Structure Process.

Please let me know if this answers your specific questions.

s/f Dave

LtGen David Ottignon Deputy Commandant, Manpower & Reserve Affairs (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

From: Mundy LtGen Carl E III <(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Sent: Thursday, April 22, 2021 7:57 AM To: Ottignon LtGen David A (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Cc: Borgschulte BGen Michael J (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Subject: ADCs

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(<u>c</u>) **COI** (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Dave,

How are Colonel ADCs assigned when no GO is available to fill? Is this a decision typically left up to MEF or Division CGs? I.e. are these Generals free to shuffle their Colonels? What if any role does M&RA play in this decision? And finally is any of this stipulated in a formal order or policy?

Would appreciate answers before COB tomorrow.

Thanks Sam

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GO Slate to ADC / AWC CY11-21 (Does not include O6 (non GO select) slate)									
	1st MarDiv	2dMarDiv	3dMarDiv	1st MAW	2dMAW	3dMAW			
CY11	BGen David H. Berger	BGen Walter L. Miller, Jr.	Vacant		MajGen (sel) Glenn M. Walters	BGen Gregg A. Sturdevant			
					BGen Gary L. Thomas				
CY12	MajGen David H. Berger	BGen Walter L. Miller, Jr.	Vacant		(deployed as 2d MAW CG FWD)	MajGen Gregg A. Sturdevant			
					BGen Gary L. Thomas				
CY13	Vacant	Vacant	Vacant		(deployed as 2d MAW CG FWD)	MajGen Gregg A. Sturdevant/BGen Mark R. Wise			
CY14	BGen Daniel D. Yoo	BGen Julian D. Alford	Vacant		BGen Paul J. Rock, Jr.	BGen Mark R. Wise / BGen Kevin M. liams			
CY15	BGen Daniel D. Yoo	BGen Julian D. Alford	Vacant		BGen Paul J. Rock, Jr.	BGen Kevin M. liams			
CY16	Vacant	BGen (Sel) Benjamin T. Watson	Vacant	BGen (Sel) Christopher A. McPhillips	Vacant	BGen Kevin M. liams / BGen (Sel) Robert B. Sofge Jr			
CY17	Vacant	BGen Benjamin T. Watson	Vacant	BGen Christopher A. McPhillips	Vacant	BGen Robert B. Sofge Jr/ BGen (Sel) Michael J. Borgschulte			
CY18	Vacant	BGen David L. Odom	Vacant	BGen Sean M. Salene	Vacant	BGen Michael J. Borgschulte			
CY19	Vacant	BGen David L. Odom/ Vacant	Vacant	BGen Sean M. Salene	Vacant	BGen Michael J. Borgschulte			
CY20	Vacant	BGen David L. Odom/ BGen Worth	Vacant	Vacant	Vacant	Vacant			
CY21	Vacant	BGen Calvert L. Worth Jr.	Vacant	Vacant	Vacant	Vacant			
Count:	2	5	0	2	3	5			

[The investigative interview commenced on 1400, 15 April 2021.] [WIT: Col K. Clark]

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

[IO: Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

[CR: SSgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Good afternoon. My name is Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}. And we are part of our (^{b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, along with Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}. And we are part of our team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU in actions and decisions associated with the material conditioning, training and personal readiness thereof. This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020.

We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April 2021 to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with

information relevant to the investigation. And we can provide you with a copy of the convening order if you would like.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed us to the investigating team on 8 April. We are talking to you and our investigatory capacity as a representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We're required to provide General Thomas a written report upon completion of our investigation. And again, we can show you the letter that grants us the authority and assigns us to the investigative team.

We're talking with you because the investigating team believes that you might have information that is relevant to this investigation. Some of the topics that we may cover with you today include the formation and compositing of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, training a material readiness surrounding the formation and compositing of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and I MEF oversight of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

This is an administrative investigation. However, due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing review, we are asking personnel that we talk to as part of the investigation not to share anything we discussed today with any other person.

So before we start, Colonel Clark, is there any questions you have about our role or this investigation?

WIT: No.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Okay. I would just start with a few identifying comments from you. Can you please state your name, your rank, and your current billet?

WIT: I'm Colonel Kevin Clark. I am the Marine Detachment Commander at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Marine Element director for Command and General Staff College.

IO (Col : Okay. And what was your billet on 30 July 2020?

WIT: On 30 July 2020, I was on leave. I was here in Fort Leavenworth in route to this duty station.

IO (Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Okay. When did you turn over prior to PCSing from the west coast? What unit were you assigned to?

WIT: Yeah, I was the CO for 1st Marine Regiment from June of 2018 to June 2020. What's relevant to this conversation is that for that first ten months 1/4 fell under my charge until they chopped -- well, from the time they returned -- as you were -- they chopped to the MEU in April 2020.

IO (Col Content and Correct. Mainly our questions will focus on your supervisory and oversight of 1st Battalion, 4th Marines up until that time that you left your command.

So let's just start with the first question. And we

are kind of painting context here. What was the command environment and what were you experiencing as the commanding officer of 1st Marine Regiment during the phase where your battalion was working up to chop to the MEU.

WIT: Okay. Well, I think I'll capture this in kind of two phases. I had two commanders at 1/4. When I first assumed command there, I put 1/4 through a MCCRE and they deployed. And when they returned from deployment around May of 2019, that's when really my relationship started to develop with them after their deployment. I think V 1/4 had a change of command around June 2019. It was a good command -- it was different, okay. And what I mean by that is V 1/4 had a great reputation of material readiness. Right. And they've always had that they've led the Division in material readiness. I think when Lieutenant Colonel Reyner took over, it just got better. And I think he took them to another level in terms of training readiness.

So I saw a great improvement from the little bit of 1/4 that I saw before their deployment. And I saw a lot of improvement after got there and got to witness their work ups. So it was a very positive environment. I give you some anecdotal evidence if that's appropriate here.

IO (Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Sure.

WIT: So a few things stick out with me. One is, you know, shortly after "WANNOW taking over that battalion, we assigned him to the southwest border mission. Now, I believe that was a 90 day assignment. So within a few weeks of him taking command, he was the first unit to go down there. And I mean, they knocked it out of park. I mean, we tried to look at that as an opportunity to move the headquarters. All while continuing to improve on readiness. Even though he had a mission to do down there. So they kind of split the battalion.

But fast forwarding from that, getting through that and building up to ITX they knocked it out of the park at ITX. I mean, I don't know if any of you have followed any of that, but as one of the first adversary forces it was kind of a non-standard ITX form. And they just they really did a good job.

And in my visits up there to observe, especially to observe the after action reviews and having 1/4 Marines around me talking to me, they're all smiles. They knew -- those Marines knew they did a good job. And it was a great thing.

So I'd say, from my observations that battalion was very solid. And really much a can do attitude as soon as I got back from that. And today we got a few hours or a couple of days. And we need you to take another mission. When a U.S.

Naval Ship Mercy docked in Los Angeles security missions. Again, they knocked it out of the park.

So this is one of those battalions where, you know, my guys, the battalion commanders, is that good units do everything, well. They don't give everything perfect, but they do everything well and they don't get Ds. And that battalion, 1/4 is just one those units that did everything well. And if that informs what I thought about that battalion, I had a very high opinion of them.

IO (Col): Hey, Kevin, this is ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

WIT: Yeah.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col : Could you comment on the quality of the relationship you had with the 1st Marine Division command element and then your staff, their relationship with the Division staff as well as your relationship with the 15th MEU headquarters?

WIT: Sure. My relationship with the Division staff was very good. There was no adversarial relationship. I know a lot of people kind of expect that. But that wasn't the case with us. There's a little rifleman down there saying that the guy's a big squad headquarters are all messed up.

That's just not the case. I mean, we had a great relationship with the Division. I'd say there's a lot of top down planning and bottom up refinement and it's very cordial and

professional. My relationship with the 15th MEU was really only a few phone calls. I mean, I knew Chris Bronzi, but there wasn't a lot of talk on my part. I couldn't speak for my staff and their interaction, but I can speak to my staff. I know they interact well with the Division. I just can't speak to how frequent they interacted with the MEU.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: Okay.

WIT: I can tell you there was no adversarial relationship. It just wasn't as frequent with our division.

IO (Col : Sure. That makes sense.

IO (Col $\overset{(b)(3),\;(b)(6),\;(b)(7)(c)}{:}$ Kevin, can I ask you about as January 2020. You already said 1/4 knocked it out of the park at the ITX and then rolled into a SECFOR mission and also did very well down at the border. As January 2020 rolled around, what were some of the additional major challenges that faced you as a regimental commander, specific to that period of forming the battalion to chop to the MEU?

WIT: Well, informing the battalion, I'm just talking about the organic battalion. So as far as any attachments related to that forming a BLT, there's not a lot of involvement there. So I'm not sure where you're getting at with that question.

IO (Col $\overset{_{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)(c)}}{:}$. Okay. So up until the time that 1/4

chops to the MEU --

WIT: Yeah.

IO (Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: -- did you have any involvement, any knowledge, any awareness of the status of, for example, their mechanized company and the AAV platoon that was going to be attached to them?

WIT: No, I didn't. I was focused on his personnel manning, his personnel readiness so we could chop that battalion. Not the attachments as you would inherit.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col : Kevin, based on your experience out in 1st Marines and before is there a significant time gap between the forming of the BLT and compositing with the MEU, and specifically in this case, how much time was there between the forming of the BLT so that the enablers attaching to the battalion and then that BLT attaching to the MEU?

WIT: We're not aware of it. My assumption was that they were attaching to the MEU or all this is happening around the same time where they're reporting to the MEU and forming that BLT and becoming a BLT once they chop to the MEU.

IO (Col^{(b)(3).(b)(6).(b)(7)(c)}: So up until that time, Kevin, up until the battalion chops to the MEU and becomes a BLT, there's certain training requirements that a battalion must meet per MEF and

Marine Corps Orders specific to training qualifications supposed to be accomplished by the chop date. Were you in the work up to that chop date kept appraised of the status of readiness of that battalion?

WIT: I would. I mean, in great detail, I would tell you the issue was really was the dunk tank. That was one that it warranted attention just because of the maintenance or breakdowns at the tank and that limited ability to get people through that dunk tank. That was the only one that really -- aside from just working out for the inspections that they had and surging personnel to personnel and outside resources to help them fix all their gear. So those were the main issues that concern me. And also, obviously, the personnel and making sure that they had the requisite number of Marines.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: What were your concerns with the dunk tank and how were they made aware to you?

WIT: Well, it was pretty much a big continuous issue with the dunk tank of it not working. I'm not sure if we have enough quotas to get everybody through there. But our work around -that tank is actually in Camp Horno, I personally would coordinate with those folks and say make sure that if anybody doesn't show up and you have any gaps in the schedule, don't let

them go to waste. They call down to my three shop or 1/4 directly. It doesn't matter. But we have people on standby to get any additional training just to make up for the gap.

Mike never really identified any major concerns to me about when he was forming and beaten the people and gathering rosters to kind of do what? So I had no real issues with to work on except for just helping out with the three shop and get the training for that, which I thought we could mitigate with a six month work up. They obviously prioritize folks that are going out the door and that dunk tank and they've got their priorities as who goes there. And I think everybody is doing the best they can with dealing with maintenance issues.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: So at the time of the chop, were you aware of how many or what percentage of 1/4 had completed the underwater egress trainer?

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WIT: I can't recall, no.
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(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col your supervisory role as it pertains to the attachments of the BLT, so you did not monitor, for example, when the artillery battery joined 1/4 or the engineer platoon or anything like that?

WIT: No. I did not have like direct oversight of attachments joining.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} : Can I ask what your role is? Certainly you had a relationship with the Division Commanding General. Did you have cause to brief him or did he ask for briefs from you as to the readiness and preparedness of your battalion in preparation to chop to them?

WIT: There's obviously the standard DRRS reports, which I don't recall them right now, but obviously the secret briefs. But there's the monthly report that we give to Division via DRRS on the readiness of the battalions.

WIT: I'm not specific to forming but specific to readiness in general along their METS. I mean, all four battalion would brief. We'd meet every month to go over their reports in advance of submitting them to Division. DRRS was our official reporting channel.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IO (Col : So were there any concerns you had with the preparation of the battalion?

WIT: I had no concerns with their preparation.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Kevin, do you think that they had adequate and a fair amount of time to train to standard at the required

T&R and MET levels in preparation for their deployment on the 15th MEU?

WIT: I mean, for a deployment to the 15th MEU, there's a work up that they're gonna do with the MEU, the six month work up that they're going to do. So I don't think they're ready to deploy yet, but I think they were ready to CHOP to the MEU to begin their workup.

IO (Col : Yeah, fair enough. The reason I ask is I know that so I had the border mentioned before.I did a rip with them and I know that they had a thorough ITX and then they supported the USNS mission and maybe some other things along the way. So but, again, you're satisfied with the time available to them to prepare to chop?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

WIT: I guess the question is, could have had more time? Of course. I mean, that 90 days that you take out for the border mission was huge. You know, I'm confident because of the manner in which they kept people back to continue sending them to school, to continue to move forward in training. It wasn't ideal to have that mission on top of it. You can speak to it directly. You're going to lose something by doing that mission. But in my observations, in general, looking at the culture of this battalion and its attitude of just really being a can do

battalion. There was nothing alarming that said these guys are -- I was not in fear of these Marines chopping to the MEU to begin a work up. They were very confident and I thought they were ready to begin training.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col :: Kevin, during the JLTI process in which the inspections are conducted in preparation to turn the equipment over to the MEU, that occurred in April, it was noted that a number of the AAVs were deadline and did not pass JLTI. Were you aware of that? And if so, who made you aware of that? And what was done about it?

WIT: I was not aware of it.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IO (Col : Kevin, was your regiment or 1/4 hampered by any lack of funding or resources as they were doing as the battalion was forming and then composited under the 15th MEU?

WIT: For the regiment in general, I think -- for the Division in general, its lack of amphibious training, lack of ship availability. There's really only one ship that I saw in two years that we had any relationship, and that was the USS Somerset and that was during Iron Fist. I think they did it the following year too. But the ability to put -- to do the amphibious operations I know during the last Division exercise that we did, we lost the ability to go on ship. Even the one

time we were gonna be able to actually get on ship and practice train to that MET we lost the ability to do it, had to work for a month from a shore, and then a simulated environment. And we have the LSOC ashore.

So, yeah, I think in terms of resources, I would say, yes, there's limited resources. Regarding ship availability and to be able to do just waterborne ops with AAVs splashing off the back of a well deck.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: Kevin, in your time as the regimental commanding officer, how many battalions did you prep to chop to a MEU or was 1/4 the first?

WIT: Well, we sent two to the 31st MEU. 1/4 was the first numbered MEU. 31st MEU was a little different. Obviously they fly the Okinawa and that was my experience with them. Both 2/1 and 1/4 did at 31st MEU. This was the first for 1/4 with 1/1 getting ready to do the same.

IO (Col : Kevin, one, first I'd like to thank you for your time this afternoon. And then ask is there anything else you'd like to add that can help paint the picture of 1/4 forming and chopping to the MEU?

WIT: Well, I just reiterate that battalion was a solid battalion. Yeah. I'll give you one more anecdotal piece. In

terms of the training that they had, I think the quality of the training that they had helped to compensate for some of the lack of available training time that they had. That used to be that I would see this battalion, their battalion gunner kind of would comment during the last deployment about how the had limited time in the field. And then when this last team came ashore, I'd never heard that comment again. As a matter of fact, I rarely saw that gunner again. And the time that I did see that gunner, he was filthy because he was coming from the field every time I saw him. So I know that battalion worked hard and I felt confident that they were doing everything that they could prepare. I don't think there's anything we can do about missions that pop up except mitigate the risk by doing what we can to get them in the schools.

And I don't think any of this is new with the relationship with the Navy and availability of shipping, but I do think that would help. More familiarity with AAVs and I was thinking about this before we talked about my time just even as a lieutenant and being able to splash and cross New River, something simple, and just gain exposure more time on the water with AAVs. In hindsight being 20/20, I wish we did more of that. I wish we had more opportunity to -- or made more opportunity to

do that. And that's something that I should have done. In hindsight 20/20.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IO (Col : Was that lack of waterborne training or experience was that raised as a concern at any time to you prior to chop?

WIT: No, it's just something that I was thinking of myself. With this accident and thinking about how I felt in the back of an AAV as a young Marine. And I think just the more time on the water probably would have benefited everybody but that's speculation.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) : I certainly appreciate your thoughts and IO (Col your comments. I don't have any more questions. Colonel (()(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c))??

): I don't either. And I also appreciate your IO (Col candid thoughts, Kevin. Thank you.

WIT: Thanks.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$: Kevin, I've got one closing comment. Again, part of the administration of conducting an interview.

Closing comment as follows: You're directed not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone other then members in the investigation team. If you are asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify me, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) or

16

Enclosure (62) Page 16 of 21

your chain of command.

[The investigative interview closed at 1432, 15 April 202021.] [The Investigative Interview reopened at 1438, 15 April 2021.]

IO (Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Hey, Colonel Clark, how you doing? Colonel Bardorf and Colonel Quehl calling you back.

WIT: Yeah. Hey, I know not just all the reasons why -just when I look at March and April. And you guys mentioned a brief about readiness -- just to clarify, that brief, I'm sure, went directly to Division for any of those to officially chop them. They were handled at division. The reason I say that is because for the month of March and most of April, we in that regimental headquarters was actually deployed in the United Arab Emirates and then quarantined for another two weeks.

So during that period where any briefs prior to chop, we weren't there for the battalion. So I can't speak about the readiness brief or anything that was brought up about the maintenance of that. You're talking about JLTIs and issues with AVV. Probably because that I wasn't in a room, but I don't want to make you think that nothing was ever briefed to anybody. It was just probably briefed at a higher level. Does that makes sense?

IO (Col : Yes, sure does. Yeah. That's very, very

17

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

helpful. Kevin, can I ask what dates, if you recall off the top of your head were you in the UAE?

WIT: Yeah, so we were in the UAE the first week of March through -- coming back around the 5th or 6th of April. And then in quarantine for two weeks after that. So probably effectively out of pocket and quarantined until around the 21st

of April.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) : So were you taking part in exercise IO (Col Native Fury?

WIT: Yes. While taking part of the GCE.

IO (Col . While taking part in that exercise, did you have occasion to observe your Amtrac platoon?

WIT: Yes, I did. Well, of the ones that we had, yes. The artillery and a lot of the Amtrackers I believe were on the last wave that we had to turn off because of COVID and did not make it in. So actually, to make that mission work -- I had to give estimates every day. And General Savage, would ask can you still do the missions. Yes, I can. If I can have all of the drivers that you have within the AAOG if I can get all those drivers to man the vehicles, yes. And they did well. I had no issues with AAV drivers. They initially served as -- given our lack of vehicles, they served as our safety vehicles. When we first

started the exercise. It was the only vehicle we had to transport and move people in. They did a lot of rehearsals, rehearsing back and forth from a range to the role to just to make sure that we can make time lines and no issues with the AAVs. But I had to tell the slow down once, you know, during one of the rehearsals to get somebody to the role to they get a little overzealous. But other than that, they were very reliable worked well with the Emerates.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Again, that's very helpful. One last question associated with that. When you found out that you were gonna be the GCE for Native Fury, and you deployed at the beginning of March, what was your preparation phase for that deployment? How long did it take and what was involved with it?

WIT: It was obviously a lot of planning. I'm not sure off the top of my head. I can speak to the details of the preparation of that. It wasn't a surprise for us, it was just balancing tasks and dates to the MEF forward. I would say there was weekly interaction with the MEF regarding Native Fury.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Thank you. Colonel $^{(b)(3),\,(b)}_{(6),\,(b)(7)(c)}$, any additional questions?

IO (Col (b)(3), (b)(6),): No. Thanks for calling back.
WIT: Yeah. And then and I would say in terms of -- also,

19

Enclosure (62) Page 19 of 21

it's probably relevant to know, like I mentioned it to ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}, is
I did ^{(b)(6)} in August of 19, which effectively I
lost some time with the command during three different ^{(b)(6)}
to spend with 1/4 which I regret. But it's probably relevant to
know that the three different ^{(b)(6)} for
another couple months.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): It is certainly relevant. And I'm glad that you called back and shared this additional information with us. It is very helpful.

WIT: Yeah. It's all relevant to know that, you know, briefs were given? They just may not have been given to me personally, but a lot of those things are VFR direct to division anyway.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Well, thank you. And just a reminder, our closing paragraph that we read at the end of the interview reminding you not to discuss anything that transpired here during this interview still remains in effect.

WIT: Yes, I got you.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): All right, $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}$, thank you very much for calling back.

[The Investigative Interview closed at 1445, 15 April 2021.]

I, Col $^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)}_{(7)(c)}$, attest that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of Col Clark held on 15 April 2021.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Col, USMC

[The investigative interview commenced on 1007, 16 April 2021.] [WIT: LtCol (c)^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}]

[IO: Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}]

[IO: Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}]

 $[\, \texttt{CR: GySgt}_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),} \ \ _{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),} \,]$

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Good morning. My name is Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)} (c) ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}, along with Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, and we're part of a team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU and actions and decisions associated with material conditioning, training and personal readiness thereof.

This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020. We're not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the incident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April 2021 to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with information relevant to the investigation.

We've got a copy of the convening order, if you'd like to review it. You have to look at both two.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed me and Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),} to the investigating team on 8 April 2021. And we're talking to you in our investigatory capacity as a representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We're required to provide General Thomas a written report upon completion of the investigation.

The letter you're looking at now is a letter designating us as a member of the investigation team.

I'm talking with you -- or we're talking with you -because the investigation team believes you may have information that may be relevant to the investigation. The topics that we would like to cover with you today may include the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, the training and material readiness surrounding the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, I Marine Expeditionary Force oversight of the 15th MEU.

And just note that this is an administrative investigation; however, due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing review, we are asking personnel as we talk to -- I'm sorry. We're asking personnel that we talk to as part of the investigation not to share anything we discuss today with any

other person.

So before we start, do you have any questions about our role or any questions about this investigation?

WIT: No, sir.

IO (Col $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): If you would, would you please state your name, rank and current billet.

WIT: Lieutenant Colonel ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$. I'm currently the G-7 and Inspector General for the 1st Marine Division.

IO (Col $_{(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)})$: Okay. What was your billet on 30 July 2020?

WIT: 30 July 2020, I had already moved to the IG's office, sir. I was the G-7.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): What dates were you acting commander of 1st Marine Regiment?

WIT: I don't recall the exact date, but it would have been the period of time -- I believe it was late February into early March. The regiment deployed to U.A.E. to take place in a TSC exercise. I don't recall the name of it. But it was during that period, maybe, I think, probably three weeks total, sir, two or three weeks.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): What date did you leave the regiment to go to division?

WIT: It was early June. I don't recall the exact date, sir. I'd have to look back at my calendar.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay. The first question: When you were acting regimental commander of 1st Marines, were you given an acting letter?

WIT: Yes, sir, I was.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Is it possible to provide us with a copy of that letter?

WIT: If one still exists, sir, it would be in -- somewhere in either the CO's or XO's office at 1st Marine Regiment.

IO (Col $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),})$: Did you also serve as the acting commander during a different time?

WIT: Not that I remember, sir. Colonel Clarke had a couple during that time period. I think he had one while -another one while I was there, after they returned from the U.A.E. But it was -- he was only out of the office for maybe three or four days. So I don't -- I don't think we did an acting letter for that one, sir.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}$): Okay.

WIT: We may have, but I just -- I don't remember if we did one or not.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): What billet did you hold at 1st Marine

Regiment?

WIT: I was the executive officer, sir.

IO (Col $\frac{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$): How long did you hold that billet?

WIT: Six months. A little under six months. January of '21 to June of '21.

IO (Col $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7/6)}$): Do you mean '20 or '21?

WIT: I'm sorry. '20, yes, sir. Correct. January of '20, June of '20.

IO (Col $\frac{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$): What was your billet before that?

WIT: I was the battalion commander for 2d Battalion, 1st Marines.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay. Did you do a MEU deployment with 2/1?

WIT: 31st MEU, yes, sir.

IO (Col $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$): 31st MEU. Okay.

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay. That'll be very helpful for us to, kind of, compare and contrast.

In your capacity as the acting commander of -- or even in your capacity as the executive officer of 1st Marine Regiment -- what was your relationship with the Division? And then what was your relationship with 1st Battalion, 4th Marines?

WIT: With the Division, the majority of my interaction on a day-to-day basis was directly with the Chief of Staff during that time, Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}: normal reporting incidents, normal battle rhythm and reporting requirements. The other individual that I probably interacted the most with as the XO is probably the G-1, just from manpower management, making sure the battalions were staffed correctly. That is the majority that I dealt with, with the division.

There were times, you know, I would attend briefs, regular scheduled briefs for pre-deployment, deployment minus 180, that kind stuff, if Colonel Clark was unavailable for any reason. I did sit in a few of those. And then, you know, eight-day briefs, that kind of stuff, sir.

In terms of with 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, I met with XOs on -- all the XOs on a weekly basis, just to, you know, give them -- one, it was a venting session for them. You know, if they needed to get anything off their chest. And then, two, for them to provide me any input where I needed to either, A, apply pressure on regimental staff or, B, anything I needed to take up to Division or anything potentially existing outside the division purview that that they might need help on.

IO (Col $_{(c)}^{\scriptscriptstyle (b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)})$: Okay. What was the overall, during that

timeframe -- and when I talk about the timeframe, we'll scope it from, say, January through the time you left the regiment and reported to Division. What was the environment at 1st Marines in context of operational tempo, of TEEP execution, etc.?

WIT: It was fairly busy, sir, but I don't think I would characterize it as any busier than anybody else in the Marine Corps right now or during that same timeframe. So, you know, you had 1/4 that was working up to CHOP over to the 15th MEU. 2/1 had just returned from deployment and were, you know, diving right back into ACB testing, a lot of other stuff. You know, 1/1 was starting their ramp up to CHOP. And then 3/1 was getting ready to get out the door to SPMAGTF.

So unusual in that respect, that all four battalions were actually physically present. So it was busy. There was a ton going on. Normally, you know, you only have three battalions to manage, from a regimental standpoint. But it was just busy, sir. I mean, there was a ton of stuff going on in terms of battalion FEXes; the regiment had, you know, the exercise in U.A.E., and then all the normal stuff that accompanies MEU workups: The EOTG, the EWTG PAC courses, all of that stuff.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay. In the context of your role as both the executive officer of the regiment and as the acting

commander --

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): What role did you have in assisting or overseeing the formation of 1/4 as they prepared to CHOP to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit?

WIT: The majority of what I dealt with, with 1/4 was, again, the manpower stuff. I didn't -- I didn't have a whole lot of visibility on Delta TAMCN readiness or vehicle readiness. That was usually briefed commander to commander. Colonel Clarke was pretty adamant about taking those DRRS briefs from the battalions. Occasionally, I would sit in on them, but the majority of it was manpower.

The most difficult thing they were -- issue we were having trouble with at the time was everybody was experiencing a shortage in 0302 lieutenants and 0302 captains, and that was my primary focus with 1/4, sir.

IO (Col $_{(6),\,(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)}$): What do you think caused that shortage of 0302s?

WIT: There was a lot of things. Dealing with the G-1, Lieutenant Colonel ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$, you know, working through him and outward into the bigger Marine Corps, a lot of it was just, from what I got -- and this is also talking to monitors myself -- a

lot of throughput issues at IOC. So a lot of the graduating classes were, kind of, shrinking just due to DORs and officers not meeting requirements.

And then on the captain side, you know, just natural attrition, lower numbers, and not being able to get those individuals back into the fleet before they were selected to major. So they had a very, very narrow horizon. And it was -it was just difficult to do. It wasn't really possible to get the -- the picturesque, you know, all six captains you need, you know, five with companies and then one -- one is it 3A. Lieutenants, for the most part, you would deploy with on hand, but timeliness was an issue. So in terms of meeting that magic D minus 180, you know, for lieutenants and captains, it was definitely right of that. We were -- it was kind of "just in time" delivery.

We made a concerted effort, for 1/4 specifically. When I came back from the 31st MEU deployment, I actually sent, I want to say, four of my lieutenants over to 1/4 so they could staff them appropriately and because 2/1 had such a long dwell time. You know, they were -- 1/4 was the priority; they were the next out the door. So we worked a lot of stuff to try to get them to where they were.

The biggest issue they had was the 3A, getting that on -- getting that into the battalion. It was -- it was incredibly difficult to do. And then they had -- a company commander was relieved from 1/4, which took another captain that was going to be their 3A and then still left a gap in it.

So I rambled on a little bit and then kind of went tangential there. So I apologize, sir.

