UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
BOX 555300
CAMP PENDLETON CA 92055-5300

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5830
CG
19 Dec 25

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on (b) (3) (A) s ltr 5830/IO of 17 Dec 25

From: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
To: File

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BATTERY E, BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5, 11TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT FIRING INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON 18 OCTOBER 2025

1. I concur with the findings of fact, including the factual assertions made in the preliminary statement, and the opinions and recommendations of the investigating officer.

2. Brief Synopsis. This incident occurred during the execution of the Amphibious Capabilities Demonstration as part of our 250th Birthday celebration. A single M795 round paired with a M767A1 electronic fuze prematurely detonated at an approximate altitude of 453 meters and approximately 1014.1 meters from its firing point within the designated surface danger area. The fuze was set for point detonation (PD), which means it should detonate upon contact with an object, not based on a calculated time. The M767A1 fuze is extremely reliable, with only one malfunction in its service history, in 2017, that was ultimately determined to be caused by an external factor. It is manufactured to a tolerance of one defect in a million. Battery E planned and executed their mission with significant oversight and safety structure in place. The likelihood that the M767A1 fuze malfunctioned is a statistical anomaly that was outside any reasonable probability. Based on the unique circumstances of this case, it was determined that a fuze malfunction – potentially caused by blast overpressure and a unique electro-magnetic environment – caused the premature detonation.

3. I direct the findings of the Investigating Officer be distributed to the appropriate and necessary entities to evaluate the potential vulnerabilities of the M767A1 fuze on the modern battlefield. Specifically, the Chief of Staff, or his designee, will:

a. Coordinate with Marine Corps Systems Command Product Manager Ammunition (PMM-152), Expeditionary Systems Engineering Division (RS40) NSWC-C, Detachment Fallbrook, and other associated agencies to evaluate the M767A1 fuze in scenarios replicating overpressure forces at the muzzle brake similar to those encountered by Gun 5 and Gun 6 on 18 October 2025 and a notional electro-magnetic environment replicating those produced by fielded electronic warfare systems wavelengths and power outputs.

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b. Coordinate with I MEF staff and other stakeholders in determining the feasibility of standardizing resourcing of artillery personnel with Peltor hearing protection to both ensure the health of artillery personnel and further strengthen gunline communications.

c. Coordinate with HQMC Risk Management Directorate, Marine Corps Systems Command, and Training and Education Command to review minimum howitzer spacing for battery operations given surface conditions, charge, and electro-magnetic environment.

d. Inform Marine Corps Installation-West/Camp Pendleton about the limitations of their range observations systems encountered during the investigation to determine whether any improvements can be made to their range observation systems.

4. This investigation is closed.

5. The point of contact for this matter is the I MEF Staff Judge Advocate, (b) (3) (A) who can be contacted at (b) (3) (A) or (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

C. F. WORTMAN

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
BOX 555300
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5300

5830
IO
17 Dec 25

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) USMC
To: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BATTERY E, BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5, 11TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT FIRING INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON 18 OCTOBER 2025

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7G w/ CH-2 (JAGMAN)
(b) JtRegtO P3570.1H (Marine Corps Artillery Safety SOP)
(c) MCO 3570.1D (Range Safety)
(d) MCRP 3-10E.3 / FM 6-50 (TTP for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery)
(e) M762E1/M767E1 Electronics Fuze Report dtd 10 Nov 00
(f) TM 43-0001-28 Change 9, 7-149 to 7-150 (M767_M767A1 NA15)
(g) MIF-A-0041-2018 NA15 Early Detonation dtd 25 Jan 19
(h) DODIC NA15 D529 Visual Inspection Report dtd 23 Oct 25
(i) TM 10407C-10/1C w/ CH-1, Operator Manual for M777/M777A2, dtd 1 Mar 24
(j) CO, MCSOA ltr 5830 CO of 8 Nov 25 (MCSOA Third-Party Review)
(k) MCRP 3-10E.4 / FM 6-40 (TTP for the Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery)
(l) AFDP 3-85 (Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations)
(m) DCG, I MEF MFR 5800 DCG of 15 Dec 25 (USSS Reply to WHMO)

Encl: (1) CG, I MEF ltr 5830 CG of 29 Oct 25 (Appointment Letter)
(2) CG, I MEF ltr 5830 CG of 19 Nov 25 (Approval of IO's Extension Request)
(3) (b) (3) (A) ltr 5830 IO/rsb of 15 Nov 25 (IO's Extension Request)
(4) Battery E MCCRE Confirmation Brief Slides dtd 9-17 Jun 25
(5) Battery E 2/11 MCCRE Debrief Slides dtd 9-12 Jun 25
(6) Battery E Certification Letter of 22 Jul 25
(7) Summary of Interview ((b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) 2/11 CO, 14 Nov 25)
(8) Email Thread ("FW: Prep for SECNAV USNUSMC 250 engagement 1300 Monday")
(9) CPEN Site Survey Trip Book as of 5 Aug 25
(10) Statement of (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) dtd 5 Dec 25
(11) Email ("250th") from (b) (3) (A) dtd 15 Aug 25
(12) Email ("RE: STRATEGIC OPERATIONS, INC. (STOPS) - STU SEGALL PRODUCTIONS (SSP)") from (b) (3) (A) dtd 8 Sep 25
(13) Email ("UPDATE: INFO. NEF Demo Cancelled & Amphib/MAGTF Demo solidified aboard CPEN") from (b) (3) (A) dtd 17 Sep 25
(14) Email ("RE: RCO Special Brief Red Beach Artillery Live Fire NMC 250 I MEF 17 -18 October 25 No I-5 Closure") from (b) (3) (A) dtd 15 Oct 25
(15) I MEF and C3F Amphibious Demonstration Confirmation Brief Slides dtd 6 Oct 25
(16) Email ("[Non-DoD Source] UPDATE: TFR Requests In Support of Navy and

