

1st MAW IRS

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If you have any questions, please contact the IMO at:

IMO Email; (b) (6)

IMO Phone: (b) (3) (A)

Wing Duty Officer Phone: (b) (3) (A)

or Japan Cell Phone (b) (3) (A)

Wing Duty Officer Email: (b) (6)

General Information		
Group +	MAG-12	Y
Squadron *	VMFA(AW)-242	V
Type *	Aviation Ground	
Category *	In-Flight Emergency	Y
	Other	V
Incident Date *	04/28/2016 Unknown	
Incident Time +	2015 Unknown (ev 2039)	
Incident Location *	Other (not listed)	V
	Tiger Airspace	
Aircraft TMS =	F/A-18D	V
BUNO +	164	653
Flight Mission *	1A7 - TRNG SYL/EXC ATCK	V
Flight Origin +	MCAS Iwakuni	Y
Current A/C Location *	Kadena AB	V
Aviation Mishap?	None	~
Severity 1	MEDIUM	V
Duty Status •	On-Duty	¥
Injuries?	NO	V
Narrative & Description of Incident *	This is an Aviation, Non-Injury, Non-Alcohol related incident. While ducting a night Air-to-Air refueling mission in the Tiger airspace, the A-18 aircrew heard a loud bang and noticed that the refueling hose wrapped around their wing tip and no longer attached to the tanke he aircrew successfully diverted into Kadena Air Base. The incident the divert were conducted over water. This report has been review by (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) VMFA(AW)-242 CO.	con e F/ was r. T

Log Book for (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

12/1/2015 - 12/31/2018

Report run on 01/27/2019 1528 UTC-08:00

Date	Range	Fotals							Hours					
	TMS	Device	Туре	TPT	FPT	СРТ	ACMDR	SCT	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG
Totals				547.5	530.6	16.9	271.7	4.3	63.9	28.4	67.3	23.1	66.9	6.9
02/04/16	T-45	Baseline	Aircraft	171.5	155.6	15.9		4.3	11.6	19.4	26.0			
07/26/16	FA-18B	Baseline	Aircraft	5.4	4.9	0.5			1.0	1.0				
09/27/16	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft	32.1	31.6	0.5	9.6		4.7	0.4	2.8			
09/30/16	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft	15.5	15.5		15.5		2.4	0.1	3.4			
01/30/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft	23.7	23.7		14.3		6.1		5.2			
01/31/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft	17.1	17.1		17.1		3.9		2.5			
04/18/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft	0.6	0.6		0.6							
04/19/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft	0.6	0.6		0.6							
05/24/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator	2.0	2.0		2.0							
05/25/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator	2.0	2.0		2.0							
05/26/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	2.0	2.0		2.0							
06/05/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5		0.1					
06/06/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4							
06/07/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	1.3	1.3		1.3							
06/08/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	1.7	1.7		1.7							
06/09/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4							
06/21/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	2.2	2.2		2.2							
06/26/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4							
06/27/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.6	1.6		1.6							
06/28/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.9	1.9		1.9							
06/29/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	2.0	2.0		2.0							
06/30/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.8	1.8		1.8							

Date	Range	Γotals		Но	ours			Landings				A	рр		T&R
	TMS	Device	Туре	SLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	Р	w	7	1	2	Α	В	T&R 1
Totals				10.7	38.7	95	21	1	2	5	12	12	9	4	
02/04/16	T-45	Baseline	Aircraft												
07/26/16	FA-18B	Baseline	Aircraft												
09/27/16	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft												
09/30/16	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft												
01/30/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft												
01/31/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft												
04/18/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft												
04/19/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft												
05/24/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator												
05/25/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator												
05/26/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator												2305
06/05/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									2102
06/06/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									2102
06/07/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			1									2102
06/08/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			1									2307
06/09/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									3800
06/21/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									2201
06/26/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									2308
06/27/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									2309
06/28/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									2310
<u>ज</u> ि6/29/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									2505
6/30/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									2506

Date	Range	Fotals						T&R					
	TMS	Device	Туре	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	T&R 10	NAVFLIR
Totals													
02/04/16	T-45	Baseline	Aircraft										
07/26/16	FA-18B	Baseline	Aircraft										
09/27/16	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft										
09/30/16	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft										
01/30/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft										
01/31/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft										
04/18/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft										
04/19/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft										
05/24/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator										
05/25/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator										
05/26/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										
06/05/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	6735	3800								<u>GF7175N</u>
06/06/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	6735	2303	3800							<u>GF71765</u>
06/07/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	3800	2306								<u>GF7176G</u>
06/08/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	3800									<u>GF71760</u>
06/09/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	6735	2304								<u>GF71770</u>
06/21/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	2102	3800								<u>GF7179D</u>
06/26/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	6735	6701	6709							<u>GF717A1</u>
06/27/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	6706	6735	3800							GF717AC
06/28/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	3800	2201	6705							GF717AL
(D)6/29/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft										GF717AR
96/30/17 2	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	_									<u>GF717B2</u>

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Date	Range 1	Totals							Hours					
	TMS	Device	Туре	TPT	FPT	СРТ	ACMDR	SCT	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG
07/06/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.0	1.0		1.0							
07/07/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	2.1	2.1		2.1		2.1		2.1	2.1		
07/11/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4		1.4		1.4	1.4		
07/13/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4		1.4		1.4	1.4		
07/13/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4			0.3				
07/14/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4		1.4		1.4	1.4		
07/21/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	2.1	2.1		2.1							
08/02/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.0	1.0		1.0		0.1					
08/04/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	2.0	2.0		2.0							
08/10/17	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator	2.0	2.0		2.0							
08/15/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator	2.0	2.0		2.0							
08/16/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.3	1.3		1.3		0.3					
08/23/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.3	1.3		1.3		1.3		1.3	1.3		
08/24/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.6	1.6		1.6							
08/24/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.2	1.2		1.2							
08/25/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	0.9	0.9		0.9							
08/25/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	0.8	0.8		0.8		0.8		0.8	0.8	0.8	
08/26/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5		0.4					
08/26/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	0.8	0.8		0.8							
08/28/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.2	1.2		1.2				1.2	1.2		
08/28/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5		0.3					
08/29/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5							
08/29/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4		1.4		1.4	1.4		
08/30/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.3	1.3		1.3		0.2					
09/20/17	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft	1.7	1.7		1.7		1.0					
09/26/17	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft	0.8	0.8		0.8							
09/27/17	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft	0.7	0.7		0.7		0.4					

Date	Range	Fotals		Но	ours			Landings				А	pp		T&R
	TMS	Device	Туре	SLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	Р	w	7	1	2	Α	В	T&R 1
07/06/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									3800
07/07/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft				1								2402
07/11/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft				1								2402
07/13/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft				1								2403
07/13/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									3800
07/14/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft				1								3800
07/21/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									3101
08/02/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									3103
08/04/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator												3201
08/10/17	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator												3703
08/15/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator												
08/16/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1					1				2101
08/23/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft				1				1				2404
08/24/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft		1.6	1									3104
08/24/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft		1.2	1									2102
08/25/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft		0.9	1									3800
08/25/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft		0.8		1								3106
08/26/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft		1.5	1					1				3800
08/26/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft		0.8	1									3201
08/28/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft				1								3203
08/28/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1						1			2102
08/29/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft		1.5	1									3105
08/29/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft		1.4		1				1	1			3203
08/30/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft		1.3	1									2102
09/20/17	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft			1						1			
9/26/17	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft			1									2102
රි 9/27/17	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft			1					1				

Date	Range	Γotals						T&R					
	TMS	Device	Туре	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	T&R 10	NAVFLIR
07/06/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	2102	2507								<u>GF717BH</u>
07/07/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	2404	2401	2202	3800						<u>GF717C2</u>
07/11/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	6703	6733	6701	3800	6735					<u>GF717CC</u>
07/13/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	3800	2402								GF717CT
07/13/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	2102									<u>GF717CP</u>
07/14/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	2402	2405	6735	6703						<u>GF717D5</u>
07/21/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	2201	6713	2102	6735	3800					GF717DY
08/02/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	2102	3101								GF717ER
08/04/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										
08/10/17	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator										
08/15/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator										
08/16/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	2102									GF717GH
08/23/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft										<u>GF717H1</u>
08/24/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	3102	3800								<u>GF717HI</u>
08/24/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft										GF717HH
08/25/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	3102	3105								GF717HJ
08/25/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	3102	3800								<u>GF717HK</u>
08/26/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	2102									GF717HQ
08/26/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	2102	3202	3800							GF717HR
08/28/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	2402	3800								<u>GF717HY</u>
08/28/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	3800									<u>GF717HX</u>
08/29/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	2308	3104	3800							<u>GF717HU</u>
08/29/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	2308	2404	2402	2310	3800					<u>GF717HV</u>
08/30/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft										<u>GF717I1</u>
09/20/17	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft										GF717JW
9/26/17	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft										<u>GF717KM</u>
ර ි9/27/17	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft										GF717KV

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Date	Range 1	Totals							Hours					
	TMS	Device	Туре	TPT	FPT	СРТ	ACMDR	SCT	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG
09/29/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.1	1.1		1.1							
10/03/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator	1.5	1.5		1.5							
10/04/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator	1.8	1.8		1.8							
10/05/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	1.8	1.8		1.8							
10/06/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator	1.8	1.8		1.8							
10/11/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator	1.8	1.8		1.8							
10/31/17	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator	1.8	1.8		1.8							
11/01/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator	1.8	1.8		1.8							
11/02/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator	1.8	1.8		1.8							
11/03/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4						1.4	
11/06/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4		0.2				1.4	
11/08/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	1.8	1.8		1.8							
11/16/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	0.8	0.8		0.8						0.8	
11/17/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	0.9	0.9		0.9		0.3					
11/18/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.0	1.0		1.0		0.5		0.3			
11/19/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.1	1.1		1.1				1.0			
11/19/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.3	1.3		1.3							
11/19/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4		0.1					
11/20/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.6	1.6		1.6		1.6		1.6	1.6		
11/21/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	0.8	0.8		0.8			0.3				
11/28/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator	0.8	0.8		0.8							
11/29/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator	3.5	3.5		3.5							
11/30/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator	2.3	2.3									
11/30/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator	1.5	1.5		1.5							
12/01/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator	1.0	1.0									
12/01/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator	1.0	1.0									
12/01/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator	1.0	1.0									

Date	Range	Fotals		Н	ours			Landings				А	рр		T&R
	TMS	Device	Туре	SLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	Р	w	7	1	2	Α	В	T&R 1
09/29/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									2501
10/03/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator												
10/04/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator												
10/05/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator												3301
10/06/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator												
10/11/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator							1					
10/31/17	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator												2101
11/01/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator												
11/02/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator												
11/03/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									2310
11/06/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									2102
11/08/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator												3501
11/16/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									2102
11/17/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									2101
11/18/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			2	1					3			2102
11/19/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft				1								2102
11/19/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									2503
11/19/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									2502
11/20/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft				1								3302
11/21/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator							1			1		2101
11/28/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator												
11/29/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator												
11/30/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator												3401
11/30/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator												
12/01/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator												3601
2/01/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator												3601
ਰੋ <mark>2</mark> /01/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator												3701

Date	Range 7	Totals						T&R					
	TMS	Device	Туре	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	T&R 10	NAVFLIR
09/29/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft										<u>GF717LF</u>
10/03/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator										
10/04/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator										
10/05/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										
10/06/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator										
10/11/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator										
10/31/17	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator										
11/01/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator										
11/02/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator										
11/03/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft										<u>GF717PV</u>
11/06/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft										<u>GF717Q6</u>
11/08/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										
11/16/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft										<u>GF717R6</u>
11/17/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	3800									<u>GF717RK</u>
11/18/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft										GF717RM
11/19/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft										GF717RN
11/19/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft										GF717RQ
11/19/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft										<u>GF717RO</u>
11/20/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	3203									<u>GF717S0</u>
11/21/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										
11/28/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator										
11/29/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator										
11/30/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator										<u>IAYVMZT</u>
11/30/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator										
12/01/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator										IWEUW84
2/01/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator										YUAF249
2 2/01/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator										8Q09G9E

Ticiosure

Date	Range 1	Totals							Hours					
	TMS	Device	Туре	TPT	FPT	СРТ	ACMDR	SCT	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG
12/01/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator	1.0	1.0									
12/01/17	FA-18D	2F193A-30	Simulator	1.3	1.3									
12/01/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator	2.0	2.0		2.0							
12/01/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator	1.3	1.3		1.3							
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator	1.5	1.5									
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator	0.8	0.8									
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator	1.0	1.0									
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator	1.2	1.2						1.2	1.2		
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator	1.3	1.3									
12/02/17	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.0	1.0									
12/02/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator	5.8	5.8		5.8							
12/02/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator	1.0	1.0		1.0							
12/13/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator	2.0	2.0		2.0							
12/18/17	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
12/18/17	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator	1.8	1.8					1.6				
12/20/17	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator	1.8	1.8					1.8				
12/28/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.1	1.1		1.1		0.1					
12/28/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
01/03/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	1.5	1.5									
01/04/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
01/04/18	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator	0.0	0.0									
01/11/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	0.6	0.6		0.6		0.3					
01/16/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
01/16/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
01/17/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
01/18/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5		0.2				1.5	
01/22/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.2	1.2		1.2				1.2	1.2		

Date	Range	Fotals		Но	ours			Landings				А	рр		T&R
	TMS	Device	Туре	SLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	Р	w	7	1	2	Α	В	T&R 1
12/01/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator												3703
12/01/17	FA-18D	2F193A-30	Simulator												3101
12/01/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator												
12/01/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator												
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator												3703
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator												3603
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator												3403
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator												3404
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator												3403
12/02/17	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator												3601
12/02/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator												
12/02/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator												
12/13/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator												
12/18/17	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator												3102
12/18/17	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator												3703
12/20/17	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator												3703
12/28/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1			2						3202
12/28/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator												2101
01/03/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator												3102
01/04/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator												3502
01/04/18	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator												
01/11/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1					2				2102
01/16/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator												3401
01/16/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator												3601
01/17/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator												2101
<u>5</u> 1/18/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									2509
र्ह्म 1/22/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft				1								3106

Date	Range	Γotals						T&R					
	TMS	Device	Туре	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	T&R 10	NAVFLIR
12/01/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator										VTSLE4F
12/01/17	FA-18D	2F193A-30	Simulator										FZLX6GJ
12/01/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator										
12/01/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator										
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator										<u>726Z2UJ</u>
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator										TJVF0PC
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator										DK834HS
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator										8120POK
12/02/17	FA-18C	2F193B-32	Simulator	3404									7HM08GN
12/02/17	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	3603									0VVLJ5Z
12/02/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator										
12/02/17	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator										
12/13/17	FA-18C	Baseline	Simulator										
12/18/17	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator	2101									9GCXP4X
12/18/17	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator										MIYC8CY
12/20/17	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator										SHTNU8S
12/28/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft										1JLE64G
12/28/17	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										YWXFHL5
01/03/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										TFUNEKY
01/04/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator										<u>HIVZ7FW</u>
01/04/18	FA-18D	Baseline	Simulator										
01/11/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft										B3MAHGG
01/16/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator										9MCOBSH
01/16/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										<u>P1HNHIU</u>
01/17/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator	3701									CJ6EOIB
<u></u> 1/18/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft										AKVWD71
ලි <mark>1</mark> /22/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft										2XFKPSB

Ticiosure

Date	Range 1	Totals							Hours					-
	TMS	Device	Туре	TPT	FPT	СРТ	ACMDR	SCT	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG
01/23/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
01/23/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
01/24/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.2	1.2		1.2		1.2		1.2	1.2		
01/25/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
01/29/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
01/29/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4		0.4				1.4	
01/30/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.0	1.0		1.0		0.1				1.0	
01/31/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.6	1.6		1.6			1.0			1.6	
02/01/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
02/02/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.6	1.6		1.6		0.2				1.6	
02/06/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	0.6	0.6									
02/13/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.2	1.2		1.2		0.3				1.2	
02/15/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.2	1.2		1.2						1.2	
02/16/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	0.4	0.4		0.4		0.1					
02/19/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4						1.4	
02/20/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5		0.5				1.5	
02/21/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	2.2	2.2		2.2						2.2	
02/26/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5		0.1				1.5	
02/27/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5		0.1				1.5	
03/01/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4		0.1				1.4	
03/06/18	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5		0.3					
03/07/18	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	1.6	1.6		1.6		0.1				1.6	
03/14/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5		0.1					
04/04/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.3	1.3		1.3		0.3				1.3	
04/06/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	0.6	0.6		0.6		0.3					
04/10/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.2	1.2		1.2						1.2	
04/11/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4		0.3				1.4	

Date	Range 7	Totals		Но	ours			Landings				А	рр		T&R
	TMS	Device	Туре	SLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	Р	w	7	1	2	А	В	T&R 1
01/23/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator												3102
01/23/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator												3102
01/24/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft				2				2				2402
01/25/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator												3301
01/29/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator												3102
01/29/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									3104
01/30/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									2508
01/31/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1							2		6111
02/01/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator												3102
02/02/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1									2509
02/06/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator												3502
02/13/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1						1			2102
02/15/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									2504
02/16/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									3800
02/19/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									3202
02/20/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1						1			3104
02/21/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									3103
02/26/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									3403
02/27/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									3703
03/01/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									3403
03/06/18	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			1									3503
03/07/18	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			1									3202
03/14/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1						1			2102
04/04/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									3202
04/06/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1					1				2102
4/10/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									3402
2 4/11/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1						1			3704

Date	Range 7	Γotals						T&R					
	TMS	Device	Туре	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	T&R 10	NAVFLIR
01/23/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator										<u>7IBUXIJ</u>
01/23/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator										Q3ZHC7J
01/24/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft										G8EB26D
01/25/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										FQS1ZS0
01/29/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator										R80TJ2L
01/29/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft										F6HZA8U
01/30/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft										UK5TQ5X
01/31/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft										<u>OUFI9O3</u>
02/01/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										GTK7JP7
02/02/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft										N9WUGPZ
02/06/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										82LL38B
02/13/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	3800									4IPNRUJ
02/15/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	3800									2LURRGU
02/16/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft										TWH61GM
02/19/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	6701	6704	3800	6735						611Q3V8
02/20/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	6707	6710								I3DDW73
02/21/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	3104	2102	2201	6109	6701	6707	6710	6111	6735	DK3YEIM
02/26/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft										T0Q3W29
02/27/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft										HC2OCY4
03/01/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft										<u>Cl3678Q</u>
03/06/18	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	6720									2WCS680
03/07/18	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	3301									J2WVGFN
03/14/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	3800	6735	6704							CTS9ZAD
04/04/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	3201	6735								LR9XVPQ
04/06/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft										TQK5EDL
4/10/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft										AG20EYF
20 4/11/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	_									D46DPWF

Ticiosure

Date	Range 7	Totals -							Hours					
	TMS	Device	Туре	TPT	FPT	СРТ	ACMDR	SCT	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG
04/12/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	2.0	2.0					0.3				
04/13/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator	1.0	1.0					1.0	1.0			
04/17/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4		1.4		1.4	1.4		1.4
04/18/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
04/19/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.0	1.0		1.0						1.0	
04/19/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	3.1	3.1		3.1		0.5		0.5		3.1	
04/20/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.3	1.3		1.3						1.3	
04/21/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.1	1.1		1.1						1.1	
04/21/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.0	1.0		1.0						1.0	
05/02/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
05/14/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.1	1.1		1.1						1.1	
05/14/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5		0.1				1.5	
05/15/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.1	1.1		1.1						1.1	
05/15/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.1	1.1		1.1						1.1	
05/16/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.6	1.6		1.6						1.6	
05/16/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.1	1.1		1.1		0.5				1.1	
05/30/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
05/31/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.3	1.3		1.3		0.1				1.3	
06/04/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4			0.3			1.4	
06/06/18	FA-18C	164230	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5		1.3				1.5	
06/11/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
06/15/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4			0.2			1.4	
06/15/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4		0.1				1.4	
06/19/18	FA-18D	164711	Aircraft	5.3	5.3		5.3		1.5					
06/20/18	FA-18D	164711	Aircraft	5.1	5.1		5.1							
06/27/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator	1.8	1.8					0.1				
06/28/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.6	1.6		1.6		0.1	0.2				

Date	Range 7	Totals		Но	ours			Landings				А	pp		T&R
	TMS	Device	Туре	SLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	Р	w	7	1	2	А	В	T&R 1
04/12/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator							3				1	6101
04/13/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator				1						2	1	6102
04/17/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft					1				1			3705
04/18/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator												3102
04/19/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.0	1									2102
04/19/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		3.1		1								3103
04/20/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.3	1									2102
04/21/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.1	1									2503
04/21/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.0	1									2102
05/02/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator												3701
05/14/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft		1.1	1									2102
05/14/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft		1.5	1									2102
05/15/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft		1.1	1									2503
05/15/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft		1.1	1									2503
05/16/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft		1.6	1									2102
05/16/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft		1.1	1									2102
05/30/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator												2101
05/31/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									3202
06/04/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1							2		3202
06/06/18	FA-18C	164230	Aircraft			1					1				6111
06/11/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator												3102
06/15/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1							1		3104
06/15/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									3103
06/19/18	FA-18D	164711	Aircraft		5.3	1									2101
06/20/18	FA-18D	164711	Aircraft		5.1	1									2101
6/27/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator												3201
26 6/28/18 €1	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									

Date	Range 1	Totals						T&R					
	TMS	Device	Туре	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	T&R 10	NAVFLIR
04/12/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										ANVY7OL
04/13/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator										EF6AXI9
04/17/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft										N19TAZW
04/18/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator										40U4PLT
04/19/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	3800									40BODZE
04/19/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft										VWZ9MPW
04/20/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft										BJLXTP4
04/21/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft										2JAQHWF
04/21/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	3800									RU55KVO
05/02/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator	3703									<u>AMHNPXR</u>
05/14/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft										SZ3CWLV
05/14/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft										3VZO57L
05/15/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft										<u>739UOV1</u>
05/15/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft										ZTCKD7C
05/16/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft										NTW1JH6
05/16/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft										CM5LFP1
05/30/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										<u>9ZEPEQK</u>
05/31/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft										JOVN1NW
06/04/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	6735	2307	2304							AVDLY44
06/06/18	FA-18C	164230	Aircraft										BFIHYA6
06/11/18	FA-18C	2F193A-16	Simulator										BYX83WG
06/15/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft										<u>I59L6F5</u>
06/15/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	2303	2304	2305	2306	6735					001DLSK
06/19/18	FA-18D	164711	Aircraft	2201	6111								U3C0CNT
06/20/18	FA-18D	164711	Aircraft	2201	6111								BBW3BE9
6/27/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator										CD8F9YV
26 6/28/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft										<u>Z8M1B9L</u>

Ticiosure.

Date	Range 7	Totals							Hours					
	TMS	Device	Туре	TPT	FPT	СРТ	ACMDR	SCT	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG
07/12/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.2	1.2		1.2			0.2				
07/16/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator	1.8	1.8									
07/18/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	1.0	1.0									
07/22/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.3	1.3		1.3		0.4				1.3	
07/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	7.6	7.6		7.6							
07/30/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4		0.3				1.4	
08/01/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.4	1.4		1.4						1.4	
08/02/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.7	1.7		1.7						1.7	
08/07/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	0.3	0.3		0.3			0.1			0.3	
08/09/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	2.0	2.0		2.0						2.0	
08/13/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.3	1.3		1.3						1.3	
08/14/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5						1.5	
08/16/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.1	1.1		1.1		1.1		1.1	1.1		1.1
08/22/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.3	1.3		1.3		1.3		1.3	1.3		1.3
08/29/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.0	1.0		1.0			0.1			1.0	
09/03/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	0.8	0.8		0.8							
09/05/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	0.9	0.9		0.9							
10/05/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	1.0	1.0									
10/08/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.3	1.3									
10/09/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.2	1.2									
10/09/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.3	1.3									
10/10/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.3	1.3									
10/10/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.3	1.3									
10/11/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.3	1.3									
10/11/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.3	1.3									
10/12/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.3	1.3									
10/19/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.1	1.1		1.1						1.1	

Date	Range	Totals		Но	ours			Landings				P	лрр		T&R
	TMS	Device	Туре	SLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	Р	w	7	1	2	A	В	T&R 1
07/12/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1							1		6735
07/16/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator												3102
07/18/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator												2601
07/22/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1						1			2102
07/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									6111
07/30/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									3104
08/01/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1									2102
08/02/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									2503
08/07/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1								1	2102
08/09/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1									3704
08/13/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1									2102
08/14/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									3602
08/16/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft				1								2402
08/22/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft				1								3405
08/29/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1								1	3702
09/03/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									2102
09/05/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1									2102
10/05/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator												2101
10/08/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator												3601
10/09/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.2											6303
10/09/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.3											6311
10/10/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.3											3403
10/10/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.3											6305
10/11/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.3											6309
10/11/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator												3701
<u>3</u> 0/12/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator	1.3											6306
ਰੂੰ0/19/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									3201

Date	Range	Totals						T&R					
	TMS	Device	Туре	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	T&R 10	NAVFLIR
07/12/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	2301	3202								<u>ULCZ4XE</u>
07/16/18	FA-18C	2F139A-26	Simulator										8FT6KES
07/18/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										DBR8AY0
07/22/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft										FZATY63
07/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	3800	2102								ZJ7RVCU
07/30/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	3103	6735	3403	3404	3603					ZRL98SQ
08/01/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	3403	3404	3603							E2SPZYT
08/02/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	2504	4201	4202	6111						WFO5V8V
08/07/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	3800	4601	2101							6EV11NP
08/09/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	4601	3104	3102							352M5K0
08/13/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft										<u>DJ41P0O</u>
08/14/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	4601	3604								K8G7KW8
08/16/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft										CMC3VG3
08/22/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft										ZGWP0HD
08/29/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft										M6732UE
09/03/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft										<u>AUVYT4N</u>
09/05/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	3800									KVR70QN
10/05/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										F4W0JY4
10/08/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator										<u>KPO446H</u>
10/09/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator										OE5PG6U
10/09/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator										NNIMWL0
10/10/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator										ZVFEFZV
10/10/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator										SD2E5QM
10/11/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator										LMF2UMF
10/11/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator										ZA3T0QS
<u></u> 30/12/18	FA-18D	2F193A-31	Simulator										N2GPIRE
ਨੂੰ 0/19/18 ਵੰਧ	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	2101	3202								<u>0H3EW41</u>

Date	Range 1	Totals							Hours					
	TMS	Device	Туре	TPT	FPT	СРТ	ACMDR	SCT	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG
10/23/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator	1.0	1.0									
10/30/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5		1.5		1.5		1.5	
10/31/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	2.3	2.3		2.3		0.5					
11/01/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.6	1.6		1.6		1.6		1.6	1.6		1.6
11/01/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.9	1.9		1.9							
11/02/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.2	1.2		1.2							
11/20/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	2.0	2.0		2.0							
11/27/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.5	1.5		1.5		1.5		1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5

Date	Range	Γotals		Но	ours			Landings				A	op		T&R
	TMS	Device	Туре	SLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	Р	w	7	1	2	Α	В	T&R 1
10/23/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator												3502
10/30/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.5			1								2102
10/31/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.5	2.3	1									3102
11/01/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft				1								3105
11/01/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									3102
11/02/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									2101
11/20/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									3503
11/27/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft				1				1				2402

Date	Range 1	Totals			T&R								
	TMS	Device	Туре	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	T&R 10	NAVFLIR
10/23/18	FA-18D	2F193B-37	Simulator										RX67SAO
10/30/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft										U6H0UE3
10/31/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	3103	3104								MBQAI11
11/01/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	3106	6307								<u>VBWAKLM</u>
11/01/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	3103	3104								38A1V8X
11/02/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft										W5KR98D
11/20/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	3501	2201	3704	3502						K59FJY6
11/27/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft										5N7CGYV

Career	Totals							Hours							Landings
	TMS	TPT	FPT	CPT	ACMDR	SCT	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG	SLUI	XCNTRY	6
Totals	All	622.4	593.1	29.3	276.9	4.3	68.1	46.7	75.2	23.1	66.9	6.9	10.7	38.7	95
	FA-18B	5.4	4.9	0.5			1.0	1.0							
	FA-18C	104.4	104.4		66.1		9.0	4.6	8.1	1.2	1.5				4
	FA-18D	266.2	265.7	0.5	205.6		42.3	3.4	33.2	21.9	65.4	6.9	10.7	38.7	91
	T-45	171.5	155.6	15.9		4.3	11.6	19.4	26.0						
	T-6B	74.9	62.5	12.4	5.2		4.2	18.3	7.9						

Career	Totals		Land	dings		Approaches				
	TMS	F	Р	w	7	1	2	Α	В	
Totals	All	21	1	2	5	12	12	9	4	
	FA-18B									
	FA-18C	1			1	2	1	2	1	
	FA-18D	20	1	2	4	10	11	7	3	
	T-45									
	T-6B									

AIRCREL DATE HOW NOW NOW WOD POSTOL I ED HL EL

P(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

O COUS WURS WURS - O TELLOW -



Requested Org Code: GF7
Requested Assy Cd: YPHE
Requested Serno: 00406

NALCOMIS Configuration Management Aircrew Equipment Report

Date : 22 OCT 2018

Time : 03:32

Req By (b) (3) (A), (b)

Page : Pof 1

Crew Member: Equipment Not Assigned

		Cont # /			Mfg	Instali	Expire
<u>Nomenclature</u>	Part Number	Lot# DODIC	<u>Serno</u>	Quantity	<u>Date</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Date</u>
HELMET UNIT INTERGATED	A/A24A-56		00406	01			
NIGHT DISPLAY ADAPTER (NDA)	720100-04-02	N00019-15-D	00406	01		24 Apr 2018	

NALCOMIS OMA Components Tab

BUNO/Serno:00945

MALS12

11 JUL 2018 08:27

Page 1 of 1

Pos

Part No: 720205-01-00


Next Highest Inventory Serno: 00945


Nomen: BINOCULAR ASSEMBLY

Next Highest Inventory Nomen: BINOCULAR ASSEMBLY

Nomenclature	•	CAGE	Part Number	<u>Serno</u>	Instin Dt	<u>wuc</u>
BINOCULAR ASSEMBLY		06VL3	720205-01-00	00945	02 JUL 2018	74T1830
MONOCULAR LEFT		06VL3	720210-02-01	00951	09 JAN 2017	.74T1831
MONOCULAR RIGHT		06VL3	720220-02-01	00951	09 JAN 2017	74T1832
LOWER BRIDGE		06VL3	720230-04-01	00264	09 JAN 2017	74T1833

ISSUED DATE: 10 JUL 2018
REMOVAL DATE: 00 JAN 2019
CDI NAME: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)





1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

0

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 101

Event Pre Reqs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Type Met Can Log Date Date Туре SIMULATO True False All Data Complete 4/13/2016 NORMAL True R

SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS
1. Brief/Questions of the Day	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0	well prepared
2. Admin	Р	0	0		0	0	0	0	
3. Tac Admin	Р							•	
4. Mission Execution	Р	0	0		0	0	0	0	see overall comments
5. Headwork / CRM	Р	0	0		0	0	0	0	
6. Training Rules Adherence	Р							•	
7. Debrief/Professionalism	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0	
8. Other	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•	
Total Grades		0	0	3	2	0	0	3	

Overall Comments:

Front cockpit intro and flight in VMC conditions complete. Good work on the SID and RTB. Good understanding of required mission data input.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 4/13/2016 3:08:18 PM

Grade: 2.40

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

b) (3) (A), (b) (6) SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 102 Grade: 2.40 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Date Type Can Log Date Type **SIMULATO** True **NORMAL** All Data Complete 4/15/2016 True False R (6)SKILL COMMENTS 0 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ O O O 0 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc O \bigcirc 0 \circ 3. Tac Admin Ρ Ρ 0 0 4. Mission Execution O O O 0 0 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ O 0

Overall Comments:

8. Other

6. Training Rules Adherence

7. Debrief/Professionalism

Total Grades

Initialize Hold Short engines off. WX 800/2. T-01 MOUSE, RTB via HI TACAN RWY 24R to roll and go 80 kts/4 board. Exit pattern for ATLAS to overhead. Practice T&Gs in the visual pattern and intro crosswind component on RWY 24L carrier box, then full stop on 24R. Good job with all checklist requirements, INS mission data entry, and solid flying for 2nd simulator event.

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Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 4/15/2016 11:20:53 AM (6)

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1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 103 Grade: 2.20											
	Student Can Log	On Tracl Date	k Stat	tus	Actual Date	Gradesl Type		Instruct	or Signature	Reviewed	
SIMULATO True A	III Data		Com	plete	4/19/2016	NORM	AL (b	(3) (A), (B)	(<mark>b)</mark> True	False	
0							(-	,			
SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS		
1. Brief/Questions of the Day	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0	well prepared		
2. Admin	Р	0	0		0	0	0	0			
3. Tac Admin	Р							•			
4. Mission Execution	Р	0	0		0	0	0	0			
5. Headwork / CRM	Р	0	•	0	0	0	0	0	see overall comments.		
6. Training Rules Adherence	Р							•			
7. Debrief/Professionalism	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0			
8. Other	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•			
Total Grades		О	1	2	2	0	0	3			

Overall Comments:

Night/IMC instrument flight complete. Flew the LAKEE departure/ADUDE transition, then direct LOOTS for 1 turn in holding followed by a TACAN approach with ILS backup to a low approach, then enter GCA box pattern for a normal PAR to a T&G, and a PAR on the standby HUD to a full stop landing. No time for an ASR approach due to a miscommunication where he climbed to 14000 feet instead of 4K' on the first GCA box.

This was a solid one below for headwork for the first half of the flight. Instrument scan needs a lot of work. Airspeed was all over the place on the SID. When cleared to 16K' inbound from ADUDE to LOOTS, descended to 12.8K' before realizing his mistake. Totally messed up the 1 turn in holding and called commencing 3 miles before the IAF.

On the plus side, solid TACAN approach, PAR and PAR on stand-by HUD. Good job with all required PCL checklist items.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 4/20/2016 10:59:04 AM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 104 Grade: 2.40 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data 4/21/2016 Complete 4/21/2016 **NORMAL** True False R (**ゟ)**, (b) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ O O O \bigcirc 0 2. Admin Ρ O \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ Ρ 4. Mission Execution O O O 0 O O 0 0 \bigcirc 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ O 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O 0 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 O O 0

Overall Comments:

Good event for (b) (3) Flight Line ENG's off, WX 800/2 tops 6K. Ground/Start EPS: APU FIRE, RT OIL PSI ZERO, HUNG START RTAIR X. X-Bleed start the left, ENG FIRE LT, NWS then BRAKE FAILURE on taxi.

T/O 24L, Good (3) ORT for DUAL BLEED WARNING @ 108 KTS, good ABORT for MECH @ 154 KTS.

T01 RODEN P5 T03, VEC HI TAC NZY 36, touch and go, cleared WX, Depart and re-enter for the overhead 36, touch and go 36, TWR downwind full stop 36, taxi back with a partial shutdown.

RP gave the wrong BOLDFACE for LATS AIRBORN and on the SID early turned the HDNG 300* well prior to intercepting the 300* radial.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 4/21/2016 4:47:06 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 105 Grade: 2.80 On Track **Event** Pre Reqs Student Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Туре Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True **NORMAL** All Data Complete 4/22/2016 True False (b) (3) (A), R (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 0 0 O 0 0 Р 0 0 0 2. Admin 0 Ρ 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 0 0 0 4. Mission Execution O O 0 0 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ Р 6. Training Rules Adherence 0 0 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 8. Other 0 0 Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc

Overall Comments:

SFAM 105 Complete. Average

Total Grades

Duplicate Gradesheet

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 7/27/2016 3:39:21 PM

0

(b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 106 Gr												ide: 3.00
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Stat	tus	Actual Date	Gradesl Type		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	True	All Da	ta		Com	plete	4/26/2016	NORMAL		(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	True	False
0												
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Ques	stions of the Da	ау	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admir	1		Р									
4. Mission Ex	ecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	/ CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training R	ules Adherence	е	Р									
7. Debrief/Pr	ofessionalism		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Tot	al Grades			Ο	0	0	5	0	0	3		

Overall Comments:

Low average SFAM hop for (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) . Well prepared for the brief. Good systems and procedures knowledge.

Lost 15 minutes at the beginning of the event to sim reboot and throttle rigging.

Ground ops - Twice moved FLAPS w/o coordination with P/C. Also doing a few things out of the PCL order which delayed getting to the CAS checks and releasing the P/C. Response to fuel system malfunctions OK.

T/O, abort decision and SW SID - Good decision to continue with CAUT DEGD above 100 knots. Able to reset SDC airborne. SID OK.

Good response to airborne fuel system malfunctions.

Hi TACAN RWY 24 at NUC. No ATIS, No request for MA instructions or FAF call until pimped. Big overshoot of inbound at BIREE. Weak scan - once back on course, drifted right until 0.4 NM. Then made heading correction back to left and held that correction until 0.1 left. Did not follow climb out instructions of "After completion of this approach, climb runway heading to 2,500 feet, then turn left to 180 and continue to climb until VMC on top. Report VMC on top." Leveled off at 2450 and turned to 180, until pimped.

Good recognition of Runaway R ENG. Got headed to NUC from P-6 and started to work the procedures. Brought base into the loop and got engine secured. Single engine procedures out of order and not properly followed. Discussed X-Bleed to get gear down, but then attempted to re-start vice X-Bleed. Then configured with FULL Flaps vice HALF and did not catch it on landing checks. Had to pimp. Then got to GW adjust. Not great planning for getting to NUC.

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 106 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b) (e) up 18 NM East for long straight in. Still at 4,100 feet at 5 DME. Very steep approach visual approach, but got it down to GS by about 1 NM from TD. Good arrested landing. Did not coordinate with NUC or question A-Gear status. A/C control was OK, but positioning and timeliness could have been better.

Bingo profile - Set up on 3 NM final to NKX to get as much of the bingo completed as possible in the shortened period. After MA, could have turned tighter to get NJK on the nose. By the time NUC was on the nose, the jet was above 12K and 350 Kts. A bit rough controlling A/S / mach in the climb. Froze the sim at the start of the descent.

Overall A/C control instrument scan instrument flight are not where we want at this event

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 4/26/2016 1:32:21 PM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 107 Grade: 3.00 **Event** Pre Reqs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Can Log Date Type Date Type **SIMULATO** True **NORMAL** All Data Complete 4/27/2016 (b) (3) (A), (b) True False R SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ O 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ Ρ 0 0 4. Mission Execution O O O 0 0 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \circ Ρ 6. Training Rules Adherence 0 0 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc

Overall Comments:

This was an average sim for (b) (3)

Total Grades

All objectives met. Good working knowledge & application of normal & emergency procedures. Good airwork, headwork, & s/a.

0

0

0

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 6/20/2016 1:52:33 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 108 Grade: 3.00 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True None Complete 4/28/2016 **NORMAL** True False R (18),(69) SKILL COMMENTS Ρ 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc O \bigcirc O \bigcirc \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ Ρ 0 4. Mission Execution \bigcirc \bigcirc O O \bigcirc 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 O 0 0 O 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc Total <u>Grades</u> 0 0 O 0

Overall Comments:

Good event for (b) (3), T01, P6, HI TAC 24 NUC. Marshal ENG's off. RT ATS VALVE FAILED on start, EXT TANK, TK PRESS HI. (A), (b)

Good ABORT for UAL BLEED WARNING @ 132kts.

Cabin pressurization failure, abbreviated combat checks, OBOGS DEGD, EXT TXFR and investigated Cruise Check from 30K then 40K.

Cockpit white smoke (TAC fire, would not fully clear, RP Jett Canopy), divert NUC for a GCA, in close received a LT BLEED WARNING (light went out after LT throttle off), executed SNGLE ENG checklist in accordance with NATOPS, hook skip, trapped long field gear NUC 24.

Discussed; HYPOXIA, COCKPIT TEMP HI, CABIN CAUTION LIGHT, WINDSHIELD HOT, AV AIR HOT and CK ECS CAUTION LIGHT.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 4/28/2016 4:00:09 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 109 Grade: 3.40												
Event Type				On Trac Date	k Stat	tus	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed	
SIMULATO R	True	All Da	ta		Com	plete	5/3/2016	NORMAL		(b) (3) (b) (3)	True	False	
0										(8), (b)			
	SKILL			0		2	3	4		NA NA	COMMENTS		
1. Brief/Ques	tions of the Da	ау	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0			
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0			
3. Tac Admin			Р							•			
4. Mission Ex	ecution		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0			
5. Headwork	/ CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0			
6. Training R	ules Adherence	е	Р										
7. Debrief/Pro	ofessionalism		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0			
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Tot	al Grades			0	0	0	3	2	0	3			

Overall Comments:

Good event with (b) (3). A07 R2507N/S A22, Divert NJK. FCS CH 1 CB popped @ lift-off. Investigated multiple combinations of (5) (ch) annel failures. Investigated Gain Oride flaps auto/half and full. Investigated DEL/MECH turns/reversals, (fi) mbs/descents, clean/dirty. Investigated Mech after dirty configuration CAS. 2 Out of control, 3 Spins, 2 Unusual ATT. Investigated RT LEF Barn Door UP (Short Shaft). TEF failure divert to NJK, completed the full controllability check.

RP observed POSSUM's event with a compound LEF failure combined with left PLANNING LINK failure for a fly-in arrest.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 5/5/2016 12:32:02 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 110 Grade: 4.00													
Event Type				On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type		Instruct	or Signature	Reviewed		
SIMULATO R	True	All Da	ta		Com	plete	5/4/2016	16 NORMAL) (3) (A), ((<mark>b)</mark> True	False		
O											22111-1-2			
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS			
1. Brief/Ques	tions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0			0	0	well prepared			
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
3. Tac Admin			Р							•				
4. Mission Ex	ecution		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	see overall comment	S		
5. Headwork	/ CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
6. Training R	ules Adherenc	e	Р							•				
7. Debrief/Pro	ofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•				
Tot	al Grades			О	О	О	0	5	0	3				

Overall Comments:

Intro to hydraulic system EPs and complex emergencies complete. Solid instrument flying on the SEAWOLF departure, practice TACAN approach to RWY 36 at NZY, and on the emergency divert from P-5 to North Island. Ground EP was brake failure out of the chocks. Handled correctly. Abort decision was a HYD 2A caution. Handled well. An RLS demo and practiced day aerobatics in preparation for FFAM 101 in P-5. The hyd/complex emergency was SDC/IFEI comm lost, followed by HYD 2A/1B and a L AMAD PR caution. Did not know how to clear the blinking IFEI with the SDC reset. The emergency was handled IAW NATOPS and using good judgment (turned off the left generator but did not shut down the engine in response to the L AMAD PR caution, so did not end up in a situation where he would have put himself in HYD 2A only situation). Be careful of doing some violent maneuvering to get slowed down on the extended centerline of the duty runway.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 5/4/2016 11:37:54 AM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 111 Grade: 4.00												
Event Type				On Trac Date	k Stat	Status		Gradesheet Type		Instructo	r Signature	Reviewed	
SIMULATO R	True	All Da	ta	5/5/2016	Com	plete	5/5/2016	NORMAL		(b) (3) (b) (3)	True	False	
0										(A), (b)			
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS		
1. Brief/Ques	stions of the Da	ay	D	0	0	0	0		0	0			
2. Admin			D	0	0	0	0		0	0			
3. Tac Admin	ı		D	0	0	0	0	0	0	•			
4. Mission Ex	ecution		D	0	0	0	0		0	0			
5. Headwork	/ CRM		D	0	0	0	0		0	0			
6. Training R	ules Adherence	е	D	0	0	0	0	0	0				
7. Debrief/Pr	ofessionalism		D	0	0	0	0		0	0			
8. Other			D	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Total Grades				0	О	0	0	5	0	3			

Overall Comments:

Good event for (b) (3) both in brief reviewing systems and flight conduct. T01 MOUSE NAOPA T03. Flight Line ENG OFF. Using the SLEW function to build the NAOPA AREA. Completed G-Warm and the ACRO portion of the FAM 101 followed by HI (FAC 24R NKX, LOW APP, depart ATLAS for the break 24R, 80 KT R & G, TWR downwind, 1X T & G, full stop 24R, LINE/ Shutdown.

SAFE TO FLY

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 5/5/2016 12:53:26 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFAM 101 Grade: 2.40 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 5/6/2016 **NORMAL** True False (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS Ρ 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O \bigcirc Ρ O 2. Admin 3. Tac Admin Ρ Ρ 4. Mission Execution \bigcirc \bigcirc O \bigcirc \bigcirc Ρ 5. Headwork / CRM 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ Ρ 7. Debrief/Professionalism \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc Ρ 8. Other \bigcirc Total Grades O O 2 O 0 3

Overall Comments:

Nice flight for (b) (3) today. FFAM 101. Executed the conduct per the card.

Ground Ops: (6)

Keep staying busy. Try to keep the PC moving and finding time to accomplish everything we need to. No major issues, there was just some time where we could have been doing things and weren't.

Be hard on yourself with tail pipe courtesy. (b) (3) tendency was to not gain enough speed prior to the turn and then keep the power up throughout the turn. Don't thake this a habit. Get enough speed to turn, then bring the throttles back and then execute the turn. (6)

No major issues on the departure or en-route to the area. If you need to slow things down because you are getting a little behind the jet, don't be afraid to pull a little bit of power.

Following the hi work, executed T+Gs at KNUC. No major issues, and everything was safe. All day (b) (3) was doing a nice job walking the throttles. Keep it up. No lens at KNUC or KNKX.

Following T+Gs brought it back home for the overhead. No major issues. Work hard to conserve your fuel. Use FPAS. Once you are level, set max range and then use your pilot relief modes.

Overall real nice flight. No major issues noted. Keep it up.

Welcome to the Hornet!



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(b) (3) (A), r SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFAM 101 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b) (3) (A), on 5/9/2016 10:32:03 AM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFAM 102 Grade: 2.60 **Event** Pre Reqs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Can Log Date Date Type Type **FLIGHT** True **NORMAL** All Data Complete 5/9/2016 True False (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day 0 0 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ 3. Tac Admin Ρ Ρ 4. Mission Execution 0 O O O 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ O 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O 0 0 \circ 0 \bigcirc 0 0 8. Other Ρ **Total Grades** 0

Overall Comments:

FFAM 102 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Route:

Stereo route I15/I33 KNKX-KNYL-KNKX

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 5/10/2016 6:42:12 PM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFAM 103 Grade: 3.00 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 5/10/2016 **NORMAL** True False SKILL COMMENTS Ρ 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O O \bigcirc \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 4. Mission Execution Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc O O \bigcirc 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 O O 0 O O 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc Total Grades 0 O O 0

Overall Comments:

FFAM 103 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Route:

Stereo route 113/I33 KNKX-KNYL-KNKX

BRIEF:

Standard. Informed RP to have performance data for both 400 single CL and 402 double tanks.

GROUND OPS:

RP slow with start up and still needs to refine checklist. Use downtime to get other tasks done i.e ATIS/Clearance. Do not start taxi without first having NWS selected and whenever the parking break is set paddle off NWS.

Have proper DDI set up during taxi and takeoff checks. Do not need to rush yourself in marshal and get out of your habit

patterns. Take your time and ensure everything is set up properly.

DEPARTURE:

Double check comm set up prior to take off. Initially had wrong departure frequency. Started off well and then scan began to drop out. Rapid level off at 11k and ended up being 100ft high. Back yourself up and make an easy transition. Climbing above to 11k did well with setting 350 and nose attitude but again scan dropped and accelerated to

380 in the climb. Level and immediately set your best range A/S. Check the FPAS or reference alpha.

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(b) (3) (A) SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFAM 103 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b) (6)

ENROUTE:

No major issues. +/-40 ft enroute to BZA but do not accept that. If assigned 230 maintain 230 and use pilot relief modes as needed.

Heading to KNYL get ATIS sooner rather than later.

DESCENT/APPROACH:

Fast on descent. Set 250 and work on maintaining that. Slightly non-standard RV to final due to multiple aircraft also shooting approaches. Overall average TCN 21R into NYL. Pay attention to missed approach instructions. Assigned RWY HDG at 700ft and ballooned up to 800ft.

Vectored around for an ASR 21R. Average. Proceed visually 1nm out. No need to have them control you to the in close position if you have the

the field in sight. IP took controls for departure just to quickly get to altitude and start heading make home to make land time.

RTB:

Direct LOOTS at FL220 for a PAR Full Stop KNKX. No issues. Keep in mind you start high at 5k on the PAR. Get to 2600ft quickly and then reset for a normal O/S glidescope to final.

Good experience for RP to see the pits and hot seat. No issues.

Overall, average, Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 6/28/2016 12:45:32 PM

(6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFAM 104 Grade: 3.20 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type True **NORMAL FLIGHT** Top Half 5/11/2016 Complete 5/11/2016 True False (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)SKILL COMMENTS Ρ 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 0 Ρ 0 2. Admin 3. Tac Admin Р Ρ 4. Mission Execution \bigcirc O 0 \bigcirc \bigcirc Ρ 5. Headwork / CRM 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O O O \bigcirc 8. Other Ρ O O **Total Grades** O 0 0 0

Overall Comments:

Solid Hop for (b) (3) Safe for FFAM 105.

Completed in (R) ane E MOA, VFR.

ADMIN:

Asked student to brief Admin - Correct on all procedures and above average flow and content for FRS pilot.

EXECUTION:

Completed all required events.

DEBRIEF:

Discussed only "other" from the flight regarding uses/awareness of the BINGO bug. 2x in flight acknowledged the BINGO bug caution but did not immediately fix the problem. BINGO caution came on twice deacter time before he addressed the BINGO bug. Discussed that cautions/warnings must be taken care of immediate for avoid complacency in the cockpit.



Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 7/7/2016 1:24:33 PM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFAM 105 Grade: 3.00 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 5/12/2016 **NORMAL** True False (6)SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc O O \bigcirc Ρ 2. Admin 3. Tac Admin Ρ Ρ 4. Mission Execution Р 5. Headwork / CRM 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ \bigcirc \circ 0 \circ Ρ 8. Other O \bigcirc Total Grades O O O 0

Overall Comments:

FFAM 105 **PASS/COMPLETE**

ROUTE OF FLIGHT: KNKX - W291 NAOPA - KNKX

Delayed take off time due to weather.

(b) (3) (A), (b) started off in A/C 165. Normal start with no issues line to hold short. On Take off the gear would not

RP kept the A/C below 250 and continued flying the SID. (b) (3) (A), (b) coordinated with the the ODO and ATC. RP climbed to above 6k ft and orbited near MOUSE in order to landing weight. RP picked up radar vectors for a visual straight in to KNKX. Normal landing. Taxied back for shut down.

(b) (3) (A), (b) then quickly got into A/C 215 for a normal start up. Uneventful from line to the area. RP worked the M291 NAOPA and coordinated with two other FAM Solos for airspace de-confliction. Normal ops in the area. RTB via WIZKY for the overhead at KNKX. 3 T&Gs and 1 Full Stop.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 2/1/2017 12:56:16 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFAM 107 Grade: 3.60 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 5/16/2016 **NORMAL** True False **/6)**, (b) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Р O O \bigcirc \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 3. Tac Admin Ρ Ρ 4. Mission Execution \bigcirc \bigcirc O O O O 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc O 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 O O O 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 O 0

Overall Comments:
FFAM 107 **PASS/COMPLETE**
KNKX - KNTD - KNKX
1.5hrs
Radar Vectors to TCN NTD
2x PAR NKX
5 T&G NKX

Brief:

Solid brief. No issues. Set up comm in advance. Put frequencies in presets you are not going to use to reduce pilot loading in flight.

Recommend taking a finger light. At this stage in the game conduct your preflight with the PCL in hand.

Ground:

Get radios on quicker after the generators come online. RP did not get bleed air knob all the back to on. Be expeditious getting the checklist complete but do not miss items. RP forgot to call "clear canopy"

Conduct:

RP did well keeping his navaids and waypoints ahead of the jet in order to maintain a better situational awareness. Initially altitude and airspeed fluctuated but as the flight went on these came under more control. Continue to strive for +/- 50ft. Coming in for the approach at KNTD get slowed to 250 kts earlier. Keep that airspeed under control, at one point RP got down to 200kts.

Vnock out the landing checklist as soon as the goar is down and lacked DTP want smooth no issues. 1st DAP DP anded
Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFAM 107 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b) (6) out the landing checklist as soon as the gear is down and locked. RTB went smooth no issues. 1st PAR RP ended up high on glidescope the entire way. Remember to push 5 degrees nose down to arrive at 2100'ft on glidescope. 2nd PAR went better and ended with a tower downwind. Continue to go to school on each pass and make corrections. No Lens but still hit each of your checkpoints and make corrections to get there. Improving trends from each pass.

Taxied too slow coming back into the line. Keep the scan up to know your GS. No issues on shutdown.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 7/22/2016 11:47:11 AM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 TXN/	SFAM	114					Gra	ade: 4.00
Event Type				On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	True	All Da	ta		Com	nplete	5/31/2016	NORMAL		b) (3) (A), b) (6)	True	False
0												
	SKILL			0		2	3	4		NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Ques	stions of the D	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admir	۱		Р							•		
4. Mission Ex	recution		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
5. Headwork	/ CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Training R	ules Adherenc	е	Р							•		
7. Debrief/Pr	ofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•		
Tot	al Grades			0	О	0	О	5	О	3		

Overall Comments: SFAM 114 Instrument Check **PASS/COMPLETE** KNKX - KNUC - KNZY 1x Turn in Holding 1x HI-TCN to KNUC 1x PAR KNUC 1x Standby Instrument No Gyro ASR KNUC Divert to KNZY for visual RWY36

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 2/1/2017 9:56:19 AM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SAWI 101 Grade: 2.43 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 5/23/2016 **NORMAL** True False R SKILL COMMENTS (6) 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ O O O \bigcirc \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ O \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ O 0 4. Mission Execution Ρ O \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ 0 \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ \bigcirc O O 0 \circ 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O O O 0 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 O 4 O 0

Overall Comments:

SAWI 101 ** PASS/COMPLETE**

Initial brief with Mr.Leitner. No Issues.

Conducted thorough walkthrough of combat checks. RP is reminded to use technique to his advantage but back himself up with the checklist.

On Radar departure fly the same ground track as lead, ensure that you do not cut the corners of the SID. Continue to practice short range radar technique. Be smooth and don't rush through it.

Use the radar to your advantage to have proper bearing line joining on lead for the B&Rs and TCN RVs. RP is reminded to be hard on

himself to maintain a good scan of altitude and airspeed. Establish yourself on bearing line and make smooth corrections to drive it in.

Press. Slappy

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 5/25/2016 2:34:04 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Grade: 2.43 SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SAWI 102 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 5/23/2016 **NORMAL** True False (b) (3) (A), R (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 O O O 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Р O O 0 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 Ρ 4. Mission Execution O 0 O O 0 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O O 0 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 0 4 0 0

Overall Comments:

SAWI 102 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Initial brief with (b) (3) (A), . No issues.

RP Practiced short inger radar mechanics. Continued to work on B&Rs and TCN RVs. RP is reminded to use the radar to his advantage for joins and TCN RVs.

Solid discussion about stern conversions.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 7/27/2016 3:41:20 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SAWI 103 Grade: 2.29 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data 5/26/2016 Complete 5/25/2016 **NORMAL** True False R (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS Р 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc O \bigcirc O \bigcirc \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 3. Tac Admin Ρ O 0 0 4. Mission Execution Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \circ \bigcirc 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O O \bigcirc \bigcirc 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 O 2 O 0

Overall Comments:

SAWI 103 **PASS/COMPLETE**

BRIFF:

RP was prepared for brief and went over briefing items accordingly. Good discussion about how the radar operates and what the symbology means.

GROUND:

RP started with the jet already running on the hold short. Practiced going through the combat checklist. Comm check in and taxi out to the runway.

DEPARTURE:

T-01M flying radar trail off lead. WX set from 300ft-4000k to emphasize the use of the radar to build your SA even when lead is not visible.

Good discussion about remaining within 1nm of lead in order to alleviate any hiccups with ATC.

CONDUCT:

RP conducted weapons check on the way towards Mouse and joined on lead to begin feet wet/dry checks. Executed G-warm and began setting up for stern conversions. RP Practiced 3 stern conversions. Actual knowledge of the timeline and hitting the wickets were good but airspeed dropped out of RP's scan. This lead to having to drastically wrap up the turn in close.

Set up for practice joining on a tanker. C-130 was placed in orbit and RP worked through the radar mech in order to

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SAWI 103 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(to)r(6) late the target and execute a successful join. Discussion real time was had about how the new geometry caused an increase in complexity to work the stern conversions. Emphasis was placed on getting yourself to a known. Working to arrive on bearing line and follow the ABCs of a s successful join.

Last maneuver included a TCN RZ. Similar angular issues as with the tanker join.

DEBRIEF:

RP gained a better understanding of stern mechanics after seeing it play out in real time. Good discussion about solving those angular problems on tanker joins and TCN RZ by working yourself out to bearing line and envisioning ahead of where you need to be vice where the tanker/lead is currently at. Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 7/19/2016 6:46:55 AM (b) (6)

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1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFRM 101 Grade: 2.20 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Actual Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 5/23/2016 **NORMAL** True False (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc Ρ 0 2. Admin 3. Tac Admin Ρ

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Overall Comments:

4. Mission Execution

5. Headwork / CRM

8. Other

6. Training Rules Adherence

7. Debrief/Professionalism

Total Grades

Start Up: Flew a Bravo, briefed how to do fuel BIT, briefed it again in the jet. Taxiing out of the line, we still had a fuel advisory.

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Initial Join: Went blind on initial join, get your radar out in front of you and start to use that to help get SA. If you go blind, call it and listen to ATC to see where they are vectoring your lead or telling lead to climb.

Tac Turns / basic form keeping: Trend was today to be sucked or acute (out of position) and just settle for that. There should be two things going on. 1) you're either in position and keeping yourself there, or 2) you're out of position, realize it, and FIX IT!!! way to many times today the IP had to say, "you're sucked" followed by no correction then "If you're out of position, work to get back into position". You need to lead your corrections, so if you are sucked, add power, but take power off to end up in position. Do not just take off power when you are finally in position or you'll go acute, which we saw today.

B&Rs: first was decent, second was decent as well, don't get spit out on the cross under. Remember to keep your closure under control and bring your jet in close and then do a controlled cross under. third: fuselage misalignment will be a player here. Get your fuselages aligned early so you can work on the ABCs.

Final Join: Joined from ATC spread to the north or left side as we were RTB to Miramar. Post Mouse, started a join from ATC spread and IP had to give a "Watch your closure", which caused a hockey stop and a very un comfortable site picture for both lead and IP in the back seat. Remember, NEVER is it ok to put lead under your LEX when you are joining on him. Maintain site at all costs.

Finally, think ahead of the jet. Just because you are flying form doesn't mean you just sit there and stare at lead and

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFRM 101 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(e) (fi)m fly you around blindly. You will need to update your systems in a timely manner. When lead asks you a question, don't pause for 5 seconds. Later in division, if I'm -3 and you're -2 and you wait 5 seconds to answer lead, I'm going to jump in and talk.

Chair fly your form and what you are going to do with your jet. You'll get the form with practice. Remember, later on, this is stuff you don't even need to think about as you have much more complex tactics to execute.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 6/9/2016 9:55:54 AM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 112 Grade: 4.00												
Event Type				On Trac Date	k Stat	tus	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type		Instructo	r Signature	Reviewed	
SIMULATO R	True	All Da	ta		Com	plete	6/1/2016	NORMAL		(b) (3), (b) (3)	True	False	
0										(B),(B)			
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS		
1. Brief/Ques	tions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0			
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0			
3. Tac Admin			Р							•			
4. Mission Exc	ecution		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0			
5. Headwork	/ CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0			
6. Training Ru	ules Adherence	Э	Р										
7. Debrief/Pro	ofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0			
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Tota	al Grades			0	0	0	0	5	0	3			

Overall Comments:

Good event for (b) (3) both in brief with system's review and flight conduct. T01 RODEN P5 T03. Ground/Start EPS: HOT START, RA(PS, (ENG FIRE LEFT. HI SPD abort for LT Bleeds @ 143 KTS. Airborne EPS: L GEN, OBOGS, LT OIL PSI LO, repaire (6) r removed these malfunctions. 1X OOC/SPIN.

HYD 1B, RTB. In route received RT AMAD PR, discussion with base, dumped fuel, DIVERT to NZY, declared an EMER with appropriate com. RP elected to keep RT ENG running, trap NZY 36. RP needs to use base more when dealing with EMER's.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 6/1/2016 1:07:51 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 113 Grade: 3.40 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Type Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Failed 6/2/2016 **NORMAL** True False R (3)SKILL COMMENTS (6)) Р 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O O \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc 3. Tac Admin Ρ Improper execution of boldface 4. Mission Execution Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc O \bigcirc items x3 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ O \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O O O O 8. Other Ρ \cap \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 0 4 0

Overall Comments:

(b) (3) (A), (b) / SFAM-113 NATOPS check / 02 June 2016

missed or misread boldface steps on three separate emergency scenarios during his NATOPS simulator check (Add today.

Brief (6) ebrief:

Very receptive and great attitude entire time. Struggled with recreating TOLD numbers. Discussed assumptions in the Bingo profile and using the correct charts. Also saw the numbers for sea level cruise vs full-up profile execution on shorter legs and how simplicity may be worth 50lbs of fuel. Discussed real life scenarios of the ability to go to a divert if you are below "SOP" fuel for that divert if that is the best way to get the jet safely on deck and making the decision early. Also did not know about the form F to get specific aircraft weights – Just thought you always start with 26,000# and add tanks, CATMs and fuel, etc...

On deck startup:

0 Oil R – good catch.

Hung start R – good catch, however discussed importance of PCL usage to verify and appropriately execute follow on startups/procedures.

R ATS – late catch, but good procedures.

RGEN (resettable) at R Engine start. – good system knowledge knowing the GEN wasn't working – but reach down and reset – fixes 99% of hornet issues.

Good discussion on Cautions that are unfamiliar (IFF4), and how to use PCL, ODO, Flight lead, PC to assist.

LGEN (resettable) on the runway immediately following takeoff clearance - You can try a quick reset, but nice job clearing the runway if you choose to troubleshoot. Good comm with tower, especially since traffic is in the overhead looking to land soon.

LADDER light at 75 knots – good low speed abort and procedures. Brake failure on the abort as well, handled timely.

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A). SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 113 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(H) (R) ver remember to use ebrakes lightly as we did pop one tire. Good control throughout the stop while remembering the long field gear. Discussed bringing in line speed scan to verify the urgency of ebrake usage. Nice work not letting tower talk you into clearing the runway, but holding strong to the decision to get a tow. Takeoff try take 2, Windshield hot Caution at 130kts – good decision to keep flying away. Upon rotation, hits a flock of birds - Engine R stall with loss of thrust on the R on the climb out, good job not going to idle, checking half flaps and getting the gear up. Initially will fly away and have airspeed and altitude increase. 5 seconds later, L engine flameout and airspeed declines and altitude sinks – don't forget about your last step - emergency jettison. Also, despite stem power, don't keep pulling back the nose if airspeed is severely decreasing. Safe ejection – good final decision of that scenario.

Takeoff try take 3 – no emergencies. Will go through 2k and 4k level offs during the SID by 100-150 feet. OCF – good knowledge and procedures. Discussed the importance of altitude scan and how they may change my decision to go right to 35 alpha. Very low and slow – yes, right to 35. At 21,000' and 150kts, probably not right to 35 alpha.

In the NAOPA, single ship 5k fuel received a R Bleed Air Warning light that would not extinguish. Executes – Idle, R Bld off, e02, descend blw 10 and heads to San Clemente with the warning light remaining illuminated. (Does not turn engine off). Talks to Beaver and Base, but tells base that bold face is complete and declares an emergency. A minute later and once again brings out the book, reads that the throttle should be off and states that boldface is complete. Upon the 3rd read he realizes the engine should be off and shuts down the motor approximately 3 minutes after initial indications. He realizes he needs to emergency extend the gear and brings the left throttle back to idle for a bit to slow down and emergency extends the gear and gets 3 down and half flaps (I am surprised the jet did not go into MECH during the prolonged sub 85 setting and hyd demands). He sets up for a straight into San Clemente and does not realize his hook is not extended for the arrestment due to a red hook warning light. His initial game plan with 3,600# is to keep it on deck. He will fly and uneventful apch for a planned fly in engagement, and miss both short field and long field gear resulting in an ejection at the end of the runway with about 109 knots left on the jet. Discussed the default game plan needs to be going around and staying on deck being secondary game plan that you should have a very good reason for. Discussed that CRM can come from anywhere including tower, other airplanes. beaver control – not just ODO. Discussed all of the runway you give up on a fly in engagement if your plan was to keep it on deck. Discussed importance of knowing boldface, methodically going through landing checks and processing what the jet is showing you.

Reset and uneventful takeoff from NUC to NAOPA. Middle of NAOPA receives FCS and FLAPS OFF Cautions. All channels and both servos of the TEF were X'd out but does not pull up FCS page until ODO questions what issues he has. Proce

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 6/7/2016 4:48:20 PM

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1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 113 Grade: 4.00 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 6/8/2016 **NORMAL** True False R (3)SKILL COMMENTS (6)) Р 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O O O 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc

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Overall Comments: NATOPS CHECK(2)

Overall still not the strongest performance for (b) (3) (A), (b) but improvements have been made since the first go.

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Ground:

8. Other

3. Tac Admin

4. Mission Execution

5. Headwork / CRM

6. Training Rules Adherence

7. Debrief/Professionalism

Total Grades

RP got a Hot Start. LGEN Caution, and Launch Bar caution. RP noticed these quick enough and took the proper actions for the situation.

On Take off RP missed improper nozzle swing resulting in a loss of thrust. RP continued the takeoff and once airborne noticed the issue and began the steps for Loss of thrust on takeoff. Bold Face was conducted correctly and RP successfully kept the aircraft airborne.