To, you know, kind of, I guess, put it in a box, there were a lot of things that everybody was experiencing at that time with regard to captain, you know, company grade 0302 shortage. For the captain side, what I got back from both MMIB, from Division G-1 and the monitor, was just -- I hate to use the word "inventory," but just people shortage, sir. Just -- it wasn't there.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6).}): Would you mind discussing personnel challenges as far as enlisted 03XX structure and/or any other critical MOS's in 1st Marines and 1/4. Specifically, are you getting the right amount of people before you have to go on a deployment or before the training requirements really start getting giving hot and heavy? Both from your experience with --was it 2/1?

WIT: 2/1, yes, sir.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}$): 2/1 and as you watched other battalions get ready for deployments.

WIT: To answer succinctly, and then I'll explain, sir, I will say, no, upfront.

For your high density, low demand MOS's, the majority of those come through when they should. And I'm -- I base this off the traditional model, D minus 180, for personnel delivery. So most your high density, low -- I'm sorry -- high demand, low density MOS's get theirs. So your critical communicators, for the most part, are in place. Your logistics folks, for the most part, in place. From my perspective, at 2/1, I had my mechanics and drivers in place as well.

The critical element and not getting those individuals in on time is really staff NCOs and your sergeants, from my perspective. So MMIB, you know, puts out your DSR report and says, you know, This is what you have, here's your deployment cutoff, and we've got to backfill you all these different rank by MOS. But that happens, you know, soon after you return from a deployment, and there is an expected maturation process that's supposed to take place. So, you know, while your staffing goals says you're supposed to have X amount of sergeants, you really don't. You have a handful sergeants and you got a lot of

corporals who have probably just done one deployment at that time, and a lot of them may EAS'ing as well.

So that -- that first six-month period when you return from a deployment -- and I'll couch this by saying I did two deployments with 2/1 as the battalion commander. So I deployed, saw that dip, and then, you know, worked the battalion back up. And then deployed again. You really don't get your personnel in a good place, where you have the right folks in the right seat, probably, maybe four months prior to deployment, and especially for staff NCOS.

Staff NCOs, by far, are the hardest to get back in to the battalion, which means, you know, now you have a sergeant serving as a platoon sergeant. So even though you may have a good bit of sergeants, they're not in the billets that they're supposed to be in, leading the Marines they're supposed to be leading. They're, you know, they're one up or maybe they're a platoon commander, if you have an officer shortage as well, or if you have to send an officer to school.

And then you have the added requirements of sending that new staff sergeant to IULC, to get the bona fide 0369 stamp, which is a significant amount of time out of pocket as well. So, you know, all the way up to and including your SLTE, and then

potentially even the MCCRE, your -- I would not describe the manpower you have to train with as a stable one. Up until, you know, two to three months prior to deployment, you're probably still going to be getting folks in. I didn't get my ops chief in until, I want to say, two months prior to deployment. It was after my SLTE. Thankfully, we got him before the MCCRE, but it's hard.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): And both your deployments were 31st MEU, when you were at 2/1?

WIT: No, sir. The first one was a normal UDP to Okinawa.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Okay. For your 31st MEU deployment, did you bring any 1st Marine Division attachments with you or train with them or did you gain 3rd Marine Division attachments when you got over there?

WIT: It's all -- well, it's yes and no, sir, to that -- to that question. So my attachments technically come from either III MEF or 3d Marine Division. So they -- we do not aggregate on the ground or until, you know, 30 days plus or minus, once you get to Okinawa. Now, we know who those units are. We know what track platoon is gonna be deploying with us. We know what LAV platoon is going to be deploying with us. And we seek them out in our training to work up to that. Same thing with our B FST

for the battalion, for the artillery attachments. But you don't own them operationally until, you know, you aggregate as a BLT on the ground.

But technically they come from 3d Marine Division and III MEF.

IO (Col $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6)}{(b)(7)(c)}$): But they emanated from here?

WIT: But they originate from here, yes, sir.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}): So before you did your deployment as 2/1's battalion commander in support of the 31st MEU, when you did your MCCRE before you departed Pendleton, did you incorporate the AMTRAC platoon into your platoon, LAV platoon with you when you did that MCCRE?

WIT: The engineer platoon for sure. The track platoon, I want to say, yes, I think we got them in total. I think that was probably the most successful engagement that we had, was with the AAVs over that long stretch of training. LAVs, I don't think we had them as an attachment for my MCCRE. I know they were -- they worked in op-4 a lot, that's tend to -- how they get employed. So they were kind of adjacent, but I'm not sure if it was the same platoon, to be honest, sir.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): How did you coordinate that training with your track platoon?

WIT: A lot of it was, you know, just reaching out to the -to the battalion and saying, Hey, we're doing these things. We're having a battalion FEX during this time. Can you -- can you block that period off so we can, you know, have the AAVs available and ready? A lot of it was, how much we could do with them, was dependent on where that AAV platoon was, potentially, in their training cycle. So if they didn't have, you know, their surf quals done or something like that, it was land only.

We -- I want to -- I think we had them -- that same platoon during our EOTG and EWTG PAC courses. So that worked out for us. We were all in that together. So we got the swimming done with them. We did the mechanized raid with the same platoon that we were going to be working with. So I think I was fortunate in that. I don't know if that is the case for every battalion that goes through, sir.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Do you recall, when you first got or started working with your track platoon, what administrative or safety classes did they provide to your Marines?

WIT: We did it on the parade deck at 2/1. We did some more down at Red Beach before we ever started training with -training with them. When we got back from the UDP battalion, we did the SoCal RIMPAC exercise, and it was 2018. So we had the

15

Enclosure (63) Page 15 of 26

Mexicans -- Mexican Marine Corps, and then we had some Canadian light infantry come down. We were all using the AMTRACs together; that happened to be the same platoon that we were gonna be deploying with.

So it was fairly early, but it was just, you know, the staff NCO that was responsible for the AAV -- giving the Marines, you know, ingress and egress instructions, you know, what to do in case of taking on water, you know, emergency egress, talking about all the systems inside, you know, "don't touch the red handles" kind of speeches, sir. And then it was just, at that point, it was a lot of familiarization with regards to, you know, rehearsing how you get in and out of those all the time.

On the -- you know, we really didn't get hot and heavy until -- for the, you know, ocean-born egress or the water-side egress stuff until we got closer to the EOTG, EWTG PAC stuff.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): During your work up time, prior to your deployment to Okinawa and the 31st MEU, did you have any other operational requirements, or did you have a substantial block of training time to prepare for your deployment?

WIT: For the 30 -- for the UDP, no, sir. I -- I was actually slated to take over 1/1. The 2/1 CO was relieved, and I got placed into command of the battalion about 30 days before

they deployed. So my frame of reference for that portion of the workup is very, very limited. Basically, pre-deployment leave and then go.

For the 31st MEU, a lot of that time is spoken for. I mean, we try to get in, you know, two to three battalion FEX's, several CPX's. And then outside of that, you know, you're, up until about, you know, D minus 180 to D minus 120, you're still incorporating a lot of your folks. So you're really, you know, it really gets compressed on the back end. So you have a lot of time for individual skills, field skills, marksmanship, your annual training, annual requirements on the front end.

You know, mine was a -- we had a year dwell, so that first six months was a lot of forming, individual skills, and then the collective stuff really doesn't start until, you know, D minus 180 to D minus 120. So it gets shrunk into that little window. But that's also the same time period where you have to do your SLTE, you have to do your MCCRE, you've got to get a couple battalion FEX's in there so your staff can get familiar with command and control. You have your theater specific pre-employment requirements. You have your III MEF pre-deployment requirements, 31st MEU pre-deployment requirements, and then all the administrative stuff that goes

with that. So he gets significantly pressed on the back end, sir.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Do you recall any external distracters like that, like any security force missions or --

WIT: I was pretty fortunate. We did not get tagged with a lot of those, but normally you see those on the front end of when you return from deployment. So that first hundred -- deployment plus 180 is when you're kind of -- it's open season for, Hey, you're gonna get this TSC event. You're gonna go do a UET. Which we did. I did do a UET. We took that opportunity to send the whole battalion to Twentynine Palms.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)}_{(6), (b)(7)(c)}$): U --

WIT: United Arab Emirates training.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), }_{(b)(7)(c)}$): Oh, copy.

WIT: They come to Twentynine Palms and we pair up with them.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), }_{(b)(7)(c)}$): Okay.

WIT: So we took the opportunity to send the whole battalion, and just -- we did a month of live-fire training, you know, 4-10A for the platoons, just to build that part up. But that's usually when you get hit with all those D minus 180. And the Division does a pretty good job of fencing you off and

letting you focus on all of your pre-deployment stuff, sir.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): One last question about your BLT experience. Your mech platoon.

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Do you recall the percentage trained in the underwater egress trainer?

WIT: I'm pretty sure we hit almost 100 percent on that. We made a concerted effort to get everybody through the dunker training. Both on the air side and the track platoon, plus the track company, went through the track version of the dunker, sir. We pushed that fairly hard. This -- and just for reference -this was still in the shadow of when the Osprey kissed the deck out in Okinawa and that -- a Marine from 11th Marines was killed in that one, sir.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Fast-forward to your time as the XO, inclusive of your time acting. Can you compare and contrast 1/4's work up in preparation to chop, given your experience?

WIT: My chop was a little bit different because it doesn't happen until we deploy, sir. I know they're talking with their XO and talking with Lieutenant Colonel Regner during the time. I mean, they had a lot going on working up to that. I can't remember if it was -- I think their CHOP date got slid a little

bit to the left because the MEU wanted to hurry it. You know, they were on a -- they were potentially going to be on a compressed timeline as well. So it happened a lot earlier, I think, then it was originally planned for.

And it was, you know, they -- it's -- when you slide things left that way, it just -- it pressurizes that front-end system. The West Coast MEU battalions, more than any, probably, feel that just because, you know, the MEU wants to receive them in a -- in a trained state. So you -- prior to CHOP'ing over, for that last six months, that's when you have to do your SLTE, that's when you normally do your MCCRE as well.

So it's significantly earlier in a battalion's lifecycle, but -- and significantly earlier than what a normal battalion would be doing. You know, if the D minus 180 is here, and that coincides roughly with a CHOP date, all of that stuff has to be completed on the left side of that, my left vice the right side, if you're, you know, 31st MEU or UDP or an SPMAGTF battalion. So I know they felt the pressure for having to get that stuff done, sir.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Do you think 1/4 had adequate time to train to standard before they CHOP'd to the 15th MEU?

WIT: Man, that's a -- that's a difficult question to ask --

or to answer, sir. If I would look at it based on my experience from a 31st MEU perspective, had I -- had I had to CHOP at that similar timeline, I would have concerns about having the right people in the right place and just having too junior of folks go directly into CERTEX or anything else like that. You know, from a 31st MEU perspective, your CERTEX doesn't happen until you actually deploy. And it's that first, you know, usually two or three weeks at sea period when you get underway. For us, we did en route to Talisman Saber, going to Australia.

But if I was on that same timeline and, you know, personnel, manpower, being identical between the two, you're just -- you're so left of that, where it normally would be, I would think they probably had concerns. What they expressed to me, again, was just the, you know, wanting to get the 3A and the officership in place, sir.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}$): Okay.

WIT: That's also why we moved those lieutenants over there from 2/1 upon return. I believe 1/1 moved a couple of lieutenants over there as well, sir.

IO (Col $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Do you recall when the course of action was presented to shift CHOP date to the left?

WIT: I'm trying to think. It was -- it was a conversation

21

Enclosure (63) Page 21 of 26

that went on for a while. I want to say, for some reason, February sticks out, sir. I think that's probably when it might have happened. I'm not 100 percent sure of when that -- when that actually occurred, when it was said we are definitely going to CHOP.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): Do you recall any training concerns being articulated at that time?

WIT: None to me, no, sir. If that conversation happened, it was -- it was outside of my sphere. Or if it was discussed, it was a commander-to-commander discussion. I don't recall ever being brought any concerns by 1/4 with regards to training. I know the one they did bring up was the underwater egress trainer, because that facility had been down. I think it was a heat pump that went down and it was offline for a significant amount of time.

But we worked with Division and, you know, working with 1/4, I know they were able to get their guys through the chair. At least that's -- from what I was tracking. And there was, I think in the -- I don't know if it was a MEF order, a MEU order, or a Division order, I know there's somewhere, specific verbiage about, you know, if the full scope of the trainer is down, you can use just the chair as a qualification mechanism, sir.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): When this occurred -- and as you stated, you think it occurred in February of 2020 or thereabouts?

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): That would have been around the same time that Colonel Clarke was getting ready to transition to his role in support of Native Fury.

WIT: Native Fury, yes, sir.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Did he give you guidance specific to the forming of 1/4 as he departed for Native Fury?

WIT: I don't think specifically, sir. It was, you know, general guidance in terms of, you know, just take care of the battalions, make sure they have what they need, that general stuff. Like, you know, everybody was kind of busy at that point. But I don't recall anything specific with regards to, you know, focused on 1/4.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}): Were you involved in the sourcing and supervision of attaching the enablers, for example, the combat engineer platoon, AMTRAC platoon, to BLT 1/4, or were you in communication with Lieutenant Colonel Regner about how that was working?

WIT: Through the -- through the XO, through the battalion XO, you know, I was communicating with him, you know, asking if

there were any issues or if we needed to weigh in. Usually, the Division has a very large presence on those CHOPs. They oversee, you know, you have MEF SMEs come in, Division SMEs come in to conduct the joint LTIs with regards to the equipment. So there -- you know, I recall there being a heavy presence, and nothing alarming coming out of -- of that process, other than just the, kind of, reduced timeline from the CHOP date, sir.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay. So what is the regiment's role in supporting their subordinate battalion in preparation for a CHOP?

WIT: I've never been through the process for a West Coast MEU, so I guess I'm speaking theoretically just from what I would expect. It would be somewhat of a man, train, and equip responsibility, overseeing that. But had there been anything alarming, you know, the biggest thing I think that was alarming, from my perspective, what was on my plate, was the underwater egress trainer being down and having to, you know, work to get those seats back to 1/4, and then the manpower issues. I wasn't aware of any training deficit, you know, or any level of discomfort with regards, you know, having to move that CHOP date early, sir.

IO (Col $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Do you know if there was any interaction at the battalion or the regimental level with 3d Tracks prior to

CHOP?

WIT: None that was in my sphere, sir. If it was, I would -- I would guess it would probably be either in the S-4 shop or the 3 shop, sir. But nothing specific.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay. Thank you. I don't have anything else.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,}_{(b)(7)(c)}$): Yeah, I don't think I have anything else either.

IO (Col (b)(3). (b)(6). (b)(7)): One, thank you very much for coming down here. I know you're a busy man and we certainly appreciate you taking the time to come down and help us out with this investigation.

There is an administrative paragraph that I will close with.

You are directed not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during this interview with anyone other than members of the investigation team. If you are asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify me, the investigating officer, or your commanding officer.

Any questions whatsoever?

WIT: No, sir.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Thank you very much for your time. [The investigative hearing closed at 1042, 16 April 2021.]

I, Colonel D. $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$, attest that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of Lieutenant Colonel $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$ held on 16 April 2021.

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(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Col, USMC



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 1ST MARINE REGIMENT 1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) BOX 555401 CAMP FENDLETON, CA 92055-5401

IN REPLY REPER TO; 1000 CO 6 Mar 20

From: Commanding Officer To: Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

USMC

Subj: DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO SIGN "ACTING"

Ref: (a) MARCORMAN Paragraph 1007.1 (b) SECNAV M-5216.5


1. Per the references, you are hereby authorized to sign official correspondence as "Acting" for the Commanding Officer in the performance of your duties as the Regimental Executive Officer.

2. The term "official correspondence" is defined as all recorded communications originated by this command, i.e., letters, memorandums, orders, and bulletins. You are delegated "Acting" authority to authenticate all routine correspondence regarding Regimental matters.

3. The below is a sample of your signature: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)

4. This authorization will be effective from 9 March to 7 April 2020 when the location of the Commanding Officer may reasonably prevent him from executing his normal duties in a timely or effective manner. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

K. E. CLARK



1. Did you know that 12 of 14 AAVs were deadlined when the 15th MEU AAV Plt joined the MEU?

Prior to the AAV platoon joining the 15th MEU the JLTI identified several AAVs that were either deadlined or degraded. My direction, through one on one meetings, Command and Staff meetings, and Maintenance Readiness Briefs was that no AAV would be CHoP'ed to the MEU until it was replaced or 100% operational. (Present at these briefs were the H&S Co Cmdr, Bn Mn Officer, the Bn Mn Chief and the Bn MMO) Furthermore, to my knowledge a vehicle cannot be CHoP'ed in the Global Combat Support System – Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) until it is 100% operational. Based on this information, while the JLTI did identify issues, no AAVs were deadlined when they were formally CHoP'ed to the MEU.

2. What type of training did the 15th MEU AAV Platoon receive prior to joining the 15th MEU?

Prior to joining the 15th MEU the 15th MEU AAV Platoon was established as the 13th MEU AAV Plt in 2019. The platoon has been together and training since. At the end of August 2019 the platoon completed amphibious training, to include jetty ops and open ocean training and worked with the USS Comstock for the ship's AMW Certification; in Sept/Oct 2019 they conducted gunnery training at R222; and from Oct-Nov 2019 they participated in AFX 1-20, completing offense, defense, recovery and other land based training. In Feb/Mar 2020, the platoon returned to R222 to conduct additional gunnery training. From February through March they conducted training and operations in support of Native Fury. (The Bn TEEP shows training of the 13th MEU AAV Plt; Capt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}, can verify the MEU AAV Plt name change.)

3. Were the 15th MEU AAV Platoon's training requirements codified in a 3rd AA Battalion Training Exercise and Employment Plan (TEEP)?

The battalion's TEEP was updated to reflect actual training conducted and does not reflect required training planned.

4. Why wasn't the 15th MEU AAV Platoon given a MCCRE prior to chopping to the 15th MEU?

Training required by the MCCRE was conducted to AAV T&R level standards. This metric was utilized because 1st Marine Division generally applies MCCRE standards to company through regimental-level units. (See Division Order 3501.1D, Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation, dated 30 April 2015) "1st Marine Division conducts MCCREs to standardize the training and evaluation of **company through regimental-level units** in core and/or assigned METs in order to ensure unit preparation for operational deployments."

Therefore, readiness at the platoon level was conducted to AAV T&R standards in accordance with MCO 3502.3C, Marine Expeditionary Unit Pre-Deployment Training Program, dated 13 September 2019). "On the composite date, each GCE element needs to be **capable of executing platoon and company/battery level T&R standards.**"

The training and capability of the 15th MEU AAV Plt was discussed during one-on-one conversations and small group meetings Training outlined in the MCCRE but required by the T&R Manual was conducted during various exercises and training such as those listed in question two's answer. (The following individuals can provide additional information about these discussions: Bn Executive Officer, Maj ${}^{(b)(3)}_{(b)(6)}$, ${}^{(b)(7)}_{(b)(7)}$



(c)

the H&S Co Cmdr, Capt ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}$, the Bn Operations Chief, MGySgt ${}^{(b)(3), (b)}_{(6), (b)(7)'}$ and Bn Operations Officer, Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)}_{(6), (b)(7)(c)}$.

5. Why was the 15th MEU AAV Platoon assigned to Exercise Native Fury?

The decision to send the 15th MEU AAV Platoon to Exercise Native Fury was predicated on two points. First, the platoon would be conducting the same training requirements throughout the exercise as they would here in CONUS for PTP (amphib/land operations/and gunnery). Second, the platoon would be conducting the required training with their future supported unit, V14, in keeping with MCO 3502.3C, "In the months prior to composite, the battalion and its projected attachments should train together whenever possible during their conventional training period. This will allow concentrated individual and small unit training while integrating the GCE." Exercise Native Fury provided an opportunity for the two units to begin working and training together to build a more cohesive unit. This training exercise also provided opportunity upon their return to continue their PTP training requirements prior to CHoP.

6. Were all of the 15th MEU AAV Platoon Section Leaders qualified via the formal Assault Amphibian Unit Leaders Course?

Based on briefs I received from the Bn Operations Chief, MGySgt ${}^{(b)(3), (b)}_{(6), (b)(7)}$, all of the 15th MEU AAV Platoon Section Leaders were qualified via the formal Assault Ambhibian Unit Leaders Course.

7. Were all of the 15th MEU AAV Platoon Vehicle Commanders qualified via the formal Assault Amphibian Vehicle Commanders Course?

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Based on briefs I received from the Bn Operations Chief, MGySgt ${}^{(b)(3), (b)}_{(6), (b)(7)'}$ roughly half (exact number unknown) of the Vehicle Commanders have attended the formal Assault Amphibian Vehicle Commanders course.

ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: KEIN BRENIZE

Rank/Rate: LTCo

Activity: EDUCATION COMMAND

Unit: MARINE COPPS WAR CONFECT

Telephone number; ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

(b)(3), (b) (6), (b)(7) (c)

7) L have the right to remain silent.

Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.

I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both. I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.

I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

 $\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ (b)(3) \end{bmatrix}$ I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.

(b)(6), I expressly desire to make a statement.

^{(b)(7)(c)} I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.

 I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
 (b)(3), (b) (6), (b)(7)
 (b) This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and


This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), Z020 09 08 (b)(6), Z020 09 08 (b)(Wember signature/date)

(c)

(Witness signature/date)



TO: 1ST MAR, 5TH MAR, 7TH MAR, 11TH MAR, HQBN, 1ST CEB, 1ST RECON BN, 1ST TANK BN, 1ST LAR BN, 3D LAR BN, 3D AABN CC: DIV G-1, DIV G-3, DIV G-4 UNCLASSIFIED MSGID/GENADMIN/1ST MARDIV G-1/1ST MARDIV G-3/1ST MARDIV G-4// SUBJ/NATIVE FURY 2020 INDIVIDUAL AUGMENT REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS// REF/A/MSG/1ST MARDIV G-1/MSG #0358-19/DTG: 130034Z DEC 19 (EMAIL)// NARR/REF A IS THE 1ST MARDIV G-1 TASKING ISO NATIVE FURY 2020 INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION. // ATT/1/NATIVE FURY 2020 DIVISION MANNING DOCUMENT/ ATT/2/GEAR LIST/ ATT/3/TRAINING REQUIREMENTS/ ATT/4/SITREP FORMAT// /MAJ/OPSO/1ST MARDIV G-1/TEL: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) POC/A/(b)(3), (b)(6), EMAIL: (b)(7)(c)(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 11 POC / B / (b)(3), (b) /MAJ/MNPRO/1ST MARDIV G-1/TEL: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) / EMAIL: $\binom{(6), (b)(7)}{(b)(3)}$, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 11 POC/C/(b)(3), (b)(6),/CWO4/MNPRO/1ST MARDIV G-1/TEL: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) / EMAIL:^{(b)(7)(c)}(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 11 POC / D / (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /MSGT/OPS CHIEF/1ST MARDIV G-1/TEL: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) / EMAIL: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 11 /MAJ/LOGISTICS PLANNER/1ST MARDIV G-4/TEL: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) POC / E /(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) / EMAIL:^(C)(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 11 POC/F/(b)(3), (b)(6), /GYSGT/LOGISTICS PLANS CHIEF/1ST MARDIV G-4/TEL: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)11 GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. THIS MESSAGE ESTABLISHES THE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS ISO NATIVE FURY 2020. THE UNITS IDENTIFIED IN ATTACHED MANNING DOCUMENT WERE TASKED VIA REF A AND THE MODIFICATIONS TO THAT MESSAGE. ATTACHMENT 1 PROVIDES THE NO EARLIER THAN AND NO LATER THAN REPORT DATES ASSOCIATED WITH EACH LINE NUMBER. 1.A. PERSONNEL ON THE AAOE AND DRIVERS POOL WILL REPORT TO DIV G-1 WITHIN THE DATES INDICATED FOR FURTHER REPORTING TO HOBN S-1 FOR TAD PROCESSING. GYSGT (b)(3), (b)(6), IN THE (b)(7)(c) G-4 WILL RECEIVE PERSONNEL INTO THE AAOE AND DRIVERS POOL. 1.B. PERSONNEL ON THE SEAY AND WILLIAM OPP WILL REPORT TO DIV G-1 WITHIN THE DATES INDICATED FOR FURTHER REPORTING TO HOBN S-1 FOR TAD PROCESSING. CWO2 (b)(3), (b)(6), AT 11TH (b)(7)(c) MARINES WILL RECEIVE PERSONNEL INTO THE OPPS. 1.C.1. PERSONNEL ON THE FTX WILL REPORT TO THE CO, 1ST MARINE REGIMENT ON 3 FEBRUARY 2020. POC IS THE REGIMENTAL ADJUTANT, CAPT (b)(3), . DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZATION BETWEEN OICS AND COMMANDERS WITHIN THE FTX AND LIST MARINES PERSONNEL HAS BEEN GRANTED VIA SEPCOR. 1.C.2. UNITS LISTED AS THE SOURCING UNIT, COLUMN T, WITHIN THE FTX TAB OF ATTACHMENT 1 ARE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE GRADE, NAME, AND EDIPI INFORMATION FOR EACH LINE NUMBER ASSIGNED AND RETURN THE PERSONNEL DATA TO THE DIVISION G-1 NO LATER THAN 17 JANUARY 2020. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT ALL PERSONNEL ASSOCIATED WITH THE FTX HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED WITHIN THE CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE PACKAGE OF RAPID FORCE DEPLOYMENT. 2. ADMINS AND LOGISTICS. GEAR LIST IS PROVIDED WITHIN ATTACHMENT 2. 2.A. ARMORY TRANSFER PROCEDURES. PARENT COMMANDS OF MARINES REPORTING IN SUPPORT OF NATIVE FURY 20 WILL TRANSFER WEAPONS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT VIA LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL (LOT). 2.A.1. ARMORY TRANSFERS. 2.A.1.A. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT FOR PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION ARRIVAL AND ASSEMBLY OPERATIONS ELEMENT AND THE MAGTF DRIVER'S POOL WILL TRANSFER WEAPONS TO HOBN ARMORY NO LATER THAN 27 JAN 2020. 2.A.1.B. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT FOR PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION OFFLOAD PREPARATIONS PARTY (USNS WILLIAMS AND SEAY) WILL TRANSFER WEAPONS TO 1ST BATTALION, 11TH MARINES ARMORY NO LATER THAN 27 JAN 2020.

2.A.1.C. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT FOR PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE FORCE WILL TRANSFER WEAPONS TO 1ST MARINES ARMORY (VIA P-DODAAC M93524) NO LATER THAN 3 FEB 2020.

2.A.2. PARENT UNITS WILL PROVIDE AN EQUIPMENT DENSITY LIST (EDL), IN MICROSOFT EXCEL FORMAT, CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING: PARENT COMMAND ACTIVITY ADDRESS CODE (AAC), RANK, FIRST NAME, LAST NAME, MIDDLE INITIAL, EDIPI, TAMCN, NSN, NOMENCLATURE, AND SERIAL NUMBERS OF ITEMS BEING TRANSFERRED.

2.A.3. (U) AFTER COMPLETION OF NATIVE FURY 20 PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING (NLT 31 JAN 2020), GAINING ACCOUNTS WILL TRANSFER WEAPONS TO THE FOLLOWING:

NF20 P-DODAAC	NF20 CATEGORY	TRANSFERRING UNIT
M93502	GCE AAOE	HQBN
M93502	WILLIAMS AND SEAY OPP	1ST BATTALION, 11TH MARINES
M93511	MAGTF DRIVER'S POOL	HQBN

NOTE 1: FTX FORCE WILL TRANSFER WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT TO P-DODAAC ONLY.

2.A.3.A. TRANSFERS WILL INCLUDE GCSS-MC AND MARINE CORPS SMALL ARMS REGISTRY (CRANE); PHYSICAL PICKUP OF WEAPONS WILL BE COORDINATED VIA SEPCOR.2.A.4. ENSURE ALL TRANSFERRED EQUIPMENT IS PROPERLY INVENTORIED, INSPECTED, MAINTAINED AND ACCOUNTED FOR PER MCO 4400.201.//

2.A.5. PERSONAL EFFECTS/POV STORAGE. PARENT COMMANDS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING ALL DMO ACTIONS ARE COMPLETE PRIOR TO CHECK-IN TO GAINING COMMAND. POVS WILL BE STORED AT MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, CA. PERSONNEL WILL MAINTAIN ON THEIR PERSON ONLY THOSE ITEMS AS APPROVED ON ATTACHMENT 2.

3. U.S. CENTCOM AOR PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING PROGRAM (PTP) AND THEATER ENTRY REQUIREMENTS ARE PROVIDED AS FOLLOWS. PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO REPORT NO EARLIER THAN 21 JANUARY 2020 AND SOONER WILL COMPLETE PTP REQUIREMENTS WITH THEIR ASSIGNED NATIVE FURY ELEMENT. TRAINING AND READINESS REQUIREMENTS TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO CHECK-IN TO NATIVE FURY ARE IDENTIFIED IN ATTACHMENT 3.