Marine Corps 250th Event") from (b) (3) (A) (FAA) dtd 14 Oct 25
(17) Email ("RE: INFO: 18 OCTOBER USMC DEMO / RALLY") from (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) dtd 15 Oct 25
(18) Interview Q&A (b) (3) (A), E BTRY CO, 6 Nov 25)
(19) Email ("RE: REQ:") between (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) btw 11-12 Nov 25 [Updated RCO Special to Deconflict Area E].
(20) Interview with CPEN Range Control ((b) (3) (A) 7 Nov 25)
(21) Emails with Range Control ("Re: RCO Special Brief Red Beach Artillery Live Fire NMC 250 I MEF 17 - 18 October 25 No I-5 Closure")
(22) Interview Q&A (b) (3) (A), BLT 3/5, 18 Nov 25)
(23) Interview Q&A (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), E BTRY 1423, 13 Nov 25)
(24) Interview Q&A ((b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), E BTRY 1423, 13 Nov 25)
(25) Email ("INFO: (SA ONLY) ARTY SDZ ISO") from (b) (3) (A) dtd 16 Oct 25
(26) Email ("ACTION: Recommend Approval of Overhead Fire") from (b) (3) (A) dtd 16 Oct 25
(27) Figure 1 (Range Special Brief TA-BCH RED)
(28) Figure 2 (Red Beach - Whiskey 155mm VIP Demo SDZ)
(29) FRAGO-2 to I MEF EXORD ISO NMC250 Campaign, DTG 160006Z Oct 25
(30) Email ("RE: ACTION: Artillery Incident Command Investigation") from (b) (3) (A) dtd 6 Nov 25
(31) Figure 3 (Three Quarters View of E BTRY Position 16-18 Oct 25)
(32) Memorandum for the Record by (b) (3) (A) dtd 22 Oct 25
(33) NAVMC 11381 (Expenditure Report) and DD Form 1348 (Receipt)
(34) Figure 4 (Confirmation of Fuze Setting, Fuze, and LOT# on 18 Oct 25)
(35) Figure 5 (E Battery NMC 250 Layout)
(36) Figure 6 (E Battery Firing Position Diagram)
(37) Interview Q&A ((b) (3) (A), E BTRY Plt Sgt, 17 Nov 25)
(38) Interview Q&A ((b) (3) (A), E BTRY Plt CO, 17 Nov 25)
(39) Email ("RE: REQ: Support for I MEF Command Investigation") from (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) dtd 13 Nov 25
(40) Email ("RE: REQ: Support for I MEF Command Investigation") from (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) dtd 12 Nov 25
(41) Email ("RE: REQ: Support for I MEF Command Investigation") from (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) dtd 12 Nov 25
(42) Email ("I MEF CI – response") from (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) dtd 12 Nov 25
(43) Email ("RE: REQ: Support for I MEF Command Investigation") from (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) dtd 12 Nov 25
(44) Figure 7 (E BTRY Gunline, 17-18 Oct 25)
(45) Figure 8 (Range Control Perspective of Gunline, 18 Oct 25)
(46) Notes (Battery Leadership_(b) (3) (A) of 17 Nov 25)
(47) Interview Q&A (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), E BTRY Section Chief, 13 Nov 25)
(48) Interview Q&A (b) (3) (A), E BTRY Section Chief, 13 Nov 25)
(49) AMWS_IMEI 300534061938320 (METOC Data), 17-18 Oct 25
(50) 250th Celebration PMO Support Overview Brief Slides dtd 14 Oct 25