Flight:

Situation developed and aircraft eventually went into MECH. RP declared an emergency and diverting to North Island intending to take a trap. RP began procedures for arrestment landing and that is when RP received the dumps stuck to open. Keep any extra base comm to a minimum and just be concise with what you tell base.

RPs hook skip gameplan was to keep it on the deck and take the long field gear if necessary. Always be ready to back up and validate your decision. Set the emergency brakes before you touchdown. Retard the throttle to idle sooner, left them mid range down the runway with a "stay on deck" game plan. Discussion about how 1/2 flaps give you a better flyaway performance.

Still room for improvement for (b) (3) (A), (b) but progress is being made. Continue to stay in the books and practice chairflying different scenarios. Abgradual increase of NATOPS knowledge will follow you throughout your career but build a strong foundation bere at 101

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(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 113 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (b) i(6) a strong foundation here at 101

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 7/26/2016 6:24:21 PM

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(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(5) (6) (71);	(3) (3)											
SYLL PI	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 TXN/	FFRM	102					Gra	de: 3.00
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L				tus	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ta		Com	ıplete	6/15/2016			b) (3) (A), b) (6)	True	False
9	SKILL			O	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	estions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0		0	0	0	0		
3. Tac Adm	in		Р							•		
4. Mission E	Execution		Р	0	0		0	0	0	0		
5. Headwor	k / CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training	Rules Adherenc	e	Р									
7. Debrief/F	Professionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
То	otal Grades			0	О	2	1	2	0	3		

Overall Comments:

FFRM 102

Parade position maneuvers
TAC Form from fighter wing and spread
2x300 B&Rs
1x250 B&R
1x TCN RV
RTB VFR for Overhead

Solid Brief/Debrief. Good discussion about FPAS. No Issues

Conduct:

RP needs to visualize the 45 degree bearing line.5NM out and fly to that for the join. As it was RP was flying towards lead aircraft and then stepping it out to bearing line.

B&Rs showed improving trends but overall there has been drastic altitude changes while coming in for the join. That itself is not ok. RP was aware of these altitude changes and kept everything safe but it shows a clear breakdown in scan. Continue to be hard on yourself for those mission cross check times and continue to work on getting practice sims.

At night there is no need to get so close on the join up to begin the crossunder. Just a close comfortable position and then work it under.

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFRM 102 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b) (6)

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Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 8/16/2016 1:52:47 PM

(b) (6)

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(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), ((D) (D)											
SYLL PH	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 TXN/	FFRM	103					Gra	de: 3.40
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type		Instructo	r Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ta		Com	plete	6/8/2016	NORMAL ((b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	True	False
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	estions of the Da	ay	P	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admi	in		Р									
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	k / CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training I	Rules Adherence	е	Р									
7. Debrief/P	Professionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•		
То	tal Grades			Ο	0	0	3	2	0	3		

Overall Comments:

FFRM-103 Day Division **PASS/COMPLETE**

When troubleshooting RP needs to keep base and lead informed of the situation. No reason to have anyone in the dark.

Initial join was safe and under control but also slow. Keep that 50 knots of closure until within .5nm. If lead gets vectored to mouse early use that cut to collapse the distance.

B&Rs:

- 1 Started off ok, on altitude and bearing. Sucked in the middle to in close.
- 2 Sucked all the way. Do not give up on the join. Work it into bearing line and then begin the cross under.
- 3 Started acute and got sucked into the middle. Improving trends from the last two but keep the aircraft on proper bearing the entire duration. Use rudder to help maintain your closure and bearing.

TCN RV - No issues. Improving trend on the join. Join was a bit slow. Keep up the closure but keep it under control and on bearing.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 8/3/2016 9:36:03 AM

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(b) (3) (A),	(b) (6)											
SYLL P	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 TXN/	FFRM	104					Gra	de: 3.33
Event Type				On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ta		Com	nplete	6/9/2016	5 NORMAL		(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	True	False
<u> </u>	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Qu	estions of the D	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Adm	nin		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission	Execution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwor	rk / CRM		Р	0	0	0	•	0	0	0		
6. Training	Rules Adherenc	e	Р									
7. Debrief/	Professionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
To	otal Grades			0	0	0	4	2	0	2		

Overall Comments:

FFRM 104 Division Tac Form **PASS/COMPLETE**

When in marshal be professional and keep your aircraft in line with leads jet. RP was parked aft by a couple of feet from the rest of the formation.

Initial join was safe and under control but took too long. Use the 50 knots of closure until .5nm to your advantage and the cut the corners to collapse the distance.

Conduct:

Overall the tac form went smooth. During fluid four, as wing, pull harder towards the inside of the turn to arrive at proper position on lead as they roll out. Keep the spacing a little further out and stepped down.

TCN RV - a little sucked all the way and the closure was not where it should be. Keep an ear out over the radio to build your SA. As it was dash 3 was collapsing the distance.

RP lead section approach back to KNKX. RP is reminded to practice the comm flow at home and as lead to back everything up a few miles as not to get jammed up. Remember the PAR starts you off high. Make the aggressive correction early to get down on glide slope and intercept a normal profile.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 6/17/2016 1:50:01 PM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFRM 105 Grade: 3.00 **Event** Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 6/22/2016 **NORMAL** True False **/6)**, (b) SKILL COMMENTS Р 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O O O \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc 3. Tac Admin Ρ Ρ 4. Mission Execution \bigcirc O 0 O \bigcirc Could not communicate to flight 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ lead where he was 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 O O O 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc Total Grades 0 O 0

Overall Comments:

FFRM-105 Night Division NKX-W291-NKX RTB Section GCA Night Bouncing.

Brief:

Solid Brief. No issues.

Admin:

When the flight lead asks a question make sure you give them a response. Even if you are taking care of other things just give them a quick "2" so that they know you heard them. Continued to be a trend throughout the flight with either not responding or being too slow to respond in the case of fuel/G checks.

Maintain that inside/outside scan to help you when there isn't a clear horizon. Know that lead will be at a known altitude and airspeed and won't deviate too much from that. Use those knowns to lessen the amount of variables to solve for.

Initial join was safe and expeditious. When taking the lead during a lead change pull up a little further acute with enough energy to quickly take the lead. During the RTB comm got a little messy but RP missed a call to switch back to tac 17 from tac 18. Keep aware of the situation and when in doubt ask.

Conduct:

Initial Tac right DD did an in place turn. Load provided a reference heading it should have been apparent that an

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(b) (3) (A). SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFRM 105 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b) (a) Tac right RP did an in-place turn. Lead provided a reference heading it should have been apparent that an in-place turn would not work. Practice that good headwork to determine situations like that before they become an issue and again if in doubt just ask for clarification. At the completion of the turn RP was widely separated from the rest of the formation and did not call out blind immediately. This is a big other for the flight as it was briefed clearly what should be done in the case of lost sight. Flight lead began to coordinate a rejoin instructing RP to fly to the northeast corner and orbit. RP made another headwork mistake and flew to the northwest corner. Besides the obvious of turning in the wrong direction noticing the A/A TCN was increasing vice decrementing should have keyed RP that something was amiss.

Flight eventually got rejoined and began the tac form maneuvers. RP did an average job of correcting and remaining in position with improving trends as the flight went on. 1st B&R RP started off with good closure but was sucked and got stagnant in the middle. Continue to work that inside/outside scan in order to keep the join coming. 2nd B&R RP kept the closure coming but at .4nm got stagnant again. As the fuselages become aligned and your jet gets closer and closer to lead it will require more power vice angles to keep the closure going. Altitude started to deviate due to lack of horizon but it is that exact situation where RP needs to trust his instruments.

TCN RZ. Call "visual" as soon as you see lead. Coming in on bearing line altitude began to get unstable again at the . 2-.3nm position. If this happens just need to re-cage your brain, loosen up and take a deep breath to release the tension and make that join smoother.

RTB for a section GCA no issues.

Overall not the strongest performance for (b) (3) (A), (b) . Chairfly the mission beforehand and strive to see the errors quicker in order to fine tune the correction (c) Continue to put in the effort and learn from previous mistakes in order to perform better in the future.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 7/22/2016 11:45:26 AM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SAWI 104 Grade: 2.57 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True **NORMAL** All Data Complete 6/10/2016 True False R (3)SKILL COMMENTS (b) 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ O O O O 0 0 2. Admin Ρ O O O 0 \circ 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 Ρ 4. Mission Execution O 0 O 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ O \circ 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O O 0 \circ 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

Overall Comments:

SAWI 104 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Total Grades

no issues brief/debrief.

RP practiced working the stern conversion gates with some discussion about comm. Each drill got progressively better as the flight went on.

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Continue to work those gates and use the SA page to your advantage.

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Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 7/26/2016 6:24:54 PM

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(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Grade: 3.00 SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SAWI 105 **Event** Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 6/13/2016 **NORMAL** True False R (B),(B) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 0 O O 0 0 2. Admin Ρ O O 0 O 0 \circ 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ Ρ 4. Mission Execution \bigcirc 0 0 \bigcirc O O 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ 0 0 \circ 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ \bigcirc O 0 \circ 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 0 0 0 0

Overall Comments:

OVERALL, GOOD SIM FOR (b) (3) CONDUCTED SEVEN SETS, BOGEY UNAWARE X 3, AWARE X 2, HOS X 2. (A), (b)

GOOD MECH ON GETING (MITAL RADAR LOCK, CONTINUE TO WORK ON SMOOTHING OUT COM, U G W 9 / SRRM / NOTCH MECH. GOOD LEARNING CURVE, PRESS.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 6/14/2016 2:30:30 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

Grade: 3.00 SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SAWI 106 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Date Date Type Can Log Type **SIMULATO** True **NORMAL** All Data Complete 6/13/2016 True False R (3)SKILL COMMENTS **(2)** 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 0 O O 0 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc 0 0 O 0 \circ 0 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 Ρ 4. Mission Execution 0 0 O O 0 \bigcirc 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ 0 \circ 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ \bigcirc O 0 \circ 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

Overall Comments:

SAWI 106 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Total Grades

Good brief about radar mechanics and how to set and switch between track files. Meld and sort mechanics when you have two targets vice a single.

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Sim conduct went smooth with multiple runs. Improving trends on each run.

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Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 7/26/2016 6:25:29 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FAWI 101 Grade: 2.86 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed

Type	Met	Can Lo		On Track Date	C Sta	tus	Date	Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Data	a		Con	nplete	6/13/2016	NORM	1AL	(b) (3) (A),	True	False
0										(b) (6)		
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	estions of the D	ay	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admi	n		Р	0	0		0	0	0	0		
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0		0	0	0	0		
5. Headworl	< / CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training	Rules Adherenc	е	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			

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Overall Comments:

FAWI 101 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Total Grades

Brief:

Solid Brief. No issues. Good discussion about how to BIT the RDR and the SENS BIT. Understanding when radar mech is complete.

SA page can be a huge tool to help during the stern conversions.

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Conduct:

Section Go was poorly executed by RP. Slow to get the jet to AB and as it was leads jet remained ahead for the entire run down the runway. Once airborne settled into parade position no issues. Reminder that if ever the situation arises where your jet takes off before leads aircraft you must resist the urge to push the stick down.

Clean and dry checks are from the wing line and below.

Overall ATC spread going out to the area needed a lot of work. RP was fighting to stay in position but was making too drastic of corrections resulting in being all over the place. RP is reminded to use the pilot relief modes to his advantage and think about what leads aircraft is doing. Know when leads jet is flying and fly to that same point i.e waypoints. Make small corrections and see how that works vice making huge movements with the stick and power corrections. When pushed to spread make an aggressive move to get there guickly.

Altitude was an issue during this flight. You have numerous systems working for you to make maintaining altitude

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(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FAWI 101 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

base. Remember in ATC spread you have +/- 50 of leads altitude. Double check your altimeter setting and take a look at lead to see where his aircraft is in relation to the horizon. Constantly scan and make the corrections.

2x Hostile aware runs

1x Bogey Unaware (basic stern conversion)

1st run went well. Timeline worked out and the mechanics came into place to set up a successful merge. 2nd run took RP longer to find and sort the target resulting in being behind timeline. Was able to still execute the notch correctly and on time but miscalculated the turn in and was unable to get a lock on the target. RP is reminded to adjust the scan azimuth during this turn in as the target would be higher and closer than expected. 3rd run was standard stern conversion to follow a FENCE in and join up for RTB.

Still had the same issues returning as coming out but there were improving trends as the flight went on.

Do no get slow in while in the pattern.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 2/1/2017 9:57:20 AM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FAWI 102 Grade: 3.14 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 6/21/2016 **NORMAL** True False SKILL COMMENTS Р 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O O O \bigcirc \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 4. Mission Execution Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc O 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O O O O 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 O 0

Overall Comments:

FAWI-102 21 JUN 2016

T/O: 2030 LND: 2145

W291 P5 N/S

A lot of headwork issues and scan break downs. There were improving trends throughout the flight but there needed to be a stronger show at this stage.

Brief:

No issues.

Start-Up/Taxi:

Expeditious on getting the aircraft started and going. APU online 30min prior to takeoff. As it was RP started 1 min earlier and while that may not seem like a big deal it is a reflection upon oneself and their adherence to that discipline. If the FCS IBIT does not go through remember to double check that your hands and feet are off the stick and rudders. Attempt the initializer BIT after clearing the BLINs. Get both the hard and soft RADALT bits going sooner next time. Careful when closing the canopy do not allow it to stop in motion as it can be difficult on the frame. Strong reminder that the throttles need to be at idle and spooling down before you begin a turn. There were too many occasions when RP put the throttle above 75% and was also not quick enough about getting the throttles to idle and checking that they were indeed spooling down.

Give proper callsign to the agency. RP was SHTR-21 but told ground SHTR-20 for taxi. Have the landing/taxi light on as you peed it but refrain from blinding other circust if possible

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(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FAWI 102 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (b) (h) u need it but refrain from blinding other aircraft if possible.

Departure:

Stayed in GUNACQ too long. As soon as you get a lock switch it to AIM-120. If VMC no need for a tied call. No greater than 25kts of excess closure at night. A few times RP got well higher than that. Practice proper lead changes.

Conduct:

Poor G-Warm. Hold 4gs Initially and then touch 6Gs and come back to 4. Preload any frequencies to save yourself time or mistakes from switching mid flight.

1st run was Bogey unaware stern conversion. Took a bit long to gain radar SA and didn't heat up the target enough once coming to the in close position. Work on proper Tally comm. If you do not have CATM on the aircraft do not shoot AIM-9 as this could lead to poor habits down the road. Call visual as soon as you have the other aircraft in sight. Both Hostile Aware runs went relatively smooth, continue to be faster on the SRR and continue to work on the tally and kill comm.

RTB:

RP started to get task saturated and did not use the radar to complete the final RZ. Work through everything you have learned at this point to get help yourself out. A/S started to get excessive but RP caught it. Shouldn't get that excessive in the first place. There was a point were RP slowed to near 200kts. Be aware that this is very dangerous and should not happen again.

No major issues coming back to KNKX for the 4 sec break. Use your position to your advantage to maintain SA. Three separate occasions RP got slow in the pattern. While RP corrected these without any say from the IP it should not happen in the first place. When landing do not do a brake check until 100knots or below.

Do not taxi too fast in the line and chairfly proper shutdown technique.

Overall, below average event. Student maintained a positive attitude throughout the event and was very receptive in the debrief

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 6/28/2016 12:32:28 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FAWI 103 Grade: 3.29 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 6/16/2016 **NORMAL** True False (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc \bigcirc Ρ O 0 0 2. Admin 3. Tac Admin Ρ \bigcirc Ρ \bigcirc 4. Mission Execution O Ρ 5. Headwork / CRM O 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 0 Ρ 7. Debrief/Professionalism \bigcirc Ρ 8. Other

Overall Comments:

FAWI 103 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Total Grades

Overall not bad but not the best flight for (b) (3) (A), (b)

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Brief:

Solid brief and most of what the flight is about was known but there still can be a lot cleaned up on the actual air-to-air and weapon engagement parameters.

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Conduct:

When sitting in marshal let lead know you are up and ready. Do not remain silent. Initial join off the 10sec go started off great. Once RP go in close he let himself get stagnant. Continue to make the joins safe but expeditious. When conducting BDA and ready to take the lead pull up abeam to leads aircraft first.

Overall ATC spread was not working out. Still making too big of corrections to stay in position. Make smaller corrections and see how that works out for you and continue to fine tune your position. Tac Form started off poor but improved as the flight progressed.

Continue to practice comm. Tally comm was poor. Chairfly and study these items so during the flight it is a non issue.

Don't shoot bogeys and do not shoot the AIM-9 if you do not have tone. When you are visual and go into the merge, Continue to follow through with the merge.

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

RTB still had som issues with positioning but overall worked out better than earlier in the flight.

Continue to be hard on yourself and set high standards for yourself to work on these issues.

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Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 8/3/2016 9:25:11 AM

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1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT	Γ: PLT	1 TXN/F	AWI	104					Gra	ade: N/A
	tudent an Log	On Track Date	Stat	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	r Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT True Al	II Data			lot duled		NORM	ИAL		False	False
O SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
Brief/Questions of the Day	Р	0	0	0	0	O	0	0	COMMENTS	
2. A/A timeline Awareness	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
3. Admin Comm	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
4. All Aspect Missile Defense	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
5. Basic Airwork	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
6. Deck Procedures	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
7. Formation	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
8. Headwork / CRM	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
9. Intercept Mechanics/Mutual Support	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
10. Landings	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
11. Radar Mechanics	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
12. Rendezvous	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
13. System and Display Management	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
14. Tactical Comm	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
15. Tactical Displays Interpretation	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
16. Tallies / Merge Cleanup	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
17. Training Rules Adherence	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
18. Weapons Employment	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
19. Flight Discipline/ORM	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
20. Forward Quarter Intercepts	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
21. Stern Conversion Intercept	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
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(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT:	PLT 1	TXN/FAWI 10	4 (1/17/201	9 10:45:52	AM)				
(b) (6) SKILL		0		2	3	4		NA	COMMENTS
22. Tac Turn	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
23. Takeoff/ Rendezvous	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
24. Weapon System Checks	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
25. Debrief/Professionalism	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Total Grades		О	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM W/U

Student On Track Gradesheet Signature **Event** Pre Reqs Status Actual Instructor Reviewed Туре Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data **NORMAL** False Complete 3/27/2017 True R

SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS
1. Completion	D	0	0	0	•	0	0	0	
Total Grades		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	

Overall Comments:

Average to slightly below hop.

Review of fuel, AMAD and engine EPs.

Good abort.

SID: Went direct RODIN from SEAWOLF.

EPs were done OK but very slowly, the rust was evident. On AMAD PR, forgot GEN on at restart.

Get ATIS before talking to Approach.

When making an arrested landing always have a hook skip plan.

No problems with single engine TACAN to NZY.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 3/27/2017 1:38:22 PM (6)

Grade: 3.00

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM W/U Grade: 2.00 Pre Regs Student On Track Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Event Status Actual Type Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 3/28/2017 **NORMAL** True False R SKILL COMMENTS (හි D 1. Completion O \bigcirc O 2- below average EP warmup O О 0 O 0 **Total Grades** 0

Overall Comments:

CI "Hog" Wild.

Consistent trend of rushing decisions; not listening to base, SOCAL or final controller instructions; not thinking ahead of the jet nor referencing NATOPS; and poor airwork.

Brief - No issues. I didn't press him too much for knowledge. Amongst others, specifically discussed Abort decisions, FCS issues, FLAPS OFF (specifically TEF failures), and INS Fail + CSC Fail.

Scenario - Instrument Round Robin to NYL for an approach and then back to NKX. 400 OVC, 1 Mile vis all over.

Takeoff - Flaps Off caution popped at 100 KTS on the roll. CI intent was for him to abort, but he took it airborne. Declared an emergency, and then completely disregarded SOCAL instructions regarding headings and altitudes for traffic. RAC really wanted to head west to W-291 to adjust weight, and he did so.

- -Stayed IMC despite being briefed (and cleared) that VMC on top at 10k. Was pimped by CI to climb to VMC for troubleshooting.
- -Contacted base, but did not allow base to contribute to decision making. CI could have volunteered base suggestion, but RAC was insistent on getting things moving with Beaver clearance to NZY and switch to SOCAL.
- -No discussion or internal decision making for alternate airfields (better Wx/longer runway)
- -Never asked for Wx at NZY nor Wx at any potential alternates. Got word from SOCAL during descent that NZY was 400' 3/4 mile vis, landing PAR RWY 29.

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM W/U (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (b) (6)

- -RAC insisted on RWY 36 PAR NZY.
- -Never discussed nor considered jettison of externals (only had a CL and AIM9's, so not likely to have gained much, but the point is the option never came up with base).
- -Dumped down to an arbitrary weight. Asked for trap NZY. Did not provide accurate landing weight, nor speed (said 175 Kts, 33K, when actual approach speed more like 215 Kts and ~30K). Never brought up checklist page to verify weight. Despite being dirty and seeing onspeed of ~215 Kts, kept insisting approach speed would be 175Kts.
- -Never checked PCL for E-28 limitations. Despite discussing in brief that a TEF off condition might preclude short field arrestment, RAC went for the short field arrestment.
- -Never conveyed to SOCAL nor Final Controller that approach speeds would be significantly faster than normal. This caused overshoots on final. RAC had RWY 36 TACAN final bearing selected, and pretty much disregarded final approach heading correction instructions inside of 3-4 miles. Unsurprisingly, this caused RAC to breakout lined up left of runway and without the ability to safely land. Go around followed.
- -RAC had received and acknowledged missed approach instructions on final, but was unprepared to execute upon go around ("Climbing right turn to 2k, intercept NZY R-208 to SKATE and Hold). Upon MA, told by PAR controller to execute missed approach procedure and contact SOCAL. Didn't have Skate, R-208 radial or any reference to Skate, and didn't attempt to go to Skate, nor convey to SOCAL an inability to do so. Instead, climbed straight ahead, and encroached on Lindbergh, got instructed by SOCAL to avoid Lindbergh (too late) and then picked his own heading of 170 for a downwind leg. Fuel state now 4.2
- -On downwind, told to go to Skate and hold. RAC requested a 10 mile final for RWY 36 PAR NZY. When given a vector of 270 in order to setup for a left two-seventy hook onto a \sim 10 mile final, RAC just kept turning right to 360 (and now well inside of 10 NM).
- -CI froze sim at this point to explain intent of doing a 270 for a 10 mile final.
- -SOCAL new querry for arrestment speed and weight = "33K/175Kts"
- -Long final, on glideslope, but disregarded Final Controller heading instructions inside of 3NM because RAC was again flying the final heading off of the TACAN. This again had RAC lined up well left of runway, but he made a big play and got the jet on deck. Arresting gear stopped the jet despite weight and speed anomalies.

-End	of	this	scenario
-LHU	ΟI	นเมอ	3CEI I al 10

Setup back at Miramar with the same Wx. CI intent to show INS fail + CSC (frozen Standby attitude in the HUD). On first attempt, RAC aborted at 140 KTS on the INS failure. Good procedures, and probably not a bad decision given the 400' ceiling. Next attempt, INS failure at 160 KTS, so committed to fly.

- -RAC did a good job of transition to the Stby ARI, declared an emergency, but again insisted on heading and altitude at his discretion. Granted he declared an emergency, but there was no real reason not to at least attempt altitude and/or heading control...or ask for no gyro vectors as you sort it out.
- -Go on top, discussed the indications, cross checks, etc.
- -CI indicated intent was to continue and shoot a standby instrument approach. Fuel set to 4.0.
- -RAC did consider and explore alternate airfields. Was told NZY VFR (3000/3NM, RWY 29, Winds 270/10). RAC elected PAR NZY Did not get ATIS. Similar to previous scenario. RAC had plenty of time

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 4/11/2017 1:10:49 PM (6)

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(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FAM W/U

Grade: N/A

Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Student Can Log	On Track Date	Status	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type	Instructor	Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	None		Not		NORMAL		False	False

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 COMMENTS

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Overall Comments:

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SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SSTK 101 Grade: 3.29 **Event** Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 6/28/2016 **NORMAL** (b) (3) (A), (b) True False R (6)SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 0 O O 0 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ O 0 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ Ρ 4. Mission Execution \bigcirc 0 0 O O O 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ 0 \circ 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 \circ 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 0 0 0

Overall Comments: SSTK 101 COMPLETE.

CONTINUE TO WORK ON SCAN AND WATCH A/S AND LIFT VECTOR PLACEMENT. TOWARDS THE END OF THE SIM THE SCAN STARTED TO SEEM TO COME TOGETHER. PRESS

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 6/28/2016 4:01:06 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10: 45: 52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

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SYLL PH	IASE/EVE	NT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	SSTK	102					Gra	ade: 3.29
Event Type	ype Met Can L				k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	MULATO True All Data		ta	6/29/2016	6 Com	nplete	6/29/2016	NORM		(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	True	False
0	21/11											
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Ques	stions of the Da	ау	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admir	ı		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission Ex	recution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	/ CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training R	Rules Adherence	Э	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
7. Debrief/Pr	ofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other P		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•			
Total Grades			0	0	0	5	2	0	1			

Overall Comments:

Average CTW SSTK hop for (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) . Well prepared for the brief.

Inconsistent pattern work and scan. Roll in / roll out technique was fair for line up. Setting and holding AOA was inconsistent. On some runs the pull down was too close to the tgt requiring a reset of AOA. Scan in the dive is weak particularly on targeting. A/S and altitude control and SA was OK. Inconsistent pattern work and RIP tech caused several runs to be no drops or called off by CI.

All runs 30 degree CTW.

CCIP X 5 - Runs generally had decent release parameters, but had little or no correction to get the cross to the tgt and some releases were well L or R.

AUTO Designated X 5 - Line up and ASL corrections are a work in progress.

AUTO designate and slew - Challenging, but progressing.

Saw AUTO and CCIP X wind releases.

Some SE not 5 G through 15 degrees.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 7/6/2016 2:06:55 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

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SYLL PHA	SE/EVE	NT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	SSTK	103					Gra	ide: 3.29
Event P Type	re Reqs Met	Stud Can l		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	MULATO True All D		ıta	7/1/2016	Com	plete	7/1/2016	NORM	AL (6	(a) (a) (b), (b)	True	False
0											201115	
SI	KILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Questio	ons of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission Execu	ution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork / C	CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training Rule	es Adherence	9	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
7. Debrief/Profe	essionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Total			0	О	0	5	2	0	1			

Overall Comments:

SSTK 103 COMPLETE.

Brief.

Check the Target Attack Planning Guide for standard Z diagrams that have already been calculated for certain loadout. Discussion that you cant fire the laser with the gun and the difference between In Range and In Zone.

Discussion about how to check the slant range for your 9k checks.

Debrief:

When flying the pattern use your target locator line to determine 45 degrees off and take a snapshot outside to develop a sight picture. RP initially flew too large of a pattern and once RP started referencing the Tgt Locator line the pattern tightened up.

Intro to the bunt strafe and why it is the preferred option. RP's trigger squeeze was too short. Make sure to get the full 2sec off

Over all slightly below average hop for pattern work tended to fly out of the range space without recognition. Initially submitted grade sheet with no comments below average for headwork. RP got progressively better as event went on. Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 7/22/2016 12:43:50 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	IASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	SSTK	104					Gra	de: 3.29
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	True	All Da	ta	7/5/2016	Com	nplete	7/5/2016	NORM		(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	True	False
0												
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Ques	stions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admin	1		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission Ex	ecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	/ CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training R	ules Adherenc	е	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
7. Debrief/Pr	ofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•		
Tot	al Grades			0	0	0	5	2	0	1		

Overall Comments: SSTK 104 COMPLETE

flew the complete take off, transit, circle the wagons and then RTB.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 8/4/2016 10:53:46 AM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PI	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	FSTK	101					Gra	ade: 3.29
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can l		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Type		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	GHT True All Dat				Com	nplete	7/7/2016	NORM	IAL (b	(3) (A), (I (b)	True	False
0	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	(3) (A), NA)	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	estions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	(b) (b)	COMMENTS	
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admi	n		Р	0	0	0	•	0	0	0		
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headworl	c / CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training	Rules Adherence	e	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•		
То	tal Grades			0	0	0	5	2	0	1		

Overall Comments:

FSTK 101 *PASS/COMPLETE*

7 JULY 2016 A/C: 350

T/O: 1016 LND: 1116

R2510 ST

Ground

Initially started in A/C 251 but transferred to A/C 350 due to RDR MUX Fail. When Troubleshooting continue to work through the checklist. Try not to be so fixated on the problem.

Put LPOD to STBY prior to taxi.

During T/O Checks RP Said "Harness as you like it" vice "8 points, Secure."

10 seconds goes by fast as dash 4 off the runway. Be slightly faster on the 10 sec go as dash 4. RP was safe and conservative but it is ok to speed things up slightly to make it within that 10 sec window. As it was it turned into about a 20sec go. When executing the join up go ahead and cut the corner in a turn to save time and fuel.

Conduct:

Can complete all of SAPDART with the exception of arming up prior to entering the area. Use that transit time to get everything sorted before the spacer pass.

Can be a bit looser on the spacer pass. Don't forget to note the winds at the target.

TACADMIN discussed in debrief and debriefed the tapes. Overall moderately within parameters but the safe escapes tonded to be week pulls. Improving trends on each pass with the last few being highlights. You points to work on

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 101 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b) (6) d to be weak pulls. Improving trends on each pass with the last few being highlights. Key points to work on include pulling at least 3Gs during your roll in to increase that tracking time. Unload earlier in order to roll out with the ASL on or closer to the target. Do not forget to slew the target but this got better later in the runs. Remember to slew the target first and then line up the ASL.

On the safe escape get to 5Gs within 2 secs and maintain. Pickle Pause Pull.

OTR. Visualize where each aircraft should be and that will help you out with where to look. Use SRR mechanics to help acquire your wingmen.

Coming back home try to fly a tighter formation as -4. Fly form off lead but continue to keep-2 and -3 in your scan. Treat the break as an In Place turn. Fly your jet during the break and towards the end of the roll out look out for lead aircraft. As it was got slight nose high on break due to RP looking out too early at interval.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 7/26/2016 6:18:48 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

Grade: 3.29 SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 102 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **FLIGHT** True **NORMAL** All Data 7/8/2016 Complete 7/8/2016 True False (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ 3. Tac Admin Ρ \circ 0 0 \bigcirc \circ 0 0 0 4. Mission Execution Ρ \bigcirc 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 \bigcirc O 0 0 8. Other Ρ O **Total Grades** 0 О 0 2 0

Overall Comments:

FSTK 102 8 JUL 2016

T/O: 1104 LND: 1210

R2510 ST

Event flexed to a single launch for RP. No issues on start up or transit to and from the area.

Conduct:

When checking in late to a range keep an ear out on the comm to make sure you do not step on anyone.

RP flew a total of 11 passes with 5 No Drops.

- 1 248/11
- 2 ND (TDC Not to HUD)
- 3 ND (~)
- 4 ND (~)
- 5 ND (~)
- 6 45/12
- 7 33/10
- 8 42/7
- 9 ND (Switch Pig)
- 10 16/6
- 11 33/10

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 102 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b) (a) IRP needs to do his checklist. That would have saved all the no drops. When in doubt fall back on the checklist.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 2/1/2017 2:40:08 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 103 Grade: 3.14 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 7/12/2016 **NORMAL** True False SKILL COMMENTS **(**€) Ρ 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc O \bigcirc O \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ O \bigcirc 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 0 Ρ 4. Mission Execution O 0 \bigcirc \circ 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 0 O 0 \circ 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 2 **Total Grades** 0 0

Overall Comments:

FSTK 103. Complete.

Solid brief. No issues. Make sure to take a snapshot outside when rolling into the pattern. The numbers are there to help you develop a sight picture to roll in on targets in the real world. Make sure to nail your safe escape maneuvers in order to not invalidate your run. Discussion on ordnance preflight and nordo RTB Procedures.

Debrief:

When being detached for a straight in call clear when away from the formation. If already below or close to 250 knots no need to use the speed brake. Discussion about calling out Bingo. Started RTB 200# below BINGO without a comm call to lead. Different levels of fuel could lead to a different gameplan.

Coming into the range autocollapse the distance from ATC spread.

Hits recorded in the email.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 8/3/2016 1:43:54 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)											
SYLL PH	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	SLAT	101					Gra	ade: 3.43
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instruct	or Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	True	All Da	ta		Con	nplete	7/15/2016	NORM	IAL (b) (3) (A), (b) True	False
0	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	5
1. Brief/Que	stions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admir	า		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission Ex	xecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	:/CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training F	Rules Adherenc	e	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/Pi	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•		
Tot	tal Grades			0	0	0	4	3	0	1		

Overall Comments: SLAT 101 Complete.

Briefed with CI. No Issues.

Conduct - VR1266 Route. Standard admin no issues. If RADALT goes off continue to verbalize and put some G on the aircraft to pull up.

Coming over superstitious mountains make sure to have your radar up and keep an eye out for civilian traffic and doubly so for glider pilots.

Discussion about 10% rule.

Main debrief focused on getting off the route and executing the RTB. Chairfly the comm beforehand and walk through exactly how you are going to get home.

Demo of the Single Hornet Approach using the A/G radar. Keep in mind the Null zone and hold down the TDC to slew. Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 7/22/2016 12:46:39 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FLAT 101 Grade: 3.29 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Met Type Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 7/19/2016 **NORMAL** True False (43), (63) SKILL COMMENTS Р 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc O O O \bigcirc \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 Ρ 4. Mission Execution \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O \bigcirc O \bigcirc 8. Other Ρ \cap \bigcirc \bigcirc Total <u>Grades</u> 0 0

Overall Comments:

FLAT 101 VR1266

T/O: 1515 LND: 1625

Two roll ins on Mine Tgt Near Point H

2 T&G 1 Full Stop

Brief

No Issues, clean up on proper terminology for actions. Make sure to have proper models and check that all markers are good to be used.

1 Safety of flight. As RP was setting up SAPDART in preparation for the roll in IP had to call Pull Up to avoid terrain.

Prior to Take off. RP read back the clearance incorrectly. Said the radial but not the DME for BZA. Forgot to set up the AA waypoint and complete the Air-to-air set up. Wait until you are right on the runway to drop Mark 1. Want it as accurate as possible.

Two altitude busts on the RT. Told to level off at 10k and touched 9800' and again told to cross Atlas at or about 5k but RP was descending to 3k. IP had to take corrective action. Do as TWR tells you. RP did not break at the #s and stepped on the SHUTR91's comm call.

TacAdmin:

Getting onto the route RP was not ready to begin the route. Did not have AutoSeq set up or the ToT. If you need more time just back vourself up earlier and do a spin before getting onto the route. RP was briefed that an each point be

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FLAT 101 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(bin(6)) just back yourself up earlier and do a spin before getting onto the route. RP was briefed that on each point he was to state heading to the next point, distance, and fuel. RP did not do so.

While on the route the bingo for 7500 went off and RP did not check for CTR line transfer. If you feel you are task loaded climb to cope. On each ridgeline crossing RP did not state "Good R, _____ Terrain"

Biggest recommendation is to chairfly events more and do it with another person.

Overall. Well below average for admin getting on the route and a potential safety while conduction SAPDART checks prior to the roll in.

Leftv

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 7/22/2016 11:37:26 AM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SVII DL	IASE/EVE	NIT. E	υт	1 A/G/	SLAT	102					Gra	de: 3.43
SILLII				1 // 0/	JLAI	102					Gra	uc. 5.45
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type		Instructo	r Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	True All Data		ta		Com	plete	7/20/2016	NORM	1AL	(b) (3) , (b) (3)	True	False
0										(B),(B)		
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Ques	stions of the Da	ау	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admir	1		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission Ex	ecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	/ CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training R	ules Adherence	е	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/Pr	ofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•		
Tot	al Grades			0	0	0	4	3	О	1		

Overall Comments:

SLAT102 AFT4

0930-1100

Brief: No Issues

Conduct:

Don't need to be so fast repeating back the instructions. Repeat the comm in a smooth, clear manner and make sure you understand yourself what is to be done.

Pull Velocity vector to the degree required. Aim for +/- 1 degree.

Don't say "Good R" without actually having it in the HUD.

Don't confuse SOJ for TOJ, only happened once, no issues after this one.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 7/20/2016 11:45:22 AM
(6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SLAT 103 Grade: 3.29 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Actual Type Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 7/21/2016 **NORMAL** True False R SKILL COMMENTS (6) Ρ 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O \bigcirc O \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc O 0 \bigcirc 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 4. Mission Execution Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ 0 \bigcirc \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ \bigcirc O 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O O O 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 0 0

Overall Comments:

SLAT 103

Brief: RP needs to clean up the respective boldface for maneuvers.

Conduct:

Only alibis for fence in comm would be the radar or radalt inop. Proper comm for lat checks should be "SH-03 Lat checks complete, Good R, 270' set"

Avoid any extraneous comm.

Do not need to roger up check turns or hard turns. Use small descent rule of thumb to your advantage. If you have the max 10 degrees nose low, use it. Flights are very fuel intensive so it is important to be as fuel efficient as possible getting set up.

Know the maximum elevation for the range you will be working in. Going to the R2301 they read you a mouthful of restrictions. Have the In-flight guide out and just read what you have to make things easier.

RP tended to be slightly low on recoveries. Anticipate your gates coming up and hit them as soon as your altitudes come up.

Chairfly comm for SACT maneuvers.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 8/3/2016 1:28:44 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SSTK 105 Grade: 3.43 On Track Event Pre Regs Student Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Can Log Date Date Type Type **SIMULATO** True **NORMAL** All Data Complete 7/22/2016 (b) (3) (A), (b) True False R $\overline{(6)}$ SKILL COMMENTS 0 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 O 0 O O 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ O 0 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 Ρ 0 0 4. Mission Execution O O O 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ 0 0 0 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 0 0 0

Overall Comments:

Average hop.

Intro to LALD bomb and strafe patterns.

Sixteen runs completed using offset. oblique and bunt strafe patterns.

Keep that airspeed in your scan.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 7/22/2016 1:59:47 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SLAT 104 Grade: 3.43 Event Pre Reas Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type SIMULATO True All Data Complete 7/25/2016 **NORMAL** True False R (Ab), (Bb) SKILL COMMENTS Р 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O \bigcirc O \bigcirc \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc 0 \bigcirc \circ 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 Ρ 4. Mission Execution \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 \bigcirc 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 \bigcirc \circ 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O O 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

0

Overall Comments:

SLAT104

Sim LD: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Total Grades

Console: (b) (3) (A),

(b) (6)

Briefed with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) . No issues

Conduct:

Formation keeping was poor. RP needs to have a better scan and work to get himself in position. The more time you are in position the more fuel you have to play with to actually conduct LAT. When executing TAC turns you do not need to elevate if you are in position.

When conducting the vertical maneuvers in the low altitude environment RP would have a tendency to fly around 280-270' while executing the comm. Need to be able to talk and also keep the scan up on where the aircraft is.

RP had weak break turns. Need to pull more.

A/S control on bottom of DRR tended to lean towards the fast side. Keep the scan going.

0

Quicker reversals on the 2D/3D weave. Look outside the aircraft and have that GeoRef and realize that pulling towards the abeam may not be as big of a turn and on the 3D weave you need to start your reversal earlier based on the geometry.

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SLAT 104 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (b) (6)

Biggest items for RP to work on are the SACT Maneuvers and maintaining tac formation. Overall not that best sim for RP. Continue to chairfly and work on the scan and improvements will be made.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 8/19/2016 7:18:11 AM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FLAT 102 Grade: 3.29 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 8/2/2016 **NORMAL** True False SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 Ρ 0 0 2. Admin 3. Tac Admin Ρ \bigcirc 0 Ρ \bigcirc 4. Mission Execution Ρ 0 5. Headwork / CRM 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 0 Ρ 7. Debrief/Professionalism \bigcirc Ρ 8. Other \bigcirc Total Grades 0 O 3 0

Overall Comments: FLAT 102 COMPLETE 02 AUG 16

Brief: Standard. When asked dive recovery rules do not give ancillary details. Just spit them out.

Admin:

Start up was fine but can still be improved. Recommend getting clearance while doing FCS IBIT vice waiting for final checkers. RP loaded fills on jmps prior to flight but still check and make sure the loads are inputted correctly. Do the ALR BIT earlier. RP waited until marshal.

Do issues on transit. Have a plan if something goes amiss getting into the area. Arrived and range was still being occupied so we canceled and proceeded VFR and held outside the range until it was open. Continue to have a high SA during these situations as multiple aircraft were leaving the range while we were getting in.

Transit back to KNKX from the range was no issue. Try not to make LA CTR angry with your requests even if they did not acknowledge your call. When doing the simulated single engine approach remember to keep your RPM up during high loads on the aircraft. RP had throttle set around 73-75%. Back things up during the visual straight in. RP held too much airspeed coming in and that compressed the final portion and involved big corrections. Do not want to be putting so much undue strain on the aircraft system in the event of a real single engine approach. Slow down to 250 earlier.

TACADMIN:

RP tended to have slight climbs on turns. Strive to keep the velocity vector on to just peaking about the horizon to avoid being 100ft high at the conclusion of maneuvers. More aggressive with your check turns.

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FLAT 102 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (b) (6)

Need to trust the #s on the vertical maneuvers and again be more aggressive. RP would roll out ~3 degrees lower (i.e rolling out at 17 vice 20 degrees) than what is called for and nose would tend to creep upwards while traversing downhill. RP was demoed a maneuver to show how the vertical maneuvers should feel and to increase the ratchet pulls as you hit each gate.

Continue to work on threat maneuvers. There was an improving trend. Overall for the tacadmin today RP needs to develop a faster spoke scan. RP would nail airspeed but be climbing slightly in altitude and vice versa.

Debrief:

Important discussion about the 7500 bug in regards to tank 4 transfer and fixed a severe misconception RP had in regards to that check. No other outstanding issues.

1 Below average for lack of NATOPS knowledge in regards to 7.5 Fuel check. This should not be something that learn this far along in the syllabus. If you have questions ask.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 8/5/2016 8:21:32 AM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(D) (3) (A),	(D) (O)											
SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FLAT 103 Grade: 3.29												
Event Type					k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Data			Complete		8/5/2016	NORMAL		(b) (3) (b) (3) (A), (b)	True	False
	SKILL			О	1	2	3	4	5	(<mark>6)</mark> NA	COMMENTS	;
1. Brief/Questions of the Day			Р	0	0	0	•	0	0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission Execution			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork / CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0			
6. Training Rules Adherence		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0			
7. Debrief/Professionalism			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other P			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Total Grades				0	0	0	5	2	0	1		

Overall Comments: FLAT 103 COMPLETE 5 AUG

R-2510

Brief:

Below average brief for RP. Lack of materials (SLAP Data, BASH) Incorrect brief of NOTAMS (KNJK arresting gears), Lack of acknowledge regarding the operating area (MSA, obstructions, correct comm freqs). Don't let this occur again. One below.

Admin:

Initial join up after breaking through layer RP did not call visual. 1 safety of flight during initial BDA. RP was too tight and had wing overlap with lead.

ATC is 1.0nm abeam, be there and do not be sucked. RP should look back towards lead slightly. On the RTB RP bracketed too far out on the BDA and gained 20kts of airspeed when in the lead. Do not detach yourself for the individual PAR. No issues with PAR to full stop.

TACADMIN:

Conducted tape debrief for specifics on maneuvers.

Match lead on the way down for G warm. No nose slices on the break turns but they were all weak pulls. Max perform the aircraft and work on that for next flight.

Tended to have slight ballooning on most turns but improving trend throughout flight. Strive to make the turns as level

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FLAT 103 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (b) (6)

Vertical maneuvers overall went average. Have more of a loaded roll on the gun jinks. Should be one continuous maneuver. During SACT maneuvers tendency to pull too hot and then too cold into the abeam. Improving trend with each maneuver. More lateral stick for 3D maneuvers will help RP but stick mechanics got better.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 8/19/2016 7:13:28 AM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FLAT 104 Grade: 3.57											
	Student Can Log	On Trac Date	k Stat	tus	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type		Instructo	r Signature	Reviewed	
FLIGHT True A	III Data		Complete		8/8/2016	NORMAL		(b) (3) (A), (b) (b)	, True	False	
O (3)											
SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	(b)	COMMENTS		
1. Brief/Questions of the Day	P	0	0	0	0		0	(8)			
2. Admin		0	0	0		0	0	0			
3. Tac Admin		0	0	0		0	0	0			
4. Mission Execution		0	0	0	0		0	0			
5. Headwork / CRM		0	0	0		0	0	0			
6. Training Rules Adherence		0	0	0	0		0	0			
7. Debrief/Professionalism		0	0	0	0		0	0			
8. Other		0	0	0	0	0	0	•			
Total Grades		0	0	0	3	4	0	1			

Overall Comments: FLAT 104 **PASS/COMPLETE** 8 AUG 16 R-2510 ST/LL

Brief:

No Issues.

ADMIN:

When in marshal make sure to match lead and line up the aircraft correctly. Technique is to line up the actual pilot's head vice the nose landing gear. Have more A/S when you take the lead on a BDA. On the transit out to the area RP Started out too far acute on LD in spread, notice those trends earlier and make corrections to end up on position.

No Issues during RTB. Speed up the taxi slightly when on deck.

TACADMIN:

Conducted Tape Debrief.

RP comfort level was initially 400-500ft but worked it down to the 320-400ft area. Velocity vector was slightly high on most turns. Not excessive and no nose slices but continue to strive for those level turns. Vertical maneuvers for the most part went well. On a few RP had slightly late gate corrections in the middle. Nothing unsafe just performing the jet at 830'ft on a 15 for 8 vice 880-900ft.

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FLAT 104 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

Overall this flight went well for RP. Definite improvement since the start of the phase. Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 8/19/2016 12:49:55 PM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)										
SYLL PH	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	SSTK	106					Grade: 3.43
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instruct	tor Signature Reviewed
SIMULATO R	True	All Da	ta		Con	nplete	8/1/2016	NORM	1AL (b) (3) (A), ((b) True False
0	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS
1. Brief/Que	stions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	well prepared
2. Admin	·			0	0	0		0	0	0	
3. Tac Admir	า		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0	
4. Mission Ex	xecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0	see overall comments
5. Headwork	: / CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0	
6. Training F	Rules Adherenc	е	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	
7. Debrief/Pi	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	
8. Other	3. Other		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•	
Tot	tal Grades			0	Ο	0	4	3	0	1	

Overall Comments:

SSTK 106 section pop up attacks complete. Flew as wingman on 3 30/30 LALD, 4 Marine Method LALD and 5 shift attack runs. Overall solid work in the patterns, pops, tracking and delivery technique. Good SA on all runs. Handled a HYD 2A/1B EP IAW NATOPS.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 8/1/2016 12:40:28 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	FSTK	104					Gra	nde: 3.43
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Type		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ıta		Com	nplete	8/17/2016	NORM	AL	(b) (3) (A(b)	True	False
0										(6)(3)		
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	(A), (b) (6)	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	stions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admii	n		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	c / CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training F	Rules Adherence	е	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
To [.]	tal Grades			О	Ο	0	4	3	0	1		

Overall Comments: FSTK104 **PASS/COMPLETE** 17 AUG R-2510

Brief: No issues.

Admin: APU start was 20sec late. Make sure the brightness is turned up prior to turning on the DDIs. Say what clearance you are requesting i.e "SH-11 A03 on request etc." vice just saying "CLR on request ready to copy". Avoid telling clearance to stby.

More prudent punching out the master caution. Focus on staying exactly on center taxi line as well as runway centerline when lining up for takeoff.

On the RTB if RP is going to use a course line for the runway set 243 as opposed to 240. When dirtying up immediately set 8.1. Do not offset at a high speed on the rollout. On the shutdown forgot to set bingo bug back to 7500.

TACADMIN: When doing the tgt recce offset more to a side so that you will have a clear view of the tgt to make sure the area is clear. Issue with ordnance not coming off rails. Continued to do roll-ins and troubleshoot with no success. Overall roll-ins were average with improving trends.

Debrief: No issues.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 8/24/2016 12:37:07 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 105 Grade: 3.57 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 8/18/2016 **NORMAL** True False (3)SKILL COMMENTS (6) Р 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O \bigcirc O O 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 Ρ 4. Mission Execution \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 \bigcirc 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 \bigcirc \bigcirc 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O \bigcirc O 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

4

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Overall Comments: FSTK105 **PASS/COMPLETE** 18 AUG 2016 R-2510 ST

Total Grades

Brief: Standard. Minor discrepancies between Z on he board and KBC. No issues,

0

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ADMIN: No issues starting up and getting out the line. Departure and transit as standard. Minor mistakes in hand signals for the BDA. Debriefed on deck. RTB standard. Discussion about proper fuel checks during the flight in order to prevent any issues from occurring.

TACADMIN: Conducted tape debrief. Overall RP worked shallow on the dives but there was improving trend as the flight went on. Have a quick unload and snappy reversal to allow yourself more tracking time. Be diligent about flying your parameters but make adjustments as necessary since wing is not on the same parameters as lead. Discussion about how to fix shallow dive angles earlier.

Debrief:

RP practiced debrief using the BATTSEAT format.

Overall not the strongest flight for RP in certain areas but good improvement in others. Lessons learned for RP include how to fix dive angles and manipulate the offset angle to RPs advantage. Good discussion and learning point about the fuel system/checks and good experience for RP to conduct his own debrief.

Drocc

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 105 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (P) (S)

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 10/13/2016 3:59:09 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(b) (b) (A),	(D) (O)											
SYLL PI	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	FSTK	106					Gra	nde: 3.14
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT O	True All Data		ta		Com	plete	7/21/2016	NORM	IAL (6	o) (3) (A), (S)	b) True	False
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	estions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	•	0	0	0	0	0		
3. Tac Admi	n		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headworl	k / CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training I	Rules Adherence	е	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•		
То	tal Grades			О	1	0	3	3	0	1		

Overall Comments: FSTK 106 Complete

Brief: No Issues

Standard admin on the way out to the area. RP can be quicker joining up and executing the crossunder.

Range conduct. No Issues

Biggest other was the off target RZ. RP picked up dash 4 and called "1 in sight" thinking it was lead. RP waited until a comm call was made and realized his error. Called blind and climbed up to altitude. Eventually couldn't locate remainder of flight and began to get own clearance back home when dash 3 was able to join on RP. Rest of RTB was no issue. Debriefed OTR.

2 below for OTR:

As -2 off target, RP initially tried to join on -4 who was still in the strafe pattern and had to be corrected by -3 IP. Subsequently tried to join on next flight that was incoming to the 2507. Lead had to point out that was not the correct flight to join on and then lead directed to fly toward loots and that he was slowing to 275 knots. RP could not fly to loots - instead he flew a heading that pointed him 30-40 deg to the south of Loots and at 400+ kts. -3 ran him down and even at 415 kts still did not have closure on him. Overall 2 below for complete breakdown of SA and inability to follow simple direction from flight lead.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 8/1/2016 2:26:54 PM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(b) (b) (rt), ((6) (6)											
SYLL PH	HASE/EVE	ENT: P	LT	1 A/G/	SFAM	115					Gra	ade: N/A
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can Lo		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	r Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	True	None				lot eduled		NORM	1AL		False	False
0												
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	stions of the Da	ay	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
2. Admin			D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
3. Tac Admir	n		D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
4. Mission E	xecution		D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
5. Headwork	c / CRM		D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
6. Training F	Rules Adherenc	е	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
8. Other	8. Other			0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
To	tal Grades			0	0	О	0	0	0	О		

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

Grade: 3.43 SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SSTK 107 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 8/15/2016 **NORMAL** True False R (B),(B) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 O O O 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ O 0 \circ 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ Ρ 4. Mission Execution \bigcirc 0 0 O O O 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ 0 \circ 0 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 \circ 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 0 0 0

Overall Comments:

COMPLETE

OVERALL WELL PREPARED, GOOD MECH, DISUCSSED RADAR TO TGT, LPOD TO TGT, RADAR TRANS LPOD TO TGT, AND KEY APPLICATION POINTS OF THE LPOD TO INCLUDE: MODES, BDA, FLAGS, AND TGT POINTS.

PRESS

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 8/17/2016 9:46:16 AM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), (l	b) (6)											
SYLL PH	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	SSTK	109					Gra	nde: 3.43
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	True	All Da	ta		Con	nplete	8/16/2016	NORM	IAL	(b) (3) , (b) (3)	True	False
O	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	(b),(b) (c) NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Ques	stions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	OOMMENTS	
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admir	۱		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission Ex	recution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	/ CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training R	ules Adherenc	е	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/Pr	ofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other	8. Other P		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Tot	al Grades			0	О	0	4	3	0	1		

Overall Comments:

Good brief and flight conduct, Full combat checklist on deck and airborn, SWOLF 7, NUC TGTS. Completed all required flight conduct of FLIR/LST/GBU's & LMAV. 3X LST, 8X GBU 12's-6X Self LAS Continuous and Delay, 2X JTAC LAS Continuous and Delay and 4X LMAV.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 8/17/2016 9:54:03 AM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(D) (S) (A),	(6) (6)											
SYLL PI	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	FSTK	107					Gra	nde: 3.86
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT			ta		Con	nplete	9/14/2016	NORM	1AL	(b) (3) (A(b) (6(3)	True	False
9	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	(A), (b) (6)	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	estions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Adm	in		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Mission E	Execution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwor	k / CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Training	Rules Adherenc	е	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/F	Professionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
То	tal Grades			О	O	О	1	6	0	1		

Overall Comments:

Overall, solid flight (b) (3) getting back into the jet after some time off.

Brief - Good Brief (6)

Admin - No Issues

Tac Admin - No Issues

Conduct - W291 P5 to work simulated sensor runs as aircraft did not have a LPOD. Improving trend on JLASE comm.

Lesson Learned – Recongnizing at night that it is an instrument scan when delivering weapons, and that you must rely more on instruments then outside visual cues. Proper LGB crank and concise JLASE comm. Continue to build off the experience that your received during this hop.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 12/14/2016 8:06:59 AM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 108 Grade: 3.43 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **FLIGHT** True All Data Complete 8/19/2016 **NORMAL** True False (A), (b) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ O O O O O 0 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc O 0 0 \circ 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 Ρ 4. Mission Execution 0 0 \bigcirc 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ 0 \circ 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ \bigcirc O 0 \circ 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 0 0 0

Overall Comments: FSTK108 **PASS/COMPLETE** 19 AUG 2016 R-2510

Brief: Standard

Admin: RP a little slow taxiing out the line. Remember double bubble requires a bit more power to get moving. JDAM on deck set up went as per checklist.

Standard Departure, transit, RTB

TACADMIN: Set up and employment as per checklist. Continue to narrate the validation checklist. No issues

Debrief: Standard.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 11/3/2016 4:24:04 PM

SYLL PH	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	FSTK	110					Gra	nde: 3.29
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stud Can l		On Trac Date	k Stat	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ta	10/1/2016	o Com	nplete	8/23/2016	NORM	AL	(b) (3) (A),	True	False
0										(b) (6)		
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	stions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			P	0	0		O	0	0	0		
3. Tac Admi	n		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	C / CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training F	Rules Adherence	е	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		P	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
То	tal Grades			0	0	1	3	3	0	1		

Overall Comments: FSTK 110 23 AUG 2016 R-2508

Brief: RP's second time briefing event. Standard, no issues.

ADMIN:

Overall RPs scan was slow. Could focus on one thing but other items would drop out of scan. Keep the scan moving and do not fixate on parameter at a time. On the way to the range flew slightly faster than FPAS recommended. Fine tune and modulate the throttles to conserve as much fuel as possible. Know how to sanity check your fuel to make sure the wypt or FPAS isn't malfunctioning.

On the RTB RP did a better job at flying FPAS. Manage your descents to maximum range. Discussion about losing sight on interval coming in for the overhead back at home field. Bingo bug should never be heard going off. Monitor your fuel and after Joker/Bingo set the bug to a fuel state that makes sense.

TACADMIN:

RP trended to overshooting the ASL and running a bit behind on the A/G timeline. Continue to tighten up those parameters. Getting better at high altitude roll-ins will come with experience. Do not stay in map mode on the A/G radar. EXP 1 does not do anything for you. With a good wypt go to EXP 2 and let the picture build until you go to EXP 3. Watch out for slewing too much in the radar display.

Remained flexible in the area due to traffic and weather. Roll-ins weren't the greatest but RP ended on a high note

Page 1 (b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 110 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (b) the final roll-in at T Plant.

Debrief: Standard. Discussed learning points and ways to improve for future events.

Overall one below for Admin but steady progress was being made and RP should see improvement on subsequent flights. Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 12/22/2016 10:14:20 AM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 111 Grade: 3.29 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Status Reviewed Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 8/24/2016 **NORMAL** True False (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 0 Ρ 0 0 2. Admin 3. Tac Admin Ρ \bigcirc 0 Ρ \bigcirc 4. Mission Execution Ρ 5. Headwork / CRM O 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 0 Ρ 7. Debrief/Professionalism \bigcirc Ρ 8. Other

0

Overall Comments: FSTK 111

Total Grades

23 AUG 2016

R-2508

Brief: Standard. Few errors on KBC. Nothing major but RP should double check to make sure everything is correct.

ADMIN:

On the transit toward the working area RP was sucked in ATC spread and making a lot of corrections to stay in position. Make corrections but also manage your fuel. Do not be at MIL while climbing during a BDA. On the RTB RP improved the ATC position keeping. No issues from range to full stop.

TACADMIN:

Discussion with RP about the proper TACSOP procedures for comm check in. Overall tacform for the area was standard. RP still should take advantage of any excess airspeed and angles to facilitate the join up back to DCS for the next tgt. RP had * in the radar channel, reminder that resetting the gens on deck you need to redo the tacadmin checklist.

Final off target rendezvous took a little long to complete. See above points.

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Important discussion and debrief about the proper use of APG-73. One below for sensor usage.

Overall not a bad flight as a wingman for (b) (3) (A), (b) He simply pulled a standard CAT I and was worrying about questions of the day and what side of the formation to be on when his instructor was specifically briefing him on what

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A) SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 111 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

the day before, so you've got it suitcased... those are usually the ones that come back to get you when something the day before, so you've got it suitcased... those are usually the ones that come back to get you when something (like flying with an APG-73 instead of a APG-65 on your FSTK-110) comes back to throw everything off the rails. Jahmar, made a valiant attempt to slew the cursors on the target in the MAP mode without ever successfully getting the radar into EXP 2/3 very cognizant of the A/G Timeline, was visually tally target every time, and was in the right position. This is one time that having the elbow cameras was more beneficial than a direct feed, since I was able to view his exact buttonology (or lack thereof) and it also worked him away from a SOD since I could see the reflection of his head on the DDI and the time he spent checking the formation explains why he was never out of position. Overall, good wingman procedures (if nothing else follow your lead, he is supposed to get you there), poor sensor usage (what happens when I'm bent gadget and press you the tac lead?), and okay admin.

Press!

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 9/6/2016 8:39:24 AM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SSTK 111 Grade: 3.86 Event Pre Reas Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 8/26/2016 **NORMAL** True False R (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS Р 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O \bigcirc O O \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc O \bigcirc \bigcirc 3. Tac Admin Ρ O 0 4. Mission Execution Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc O 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O \bigcirc 0 O 8. Other Ρ \cap \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 O 0

Overall Comments:

Average CAS intro hop for (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) . Well prepared for the brief.

Admin and tac admin OK. Overall good comms with DASC and JTAC. CAS pg usage and mission set up were no problem. Positioning to push on time is a work in progress. Weapons deliveries were fair with inconsistent release parameters. Run info is: AOA/FPA, Release FPA / A/S / Alt / G.

Run 1 - CAS Pg intro - Set up good. Coached push OK. A/S control to tgt was weak. Scan and tgt acquisition were slow. Late RIP to very steep and abort.

Run 2 - Re-cock of run 1 - Better IP to tgt. OK RIP. No slew attempted so BOC. -32 / 457 / 7414 / 1.3. ASL fair. +4 sec of TOT.

Run 3 - Good to RIP. Pull down with VV on tgt - 0 AOA. Right to dive toss after slew. Diamond and ASL good. -30 / 504 / 6453 Below NLT / 1.9. Kill the tgt - 6 sec of TOT.

Run 4 - Good set up. Poor positioning for push. Push with440 reqd. Good RIP. -29 / 515 / 8029 / 1.1. Good diamond and ASL. Kill -5 sec of TOT.

Run 5 - OK to push. Got over IP too early with 260 reqd and not enough time to reset. Rolexed the TOT. OK start. Late offset from Invader. Not a good designation, ASL OK. -27 / 515 / 6925 / 1.5.

Run 6 - OK set up. Poor position for push - only 430 reqd. Had DSG well off the tgt to NE. Pimped to undsg and dsg.

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SSTK 111 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)
(b) (C) o rolex. Re-try was better. 6 AOA at -30, -30 / 525 / 7258 / 1.1. Good diamond and ASL. Kill -6 sec of TOT. Best weapon delivery except for fast.

Run 7 - Visual talk on. Good tgt acquisition. -33 / 485 / 6150 / 1.5. Kill.

Overall most of the standard mistakes on the first try

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 8/31/2016 1:55:51 PM

(b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

0)// 1 511	SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SSTK 112 Grade: 3.86													
SYLL PH	ASE/EVE	:N1: H	² L1	1 A/G/	SSIK	112					Gra	de: 3.86		
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can l		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed		
SIMULATO R	True	All Da	ta		Com	nplete	8/29/2016	NORM	//AL	(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)	True	False		
0														
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS			
1. Brief/Ques	tions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
2. Admin			P	0	0	0	0		0	0				
3. Tac Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
4. Mission Exc	ecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0				
5. Headwork	/ CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
6. Training Ru	ules Adherence	e	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
7. Debrief/Pro	ofessionalism		P	0	0	0	0		0	0				
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0					
Tota	al Grades			0	0	0	1	6	0	1				

Overall Comments: SSTK 112 - LOW/MED Threat CAS 29 AUG 2016

Brief: Good knowledge

Admin: Make sure you sweep the cockpit so you're not holding in the stack with your gear down. Get the target area WPT up for steering.

TacAdmin: DASC/JCAS Check-In: just do the check in in order MNPOPCA, this is what the FAC/JTAC expects. Work on your holding airwork to make sure the aircraft is a stable platform and not going past the holding IPs into the target area. Recommend for the CAS page RP only lines 4 + 6 and the TOT. Line 1 for the IP if you have time; all other lines are ancillary.

Always Save-Undes-Use-use. This hindered RP on a few set ups. Continue to build habit patterns of expendables coming into and off target. Keep doing SRR mech coming off target and back into the holding stack. Be harder on SAPDART checks, RP forgot to set wypt 47 on initial set up. Make sure you are fully set up prior to the IP inbound. Reduce as many variables as possible before going in for the attack.

1st Attack T1 BOT

Read back from WPT 12... make sure you're reading back from WPT 47 per the TACSOP. Don't forget your course line to define the FAH for you on the HSI. Forgot to ARM up, so we rolled the TOT. Speaking of TOT, make sure the Zulu Hour is correct. 2 exposures/1 release

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SSTK 112 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b) (6)

2nd Attack T1 BOT

Back to the basics for the roll-ins... RIPing at 2.4 DME isn't going to work. Talked about how to use the GREQ on the HSI to work your timing problem. 2 exposures/1 release

3rd Attack T1 BOT

Don't forget SAVE/UNDES/USE, otherwise your data won't go into WPT 47, and your GSPD won't show up.

4th Attack T1 BOT Gun

Don't forget to set your altitude bugs per the Z diagram, they will save your life one day. You own all altitudes inside the IP-Tgt line and your FAH, unless given an ACA, so once inside the IP, get down to your RIP altitude for the Gun Z. ATM checks: Do them so you don't switch pig.

Debrief: Solid discussion about learning points. RP instructed on how to conduct a CAS debrief and board set up.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 8/30/2016 4:34:18 PM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	IASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	SSTK	113					Gra	de: 3.86
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	True	All Da	ta		Com	nplete	8/30/2016	NORM	1AL	(b) (3) (A)(b) 6)	, True	False
0	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	(3) (A),	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Ques	stions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	(6)		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admir	ı		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Mission Ex	ecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	/ CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Training R	ules Adherenc	e	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/Pr	ofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•		
Tot	al Grades			О	0	0	1	6	0	1		

Overall Comments: SSTK 113 High Threat CAS 30 AUG 2016

Brief: Hit the books a bit more.

Conduct:

When entering into the area. Have all your LAT checks complete minus hearing tone and resetting the radalt. Just get used to seeing the flashing B in the HUD. For everything in CAS it is about solving as many variables as possible ahead of time so that when it comes to the execution your bucket is not already full and RP can focus on attacking the target. Go through your checklists, solve for any geometry ahead of time and do not let yourself get pushed into a bad situation.

Discussion in flight and debrief about how to improve timing. When everything is set then you can proceed with amplifying remarks. Can always ask questions and make requests to the controller in order to best set yourself up for success. Continue to build the habit of expendables coming into and off target.

Debrief: Standard

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 8/31/2016 12:20:14 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(h) (3) (A) (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 112 Grade: N/A **Event** Pre Reqs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Туре Met Can Log Date Date Type Not **FLIGHT** True **NORMAL** All Data False False Scheduled SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 0 0 0 0 O Р 0 0 0 0 0 2. Admin O 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 Ρ 0 0 4. Mission Execution O O 0 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ Ρ 0 0 0 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence O 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 0 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

Total Grades

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	FSTK	113					Gra	de: 3.86
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ta		Com	plete	8/25/2016	NORN	ЛAL	(b) (3) (A), (t(b) (3)	, True	False
0	8.00									(A), (b) (6) NA		
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	stions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admir	n		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	c / CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Training F	Rules Adherenc	е	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
To	tal Grades			0	Ο	0	1	6	0	1		

Overall Comments: FSTK 113 25 AUG 2016 R-2508

Brief: Standard

ADMIN: RP carried too much excess airspeed during the initial join. If the join-up is going to take a while then let it take a while. Better to be smooth and stable than have an unsafe situation develop. Transit to and from the range was standard. When making big turns while in ATC spread play out the angles better and be mindful of what lead is doing with his jet. Remain within 1 NM but no need for any drastic maneuvers. Overall default abeam position was slightly acute.

TACADMIN:

Confusion on final BDA. Remember how the flight was briefed and overall flow concerning the checkout and RTB out of the area. If RP is in a situation where he ends up in trail of lead on his 6 o'clock position. Make a more drastic cut out towards the abeam so lead can also get eyes on your aircraft.