4. PTP AND THEATER ENTRY REPORTING

4.A. ELEMENT OICS AND COMMANDERS ARE DIRECTED TO CONSOLIDATE AND TRACK STATUS AND COMPLETION OF U.S. CENTCOM AOR PTP AND THEATER ENTRY REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED WITHIN RESPECTIVE UNITS/ELEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF NF20. COMMANDERS ARE DIRECTED TO REPORT CUMULATIVE PERCENT COMPLETE OF TOTAL PERSONNEL FOR EACH OF THE THREE CATEGORIES IN THE PREVIOUS PARAGRAPH (CLASSES, TRAINING, INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS). ADDITIONALLY, PROVIDE COMMENTS IDENTIFYING CAPACITY AND OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE THAT ALL PERSONNEL WILL MEET PTP AND THEATER ENTRY REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT, IN ADDITION TO ANY CONCERNS, CHALLENGES, OR REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPORT.

4.B. PTP AND THEATER ENTRY REPORTING SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO 1ST MARDIV G-3 NLT 1600 EVERY TUESDAY AND THURSDAY UNTIL FURTHER DIRECTED BEGINNING ON 21 JANUARY 2019.

4.C. REPORTS WILL BE MADE BY SUBMITTING ATTACHMENT 4 TO LTCOL (b)(3), (b)(6), BY ELECTRONIC (b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(c)

G-4 PLANNER, AND MAJ (b)(3), , G-1 MNPROPSO.// (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Encl (67) I MEF Letter of Instruction for 15th MEU Deployment 21-1, 30 Dec 19

The above-referenced enclosure is classified SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY and is available by contacting Judge Advocate Division.

[The investigative interview commenced on 1304, 16 April 2021.] [WIT: Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}]

[IO: Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}]

[IO: Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

[CR: GySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}]

1

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Good afternoon. My name is Colonel ${}^{(b)(3), (b)}_{(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$, and I'm a part of the team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU and actions and decisions associated with the material conditioning, training and personnel readiness thereof.

This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020. We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant Commandant of Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April '21, to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with information relevant to the investigation.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed me to the investigating team on 8 April '21, and I'm talking to you in my investigatory capacity as a representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We are required to provide General Thomas with a written report upon the completion of our investigation.

Both myself, Colonel $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$, and Major $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$ will be participating in this investigation and both are appointed to the investigating team.

So up here, just for you, if you need to look at it, this is the assignment letter and this is the directive for the investigation itself.

We are talking to you because the investigating team believes that you might have information that may be relevant to the investigation, and this is important for us to understand. So please inform us of anything you believe should be considered in this review.

The topics that I would like to cover with you today may include formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, training and material readiness surrounding the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, I MEF, division, and battalion oversight of the 15th MEU.

This is an administrative investigation; however, due to the sensitive nature of this ongoing review, we are asking personnel we talk to as a part of this investigation not to share anything we discuss today with any other person.

So before we start, do you have any questions about my role, Major ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$'s role, or the investigation as a whole?

WIT: My name is Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, currently assigned to AVTB. I acknowledge the assignment letters and I understand, yes, sir. Thank you.

IO $(Col_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)})$: So you already took care of one, which is, State your name, your rank in your current billet.

If you could tell me what your billet was on 30 July 2020, and before that.

WIT: On 30 July, I was -- I am assigned to AVTB as the deputy director. I had previously been assigned to 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion as the operations officer. I departed 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion on 16 July, and checked in to AVTB that same day.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay. So what were the dates that you were the -- from what date to what date were you the operations officer of 3d AA Battalion?

WIT: From 16 January 2020 to approximately 16 July 2020.

IO $(Col \binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)})$: Okay. Excellent. Thank you.

So as we begin here, I'm going to start with just a couple of general questions about the compositing or the forming and compositing period of time.

What would you say your relationship was as the Battalion S-3 with the Division G-3 as it relates to the topic of forming and compositing the AAV platoon?

WIT: At that time, I would call myself in the execution mode of plans that were already in place. The 13th MEU was back in CONUS, but I -- but I recall that there CHOP back to the battalion was delayed. I don't recall --

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Was that the 13th or the 11th MEU? WIT: That was --

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): I think it was the 11th MEU that you were waiting on to come. Is this -- this is the one where you're waiting for the 11th MEU to come back because it has a relationship to your composite -- your forming of the 15th MEU; is that correct?

WIT: That's correct. I apologize.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay.

WIT: And they returned, they CHOP'd back, including their equipment, I believe it was December of 2019. And I recall that

the -- that those personnel and then their equipment, the status of their equipment, was really unknown, I would say, especially their equipment, what is the status and their equipment, until they conducted the JLTI's and returned back to the battalion. And I recall, prior -- and I would say as a company commander from Charlie Company from the 2019 timeframe, a lot of concern. I observed a lot of concern from then the H&S company commander, Captain ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} , and communication with the headquarters staff about what MEU was going next and the formation of that next MEU. But I wasn't completely tied in as an adjacent company commander to the forming of that platoon out of H&S company.

And so the battalion, the battalion staff, had answered, basically, a request by Colonel Brenize on the structure of the battalion. The company commanders, at least myself, was not consulted in the reorganization of the battalion, and we were basically given marching orders in, I believe was Nov -- end of November, early December timeframe, around Steel Night, which started the beginning of December and roughly ended midway through December. So we were given marching orders: Captain (b)(3), (b)(6), , you will turn over Charlie Company to Captain (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) , and you will serve as the operations officer. Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) was to detach from the battalion and serve on an IA. And Captain

 $_{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$ and Captain $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$ were to switch out and and Captain $_{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$ was to go on an IA. So there was a lot of personnel shifting.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): So Captain $^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}$ was H&S Company. WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (Col $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$): And Captain $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}{(c)}$ --

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): -- took over H&S Company. And that would be effective January?

WIT: I believe, yes, sir, January.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay.

WIT: The -- I believe -- yeah, we were the same day. I think the formations went back to back, Charlie Company and then H&S Company. Captain ^{(b)(3, (b)(6), (b)(7)} had come out of the operations office as the S-3A and swapped with me. And so there was a lot of personnel movement. A lot of the senior leadership were moving. And from the battalion's perspective -- I was in a conversation with -- a staff meeting with Colonel Brenize when he was asking for the company level leadership on who we recommended to be the company -- or, excuse me -- the 15th MEU platoon commander.

I recommended First Lieutenant $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$ because of his

performance in Charlie Company. He had exercised great judgment and knew the SOP and orders back to front. He was my best platoon commander out of Charlie Company. He had also gone forward as part of a single ship, special purpose MAGTF, to Adak, Alaska. And even though they didn't get to fully exercise their full capability on that -- on that deployment, short deployment, the feedback that I got from the supported infantry company commander was exceptional. So considering his performance, his experience with the U.S.S. Somerset, who he deployed with, and his performance during Steel Knight exercise, which for Charlie Company was in Camp Pendleton, also maneuvering off of the U.S.S. Somerset, he was my recommendation battalion. And the battalion staff, I believe, appreciated that feedback. And they identified him to be the platoon commander.

I made -- I also made a recommendation during that meeting for Gunnery Sergeant ^{(b)(3),(b)(6),} , but was basically -- the feedback I received was -- the conversation was focused on the platoon commander only, and my recommendation was not considered at that time. So we moved out smartly from there.

In my turnover -- so we had executed Steel Knight, turned to our equipment, closed out repairs and actions prior to the holidays, executed the holidays. I believe it was the week

of the 6th of January, we returned, did back in the saddle type training, and then that following week, Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} at the time -- Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} -- and I did a left-seat, right-seat. And my perspective -- I believe my perspective at that time was that the 15th MEU platoon was tasked and ready to do a -- not a service -- I believe a service or a joint level exercise by attaching to 1/1 and deploying forward to U.A.E. as part of Native Fury in 2020.

I was fairly familiar with that exercise because I, just out of sure chance, I was at a planning meeting with 1st Marine Regiment for Steel Knight in roughly October, and they rolled that meeting into a Native Fury '20 meeting at 1st Marine Regiment headquarters where there was no AAV representation. So I took the initiative and I stayed in the meeting and captured as many notes as I could, got back to the battalion that same day, put together, kind of, a summary of what I found out, and I sent that to the H&S company commander. So this was late October, sometime in November, before Steel Knight executed.

So my understanding was that H&S Company got that feedback and was tracking on the platoon to do the -- to do Native Fury, return according to the schedule, the first week of April, conduct final, any outstanding training, and prepared a

JLTI, battalion commander inspection, and turn and CHOP to the 15th MEU in May of 2020.

So my perspective on life when I -- when I took over as operations officer was that tasking and understanding was already in place, and that the platoon, besides the final changes of First Lieutenant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} joining the platoon, the platoon was already formed. That was my understanding at the time, sir.

IO (Col ^{(b)(9)}, ^{(b)(6), (b)}): Okay. I want to pull a thread for second on the reorg. So the reorg, as you discussed, was sort of a directive; it wasn't necessarily a full blown battalion planning effort, which is certainly the battalion commander's prerogative. A directive for the reorg to occur: How did that go in the battalion? How did that -- did it -- was it -- was it a fairly seamless transition to this new organizational construct? Was it sort of chaotic? What would your description be of how smoothly or not so smoothly did that go?

WIT: I think it was clear of who was moving to what billet, if not by the battalion commander briefing it, you know, giving the guidance during staff brief, then the battalion XO, Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)}_{(c), (b)(7)}, following up to make sure that we understood who was going where and closing out of CMR's and fit reps and all of those action items.

It was - the plan was understood, as far as who was moving to where. I would say that the timing was not great. Just -- we understood the risk, wanting -- the battalion commander's desire to minimize the risk of personnel changing over before the holidays and not understanding where or the personalities and leadership change over the holidays as Marines took leave and shotgunned across the country. But the schedule, battalion schedule was slammed.

We had one company already on UDP; that was Bravo Company. We had Charlie Company that was returning from the holidays and going immediately to Twentynine Palms for SLTE. We had Alpha that had returned from UDP and was in the process of reorganizing and also starting a joint level exercise with the Japanese Self-Defense Force. Delta Company had fairly well been, kind of, stabilized, and I would use the term "fenced off" to prepare for ACV IOT&E, you know, training and execution in 2020. But there was a lot going on.

The new platoon changing, the leadership within six months, and right before going to an overseas exercise, was not recommended or not -- was risk that the battalion commander had to accept.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): So risk that he had to accept. Did you all have an opportunity to have that conversation with him? Is

this -- was it, sort of -- what was -- you know, so it's risk that the battalion leadership understood?

WIT: I believe so.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay.

WIT: Like I said, sir, I was not in the conversation. I was aware of the conversation occurring with the battalion commander and the -- Lieutenant Colonel ${}^{(b)(3),(b)}_{(6),(b)(7)}$, Major ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}_{(c)}$, Major ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}_{(c)}$, and the -- I believe the operations chief and the senior enlisted members of the battalion. But I was -- I and none of the other company commanders were aware of, you know, how the decision was come to.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): So on that note, you said everybody understood the directive of the reorganization. And how was it received, though? I mean, in terms of, was it widely supported? Was it -- was there --

WIT: Depended who you asked, to be honest with you, sir.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay.

WIT: But I would say, as far as the other company commanders, that I had discussed it, it was, this is a task, not an ask. This is going to happen. So we needed to focus on doing it, making it happen, between changing overs of CMRs and all those actions and steps and trying to turn over in a logical fashion so that there wasn't any gaps.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): So the relationship between when -- they went to Native Fury when? January?

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): March.

IO (Col $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$): March, okay.

WIT: They CHOP'd -- a little bit disjointed. And that was a learning curve for me, was the -- for the operations shop -and the battalion understood that the 15th MEU was tasked and would deploy and support. But we did not fully understand the NPF enablers that were required to execute the plan. There was three different groups that composited the operation. I can't remember all the acronyms, but basically, folks that would actually board the NPF ship and prep the vehicles to be offloaded, then the actual team that would stage the vehicles once offloaded on the pier, and then another group that would then stage from the pier to the motor pool and hand off the vehicles to the platoon.

My -- in my turnover with Major ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$, and my understanding with Lieutenant Colonel ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ -- was that it was the 15th MEU platoon organic, and then approximately six to eight additional Marines to do the NPF offload -- or offload the NPF ships of the AAVs, and then turn those over to the 15th MEU

12

Enclosure (68) Page 12 of 40

platoon, whether it was pier side or wherever the motor pool was that they would be consol -- the equipment was going to be consolidated. And that was from NIPR traffic that he had provided me. And when I responded with here -- to 1st Marine Division G-3 with the Table of Org -- a roster of the 15th MEU platoon and additional personnel, the immediate response was: Wrong, look at this, try again. Which was not good. Basically, it became a platoon plus a couple enablers, to a two platoon construct of, I think it was about 54 personnel. So I was quickly corrected by the G-3 staff on: Wrong answer, try again. You're not reclamaing. You're going to provide us names in the next 24 hours, which led the battalion, especially H&S Company, to knee-jerk very rapidly.

And so I basically got that correct list and actioned that with Captain ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ at the time and First Sergeant -- I'm sorry, I forgot -- I forget the name.

IO (Col $\frac{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$): No worries.

WIT: But the H&S Company staff to understand what could they actually fill by the type, data, description, deployable status of their personnel. The feedback that they were provided -- that they gave me and what I got from the operations chief was H&S Company alone cannot sustain battalion level operations in

garrison if they if we cut out these key enablers. So the recommendation I got, the feedback I got, was to take a det out of Delta Company, Marines that were not associated with ACV IOT&E and then H&S Company and Alpha Company. So, basically, cut out the assignments for those three separate groups of the NPF, identified an OIC, that was First Lieutenant $\binom{0}{0}\binom{3}{0}\binom{0}{0}}{0}$ out of Delta Company, assigned the names for those Marines with those skill sets and the deployable status, provided that back to 1 Mar Div. They acknowledged and we then received, I think it was the next week, the actual check-in instructions. So my focus during that time was very heavily into Native Fury and trying to close the gap of what we didn't understand. And I would say that I never fully closed that loop.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3). (b)(6). (b)}): So let's -- so I'm going to pull that thread for a second. So you come in as the S-3. Immediately, it sounds like you're being -- your main focus becomes Native Fury very quickly.

WIT: It was.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3).(b)(6).(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Did the conversations about the MEU platoon, with respect to -- so at this point, the MEU platoon is the one going to Native Fury or the one that you've composited up to this point at 3d AA Battalion to be the MEU platoon --

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): -- is going to Native Fury. And then they're going to come back and pretty much immediately turn to, you know, taking vehicles and prepping them for a joint LTI.

How about training? I mean, what was there -- what was the conversations with the battalion and the leadership with respect to ensuring these Marines were adequately trained and when the time -- where was the time to do that?

WIT: We never did it. My perception of that time was we never closed the gap of Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} 's understanding and plan and actual what is their by-checklist status. Based on the feedback he gave me, in a nutshell, was this deployment, Native Fury 20, is perfect. The platoon is formed. They will do their culminating exercise with the infantry battalion that they will deploy with on the MEU, and this will serve as their culminating exercise; they will return, do final checkouts, and CHOP to the MEU.

IO (Col $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$): So, in essence, that's kind of their MCCRE? Not evaluated, I'm guessing, but --

WIT: Yes. Yes, sir.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): -- it would count -- you know, that would count as their MCCRE?

WIT: That was --

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Did you have an understanding of what they would actually do in Native Fury, as to whether there'd be, sort of, a really true comparable, one to one, comparison to what you would require in a MCCRE and what they were doing in Native Fury? Or was it was just sort of, hey, they're going to work with 1/4 over there, so that should constitute good enough.

I'm just kind of curious, sort of.

WIT: So I knew from that meeting in October that I had just by chance covered that there was an amphibious portion, a live fire portion, a mechanized MOUT scenarios that they were trying to align as part of that exercise. So that -- that made sense to me.

What I did not recognize at that time of our turnover was, it was not 1/4 that was assigned to Native Fury; it was 1/1. And I'm going to try to say that -- make sure I said that right. Basically, there was confusion on which battalion out of 1st Marine Regiment was going on that, on Native Fury, and then which was going on 15th MEU. And I -- I can't tell you where the confusion came from because it was in black and white in the 1st Marine Division playbook. So that misunderstanding, not understanding the facts of who was assigned to go do what, we

didn't catch that until that platoon was already at Native Fury.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Was there -- did the Division ever ask you or require you to brief them on any sort of formal planning with respect to forming the AAV platoon? Like, where you would have to go up and talk to the G-3 and, sort of, do some sort of confirmation brief as to what 3d AA Battalion's plan was for forming the 15th MEU platoon?

WIT: Unless that occurred prior to me taking over, no, sir. The traffic that I was getting related to the 15th MEU was coming out of the 1 MarDiv G-3 action officer, Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}. And that traffic was, he would ping me on -- via NIPR: Hey, get -take a look at your SIPR vault. I need a response in how many -however much time. So that looked like he sent me the forming order -- yeah, I'll call it the "forming order" -- for the 15th MEU. I reviewed it, I gave him feedback via SIPR and send that back.

At various points, he asked for a slide of, what is the status of the platoon? So I jumped in to the SIPR vault, answered the slide with not a whole lot of background, but, I mean, to the best of my ability, what is the status of this platoon. And I was very open about what other attachments to that AAV platoon, organic, that we recommended that they consider, and the fact that they were at Native Fury at the time. I provided that and got

very little feedback.

The order that was provided was the base order from the 11th MEU, if my recollection is correct. So we were modifying, orienting off in that last known point to formalize the forming order for the 15th MEU. And I remember being in the SIPR vault at one point when I actually received the order, when same trigger occurred, Hey, by email, NIPR, hey, get in to the SIPR vault, take a look at this traffic.

And I remember, basically, you know, my heart sinking when I read that the actual JLTI and CHOP date had moved almost 30 days. What we were orienting off of in the 1st Marine Division playbook basically had -- got out-cycled.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): So it moved left -- you said left for about 30 days from what you were planning to?

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\;(b)(6),\;(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay. What was the battalion commander's perspective on that? I mean, did --

WIT: I don't remember any, you know, push back, move right, move left. I remember briefing that, per our weekly battle rhythm, but we were -- I would say there was a lot of other concern because that platoon was -- half of the platoon had

18

Enclosure (68) Page 18 of 40

actually deployed to Native Fury. The other half had been basically turned around at the flight line due to COVID-19 impacts. So half the platoon had already gone out and we were still getting feedback from the first sticks that actually arrived from the NPF Enabler Group. I was getting phone calls at all kinds of weird hours from the G-3 staff forward about, Hey do you have CVC helmets? Hey, do you have bore sight kits? Like, all of these items that should have come off the MPF ship, which apparently the MPF didn't want to issue to that platoon.

And so as sticks were going out, we were receiving feedback of shortfalls. And the successive sticks that were following, we were basically loading with pelican cases to actually fly in that equipment shortfalls. And so the final stick actually, you know, got all the way to that flight line and then got turned away. And they had, also, key gear. So the feedback that I got on the back end, I basically commend, you know, first Lieutenant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} and First Lieutenant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}, for what they could put together, they did with the forces and crews that they actually had. But I think the battalion staff as a whole was very much focused on the platoon that was already in the UAE, what is going on with COVID, and then everything else that was also going on concurrently: Charlie Company in

Twenty-nine Palms, and getting out to see them. Delta Company preparing for ACV. And it was -- there wasn't a, you know, a very strong reaction of, okay, this is the new CHOP date; this is when the JLTI's are going to occur. Make it happen.

And there was significant friction at that time, that we didn't identify the gaps in what was the plan and what was actually occurring.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Where would you say the 15th MEU fell out in the priority of -- obviously, op tempo seems to be really high, a lot of things going on in the battalion. Where did the forming of the 15th MEU fall in, in, sort of, the commander's priority list?

WIT: As far as the either written or verbal guidance that he gave us, the MEU was the priority. Or GFM. The MEU and all GFM requirements are the priority. But then restructuring the battalion, waiting until January to move that platoon commander and why were we -- excuse me, sir -- why we were still talking about who's going to lead the platoon, who's the key leadership of that platoon in November timeframe. The guidance was there, but there was no follow through, if that makes.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): No, it does. It does.
WIT: And I'm saying that now, here, you know, in April of

2021. The -- instead of looking back with, you know, rose colored glasses of, hey, we did everything right, I look back and I think there was a lot of things we could have done better. And -- but I understand the information and our reactions at that time were with the information that we had. So it was clear that that was a priority, but there wasn't action driving: Establish that platoon, drive them to -- you know, drive their training plan, ensure these things, this commander's guidance happens. Like, that wasn't being driven.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Do you think the commander believed it was being -- was happening?

WIT: I don't know. He never asked me. I briefed multiple times a week. Mondays and Tuesdays, I briefed the current training and planned training. I provided a weekly roll up of tasking and training activities as far as we could track from the Division: What's the status of that we were receiving and what we were going to provide. And so I -- I thought we were -- I was doing a good job. There wasn't a whole lot of, you know, push, pull. There was concern after we had CHOP -- either right around or right after they had actually CHOP'd over to the 15th MEU on, What is their capability of -- Did they MCCRE? Did they do Amphib? Unconcerned.

And so I took that to heart. And I had already -- I was aware of their short term, kind of, CHOP, post-CHOP PTP plan, from what I was getting from G-3. And so I had already been coordinating with -- I believe it was Major $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$. I can't remember if he was part of the 15th MEU staff or the BLT staff. But my recommendations, I provided them the SVET, you know, policy on what is -- what training is required and whose responsibility is it? Because it wasn't ours, as far as their -- the infantry mechanized -- mech infantry company that the platoon was going to support, and my recommendations as far as the --

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Sir, if I could, real quick, because it comes out of another conversation.

Major $(7)(c)^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$ was the BLT OpsO.

Ballpark, when did you have that conversation with him? Ballpark. Because it sounds like you linked up with him post-CHOP to talk to him about, if I'm reading what you're saying correctly, you linked up with post-CHOP to address some of these training concerns. Just ballpark, if you remember when that was.

WIT: I believe it was March, April timeframe.

IO (Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): Okay. Thank you.

WIT: As far as what were the requirements. And there was two topics: The EOTG mech raids package, and then the -- a

surface warfare, amphibious tactical training package that we were already tracking coming out of San Diego, out of the U.S. Navy. I can't recall if -- which ship it was off the top my head, but we had been seeing that, that a FOS was coming from the Navy through the MEF and Division, but down to us. At the earliest timeframe I think we saw it was 2019, like summer of 2019. So for about a period of six months, we were getting both AMHS -- or we're getting FOS's to do AMW certifications on specific ships, but then providing AAV between sections and platoons to support, basically, a Navy culminating exercise with amphib task force, typically three ships.

So we knew that this, this next SWAT exercise was already on the way. It was in the pipeline. And so I was trying to get a line, the actual MEU PTP training, for that platoon, and preferably whoever else that they could leverage, to -- to actually reply to that FOS instead of it coming to third, you know, all the way down to 3d Tracks, to stop at MEF and get redirected to the MEU for those ships that were participating in the -- that would composite and develop that ARG, to work with the AAV platoon and the LCU det and the LCAC det at the same time.

And I believe that the SWAT was supported. I'm a

little rusty on who actually supported that one. But the -- but the response that I got back from -- from -- I believe it was Major $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$ and Major $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}{(c)}$, I believe, was at EOTG mech raids package. Kind of the response I got, that I first initiated with -- with EOTG, Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) goes, hey, I recommend that the AAV platoon also conduct an amphib movement as part of the mechanized raid package. This is just a great opportunity to actually exercise -- to conduct this maneuver and be evaluated. And he gave me, you know, honest feedback that it wasn't a requirement and it depended on the supported infantry's preference, essentially, if they wanted to capture that training at that time. And I believe the feedback that I got was, hey, we understand that, but we're also still evaluating our own PTP cycle. So right now, we're only going to focus on the land portion of the mechanized raid package, and that we will do that portion at a later event.

So back to the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Brenize's concern about the training readiness of that, of the 15th MEU platoon, I grabbed the previous platoon sergeant and platoon commander, First Lieutenant -- or Captain, I think at the time, ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}, who was serving as the battalion MMO prior to executing orders in 2020. I don't remember when he departed, and

Gunnery Sergeant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}, from that previous MEU. And I also invited my Peruvian exchange officer that was assigned to me. And the four of us, you know, I coordinated with Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} about that EOTG raids package. And, you know, what was his range regulations and what was his thought on us providing either observation and/or observation and feedback to the platoon and to the -- to the exercise, and he welcomed the op -- the offer. He identified that there was not an 1833 or 1803 assigned to his EOTG staff, and so he welcomed the opportunity for us to provide some insight on the AAV mechanize side.

So we did that. And during both major iterations, we were there for the operations briefs and the actual execution of the packages. And then the after actions, we gave our feedback to the platoon commander, platoon sergeant, and section leaders, both, kind of, on the side. And then we participated in the overall after action, the hot wash, with the EOTG raid staff. And the feedback I got from the EOTG was, you know, we appreciate your insight, you know, value added, look forward to having you out there. So that was something I passed on, that relationship both with EOTG raids and the -- not ACU -- the

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): BLT?

WIT: No. The Chief Warrant Officer (b)(3). (b)(6). (b)(7)(c) [ph].

Basically, a headquarters group that coordinated the beach masters for all AMW certs, and that was a great point of contact to understand the SWAT schedule that was coming up. Those were two point of contacts that I, kind of, developed and that I passed on to Major ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(0)}_{(b)(7)(c)}$. I'm trying to improve the -- what we under -- we thought was shortfalls in the training package for the MEU. And I basically captured our observation of the EOTG mech raids back to back to Colonel Brenize.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3)}, ^{(b)(6), (b)}): So when the platoon came back from Native Fury with the intent being, hey, these guys are going to conduct exercises there that's comparable to what we require at a MCCRE. Did -- did -- was there any sort of reconciliation of that on the tail end when they got back? Like, did they indeed do the things they -- obviously, it was only half a platoon, so it wasn't the whole platoon. But some sort of reconciliation to determine if that -- if that platoon had done -- what they did was adequate enough to qualify as -- as their MCCRE?

WIT: Basically, the feedback that I received from both Lieutenant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} and Lieutenant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),} was, we got to do mechanize operations, but we did not get to splash; we did not get to fire. So that training package was -- was not what we were -- not what I anticipated, which was -- I anticipated,

basically, better than an ITX, better than an SLTE because it would -- it would have been the same, you know, desert, mechanized, live fire and MOUT scenario, plus amphib. So when they got back, the -- half the platoon had stayed back in CONUS and my understanding was that they were preparing their equipment set for the CHOP, and then the platoon commander and the portion of the platoon and the additional 3d Tracks personnel that were doing the offload that actually did deploy were then stuck on a two week ROM. And -- and so our -- we didn't get a very good -looking back, we did not get a good baseline understanding of what actually occurred until almost two weeks later.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Did the battalion commander inquire about this?

WIT: He was definitely interested in the factual serials of flights returning.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3)}, ^{(b)(6), (b)}): As far as whether or not, you know, the -- that the training they did in Native Fury, it did indeed, sort of -- I guess what I'm interested in is, before the CHOP date, right, you had -- it sounds like you had a plan, and maybe not -a non-standard plan; you're going to leverage the op tempo and the activities that you're mandated to do to sort of help you meet your PTP requirements in your MCCRE requirements. But at

any point in time before the CHOP date, did the battalion commander, sort of, mandate a reconciliation and review of that platoon's preparedness for CHOP?

WIT: Unfortunately, I -- I don't recall a D minus 180, D minus 60, D minus 30. I do not recall ever actually executing a reconcile -- I think that was partially due to the nature of the battalion and how we did those, was, Hey, this is an opportunity for you, the deploying, you know, senior leadership of whatever platoon, section, company, whatever, to sit down with my staff and your company or whoever's higher staff, and we all have a no shit reconcile of your status and the support that you need, and that we have an honest broker conversation about your readiness to deploy.

I think -- my recollection of that, mid to -mid-February to the first, second week of April, it just never happened. The follow through never happened.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Well, and that's -- I want to make a statement -- and this is not being indicting, not necessarily a full indictment of the battalion commander. But I'm just gonna give you what my perception is of things. And you can tell me whether I'm on the mark or I'm not on the mark.

You talked about the 15th MEU being a priority for the

battalion commander in words, but from what I'm hearing from you, and to some degree what I'm hearing from others, is that the actions didn't necessarily support the verbal declaration. And so my interest here is determining whether or not, yes, verbally the 15th MEU is a priority, but in the follow-on actions after that declaration of "the 15th MEU is a priority" did the actions support that verbal declaration?