(51) Figure 9 (PMO ICP)
(52) NMC 250 EXCON OIC ORA Endorsement Package
(53) Screenshot (NMC 250 ChatSurfer (b) (3) (A))
(54) Excel Printout (250th timeline + EXCHECK V.27 18 Oct FINAL)
(55) Media File (Video_Rehearsals B-Roll_17 Oct)
(56) Figure 10 (Traffic on I-5 During Registration Round Firing, 17 Oct 25)
(57) Interview Q&A ((b) (3) (A) , E BTRY Section Chief, 13 Nov 25)
(58) Email ("Re: RFIs for ACU 5 ICO 250th Amphibious Demonstration") from (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) dtd 5 Nov 25
(59) Email ("RE: PMO RFIs ICO 250th Amphibious Demonstration") from(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) dtd 11 Nov 25
(60) Message from COMMICOM to CMC Washington DC PPO (SUBJECT: OPREP-3SIR/MCB CAMP PENDLETON//)
(61) Email ("RE: RFI: C-UAS Systems") from (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) dtd 20 Nov 25
(62) Email ("RE: RFI USSS Spectrum Request") from (b) (3) (A) dtd 19 Nov 25
(63) Interview Q&A ((b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) E BTRY, 13 Nov 25)
(64) Interview Q&A (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) E BTRY, 13 Nov 25)
(65) Figure 11 (Grade 3 Fuze – No LCD Display)
(66) Interview Q&A (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) , E BTRY, 13 Nov 25)
(67) Interview Q&A (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) , E BTRY, 13 Nov 25)
(68) Interview Q&A ((b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), E BTRY, 13 Nov 25)
(69) Interview Q&A ((b) (3) (A) , E BTRY, 13 Nov 25)
(70) Screenshot (CALTRANS I-5 Closure Notification of 18 Oct 25)
(71) Screenshot (I-5 Closure times-NMC 250 LOE 3 Teams Chat)
(72) Figure 12 (Layout of PMO, NCIS, and CHP Locations)
(73) Figure 13 (TA-BCH RED Motorcade)
(74) Figure 14 (SUV with Several Antennae)
(75) Interview Q&A ((b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) E BTRY, 13 Nov 25)
(76) Interview Q&A (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), E BTRY, 13 Nov 25)
(77) Figure 15 (USSS and WHPO IVO Gunline on 18 Oct 25)
(78) Interview Q&A (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) , dtd 17 Nov 25)
(79) Email ("RE: REQUEST: I MEF Command Investigation") from (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) , Border Division, CHP dtd 20 Nov 25
(80) Figure 16 (WHPO Cameraman IVO Gun 1 on 18 Oct 25)
(81) Interview Q&A ((b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), E BTRY, 13 Nov 25)
(82) Figure 17 (Bird Flying Left to Right Along Gunline)
(83) Investigation Diagram Slides
(84) Email ("RE: CI: Fuze Damage Hypotheses") from(b) (3) (A) dtd 25 Nov 25
(85) Figure 18 (Still Shot Visual Evidence from Video: Projectile Gun 5 and 6)
(86) Preliminary Trajectory Summary Analysis 102225 - NSWC, Corona Division
(87) Figure 19 (Early Function Screen Capture)
(88) Interview Q&A with NSWC Engineer ((b) (3) (A) , 10 Nov 25)
(89) Figure 20 (M767A1 Fuze Safeties and Diagram)
(90) Email ("RFI: Reliability for M767A1/NA15 and M795/D529") from (b) (3) (A) dtd 13 Nov 25

(91) Email ("X-Ray Verification of Samples/Attachment: NA15 X-Ray Verification") from (b) (3) (A) dtd 13 Nov 25
(92) Figure 21 (Fragmentation Locations)
(93) Incident Report of 18 Oct 25 (CAD # 251018BC0154)
(94) Figure 22 (Picture of CHP Vehicle Damage)
(95) Interview with BFSO Team ((b) (3) (A), 18 Nov 25)
(96) Figure 23 (Flock of Birds at Del Mar Beach, ~6 Miles South of Event Site)
(97) Interview Q&A ((b) (3) (A), 11th Marines Operations Officer and Operations Chief, 10 Nov 25)
(98) Email ("RE: FDC Setup - 18 October 25 - CI RFI") from (b) (3) (A) dtd 2 Dec 25)
(99) Figure 24 (Ammunition Chain of Custody, 15-21 Oct 25)
(100) Figure 25 (Two Fuzes with Setting Used for Demonstration)
(101) Email ("Statement regarding SUAS detections aboard Camp Pendleton") from (b) (3) (A) dtd 23 Oct 25
(102) Media File (Video_behind Gunline POV_18 Oct)
(103) Figure 26 (Overpressure Fuze Damage Probability Slide)
(104) Interview Q&A (b) (3) (A), 13 Nov 25)
(105) Cannon Artillery Accident Investigation dtd 22 Oct 25 w/ Endorsements (1 and 2)
(106) JtRegtO P3570.1H, Appendix H - Check Rounds, at Pgs. II-78 to II-79
(107) ADEX Confirmation Brief (Command: ADEX Schedule of Key Events), Pg. 29
(108) MCRP 3-10E.4 (Appendix A - Fire Direction Center SOP), Pg. A-7
(109) TM 10407C-10/1C w/ CH-1 (Operator Instructions), Pg. 0023-1
(110) TM 43-0001-28 Change 9 (Fuze, Electronic Time M767 Series), Pg. 7-149
(111) SF 298 dtd Mar 02 (Technical Report ARCCD-TR-02001: "M767 Artillery Electronic Time Fuze Design Evolution to Eliminate Susceptibility to Atmospheric Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)")
(112) Joint Agreement on Data Sharing dtd 2 Feb 2011
(113) Email Thread ("RE: Request for Clarification in Support of Investigation")
(114) MIL-A-48078A dtd 16 Dec 88 ("Military Specification: Ammunition, Standard Quality Assurance Provisions, General Specifications for")
(115) TM 43-0001-28 Change 9 (Fuze, Electronic Time M767 Series), Pg. 7-150
(116) MIF-A-0041-2018 NA15 Early Detonation, Pg. 25
(117) MSGID/GENADMIN/NAVAMMOLOGCEN MECH PA MSG (Subj/Supplement 2012-OH10. Lots Functionally Clear /Or Not Clear for Overhead Fire//) posted 7 Mar 12