RP tended to track across the horizon too much. Not only be at the correct RIP position but have the jet in a good position as well to avoid tracking the nose so far across the horizon. Overall the roll-ins were inconsistent and slightly below average for RP. Important discussion about doing the SAPDART checklist justice and having better roll-in mechanics. Do not spend so much time slewing the target that it drives you out of parameters. Sensor work from RP needs work. If you have a good picture on the radar return and your designation is slightly off make a small slew to fine tupe the placement but avoid making big and repeated slows. Need to let the picture build

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 113 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(iii) (6) une the placement but avoid making big and repeated slews. Need to let the picture build.

Overall the Sensor portion for Form, Sensor, Comm was below average for RP. Nothing that can't be fixed but continue to strive for improvement.

Debrief: Conducted tane debrief

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 2/1/2017 3:02:39 PM

1/17/2019 10: 45: 52 AM

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)

(D) (S) (A),	(b) (b)											
SYLL PI	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	FSTK	114					Gra	de: 3.86
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT			ta		Com	ıplete	9/30/2016	NORM	<u>\</u>	b) (3) (A), b) (6)	True	False
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	estions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admi	in		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Mission E	Execution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwor	k / CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Training	Rules Adherence	е	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/F	Professionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
То	tal Grades			0	0	0	1	6	О	1		

Overall Comments: FSTK114 30 SEP 2016

R-2508

SCAR-AR Intro

Brief: Standard

Admin: Standard getting out the area. Lead would experience some initial comm troubles with RP picking up the comm lead. Eventually sorted prior to entering the working area.

Tac Admin:

Overall flow would be to conduct multiple runs on the ammo dump and H-Dam targets.

Ammo Dump

1st Run. Bomb on Target SIM 1xMk82 on 6-digit grid provided by lead. Good run in with sim good effects on target.

2nd Run. Following 1st run RP would enter holding above the target for a talk on to the next target from lead. RP correlated and became visual target for another run with sim good effects on target.

3rd Run. Another talk on to a small bridge just north of ammo dump. Good job from the RP of owning up to not seeing

Page

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 114 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

the harget and talking lead on to what he does see. RP would eventually call visual and set up for the roll-in. On the roll-in RP would lose visual and abort the run.

4th Run. Immediate reattack on previous target. RP maintained visual for successful run in.

Transition to H-Dam

1st Run. Sim 1xGBU-12 on the dam itself. RP compressed himself slightly on the timeline but still managed to get a sim ordnance away.

2nd Run Sim 1xMk82 for a talk on to a parking lot south of previous target. Good roll-in.

At this RP is bingo and flight executes the RTB home. No issues and good discussion about fuel management on the way home.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 1/30/2017 11:13:48 AM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10: 45: 52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(6) (3) (7), (6) (6)											
SYLL PHASE/E	VENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	FSTK	115					Gra	de: 3.86
Event Pre Reqs Type Met	s Stud Can I		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT True	, <u>,</u>			Com	plete	9/27/2016	NORM	<u> </u>	b) (3) (A), b) (6)	True	False
SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Questions of the	e Day	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admin		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Mission Execution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork / CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Training Rules Adhere	ence	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/Professionalis	sm	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Total Grade	es		О	0	О	1	6	0	1		

Overall Comments: FSTK 115 CAS 27 SEP 2016 R-2510

Light division out to R-2510. FAC(A) provided by T34. Worked Guam / Johnson with all runs on the Shade Tree target area.

Brief:

Standard

Admin:

Hot seat in A/C 271. RP was expeditious getting jet up and ready for takeoff but don't forget to grab ATIS. On the initial join use the angles to your advantage but once it turns into a runner make sure you have the airspeed to complete the join. Keep rudder trim in your scan and adjust to profile the jet better.

Anticipate what lead is going to do. Have appropriate waypoints up and put yourself in a good position. Got acute when lead turned from JLI to head towards the R-2510. On the RTB continue to step out your navaids to what makes sense.

TACADMIN:

Have better SA towards staying within the range.

Debriefed:

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 115 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

- (b) (hission Planning/ Holding (9-Line)
- 2) System Entry
- 3) Pre-Ingress/Geometry holding
- 4) Push (Focus on attack)
- 5) Roll-In
- 6) Off Target

Runs:

1st Run - No drop - Pushed late and did not adjust to ASL when slewing target. Good tally of target, however. 2nd Run - Dropped 4 Mk76s but slewed away from actual target back to bullseye (debriefed). Also, incorrect IP set in CAS page. Instructor input to correct.

3rd Run - Dropped 2 Mk76s on correct target ~ 50. Still some instructor pimping to make the geometry work for the attack.

Overall RP received a lot of coaching but improving trend throughout flight. Good system knowledge and receptive in debrief to the inputs.

Press

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 9/29/2016 2:14:29 PM

(b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SSTK 119 Grade: 3.86 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 9/1/2016 **NORMAL** True False R SKILL COMMENTS Р 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O \bigcirc \bigcirc O \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 3. Tac Admin Ρ O 0 Ρ 4. Mission Execution \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 5. Headwork / CRM Р \bigcirc \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O \bigcirc \bigcirc O 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 O 0

Overall Comments:

Brief: Well prepared.

Admin - Had trouble entering precise waypoint. Had to coach through how to do it. Getting too far away from your assigned IP (B-15) during CAS Holding. 17 miles away is not acceptable.

Conduct:

- 1 LGB Self lase. Entered coordinates backwards (northing/easting)/. Actually read that back to the FAC. Good push and timing. Unable to capture target due to being slightly hidden by vertical wall. If that happens, say target area captured, then it is up to the FAC to decide if he wants you to release. On this run, capture came just after missing release cue. However, no in call was ever given.
- 2 LGB self lase Good timing. No in call again. No clearance given, but said one away? No drop.
- 3 LGB Self lase Reattack. Good, but cranked wrong direction and egressed wrong direction.
- 4 LJDAM Rel NAv Good run with some coaching. Good hits and timing.
- 5 LJDAM relnav on his own. Improper validation and weapon set up procedures for rel nav. Rushed the delivery. Good hits.
- 6 LJDAM with LST Fac Lase good run. Weapon missed, but procedures were good.

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(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SSTK 119 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b) (6)

Transition to admin for RTB. Fence out! Make sure the dispenser is OFF and jettison knob is set back to safe. He actually landed with Dispenser on and Jett knob in stores.

Stav in the books!

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 9/2/2016 4:43:08 PM

(6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SSTK 114 Grade: 3.86 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Type Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 9/6/2016 **NORMAL** True False R (B),(B) SKILL COMMENTS Ρ 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O O O O 0 0 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc O 0 \bigcirc \circ 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 4. Mission Execution Ρ O 0 0 0 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ O 0 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 \circ 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc Total Grades 0 0 6 0

Overall Comments:

Good hop. Well prepared. Overall good urban CAS procedures, targeting and weapons deliveries in Bakersfield. Good check in com and admin/TAC admin set up. Good sensor talk on procedures, target recognition and coordination with the JTAC. Good set up, procedures and delivery of GBU 12's and AGM 64E's.

Run 1 - GBU 12 Bomb NEAR TGT, On Time, JTAC LAS, Missed the TGT due to BAD LASER COMM, NO LASER ON CALL, also No IP Inbound Call. Reload for a do-over.

Run 2 - GBU 12 BOT 3'L on Convoy.

Run 3 - GBU 12 BOT +/-10", SELF LAS. Almost lased the wrong code until CI intervention. Direct hit on Tank.

Run 4 - AGM 64E BOT. All good and direct hit on Helo.

Run 5 - AGM 64E BOT. All good and direct hit on Vessel.

Run 6 - GUN. Sensor search for Sniper's. Quickly located TGT's, killing TGT's.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 9/6/2016 2:26:00 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A),	(b) (b)											
SYLL P	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	FSTK	116					Gra	nde: 3.86
Event Type	•				x Status		Actual Date	Gradesheet Type		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Data		Complete		nplete	9/28/2016 NORMAL		1AL	(b) (3) (A(b) (3) (d(A),	True	False
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	(b) (6) NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Questions of the Day			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Mission Execution			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork / CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0			
6. Training Rules Adherence			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/Professionalism			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other P			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Total Grades				0	0	О	1	6	0	1		

Overall Comments: FSTK116 28 SEP 2016

R-2510 ST

Low Threat CAS. Light Division out to Shade Tree.

Brief: Standard

Admin: Standard, Issues.

Tac Admin:

Overall gameplan RP will hold in stack to receive 9-Line and then remain overhead target for follow on talk on.

1st Run. 7 secs late. Direct Hit on target. Remember to push with a tactical airspeed to help make your timing valid from the IP. RP would then enter holding above target.

2nd Run. Initial talk on with a description of what RP sees. Remember to start big to small when describing features. You want to have a high degree of confidence in your correlation. No LPOD for this flight but that or the use of kinematics on deck will help to increase your degree of confidence.

RP called tally the target and began to set up for the run in. RP would initially drive out to 5-6 miles and then begin a turn in. Debriefed this at the conclusion. The goal is to hold at your TIP and turn into your RIP from that point. As it was RP still made things work with a direct bit on the target.

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 116 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (b) (6)

3rd Run. RP got slightly turned around with the cardinal directions in relation to the target. Don't make assumptions when it comes to your target, always strive for that high degree of confidence. Eventually got it sorted and correlated. Still drove out slightly for the run in but not as much. Direct hit on target.

6xMk76s dropped. RP would then transition to holding above the target at a higher altitude to observe Capt Rystrom's talk ons.

Conclusion of all the runs the join up and RTB were expedient. No issues on the way home.

Overall solid flight for RP with main lessons learned being to make sure you are at your tactical airspeed when pushing past the IP and to turn in from your TIP to your RIP vice driving out and turning back in.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 11/21/2016 4:57:41 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

b) (3) (A), (b) (6) SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SFTN 102 Grade: N/A Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 9/16/2016 **NORMAL** True False R (**ゟ**), (b) SKILL COMMENTS P. Brief/Questions of the Day O O O O O O 2. Admin \bigcirc O 0 O \bigcirc \circ 0 0 0 ₽. Tac Admin O ₽. Mission Execution \bigcirc 0 0 \bigcirc 0 0 ₽. Headwork / CRM \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **B.** Training Rules Adherence \bigcirc 0 0 O 0 \circ 0 0 P. Debrief/Professionalism O O 8. Other \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

Overall Comments:

Total Grades

Intro to HARM employment, PB/TOO/SP modes complete. Good task and system management.

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Good job with all HARM mission data input but at the end of the missions RP was tasked to shoot a HARM at a pop up threat unknown location and could not remember how to set it up and later on given another threat at a known location took a bit of time remembering how to set that mission up.

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Covered all required flight conduct modes of release with weapons impacting intended targets plus Slapshot and Snipper.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 9/19/2016 11:37:10 AM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)												
SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SSTK 115 Grade: N/A												
Event Type				On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	MULATO True All Data		ta	Not Schedule				NORMAL			False	False
0												
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
Brief/Questions of the Day			D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
2. Admin D			D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
3. Tac Admin		D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
4. Mission Execution D			D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
5. Headwork / CRM D		D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
6. Training Rules Adherence D		D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
7. Debrief/Professionalism D			0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
8. Other D			D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Total Grades			0	0	0	0	0	0	0			

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

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SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 117 Grade: 4.00 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Gradesheet Instructor Signature Status Actual Reviewed Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 9/29/2016 **NORMAL** True False (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 Ρ O 0 0 2. Admin 3. Tac Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc O

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Overall Comments: FSTK117 29 SEP 2016 R-2510 ST

4. Mission Execution

5. Headwork / CRM

8. Other

6. Training Rules Adherence

7. Debrief/Professionalism

Total Grades

High Threat CAS. Light Division out to Shade Tree.

Brief: Standard

Admin: Other for today is RP was briefed to take off 15 min later from main body. RP did not do so. Did not negatively affect the overall mission but caused some flexibility to be conducted. Execute what is briefed. No issues getting out to the area.

Tac Admin: RP holding between Guam / Johnson for all runs to be conducted on ST. Conducted tape debrief.

1st Run. RP executing pre-briefed 9-Line. RP pushed late and while executing the pop mechanics could not visually acquire target and would no drop. On the push in RP spent too much time looking for target vice making sure all the pop mechanics were properly met. Was overall shallow and slow.

2nd Run. RP pushed on time but did not have the proper tactical airspeed set. Would be 13sec late to target. Drop of 2xMk76 ~60m off target. Improvement from first run but again slow scan from RP due to spending too much time trying to visually acquire target.

3rd Run. RP pushed on time. Overall 6 sec late. Dropped 4xMk76s for good effects on target ~20-30m. Better

Page 1 of 2

Took a bit to complete the return to force but once all aircraft were visual and joined up no issue on the RTB.

Overall good learning points for RP. Continue to keep the scan building and execute the proper pop mechanics. If unable to contact target call contact the bullseye to get a quick adjustment from the FAC. Compartmentalize each aspect of the flight from holding in the stack down to the final RIP. Execute per parameters and do everything you can to achieve that high degree of confidence in your correlation.

Not the strongest flight for RP but there were improving trends on each run. Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 10/7/2016 10:00:20 AM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SSTK 110 Grade: N/A												
Event Type					k Sta	Status		Gradesheet Type		Instructo	r Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	LATO False All Data		ta	Not Schedu				NORMAL			False	False
0												
	SKILL			0		2	3	4		NA	COMMENTS	
Brief/Questions of the Day			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
2. Admin P			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
3. Tac Admin			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
4. Mission Execution P			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
5. Headwork / CRM P			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
6. Training Rules Adherence P			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
7. Debrief/Professionalism P			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
8. Other P			0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Total Grades				0	0	0	О	0	0	0		

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

1/17/2019 10: 45: 52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(5) (6) (71),	(3) (3)	ļ										
SYLL PI	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	FSFT	103					Gra	de: 4.00
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	0		ta		Com	plete	9/19/2016	NORM		b) (3) (A), b) (6)	True	False
SKILL				0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	estions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Adm	in		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Mission E	Execution		Р	0	0	0	0	•	0	0		
5. Headwor	k / CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Training	Rules Adherenc	е	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/F	Professionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Тс	otal Grades			О	0	О	0	7	0	1		

Overall Comments:

Incomplete due to being single ship and only conducting A/G portion. Just like his classmate, (b), (b) (d) did an excellent job staying focused with all the flex that took place. Had to transit to 2301 CW in the weather the entire time which prevented any time to adjust to the goggles. Due to the slide in our launch time, (b), we (c) able to enter the range but not allowed to drop ordnance. (b) (d) pattern was flown extremely well and was above average even if considered off the goggles during the day time.) (o) Insidering he had only a couple of minutes (6) adjust to the goggles, this was above average performance.

Event is incomplete but can be considered complete for the A/G portion. However, because did not actually get to drop any ordnance, consideration for redoing the entire event should be given so as to give him opportunity.

(b) (6)

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 9/21/2016 10:16:09 AM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/FSTK 109 Grade: 4.00 Reviewed Event Pre Regs Student On Track Gradesheet Instructor Signature Status Actual Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 9/15/2016 **NORMAL** True False (**/%)**, (b) SKILL COMMENTS Ρ 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O O O O 0 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc O 0 O \bigcirc 0 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 4. Mission Execution Ρ O O \bigcirc 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ 0 \bigcirc 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ \bigcirc O 0 O 0 \circ 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 O 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 0 0 0

Overall Comments:

Overall, solid flight for (b) (3) (A), (b)

Brief – Good Brief (6)

Admin – Get the proper comm check in complete. If you think there is an issue let lead know. Other than that no issues

Tac Admin - No Issues

Conduct - Good recognition to take your own aborts due to not meeting parameter for weps delivery. Good ASL placement, had descent hits during the hop. RP was able to deliver all 6 MK76's.

Lesson Learned – Recongnizing at night that it is an instrument scan when delivering weapons, and that you must rely more on instruments then outside visital cues when conducting the weapons pattern. Continue to build off the experience that your received during this hop.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 10/12/2016 4:03:00 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SSFT 103 Grade: 3.86 **Event** Pre Reqs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True **NORMAL** All Data Complete 9/16/2016 True False (b) (3) (A), (b) R (6)SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 0 O O O 0 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ O 0 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ Ρ 0 0 0 4. Mission Execution O 0 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ O \circ 0 0 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

Overall Comments:

Total Grades

NVG Intro

Brief: Standard

Conduct:

2x Stern conversions in the R-2510 followed by multiple runs on the ST TGT. Good learning and exposure throughout event.

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Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 2/1/2017 1:00:16 PM (6)

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1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(D) (S) (A), (D) (O)											
SYLL PH	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	SFAM	115					Gra	ade: N/A
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	True	None)			lot eduled		NORM	ЛAL		False	False
O	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
	SKILL			U	'			4		INA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	. Brief/Questions of the Day				0	0		0	0			
2. Admin	2. Admin		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
3. Tac Admir	า		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
4. Mission Ex	xecution		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
5. Headwork	:/CRM		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
6. Training R	5. Training Rules Adherence		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
7. Debrief/Pr	7. Debrief/Professionalism P		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
8. Other P			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Tot	Total Grades				О	О	0	0	О	0		

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A),	(b) (b)											
SYLL P	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/G/	FIFR	102					Gra	ade: N/A
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ta			lot eduled		NORM	IAL		False	False
0	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Qu	Brief/Questions of the Day			0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
3. Tac Adm	nin		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
4. Mission I	Execution		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
5. Headwor	rk / CRM		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
6. Training	Rules Adherenc	e	Р	0	0	0	0	O	0	0		
7. Debrief/l	Professionalism		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
8. Other	8. Other		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

Total Grades

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A),	(b) (6)											
SYLL P	HASE/EVE	ENT: P	LT	1 A/G/	FIFR	103					Gra	ade: N/A
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can Lo		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Type		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Dat	а			lot eduled		NORM	AL		False	False
0			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS		
1. Brief/Que	estions of the D	ay	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
3. Tac Adm	in		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
4. Mission E	Execution		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
5. Headwor	k / CRM		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
6. Training	Rules Adherenc	e	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
7. Debrief/Professionalism P		Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
8. Other	8. Other			0	0	0	0	0	0	0		

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

Total Grades

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PI	HASE/EVE	ENT: PLT	1 A/G/FS	STK W/I	J			Gra	ade: N/A
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Student Can Log	On Track Date	Status	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type	Instructor	Signature	Reviewed

FLIGHT True All Data Not NORMAL False False Scheduled

0									
SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS
1. Brief/Questions of the Day	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2. Admin	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3. Tac Admin	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
4. Mission Execution	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
5. Headwork / CRM	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
6. Training Rules Adherence	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
7. Debrief/Professionalism	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
8. Other	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Total Grades		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

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(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/SLAT W/U Grade: N/A On Track **Event** Pre Reqs Student Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Туре Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** Not True **NORMAL** All Data False False Scheduled R SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 2. Admin D O O 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin D 0 0 0 4. Mission Execution D O O O 0 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ Ρ 0 0 0 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence O 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 0 0 8. Other D \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades**

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

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SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 101 Grade: 2.71 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **FLIGHT** True **NORMAL** All Data Complete 10/13/2016 True False (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 0 2. Admin Ρ 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ \bigcirc O 4. Mission Execution Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

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Overall Comments: FBFM 101 13 OCT 2016 W-291 P6/7

5. Headwork / CRM

8. Other

6. Training Rules Adherence

7. Debrief/Professionalism

Total Grades

Brief: Standard Admin: Standard

Conduct: Intro for RP on the advance handling characteristics of the hornet. A lot of show & tell, Demo/do maneuvers to expose RP to the handling characteristics of the aircraft while in the offensive/defensive regime. Improving trend on each maneuver with a lot of good experience for the RP. No issues on the RTB.

Debrief: Standard. RP is advised to chair fly the maneuvers as they are still fresh in order to develop upon the training received.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 11/2/2016 2:38:10 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

b) (3) (A), (b) (6) SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SOCF 101 Grade: 0.00 **Event** Pre Reqs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Can Log Date Date Type Type **SIMULATO** True NORMAL All Data Waived 10/13/2016 False False R SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ O O 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 0 Ρ 0 4. Mission Execution O O O 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ 0 0 0 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 0 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

Overall Comments:

Total Grades

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 10/17/2016 1:15:10 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FOCF 101 Grade: 2.86 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Actual Met Type Can Log Date Date Type True NORMAL **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 10/17/2016 True False (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O \bigcirc 0 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 O \bigcirc \circ 0 0 Ρ \bigcirc 4. Mission Execution Ρ \circ 5. Headwork / CRM O 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 \bigcirc \bigcirc O Ρ 8. Other O O **Total Grades** 0 О 2 0

Overall Comments: **FOCF 101** 17 OCT 2016

W-291 P6/7

Brief: Standard

Conduct: 2nd Go of hot seat out to the W-291 for OCF

Admin: Solid. Don't miss tank 1 during fuel checks, be guicker to climb at 350 in order to save fuel. No issues on the RTB.

TacAdmin: Standard down the card.

- -Accelerated Flight Radome check
- -Vertical Departures
- -Spins

Overall good recovery procedures from RP.

Debrief: Standard

No issues, press. -

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 2/1/2017 9:51:19 AM

(6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SBFM 101 Grade: N/A Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Actual Type Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** False All Data Complete 10/14/2016 NORMAL False False (b) (3) (A), R (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS P. Brief/Questions of the Day O O O O 0 0 0 2. Admin \bigcirc O O \bigcirc \circ 0 0 0 0 0 ₽. Tac Admin 0 ₽. Mission Execution O 0 O 0 0 0 0 \bigcirc ₽. Headwork / CRM \circ 0 0 **B.** Training Rules Adherence O O 0 \circ 0 0 0 0 P. Debrief/Professionalism O 0 8. Other \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc Total Grades 0 0 0 O 0 0

Overall Comments:

Overall, solid intro to BFM.

Brief: Standard Admin: No issues Tac Admin: No issues

Conduct:

Still a lot of learning and refinement to be done but great work getting to PADS quickly each time. This saves a lot of fuel and allows you to get more sets in. Early on your AWE, remember to look for the sight pictures of TA and LOS rate. Continue to work on sight picture from the defensive position and LV placement.

Lessons Learned for RP:

Capture Rate band during AWE, utilize good deck mech / LV placement when transitioning to a one circle fight. This continues all the way down to the deck.

Press.

Last Modified (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 2/1/2017 4:58:36 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM W/U

Grade: N/A

Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Student Can Log	On Track Date	Status	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type	Instructor	Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Data		Not Scheduled		NORMAL		False	False

0									
SKILL		0		2	3	4		NA	COMMENTS
1. Completion	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Total Grades		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

SYLL PH	HASE/EVE	ENT: I	PLT	1 A/A/	FBFM	102					Gra	ade: 2.71
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stud Can I		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Type		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ıta		Com	plete 1	0/18/2016	NORM	AL	(b) (3) (A), (b)	True	False
0										(6)		
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	stions of the Da	ау	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
2. Admin			P	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admi	า		Р	0	0		0	0	0	0		
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0		0	0	0	0		
5. Headwork	C / CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training F	6. Training Rules Adherence			0	0		0	0	0	0		
7. Debrief/P	7. Debrief/Professionalism			0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
To	tal Grades			0	Ο	3	3	1	О	1		

Overall Comments: FBFM 102 18 OCT 2016 1v1 PADS setup / OFF BFM W-291 P6/7

Brief: Standard

Admin:

No issues during start up or taxi out. Walked late due to jet not being ready. When checking in with lead let them know if you do not have clearance. IFF was in off during take off and RP had wypt 0 selected vice M9 for the departure. On the departure don't cut the corner of the TCN. Fly the same departure as lead.

Verbalize the fuel transfer checks are complete. During the fence out/RTB help yourself out by gaining a radar lock and using the basic rules to join up. Use your position to your advantage. Coming in for the overhead the radalt went off and RP reset it but took too much of a cut away from lead to do so. Need to look good coming in for the break.

Tacadmin:

Briefed having 2/3 for the 'speed & angels' call but still need to have all the parameters met once the fox2/fights on call is made. Have the proper radar mode set up when turning in for the sets.

SSDx3 as target SSDx3 as shooter

High Work sight picturex2 Offensive with an extra being an IP demo.

(b) (3) (A). SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 102 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (4) (G) Work sight picture x2 Def Guns weave x1

Continue to develop a proper sight picture for the attack window entry and use the TLE to help develop what the sight picture is.

Overall RP needs to be more aggressive on the unload/capture mech and watch bleeding too much airspeed.

Average flight. Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) on 2/1/2017 1:20:12 PM

(A), (b)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 103 Grade: 3.00 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **FLIGHT** True **NORMAL** All Data Complete 10/19/2016 True False (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 0 \bigcirc 0 4. Mission Execution Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc Р \circ 5. Headwork / CRM 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc O **Total Grades** O О 0

Overall Comments: FBFM 103 19 OCT 2016

1v1 Offensive BFM W291-P4

Brief: Standard

Admin:

Started APU 30 secs early. No issues getting jet started and out to marshal. During transit make sure to bit the radar to make sure it is fully up.

Check in with negative expendables if you don't have any. During RTB make your life easier and get a radar lock on Lead to ease the join up. As it was RP overshot lead and worked it back in. Nothing unsafe but not as good as it could have been.

Tacadmin:

SSDx3 Target SSDx3 Shooter 9k Offensive Set x2 6k Off Set x1 3k Off Set x1

SSD:

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A) SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 103 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

willed too much as a tgt driving the shooter a bit close forcing him to have to dig into the turn more. On RPs defensive maneuver executed too late, start slightly earlier to avoid the tracking of the bandits bullets. If going to do wingtip on make sure to go full wingtip on and pull.

9k Sets:

- 1 Delay your turn in slightly after 'check it L/R 50' call to help with closure. Early on attack window entry. Overall not great. IP will demo the next set up.
- 2 Took this one all the way to the deck. AWE was better. Ok alignment going downhill but still gave up some angles. Be sure to be on your 1 circle numbers and taking the appropriate shots coming down hill. Mech to help with this was debriefed.

6k Set:

RP Still working on refining the AWE. Defender was able to pull RP forward on his canopy and the opportunity to reverse could have occurred. Training Rule deck bust. Acknowledged by RP

3k Set:

RP Short-mic'd himself on Fox2 call. Just be sure to annunciate it and if the bandit looks like he isn't maneuvering go ahead and call it again. Again RP held way too much airspeed coming downhill. Debriefed.

Would have been above average BFM event except for the rejoin. Focus on the admin and tacadmin!

- Pablo

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 2/1/2017 9:49:56 AM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 104 Grade: 3.57 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 10/20/2016 **NORMAL** True False (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 0 Ρ 0 0 2. Admin 3. Tac Admin Ρ \bigcirc Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 4. Mission Execution Ρ \circ 5. Headwork / CRM 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc Ρ 8. Other \bigcirc O

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Overall Comments: FBFM 104 Offensive Solo 20 OCT 2016 W-291 P5

Total Grades

Brief: Standard

Admin: On the initial join and both the battle damage checks bring it in to a tighter formation. As it was RP was flying slightly loose. Set up the voice callsigns in jmps prior to the flight so you do not have to set it up while in the jet. On the full stop at knkx wait for lead to call 3 down and locked first, as it was RP jumped ahead a bit. Standard admin rest of flight.

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TacAdmin:

5 total sets completed with a tape debrief.

Formation keeping could be tighter. On the initial set up for the 9k RP had to be pimped to flow out to 2nm vice 1nm. Can save fuel and time if formation was set up immediately.

9k set: Valid fox2 with a good AWE. When the bandit redefines RP needs to pull up slightly and then go down hill. Continue to max perform the aircraft. RP had too much speed going downhill. RP recognized and began a deck save but settled below the deck and called his own KIO.

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 104 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(Set: Ok AWE. RP maintained the offensive position and took follow on shots while going downhill. RP still carried too much airspeed going downhill and made a successful deck transition but in doing so gave up angles to the bandit and would eventually lead to being gunned by the bandit. Continue to watch the deck but put your aircraft in a better energy state when going downhill. Do not sacrifice the offensive position to take shots.

3k set: Intial set RP was flying 60 deg AOT, need to be 40. Energy management was better going downhill. When taking follow shots downhill bias towards using the aim-120. RP crushed the deck and called his own KIO. Second 3k set had a better set up and RP did better with energy management going downhill.

Total of 3 deck busts. All recognized by RP. A lot of good learning points and conducted a tape debrief.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 12/5/2016 9:47:52 AM

(b) (b)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(6) (3) (7), (6) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 105 Grade: 3.29 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 10/21/2016 **NORMAL** (b) (3) (A), True False (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O \bigcirc 0 2. Admin Ρ 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc 4. Mission Execution Ρ 0 5. Headwork / CRM 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc Ρ 8. Other \bigcirc O Total Grades O O 0

Overall Comments: FBFM 105 Defensive BFM 21 OCT 2016 W-291 P5

Brief: Standard

Admin: Standard. Departure RP did not wait a full 10sec before following lead on the departure. Use ATC hold to your advantage to minimize throttle movement on the way home to save on fuel.

TacAdmin:

1st SSD RP was ~900ft on the shooter pass. 2nd Pass RP worked it back out to 1200ft. Not a safety of flight but a TR violation.

1st 9k set RP did well on the capture timing and mech. ok energy management going downhill. Transition to the deck save a bit earlier as it was RP initiated but would eventually settle ~100ft below the deck.

6k set. Overall trend of a slight climb during the defensive break turn. Continue to move your scan inside and outside. On RPs ditch mechanics should feed in opposite rudder to stop your LV placement and continue to max perform in the descent. RP did well maintaining sight but as a technique if you see your nose 45 deg nose low unload and ditch again to keep up with the timing for the reversal.

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 105 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(\$\footnote{\text{the}}\) (Standard and good mech going downhill. Continue to watch the deck and remember the floor is now higher.

Conducted a tape debrief and discussion about how to validate the gun shots. Press

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 11/2/2016 2:11:27 PM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 106 Grade: 3.71													
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stud Can l		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instruct	tor Signature	Reviewed		
FLIGHT O	True	All Da	ıta		Com	nplete	10/26/2016	NORM	1AL (6	(3) (A), (b) (3)	<mark>(b)</mark> , True	False		
0	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	(A), ∖\b′)	COMMENTS			
1. Brief/Que	stions of the D	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	(6)				
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
3. Tac Admii	n		Р	0	0	0	0	•	0	0	PADS setup			
4. Mission Ex	xecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0				
5. Headwork	:/CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
6. Training F	Rules Adherenc	e	Р	0	0	0	•	0	0	0	2x deck busts			
7. Debrief/Pi	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•				
To	tal Grades		0	0	0	2	5	О	1					

Overall Comments: FBFM 106 Defensive Solo 26 Oct W-291 P5

Brief: Standard

Admin: Overall solid job. During the RTB RP has too much of a 'U' shape when collapsing in from ATC spread. Nothing unsafe and the join was fine but in an effort to increase fuel efficiency take a 5-10 degree cut and let the angles work out in your favor to decrease the range while minimizing throttle movements.

TacAdmin: Solid tacadmin overall Timely PADS set up and BDA went well. On the initial check in remember to reply with "2" to the comm calls. As it was RP replied "Shooter 08" initially but corrected himself on subsequent calls.

Conduct:

2x sets of SSD. Decent gun solution with RP averaging ~1200 ft. Good recognition of errors in range, plane of motion and lead with early corrections as both the shooter and target.

9k set: RP needs a little more pull on the break turn. Slight climb on the initial pull. On the second break turn RP had too much of an altitude loss. Remember that you are bleeding down your airspeed and this will require a reduction in angle of bank in order to maintain altitude. Giving up that altitude in the break just gives that advantage to the attacker. Ditch occurred slightly early but ok lift vector placement with timely reversals. Hard Deck was set at 6k and RP would call his own knock it off for a dock bust

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 106 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (b) (6)

6k set: Improving trend throughout entire set, mostly so with lift vector placement. Ditch still slightly early but reversals were again timely. RP would call his own knock it off for a deck bust.

3k set: RP too late imitate ditch mechanics and IP would call for the ditch. Sensor nose becomes a factor quicker on the 3k sets. Ditched all the way down to the deck with RP having late reversals down the deck. RP would call his own knock it off for an FCS caution that would reset. No deck busts from RP.

Debrief: 1st of 2nd back to back flights. Would have a quick conduct debrief while refueling with a more in-depth with tapes following the 2nd flight.

Key learning points for RP would include recognizing when target aspect is changing and sensor nose is becoming a factor to avoid initiating the ditch too early. Better mechanics on the defensive break to avoid unnecessary climbs and descends. Quicker scan and better judgement when approaching the hard deck in order to avoid further deck busts.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 11/8/2016 7:56:05 AM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (b)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 107 Grade: 3.71 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Actual Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 10/26/2016 **NORMAL** True False (3)SKILL COMMENTS (6) Ρ 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O \bigcirc O 2. Admin Ρ O \bigcirc O \bigcirc 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 4. Mission Execution Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc O O 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc O 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O \bigcirc 0 O 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 0 0

Overall Comments: FBFM 107 OFF/DEF Combo 26 Oct W-291 P5

Brief: Standard

Admin: Standard. RP would forget to reset Take off trim prior to going back through final checks. Final checkers would catch it in the line.

TacAdmin: Standard.

Conduct:

2x SSD. Sight picture still slight far with RP averaging about ~1300ft.

9k defensive set: Better defensive break turns but still slightly early on the ditch mechanics. Solid work going down hill with better reversal timing on the deck.

9k offensive set: Early attack window entry but solid work following downhill. RP would start to get slightly neutral while down on the deck. Remember to call out 'left to left' 'high / low' calls.

6k offensive: Improving trend on the attack window entry and initial follow on the first ditch was good but second follow was late. Solid work down on the dock

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 107 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (b) (6)

3k defensive: Quick set up due to fuel with only one turn downhill before knock it off for Bingo. RP would have a deck bust.

Debrief: Conducted tape debrief for both flights. Learning points for RP would be to check the FCS page to note the current G-LIM of the aircraft prior to maneuvers. Unload for just a bit longer in order to build up more airspeed and have more energy on the jet to work with.

Sight picture showed an improving trend as the flight went on but continue to adjust nose position as the deck becomes more of a factor.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 11/8/2016 7:56:27 AM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 108 Grade: 3.29 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Actual Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 10/27/2016 **NORMAL** (b) (3) (A), (b) True False (6)SKILL COMMENTS Ρ 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O \bigcirc 0 Ρ 0 0 2. Admin 3. Tac Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 4. Mission Execution Ρ 5. Headwork / CRM O 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O O 0 0 Ρ 7. Debrief/Professionalism \bigcirc \bigcirc 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc

0

Overall Comments:

Total Grades

FBFM 108

High Aspect BFM

Brief: Standard. Clean up a bit on the enemy wez numbers. Miles vice ft.

O

Admin: Standard. After you knock it off for Bingo be as fuel efficient as possible and immediately point towards home. Do the T/O trim prior to running the IBIT. If you have no GPS on the jet just immediately go to NAV mode

TacAdmin: On the items check RP would roger up 'Chaff' vice actually saying "Flares". Quicker to get set up for PADS. Need to be a fuel efficient as possible. After each set reset the G.

O

Conduct:

2x SSD. RPs second run as the shooter was a close. ~700 ft. On the 3rd run RP would be too late in his maneuver to acquire a guns solution.

Roller: RP would receive coaching from IP on better roller mechanics. Continue to assess and pull for shots.

Butterfly sets: Overall learning point for RP is energy management and setting up the initial merge for the airspeed and geometry that you want. Again continue to assess for times to either take shots or maintain your energy state. On the 1st set RP would elect to go high. Be more willing the take shots. Continue to practice the mech for queuing up the appropriate radar mode and weapon selection.

2nd set. RP will go low with the bandit going high. RP would correctly assess he had a shot opportunity and maneuver

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 108 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(a) (a) the shot but used the incorrect comm cal based on his set up. RP would call a 'fox2' when it was actually a 'fox3'.

After the shot move quickly to set up for a follow on merge. You want to always be controlling the fight. Second merge would see a low to high merge with RP reversing 1 circles for a follow on shot opportunity.

3rd set would be an Abeam start. Bandit would stack the merge against me. Do not let the bandit aircraft bully you into any merges you don't want. Continue to set your own angle and geometry to drive the fight.

Overall learning points for RP. More aggressive bunt when going through your merges to build airspeed on the jet. That airspeed will lead to a increase in energy that will be useful in subsequent merges. Set your airspeed early during the start of the sets to arrive at the merge with an energy state that makes sense for your gameplan. Use your early turn options. Better energy management and lift vector placement will go a long way.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 12/6/2016 1:41:38 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PI	SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 109 Grade: 3.86													
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Stat	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instruct	or Signature	Reviewed		
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ta		Com	iplete 1	0/28/2016	o NORM	IAL	(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)	, True	False		
	SKILL			О	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS			
1. Brief/Que	estions of the D	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
3. Tac Admi	n		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0				
5. Headworl	k / CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
6. Training I	Rules Adherenc	е	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•				
То	Total Grades				О	0	1	6	0	1				

Overall Comments: FBFM 109 HABFM Solo

W-291 P1/2

Brief: Standard

Admin: While out over the area doing a weather recce be closer in the Tac Wing position. As it was RP was still roughly in an atc cruise position. On the ground when finished with refueling RP would refer to Ground as "base".

TacAdmin: Solid work.

Conduct:

2x SSD. Would skip the maneuvering set due to weather and another section RTB beneath. As shooter RP would be 1300ft / 1300ft / 1600ft respectively. On the far side so continue to safely work in the sight picture to achieve that guns solution at a closer distance.

Weather in the area would force a low war with a ceiling of 20k and a hard deck of 5k. Conducted a tape debrief of each set.

Key learning points from each set. Nose high oblique is not the greatest option as it does not fully give any of the benefits of going pure nose high. Prioritize boresight for your radar modes. Assess your own energy state as well as the bandits energy state in order to determine what type of flow (1C / 2C) is best to set. Always look to find when is a time to either take a shot or continue maintaining your energy. Even after a shot is taken continue to set up for the

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 109 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (6)16% on merges.

Debrief: Thorough debrief of the tapes as well as learning points for RP. Overall RP developed a better sight picture of the geometry of HABFM. Improving trend of gaining a deeper understanding of when take those energy excursions and what is the best flow to set that will work in your advantage.

(b) (3)

(A), was Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 11/18/2016 1:07:38 PM

(b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFWT 101 Grade: 3.00 **Event** Pre Reqs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Can Log Date Type Date Type **SIMULATO** True **NORMAL** All Data Complete 11/4/2016 (b) (3) (A), (b) True False R (6)SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ O O 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 Ρ 0 4. Mission Execution O O O 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \circ 0 0 0 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0

Overall Comments:

SFWT 101

4 NOV

AFT 3

Comments to follow.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 12/6/2016 1:42:28 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFWT 102 Grade: 3.57 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 11/7/2016 **NORMAL** True False R SKILL COMMENTS (6) 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ O O O \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ O 0 \bigcirc 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 4. Mission Execution Ρ O 0 0 0 \bigcirc 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ \bigcirc O 0 O 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc Total Grades 0 O 4 0

Overall Comments: SFWT 102 7 NOV

Conduct: Executed (1) Bogey run and (2) Hostile runs. On the bogey run, set your geometry early so that you can asses the bogey's awareness level. Radar mechanics are coming along; briefed the differences between the simulator and the aircraft, big takeaway is slow everything down in the aircraft. Debriefed proper labeling of groups on the VID call. For the hostile runs, do not forget to execute different tactics based on whether or not the bandit is targeting you. Instructor debriefed additional techniques and procedures to tighten everything up. Execute the tactics as they are taught to you and everything will fall into place. Discussed the wording from the TACSOP in regard to when you are permitted to come out of your block. Nice SA recognizing the aggressive move to set geometry with block awareness. Remember that being smooth leads to people being calm which make us more lethal and tactically effective.

Blocks, Radar, HDG, In. This will keep you safe.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 2/8/2017 3:29:25 PM (6)

Enclosure 6

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFWT 103 Grade: 3.71 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 11/7/2016 **NORMAL** True False R SKILL COMMENTS **(**€) Ρ 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O \bigcirc O O 0 2. Admin Ρ O 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 4. Mission Execution Ρ O 0 \bigcirc 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc 0 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O O O \circ 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

0

Overall Comments: SFWT 103 7 NOV

Total Grades

Conduct: Executed (3) runs with (1) bogey and (2) hostile. On the first run, Work to create a little more separation as the shooter turning in and it will solve problems for taking a shot after lead makes the ID. ON the second and third run, similar trends noted on both. RP devoting a lot of time scanning lead for formation which is good; however, start to work the mission crosscheck time a little more and you may notice SA building on your sensors earlier. Think about what lead is doing with his jet during the intercept so that you can anticipate necessary corrections to stay in position. Nice job gaining tally on the last two runs. IP's debriefed additional techniques and procedures in depth. Take on board the lessons learned from today and apply them to your follow on events.

Press

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 2/8/2017 3:27:58 PM (6)

0

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

b) (3) (A), (b) (6) SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FFWT 101 Grade: 3.29 **Event** Pre Reqs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Can Log Date Date Type Type **FLIGHT** True NORMAL All Data Complete 11/28/2016 True False (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 0 1. Brief/Questions of the Day 0 0 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ 3. Tac Admin Ρ \circ \circ 0 Ρ 0 0 0 4. Mission Execution 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ O O 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 0 O O 0 8. Other Ρ O **Total Grades** 0

Overall Comments: FFWT 101 PASS/COMPLETE

Comments to follow

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 12/5/2016 1:33:52 PM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FFWT 102 Grade: 3.71 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 11/29/2016 **NORMAL** True False (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 0 Ρ 0 0 2. Admin 3. Tac Admin Р \bigcirc \bigcirc Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 4. Mission Execution Р \circ 5. Headwork / CRM 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc Ρ 8. Other \bigcirc O Total Grades O O 2 0

Overall Comments:

FFWT 102 PASS/COMPLETE

TRs: One block bust by 200', IP called it out, correction made, no safety issue

Brief: Good knowledge, keep it up.

Admin: no issues.

Tac Admin: Nice job with Comm checks. Got WAY SUCKED on expendables checks... how's lead gonna see em when we're way back there? Missed check in on PRI... pay attention. For tac-turns, no need to call deconfliction (hi/lo) if an acceptable trend already exists.

Execution Take Aways:

For post merge flow, LISTEN TO YOUR LEAD. We turned 50 degrees AWAY from called heading... let's stay together and execute SRR.

Calculate your notch heading PRECISELY EVERY TIME. A cold notch is an INEFFECTIVE notch...

For post-notch RADAR setup: QA this prior to pitch-in, especially BRA and altitude.

Otherwise, formation keeping is coming along nicely, we found 3/4 merges, 3/4 tallies, and took 3/4 post notch shots.

AND PAY ATTENTION TO YOUR BLOCK.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 12/9/2016 4:47:38 PM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FFWT 103 Grade: 3.86													
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instruct	or Signature	Reviewed		
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ta		Com	iplete 1	1/30/2016	o NORM	1AL	(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)	True	False		
	SKILL			О	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS			
1. Brief/Que	estions of the Da	ау	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
2. Admin				0	0	0	0		0	0				
3. Tac Admi	n		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0				
5. Headwork	< / CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
6. Training I	6. Training Rules Adherence				0	0	0		0	0				
7. Debrief/P	7. Debrief/Professionalism P		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0				
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•				
То	tal Grades			0	0	Ο	1	6	О	1				

Overall Comments: FFWT 103 - PASS/COMPLETE W291 - P3/4

Conducted tape debrief

Admin:

Standard brief. RP knew what an F-14 is. If troubleshooting in the line let lead know about the issue early on.

TacAdmin: Keep working on formation keeping. Environmentals were difficult due to sun angle but if that is the case put yourself on the side of the formation where it is best to see lead.

On the first run during the VID, RP would turn in early following a blind call which would put RP ahead of lead coming to the merge. If this happens, we have perfect shooter eyeball split. You need to have SA to this so you know and can make the merge to ID the threat. Continue to work on radar mech and check to make sure the appropriate radar set is correct.

2nd VID worked out better than the first and overall each run improved upon the last. Reminder to check AOA indicator brightness when taking off during the day but landing at night. No issues on the RTB

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 12/15/2016 10:36:17 AM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SSFT 101 Grade: N/A **Event** Pre Reqs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Туре Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** Not True **NORMAL** All Data False False Scheduled R SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ O O 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 0 Ρ 0 4. Mission Execution O O O 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ Ρ 0 0 0 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence O 0 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 0 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades**

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FFWT W/U

Event Pre Reqs Student On Track Status Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Actual Type Met Can Log Date Date Туре

FLIGHT True All Data Not NORMAL False False Scheduled

0									
SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS
1. Completion	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Total Grades		Ο	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

Grade: N/A

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFWT 104 Grade: 3.43 **Event** Pre Reqs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Can Log Date Date Type Type **SIMULATO** True **NORMAL** All Data Complete 11/8/2016 True False (b) (3) (A), R (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ O 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 Ρ 0 0 4. Mission Execution O O 0 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ 0 Ρ 0 0 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence O 0 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0

Overall Comments: SFWT 104

8 NOV

Debrief complete

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 11/23/2016 8:10:43 AM (b) (6)

Enclosure 6

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	IASE/EVE	1 A/A/	SFWT	105					Gra	ide: 3.57		
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stud Can l		On Trac Date	k Stat	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	r Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	True	rue All Data			Com	plete	11/8/2016	NORM	1AL	(b) (3) ()(b) (3)	True	False
0										(6升), (b) (6) NA		
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Ques	stions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admin	ı		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Mission Ex	ecution		Р	0	0		0	0	0	0		
5. Headwork	/ CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Training R	ules Adherenc	e	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/Pr	ofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•		
Tot	al Grades			0	0	1	1	5	0	1		

Overall Comments:

SFWT 105

Well prepared for brief. DCA in the R-2301W. Blackout control.

5 runs total, 1xbogey, 4xHostile.

Tac Admin - no issues.

Run 1 - Bogey. Don't notch with lead. Execute the tactic as briefed. Need to take a shooter split. No shot at the merge. Radar work was descent up to the notch, then it was driven down into the dirt. Late to correct this issue, so no pre-merge radar SA. Late to go WACQ. Need to call no shot if no shot available.

Run 2 - SG Hostile - Good loft, just start earlier. Good notch mech, elevation too low again. Got a late STT at the merge so no shots. Too close to flight lead for this merge (.3). Went blind at the merge. Need to keep sight.

Run 3 SGHvy Hostile - Good crank. Initially a little cold for the notch, then good update. Pre-,erge Radar SA and shot. also visual tally at the merge. Good run.

Run 4 - SG Hostile NTM - Good shots and crank. Good notch with updates, but ended up hot at the end. Go WACQ on the in form the notch. Eyeballs out, gain a tally. Late radar and Aim-9 lock so no pre-merge shot. Good tally.

Run 5 - SGHvy Hostile NTM - Good shots and crank. Good notch. Late radar and Aim-9 lock so no pre-merge shot.

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFWT 105 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (6) (6) tally.

FORM, sensors, comm. Your best sensor approaching the merge is your eyeball. Make WACQ work for you. HOTAS your way to the merge but keep sight! Priority is VMSI. Radar mode and weapon is forever linked from this point

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 11/10/2016 12:03:57 PM (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFWT 106

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Pre Reqs Student On Track Gradesheet Signature **Event** Status Actual Instructor Reviewed Туре Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 11/9/2016 NORMAL True False (b) (3) (A), R (b) (6) O

SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS
1. Brief/Questions of the Day	P	0	0	0	0		0	0	
2. Admin	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	
3. Tac Admin	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	
4. Mission Execution	P	0	0	0		0	0	0	
5. Headwork / CRM	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	
6. Training Rules Adherence	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	
7. Debrief/Professionalism	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	
8. Other	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•	
Total Grades		0	0	0	1	6	0	1	

Overall Comments:

SFWT 106 9 NOV

AFT 3

Overall average for (b) (3) Trends:

- Not consistently be cketing threat altitude in meld and out of the notch.

- Cleaning radar contacts off of the scope unnecessarily.

- Taking invalid shots.

Overall improving trend throughout sim. Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 11/21/2016 10:34:14 AM (b) (6)

Grade: 3.86

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PI	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/A/	FFWT	104					Gra	de: 3.43
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ta		Com	plete	12/1/2016	NORM	1AL	(b) (3) (A), (b)	True	False
9	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	(6) NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	estions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admi	'n		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0		0	0	0	0		
5. Headwork	k / CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Training	Rules Adherence	e	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•		
То	tal Grades			0	0	1	2	4	0	1		

Overall Comments: FFWT 104 - PASS/COMPLETE W-291 P1/2 + MISR E

Conducted tape debrief

Admin:

Standard Brief, good job on RP stating maneuvering target mech. No issues on start up to take off. Smooth and efficient join by RP and no issues heading out to the area. Discussion in the debrief about how RP can work a little less hard maintaining ATC spread by using the appropriate pilot relief modes. No issues on the RTB.

TacAdmin

RP was able to maintain sight through out the event today. Formation keeping in the notch tended to be less than ideal but workable. Debriefed techniques and ways to fix that. Maintain/Regain mech needs to happen faster. Push button 5 is your friend.

Employ weapons in the proper radar mode. Discussion in debrief about RWS vice TWS. Continue to QA radar mech for taking shots to assess validity.

Keep practicing radar mech, it is improving but still overall poor.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) on 2/1/2017 1:22:47 PM (A), (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FFWT 105 Grade: 3.86 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 12/2/2016 **NORMAL** True False (3)SKILL COMMENTS Р 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc O \bigcirc O O 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc O \bigcirc 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 4. Mission Execution Ρ \bigcirc 0 \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 O \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ \bigcirc O 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 O 0

Overall Comments:

FFWT 105 - PASS/COMPLETE

W291 - P3/4

Conducted tape debrief

Admin:

No issues getting out of line. Smooth and efficient join and transit out to working area. Slightly nonstandard vectors coming back home for the overhead, RP would have been best positioned on the outside of the formation vice remaining on the inside, as it was no issues on the RTB.

TacAdmin:

RP was able to maintain sight throughout the entire event and follow lead to the merge. Continue to work on the radar mechanics. RP is taking shots on timeline but still working on gaining radar SA coming to the merge. Smooth and methodical with the radar and if necessary go through your maintain/regain mech. QA your shots for validity.

Lessons learned for RP. Form, sensor, comm works as shown today. RP wasn't always able to regain radar SA but by following lead and maintaining visual mutual support RP was in position coming to the merge. Patient with the radar and if necessary guickly write down the AIC calls to help with regain mech.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 1/19/2017 2:37:30 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FBFM 110 Grade: 3.29 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Actual Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 11/2/2016 **NORMAL** (b) (3) (A), (b) True False SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc O O \bigcirc 0 0 Ρ 0 2. Admin 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 \bigcirc 0 0 Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc 4. Mission Execution Ρ 0 5. Headwork / CRM 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

Overall Comments: FBFM 110

Total Grades

FBFM 110 SEM

8. Other

2 NOV

Brief: Event in FWT the BFM knowledge is still applicable. Good job brushing up the principles of SEM and HA but not let the basic knowledge (i.e training rules) fall out of your study habits.

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Admin: No issues starting up and getting out the line. Standard join up out the area. RTB as a section.

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Conduct: Conduct (3) SEM sets. Good job on RP for maintaining sight of lead throughout the evolution. Late on gaining initial tally during the start of sets but would maintain tally/visual from then on. Understand it has been a while since the last BFM flight but there needs to be a higher level of aggression from RP overall. RP is getting out of plane/ out of phase for all passes minus the last where lead and RP would be in the same piece of sky going the same direction for too long. The lack of aggressiveness comes from maintaining sight at the sacrifice of not max performing the jet. Yes, maintain sight, but fighting your best 1v1 BFM is just as important.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 2/2/2017 7:19:42 AM (6)

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1/17/2019 10: 45: 52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (d)

SYLL PH	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/A/	FFWT	106					Gra	nde: 3.71
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Stat	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ta		Com	iplete 1	2/14/2016	NORM	IAL (b) (3) (A), (I	b) True	False
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	stions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	•	0	0	0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admir	า		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0	0	0	•	0	0		
5. Headwork	C/ CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Training F	Rules Adherenc	e	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
To	tal Grades			0	О	1	О	6	О	1		

Overall Comments: FFWT 106 - PASS/COMPLETE 14 DEC 2016 W291 P1/2

Decent work today. Unsatisfactory performance in the brief, slightly above average performance in the airplane to balance out for an overall average event. Do not let your guard down with pre-flight preparation.

Conducted tape debrief.

Admin:

Overall solid. Hit on RP for the brief to clean up the BFM knowledge -- could not clearly define training rules WRT the soft-deck. Took about 4 tries and input from the student WSO in the event to get it figured out.

TacAdmin:

Overall solid. No need to be so close during the expendables check. As it was RP was at a .2 and slightly sucked. Keep it within a .5 and maintain abeam.

Conduct:

BFM principles never go away. Continue to engage the offensive/defensive axioms. Need to always honor the bandits sensor nose

and ditch when the situation calls for it. Debriefed a set where lead and -2 were not OOPL/OOPH and a timely ditch would have been

necessary.

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FFWT 106 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b) (6)

Overall good job on RP for maintaining high SA throughout the event but do not sacrifice aggressiveness. Need to still fight your

best 1v1 BFM at all times. RP took 3 AIM-9X shots with valid parameters but be careful to QA that lead is not within your HUD FOV.

Learning points for RP:

BFM principles and knowledge need to always be fresh in your mind. Take the extra second to be sure that lead is outside your HUD FOV.

Maintain high SA but also be very aggressive in the fight and enact on the BFM principles that you have learned.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 2/2/2017 7:18:51 AM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	IASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/A/	SFWT	107					Gra	de: 3.71
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Stat	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	True	All Da	ta		Com	plete	11/9/2016	NORM	N .	b) (3) (A), b) (6)	True	False
<u>O</u>												
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Ques	stions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admin	ı		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Mission Ex	ecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	/ CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Training R	ules Adherenc	е	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/Pr	ofessionalism		P	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Tot	al Grades			0	Ο	0	2	5	0	1		

Overall Comments: SFWT 107 9 NOV AFT 3

You were really slow to recognize the maneuvers but got progressively better throughout, which is par for the sim. Vc is the first cue followed by ASE circle shrinking, steering dot moving out of the ASE circle and suppression of IN LAR. Work on maintain / regain mech. Thinking about progressively opening your radar scan volume by going from STT to TWS scan raid to TWS in increments no larger than 10sec. Scan for the PreMEM or RMEM cue that you've lost radar SA. If you have, admit it on aux "clean single group." Go through regain mech by undesignating the ghost trackfile, and pressing PB5 until it says RWS. This will get you a brick more often than not.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 11/23/2016 8:19:40 AM (b) (6)

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1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

Grade: 3.71 SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFWT 108 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 11/10/2016 **NORMAL** True False (b) (3) (A), R (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ \bigcirc O O \bigcirc \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ O 0 0 \bigcirc \circ 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ

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Overall Comments: SFWT 108 10 NOV AFT 3

4. Mission Execution

5. Headwork / CRM

8. Other

6. Training Rules Adherence

7. Debrief/Professionalism

Total Grades

Comments to follow.

You HAVE to have better SA approaching the merge. Execute the tactics appropriately and that will help you maintain training rules and safe deconfliction. Lack of radar mech/SA and not being co-altitude at MDR led to Jayden pitching in from the notch co-altitude with the digi bandits and literally flying through their formation with zero SA.

We stopped the sim and talked about it. Subsequent runs were much improved in regards to basic radar mechanics. No further training rule violations. All other runs were average.

- Pablo

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 2/1/2017 9:48:09 AM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FFWT 107 Grade: 3.71 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 12/6/2016 **NORMAL** True False SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O \bigcirc 0 Ρ 0 0 2. Admin 3. Tac Admin Ρ \bigcirc Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc 4. Mission Execution Ρ \circ 5. Headwork / CRM 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 O 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ \bigcirc Ρ 8. Other \bigcirc O

Overall Comments: FFWT 107 - PASS/COMPLETE W291 P1/2

Total Grades

Unable to conduct tape debrief.

Admin:

No issues on start up or getting to the area. On the RTB, RP waited a little too long to rejoin into cruise position from ATC spread. Usually once hitting sierra is time to start collapsing it in.

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TacAdmin:

Overall RP was able to maintain sight through out the entire event. Focus on being a thinking a wingman, RP has done enough events to know what each run should look like and know what looks right and what doesn't. With that being said RP would turn right based on a comm call when the more apt maneuver would be to turn left. Debriefed and lesson learned for RP.

First run RP would call clean and lead would meld in and take shots. RP had radar SA but would put himself into a weird place with the radar. Reminder to work smooth and steady with the radar and if something is not right just go back to RWS and/or hit reset. Improvement on each run when it came to radar mech and SA with RP taking shots coming to the merge. Improving at these scenarios just comes with chair flying through scenarios and being methodical with the radar.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 2/1/2017 2:37:34 PM

SYLL PH	HASE/EVE	NT: F	PLT	1 A/A/	FFWT	108					Gra	ade: 3.86
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stud Can l		On Trac Date	k Stat	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ıta		Com	plete	12/8/2016	NORM		(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	True	False
0	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	stions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	COMMENTS	
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	•	0	0	0		
3. Tac Admi	n		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0	0	•	0	0	0		
5. Headwork	c / CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Training F	Rules Adherence	Э	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0	0	•	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
То	tal Grades			0	Ο	0	2	4	1	1		

Overall Comments: FFWT 108 - PASS/COMPLETE W291 P1/2

Conducted tape debrief.

Admin:

No issues on start up or take off. Transiting out to the area RP remain too close to lead (around .6) after being told to take ATC spread. Be quicker to get out to position. On the RTB RP would call his own underrun on the final join. While the call was timely and maneuver safe, it should have not developed to that point in the first place. Debriefed as to why that is important and lesson learned for RP. One below for admin.

TacAdmin:

Forgot to switch radar channel. 1 SOF/TR where RP was 8nm from bandit and would notch and descend through a bandit block. Debriefed.

Overall 3 runs conducted with an improving trend on radar mech for RP. Tally of bandits 2/3 times coming to the merge. Remember to use expendables coming to the merge and to make your turn instighter to increase the chance of finding radar SA coming to the merge. QA your radar and make sure you are not taking locks on RMEM and to validate your shots prior to trigger squeeze.

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(h) (3) (A) (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFAM 116 Grade: N/A **Event** Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Date Type Can Log Date Type **SIMULATO** Not True All Data **NORMAL** False False Scheduled R SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ O O O O 0 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Comm Ρ O O 0 0 0 0 0 0 3. Basic Airwork Ρ 0 Ρ 0 4. Deck Procedures O O O O 0 0 0 0 5. Degraded Approach/Landings Ρ \circ 0 0 0 6. Emergency Procedures Ρ O O 0 0 0 0 0 0 7. Headwork / CRM Ρ Р 0 0 8. Instrument Procedures \bigcirc 0 \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 9. Landings Ρ O 0 \circ 10. System and Display 0 0 0 0 0 Ρ O Management 11. Ground Emergencies Ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12. In-Flight Emergencies Ρ O O 0 0 0 0 13. Compound Emergency Ρ 14. Short-field Arrestment Ρ \bigcirc 0 0 \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 0 0 15. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ **Total Grades** 0 0 0 0 О 0

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFWT 110 Grade: 3.43 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 11/17/2016 **NORMAL** True False R SKILL COMMENTS (6) Р 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O \bigcirc \bigcirc 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ O 0 4. Mission Execution Ρ \bigcirc O \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O \bigcirc O O 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 O 2 4 0

Overall Comments:

SFWT 110 17 NOV 2016

ADMIN: No issues, initialized in the P6/7.

TACADMIN: No issues.

Conduct: Executed (4) total runs with various presentations from the bandits. Introducing the new timeline with emphasis on stick and rudder mechanics, radar mechanics, communication, and overall timeline awareness. Overall, improving trend from each run. On the initial picture, remember the techniques that you can utilize if you are not picking up any contacts on your radar. Keep in mind that the timeline is more compressed as compared to previous events and execute accordingly. Do not lose track of your airspeed and G control when executing the out maneuver (debriefed exactly what to target and techniques to get there). Work to get every piece of the shot communication out so that you can build SA for all players. Before you pitch in, ensure that your radar is set up exactly how you want it. Debriefed more in depth for the specific runs and tactics to execute based on what the bandits are doing.

Lessons learned: Airspeed, G, and geometry management in the out maneuvers. Techniques to build more radar SA. Set up your radar for success before you need it.

Blocks, Radar, In.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 2/8/2017 3:28:54 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFWT 111

SYLL PF	IASE/EVE	.NI: F	² L1	1 A/A/S	SFWI	111					Gra	de: 3.57
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Track Date	: Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	True	All Da	ta		Com	nplete	1/4/2017	NORM	AL (6	(b) (3) (A), (b)	b) , True	False
0										(3) (A).		
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	(df)	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Ques	stions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0		0	0	8		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admir	ı		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Mission Ex	recution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	/ CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training R	ules Adherence	9	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/Pr	ofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Tot	al Grades			О	0	0	3	4	0	1		

Overall Comments: SFWT 111 Self Escort Strike 4 JAN 2017

Combined the class and brief mostly as one due to no opportunity for a dedicated planning day.

BDS debrief.

Conduct:

Conducted a total of two runs.

Run 1 - RP would quickly fall behind lead and become blind. From this point RP would spend a majority of the run playing catch up. RP able to make it to the target on time but no validation of JDAM was conducted. Remember use the SA page for A/A and HSI for A/G. Coming off target and heading back north RP would be slow to bracket and create some weird geometry coming to the merge. RP would follow lead to the merge and be able to get shots off with lead getting the kills.

Run 2 - A lot of improvement for RP on this run. RP was able to maintain VMS throughout the run. Continue to work on the radar mech and not have it in a nebulous zone.

Learning points for RP: Form, sensor, comms. Work hard to maintain formation and when that is under control you are able to involve yourself more in the fight.

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(b) (6) on 1/19/2017 2:32:48 PM

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFWT 112 Grade: 4.00 **Event** Pre Reas Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 11/23/2016 **NORMAL** True False R (3) \circ SKILL COMMENTS (6) 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Р \bigcirc O \bigcirc O O 2. Admin Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc O \bigcirc \bigcirc 3. Tac Admin Ρ O 0 0 Ρ 4. Mission Execution O 0 \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ O 0 O \bigcirc \circ 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ O 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 0 0

Overall Comments: SFWT 112 Launch & Leave 23 NOV AFT 2

Brief: Conducted group brief with (b) (3) (A), (b) at the squadron. No issues.

Conduct:

RP would start out airborne in the northern area of the P6/7. A total of 5 runs would be conducted.

1st Run:

Single Group Hostile - Decent adherence to timeline throughout the run. If confident in correlation decrementing the bar scan can help develop a brick sooner in order to help with the quick timeline adherence. Use the SA page at 40nm to help with correlation. 40nm will give you better fidelity towards the picture calls. Continue to clean up and improve the radar mech.

2nd Run:

-Single Group Hostile - RP would get slow during both the outs but would correct the airspeed. Keep the airspeed in your scan and modulate pull to prevent this. Keep the happy medium of airspeed. Pull too much you get slow, going too fast you will arc. Both of which are disadvantageous. Support your missile shots in TWS. On the turn back in make sure to manage your airspeed and take back altitude. Improve your shot comm by saying who it is you are shooting.

2rd Dun

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(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFWT 112 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(**b**r)d(**6**Run:

Single Group Hostile (Staggerback) - Initial loft shot will be invalid for slow airspeed. Improving trend throughout the run and the radar mech was improving. Slight confusion on staggerback techniques but will debrief and clarify.

4th Run

Single Group Hostile (Staggerback) - Arcing too much on the outs. Continue to keep your scan on your aircrafts energy state. Continue to take back altitude every chance you can get. Picture call isn't always immediately a threat group.

5th Run:

IPs choice. Single Group Hostile (Staggerback) with RP acting as dash 2 and maintaining the sanitization set. IP will talk though RP on the mechanics.

Overall not too bad for RP. Improving trends throughout the event. Lessons learned for RP include keeping in mind the energy state of the aircraft and keeping it in the happy medium. Continue to take back altitude any chance you can and to make sure the radar is properly set prior to turning back into the fight.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 11/23/2016 1:50:40 PM

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(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: F	PLT	1 A/A/:	SFWT	113					Gra	de: 3.93
Event Pre Reqs Stud Type Met Can I	ent	On Track Date			Actual Date	Grade Ty	sheet pe	Instructor	Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO True All Da	ıta		Com	iplete 1	1/29/2016	NOR	MAL	(b) (3) (,(b) (3) (6A),	True	False
O SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	(b) (6) NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Questions of the Day	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin Comm	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admin	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Visual Mutual Support	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
5. A/A timeline Awareness	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Lofted Shot Mechanics	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Skate Mechanics	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Cold Ops	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
9. Re-Attack Mechanics	P	0	0	0	0		0	0		
10. Staggerback	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
11. Post Notch Radar Mechanics	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
12. Post Merge Radar Mechanics	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
13. Delouse	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
14. Tactical Comm	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
15. Debrief/Professionalism	D	0	0	0	0		0	0		
Total Grades		О	0	0	1	14	0	О		

Overall Comments: SFWT 113 PASS/COMPLETE

Well prepared for brief.

4 runs total. Skate, short skate flow. Sar-2 threat.

Tac Admin - no issues.

1 Cood cort and chart. Cold and avacute the comm as briefed. On roottack look law to surface. Cot avaked an

(b) (3) (A). SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFWT 113 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b)-(G)ood sort and shot. Cold ops, execute the comm as briefed. On reattack, look low to surface. Got sucked on re-attack. SRR on abort, set mate.