WIT: Not when I was the -- not from my observation. There may have been -- and this is something I keep racking my brain about, is -- did those meetings D minus 180, minus 60, 30, that was our normal battle rhythm, did those occur in 2019? I know that the battalion -- Charlie Company, H&S Company and the battalion staff -- had gone out to Steel Knight and supported those exercises, at which point -- and the design of the H&S Company and battalion going forward to Twentynine Palms was to be MCCRE'd by the Division. And so, unfortunately, I can't answer that question.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Well, but I'd say D minus 90, even if it's in April, you know, a D minus 90 review would have occurred in your --

WIT: It should've, yes.

IO (Col $\frac{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$): And so -- and that's just kind of -- I'm

just kind of curious, you know, to that point, you know, which is, to what degree did the battalion -- the environmental -- the battalion environmental, sort of, leadership, command and control of the battalion, sort of mandate adherence to -- do you -- I mean, is there a PTP policy that's generated by the battalion that says, This is how we form for MEUs, or is it just -- it's just inherent knowledge and, sort of -- which is just, This is just kind of the way we do it.

WIT: So --

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): I know there's a policy on MCCRES. I've seen the policy letter on, They will do MCCRES. But I'm just kind of curious if the battalion has a policy or a standing plan for, This is how we expect to prepare platoons for MEUS.

WIT: There was definitely a battalion operational SOP. It hadn't been really executed in my time at 3d Tracks until approximately Steel Knight in December of 2019, at least from my observation. There was a UDP policy, which talked -- or -- and if it wasn't talked in the UDP SOP, then it was basically distributed as a 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion operations office SOP or policy letter stating, you know, These are the formats and this is our operations tempo, you know, from the operations officer to the battalion -- or the company commanders and ops chiefs of, Hey, this is the, kind o, the tempo of us syncing, you briefing, and

our kind of reconcile every week. And that battle rhythm was there.

But besides the UDP actual deployments, I think that there was, honestly, an atrophy, if you will, of how this battalion, you know, actually prepares that MEU platoon because of how long that gap was between the 11th MEU and the 15th MEU. That's the only thing I can -- my perspective on it.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): That's fair. I only have two quick questions. And, you know, you can give me, you know -- the first question is: My understanding of the reorganization in part was to align the MEU platoons to H&S company for stability in terms of preparing MEU platoons for their ultimate CHOP date. Did the company commander ever raise any issues to you directly? What kind of ownership did the H&S company commander take then, at that point, for the MEU platoon preparation?

WIT: Captain ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}, I recall, I think it was end of February or -- call it mid-February. I can't recall the actual date that we received the actual MEU composite order. But as soon as I got it, I remember my, you know, my heart hitting the floor when it said April instead of May. I can't recall if it was the same day, but I remember grabbing him and we both went up

to the SIPR vault -- because he didn't have a SIPR account or maybe his token had been deactivated, I can't remember. But we went through the composite order. I made sure he understood it. I'm pretty sure he asked me to print off copies. So even if I wasn't there and couldn't log in, that we -- that a printed copy, because of the classification, could be -- and I did. I worked -- I made sure that the S-2 officer had a cover that -- basically, printed it, make sure it was logged, and just, you know, displayed correctly, and stored it, that he understood that he had the original copy of what the MEU composite order stated. We had had conversations -- and this was also a learning exercise -- January/February timeframe of which vehicles were going to go, which vehicles were going to actually CHOP over to the MEU and be that MEU platoon?

I think that was -- my recollection of that timeframe was, because of our understanding -- not full understanding of the 11th MEU vehicles returning back to the battalion and then the ACV and how that plus the status of the vehicles and the AAV modification schedule and RCCA schedule were aligning, that there was a lot of -- I specifically remember having at least a few battalion staff meetings on which vehicles are deployable and what are the risks. And it was in that early January, February

timeframe where we were still figuring out a no-shit plan of which vehicles are deployable for this MEU.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Any conversations about, Hey, the best vehicles are in Charlie Company. The best vehicles are in Alpha Company. So let's take their vehicles and backfill them with vehicles that that may not be, you know, the best, but they're not deploying, so they can assume that risk.

Was there any of those conversations?
WIT: I don't recall us having -- exploring those options.
IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Okay.

WIT: We came from the perspective of RCCA vehicles, either in or coming to, vehicles coming in and out of all of the companies in the battalion, including Delta Company. We started with H&S company first because of the quantity of vehicles in H&S Company. The MEU platoon, the 11th MEU platoon, the 15th MEU, the GS, MCM, the quantity of vehicles in H&S company alone, were evaluated on which ones are RCCA, which ones need modifications, and which ones can deploy. And our -- in a snapshot, we identified that there was sufficient vehicles in H&S Company. Maybe not all in the MEU platoon at that time, but it was more efficient to swap vehicles inside one --

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): -- company.

WIT: -- inside one company, then start pulling from other companies, increasing the risks there.

And our understanding of -- our thought process at the time was the legacy, if you will, the non-modified AAV's at that snapshot in time, and the vehicles that were not slated to get additional modifications were already deployable, deployed, and they were the -- were at less risk then any delays that may happen with modifications or exotic items may be harder to logistically replace while deployed.

And I remember those conversations, which included Captain $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$, and I under -- my recollection at that time was they were -- they understood and they were going to move out.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): So last question for you real quick, and then I'll turn it over to Mike for a few minutes.

What was the relationship between the company commanders in the battalion commander? I mean, was it -- was it sort of direct line? Did was it, sort of, Hey, I filter my directives through the staff, and the relationship is the company commander to the staff and then to the battalion commander? Did he have sort of a direct relationship with his commanders?

WIT: He had a direct relationship with commanders that -that his door was always open. And we typically -- if my

recollection -- I can't remember which day of the week, but at least once a week, there was a scheduled opportunity for all the company commanders and the battalion commander to sit down and talk. And I remember, you know, being a Charlie Company commander with Captain ^{(b)(3, (b)(6)}, and Captain ^{(b)(3, (b)(6), (b)})</sup> and Captain ^{(b)(3, (b)(6),}</sup>, you know, sitting in those meetings. Me personally, I didn't get a whole lot out of it, besides, you know: Fix this. Fix your SL-3. Fix your post-ops. This is why we're going left, right, center. And then, hey, we've got to tighten up this, tighten up that. And he -- he opened feedback for -- for us.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Did you have a -- did you -- when you were a company commander, did you feel like, I can walk in his office any time and lay out concerns and risks and issues? Or was that, sort of, preferred to go through the staff?

WIT: It was preferred to go through the staff.

IO $(Col_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)})$: Okay.

WIT: And I think it may have varied person to person. But I definitely leveraged the XO before I ever, you know -- on very few occasions did I get a VHF direct to the battalion commander.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay.

WIT: And I think that -- and this may be personality driven, but I think that was the same approach by most of the

other company commanders. If not the XO, then the other staff. IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay. ${}^{(b)(3), (b)}_{(6), (b)(7)}$. IO (Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): Thank you, sir.

Major ${}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}$, I've just got a couple of quick questions.

BLT composition: Did you -- not counting Marine Corps orders and stuff like that -- did you ever during your tenure as an OpsO receive any verbal or policy guidance either from your battalion leadership or from division regarding "you need to be X, Y, Z training, manned, equipped, in preparation for the MEU"? WIT: No.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Was there any kind of mandated brief or touchpoint with division, to your knowledge, that you can recollect, along that line, or any info that you pushed to them in preparation for that?

WIT: The only traffic, the only communications that we had about it was -- for the 15th MEU, even before Native Fury actually deployed -- was via Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, via SIPR traffic.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): And who is that? What billet is he? WIT: He -- he was in the G-3 staff.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)): Okay.

WIT: I'm not sure --

IO $(Maj_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)})$: He was in the G-3?

WIT: Yes.

IO $(Maj_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)})$: Check.

WIT: I remember requesting point of contact information from Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} [ph], who was the acting G-3 current ops when Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)} and some of the other staff had, kind of, deployed to Native Fury 20 as the -- as the, kind of, leadership there. And -- and I was -- I got, you know, points of contact for the MEU from -- from Division, because I wasn't sure where to start. And I wanted to make sure that I started before it went VHF direct. But there was -- I do not recall ever --

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}$): There was no mandated, At that this, you will brief --

WIT: D minus 180, 60, 30. I -- it never happened.

IO $(Maj_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)})$: Okay. Check.

And then just a couple more, sir. With regard to the BLT, again, did you get any kind of verbal guidance or policy guidance saying, Hey, reach out to them, staff to staff, or did they reach out to you, staff to staff, in order to link up that attachment with the BLT? Or was that, to the best of your knowledge, recollection, you know, was that, just Handled at the small unit leader, company to company, platoon

to battalion?

How did that -- how did that play out? Because I don't -- you did mention you talked to Major $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$ about some training stuff. But was that -- was that captured anywhere else?

It depended on the section. I recall our S-4 at the WIT: time, First Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) -- yeah, I think it was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) (c) -- that was coordinating, if not with the MEU MMO, then with the MEU 4 to coordinate the JLTI setups. But it was -- it depended on the section. It wasn't, you know, hey, kneecap to kneecap, three to three, four to four, six to six. And, you know, commander to, you know, support -- supporting to supported. There wasn't -- I -- that never happened. And I think that caused -- Native Fury and the lack of that, kind of, true detailed walk through, I think that's what led to a lot of the gaps in both understanding of when you're -- when you actually anticipate this platoon to CHOP over and -- and what was -- what was the true expectations? Because even at the NOTM section, which we had -- I had specifically put in some of the e-mail traffic to Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , like, Hey, recommend you look at this because it's not in the draft order -- they were still figuring that out from bottom-up from the AAV -- the 15th MEU, AAV

platoon, platoon commander, Lieutenant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} and Gunny ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}, were still, you know, kind of coaching that through the mech company to the BLT staff to the -- to the MEU staff, even to one or two months later, that we never actually got a follow-up of, Yes, we want NOTM capability. Okay, well, what does that mean? Do you want the whole section or do you want a vehicle? It was -- there was not very good communication on what capabilities that they expected as a MEU that they wanted to take. Like, I'm not a mind reader. Like, we can recommend all damn day, but at the end -- but they weren't -- we never had very effective communication. Okay.

IO $(Col {}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)})$: All right. Major ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(b)(7)(c)}$, I'll just ask you one last time, is there anything else you want to add before we conclude the interview?

WIT: No, sir.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Okay. I've got to read you one statement and then we're complete here.

You are directed not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone other than the members of the investigation team. If you're asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify me or your commanding officer.

WIT: I understand, sir.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Outstanding. Thank you. This concludes the interview.

[The investigative interview closed at 1412, 16 April 2021.]

I, Colonel ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$, attest that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of Major ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7), (c)}_{(7)(c)}$ held on 16 April 2021.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Col, USMC

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	1540362150623-20	,	CAMPEN F. CAMPEN 87		GROUND T 9 MOS	N/A	######## ######## 3D AABN				FALSE		3,6B,8,13,11833	MNPR
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	1548106170686-20	3 DIVISION S DS-007	DIVISION B CAMPEN 80		ARMORY C 12 MOS		######## ######## 3D AABN	########	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	*****	FALSE	SOURCED	1833	MNPR
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FREEDOM BANNER 21 FB028 (B)(C) PENDING E4-E5		2 FREEDOM FB028	FREEDOM GUAM/TIN 28	41 E4-E5	GROUND R < 3 MOS	,	######## ######## 3D AABN	6/1/2021 6	/1/2021 #########	5/3/2021	FALSE	TASKED	2841	OPS
FREEDOM BANNER 21 FB036 (6), PENDING E4-E5		2 FREEDOM FB036	FREEDOM GUAM/TIN 18	33 E4-E5	AAV CREW < 3 MOS		######## ######## 3D AABN	6/1/2021 6	/1/2021 #########	5/3/2021	FALSE	TASKED	1833	OPS
FREEDOM BANNER 21 FB037 (b) PENDING E1-E3		2 FREEDOM FB037	FREEDOM GUAM/TIN18	33 E1-E3	AAV CREW < 3 MOS		######## ######## 3D AABN	6/1/2021 6	/1/2021 #########	5/3/2021	FALSE	TASKED	1833	OPS
FREEDOM BANNER 21 FB038 (7) PENDING E1-E3		2 FREEDOM FB038	FREEDOM GUAM/TIN 18	33 E1-E3	AAV CREW < 3 MOS		######## ######## 3D AABN	6/1/2021 6	/1/2021 #########	5/3/2021	FALSE	TASKED	1833	OPS
FREEDOM BANNER 21 FB039 (c) PENDING E1-E3		2 FREEDOM FB039	FREEDOM GUAM/TIN18	33 E1-E3	AAV CREW < 3 MOS		######## ######## 3D AABN	6/1/2021 6	/1/2021 ########	5/3/2021	FALSE	TASKED	1833	OPS
FREEDOM BANNER 21 FB040 (C) PENDING E1-E3		2 FREEDOM FB040	FREEDOM GUAM/TIN 18	33 E1-E3	AAV CREW < 3 MOS		######## ######## 3D AABN	6/1/2021 6	/1/2021 #########	5/3/2021	FALSE	TASKED	1833	OPS
FREEDOM BANNER 21 FB041 PENDING E1-E3		2 FREEDOM FB041	FREEDOM GUAM/TIN21	41 E1-E3	AAV MECH < 3 MOS		######## ######## 3D AABN	6/1/2021 6	/1/2021 ########	5/3/2021	FALSE	TASKED	2141	OPS
FREEDOM BANNER 21 FB042 PENDING E4-E5		2 FREEDOM FB042	FREEDOM GUAM/TIN21	41 E4-E5	AAV MECH < 3 MOS		######## ######## 3D AABN	6/1/2021 6	/1/2021 ########	5/3/2021	FALSE	TASKED	2141	OPS
FREEDOM BANNER 21 FB043 PENDING E4-E5		2 FREEDOM FB043	FREEDOM GUAM/TIN21	41 E4-E5	AAV MECH < 3 MOS		######## ######## 3D AABN	6/1/2021 6	/1/2021 ########	5/3/2021	FALSE	TASKED	2141	OPS
FREEDOM BANNER 21 FB044 PENDING E4-E5		2 FREEDOM FB044	FREEDOM GUAM/TIN 28	41 E4-E5	GROUND R < 3 MOS		######## ######## 3D AABN	6/1/2021 6	/1/2021 ########	5/3/2021	FALSE	TASKED	2841	OPS
FREEDOM BANNER 21 FB058 PENDING E1-E3		2 FREEDOM FB058	FREEDOM GUAM/TIN28	41 E1-E3	GROUND R < 3 MOS		######## ######## 3D AABN	6/1/2021 6	/1/2021 ########	5/3/2021	FALSE	TASKED	2841	OPS
FREEDOM BANNER 21 FB081 PENDING E4-E5		2 FREEDOM FB081	FREEDOM GUAM/TIN18	33 E4-E5	AAV CREW < 3 MOS		######## ######## 3D AABN	6/1/2021 6	/1/2021 ########	5/3/2021	FALSE	TASKED	1833	OPS
FREEDOM BANNER 21 FB082 PENDING E4-E5		2 FREEDOM FB082	FREEDOM GUAM/TIN18	33 E4-E5	AAV CREW < 3 MOS		######## ######## 3D AABN	6/1/2021 6	/1/2021 ########	5/3/2021	FALSE	TASKED	1833	OPS
FREEDOM BANNER 21 FB083 PENDING E4-E5		2 FREEDOM FB083	FREEDOM GUAM/TIN18	33 E4-E5	AAV CREW < 3 MOS		######## ######## 3D AABN	6/1/2021 6	/1/2021 ########	5/3/2021	FALSE	TASKED	1833	OPS
III MEF MRD-D 21.2 DEPLOYMI(b)(3), (b)(6), (b) O2	1517365300750-20	1 III MEF MR CE037B	III MEF MR TBD 80	07 04	ASST OPSC 12 MOS	N/A	######## ######## 3D AABN	1/5/2021 ##	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	*****	FALSE	TASKING N SOURCED	1803	OPS
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KOA MOANA 21 KM135D (b)(3), (b)(6), (b) LE4	1527672390154-21	2 KOA MOANKM135D	KOA MOANA 21 35	31 E2-E5	MOTOR TRANSPORT	CSECRET	######## ######## 3D AABN	#######################################	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	3/1/2021 3/1/2021	FALSE	SOURCED	3531	OPS
KOA MOANA 21 KM136D (D) E4 :	1546655580154-21	2 KOA MOANKM136D	KOA MOANA 21 35	31 E2-E5	MOTOR TRANSPORT	CSECRET	######## ######## 3D AABN	#######################################	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	3/1/2021 3/1/2021	FALSE	SOURCED	3531	OPS
	1463937150102-21	2 KOA MOANKM147B	KOA MOANA 21 06	29 E7	RADIO CHIEF	SECRET	######## ######## 3D AABN	3/8/2021 3	/8/2021 ########	3/1/2021 3/1/2021	FALSE	NOMINEE : SOURCED	0621	OPS
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(b)(b)), (b)(b)(b) (7) (c) [The Investigative Interview commenced on 1422, 16 April 2021.] [WIT: (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)})

[IO: Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}]

[IO: MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}]

[CR: SSgt (b)(3), (b)(6),]

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)): Good afternoon. My name is Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) . Alongside me is Master Gunnery Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , and we are part of a team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU and actions and decisions associated with the material conditioning, training, and personnel readiness thereof.

This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020. We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April 2021, to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with

information relevant to the investigation. One of those two pieces in front of you is going to be the convening order. We can provide copies to you after this, if you'd like.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed me to the investigating team as well as Master Gunnery Sergeant ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}_{(c)}$ on 8 April 2021, and I'm talking to you in my investigatory capacity as a representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We are required to provide General Thomas with a written report upon the completion of our investigation. There's the other letter where Master Gunnery Sergeant ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}_{(c)}$ and I are designated as part of the team.

I'm talking with you because the investigating team believes you might have information that may be relevant to the investigation. It is important for us to understand the decision making process involved in the forming, composition, training, and material equipping readiness of the assault amphibious vehicle platoon identified for the 15th MEU. So please inform us of anything you believe should be considered in this review.

The topics that we will cover with you today may include, but not be limited to, formation and composition of the AAV platoon for the 15th MEU, training and material readiness surrounding the formation and composition of the AAV platoon for

the 15th MEU, 3rd Assault Amphibious Battalion, 1st Marine Division, and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force oversight of the 15th MEU as well.

This is an administrative investigation; however, due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing review, we are asking personnel we talk to as part of the investigation not to share anything we discuss today with any other person.

Before we start, do you have any questions about our roles for this investigation?

WIT: No, I don't.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)): Please state your rank, full name, and your current billet.

WIT: My name is Master Gunnery Sergeant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} (^{b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}. My current billet right now is the battalion operations chief.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Thank you. What was your billet on 30 July 2020?

WIT: I was the battalion operations chief at the time.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): And so, when did you assume that billet?

WIT: I assumed that back, with a turnover with Master Gunnery Sergeant ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}$, back late April 26th, that timeframe. And I wasn't actually in the seat until May.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): So May 2020, you assumed battalion operations chief. Before that, what was your billet at 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion?

WIT: I was the battalion's logistics chief.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}$): The battalion logistics chief. And when did you assume that billet?

WIT: I checked in to the battalion July 14th, 2019. And at that point, I was told I was going to be the battalion logistics chief. At that point, around the August 1st, after my PTAD coming back from Okinawa and moving into my house, I assumed into the chair.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): So July 2019?
WIT: August 1st.
IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): August 1st. Got it.

WIT: I checked in 14 July.

IO (Maj $_{\rm (c)}^{\rm (b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}$): August 2019 to May 2020, logistics chief, 3rd Assault Amphibious Battalion.

Please, briefly, if you can, describe your duties and responsibilities as the logistics chief.

WIT: My duties and responsibilities are, basically, to ensure the company's logistics. Oversaw within the shop. We are handled under CLCS-2 as training perspective, oversight and the

function areas of all supplies, making sure BAS is running appropriately, making sure the H&S Company is -- all the maintenance and things of that nature -- battalion maintenance and make sure those function areas in the H&S as for maintaining and support to the companies were running smooth. At the point of internal to the staff, make sure that the 4 shop is synced with the 3 and make sure logistics and the operations sections were synced in a combined effort to make sure logistics were supported.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Thank you. So just a couple quick questions here. So between August 2019 to May 2020, please, confirm, the battalion commander was Lieutenant Colonel Brenize.

WIT: Right.

IO (Maj Skalicky): Executive officer was Major Hohl.

WIT: Correct.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): The battalion operations officer, do you remember who that was?

WIT: The battalion operations officer at the time, I believe it was Major $\binom{(b)(3)}{(7)(c)}$ at one point. Major $\binom{(b)(3)}{(c)}$ $\binom{(b)(3)}{(c)}$ had come in. There was a lot of turmoil -- or turnover, shall we say, internal to the 3 shop, itself. Captain $\binom{(b)(3)}{(c)}$ ended up coming in and replaced Major $\binom{(b)(3)}{(b)(6)}$ $\binom{(b)(7)(c)}{(c)}$ at one point.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Do you remember, ballpark, what time? WIT: The February, January -- February timeframe.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): January 2020. Got it. And then, for logistics officers, just briefly, from that summer untill May, whodo you remember working with?

WIT: Major ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ was there. He arrived in as the 4 officer back in June, I believe, right before I checked in, in July. And then, he was in place until probably around the January, February timeframe, where it changed over. There was an interim where, lieutenant at the time, Captain ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ was interm, and then Major ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ had checked in. And then, he was IA'd as well for probably about a good three-month, two-month period. And theń, that's where Captain ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ took over at the time along with Lieutenant ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ coming into the 4 shop as the alpha. And then, Captain ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ left, right around the May, June timeframe, and Lieutenant ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ was now the 4.

IO (Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): So I'm tracking Major ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ had from summer 2019 all the way to about January 2020. Major ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$, an assault amphibian officer. Captain ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$ takes over. Captain ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ is a --

WIT: He is --

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Amtrak officer to your knowledge or is

he a logistician?

WIT: I think he's a logistician.

IO (MGySgt $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): 04.

IO (Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): 0402. Okay. Then, Major ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$, another assault amphibian officer takes over the shop. He gets IA'd after a couple of months, and then ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ steps back in and takes over?

WIT: Correct.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): You mentioned battalion maintenance, probably swing back to them at some point, but they, competency wise, fall underneath the 4 shop.

WIT: Yes. Oversight from the 4 shop.

IO $(Maj_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)})$: Copy. Maintenance officer and maintenance chief during that time period are Chief Warrant Officer $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$ and Master Gunnery Sergeant $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$.

WIT: Correct.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Okay. During this time period when you were the logistics chief, just run us quickly through what were some of the major challenges at the unit level or institutionally that you were dealing with? You know, what was it -- walk us through what the operational tempo was like, and obviously, what was COVID like. I'm sure COVID played a part as well.

WIT: Right. 2020 took a -- put a big damper on a lot of operations and things of that nature. From 2019 through the rest of the year, when I was there, getting a 4 shop perspective in order, which it wasn't all there. So that was my priority was to get the 4 shop in sync, because there was no synchronization between 3 and 4.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}$): Okay. Could you expound on that a little bit?

WIT: Yeah. So as far as operations, you know, what is an operation logistics sync, making sure operations were supported. So I felt there was no synchronization. UMCC as far as getting things under that.

IO (Maj $_{\rm (c)}^{\rm (b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}$): For the purposes of the investigation, UMCC is?

WIT: UMCC is coordinating getting TTs, getting bus support, tracking on motor-T assets, and things of that nature, unit management coordination.

So at that point, I feel, it was my perspective, to get a 4 shop in sync with the 3 shop at the time. So and I didn't think that was there.

And in that timeframe, I think in coordination to see oversight with and engaging with battalion maintenance to see

where they were at and getting with master gunny $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}_{(c)}$ was my lead in for the maintenance side

IO $(Maj_{(c)}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)})$: Okay. Were you -- was the battalion doing -- obviously, there was a lot going on, deployment wise, was the battalion exercises heavy, what was the op tempo like?

WIT: Yeah. Op tempo for '19, you had 11th MEU coming back, you had a UDP that was PTP. So there was a lot of in and out training going on. So just to keep up with that in a force perspective, in my eyes, was, Hey, the priority is, Hey, we have to meet that concept, the logistics, for the companies to make sure they're supported.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Okay. Kind of tying now into and --COVID, if you could, just a quick recap on how COVID hit you. Did it hit you? Did you run an alpha/bravo team? Was there a port and starboard?

WIT: Once we hit COVID and everything was a remain in a ROM, you know. So we took it -- I was able to look at it, perspective is what is ROM, so a cleansing, making sure sanitization, everybody was in place, you know. And then, we went to an alpha/bravo team.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)): Do those responsibilities fall underneath the 4. I assume they did since you were supervising

the BAS and whatnot.

WIT: Correct.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)): Okay.

WIT: I coordinated a team out of the H&S Company to have a sanitization crew every week.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)): Okay.

WIT: Making sure things were across the board; making sure chows, because Marines were in ROM at the time; making sure chows are done.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): So COVID hits around -- was it January 2020, it starts to kick off when, ballpark, when do you remember?

WIT: March 2020.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): March 2020. Okay, so that kind of eats you -- I am not trying to put words in your mouth, kind of a read back. Does that eat up a lot of your time then, dealing with what you just described?

WIT: A lot of internal things of the 4 shop, yes.

Trying to synchronize things to make sure things -- I got pieces of pie doing those things to support.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}}$): Okay. Talk to me about the internal competencies of the 4 and unity of effort thereof, or lack, when

10

Enclosure (70) Page 10 of 33

you showed up on deck.

WIT: So synchronization, there was no board of tracking on logistics requests. So I quickly had to implement an understanding of what operations were going on, so I can best support the companies in the training perspective. I don't think the field mess was integrated in that piece, into the support pipeline as appropriately.

IO (Maj ${}_{(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}$): What was your interaction with maintenance?

WIT: Maintenance? So I was integrated with them as far as understanding how things were going at the battalion maintenance level, how did we support H&S Company? There was also Steel Knight going on at the same time, and on how we implement into a BSA. So I was trying to understand how it all fit with them together, as far as where we were.

IO (Maj Skalicky): Steel Knight is battalion exercise in support of division?

WIT: Correct. So I think, understanding where we were, I didn't know a baseline of where we were. So I had to look at that, as far as logistically, in the context of a like a RAOC perspective, a rear area operation center, of what we were gonna do, because that is a logistics heavy.

So understanding, I was trying to still fit and put pieces of the pie for the 4 shop together, understanding what battalion maintenance was doing and what a -- We did have an ADL program.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): An administrative deadline program? WIT: Correct.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}$): Okay. And under whose purview did that fall?

WIT: So that was under the battalion maintenance with chief Warrant Officer Shiki. And at that point, he was retiring, getting out of the Marine Corps.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): At what point is this, ballpark?

WIT: This is around the August -- it's late August timeframe, 2019.

IO (Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): So Chief Warrant Officer ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$ is taking over August 2019, ballpark.

WIT: So Chief Warrant Officer $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$ was not in charge of that. It was changed over to myself.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): The ADL lot?
WIT: Correct.
IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Copy.
WIT: I was the appointed the RO for the ADL.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Is there a policy -- a battalion policy or a division policy as far as how that ADL is run - what vehicles are authorized to get in, get out?

WIT: There is a LOI and an order about the admin administrative deadline report -- program. I am sorry. So that discusses 18 months or less is the longevity of what an ADL is supposed to be.

There is a LOI that was signed and put out there previously from me, getting -- assuming the RO roles for the ADL.

IO $(Maj {(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) \atop -})$: Who has ultimate authority on whether vehicles get in and out of there? Obviously, you're in the chain, but is that a battalion commander call?

WIT: That is a battalion commander call and vetted through battalion maintenance.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Vetted through battalion maintenance.
WIT: Yes.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Talk to me, if you can, about the command environment of the battalion interaction between staff sections, interactions between staff sections and the command deck, interactions between staff sections and the companies, companies and the command deck. Talk me about the command environment, if you can, unity of effort, that kind of stuff.

WIT: When I got there, it was very -- not very, very good. Understanding what the staff was doing, I don't know what the staff was doing at that point. You had interaction with Master Gunny ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}$. Obviously, I was always given a 4 shop perspective, where he had taken it over from -- to a 3 shop -- he went to a 3 shop perspective under Master Gunny ${}^{(b)(3),(b)}_{(c)}_{(c)}$. So ${}^{(b)(3),(b)}_{(6),(7)(c)}$ handed it off to him, and I've got a very little turnover with the S-4 shop.

So I just came in there. I was like, Okay, I'm just going to make my own assessment, and it wasn't very good.