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. This reports completion of the command investigation conducted in accordance with reference (a) into the facts and circumstances surrounding Battery E, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3d Battalion 5th Marines (3/5), 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (henceforth "E BTRY") firing incident that occurred on 18 Oct 25. The investigation was completed in compliance with reference (a) and enclosure (1), and an extension of time was required due to the number of interviews required and the depth of technical review required.[1]

2. General Comments.

a. At approximately 1346 Pacific Daylight Time on Saturday 18 Oct 25, an artillery round from E BTRY detonated shortly after being fired as part of an event to celebrate the 250th Birthday of the United States Marine Corps and to demonstrate the capabilities of the Marine Corps to the Vice President of the United States and other very senior officials. Statistically, an early detonation of an M795 high explosive (HE) round with an Electronic Time M767A1 fuze is highly improbable; beyond reasonable expectations and should not have happened, but it did.

b. To understand what happened, the investigating officer (IO) and his team sought to identify anomalies particular to that day which could have altered the normal probabilities associated with safety and reliability of the weapon system and projectile. In other words, of all days for this very low probability event to happen, why this one? What was different from the thousands of times before this event employing the same shell-fuze combination, weapons system, and highly trained Marines?

c. There is no definitive answer to these questions. However, the IO was able to rule out any negligence or wrongdoing by members of E BTRY or ammunition chain of custody being the proximate cause of the early detonation. Further, the IO found no evidence of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in the vicinity of the gun-target line (GTL) during the time of the early detonation. Moreover, although birds were present in the vicinity of the demonstration area, none were observed along the flight path of the projectiles during the incident, and no organic residue was found on shell fragmentation.

d. As to differences associated with that day, there are a few areas that, though possibly benign individually, could have aligned in an unforeseeable way that could have contributed to causing an early detonation or at least altering normal probabilities of a malfunction. These issues include the abnormal (though not prohibited) proximity of the howitzers[2] to each other, the high charge being shot in that close proximity, and the potential presence of anomalous electromagnetic energy in the vicinity of the Guns during firing.[3]

[1] See also, enclosures (2) and (3).
[2] "Howitzers" are also referred to as a "Gun" or "Guns" throughout this report.
[3] Potential presence of abnormal electromagnetic energy may include electromagnetic radiation/pulse/jamming/intrusion that may be unaccounted-for, unforeseen, and hidden. See generally, reference (l).

e. It is beyond the capabilities of the IO to conduct the level of testing required to answer if and how muzzle blast overpressure and electromagnetic energy could have combined to cause the early detonation. The technical findings of fact below, however, are validated by engineers at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona (NSWC-C) as technically correct and the IO's opinions plausible. This investigation further complemented the separate technical investigation being conducted by NSWC-C by reducing variables and narrowing research parameters. This may ultimately lead to a quicker and more conclusive technical investigation by NSWC-C.

3. All reasonably available relevant evidence was collected and command directives met. To the maximum extent possible, this investigation attempted to cite primary sources of information, technical publications, field manuals, and original interviews and witness statements.

4. The IO's coordination with external agencies during the investigation faced the following challenges:

a. Representatives from the United States Secret Service (USSS) did not initially respond to queries but later replied through the White House Military Office (WHMO). The purpose of the queries was to request information that could have been helpful to the investigation, including whether there were any electronic countermeasures (ECM) employed by USSS during 18 Oct 25/Amphibious Capabilities Demonstration. WHMO was informed that USSS did not emit ECM.[4]

b. Representatives from the California Department of Transportation (CALTRANS) did not fully respond to all queries. Information gaps were filled through secondhand data from Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton Provost Marshal Office (PMO).

5. In the course of this investigation, the IO consulted with the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) and his representative to the Investigation Team, (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) . (b) (3) (A) of the 13th MEU, (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) of the I MEF G-35, (b) (3) (A) of 3d Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Battalion, and (b) (3) (A) of the I MEF Communication Strategy and Operations (COMMSTRAT) section assisted in all aspects. Their professionalism, technical expertise, and critical thinking contributed significantly to this investigation.

(Continues on the next page)

[4] See, reference (m).

FINDINGS OF FACT

[Finding of Fact Timeline (all times Pacific Daylight Time (UTC-7)]

1. From 9-12 Jun 25: 2d Battalion, 11th Marines (2/11) conducted Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE) of E BTRY. [Encls (4), (5), (6)]

2. Post-MCCRE, 2/11 Commanding Officer (CO) changes battery leadership to (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) due to leadership concerns with previous battery commander. [Encl (7)]

3. From 14-18 Jul 25: 2/11 CO evaluates (b) (3) (A) during Battalion Fire Exercise (FIREX) and is satisfied with his performance. [Encls (6), (7)]

4. On 7 Aug 25: The initial site survey of Red Beach is conducted with White House Production Office (WHPO) to discuss Amphibious Capabilities Demonstration (ADEX).[5] [Encls (8), (9)]