- 2 Good sort, shot. Work on proper radar set up on cold ops. delayed turn in on re-attack, which will eventually lead to blind on the next out. High mid-air potential here based on geometry and altitude changes@! Lead will execute an aggressive turn away to avoid impact. On the re-attack prior, had radar SA to an uncalled group at 3K', but didn't call it. that's the reason you are sanitizing low!!
- 3 Stack, good sort and shot. Kept sight entire run. Staggerback, pull 3D cata till about 5nm, then pure. Found merge and cleaned it up. good work.
- 4 Forgot husky call. super important for lead. Radar mech on short skate poor. Radar in the dirt. Delouse computer generated 3/4 given. Lead called clean. will meld into notional 3/4, de-meld after realizing friendlies, meld into threat group and kill. Good job. Recomplement of the BRAA call that lead just received though.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 12/2/2016 10:17:31 (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(h) (3) (A) (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFWT 114 Grade: N/A **Event** Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** Not True All Data **NORMAL** False False Scheduled R SKILL COMMENTS Ρ 1. Brief/Questions of the Day 0 O O O O 0 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Comm Ρ O 0 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ Ρ 4. Visual Mutual Support \bigcirc O 0 O 0 0 0 0 5. A/A timeline Awareness Ρ 0 \circ 0 0 0 0 6. Lofted Shot Mechanics Ρ O 0 0 0 0 0 7. Skate Mechanics Ρ O 0 0 0 0 8. Cold Ops Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 0 0 9. Re-Attack Mechanics Ρ \circ 10. Staggerback Ρ \bigcirc O 0 O 0 O 11. Post Notch Radar Mechanics 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12. Post Merge Radar Mechanics Ρ O O 0 0 0 13. Delouse 14. Tactical Comm Ρ \bigcirc 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 15. Debrief/Professionalism D **Total Grades** 0 0 0 0

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PI	HASE/EVE	ENT: F	PLT	1 A/A/	FFWT	110					Gra	de: 3.43
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Stat	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ta		Complete		12/12/2016	NORM	IAL (b)	7-1	True	False
0	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	(3) (A), NA)	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	estions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	•	0	0	8		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admi	n		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	< / CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training I	Rules Adherenc	e	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
То	tal Grades			О	0	0	4	3	0	1		

Overall Comments: FFWT110 - PASS/COMPLETE R-2301W H + DOME Red Air provide by 401

Brief: Standard

Admin:

RP is working to maintain position on the transit out to and from the area. Specifically returning from the area RP was flying a bit sucked. Work to get into position and then use pilot relief modes to ease the situation.

TacAdmin:

RP maintained sight throughout the entire event. Tended to end up sucked during the initial run ins. Be sure to set your power at mil and if anything lean towards being slightly acute. Shots tended to come off near the late side on timeline due to compressed working area, continue to work the radar mech. Good job being correlated and shooting the correct bandit minus the final notchback.

Unable to conduct tape debrief. Conducted a thorough debrief at the TCTS facility.

Lessons learned for RP: Work to maintain a better position with lead. Good job maintaining sight but do not settle for being sucked. Keep up the good correlation but work to improve the radar mech in order to get shots off sooner on timeline. Work to remove admin issues on the transits. Overall average flight for RP.

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FFWT 111 Grade: 3.57 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Met Type Can Log Date Date Type **FLIGHT** True NORMAL All Data Complete 12/20/2016 True False (A), (b) SKILL COMMENTS Ρ 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc O \bigcirc 0 0 0 0 2. Admin Ρ 3. Tac Admin Р 0 0 0 0 0 Ρ 4. Mission Execution Р \circ 5. Headwork / CRM 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Р 0 \bigcirc O \bigcirc 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc O 4 **Total Grades** 0 0 0 0

Overall Comments: FFWT-111 PASS/COMPLETE 20 DEC 2016 W291 - P6/7

Brief: Standard

Admin:

TacAdmin:

Continue to clean up shot comm.

Conduct:

3 runs conducted.

Overall decent for RP. Good job generating your own BRAA from the SA page on the staggerback but also do not be afraid to ask for a BRAA from AIC. Biggest note is VMS breakdown on final run. It is difficult to be a wingman on a re-attack. Set up your radar and then focus

on flying form to maintain position. As it was RP ended up suck on the pitch in and during the turn out RP did not wait long enough for a correction and then ended up acute. Use Link16 to your advantage, it will make rejoining a lot simpler.

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FFWT 111 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

needs improvement, nice job not losing sight, but you need to be in better positions.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) on 2/1/2017 1:24:26 PM (A), (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FFWT 112 Grade: 3.86 Event Pre Regs Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Status Met Type Can Log Date Date Type True **FLIGHT** All Data Complete 12/21/2016 **NORMAL** True False (6)SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 2. Admin Ρ 0 0 \circ 3. Tac Admin Р 0 \bigcirc O 4. Mission Execution Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 Р 5. Headwork / CRM \circ 6. Training Rules Adherence Ρ 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc Ρ 8. Other O O O Total Grades 0 0 0 6 0

Overall Comments: FFWT-112 DCA 4vX PASS/COMPLETE 21 DEC 2016

W291 P6/7

Brief: Standard

Admin: Overall solid for RP. Good job hanging on during the RTB back through the weather.

TacAdmin: Remember to float to the correct side when setting up for runs. Overall solid work for RP maintaining sight and taking valid shots.

Conduct:

Completed three runs with RP as -2. RP was able to maintain sight and achieve radar SA coming to the merge and maintaining solid geometry during the outs. Continue to work and improve on Form, Sensors, Comm.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 2/1/2017 2:16:11 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	HASE/EVE	' ENT: F	PLT	1 A/A/	FFWT	113					Gra	de: 4.00
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ta		Com	iplete 1	2/22/2016	NORM	<u> </u>	b) (3) (A), b) (6)	True	True
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	estions of the Da	ay	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admir	n		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0	0	O	•	0	0		
5. Headwork	c / CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Training F	Rules Adherence	е	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
To	tal Grades			О	0	0	0	7	0	1		

Overall Comments: FFWT 113 4vX DCA 22 DEC 2016 W291 P6/7

Brief: Standard

Conducted tape debrief.

Admin:

RP waited too long to call initial jet down. Would delay take off. Due to weather and RP having a high fuel state lead would elect to return as singles, kissing off RP to remain in the area to create spacing. No issues on the RTB.

TacAdmin:

Overall standard.

Conduct:

RP will maintain sight throughout the entire evolution and remain for the most part in position. Able to correlate and take shots based on the targeting. Lead would make a 'shot trashed' call and RP would be able to maintain radar SA and keep the element on timeline. On a separate occasion lead would call clean during a reattack and RP would able to meld in and take shots.

Good job on RP on profiling the jet and managing the fuel. Would conclude the VUL with RP having 1000lbs + more fuel than lead.

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FFWT 113 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b) (6)

Debrief:

Overview on how to properly validate shots and discussion about cursor placement for the low looker when the decks are set high.

Overall solid flight for RP. One Above.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 2/1/2017 2:35:50 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FFWT 114 AI Grade: N/A **Event** Pre Reqs Student On Track Status Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Туре Met Can Log Date Date Type Not **FLIGHT** True **NORMAL** All Data False False Scheduled SKILL COMMENTS 1. Brief/Questions of the Day Ρ 0 0 0 0 O O Р 0 0 0 0 0 2. Admin O 0 0 0 0 3. Tac Admin Ρ 0 Ρ 0 0 4. Mission Execution O O 0 0 0 5. Headwork / CRM Ρ Ρ 0 0 0 0 0 6. Training Rules Adherence O 0 0 0 0 7. Debrief/Professionalism Ρ 0 0 0 8. Other Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)

Total Grades

Student

Can Log

On Track

Date

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

Event

Туре

Pre Reqs

Met

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/SFWT 109 Grade: 3.86

Actual

Date

Gradesheet

Type

Signature

Reviewed

Instructor

SIMULATO True All Data Complete 11/15/2016 NORMAL (b) (3) (A), True False (b) (6)

Status

0									
SKILL		O	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS
1. Brief/Questions of the Day	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0	
2. Admin	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	
3. Tac Admin	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	
4. Mission Execution	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	
5. Headwork / CRM	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	
6. Training Rules Adherence	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	
7. Debrief/Professionalism	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0	
8. Other	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•	
Total Grades		0	0	0	1	6	0	1	

Overall Comments: SFWT 109 PASS/COMPLETE

Overall average event. Need to be more methodical with radar mechanics. Continuously strive to be in position. Biggest other was shooting flight lead during the notchback. Notchback is a visual maneuver. It is imperative that you stay visual when you are pitching in so you don't shoot your lead. Debriefed thoroughly. Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 12/12/2016 1:17:42 PM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (0)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FFWT 109 Grade: 4.00												
Event Type				On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Gradesheet Type		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Data			Com	nplete	1/5/2017	NORMAL		b) (3) (A), b) (6)	True	False
0	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	estions of the D	ay	P	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin			P	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Tac Admi	n		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Mission Execution		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0			
5. Headwork / CRM		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0			
6. Training Rules Adherence		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0			
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•		
То	tal Grades			0	0	0	0	7	0	1		

Overall Comments: FFWT 109 Self Escort Strike 5 JAN 2017 W291 P6/7

Brief: Did a thorough brief the day prior with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6). Brief today was mainly focused on how to achieve mission success.

Admin:

RP would fumble slightly the initial admin check in. Gave alibis on initial check vice waiting for proper time.

TacAdmin

RP would also fumble the hand signals slightly on the initial BDA. On the way back RP would miss the BDA hand signal and so would take slightly longer to get it done.

Conduct:

Conducted tape debrief.

RP was able to maintain sight the entire time and take shots when directed. Biggest learning point is double checking the JDAM validation. Good job on taking shots when directed to do so as well as being quick with the meld and follow on shots when lead called clean. Work on being to be more proactive with the formation keeping. You know what lead is going to do per the gameplan so make sure the jet is in a proper position to get there. This will help make the formation keeping tighter.

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/A/FFWT 109 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (b) (6)

RP would RTB as a single, no issues.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 1/10/2017 8:07:55 AM

(b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/SCQL 101 Grade: 3.31										
Event Pre Regs Stude		On Track			Actual	Gradesheet		Instructo		Reviewed
Type Met Can I	_og	Date			Date		Туре			
SIMULATO True All Da R				Complete 1/10/2		7 NORMAL		(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	True	False
O SKILL		0	1	2	2	4	-	NIA	COMMENTS	
Brief/Questions of the Day	D	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA O	COMMENTS	
,		-			0			_		
2. Debrief/Professionalism		0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Admin Comm		0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Basic Airwork		0	0	0	0		0	0		
5. Deck Procedures		0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Emergency Procedures		0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. Headwork / CRM		0	0	0		0	0	0		
8. System and Display Management		0	0	0		0	0	0		
9. ACLC/ILS Approach		0	0	0		0	0	0		
10. Catapult Procedures and Emergencies		0	0	0		0	0	0		
11. CV-1 Approach/Case III		0	0	0		0	0	0		
12. Mode 3 Approach		0	0	0		0	0	0		
13. NORDO/Bolter/Waveoff Pattern		0	0	0		0	0	0		
14. Settle Off CAT		0	0	0		0	0	0		
15. Marshall Procedures		0	0	0		0	0	0		
16. Waveoff Technique		0	0	0		0	0	0		
Total Grades		О	0	0	11	5	0	О		

Overall Comments: SCQL 101 10 JAN 2017

Started airborne. Not necessarily a need to give strike a courtesy call and no need for a courtesy call when switching to marshal. Keep your comms as brief as possible. Make your big timing corrections early, and be setup on the radial, at the correct speed, and ready to commence at least 10 miles prior. Don't want to rush and burn a lot of fuel

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/SCQL 101 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(tp)(6) ing up to make your timing. RP would turn about 40 degrees into the radial vice a max of 30. Keep this in mind as that will cut into spacing. Make sure you get a good HAILR check.

Keep your HUD repeater up on the left display, and do everything else on the right. RP would keep the checklist page up for too long. Have it up prior to marshal and get everything you need from it prior to commencing. At ten miles you need to be at 1200 feet. It is not acceptable to be slightly high, RP would stay at about 1350. Be hard on yourself and maintain the exact parameters. RADALT to the HUD. Uncage the velocity vector to get a better idea of your crosswind drift.

On deck, make sure you check your BLINS prior to saluting or turning on your lights. The climb to 1200 feet needs to be more controlled. RP was fast, and overshot altitude on most climb outs. Pay attention to fuel. Even in the sim, go through the motions and don't taxi to the catapult if you are below hold down. When in tension, don't throttle back until signaled to do so

Overall, RP had a definite improving trend throughout the sim. Keep working on the comms. Make sure timing is precise. Altitudes and airspeeds need to be spot on, BAW on precision approaches was very poor. Always keep your RADALT set below you, and keep your bingo bug set appropriately.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 1/30/2017 10:33:01 AM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PH	ASE/EVE	NT: F	LT	1 CQ/S	CQL 1	02					Gra	de: 3.29
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Stat	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO R	True	All Dat	ta		Com	plete	1/12/2017	NORM	IAL (b	(a) (b) (b) (b) (c) (d)	True	False
0									,	,		
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Quest	ions of the Da	У	D	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. Admin Com	nm		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Basic Airwo	ork		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Case III La	unch		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Catapult Pr Emergencies	ocedures and		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. CV-1 Appro	oach/Case III		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
7. Deck Proce	dures		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Emergency	Procedures		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
9. Headwork /	CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
10. Marshall F	Procedures		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
11. Mode 3 Ap	oproach		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
12. NORDO/B Pattern	olter/Waveoff		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
13. Settle Off	CAT		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
14. System ar Management	nd Display		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
15. Waveoff T	echnique		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
16. Debrief/Pr	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
17. ACLC/ILS	Approach		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
Tota	al Grades			0	0	0	12	5	Ο	О		

Overall Comments: SCQL 102 12 JAN 2017

Brief: Standard

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/SCQL 102 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b) (6) Started airborne about 50 miles from the ship. Checked in with Marshall no issues. When assigned your altitude get to it a bit quicker. As it was RP remained high for a too long before pushing over. Good job with the timing problem, would push about 2 seconds early. Good job modulating your throttles to arrive on time but do not forget you want to be at 300 GS at the expected DME. RP was not excessively fast but around 270kts when commencing.

Flew multiple Mode II and Mode III approaches. Good job having your radar out in front and catching that low loitering traffic. no issues. Make sure you are keeping up displays that make sense. Good job on recognizing the soft CAT shot and going through the appropriate procedures and making a safe ejection.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 1/24/2017 10:55:20 AM

(6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT:	PLT	1 CQ/S	CQL 1	03					Gra	ide: 3.53
Event Pre Reqs Stud Type Met Can		On Track Date	Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructor	Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO True All D. R	ata		Com	nplete	1/18/2017	NORM		(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	True	False
O SKILL					2		-	N. 0	COMMENTS	
	D	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA NA	COMMENTS	
Brief/Questions of the Day	U	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. ACLC/ILS Approach	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Admin Comm	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Basic Airwork	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
5. Catapult Procedures and Emergencies	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. CV-1 Approach/Case III	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
7. Deck Procedures	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Emergency Procedures	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
9. Headwork / CRM	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
10. Marshall Procedures	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
11. NORDO/Bolter/Waveoff Pattern	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
12. Settle Off CAT	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
13. System and Display Management	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
14. Waveoff Technique	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
15. Debrief/Professionalism	D	0	0	0	0		0	0		
Total Grades		О	0	0	7	8	0	0		

Overall Comments: SCQL103 PASS/COMPLETE

Initialized in the W-291 to get established in the marshal stack. RP commenced approach time 30secs late with a rolex to push 1 min later. HAILR checklist did not get completed until landing checklists

Continued approach to an arrested landing below max trap weight. Executed a CAT shot to enter the bolter/wave off pattern. Remember that approach may not necessarily be passing on any failures to paddles so ensure that you are directive and if you still have the failure when you call the ball, add it to your ball call. Continued with multiple

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/SCQL 103 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(tb) (fa) ded ICLS approaches and TCN approaches. Smooth basic air work here. Do not go fishing for centerline.

Good use of EP for soft cat shot. Due to the sim was unable to adequately show a red launch bar light but was able to talk through the issue real time.

Lessons learned for RP. Make your push time, smooth and steady basic air work. Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 1/30/2017 10:53:50 AM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/SCQL 104 Grade: 3.78 Pre Regs Student On Track Actual Gradesheet Instructor Signature Reviewed Event Status Type Met Can Log Date Date Type **SIMULATO** True All Data Complete 1/25/2017 **NORMAL** True False R (b) (6) SKILL COMMENTS D 1. Brief/Questions of the Day O O O O O 0 2. ACLC/ILS Approach Ρ \bigcirc O 0 0 O \circ 0 0 0 0 3. Admin Comm Ρ Ρ 0 4. Basic Airwork \bigcirc O O 0 0 5. Bingo Profile 0 Ρ 0 \circ 6. Catapult Procedures and Ρ 0 0 O 0 0 0 **Emergencies** 0 0 0 0 7. CV-1 Approach/Case III Ρ 0 0 8. Deck Procedures Ρ \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc 9. Emergency Procedures Ρ O 0 \circ 10. Headwork / CRM Ρ \bigcirc O 0 0 O 11. HYD 2/HUD Ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0 12. Launch Bar Ρ O O 0 0 0 0 13. Marshall Procedures Ρ O 14. NORDO/Bolter/Waveoff Ρ \bigcirc 0 0 \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 Pattern 0 0 0 0 15. Settle Off CAT Ρ 16. System and Display 0 0 Ρ O O O 0 Management 17. Waveoff Technique Р O 0 \bigcirc O 0 0 18. Debrief/Professionalism D O O \bigcirc \bigcirc **Total Grades** 0 О 14 О

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/SCQL 104 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (b) (6)

Overall Comments:

SCQL104 PASS/COMPLETE

Initialized airborne to get established in the marshal stack. HAIL-R checklists complete and RP was 14 seconds early commencing. If you are outside the +/- 10sec make sure to let marshal know. A little slow to reset to 2000fpm passing platform and RP dipped below 1200 briefly before becoming stabilized. No issues remaining approach and RP would land 100lbs below max trap weight.

Continued into the bolter waveoff pattern with multiple degraded approaches. Ball flying in the sim isn't accurate but continue to make meaningful corrections. PASS # 2 RP went CLARA low in close RESULTING IN A RAMPSTRIKE (-3ft Hook/Ramp). DO NOT LET BALL DROP BELOW DATUMS EVEN IN THE SIM. If flying a TCN only approach make sure to keep the course line up. RP would get an ADC failure, discussed how to handle and how it would be a divert scenario but due to sim issues would clear to continue.

Good job executing the bold face for brake failure on deck and good work executing Emer cat flyway with a soft cat shot and a stalled right engine. RP would be able to fly the aircraft away.

Nice work on the bingo profile turning the aircraft first before accelerating. Watch the small deviations on airspeed as that can cost you fuel. Good system set up for feet dry checks and getting ready for the PAR at KNZY. No other issues on the bingo.

Overall - BAW needs to improve on CV-1 approach and letting the ball fall out CLARA low is a below average deviation even for the sim.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 1/31/2017 8:33:54 AM

(b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT:	PLT	1 CQ/SC	QL 1	05					Gra	de: 3.57
Event Pre Reqs Stud Type Met Can		On Track Date	Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grade Ty		Instructo	r Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO True All Da R	ata		Fa	iled	1/31/2017	NOR		(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	True	False
O SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
Brief/Questions of the Day	D	0	1 O	0		4	0	O	COMMENTS	
ACLC/ILS Approach	Р	-	_	_				-		
		0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Admin Comm	P	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Basic Airwork	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Case III Launch	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Catapult Procedures and Emergencies	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. CV-1 Approach/Case III	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. CV-2	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0			
9. Deck Procedures	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
10. Degraded Approach/Landings	Р	0	0		0	0	0	0		
11. Emergency Procedures	Р	0	0	0	•	0	0	0		
12. Headwork / CRM	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
13. Inflight Alignment	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
14. Marshall Procedures	Р	0	0	0	•	0	0	0		
15. No HUD	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
16. NORDO/Bolter/Waveoff Pattern	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
17. Pitching Deck/Barricade	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
18. Settle Off CAT	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
19. Standby	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
20. System and Display Management	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
21. Waveoff Technique	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
		ı I	Page	1	of	3	ı			

(b) (6) SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS
22. Debrief/Professionalism	D	0	0	0	0		0	0	
Total Grades		0	0	1	7	13	0	1	

Overall Comments:

received a SOD today on his CQ-105 sim for procedural knowledge, heachwork, and failure to execute boldface for a right engine fire.

Brief: No issues

Marshal: Initiated students 40nm South of the ship. Marshal radial was 175 so students were basically in the Marshal stack at 15K. RP initiates a decent and is told to level off until he is away from the Marshal stack. RP flies directly over the Marshal radial and tries to initiate second decent and is told a second time to get away from the stack before descending. RP then proceeds 12 degrees cold of the stack, starts a decent, and then turns back toward the stack while still descending. The last 3,000 feet of altitude loss RP was on the Marshal radial proceeding outbound.

Approach: Because of the previous paragraph, RP needs 550 knots to make it to the fix on time. Rather than requesting a new push time, RP elects to commence at over 400 knots and never gets below 250 until configuring. The check turn toward final bearing is not made until 14nm. RP will chase lineup all the way down on the approach which leads to a very scary pass. Biggest learning point here is to slow down if you are behind the jet, fess up, and ask Marshal/Approach for a new push time or to discontinue the approach (headwork).

ADDED TO GRADESHEET 01 FEB: RP Commenced approach with Bingo Bug set at 4.6 (hold down). Max trap was approximately 6.5. Secured dumps manually at approximately 7.0. Debriefed RP extensively on the importance of backing yourself up with the Bingo Bug.

First Pass: RP will get to a slightly high lined up left start. Fly through down on a lineup correction. Gets two power calls prior to the red cell disappearing. Technique waveoff. This is a trend. On the previous sim I had with him, RP went Clara low resulting in a ramp strike and was debriefed accordingly. We are not teaching ball flying in the sim but being comfortable with such an extreme deviation on the low side is a concerning trend.

EP: Second time in the bolter-waveoff pattern RP will receive indications of a right engine fire. Does not execute boldface. Pulls right engine to idle and asks approach for the hornet rep. Hornet rep asks RP what he has. "I have right engine fire indications, no secondaries, right throttle is currently at idle (roughly 45 seconds after initial indications). Hornet rep asks RP to confirm whether he has executed the boldface. RP then executes boldface procedures.

Debrief: (b) (3) (A), (b) was very receptive in the debrief and acknowledges that he hade very bad decisions today. He wants to improve and did not make a single excuse for his performance. Recommend two ET sims to perfect Case III procedures and demonstrate the ability to make better decisions at the ship.

Respectfully,

Page 2 of 3

(b) (3) (A). SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/SCQL 105 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM) (45) (6) pect

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 2/1/2017 12:20:14 PM (b) (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: F	PLT	1 CQ/S	CQL 1	06					Gra	de: 3.82
Event Pre Reqs Stude Type Met Can I		On Track Date	Stat	us	Actual Date		esheet /pe	Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO True All Da	ita		Com	plete	4/18/2017	NOF		b) (3) (A), (l 6)	True	False
0							\			
SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Questions of the Day	D	0	0	0	0		0	0		
2. ACLC/ILS Approach	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
3. Admin Comm	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
4. Basic Airwork	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
5. Bingo Profile	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
6. Catapult Procedures and Emergencies	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
7. CV-1 Approach/Case III	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Deck Procedures	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
9. Degraded Approach/Landings	Р	0	0		0	0	0	0		
10. Emergency Procedures	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
11. Headwork / CRM	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
12. Marshall Procedures	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
13. NORDO/Bolter/Waveoff Pattern	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
14. Settle Off CAT	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
15. System and Display Management	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
16. Waveoff Technique	Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
17. Debrief/Professionalism	D	0	0	0	0		0	0		
Total Grades		0	0	1	1	15	О	0		

Overall Comments:

SCQL 106 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Started on deck for a Case III departure. Nice work catching the mismatched nozzle position on the catapult. RP would spend too much time troubleshooting ACLS issues. Good work asking for a new push time. Would push early but within the contract of called BADALT but would do so and self-for a

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/SCQL 106 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b)(G)/- 10sec window. Good job flying the approach. Late to recognize a failed RADALT but would do so and ask for a new altitude to trouble shoot. Started high and kept it high on the ILS for the trap.

Caught the brake fail and executed to the correct steps for the E Cat flyaway. Getting an AV hot on the ball call is not necessary to report to paddles as it could only create confusion, just go ahead and land and troubleshoot afterwards. Good CRM handling the Left AMAD PR and comm work with talking to beaver control. Remember to use FPAS when flying the profile.

Press

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 5/3/2017 1:37:28 PM (6)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(b) (5) (A), (b) (b)										
SYLL PHASE/EVENT: I	PLT	1 CQ/S	CQL 1	07					Gra	ide: N/A
Event Pre Reqs Stud Type Met Can I		On Track Date	c Stat	tus	Actual Date	Grades Type		Instructo	r Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO True All Da	ıta			lot duled		NORM	IAL		False	False
0										
SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Questions of the Day	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
2. Admin Comm	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
3. Basic Airwork	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
4. Catapult Procedures and Emergencies	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
5. CV-1 Approach/Case III	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
6. Deck Procedures	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
7. Degraded Approach/Landings	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
8. Depart and Re-enter	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
9. Emergency Procedures	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
10. Headwork / CRM	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
11. Landing Pattern	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
12. Marshall Procedures	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
13. NORDO/Bolter/Waveoff Pattern	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
14. Settle Off CAT	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
15. System and Display Management	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
16. Waveoff Technique	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
17. Pattern Entry, Spin, Break	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
18. Debrief/Professionalism	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Total Grades		О	Ο	0	О	0	О	0		

Overall Comments:

(b)s(6) odified: (Not Saved Yet)

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: I	PLT	1 CQ/SC	QL 1	80					Gra	de: N/A
Event Pre Reqs Stud Type Met Can I		On Track Date	Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructor	Signature	Reviewed
SIMULATO True All Da R	ita			lot eduled		NORM	IAL		False	False
0										
SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	NA NA	COMMENTS	
Brief/Questions of the Day	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
2. ACLC/ILS Approach	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
3. Admin Comm	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
4. AOA Probe Damage	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
5. Basic Airwork	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
6. Bingo Profile	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
7. Catapult Procedures and Emergencies	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
8. CV-1 Approach/Case III	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
9. Deck Procedures	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
10. Degraded Approach/Landings	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
11. Emergency Procedures	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
12. GCA With Degraded Symbology	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
13. Headwork / CRM	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
14. HYD 2/HUD	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
15. INS Fail	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
16. Marshall Procedures	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
17. NORDO/Bolter/Waveoff Pattern	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
18. Pitot Static Fail	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
19. Settle Off CAT	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
20. Single Engine	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
21. System and Display Management	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
			Page	1	of	2				

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/SCQL 108 (1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM)

(b) (6) SKILL		0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS
22. Waveoff Technique	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
23. Debrief/Professionalism	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Total Grades		О	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
UNIT 37310
FPO, AP 96310-7310

3740 S-3/Tng 25 May 18

From: Commanding Officer

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (5)

/7523 USMC

Subj: FLIGHT QUALIFICATIONS AND DESIGNATIONS

Ref:

(a) NAVMC DIR 3500.50C

(b) NAVMC DIR 3500.14D

(c) CNAF-M 3710.7

(d) F/A-18 ADMIN SOP REV 4


1. Having fulfilled the requirements set forth in the references, you are hereby granted the following qualifications and designations:


Operations Duty Officer Night Systems Air Combat Maneuvering 9 June 17 1 August 17 19 February 18





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
NATOPS











1/29/2019 9:56:50 AM

) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ESI

SYLL PH	YLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FSFT 101 Grade: 3.17											
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Stat	tus	Actual Date	Grades Type		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT	True	All Da	ta		Com	plete	7/28/2016	NORM		(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	True	False
	SKILL			О	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	estions of the Da	ау	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admi	n		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission E	xecution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwork	< / CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training I	Rules Adherence	е	Р									
7. Debrief/P	rofessionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•		
То	tal Grades			0	Ο	0	5	1	0	2		

Overall Comments:

FSFT 101 Day Tanking PASS/COMPLETE

Brief: Standard

Ground:

RP is reminded to look professional in marshal. As it was the aircraft were not exactly aligned. First guy to marshal sets the standard and should have their butt over the yellow line when the parking break is set. All other aircraft should match.

Departure/Join-up: Departed as a 4-ship. Standard

Conduct:

RV with tanker went as briefed. RP in SH-23 was first student to begin tanking. Positive learning trend throughout. No necessary after a missed approached to drop back as far as RP did. If you miss the plug just drop back a few feet, stabilize and try again. Lead informed RP and a positive correction was made. Multiple dry plugs with the final being a wet plug for 500lbs. Departed as a single VFR to KNJK. No Issues getting to the airfield or on deck.

End of Day evolution.

Page 1 of 2

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FSFT 101 (1/29/2019 9:56:50 AM) (b) (6)

RECOMMEND CALLSIGN REVIEW TO CHANGE CALLSIGN FROM (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) AS HE IS THE ONLY PERSON I HAVE EVER SEEN STICK THE ENTIRE NOSE CONE INTO THE REFUELING BASKET.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 8/4/2016 3:16:47 PM (b) (6)

1/29/2019 9:56:50 AM

SYLL PI	SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FSFT 102 Grade: 3.17											
Event Type	Pre Reqs Met	Stude Can L		On Trac Date	k Sta	tus	Actual Date	Grades Typ		Instructo	or Signature	Reviewed
FLIGHT O	True	All Da	ta		Com	plete	7/28/2016	NORM		(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	True	False
	SKILL			0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	COMMENTS	
1. Brief/Que	estions of the D	ay	Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
2. Admin			Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
3. Tac Admi	in		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
4. Mission E	execution		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
5. Headwor	k / CRM		Р	0	0	0		0	0	0		
6. Training	Rules Adherenc	е	Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•		
7. Debrief/P	Professionalism		Р	0	0	0	0		0	0		
8. Other			Р	0	0	0	0	0	0	•		
То	tal Grades			0	0	0	5	1	0	2		

Overall Comments: **FSFT 102** Night Tanking PASS/COMPLETE

Brief: Standard

Ground:

No issues with hot refueling or departure out of KNJK back to the MOA.

Conduct:

RP arrived in the MOA and called visual contact with the tanker. Cleared into left observation. RP caught a pass and was able to join up during twilight so there were still a lot of visual cues. Keep in mind for joining at night that when in doubt slow things down to figure out your situation and always fall back on the ABCs of joining and closure.

RP performed multiple dry plugs with improving trend. No wet tank due to Raider33 having a transfer issue and unable to balance its fuel. RP cleared to detach for RTB to Miramar. RP picked up an IFR clearance while still in the area and heading back to Miramar. No Issues. Debriefed about the possibility of leaving the MOA VFR and picking up clearance with LA CTR.

Don't put your nose in the basket.

(b) (3) (A), SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FSFT 102 (1/29/2019 9:56:50 AM)

RECOMMEND CALLSIGN REVIEW TO CHANGE CALLSIGN FROM (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) " AS HE IS THE ONLY PERSON I HAVE EVER SEEN STICK THE ENTIRE NOSE CONE INTO THE REFUELING BASKET.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 8/4/2016 3:17:17 PM (b) (6)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Event Proficiency Audit Report for (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) as of 01/28/2019 0811 UTC +09:00

Code	Method	Proficient	Expires	Environment	Parent	Parent Method
2202	Chain Updated	08/02/18	08/03/19	Day	6111	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	07/24/18	07/24/19	Day	6111	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	06/20/18	06/20/19	Day	6111	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	06/19/18	06/19/19	Day	6111	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	06/06/18	06/07/19	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	02/21/18	02/22/19	Day	6111	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	02/21/18	02/22/19	Day	6109	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	01/31/18	02/01/19	Day	6111	Logged
2202	Logged	07/07/17	07/08/18	HLL		



DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY 115 PURPLE HEART DRIVE DOVER AIR FORCE BASE, DELAWARE 19902

February 13, 2019

VIA ENCRYPTED EMAIL:

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

United States Marine Corps 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Attn: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Unit 37101

FPO AP 96373-7101

Dear(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

As requested, attached is a complete copy of the Autopsy Examination Report of Capt Jahmar F. Resilard.

I understand this report will be used as part of a Death Review. If you have any questions regarding the report provided or require interpretation of the findings, please do not hesitate to call me at (302) 346-8648. You may also contact our office via email at the following address: usarmy.dover.medcom-afmes.mbx.operations@mail.mil.

As this is a copy of the report, there is no need to return it to our office. However, if the next-of-kin desires a copy of this report please have them contact the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System directly. Work products generated by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System may only be released through our office. If you need any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Armed Forces Medical Examiner

Casualty Status Report

Report Date: 02/07/2019

SSN Name Death Date

(b) (3) (A), (b) (12/6/2018

SERVICE MEMBER INFORMATION:

Branch: Marine Corps Component: Regular

Birth Date: (b) (3) Gender: Male Race: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Rank: (A), (B)
Pay Grade: O-3
Duty Status: Present For Duty

Retirement Date: DOD CAS GRP CD: Non-hostile, Deceased, Accident

Personnel Category: Obligated/Voluntary Service Personnel Affiliation: Active Duty

RC Training Type: TDRL/PDRL Date:

Unit: VMFA (AW)-242, MAG-12, 1st MAW, MCAS Iwakuni, JA

<u>CASUALTY INFORMATION:</u> Operation:

Casualty Status: Deceased Casualty Category: Accident

Incident Date: 12/6/2018 Incident Place: North Pacific Ocean

Death Date: 12/6/2018 **Death Place:** North Pacific Ocean,

Treatment Facility Type:


Vehicle Class: FIXED WING AIRCRAFT Vehicle Type: F/A-18A/C Hornet


Role in Vehicle: Pilot Vehicle Owner: US Government


DCIPS CAUSE OF DEATH:

CIRCUMSTANCES:

Determination Pending: Result of an aircraft mishap.







Enclosure 1

Mishap pilot's Watch: Garmin Fenix 3 HR Enabled with Wifi and GLONASS





connect

Dashboards

Daily Summary

Challenges

Calendar

News Feed

Activities

Health Stats

Golf

Training

Gear

Insights

Reports

Connections

Groups

Badges







Kullillig

Event Type: Uncategorized v Course: - v Gear: Add

170.08 mi

Distance

11:56:03 4:13 Time

min/mi

Avg Pace

64,255 ft 3,913 C


Elev Gain


Calories

Photos


Click to add photos to your activity.

Badges











Over Time ▼ Customize ▼


11.06:40



4.10.00

Enclosure 19


~0142 ejection ~0218 pilot starts data 1046 spotted ~1130 heart stops 1220 recovered



https://buy.garmin.com/en-US/US/p/545480

OUTDOOR RECREATION | HIKING & HANDHELDS | PREVIOUS MODELS







UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242

Marine Aircraft Group 12

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan 1st Marine Aircraft Wing MARFORPAC

Unit 37310 FPO-AP 96310-7310

Wednesday, December 5, 2018 (18339) THIS FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS

ALL DOMESTIC TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED IAW MCO 3800.28



Sunrise: Sunset: EENT: Airfield Hours:	0702 1701 1800 24 Hour	SDO: SDC: DNCO: ADNCO:	(o) (3) (A), o) (6)	gpo:		(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) SUBJECT OF THE WEEK. POWER PLANT			MONTHLY SO		7/12.8 ROJECTED 8 / 171.6 14 / 566.4	Sch	FLOWN AS 61 / 78.5 98 / 149.0 98 / 149.0 edule Written By	
-							FLIGHT EVENTS:								(A), (b
EVT	C/S	BRF /ETD/ ETA	ICAO		CR	EW	MISSION	TMR	AREA	FLIGHT PLA	N FUEL	TAC	Priority	ORD	(6) NOTES
1-1 1-2	Bat 01 Bat 02	1100/1300/1335	RJOI/RKT	н	(b) (3) ((A), (b)	2102 2102	232	-	1801	HP HP	17	1 2	ABCD ABCD	1
2-1 2-2	Bat 01 Bat 02	1100/1415/1535		TH *	(b) (3) (a	A), (b)	3202 3202	LA7	R-567 (1430-1515)	1801	HP HP	17	1 2	A B C D A B C D	2
3-1 3-2	Bat 01 714/	1100/1620/1750 755	RKTH/RJC	01 -	(b) (3) ((A), (b)	3202 3202	1A7	MOA 6/R-110 (1630-1700)	1801	T	17	1 2	ABCD ABCD	3
4-1 4-2	Profane 11 Profane 12	2215/0015/0145		oi ·	(3) kesmao	• 7	2102 2102	1A6	ITRA-S (0000-0430)	JOI-2	HP / HR HP / HR		1 2	ABCDEF ABCDEF	
5-1 5-2	Profane 11 Profane 12	2215/0245/0415 C X C	P5 RIOI/RIC		A Capt Resiland	(b) (3)	3202 3202	1A7	TTRA-5 (0000-0430)	JOI-2	T	17	1 2	ABCDG ABCDG	
6-1	BAT 9I	0348/075	0	* SEC	CTION LEGO POINT	(b) (6)		FING OFFICER	SINSTRUCTOR SCHMR	JOT	-2	70	1		
			EVENT	BRF/ETD/ETA	(6) <u>of</u>	(0) (0)	CREW		T&R CODES	ICSET	NOTES				
			1-1	0300/0900/110		@ \$	(b) (3) (A),		2307	RJOI					
			2-1	1200/1300/150	0 C Console	@	(b) (6)		2302	RJOI					

FLIGHT NOTES:	GENERAL NOTES:	REQUIRED ORDNANCE:
1. PPR TIME 1335-1505.	1. 0700 MAINTENANCE MEETING.	A - 2 X TANKS
2. PPR TIME 1535-1620.	2. 0700 CUB AT MAG-12 CONFERENCE ROOM (b) (3) ATTEND	B - LPOD
3. NO FLIGHT BELOW 7,000 MSL	3. 0715 FOD WALK.	C - CATM-9X X2
4. ITRA-S IS DUE REGARD AFTER 2345. NO FLIGHT ABOVE FL 290.	4. 1500 CUB AT MAG-12 CONFERENCE ROOM (D) (3) ATTEND.	D - CATM-120 X2
5. USE 33 WIP CODE FOR BRU-55. (SIM GBU-12)		E - LAU-118
6. CHANGE WIP CODE TO FO.	5. 1900 NIGHT CREW MAINTENANCE MEETING (A), (b)	F - BRU-55
	(6)	G - AGM-88C / GBU-32 INERT X2
	(0)	



CELEBRATING 75 YEARS OF DEATH FROM THE DARKNESS

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan Marine Aircraft Group 12

1st Marine Air Wing MARFORPAC Unit 37310 PPO AP 96310 7310

THIS FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS ALL DOMESTIC TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED IAW MCO 3800.28 Friday, July 7, 2017 (17187)



	FLOWN	6 / 10.3	6 / 10.3	1266 / 2015.9				(a) (b) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c
		172 / 304.0	556 / 805.2	1968 / 2831.0			,	b)
TYPE ACFT: F/A-18D	DAILI SONIES/ NOONS SCHED.	MONTHLY SORTIES/HRS:	QUARTERLY SORTIES/HRS:	FY SORTIES/HRS:				6)
0945-1400 1645-1POD								
		CHBIECT OF THE WEEK.	FUGHT CHARACTERISTICS					
(b) (A) (6)	(3) , (b)	ien.		AKIEK:			
:000	FCF Aircrew:	NCO OF THE OLIVE	(t	S Line	MAKINE	3		
b)	(3)	()	(<i>F</i>), (b	AM	٠,	A , b		
b) (6)	(0)) (E		()	6		
SDC:	DNCO:	Shore Patrol:		Schedule Writer:		Schedule Clerk:		
6020	1207	0517	200	200	1923	8090-8050	1923-0619	0000-2359
Sunrise:	Sunset:	Moonset:	or Illian	W III on III:	EENT:	LLL Period:	Period:	eld Hours:

									TPUN FLIGHT EVENTS							1					
EA	575	BRF/ETD/ETA	ICAO		CKEW				T&R CODES	TMR	MSM	SBTP	FUGHT PLAN	4 AREA/TOS	8	FUEL TAC	GNO ORD	55 ST-35	PRI	SYSTEMS	NOTES
1-1	Bat 11	1000/1200/1400	VPDN/YPDN		(A (b (6	(b (3	45		6103 2506 2201 2102 3800	146	AA	1/2.0	SID/STAR	BFTA / R-225	225	T 13	3 ABCDE	DE	2	123	12
1-2	Bat 12			0),)			2506 2201 2102 3800			1/2.0		(1200-1500)	(00)		ABCDE	DE	3	13	
2-1	Ivan 21	1000/1200/1400	VPDN/YPDN		(b (6	(b	+		2102 2201 3800	2K4	RED AIR	R 1/2.0	I SID/STAR	BFTA / R-225	522	T 14	4 ACE	3	4	123	12
2-2	Ivan 22								6103 2201 2102 3800*			1/2.0		(1200-1500)	(00)		ACE	9	9	13	
3-1	Slasher 31	1000/1200/1330	YPDN/YPDN	%*	(b) (6)	(b) (3)			6103 3102 3104 6735 2102 3800	1A7	CAS	1/1.5	SID/STAR	MT BUNDY	DY	T 15	S ABFGH	GH	1	123	8
3-2	Slasher 32),))	%		3102 3104 6735 2102 3800			1/1.5		(1200-1500)	(00)		ABFGH	ВН	2	m	
4-1	Bat 41	1700/1900/2100	YPDN/T	1000	(3) ((b	+		6103 2404 2202 2402 3800	117	NS	1/2.0	SID/STAR	BFTA / R-225	225	T 13	3 ABCDEF	DEF	2	123	24
4-2	Bat 42	(b)(6)	, (b	(A)	nuni dan		0		2401 2402 2404 2202 3800			1/2.0		(1900-2200)	(00		ABCEF	EF	3	13	
5-1	Bat 51	1700/1900/2100	YPDN/YPDN	s.	, (b (6	(b)			6103 2402 2404 2202 3800	1A6	NS	1/2.0	SID/STAR	BFTA / R-225	225	T 14	4 ABCDEF	DEF	4	123	24
5-2	Bat 52			0	4)	9)			2402 2404 2202 3800	1		1/2.0		(1900-2200)	(00		ABCEF	, EF	2	13	2
13	Stasher 61	1700/1900/2030	YPDN/YPDN		(b) (6)	(£)(3)	*	61	6103 3106 3102 3104 6735 2402 3800	1A7	CAS	1/1.5	SID/STAR	MTBUNDY		T 15	S ABFGH	ВН	1	123	.3
6-2	Slasher 62				()		Į	STATE OF STREET	3106 6735 2402 3800		1000000	1/1.5	を できる	(1900-2200)	(00)		ABFGH	НЭ	9	6	
					* SECTIO	* SECTION LEAD ** DIVISION LEAD	DIVISIO	ON LEAD	@ ACUI # MISSION COMMANDER + BRIEFING OFFICER \$ INSTRUCTOR % CMMR	+ BRIEFING C	DEFICER \$	INSTRUCTO	R %CMMR								



×





WITH THE SPIN SWITCH IN NORM, WHEN WILL THE SPIN RECOVERY MODE (SRM) BE ACTIVATED?

POST DEPARTURE DIVE RECOVERY

MIG-23E

NGOD: EQOD:

Event Proficiency Audit Report for Capt RESILARD, JAHMAR as of 01/28/2019 0811 UTC +09:00

Code	Method	Proficient	Expires	Environment	Parent	Parent Method
2202	Chain Updated	08/02/18	08/03/19	Day	6111	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	07/24/18	07/24/19	Day	6111	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	06/20/18	06/20/19	Day	6111	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	06/19/18	06/19/19	Day	6111	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	06/06/18	06/07/19	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	02/21/18	02/22/19	Day	6111	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	02/21/18	02/22/19	Day	6109	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	01/31/18	02/01/19	Day	6111	Logged
2202	Logged	07/07/17	07/08/18	HLL		

Event		Instructor	Grade Sheet Y/N
SFAM 2101 EP SIM	24 MAY 2017	(a) (b) (b)	γ
FAM 2102 DAY FAM/1V0/1V1/AWI	5 JUN 2017) 	
AAR 2201 DAY AAR	21 JUN 2017		Y
NAAR 2202 NIGHT AAR	7 JUL 2017		Y
SAS 2301 HI/MED/LOW ANGLE DIVE/BUNT	24 MAY 2017		y
SAS 2302 SGL/SEC POP MED/LOW ANGLE DIVE/BUNT/STRAFE	25 MAY 2017		7
AS 2303 HI/MED ANGLE DIVE	6 JUN 2017		γ
AS 2304 MED/LOW ANGLE SGL/SEC POP	9 JUN 2017		γ
SAS 2305 SACT	26 MAY 2017		4
AS 2306 SACT	7 JUN 2017		Ý
SAS 2307 TPOD/LGB/LMAV	8 JUN 2017		γ
SAS 2308 TPOD/JDAM/LJDAM	26 JUN 2017		Y
SAS 2309 BUDDY LASE/BUDDY BOMB/TPOD	27 JUN 2017		Y
AS 2310 BUDDY LASE/BUDDY BOMB TPOD	28 JUN 2017		Y
SNS 2401 FAM	10 JUL 2017		4
NS 2402 FAM/FORM/AWI	7 JUL 2017		4
NS 2403 2V2 INT	13 JUL 2017		Y
NS 2404 SEC DELIVERIES LGW/IAM	7 JUL 2017		Y
NS 2405 MED ANGLE DIVE/POP/STRAFE	14 JUL 2017		Y
AA 2501 OBFM	29 SEP 2017		Ý
AA 2502 DBFM	19 NOV 2017		Y
AA 2503 HABFM	14 NOV 2017		7
AA 2504 DISSIMILAR BFM	15 Feb 2018		4
SAA 2505 BVR RADAR L&D	29 JUN 2017		Y
SAA 2506 SEC BVR RADAR VID	29 JUN 2017		Y
SAA 2507 SEC BVR L&D/L&L	6 JULY 2017		Y
AA 2508 2V2 OR 2V2 SEM/TAP THE CAP	30 JAN 2018		Y
AA 2509 2V2 BVR	185AN 2018		
SLAT 2601 LAT			
AT 2602 SGL SHIP LAT			
AT 2603 SEC LAT			

F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012) AAR-2201: DAY AAR

STUDENT: (b) (3) (A), (b)							INSTRUCTOR: (b) (3) (A), (b)
FLIGHT POSITION: Dash 2							DATE: 5 JUN 2017
CREW POSITION: Pilot			-				-)
CREW POSITION. FILE			_	-	_	_	
	PASS:	X		IN	COI	MDI	LETE: REFLY:
	A33.			IIV	icoi	1411 1	TELET.
ITEM	DND	Unsat	1	2	3	4	REMARKS
1. Mission Preparation					X		Tanking:
2. Brief	X						Good job being smooth and expeditious getting into the basket. It helped with
3. Admin			-		X		managing the timeline for the LFE. Work on not sliding so far back from the hose
4. TacAdmin					X		as it will only take up more time slowly sliding forward. Once you have more
5. Tactical Execution							experience you will be able to position yourself closer to the hose and start from
6. TCC							there.
7. Debrief							
8. Mission Performance Standards		1			X		
a) Adhere to USMC FA-18 ADMIN SOP.					X		Instructor Comments: Real nice job on the tanker. Always remember to remain
b) Adhere to Air-to-Air Refueling Manual.					X		calm when behind the basket. Everyone gets the "tanker blues" at some point,
c) Execute safe rendezvous procedures.					X		so don't ever let a bad day on the tanker effect your confidence. For this
d) Use proper communications procedures.				7 7	X		evolution, real nice job being safe and expeditious.
e) From a stabilized position, successfully engage the							
basket expeditiously.					X		
f) Respond quickly and safely to all communications							
and communication out signals from the tanker aircraft.					X		
9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).	X						
REMARKS							
Conduct two ship red air in support of larger Australian for	rce ex	ercis	p (ond	lucte	h	
pre-mission tanking on an RAAF KC-30. Conducted one pla							
pre mission talking on an raw in the set contacted one pri	4011						
7/19/2	2017						



Signed by: (b) (3) (A), (b) (

DND - Not applicable or not observed.

UNSAT* - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.

 $\ensuremath{\text{\textbf{1}}}$ - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.

- 2 Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.
- 3 Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
- 4* Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.
- *Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)

AAR-2202: NIGHT AAR

F	PASS:	X	(IN	CON	MPL	ETE: REFLY:
ITEM	DND	Unsat	1	2	3	4	REMARKS
1. Mission Preparation		1			Х		Tanking:
2. Brief	X	\forall					Good work being smooth and expeditious on the night tanking. Would drop bac
3. Admin					Х		a little too far prior to getting into position behind the basket but this will
. TacAdmin					Х		improve with experience. Good procedures and comm.
. Tactical Execution							
5. TCC							
. Debrief	X				TI		Instructor Comments: Nice work.
. Mission Performance Standards					X		
a) Adhere to USMC FA-18 ADMIN SOP.					X		
b) Adhere to Air-to-Air Refueling Manual.					X		
c) Execute safe rendezvous procedures.					Х		
d) Use proper communications procedures.					X		
e) From a stabilized position, successfully engage the							
asket expeditiously.					X		
f) Respond quickly and safely to all communications					14		
and communication out signals from the tanker aircraft.					X		
). Administrative flight requirement (if required).	X						
REMARKS		-					
Conducting night A/A and A/G events in the R-225. Mid m	ission	tank	0				
	ission						

Signed by: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
DND - Not applicable or not observed.

Instructor Sign

UNSAT* - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.

- 1 Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.
- 2 Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.
- 3 Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
- 4* Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.
- *Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.

Enclosure 21

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- 2.5.12 Sortie Requirements. Sortie requirements state the minimum number of passes, engagements, or maneuvers required to demonstrate proficiency. T&R event requirements are written to allow completion on one sortie. Squadrons who cannot complete all stated requirements in one sortie (e.g., CV squadrons or squadrons limited by range access and regulations) may complete the requirements of an event in multiple sorties as long as the completion sorties are flown in succession and within normal currency windows defined by unit SOP. If an aircrew's currency expires (e.g., a warm up flight is required), or the event requirements cannot be completed on the next scheduled sortie, the event shall be re-flown in its entirety.
- 2.5.13 <u>Performance Standards</u>. Performance standards are listed for each T&R event description. These are training standards for individual aircrew performance and should be utilized by the evaluator as a guideline to determine the satisfactory completion of each event. If the aircrew did not successfully attain the performance standards, the training code shall not be logged as a completed flight.
- 2.5.14 T&R Chaining. Event chaining allows for the completion of more complex or advanced events using the same skill to update proficiency status of events. Only events in a sequence entailing demonstration of equivalent skills shall be chained. Refer to the Aviation T&R Program Manual Chapter 2 for detailed guidance on conditional chaining. For the purposes of this T&R, any flight event will chain FAM-2102, and any event flown with the aid of NVGs will chain NS-2402. Simulators will not chain flights.
- 2.5.15 FA-18 Tactical T&R Refresher. The FA-18 Tactical T&R Refresher syllabus shall be completed in tactical squadrons. Aircrew should fly all R coded events. However, the Refresher aircrew need not fly every event within a stage to be requalified in that stage. The commanding officer may tailor the Refresher syllabus to fit the experience level of the aircrew per the Aviation T&R Program Manual. When all of the R coded events within a stage are successfully completed, all remaining events in that stage that are proficient or delinquent are updated. This assumes that the Refresher aircrew had completed all events in the stage during his previous tour. If the Refresher aircrew did not previously complete events in a stage of training, those events must be completed in addition to R coded events. Experienced aircrew (completed at least one fleet tour in an operational unit) who have not flown for an extended period of time, but not long enough to require FRS Refresher training, shall be assigned to the Refresher POI. When an individual assigned to the Basic POI has attained individual CSP in all Core Skills, that individual shall be re-assigned to the Refresher POI.

2.5.16 FA-18 FRS Training

FA-18 FRS training is provided at a designated FRS (VMFAT-101 or VFA-106).

Pilot FRS training standards is the FRS approved FA-18A/C/D pilot syllabi. WSO FRS training is provided only at VMFAT-101.

WSO training standards is the VMFAT-101 sanctioned FA-18D WSO syllabi.

The FRS Pilot training syllabi is not updated in conjunction with this manual and is not included herein.

Basic/Transition/Conversion (CAT I/II) aircrew will be assigned to fly the entire FRS Basic (CAT I) training syllabus at a designated FRS training squadron.

2.5.17 FRS Refresher Syllabi

Pilots who have not flown the FA-18 in 366 days or greater but less than 485 days will complete a Safe-for-Solo (CAT V) syllabus at a designated FRS training squadron.

Aircrew who have not flown the FA-18 in 486 days or greater but less than 730 days will complete a Modified FRS Refresher (CAT IV) syllabus at a designated FRS training squadron.

Aircrew who have not flown the FA-18 in 731 days or greater will complete the comprehensive FRS Refresher syllabus (CAT III) at a designated FRS training squadron.

2.6 CORE PHASE

General. This phase contains basic Core training essential to wartime employment of the unit platform/system. This phase should provide aircrew with the skills required to complete 3000 phase missions. This phase should be completed prior to beginning the 3000 phase events if practicable.

Ground/Academic Training. Aircrew must be current per NATOPS flight manual and USMC FA-18 ADMIN SOP. Aircrew shall review the USMC FA-18 ADMIN SOP, TACSOP, local addendums and local range manuals. Aircrew shall complete all FAM academic codes prior to completion of this phase of training. In addition to all academic codes applicable to this phase of training, the following administrative and academic tasks will be accomplished prior to completing the 2000 phase T&R codes.

Demonstrate proficiency in maintaining aircraft control throughout FA-18 envelope.

Maintain proper formation and visual mutual support.

Demonstrate proficiency in basic radar mechanics.

Arrive at a valid rear quarter weapons envelope with 0 to +100 KTS V_C.

Take valid shots.

Prerequisite. 2101

Ordnance. CATM-9X

Range Requirements. AA

2.7.2 AIR-TO-AIR REFUELING (AAR)

Purpose. To gain and maintain proficiency and familiarity with AAR operations.

<u>General</u>. Operations shall be conducted in accordance with the Air Refueling NATOPS Manual. Squadrons may conduct AAR as a part of other ferry or tactical missions.

<u>Ground / Academic Training</u>. Squadrons shall complete the AAR stage briefs before conducting any AAR flight per the NATOPS Flight Manual, Air-to-Air Refueling Manual and local SOPs.

AAR Overview

				AIR-TO-AIR REFU	ELING (AAR)	
EVENT	TIME	REFLY	POI	CONDITION	DEVICE	NUM	DESCRIPTION
AAR-2201	1.3	365	B,R	D	A	1+	DAY AERIAL REFUELING
AAR-2202	1.3	365	B,R,M	NS	A	1+	NIGHT AERIAL REFUELING

AAR-2201 1.3 365 B,R D A 1+ FA-18A/C/D

Goal. Become proficient in day aerial refueling.

Requirement. Perform all AAR procedures to include tanker rendezvous, observation position, astern position, refueling procedures, and tanker departure. Six contacts required for completion. If proficient, one contact required for completion.

Performance Standards

Adhere to Air-to-Air Refueling Manual.

Execute safe rendezvous procedures.

Use proper communications procedures.

From a stabilized position, successfully engage the basket expeditiously.

Respond quickly and safely to all communications and communication out signals from the tanker aircraft.

Prerequisite. 2102

Range Requirements. AAR

External Syllabus Support. One compatible tactical or strategic tanker.

AAR-2202 1.3 365 B,R,M NS A 1+ FA-18A/C/D

Goal. Become proficient in night aerial refueling.

<u>Requirement</u>. Perform all AAR procedures to include: tanker rendezvous, observation position, astern position, refueling procedures, and tanker departure. Six contacts required for completion. If proficient, one contact required for completion.

Performance Standards

Adhere to Air-to-Air Refueling Manual.

Execute safe rendezvous procedures.

Use proper communications procedures.

From a stabilized position, successfully engage the basket expeditiously.

Respond quickly and safely to all communications and communication out

NOT Logged

<u>Requirement</u>. To maintain proficiency as a division leader a pilot shall brief, lead, and debrief the designated event in accordance with the mission performance standards for that event.

RQD-6105 0.0 365 B,R,M (NS) A 6+ FA-18A/C/D

Goal. Track mission commander proficiency.

<u>Requirement</u>. To maintain proficiency as a mission commander aircrew shall brief, lead, and debrief the designated event in accordance with the mission performance standards for that event.

RQD-6106 1.3 * B,R (NS) A 1 FA-18A/C/D

Goal. Provide air-to-air JHMCS introductory flight exposure.

Requirement. Conduct an air-to-air sortie and gain proficiency in the use of JHMCS.

Prerequisite. 2506

RQD-6107 0.0 * B,R (NS) A 1 FA-18A/C/D

Goal. Provide air-to-ground JHMCS introductory flight exposure.

Requirement. Conduct an air-to-ground sortie and gain proficiency in the use of JHMCS.

Prerequisite. 2309

RQD-6108 0.0 * B,R NS A 1 FA-18A/C/D

Goal. Provide JHMCS NVCD introductory flight exposure.

Requirement. Conduct a night systems sortic utilizing the JHMCS NVCD system.

Prerequisite. 2309, 2405

RQD-6109 0.0 545 B,R,M (NS) A 1+ FA-18A/C/D

Goal. Track proficiency in day or night strategic aerial refueling.

Requirement. Two day contacts or two night contacts required for completion.

External Syllabus Support. KC-10 tanker or similar.

Prerequisite. 2201

SRQD-6110 1.0 1095 B,R,M S 1 TOFT

Goal. Introduce and demonstrate techniques and procedures associated with the Functional Check Flight (FCF).

<u>Requirement</u>. Simulator shall be used under the supervision of a designated FCF pilot. All portions of the FCF checklist shall be reviewed during the simulator period.

RQD-6111 0.0 545 B,R,M (NS) A 1+ FA-18A/C/D

Goal. Track proficiency in day or night strategic aerial refueling on a KC-135.

Requirement. Two day contacts or two night contacts required for completion.

External Syllabus Support. KC-135.

Prerequisite, 2201

2.15.4 QUALIFICATION EVENTS (QUAL)

Purpose. To track training codes associated with qualifications.

<u>General</u>. Once the flight to attain the qualification is complete, a letter from the squadron commanding officer awarding the qualification shall be placed in the NATOPS jacket and APR.

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			_	_	_						11 4 4	NII I'AAs	MI IA		KUID	-					_	_	
au tora	diam'r.		EVENT	ATT	AIN	AIN.	ACA	D/GRND	1	SIM	FL	IGHT	CON	7.1	o.	ORK	>						5:
SKILL	PREFIX	T&R DESCRIPTION	NUMBER	В	R	MAIN	#	TIME	#	TIME	#	TIME	D	TYPE	# A/C SIM	NETWORK	REFLY	PREREQUISITE	CHAINING	INST	EVAL	EOM	EVENT
	RQD	SEC LEADER PROFFLT	6103	X	X	X							(N)	A	2		90		2102,2402(NS)		T		610
	RQD	DIV LEADER PROF FLT	6104	X	X	X							(N)	A	4		180		2102,2402(NS)				610
	RQD	MSN CMDR PROF FLT	6105	X	X	X							(N)	A	6+		365		2102,2402(NS)				610
	RQD	A/A JHMCS INTRO	6106	X	X		100						(NS)	A	1+		*	2506	2102				6106
000 BOD	RQD	A/G JHMCS INTRO	6107	X	X		139						(NS)	A	1+		*	2309	2102				610
5000 RQD	RQD	NVCD INTRO	6108	X	X				-				NS	A	1+		*	2309,2405	2402				6108
	RQD	STAT TANKER	6109	X	X	X	RE 1		馬		100		(NS)	A	1+		545	2201	2102,2201,2202(NS),2402(NS)				6109
	SRQD	FCF SIM	6110	X	X	X			31	1.0	題		1	S	1		1095		2101				6110
	RQD	STRAT TANKER (KC-135)	6111	X	X	X							(NS)	A	1 ±		545	2201	2102,2201,2202(NS),2402(NS), 6109				6111
	QUAL	DAYCQ	6201	X	X		الما				Par	- (B	A	1+		*	4104	2102				6201
	QUAL	NIGHT CQ	6202	X	X		EU				ET		N	A	1+		*	4105	2102				6202
	QUAL	LAT QUAL	6203	X	X		1241.4						D	A	2		*	2603	2102				6203
	QUAL	NSLAT QUAL	6204	X	X				100				NS	A	2		*	4703	2102,2402				6204
6000	QUAL	LSO QUAL	6205	X	X	х							*	G	*		1095	6201,6202,LSO REQ TRNG					6205
QUAL	QUAL	FCF QUAL	6206	X	X				1		03	1.3	D	A	1+	200	*	6110	2102				6206
	QUAL	FAC(A) QUAL	6207	X	X				15				(NS)	A	2		*	3812	2102,2402(NS)				6207
	QUAL	TAC(A)	6208	X	X						190		(NS)	A	2		*	3901					
	QUAL	NS QUAL	6209	X	X				7				NS	A	2		*	2405	2102,2402(NS)				6209
	QUAL	ACM QUAL	6210	X	X				35%				(NS)	A	2		*	2509	2102				6210

Total ANN TOTAL

VMFA(AW)-242

COMMANDER'S PHILOSOPHY AND GUIDANCE

(25 May 2018)

PROTECT THE FORCE - KNOW THE PLAN - HIT YOUR TARGET



Over the past 75 years, the Bats have a long history of success in both peace and war. From Iwo Jima to Da Nang, Al Asad to Iwakuni—our predecessors have established a legacy of excellence. We are now the only permanently forward deployed USMC F/A-18 squadron and bear a unique burden to be ready to "fight and win tonight." We will never have all the people or parts we desire. We won't be afforded a long reset period. Inspired by our forefathers and with steeled resolve, we will overcome our challenges by protecting the force, knowing the plan, and hitting our targets.

<u>Protect the Force</u>. We are charged with protecting our people, jets, and warfighting capability from the enemy and from all who threaten it. Our resources are constrained. Whether or not it's our Marines and Sailors, our jets, our parts, or our enablers—replacements will not be timely. Whether flying, fixing, or on liberty—you are obligated to protect each other from lurking threats. If it doesn't look right, feel right, smell right—speak up and fix it.

- -Be a hard target—know the enemy and respect him. The enemy isn't dumb. He will seek every advantage and knows our weaknesses. He's watching and listening--we will red team everything.
- -Respect the danger that surrounds you—don't do the enemy's job. This is a dangerous business. Not following procedures or not adhering to standards will lead to fratricide. Debrief and learn.


<u>Know the Plan</u>. We are here for two key reasons: to deter aggression and to aggressively fight if deterrence fails. As we are the first Marines to the fight--and resources will be constrained--we must master our contingency tasking and share our knowledge with the UDP squadrons. We will be the resident experts.

- -Our wartime mission takes precedence over all else. We're defending our homeland, our allies, and families here with us. That being said, we will "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's" and pay the taxes orders require.
 - -Tailor sortie/training events to the wartime mission. Tie the tactical to the operational when practical.

<u>Hit Your Target</u>. Execute with precision, aggressiveness, and resolve. Whether or not it's conducting a maintenance action, completing a checklist, or gunning a Flanker—do your job! Know your role and how it fits—master your skill and stay focused. We will rapidly pivot from peace to war—you are in your prep time.

- -Plan for Margin. There are no perfect people, systems, or weapons—back each other up.
- -Be spiritually ready to fight hurt—Chaos, confusion, and casualties will happen in battle.
- -Be mentally ready to kill—that's our business, our cause is just.

As we celebrate 75 years of combat excellence—be always faithful to our legacy. Be ready, be the difference.



Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps



SAFETY AND FORCE PRESERVATION

POLICY STATEMENT

(25 May 2018)



PROTECT THE FORCE - KNOW THE PLAN - HIT YOUR TARGET

<u>Protect the Force</u>. Force Protection is one of six warfighting functions of the United States Marine Corps. We are charged with protecting our people, jets, and warfighting capability from the enemy and from all who threaten it.

- -Be a hard target—respect the enemy. He won't fight fair—expect it.
- -Don't do the enemy's job-respect the danger surrounding you. No one ever plans to be in a mishap.
- -Mitigate all danger—respect rules and procedures. These are designed to protect you from yourself.

<u>Identify and Mitigate Threats</u>. This is an inherently dangerous job. We are trained to kill the enemy and he will try to kill you—but flying and fixing aircraft can be lethal without the enemy's involvement. We must train to mitigate both the "Red" and the "Blue" threat.

- -Red Threat: How the enemy can hurt us. Intelligence helps us identify and understand the "Red Threat."
- -Blue Threat: How we can hurt ourselves or how the environment / situation can hurt us. Safety helps us identify and understand the "Blue Threat."

<u>Employ Tactically.</u> No matter what the mission, Marines always have an offensive mindset. We will give the enemy no quarter—while exploiting the enemy's weaknesses smartly.

- -There is no tactical plan that is inherently unsafe. If the plan only accounts for the "Red" and not the "Blue" threat—it's a bad plan; it's NOT tactical.
- -Be aggressive, but preserve options/decision space. Don't paint yourself into a corner, leave yourself an "exit available." Respect timelines, weather and fuel. Respect maintenance procedures, supervision, and policy. This applies to everything we do, from fighting the enemy to having fun on liberty.

<u>Debrief and Learn</u>. Honest mistakes are going to happen—although nobody wants them to. Our procedures and layers of oversight are built with this fundamental human fact in mind. Despite all of that, things get missed. When it does we must learn. Don't hide your near misses—debrief and share.

- -The "close calls" or the "near misses" are free. We will have numerous forums to highlight our errors and to share and learn. This is never to embarrass anyone—it's to save someone's life.
 - -A true professional admits errors, debriefs, learns, and teaches. Park your pride and debrief.

Mors ex Tenebris,



Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

PROTECT THE FORCE - KNOW THE PLAN - HIT YOUR TARGET



UNIT, PERSONAL AND FAMILY READINESS

POLICY STATEMENT





PROTECT THE FORCE - KNOW THE PLAN - HIT YOUR TARGET

<u>Protect the Force</u>. Our families sustain us—we defend them every day. They are vital to our ability to keep balanced and to be at our best.


- -Be balanced—spend real time with your family. This job is vital, but fleeting—your family is for life.
- -Don't neglect the homefront. You are your own family readiness officer first.
- -The chain of command is here to support you. I require you to be focused on the mission. If you've got stressors that are taking away from being at your best—ask for help.

Know the Plan. When we take the fight to the enemy there won't be much time for paperwork. The fight will demand 100% of your attention. MCO 1754.9A provides key guidance.

- -Official Communication: Our families will receive information while protecting OPSEC and PII.
- -Readiness and deployment support: Empowering our families to be self-sufficient during crisis.
- -Information and referral: Our program will push information and pull what's necessary.
- -Volunteer management: Our squadron has a wealth of experience—those willing to help are value added.
- -NEO paperwork must be current. Have an emergency plan, stores, and money ready to go.
- -Keep your family care plan up to date. While an inspectable item, the real issue is making sure you've covered the bases necessary to deploy rapidly.