The command climate at that point, I think, between the staff and understanding what transpired in the battalion was some senior high level stuff around the 3 shop perspective was not very good. I feel that the battalion.

IO (Maj $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}{(c)}$): Would you expand on that?

WIT: The 3 shop lost some officers due to the fact of misconduct.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Okay. So I remember there is a major that we used to be the operations officer who was --

WIT: Correct. IO (Maj ^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}): He had some misconduct and --WIT: He did.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Okay.

WIT: So I feel there was some loss of confidence within some of the staff shops and from the battalion.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}$): Okay. So the battalion commander has lost some of his trust in some of the staff sections because of that incident.

WIT: Yes.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Okay. And that incident occurred early 2019 -- before you arrived?

WIT: Yeah. Before I arrived.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): It occurred before you arrived.

WIT: Making my assessments based off of things have that had transpired previously.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Okay.

WIT: You know, I was always open with the battalion commander. I felt the command climate was not all what a staff should be. The company level -- the company levels, I think, the relationship between what the battalion commander and the company commanders was always just a direct to. There was no feed into the staff shops.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): So what does that translate to? That just translates into a company commander could go to the battalion commander, say what he or she wanted, and then they

would get it, and then you would find out about it post-fact?

WIT: Yes. And it was usually, I would say, I would bring him a COA or bring him a perspective on a certain thing, and then -- for an example, we would bring him a course of action, and then a company commander would come up and totally change that course of action on what his staff would say. And then, he'd he end up going with that company commander. In my eyes and my perspective.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Was this -- to your knowledge or recollection, was this ever brought up to either the command deck or to the battalion commander, himself, or to the sergeant major?

WIT: Yeah. So the sergeant major that was there when he was there, I don't think he was fully engaged. He was retiring. He had medical problems and he was very, very limited around.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): So to your knowledge, was this brought up directly with battalion commander or the battalion XO?

WIT: We've had discussion, I think, about that.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Who is we?

WIT: So I think the staff when I first got on deck, Master Gunny ^{(b)(3),(b)(6),}, I mean, we've had an understanding. I told him when I checked in, Hey, sir, you know, where do you want me? He wanted me as the logistics chief. I felt I was the most, shall

we say - suited to be the ops chief, I think I was most qualified. I am in 0577, operations tactics instructor chief, through the formal course, and I felt I was taking it over as the 3 shop perspective. When I learned that I was taking the logistics chief, it was, okay, but I asked.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): What do you got before -- take a second as I digest that.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Do you remember -- changing course here, ITX 1-20, which was in January of 2020. Do you remember which platoon supported that off top your head?

WIT: No idea. I can't remember.

IO (MGySgt ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): It was a shot in the dark. When did the 15th MEU platoon stabilize? When did you form and stabilize that platoon prior to chop?

IO (Maj $_{(G)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): To your knowledge.

WIT: I can't even answer that because I wasn't in a place to say if they were stabilized or not.

IO (MGySgt ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): Did you and Master Guns ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}_{(b)(7)(c)}$ work together on the recommendations on who would be the section leaders and the platoon sergeant for that platoon?

WIT: We gave our decision -- not decision, but we gave recommendations to the battalion commander, which we had at the

time of what qualified guys that we did have.

IO (MGySgt ${}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}_{(c)}$): Was that who was chosen for the platoon?

WIT: That decision, yes, that the battalion commander went with.

IO (MGySgt ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): The battalion commander went with you and Master Gunny ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), \cdot}_{(b)(7)(c)}$'s recommendation?

WIT: Yes.

IO (MGySgt ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): Okay. Are you aware of a formal training plan for that platoon prior to chop?

WIT: No, I'm not.

IO (MGySgt $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): From your perspective and understanding in the S-4, what were the impact of RCCA and the mods being applied to those RCCA vehicles, and how did that impact the equipment management within the battalion?

WIT: Yes. So there was a plan devised which was reorganizing the battalion to get companies full with their platoons back to a three-line platoon. We were only deploying two platoons at a time.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}$): Before we go down, just quick question to back it up. So the reorg plan, where did -- what drove the creation of this reorg plan before you walk us through it?

WIT: So the reorg plan was driven from a perspective of the amount of mods that needed to go on vehicles and RCCA -- on specific RCCA vehicles is what the battalion commander wanted to go on.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Okay. Was there any operational need or priority that was communicated to you that you can remember that also contributed to that re-organization plan, or to the best of your knowledge, was it only driven because of the RCCA modification line?

WIT: Yeah.

IO (MGySgt $_{(c)}^{_{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}}$): For the record, RCCA being the return to condition code alpha, deeper level maintenance program.

WIT: Okay. So RCCA was the newest vehicles that were in the battalion. The 11th MEU had just gotten back to a line. The battalion planned to -- the best vehicles -- I felt the RCCA vehicles needed to go to the MEU platoons, which are the best vehicles that needed to be aligned to that.

So in order to make that happen, you had to have all these vehicles. But considering there was amount of mods that needed to happen with RWS, remote weapons station modification, and also the 7800-I comm suite that was coming in to be

installed, it was, as they call it, going in, the battalion commander did not want any other vehicle other than RCCA vehicles to get them. So in order to align the MEU platoon with vehicles that were best prepared, even the battalion maintenance chief informed the battalion commander -- and also Chief Warrant Officer $\binom{b|(3), (b)|(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$ recommended -- that we align to RCCA vehicles for the MEU platoon. But because of the mods, the battalion commander's guidance was to not align RCCA vehicles to that MEU.

So we had to get the best vehicles that the battalion maintenance had to align the best vehicles to that platoon, which were IROAN vehicles.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): IROAN vehicles out of the administrative deadline program?

WIT: So the way the administrative lot program worked was, the COA going in was to get all -- this goes back to the reorg plan -- was to get -- pull vehicles out of the admin deadline storage to align platoons and allow the companies to align their vehicles per what they have for equipment sets per the plan of Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(6)} had that Lieutenant Colonel Brenize tasked him with, which was his plan to come together and organize a reorganization plan.

So to get back to the point of when we pulled vehicles

out of ADL, it was to align companies to three platoons and allow H&S to maintain the MEUs under their oversight. So I think the plan, trying to pull -- because the MEUs were under H&S because of the UDPs, when they would leave, it left the MEU platoons high and dry with no oversight. So there was no support there.

So back in the day, it was realigned to H&S Company to have oversight fully under a support platform to do that. So pulling out vehicles out of the ADL was aligning Alpha Company, Charlie Company, and H&S Company with the amount of ADL vehicles which would leave a divestment when it came down to it, 30 vehicles left - 31 vehicles left in the ADL after the reorganization.

So there was, approximately, six RCCA vehicles inside of there that got realigned. I can't tell you where they went. But H&S Company was to pull a vehicles set out of H&S Company to align to the 15th MEU.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Read back, Major $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$ is tasked by the battalion commander to come up with a battalion vehicle reorganization plan --

WIT: Correct.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): -- to divvy up these vehicles among the different companies while concurrently supporting modification

installs on RCCA vehicles, when able.

Were these companies and commodities within 3rd Assault Amphibious Battalion, were they, one, aware of the reorganization plan; and, two, were they given an opportunity to provide input or feedback to it prior to being given to Lieutenant Colonel Brenize?

WIT: I think the plan was definitely briefed out of the staff perspective and the company commanders.

IO (Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): So the staff knew about it, and they would provide input to it, and it was then given to Lieutenant Colonel Brenize for decision?

WIT: Yes.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}}):$ But he'd made the decision, RCCA, mod, etc.

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WIT: Right.
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IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}}$): H&S Company. The H&S Company has oversight, supervision of the AAV platoon, the AAV MEU platoon, correct?

WIT: Correct.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): So is there maintenance chief in H&S? WIT: There is only battalion maintenance.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): So there is no ordinance officer or

ordinance chief directly at the company level? There is just battalion maintenance, who provides supporting fires to that?

WIT: That is correct.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): But on the operational side of the house, there is a company commander and operations chief? WIT: Correct.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): That provides support to those MEU

platoons?

WIT: Right.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): At the maintenance readiness briefs, did you attend maintenance readiness briefs internal to thebattalion? WIT: Seldom.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Okay. Who would normally lead those maintenance readiness briefs internal to the battalion?

WIT: So that was driven off of the S-4 officer and the MMO.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Okay. So to your knowledge, who would brief the readiness then for that AAV platoon at these maintenance readiness briefs?

WIT: That should have been, probably, the platoon to the company commanders who they report to.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): And then, at the battalion, it would

23

Enclosure (70) Page 23 of 33

have been the H&S Company commander to the battalion commander?

WIT: Yes.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): This is, generally speaking for the battalion and from your knowledge from when you checked in to now, how does the battalion evaluate companies and platoons? How did -- how was that done when you got there, and how has that evolved since you've been there?

WIT: Okay. So MCCREs internal to a company, we transpired -- we did company level MCCREs, and I was involved with a couple of them on our 4 perspective and evaluation.

The platoons as they were formed to a MEU, should have gotten a MEU platoon MCCRE.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{\scriptscriptstyle (b)(3),\,\,(b)(6),\,\,(b)(7)}$): Who would have provided that in your opinion?

WIT: So that would have been an oversight from a 3 shop perspective and the company.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Does that -- so that's how it was done then, and did that ever change? I mean, it may have been the policy, whether or not it was done or not, but that was still a policy.

WIT: Correct.

IO (MGySgt $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}_{(c)}$): So that's what I was getting at.

Sorry, I may be wasn't clear enough. That was what was supposed to happen to your knowledge based off the battalion policy, higher headquarters guidance, whether or not it happen or not --

WIT: Correct.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): To your knowledge, did the 15th MEU platoon receive a MCCRE before they chopped to the BLT?

WIT: NO.

IO (MGySgt ${}^{(b)(3),\;(b)(6),\;(b)(7)}_{(c)}$): They did not?

WIT: They were also in Native Fury.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): That's my next question. So Native
Fury that happened in February, March timeframe, correct?
WIT: Correct.

IO (MGySgt ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): Who made the decision that that platoon would support Native Fury?

WIT: Ultimately, it is the battalion commander.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Are you --

WIT: I wasn't involved sending them to Native Fury?

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): To your knowledge, was there any higher headquarters influence; i.e., higher headquarters being Division, to send that particular platoon to Native Fury.

WIT: So I feel there is a RFD and there is a CRFP, and I think there was a lot of confusion at the time to understand that

at the battalion level where --

IO (Maj $_{\rm (c)}^{\rm (b)(3),\,\,(b)(6),\,\,(b)(7)}$): Can you spell out those acronyms, please.

WIT: RFD is the rapid forced deployment. CRFP is the crisis response force package to go out.

Though there's two different things. One has a supporting, which is the RFD, which is the fly over to offload gear and prep the gear for flow in for the CRFP to fall in on that gear set. I don't think the battalion understood what that looked and it comprised. But I also think the battalion was also put in a crunch, you have to understand because there was an FTX, field training exercise, tied to that on the back end of the offload.

So certainly there was Marines out of Delta Company, and there was Marines from H&S, there was Marines from all over the battalion to make what that RFD looked like. It was a 73 pack --

IO (MGySgt $_{(c)}^{_{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}}$): In addition to the platoon -- elements of the platoon that went.

WIT: Yes.

IO (MGySgt $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): So, again, circling back, like, in your opinion, was there influence from division on that platoon

being the platoon supporting Native Fury?

WIT: I don't know.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): So when they do a MCCRE, who in the battalion is certifying those MCCREs, whether it's a MEU platoon or company going on UDP? Who is -- obviously, the battalion commander ultimately certifies, but who is responsible for the actual conduct of it?

WIT: The operations officer.

IO (MGySgt $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Regardless of whether it's a platoon or a company?

WIT: It doesn't matter. Overall, the certification lies within the 3 shop.

IO (MGySgt ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): So would there ever be an instance where H&S Company would be responsible for the MCCRE for the MEU platoon.

WIT: No.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): I just want to explore some of your touch points with Division. Who do you interact with outside of battalion as a logistics chief? I'm assuming you talk to the G-4 chief?

WIT: Yes.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Okay. Is that a monthly thing? Is that

a weekly thing?

WIT: That is just a touch point. In the arise of - if there was a need or an information flow, I would touch base.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Okay. Is that is vehicle readiness addressed in that line of communication?

WIT: No.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Okay. Where would vehicle readiness be addressed to your -- in your opinion, if it was between 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion and 1st Marine Division?

WIT: And vehicle readiness, as far as like DRRS perspective in readiness, is that touch point. So I would think that if the G-4 were to reach out as far as trying to see what vehicles are available for a certain operation. Maybe that would be a reach point.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): DRRS?

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): DRRS, right.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}}$): Is there any other touch point, to your knowledge, besides DRRS?

WIT: No. Other than if you're to tie it to a confirmation brief for chopping of a MEU, or a D minus -- we'll just call it a D minus 30, D minus 180 briefs. Those are all briefed in that brief as far as vehicle readiness and status.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Thank you.

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Real quick. In those touch points, and this carries over to the 3, but what's Division's oversight on UTM. So specifically MCBUL 1500, and then your T&R based training in MCTIMS. What's the oversight from Division?

WIT: Basically it's in a CGRI perspective to make sure we are doing what we are supposed to every other year. I know of, like, in a MCTIMS, in a training perspective from the G-3 training is our touch point to make sure we're getting fed the classes and things of that nature, and in a T&R perspective to help us facilitate you UET and other things, if we need to have support from.

IO (MGySgt $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Are they readily looking to see where your readiness -- you know, T&R, MET readiness --

WIT: CRP?

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Well, CRP, but within your event analysis strategy, within your readiness planning, you know, under your commander's assessment, are they regularly inspecting those kinds of things?

WIT: Not normally from my perspective.

IO (MGySgt $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): It's really on the battalion to do, and division looks at it as needed.

WIT: Yes. Other than the normal CGRIs and things of that inspections, right?

IO (MGySgt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Correct. Every couple of years, but they're not like hounding you on whether or not stuff is filled in or not?

WIT: No.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): AAV UDP company. These briefs you just talked about. They would get briefed internal to the battalion, I'm assuming, before getting briefed to Division?

WIT: Yes.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}): Okay. Was there an internal AAV MEU platoon brief prior to chop?

WIT: I don't recall.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Do you remember if there was one given to either the BLT or Division that you were part of or to your recollection?

WIT: I don't recall one.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Okay. And then, was there any verbal guidance or policy with regards to battalion to battalion lines of communication with the BLT 1/4 when it came to chopping and these vehicles over equipment readiness?

WIT: I believe there was some contact made and reach out as

far as to be able to have touch points for the platoon commander and platoon sergeant to feed into 1/4, because they are asking about it.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Who was asking about it?

WIT: 1/4's OpsO, I believe.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): 1/4's OpsO. Okay. Did you have any lines of communication with their 4?

WIT: I did not .

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): And then, you took over the 3 in May, correct?

WIT: Yes.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Okay. Was there any conversations between you -- shifting gears here -- in May 2020, as the operations chief and the operations chief from BLT 1/4, were there any conversations regarding the training and readiness of that AAV MEU platoon post-chop?

WIT: No.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): I think that's -- I think we can conclude here. I got a few other questions, unless you got something, Master Guns?

Do you know any other witnesses this investigation team should interview?

WIT: On a maintenance perspective, Master Gunny $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$, which we have already mentioned.

IO (Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): Roger. Master Gunnery Sergeant ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$, and he is no longer with the battalion, correct?

WIT: Correct.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Okay. Do you have any documents you'd recommend the investigation team review? Was there a 3rd Assault Amphibious Battalion MEU prep policy, anything along those lines?

WIT: Not that I can recall, other than what the internal inspections of what a chop looks like. And there was no time for that after they got back from Native Fury.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): And then, do you have any additional comments or information relevant to the investigation? Anything you want say now that we might have not covered or miss that you want to get off your chest?

WIT: No. I'm just trying to go through all the process that led up to what that looked like, you know? I was very much in depth on trying to create a synchronization process and making sure things internal to the, as you would say inside your house, right? Run smoothly.

IO (Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): So do you think 3rd Assault Amphibious Battalion -- this is an opinion question. Do you think 3rd

Tracks gave that MEU platoon the best vehicles that were in that battalion.

WIT: At the time, without RCCA, yes.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Okay. No further questions. That being said, got a small part I've got to read to you.

You are you're directed not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone other than members of the investigation team. If you are asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify myself or the investigating officer or you commanding officer.

WIT: Okay.

[The Investigative Interview closed at 1505, 16 April 2021.]

I, Major (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), attest that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of MGySgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) held on 16 April 2021.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Maj, USMC

[The investigative interview commenced on 1500, 20 April 21.] [WIT: LtCol^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}]

[IO: Col^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

[IO: CWO5/W-5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}]

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[IO: Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}

 $[CR: Sgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) \\ (c)]$

Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}: Good morning. My name is Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}. I'm accompanied by Chief Warrant Officer 5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)} and Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}. We are a part of a team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU, and actions and decisions associated with the material conditioning, training and personnel readiness thereof.

This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020. We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional prospect to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April '21, to conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with information relevant to the investigation. We have copies here of the convening order and the membership of the investigation, if you want to see that in front of you as well. I don't have those copies here, but if you would -- if

you would like me to send you the two copies, one appointing to the investigation and the directive that initiates the investigation.

WIT: I don't need them, sir.

Col^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)}: Okay. The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed us to the investigating team on 8 April '21, and I am talking to you -- or we are talking to you in that investigatory capacity as representatives of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas.

We are required to provide General Thomas with a written report upon the completion of our investigation. I'm talking with you because the investigating team believes you might have information that may be relevant to the investigation. It is important for us to understand this, but please inform us of anything you believe should be considered in this review.

The topics that we will discuss will likely cover formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, training and material readiness surrounding the formation and compositing of the 15th MEU, and I MEF and division oversight of the 15th MEU.

This is an administrative investigation; however, due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing review, we are asking personnel we talk to as a part of this investigation not to share anything we discuss today with any other person.

So before we start, do you have any questions about our role or this investigation?

WIT: I do not, sir.

Col $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$: Could you start by stating your full name and your current billet?

WIT: Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} . Currently, the Assault Amphibian Capabilities Integration Officer at Combat Development Directorate, CD&I.

Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}: Okay. Thank you. And could you tell us what your billet was on 30 July 2020?

WIT: I was the battalion executive officer for 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion.

Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}: Okay. So as I start off on this process, the first question is: How would you describe the relationship between 3rd AA Battalion and 1st Marine Division as it pertains to material readiness and the maintenance of -- I shouldn't say maintenance. What I'd say is, the relationship you have with 1st Marine Division in terms of maintaining awareness of your material readiness in the division?

WIT: Sir, I'd say our relationship with 1st Marine Division, with not only the commanding general, but with their maintenance management personnel, Lieutenant Colonel ()(6),(b), who does their material readiness, we were -- we were extremely close hand in hand. So our bi-monthly command SitReps to General Castellvi and his staff had our material readiness on it. General Castellvi consistently looked at it and commented on it on his responses back.

And then, Lieutenant Colonel $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$, as the material readiness officer for the division, he worked hand in hand, mostly, with me as

the battalion executive officer really in charge of the inspections, as we had a LRE and a FSMAO all -- all really done within that one-year period from the time of the incident. So we went through a FSMAO inspection first, and then we went through a LRE inspection, and then another LRE assist visit as well.

Col $_{(c)}^{\scriptscriptstyle (b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}$: Okay. Well, I do have questions about the LRE and the FSMAO.

WIT: Yes, sir. Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}: But I'll hold off --WIT: Yes, sir.

Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}: -- for a second. I'd like to, kind of, continue to talk about a little bit about the -- the command relationship between the division and the MEF. So bi-monthly reports go to the division commander.

WIT: Yes, sir.

Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: How much was focused on -- was it just overall battalion readiness, or did you dial into a little bit more? For example, the forming piece of the AAV platoon and the readiness of that platoon.

WIT: The -- from what I saw, sir, as the -- on the XO seat is -- and I can provide you a copy of our SitReps from December on. I have them. I have all the SitReps. I can provide you that. It shows General Castellvi's response to Colonel Brenize, that he acknowledges our readiness levels. So in the section, it has, you know, current AAV readiness by PCRs, and then it's -- it goes down to the lower

paragraph format where we would explain what our current ops are, forming the 15th MEU platoon or training this platoon or this company training, preparing for ITX, everything else.

So -- yes, sir. As a quick -- quick highlight of what our SitReps are. So you can scroll up and down, and it clearly shows kind of what our -- our reporting requirements were to division.

Col $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$: So if you -- if you still have records of those -- WIT: I have them all, sir.

Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$: I'm confident that the team would like to see those.

WIT: Yes, sir.

Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}: Somewhere between, what? January and June? Is that -- that's probably the sufficient timeframe, I would think. But we can -- we can discuss later as to what the -- what the particulars are of the dates, and we can close that gap after this. But, yeah, I think that would be really helpful to us.

So that would be an opportunity for the battalion commander to -- if he had concerns about forming the AAV platoon from a readiness perspective, that would -- that report would be the tool he would use to enlighten the battalion -- or the division commander as to what his concerns are, his issues were?

WIT: Yes, sir.

Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: Okay.

WIT: Yes, sir. And as some of these will state, you know, really in January when we started projecting how -- how crazy busy it

was going to be that spring time, you know, the general's response back, he acknowledged a good job -- he called it juggling. "A good job juggling all your tasks."

And I remember that January -- if I can find that right now -we had multiple -- it might have been this one -- multiple exercises and tasks going on at the same time. We, kind of, labeled that all out. Yeah, it was the January 24 to February 6's sitrep. Your know, the CG responds back, you know, "You were juggling support to ITX, Iron Fist, Native Fury while maintaining Delta Company's focus where it needs to be on ACV transition. Good to have your platoon back." I mean, we -- we label everything out. And General Castellvi was consistent to provide a response back, and his responses back were normally on weekends. I have always noticed that he would be responding back on Saturday night or Sunday afternoon.

Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)} : Okay. So you again -- so, again, it certainly appears that communication flow was -- was very good up and down the chain of command, and that General Castellvi was -- was very interested in the -- the steady progress of -- of readiness within the battalion.

WIT: He was, sir. And then to -- to dial in more specifically to the -- the 15th MEU platoon. The -- there was a dip in readiness in -- between March and April by ten points. It went from -- I believe, it went from 92 percent down to 80 percent. The general, kind of, called it out. Kind of, what's going on? We did a quick analysis at the battalion level. Respond -- responded back to the

general informing him that Charlie Company was at ITX, so their vehicles sat on the ramp. They had just gotten back on their tractors after 45 days. So they had to do an assessment on their tractors.

And at that point, we had started executing the battalion reorg, which meant pulling vehicles out of the ADL lot, which, as we know, once they're in the ADL lot, they need to come out and they need to be checked all over. And, of course, if any vehicle sit for a period of time, there is going to be something or another that needs to get unfrozen. So we explain that clearly to the general. Didn't really focus on the 15th MEU platoon. It was a battalion readiness report, which we responded to and explaining that, yeah, we are pulling vehicles at ADL, but most of the fixes that are being identified right now are -- are just those quick fixes to get them up and running. And again, that -- that was April, and we did bring that readiness back up because we were pre -- getting ready for a LRE inspection as well.

Col $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$: Okay. So let's shift gears to the -- to the internal to the battalion a little bit.

What would you say the priorities were of the battalion? You, obviously, have a lot going on.

WIT: Yes, sir.

Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)} : By your -- by your comments with respect to the op tempo; Native Fury, Iron Fist, ITX. You've -- you have this reorg going on at the same time, and you're trying to form a MEU platoon.

What would you say the priorities were of the battalion during that period of time?

WIT: So, sir, to -- to specifically answer your question, Colonel Brenize gave us his bi-weekly priorities. Every time we had a staff meeting, his last three comments were his priorities and he would label them out. Obviously, he had his TEEP mission on his commander's philosophy. But each week, he -- sorry -- every two weeks, he would provide the staff, kind of, his priorities of execution and what they were, and it really had to do with that 30-day outlook.

He always did keep some other things in the background with, you know, PE-19 for the new construction, ACV transition. But his priorities would probably change monthly depending on -- on what we had, whether it was for a -- you know, priority this week is FSMAO prep or priority this week is LRE prep followed by, you know, you know, training to Delta Company or training the Charlie Company or whatever it may be.

So I can't really say he had a priority, you know by the quarter, by the month. It was really, you know -- he took an assessment of the slides that we provided him on his update, and he said, "Good to go". You know, he understood where the strengths were and the weaknesses were, and he addressed them in his priorities so that the staff knew -- the commanders knew what the colonel's priorities were.

Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$: Do you ever recall him making the 15th MEU the battalion priority?

WIT: The 15th MEU became the battalion priority in a couple -couple incidents. It became a priority -- and I'm going to call it

that MEU platoon. They went and did an ITX in the fall of '19. They were a priority to get them out the door for that. They came back. That whole platoon was reorganized. And then when they get assigned Native Fury, they became a priority, but they were a competing priority with Task Force Ellis, Task Force Oceana, which was a -- if you have -- are you tracking Task Force Oceana or Ellis -- was that individual section of AAVs going out, alone and unafraid, on a -- on a one -- one ship deployment for six months to the Pacific.

So they were competing priorities because it was Native Fury and Task Force Oceana were competing priorities, understanding that we had to get the Native Fury platoon trained for maneuver and gunnery prior to deployment. And then once they came back from Native Fury, and we did the JLTI's and the turnover and we got the results of the JLTI's, they became the priority.

So they were a priority because that was -- that was April, May, where they were either the priority or the second priority based on trying to get, whatever the company was, out the door for UDP to support GFM. So, obviously, they competed with them because it was COVID. A lot going on, but we had to get a company out the door and one back from a GFM requirement, and the MEU had the maintenance priority, I'd say, in that making sure that their vehicles were -were up and running.

Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: But they -- but the joint LTIs discovered five vehicles. So what we can find is -- so --

WIT: Yes, sir.

Col $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$: You know, in full transparency --

WIT: Sir.

Col $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}$: The investigation alludes to 13 of 14 vehicles being deadline.

WIT: Yes, sir.

Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}: We can't necessarily find the documentation that that defines 13 of 14 vehicles deadlined. What we can find is joint LTIs that deadline 5 of the 13 -- 14 vehicles. So I guess where I'm ongoing is -- is the -- the -- was the priority on the MEU platoon prior to the joint LTIs or in response to the joint LTIs?

WIT: I'd say its response. So the whole platoon was to pick up and go to Native Fury. Obviously, the second echelon was at March Air Reserve Base when DoD came down and said, "Stop move." So we had to go to March Air force Base, pick up that half of the platoon, and bring them back.

So I think as a battalion, we assumed that their task was to, since they're not in -- at Native Fury, is take care of their platoon tractors. So we -- we -- we assumed -- and I would say, sir, they were doing their -- their normal job of taking care of those tractors on a day to day basis. There were some switches of the vehicles in March based on the reorg guidance that was provided, that had to do with all ruck of vehicles had -- were going to receive the modifications.

And with those vehicles receiving the modifications, we couldn't have RCCA of vehicles out on float for -- sending out 12 to 16 months

10

Enclosure (71) Page 10 of 51

and not come back, and all of a sudden they would be -- they missed modification. So that was a decision that Colonel Brenize struggled with. And as a battalion, we struggled with clearly presenting him, you know, a solid way ahead, because there were -- there were some risk that was being assumed in both -- both decisions.

But the decision was made, I believe, in March, that, you know, the RCCA of vehicles were going to stay and receive the modifications, and we were going to give the next set of vehicles that were best operationally running to that platoon. Our initial -- our initial cut was going to be the 11th MEU vehicles, but they kept getting extended to stay composited to -- to meet some real world missions that were going on out -- out there at the time. They didn't want to decomposite the 11th MEU. So we couldn't count on getting those vehicles back.

But we gave the -- we gave the tractors to the platoon. The platoon sergeant, the maintenance chief were aware of the vehicles they had, and we provided support to them. You know, what do you need? Let us know. And I think my -- my personal perspective is because we were port -- you know, port and starboard coming to work, they were port and starboard for already a half of a platoon. And really the month of March, the guidance on, kind of, what's going on, what are we doing, there's a lot of questions.

Gunnery Sergeant ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}$ would come by my office every now and then and just give me, kind of, updates because I know Gunny ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}$ -it's, kind of -- you know, he would -- he would vent to me sometimes

that the vehicles are crap and, you know -- but I have -- I would have the data to be, like, "Hey, listen. We gave you the youngest, less mile vehicles that we have that are operational right now."

We also had elements of the battalion going out there -- I'm sorry -- providing support to amphib ops. I mean, we -- we were -- we were busy. And at times, as the battalion executive officer, I almost felt that we were kind of beyond our limits with what was going on, and that was just consistently as an AA battalion. I have always felt that we were just, "Yeah, we'll make it happen. We'll find a way to make it happen," and we did.