5. Interstate 5 (I-5) closure was initially mentioned by the WHPO as a requirement with the Honorable Donald John Trump, 47th President of The United States as the Very-Very Important Person (VVIP) in attendance. [Encls (9), (10)]

6. WHPO also specifically noted that the USSS would not entertain employment of Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) the day of demonstration. [Encl (10)]

7. On 8 Aug 25: The I MEF Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the ADEX is submitted to Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC). [Encl (8)]

8. ADEX is rescheduled from the initially planned 11 Oct 25 to 18 Oct 25 to maximize support of Amphibious Warfare Ships. [Encl (11)]

9. 10 Sep 25 on or about (o/a) 1100: Strategic Operations (STOPS) conducts site survey at Red Beach and analyzes contracted pyrotechnic engineer support. [Encl (12)]

10. Participants at the STOPS site survey included (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), 11th Marine Regiment Operations Officer (OPSO), to support artillery live fire planning. [Encl (12)]

11. 17 Sep 25 o/a 0455: ADEX confirmed for 18 Oct 25. [Encl (13)]

12. 17 Sep 25 o/a 0455: Commander Third Fleet (C3F) Navy and Marine Corps (NMC) 250 Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) Demonstration originally scheduled for 9 Nov 25 is cancelled. [Encl (13)]

[5] For emphasis or clarification, ADEX may be referred to as Amphibious Capabilities Demonstration.

13. 29 Sep 25 o/a 1143: Camp Pendleton Range Control, (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), sends (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) and others the "RCO Special Brief Red Beach Artillery Live Fire NMC 250 I MEF 17 - 18 October 2025." [Encl (14)]

14. 6 Oct 25 o/a1400: I MEF/C3F NMC 250th Confirmation Brief. [Encl (15)]

15. 14 Oct 25 o/a 1105: Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) request for 15, 17, and 18 Oct 25 for the ADEX at Red Beach is approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). [Encl (16)]

16. 15 Oct 25 o/a 0855: Confirmation from Communications Directorate, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) received that the VVIP will be the Honorable James David Vance, 50th Vice President of the United States. [Encl (17)]

17. Change from the President to Vice President as VVIP confirmed, and I-5 now has the possibility of being open to traffic, and Area E[6] is identified to be over the I-5 in the planned firing position prior to 15 Oct 25. (b) (3) (A) asks Range Control to develop an updated position to ensure proper standoff of Area E from I-5 due to the new circumstances. [Encls (17), (18)]

18. (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) and the Range Control team receive the request to produce an RCO Special brief firing into the Whiskey Impact Area to keep Area E west of I-5 in the event the freeway remains open. [Encls (18), (19), (20)]

19. Surface Danger Zone (SDZ) is built by (b) (3) (A) (Range Specialist) and approved by (b) (3) (A). [Encl 20]

20. 15 Oct 25: E BTRY's planned position changes to (b) (3) (A) before they occupy the training area based on the updated RCO Special from Marine Corps Installations-West (MCI-West) Range Control to keep Area E west of I-5. [Encls (18), (21), (105)]

21. As a result of new administrative firing position, the howitzers occupy a 50m x 50m box, which was smaller than originally planned. [Encls (18), (19), (21)][7]

22. (b) (3) (A) has seen Guns employed this close before. [Encl (20)]

23. 15 Oct 25 o/a 1200: BLT 3/5 ammunition chief (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) draws ammunition and fuzes from Camp Pendleton Ammunition Supply Point (ASP). [Encls (22), (23)]

[6] Area E (primary forward danger area) is defined: "This area is endangered by muzzle debris, overpressure, blast, and hazardous impulse noise, and for 155mm artillery cannon live fire is the distance 725m from the cannon firing point."

[7] There is no restrictive minimum distance between howitzer/gun placement in relation to administrative artillery live fire. See reference (d): Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) Field Manual (FM) 6-50.

24. The ammunition lot numbers match the paperwork, there are no scratches nor dents, and it is banded and in good condition when inspected by (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), and (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) at the ASP. [Encls (22), (23), (24), (33)]

25. 15 Oct 25 o/a 1330: The new SDZ and geometries of fire are reviewed by several parties to include: 11th MEU Gunner, (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) members of the I MEF Fires and Effects Coordination Cell (FECC) including (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) , (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A), and (b) (3) (A) . No issues are noted. [Encls (25), (26)]

26. 15 Oct 25 o/a 1330: E BTRY ammunition technicians (Ammo Techs) (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) transport the ammunition from Camp Pendleton ASP to Training Area (TA) Red Beach on a Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) truck with 593 Trailer attached. [Encl (23)]

27. 15 Oct 25: Ammo Techs establish roving patrol. [Encl (23)]

28. 15 Oct 25 o/a 1659: Camp Pendleton Range Control emails "RCO Special Brief Red Beach Artillery Live Fire NMC 250 I MEF 17-18 October 25 No I-5 Closure." [Encl (21)]



Figure 1 Range Special Brief TA-BCH RED – 15 Oct 25 – Encl 27



29. 15 Oct 25: Range Control is aware the firing box would be constrained to 50m x 50m to keep Area E clear of I-5. [Encl (20)]