<u>Build and Sustain the Team.</u> We will have fun together. Social events won't always be mandatory for the Marines, and never for the spouses—participate as you desire. My real purpose in bringing families together is to facilitate the support network necessary to sustain the families when the squadron deploys. Everyone will need some help at some point. When you do, the Bat Family will be there!

Mors ex Tenebris,



Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps



EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY STATEMENT



(25 May 2018)

PROTECT THE FORCE - KNOW THE PLAN - HIT YOUR TARGET

<u>Protect the Force</u>. We are charged with protecting our people, jets, and warfighting capability from the enemy and from all who threaten it. Discrimination of any type erodes our ability to fight as a team—it's a force protection issue.

- -"Discrimination in any form is adverse to mission accomplishment and will not be tolerated."
- -Discrimination degrades our unit effectiveness and ability to fight.

<u>Tradition</u>. We all belong to a sacred warfighting organization, feared and respected throughout the world—we are United States Marines. We are privileged to wear our Nation's uniform and serve in any clime and place—ready to defend our homeland, our Allies, and to be the Nation's sharpest sword when called.

- -Every Marine and Sailor in the Bats--no matter what his or her background--is on OUR team.
- -There can be no victory without an effective team.
- -There is no excuse for a hostile work environment—our hostility is reserved for the enemy.

<u>Opportunity</u>. "The Marine Corps will provide equal opportunity for all military members without regard to race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin or sexual orientation, consistent with the law, regulations, and requirements for physical and mental abilities."


- -"Sexual Harassment is a form of discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."
- -"Equal Opportunity is everyone's responsibility. Anyone who witnesses an act of discrimination has a responsibility to address, correct or report the inappropriate behavior immediately."

<u>Resolution/Reporting</u>. If you suspect discrimination has occurred/is occurring. Address the issue immediately and use the chain of command, without fear of reprisal. Any member attempting to take reprisal action will be held accountable. I encourage the use of the Informal Resolution System.

-Contact the Squadron or MAG EOA/EOR to discuss options for making a formal complaint.

_(b) (6)

Mors ex Tenebris,



Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps



SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE





PROTECT THE FORCE – KNOW THE PLAN – HIT YOUR TARGET

<u>Protect the Force</u>. We are charged with protecting our people, jets, and warfighting capability from the enemy and from all who threaten it. Sexual Assault is not only a crime—it's a force protection issue.

-"Sexual assault is a crime that is incompatible with our core values of honor, courage, and commitment. It is an affront to the basic American principles we so bravely defend. Sexual assault goes against everything we claim to be as Marines. It is a crime."

-Sexual Assault degrades our unit effectiveness and ability to fight.

<u>Sexual Assault Defined</u>. Sexual assault is: "Intentional sexual contact, characterized by use of force, threats, intimidation, or abuse of authority or when the victim does not or cannot consent. Sexual assault includes rape, forcible sodomy (oral or anal sex), and other unwanted sexual contact that is aggravated, abusive, or wrongful (including unwanted and inappropriate sexual contact), or attempts to commit these acts."

<u>Prevention</u>. Every Marine is charged with intervening when required. Engaged leadership and bystander intervention are essential.


-NO one is too junior to intervene. If it looks wrong, feels wrong—step in.


Keep our honor clean. We do not inflict casualties on our own force.

<u>Response</u>. All Marines and Sailors that are victims of sexual assault are entitled to be treated with dignity, fairness, and respect and will have access to appropriate assistance.

-Contact the Squadron UVA for questions on reporting options (restricted and unrestricted). UVA's have confidentiality and have been trained to help all Marines and Sailors get assistance.

-The chain of command will take appropriate measures to protect the victim from retaliation, reprisal, ostracism, and maltreatment in unrestricted reports.





Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps



HAZING

POLICY STATEMENT



(25 May 2018)

PROTECT THE FORCE - KNOW THE PLAN - HIT YOUR TARGET

<u>Protect the Force</u>. We are charged with protecting our people, jets, and warfighting capability from the enemy and from all who threaten it. Hazing is not only a moral issue—it's a force protection issue.

- -Hazing is unlawful, prohibited, and will not be tolerated.
- -Hazing degrades our unit effectiveness and ability to fight.

<u>Hazing Defined</u>. Hazing "is any conduct whereby a military member or members, regardless of Service or rank, without proper authority causes another military member or members, regardless of Service or rank, to suffer or be exposed to any activity which is cruel, abusive, humiliating, oppressive, demeaning, or harmful. Soliciting or coercing another to perpetrate any such activity is also considered hazing. Hazing need not involve physical contact among or between military members; it can be verbal or psychological in nature. Actual or implied consent to acts of hazing does not eliminate culpability of the perpetrator."


Tradition. There are no legitimate "traditions" that are exempt from the Marine Corps policy on hazing.

- -Keep our honor clean. Our most important tradition is fighting and winning wars. Any supposed "tradition" that harms our unit effectiveness or harms another Marine is not consistent with our true heritage.
 - -No better friend, no worse enemy. We take care of our own and respect each other.

<u>Reporting</u>. All Marines and Sailors must report all allegations of hazing immediately to your chain of command. All allegations of hazing will be processed IAW MCO 1700.28B.

- -Engaged leadership and bystander intervention are essential. If it looks wrong, feels wrong—step in. NO one is too junior to intervene.
- -The chain of command will protect those reporting allegations of hazing. ANY reprisal against a victim or witness will not be tolerated.
- -For further information, contact the MAG-12 Equal Opportunity Representative (EOR, 315-255-3902) or 1st MAW Equal Opportunity Advisor (EOA, 315-636-2532).

Mors ex Tenebris,



Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps



VMFA(AW)-242 SUICIDE PREVENTION POLICY STATEMENT



(25 May 2018)

PROTECT THE FORCE – KNOW THE PLAN – HIT YOUR TARGET

<u>Protect the Force</u>. We are charged with protecting our people, jets, and warfighting capability from the enemy and from all who threaten it. Suicide threatens our ability to fight—it's a force protection issue.

- -We need every Marine and Sailor in the fight. Suicide is a real and present danger to our force.
- -No one is immune; no one unaffected. The strongest among us can experience despair and loneliness. A suicide in the squadron would devastate our warfighting ability. Asking for help is NOT a sign of weakness.


Recognize, Ask, Care, Escort. Assume nothing—take no chances.

- If you even slightly suspect one or our Marines or Sailors might be thinking of suicide, stay with the Marine and get help immediately.
- Be a hard target, help your fellow Marine. Listen when someone is struggling. Don't be the Marine who says "I thought something was wrong, but..." Drop what you're doing and step into the breach.

<u>Treatment and Prevention</u>. The chain of command is here to support you.

- -Chaplains are well equipped and maintain 100% confidentiality—ask for a Chaplain, no questions asked.
- -Call the DSTRESS hotline (098-970-7734 / 1-877-476-7734 / 315-645-7734 www.dstressline.com)
- -Call the Military OneSource hotline (1-800-342-9647 or www.militaryonesource.mil)
- -Call the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline (1-800-273-TALK)

You Are Vital to Our Success. Each Marine or Sailor in this command is here for a specific purpose. We need each other in order to maintain our forward presence and fight at a moment's notice. Whether you fly, fix or file—I need you in the fight!



Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps



SUBSTANCE ABUSE

POLICY STATEMENT





PROTECT THE FORCE - KNOW THE PLAN - HIT YOUR TARGET

<u>Protect the Force</u>. We are charged with protecting our people, jets, and warfighting capability from the enemy and from all who threaten it. Substance abuse threatens our ability to fight—it's a force protection issue.

-Use of illegal drugs (or the abuse of legal drugs and alcohol) impairs our judgment and puts our Marines' and Sailors' health at risk.

-Substance abuse degrades our unit effectiveness and ability to fight—it will not be tolerated.

<u>Tradition</u>. We all belong to a sacred warfighting organization, feared and respected throughout the world—we are United States Marines. We are privileged to wear our Nation's uniform and serve in any clime and place—ready to defend our homeland, our Allies, and to be the Nation's sharpest sword when called.

-Impaired Marines at best slow down our ability to fix and fly jets. At worst, we make casualties for the enemy. Be a hard target—don't do the enemy's job for him.


-The Marine Corps was born in a bar—Tun Tavern—on 10 November 1775. Responsible use of alcohol is undoubtedly a part of the culture, but no one should feel pressured to drink—ever.

-Marines fight and win the Nation's wars. For 75 years the Bats have stood for excellence—from Espiritu Santo, to Iwo Jima, to Da Nang, to Al Asad, to Iwakuni today. Have fun—and we will—but be ready.

<u>Treatment and Prevention</u>. Some Marines and Sailors will struggle with alcohol. Help them out before they make a bad decision or harm the force.

- -If you need help or know someone that does—contact the SACO or the Chaplain.
- -Urinalysis and alcohol screening are enduring events and should deter Marines and Sailors, but are no substitute for knowing for and caring for our Marines.

<u>Never Drive, Fix, or Fly Impaired</u>. If you know you're not free from the effects of alcohol—pick up the phone and admit it. The command will support you, no training event is worth the risk. Everyone gets a mulligan, but know this: flying or performing maintenance drunk will be a zero tolerance event.



Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps



12/1/2018 12:39:44 PM(UTC+9)

Welcome back

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite: 0xF3F339 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)



(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

12/1/2018 12:41:27 PM(UTC+9)

Excellent

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b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

12/1/2018 3:51:41 PM(UTC+9)

10 Marines on a C-130 from Kadena to Iwakuni taxiing now.

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(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

12/1/2018 5:59:14 PM(UTC+9)

Rescue det Marines SOD Iwakuni

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12/1/2018 6:07:02 PM(UTC+9)

Copy, thanks

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(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

12/3/2018 11:54:03 AM(UTC+9)

Looking for WSO volunteers for XC going to Osan from 12-14 Dec. LFE flying on 13, SEM on 14th.

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(3) (A), (b) (6)

12/3/2018 4:58:34 PM(UTC+9)

Some aircrew have asked me for go and/or no-go pills.

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(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

12/3/2018 4:58:59 PM(UTC+9)

Per General NATOPS, "The use of stimulants and/or sedatives shall only be authorized following the commanding officer's consultation with the wing commander or equivalent, and the flight surgeon. The flight surgeon, further, shall have consulted with his/her supervisor in the aeromedical chain of command.

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12/3/2018 4:59:37 PM(UTC+9)

QRF landed

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(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

12/3/2018 6:16:18 PM(UTC+9)

Wing CG said hard no to performance enhancement. Sorry dudes.

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12/4/2018 7:50:30 AM(UTC+9)

Attachments:



I think this is all we got boys...

https://mmg-

fna.whatsapp.net/d/f/AkFksqo3c059gG8j7wpqiX

tWLhXORiyfAFHsMzZZpLAS.enc a0796260-7296-45ee-b72f-7ab4be2e52cc.jpg

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite: 0xF87FB8 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, ZWAMEDIAITEM, Size: 33865728 bytes)
Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/Message/Media/16714872682-1473210235@g.us/a/0/a0796260-7296-45ee-b72f-7ab4be2e52cc.jpg: (Size: 22770 bytes)





12/4/2018 7:55:48 AM(UTC+9)

FYI: melatonin is minimum 24hrs grounding.

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(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

12/4/2018 7:57:48 AM(UTC+9)

Attachments:



https://mmg-

fna.whatsapp.net/d/f/Aldt1p2CLgvs6LC-RizHym5RJI6tNmoRVF1XntVcdRQq.enc

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite: 0xF87D5D (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, ZWAMEDIAITEM, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/Message/Media/16714872682-1473210235@g.us/5/6/56f53ead-04e4-4561-8716-239b1b5eb9eb.jpg: (Size: 499950 bytes)





(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

12/4/2018 10:12:00 AM(UTC+9)

Requesting 8 x GBU-12 for tomorrow.

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b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

12/4/2018 11:02:29 AM(UTC+9)

, give me a call

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3) (A), (b) (6)

12/4/2018 6:58:26 PM(UTC+9)

🖒 ent 4 tomorrow: do NOT turn on your APUs until 0001L 6 Dec. Schedule has you taking off at 0015L. Adjust your timelines accordingly. (MAG CO directs)

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(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

12/5/2018 9:03:21 AM(UTC+9)

Maintenance is looking for any available pilot who can turn a jet.

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(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

12/5/2018 9:08:34 AM(UTC+9)

I can

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite: 0x15495DD (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)





(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

12/5/2018 9:33:02 AM(UTC+9)

SVTC is up in S2. Account tied to SIPR token. Instructions will be posted next to computer.

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(3) (A), (b) (6)

12/5/2018 10:30:37 AM(UTC+9)

(2) Wizards needed for this weekends BFM XC to Futenma. Noonish RTB Sunday. Tell your wives to suck it up and Ops is requiring that you go because you have a special skill set that can't be replaced. Blame it on me, I'll take the hit.

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite: 0x160FEC8 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)





12/6/2018 5:29:24 PM(UTC+9)

Tokushima personnel, if it comes to it for transportation there are three rental car companies near the civilian terminal

Budget: Nissan: Nippon

Two taxi phone numbers from the airport info site:



Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite: 0x1BE0E08 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NAVAL AIRCRAFT FLIGHT RECORD

RTX71YE

AIRCRAFT DATA (RECORD TYPE 7B)

SIDE	EXC	BUNO	TEC	ORG	тот	AL MISSI	ON REQU	JIREMEN	T (TMR) [DATA	SUPT	TOT FLT	OPS	CAT	AIRLIFT MSN	REC		ENGIN	IE HRS		HOIST
		405005		057	MSN 1	HRS 1	MSN 2	HRS 2	MSN 3	HRS 3	4.5	_					ENG 1	ENG 2	ENG 3	ENG 4	_
01		165685	AMAG	GF7	2J2	7.8					AP	1	1	0			7.8	7.8			0

AIRCREW DATA (RECORD TYPE 7C; IF EXC CODE = F, L, OR R; RECORD TYPE 7D)

LINE	EXC	FIRST INIT	NAME	DOD ID	SPL QUAL	svc	FL	LIGHT TIN	ИΕ	INSTRI	JMENT	NIGHT TIME				LAND	INGS						AF	PPRC	ACHE	ĒS			TRA	INING CO	DDES
							FPT	CPT	SCT	ACT	SIM		Т	N	Т	N	Т	N	Т	N	Т	N	Т	N	Т	N	Т	N	1ST	2ND	3RD
1			(b)	xxxxxxxxx	А	3	7.8			3.0			6	1															2102	6111	3800
2		þ	(b) (3)	xxxxxxxxx	Р	8			7.8																				2102	6111	3800

LOGISTICS DATA (PEPART - RECORD TYPE 7E; ARRIVE - RECORD TYPE 7F)

		7	(0)						DE	LAY				CONFI	RMED PAY	LOAD		OF	PPORTUNE PAY	LOAD		CON	NFIG DATA
		?						18	т	2N	D	PRI 1	PRI 2	PRI 3	PRI 4	PRI 5				CC	DDE		
LINE	EXC CODE	TIME	TIME	DATE (JULIAN)	ICAO OR SHIP I.D.	ss	DISTANCE	CODE	HRS	CODE	HRS	PAX NO.	PAX NO.	PAX NO.	PAX NO.	PAX NO.	CARGO (LBS)	PAX NO.	CARGO (LBS)	1	2	MAX PAX	MAX CARGO (LBS)
1		Α	0830	18203	RJOI																		
		(1620	18203	YPTN	F																	

WEAPONS PROFICIENCY DATA (RECORD TYPE 7G)


LINE	EXC	6 LINE	TRAINING AREA	DATA		DELIVERY DA	TA 1		DE	LIVERY DA	TA 2		DE	LIVERY DA	TA 3		MISC	DATA 1	MISC DAT	ΓA 2
	CODE	600	TRAINING AREA	HRS	ORD 1	DEL 1	RUNS 1	SCORE 1	ORD2	DEL 2	RUNS 2	SCORE 2	ORD 3	DEL 3	RUNS 3	SCORE 3	CD 1	DATA 1	CD 2 DAT	ΓA 2

REMARKS			(NAME	/ GRAD	E / LOC	AL USE)		NATOPS	MEDICAL	INSTR	WATER	PHYSIOLOGY	A/C OR MSN CMDR SIGNATURE / GRADE
Er	Α	В	С	D	E	F	G	Н	А	В	С	D	E	(b) (2) (A)
ıclos														(b) (6)

UNCLASSIFIED - FOUO



Crew Flight Hours per Month



	FY15 Avg	FY16 Avg	FY17 Avg	FY18 Avg	FY19 Avg
F/A-18	13.3	11.8	12.9	15.0	10.0
VMFA(AW)-242	15.1	12.9	13.6	10.8	4.9
VMFA(AW)-242 % to F/A-18	14%	9%	6%	-28%	-51%

VMFA(AW)-242 CREW PROFICIENCY PILOT / WSO

Event Proficiency VMFA (AW)-242 - FA-18D Pilot

12/13/2018 1628 UTC+09:00

Days Until Expired:	>= 90 days	60-89 Days	30-59 Day	< 3	0 Days	Eymon		
			Familiarization	(FAM(2))		Air	-to-Surface (AS	(2))
		2001	2002	2101	2102	2003	2004	2005
Permanent								
b) (6), (b) (7	()(C)	No Refly	No Relly	1001003	01/05/19	No Redy	No Refly	No Relly
		No Retly	No Retty	03/01/19	01/01/19	No Retty	No Retty	No Refly
		No Redy	No Refy	02/27/19	01/13/19	No Reay	No Refly	No Rety
		No Refly	No Refly		01/04/19	No Rety	No Relly	No Retly
		No Refly	No Relly	03/12/19	01/04/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly
		No Refly	No Reay	02/14/19	12/30/18	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
				03/12/19	01/13/19			
		No Refly	No Refly		01/04/19	No Relly	No Rolly	No Redy
		No Refly	No Relly	02/05/19	12/29/18	No Resy	No Refly	
		No Retly	No Retly	02/28/19	12/31/18	No Reby	No Refy	No Refly
(b) (3) (A), ((b) (6)	No Refly	No Rely	03/12/19	01/05/19	No Refly	No Reay	No Refly
		No Refly	No Relly	03/12/19	12/21/18	No Refly	No Refly	
		No Refly	No Refly	01/10/19	01/04/19	No Refly	No Relly	No Reby
		No Refly	No Resty	02/01/19	12/28/18	No Redy	No Refly	No Rety
b) (3) (A), (b	0)	No Refly	No Refly	02/01/19	1200110	No Relly	No Refly	No Relly
6)		No Relly	No Refly	01/11/19	01/05/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Fally
0)		No Relly	No Rety	02/01/19	01/05/19	No Retly	No Rely	No Rely

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			Air	-to-Surface (AS	(2))		
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Permanent							
b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Relly	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	No Refe
	No Refly	No Retly	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	No Res
	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	No Roby	No Refly	No Refly	No Refe
	No Refly	No Refly	No Retly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Red
	No Relly	No Relly	No Rety	No Rely	No Refly	No Refly	No Ret
	No Refly	No Refly	No Rely	No Rolly	No Refly	No Refly	No Rell
			No Refly	No Refly			
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refy	No Refly	No Res
(A) (A) (b) (C)	No Relly	No Reby	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Rety	No Refi
o) (3) (A), (b) (6)			No Retty	No Refly		1	
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Ref
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Rell
) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Relly	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	No Rafy	No Refly	No Ref
(1)(0), (3) (1)(0)	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Rety	No Refly	No Refi
	No Rafy	No Reby	No Refly	No Refly	No Rety	No Refly	No Ref

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			Air	-to-Surface (AS	(2))		
	2013	2014	2015	2301	2302	2303	2304
Permanent							
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Refly	No Relly	No Retly	No Refly	No Refly	0071012	3860/13
	No Relly	No Reity	No Retiy	No Refly	No Refy	12/13/18	01/23/19
	No Refly	No Rely	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	180019	01/23/19
	No Relly	No Relly	No Retty	No Relly	No Refly	1800805	
	No Refly	No Refy	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	05/06/19	330301
	No Relly	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	02/26/19	12/21/18
				No Refly	No Refly		
	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refy	No Relly	24/04/18	30.281
				No Refly	No Relly		
	No Refly	No Redy	No Reby	No Relly	No Refly	05/16/19	1900011
	No Rolly	No Relly	No Retly	No Refly	No Reby	02/25/19	02/25/19
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)				No Refly	No Refly	02/27/19	03/27/19
	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	80,08/17	78041
	No Redy	No Rolly	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	12/13/18	02/26/19
b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Refly	No Rety	No Rety	No Refly	No Raffy	- Aritalia	03/12/19
	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	MILETS	28119115
	No Rolly	No Refly	No Retly	No Redy	No Refly	21/10/18	03/27/19

			Air-to-Surf	face (AS(2))			Night Systems (NS (2))
	2305	2306	2307	2308	2309	2310	2016
Permanent							
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	PERMIT	04/2015	No Relly	No Refly	MISSIN	No Rolly	No Relly
	121212	05/10/20	No Refly	No Reay	06/15/19	No Refly	No Refly
	Reduks	05/10/20	No Refy	No Refly		No Rely	No Refly
	121318	02/06/20	No Relly	No Refly		No Refly	No Refly
	121211	05/28/20	No Rety	No Refly	06/19/19	No Refly	No Refly
	01/17/19	05/10/19	No Relly	No Refly	07/21/19	No Refly	No Refly
	TIMELIT	02/01/20	No Refly	No Refly		No Refly	No Relly
			No Refly				
	美国建筑工 员	03/17/19	No Retly	No Refly		No Refly	No Refly
b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	1 121208	02/22/28	No Rafy	No Refly		No Refly	No Rody
b) (b) (i t), (b) (b)	03/27/19	03/21/20	No Refy	No Redy	06/19/19	No Refy	
	161416	05/28/20	No Refly	No Refly	05/17/19	No Refly	No Redy
	12/13/18	05/14/20	No Rely	No Refly		No Refly	No Refly
b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	12011116	02/20/20	No Refly	No Refly	08/15/19	No Refly	No Refly
	963316		No Refly	No Relly	06/19/19	No Refly	No Refly
	DATESTAS	03/21/20	No Rety	No Refly	WEREN !	No Refly	No Redy

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		Nig	ht Systems (NS	5(2))		Air-to-A	ir (AA(2))
	2401	2402	2403	2404	2405	2017	2018
Permanent							
b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Refly	05/20/19	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	No Rety	No Rely
	Na Refly	05/20/19	No Refly	No Relly	No Retly	No Retly	No Refly
	No Refly	05/19/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Rolly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Refly	02/25/19	No Refly	No Relly	No Resy	No Refly	No Rety
	No Refly	05/27/19	No Retty	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Relly	05/14/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	No Refy
	No Refly	05/14/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	No Rolly	No Relly
o) (3) (A), (b) (6)	No Refly	SECOND .	No Retly	No Refly	No Retly	No Refly	No Refly
(3) (A) , (b) (0)	No Refly	04/05/19	No Relly	No Relly	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly
	No Refly	03/27/19	No Refly				
	No Refly	04/24/19	No Retly	No Refly	No Reny	No Refly	No Relly
	No Relly	05/27/19	No Refly	No Resy	No Rolly	No Refly	No Refly
o) (3) (A), (b)	No Rely	04/92/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly
(a) (b) (b) (b)	No Resy	05/20/19	No Refly	No Relly	No Rely	No Refly	No Refy
7	No Retly	05/01/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Raby	No Rely

			1	Air-to-Air (AA(2))		
	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Permanent							
b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Refly	No Refly	No Rely	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Retly	No Refly
	No Refly	No Retry	No Reily	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refy	No Real
	No Refly	No Refly	No Rety	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refl
	No Relly	No Relly	No Rety	No Relly	No Relly	No Refly	No Refe
	No Refly	No Relly	No Resy	No Redy	No Refly	No Refly	No Reth
o) (3) (A), (b) (6)	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refl
	No Refly	No Refly	No Resy	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly	No Reil
	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Rety
	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	No Relly	No Redy	No Refly
	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	No Relly	No Rety	No Refly	No Refr
	No Refy	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Rety	No Refly	No Ref

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
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			9	Air-to-Air (AA(2))		
	2026	2027	2028	2029	2501	2502	2503
Permanent							
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Refly	No Rely	No Relly	No Refly	01/09/19	05/30/19	10/30/13
	No Relly	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	05/30/19	05/17/19	02/16/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Retly	No Refly	05/17/19	05/17/19	02/16/19
	No Relly	No Relly	No Resy	No Relly			
	No Relly	No Refly	No Ristly	No Refly			45.4704
	No Refly	No Relly	No Relly	No Resy	19/04/19	19:2414	17778 F
	No Relly	No Refy	No Relly	No Reby	Medite	(6/30/17	19869
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	8848/F	12/217	02/77/18
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	No Relly	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly			
					12/30/18		10/38/21
	No Relly	No Refly	No Reby	No Refly	110103	03/11/19	01/27/19
	No Refly	No Rody	No Refly	No Relly	F8(38 H4)		
b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	No Resy	10000011		
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	6014/18		
	No Rety	No Rely	No Retly	No Refly	12/20/18	12/20/18	100/23/11

			Air-to-A	ir (AA(2))			Low Altitude Training (LAT (2))
	2504	2505	2506	2507	2508	2509	2030
ermanent							
b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	08/01/19	No Relly	No Relly	No Refly	983011	No Relly	No Relly
	08/01/19	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly	12012018	No Refly	No Refly
	4505014-8	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	0500018	No Relly	No Refly
	21/12/15	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	11.5(1).12	No Refly	No Refly
	93/23/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	34(59)18	No Refly	No Refly
	03/23/19	No Relly	No Refly	No Retly	12/22/18	No Refly	No Refly
	08/03/19	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly	01/30/19	No Refly	No Refly
							No Refly
	001(6)18	No Refly	No Relly	No Relly	75/2016	No Refly	No Refly
a) (2) (A) (b) (6)	08/01/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	07113118	No Refly	No Refly:
o) (3) (A), (b) (6)	08/01/19	No Refly	No Rety	No Refly			No Refly
	10/27/19	No Rally	No Refly	No Refly	910447	No Refly	No Refly
	08/03/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Rully	07700016	No Reby	No Refly
	02/19/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	01/29/19	No Refly	No Rely
	02/16/19	No Refly	No Refy	No Refly	001010	No Refly	No-Rely
	02/16/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Reby	12/23/18	No Refly	No Refly

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			Low Altitude T	raining (LAT(2)			Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR(2))
	2031	2032	2033	2601	2602	2603	2201
Permanent							
b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Resy	No Rely	No Refly	No Rely	No Refly	1000012	19/19/12
	No Resty	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	07/27/19	11/21/19
	No Refly	No Relly	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly	07/27/19	10/08/19
	No Relly	No Resy	No Relly	No Refly			03/03/19
	No Refly	No Relly	No Retly	No Refly	No Refly		09/24/19
	No Redy	No Resy	No Rely	No Relly	No Relly	327,017	03/18/19
	No Relly	No Redy	No Refly	No Rolly	No Refly	0000011	08/10/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly				
	No Refly	No Refly	No Rely	No Relly	No Rely		
	No Relly	No Refy	No Refy	No Resy			10/07/19
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	No Retly	No Rolly	No Refly	No Refly			07/31/19
	No Rely	No Rely	No Relly	No Redy	No Retly	01/27/19	10/12/19
	No Refly	No Relly	No Relly	No Relly			11/21/19
b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Relly	No Refly	No Refly	No Redy			10/14/19
	No Relly	No Relly	No Relly	No Refy	No Relly		09/23/19
	No Refly	No Relly	No Retty	No Relly	No Relly		68/13/19



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Event Proficiency VMFA (AW)-242 - FA-18D Pilot

12/13/2018 1630 UTC+09:00


			Close	Close Air Support (CAS (3))	AS (3))		
	3001	3002	3003	3004	3005	3101	3102
Permanent							
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	02/27/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	03/01/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	02/10/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Roffy	No Refly	02/02/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refy	No Refly	No Refly	61/10/20
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	02/10/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Raffy	No Refly	81/10/00
	No Roffy	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Rofty		
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Roffy	No Relly	02/08/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	8112720
(h) (3) (A) (h) (6)	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Roffy	No Refly	02/09/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	81/12/20
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refy	No Refly	No Refly	No Rosy	03/02/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	61/10/20
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	02/07/19
					ALCO ALCO ALCO ALCO ALCO ALCO ALCO ALCO	No. of the last	Oriconea

		Close Air Sup	Close Air Support (CAS (3))		Offensive A	Offensive Anti-Air Warfare (OAAW(3))	(OAAW(3))
	3103	3104	3105	3106	3006	3007	3008
Permanent							
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	10/05/19	02/05/19	25,86,01	01/23/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	61/15/20	01/27/19	03/29/19	01/09/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	04/24/19			\$1,8003	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	61/50/01	04/03/19	04/11/19	01/09/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	61/82/80	02/24/19	11/22/19	63,0250	No Refly	No Rofly	No Refly
	61/10/80	01/28/19	08/02/18	01/29/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	61/50/01	04/03/19	11/07/19		No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	83,00014				No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	61/90/90	01/22/19		02/05/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Rofy
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	10/24/19	04/22/18			No Refly	No Refly	No Rofty
	11/02/19	05/01/19	11/02/19	61/10/50	No Refly	No Rofty	No Refly
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	08/01/19	02/05/19	01/12/19	02/06/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	61/10/80	01/28/19	11/21/19	02/05/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	11/02/19	05/01/19	11/02/19	05/01/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly

		Offensive A	Anti-Air Warfare	(OAAW(3))		Suppression Defenses	of Enemy Ai (SEAD(3))
	3009	3601	3602	3603	3604	3010	3011
Permanent							
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Reily	No Refly	08/07/19	02/03/19	08/07/19	No Relly	No Refly
	No Refly	No Refly	D8/17/19	12/11/19	11/21/19	No Refly	No Relly
	No Refly	No Refly	08/03/19	01/30/19	68/10/19	No Rety	No Reby
	No Refly	No Refy	08/08/19	05/31/19	08/10/19	No Refly	No Rety
	No Relly	No Refly	04/12/19	05/31/19	04/12/19	No Roby	No Refly
	No Refly	No Refly	38/15/18	n5/31/19	(E/E/E	No Refly	No Reby
						*	
	No Refly	No Refy		02/03/19	08/07/19	No Refly	No Rolly
	No Refly	No Refy	Section 5	281846	Marent	No Refly	No Relly
	No Refly	No Refly	02/21/19	01/30/19	08/03/19	No Relly	No Relly
(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)							
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	No Resy	No Refly	03/02/19	1,51,021,5		No Refly	No Relly
	No Refly	No Refly	08/15/19	01/28/19	08/15/19	No Refly	No Relly
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Relly	No Redy	04/13/19	02/03/19	02/07/19	No Refly	No Reby
	No Refly	No Refly	06/14/19	05/31/19	08/07/19	No Resy	No Relly.
	No Redy	No Redy		D5/31/19		No Relly	No Redy


		3	Suppression of	Enemy Air Def	enses (SEAD(3)))	
	3012	3013	3014	3015	3016	3501	3502
Permanent							
b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	980912	11/21/19
	No Rely	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Rely	03/02/19	11/21/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	No Relly	2111216	11/17/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	BERRITE	03/07/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	06/23/19	03/09/19
	No Refly	No Refy	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	98/04/19	10/24/15
	No Refly	No Refly	No Rety	No Refly	No Rely	Contra .	03/07/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	12/20/18	163871
	No Refly	Ne Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Rolly		10/24/18
b) (3) (A) (b) (6)							
b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	No Refly	No Refly	No Resy	No Refly	No Belly	MODERNIA	2311111
(0) (1) (7) (0)	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	No Refly	11/21/19	11/21/19
b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Rety	No Rolly	10/24/19	11/28/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Relly	No Rety	03/02/19	10/24/19
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refy	No Relly	No Refly	12/14/18	10/24/19

- ,	Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD(3))			Air Interdi	Air Interdiction (AI(3))		
	3503	3017	3018	3019	3020	3701	3702
Permanent							
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	11/21/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refy	No Refly	08/29/19	08/29/19
	11/21/19	No Refly	No Resy	No Refy	No Refly	05/04/19	61/91/60
	11/17/18	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	08/30/19	02/25/19
	03/07/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	61/21/20	05/09/19
	61/60/20	No Refly	No Roffy	No Refly	No Rofty	06/23/19	61/32/20
	8138286	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly		
	03/07/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	06/27/19	02/27/19
	814090	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly		
	03/09/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	03/28/19	03/28/19
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	021010	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly		
	11/21/19	No Relly	No Refly	No Refy	No Rofy	10/12/19	61/05/80
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	03/07/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	08/29/19	61/62/90
	04/18/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	08/08/19	02/27/19
	03/09/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	05/05/19	



	Active Air De	Active Air Defense (AAD(3))		Forward Air Co	Forward Air Controler - Airbome (FAC(A)(3))	me (FAC(A)(3))	
	3404	3405	3022	3023	3024	3025	3026
Permanent							
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	05/101/19	02/18/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Rolly	No Refly
	05/01/19	02/19/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	61/02/20	02/20/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	61/10/50	02/20/19					
	61/90/20	02/18/19	No Rofty	No Resy	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	61/01/10	05/14/19					
	61/22/10	05/14/19					
	61/10/50	11000					
	05/01/19	02/20/19					
(b) (3) (A), (b)							
(6)	11/2011						
	01/28/19	02/19/19					
b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	01/28/19	02/19/19					
	01/28/19	02/20/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	Calculation	2000000			10.00	1	

	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		(b) (3) (A), (b) (b)	(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)						(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Permanent		
No Refly							No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly		3027	
No Refly							No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly		3028	
No Refly							No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly		3029	Forward Air C
No Refly							No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Rofty		3030	Forward Air Controler - Airbome (FAC(A)(3))
No Refly							No Refly	No Refly	No Refy	No Refly		3031	me (FAC(A)(3))
No Refly							No Rofty	No Refly	No Refly	No Rofty		3032	-
No Refly							No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly		3033	



Enclosure 26

		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		(b) (3) (A), (b) (b)	(F) (S) (A) (F) (C)					(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Permanent		
No Ban	No Refly								No Refly			3806	
0.000000	05/02/19								61/06/90			3807	
	81,520,10								01/09/19			3808	Forward Air C
סויכחוכת	10/27/19								12/18/19			3809	Forward Air Controler - Airbome (FAC(A)(3))
Distriction	90,6200								01/13/19			3810	me (FAC(A)(3))
No Decu	No Refly	No Relly							No Refly			3811	
0.0000	312211								07/13/19			3812	

	Tactical Air Coordination - Airbome (TAC(A)(3))	ordination - AC(A)(3))		Armend	Armend Reconnaissance (AR(3))	e (AR(3))	
	3046	3901	3047	3048	3201	3202	3203
Permanent							
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Refly		No Refly	No Refly	05/15/19	81/10//11	215120
	No Refly		No Refly	No Refly	05/17/19	07/13/19	02/06/19
	No Refly		No Refly	No Refly	04/22/19	04/29/19	6,000,00
			No Refly	No Refly	06/03/19	12/05/19	
	No Refly		No Rety	No Refly	04/30/19	10/04/19	
			No Refly	No Refly	04/24/19	06/24/19	12/22/18
			No Refly	No Refly	06/03/19	12/05/19	8115980
			No Refly	No Refly	05/27/19	12/23/18	84,000,000
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)			No Refly	No Refly		61/51/90	
					05/27/19	10/04/19	
			No Refly	No Refly	04/18/19	61/02/01	61/81/70
			No Refly	No Refly	61/81/90	10/20/19	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)			No Refly	No Refly	04/30/19	03/24/19	61/20/10
	No Refly		No Refly	No Refly	04/02/19	10/04/19	01/08/19
	No Refly		No Refly	No Refly	04/16/19	10/18/18	

Enclosure 26

	Strike, Cool Reconnaissa		Expeditionary Shore-Based Operations (EXP(3))
	3301	3302	3800
Permanent			
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Magang	(Br 8 12	09/24/19
	05/17/19	07/11/119	09/19/19
	169518		08/31/19
	06/03/19	03/27/19	09/01/15
	04/30/19	03/27/19	11/22/19
	04/24/19	05/25/19	06/25/19
	03/03/19	02/02/19	09/01/19
			09/13/19
	05/27/119		12077118
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	98 197 F	03/29/19	12/06/19
(b) (b) (h), (b) (d)	05/27/19		08/31/19
	01/07/19	10/20/19	08/10/19
	98/04/16	115148	09/06/19
	04/30/19	03/27/19	09/13/19
	-ENTITIE	07/12/19	09/23/19
	04/16/19	03/29/19	09/26/19

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Event Proficiency VMFA (AW)-242 - FA-18D Pilot 12/13/2018 1631 UTC+09:00

			NATOPS (NTPS(6))	(NTPS(6))		Instrum	Instrument Evaluation (INST(6))	INST(6))
		6101	6801	6802	6803	6102	6804	6805
Permanent								
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	7)(C)	61/10/20	21110180	200000	200,000	61/10/11		
	//-//	08/01/19		84710162	801,610	03/01/19	81/16/20	3111060
		04/01/19				04/01/19	3115960	311000
		studing				11/01/19		100000
		61/10/90		260103	831(0)30	06/01/19	8,11890	\$11000
		61/10/60				81/10/60	09/01/19	61/10/60
		02/01/19				02/01/19		
		02/01/19				02/01/19		
(4) (5) (4)	F) (E)	61/10/90				07/01/19		
(n) (a) (A), (n) (o)	ע) (ט)	11/01/19						
		61/10/10	01/01/19	61/10/10	01/01/19	1200000	01/01/19	61/10/10
		61/10/50				61/10/50		
		61/10/90				07/01/19		
		61/10/11						
		61/10/90		811080		02/01/19		

	To To	Requ	uirements, Qua	lifications, & D	Requirements, Qualifications, & Designations (RQD(8))	D(6))	
	6103	6104	6105	6106	6107	6108	6109
Permanent	T A						
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	11,2148	1998001					Company
	02/16/19			No Refly	No Refly		04/11/20
	01/81/20		08/28/19		No Refly		STATE NO.
							02/22/10
							03/22/20
	10000	12/22/18		No Refly	No Rolly	No Refly	61/71/80
							02/81/10
					0		01/27/19
							04/04/20
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)							02/22/10
	01/24/19			No Refly	No Refly		04/09/20
							01/30/20
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)							
							03/21/20
		02/26/19					02/09/20

Enclosure 26

	Requirements, Qualifications, & Designations (RQD(6))	ments, itions, & ns (RQD(6))		Qu	Qualification (QUAL(6))	-(6))	
	6110	6111	6201	6202	6203	6204	6205
Permanent							
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	2345000	03/22/20			No Refly	No Refly	
	10/30/20	04/11/20			No Refly		
	10125114	04/05/20			No Refly		
	05/20/21	021727120	No Refly	No Roby			
	04/02/21	02/22/20	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly		200000
	06/13/21	09/14/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly		01/11/20
		01/18/20			No Refly		
		01/27/19			No Refly		
(b) (3) (A) (b) (6)		04/04/20					
		01/27/20					
		04/707/19	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly		
		01/30/20					
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		04/11/20					
	05/14/21	03/21/20			No Refly		
		02/09/20			No Refly		

		Qual	Qualification (QUAL(6))	L(6))		Section Leader (SL(6))	ider (SL(6))
	6206	6207	6208	6209	6210	6301	6302
Permanent							
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Refly			No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Refly	No Refly		No Refly	No Refy	No Refy	No Refly
	No Refly			No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Refly			No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Refly			No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Rony			No Refly	No Rolly	No Refly	No Rolly
				No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
				No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)				No Refly	No Refly		
				No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
				No Refly			
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)				No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Refly	No Refly		No Refly	No Refly	No Refy	No Refly
		No Refly		No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly

Permanent (b) (6), (b) (7) (C) No Reily No Rei

	Sec	Section Leader (SL(6))	L(6))	Section L Standaradiz	Section Leader-Flight Leadership Standaradization Evaluator (SL FLSE(6)	adership (SL FLSE(6)	Division Leader (DL (6))
	6313	6314	6315	6304	6306	6310	6401
Permanent							
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Rosy	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Rosy	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Raffy	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refy	No Refly	No Refly
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refy	No Refly	No Refly
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)							
	No Refly		No Refly		No Refly	No Refly	
					No Refly		
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Refly	No Refly			No Refly	No Refly	
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refy	No Rofly	No Refly
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly

No Refly No Refly	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	No Refly	(b) (3) (b) (b) (6)			No Refly No Refly	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) No Refly No Refly	Permanent	6402 6403	Division				
No Refly						No Refly		6405	Division Leader (DL(6))					
No Reay		No Refly				No Rony		No Rolly	No Refly	No Refly	No Refly		6406	L(6))
No Refly						No Refly		6407						
No Refly						No Refly	No Resy		6404	Division Leader-Flight Leadership Standaradizat ion Evaluator (DL FLSE(6)				
Ma Dani									No Refly	No Refly			6501	Mission Commander (MC(6))

	Mission Commander (MC(6))	nander (MC(6))	Weapons S	Weapons School Graduate Instructor (INSTR(6))	Instructor	Specific Weapons Delivery - Surface (SSWD(6))	ons Delivery - SSWD(6))
	6502	6503	6601	6602	6603	6701	6702
Permanent							
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)				No Refly		02/28/19	
	No Refly	No Refly				911/21/16	
	No Refly	No Refly	No Refy		No Refly	\$1,92(5)	
	No Refly					61/2/190	
						44,64,80	
						01/29/19	
						8,150,190	
						02/28/19	
						\$1,53490	
						87/07/83	
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)						02/27/19	
						04/22/19	
						0.032000	
(b) (a) (b) (7)(c)						\$6,91,80	
						02/25/19	
	No Refly	No Rafly				20,000,00	

Event Proficiency VMFA (AW)-242 - FA-18D Pilot 01/28/2019 0826 UTC+09:00

Days Until Expired:	>= 90 days	60-89 Days	30-59 Days	< 30 Days	Expired
		Air-to-Air Refue	ling (AAR(2))		
		2201	2202		
Permanent					
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		10/19/12	10/19/12		
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		11/21/19	10/14/19		
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		10/08/19	10/08/19		
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		08/08/19	03/13/16		
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		09/24/19	09/24/19		
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		03/18/19	03/18/19		
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)					
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		08/10/19	08/10/19		
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)					
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		07/31/18	07/31/18		
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		10/07/19	10/07/19		
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		07/31/19			
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		10/12/19	10/12/19		
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)		11/21/19	08/03/19		
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		10/14/19	10/14/19		
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		09/23/19	09/23/19		
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		08/13/19	08/13/19		

VMFA (AW) -242 HOTBOARD (30/60/90)

VMFA (AW)-242 - FA-18D Pilot 30 60 90

Report run on 12/13/2018 1539 UTC+09:00

	LAST FLIGHT	TFT30	ТРТ30	TFT45	TPT45	TFT60	ТРТ60	TFT90	ТРТ90	FYTFT	LAST ACMDR	LAST NVG	LAST NIGHT	CURRENT MONTH TFT	LAST MONTH TFT	LAST 30 NVG	LAST LLL	TOTAL 30 NIGHT	LAST FCF	TOTAL 180 INST	TOTAL 365 INST	TOTAL 180	TOTAL 365 APP
Permanent										7													-
(b) (6), (b) (3) (A)	12/05/18	8.5	8.8	111.6	27.1	THE.	011	31.4	29.6	14.9	12/05/18	08/21/18	12/05/18	3.4	7.7	0		0.8	SI - ST	9	9.4	5	6
(=) (=); (=) (=)	12/01/18	10.2	10.2	10.9	10.3	- 10.9	10.9	2019	\$7.3	18.5	12/01/18	08/22/18	08/22/18	1.3	9.6	0		0		10.3	32.1	5	22 [
	12/03/18	8.1	2.1	3.5	9,5	4.5	88	16.4	18.2	16.6	12/03/18	11/19/18	11/19/18	1.1	7.6	1.2		1.2		13.1	14.3	14	18
	12/04/18	5.3		7	100	1	17	188	16	8.6	12/04/18	08/23/18	08/23/18	1.2	5.8	0		0		12.8	35.8	14	31
	12/04/18	8.8			10.1					11.4	12/04/18	12/04/18	12/04/18	1.9	7.3	1.9		3.3		8.7	25.3	2	14
	11/29/18	4.5			72		132			8.3	11/29/18	11/14/18	11/14/18	0	6.5	1.5		1.5		3.4	3.4	3	3
	11/27/18	1.8			2.0					1.4	11/27/18			0	1.4	0		0		0.5	0.5	0	0
	12/04/18	33								10.6	12/04/18	11/14/18	11/14/18	1.1	5.7	1.5		1.5		12	28.4	9	23
	11/29/18	129				2.5		4.5		2.8	11/29/18		10/23/17	0	2.8	0		0		0	0.4	0	0
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)	11/30/18	- 4,31				- 6.7		4.8		4.3	11/30/18	12/06/17	12/06/17	0	4.3	0		0		0	0.8	0	0
(b) (c) (; t); (b) (c)	12/05/18	1.58					2.1			14	12/05/18	08/23/18	12/05/18	3.4	2.2	0		0.8		11.2	22.7	0	19
	11/20/18	1.3						10.2		8	11/20/18	08/16/18	08/16/18	0	2.9	0		0		6.5	8.8	8	9
	12/04/18	3.5								3.5	12/04/18	12/04/18	12/04/18	2	1.5	2		2		2.9	2.9	2	2
	11/27/18	3.5			-					13.1	11/27/18	11/27/18	11/27/18	0	8.2	1.5		1.5		9.8	17.6	2	12
((b) (3) (A),3) (A)	11/27/18	14	7.8			335		12.1		10.8	11/27/18	08/22/18	08/22/18	0	2.1	0		0		15.7	27.1	4	19
k(b) (6)	12/06/18	5.3	8.8		5.5		5.8		125.	8.3	12/06/18	12/06/18	12/06/18	2	3.9	2	-	2		17.5	38.1	11	29
US) (S)	12/06/18	4.8				154	18.8	33	33	19.2	12/06/18	12/06/18	12/06/18	2.9	7.1	2.9		2.9		7.4	30.7	2	18

TPT hours in last 30 Days	:= 15	14.9 - 10	< 10
TPT hours in last 45 Days	- 22°E	22.4 - 14.9	14 14 A
TPT hours in last 60 Days	- 70	29.9 - 19	~ 18
TPT hours in last 90 Days	±-61	59.9 - 30	= 30

(b) (3) (A)

VMFA (AW)-242 - FA-18D WSO 30 60 90

Report run on 12/13/2018 1544 UTC+09:00

	LAST FLIGHT	TFT30	SCT30	TFT45	SCT45	TFT60	SCT60	TFT90	SCT90	FYTFT	LAST ACMDR	LAST NVG	LAST NIGHT	CURRENT MONTH TFT	LAST MONTH TFT	LAST 30 NVG	LAST LLL	TOTAL 30 NIGHT	LAST FCF	TOTAL 180 INST	TOTAL 365 INST	TOTAL 180	TOTAL 365
Permanent				N E																		200	1 -9
b) (6), (b) (3) (A)	12/03/18	4.7		15	15	18	18	24.5	24.5	22.1		11/01/18	11/01/18	1.1	9.3	0	01/18/07	0		0	0	0	0 8
	11/20/18	28	2.6	0.1	4.5	11.2		8/9	9.0	7.6		11/14/18	11/14/18	0	4.1	1.5	02/06/07	1.5		0	0	0	0 [1
		1.8.			0		7	7	(0)	0				0	0	0		0		0	0	0	0
	12/05/18	12.7	12.7			13.6	18.6	75.9	-36.1	17.4		12/04/18	12/05/18	5.4	7.3	2		2.8		0	0	0	0
	11/19/18	2.8	2.9	4.4	1.4	9.0	6.6	4.4	4.6	4.4		08/23/18	08/23/18	0	3.2	0		0		0	0	0	0
	11/29/18		4.5			81		16.3	16.3	13.6		08/07/18	08/07/18	0	5.3	0		0		0	0	0	0
	11/30/18	6.8	8.5			6.9	8.0	718	117	11.1		11/27/18	11/27/18	0	6.9	1.5		1.5		0	0	0	0
	12/04/18		6.3			10.5	10.5	74.1	14.7	11.9		11/14/18	11/14/18	1.2	9.3	1.5		1,5		0	0.1	0	0
	11/30/18	11.8	11.8	31.6	11.8	323	15.8	23	23	21.9		08/23/18	08/23/18	0	11.8	0		0		0	0.1	0	0
	12/06/18	10	10	12.5	12.3	12.3		124		12.3		12/06/18	12/06/18	4.4	7.9	2		3.4		0	0.2	0	0
	12/06/18	0.6	9.8		100.4	-10.4		22.9	22.2	13.1		12/06/18	12/06/18	2.9	7.5	2.9		2.9		0	0.1	0	0
	12/05/18	59				3.2		32.5		13.8		12/04/18	12/05/18	5.3	3.9	1.9		2.7		0	0	0	0
	11/29/18	3.8	1.0	8.8	Tid	-79	3.0	12.0	17.9	6.3		08/23/18	08/23/18	0	3,9	0		0		0	0	0	0
	04/27/18		8	T	0	- D.	- 0	6		0		03/28/18	03/28/18	0	0	0		0		0	0	0	0
	12/10/18	14.9	14.9	24.5	725	25.6	356	546	10.00	45		11/28/18	11/28/18	6.4	18.2	2.9		2.9		0	0.5	0	0

TPT hours in last 30 Days	>= 15	14.9 - 10	< 10
TPT hours in last 45 Days	>= 22.5	22.4 - 14.9	< 14.9
TPT hours in last 60 Days	>= 30.	29.9 - 19	< 10
TPT hours in last 90 Days	±= 60	59.9 - 30	5.83

VMFA (AW) -242 SCHEDULES



1701

1800

0630-2300

SDC:

DNCO:

ADNCO:

Sunrise:

EENT:

Airfield Hours:

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS


MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242

Marine Aircraft Group 12

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan

1st Marine Aircraft Wing MARFORPAC Unit 37310 FPO-AP 96310-7310

POWER PLANT





QUARTERLY SORTIES/HRS: 404 / 566.4 98 / 149.0

FY SORTIES/HRS: 2105 / 2842.9

98 / 149.0

Schedule Written By

FLIGHT EVENTS: No Flight Events

	F 22 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	REQUIRED ORDNANCE:
FLIGHT NOTES:	GENERAL NOTES:	negoties distributed
NO FLIGHT NOTES	1. 1000 SHOWTIME FOR DAY FLIGHT CREW.	NO ORDNANCE NOTES
	2, 1900 NIGHT MAINTENANCE MEETING.	





0700

1702

1800

24 Hours

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242

Marine Aircraft Group 12

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan 1st Marine Aircraft Wing MARFORPAC

Unit 37310 FPO-AP 96310-7310

Monday, December 3, 2018 (18337)

THIS FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS ALL DOMESTIC TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED IAW MCO 3800.2B



TYPE ACFT: F/A-18

DAILY SORTIES/HOURS SCHED: 6/12.6

PROJECTED MONTHLY SORTIES/HRS: 148 / 171.6

QUARTERLY SORTIES/HRS: 404 / 566.4 FY SORTIES/HRS: 2105 / 2842.9

Schedule Written By:

61 / 78.5

98 / 149.0

98 / 149.0

FLOWN AS OF 29 NOV

Enclosure 29

FLIGHT	EVENTS:

						PEIGHT EVENTS.	1	abea.	FLIGHT PLAN	CHE	TAC	Priority	ORD	NOTES
VT	C/S	BRF /ETD/ ETA	ICAO		· <u>CREW</u>	MISSION	TMR	AREA	FLIGHT PLAN	PUEL	IAL	PHOTEY	- toron	HOTES
1-1 1-2	Profane 01 Profane 02	0545/0745/1015	RJOI/RJOI	*	,	3704 3704	1A7	ITRA S (0745-0915)	JOI-2	HP HP	17	1 2	ABCDE!	1
2-1	Ivan 11	0545/0800/0935	RJOI/RJOI			2102	2K4	ITRA 5 (0745-0915)	JOI-2	T	17	3	ABCDGI	2
3-1 3-2	Profane 21 Profane 22	0545/1130/1345	RJOI/RJOI	*	<u>©</u> (9)	3704 3704	1A7	ITRA S (1130-1315)	JOI-2	T T	17	1 2	ABCDFI ABCDFI	1
4-1	Ivan 31	0545/1130/1300	RJOI/RJOI		0 0	2102	2K4	ITRA S (1130-1315)	JOI-2	T	17	3	ABCDHI	3

* SECTION LEAD ** DIVISION LEAD @ ACUI # MISSION COMMANDER + BRIEFING OFFICER \$ INSTRUCTOR % CMMR

FLIGHT NOTES:

Sunrise:

Sunset:

EENT:

Airfield Hours:

- 1. ARCT PROVIDED BY SUMO. POC SUMO READY ROOM DSN 255-2152
- 2. PROVIDE TURNING SPARE FOR EVENT ONE. LAUNCH NO EARLIER THEN 0800.

SDO:

SDC:

DNCO:

ADNCO:

3. PROVIDE AIRBORNE SPARE FOR EVENT THREE.

GENERAL NOTES:

- 1. 0700 MAINTENANCE MEETING.
- 2. 0715 FOD WALK.
- 3. 0730-0740 NOISE ABATEMENT. STRAIGHT IN APPROACHES ONLY.
- 4. 0910-0930 QUIET HOURS. NO TURNING AIRCRAFT.
- 5. 1115-1125 NOISE ABATEMENT. STRAIGHT IN APPROACHES ONLY
- 6. 1900 NIGHT CREW MAINTENANCE MEETING.

REQUIRED ORDNANCE:

- A 2 X TANKS
- B-LPOD
- C CATM-9X D - CATM-120
- E LAU-118 / SIM JDAM
- F AGM-88C / SIM JDAM
- G LAU-118
- H- AGM-88E
- 1 30 CHAFF/30 FLARES





UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242

Marine Aircraft Group 12

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan 1st Marine Aircraft Wing MARFORPAC

Monday, December 3, 2018 (18337) Unit-37310 FPO-AP 96310-7310

ALL DOMESTIC TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED IAW MCO 3800.2B THIS FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS



Enclosure 29

FY SORTIES/HRS:			
QUARTERLY SORTIES/HRS:	POWER PLANT	(b) (A) (6)	ADNCO
MONTHLY SORTIES/HRS:	SUBJECT OF THE WEEK:		DNCO:
DAILY SORTIES/HOURS SCHED:	(a) (b) (b) (c) (c) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d	3) (b)	SDC:
TYPE ACFT:	ODO:		SDO:

2105 / 2842.9 404 / 566.4

Schedule Written By 98 / 149.0 98 / 149.0 61 / 78.5 FLOWN AS OF 29 NOV

PROJECTED 148 / 171.6 F/A-18 8/17.5

EENT: Sunset: Sunrise:

1702

Airfield Hours:

24 Hours 1800

Ivan 32	Ivan 31	Profane 22	Profane 21	Profane 04	Profane 03	Profane 02	Profane OT	2	<u>5/5</u>	
The street of th	0545/1120/1300		0545/1130/1345				0545/0/50/1015	2001/0350/3030	BRF /ETD/ ETA	
To the second	RJOI/RJOI		RJOI/RJOI				NOI/NOI	חומו לוחומו	ICAO	
	*		*	%	*		1	i e		
(b (6		(3)) (A),	(1	b)		CREW	
							4	±		FLIG
2102	2102	3704	3704	3704	3704	3704	100	3704	MISSION	PLIGHT EVENTS:
	2K4		1A7				5	107	TMR	
	ITRA S (1130-1315)		ITRA S (1130-1315)				110000000000000000000000000000000000000	ITRA \$ (0745-0915)	AREA	
	JOI-2		JOI-2					101-2	FLIGHT PLAN	
T	-1	T	1	HP/HR	HP/HR	HP/HK		HP / HR	FUEL	
	18		17				-	17	TAC	
4	ω	2	1	4	N		3 1	-	Priority	
ABCDH	ABCDH	ABCDFH	ABCDFH	ABCDEH	АВСИЕН	ADCC	> 1	ABCDEH	ORD	
	12		12				10.00	12	NOTES	-

* SECTION LEAD ** DIVISION LEAD @ ACUI # MISSION COMMANDER + BRIEFING OFFICER \$ INSTRUCTOR % CMMR

FLIGHT NOTES:

PROVIDED BY SUMO. POC SUMO READY ROOM DSN 255-2152

PRNING ARE FOR EVENT 1-3.

GENERAL NOTES:
1. 0700 MAINTENANCE MEETING.
2. 0700 CUB AT MAG-12 WAR ROOM
3. 0715 FOD WALK.

ATTEMES) (

A

b)(6

6. 1115-1125 NOISE ABATEMENT. STRAIGHT IN APPROACHES ONLY.
7. 1500 CUB AT MAG-12 WAR ROOM
8. 1900 NIGHT CREW MAINTENANCE MEETING.

日等((A),(b)(6)

G - AGM-88E / GBU-32 INERT X2 H - 60 CHAFF/60 FLARES E - LAU-118 / GBU-32 INERT X2 F - AGM-88C / GBU-32 INERT X2

D - CATM-120 X2 C - CATM-9X X2 B-LPOD

REQUIRED ORDNANCE: A - 2 X TANKS

5. 0910-0930 QUIET HOURS. NO TURNING AIRCRAFT. 4. 0730-0740 NOISE ABATEMENT. STRAIGHT IN APPROACHES ONLY 2-1 2-2 3-1 3-2

1-3

CHANGE

CELEBRATING 75 YEARS OF DEATH FROM THE DARKNESS



0700

1702

1800

24 Hours

SDO:

SDC:

DNCO:

ADNCO:

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242

Marine Aircraft Group 12

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan

1st Marine Aircraft Wing MARFORPAC

Unit 37310 FPO-AP 96310-7310

Monday, December 3, 2018 (18337)

THIS FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS ALL DOMESTIC TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED IAW MCO 3800.2B



TYPE ACFT: F/A-18

8/17.5 DAILY SORTIES/HOURS SCHED:

> PROJECTED MONTHLY SORTIES/HRS: 148 / 171.6

FLOWN AS OF 29 NOV 61 / 78.5

QUARTERLY SORTIES/HRS: 404 / 566.4 FY SORTIES/HRS: 2105 / 2842.9

Schedule Written By:

FLI	GHT	EVENTS:	

								11 41411101								
EVT	c/s	BRF/ETD/ ETA	ICAO	PARTIES AS		CREW		MISSION	TMR	AREA	FLIGHT PLAN	FUEL	TAC	Priority Priority	ORD	NOTES
1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4	Profane 01 Profane 02 Profane 03 Profane 04	0545/0750/1015	RJOI/RJOI	**	A), (b)		ENX WX	3704 3704 3704 3704	1A7	ITRA S (0745-0915)	JOI-2	HP / HR HP / HR HP / HR HP / HR	17	1 3 2 3	ABCDEH ABCDEH ABCDEH ABCDEH	12
2-1 2-2	Profane 21 Profane 22	0545/1130/1345	RJOI/RJOI		(3) (3704 3704	1A7	ITRA 5 (1130-1315)	JOI-2	T T	17	1 2	ABCDFH ABCDFH	12
3-1 3-2	Ivan 31 Ivan 32	0545/1120/1300	RJOI/RJOI		(9)		1	2102 2102	2K4	ITRA S (1130-1315)	JOI-2	T	18	3 4	ABCDH ABCDH	12

** DIVISION LEAD @ ACUI # MISSION COMMANDER + BRIEFING OFFICER \$ INSTRUCTOR % CMMR Profame 01 1200 4-2 4-3 HOT LOAD

ODO:

FLIGHT NOTES:

Sunrise:

Sunset:

Airfield Hours:

EENT:

1. ARCT PROVIDED BY SUMO. POC SUMO READY ROOM DSN 255-2152

PRNING PARE FOR EVENT 1-3.

GENERAL NOTES:

- 1. 0700 MAINTENANCE MEETING. 2. 0700 CUB AT MAG-12 WAR ROOM
- 3. 0715 FOD WALK.
- 4. 0730-0740 NOISE ABATEMENT, STRAIGHT IN APPROACHES ONLY.
- 5. 0910-0930 QUIET HOURS. NO TURNING AIRCRAFT.
- 6. 1115-1125 NOISE ABATEMENT. STRAIGHT IN APPROACHES ONLY.
- 7. 1500 CUB AT MAG-12 WAR ROOM ATTEND. A CO
- 8. 1900 NIGHT CREW MAINTENANCE MEETING

REQUIRED ORDNANCE:

A - 2 X TANKS

B-LPOD

C - CATM-9X X2

D - CATM-120 X2

E - LAU-118 / GBU-32 INERT X2

F - AGM-88C / GBU-32 INERT X2

G - AGM-88E / GBU-32 INERT X2

H - 60 CHAFF/60 FLARES



CHANGE 1

CELEBRATING 75 YEARS OF DEATH FROM THE DARKNESS



Enclosure 29

98 / 149.0 98 / 149.0





MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242

Marine Aircraft Group 12

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan 1st Marine Aircraft Wing MARFORPAC Unit 37310 FPO-AP 96310-7310



Schedule Written By

FLOWN AS OF 2 DEC 1/1.3 104/155.7 104/155.7

Enclosure 29

EENT: Sunrise: Sunset:

0701 1701 1800 24 Hours

SDC:

ADNCO: DNCO:

Airfield Hours:

3-1	2:1	1-1 1-2	IVI
Profane 21 Profane 22	Profane 11 Profane 12	Profane 01 Profane 02	c/s
1600/1800/2130-	0700/1330/1945	0700/0900/1215	BRF /ETD/ ETA
RJOI/RJOI	RJOI/RJOI	RJOI/RJOI	icao
(b)	(3)	(A).	
(b)	(6)		CREW
	1		
3704 3704	3704 3704	3202 3301 3202 3301	NOISSIM
1A7	147	1A7	TMR
ITRA S (1815-2100)	(TRAS (1345-1645)	R-567 (0900-1200) ITRA-N2 (0830-1215)	AREA
JOJ-2.	JOI-37	JOI-1	FLIGHT PLAN
HR/T HR/T	HP HP	HP/HR HP/HR	FUEL
17	17	17	TAC
2	, <u>,</u>	2	Priority
ABCDGH ABCDGH	ABCDGH ABCDGH	ABCDEF	ORD
II	145		

	ELIGHT NOTES: 1. ARCT PROVIDED BY SUMO. POC SUMO READY ROOM DSN 255-2152. 2. CONTROL SURVEY OF SUMO READY ROOM DSN 255-2152. 3. USE 33 WIP CODE FOR BRU-55. (SIM GBU-12) 4. CHANGE WIP CODE TO FO. 5. DOWNLOAD ORDNANCE AND HOT PIT. PROVIDE TURNING SPARES FOR EVENT 3. 6. EVENT 3 COLD START. PROCEED TO TAC VAL FOR HOT LOADING OF EVENT 2 ORDNANCE.
3) (A), (b) (6)	GENERAL NOTES: 1. 0700 MAINTENANCE MEETING. 2. 0700 CUB AT MAG-12 CO'S CONFERENCE ROOM. D ATTEMS (A) (A
	REQUIRED ORDNANCE: A - 2 X TANKS B - LPOD C - CATM-9X X2 D - CATM-120 X2 E - LAU-118 F - BRU-55 G - AGM-88C / GBU-32 INERT X2 H - 60 CHAFF/60 FLARES



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan Marine Aircraft Group 12

1st Marine Aircraft Wing MARFORPAC Unit 37310 FPO-AP 96310-7310

THIS FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS Tuesday, December 4, 2018 (18338)



EENT: Sunrise:

Sunset:

0701

1701 1800

Airfield Hours:

24 Hours

DNCO: ADNCO: SDC: SDO:

DAILY SORTIES/HOURS SCHED: QUARTERLY SORTIES/HRS: MONTHLY SORTIES/HRS: TYPE ACFT: F/A-18 6/20.0 404 / 566.4 112/145.6 PROJECTED

FY SORTIES/HRS: 2105 / 2842.9

FLOWN AS OF 2 DEC 1/1.3

Enclosure 29

104 / 155.7

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	ITRA S (1815-2100)		ITRA S (1345-1645)	ITRA-N2 (0830-1215)	R-567 (0900-1200)
	JOI-37		JOI-37		J0I-1
HR/T	HR/T	HP	HP	HP/HR	HP/HR
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2	ш	2	1	2	ы
ABCDGH	ABCDGH	ABCDGH	ABCDGH	ABCDEF	ABCDEF
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3704 3704

> 1A7 1A7 1A7 TMR

0)	
b. Tago Might Ckg) START. PROCEED TO TAC VAL FOR HOT LOADING OF EVENT 2 ORDNANCE.
T TOO NICHT COL	STANDER AND LOT DIT DECKLOST TORNING COADES FOR FURNIT S
4. 1500 CUB AT M	CODE TO FO.
3. 0715 FOD WALK	ODE FOR BRU-55. (SIM GBU-12)
2. 0700 CUB AT MA	TURSING SPAREFRA EVERTA b (6)
1. 0700 MAINTENA	ED BY SUMO. POC SUMO READY ROOM DSN 255-2152.