We found a way to make it happen, but usually it was across the backs of the Marines staying late, you know, doing maintenance and those types of things just so that, you know -- our story to division was never -- never really held any water. When it was like, we can't support this. And they would be like, well, here's your TEEP and here -- I'm sure you can. And you'll see in some of my documents, we kind of label it out. Like, we have ITX, we have Native Fury. We had to put together a -- our MCM platoon to go support a ship op because there were the only -- the only Marines that we had available the task at the time. So we were -- we were tasked saturated trying to find units to -- to provide for -- for these tasks from division.

Col $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)}$: Okay. The -- how did the -- so as we sort of pull the thread on some things, what we discovered, obviously, is your three and four in January both transition out to IA billets.

WIT: Yes, sir.

Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: And it appeared that the four billet changed over

WIT: Multiple times.

Col $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$: -- multiple times.

WIT: Correct, sir.

Col $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$: How did that impact the -- the -- the platoon's readiness or the platoon's ability to -- or the battalion as a whole?

WIT: So a couple -- a couple of things with that, sir. You had myself, Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} at the time, and now Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}, and we -- we had a solid team. Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} got tasked first -- as I was. Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} got tasked first to go out on an IA billet to CENTCOM. And we got him -- you know, he was -he was set to do that deployment in the fall with a chop date in February, which was fine.

We had a solid as S-4 Alpha that had been there for a while. So we really didn't have a whole lot of concerns there. And then in December, January timeframe, Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} -- or lieutenant colonel at the time -- Lieutenant Colonel select ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} got -- got selected by division to go on another IÃ, and that was because at the time, he and I were both lieutenant colonel select. So they were, technically, three lieutenant colonels in the battalion. And so, you know, the division had to -- had to -- and then they had a requirement to meet. So it wasn't optimal to lose the two other majors in the battalion right around the same time. And then a third, if you count Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}, but we had enough experience in my eyes

as a battalion executive officer and really the officer manpower manager. I felt we had enough experience in the lieutenants that had been there and the captains that had been there to provide continuity and experience.

The operations section had the master gunnery sergeant and it had -- it had a solid supporting staff that when Captain $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6),}{(b)(7)(c)}$ fell in on operations, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had him set up. Just, you know, here's your battle rhythm. Did you do this? You got master guns, and follow and execute. For the S-4, Major $\frac{(b)(3)}{(c)}$, $\frac{(b)(6)}{(c)}$, $\frac{(b)(7)}{(c)}$ got everything set up for Major ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$, but he also had a pretty solid S-4 Alpha already established and experienced with battalion ops. So comfort level -my comfort level as the XO, I had confidence in our -- all of our officers. When Major ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ got on deck and was assigned the four, he personally -- we had a lot of conversations. He -- he was looking to get the senior billet to be the operations officer. And at the time, Colonel Brenize felt that the senior billet in the AA battalion should be the -- the four based on maintenance logistics, and that is something that Colonel Brenize had preached since day one I got on deck was that, you know, the senior billet in AA battalion should be the S-4.

So when Major ^{(b)(3).(b)(6).(b)(7)} was -- was inbound, I told him he was going to be in the four, you know, and he got on deck right before COVID hit. He provided a lot of guidance for us during the COVID timeframe. But he, too, wanted to get a deployment in, and there were frustrations in the four shop. He didn't feel like he was being

14

Enclosure (71) Page 14 of 51

utilized enough. So he came to me and asked if -- if there were any IA billets available. I said, there's always IA billets available in division. He looked at it. We looked at it together, and we found him an IA billet and so he deployed. And again, that was based on approval from Colonel Brenize that Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} could deploy. He also had the -- the requirements to deploy with security clearance and everything else. So having -- having the majors, kind of, all depart on IAs wasn't ideal for the battalion, but I had confidence in -- in our lieutenants and in our captains. And I provided as much oversight and bandwidth as I could as the XO.

To answer your question, sir -- I just danced around it. To answer your question, the effects on the three -- the three and the four turnover on that MEU platoon, I would say negligible, if any. Captain ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}$ had -- had a solid grip and grasp on everything. The -probably, the only point of friction for that platoon would have been its association to the Headquarters Company. And there was turnover there, too, from Captain ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(6)}_{(b)(7)(c)}$ to Lieutenant ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)}_{(7)(c)}$ [ph] to Captain ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}_{(c)}$ when he replaced -- or when Major ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}_{(c)}$ replaced him out in -- in Iraq. So, yeah -- or Kuwait. There was a lot of turnover amongst all those billets.

Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: So, you know, obviously, growing up in this MOS, the company -- the company plays a large role --

WIT: Yes, sir.

Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: -- in the focus of attention on a MEU platoon. WIT: Yes, sir.

Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: Obviously, ultimately, it's the battalion responsibility to hand over a MEU platoon too.

WIT: Yes, sir.

Col $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$: But the company, in the execution of the day to day efforts, plays a significant role in prepping the platoon.

Did -- how does that -- what was your sense of how that materialized being under H&S company and not a line company?

WIT: So, sir, that -- that's a -- I have a pretty lengthy answer for that question.

So that -- that platoon -- I will just called it MEU platoon -that MEU platoon had gone through a lot of transition from the time I got on deck. When I got on deck as the battalion's XO in -- or really the end of March of 2019, I had already heard the grumblings that, you know, this -- this MEU platoon has got a lot of -- a lot of issues. Obviously, a lot of issues. So, you know, what's the assessments going on? You know, was it the leadership? Was it the lieutenant? Was it the gunnery sergeant? Who was it? And so I kept an eye on it, and again, they had, you know, plenty of solid leadership down there in H&S, but that platoon just stuck out. And so, okay, fine. They kept having some issues here and there.

Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b) : What kind of issues if you don't mine me asking?

WIT: So this was -- again, sir, this was April of '19. So vehicles bumping. They had disciplinary issues. They had a lot of, from what I saw -- what I recommended was that the platoon leadership were more friends than they were leaders that get together. So

looking at the platoon, looking at -- they had some issues with leadership.

They went up to Twenty-nine Palms. They had some issues out there. Getting reports back from their leadership out there. It was like, "Okay." So when they came back, you know, talking with H&S company commander, we assessed it. And because the MEU kept getting extended and pushed to the right, some of their personnel weren't even going to be able to stay on schedule for the MEU anyways. So we made the decision to start rebuilding that platoon. Based on the new 15th MEU deployment schedule and how it pushed so far to the right, we basically had to rebuild that platoon from scratch, but we didn't have the manpower that had the legs, and we didn't have the experience and leadership we wanted in hand to make that platoon, you know, go through that whole PTP process.

So now, it's summer of '19 platoon. That platoon got to go do an ITX in October, November, and we basically put new leadership on top of that platoon. Knowing that lieutenant, and at this point the staff sergeant who was platoon sergeant, weren't going to be the guys that were going to deploy that platoon, but that platoon needed new leadership at that time to go execute an ITX, and that's what we gave them. So we provided them that -- that leadership. They went out and did the ITX. Still saw some residual, kind of, you know, disciplinary customs courtesies issues, you know, but they went out and executed ITX and they came back.

During the fall of '19, we knew that we had to rebuild that new

platoon. So we reached out to Alpha Company in Okinawa and said, you're coming back in November. You guys are going to have the ability to rebuild a majority of the new 15th MEU platoon. You know, get your master sergeant. Start making recommendation on who you want to see take out this MEU. So we pitched it to Alpha Company. Got feedback from them on who their wish lists were of those Marines that were going to be, you know, outstanding for the MEU and we talked about leadership back at 3rd Tracks proper in California and who we want that leadership to be.

Staff Sergeant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} [ph] was in the three section. We knew he was solid. We wanted him to go out and have a new experience. Andthen when it came to the lieutenant, if you looked across the spectrumof lieutenants, none of them really had deployment experience. And the ones that were coming back from Alpha Company were not recommended by the company commander or other leadership in the battalion to be mature enough and strong enough and intelligent enough to take a MEU out.

Lieutenant ^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)} had shown us maturity, leadership, and intelligence. I mean, he was an honor grad from his AO course. He was -- he was number one in Charlie Company. He was selected to take out the -- the exercise that went up the coast to Alaska and San Francisco fleet when he came back. And that was kind of his -- his little mini MEU, his -- his -- his proof that he had what it takes to be a MEU platoon commander because he went out there with two sections, went up there and executed it. Never got off ship, but

18

Enclosure (71) Page 18 of 51

that's because the sea state was too high at ADAC for him to get off ship. So he had what we thought as a battalion was the right stuff to be a MEU platoon commander, and that was all brought to Colonel Brenize.

There were some other lieutenants that were brought to him. Hey, sir, here's -- here's your decision space. Here are the three options. Here's our recommendation to you, and he went with our recommendation with Lieutenant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, and that was decided in December of '19. That platoons overall manning was decided in December of '19, understanding that Alpha Company still needed to execute their post deployment leave. When they come back from post deployment leave, that's when they kick it off. That's when they -they come together and they're that MEU platoon.

So in January, they were formed under H&S. Again, they went from Alpha to H&S. And the manpower, actual BIC movement, you know, in the S-1 and and who's their big daddy, there were some -- there were some, you know, like, growing issues right there in January. But right there in January, they knew that they were tasked with Native Fury based on division, who would want to see the BLT -- the future BLT 1/4 work with this AA platoon as early as possible.

So that's why that platoon was formed in January, and then focused solely on gunnery and maneuver. Originally, it was all three. They were supposed to do an amphibious landing, but that was canc'd in early January, and it was just gunnery and mechanized maneuver. So their training changed. It was focused on that.

19

Enclosure (71) Page 19 of 51

Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}: So my understanding from -- from other interviews was -- the plan was for that -- they originally planned to do in Native Fury was to, sort of, be the MCCRE event for the platoon because they were doing amphibious operations, they were doing mechanized operations, and they were doing gunnery that was sort of the initial plan.

WIT: I wasn't aware of that, sir, as the XO if that was going to be their MCCRE. You know, that might have been a conversation between the master guns and the OpsO and division. But I -- I don't have any email traffic on that and I don't remember that. I mean, they -- they had a very condensed training program to get ready for Native Fury. I think they might have done one amphib op and that wasn't very successful. And yeah, they were -- they were stressed. They were put to the stress mark to get themselves ready to go to Native Fury. I remember that in the front end.

And when it comes to MCCRE, I don't ever remember a single platoon being MCCRE'd. Supporting an infantry company or battalion for MCCRE, maybe, but usually we would assign companies to that. I --I've never seen, "Hey, 3rd Tracks. Did you MCCRE'd that -- that MEU platoon?" It's always been, "Has that platoon been certified by the battalion?" I think --

Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$: So what's the certification process by the battalion commander?

WIT: I think what it is, I think the S-3 goes out there and observes a platoon level operation of some sort or whatever --

20

Enclosure (71) Page 20 of 51

whatever their training package might be. And that's probably through the H&S company commander, what he has setup for them or she has setup for them. Yeah, I don't -- I don't -- I don't remember individual platoons. I'm remember getting down to AA company level, but never -never at the platoon level.

Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: Okay. Do you have any questions? CWO5 ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(b)(7)(c)}$: I do. Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: Please. CWO5 ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: Good afternoon, sir. Thanks for your time. WIT: Yeah.

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}$: I really appreciate it. So the -- how would you describe the relationship between the S-4, the S-4 Alpha, the MMO, and the battalion maintenance officer during that time, knowing there was fluctuation?

WIT: The MMO, maintenance management officer?

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}$: Correct, the MMO.

WIT: So the good -- good point in bringing the MMO, and the MMO was another billet that that rotated based on just availability of trained Marines that have the capability to be the MMO. Obviously, it's in S-4. It's an 0402 billet, but we have an 0402 as, you know, a motor T platoon commander. One is the S-4 Alpha. I think one was always deployed.

Relationships: So Major ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ has a very, very strong personality, and his personality compared to his predecessor, which was at the time Captain ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(b)(6), (c)}$, were like night and day. So -- and Major

^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} again took -- took what Colonel Brenize told him as you are the senior -- it's a senior major billet in the battalion, and he took it as so. He did a lot of work on and he always didn't give -- he never really gave the "so what" behind what he was asking. So he was a tasker and never really gave the "so what." So, of course, they would all, you know, grumble into my office. You know, "Sir," and I would have to provide the "so what" to them, and then they go execute. So not to undermine the S-4, but he just was not good at giving the "so what" behind the tasks, and the tasks were coming down from the three and the colonel and everything else.

The MMO. Great really -- whoever the MMO was at the time would always lean heavily on the battalion maintenance officer or myself or the four. And same thing, they would always understand what their job was and they go execute. So whether it was $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$ or Chief Warrant $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$, those two. I mean, they -- they knew -- the chief warrant officers that were our MMOs, and then I think $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$ had it for a little bit too, they -- they -- they knew it. They had their bread and butter, clearly with preparation for the LRE and FSMAO. Our MMO had to be -- had to be locked on.

And so that was another thing that Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} came in on was he came in like, boom, right into FSMAO, right into a LRE. So he -he and I really were really, like, Hey, make sure we are doing our checklists, make sure we're doing the proper procedures. So -- and then he would hold individual logistics meetings or when Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} were there, they would do ops and log meetings. So

22

Enclosure (71) Page 22 of 51

relationship wise, I mean, he's -- he's a really gruff person. My way or the highway, you know, but I think it was for the right. I mean, he had good intent. He had the colonel's guidance, and it was definitely getting the battalion to cover and align.

CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}: And -- and I think you answered this already -just answered with ops and the log briefs, but how often was the S-4 MMO and battalion maintenance officer, as a team, briefing the command deck on the readiness or was it just --

WIT: So we would do -- and, obviously, we did overkill. So we would do the SRB every other week. So we would have -- when I got on deck, we were doing a battalion staff meeting every other week, and I'm a creature of habit. So it had to be every week, whether the colonel is there or not. So same slide, same brief. Just whether you are giving it to the colonel or you are giving it to me. Same thing. So it took me a little while to snap the staff into that.

And then we would do a SRB, a supply readiness brief. So the supply readiness brief would go every other week to the colonel. It would offset the week that he would sit in for the staff meetings. And then we -- I think after the FSMAO, we were like, we need to do another brief to cover the other aspect of logistics. And so we did that the other week. So it would be every Tuesday there's a staff meeting, and every Thursday there were either a SRB or a MRB. And that would cover -- so those two briefs on Thursday were led by the four and his MMO or his maintenance officer or his supply officer.

So they would brief us or the staff with the key members, you

know, once a week, and they would meet as an organization between them and three and other members of the staff, you know, once a week. So I think there were -- there were consistent touch points amongst the staff. Obviously, the commanders always pushed back that there were too many meetings. But I think we -- we found that harmony of, you know, they knew what the schedule was. Every week, there's a battle rhythm. They knew when their free time was and -- and we stuck to it.

CWO5 $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}$: And so, those SRBs and the --

WIT: MRBs. Yes.

CWO5 ${}_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}$: How did they feed into the DRRS process and who was responsible -- obviously, the battalion commander is responsible for DRRS, but who was responsible help -- helping him craft his S&R comments?

WIT: So the DRRS -- the DRRS was crafted through the three shop. They had the lead on DRRS. And, again, XO. I don't have any play until he needed my SIPR card because no one in the battalion had a SIPR card, and I became the DRRS guy. But it was -- it was always the three -- the three's chief. And the SRB data, the sitrep data, the weekly maintenance data, we would get from the maintenance officer or the maintenance chief would always bubble up, and the colonel would have those documents. And if he had questions, he would call them to come in and sit down and do DRRS with him. But it was always the colonel, the master guns, and the three and the four, or the three and the MMO, or the three -- and they were always -- always there for DRRS reporting.

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}$: Roger that. So before the reorg and then during the reorg, the relation -- H&S company's senior mechanics or maintenance management of H&S company --

WIT: Yes.

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\ (b)(6),}$: -- as the XO, who do you feel that would fall upon?

WIT: So that was a -- that was a big point of contention is during the reorg and -- and there is no assigned maintenance officer, like -- like a chief warrant officer 2 or warrant officer for H&S, even though they had like fifty-something tractors. But you have the battalion maintenance officer who is a chief warrant officer 3 or 4 that is supposed to be responsible for those 43 as a maintenance officer and then the rest of the battalion.

So I think that's a structure thing that we never really got right as a community. I mean, it's -- the community -- that is just the way we are. We've always figured it out one way or another. But I think that -- not having a chief warrant officer to provide direct guidance to a captain company commander that is now responsible for MEU, because -- again, the MEU -- those MEU platoons would shuffle in the past. I mean, 3rd Tracks had Echo Company, which was just a MEU company. And then, you know, MEU fell into line companies, and then they fell under H&S, which didn't have a maintenance officer. It had a master gunnery sergeant and a chief warrant officer 4, but it didn't have, necessarily, the structure for maintenance. But the MEU platoons, all those platoon maintenance chiefs knew open door policy

25

Enclosure (71) Page 25 of 51

for the ramp chief or Master Guns $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$ or Chief Warrant Officer $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$, once he got on deck.

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}$: So COVID impacts down at the ramp. I know you were saying it was 50 percent.

WIT: Yeah.

 $CWO5 \frac{(b)(3), (b)(6)}{(b)(7)(c)}$: So was that guidance from the battalion?

WIT: So COVID -- COVID was -- was a very interesting time.

We saw it coming as a battalion. We, kind of, saw it coming and then COVID hit and we were still normal day to day operations, but luckily, Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} -- it's not Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} -- Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} had been in Twenty-nine Palms during a lot of COVID planning out there.So he brought a wealth of knowledge to us.

So we were in planning phases when the direction from division came down, like, stop all day to day operations, you know. There's -there's a pause for, like, a day or two. I mean, the whole state of California basically shut down and then we had to figure how we were going to -- going to execute as a battalion without really impacting operations. Division was driving, like, no stop and so was the MEF. Like, no, we're driving the bus. But everybody's hands were tied because they don't want large gatherings. They don't want large groups. Obviously, we have vehicles that needs maintenance.

So we pitched to the colonel, "Hey, sir, we can do a port and starboard, you know. People come in one day," and then -- actually, I'm sorry. It was a port and starboard week. So people were talking about coming in one day -- one day on, one day off. It's like that --

your schedule is going to be so jack. So we eventually decided on a week on, a week off. So you would come in for a week, you work from home for a week.

So as a staff, we all had Microsoft teams. We all had the cameras. We all executed. We all communicated daily, but it was the Marines that were in the barracks like, you know -- we had to find ways to keep them -- keep them busy, keep them engaged in non-ramp things.

So, yes. We were -- we were at a port and starboard. And then division rolled into a port and starboard, and then I think we came out of it mid-April, mid-May, because it was just too overwhelming and we -- the bus was still driving. I mean, it felt, legitimately, like buses still going down the road, whether there's a driver there or not. And so we had to, like -- it was just, like -- Colonel Brenize was, like, "Enough. We got to get -- you got to get back to the ramp." So he assumed that risk, and then division came out of the port and starboard.

And then it -- it was really like touchy. Like group formations, no PTs, still following California regulations, base regulations, MEF regulations, division regulations. So yeah, they were all -- all very different, but I mean it was March 11th when it hit and that's when everything was just, kind of, what -- what do we do now? It took us a little while to figure it out. Port and starboard. Are they still training? Are they allowed to train? No training areas were open. Couldn't even do platoon -- I mean, we were

27

Enclosure (71) Page 27 of 51

figuring a lot out the second and third weeks of March.

CWO5 $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$: So April 13th, 14th, 15th was the joint LTIs? WIT: Yeah.

CWO5 $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}$: April 20th that platoon chopped to the BLT, correct?

WIT: Correct?

CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),} : So how -- after April 20th, how much oversight or -- or understand do you -- did the command have of the readiness that AAV platoon?

WIT: 100 percent oversight. So what -- in conjunction with the BLT. So what had happened was JLTI are going up. We assign a staff sergeant from the battalion to be the lead, eight -- 21XX guy doing the JLTI. So he goes up to division, up to MEF, and then he comes down as a JLTI, and he just goes through and deadline, deadline, deadline. So my initial report back from my maintenance team was like, you know, he -- he took it a little hard and high you know. Deadlined tractors for not having glow in the dark Azimuth tape, were some of the things -- were some of the things that could have been fixed on the spot.

As my maintenance officer said, like, "Hey, man, like, why weren't we fixing these things." Like, "Hey, this is deadline. I'm going to go get a screw and fix it. Let me just turn it." So -- but unless there was a -- he said it was deadline, it was marked deadline, whether they fixed it on the spot or not. And that's the piece of paper that was the report that went up. And then I have the email

28

Enclosure (71) Page 28 of 51

from -- it went through MEF and division that's, like, "What's going on here?" You know, it went through the chain -- basically, the maintenance officer chain.

Like, hey, did you really -- thirteen deadline tractor, did you really hand over it, and that went to, you know, from -- from CWO4 $\binom{60(3), 60}{(6), (6)(7)(6)}$ [Division Assistant Ordnance Officer], because he is on the list, to $\binom{60(3), 60(6)}{(7)(6)}$, to $\binom{60(3), 60(6), (6)}{(7)(6)}$, to Chief Warrant Officer $\binom{60(3), 60(6), (6)}{(7)(6)}$ [ph] to me. And, you know, at that point, we assume that there wasn't like a red star cluster, but apparently there was. Because most of time it's like, what's deadline? This? Okay, go fixit. It was now just deadline. Here's your -- here's your deadline report. Everything's bad. So that basically caused, as expected, inall like what's going on with 3rd Tracks. We got our story straight on what the current status was and what the way ahead was. And we were not to chop or e -- e -- EATO, EATO any of the vehicles over to the BLT until they were 100 percent ready, validated and verify -- verified by the BLT and the MEU staff before we chop them.

So those vehicles remained on 3rd Tracks' CMR until they were 100 percent ready to go over, and we surged maintainers to help them and support. Obviously, we don't have the same maintenance priority as the BLT or the MEU has, but that was the -- What do you do? Our money or their money. Well, it was our responsibility so we were going to fix it. Colonel Brenize had to sit down with Colonel Regner. They discuss that, and the division CG also understood that.

There was a understanding that none of the vehicles were going

to be chopped over to the BLT until they were 100 percent ready. And

we provided daily updates to the battalion commander on what the status of those vehicles were. I think it was -- I want to say May -what was the date we actually turned them over. EATO is done on the -- you have the 21st of April with our written result inspections. EATO was done on 24 May.

Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$: So you referenced -- you referenced 13 or 14, again.

WIT: Yes, sir.

Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)} : How was that determined? I mean, like I said, you go back to the joint LTIs themselves, and GCSS Marine Corps indicates five. So this is where we've struggled to reconcile 13 to 14. But the MEU mentions -- the MEU mentions that in statements. You have a couple of the mechanics that reference that in a statement from -from the platoon.

WIT: Sir, from Master Gunnery Sergeant ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$, on the Tuesday, April 21st, sent an email -- I'm sorry -- from Gunny ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$ to Master Sergeant ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$ with Major ${}^{(b)(3), (b)}_{(c)}$ and Capital ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$ cc'd in on it, "deadline AAV," and he labels them all out. Deadline --

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}$: With serial numbers? WIT: Correct. Have you not seen that e-mail? CWO5 $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$: No, sir.

WIT: Yeah. So I can get you if -- again, I've got a whole folder.

Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$: I'm just kind of shooting. Where was that reflected in -- in --

Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$: Right. If we could get that -- that -- thate- mail, sir.

WIT: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I've got a whole folder for you guys. So, you're welcome.

Col $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$: Well, it does help. It helps greatly.

CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}: Yeah. Because that has -- that has been a -trying to understand those 14 serial numbers that were on ship on July 30th and how they got -- you know, what was swapped out, what was actually LTI'd.

WIT: Yeah. And, again, so --

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\ (b)(6),}$: Trying to put that puzzle. It just have been difficult.

WIT: So I'll be honest. The day that the JLTI's came back that bad, I mean, like Colonel Brenize was freaking pissed, as he should have been. What went wrong? And he assumed responsibility. He assumed full responsibility. He -- I haven't found the email yet, but he had an email conversation with General Castellvi explaining we're going to fix it. You know, we are going to fix the AAVs. We would have them ready for the EOTG -- MEF EOTG ray package that was coming up. And, you know, if the vehicles weren't 100 percent by then, then we're going to fix them. You know, they'll break them for the MEU training, but we're still going to fix them until all the vehicles are 100 percent.

Col $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$: So what -- so those e-mails would be very helpful. WIT: There's another e-mail, too. Like when I took -- again,

running the staff, I take it personal. It's my staff. So I sent an email on the -- where is it. On -- here it is -- April 27 27th, basically asking the staff, "Whiskey Tango Foxtrot over." And "Should I be concerned about training? Should I be concerned about EOTG?"

So that was April 27th, and I sent it to the company commander, the three, the maintenance -- the logistics operations chief, and my maintenance officer in my S-1, because Manpower 2 -- we didn't chop our manpower over either. You know, safety first, right, my email. So it's -- it -- it's hard to see this email on April 27th saying, "Is the platoon training and readiness levels ample enough to carry and embark troop -- carry and embark infantry? Safety First."

I get responses from my staff. I get it from the S-1. I got them from the three. And, obviously, I have a separate accord from the -- the maintenance officer too. Basically like, Hey. Here's a historical perspective of the 15th MEU forming. Captain ^{(b)(3),(b)(6)}, or Major ^{(b)(3),(b)(6)}, lays it all out. And then, Hey. We're good. We're -we're doing a EOTG. We -- you know, everything's fine. I have that you ETOG report Captain ^{(b)(3),(b)(6)}, to Colonel Brenize. Colonel Brenize on up the chain that EOTG went well, "Didn't do any amphib because the infantry wasn't trained to go do amphib." So if people were following closely, there was no really amphib --

CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b) (b): Right.

WIT: -- evaluation.

Col $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$: So yeah. So --

WIT: It might call it out, sir.

Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: It's interesting how -- how there's several references to 13 out of 14 vehicles and of course this might be the most --

WIT: I just counted them. There's only nine in there. Nine serial number. It looks like a lot but --

Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)} : Right. So I mean -- and that's it -- that's the problem that it doesn't it feel -- well, that's one of the problems. It doesn't appear that it was ever captured appropriately whether in GCSS Marine Corps.

CWO5 $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$: Or on the LTIs.

 $Col_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$: Or the LTIs.

WIT: Yes, sir.

Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}: And so, again, by our count, there's five. Still probably excessive for a joint LTI and -- and a chop date to a BLT but it's -- but officially, or at least from what we can officially account for, it's not 13 of 14. So that that would be helpful, and you said there's only nine on there. So there's some -- there's some ambiguity between the -- the LTI, the reports, or the official documentation within GCSS Marine Corps and the email traffic, but -but -- but it's all helpful in us trying to put together the puzzle.

What would you say -- what would so -- in your opinion, what should be the process the battalion goes through pre-chop? I mean, was there any kind of battalion commanders inspection? Was there any, sort of, you know -- so whether it was verbally or email, make a declaration that this is a priority and this is what I want to happen

then there's this, sort of, the validation process internal to the battalion to, sort of, ensure success on that day.

What -- what's your -- what's your perspective on that? WIT: So I think -- I think we learned a lot from this chop. The -- I don't -- I don't think any of the key players in the battalion were there for the 11th MEU chop to see how that actually worked, to learn from that experience. So there was -- there were zero -- zero understanding of -- of a correct shop from really anyone seeing it. They only had reference material. And then the 15th MEU just kept getting pushed and pushed and pushed, and then you have a chop during COVID. You a chop when a platoon just comes off from ROM. You have a chop where vehicles were just switched out based on a decision made to have ruck available for MODS and not for the MEU.

So there was a lot of friction. A lot of -- a lot of things added to the mix at that last minute. I think we knew that platoon wasn't 100 percent up just because you had Marines just getting back from a deployment -- a one-month deployment. They -- they probably haven't been on their own vehicles. Someone else was turning the wrench. We had assumed that the MEU was to chop in May, because that's what the division's playbook said. I have copies of the division's playbook. And then you also -- then in January, it's like, "Hey, we're thinking about April." And then a message came out in March like, "Hey. Here's a chop inspection date." It's like, What? That bumped up, but we didn't expect a ROM -- a COVID ROM, and then that all played into it too.

35

Enclosure (71) Page 35 of 51

So should we have done a better job; yes, we should have. Did the battalion look at its -- its chop procedures; yes, it followed the Marine Corps order for chopping units to a MEU, which I think that came out in the fall of '19. So yeah, there should have been a battalion -- it should have been just like deploying a company, except it's a platoon. Are they ready to go? But we had -- we had units all over the place. We had COVID restrictions, dos and don'ts. So yeah, I think we missed that one.

Col $^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)}_{(7)(c)}$: Okay. Sort of the last question I have, Matt, is -- is with respect to the LRE and the FSMAO. We've taken a look at the results.