30. 15 Oct 25 o/a 1704: All personnel supporting Red Beach Amphibious Capabilities Demonstration are directed to park at Artillery Firing Area (AFA)-15 ((b) (3) (A) to minimize the number of vehicles at Red Beach Training Area. [Encl (29), (37)]

31. 16 Oct 25 o/a 1000: (b) (3) (A) , E BTRY Commander arrives at Training Area - Red Beach. [Encls (18)]

32. 16 Oct 25 o/a 1430: E BTRY occupies TA BCH RED/firing position (b) (3) (A) . [Encls (18)]

(b) (3) (A)

33. 16 Oct 25: The battery position is composed of 6x M777A2 howitzers, 7x MTVRs, 84 battery personnel, with the Fire Direction Center (FDC) setup south of Gun 1. [Encls (32), (35)]

34. 16 Oct 25: Ordnance at the position consists of (120) x M795 HE shells, (122) x M767A1 Electronic Time (ET) fuzes (LOT#: BTF04M001-028), (360) x M232A1 propellant (Hotel Charge), and (125) x M82 primers. [Encl (33)]

Figure 4 Confirmation of Fuze Setting, Fuze, and LOT# on 18 Oct 25 – Encl 34

35. 16 Oct 25: Composition of the battery and personnel at the location are captured in Figures 5 and 6. [Encl (36)]

Figure 5 E BTRY NMC 250 Firing Position Diagram -16-18 Oct 25 – Encl 35



Figure 6 "E Battery Firing Position Diagram" provided by (b) (3) (A) , Encl 36

36. 16 Oct 25: Due to the constrictions of the SDZ, the battery emplaces into a very small firing position (~50x50m Firing Point). This places Guns as close as 10-15' apart. [Encl (27)]

37. 16 Oct 25 o/a 1500: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) set up the aiming circles and survey points. [Encl (38)]

38. 16 Oct 25: The gunline established a non-typical/standard level of dispersion between howitzers based on the constraints of the administrative firing position provided by Range Control for 16-18 Oct 25. Total gun line length was approximately 35 meters. [Encl (105)]

Section Adjacent spacing:

Gun 1 to Gun 2	~6.4 meters
Gun 2 to Gun 3	~5.0 meters
Gun 3 to Gun 4	~4.2 meters
Gun 4 to Gun 5	~10.0 meters
Gun 5 to Gun 6	~6.4 meters

39. 16 Oct 25: Several career artillery officers note they have never seen howitzers placed this close together but also acknowledged that there was no restrictive minimum distance of Gun placement in relation to administrative artillery live fire. [Encls (39), (40), (41), (42), (43)][8]

Figure 7 E BTRY Gunline 17-18 Oct 25 – Encl 44

(Continues on the next page)

[8] See also, reference (d): Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) Field Manual (FM) 6-50.

Figure 8 Range Control Perspective of Gunline – 18 Oct 25 – Encl 45

40. 16 Oct 25 (Late Afternoon): Due to the small size of the firing position, E BTRY leadership carefully emplaces howitzers into position with MTVRs. The howitzers are constrained to a Left Lateral Limit (LLL) of 0024 mils grid and Right Lateral Limit of 0025 mils grid. This is completed by (b) (3) (A), 2d Platoon Commander, and (b) (3) (A), 2d Platoon Guns Platoon Sergeant. [Encls (27), (46)][9]

41. 16 Oct 25 (Late Afternoon): Platoons are given the safety box for firing points that are then plotted in the navigation application MilGPS. MilGPS then determines an appropriate 10-digit grid for each Gun which was verified with Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR). [Encl (38)]

42. 16 Oct 25 (Overnight): E BTRY sleeps at their positions in and around their trucks near the gunline. [Encl (18)]

43. 16 Oct 25: Headquarters bivouacked near the base of the cliff to the south of E BTRY. [Encl (18)]

44. 16 Oct 25: Battery CO confirms no ammunition was unloaded the night of 16 Oct 25. [Encl (18)]

[9] Enclosure (27) provides the left and right lateral limits. These limits are administrative range safety controls which are directed by Range Control Special Brief.

45. 16 Oct 25: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) stand watch overnight. [Encl (47)]

46. 17 Oct 25 o/a 0600: Reveille at E BTRY on Red Beach. [Encl (48)]

47. 17 Oct 25 (Enduring): Meteorology and oceanography (METOC) historical data for 17-18 Oct 25 shows favorable conditions with minimal impact on ADEX, artillery live fire exercise (LFX), electromagnetic spectrum, and sUAS operations. [Encl (49)]

48. 17 Oct 25: Planned establishment of MCI-West Provost Marshal's Office (PMO) Incident Command Post (ICP) at Red Beach in support of ADEX no later than (NLT) 0600. [Encl (50)]

Figure 9 PMO ICP – Encl 51

49. 17 Oct 25 o/a 1000: Exercise Control (EXCON) Officer in Charge (OIC) (I MEF Deputy Commanding General) signs ADEX Operational Risk Assessment (ORA) endorsement which included updated RCO Special and updated 11th MEU, BLT 3/5, E BTRY live fire Operational Risk Management (ORM). [Encl (52)]

50. 17 Oct 25 from 1300-1400: ADEX rehearsal conducted. [Encls (15), (53), (54)]