6. EVENT 3 COLD 5. DOWNLOAD O 4. CHANGE WIP (1. ARCT PROVIDE

3-1 2-1 1-1

Profane 21 Profane 22 Profane 11 Profane 12 Profane 01 Profane 02

1600/1800/2130

RJOI/RJOI RJOI/RJOI RJOI/RJOI ICAO

0700/1330/1645 0700/0900/1215

BRF/EID/ ETA

FLIGHT EVENTS:

FLIGHT PLAN

FUEL

TAC Priority

NOTES

	5. 1900 NIGHT CREW MAINTENANCE MEETING	
E ROOM. O 3 ATTEND 6	4. 1500 CUB AT MAG-12 CO'S CONFERENCE ROOM.	
	3. 0715 FOD WALK.	
EROON D COTEMA (A), (b)	2. 0700 CUB AT MAG-12 CO'S CONFERENCE ROON	
	1. 0700 MAINTENANCE MEETING.	
	GENERAL NOTES:	

6

D - CATM-120 X2 E - LAU-118 B - LPOD C - CATM-9X X2

REQUIRED ORDNANCE: A - 2 X TANKS

F-BRU-55

G - AGM-88C / GBU-32 INERT X2 H - 60 CHAFF/60 FLARES





UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan 1st Marine Aircraft Wing MARFORPAC Marine Aircraft Group 12

Wednesday, December 5, 2018 (18339)

Unit 37310 FPO-AP 96310-7310

11

THIS FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS ALL DOMESTIC TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED IAW MCO 3800.28

000:

POWER PLANT	SOBJECT OF THE WICEY.	Å),	(6)	
TV	WCLN.			
_			1	

EENT: Sunset:

Sunrise:

1701

Airfield Hours:

24 Hours 1800

> ADNCO: DNCO: SDC: SDO:

> > DAILY SORTIES/HOURS SCHED: TYPE ACFT:

> > > F/A-18

Enclosure 29

10/12.8 PROJECTED

QUARTERLY SORTIES/HRS: MONTHLY SORTIES/HRS: FY SORTIES/HRS: 2105 / 2842.9 404 / 566.4 148 / 171.6

98 / 149.0 61/78.5 FLOWN AS OF 29 NOV

98 / 149.0

Schedule Written By

NOTES

o) (A), (b)	1. 0700 MAINTENGNOE MEETING. 2. 0700 CUB AT MAG-12 CONFERENCE ROOM 3. 0715 FOD WAJK. 4. 1500 CUB AT MAG-12 CONFERENCE ROOM 5. 1900 NIGHT CREW MAINTENANCE MEETING. 3. 0715 FOD WAJK. 4. 1500 CUB AT MAG-12 CONFERENCE ROOM 5. 1900 NIGHT CREW MAINTENANCE MEETING.
	A - 2 X TANI B - LPOD C - CATM-9; D - CATM-1 E - LAU-118 F - BRU-55 G - AGM-88

1. PPR TIME 1335-1505.
2. PPR TIME 1535-1620.
3. NO FLIGHT BELOW 7,000 MSL.
4. ITRA-5 IS DUE REGARD AFTER 2345. NO FLIGHT ABOVE FL 290.
5. USE 33 WIP CODE FOR BRU-55. (SIM GBU-12)

FLIGHT NOTES:

5-1 4-1 3-1 2-1 1-1

Profane 11 Profane 11 Profane 12

2215/0245/0415

RJOI/RJOI

* SECTION LEAD ** DIVISION L

VAN WENDERTOON

TOUT

SIMULATOR EVENTS:

CREW

T&R CODES

IC SET

NOTES

2302 2307

RIOI RJOI

REQUIRED ORDNANCE:

- AGM-88C / GBU-32 INERT X2

BRU-55 CATM-120 X2 LAU-118 CATM-9X X2 2 X TANKS # MISSION COMMANDER + BRIEFING OFFICER \$ INSTRUCTOR

3296

IA7

TRA-S (0000-0430) ITRA-S (0000-0430)

101-2

% CMMR

JOT-2

20

11

) JOE

1A6 1A7 1A7 212

JOI-2

HP/HR

17 17 17 17

ABCDEF ABCDEF

ABCD ABCD

ABCD ABCD ABCD

ABCDG

ABCDG

46 45 3202 3202 2102

MOA 6/R-110 (1630-1700)

1801

R-567 (1430-1515)

1801

등 등 푸푸 FUEL

2215/0015/0145 1100/1620/1750

Bat 02 714 Bat 01 Bat 02 Bat 01 Bat 02 C/S

> 1100/1415/1535 1100/1300/1335

> > RKTH/RKTH RJOI/RKTH

RKTH/RJOI RJOI/RJOI

BRF /ETD/ ETA

ICAO

FLIGHT EVENTS:

TMR

AREA

FUGHT PLAN

1801

BAT 91

03/8/0550

1-1

BRF/ETD/ETA

OFT

2-1

1200/1300/1500 0800/0900/1100

s D 45 E

Aonsole

GENERAL NOTES:

6. CHANGE WIP CODE TO FO.



0702

1701

1800

24 Hours

SDO:

SDC:

DNCO:

2215/0245/0415

RJOI/RJOI

ADNCO:



MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242

Marine Aircraft Group 12

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan 1st Marine Aircraft Wing MARFORPAC

Unit 37310 FPO-AP 96310-7310

Wednesday, December 5, 2018 (18339)

THIS FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS

ALL DOMESTIC TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED IAW MCO 3800.2B





FY SORTIES/HRS: 2105 / 2842.!

DAILY SORTIES/HOURS SCHED: 10/12.8

PROJECTEL MONTHLY SORTIES/HRS: 148 / 171.6 QUARTERLY SORTIES/HRS: 404 / 566.4 FLOWN AS OF 29 NOV 61 / 78.5 98 / 149.0 98 / 149.0

Enclosure 29

46

ABCDG

ABCDG

	Schedule Written By
 100	

101-2

EVT	C/S	BRF/ETD/ETA	ICAO		CREW	MISSION	TMR	AREA	FLIGHT PLAN	FUEL	TAG	Priority	ORD	NOTES
1-1 1-2	Bat 01 Bat 02	1100/1300/1335	RJOI/BKTH		A),	2102 2102	2J2	17	1801	HP HP	19	1 2	ABCD ABCD	1
2-1 2-2	Bat 01 Bat 02	1100/1415/1535	RKTH/RKTH	*	9	3202 3202	1A7	R-567 (1430-1515)	1801	HP HP	17	1 2	ABCD ABCD	2
3-1 3-2	Bat 01 Bat 02	1100/1620/1750	RKTH/RJOI		(p) (q)	3202 3202	1A7	MOA 6/R-110 (1630-1700)	1801	T	17	1 2	ABCD ABCD	3
4-1 4-2	Profane 11 Profane 12	2215/0015/0145	RJOI/RJOI	(b) (3	(A), (b) @@	2102 2102	1A6	ITRA-S (0000-0430)	JOI-2	HP/HR HP/HR	17	1 2	ABCDEF ABCDEF	45

FLIGHT EVENTS:

** DIVISION LEAD @ ACUI # MISSION COMMANDER + BRIEFING OFFICER S INSTRUCTOR % CMMR

3203

3202

ALTEND & CO

1A7

ITRA-S (0000-0430)

SIMULATOR EVENTS:

EVENT	BRF/ETD/ETA	OFT		CREW	T&R CODES	IC SET	NOTES
1-1	0800/0900/1100	C Console	@ \$	(Q)	2307	RJOI	
2-1	1200/1300/1500	C Console	@ 5	(S), (S)	2302	RJOL	

FLIGHT NOTES:

5-1

5-2

Sunrise:

Sunset:

EENT:

Airfield Hours:

- 1. PPR TIME 1335-1505.
- 2. PPR TIME 1535-1620.
- 3. NO FLIGHT BELOW 7,000 MSL.
- 4. ITRA-S IS DUE REGARD AFTER 2345. NO FLIGHT ABOVE FL 290.
- 5, USE 33 WIP CODE FOR BRU-55. (SIM GBU-12)

Profane 11

Profane 12

6. CHANGE WIP CODE TO FO.

GENERAL NOTES:

- 1. 0700 MAINTENANCE MEETING.
- 2. 0700 CUB AT MAG-12 CONFERENCE ROOM

ODO:

- 3. 0715 FOD WALK.
- 4. 1500 CUB AT MAG-12 CONFERENCE ROOM
- 5. 1900 NIGHT CREW MAINTENANCE MEETING

REQUIRED ORDNANCE: A - 2 X TANKS

17

- B-LPOD
- C CATM-9X X2
- D CATM-120 X2
- E-LAU-118
- F BRU-55
- G AGM-88C / GBU-32 INERT X2





UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS


MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242

Marine Aircraft Group 12

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan 1st Marine Aircraft-Wing MARFORPAC Unit 37310 FPO-AP 06310-7310

Wednesday, December 5, 2018 (18339)

THIS FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS ALL DOMESTIC TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED IAW MCO 3800.2B



	POWER PLANT	SUBJECT OF THE WEEK:	(b) (3) (b) (c)	DAILY SI	
FY SOR	JARTERLY SORTIES/HRS	ONTHLY SORTIES/HR		ORTIES/HOURS	TY
FY SORTIES/HRS: 2105 / 2	IES/HRS: 404 / 566.4	IES/HRS: 148 / 171.		S SCHED:	TYPE ACFT:

Schedule Written By

98 / 149.0 98 / 149.0

EENT: Sunset: Sunrise:

1701 0702 1800 24 Hours

DNCO: ADNCO: SDC: SDO:

Airfield Hours:

-		-	-		-
Profane 11 Profane 12	Profane 11 Profane 12	Bat 01 Bat 02	Bat 01 Bat 02	Bat 01 Bat 02	QS.
2215/0245/0415	2215/0015/0145	1100/1620/1750	1100/1415/1535	1100/1300/1335	BRF /EID/ ETA
RJOI/RJOI	RJOI/RJOI	RKTH/RJOI	RKTH/RKTH	RJOI/RKTH	ICAO
	(<mark>b</mark>)	4.		*	
(A),	(3) (A), (b) (6)		(3) ((6)	A),	CREW
(A), (6)	(b) (b) (6)				
3202 3202	2102 2102	3202 3202	3202 3202	2102 2102	MISSION
1A7	1A6	1A7	1A7	212	IMR
ITRA-S (0000-0430)	ITRA-S (0000-0430)	MOA 6/R-110 (1630-1700)	R-567 (1430-1515)		AREA
J01-2	JOI-2	1801	1801	1801	FLIGHT PLAN
7 7	HP/HR HP/HR		푹 푹	푸	FUEL
17	17	17	17	17	TAC
2	2 1	2	2	2	Priority
ABCDG	ABCDEF	ABCD	ABCD	ABCD	ORD
	-	-	1	-	NOTES

4-1 5-1

3-1 2-1

1-1

SREF/ETD/ETA	OFI Console \$ Console \$	2-1			+ +	14	EVENT
v @ v @	© (3) (b) 2307 \$ (A) (b) 2302	1200/1300/1500			0000/0000/ ++00	0000/0000/1100	BRF/ETD/ETA
o) (3) A), (b)	W TER CODES 2307	0	 Console			2	OFI
b) (3) A), (b)	W TER CODES 2307	(0)	5	1	0	9	
							CREW
RJOI RJOI		200	Ī				NOIES

SIMULATOR EVENTS:

1. PPR TIME 1335-1505.
2. PPR TIME 1535-1620.
3 FLIGHT BELOW 7,000 MSL.

GENERAL NOTES:

1. 0700 MAINTENANCE MEETING,

2. 0700 CUB AT MAG-12 CONFERENCE ROOM

3. 0715 FOD WALK.

4. 1500 CUB AT MAG-12 CONFERENCE ROOM,

5. 1900 NIGHT CREW MAINTENANCE MEETING.

ATENA), (b)

(6

C - CATM-9X X2 D - CATM-120 X2 E - LAU-118 B-LPOD

G - AGM-88C / GBU-32 INERT X2

REQUIRED ORDNANCE: A - 2 X TANKS

A)

b

(6

A-S IS DUE REGARD AFTER 2345. NO FLIGHT ABOVE FL 290. 5. USE 33 WIP CODE FOR BRU-55. (SIM GBU-12)

6. CHANGE WIP CODE TO FO.

(b) (6)	(3)	(A),	(b)	



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12
IST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
UNIT 37310
FPO. AP 96310-7310

1000 CO 1 May 18

From: Commanding Officer, Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242

To: Distribution List A

Subj: STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 FLIGHT OPERATIONS

Ref: (a) CNAF-M 3710.7

(b) NAVMC 3500.50C (FA-18 Training and Readiness Manual)

(c) MCO 3710.8, USMC NATOPS Program

(d) 1st MAW Standard Operating Procedures for Air Operations

(e) F/A-18 A-D NATOPS Flight Manual

(f) USMC FA-18 Admin SOP

(g) FA-18 TACSOP

(h) Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12) In-flight Guide

(i) MCASO 3710.3X (MCAS Iwakuni Air Operations Manual)

Encl: (1) Functional Check Flight Exam

(2) Tablet Contents and Set-up

- 1. Situation. References (a) through (i) do not cover all facets of squadron operations, therefore, this SOP will serve as a guide to achieve squadron standardization. This SOP will cover topics regarding aircrew responsibilities from mission planning through post-flight debrief as well as Operations Duty Officer (ODO) responsibilities during the execution of the daily flight schedule.
- 2. Mission. The Commanding Officer, VMFA(AW)-242, publishes this order to amplify procedures contained in references (a) through (i) and prescribes additional procedures, where necessary, to conform to local requirements and facilitate fleet operational training.

3. Execution

- a. Commander's Intent and Concept of Operations.
- (1) Commander's Intent. To maximize operational training and standardization while adhering to established standards and procedures governing flight operations and safety.
 - (2) Concept of Operations.
- (a) All aircrew operating VMFA(AW)-242 aircraft are responsible for knowledge of and compliance with the instructions set forth in this order.

Subj: STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 FLIGHT OPERATIONS

- (b) The following definitions apply to this order:
 - 1. Shall: Used when application of a procedure is mandatory.
 - 2. Should: Used when application of a procedure is recommended.
 - 3. May and Need not: Used when application of a procedure is optional.
- (3) This order does not cover every possible situation nor does it relieve personnel of the responsibility to exercise sound judgment during flight operations. Should a conflict arise between this order and any of the references listed, the most restrictive guidance shall take precedence.
- (4) Operational Risk Management (ORM) is a framework for decision-making. Its goal is to minimize losses and preserve assets while maximizing mission success. In the operational environment, this is accomplished by continuously applying ORM control measures outlined in this SOP and references (a) through (i). As a result, this document is an integral part of VMFA(AW)-242's ORM program and shall be incorporated into every phase of flight from premission planning through post-flight debriefs.
 - (5) Deviations from this order:
- (a) Flight leads may deviate from this order as circumstances dictate for safety of flight and mission accomplishment.
- (b) Flight leads are responsible for ensuring all deviations are thoroughly briefed and understood by all flight members and that such deviations comply with ORM guidelines and higher directives.
- 4. Administration and Logistics. Recommendations concerning flight operations and administration are invited. Recommendations should be forwarded to the VMFA(AW)-242 Director of Safety and Standardization (DOSS) for consideration at the next Standardization Board meeting.
- 5. Command and Signal
- a. Command. This order is applicable to all VMFA(AW)-242 flight operations and shall be adhered to by all squadron and augment aircrew.
 - b. Signal. This order is effective the date signed.



Subj: STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 FLIGHT OPERATIONS

Copy to: Safety Distribution List A

THE FOLLOWING 25 PAGES OF THIS ENCLOSURE HAVE BEEN REMOVED DUE TO BEING COMPLETELY REDACTED UNDER (b)(2)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

3500 ASM-32 21 Feb 17


From: Deputy Commandant for Aviation

To: Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 101

Subj: DEFER CAT I CARRIER QUALIFICATION TO INCREASE PRODUCTION

1. In order to reduce the USMC F/A-18 CAT I production deficit HQMC Aviation directs VMFAT-101 to defer all, but 15 CAT I students carrier qualification phase during each FY through FY19.

- 2. Due to low USMC F/A-18 readiness at VMFAT-101, late CNATRA production, and USMC accession shortfalls; USMC F/A-18 production is forecasted to be behind by 32 pilots in FY 18.
- 3. This deferment will reduce the CAT I syllabus by 22 sorties and 22.9 hours. The current 1000 level F/A-18 Training and Readiness syllabus provides 108.1 hours of flight training for CAT I students. This reduction in training time and hours will transfer some risk to the fleet squadrons due to the experience not gained from carrier based aviation.
- 4. Naval Aviation Production Analysts (NAPP), USMC Training and Education Command (ASB), MMOA-2 and HQMC Aviation have collaborated to determine that this is a feasible course of action to temporarily increase production.
- 5. This increase in production will provide necessary pilot inventory for a 7523 PMOS community that is at 48% of the target inventory for Company grade officers. Production is expected to increase by four to eight CAT Is per FY of this deferment.
- 6. HQMC AVN will continue to monitor USMC F/A-18 CAT I production and will cease this deferment at the end of FY19 if inventory and production problems have been solved.
- 7. VMFAT-101 will coordinate with Training and Education Command (ASB) identifying by name those aviators that received a carrier qualification deferral. This letter will be placed in both the aviation training jacket and NATOPS jacket of each individual deferred.



DFIRS Data Summary First look BUNO 165416 Event , NAVAIR ASIST, 17 December 2018

Data Summary:

The data was provided to ASIST team from (b) (3) (A), (b) on 17 December 2018. The file was examined for validity. Data records showed valid stroture and the data appeared consistent. The start of the DFIRS data is GMT time: 16:11:26 and end of DFIRS data is at GMT time: 16:44:19.

The data indicates that aircraft started receiving fuel (indicated by fuel increasing) at approximately 16:38:32 when the aircraft was at 245 knots and 15,000 feet at coordinates: 134.60998382, 32.497558224. The DFIRS data indicates that the aircraft likely disconnected from the tanker at approximately 16:42:30-16:44:06. The DFIRS has some fuel related signals that can be examined more closely to determine more precisely when fuel tanking was completed. Fuel stops increasing at approximately 16:42:27.

There were not flight control, engine or subsystem failure recorded prior to an excursion that appears at time 16:44:17. Aircraft experienced an uncommanded roll and pitch transient. First, evaluation suggests the aircraft may have been hit from the bottom.


MSP codes recorded once at the end were:


 $BV^{(b)}(3)(A), (b)(6)$


C01, C02, C03, C04, 44, 70, 34C, 34E, 339, 340, 47, 95, 23E, 718, 768


CAUTIONS at end of data set:


CAUTIONS: L STALL, R STALL, LADDER,



















NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER WEAPONS DIVISION CHINA LAKE, CALIFORNIA




REPORT OF TEST RESULTS

REPORT NO: NAWCWDCL/RTR-2008/011

JOINT HELMET MOUNTED CUEING SYSTEM (JHMCS) MINI-QUADEYETM INTEGRATED TEST AND EVALUATION

By



21 March 2008

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AIR COMBAT COMMAND PROJECT 10-046A





USAF Warfare Center

4370 North Washington Blvd, Suite 117 Nellis AFB, Nevada 89191-7076

NIGHT VISION CUEING AND DISPLAY OPERATIONAL UTILITY EVALUATION

FINAL REPORT

AUGUST 2013

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THE FOLLOWING 39 PAGES OF THIS ENCLOSURE HAVE BEEN REMOVED DUE TO BEING COMPLETELY REDACTED UNDER (b)(3)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND RADM WILLIAM A. MOFFETT BUILDING 47123 BUSE ROAD, BLDG 2272 PATUXENT RIVER, MARYLAND 20670-1547

IN REPLY REFER TO

30 May 14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: Assistant Commander for Acquisition (AIR-1.0)
To: Program Manager, Aircrew Systems (PMA202)

Ref:


- (a) TEMP 1589, Ref F, F/A-18E/F Software Qualification Testing and Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation, 2 Dec 2008.
- (b) ORD CAF USN 308-93-III-A for JHMCS, Nov 2002.
- (c) NVCD CPD, AFROCM 09-09-03, Sep 2009.
- (d) 191724Z SEP 08 Quick Reaction Assessment of the JHMCS NVCD Onboard the FA-18.
- (e) H5E OT Report.

Encl: (1) JHMCS NVCD ASR PowerPoint Presentation, 7 April 2014

Subj: COMPLETION OF OPERATIONAL TEST FOR THE JOINT HELMET MOUNTED CUEING SYSTEM (JHMCS) NIGHT VISION CUEING AND DISPLAY (NVCD)

- 1. The JHMCS NVCD system was subject to two phases of operational test: a Quick Reaction Assessment (QRA) from July August 2008, and an OT period in conjunction with the F/A-18 H5E software upgrade from October 2008 May 2009. The test requirements for the operational test periods came from the F/A-18E/F H5E TEMP, reference (a), and were traced to the JHMCS Operational Requirements Document (ORD), reference (b). The NVCD Capabilities Production Document (CPD), reference (c) was developed after the OT periods were complete. The QRA and OT reports, references (d) and (e) respectively, showed that the JHMCS NVCD system met the TEMP KPP thresholds and demonstrated the ability to bring JHMCS capability to night operations and satisfy the fleet's needs for operating JHMCS at night.
- 2. Based on the conclusions in these reports, no additional operational testing is required to further validate the JHMCS NVCD system's capability. All OT objectives were achieved during the Air Force led ACAT III phase of the program. The JHMCS NVCD program may proceed with the test strategy presented in the Acquisition Strategy Review brief, enclosure (1), as an ACAT IVT program with OT considered complete.


d complete.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)





























```
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Today is Friday the 25th of January 2019.
We are in Iwakuni, Japan. The time is roughly 1207, local time.
                                        from 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing. I'm assisted by (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
                                                 , Staff Judge
                                    Our next witness is (b) (3) (A), (b)
Advocate, and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
                               , can you please state your full
name for the record, spelling your last name.
                                                        , how would
                            And (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
you like me to refer to you during this interview?
                                    You can call me
                                                     (b) (6)
                                                           (6)
anything you want, sir.
                                    That's good.
                            All right.
                                                 b)(3), you can call me
                                         Okay.
     or sir at any time as well, and you can ask^{(b)} me to pause as we
6 do through.
            (3), what is your MOS?
                                    7525.
                           What is a 7525?
```

b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you're a Hornet back seater?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I am.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : How long have you been doing that (b) (3)?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Since 2001.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Two thousand and one. So about 18 years.

Roughly, how many hours do you have on the hornet?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Twenty-seven hundred.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : About 2,700 hours in the F-18. What are your key qualifications and designations in the F-18?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Weapons and Tactics Instructor; some of -- I used to be a Forward Air Controller Airborne

Instructor, not current in that; Tech-AI; FLC; Division Lead Mission

Commander; Section Lead FAC-A, TAC-A; pretty much everything.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So it'd suffice to say you feel like you're well qualified to be a weapons systems operator and a officer in the F-18?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you feel like you are also well qualified to be a commanding officer in 242?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What are some things that make you feel well qualified to be the CO of 242, in addition to the qualifications and designations you just listed?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Background in previous assignments, experience.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) \cdot Tell me about some key assignments that prepared you for this command.

I was a MAWTS-1 Instructor, I got : a chance to see, you know, and also be the director of safety and standardization MAWTS-1. I got to see every type, model, and series up close and personal. I got to see the best of all communities. Ι got to see what each squadron, on fleet support, how each F-18 squadron operated and see how the best practices and the worst. I got to train with some of the best students out there and some of the finest, you know, pilots and WIZO's. And then really, frankly, from every [inaudible] series, I got to see the duty experts up close and personal. So that was one of them. Staff assignment wise, how that runs as squadron, you know, that's one thing but the key assignments in squadrons I think are essential. So I happen to have been out here in Iwakuni, Japan MAG-12 from I think 2008 to 2011. I was the Assistant Operations Officer. I was the WIZO Training Officer.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : At 242?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : At 242.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

242 and Assistant Aircraft Maintenance Officer, so I knew a lot about how this squadron, you know, the challenges they would face here, or at least I thought I would know and I thought I'd be best prepared. So I put this down number one because with my experience here in Iwakuni before, that was on the front side of its PCS year, I did not come over with the squadron then. I came over just shortly. It was on my FAP tour then with the 1st Marine Regiment, but came over, you know, had been in the squadron at Miramar and deployed to Iraq and the rest of my FAP tour they PCS'd over here. So three years previous here in Iwakuni. I worked at headquarters Marine Corps Aviation.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : What did you do in the hallway?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I worked in U.S. programs and I was the aide-de-camp to Deputy Commandant for Aviation, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

So I had worked at MAWTS, I had worked at the hallway, a lot of key staff positions, I think, within the squadron. So I may be qualified, I think, but as you know, there's always things that

you don't know and we will always wish we could add a little bit more experience.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you mentioned you were the DOSS at MAWTS-1, I assume at the time-frame that would've been under (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ph] perhaps, did -- were you also an ASO?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No. Never an ASO.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did you ever attend ASO school?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did not attend ASO school. I did attend the Senior Aviation Variance, the commanders course --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : The ASC perhaps, the one week course?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I did. It was two weeks, but I

found --

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : When did you do that? As part of your workups to being skipper?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, I did. Before I PCS'd over here. I think it was around -- I think it was -- Easter time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : March of '18?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir -- March of '17.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : March of '17. Oh, that's right, because you came out April.

Okay. Did you ever attend CRM school, CRMI school, also in Pensacola?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No. Never attended that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Did you ever attend any formal ORM or CRM training that is like they teach at the safety school?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Not at safety school. Of course we did a lot of that that actually taught tactical risk management as part of the curriculum at WTI.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : At TRM? Tell me a little bit about that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So it was a two to three-day

course, it varied. It started at three, I think, we paired it down to two. It was designed to take the tacticians, because I think people noticed back in the, you know, post OYF we had a real peak of mishaps. And there was a belief that within the squadrons you had tactical aviators and you had safety guys and then there was this attempt to say "hey, there's no.

There's not supposed be any barrier between these two" that there aren't tactical guys that aren't inherently safe. And so that was, I think, (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) got started as (b)(3)(A),(b)(6). But the idea was to say, I say glamorizing safety is probably the wrong way but that is essentially what they are trying to do. Say like, listen, this is not something that you need to shy away from, this is actually something you need to embrace. And so it was a module that went through basically, you know, mishaps. It went through,

you know, squadron aviation culture. It went through how to be a training officer and really, kind of, bring along all the different levels of talent that you have; how to give the commander the best advice possible, you know; and how to build training plans that addressed, you know, all these different, kind of, typical aviation personalities.

And so it also, kind of, brought in some outside folks to say, you know, there's a ski, like an extreme sports guy that came in and talked to us. It was like a [inaudible], that was an F-14 commander to talk about some things that he experienced and let's see, [5](3)(A)(5)(6) [ph] would come in and talk. And so we had ethics folks, we had, you know, probably some of the best guys that do the safety surveys talk about how to use those. So it was fairly effective, I think. And everybody went through that all-type model series. Practically speaking, it was not as popular amongst the instructors there because you lose a model, you lose time, you lose training time. But the command and leadership felt like it was very, very important to keep that narrative going.

My personal opinion was, is that, now while it was important, it was that the culture has shifted significantly in my career time. I would say that, you know, early on, early 2000's there certainly was these two camps. I certainly saw it morph, you

know, over time. And so the leadership, what they remembered, you know, when they were young captains was significantly different from, you know, when I was, you know, department head. There really weren't a lot of these off the reservation, kind of, rogue aviator folks. You know, really most people were -- had inculcated the concept of ORM in their daily approach to life. In fact, if anything, they kind of took it almost to the other extreme.

Almost always, people were padding their fuels and what not. So it's not uncommon now to see somebody land out here with 4,000 pounds of fuel. You know, back in the day, you'd been savage for something like that. You know, the on deck fuel, you know, being 2.5 or 2.0 depending on the runway conditions, where you are, even Beaufort 1.5, right? Using every bit of those dead dinosaurs to train was always an important thing.

I think you'll see young guys who are on the opposite extreme of that. You know, when you look at, hey, what's your fuel?" or "what's your weather requirements to have diverts?" and stuff like that, they almost instinctively add to them as a matter of course. You know, so there is a very interesting ying yang, you know, over my career that I've seen. But in general, I think, the ideas really kept on. So TRM in it's importance, I don't know -- I think they're just calling it risk mitigation now, but they really

highlighted on "hey, there's a blue threat out there too."

Now, there's a red threat that we focus on quite a bit, we talked about threat west weapons systems and we talked about maximum ranges and, you know, effective altitudes and so on and so forth but we'll just go to the end degree about how we're going to mitigate the enemy threats. But hey, you know, you're a risk to yourself too, right? You're a risk to, like I said, to just the straight up mishap angle. It's always a dangerous business; take-offs, landings. All of those things, but also, you know, like hey you're thinking about where your missiles can go and think about, you know, the sweep coming off a target. You're sitting there as the bar cap and, you know, what's -- how is it going to look on your radar scope? You know, you can shoot him down too.

So really taking on all of these, hey, blue threats and mitigating them as well and emphasizing in the course of the tactical, the WTI's, either there are no plans that are inherently unsafe. You know, there's not a safety plan and a tactical plan, it's like, hey there is no tactical plan that doesn't incorporate the blue threat as well. So in my safety policy and everything else you see, all that stuff highlighted, you know, it's all pulled over from that formal instruction. So I'd, you know, I've received that at WTI as well as a student and then I help teach it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So in your teaching, how did you define a hazard?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well defined, a hazard is anything that would be no effect, safe, you know, for your flight operations. Something that could adversely affect.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And how did you define a risk?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I can't remember exactly the perfect definition. But it's something that --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, in your own words.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- you know, lost -- anything that could cause a -- something to go wrong. You know, we talk all the time and they involve our briefs: Risk to mission or risk to force. So anything that's going to -- any barrier that's going to keep you from either accomplishing the mission or any barrier that's going to potentially harm your force or the force you're supporting.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So what's the difference between a hazard and a risk? It sounds like you said the same thing.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah, they sound pretty much the same. I guess, identified hazards that are specific to the operations, I guess. I don't remember, to be honest with you, exactly the same --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Did the TRM program or instruction

you taught, did it include what I might know as the ORM process?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Do you remember, since you taught that, as an instructor, do you remember how many steps there are in the ORM process?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you remember --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- seven steps, I think.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Do you recall the key components, like the general thesis of the ORM concept?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So as a person who once taught that

course and was also the operations officer at 242, how do you incorporate what you just described into your operations process, your scheduling process?

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6) : Well, I would say a lot of this is baked into the calculus of just how we think now. Like I mentioned before, we do have a formal review process. Our schedule for instance, it goes from, you know, the flight up -- first there's ops and maintenance meetings routinely and they look at what's the aircraft availability. We look at where we are on our training block and training plan and what available assets that we need and we look at the MSHARK for the currency to see what, you know, and basically proficiency to see what areas we need to address and we step all the way through those the formal way and we come up with the flows for the week and the fly windows and we make sure that we don't have an insurmountable task ahead. Level all that.

So on a daily basis that's up on the board, we have this, kind of, a website, I think, that has that stuff too. It's sharepoint, but it kind of shows what the ops calendar is and stuff and so it can be a mood to target a bit but there's a standard plan and they're based on what we think we know and then we take from there and go to the daily flight schedule. You know, the schedule writer himself looks at what the flight officer and the training

officers have, kind of, messaged from Ops O guidance and my guidance and it then comes up with the flows for those days and puts the crew pairings together and, you know, gets the ranges together, all the support assets, all that stuff and, you know, puts it into the schedule.

And then that gets reviewed first in, you know, local operations pit. The training officer comes up and sees if he sees anything wrong with that. I've tried to, kind of, encourage him as having done that job before, if you're always in the weeds you're never -- you're not doing the back there, you know, going over tapes like you should be. So there's a piece there.

The operations officer, you know, this gets shown down to maintenance at some point, you know, before or after ops. Usually ops sees this thing just about last, but it's reviewed by maintenance [inaudible], it's reviewed by operations officer and then it's finally reviewed by DOSS, and then it comes to me. And the skeds writer comes up and he has a binder with it in there. There's a lot of supporting documents but it's basically, the people on the schedule is the primary. I review it in detail, I take a look at what I know, human factors wise for folks. You know, if there are, you know, based on when we do the human factors councils and whatnot and consider the things that the skeds writers might not

be privy to. But for the most part, it's looking at basic turn times and making sure that they don't put any errors on there.

One of the things that I did learn from my time in maintenance and as an operations officer was that the daily flight schedules, essentially the coordinating, you know, order for the entire squadron is what people have. It's the daily, you know, guidance and such priorities and let's everybody know what they're supposed to do and when they're supposed to do it.

You know, so we take the timeliness of the delivery of the schedule to be very serious and then of course what's on there to be very, very serious. I spend a lot of time just looking at it line by line and our schedule has not been very robust either so it's easy to look at line by line and think about what they're doing and when they're doing it and who's doing it. Now behind that, all the supporting documents are proficiency; currency; the hotboards; or how much have they flown; what have they done, you know; what are they red in, meaning that they've expired in said name code be it core, mission, and then; hey, what are they actually proficient in?

And something our skeds writers weren't doing a really good job of was paying attention to necessarily how to, you know, how to get to green on some of these people and these crews easier.

So, you know, I was helping him with that, right? Look at, look at

this -- he swapped these two guys right here and look boom, you've got a new proficient crew in whatever med it's going to be versus, you know, just knocking out another code so -- we're working on playing money ball as much as we can with our limited assets.

So that's it, in a nutshell, but it's several people look at the schedule throughout the course of the day and all that's [inaudible]. There is a -- we did not use a daily since I've been in command up until I was, you know, ordered to do this in December. Did not routinely use what I would consider the, you know, the ORM formal ORM worksheet. Why? Because in my career, I had found them to be completely ineffective and when I went to the ASC course it was a lot of people up, it was about 50/50 so did not use them because we were doing basically all those things in the course of the discussion of each line but, you know, somebody said "hey, why don't you use one?" So I said "Okay. We'll put it in there." Same thing on signatures on the flight schedule. I'm the only guy that signs the flight schedule, up until recently. Why? Because I'm the only person that's ultimately accountable for this so I mirrored many other squadrons that do the same thing. In fact, I just went to MAG-31 and every single squadron in MAG-31 schedule looked exactly like ours did, one signature. But (b) (3) gave me a lawful order here a couple weeks ago that said put (6) the Safety Skid, Safety

AAMO, and Ops O on there so we have them all on there up to date.

At the time of the mishap, we did not. Don't know if that answers that question or not, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Thanks, (b) (3) . So in the context of the process you just described, why did (b) (6) choose (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) for the mission he was on?

: Well, I will just take a quick, you know, I'll answer that this way. This is a -- in the context of an exercise that was originally planned to be Vigilant Ace and then morphed into something that became MAG-ULT, MAG-12 Unit Level Training, of which the flows, which I won't go into how they were derived for the classification purposes, but the flows were essentially mandated to us from higher headquarters. So we had to come up with a plan to cover down on 24 hour operations. When we looked at how we're going to do crew pairings and we looked at how we were going to cover down on, I broke the flight, the day, with the help of my operations officer into three parts, three crews. Why? When I was last deployed to combat with the bats that's what we did. And [inaudible] how we did 24 hour operations, we said, hey, I don't want to do two day/night crew just a straight up 12 hour on/off. I want to stagger to give ourselves more flexibility throughout the day. So we essentially built a ten hour stagger, if

you will, and really trying to focus more on an eight hour fly window for individuals, you know, to give them more time to adjust. So that was our going game plan. Not on our training plan to fly in the [inaudible]. Again, I view that as a frag that we were supposed to comply with.

So how do we come up with that, with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) flying there? What -- I was very cognizant of the fact that they fly in during that time of day, so you know to identify, you know, hazards. If a hazard is flying during the [inaudible], you know, so all right, how do we mitigate that? Well who doesn't have kids, you know, so that's a big piece of this is he was one of my Captain pilots that did not have children. You notice that my CAT-1's, you know, we're the ODO's during this period. Why? Because they didn't feel like they had the requisite experience at this point, especially with their even lower flight hours to fly during this exercise. So they were put on the shelf. Oh. And we didn't have a limitless amount, we're well below the TO of pilots, so if you take away a few people, next thing you know, there's only so many people left. You got to think about key staff function, where the battle rhythm meetings are going to go, the daily commanders update brief was at 07:00 and afternoon one was, I think, at 15:30, I can't remember exactly that one, and I know that one was at 07:00. But,

anyway, so, we had to be available to send the right representatives to those things and practically speaking we still had to have staff function to run the squadron. So not a lot of meetings going on during that time. So as a result, I think you see the staff function during the, you know, the midnight crew.

I think, I don't know what we actually called the third shift but he was, kind of, a natural to fit in there. The other thing is, (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) has been in the fleet for, you know, a year and a half at this point; he's in a section lead work-up; as far as proficiency within the squadron, he had more than, I would say, the average folks did, at least that was my perception.

And I did that somewhat based on my amount of time with him. So I had flown with him personally in the same aircraft on the 20th of November, not long prior to this we did aerial refueling, we went out and did some rehearsal of our wartime mission as part of an [inaudible] in the [inaudible] same range where the mishap would occur. I had flown with him on the road as part of his section lead workup and the other airplane with (5)(3)(A),(b)(6) now, so flight lead down to Okinawa over four something called (5)(3)(A) [ph]. Is it a CAS Frago we had, so out of Kadena, and we did stuff in the CTA and then out over the W-174. So I had seen these guys fly day and night, you know, within a [inaudible] on time, 45 days, whatever

that is.

We judged that he was good enough to be section lead workup. So I'd seen a lot of these guys and I had no issues with his, you know, the way he handled himself. I felt like he was mature; felt like he was a professional; felt like he prepared; and, you know, really the final thing there was, hey, he had out of everybody the most time, kind of, in the squadron to handle something like that as a DASH-2 pilot and it's like one of those, he had no kids around to distract him.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So why'd you pick (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) to be in his back seat?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, ran out of -- I won't say, you know -- again, some of this is how who's left over. Only had, I think 14 WIZO's to start with. You start putting a lot of more senior ammo, myself, [inaudible], DOSS turned XO, DOSS turned XO would have been on that mission had he not been on PTAD.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: Where was he PTAD?

: He was -
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: Is that (b) (3) (A), ? [sic]
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: What's that? (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It was kind of --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Like Marine Corps business?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It was like a, kind of, like a leadership development thing that -- maybe that's the wrong term to use -- he probably technically was on leave.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : But it was, kind of, like a training, kind of, thing. It was a leadership development --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It was a scheduled event? It had been scheduled --

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Scheduled, scheduled for some time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- for some time. So you had approved his absence in whatever context, months or weeks before the ULT became apparent?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I did. Before we even knew we were going to have to execute it. You know, our SA at that time was, hey Vigilant Ace is canceled based on what national command authority wanted to see happen. I didn't think that our leadership would basically say "we don't care what the president thinks, we're going to execute anyway." That's really what the perception was.

Everybody was like, roger that, you know it's I guess a lawful

order. And so we did everything we could to pivot back in and get there.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Your nonverbals indicate a little bit of frustration with the fact that after the Vigilant Ace was canceled, you guys were asked to execute on the same schedule and I've heard that from others too. How would you articulate that? Was there confusion about the purpose and a confusion about the plan?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Massive confusion about both.

And, in fact, the Thursday -- let's see, the Wednesday prior, I finally said "Ops O, what are we doing?"

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : To the MAG or squadron Ops O?

Exercise to the squadron, and he was very frustrated. He had been in a number of these meetings and, I mean, he is a blue chip guy too. (b)(3)(A)(b)(6) is as fine as they come, recruited to come out here, very few people will come out here of quality, to be honest with you. But, that aren't, kind of, forced. He came out here because he, kind of, believed in in, kind of, changing, trying to change things. And he's one who was very inclined for action and try to get things done, and so he worked it pretty hard. What the flows were going to be like, they were all over the place. MAG's plans officer had turned over, so it went from (b)(3)(A),(5)(6) [ph] to (5)(3)(A),(b)(6) [ph]. In close

proximity to this, or just prior to this, what was going to be MAG-ULT nobody knew. Nobody knew, none of the squadron guys, none of the commanders knew, frankly, right up until execution.

So on the Wednesday prior, I finally called over to the boss and I said, "I heard that they were having a coronation meeting" I said, "Sir, I would like come and attend this, because right now I can't understand what it is that our tasking is really going to be. And I don't know what it is that we are going to do and I don't think I can effectively --" I think I even used the term "--mitigate the risks without, kind of, understanding what it is that we are being tasked for." Is this an OPlan rehearsal? Is this a personal task, trainer on the following skill sets? Is this sorority generation? You know, what is the tasking going to be? And he said to me "Oh that's good information (a)(3). Come on over to this meeting, you're welcome to anything thefe."

The staff when I showed up was a little surprised to see me there and I think, you know, they're a little frustrated because I think they felt like my staff hadn't communicated with me but it became really apparent that we had massive holes in the plan. I mean, there were no slides presented, there were no flows discussed.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Were you provided JTARS outside of like a typical ATO cycle?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No. We were provided -- basically, nothing but what the flow -- flight flow should be.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And by flow you mean like a one slide Powerpoint with the gant chart that showed like a long horizontal line that --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Gant chart, exactly.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- with your squadrons name on it to takeoff and land?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Takeoffs and lands and locations and ranges. And a lot of those integrated assets, you know, in each one of these spots, you know, so looking at them in [inaudible] well what are the missions supposed to be for here? A lot of the times it was "well, you guys are just going to figure that out on the squadron level."

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : So then what's the purpose of the exercise?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Great question, sir. I don't think we ever established that to be honest with you. So after that, there was not a whole -- was (b) (6), going to be open or not (b) (1) for operations? It was not known whether or not it would be on the Wednesday prior. The wing obviously had great interest in making that happen. We obviously want to get in there, there is a

well-intended and well-intentions policy to try to maximize our [inaudible] operations, support that completely. My prior job was plans officer, as the MAG-12 Plans Officer before I became the commander, sir. Everything that's involved in, you know -- which we won't go into detail -- is part of that branch out. So again, I want to maximize what we're doing over there too. But there's a lot of limitations to this and a lot of limitations to taking, you know, certain flows and applying them like worst case scenario, kind of flows, and applying them to daily training operations.

A number of violations of the F-18 admin SOP were basically presented as a result of this.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So your higher headquarters directed you to exceed the 6.5 hour flight hour window?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : They exceeded -- well, I don't know one hundred percent that to be true. It was close to that. The real one was the amount of sororities. So it would be like four sororities in a day, you know, not being beyond what we're supposed to.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Who has the waiver authority for that? (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Unclear based on the SOP.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did the MAG CO provide you a signed waiver for anything outside of that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Once he -- well once that was brought to his attention, he said "we're not going to exceed anything in the fourth sorority bit." But we're still --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Were there F-18 crews on the MAG staff familiar with the F-18 admin SOP?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That should have been familiar with those restrictions preparing those flows?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes. Definitely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And how many days before execution did you come to be aware of this direction coming down that exceeded the safety SOP's?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Two or three.

b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Like Thursday or Friday?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Like Thursday or Friday.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Probably Thursday. So we were going to have a confirmation brief on Thursday.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And the confirmation brief was a little more admiring of the problem, I would say, from the previous day. It was a bunch of guys around circled talking about "hey, well

(b) (6), (b) (1) (B) is still off. We're still working it." Those kinds of (b) (1) (B) things. It wasn't like you would expect "hey, here's the slides, here's the -- how we're stepping through, hey, this is our mission, this is our," you know, like we do for everything that we go and execute. Every DFT, you know expected to provide that for the --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So (b) (3), I'm trying to focus on things (A), that you can control and things you can't. And I fully understand and appreciate the fact that this was, frankly, a half baked bag of trash as far as the plan goes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And that's not okay. And I'm going to address that in my report, but to take it back to the things that you can control.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Why'd you pick (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) ?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Oh that's right. Yes, about that. I mean, frankly, he was -- it's experience based. He's been in the fleet a couple years, you know, he's been on every deployment that we've done, you know --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : But you said that you picked (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (b) (6) (c) (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (c) (d) (d) (d) (d) (e) (e) (e) (e) (e) (e) (finitely has (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (finitely has (b) (finitely has (b)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you did the best you could with the crews.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I did.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : But, sir, you know, looking back on it I'm like, you know, those (b) (3) (A). -- probably was very hard (b) (6) for him to adjust.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. Did -- was there ever discussion about the use of Ambien or no-go pills -- go pills?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes. There was.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Tell me a little bit about that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So the Thursday prior, as we did our confirmation brief here. Air quotes with my hands, sir. This

came up from COVMFA it'll be 225.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Your adjacent fighter commander?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Adjacent fighter commander,

[ph], tremendous respect for her, great teammates and did a lot of stuff right. And then very supportive of us before and after and during. So he probably said, "hey, you know, these flows are beyond our normal operations -- 24 hour operations is abnormal for us. I'm going to ask -- request permission for performance enhancing drugs in order to make it through these flows." And he said, "would you support that idea?" and I said "Absolutely, that makes sense, I wish I would have thought of that, I did not think of it." So I said I would like to be included on that request.

And so he routed up, he talked to it with (b)(3)(A),(b)(6), like it was all very positive and then that goes downrange and then it get's returned. And it's very clear when it was rejected. So we got very clear information that --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you had the perception that yourself and your adjacent commander thought it was reasonable and you took it to your higher headquarters (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and was accepted as something that he would forward to the wing.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And (b) (3) was reasonably (A), (b) supportive, he didn't say absolutely not, I guess, immediately. And then it's your perception that was forwarded to the Wing Commanding General, General Weidley. General Weidley said no and then it's communicated back down as a no.

Exercise Exe

Now, I'll say this as a sidenote, that the use of Ambien is prevalent throughout all of aviation. If you ask the guys coming from OIR right now, they know whether or not -- how many of their guys are flying six and a half hour sororities over Syria right now, all their night shift guys are doing this. And they're doing the opposite too. They're using their go-pills too.

I don't think that there was -- I think I was surprised.

I was surprised by the commanding generals response to that, but,

again, it's lawful authority to say yes or no to this and so we complied. At least I thought we did.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you think that decision could have in any way contributed to the mishap? Do you think if you guys would have had Ambien perhaps (b) (3) (A), (b) or (b) (3) may have been better (6) (A), (b) rested, potentially? Would you care (6) to speculate?

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6) : I would speculate that, I would say yes. I don't know what caused the loss of -- weird things about being a squad commander through a mishap is how everybody's -- you know everything and then you know nothing. Now suddenly, everybody can tell you about anything that occurred. So I only have in my mind what I think has happened here but somebody didn't fly formation off of a plan they're supposed to fly formation on, or they really want to wear sacred trust. Now what led to that, I don't know. Whether or not he is inattention or his fatigue factor were causal factors, I'm sure you gentlemen will look into and determine. That very well could be a factor here, was that he was not adequately rested.

What we did to try to get him on path was we identified these crews, we did a brief on Thursday prior -- I think it was Thursday or the, yeah, it was Thursday -- Opso put together a good thing. He talked about, hey, the combat capabilities, and that's

another thing that we did is. We balanced our crews, we looked at, you know, what qualifications we had and tried to balance them out, because really this is what we were going to try to go downrange with if we had to. Their idea was, we're going to pivot this in to take it in if we have to [inaudible]. I was going to go, and so that we were prepared to execute every possible mission and all these cells with minimum adjusting of schedules.

So by the time this gets to Wednesday, I mean, these guys have had, you know, six days of prep time. Now that's not always easy to adjust your schedule, that's for sure. But that's about as much lead time as we had, we gave it to them.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So what field grade officer did you put on the night crew to supervise the night crew? The late shift. Did you have a -- what Lieutenant Colonel or Major?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Oh, I didn't have any -- I don't think I had any Majors on that pit or Lieutenant Colonel's. I did have -- (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) would have been there, had he not been gone. He was assigned to that shift, if you will. But I didn't have any field grade in that particular --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So the only field grade officer you had assigned to that shift was on leave?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Correct, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You know, the shifts though, again, are [inaudible] my XO at the time, right, is on the next shift over. So we're trying to maximize, again, we're staggering these throughout the day.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So how late is your XO? How late is your XO able to remain on -- in squadron spaces and not violate his crew rest for the next day?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah, 12. He can basically be able to stay there for the 12 hours and I can go back and probably produce probably have that document. I can show you what the crew, the bits is, but the non-availability of the senior leadership was, you know, not a lot of the day. You know, it was not like 12 hours or something like that. But admittedly, it was during this time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you think that your XO would have been there for (b) (3) (A), (p) (6) flight brief? Would he had (b) (6) (6) been -- would he have been able to stay late enough to observe their flight brief or do you think they were briefing?

Just what's your instinct? I have the records. I'm just curious what your preparation is.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I think he would've been around for their flight prep period for sure. I don't know a

hundred percent. Now, that day, this is --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's part of it, because that day was non-standard, right?

: That day was non-standard. day. And so in the whole irony of this day was the (b) (6) The irony of all irony is we went from not being able [inaudible]. to operate in (b)(6), at all to the only place we can operate on the 5th of Decembe $^{(B)}$ is operations in and out of So if I only got turned on that we would land there, National Day of Mourning for President George H. W. Bush was mandated by the POTUS to be observed and we decided what we could and could not listen to, again. And this was like, well, let's keep this exercise going and just do the on Pan stuff. No local flying. In fact, that evening, MAG Commander mandated that we did not have APU's on, until after midnight. So the auxillary power didn't start the airplane up until after midnight in order to fully adhere what the, you know, wings guidance on that would be.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Which was just a few hours before the actual mishap.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It was. It was the start of this. Yes, absolutely, sir. So, yeah, it is a factor. And the XO and AAMO, so we were very vigilant about taking a look at what we

thought was the bigger hazard to our flight operations that day, which was flying in and out of a field of which is shorter than our F-18 SOP states. You know, 8,000 feet is our normal. This is 7,000 feet at (b)(6),(b) We were going to mitigate that by putting in M-31 (1)(B) here. It was not installed in time due to a multitude of evactions. So we're hyper focused on all right.

What is our, what are we going to do for fuel? What are we going to do for landing weight? What are we going to be allowed for ordnance operations there? What crew pairings are we going to put into this field situation? You know, so that is taking up pretty much over, cognitive abilities that are going into that day. Again, we've already done a couple days of operations at this point. So that gets probably wire brushed to the end degree.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Sir, were your shifts already set though, before you had to work the (b) (6), problem?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, yes. We set the shifts on the, again, the Thursday prior. We're trying to, again, we're trying to adjust the [inaudible].

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : But to your point, the on again, off again with regard to (b) (6), (b) (1) (B) took away from your unit capacity to manage flight operations normally, because you had distracted attention basically on (b) (6), (b)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And it took away from your ability to supervise over here. Would that be a fair assessment?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I think that's fair.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [Inaudible.]

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : Yeah, I would get this -- you know, we looked at, okay. We definitely looked at [inaudible] deliberately and said, okay, what will we do with this? And our answer was, we will dumb down basically what we're doing during these times to [inaudible] so you'll see on my schedule that evening, was a -- basically doing an all weather intercept. They -- one of the simplest things that we do. Two airplanes go down to the training range, no integration with outside agencies. One spot, and just looking at each other and establish blocks and very, very simple.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you're getting into the schedule now. So were you surprised -- when you were notified of the mishap, were you surprised to learn that they were conducting aerial refueling?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : In my mind, I did not remember it being there, but I thought, you know, again, this is the context of the MAG exercise. Okay. It did not surprise me that a tanker was put into this problem, because, you know -- let's take a quick

example --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I'm familiar with the O Plan. So, I'm familiar with the flows in general. So I think what you're saying is, another way of what you're saying is that you're not surprised that your crews were shifted to a different part of the plan, to basically support C-130 training by serving as a surrogate for perhaps another platform.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. And I looked at this as, hey, you know, what role does the MAG operations center play view this very much as like launch aboard change type of authority? You know, so like.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Like a tact.

exactly what they're trying to be, is a tact forward and so it did not surprise me that something like that would change. And I think that's an important context that A, there's a standalone flight schedule and I'm not in any way suggesting that we don't ORM everything that's on the signed flight schedule. What I am saying, looking at it in the context of an exercise is different. There is somebody who has overarching authority that's higher than the squadron commander in these instances and is probably going to make changes. The wing SOP and others really doesn't account for it

because the contextualism or -- it's not contextualized properly into that exercise mindset. You know, if we were sitting out there and, you know, the exercise that you go to and an asset appears, you know, that wasn't on the schedule. That's not the flight lead making a [inaudible] the schedule change, it is, you know, the command control making a within their purview launch aboard change decision.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So is it your perception that through the MAG flow, affectively ordered your crews to go to the tanker?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. It is.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So is it your perception in that same context that if your crews would have refused to go to the tanker, they would have been basically saying no to (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) ? Not to get in the context of refusing a lawful order, but they would have been say no to higher headquarters?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. Just like, I perceived flying during the time, is not necessarily an optional thing. Now, you know, I did -- I can and did personally stop things that week that I did not feel comfortable executing. I was the very first mission commander out the gate the first day and I took that on because I thought it was important, responsibilities of a squadron

commander is to lead from the front and show what could be done.

The other thing is, I wanted to -- I knew the weather was very tough that first Monday and I knew that it involved a lot of assets and I knew our guys hadn't flown that much. And so I wanted to make sure I was up close and personal with all those decisions. And I canceled the first one.

b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : So did you get -- so we all know that air refueling was not on your daily flight schedule which you signed, so therefore it was not deliberately ORM because it couldn't have been because it wasn't on the flight schedule. And there wasn't a tanker note on the schedule, so -- and we also know that b)(3)(A),(b)(6) learned that he was going to go conduct air refueling when the tanker crew called your ODO. So now, we have what I would call a change to the flight schedule. Though directed from MAG through the MGR to your ready room, would you -- would it have been normal for b)(3)(A),(b)(6) to call you at home at say 2100 and get your permission to execute that, or would you expect him to execute that air refueling without seeking approval from the commanding officer for a squadron flight schedule change?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I've thought a lot about this in anticipation for this question. Fairly, and honestly, I would not have viewed that as a bona fide schedule change before.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Tell me why.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I would view this as a, in fact, I would've said great. I mean we're getting no tactical training, nothing that moves the needle whatsoever out of this particular block of time other than flying two jets through burning dead dinosaurs through that time of day. Getting out there and actually hitting something that refreshes the code and builds a practical skill would be good.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So the code that he refreshed would be the 2202 night tanker code in the Hornet?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It would. 2202.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Does that sound right? So how do you know that (b) (3) (A), (b) was current and proficient and going to the night (6) tanker?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : I had -- well I remember that he done it during Australia.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He went to the night tanker in Australia?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He did.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Were you in the cock pit with him?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I was not, but I remember it. I think it was somewhere like on the beginning of, it was either the 2nd or the 6th of August. I was in the tanker with him -- so, you

know, he was, he would've been proficient to do this though because I knew for a fact that he had gone to the day tanker. I had gone with him on the 20th of November in the same airplane so he had the prerequisite and he was night current which I had flown with him, again, in the previous month. So he was completely legal to do this. And that's how -- he was unked, for instance, and hadn't tanked in Australia he wouldn't be current. He would have still met all the wickets to go that night.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) \cdot Even if it was his first trip to the tanker? The night tanker?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Not if it was his first trip ever.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : What if it was his first trip ever? What would be different?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, actually -- if it was his first trip ever, he probably would have recently gone through probably his NS syllabus as well. Really the only requirement is to go up to the night tanker. Assuming that he went to the day tanker.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

: That's really all it is on the T&R prerequisite, I believe 2201 and then 2202.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So I mean, obviously first time

somebody does something you always treat it a little bit differently. You are trying to --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Is that what you call an initial X? Do you guys use that term in Hornet land?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We would use our 18 attain code.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Or evaluating --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And every attain is always evaluated.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And by evaluated, does that mean a grade sheet is generated?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Should be a grade sheet generated for each one of these?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Does that also mean there's more deliberate planning and briefing about the special considerations associated with that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : To be completed.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So do you believe that happened on either the 2nd or the 6th of August in Australia?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, that wouldn't have been the first time he had been to the tanker in Australia.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : When do you think he went to the first night tanker?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Oh, probably a year or more before that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What's the reflight currency for the night tanker?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : 365 days.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What happens when you go outside of that with regard to a grade sheet and an evaluation and a brief?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Technically speaking, you should go back and get a new -- and get a grade sheet for anything you're "unq" on. I would say we're not -- probably culturally, we don't do that as much. Two thousand level codes. Once people are through, like, what used to be the Combat Wingman Syllabus, you know, once they're through the, kind of, CAT-1 period.

But by the book, you should.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So my records indicate that I can find no record of him going to the night tanker, other than him going in the FRS in July of 2017, which is a night unaided tanker for which he has a 2202 and a grade sheet.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I can't find any night tanker codes in August, nor can I find any grade sheets in August.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Now, I'm not saying he didn't go in

August. I'm not calling you a liar. Okay? I'm just telling you I

don't have a grade sheet for that. I don't have a 2202.

The only 2202 anywhere on MSHARP for him is in July of 2017, which would have been night unaided. So part of my job is to see how much training(b)(3)(A),(b) has had.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [Non verbal response]

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And as best I can tell, the night of the mishap was the first time he ever went to the night tanker with goggles on his face.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : A lot of people have told me that he went in August because everybody went in August. It's not in MSHARP and I don't have a grade sheet.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So if you have the opportunity to get with your guys and dig through that and let me know.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I'll dig through it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I asked your Opso, the last guy I talked to, and I asked him some pretty tough questions about this because I understand. I'm a former squadron commander; former operations officer much like yourself. I'm just a few years ahead of you. And I know that trust and confidence we put in those folks to bring you

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Certainly.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- what I'm getting at.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, I would -- it was not my SA that this was an initial code by a long stretch. And if he hadn't completed a 2000 level code like that, then he wouldn't have -- shouldn't have been in the section lead syllabus yet. So my SA was that he was done with that. So I guess we had to go back and look at the records and determine that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Which I will do so.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : All right.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That I -- I did not experience -- I did not think that he was the new guy --

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : That's the genesis of the email exchange we had.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So I asked you to email records on that because I figured you'd have it T-ed up. And I've done my research. And then, I got yours and yours is different than mine. So again, these aren't fancy lawyer tricks. I'm not trying to trick you into anything. I'm just being very transparent with you. I cannot document that (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) had ever been to the tanker at night with goggles on his face. And I'm just curious, if you have any personal experience.

Did you fly with him, or were you in a flight?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Not that I remember. Now, we were supposed to go on that same blue crew night time. So I flew with him quite a lot at night time down in -- I don't know how many hours -- but down in blue crew night over the -- Halloween night. So that's what I remember that, but --

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : So October of 18, so just a few months before the mishap.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. October 18 and I think the first two days of November.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And so we flew night operations during that. And I really saw no issues that led me to believe that he had any kind of issues maintaining altitude, time, flying

formation, or anything else on the goggles.

We did daytime tanking. They were supposed to go at night. We canceled the night tanker, basically, because we didn't need it as much. It was in a -- I don't want to waste -- I knew how they were on sorties and everything else, and I didn't want to waste them based on that, hey, we can put them out on the 174. You know, I thought a lot about that. I was like, boy, if we had gone there, maybe we could have gotten a couple more swings at the bat. But, I think, if you look at it from what I know, he had no problems tanking. You know, he tanked; he got gas. You know, somewhere post-AR is the, I think, the issue, from what my SA is. And so how that breakdown in formation occurred post-tanking is what the crux of the matter is. And I, for one, am really looking forward to finding out what happened.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Okay. And I'd be happy to discuss that with you candidly outside the interview.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : And what I'm asking you is to provide me documentation of his night currency at the tanker, when you can.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. Will do.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Thank you. Just take a look and see what you have in your records. Please don't go and make anything up.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Of course not.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : But just go look through and see what you got.

Okay. You said earlier that you have got 2700 hours or so in the hornet. And I would assume you've got 1000 hours or so in the goggles?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Probably sir. I'm not sure, to be honest with you.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : A couple hundred? A lot?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : A lot. A lot.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : More than most?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : A lot.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And that's why you're the CO. And of those hours, roughly, how much with the 11 and how much with the 9?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Much more with the 9's. The 11's came out while I was at MAWTS-1, and there weren't a lot of them around. But at once I discovered the 11's, I did gravitate towards them. I was comfortable wearing them. They seemed lighter to me. And of course, you get the injected video of the [inaudible] cueing system, which is a massive, you know, kind of force enabler for us. Good for SA.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What kind of transition training did you

personally experience going from the ANVS-9 to ANVS-11?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We received a brief on, basically, the capabilities from the AMPSO.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What are some of the key limitations?

I'm familiar with the capabilities. What are some limitations with the ANVS-11 compared to the ANVS-9?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, just that the overall visual acuity -- not as good. Obviously, you don't have the ability to do the diopter adjustment. So if you have any kind of weird stuff going on, you know, you're not 20/20 vision, you're never going to improve or align each eye. So there is that.

Of course there is one battery instead of two, but you get your -- it's powered by the --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Is there any difference in performance in highlight level and lowlight conditions between the 9 and the 11 that you recall from your briefs?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : I'm sure the 11 is degraded. I don't remember specifically, but probably not as good in lowlight level.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Why would you think the 11's not as good as the 9 in lowlight level?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It seemed like the 11 in general

has a lot of -- I don't remember that. I just remember there was some kind of strange thing with -- it made some compromises to make the injected video, I think, and to get a little lighter. But I have never personally noticed a lot of difference with it flying with them. And so that could be because I just got comfortable with the 11's. But I really like the 11's. And I also think, like, when you look at being able to see the PPLI's, for instance, you're able to see if it's the precise participant locator information is over in the Line 16 network. Now you can see that in the JHMCS. So your wingman, you see him. Like where they are in the helmet, which helps you find them faster. You know, so there's a lot of benefits to that. You know, in a sense of you being able to cue your weapons, or be able to look down and see, you know, a target at night and say, All right, I want to --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : How do they help you maintain your formation with the tanker once you're established in the stern and in the basket?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, they're --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So what's the proximity to tanker?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : There I think you're seeing -- now you're rendering more your traditional kind of -- you know, it just helps you to see the silhouette of the airplane. I mean, you can

see the plane better than actually seeing and, like, interpreting formation lights, which is, I think, different for people.

So tanking aided is like ops normal. Out of all the people I've flown with, I've almost never seen anybody -- except for, I mean, years ago that preferred to tank unaided. Most of those were brand new folks that just hadn't built up a comfort level. But almost every experienced person I have ever seen prefers goggles for non-goggles. So those ANVS-9's and 11's.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What's the benefit of tanking aided as opposed to tanking unaided? What's the benefit?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I think the benefit is you actually see more actual detail and it's closer experience to day tanking, the experience. I mean, again, you're looking at checkpoints and you're seeing -- of course, you're looking through a sensor; it's still a sensor -- but you're looking at the other airplane proper. At, you know, night tanking, you're not seeing really anything but the formation lights itself.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Night unaided tanking?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Night unaided tanking. And now you're required to kind of interpret those, you know, those lights, which is not as natural for some folks. So, I mean, there's a sense that, you know, there's a big -- I'm not saying that we don't look

at (b) 's with, you know, as an important sensor that's your --

(A)
(b)
(b)
(6)
communities tank aided in the U.S.?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, I mean, other than, like harrier guys?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, I know they do. It's become -- I mean, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) brought this up just this morning. I was surprised to hear --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Which I'm shocked at.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : I have the references over here. I'll show you when we're done.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I believe it. And I think that the only reason that the F-35 guys don't is because, basically, they just -- they're -- the way their system is set up right now. That's been a cultural discussion.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : But as far as the Navy not doing

it, I'm kind of surprised at that. The Air Force, the reason that I'm sure that they don't do it is because their strap tanking is fundamentally different than perb and drogue. Number one and number two, their tankers don't have covert lighting. So if you don't have the ability to -- and if our tankers couldn't do that, then tanking aided would be a significantly different experience. So if you can get rid of all those --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, you're almost as old as me, so you may already remember going to the old C-130 --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I do.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- where they tape up the lights before they took off. Then, you'd go find them and you'd ask them to turn the lights on. They'd say, dude, they're on. I just got duct tape over them. So I think we kind of ended up there in part because the old tankers were effectively preflight set to covert, is what I think its true. I'm telling you what I think. But I think that led us to this direction to some extent.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I mean it was pretty normal to see the covert lighting tanking so -

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- I was not uncomfortable with that at all.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What do you know about search and rescue capabilities here in Iwakuni before the mishap. If you could try to put yourself before the mishap.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We had the benefit of knowing, somewhat, about the VMFA-115 mishap that took place in almost two years prior. I think on the same day, same range.

We knew that the coordination effort there, you know, that the Americans kind of got in the Japanese way a little bit. And we got into a strange, kind of, like, information dooloop with them.

So we knew enough that, hey, the Base Operations Center will be our principle liaison to Japanese SAR. We knew that the U.S. 2's, that the helicopters would be available to us. We knew that their P3's would be out there.

But we also were very much aware that we did not have

American SAR assets anywhere within a reasonable response. We knew
this was going to be a Japanese-led effort. And basically, we were
going to count on them, other than our own initial, you know,
reports and ability to see people with our own sensors.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So what did you think the response time was at 2:00 a.m. from Iwakuni to the center of the intersouth where you scheduled your crews to go?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Where I expected it to be was like

a 30 minute response time. I think that the --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You said "30 minute response time," so 100 mile an hour helicopter, so 50 miles away. So you thought

(b) (3) and (b) (3) (A), would only be about 50 miles from Iwakuni? (A), (b) (b) (6)

(6) (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : About 50 minutes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Fifty minutes?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Yes, sir. Yeah. I didn't think that they would be -- it would take --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You said 5-0, right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : About an hour? Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : About an hour.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : About an hour away.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I thought they would be in the water for no longer than -- that they'd be able to be out there, you know, response to take off, 30 minutes and get out there and find them in that amount of time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So you're surprised to learn that it took several hours for, using (b) (3) as an example before he was (A), (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I was surprised that -- I now found out that it's a two-hour response time, which we did not

know.

believe the alert disposition of the search and rescue crews varies based on normal flying hours in the middle of the night. And during the preparation for the MAG ULT, did your higher headquarters ever provide you with any updated information about SAR response and capabilities during your third shift fly window that you could use to identify risk and mitigate them.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No. Definitely not. And something I should have thought of, you know. And I did not, you know, that didn't even -- we were kind of, like, I can't think that they're doing everything all the time. Of course they were going to have degraded operations during hours when things are not normally flying. So, I mean, this should have been something I thought of too. But, no. It definitely did not come from higher headquarters. And I think we're all surprised.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : (b) (6) , I'm not criticizing you. So don't

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Oh, sir, a lot of this is, you know --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I know it's tough.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- I look back and think -- I'm

not coming back at you at that. I'm, like, more at myself. You know, maybe I should have thought of that, and things like that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, I mean, we -- let me take a little out of that blow, right. We depend upon station to have the airfield open and the tower manned and the fuel trucks and all that other stuff, right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So those are higher headquarters' responsibilities.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And it is interesting, our relationship, on those front support agencies versus kind of other services. I mean, going down to Australia, there base was completely tied in with everything. That when the fighters were up that they, I mean, they had their medical folks were on alert, you know, waiting for anything to happen. And Marine Corps doesn't do that. I mean, the base guys are the base guys, and the operators are the operators. So, interesting.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So what does OPNAV 3710 say about anti-exposure suits? Are you familiar?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I am, sir. And it leaves a lot to subordinate discretion.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And in general, what does it say?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, in general, it gives some guidelines in terms of exposure times and puts a lot on me to basically decide it. You know, the old version was, you know, below 60 degrees. You know, basically scored on commanders as mandatory below being 50 and you know, air temperature 32 degrees. I issue the squadron a policy. It basically said 60 degrees was our, you know. Anytime it reached the water temperature there, that we would put them on.