WIT: Yes, sir.

Col $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}$: Certainly, they're less than desirable.

WIT: Yes, sir.

Col ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)}_{(7)(c)}$: What -- what -- what interaction -- or what interest did the division take in the battalion with respect to corrective actions and follow up efforts on --

WIT: Division -- division was -- so after the FSMAO inspections -- the FSMAO results came out, there were a lot -- I mean, we had a brief -- had to brief division. Obviously, I think we went three and three; three yellow and three green for FSMAO. I think that was right. Three and three. So three and three, which was definitely the low of the division at the time. It wasn't the lowest in the Marine Corps. Someone on the East Coast hooked us up, so we didn't look as bad, but division took -- took a solid interest.

We had to do a corrective action plan, had to execute the corrective action plan, had spot checks from division on the corrective action plan, had LRE scheduled for less than eight months after the -- the FSMAO. So I mean, does that give you really enough time to make those corrections, especially when you have a ADL and -and everything else.

I would say that, you know, Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)} -- Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} and I talked probably every other week about where we were in cap, how things were coming along, how we prepped for LRE. All those things. And I think with both the FSMAO and LRE inspection, we -- we were doing self-assessments for both and no one really outside coming in, you know, giving you that hard, hard look. It was, you know, look at the checklist. Did you do that? Yeah, I did, you know. And as opposed to -- or me going in, "Hey, did you do that? Show me," and they're showing me as opposed to having outside entities come in and do those assessments.

So division was well aware of our readiness, of our results, of our corrective action plans. You know, we did -- we did a LRE right before the change of command and that came back, I think, average too.

Did you see that one? CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}: Yes, sir. WIT: So that was --CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6).} : A little bit below average but --WIT: But yeah. Yeah, I was going to say mediocre-ish. But, yeah, that is, kind of, like, "How did you go from a FSMAO to LRE?

What's -- what's really going on?" I think a lot of it was -- there wasn't really any trends because the FSMAO was PMCS, supply got destroyed for FSMAO. LRE supply wasn't as bad, but we took some hits in armory and some other weird areas. So yeah, I think -- I think, yeah. Yeah. I think that majority -- you know, who's the officer in charge of inspections within the battalions, internal inspections? So a lot of that probably falls on me. So --

CWO5 $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\ (b)(6),\ (b)}$: Lieutenant Colonel $_{(c)}^{(b)(3),\ (b)(6),\ (b)(7)}$ mentioned that prior to the FSMAO in the summer of 2019 --

WIT: Yeah.

CWO5 $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$: -- you received a LRE also. Do --

WIT: I think we might have. I think we might have. Yeah, there might have been -- we -- it just felt like that's all we were doing when I got on deck. I think you're right. Let me double check that.

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\ (b)(6),}$: We haven't been able to find documentation on that.

WIT: For LRE. CWO5 ^{(b)(3),(b)(6),} : For the one in the summer of 2019 --WIT: FSMAO was September. CWO5 ^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)}: Correct. WIT: The other LRE --CWO5 ^{(b)(3),(b)(6),} : Was June of 2020. WIT: June, correct. Let me here -- let me see here and look in

my folder. I do -- I mean, it was -- there was three and I couldn't

find the other ones.

CWO5 $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$: There was CGI --WIT: CGIP. CWO5 $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$: -- in 2020. WIT: Yeah. That might have been it. CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$: July.

WIT: There might have been it. That might have been it. That would have been the other inspection. So the CGIP then we enter a FSMAO and then we had a little break and then went into a LRE.

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),}$: Right.

WIT: The LRE, I think, he's referring to was probably early '19.

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}$: Okay.

WIT: Because I kept -- I keep everything.

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),}$: So during that 12-month period, the conversations between Lieutenant Colonel $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)}$ and either you or -- or for your OpsO about the MRTC, the -- the Material Readiness Training Center that the MEF provides, RO training --

WIT: Yes. CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}: -- GCSS Marine Corps training. WIT: Yes. CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),} : I don't know if you are familiar with them or not. WIT: Yes. CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),} : Do you remember that being a topic discussed,

sending Marines to that to get that to get their --

WIT: So it was -- it was sending Marines to -- to courses as well as division coming down and doing division level training for our -- our maintenance -- or supply section. So our supply section, you had an average captain in there and then you had a lieutenant -- a junior lieutenant, really average lieutenant. And so our supply section was always a -- there was -- I felt like our supply section always had a target on their back and I watched them work. I watched their work ethic again.

Again, their -- the supply officer was a very gruff, do as I say because I say it, not because I'm teaching you how to do it. So there was some -- some leadership individuals at the company level that were really -- the supply officer really rubbed them raw, and I think he rubbed the inspectors raw, too. That's why they really graded him hard. But the supply section for AA battalion, I mean, that is your -- your -- your heart. So if you can't get that right, you can't stay on top of it.

 $CWO5_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)}$: It's a beast.

WIT: It's a beast. And -- and -- and I don't think those guys get credit for the work they were doing and I think that they were also doing a lot of other people's work that wasn't getting done at the company level as well. And when supply would push back to tell the companies to do their work that's when the companies would get upset. So yeah, the supply section -- I mean, keep punching -doing -- keep punching things wrong or trying to work with outside entities. So that's where Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)} would like -- would really,

40

Enclosure (71) Page 40 of 51

really focus on it. I mean, particularly he was -- I remember his concern was, why is your supply chief also your --

CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),} : EAO.

WIT: -- EAO. Yeah, EAO. And it's like, well, he's trained and everybody got to do -- everybody had -- everybody had a collateral billet. And Gunny ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}, he fell in on a very terribly run EAO, and he -- he cleaned it up as best as he could. But I think because the supply section was so junior, so young -- there's a lot of junior Marines in there that it was hard to balance and -- balance training the junior Marines, but he also had the captain and lieutenants too.

So to me, if it wasn't Gunny ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}, I really didn't have a whole other options. So yeah, that Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)} big thing. Like, Hey -- he would shot e-mails. "Hey, did you consider our recommendation for Gunny ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}?" And it's like, "Considered it," but I mean, we're -- we have bodies all over the place. So it has to be like a certain rank and all those other requirements.

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\ (b)(6),}$: That's all I have. Thanks -- thanks, sir. I appreciate it.

Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: ${}^{(b)(3), (b)}_{(c)}$, do you have anything? Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$: Sir, just a couple of quick questions. WIT: Yes.

Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}: Sir, thank you for taking the time today -- I know you got a lot of stuff going on up there in CD&I, and thanks for your candor and your transparency, because I know those e-mails are going to help us out a lot. Just a couple of quick question, sir.

Lieutenant Colonel Brenize, did at any point in time prior to chop, did he ever ask for a readiness brief regarding the training, equipment, manpower of that platoon prior to chop?

WIT: I can't --

Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7): To your recollection.

WIT: Not to my recollection. I would have to look in emails for specific MEU chop brief. I don't remember having a specific MEU chop brief. Again, COVID. They weren't even around for Native Fury. We had Native Fury briefs. So, we had pre-deployment briefs before that -- that group of Marines went to ITX, but there was no pre-chop brief.

Maj (b)(3).(b)(6).(b)(7) : To your recollections, sir, did -- did anyone from division or BLT 1/4 ever ask for a brief along those lines?

WIT: No. The only thing I remember seeing from the BLT was point -- like from the -- from the BLT XO, who is your points of contact. You know, here are -- here are the chop dates.

Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}: Okay.

WIT: Yeah. Nothing about what's the status of your platoon. Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}: Okay. Sir, did -- sir, you mentioned the dates for chop changing and I think we've heard that a couple of times in different interviews.

WIT: Yeah.

Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$: On 7 January -- and this is more of a three, four question, but just curious if you have any insight into, sir -- on 7 January, the S-4, Major ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$, sent an email to Lieutenant Colonel

Brenize with the reorg for the battalion, the plan. He calls out the forming of the 15th MEU vehicle set. Now given that, my assumption is, at this point, Colonel Brenize is tracking a May chop date of some point.

WIT: Correct.

Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}: You know, bar math here, that's about 120 days including weekends. To your recollection or knowledge, does that timeline ever get communicated to him or is he aware of that timeline?

WIT: Colonel Brenize?

Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) : Correct.

WIT: May?

Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$: That -- the platoon would have from the end of January until May chop date to get all their stuff ready.

WIT: Yeah, he -- he was -- Colonel Brenize was tracking May. I think, when -- when the April chop date snuck up on us in January timeframe -- I believe it was January -- January, February timeframe. I have an email. When that snuck up on us that's when we, kind of, were like, "What do we need to do, three, to get that platoon ready to go?"

Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}: Okay. I know Chief Warrant Officer ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)} mentioned, you know, as we -- as we peel the onion on these vehicles that were actually part of the MEU that none of them were pulled from the ADL lot. Were any vehicles ever pulled?

WIT: What -- none of them were or some of them were? CWO5 $_{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}$: None of them were.

WIT: The ones that platoon had.

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\ (b)(6),}$: Cor -- the ones that were on the ship on July 30th?

WIT: Correct, because we swapped some out beforehand.

Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$: Can you forward that info or do you have traffic email?

WIT: Yeah. So that was July 12. There was a whole email. Yeah, there was an email. I have the email chain. There's an email chain from July 12th. Basically, it went from the BLT to 3rd Tracks and then to the supply system saying, hey, they have a tractor that's down hard and they need to do a one for one swap. And of course, it went -- went to ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}. And ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} was like, "They need two tractors". And it's like, no. It's only this tractor and that tractor.

CWO5 $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$: They had a tractor. They replaced the engine on it, I think, on July 23rd.

WIT: See -- but that was able to be fixed. The one that -- the serial number that they're talking about needed depot level maintenance. So we could do -- we could do engines at -- at the battalion.

CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}: Right.

WIT: I mean, we supported that platoon, like, because we knew that we'd -- you know, we need -- they needed to be supported. We supported that platoon, you know, beyond chop. But yeah, they are --I do have that email that states the -- the changing of that vehicle

out.

Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}: And last, sir -- last question, sir, just out of curiosity. Do you remember who the action officer for Native Fury was pre January?

WIT: For the battalion or for --

Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7): For the battalion.

WIT: -- division?

Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$: Who is -- who would be tied into --

WIT: ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}(c)$. He was getting e-mails -- Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was getting emails for Native Fury, because he and I are cc on everything. So yeah, he -- he was tracking Native Fury. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was tracking Native Fury. He was tracking that division was asking for the marrying of the 15 MEU platoon with the BLT. And that's right around the time that, you know, ${}^{(b)(3), (b)}_{(6), (b)(7)}$ was prayer, you (c) know -- December of '19, was getting ready to switch over to his new billet in. And ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$ was still there and ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}_{(0), (0)(7)(c)}$ was coming in.

Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) : Roger. Thank you, sir.

Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: Okay. So one last question really is just -- WIT: Sir.

Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}: -- describe to me, if you don't mind, the overall climate of the battalion at that time to include, sort of, accountability for -- for the manner in which accountability was established between the battalion commander and those who may not have performed well, whether it be FSMAO or LRE or --

WIT: So I saw all the command chronology -- or all of the

45

Enclosure (71) Page 45 of 51

command climate surveys. I saw the command climate survey before I got on deck. We brought in a command climate survey team the fall of '19. I think we did another one before Colonel Brenize left. With any command climate, you have to, you know, be able to look at it objectively and not really focus on what some of the people are saying.

Overall, I think so, colonel -- Colonel Brenize had a very unique style of leadership. I mean, he has own style of leadership, and he's not a very outspoken, open, talking to everybody type of person. So I would say that his interactions with the platoon and with the staff, whether they're doing good or bad, I mean, he -- he -he would show frustration. You knew when he was frustrated or you knew when he would be upset, but he would never yell or scream. I mean, I even -- he would -- he would do this and he put his head down. I could tell he was saying a little prayer for guidance and strength, but he -- he would never yell. And he would know, you know, who he was angry at.

And and most of the time when I was there, you know, I would --I would tell him, sir, I've got it, or the OpsO or the four, we would handle it. As his majors, we would take care of the staff for him, but there's a lot of distrust in the senior enlisted ranks and that would probably come from the fall of '18. You know, he had just got on deck. And he made some calls that were not popular with the senior staff NCOs to the point where him and his senior master guns who were, at one point in their careers, you know, really good friends above

senior subordinate, to the point that master guns actually pinned on major to this individual's rank, his collar. But the senior staff NCOs really -- when -- when that relationship soured, I think the colonel's relationship with his senior staff NCO soured, and not -not to Colonel Brenize's fault.

Sometimes, you know, you disagree with your staff NCOs and they have to follow, and this particular master guns chose not to and that was difficult. And it was difficult because we also had a sergeant major who was, for all intents and purposes, retired on active duty. So you have your two senior enlisted Marines in the battalion that are there for the battalion commander that were just totally not plugged in. And I think that also helped with the senior staff -- it was staff NCOs across the battalion not necessarily trusting him, and that trickle down a little bit to the junior Marines. Not -- not as bad.

It got bad with the junior Marines, obviously, with the social media issues that we had in the battalion that really hit the battalion hard, and that was just as -- as Colonel Brenize was on his way out the door. I think that affected command climate, and that kind of showed the command climate that the Marines didn't necessarily trust his decision making or believe in him or have confidence in him. And part of that was, as always, is communication. The "so what" of what they were doing was never really getting down.

He was holding Marines accountable, and those Marines felt like they shouldn't have been held accountable. And so they turn to social media and they turn to other means to to to be heard, and that -- that

weighed on him. And that was probably spring of '20 when he was getting ready to leave. But the incident from the fall of '18, I wasn't there. That -- that was still reverberating when I got on deck in March of '19.

Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$: So the master guns, did he stay in the battalion the whole time or --

WIT: So I think things soured in -- in the fall of '18 with that master guns. And then -- and then the battalion commander continued, you know, I -- I hear but we are going this way, eventually soured that master guns. And then that master guns eventually left that summer 19. He executed orders. And I think -- I mean, there were -- there were issues with, like, "Where's the master guns? Hey, XO, Where's master guns?" It's like, "Right, sir. I'll go find the master guns," and the master guns would -- would come in at like noon in civvies, do some emails, and then take off.

I mean, it was -- it was sour. It was sour. And they eventually had to have a coming to Jesus and meet in the colonel's office. So they talked for about a couple of hours and that was it. So yeah, it was -- it wasn't very good. But at the same time, we had a retiring maintenance officer too. Same thing like just having those senior guys. You know, I need you to get on the scale there, buddy. Like just dodge me, you know. So it's -- it's just trying -- trying to get the senior guys to kind of, like, understand the colonel. Like, that was hard. And I think he -- when he tried to lay down the law like, "I'm the battalion commander," with all the staff NCOs and

officers in -- in the fall of '18, it did -- it had the exact opposite effect, because he pulled them all in.

They were in a field exercise. There were a bunch of issues. Pulled all the staff NCOs and officers in, regardless of where you were and what you were doing and had a little pow wow with them all. Opened up the -- opened up the floor for questions, comments, concerns. And it just did -- from what I hear, it just wasn't good as people were, you know, vocalizing concerns and gripes. And I don't think -- I don't think that panned well for him being able to continue to make those decisions and the staff NCOs be like, "Okay. Yes, sir. We're -- we're behind you." You know, they had -- they had to look to the OpsO or their company commander and go, "You are good with this?" Okay. Yeah. You know, fine. So I think there was a little bit of that going on.

Col $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$: Okay. Is there anything else you would like to share with us before we close the interview?

WIT: No, sir. I'm going to give -- somehow, I'll get you a data dump of all the SitReps of the -- so you've seen the LRE briefs. You don't need those?

CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b) (7)(c): Correct.

WIT: All right. I've got --

CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b): The SitReps would be phenomenal.

WIT: I've got all the SitReps. I have got General Castellvi's response to all the SitReps. So you'll see our email to the general and his response. So if it opens up with, you know, "Hey, Keith, I

understand," that's because you have to read the bottom -- read from the bottom, up.

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}$: Sure.

WIT: So I got all those SitReps. I've got the -- you know, Major $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}{(c)}$ probably provided you the 30 -- I've got them all -the 3d AA Battalion force allocation brief.

Did you have that?

Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) : Which one, sir?

WIT: 3rd AA Battalion Force Allocation Brief. The one that Major $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$ put together.

Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$: We do have that one, sir.

CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}$: And then conversations or e-mails about the -- right after the joint LTIs.

WIT: Yeah, I've got that. That's in this folder to -- yeah. Here -- here's the email. What's the date on this? March 25th, we switched our vehicles for that platoon based on Master Guns $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$'s recommendation of the colonel's decision to --

CWO5 $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6)}{(b)(7)(c)}$: Yeah, that makes sense.

WIT: Yeah. March 25th, I got the email right here. I was trying to do this since, obviously, your email the other day, sir. So will try to get you as much of the information that I had, because I was cc'd on everything. The email I was showing you was all the usage. So we did a -- an age and usage data on all the AAVs from 2015 until 2020 for the battalion. So that's what that Excel spreadsheet was. That was done in -- on -- in August of '21 -- well, August 2020.

Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: Okay. I think I'm good. Gentlemen? CWO5 ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: Yeah. Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$: I appreciate your time, sir. WIT: Yes, sir.

Col ${}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$: And your candid responses. I got to read you one more statement.

CWO5 $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}$: The closing statement.

Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)} : You're directed not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone other than members of the investigation team. If you are asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify me or one of the team members or your commanding officer. And that concludes the interview.

[The interview of Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b) (6), (b)(7) concluded at 1620, 20 April 2021.]

I, Colonel $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$, attest that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of Lieutenant Colonel $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$ held on 20 April 2021.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Col, USMC

[The Investigative Interview commenced on 0915, 16 April 2021.]
[WIT: Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}]
[IO: Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}]

- [IO: Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)]
- [IO: CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}]
- [CR: SSgt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)]

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Good morning. My name is Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)}(c) (c) ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}. I'm accompanied by Chief Warrant Officer 5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}, and Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}. We are a part of a team reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the 15th MEU, and actions and decisions associated with the material conditioning, training and personnel readiness thereof. This investigation is associated with the assault amphibious vehicle mishap that occurred off San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020.

We are not conducting a second investigation of the incident itself, but rather investigating from an institutional perspective to determine any changes that may be required or any actions that could or should have been implemented prior to the accident.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas, appointed Lieutenant General Mundy on 2 April 21 to

conduct this investigation, which includes, among other things, interviewing personnel from different organizations with information relevant to the investigation. We have copies here of the convening order and the membership of the investigation, if you want to see that in front of you as well.

The Staff Director of the Marine Corps, Major General Olson, appointed us to the investigating team on 8 April 21. And I am talking to you in my investigatory capacity as a representative of Lieutenant General Mundy and General Thomas. We are required to provide General Thomas with a written report upon the completion of our investigation.

I am talking with you because the investigating team believes you might have information that may be relevant to the investigation. It is important for us to understand this, but please inform us of anything you believe should be considered in this review. The topics that we will discuss will likely cover formation in compositing of the 15th MEU, training and material readiness surrounding the formation and composing of the 15th MEU, and I MEF and Division oversight of the 15th MEU.

This is an administrative investigation. However, due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing review, we are asking personnel we talk to as a part of the investigation not to share

anything we discuss today with any other person. So before we start.

Do you have any questions about my role or their role in this investigation?

WIT: No, sir.

IO (Col $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$): As a starting point, if you could please state your name, your rank, and your current billet.

WIT: My name is Major ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} . I am currently the battalion executive officer for 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): And what was your billet on 30 July 2020? WIT: On 30 July 2020, I was a CJ35 future operations planner at CJTFOIR.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): We were told you were the S-4 of the battalion during this period.

WIT: I was the S-4 of the battalion from July 2019 until January 2020 when I deployed to CJTF at the end of February, February 28.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Do you know who the acting S-4 was at that point, or the S-4?

WIT: In July, sir?

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): In July of 2020. The period once you left in January of 2020, who took over your role and were they

the S-4 in July?

WIT: So it switched hands between a number of people after I left, sir. So Captain ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}_{(c)}$ who was the S-4 Alpha, he was, he stepped up to be the S4 for the months of February and March 2020. Then Major ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}_{(c)}$ came in March, towards the end of March, and he was the S-4 for March and April. He was immediately tagged to be the future operations officer for the SPMAGTF. And then the duty was passed on to Captain ${}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)}_{(7)(c)}$ from April until about June.

And then we had Lieutenant ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ and eventually Captain ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(b)(7)(c)}$. I don't have a solid timeline for them in the July through September timeframe.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): So some of these obviously -- some of the questions I had prepared for you based on the idea that you were the S-4 for that period. I may have to adjust some of those questions, but still, I think your statements will be very relevant.

I'm going to start big picture. Can you describe for me the relationship that -- let me take a step back. During your period as the S-4, did you form any MEUs in any form or composite, any MEUs or any units that supported the Division or the MEF?

WIT: During my time as S-4, sir, the month of December andJanuary is when we initially formed the - well re-formed the 15th platoon out of the personnel in the battalion. So what initially happened is that Lieutenant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), '} platoon was tagged for the 13th MEU. 13th MEU continued to slide and inevitably was cancelled and then they rolled over to be aligned to the 15th MEU. However, due to EAS requirements or EAS cut off dates, it continued shifting right because of the 15th MEU changing composite date. Basically, it was a 15th MEU platoon in name only under Lieutenant Need, it was basically just an AAV platoon within H&S.

So long story short was when we received Alpha Company back from UDP in the December timeframe, the battalion realigned personnel to reform the personnel within the 15th MEU with appropriate EAS cutoff dates, the appropriate staff NCOs, and the appropriate platoon commander.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Okay. Thank you. So during that process -- and again, I'm speaking mainly from a material readiness perspective. What was your relationship with the Division before -- Division in general in terms of just the interaction and climate as it pertains to forming a unit to support the BLT?

WIT: The main interaction that I had with Division G-4 was predominantly surrounded in regards to the LRE. So their

logistics readiness evaluation and FSMAO. So aside from that, my interaction with them was rather limited. There's not a lot of oversight, inquiry, or otherwise coming from the G-4 for material readiness. Really of anything in the battalion, let alone 15th MEU.

IO (CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),}$): Do we want to expand upon the FSMAO and LRE piece now?

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): I will here in a minute. So your relation with the G-4, were not really nothing specific with respect to, you know, interest in how you're forming the AAV Platoon for the upcoming BLT. How about the BLT itself, the S-4 from the BLT, any early interaction between you and the S-4 from BLT 1/4?

WIT: No, sir. There is -- no one from 1st Marines reached out to the 3rd Tracks S-4 in regards to 15th MEU or formation of the BLT.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): What were the challenges -- you talked about, you know, obviously EAS being one of the challenges, trying to manage the EAS as you tried to composite your own platoon in preparation for the BLT. But were there additional challenges and what were some of those if they did exist?

WIT: So there were a number of additional challenges.

Basically, when I got on deck and took over as the S-4, Lieutenant Colonel Brenize had asked a question. He had asked the Division CG to assist with supporting major contingency operations as well as our continued global force management requirements. Right now, I do not believe that I'm structured to be able to do that due to the way that the UDPs are operating and how we were sourcing only two platoons and a company headquarters to III MEF. And the rest of the battalion companies were formed in various different capacities, Delta Company being Delta Company.

But as far as the other two companies, they are either in a PTP or in a forming phase, again, we're not organized to support any sort of major contingency operation. And if that were to happen, then there would be a significant number of changes that would need to happen to H&S. And just overall structure of the battalion was not -- did not align with the CG's priorities. So he [LtCol Brenize] asked that question and he had asked that question to multiple members of the staff that had checked in and said, $\binom{b}{(0, b)}{(0, 10)}$ [Major $\binom{b}{(0, 0)}{(0, 10)}$], if you can figure this out for me, I'd like -- no one can give me an answer.

So I took that and kind of ran with it. So from July till about September, October timeframe, I kind of did the research on what is the TO&E structure of the battalion. Why are

we doing things the way that we're doing. And then the whole process of administrative deadline and why does that exist and what was coming out of that decision to establish administrative deadline, contingent within the battalion's table of equipment?

So from there, I looked at the manning and equipping of a battalion, and noticed that when it came to BIC alignment, the battalion was not where it needed to be. This forced people not being aligned or being, in some cases, three people on a single BIC and just kind of getting the generalized situational awareness of where are the people in the battalion. That was a constant question that came out of the CO's mouth is like, how do we have on any given day four to 500 people not on hand. What is wrong with the reporting within the battalion? Why are so many people, quote unquote, not on hand? And that question was posed to the staff and the companies.

So looking through that, there's just a lot of misreporting. But then also there's just a significant amount of individual augments, FAPS, CAPS, additional MOS schools as far as like MOS enhancing schools like AUL and what not, to then staff academy and things of that nature. So constantly kind of had a rotation of at least about a hundred personnel that were legitimately not on hand. Whereas the excess was more

misreporting due to either, quote unquote, an inappropriate field duty when they're on the rifle range or otherwise.

So the long story short with that is that kind of guided a lot of the planning for the reorganization of the battalion to meet the two competing, somewhat competing interests. So looking through the exact TE and the crews and the requirements were, the intent and guidance from Lieutenant Colonel Brenize was to create line companies regardless of what the TE states, because Charlie Company and Delta Company have different TEs from Alpha and Bravo Company. And different for that matter, TOs from Alpha and Bravo Company. So there's no kind of cookie cutter element to the battalion when we're essentially doing cookie cutter rotations through UDP.

So I went through that whole process and determined that the 53 vehicles that were in ADL, there was 20 in excess of ADL that had not been appropriately planned for. And that ADL process and formation I was not around for. When I checked in, I had to pick up the pieces with that. That happened within the first 30 days of me coming on board and being the S-4. So that was kind of a thing that I immediately had to turn to get functional.

So the end result of reviewing everything was that we

could have Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie appropriately organized, as cookie cutter assault amphibian companies. Delta Company would be in their transition phase from AAV to ACVs, and H&S was kind of the one that was little bit more amorphous in the sense that we did not have the personnel to support a full 24 vehicle MCM platoon. And there had been kind of shifting requirements for GS/the command control sections. So at the end of the day, what was decided is that the MEUs would be formed out of H&S due to the company requirements to support the UDP. And the consistent problems of when the MEUs were out of the companies, that the company leadership had no oversight over the MEU platoon once the company went UDP since the Westpac MEUs, were not aligned to the UDP rotational cycle.

So that was a significant problem when they were operating under Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)} or previously under Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, where the company would go forward and then the Westpac MEU would be in some sort of composite type of forming phase pre chop. And they would have no direct company oversight or interim oversight between the platoon and battalion.

IO $(Col {}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)})$: So is it safe to say that the intent -- I think what I'm hearing is the intent of the reorganization was to give stability to the forming and compositing of the MEUs.

WIT: Both the UDP and the MEUs, sir. So that there would

be a standing MEU platoon within H&S and then there would be the capability, depending upon the next provided compositing chop date, for the follow on MEU to pull and organize a second MEU out of H&S from GS and MCM platoons in H&S. That was the intent behind that, given that unlike when I was a lieutenant, how we were doing six out, six forming, six in the PTP pre chop. That was no longer the cycle. So now there's significant gaps between that whole process.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): So was the H&S company commander was an 1803?

WIT: Yes. So that was Captain ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}_{(b)(7)(c)}$. Captain ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}_{(b)(7)(c)}$ was the H&S Company Commander until January of 2020. Then a transition to Captain ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ in January 2020. And he was the company commander for the entire year until January 2021.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): And he's an 1803 as well?

WIT: Right, sir.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3). (b)(6). (b)}): So you mentioned Colonel Brenize trying to align to the Division's priorities. Where would you say, from your perspective, the forming and compositing of a MEU fell out in those list of priorities?

WIT: From a manning perspective, like in the December, January time frame that was the 15th MEU was the priority, but it

11

Enclosure (72) Page 11 of 42

shifted between MEU formation and UDP formation. In a sense that the UDPs were regular, they were predictable. We knew what needed to get done and when it needed to get done. The moving target was always the MEU. And since the 13th MEU became nonexistent and they transitioned and push it to become the 15th MEU, the MEUs had been an unknown within the battalion. And generally speaking, because the date kept pushing right. And similarly, that happened with the 11th MEU decomposite due to the strikes in Iran and the 11th MEU not being allowed to decomposite like they were supposed to in January. So that whole process, the chop process back of the 11th MEU had influence on the 15th MEU equipment set.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): And so what was the rationale for -- just talk me through the selection of the vehicles that we're going to get aligned to -- the process the battalion went through to select the vehicles they did for the 15th MEU.

WIT: So I know the decision and what the selection was up until the point in January. But then how it played out February through April, I don't have cognizance of. I can only tell you that in December Colonel Brenize made a decision. He had two options, either to maintain the vehicles currently within H&S as the 15th MEU or to push Lt ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),} and those platoon assets to Alpha Company.