51. 17 Oct 25 from 1300-1400: E BTRY does not participate on rehearsal timeline due to signs not being in place on I-5 announcing live overhead fire as required by reference RCO Special Brief dtd 15 Oct 25. [Encl (46)]

52. 17 Oct 25 o/a 1500: Training Area Range Signs posted:

Range Signs #1	(b) (3) (A)
Range Signs #2	(b) (3) (A)
Range Signs #3	(b) (3) (A)
Range Signs #4	(b) (3) (A)

[Encl (27)]

53. Placement of the signs were a Range Control prerequisite for the battery to conduct live fire, fire the safety check rounds, and commence the rehearsal fire mission. [Encl (27), (106), (107)]

54. I-5 is open while E BTRY fires check rounds in accordance with Ref (b) Appendix H, JtRegtO P35701.H. [Encl (56)]

55. 17 Oct 25 o/a 1700: E BTRY fires (5) rounds from all six Guns for a total of (30) rounds. No issues noted. I-5 was open during this evolution. [Encls (55), (105)]

(Continues on the next page)

Figure 10 Traffic on I-5 During Registration Round Firing – 17 Oct 25 – Encl 56

56. 17 Oct 25 o/a 1900: E BTRY Section Chiefs and artillery mechanics conduct post-firing maintenance including preventative maintenance checks and services (PMCS) per the Technical Manual 9-1025-215-10. This PMCS includes breach maintenance, wet-swabbed the tubes, shutdown chief section display, checked the firing mechanism, closed the breach, hooked up 25ft and 6ft lanyards and both worked, checked communications with FDC. [Encls (47), (48)]

57. 17 Oct 25: Section Chiefs do not report experiencing any command pressure to speed up or change procedures. [Encls (47), (48)]

58. 17 Oct 25: Guns remain in position after the 17 Oct 25 rehearsal for the 18 Oct 25 Amphibious Capabilities Demonstration. E BTRY leadership verify the position and direction via M2 compass and aiming circles. [Encl (46), (57)]

59. 17 Oct 25 o/a 1940: Assault Craft Unit 5 (ACU FIVE) Command Duty Officer (CDO) (b) (3) (A) spots approximately (15) UAS and retains continuous observation between approximately 1940 to 2300. [Encl (58)]

60. 17 Oct 25 o/a 2020: PMO and MCI-West STORM team responds to multiple drone sightings of approximately (20) sUAS at ACU FIVE compound. [Encl (59)][10]

61. 17 Oct 25 o/a 2020: STORM team observes multiple UAS upon arriving on scene. STORM confirms that I MEF, Range Control, Border Patrol, and the USSS were not utilizing UAS at that time. [Encls (59), (60)]

62. 17 Oct 25 o/a 2025: MCI-West PMO queries adjacent agencies; USSS is the only agency that had c-UAS capabilities in the area. USSS does not employ those capabilities because the UAS are out of range. [Encl (61)]

63. 17 Oct 25 o/a 2030: STORM team notifies Criminal Investigation Division (CID), Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and PMO Headquarters (HQ). [Encl (59)]

64. 17 Oct 25 o/a 2040: PMO coordinates with MCI-West CDO to submit required reports to MCI-West Commander documenting the UAS incursion. STORM team remains on scene at ACU FIVE and searches the flight path adjacent to the I-5 Freeway in an attempt to locate the UAS operators. No UAS operators are located. [Encls (59), (60)]

65. 17 Oct 25 (Enduring): I MEF G-6 did not receive USSS frequency deconfliction requests for the 250th Amphibious Capabilities Demonstration and did not submit any frequency requests for its own communications. [Encl (62)]

66. 17-18 Oct 25 (Enduring): PMO personnel manning the Las Pulgas Gate do not observe any large formations of birds, sUAS, nor are there reports of vehicles civilian or military with antennas or other abnormal equipment on 17-18 Oct 25. [Encls (59)]

67. 17-18 Oct 25: Battery CO confirms no excess ammunition is unloaded the night of 17 Oct 25 following the (30) rounds fired for rehearsal. [Encl (18)]

68. 17-18 Oct 25: Through the period of darkness between 17-18 Oct 25, the Battery sleeps at their positions in and around the trucks near the gunline. No ammunition is downloaded following the live fire on 17 Oct 25. Headquarters bivouacs near the base of the cliff to the south of the battery. [Encl (18)]

69. 17-18 Oct 25: Through the period of darkness between 17-18 Oct 25, the following Marines stand watch: (b) (3) (A) , (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) , (b) (3) (A) ,(b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A). [Encls (47), (63), (64)]

70. 18 Oct 25 o/a 0100: Last observation of sUAS flying from North to South over Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity and ACU FIVE to Red Beach. Visual contact with

[10] The PMO STORM team is a multi-purpose team responsible for Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (c-UAS) reporting. They do not field c-UAS equipment.

sUAS is then lost and regained approximately 2- 3 NM off the coast, suggesting a circular flight path. [Encl (58)]

71. 18 Oct 25 o/a 0600: Reveille at E BTRY on Red Beach. [Encl (48)]

72. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1100: The battery breaks out ammunition from the ammunition truck including: (60) M795 HE rounds, (60) M767A1 fuzes LOT#BTF04M001-028, (210) M232A1 propellant, and (89) M82 primers which were then distributed across the gunline. [Encl (21)]