Looking at this now with the times and everything else, you know, I'm taking a hard look at just every time we're over the water at night, just wearing them during the winter month? We lose nothing. They're better than these typhoon one yesterday. There are better suits than these.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You remember the white ones?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I do remember the white ones.

They used to choke the crap out of you.

So culturally, people don't want to do something different, so I understand that. And getting into airplanes with anything constraining you is tough. But the gear is better.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So do you have any idea what your personal -- and I'm asking you for your personal body type; you personally make your own decision. How long do you think you might

survive in 68 degrees of water if you're fully immersed in 68 degrees in water. Not in your raft, just floating in the ocean at 68 degrees.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I'm not sure how long. I know it would be several hours, but it wouldn't be pleasant.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Do you think you would have several hours of useful consciousness, and then you'd have a few more hours that you would be alive, do you think?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I think so. I think I would be somewhere probably in the 6 to 8 hour window.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : That would be my perception. I don't know --

again, this is to kind of, you know, we make a lot of decisions in the back of our mind. And so, I empathize with your position about not coming down on guys and forcing them to wear dry suits if you had a perception that it only takes a couple of hours to find you, and you can live for a couple of hours longer than that. So I think that's what you're communicating. That's what I'm hearing.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It is, sir. It is.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So do you have any reason why --

any explanations as to why (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) didn't call you at home and wake you up and say sir, is it cool if we go to the tanker?

: I believe that -- I'm not sure why he didn't call me. I would have said yes, without hesitation, over this. I would have just said make sure you brief it, which to my best knowledge that he did. And I think his perception, again, was one of exercise versus individual squadron changes. I think he would have viewed this as a -- I'm not sure 100 percent; I haven't talked to him specifically about this -- but I think he would have viewed this as a, not so much as a schedule change, but as a directed additional mission skill. You know, core skill being injected into mission.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Like a FRAG from the TAC?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Like a FRAG from the TAC. And therefore, not looking at it as, hey, I'm changing what we're doing, you know. In retrospect, you know, I would have liked to have, you know, probably looked at that deliberately. With that being said, I think had he called me, I would have said, great, we're getting some training.

And, you know, as for, you know, maybe that goes to our mindset a little bit too. But I did not think that we were dangerously -- that we had reached to that low of proficiency that

we couldn't go accept fuel from a resource in which we had done several times in the previous two months with guys that had been in the fleet for a couple of years. But obviously what happened, happened. And like I said, that's on me.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Have you ever heard of anything like this happening before?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I've never hear of a no kidding, bona fide, aviation tanker collision to a hornet and KC-130. I'm sure that something like this has happened. I do -- I am aware of the mishap that occurred off of Okinawa probably two and a half years prior.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Two and a half years? Like in 2015, or so?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: It was before (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(b) (3) [ph] took command. And so that would have been two years (A), (b) (6)

before May. And I think it was somewhere that spring.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Well, what happened? Was a hornet and harrier collided?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No. It was a tanker. It was a SUMO [inaudible] VMGR-152 and KC-130J. And it was post-AAR, and it was a section of 242 bats and they, somehow, lost SA to where the tanker position was post-AAR. And they crossed flight paths and

ended up snagging, I believe, the right hose with the LAO-7.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Which is the wingtip of the hornet?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It is the wingtip of the hornet.

And somehow -- and apparently, yawed the aircraft and tore the hose off and brought it back to Kadena. And very interesting change of command. You know, nothing is mentioned for a while, I think. I

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you think it happened and that -- so you said (b) (3) [ph] wasn't the CO?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He wasn't.

don't think anybody reports it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So that would be (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) was the CO perhaps?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He was.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So (b) (3) was the CO of the bats in maybe (A), (b)

April 2016; had a midair collision with a C-130, but it wasn't investigated until after the change of command when (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ph] took over the squadron?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That is correct. That is my -(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I'm asking you that because I think you were at the MAG soon after that, right?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : About a year later I think I got to the MAG.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Oh, you weren't here to --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So I wasn't here for a year later, but I heard about it. It was not -- usually every hornet thing, I mean, I worked in the hallway at the time, so everything related to a hornet, there's a small group of us who would talk about it constantly. And it was -- this was one of those things that was almost under the woodwork. I mean under the -- can I say it? I don't know.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Under the rug? Under the radar?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It was under the radar. I mean, it wasn't really talked about or brought up. And somehow, I sniffed it out. Now, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) is working it up at DNV-98 at the time. We were down at the Commander's Course. I believe we figured this out in advance.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So if you were working in the hallway when that happened, and the attack air guys in the hallway weren't tracking it, what capability did Headquarters Marine Corps Aviation have to implement controls and policy changes and material solutions that are, you know, basically to address it if they didn't know about it?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, I think eventually they found out about it. But it was -- I mean, because they did an SIR.

And while they reported it, I think it's a [inaudible] because I think there's no --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- didn't qualify. But it was -- I would have expected to get a lot -- I think I got it from the MAWTS guys actually. I think I was talking to some MAWTS guys down at -- where was I? MDTC maybe? Beaufort? I had gone down for some training. And I think it sniffed up out of there, and I got it printed off. In fact, that is where it came from. (b) (3) (A), (b) at the MAWTS-1 F-18 Division.

So then, we started talking about it and like, holy cow.

So I -- (b) (3) and I, you know, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (6) (6) Specific thing. And we were all surprised that how none of us had heard about it yet. And it was --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What policy changes were implemented by your predecessors to address that near-miss in 2016?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, I think what really happened was the MSHARP, you know, so you garbage in/garbage out. There was a lot of stuff that had been, I think, base-lined and done. So that was a first --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : When you say "base-line," do you mean

administrative entry of a T&R code into MSHARP that could produce erroneous results and --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I do.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- goon up the validation, basically?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That is exactly right, sir.

That's better than I could have said it. So my perception is that's what occurred there, and that the -- it was a section lead and an instruction kind of situation. It was the first time that that individual, apparently, had ever been to a tanker. It was that night. Very clearly not the way the T&R has it to be. There was also multiple mission things going on that evening. Apparently it was CAS, close air support, that they were providing. Again, I wasn't there at the time, but having read the SIR a few, you know, years ago -- and I guess I should be careful of what I say about that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : In retrospect, can you see how an outsider would see these two incidents as strikingly similar?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Oh, absolutely, sir. I mean, I am -- and as a guy who has talked about this and tankered this so [inaudible] in everything else. So just absolutely floored.

Absolutely floored that this would happen.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

thought was high percentage. I had failed people for tanker stuff and division-lead workups in Australia. I was like, that is not the way we join; that is not the way you stay; we don't do the non-standard joins. We all know that. So if this had been a very -- a point of emphasis, so I was a little shocked to find out that something like this has happened.

In my mind, though, it's like (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) not the type of person that I'd say that was going to go above and beyond.

And so something that -- he was not a super aggressive individual.

He was competent. He was good. But he was not like the rogue person that you'd think of that's just going to blow off orders and directives, number one. So I was shocked.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Is there anything that we haven't touched on that you'd like to add?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [Non verbal response.]

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : We've been going for a while. We can even take a break if you want to come back?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I feel good, sir. I don't know much else I have to say, other than, you know, when a great tragedy happens, I'm very interested in finding out the final details of exactly what occurred. I think the low -- in aggregate, we need to

look at -- people have talked about low flight hours and, you know, tactical hard deck. And trying to tie aviation readiness to, you know, what it's true cost is. And, you know, I never thought that I would be on the other end of that. I'm kind of trying to prove that case with the loss of life like we've had. Especially some close friends of mine. One of my, you know, me and

know, very, very tough to have to deal with that up close and personal. I think the inspections that we have, we need to look at what we do for those, and when we have them. Our wing maintenance inspection, which did not go well. Took apart, as a matter of practice, two of the air planes. It took us a long time to put them back together. You know, those are lost --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So it was a negative -- it did not achieve the intended benefit? It was actually a negative?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It was a negative. Now, hey, inspections happen. We got to have them otherwise other things go wrong. In the process of that inspection, we come to find out that we had, you know, SRCs -- can't remember what that stands for exactly, but basically keeping track of what's in what plane.

We discovered that, Oh my goodness, you know, we have our administrative procedures here are backwards. We need to fix this.

So we do the hard thing and take airplanes out of flying status to go through these line by line and make sure that we don't overfly anything and all the components are 100 percent. And books are where they're supposed to be in each plane.

Well, when you do that stuff to be diligent and to adhere to the orders, you have lost opportunity flight time. And that was a potential factor. I've kind of raked myself over the coals in bed about [inaudible] Now, I don't know what else I could have done, but, frankly, that articulating a little bit harder, that ain't -this is -- we're approaching at a lower proficiency level here. Our tasking should probably be reduced. Looking at the summer training det, and really the sequential approach to how you handle a forward deployed unit, we need to really deliberately look at -- and this is, I think, beyond the scope here, but looking -- it's really my charge to get to healthy and make a systemic healthy approach for every person that ends up here in command of an organization here. And everybody who operates here -- you have to have periods of, you know, where you go places to train, to adhere to the T&R, and do it right the first time. You can't drop a bomb from here, you know, so you want to train your Marines, shoot. All those things that you have, the full motion simulators have enough force or we have to go to CONUS to do those things. So really getting that right, healthy

approach is essential for us. And so we went to Australia this summer, and we did not receive the fly in supports of, you know, the visdu's that we're supposed to have. We received two over a more than 2 month deployed period. In my view, that was about a sixth of the requirement. And so as a result, you know, we did not fly as much as we should have. We had a time maintaining our aircraft. Our main body -- we got our last -- this just goes to show you the state of lifting in the theatre -- we go our last pallet back from pitch black on the 23rd of January. And so it deployed some time in July.

So this is the kind of situation that we find ourselves in. It's overcommitted and under-resourced. Now, the only thing we could do is, fairly, in the "what we could control," is say, let's do a little bit less. And be deliberate about what that less is that we do until we can get back up to a certain level of health. And that is essentially the case that I'm making now.

But I assure that just because I think it's contextual for this as all of that contributes into low -- dangerously low -- flight areas as you said an hour ago, the mounted hot board and where people are. You know, I think, okay, I could have probably whipped the ponies a little harder with maintenance at times.

My thought was that we were going to hurt somebody in the

maintenance department by putting undue pressure on people to get airplanes up when they don't have the right capacity to do it. So, you know, there's that side. That was very much weighing on me.

In retrospect, you know, wow. You know, maybe I should have pressed them a little harder so we could have gotten a little more flight time out of this. But obviously, no, sure, we're going to transpack a plane that had a major problem if we didn't be very deliberate about that. So that's a lot in there, but I try to be very -- I probably gave you too much editorial that's in there, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : This is your opportunity and you can always email me or make a written statement at any time as well.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Thank you, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Judge, is there anything that you need to clarify?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, sir.

b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You sure?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, (b) (3), I mean, you know, obviously we're as upset about this as you are. We are committed to getting to the bottom of it, you know. And I know your officers and others might feel like, you know, the Wing's out here looking for somebody to blame, and that's not what I'm doing. And I've had some really

tough conversations with people, my rank and higher, that it'd gone down the same line. So nobody is getting off. And we are going to figure out what we can do better, and I'll tell you -- I'm personally committed to it. Okay?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

[The witness was sworn and departed.]

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. My name is (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) . I have been assigned to conduct a command investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding an aviation accident of a C-130 and F-18.

I am here today with (b)(3)(A),(b)(6), and just to give him the opportunity to discuss with us what happened. And without further ado, I am assisted by (b)(3)(A),(b)(6), SJA.

And (b)(3)(A),(b)(6), I would like you to kind of start in the middle of the day for the flight event. You know, whatever you're comfortable, whatever the natural time is. Maybe when you reported for duty, or start with a brief time like that. And just kind of tell me about your day. And then, we'll climax with the cathartic event and recovery. Okay?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Sir, if it's okay, I'd like to start earlier than that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Just whenever you would like.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : I would like to start Thursday prior to the mishap.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. That would be great. What was that date Thursday before?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It would have been the, I think -- I forget how many days are in November, but it would have been the last day of November I believe.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. November 30th.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : All right. I'm listening.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So that is when a determination that MAG ULT and the timeline had come out as far as the windows. Our squadron elected to break us down into three shifts. I believe it was around a 1600, kind of all aircrew meeting in the ready room. He gave us the shifts. Myself and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) were going to be the senior guys on our shift. He was currently on leave, so I, in fact, became the senior guy on the shift that was about 2200 to 0800 in the morning.

I have done a combat deployment. I've got a fair amount of time flying during those hours and felt fairly comfortable with that. But, I knew my shift really hadn't so my immediate reaction was to pull them aside and then, kind of, talk to them about trying to circadian rhythm and how to set this up.

Fast forward into the next day, we had a 0900 Friday morning OTC meeting. It was all hands. We all had to get there, so Friday I was out for -- you know, Thursday night/Friday morning was out for our first day to transition into the circadian rhythm. I asked what the plan was on Wednesday night and into Thursday morning for the flight schedule. I was told, hey, we're looking for CMRR briefing; if you got an idea, send it. So my idea was to --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : C-M-R-R?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. So basically how we track our proficiency in our core T&R syllabus.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So it's like your MSHARP report? What is the acronym for CMRR?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It's been a while since I've been an officer. I couldn't actually tell you.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. But like your readiness percentage?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) And it's based on specific facets of --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : In trip codes --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Absolutely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So you're looking to increase readiness, I think, is what you're saying?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : To demonstrate quantifiable increase in training readiness by getting your CMRR up?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And that was --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I think we spell it CRP, so I think I'm tracking now.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : All right. Thank you.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Not a problem, sir. So I'd discuss that with the Opso. And we had a rare opportunity to be flying during that time of the night to fly in the seaside ATCA, which is overheard

(b) (3) (A), (b) [ph]. Which is something that we could use for urban CAS (6) at night, which is kind of limited in this area. So that was my

immediate reaction because that airfield closes at 2100. So we just wanted the airspace that a couple of guys hadn't really seen, so I was like, let's go do that because that fit our timelines.

So that's my plan Friday. Saturday/Sunday trying to do the standard transition. Struggled a little bit with that. Come into work Sunday night. Circadian rhythm-wise, the transition.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Ramping into the night page [inaudible].

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. Personally struggled with that a little bit, and then show up to work Sunday night. I believe I came in at about 2000 and was there until 0600 the next morning. At that point in time, we were on to fly at 2215, I think, was the tentative flow for Wednesday night/Thursday morning.

Monday, I come in -- and I come in at about 2100, that will kind of be a 2030 to 2100 will be a theme up until this night. On Monday night, I am told that we have shifted an hour and a half left, now with a 2100 takeoff time. So that is Wednesday we move into planning, so this affects my plan. Okay, I got to come in a little bit earlier on Tuesday evening. And, kind of, passing this floor plan that portion of the game.

Tuesday, still starting to sleep fairly well, getting adjusted to the shift. I'll get the word that Wednesday night has now shifted to a 0001 local start time, and we can't even go ANV's on before that. To my knowledge, at the time, I believed it was a Japanese holiday and they were quiet hours. I do not know at this moment if that is accurate. I've heard two or three different things as to why that truly was. But now, everybody's been coming

in -- you know, we've shifted left, everybody starts coming in a little bit earlier so everybody's sleep pattern starts shifting a little bit more. From there, we'll go, okay, let's go home early, try to go to sleep, and then come in no later than -- or no earlier than 2030/2045 kind of deal. So just because we now know that we're going to be 0001 local start, we are taking off -- I think the planned takeoff was 0030 -- and I'll talk about that night that -- how things went later -- and we were supposed to fly until 0415 in the morning.

So all that play into, just kinda, it's a pickup game with the CAS, night CAS/urban CAS drops out, so my plan goes away because now that airspace closes at midnight. So now we can't even start up before midnight, lose that airspace -- what I've been putting my planning into is gone. Not a huge factor, but just kind of, okay, what are we going to do in place? And I turn to Ops and Ops just kind of looks at me and goes, I don't know; yeah. So I was like, okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. Figure it out, right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Absolutely. So from that, it's been a lot of changes enclose. So go home, have the great day of sleep of Wednesday. Probably wake up -- and this is the day that I go into work leading into the mishap now. Go into work. I get there at -- I woke up at 1845. Probably been asleep for maybe eight and a half, nine hours. Maybe intermittently waking up in the middle of the day once or twice, then I hit the head. I got in to work 2030 to 2045. I don't remember exactly, but I walk into the ready room to a

phonecall from Major Burphy. He is on the other line. He is --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Major Burphy is who? What's his billet?

: He is the AOpso from 152. He is the aircrew from 152.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He tells me that he's in SUMO 4-1. He's flying that night, looking to give some gas, wanting to go home early kind of deal. I was like, okay. So I didn't know at the time

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Were you previously scheduled for night air refueling, or was that an add?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That was an add.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So if somebody in ops knew it, they didn't make the schedule, and I did not know about.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Until I had that phone call. We talked about it briefly. He said he was going to send over a CORDCARD, I said great. He sends a CORDCARD, and I say we'll see you out there.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : A CORDCARD is just like an AR card right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Absolutely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : ARCP? ARCT? Time? Place?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. There were "if" basics that we had discussed on the phone, was who was going to be in the Sierra 15 in the intersouth, so that is the northwest corner. And he told me at the time that he was going to be at 17,000 feet. And then 299-2

announced in there setting -- which if we're using that airspace, we typically go with a local, but non factor. As long as we talk about what else in their setting we're using, that we're on the same page, and I'm happy to do whatever the tankers say.

He sends over the CORDCARD. I print out five copies of the CORDCARD, one for every member of the flight as well as the ODO. From there, we go into our brief. Our brief was, we didn't go into the vault from that aspect, it wasn't standardized. We will go into the ready room. The scheduled brief time comes and goes, and we start probably 30 minutes before our intended walk-time to do this brief.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Can you help me -- so you normally brief -- what, two hours before takeoff?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Correct, sir. We briefed an hour and a half an hour prior.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So I just want to make sure this is right: So the schedule takeoff was 0030? I haven't seen any of the flight schedule or anything.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I believe so, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And you estimate that you started briefing about 2300?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Instead of 2230 approximately.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Reason being that, for that, I had an hour

block of time. Typically, I'll fill an hour with an admin-attack-admin execution. This mission said everything's falling apart from what I planned, I went with admin; that's it. So I didn't need the remaining time, by my own assessment.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So what it turned into was, I have a book in my bag that I keep out to brief admin. I break it out. I go through everything.

Elike a pocket techman or an ATOPS?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: Absolutely. But ours isn't our Attack SOP,
there's an appendix -- I think Appendix B is the briefing guide. So
I've got a card of that basically that I've been through. Just
finished FAI six/seven months ago, fire attack instructor. And then
so my admin brief was down to five or seven minutes. My brief that
night was ballpark 10 minutes. Leveraged largely off SOPs, and did
go through the NS training rules to an extent. Hindsight being
20/20, I wish I had gone into it in a lot more depth. But, that was
what it was. At the end of it, I made it very clear, hey, we're
going to go out; we're going to receive gas from the tanker; and,
we're going to come back to the line. And I will make a
determination if we have time to go back out or not.

Based on the introduction of the tanker and (b)(3)(A), (b)(6)

's crew day, were factors in that. So if there was unforseen -(A),(b)

(a) so, the intent -- the real intent of our mission set that night was to hot load the aircraft when we landed. The real intent of the mission really had nothing to do with us flying, other than to get

flight time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So I want to say back to you what I think you just told me. Is it: You guys were literally just taking off; going to the working area; find the tanker; grab a squirt; repunch your vice night AR code; and then come back at some reasonable schedule; land; and do a hot load?

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6) : Yes, sir. And take back off. And the take back off part was the crucial piece of that that I was willing to drop, but I've since, you know, heard the command's philosophy on it was that we don't treat it the same if you're just going back to line to shut down as you would if you were trying to [inaudible] and employ that ordinance. So that was really what our mission was, more so the hot loading. And nobody really knew about the AR from VMFA-242's perspective -- to my knowledge -- until I got there. As the senior guy on the shift, I felt that decision was left up to me to determine whether I felt comfortable doing that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Was the AR refueling code on the flight schedule?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, it was not, sir. As far as flight time goes, we did talk -- we did discuss currency briefly. I was the least current in the flight. I had 1.4 hours in 30 days (b) (3) (A), (b) I believe, it was over 10, I think it's 11 point (c) something. And then as far as the WIZO's currency, I don's t recall off the top of my head as my primary concern was the pilo(t currency. A There is no currency that we really honor in the attacker) community for a 2202, other than being night current.

b

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And a "2202" is a night fam?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : A "2202" is night AR, nonstrap. So non aided KC-135.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6) : From that, so I have determined that based on ORM, I am the long pole in the tent with 1.4 in 30; I haven't tanked in 30 days. Again, I go back to my experience level, with that I have probably gone to the tanker, and during those times -- or excuse me -- probably night tanked 400/500 times, and the fair majority of those coming at the hours that we were going flying. I felt comfortable. So from there we walk. My last kind of, hey, be careful, was (b) (3) (A) (b) (6) [ph]. He was a friend of mine, almost two years to the day he had perished in the intersouth. I just kind of remembered -- or reminded everybody of that. That hit me as we walked. So that was my way of saying, hey, keep your head on a swivel, you know, stuff happens.

Walk is standard. Start the jets. I'll immediately start troubleshooting my jet. We'll have a flight control system issue. It'll be -- it's basically a switchy valve that's failing based on the indications that I've got in the cockpit. I will have it -- I will shut down; I'll be off comms for a little while. Out of service, I'm back up, so that would cause a slight delay.

Again, we had the 0030 local takeoff. And then from there, the other piece of the information that dropped out was we were not going to do our final checks. So SUMO harrier had final checks as well. We weren't going to do it on the line that night.

They wanted us to do them over by the pits. I didn't see a reason for that, but we wound up honoring that. And that will actually drive us away and take more time, so our takeoff -- our walk time was not accurate.

Now, our walk time didn't really necessarily matter because we couldn't turn our APUs on before 0001 local anyways. So based on what we were doing in that start time, we were going to miss the 0030 local. I think we took off, to be exact, I think it was 0051, so 21 minutes after our scheduled departure time is our actual takeoff time.

Fairly standard on the departure. We'll goggle after passing 500 feet. I will hear, DASH-2, Goggle. Per the brief, you've been cleared out to ATC spread, so he's a nautical mile upbeam on altitude as we climb up. We'll get stepped up. I believe our --

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : [inaudible] with combat spread. I'm not familiar with ATC spread.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So basically admin spread.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Staying within one mile?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Absolutely. .8 to 1.0 during the day. New Attack SOP revision, it doesn't change for the night.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That way you don't have to go to non-standard formation?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So no issues with that. He's right in

position. I know it's night; it's been awhile, necessarily, since I've flown at night. I don't think the squadron had flown in nights in, right around, 30 days. So he may have been on a cross-country and done it. But, anyways, I'll give him as much sugar as I can over the aux radio. So I'm giving him my headings, my altitudes, airspeed exactly. If I'm deviating from, you know, what I had briefed, the 300 knots to 10,000 feet, 350 knots I'm climbing up from that. More than 4 or 5 knots fast or slow, I'm letting you know.

He's in position the whole way up. We'll actually penetrate a small layer. He will lose sight. Going through that, he never tightens up. I don't know if he saw under the goggles or not. I'll give him a direct command of, hey, 170 on the hang; stay where you're at, don't take the cut away. And then I'll shift three degrees left. I'm watching the harrier attack in, and we punch through, and he's right in position after about 1,000 foot cloud layer.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So let me pause you there so you can give me a little F-18 training. These jets have MIS or something. Do you have an electronic representation of who's position on your AHS, do you decide from what you know from harrier attack nav.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We do not because MITS was not functioning that night. So the harrier attack in and turnover time was what I used to make that determination, and that could be done safely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. No worries. Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We'll step up to -- I believe we get an

intermittent of 15,000, but ultimately 127,000 feet, flight level 270. We'll check into the intersouth; he'll be one nautical mile on my right-hand side. It'd be at 27,000 feet. We'll cancel 3 miles prior to seagull, which is the entry point. And then, once we hit seagull, we will talk to -- we'll just put that we're there out on the pry-freq, so area comm. We'll immediately get responded, SUMO 4-1. And this is where a slight difference from the CORDCARD happens, but it's -- I don't assess it to be a factor. He gives, hey, SUMO 4-1, I'm at 15,000 feet, when his CORDCARD had said 17,000 feet. At that point, I looked down at the clock. I believe it was 0108, or somewhere there about local. And I set an ARTC. It may have been a little bit later then, because I was sitting at 0135 local ARTC.

So this one may help if I draw it out on the board.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. We can definitely do that, or draw it on paper might be even better.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And you can do both, but we prefer --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Sure.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And while you're doing that, I want to ask you about weather. So you punched through a layer going up --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- and the tanker is at 15, any weather between say 10 and 27,000 feet in the working area?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. So there is a -- I would call it a "broke into overcast" layer from 10 to 12,000, and that is it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So it's clear above 12?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Lux was a -- it was a little lux night. I forget it off the top of my head, but we had talked to that as well. So intersouth is kind of a little bit on an angle, but it's basically a large box. Seagull is about here, and then the Sierra 15 track kind of runs something along those lines.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
: And that's an established tanker track?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
: I'm not familiar with their established tanker tracks, but once he told me inside the Sierra 15, I expected
left-hand turns, and probably 15 to 20 nautical mile legs.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. It's standard?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So we'll approach seagull. We are heading 1-7-0. I've got my radar net down pretty far. I know now that he's at 15, so my scan was a little bit above him. I'll drop it down and I'll never get SUMO. My assessment that he was probably somewhere here heading to the east based on time and space and how this works out again.

So I elect to stay at 27,000 feet, and we proceed. And there are other layers to this and it eventually does go further south, the airspace that we're talking about at this night. I will go all the way to the souther most of the northern portion of this airspace, and then I'll do an in-place turn at 275 miles. I tell (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) hey, I'm going to be at 275 knots, 27,000 feet,

and I'm going to be at a 30 degree angle of bank turn. That's not standard. Just giving him, again, a little bit more. He's flying decent form, but just, you know, again, I wasn't going to do it --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It might, to my knowledge from an attack form, is an in-place turn is when both aircraft execute 180 degree turn, right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You come out the back side on the opposite side, right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You end up, kind of, like --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You do cross the extended flight path of the aircraft. Absolutely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : The only thing the reason I said the 30 degrees angle of bank and it's 275 knots is because the standard for us is mil power G to maintain. Or 7a roughly. So and I would --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So it's like a big kind of a big floatie admin kind of turn?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. And that night, I didn't need to do that. So I was, just, like, hey, I'm going to be at 30 degrees angle of bank vice, you know, honking on the "G".

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Tracking.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So we'll proceed back to the north. I'll get radar SA of the tanker at, about, 40 nautical miles. I'll call it BRAA, I don't really hear anything. I don't necessarily expect him

to --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And "BRAA" is bearing, range, altitude, and aspect?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So from there, I tell -- I direct the flight down to 18,000 feet. (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) will establish communications with the tanker as we are starting down. Somewhere around 20 to -- excuse me, 22 to 20-ish thousand feet, the tanker will clear us down to 14,000 feet. He is aware that I have radar SA to him. So we never stop at 18. We continue down.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Can I ask you a little bit about comms? Sorry to interrupt so much.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you have two radios and one radar, right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We do, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And so you got one radio is on -- what are you doing with the comm 1?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Comm 1 is on area comm at this point. We have not been directed to the tanker [inaudible] freq. So that's where that is. And then we have our aux freq, which is inner flight communications.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And that's comm 2 or is that --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's comm 2, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Got it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : If we were in the link and we had MIDS, we'd also have Voice A, potentially Voice B.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. That's what I want to make sure I understand.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Thank you. Because that's what I'm not familiar with. So on what radio does (b) (3) use to (A), (b) communicate with the tanker, and on what frequency?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Primary radio.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He's on area comm?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He is on area comm.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So you're talking to the tanker on area comm?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Initially. They do push us to tanker pry.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. All right. Keep -- I just really want to understand if you have four radios or two going. That's what I want to make sure I was straight on.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Just two, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Cool. So (b) (3) has talked to the (A), (b) tanker. You've directed a descent down to, (6) think you said, 18?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Eighteen was our intermediary to stay above the tanker. Once the tanker feels comfortable, we have SA which I will provide. And tell him basically where we are and where he is. And tell him we are 35 miles apart at this point. He let's us go all the way down to 14.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We get down to 14 and I will start a right-hand turn to the East. And my assessment is the tanker is starting his left-hand turn back to the west right here on this track.

I get visual of the tanker just inside 33-ish, 30 miles.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What is his lighting configuration and what is yours?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He is -- we are all over at that point.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Very, very bright.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I just wonder how you saw him at 30 miles. That's pretty good.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And I'm sorry. Something else I kind of left out was, so we had -- I was ANVS-11 so NVCDs, so the only difference is -- you guys have the ANVS-9s; is that correct?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I'm a 9 guy. Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And that's what I started out with, sir, as well.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Is this a quad eye? What's an 11?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So an 11 is --

b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Big tubes?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : They're not that big, sir. The only real difference in them is that they amplify light a little bit more. And they also do JHMCS symbology through the actual goggles.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Do you wear JHMCS?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I was wearing JHMCS. Mine was not functioning, so I did not have JHMCS symbology.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So at this point inside of 30 to 25 miles-ish, I kind of look at the tanker and make an assessment. I believe he's off altitude. So I look at DASH-2 and I query, hey, does -- I call out the visual and get his eyes on the tanker, Does he look like he's off altitude to you? Yes.

Okay. So I go over pry myself and I query, hey, SUMO, just confirm 15,000 feet; 2-9-9-2-7. I don't tell him that he looks off altitude to me, but that's a way to just kind of drive his focus into his own cockpit, hey, if I'm off.

Turns out he wasn't. I don't know if I had a false horizon for a second or both of us did or just the light angle looked weird, but actually, no kidding, what I saw on mine was that we have T-T box around whatever we have a radar contact. It was below my horizon bar. So I will drop the flight down to, instead of 14,000 feet, we are going to have a 13-5 until I am comfortable with the tankers at 15,000 feet.

From there, I assess he is at about 12 nautical miles.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you were at 18. I copy that you went down to 18. I didn't copy you going from 18 to 14.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you talked to SUMO and SUMO cleared you down 14.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So that happens as I start this right-turn.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I think you said that, I just didn't pick up on it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, of course.

TC: Sorry to interrupt you. Could you just label that; put what your altitude was and that was when you made your turn.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So this is a descending turn and we are still probably at about 17k.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And you can use fighter symbology so you can do your little things like that and stuff, if you want.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. Apologies. So we're still dropping down. I am level at 14,000 feet here as the tanker is approximately there. That is when I get my -- the distance here is probably 22 nautical miles. So somewhere -- I'm going to put approximate. That's to my knowledge.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And then I will basically -- that is where I

--

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So the tanker is at 15?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : He is, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Can you label that? And you're at about

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Great.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : This is when I'll have my first query of DASH-2 if he looks off altitude. He says yes. I'll take the flight a step further. My arrows aren't going to match up. I wasn't necessarily planning this out all that well.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It's all right. It's just to help us communicate. That's good.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I'll drop it down to 13-5 just to -- as an extra safety factor here. As you can see, this turns into a 180-out join. The arrows are not representative of what takes place. He's probably -- he's definitely going this direction. We're probably closer back here. I early turn at about 12-ish miles to start the join; 180-out to 190-out join.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And you're going 300, the tanker is going 250, something like that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I was probably still going 275. I might have picked up a little bit in the descent, sir, so maybe 280 to 290.

But I was still slow.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What was your air refueling and your speed and all that; 230? Do you remember?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : That night specifically, it sticks out because it was a squadron number. We were 242 knots.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So he's tracking. We get to the join. The join is probably 150 [inaudible] to about 3 miles. At about two, I remember seeing 80 [inaudible]. So in my assessment, it's actually a slow join. I'm extremely conservative.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You're doing a 6 o'clock rendezvous, right? At about 150 knots in closure is kind of what you're telling me?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It's kind of how it turns out. That was not really my intent. It was --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It all seems to work out that way, though, right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You're always wasting gas running down the tanker.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And I did not pick the throttles up. So I saw that this point was coming and just waited and used geometry.

But this portion -- what my idea was --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Let's get you a new piece of paper.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And again, the join -- in my mind -- be a huge factor, but just to explain it. So the tanker is here. I'm here. I'll just draw us together. Start my turns. Something like that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And as it was, based on the position, I'll draw it in red. My assessment is -- with this arrow is -- this is where we're at. So we're just a little bit aft of that. A little bit slow on the join.

Again, based on where we are in time and space, I know in another 3 to 4 miles he is going to make that turn just based on the border. I'll let the geometry play out and join. And vice heating it up or using left-hand.

So the [inaudible] comms make the join at .5 undirected.

SUMO 4-1 will go overt on their own. To me, that means I'm dealing with a senior crew. Like, they've tanked before enough to know that at about a half mile, that's when my goggles are going to get ballooned out by their lights. I probably wouldn't have directed them for another two-tenths, probably down to a .3, but I was okay with it. And I didn't say anything about that at that point.

My wingman's flying form off me. I'm still overt and there was no issues noted at that point. We'll press in. He'll clear me to stern a little early. I get to about .2, so as far as up to position off of him --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) $\qquad \qquad \textbf{We got all the paper you need to use.}$

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : All right. Do you want number 2 on this?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : From this perspective -- I'm not an artist by any stretch of the imagination. Sorry.

I'm somewhere in this realm vice being in this realm when

he clears me to start. I feel comfortable with it. Clears Profane
1-1 right as Profane 1-2 left -- he does not clear him at left stern
yet. So I go right of stern. I can you tell the observers
definitely saw me because almost immediately as I was here, he will
clear Profane 1-2 a stern left. So we're sterned --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And that's why you said there was precontact, right? So you probe out, nose is cold, switch is safe, and you're like six feet off the basket to figure out the basket.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It's where you're going to be.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. Six to ten feet off the basket.

Yes, sir. Precontact went away. The reason it went away was because if you have radio cut out, it sounds like contact. So now it's just -- excuse me, I almost misspoke -- the stern. From that position, again, ANVS-9's amplify light a lot -- or excuse me.

ANVS-11's amplify light a lot more than the ANVS-9's. The only way I can shut up my IFR probe refueling light is with my pinky switch, which kills all my lights.

So I like to go midnight on the tanker because I can't see the basket. Once I do that, I'm still having trouble seeing the basket so I start driving it up a little bit. My assessment was that I was probably 60 feet from the basket. In reality, I was 80 to 100 feet, so my SA was probably about 20 feet off. I attributed that to depth perception, slight issue with the goggles, as I'm sure you've seen that as well, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Driving in. Standard from there. I'll hesitate in position probably 5 to 6 feet behind the basket. At that point, I'll be immediately cleared contact. No issues. Plug. Start fueling.

On the left side, my attention has gone to what I'm doing. From (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) perspective, he goes right into the basket and starts refueling as well. Nonissues.

As we are tracking through the track, I will complete AR about here. Yes. So I know my DASH-2 is still in the basket. We're at about this plate in time and space. And I see what's coming up as far as how we are going to depart the tanker.

So at that point, I'll direct him to go to echelon left, non-standard. It's a deviation. I'm aware of that, but I don't want to put my wingman on the outside of the formation. Now, I say I directed him to do that. He still requests it with the tanker. The tanker owns that decision. So the tanker will initially clear him echelon right. (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) won't request echelon left. And they will clear him echelon left.

From there, we make this 90-degree turn to go North along the airspace. Again, this is probably not really drawn to scale. We are up along this border, but we are tracking North. From there, we start to talk about how we are going to depart the tanker. And I'm talking about that with the tanker.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Let me -- so you're done -- everybody's got gas, you put the probes away, you got the radar back on?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I do. I'm sorry, that's a good point. I do go overt again.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you switch out?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Radar's back on?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : My DASH-2 will also go overt. His lights do come back on. The tanker, however, remains covert throughout the entire mishap.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And I want to understand where you guys, respective to the tanker right now, are you on one side and he's on one side?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Correct, sir. So I'll go echelon right.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [inaudible] by that. Okay. We have overt. We got a blacked out -- we got a covert tanker in the middle and an overt hornet on the [inaudible] refueling complete?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Can you just mark on -- draw an "X" where you were and draw a triangle where he was.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You want an "X" -- Profane 1. And I apologize for the positions.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Not to scale.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And we're forward of that. So that should

actually be -- I'm forward of this line. And then he is --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So that you can be observed from the cockpit of the Herc?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That is what I always thought. So the APC 56c, that is actually not correct anymore if there is somebody to observe you in the back. So I was taught that as well; if I can't see the pilot, I'm wrong.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : But they want us a little further aft. And now, this got me into a whole discussion of, well, echelon left, by book definition, is actually one plane length, 60 degree bearing light at low. Well, that doesn't make sense if I'm bringing a division to a tanker. So I'm not going to put a guy -- especially if you have right hose/left hose -- I'm not going to put a guy at co-altitude with the guy in the basket when this guy has no aft. He can't go any direction. So you always elevate him there.

I understand that so that's a deviation. That's a flight lead decision. In this case, my flight lead decision was based on airspace. So that's why I wanted him on the left. Unbeknownst to him, my game plan was -- and I had this discussion with SUMO 4-1. I know, based on the conversation with (b)(3)(A),(b)(6), I'm trying to take as much gas from these guys as I can. Allow them to go on about their day as rapidly as possible.

So my game plan is to come off the tanker -- and I had briefed (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) how we were going to do that. My -- we were going to go to 15,500 feet; select AB; get to 300 knots. And I

even went as far as to say 30 degrees nose high to 18,000 feet. At 18,000 feet, this is where I was separating the flight. I didn't tell him that, but I said, I want you to go 90 degrees left; I'm going to go 90 degrees right. So now we're 3,000 feet above the tanker. We're going away from each other. And then, I will give an altitude separation after that.

From there, game plan was to go up and down as fast as possible burning gas on the north and south side so we can take another 8,000 aside from --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It's a tough job, but somebody has got to do it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. Yeah. It was literally just to burn gas to go back to the tanker. And I'm still trying to make a 0245 land time for (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) crew day so we can still have the option to do another flight. So time was more of a concern than fuel at that point.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And when did you brief that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : When did I brief what the game plan was?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I only ever briefed the departure plan. Where did I brief that was probably as soon as I heard him come off the tanker.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So not before the mission?

Like, during the mission you guys were just talking while you were doing the refueling?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. So --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- everything as far as the timing of it was because we took off late. I don't want to say it's a pickup game because we had talked about some of the options as far as, Hey, we can do this as a 3-hour sortie and just do the hot reload on the backside; hey, if this takes long, we can have less than an hour and we're not going to go all the way back out here. We're going to go use the GCA box for the rest of our flight time.

But that was a decision that I would make while we were getting gas and doing the hot reload on the backside. I didn't feel that I necessarily owed that to them then.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. That's normal.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So on Diagram 1, can you just mark with an "X" on the track where you were refueling. And then, kind of where we are at in this discussion.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So I'll give you a red "X" for me as where I come off.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's your completed refueling?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. And then I'll give you where I believe (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) is complete with a red triangle. I think it's -- and again, this turn, the track -- realize that it's more of a square here. So he's -- we've just finished a left-hand turn. He comes out. Get's cleared echelon right by SUMO 4-1. Requests echelon left on my request. Goes echelon left. It was cleared echelon left by SUMO 4-1, and then goes echelon --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Perfect. Thank you.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Not a problem.

So we're up against, you can see, this corner. This is where this is heading. I elect to have -- I have now briefed

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on how we are going to leave the tanker. He is going to be echelon left. I'll be echelon right. 15-5. Burner 300 knots. 30 degrees nose high; 18-90-90.

And he didn't have any questions with it, to my knowledge. And then because we're in this corner, the next thing that happens is that I will request from SUMO 4-1 to put us in the center of the airspace. Or at least come 90 degrees left.

I'm comfortable being tied up against the board --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- because you don't want to launch out like that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I got it.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : So I want him to turn more towards the center of the airspace.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Punch out like that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. But I think I request 2-7-0. So and just based on this airspace -- it's not as pronounced as your pen was -- but it's something along those lines. I'm comfortable with where I am up along the border. I know it's there. I don't necessarily want my wingman there. I don't want to have him -- give him as much airspace as possible.

In that turn of that turn, he agrees to it. I start

coming left. In that turn, I look down and I see my assessment of (b)(3)(A),(b)(6)

And he is slightly sucked position of echelon left. He is on the left-hand side of that.

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6) : Yes, sir. So IFR turned into he's welded wings, more or less. He is not elevated and he looks a little low. And he looks sucked, like, he looks a little aft. He goes undirected by myself. We've got some comm going. I'm still talking to the tanker about what time I think the next ARTC will go? I don't remember that conversation. I know it happened, but I don't remember what was said. He then says, alright, Profane 1-1, go with BUNO. Profane 1-1, Aircraft 0-9, BUNO 1-6-4-9-9-6, off the top of my head. I knew it at the time and was able to rattle it off.

I hear -- and this is where I know we'll have stories differ. It's I hear Profane 1-2 -- probably about 4 or 5 seconds in between -- Profane 1-2, go with BUNO. At that time, he starts, in my mind, to roll out -- SUMO 4-1.

So this takes some explaining as to the inside cockpit of the hornet. So my BUNO is basically on a 45 from my knee, probably 8 to 10 inches above. So it requires me to look down to see the BUNO of the actual aircraft. At the same time, in my mind, SUMO 4-1 rolls out. I roll out straight and level. I don't ever hear the BUNO come back. I try to go there. I know (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) says he said it. I don't remember hearing it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did the WIZO normally make that call, or the pilot?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So it is not standout in our squadron. In my former squadron it was. The pilot owned the BUNO call. I can hypothesize to the reason of that. Because if the pilot can't make the BUNO call -- yeah, okay. It's time to pay attention. What's going on? Why can't he make the BUNO call. Is he behind? Is he -- you know, that's one of the few ways that you can tell what's going through a pilot's head on the tanker.

The next thing I remember is (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) going, "What the fuck is DASH-2 doing?" And as I look in --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : (b) (3) is your WIZO?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He is(6) He's Profane 1-1 WIZO, sir. As I look in, I see -- most notably -- the form light along the nose of the F-18 basically pointed down and I see (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) -- and I apologize for talking with my hand -- coming in my direction. And now he has crossed from my assessment of the left side of the Herc to right side of the Herc.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Under the Herc? Or --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Based on my assessment -- and again, I'm in a 200 foot elevated position.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you're 200 feet above --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- the Herc, off his right wing. Starboard side. And at this point, I'm slightly acute. My best thoughts on why I'm slightly acute is, we've rolled out. I'm distracted. I was on the turn away so my throttles are higher than they normally would be to maintain that airspeed. I don't think I ever retarded them

because I was looking in at that point in time.

Based on what (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) had said, I looked back and I see a wing flash back to the left. It's not extreme so -- pardon the hands -- it's not a 45 degree flash. It's probably 20 to 30 degrees back to the left. And that happened so fast.

I think I key the mic, but I can't be certain. I think I started to key the mic when I first noticed what he was doing. And it just -- from the time that he looked like he was within 6 to 10 feet of the tanker with a right wing down [inaudible] towards me to the time he reversed back to the left -- it seems like forever when I'm sitting with you now, but I know that it literally was a depression of my comm 2.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Can we get another piece of paper?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So let me draw it first, okay?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So just bear with me. I'm going to draw just a little bit smaller tanker.

So (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) is drawing a tanker right now.

So based on what you just told me, can you show me where you were and kind of where you think he was.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. I'll do my own aircraft in black and then his in red. Now, at this point when we notice it, I'm slightly acute. So I'm probably about the front of this wing line. Elevated, at this point, 150 to 200 feet. I can't be certain.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And the AR refueling altitude was 15,000?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you're at, like, 15,200?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's fair, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And then as I look back, I see the nose -- I can't even depict it without drawing on the Herc.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. Do it; draw on the Herc.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I see his nose of his aircraft below at about there. So if you imagine the base of the ramp door being about there, he's feet away from that. I assess him to be --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you see, like, the strip lights on the ramp?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Can you write "below" right there, just so we know.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And you say "feet," so we're talking less than 10 feet?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Correct. And then I will see -- I see the pivot of the light. It's really what catches my attention at me.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And you're expecting him to be here?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Absolutely, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So that's why both my WIZO and I query it. He queries it first because the last time I looked was right after they had asked me my BUNO, and to my awareness, he was sucked but in this general vicinity. He was on the left side of the tanker at that

point of time, in my mind.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So can you make a small mark and just kind of show what you think his relative track might have been with the tanker? So he basically went from here to here kind of spread?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Maybe a little one of these?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. So somehow -- and I've tried to piece this together -- I can't. And I'm thinking about it -- that's another one. How did he either get over or under the hose to get there without hitting the hose? That doesn't make sense to me either.

And I'm being as honest with you as I can, like, it's -there's some of this stuff that I just can't answer. I just don't
know it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He may have it at the OSO, you know.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. But he winds up in this position.

I'll see the flash towards me on(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) "what the fuck is

DASH-2 doing?" Look to key the mic. Honestly, I don't even know what the heck I would have said. If I directed him to underrun -- underrun what? He's in a position where, is he going to underrun me? Is he going to underrun the tanker? I mean, the only thing --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Everybody -- you and the tanker are straight and level right now?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And the tanker is rolled out within how many seconds? Ten seconds? Thirty seconds?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Less than ten. He hit a roll --

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : The tanker just recently rolled out?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And (b) (3) (A), (b) was inside the turn?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. To my SA, he was inside the turn.

And I know that story varies between the aircrew involved but I -- and (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) and I actually spoke last night. And I said, What was your SA of me here? And he said, You were in a 20 to 30 degree angle of bank turn. I was like, brother, I was straight and level. So --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It's dark.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I know. And that part sucks. And so then we'll see the impact. Piecing things together, I assess it to be -- I don't actually see the no kidding impact, but what I see is the hornet go from this position, wings left, what appears to be a flare here and here.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: So you're marking those with astrics?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: Because like a typical flare. And in

real-time, I didn't know what they were. I thought it was the

initial impact and, you know, some kind of fire breaking out.

Within 2 to 3 seconds, you have got a fire on the Herc. It looks like it's emanating from here, but it is engulfed there. It has a left -- or port -- component to it. But that's what's going on.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And you marked that with red circles?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Sorry. Thank you. Yeah. I marked that with

the red circles, just kind of showing you where that fire -- to me, it looks like it's emulating and what is consumed by it.

After we recovered (D)(3)(A),(D)(6) , I assessed that these astrics are the ejection sequence. He goes from -- in my mind, he goes from low to high here. Clips a left wing. And if you actually have a C-130, there's a star -- the emblem on the actual side of it that's at that point. I would think it was in the vicinity of that, but higher on the Herc. And carried continued through the aircraft and ejects on the other side.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you believe he impacted on the starboard side of the aircraft and drew it straight through to portside?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Correct.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Basically just between the [inaudible] of this area?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. At this point, back to my own aircraft, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) gives the "Climb. Climb. Climb." He's already behind. I'm at max AB. I'm select 30 to 35 degrees nose up. I know I'm slow. I don't want to stall out the aircraft. I'm not trying to bulls eye nose high here.

That gets you 18,000 feet. And I know I'm still climbing, but that's not my concern. I come out of AB probably in the ball park of 290 knots/280 knots. I start a left-hand turn over SUMO 4-1.

I don't -- at this point, I no longer ever see Profane 1-2

again. I don't know where that jet went. My goggles are completely bloomed out. I can't see anything but the fire and the aircraft.

And it's like I don't have goggles on -- even though I'm looking through them. They're bloomed out.

The C-130 falls in a wings level attitude, potentially a slight left component to that. Not noticeable roll. I know that the lare was at 12,000 feet. I watch the fire enter the lare. I watch the clouds basically light up as the fire goes through them. That -- from initial explosion to clouds takes approximately ten seconds. So it looks almost controlled to me. I know that it's probably not. I'm not hearing anything on the radio. I'm sorry -- impact to when I assessed that the fire went out or impact at the water, I do not hear another radio transmission from SUMO 4-1 or, obviously, Profane 1-2.

From enter of the clouds, the light -- I can still see from the clouds until I can no longer see the light is probably another 15 seconds. Personal opinion is that that is when they actually impacted the water. Meaning that if that was the case, to go 5,000 feet took 10 seconds; 10,000 feet took 15 seconds. It would be a continuous nose over from that point.

Anything you want me to revisit there, sir, before I go to the egress portion of this? Excuse me -- the on-scene commander portion of this.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So we'll just finish this out. On Diagram 1, can you just mark where you think that the impact happened with a red square?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Absolutely. Again, we were here. We start at this turn. It's probably in this vicinity.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Can you mark the large square and just label that -- you said that was the Sierra? Can you just draw an arrow to this and just name it?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So this is the intersouth.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Can you name the entry point?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Seagull. And you're looking at this as the Sierra 15.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Can you just draw an arrow and just show which way is North?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Do you want it down here?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And I'm sorry for all this, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

, but this will, you know --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No. Absolutely, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Thirty years from now, someone is going to be looking at that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's North.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : On Diagram 2, can you again just put which way is North?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Roughly.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : So okay. Yeah. North would be more so that way.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And if you could just draw on here, what is your call sign or plate number [inaudible] is this the tanker?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It is. That's SUMO. I've drawn us together.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's fine.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And this will be Profane. Okay. And I can give you Profane. "PE" is the way we do that. Profane 1-1's position is that one.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Just label that No. 3 on the bottom and go ahead and circle it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And then four. And then I'll give you Profane 1-2 echelon left to -- we have the strip lights basically at the door. And I assess that to be the SUMO ramp -- base of the ramp.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And you're on Profane --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : --1-1.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And then for all of this, can you just initial at the bottom and then just date it?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Absolutely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Thank you.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Not a problem.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Before we get into the SAR stuff, any maintenance stuff -- like, did any, like, any electrical failures, comm failures, any reports from your wingman or his WIZO that, like, My hub was flashing off and on. Or anything like that you might recall?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Nothing there, sir, from them. We had a known I&S drift issue with our aircraft. It probably -- it wasn't known prior to us getting in it, but --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : The gear check?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Which we took into consideration with the SAR effort.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Does your jet have a GPS updated?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): It does. That night it did not. That was the problem.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : GPS was inop?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So MDS is inop; GPS was inops?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. So I say that and when we got back to the field three hours after takeoff, we had less than a half a mile of nautical mile drift. So the system was pretty tight without the aiding of GPS. That was not really a factor. And based on the information we gave, we recovered both aircrew known to be on the surface of the water in less than 12 hours.

So the -- I'm sorry. Do you have any more questions? I had no known issues to their aircraft.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I just want to ask a quick maintenance border blank, you know.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You know, if there is anything that you would know of that could have distracted your DASH-2 or caused, like, flight control malfunction?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So there is a known issue with ANVS-11's. If you have the JHMCS symbology available to you, it has been known to

completely invert itself. I've seen it three times. Never in this squadron. But when I was in OAR over in Iraq, it happened to me three different times. I've talked about that with most of the ready room here. I've told them, kind of, my -- the way I combated it.

We have an event marker in the center of the stick that blanks out in the JHMCS symbology. And the one time that didn't work for me, you just come up here and turn off your, basically, your JHMCS. And your NVCDs symbology would go with that as well.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And the jet still had a hud you can see, or no?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. But if that were to roll on you, you're going to have things projecting over top of each other.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. And can't read it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. I'm not saying that was a factor in this.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No. No. I got it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. But there is always the potential. That is a known issue with the ANVS-11.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So somehow your wingman became disoriented? I'll use that term. And somehow it went from where he was supposed to be to aft to low to a cross-under to an attempted correction that resulted in a midair collision?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Any radio calls to or from your DASH-2 from when you first saw him in an imperfect position until right before the collision? Did you hear him? Or did the WIZO say

anything? Or --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I don't believe so, sir. I don't think I spoke to my DASH-2. So the conversation -- before the BUNO conversation, the conversation was: Are we going to have time to come back?

And I'm discussing that with SUMO 4-1. And I'm like, We will try. You know, and I haven't told him -- because there was so much comm with the tanker between him and I as far as when we were coming back, I had not told my DASH-2 what the following flow was going to look like just yet. I had an echelon left. That is non-standard, but I had a reason to do it. And that's kind of was what it was.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you observed all this and you busted out your "On-scene Commander Checklist"?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Assumed your new mission?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And did a good job in getting your buddies pulled out.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : To be perfectly honest with you, sir. I froze for about 20 seconds after impact. I can't tell you if I froze or just watched SUMO go down. We did drop a mark nearly immediately. So a "mark" is we have the ability to basically push a button and it annotates where we are, time and space. We can have up to nine of them in our system. So we'll drop -- our mark one would have been, basically, our takeoff point in the runway. This would have been

Mark 2 -- was the known impact location. Apologies. I don't have that actual information on what it was -- but I can -- myself or (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) can get that to you, if required.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No. You're good. We got it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And then I start a left-hand turn. It's somewhere between 18 to 20,000. That part's a little fuzzy. Again, that's from that 35 degree climb. I don't feel disoriented there. My WIZO does, just because now he's been kicked in the pants twice. So he gets the first jolt from the blower, and then almost immediately, he gets another jolt from me pulling back on the stick. The guy at the controls -- not a big deal. Guy not at the controls -- your brain just did a backflip. I understand why he lost SA for a second as we climb up.

Come out of blower. Start a left-hand turn. He's right there with me at that point, so it was momentary. He breaks out the "On-scene Commander Checklist." I'm still eyes out. That will be kind of a common theme, that I'm eyes out while he's running the under system trying to see what I can see.

We establish a Joker Bingo. Joker was 6.5; BINGO was going to be a 4-5. It's relatively low for where we were at based on that. But bodies are in the water and I knew that I had made it home from there with a 4-2 before. I was okay with that situation. I start communicating with the Fukuoka center. Initially, it's

[b)(3)(A),(b)(6)

They give us clearance home. They don't really understand what's going on. And at that point, I make a radio call I never thought I'd make in my life. "MAYDAY. MAYDAY."

You know, basically tell them what's going on.

Still communication struggles with Fukuoka. I'm asking when the SAR assets been launched; if the the SAR assets been launched; if anybody has been notified because I don't have a warm and fuzzy.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) -- good idea. Roll White Snake. White Snake is a U.S. controller that monitors that air space. However, this is another thing that is actually on our schedule and I forgot about this in every time I've told this story. But we are restricted below 28,000 feet due to AIC. And we are "due regard" in the airspace. Not a factor, but just worth mentioning.

We'll go to White Snake. We don't assume anyone is going to answer. Somebody does. (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) starts taking to him.

Passes to him our radio number to notify -- again, I'm sorry. The impact was at about 0150 local out there.

And we are probably first notifying White Snake at about 0203. So about 13 minutes is when we come up with the idea to talk to them.

In the meantime, and the order is a little fuzzy, but I know we're checking 2-4-3-0. So guard freq. There is zero chance of communication on guard. There is a minimum of one beacon going off, and just clobbering that frequency. Scanner 2820 -- so 2-8-2-.-8. We'll roll that and we'll bounce back and forth between there there and 121-5. Part of the way I stayed in the game was, honestly, just making radio calls to SUMO 4-1 and Profane 1-2. I probably made about 100. We did not have confirmation for -- that

the SAR assets had been launched by the time we had to depicted. We're at 27,000 feet up until we reach a 7-0.

At that point in time, I have no notification that any SAR assets launched. I've done all I've can with the radio. We elect to go down below the weather and take a look.

So we drop down below the clouds. I go down to about 9,500 feet. To be perfectly honest with you, sir, I wasn't comfortable going below that. My hands were shaking; my stomach was in knots. We drop down to 9,500 feet. And the first thing I see, I assessed it to be, initially, something that was on fire. And I looked at it and looked under my goggles. Dropped the goggles back down, turned out it was a boat.

There were probably upwards of a dozen to a dozen and a half surface vessel in the vicinity of where this had happened. And we'll do two laps around. And then the next thing that we will pass to the JPRC is a flashing IR, significant light in the water looks like a strobe. I don't know what it was, but this will become Mark 3. And we overfly it the best we can as it disappears under the nose. For whatever reason, out L-Pod was not capable of picking it up.

We pass that as we come back. And it turns out that that was a small vessel that one of the surface ships had launched trying to look for what it was. I can only assume that that many surface vessels being there under the clouds within thirty minutes of that mishap -- they actually saw SUMO break through the clouds. But I don't know if anyone's tracked that or tried to speak to them about

it at all either. But we did pull up the Sea Distress Channel 16 on the sea frequencies and tried to raise any surface vessels down there. We did have one respond. Unfortunately, the response was entirely Japanese. Neither one of us speak Japanese.

We reach a 4.4, so I stay around 100 pounds under my BINGO. I don't request it, but they do give me a standard BINGO profile home. I'm clear to direct Iwakuni at 36,000 feet. Standard climb up, standard come home. And I'll land about 500 pounds below our SOP fuel on the deck, which is 2.5. 2.0 is the hornet SOP. So I'm 400/500 pounds below squadron, but above Hornet SOP.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : All right. Well, good job getting the SAR assets rolling and keeping it together and staying on station, you know. I know it was hard for you and hard for your buddy.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. Our land time was 03 -- I want to say 0340, sir. So we were an hour and 50 minutes after impact. And that's just off the cuff, I apologize. I should have had those numbers for you.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No. That's all right. That's fine. We get all that from calculators and stuff. That's a good description of the flight and the debrief.

(b)(3), any questions about that sequence of events?
(A),
(b)(3)(A),(b)(6)
: None from that night. Did you have
any flights up to 72 hours prior --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Negative.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- [inaudible] flight? Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : The biggest portion of my 72 hour history was

the circadian rhythm shift.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did -- so let's talk about (b) (3) for a (A), (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did -- when did you first see him on the day of the accident -- or I guess, the day before because you flew after midnight. But on Wednesday, when did you first see him on Wednesday? I think -- I'm showing you reported for duty at 2030 on Wednesday.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. Sometime between 2030 and 2045, I showed up. I didn't see him probably until 2115/2130. I give you those windows because I can't be exact.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I know. Was he just coming into work or was he coming from downstairs? Or you're not sure?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I don't know.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Did you -- do you have any knowledge of how he was doing crew rest, crew day? You know, was he going to maintenance meetings that morning, or do you have any information about what his 72 hour sleep, rest, crew rest, crew day cycle?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Other than I asked if he was ready to go in the ORM portion of the brief, no, sir. He said he was good to go and ready to go flying. He was excited. I kind of talked to him about the situation we were in. He was more than happy. He was [inaudible] and collect flight time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I think that's actually what he said. He was like, "I'm all about the flight time, man."

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And obviously, I think you've already alluded to it, but you didn't observe anything about him physically or mentally that day? You did your standard ORM. Everybody fit to fly thing.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And you got a thumbs up out of that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I think that's all I need today. You're welcome to add anything else that you'd like that you think is germane. It's an open door. So we talked a little bit about -- and I appreciate your candor about going back to Thursday. And I'll use my words, not yours, but it looks like you guys got jerked around a little bit on what you were doing when. It looks like you got asked to go to the tanker, and somebody might have known about it, but you didn't.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And that kind of stuff. If you want to talk -- do you want to talk about that? and how that may have affected your ability to brief what you were doing? and prepare for what you were doing? I'm all ears on that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. So something -- I think I actually said it here today. Just, kind of, somebody had said this was a pickup game. And I take that kind of personal. I consider myself a

professional aviator, you know. We don't typically leave things to chance. With that being said, going to a tanker is admin. That is absolutely admin. I'm not saying that I don't take it seriously. I'm not saying that I don't want -- nobody had any mal intent. We took it as serious. But again, we stepped through it.

The question was asked at one point. What would you do

-- when would I have canceled this flight? Or when is the last time

that I would have accepted ARTC? I didn't give the response, but

I'm thinking about it now. And honestly, with the guys that I'm

with in this squadron, I don't need a phone call. I need to know

[inaudible] setting, altitude, and the give. If you told me that

when I was in this airspace, we could still go to the tanker.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I've done that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Absolutely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I've been out doing something completely unrelated and the tanker would be like, hey, you guys want to grab a squirt?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Absolutely, sir. So a tanker of opportunity. So as far as the, you know, the pickup game -- if you want to talk to what a pickup game was, the no flight with no real mission. Like, you know, why are we flying? Why are we doing this?

And I understand the first time you fly from 0200 to 0500 in the morning, you don't necessarily want that to be in combat.

But have a mission set. That's my opinion. And maybe that's bad on me, but, I mean, I tried. I went to CAS and, you know, we were going to do an urban night CAS. And now it was just too enclose to

really -- what meets this intent? I have airspace. I have two jets. Well, we're not really current. I don't want to go do air-to-air, do 30 notches at night. You know, that's kind of where I was at with that.

And I was like, well, tanker -- that's straight and level. You know, and that's back to what I said. It's not that I wasn't taking it serious, but it's less risk, in my mind, going to a tanker and really flying formation -- is what we're talking about -- than it is to go and do a 50/60 degrees nose low, 5 G maneuver at night.

 $\label{eq:so_I} \mbox{So\ I was\ far\ more\ comfortable\ with\ that\ than\ I\ was\ with} $$$ the latter.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you felt comfortable doing your aerial refueling at night?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Absolutely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's right there with takeoff and land. I mean, it's --

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : And I felt like I was the long pole in the tent. I thought if anybody was the ORM risk, it was me with 1.4 hours in the last thirty days. And granted, I had a fair amount more of experience than he did to fall back on. But, you know, yeah. It was the decision I made.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And that goes back to the MAG ULT piece. Just the overall theme was, squadrons, we want you to execute your own plan. But we want to do this -- and it kind of went back and forth.

And I still don't know why we started our aircraft at 0001

local. I assumed it was for the memorial for 41, former President Bush. But I don't know that. And initially, I thought it was a Japanese holiday.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you think that had an effect on you that night?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Initially.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did it compress the timeline a little bit?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I don't think it compressed the timeline, sir. But when I found out the night prior, I was upset. I mean, I didn't have, necessarily, an emotional outburst or anything like that. But it was like --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- perturbed.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Absolutely. Why -- I was like, why am I going to put all of this effort into this plan? Why at the last minute are we changing something? you know, and the changes -- if it was a change to the timeline, they wanted me to go execute my plan, I would have done it. If it was a change to the timeline and they wanted us to go do admin and go to the tanker, I was comfortable doing that. If it was a change to the timeline and they wanted me to go do some mission set that I was not prepared to do, I wouldn't have been comfortable. That's there I would have drawn the line.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : But you were comfortable?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I was comfortable.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Can I ask you a couple of quick physiological questions?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Absolutely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It's supposed to be in your 72 hour history stuff. Were you under the effect of any medications at the time?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You didn't take --

Sometimes I spend a lot of time in bed trying to get my cycle right, so my back stiffened up on me a little bit.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Any significant alcohol consumption in the days prior?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I did take Advil. I have back pain.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Not in the 72 hours. I had zero alcohol in the 72 hours. I did have a few drinks Friday night.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. No worries. Big caffeine stuff? Did you --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I'm iffy. Look at me now. I have four tins of tobacco. Now, that's slightly elevated over what I typically do. I'm probably a two-tins-a-day kind of guy. But that's not outside the norm for the last four years.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : But no prescription medications? Go-pills? No-Go pills?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, sir. Those were not allowed. That's another probably factor in this.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Are you talking about the Go-pill?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. Not so much the Go-pill. I've had the Go-pill before. I don't feel like it does anything. Some of

the young guys probably haven't so they might have thought that it was the cure all. But the No-Go pill was not --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Which I think is Ambien?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It is, sir. Which was not offered. And specifically talked to as if that were a "downer" by our medical staff.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So let's go back in time a little bit.

Did you guys, three or four days prior -- a week prior -- go, hey,

dude, we're ramping into the third shift. You want me to to fly

through my [inaudible] and get some Ambien [inaudible] my cycle.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It was approached, sir, with our flight doc on Thursday afternoon, or Friday afternoon at the absolute latest.

There's an answer on WhatsApp that is basically book definition in quotations. So there was no real urgent need, I guess, is how that was dictated.

I don't know how it worked at higher. I know that Go-pills were absolutely off the table. Just -- and I think that came from the Wing CG. I don't know what his opinion was on the -- and that's again, that may not have come from the Wing CG. But that was my perception.

And then the No-Go's, I think, was shut off at the squadron's flight doc level.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Just trying to think. So yeah. I dip. You know, I'm going through a divorce, but I've been doing that since March. Like, it's not really affected me a whole lot from that

aspect. And obviously flying is my release, so --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It's a tough time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It is.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you have kids too?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Just (b) . (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) to

understand right now. (A), (b)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : (5) ah. Is your separated wife, is she CONUS?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : She is, sir. So that's actually one of the things that makes it a little bit easier. I don't have to deal with it here, day-to-day.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Probably how much tobacco did you use that night?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Probably not that much yet. So I typically use it when I'm not flying.

Now, when I say "not that much," I have a fairly worn pocket and I probably do about a quarter of a tin, maybe a little less, per one. And I probably had two dips.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So about half a tin?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Maybe a little less, but yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you normally dip when you're flying on long missions?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Long missions? Yes. This particular night, I did not.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's enough from that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : All right, man. Are you good?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I just want to help and I want to get to the right answer. And I know, as a guy there that saw it, you saw what I had to say and I can't even tell you without 100 percent, without a doubt what took place. I can tell you to the best ability of what I think happened, but that's all it is.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It sounds like you've -- one thing I've taken away from this is, you've eliminated my in my mind that there was any maintenance issues from either aircraft.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Is that a fair statement?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I believe so, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Personal opinion, I think this will come back to, at some some level, spatial disorientation. That's just my personal opinion. I can't see how it's anything else.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, you've talked to that right.

Because we know the [inaudible] and you've talked about how both you and your WIZO on the initial rendezvous misperceived the tankers altitude, right?

And you talked about how the tanker was in covert lighting, so it was kind of like a big black hole out there, right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. And that's the part that's absolutely on me. The brief, the spatial disorientation. Yes, we went through the training wheels, we talked about it, but I didn't

launch into more detail. That's definitely something of mine.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We're not here to put any blame on you. We're not here to do that so you don't need to say that to me, but I understand how you feel to be responsible. I empathize with that. I've walked that. So I'm really sorry.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Appreciate it, sir. Thanks.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So I'm in the GAL.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : "(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) ".