So the decision that he went with was the 11th MEU is returning in December. They are decomposing a few weeks after that, the 15th MEU will receive 11th MEU tractors. That was the decision. And then when the 11th MEU decomposing dragged out, that's when things got dorked up. So from there I -- that's whenI deployed and I lost cognizance of how they tried to resolve that problem set.

IO (Col (D(G), (D)(G), (D)): How about you having been part of the process of defining the mod cycles with the AAV back in the national capital region. Obviously just for clarity, we have three subsequent mods that will get done to a set number of AAVs, not the entire fleet of AAVs. We have the intercom mod. We have the RWS, remote weapon station mod, and the tactical communications or the radio upgrade mod. Not occurring concurrently but occurring sequentially over a period of four or five years. The desire was always if we can get those -- because once you modded one vehicle with its intercom and had to receive the RWS and the radio mod so that the design ideally was that we would have got the -- last vehicles in the Marine Corps, we'd have all three mods as we divested of AAV. And then further, the desire was, hey, we'd like to get these on as many RCCA vehicles

as possible. But we left that decision up to the battalion commanders to manage that challenge at their level, not wanting to put them into any sort of -- putting a constraint on them that may impact their ability to support their mission.

So if you don't have any SA, that's fine. But if you could describe for me sort of what that did to you from the challenge perspective as a battalion.

WIT: So this kind of touches on the ADL program. The intent of the ADL program was to pull our own vehicles and have those be kind of the longevity per se, depending upon how the ACV fielding played out. And in conjunction with that and the RCCA and how many RCCAs we were meant to get to then how many of each subsequent mod, those numbers were not all equitable. So there's more 7800I than there were RCCA vehicles that we got fielded. There's more RWS than there are RCCAs. And the RWS is not the same amount as the 7800I.

So given that there were multiple different numbers associated with each of those modifications, the intent was to provide all the RCCA vehicles to get the upgrades. But what Master Gunny ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)} had done is he spread those RCCAs out across the battalion. Similar to how the IROAN program was done, that when you got IROAN, you sent back a tractor. And it was just

you got a new tractor. It wasn't anything specific associated with how the one for one swaps were working.

So the other concern with those mods was training. So given UDP requirements and when those mods were going to be fielded to the tractors at 4th Marines, there was concern if we were to put all of those modifications and all of the RCCA tractors in all in one company, how that would then hamstring the battalion's ability to support UDP because Marines would be trained and familiar with those modifications, but then go to 4th Marines and operate on old equipment sets like the Up-Guns Weapon Station and Vic two system. So that problem set, didn't get defined or refined or resolved until we got the MCBULs for this FY that gave us our realignment of divestiture out of H&S, and then established how things were gonna go with Alpha Company and Bravo Company in conjunction with the ACV fielding.

So when that happened, it was much easier for the battalion to pull all the RCCAs together into Alpha Company as a division support company and dictate all the 7800I would go to Alpha Company and all of the other modifications would go to those tractors primarily. And that any excess would go to Bravo Company, Bravo Company, Third Platoon that was going to have their tractors for the longest amount of time because they were

the final platoon to get ACVs out of the next two FYs.

So based on a lot of those complications, there was -the battalion was kind of reeling from how to manage that problem set because of mods changing amounts of RCCA vehicles and then the continual UDP requirement. As soon as that UDP requirement was taken away this year with Bravo Company, that allowed the battalion to shift focus and actually do something about how it operates and what equipment sets it trains on.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): How would you describe the battalion climate with respect to material readiness through the leadership of emphasis, etc.?

WIT: So there definitely was a, we had a material readiness brief every week without fail --

IO (Col $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$): With the battalion commander?

WIT: With the battalion commander. And it was a point of importance. It was always provided to the CG in the CG SITREP to General Castellvi. So the readiness of the battalion was a measure of importance. However, scratching the surface of that and getting down to kind of the nitty gritty and the details, I think that there was -- my personal belief was that we were telling the CO readiness, but not showing him that we're ready. And what I mean by that is that, you know, the material readiness

brief is a dataset that's pulled from reports. But those reports aren't necessarily true and accurate if there's bad information in GCSS Marine Corps, which then relates back to the FSMAO results. So when I got on deck it was less than is about 45 days of FSMAO and the MMO, CWO ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}, was going through pre inspections and validation of our processes and, they were just not where they needed be. And if you go from a climate perspective, the worst problem was that, prior to my arrival, the S4 was non-existent and the commodities that are underneath the four, they had created their own fiefdoms and were not supporting each other.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): So just for clarity, and you may or may not know this answer, so the S-4 was gapped prior to your arrival. Do you know for how long?

WIT: Essentially months. Because Captain ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}, was at blended seminar and really was not there. Lieutenant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}, was ^{(b)(7)} filling in as the four but the four was also running programs for the Naval Academy midshipman. So there was not -- the four nucleus was very much not focused on anything beyond UMCC and TMRs and things of that nature. Field mess was its own thing, the battalion maintenance was their own thing. Supply was their own thing. Everybody had their own fiefdoms and battalion

maintenance and supply did not talk. They did not get along. They did not have any capacity of teamwork. It was always pointing fingers back at each other. And that was a major issue that I had to take on when I got to 3rd Tracks and took over. As the four was the bring everybody back in under the four shop.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): As I -- I'm sorry. As a point of comparison, was any of the other staff gapped?

WIT: No, sir. Right now we have a 4 that's a major, Major $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}{(c)}$ and our S3 and our X0. The only gap right now that we have really is H&S Company's CO - that's supposed to be a major and that would be Major $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}{(c)}$. And he's still deployed.

IO (Col $_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}$): Is there a captain in that billet right now?

WIT: Right, sir.

IO (Col $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$): Is he an 1803?

WIT: Yes, sir. But to kind of reiterate how much things were smaller fiefdoms, is that when I showed up within supply, there were 22 different SUCs for the battalion. And each MEU has its own SUC. Battalion has its own.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): For the purpose of the interview, could you define SUC.

WIT: Supporting Unit Unicode. So essentially, CMR,

consolidated memorandum receipt's, there are 22 different ones within the battalion, H&S had one, motor T had their own. The one, the two, the three, the four, the NBC, field mess, supply, etc. The number of different CMRs had disaggregated across multiple individuals and created this state where the supply was dealing with 22 different customers. And then add delegations of authority onto that, they're dealing essentially with 60 different people on any given day on the 22 different CMRs.

So how their how supplies of actually managing that is they didn't. And FSMAO showed just how mismanaged it was. So one of the other purposes of the reorganization was to consolidate the CMR into appropriate responsible officers. So elements of H&S would be put back under H&S company commander so that the three didn't have his own CMR, that was H&S's company CMR and that someone in the three would be a responsible individual for their section of the account.

So basically platoon commanders were not being afforded the opportunity to be responsible individuals and in some cases there were Staff Sergeants and Gunnys that had the MEU CMRs, but there was really no equipment in it. There's a number of issues associate with that I worked to resolve and get down to. Even to this day.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): I want to touch on one more thing real quick and then I'll turn it over to these gentlemen, if they have any additional questions. You talked about the LRE and the FSMAO and you talked about how the results of those weren't ideal. Did you feel like the battalion put and/or the division placed an appropriate level of emphasis on your corrective action plan and then the execution? That the corrective action plan, once the LRE or the FSMAO occurred, that you have some issues and we want to make sure that they get the help, the assistance, and the emphasis placed on the corrective action plan. How did that playout from your perspective?

WIT: Yes, sir. So the results of the FSMAO kind of confirmed my suspicion that we -- like as a unit we were not showing the boss. We were just telling him that we were good. So -- and added essentially a little bit more grounds for me as a four to make additional changes and make additional adjustments. And within the battalion and the corrective action plan that was oversaw by the XO, it was taken seriously. There is an appropriate amount of detail that was applied to it. Lieutenant Colonel $\binom{10}{(0)}$, $\binom{10}{(0)}$, $\binom{10}{(0)}$ at the Division, the material readiness officer and Captain $\binom{10}{(0)}$, $\binom{10}{(0)}$ -- I can't remember her name, but she's the LRE OIC. She was the LRE OIC. They definitely provided assistance

20

Enclosure (72) Page 20 of 42

to the supply officer to rectify his errors and discrepancies.

So there was -- when the results did come out, the corrective action plan, there was an appropriate weight behind it. However, I don't think that from a battalion perspective, to the individuals involved, there was a measure of accountability that followed up the corrective action plan as far as the failures to pass. So I believe Captain ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}, [3d AA Bn's Supply Offier] received a NPLOC, but I don't know -- I can't recall if any other members of the FSMAO -- any other permanent members that were inspected during FSMAO if they had received any sort of counseling correction or accountability.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): So just for clarity, what month did that FSMAO go in?

WIT: I believe that the FASMO was in the month of September of 19.

IO (Col $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$): Any questions?

IO (CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}): Yes, sir. Chief Warrant Officer ^{(b)(3), (b)}_(c)^{(b)(3), (b)(7)}_(c). Thanks for your time, sir. I appreciate it. You said that the CO was receiving weekly material readiness briefs. Was there any S-3 involvement in those briefs were they president those?

WIT: Nope.

IO (CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),(b)(6)}$): And the interaction or the information being passed to the S-3, was the S-3 aware of any material readiness concerns?

WIT: Yes. I personally talked to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3).(b)(6).(b)(7). He and I spoke regularly, daily, even though he was not there in the briefing, there wasn't an S-3 representative in the brief. He and I talked, again, daily and communicated the maintenance issues and ensured maintenance stand downs were put on a TEEP. When we looked at them coming down from Division, when we looked at company training plans I was involved in that. And we provided appropriate pushback and guidance to the companies on their material readiness and what they need to be doing.

So a perfect example of this, with Charlie Company's PTP. We had looked at how we were doing business for the UDPs and there was a number of issues that come up essentially from previous iterations that company commander's trying to outdo each other, but like going out to NTC and doing table 12 gunnery and trying to essentially kind of look at what I did on my PTP. Like, okay, look, let's stop that. What are the physical requirements to talk to MEF training support element at MEF, had them come down, have them provide us with the exact requirements

for PTP to go UDP. And Charlie Company, we set Charlie Company up for success so they could generate more whitespace to provide remedial training or maintenance downtime to support the actual up tempo.

And that was one thing is that the battalions op tempo was unreal. It is basically you're in, you're out. You know, you fix it on the back end and figure it out. But platoons were going out and operating and there was exceptions to non-use that was authorized for going to go out and do land operations and we don't care about how and -- I say we I mean, like a battalion and the community wasn't really caring about okay, well your deadline for your turret or your deadline for a water operation as well. So we're just doing land operations. So why do we care? And that was a very prevalent thing that was not, in my opinion, appropriate.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): I have a follow on question. When I grew up, we used to have -- it may still exist to this day. When I grew up in the assault amphibian community, we used to have a sort of a template, seven hours of maintenance for every hour of operation. Is that something that's still sort of permeates or is that sort of went by the wayside? And that's at least from a cultural look. Now, my second question is: It sounds to me

based on op tempo, that you weren't getting that sort of maintenance to operation ratio that we used to say seven to one was sort of the right number. It sounds like that may have been a challenge for the battalion based on op tempo.

WIT: Yes. I mean, they're like 50 percent on the ramp, 50 operating at any given time. It was basically you have some dog and pony, then do a little demonstration out in the basin or take the PROTRAMID Marines from one range to another. You know, there's just all of the support squad leaders course, or this or that. You know, there are those sorts of things that nickel and dimed the time to the point where, you know, operations and maintenance was just, you know, fix what's immediately broken so that we can turn around and go support the next operation.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): Understanding GFM requirements and the need to appropriately train and prep for those things. Aside from those things, was there a climate of pushback from the battalion commander or the division commander, was there -- did you push back on the battalion commander or did the OpsO pushback on the battalion commander and say we're just not getting enough maintenance time? Do you have a sense of what that may have or may not have looked like?

WIT: So Lieutenant Colonel $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}{(c)}$ and myself, we pushed

back to the CO. That was one of our immediate points, that the op tempo was not appropriate and the same thing down to the companies that they need to slow down and be more deliberate and start working through, you know, the UTM process appropriately and how they conduct training. That's how the MCCRE order got rewritten for the battalion in 2019. It was based off of that feedback and why we did what we did for Charlie Company to generate that whitespace for maintenance and for additional training opportunities if they need to do remediation or get additional testing reps prior to MCCRE. What really affected the battalion in my opinion, was that 3rd Tracks, because of its field grade population gets IA'd and those kind of key leaders get pulled. And what happens at this kind of very critical juncture in January 2020, was that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) was pulled foran IA with MEF. I was pulled based off my clearance to fill another IA with CJTF. And then again when there is an opportunity to have another Major come in, division pulled yet again for SPMAGTF, which then continued to leave the battalion with just the XO present.

And the thing that XO, Lieutenant Colonel ${}^{(b)(3), (b)}_{(G), (b)(7)}$, Lieutenant Colonel ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(C)}$, and myself consistently talked about was just there's a significant lack of experience and lack of

judgment in kind of post company commanders to be effective operations or S-4. They still don't necessarily see the broader picture and what essentially was a contentious relationship at times, because they believe the battalion headquarters was responsible for supporting the companies. Every whim, will, and need, but the feedback there is that we do it based off priority, what the battalion commander and battalion needs. And sometimes that aligns with your company's needs, but sometimes it doesn't.

So there was really an issue amongst the company commanders at that time based off of what happened with the previous S-3, Major $\binom{(b)(3)}{(b)(6)}$, and his misconduct that led to a number $\binom{(b)(7)}{(c)}$, of company commanders just essentially going rogue and doing their own thing without battalion oversight, because there no one appetite to push back to the companies and tell they're either being unrealistic or, you know, inappropriate in their requests or needs.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3). (b)(6). (b)}): Which is understandable. I'm just gonna be blunt. I mean, where was the battalion commander in this process? I mean, obviously, he had to recognize the challenges and did he -- what sort of emphasis or leadership did he provide during that period?

WIT: There wasn't a lot of action that I observed. And

there are issues. So field grade officers having misconduct within the battalion and then senior enlisted not being able to make height and weight standards but not being put on BCP to then Chief Warrant Officer ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}, the BMO, being put on BCP and processed out. So there was a number of individuals for an amount of time prior to my arrival that battalion commander wasn't really supported with a staff that could provide him feedback and support his decision making.

So when Lieutenant Colonel ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} and I finally checked in and started making changes and started moving the ball forward, it was like we had moved the ball forward only to get cut out at the knees when we got pulled for IAs. And then the unfortunate reality is that literally the day after I deployed on February 28 that first week of March is when everything shut down due to COVID.

So there was a confluence of events that happened within the battalion as far as from a leadership perspective of pulling people out of key billets with no backfill to then COVID happening and doing the Alpha, Bravo Command split and Native Fury layer that on top of that. And the late tasking from Division to support Native Fury. They didn't task us till December of 2019. And it was going to be the CRFP unit, which

was Lieutenant $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$'s, his unit with 15th MEU. And miscommunication with what unit within 1st Marines was actually going to support the Native Fury requirement.

So there was this confluence of events with the 11th MEU, Native Fury, leadership being pulled out of the unit and COVID just created an environment that was ripe for having the issues that later percolated within how the 15th MEU was formed and chopped out of the battalion anyone.

IO (CWO5 ${}_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}$): Just to tie back to the S-3. The S-4's involvement in the DRRS report, were you afforded opportunities or is your input for the comments in that report? Did you participate in that matter?

WIT: DRRS was done by Master Gunnery Sergeant ^{(b)(3)}, ^{(b)(6)}, and supported by the MMO, CWO ^{(b)(3)}, ^{(b)(6)}, at the time. I've seen this repeatedly where DRRS is very much an afterthought and an inappropriate amount of importance is put to it in. And since coming back in as the XO, that's something that I've changed with a battalion battle rhythm where everything is focused around DRRS in a sense that we have the DRRS report to the CO, that's provided with all staff input from the four, the one, all appropriate commodity's to then supporting deep dives within the MRB and within a supply readiness brief and then a mission

essential task lists review from the three to the CO. Then changes in our battalion staff brief to make sure that kind of products all aligned to essentially provide that site picture readiness.

IO (Col $\frac{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}{(7)(c)}$): That didn't exist before you --

WIT: No, that did not exist until I came back as the XO and made it so.

IO (CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}): So the commander's comments and DRRS reports while you were there, didn't necessarily -- there wasn't much input into commander's comments regarding material readiness or supply concerns or the modification concerns?

WIT: So it literally -- the way it was operating under Lieutenant Colonel Brenize and until I showed up, the MMO would go sit down with Master Gunny and they go through that portion. The S1 would then go sit down with Master Gunny and they go through that portion. Company commanders will provide their input to Master Gunny. And then the final report was generated by Master Gunny, and the colonel sat in there for like five hours going through the data.

So it wasn't a board. It was a conversation essentially between two people based off of data inputs from various commodities within the staff, which I didn't think was

appropriate.

IO $(CWO5_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)})$: So now to the admin deadline program. Was there a then MOSOP written? Was there a policy that was signed off by the battalion commander?

WIT: Yes, we -- so every vehicle that was to be put in the admin deadline status was to be in a condition code bravo. Ιt was to last no longer than 18 months. And there is a policy letter and a starting of the ADL program. There are all of those docs exist. I don't have the ADL -- like when ADL launched that signed copy the MMO shop does. And I think there were significant issues with how ADL ended up being ran long term based off of, again, for personnel turnover, because Master Gunny (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the RO for that account and then became the S-3 chief during the summer time frame in June, July. And then not necessarily having the appropriate support from certain battalion staff members like the BMO or the maintenance chief or other elements of S-6 to support the requirements to maintain those tractors in accordance with the ADL requirements.

IO (CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}$): And if a tractor was going to get pulled out of -- or a piece of a equipment was going to get pulled out of the ADL, was there a procedure in place for that?

WIT: Yes. They had to do a joint LTI. They had to do --

they, who was the element supporting the ADL, which was Master Guns ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} and an element of battalion maintenance. I can't remember the staff sergeant, and then the commodity that was receiving the tractor. So for instance, Charley Company or H&S Company, they need to do a joint LTI and then they had to do, I believe, the high service that was that needs to be done.

IO (CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}): And during your tenure there, the influx and outflux with the flow of equipment was there vehicles being pulled in and out, or was it pretty much it was just a static lot of equipment?

WIT: No. So it was a static lot. And the only thing that was being done is that vehicles were being removed from it to support the reorganization the battalion for specifically a third platoon at Charlie Company, and to provide the MCLC kits for MCM because there was only two to two sets of kits that were mounted. So we're gonna give them a full six kits to be in MCM. So six MCLCs and then six chases was what MSM was to be and then GS.

So at the end of the day there's a small number of vehicles that was to be pulled from ADL. It wasn't more than about 15. The ADL also included the MCLC kits.

IO (CWO5 $\binom{(b)(3), (b)(6)}{(b)(7)(c)}$): Thanks for that, sir. So now composition

of H&S company from a maintenance perspective, was it before the reorg or during the reorg or can you talk about the senior mechanic, was there an 0411 within H&S company as it compares to the other companies?

WIT: So that was a critical point of friction because the opinions of BMO was I'm not H&S company's maintenance officer yet structurally in the TO, we'd removed the maintenance officer out of that and we were gapped 2149 to support with a master sergeant in H&S. So I cannot remember exactly how that was resolved. But that did for say a certain measure of additional onus on the company commander to be more savvy in maintenance.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Was Colonel Brenize aware of that--WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): And did he support that position that he wasn't the company maintenance?

WIT: I, I don't know, sir. Another kind of side note with this it, again, with how personnel field grades gets pulled. There's a measure of continuity. So for instance, to BMO's fitness report was done by the XO, the MMO's fitness report was done by the XO. But regardless from that, I didn't care. You're still gonna do what I need you to do. But it was a small note. The supply officer was done by the XO and the XO and I just had

to work closer together, make sure that if they weren't supporting me as the four then, you know, the XO was going to come over the top rope and make it so.

IO (CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}$): So in hindsight, looking back, the maintenance support within H&S company was not sufficient?

WIT: Absolutely.

IO (CWO5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)): But it was resonant -- there was maintenance Marines with experience in other companies that were spread throughout the battalion.

WIT: Yes. There was resident experience. It just again, how they got fielded was --

IO (Col $^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): I'm sorry to interrupt you, but I just want a point of clarity. You still have battalion maintenance Marines assigned to the BMO, correct?

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3). (b)(6). (b)}): And so there is experienced, knowledgeable maintenance Marines within H&S Company that could address the maintenance needs of that company. But if I hear this correctly, BMOS sort of defiant declaration that he is the battalion maintenance officer and his Marines? I'm guessing that extends to his Marines, their battalion maintenance Marines. They're not H&S Company Maintenance Officer H&S Company Marines.

33

Enclosure (72) Page 33 of 42

Is that a fair assessment?

WIT: That's actually -- yes, sir. There is a small contingent of maintenance Marines that used to support H&S that no longer support H&S because we no longer have tractors in H&S. But when we did have tractors in H&S -- yes, there is a small essentially a staff sergeant and what you would give to a platoon that supported H&S ask that. It was probably not enough in my opinion in hindsight.

IO (CWO5 ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}): Talent management, with regards to forming of the MEU platoons, wherever they belonged, was there opportunities to pick and choose staff NCOs or lieutenants or key members?

WIT: Absolutely.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): So Lieutenant ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ e was specifically chosen amongst the officers as the lieutenant. So base based off of the input from the company commanders. So company commanders offered up their best and brightest and then amongst field grade officers, we -- so Lieutenant Colonel ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$, myself, and think Lieutenant Colonel Brenize all, you know, discussed the lieutenants and picked Lieutenant ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$. The staff NCOs were chosen specifically by Master Gunny ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}$ and Master Gunny ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}_{(0)(7)(c)}$. So they handpicked those Marines.

IO (CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),(b)(6)}$): So now FSMAO. In September, were you present at the brief with the battalion commander and the division commander?

WIT: Division, yes. I was.

IO (CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),}$): The division commander received that brief in your recollection?

WIT: Yes.

IO (CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),(b)(6)}$): Can you describe the battalion commanders kind of attitude towards the results of FSMAO and the emphasis put onto it after that?

WIT: One hundred percent disappointed in the staff and the unit in its performance and professionally embarrassed in briefing the CG.

IO (Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$): And just as a point to reiterate the kind of touched on this before. What aside from the corrective action plan, what sort of accountability position did the battalion leadership take at that moment?

WIT: The only accountability that I knew of, sir, was just the counseling Captain ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ on his failures.

IO (CWO5 ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6),}_{(b)(7)(c)}$): And part of that corrective action plan was the maintenance stand down that was going to be conducted within the next quarter or so. And then January it was done.

Get on in February. Do you remember if there was an LOI written for that.

WIT: Yes.

IO (CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}$): And it had a command support from the BMO, from the battalion commander. Everybody was all in on that. WIT: Yes.

IO (CWO5 $_{(b)(7)(c)}^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),}$): That's it. I was gonna ask you about COVID, but you'd left by then.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): You have any questions, $^{(b)(3),\,(b)}_{(6),\,(b)(7)}$?

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{\scriptscriptstyle (b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}$): Just a handful, sir.

So Major ^{(b)(3).(b)(6).(b)(7)}, thank you for taking the time to answer these questions. In the interest of time, I'm going to try to make these as simple, yes / no as possible. You mentioned ADL policy, who is the approval authority for vehicles going into or out of ADL at the battalion level to the best of your recollection?

WIT: The battalion commander.

IO $(Maj_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)})$: To the best of your recollection, vehicles going in to and out of the ADL, did that have to be communicated up to division?

WIT: No.

IO $(Maj (c)^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)})$: Okay, there is no requirement from

Division for anything like that.

WIT: No. The ADL program was 100 percent internal to the battalion. We had informed division that we're doing it. Battalion commander, it received approval of that. When we established the ADL, we provided updates weekly on the total number in ADL that had been processed to be in ADL. And again, once the vehicles were in ADL, there is no additions to it, there is only subtraction.

IO (Maj (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)): So Division was tracking?

WIT: Yes.

IO $(Maj^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)})$: And then you mentioned vehicles that go into ADL are condition code bravo.

WIT: Yes.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Reorg plan is specifically identified during the command investigation. Hence some of these questions. Briefly, what are the major elements that fall under the four to your recollection?

WIT: Have to clarify.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): Like maintenance, supply -- who do you task as the S-4 officer? Who do you have tasking authority? What commodities?

WIT: All of the commodities.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): All of the commodities? WIT: Yes.

IO $(Maj_{(c)}^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)})$: So maintenance?

WIT: According to the vision statement that was provided and training philosophy, guidance that was provided from Lieutenant Colonel Brenize, he tasked me with it and executing it. And I transition that over to Captain (°)^{(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)} afterwards. So within the PowerPoints that I provided through Major (°)^{(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}, it outlines specifically what each company is going to look like in the forming phase, etc. And, you know, each of the commodities and tasks associated with what they needed to do. Emails also provided included that information.

IO (Maj ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}): So to read back what I just understood, and we have all the email traffic, which I'm assuming came from you - thank you very much, I see that the reorg plan begins to be circulated around November, at least the email traffic we have, November 2019. There's a bunch of different staff members listed on that email plan to include the battalion maintenance officer, battalion maintenance chief, etc. etc, supply officer. Were these commodities, to the best of your recollection, given the opportunity -- one, were they aware of the battalion reorg plan? And, two, were they given the opportunity to provide feedback to that reorg plan to the best of your recollection?

WIT: Yes. They were provided the opportunity in September, October, November, December, January, during multiple meetings, during in progress reviews to provide feedback.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): That's an interesting line of questioning. And I'll just touch on this real quick, because I do know after about an hour and a half of interviewing, it starts to get a little overwhelming. What would you say the support you got from those staff functions were in terms of not physical support, but supportive of the idea of a reorg?

WIT: Battalion maintenance did not want to change anything. They were very hesitant. Captain ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ was absolutely not on board with changing anything, let alone doing any sort of work.

IO (Col $^{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)}_{(7)(c)}$): Despite the battalion commander saying this is my plan, execute.

WIT: Yes.

IO $(Col_{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)})$: Did you get active resistance from those commodities on -- as you start to lay out the execution of the reorg plan, did you get active resistance from those commodities?

WIT: Active resistance in the sense of just blown timeline's. So not meeting the timeline or a circumstance becoming apparent where they prioritize other things over it.

You know, in some cases for the commanders that's their prerogative. But there was significant lack of buy in and just general lack of buyin into the CO. When I say that there are fiefdoms, there were fiefdoms. There were people operating off of their own intent.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}$): Do you have a copy of the battalion commander's vision statement we could get?

WIT: Yes, I can get that.

IO (Maj (e)^{(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)}): Last question, sir, on my end. I took a look at the reorg plan dated 07 January, 2020 that you shot over to Lieutenant Colonel Brenize and in there it's got the 15th MEU forming 27 to 31 January. I don't know if at that time period the chop date of 20 April was known, but, you know, napkin bar math here, that's about 80 days, including weekends, to get that platoon ready for CHOP. Was that timeline either discussed between you and the S3 at that point in time and/or was it, to your knowledge, your recollection, was the battalion commander aware of that timeline?

WIT: Yeah, all the timelines he was aware of. As far as the S3, the S3 was aware of -- I don't know the status as far as like knowledge of the exact chop date. I believe in the presentation it puts April or May timeframe as the potential

for chop. And the personnel were realigned in December and they were already executing training requirements based off of PTP clearance for Native Fury in January.

IO (Maj $_{(c)}^{_{(b)(3),\,(b)(6),\,(b)(7)}}$): By personnel, you mean that MEU platoon relined in December?

WIT: Lieutenant ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)} and Gunny ^{(b)(3), (b)(6),} and the personnel there. They were executing -- for instance, they executed a table 3 and 4, and I executed it with them because I need to do this PTP requirement. They did this in January, prior to the end. The point of what was listed there was the AAV equipment set was going to be turned over from 11th MEU to 15th MEU during that timeframe.

IO (Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$): No, further questions, sir.

IO $(Col _{(7)(c)}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)})$: I have one last statement to make. Real quick. First of all, do you have anything else you want to add to this before I read the closing statement?

WIT: No, sir.

IO (Col ^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}): I tell you this. I appreciate your candidness. It's been extremely helpful in clarifying force. And so, again, I thank you. I'll read this.

You are directed not to discuss the interview or anything that was discussed during the interview with anyone

other than members the investigation team. If you are asked about the investigation, do not answer any questions and immediately notify me, one of the team members, or your commanding officer.

[The Investigative Interview closed at 1038, 16 April 2021.]

I, Col ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)}_{(7)(c)}$, attest that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the interview of Maj ${}^{(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)}_{(c)}$ held on 16 April 2021.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Col, USMC