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You can contact me at any time if you remember something or you want to add something. You can just send me an email. I'll call you. Just send me an email or whatever. And any conversation you and I have about this incident is in the context of this investigation.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you can -- like, if you remember something, you know what I mean?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That seems to happen when we've experienced traumatic events. We kind of block some stuff and then wires start connecting. That's happened to me in my life. I was almost burned alive in the cockpit of Harrier. I started remembering shit like three months later. You know, like, I had a [inaudible] I remember that. You know, so if that happens to come up, you know you can always communicate with me.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I'm done if you are, (b) (3).

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. Just sw(6) (6) him to his

statement.

[(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) was sworn, warned, and departed.]

Just, you know, like we talked about this morning, this investigation is the one that, you know, goes into, kind of the official record and is accessed by the Freedom of Information Act.

What I seek to understand from you is, just, kind of, like, really what you saw, and, just, kind of tell your story. You can start wherever you want. You can start the week before. You can start at the brief time. And whatever order you want. Just, kind of, tell the story. And if I have a specific question -- if it's something minor, I'll interrupt you, like an acronym or whatever. Or if I'm confused, you know, I'll just ask. I'm taking notes here, really, so I can, just, kind of, track your conversation and compare that to the others. But I just seek to confirm the facts and the circumstances surrounding the mishap.

So with that, you can.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So kind of the big picture frame of reference is that this is part of a five-day, kind of, very little longer exercise. It says five training days to it. It's going to be around-the-clock operations. So we're going to get an in-brief the week prior when generally the flow of it; the timelines, what

crews you're going to be assigned to and attached to, and what time -- what your crew days and your flight windows going to be.

I'm going to take that. Through the weekend I'm going to start adjusting to the sleep cycle. Really, the late shift is basically 8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m., roughly. We're going to start adjusting to that. And then, we're not going to fly for, like, the first three days, which I think is pretty wise. It takes about three days or so to get adjusted to a big timezone change.

So Wednesday night is our first flight. We are going to show up, and we are going to brief the squadron with everybody.

It's going to be -- the mission is not very tactical. It's one of those administrative demonstration of -- everything unclassified here, right? Everything on an unclass level, sir?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. Just keep it unclass.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Cool. All right. So were here to demonstrate our ability to do kind of around-the-clock operations. And we're hauling some ordinance on the jet, which we've been practicing the week prior, but this is the first time were going to, kind of, do it as part of the exercise for our crew.

So a lot of the brief focused on that nighttime stuff. And then it was basically just getting the aircraft out to the range and back home safely. So we'll brief there. Then we'll walk on time. We have an odd restriction, which is we have to start any APUs after midnight due to a holiday. Which, typically, we start 30 minutes prior. This is 15 minutes prior. It really would be no factor, but it's just kind of something that's different that day.

So we're going to start our APUs up. Obviously, we're going to have a late takeoff because we're troubleshooting some issues with our flight control system. Troubleshooting goes well. We clear all the systems out. We have two healthy jets for launch, I think, like 30 minutes late, roughly. But we have plenty of range time. And we know the tanker is out there, so gas is not going to be a problem. We take off, no issues. Kind of, this is the initial assessment of how everybody is flying at night. Wingman makes a safe join, a controlled join, and it looks like he is adapting well to the night.

We put on our [inaudible] on the right. We fly out to the area. Per the ATC rep, the JOI-2, it's a standard routing out there. We cancel with Fukuoka control. Kind of another thing that is different that night is the -- we're flying "due regard" because -- we have the airspaces scheduled, but due to, I think, surveillance radar problems out there, which we knew about at that time, and we knew we were going to be due regard.

So we had an altitude cap at 29,000 feet, which we don't normally have. Not going to really play into this early on. I'll get to the post -- or the SAR effort later. So the -- we were in the range. We contact SUMO immediately on the safety flight frequency. They're where we expect them to be, which is the Itierria [ph] area, South 15. They're holding at, I think, 17,000 feet. And they roger up right away.

We tell them we're heavy with gas, so we flew to the south into the Itierria [ph] South 25 range. Get down to the border.

Turn around. Burned up enough gas at that point and we start flying north to get to the tanker.

DASH-2 picks them up from the radar first. Our radar was a little funky, but eventually we pick them up too. And then we'll bring DASH-2 into a TAC wing position for the tanker join. Initially, it'll be on the right, and then it'll step to the left side to join the tanker on the left.

We go up to the tanker. We make -- we have everyone on the radar. We'll put them up visually very early because we're all SUMO and VCDs. Our wingman, I'm not sure if they're VCD's or NVG's, but they are goggled. The C-130 goes -- once we have a visual with him and we're talking about it, he goes covert lighting. And we join up to left echelon. And then he will clear Profane 1-1 to precontact right for Profane 1-2 precontact left.

Profane 1-1 is going to -- once he's cleared for contact, he's going to get in the basket first. I know the major play is to get into the basket. It was -- the Profane 1-1 pilot did, you know, hit the basket pretty much immediately without any big deal. And then, Profane 1-2 also hit the basket on his first try. He made kind of a bigger play to get into the basket, but it wasn't anything significant. He didn't introduce a big sign wave or any of the, kind of, dangerous stuff you see when you have, like, a bad -- when you enter the basket poorly.

So it's safe. He gets on. Profane 1-1 is going to offload the gas. We're going to be satisfied first. We are going to detach. Go to echelon right. Two is going to finish up and he

is going to go to echelon left. We're talking to the tanker at this point, and we're pinned up against buoys [ph] to the northside of this area. It may have been in the northeast kind of corner. And we're going to ask him for a left-hand turn to get us to point towards the center of area. We're talking with him how we're going to depart, which is going to be straight ahead and then a climb away to get above his altitude, and get away from him so we can go train kind of to the south.

At that point, this isn't the turn. In the turn, our wingman -- as we're starting to roll out, I'm looking across and I see -- sir, are you familiar when you kind of see a wingman kind of try to get back into position, you'll see his wings waggle? And he'll try to -- because he's trying to work it back. Especially when somebody gets too acute, or too far forward. And so he starts -- you see him, again, make those corrections. And I see kind of a -- kind of slightly wing high presence. And I'm thinking -- my brain initially registers this because all I can see is a silhouette at this point. I can't distinguish canopy or any features that tell me which direction he's turning necessarily.

So at that point, you'll see him -- as I see him in the turn, I'm thinking, what's he doing. So I look inside at our scale real quick, get oriented, and I look back out. At that point, I can tell that he is -- he has got an angle of bank in. And I can now at this point pick out the canopy features. So I can tell he is -- his slight turner's roll is towards us.

At that point, I'm going to see his -- he is going to drop

back. He is going to drop aft and down slightly. And he is going to start slicing in towards Profane 1-1 and the tanker. At that point, I'm going to --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So what side of the tanker is he on right now?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He is on the portside.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : On the left side?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. So he is coming across. His nose has come down and aft and right and inside. It looks to me like he is doing a cross-under. And I didn't hear the pilot call for a cross-under, so I'm asking my pilot, hey, what's he doing.

At that point, by the time I realized he is -- it's turning into a dangerous situation, I give a climb call.

Unfortunately -- so where our radios worked in the back is we have two toe switches. So we cue the mic by stepping on that toe -- or on that pedal and giving a comm call. So as I see him, basically, falling out of position, I give a climb call -- and I miss the pedal.

And as I do that, starts his climb. And then he is going to -- Profane 1-2 is going to contact the empennage, the rear portion of the C-130. And it's going to -- at that point, there is going to be a bright flash. I'm going to see sparks traveling upwards. And that's the last time I'm going to see Profane 1-2.

As we're climbing at this point, we psyche because Profane 1 pilot takes a slight cut away to get away from the aircraft, and then introduces a pretty steep climb to get away. And when the

canopy reel comes down and I look over, the next thing I see is SUMO 4-1 is on fire from the aft portion. And he is descending through the clouds there. I was in, at this point, a 12,000 foot overcast layer. And I see him descend through the cloud layer there. So that is the last time that I see either of those aircraft. After that, it is just kind of -- you can see see a bright light through -- the cloud layer is about 2,000 feet thick, so it's 10 to 12. You can still see a glow down there for a little bit.

At that point, we're going to establish high,

18,000 feet. Left-hand turns. As I see the impact happen, I drop a

mark. We have a system of safe where we -- where our position we're

in at that moment. Drop Mark 2. We climb up. And then at that

point, it's to kind of get over the shock -- to process what's

happening.

I pull out the Incident Commander Checklist. Page 119, go there, pull it up. And at that point, I call Fukuoka control to make a call and let them know that we've had two aircraft down. We had to pass them a lat-long. It takes a minute. Fukuoka control has a hard time processing. They're Japanese controllers. There's a little bit of slow language barrier there. They initially try to clear us back to Iwakuni, but we kind of get their attention finally. Pass them the initial lat-long for this -- for the mishap that occurred.

And then we -- at that point, we keep checking -- we check again with Fukuoka control and make sure they're pulling up the SAR. We are not super confident that they are yet. So we didn't think

White Snake, who is the control agency out there and just procedural control, we didn't think they were going to be available. But just in case -- we didn't hear them roger up when we called them earlier. But just in case, we gave them a call. And sure enough, somebody was listening. So we got in touch with White Snake. Passed them the lat-long for the mark, and then I passed them a phone number for ODO. I asked them to our ODO and get the previous AP plan and roll it on base.

So we'll alternate between Fukuoka control and White Snake as we need to pass information. Which is kind of -- anything we pass to Fukuoka control, we call White Snake to just make sure that the communication is happening there because they were a pretty calming presence. They understood what was going on. They knew how to talk.

We'll roll the back radio up to 282.8 for a standard SAR frequency. We hear beacons on guard. It's crushing it. So 243, we'll alternate it on and off as we need to communicate over our prior radio. It automatically listens so it can be very SA degrading if there's, like, a constant presence. So we will cycle that thing on and off listening for calls. And make calls on the 2828/243/1215.

And then eventually, we'll start -- we have the boatie contact channel, 16. So we start trying to contact vessels. The only person that ever rogers up to that is one guy who speaks Japanese. I couldn't communicate with him. So we try to pass information there.

We get set up -- we're hanging out at 18,000 feet. We don't see any chutes or canopies or anything like that, so we will -- I will pull up our -- we have an F-Pass page which helps us with real-time fuel planning. I pull that thing up and it's telling us that we need to hang out at about 26,000 feet and swig out so we can preserve gas.

So we were able to be eek [ph] out of another 90 minutes of F-1 station time. So we hang out there, at first trying to just acting really as a comm relay. Making sure the SAR assets coming. Making sure the on-scene commander checklist is complete. And, kind of, brainstorming ideas on how we can help the situation, or how we can find the guys. This overcast layer is preventing us from using our lighting pod to find anybody.

So we set a -- we run quick fuel planning numbers. We had done the preflights and we stuck with what we had for preflight, which was 41,000 pounds for going home. So at 65,000, we -- that's when we hit our trip refuel. And our game plan was we were going to drop a lower cloud layer and find -- see what we could find visually.

We climb back up and radio -- we have a hard time with radios below 10,000 feet at that range. So we'll drop down. We'll do a search. We'll find an initial glow. It turns out just to be a ship. We'll pass that mark before we can really resolve it. And then after that, we'll run into pick up -- looks like an IR strobe. We're only able to see it under the NVCD's, not -- we can't see it visually, just by looking under the goggles. So we're thinking this

is an IR strobe. We can't really break out what it is. We are having a hard with the pods, the quality is kind of degraded so it was a hard time picking out any detail.

So we'll go -- we'll descend and we'll go past that. Drop a mark as we go over it. We'll pass that lat-long twice, maybe, to Fukuoka control. We try to do our best there, look and searching visually. We know the winds are out of the west, so we're looking east at the sea down there. I tried to contact the ships to see if they could help us out.

We'll climb up. Once we hit that gas, we'll talk to Fukuoka control. They'll clear us up to 36,000 feet and direct Iwakuni. They really helped us out there. And we make it back here with about 2,000 pounds of gas. And the weather here wasn't super great, but we were able to get visual straight in and land here. We'll pass as we are landing -- or as we finally get in touch with the ODO and get in radio range, they'll let us know -- we'll pass them the three marks that we had. And then he will let us know that we're launching another aircraft. They pulled a crew together to go continue the on-station effort. We will contact those guys. We'll pass them all the information that we had, the marks.

And then we get the word that the first couple of SAR aircraft are already on station. So those guys will launch. We'll go ahead and shut down and go straight to, pretty much debriefing the A and B that they already had put together. So that's from preflight to landing.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So it was your understanding when you

touched down and you landed and you were speaking to the ODO, the SAR aircraft had [inaudible]

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. So they will pass them to that flight going out just to give them a heads up for de-confliction that, hey, there's already potentially four aircraft on station. I don't think they had direct contact with the SAR director yet. But I think the profane flight that got out there later was able to get in touch with them. Sorry, their call sign is "Bat" [inaudible]

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Thanks. So you wouldn't mind -- it'd be helpful for us -- I'm going to kind of draw a little diagram here.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Sure.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And get 1,000 words going here. Working on my C-130 drawing skills. They're still slightly raggish. So that's a C-130 dragon hose.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : If you could use a pen and kind of draw, you know, like, where you were, where he was, you know, and kind of, like, try to talk us -- talk to us while you're drawing.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : All right. So Profane 1-1 is going to be established echelon right. After the wing line stepped up, [inaudible] I'm set to pie off that. I can see the top of the C-130. If you could imagine the hornet, if we had crossed over the C-130, we would have cleared it. And we would have contacted the [inaudible]. This is about how high up we were stepped up.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And so what was the air refueling

altitudes? What altitude was the tanker at?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): He was at 16, I believe. I don't remember him telling me, but I think it was about 16,000. We were in the mid-teen block.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Can you annotate that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Sure.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Just draw it on the C-130 that it was at 16,000.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And we were heading -- at the time, the [inaudible] put this on here -- so 2-7-0.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So -- and then this jet would be at approximately -- approximate altitude? We have 16-5, or 16 [inaudible]

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : More than 500 feet up. We were probably, I think, we were stepped up slightly. I couldn't tell you a number. If I had to guess --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Sixteen plus?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes. Sixteen -- whatever his altitude was plus, probably, 50 feet. So 50 to 100 feet. Maybe not 100 feet. That would be significant. So probably about 50 feet.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Can you write that down there.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Sure.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Just label that 1-1?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Thanks.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And can you kind of draw 1-2, kind of,

like, where they were supposed to be; where they started; and, kind of, like, whatever relative path they took; and, kind of, like, where they hit the 130?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So he is basically mirror us, initially.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So he's -- that's where I expected him to be and that's where he initially was.

So I -- the scale is a little off.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That makes it a little tough. I'm going to extended this down a little bit.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes. You can -- feel free to modify.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : The empennage is going to be important here.

So I'm going to -- so what I want to see is no eyesight change;

slight change in size. And then I'm going to see it in the aft; I'm going to see it descend. That's when I see line-of-sight rates pick up.

I'm basically drawing -- this is his --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Nose track.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- nose position. Correct. His nose track.

So it's going to look like this. And then he's going to come slightly forward and impact right about here. And it's a smoothe -- it's a continuous movement. He keeps getting bigger and then I see aft line-of-sight rates. And then I see target aspect probably when he's about here. I can break out that he's got a bite into C-130 essentially.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : When you say have a "bite," you mean "heading"?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Slight heading bite, yeah. So it looked like a cross-under initially, if you can imagine what that looks like with the line-of-sight rate aft.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It all looks like he just kind of drifted into an aft, correct?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. He's going to contact nose to, basically, the upper -- for the stab -- horizontal stab, he's going to contact -- that kind of defeats the logic between the vertical and the left horizontal stab on the topside is where I'm going to see it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And then everybody kind of saw us a little different, but that's what I saw.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Now, that's okay. We just want to hear what you remember.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So that's where the contact occurred. At that point, there's going to be a flash. Goggles are -- I see sparks -- goggles are going to de-gain. There is going to be another big bloom and that's the last time I see Profane 1-2.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : When did the echelon left call come in? Was he already at echelon left?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Oh, so echelon left occurred -- so once he was complete here -- he is going to request echelon left. And SUMO is going to say, approved echelon left. And he [inaudible]

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So he was already there?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. He was already there in this turn.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And when you guys talked about that you were going to level out, and then go for a pull tug, do you just get out of the airspace after you're done refueling?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Did they confirm that? Like, [inaudible]

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. So he's going to say [inaudible] and the [inaudible] is like a vertical as far as -- somebody explained it totally different, but it's going to be straight ahead climb. So we always climb away from the tank. And typically we depart high --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- from a tanker. You want to get to the lowest altitude before you make any turns away. In case you don't have -- you probably won't have sight of them. So he is going to say, hey, we are going to depart straight ahead and high.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And you said "he is going to say it"; who said it?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Sorry. Profane 1, the flight lead pilot is going to talk to SUMO 4-1 and say, we're going to depart straight ahead.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did he do that? Do you remember that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I heard this conversation happen.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I'm not doing it -- it's not verbatim.

But I remember they talk about, we're going to go forward and climb.

SUMO 4-1 is going to roger that up and say, okay, yeah, that's approved. And we talk about managing the airspace when turning the aircraft towards the center.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. At any point, do you hear Profane 1-2, like, confirm that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Profane 1-2? Profane 1-2. So on the aux radio, on the back radio, the pilot -- Profane 1-1 pilot, Profane 1-2 pilot are coordinating what they're going to do. That they're going to go forward and ahead.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So you knew your guys are communicating, you heard them communicating?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes. Absolutely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What do you think about -- to the best of your recollection, is the C-130 straight and level, or turning?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He -- my perception is that they were rolling out of a turn -- out of a left-hand turn. So I can't remember if -- this is something that I've had trouble putting together in my head, is if we were actually established wing's level when this occurred, or if this was as we're rolling out.

I'm looking left over my shoulder so I don't know if there is a little bit of illusion there going on, but it feels like we're rolling out of the turn when he starts to fall out of position.

When Profane 1-2 falls out of position.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. All right. Good. Can we go back

a little bit? So let's talk about the week before a little bit.

So this happened on Wednesday. When did you learn about this exercise? This -- I wrote that you guys are calling it the "ULT."

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. The ULT. We learned about it the week prior. So they gave an in-brief -- our Opso gave an in-brief to the crews. I can't remember if it was Thursday or Friday, but it would have been on the flight schedule. We had a meeting so that's when we found out -- that's when I got the products and started putting together some range diagrams and things like that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : All right. And when did you -- and you said you didn't fly out Monday or Tuesday?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Correct, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And you -- was there a weekly flight schedule? Did, like, some kind of weekly schedule go out?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We don't really -- so there is a -- the MAG produced flows --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- flows.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes. So I got some flows that were sent to me on SIPR that I had access to look at what was coming in the week.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did that flow -- how did that flow describe this flight event? And how is that --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So the flows initially -- if there was an update, I never got the update. But the flows that I got, I would get on over the weekend on Monday were that we were going to have three flights that night. And the change to that -- what was

different was the flight schedule had us doing two flights that night, I think, as an ORM needs. Basically, I think they --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : When you say "flights," do you mean for you personally? Like you were going to pit? Go back out?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. It was going to be a fly -- a hot load pit fly.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And were you guys the only section flying that night?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And did that flow include your ordinance and your range space and your air refueling mission and everything?

(b) (3) (A) (b) (6) : So the MAG flow included the situated fly windows. And then the -- if tankers were on the flows, they were -- they had your FRAG on it, that's your offload expected for each aircraft, and then it had your ordinances expected. It did not have ranges assigned. Mostly because that was still on kind of a fluid state on whether pending -- pending whether or not we were approved to go to (b) (6) (b) or any of those places. So that was, I think, (1) (B) assigned by -- we knew it was going to be one of a couple places. Itierra [ph] south, Itierra [ph] north. Or if we got it, Tulson [ph] range.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : When did you first see the flight schedule?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : The flight schedule?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : The document signed by your Commanding

Officer authorizing this flight.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I saw it --

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Because you're coming to work like at what -- 1800?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I showed up at like 7:30 -- 1930.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : 1930. Okay. So you leave the squadron's spaces on Tuesday -- so on Tuesday you come to work about 1930 or so?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : A little later. That night they had -- Tuesday was pretty standard day. I left by 8:00 a.m. and I was at work around probably 8/8:30 p.m. so.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Let me make sure I understand that right. So you reported for duty at 2000 on Tuesday?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Tuesday. Yes, sir. About there, 2000.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And then you did ground work all night?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And then you left, sunrise-ish or so -- or sooner after?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I left about 0700 on Wednesday morning.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So Tuesday -- I just gotta write this down, make sure. So you're fully ranked on the night page is what I'm getting at?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Tuesday, you got there 2000. You depart at -- I'll just write down 0800-ish Wednesday, plus or minus, you know, an hour or two. And then on Wednesday -- so when you left for

work at 0800 Wednesday morning, what did you know about what you were doing 12 hours later?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : The schedule is already published. I knew that we were going to go execute this flight. There was no tanker on the schedule, so that was kind of a difference for us. I didn't see them -- I don't remember seeing them on the flows either, so I wasn't surprised we didn't have a tanker. I thought we were going to be operating when -- but we'll get that word when we show up later in the day. I'd have to check the flows -- and I'm thinking, maybe that's something I missed or I forgot there. But yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No. That's fine. I'm just trying get what's in your mind.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We're not pointing fingers here.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I didn't expect the tanker. So that was because I didn't think it was on the flows. I didn't think anybody's flow that night.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So the new report for duty on the day of the day of the mishap, Wednesday, at about 1930/2000?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. About 1930. I came in a little early to work on ground work stuff. Jumps, really, actually. It was kind of flying related, so. I came into work -- basically, day 5th rolls over that night, so I was coming in to make sure --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Were you the NAVO?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : That's a special job. Everybody loves a NAVO.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So I was trying to make sure we weren't going to lose our NAV capability in the middle of the night.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you came in and did the [inaudible]

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So what time is your flight brief?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We had a brief at -- I think it's 22 -- it was briefed at the schedule brief time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Whatever it was?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It was about 2230 you said? Or did you say 50?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I think it was 15 on the schedule because we were supposed to have --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : 2215?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- 0015 take off. So that drives two hours prior.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So when did you find out you were going to the tanker then? So you're briefed at 2215. Did you find out at the brief?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No. We found out well before that. So Profane 1-1 -- or basically the ODO came in and said, hey, SUMO 4-1 pilot has called you and wants to coordinate. Profane 1-1 pilot and senior dude in the flight lead takes -- he talks to (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ph] and they pass each other's contact information. They give a quick coordination talk. They talk about where they are going to be; what they need; and what kind of off load they're looking for.

Standard stuff you talk to a tanker about. And then he's going to -- I think (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) [ph] is going to send the tanker card to Profane 1-1 pilot. So we're going to get their CORDCARD from them.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : How do you know all that?

(b) (3) (\overline{A}), (b) (6) : I was in the ready room.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So you actually heard this conversation happening, or you were there?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): I didn't hear the whole conversation he had, I just know that he was on the phone. I didn't listen to his conversation in detail there.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Got it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [inaudible]

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And did you -- so you said the flight schedule -- what -- do you remember what training codes were on the flight schedule?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I believe it was a 2202 for the first one, which is just a standard -- that's our -- 2202 is what you -- what we flow when it's a, like, an admin style flight.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Like a FAM?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. It's a FAM flight. That's exactly what it is, sir. 2101 [inaudible] and this would be your FAM flight. For them to do any other training, we'll up that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Was it -- do you think that's the only code that was on there?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : On the first one. On the second on we're going to have night armed reconnaissance.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. What's the --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : 3203, I believe.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And did you actually see the original flight schedule? Or how did you get this information.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. They post it in the ready room. And also, it's [inaudible] so I've got my email right there. So that was passed on through email on NIPR.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Did you get an ODO brief?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. We did talk to the ODO. And we talked about the weather news, and what the previous flights had done. How things were going, generally, with the --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What kind of training -- what kind of information -- tell us a little bit about the ODO.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. We talked about whether -- I forgot what the -- I'm trying to remember specifics. I don't remember any significant [inaudible] sticking out. So it -- we talked about the weather, overcast layers. But generally, it was new VFR, VFC. We talked about the range, whether winds out of the west. And then he talked about -- he just reminded us of the kind of special restriction we had, which was to start the APUs after midnight.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Why do you think that was?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : The restriction?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I think it has something to do with either our federal holiday or a Japanese holiday. A lot of times there be noise restrictions where they don't want us to turn engines -- or if

this was a -- I don't really understand where it came from. It was never explained to me why we had it, but it was passed down from, I believe, from the MAG.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So did -- I'm sure you've stood ODO a fair amount at your squadron.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So if we're doing anything like changing air crews -- this -- so if we're changing air crew or any significant changes to the schedule like big changes to times, mission, or if significant changes in location. If we have a bunch of ranges, this won't be a big deal. Usually you have to -- if we have any ranges scheduled, you can use the ranges. But if it's a change in air crew -- absolutely.

Anything that's going to, basically, affect ORM. You got to give it to the CO and get CO approval. If he is unable or not -- or out of hand, we'll go to the XO. I've never had to go past more than the Opso to get approvals to changes. They'll mark down on our corrected flight schedule say like, okay, CO. Or anything like that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And was the air refueling that night -- the air refueling tanker code, was that something that's considered a significant change? Or is that just kind of administrative?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. Because they were part of the exercise,

I don't think -- we wouldn't normally consider that a big change to the schedule. So because they were generally operating exercise and we knew tanking would be potentially one of the evolutions that -- it doesn't seem like it would be a significant change.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And so you were informed about the air refueling. I'm just trying to understand what the communication passed. So the communications passed to the crew was VMGR representative calling the 242 ODO?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Hey man, we'd like to tank tonight and per the flow and I'd like to speak with the crew and provide the coordination card.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I think their crew -- and this is why I would love to go back and see the flows again. I think their crew was like, we're out there, you tank hornets tonight. I think they already knew this was coming. This wasn't like they changed their training at the last minute.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That was the impression I got. So he calls and says, hey, I'm going to be out there; can I talk to your flight lead so that we are on the same page.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Great. Any other issues you want to -- or observations or comments about the evening, or leading up to, that you would like to share?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : (b) (3) ? (A).

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : None, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you got off easy because we've already heard the story twice, you know. And you're just kind of confirming the story. And everything kind of lines up, so that's good. So you've got the spelling of my last name. It's just like "(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) ." I'm in the GAL.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So don't send it to my son. So if you remember something or have a concern, or feel like you left something out or misstated something, you can always contact me and we can do a follow-up interview, and whatever meeting you would like.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So the door is always open to discuss this. We're going to include your diagram in our notes, so I'd like you to initial.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Just initial [inaudible]

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [inaudible] we had everybody draw diagrams.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Just to -- those are good.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Everybody sees something a little different.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. That's right because it's kind of, like, what you remember seeing. It's not what happened. It's what you remember happening. And that's okay. It's going to be [inaudible].

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Something that's on the diagram that I -there's something that's a question none of us can -- or that I
can't remember. If the other guys know, that would be great. I
don't know if their strobes are still out, at this point, when this
occurs. Just letting you know. I don't know if that -- the strobes
are out.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You don't know --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I don't -- I can't remember if they retracted them. I wasn't paying attention to it specifically because we were already set up here. I was thinking about the [inaudible] -- I was thinking ahead for the air space, so I wasn't really paying attention to whether or not those were out. I figured that was something that we were going to -- that I was trying to remember. We never got a [inaudible] from 1-2. If that affects anything at all. I'm just --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No. That's good. Thanks for sharing that. We'll include that. Depending on the airplane, some of them may have -- I know a KC-10 that's like [inaudible] -- they pull in real fast and the new J's pull in pretty quick. It can happen very quickly.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : How long after you had finished refueling before the incident?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : If I remember this correctly, because I don't -- I'm having a hard time remembering how this airspace was working at this point, but I remember that we were on the border. And we're done fueling and basically just going into this turn.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So I think it's about a turn you were done fueling?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Correct. Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Were you starting release and you were in formation before you started turning?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes. We were establishing left and right echelon when we had the turn.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.


[(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) was sworn and departed.]

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) conducting an interview of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) for the purposes of the JAGMAN investigation to the 242 -- 152 mishap that happened last week.

I'm accompanied by (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Did I say that right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Close, sir. (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) . You're good.



So what I'd like to do, (b) (3) -- just give me the next two hours -- or so as much time as you (6) want. We can stop at any time -- and just kind of tell us kind of what happened. You know, just -- the only information that I have about this as of now is what I just got from (5) (3) , so I've deliberately had no other contact. I was in Hawaii (6) when this happened, so I was not at the Wing Headquarters during the recovery or whatever. So I don't know very much about it. You can start wherever you like. If you want to start at the brief, if you want to start the week before the brief, or wherever you're comfortable starting and just kind of take us up through

until you initiated the ejection.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Is there any -- obviously, I've never done one of these before. Is there some type of -- exactly what is it that you're looking for?

Is this going to be like you question and then I answer.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) \cdot No. This is story time, so just tell me the story.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Start wherever you want and tell me what you think. I'll ask you a few guided questions as we go along. I may pause you to ask you to clarify something at the time --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Sure.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : In order to understand, this is --

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): All right. I'll just start where I think it makes the most sense, if that's all right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Let me just put my cell phone up. It's a pink cell phone. It was donated to me. I was sitting in salt water for too long. Anyway, we saw the -- you know, obviously you have the radar side of the tanker inside the interior south. We were training down there. It's a training air-space, obviously, to south-east of where we're located. The join was the benign. It was

nothing out of the ordinary. It was the tanker was in the left hand turns. We joined another tanker. They started to rollout. If anything, I thought that we could have probably heated it up a little bit. I felt like we actually went were farther in fueling than normal, but it was nothing that I was concerned about.

I came up to the tanker. So the C-130, obviously, they had the two droves behind it. Soup goes to the right; we go to the left. Pretty uneventful tanking. I was actually pretty impressed that (b)(3) -- again, junior pilot. A lot of junior pilots have (A).(b) usual(f) a decently hard time. We've tanked behind a C-130 before. He was a basket. He moves around a lot. Once you get antsy, it's an easier to stay in, kind of, thing.

I was impressed that we had no issues. We're tanking and then we started a left-hand turn. Again, no problems with (3) on (A),(b) the basket. We're in the left-hand turn. I just remember (6) t being just really dark. We were zero lux that night? The moon was below the horizon, which is really dark. At one point, I took my NVGs and just flipped them up to kind of see what I could see with my bare eyes as we were plugged. Just to kind of see — the tanker could barely make out the vert stab as we're behind midnight. The tanker was midnight. Obviously, we were midnight — I flipped them back down. We were on NVCs again. So then as we roll out, we come out

of the basket just a little early. Again, no big issues. I've seen some pilots come out of the basket all the time. Not a huge deal.

I didn't -- I was not concerned at all. And it was to the point where -- I mean, you've come out of a basket, sir. You're probe is in and, kind of, the basket starts flailing around if you have enough torque on it. It was just nice and easy out of the back; no issues.

And then, this is where my recollection of the count -- of the account. Obviously, the A and B is privileged, but it's -- this is kind of where I'm beating myself up because it starts to get kind of fuzzy -- the thing that I can't remember is:

I read the BUNO number, the assigned BUNO number and it depends on your TCC inside the cockpit whether or not who is going to read it. A lot of times the pilots will read your BUNO number to the tanker. It just depends.

So this night it was dark. I asked him, "Hey man, do you want to read this?" and he was like, "sure." He read the BUNO number and then that was the last comm call that I can recollect. I remember there being comm, but I can't remember what was said.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So roughly in space where are you right now?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So right now, we're left of stern behind the

tanker. That was my essay as I'm reading the buno number.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So he asked you to read the BUNO number?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He didn't ask.

So again, it's more of a TCC thing.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : TCC is a tactical crew checklist. What is that?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Sorry. Tactical crew coordination inside the cockpit.

At this point, I'm -- I'm trying to explain this. If you go into the 22, you kind of know how it is. You have a loophole in the jet and the single-seat guys. Obviously, they're not used to having somebody behind them, kind of, helping them out with whatever.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So it's my habit pattern to see who's going to read the BUNO number and a lot of times pilots will take pride in -- which they should be. The pilot should own the comms behind the tanker one-hundred percent because they're the ones, you know, driving around behind the tanker they're the ones throwing the probe in the basket, et cetera.

But a lot of times, depending on what's going on, I'll

take just the BUNO number just because it's easy and it takes something away from -- something from he -- now he can focus on something else.

So I remember reading the BUNO number and.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did you arrange to do that pre-flight or is that realtime?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So my habit pattern is to always ask the pilot who's going to read it, but the timing of it is not a habit pattern if that makes sense, sir.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : So that night, did you ask as it was asked?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Yep. It was, like, almost immediately --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : The tankers, like, rippling noises or whatever he said and you said, (b) (3) do you want me to take it," and (A), (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And I already had it written down on my kneeboard card, ready to go like if I had to read it. So I'd read it real quick. I have a tendency to talk too fast on the radio so I don't know if it was too fast or whatever. They didn't ask for it again, so I'm guessing they got it down.

So then, the last thing I remember -- and this is kind of why I beat myself up -- because I just cannot remember -- I can't

remember the comm between us and the tanker and at this point.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : That's fine. Just tell us what you remember.

The last thing I remember was the position of the tanker. We were stepped up and to the right of the tanker. And I remember looking down at the tanker, and I remember feeling that we had enough lateral de-confliction as well as altitude de-confliction away from the tanker. And then I remember looking over at , which is our lead aircraft at this point. I start to transition my scan. I'm on the goggles the whole time. And then the next thing I remember was my body being slammed up against the inside of the cockpit. There was a flash of orange-yellow light. My immediate response was to reach down and pull the handle. I felt -- I'm sorry -- to include there, what felt like there was a wind on my face almost. And it was -- somebody asked me before, like, how did you know that you needed to eject. I can just tell you that -that is the most violent thing that I have ever felt in my life and, you know, sir, these things are not meant to feel that amount of violence. It was just an immediate reach.

I pulled the handle. The next thing I see is another flash of orange light, which is obviously the ejection seat going off. At this point, the next thing I remember was dropping down

into the chute. I remember hearing the Herc overhead. It did not sound abnormal. It sounded like a normal C-130 flying overhead to me.

I didn't see ours yet. I didn't see (b)(3) shoot -- I'm sorry -- (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) was my pilot. I didn(6) see the jet, which obviously if he's doing what he's supposed to be doing. He's not supposed to -- I'm not supposed to see him at that point anyway. And it was dark, but I had decent visibility. I could make out the cloud layer from what I remember. And I could, I felt like in that position, at that space and time, I would have been able to see if there was something to see, if that makes sense. And I didn't see anything and then from there it's just the whole hitting the water, popping off pen flares, getting in the raft story, which I don't know if you guys even care about that shit.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We care, but that's not what we're here to look at. So we don't have to get into that.

Diagrams are helpful for us. If you're willing, would you be willing to, like, draw out the C-130. Something kind of like this. Now that's kind of a C-130 wing line, if you recall.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : It's kind of hard to explain because I felt like there was a -- I know that you guys are recording everything.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah, it's hard to draw too.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It was more of a vertical and, like --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Let's talk about that. Which side of the aircraft were you refueling?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): We were left to stern. We were on the left side of the aircraft.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Do you remember releasing from the drop casket?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I do.

ATC: As planned, right? Like we're done getting gas or did you fall out?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Like I said, we fell out just a little early and I think --

ATC: Was it your intent to reengage and get more gas were you just going to call it good?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. We were going to call it good because at that point we only came out 1000 pounds below what we planned. So the whole point of the mission was a proof of concept kind of thing. To go out and fly that late and we knew that we had enough gas to accomplish what we were supposed to accomplish.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did you discuss that with Captain

(b) (3) (A), -- so you come out of the basket and did you have a (b) (6) conversation with him about that?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : It was so benign, I think. The ICS comm was something like, "Oops."

Like I told him, right. Here's the basket and here's the probe. If the pilot is egregiously pulling this thing away and falls out this thing will snap and start flailing around. If it was something like that, there would have been more of a conversation inside the cockpit, like, "hey man, like, get away, or something. There would have been a conversation. It was — the basket was here and the probe did just one of these. And in hindsight, you know, we were in a left hand turn. He was a little bit back on the power, probably, in this left hand turn. As we rolled out, he was still probably a little bit back on the power. Which makes — obviously, all this is hindsight. 20/20 kind of thing. It makes sense now. It was probably still — didn't correct — increase a little bit which caused us to just kind of slowly nudge out.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So for a moment, I just want to go over what you actually remember.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you come out of the refueling. What do you remember happening next?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I remember coming up just reading the -- I remember reading the BUNO. Obviously, the conversation happened inside the cockpit.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So then your eyes were down in your knee board?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Yes, at that point.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And then again, the next thing I remember was transitioning my scan to now the Herc and then the position of us being high and to the right of the Herc with enough de-confliction to feel, like, I could transition down my scan to the -- sorry -- our lead; the other aircraft. And then the next thing is the, obviously, the subsequent impact.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you looked left and that's when you saw the Herc?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I never saw the Herc during the impact.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, I was saying prior to. So you've read off the BUNO number on your knee board --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yup, so I look up --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- and you said you changed your scan.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Yup. Look up. At this point we're still, what I gage to be left of stern.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you see the Herc on your right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : All right.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): And at some point we start to transition over to the right and I feel like we are laterally de-conflicted, as well as de-conflicted from altitude, from the C-130.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you felt like you were above the Herc?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : I felt like -- yeah, I felt like I was. And I --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did you see it?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Oh yeah. I mean I had the Herc in my goggles.

I was looking at it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Now you're looking out the left side of the aircraft?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yup.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Now let me ask. When you look out, especially [inaudible]. When you look out the left side of the canopy through your goggles, what part of the Herc do you see? Do you see the rutter, do you see the jump door?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Yes, I see the whole thing. I mean, I got the wing line. I got the vert staves. I got the -- I got everything

that I can see.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you're kind of like back here somewhere?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's what I felt. The more I question myself, the more I'm trying to figure out. You know, obviously, like, I don't know if you've ever been in a mishap like this, sir; but it's like you just -- you keep beating the living shit out of yourself because you just can't fucking remember.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : As well as with the loss of life. But -- yeah so -- sorry -- yeah I remember being at least from what -- I don't know if it's right or not, but like I thought that we were on the right side of the aircraft when it happened.

b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And by right, you mean starboard?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sorry. Yeah, I thought that we were --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Not correct. Okay. So I'm drawing while you're talking okay, but I'm pointing to the left side of the airplane which is where you refueled.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yup.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And then somehow you made it kind of like over here somewhere maybe?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I believe that's what happened.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And do you believe the C-130 was straight and level during this time that your jet went from there to there, or do you believe that it was turning, or is it hard for you to remember?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : There was a -- I think there was a left hand turn somewhere after we came out of the drogue. Where that was in time and space is still -- it's hard to remember, but in my essay at this point, which obviously is -- obviously, the essay is not accurate because we hit another aircraft, but it was strait and level.

So my old man, he was a tomcat guy he was a skipper 213 and ended up retiring as a full bird. And he said, you know, he's done a few of these and he told me that, you know, your brain has a weird way of processing things like this and he said, you know, you'll find that as the days go on, you know, you'll start unlocking more information and that's the thing that's really driving me nuts. It's like nothing else is like -- nothing else is unlocked. And I don't know when it happened, I can't -- I went to the hospital and my entire head was swollen on the left side of my face. I took a pretty, I guess, decent blow when it impacted the -- honestly the ride down in the chute was uneventful. So I don't know if that plays into the recollection piece. I would like to think that I

could, you know, we -- aviators always pride ourselves on our debriefing, you know, and having the essay that was there and being able to teach to it later. So it's pretty frustrating.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I understand. Did your dad come out and see you yet; have you seen your dad?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He told me that he was, like, on the way. And I told him [inaudible]. I don't want you to have to stop everything that you're doing to focus on me. Obviously, there's other people in this mess that obviously need this more than I do.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Can we back up a little bit?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Let's go back to like a week before.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Would that be all right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. Absolutely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Let's talk about like squadron operations and flight schedules and stuff like that. So this is kind of unusual; right? You're flying early in the morning, you know, the time of day that we really don't normally fly.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yup.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : When did you learn that you would be flying at middle of your [inaudible], you know, morning and noon?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): I think it was either the Thursday or Friday prior. I'm not exactly sure. Names were up on the board in OPS.

And so, in all honest, we're just kind of going in and seeing where the names were stacking up.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So tell me what you mean by that, "names up on the board." So did the squadron break up into like two; day and night team or --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It was --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- shift, one, two, three, four?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- yeah it was like a day and midnight kind of thing.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And so we knew that MAG was directing us to do this ULT. We knew that it was coming despite Vigilant Ace being canceled due to the, you know, the sensitivities there with the political nature there in (b) (6). We, I think, originally had tried to schedule going into (b) (1), but the (b) units down there, for whatever reason, told up that we couldn't fly in there.

So we were directed and it was that Friday night where I stayed up super late. Something until like 3 or 4 in the morning to try to start working that sleep schedule.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did you work on Saturday or Sunday or

were those days off?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Those were days off, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : But still trying to, obviously, stay up late, wake up a little later. I have (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) . They are (b) (3) . I live on a single floor apartment. So, obviously, it's, you know, you want to sleep, but you get up and you have kids.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I know, I have (b) (3) (A), (b) .

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. So then I started just working the sleep cycle and it was honestly a pretty uneventful week. It was just a -- we started working at night.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So what time, roughly, did you report to your work spaces on Monday?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I think it was something like 7:30 at night. I can't remember. I obviously did the, like, 72 hour A&B thing and I

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : 1930 ish or so?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I think that sounds about accurate.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : And then what do you think you did on Tuesday?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It was the same thing. It just all blended in. The whole week kind of blended in with each other. So we stayed up

all night, I came home, you know, went to sleep, got up, saw the

(b)(3), made dinner, put the (b)(3) to sleep, went to work. It's
(A),(b)
(6) surprisingly hard to get work done as the Logistical Officer in the middle of the night. So it was, honestly, kind of useless.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
: It was kind of just jacking around?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
: I mean, I can write as many emails as I want,
but I'm not going to get a response until tomorrow. And I am going
to be asleep.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Right.

b)(3)(A)(b)(6): So, you know, we just, you know, try to knock out as many administrative things as I could. The -- and then just every day was the same thing. Go home around -- once people started kind of coming in for day work. And try to do some type of pass over -- or, you know, turnover with my guys coming in. I have my guys on kind of an off-shift work as a two seat squadron, we're not allocated to as many people in the four as a single seat squadron. Which really hurts us, obviously being here on constant deployment, if you will. So all I had -- I had a Lance Corporal that was in the states on leave and I had a Corporal and a Lance Corporal. And that was all that was running the four shop at that point. And then the MAG tasked us at that point to now send one of my Corporals down to

shifts to where there was somebody always in the shop, you know, to handle daily S4, logistical things. Which could be anything from putting a service request for something in the squadron all the way to all I need is, you know, shit paper for the fucking head.

So we're just kind of doing that for the week. It was pretty benign. There's really not a lot to talk about other than just come home, sleep, wake up, see the (b)(3), make dinner.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What about you 6 pilot, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) -- what do you know about his 72 hour history?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He didn't talk a whole lot about it, but I mean he lives off base. His (b) (6) was here, so we -- there was a couple guys, we were discussing, you know, how there sleep schedule was working and he didn't have anything remarkable. It's a lot easier to sleep when you don't have kids. So, you know, we felt like he was up and chipper. And I didn't have any reason to suspect anything.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Right.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Like, I'm pretty thick headed. I'm a pretty stubborn kind of guy. Like, I have no [inaudible] telling somebody that this is unsafe and we're not doing this. And I had total confidence that we were obviously going to come back together, or else, I would have fucking put a stop to it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What about medications or, you know, any idea if he was taking pseudoephed or had a cold or anything weird like that?

absolutely no indication whatsoever that there was anything going on with (b)(3)(A),(b)(6)

In fact he was excited to fly. You know, we were walking to the jet and we're, you know, [inaudible] you know, being myself and he's like, [inaudible]. He's all excited to fly and he was trying to, you know, pump me up. Like he was just that kind of guy. He was very energetic. He --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You'd say he's enthusiastic about flying?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He was very positive.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : When did you -- tell me more about you mission, and when you learned about your mission, and how you prepared for it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. So, I think, originally, earlier in the

week we were supposed to get the seaside AVCAV which was going to allow us to do CAS overhead the airfield --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : This airfield?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

Which is -- I've done it in the past before at night.

It's actually pretty good -- it's really good training. Especially the people that know the lay out of the base. They do some decent urban CAS. Especially, when guys start driving around the vehicles and get to really exercise the size of the pod, you know.

Then, obviously, the geometry of the jet is always super difficult in the kind of scenario, I'm sorry. I'm kind of going down a rabbit hole with the urban CAS stuff.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, that's good.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : But, I think, that got turned off at some point during the week. I don't know -- I don't remember when. And then it ended up being a -- I think it ended up turning into like a proof of kind of thing where we were just supposed to go out.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So when you were going to do the urban CAS, was that going to be a cast tank CAS?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I know that there is supposed to be tankers later on in the week, but I don't think the plan had been entirely ironed out yet.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

was two hours prior to event, we didn't think that we had tankers.

And then the -- we got word that we actually did have gas on station. So then we started working that piece. We got the tanker car. Did the standard, you know, logistical, I guess, conversation with the 152 in order to get all the information, you know, the standard stuff for. Like I said, the altitudes, frequencies [inaudible] game plan. All that stuff. So and that was -- obviously (A),(b) as the flight lead, took that. And then, you know, coordinated that. And I remember he handed me the coordination card. And I have the SUMO's coordination card on and I had it on my kneeboard of that. Actually flew off somewhere during the -- somewhere during the handle pull.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So I think what I just learned is you found out that you guys were on the tanker at the brief.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It wasn't at the brief, sir. I think it was like an hour or two prior to the brief.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : A few hours prior to the brief.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It was more than enough time, I would say, to get -- I mean, you're never going to say no to gas. You know, being a Harrier guy.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Liquid fun, baby.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you felt pretty comfortable with the mission?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Yeah. Like I've told many different people before, if I didn't feel comfortable, you know, that's the reason why we do RN. That's the reason why we brief. That's the reason why we have the TCC conversation with your pilot before you fly. There's reasons why we do all that stuff. So, you know, despite being tasked by the MAG to fly at that time. You know, yeah, absolutely, or else I wouldn't have been -- I wouldn't have sat in that seat.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Do you remember what night vision you had that night?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I had the NVCDs. So they're the, like, the smart version, if you will, of our NVGs. They plug into the jets and gives you a heads up display in the actual goggles. Airspeed, altitude, and that kind of stuff.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Is that system operating for you? (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Technical question about the hornet, I'm not familiar. If that system malfunctions, would a display on both

your system malfunction as well as the pilots, or would it be possible for it? Because I've heard about it sometimes they can invert or malfunction.

Is it possible for it to malfunction on one and not the other or?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. It is. So just to tell you, we were flying out of Australia for Operation Pitch Black, Southern Frontier. We were on climb out. Goggle up images. Inverted pilot. Nope, nothing.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yours inverted, the pilot's was good?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So when the image inverts, tell me -- I want to learn more about that. What does that mean?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It's, essentially, exactly what you would think. The entire image just rotates.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So up is down and down is up?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yup. And it's very easy to fix. It's was literally a up, down, and it was back to normal.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And it reset it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And I didn't even say anything to my pilot when it happened down in Australia, because we were joining up as a four ship. Not really a time to start talking or that kind of stuff when

he's doing it. And it was at night, obviously. And then, I was like, "man, I've never seen this before. I thought it was like a -- I thought it was a hoax. A few people keep talking about this NVG VCD inversion." And he was like, "oh shit, you got it?" and I was like, "yeah, I just flipped them up, put them back down. We're fine." But, I don't think -- maybe I'm just making an assumption. I'll just give you guys the data and you guys can figure it out. But we never, that was -- we never had the conversation inside the jet about NVCD inversion.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And that -- the night of the mishap? (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yup. We never did.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you feel like if his goggles inverted, he would have jumped on ICS and went, "my goggles are inverted."?

Do you feel like he would have said something?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I believe he would. He was a --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You don't recall him saying that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He was an easy guy to fly with, easy guy to talk to. In the jet, he had -- he didn't have any issues. There's some pilots that you fly with that are, you know, pretty -- I would say, like proud or whatever. You know, you always have different types of personalities that you fly with. He was the type that, if there was something wrong, he would have said something.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you know if his system was fully working that night; NVG wise?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I mean, so, again, the TCCP says -- you only say something if you have to. You know, he never mentioned it. So if he didn't say it and he was able to make every single join that night safe, and, obviously, when I say joined, obviously, something happened, but we weren't joining -- you know were I'm trying to go with this. But every join that I felt up to the impact was safe. There was no reason to talk about it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You know, I've flown with a lot of pilots and if people make unsafe joins, they get a little hairy. Usually, then I will start making the conversations in the cockpit like, "Hey man, like next time slow down a little bit." Like or -- you know once you start to see and giving him sight pictures or whatever start to explain to him. You know, like, "hey man, once you see this let's just pull the back on the throttles a little but. It's no big deal or try to say something. And I didn't have to say anything to him.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did you guys feel any specific pressure to fly that night? Or did you feel like it was a do or die flight?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I mean, there's always -- there's always pressure, but I -- this squadron is in the best place that I've seen

it. I've been -- I think there's only two other guys that have been in the squadron at this, well I guess, you know, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) obviously (b) (3) 's director. But, like, we -- as far as the family goes now, (1) (6), there's only a couple guys that have been in as long as the squadron, you know, because we're cycling out. But I've never seen a squadron this good and I say that because if I had any misforgivings about flying that at night, I know 100 percent if I was like -- if I said "Hey man, this is too risky" and I said "I don't want to fly." I know 100 percent that the command would back me up. I know 100 percent, and I haven't -- when I say that, like, I have no, like, reservations at all. I know 100 percent. I know and , sort of, the CO, XO, Ops O, I know 100 percent -- they would be like "All right man. That's fine." And I've never seen a squadron this good before. It's -- I PCS in June and joking around with the wife, I was like "Babe, I want to extend out here" and she wants to go back to the states. She said "you better fucking not." : Those are fighting words. I've got one

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. We have a really good family and unfortunately this incident has only showed how good everybody's been, so yeah.

of those too.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Just the description of the rescue

attempt.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah, if you could just kind of highlight some aspects of the search and rescue?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Sure.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you landed at the surface of the water, and your LPU's inflated, I assume. And your sea wires is activated and your chutes separated, sea pants hanging on the cord; is that kind of where we're at?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Yeah, if you want I can just go -- I can just go from dropping down in the chute.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's all right.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So I failed the same portion of the swim qual every four years and after -- and I re-do it which is the swim in your full gear and pull the beaded handle and the LPU doesn't inflate and you have to grab and manually inflate and I have to do it twice every year.

So the first thing that I did was grab the [inaudible] and inflate because I knew I was going to need every single second all the way down to the water to inflate this thing. But the gear worked perfectly so I was pretty happy with that. At this point, again, I hear the aircraft overhead, I know that (b)(3) is about to (A), step the on-seat commander if the Herc hasn't already. Or if the

Herc is going to take it we can't -- in my SA, at this point is that the Herc is still flying well. And I'll get down -- I'll get to the point when I found out, I guess, later in the story.

So I pull out my -- start reaching around trying to find stuff, actually pretty hard to do when your freaking LPU is all the way up to your face. I pull out my pen flares, throw a pen flare in the air, at this point I'm just trying to just launch one off to let Soup know that I'm -- that somebody's conscious. Light one off, at this point, I see a light to, kind of like, my right and obviously you're kind of, spinning around here at the mercy of whatever wind is going on at that time. It wasn't overly windy. It was calm from what I remember and I think it's (5)(3)(A). So I started yelling for (b)(6)(A). So I and spent what felt, like, three to four minutes trying to do that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You're still in the sill now?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Still in the canopy, sir. We don't get a response, obviously, so we start to transition my scan to, believe it or not, I tried to take my boots off because I -- the steeled toe boots in the water actually suck. So I try to take my boots off and I couldn't get my laces off that were underneath my G-suit. As I was hanging in the canopy. So I gave up on that. Pull out the radio, I just literally wanted to inventory everything that I had on

me, to make sure that once I hit the water, I had an idea of where everything was and I wasn't fooling around too much, if you will.

Obviously, my flashlight is still on. I think NVGs are gone. So other than that, I think at this point I have my pen flares and I tried to pull another one out and the little, like, red cartridge thing actually ended up dropping, like, three of them. I was really pissed off. So I take the remaining and I stuff them in my mouth. And then honestly the -- I would say the -- people were like, oh were you scared. And it's kind of weird when you're in those type of situations. I wasn't scared. It was a task oriented situation to where you knew there were certain tasks that you had to complete now in the next however many long minutes. And you knew that you had to complete them in order to survive. And so that was kind of like where my brain was.

Until I went through the freezing layer and I couldn't feel my fingers for like four or five minutes. And then I was like, "All right. Now I'm kind of scared." And then -- but, I pop out of the freezing layer. I start to be able to regain, you know, some dexterity and during that I had stowed stuff because I didn't want to drop anything. Everything was still attached to the liner, but, you know, you're kind of in that situation where you're like, "dude this is, like, you know, this is pretty dire." [Inaudible.]

I start to come down. I see what looks to be a boat, like, off my left. And then I see another light. I'm not quite sure what it is because it's only a single light, but off my left I see multiple lights. And I can kind of make out what looks to be some type of structure. I can't tell you exactly what it was. It just looked like it was scaffolding or something like that with lights on it. And it had this type of horizontal component to it. So I was, like, it's got to be a boat, it can't be a buoy, that kind of stuff. So I launch another pen flare thinking, you know, they're going to see -- they must have seen the wreckage, they must have seen something go down. They must have seen the fire ball, they must have seen something. So I launch another pen flare. At this point, I think I have two left. And then, it obviously didn't work and I pull out my smoke and I light that thing off. At this point I'm just trying to do anything to get anybody's attention because I'm about to go in the water and -- yeah.

So I light that thing off, and then the water actually comes as a surprise just because you're at night, you don't know when you're going to hit so I smack into the water to get your part of the story, sir. Sea wires do what they're designed to do.

Obviously, already manually inflated the LPU so that's good and hit the water. Kind of take a second. Like, okay, I'm not sinking.

LPU is holding. Like, okay, like, take a breather. Start reaching around for my C-pin, the -- for you man -- the C-pin is designed to -- when you pull it, the raft is supposed to drop, which actually it's a CO2 canister and then the raft is supposed to inflate as you're falling.

Due to the night factor, obviously, I had no idea where the water was so I pull the lanyard out, yank, the raft inflates. I can tell you, sir, it's a lot more difficult getting into a raft with your LPU inflated than I thought it was going to be. I don't know if you've ever done that other than the, obviously, mandatory water training. It took me a long fucking time to get in that raft. And -- sorry, backup -- it felt like I was in the fucking chute for an hour. And I'll note, obviously, your brain judges time differently.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well how much do you weigh?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : 145, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah, so probably at your weight, probably 800 feet per minute, 15,000 feet. That's like 20 minutes. That's a long fucking time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It felt like forever, yeah. And I'm sorry -the -- I pull this thing out -- it inflates, works awesome. Jumping
onto get into the raft after an undetermined period of time, I don't

know how long it took, again, my time is skewed.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did you disconnect the C-pin from your harness or is the C-pin still in your ass or de-aft I mean.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Yes, sir. I disconnected it, obviously, before I tried to get in.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

And, believe it or not, my apple watch survived the ejection, or else I wouldn't have had anything other than, I guess,

the radio but the -- I was looking at my watch, obviously my phone -- tried to pull my phone out but it didn't work. So I started transitioning my scan to "I need to stay warm. I need to stay warm." So I slice the C-pin off; toss it in the water; get it off, just get it out; undo all the knots; spend a really long time doing that; and then I finally get in the raft, and then at this point, I convince myself that that boat is coming towards me, which it was not.

So I launched my last pen flare and so I'm like "All right. Well fuck, no big deal. Light works, have my radio, pull out my radio. Obviously, it's Clover on the 243 and the 121-5. The other C-pin, at this point, I still didn't know that the other Herc was obviously transmitting the beacon on those frequencies too. I thought it was just (3)(A)(B) so I'm trying to follow the radio and, (6) kind of, put that down. I'm like, okay -- how do I get -- okay, it's kind of like this series of, like, grab out the radio, try to figure it out, okay, huddle, get warm. So I start taking my helmet off and start bailing off the water, I think -- sorry -- the farther away I get from the story, there are sequence of events that aren't exactly, again, in line, if you will. But, there is a portion when I'm taking my helmet, and I'm bailing out the water, you know, from the raft because the swells, they weren't any bigger than what you

would expect, I would think, for being that far out into the water.

But the -- it was enough to, like, splash over the side and I could tell you, sir, that the little see worthy aspect of the raft, I don't know if you remember, there's a little -- there's like a little canopy you can put up, it doesn't really work that well so the water still splashes over -- seeps through the little velcro thing that you put up. Then you spend another 15 minutes bailing water out of your raft but I -- once I take this thing and I get this together, I start just, kind of, holding the heat in and huddling and I start to realize that my shaking has gone down. And, obviously, the process of me trying to keep water out as well as keep warm, just building heat inside my raft.

my shivering down to once every five to ten seconds. So at this point, I'm like "All right. I'm feeling pretty good," you know, I could last easily another four hours before hypothermia probably will legitimately set in with a combination of the windchill which was fairly significant. And, you know, having to stop every -- or having to undo the thing, let the heat out, bail out the water, et cetera, et cetera. I end up taking my earmuffs out of my helmet so I can hear if there's any sonar assets overhead, and I decided to stop using my helmet because in the process of bailing water out,

it -- you put your helmet back on, obviously the water just goes down your neck and you get cold again. So I end up taking my boot off and I used my boot to get water out.

I know there was a piece of the raft that has a bailer in it and I don't know if it was just dark and I was just -- I just had so much crap on me -- I just couldn't find that piece of it. I'm sorry, there was at one point where I decided to deflate my LPU as well, just so I could have mobility inside of the -- inside of the raft. At that point, it wasn't necessary because I was [inaudible] and so, I'm huddled there. I'm still trying to work the radio, still trying to keep heat in, trying to focus on getting the water out. Focusing on still on inventory. Making sure I have what I need. So a few hours go by and, again, I'm starting to feel pretty good, like, "All right. Now, I just need to focus on getting to daylight," and "they were going to see the sea dive marker, it's just a matter of time now."

So the sooner I stopped focusing on trying to signal that boat, I gave up on that a while ago and then I -- at some point I decided to transition my scan out to see if there's anything else out there because I was just focusing on radio, heat, water, radio, heat, water. And I see blinking lights out there and I'm like, "Okay. Those weren't there before. So either this is pure

coincidence or there's SAR assets on, on station" I was like, I'm pretty sure there are SAR assets, I haven't seen that kind of blinking light before, it almost looked like sirens in the distance. So I was like, this has got to be SAR assets, and they were flying decently low though and our primary SAR asset is the JASDF out of Iwakuni and the flying boat. So I wasn't sure exactly who was on station or who it was or where they were from. So I'm like, "Okay. There's people." So I start trying to use my light again, trying to focus on seeing if I can get their attention. It doesn't work. So I transition now, next goal, make it to daylight. Water, heat, radio. Just back and forth, that -- I had my schedule set out for me, if you will, as I'm in the raft.

At one point, I undo the thing that's covering my head at this point and I'm kind of looking around and I hear a helicopter and I'm like "what's good?" Comes over to my left shoulder, I can see it all the way, light actually hits my raft, you know, kind of doing one of these things, a signal, and it goes by me. At this point, it actually gave me more hope, despite the fact they missed me on the first one because I was like "Oh shit. That's, like, a UH-6," I was like, "I didn't know that they were going to be on station and I'm like that's good." Little did I know, they had, like, a drone overhead SAR mapping the water. Like, apparently when

we went in the drink it was -- and I found out about this later -- it was just a full on like everybody launched everything, which was pretty -- it was obviously humbling, being one out of seven victims. But -- so I'm like "Dude, this is easy, like, I got this." And I'm thinking, again, that if I'm in the water, (b) (3) made it. He had to have, right? Like I stayed two feet away from the guy. And so then the -- like, alright. No big deal. And kind of focus back on getting the heat in, the helicopter comes back doing one of these things again and stops. And I'm like, "Easy day. No big deal."

Next thing, I'm just going to go find (A).

And sit there for a minute, they lower a diver in and the guy (W) wims over to me, I don't know how long you guys have been in Japan, the Japanese are super respectful, even in a weird situation like that, you know.

But, you know, he puts the thing over me, I try to actually put my left boot back on and I couldn't put it on because my legs were too tight so I just fucking tossed it in the water. And I grabbed my radio because it's like sending text messages every thirty minutes and I wanted to hold onto that so they could -- if (A).

When the same thing then they could identify him and the (b) (W) wouldn't bite off on my radio. So they put the thing on -- around me. I think the hoist operator was having some issues with the hoist. At this point, my LPU was deflated so the only inflation I had was the

orange thing that went around my chest, if you will. So they lower me up and they kind of drop back down. I am not a great swimmer, especially while at ship. So I dunk underwater, back up. I'm like, fuck this sucks, I don't like this. You know, I got the diver with me come I think this happened another two times. As I'm trying to swim, I finally just took that radio and -- like fuck. So then they finally get the hoist fixed, or whatever, and we go up to the helicopter and the guys bring me in. You know, they're like -imagine a search-and-rescue Japanese guys patting you down to come up. You know, they're trying to take care of you and everything. And you're like -- you're trying to tell them that there's another dude in the water and -- in hind-site now, they were -- I can't remember what number they gave, but it was more than one. obviously they knew that the Herc had gone down. At this time, the language barrier prevented us from -- I think. I didn't want to talk to the pilot. Because, obviously the pilot -- they had the intercom and the pilots were busy. I didn't want to -- like I said, I didn't to start task saturating them with more shit. But I was talking with the search and rescue guy that was manning -- it was their version of the pod. It, like, scans back and forth. It looks exactly like a lighting pump. And so I'm starting to tell them there's another person. A and I'm like -- I can't remember if it

was five or four. Let me pull out my patch and look. Two people ejected.

And they were base -- more assets. There were more; there were more. And I was like, we're looking. They said base, more. And then again, I didn't know that they had launched the entire fleet out. I fully expected -- I one-hundred percent expected us to fly right over to 3 and pick him up and me and him to be sitting in that helicopter. A hundred percent. If you would have asked me that, if you would have asked me that, if you would have asked me that, yeah he's right there. I mean we ejected out of the same aircraft, right?

So we fly back to their naval base. We get out. Again, exactly what you'd expect from the Japanese. I asked, "Can I borrow your cell phone?" Immediately called our RDO and as I'm doing this, the Japanese are pulling my gear off and they're patting me down with towels and shit, and they're like trying to undress me. And they, you know, told them that that was the first time that I found out that there was more than me and involved. It was just -- I remember talking to him, I was like, "Hey, it was just me and (A).(b) right?" And they were like, "We'll tell you when you get back, brother." And I went, "fuck."

Obviously, I knew that a collision occurred. But -- I mean, collisions -- I guess, my SA was just not right because I thought if I was able to punch out and able to make it to the point where I was at, there's no way that it would have been a catastrophic collision. Obviously, it's not true because we're here today talking about it. But -- I mean the reasoning behind -- I guess pieced in didn't click until later. And then jump into their -- sorry, it's a Japanese naval base. They give you another flight suit. A dry flight suit. They give you new clothes and are like, "We gotta go. We gotta go."

So they dress me all up and get my shit. And we go to the helicopter. We take the next helicopter. I think it was about an hour and a half flight from where we were at to Iwakuni. I'm just full-on, like, I just need to talk to somebody at this point. So I just get out, grab all my shit, and went right to the ambulance.

We're going to the hospital, like, I know that there was going to be people there. Apparently I just -- I walked by four or five of our squadron dudes that were just standing there. Like, I saw guys that were in flight suits walking.

So, I got to the hospital and I walk in. I see my wife and then start talking to the guys. And then, I start trying to help with the search and rescue try to -- the only piece, I think,

that came out was significant because it was dark and there was no

-- there's -- you try to explain you see two lights in the middle of
the ocean and try to see if that helps. But I think the only thing
that did help was when I explained the -- what I saw and then with
the search pattern of the helicopter, I thought that maybe they can
correlate that. Because, obviously, they know where the
helicopter's go. You know, north, south, east, and west. Like -And I don't know if that helped them find(b)(3)

So, yeah. They take me to the hospital. You know, they're taking x-rays. They're like, "how the fuck did you not break anything?" And again, I have no idea. They did all the standard stuff that you would do for an ejection. Take all the blood work, piss. I mean, at this point it's -- yeah. And then I'm talking to the guys trying to figure out what happened and the A and B starts taking my story. A and B, which is everything that you guys heard. And then, you know, day-by-day here we are.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you remember saying when you were in the ocean that your phone didn't work, but you said you're watch worked.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : When you looked at it, do you remember what time it was when you checked your watch?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. It was -- I just -- I think our ARCT.

We took off around 1200 and -- I can't remember what our ARCT time was. I know we fucking nailed it, I just can't remember exactly what it was. And then I remember counting down the hours to daylight, which is roughly around like six o'clock. I remember looking down. I think the first time that I remember recalling was I think about two to three maybe.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Between 0200, 0300?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah, I think it was somewhere around there.

I think it's about right when we punched-out. I think it was like 0130 or 0145 I can't remember exactly. Yeah, it was just a lot of pieces of the puzzle that the -- I'm still trying to piece together. It's little things like that where you'd think you'd remember a time on your watch.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Were you on any prescription medication?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): No. Pretty normal. You know, to the standard,

I just drank a little coffee. That was it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Is there anything else you want to share?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Just that I feel tremendous loss. I just want the families to know that we -- we're there for them. I know that this is releasable. I don't know if that's going to make it or not

and obviously I need to -- I still have five other mothers that I've got to talk to. But, you know, we -- I'm just -- I'm sorry. I don't know if that's --

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) : Yeah, I know. It's tough. It's tough. All right. We can go ahead and wrap up.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : The last thing. Can you just initial and date this for us?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I don't think he drew on that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah, I didn't.

hand.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I don't think we are going to use that.

We have to swear your statement, so I'll ask you to raise your right

[(b)(3)(A),(b)(6) was warned, sworn, and excused.]