73. 18 Oct 25: Upon inspection of the ammunition, three M767A1 fuzes are identified as having the liquid crystal displays (LCDs) not activating and are considered inoperable due to the display not turning on after being set. [Encls (21), (48)]



Figure 11 Grade 3 Fuze - No LCD Display – Encl 65

74. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1100: Gun 3 verifies the setting on one of the three fuzes where the LCD screen did not activate with the Enhanced Portable Inducive Artillery Fuze Setter (EPIAFS) in accordance with battery policy. [Encl (48)]

75. 18 Oct 25: The three fuzes with inoperable displays are immediately marked with date/time group, separated into marked containers, and placed to the rear of the gunline away from the ammunition pit. [Encls (21), (48)]

76. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1100: Eleven (11) M767A1 fuzes are attached to M795 shells and staged at each respective howitzer ready board. Each of the (11) rounds are prepared at the ammunition pit; the fuzes are mated to the shells and set on the ready board. The cannoneers wait for approval from the section chief to energize[11] the mated fuzes and configure to point detonating.[12] [Encls (64, 105)]

77. 18 Oct 25: The ammunition team table below contains the personnel who were the ammunition teams by gun section on 18 Oct 25. [Encls (66), (67), (68), (69)]

78. 18 Oct 25: E BTRY Gun Section Ammunition Teams:

Gun 1	(b) (3) (A)	
Gun 2		
Gun 3 – Did not fire		
Gun 4 – Did not fire		
Gun 5		
Gun 6		

[Encls (66), (67), (68), (69)]

79. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1139: I-5 is closed from Harbor Drive to Basilone Road. [Encls (70), (71)]

80. 18 Oct 25: During the ADEX, PMO has seven (7) Vehicles (1x Mobile Command Post, 3x PMO cruisers, 3x unmarked CID vehicles) at the following locations: PMO Incident Command Post south of Las Pulgas Road; a traffic control point southwest of the Red Beach LZ; a traffic control point southeast of the Red Beach LZ; on ramps and off ramps on the I-5 South. [Encl (50)]

81. 18 Oct 25: During the ADEX, NCIS has (3) Vehicles (SUV, RAZR, and ATV) at the following locations: adjacent to the PMO Incident Command Post south of Las Pulgas Road; roving along the north/south dirt path adjacent to Red Beach. [Encl (59)]

82. 18 Oct 25: During the ADEX, California Highway Patrol has external agency vehicles (cruisers and motorcycles) at the following locations: adjacent to the PMO Incident Command Post south of Las Pulgas Road; at the bike trail parking lot north of Las Pulgas Road; along Las Pulgas Road under the I-5 overpass; on the north and southbound on/off ramps; roving along the I-5 North and I-5 South IVO the Las Pulgas exit. [Encl (59)]

[11] The fuze is energized as follows: rotation of the ogive or an inductive command from an auto-setter initiates the battery primer which breaks a glass ampule within the battery and energize the fuze. See, reference (f).
[12] See, reference (i).



Figure 12 Layout of PMO, NCIS, and CHP Locations – Encl 72

83. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1200: After issuing the ammunition for the ADEX the ammunition vehicle moves to its assigned road guard position. [Encl (23)]

84. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1200: Section Chief, (b) (3) (A) observes sea gulls along with other small birds in vicinity of Red Beach but not in front of the Guns. [Encl (47)]

85. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1252: "DODGERS" (VVIP on deck) is passed (b) (3) (A) . The Vice-Presidential motorcade of 11 (8 SUVs, 2 vans, 1 box truck) arrives. [Encls (53), (54)]

86. 18 Oct 25: Motorcade vehicles park on the northwestern side of Red Beach Combat Town IVO (b) (3) (A) . [Encl (73)]

(Continues on the next page)

Figure 13 TA-BCH RED Motorcade – 18 Oct 25 – Encl 73

87. 18 Oct 25: Imagery taken during the artillery shoot shows an SUV in the motorcade with several antennae on it. [Encls (73), (74)]

Figure 14 SUV With Several Antennae – 18 Oct 25 – Encl 74

88. 18 Oct 25: Neither Oceanside Police Department nor California Highway Patrol possess c-UAS technologies. [Encl (59)]

89. 18 Oct 25: EXCON does not experience any communication degradation/meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference (MIJI). FDC Radio Operators had "had issues with HF during rehearsals," but established normal communications on 18 Oct 25. [Encls (75), (76)]

90. 18 Oct 25: No units supporting the exercise reported GPS jamming (aircraft, surface craft, etc.). Gun 4 lost navigation due to system failure and was removed from firing. [Encls (104), (105)]

91. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1300: The Fire Direction Officer (FDO) plots and confirms the target is safe and issues a fire order of "Battery 11 rounds, special instructions At My Command, shell HE, Lot A/H, Charge 4, Fz Time, Time PD, target number AF2000." [Encl (108)]

92. 18 Oct 25: Following issue of the fire order ammunition teams wait for approval from the sections chiefs to energize the fuzes and subsequent verification of setting to PD. [Encl (109)]

93. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1300: E BTRY Commander is centrally located behind Gun 3 and reports USSS Agent is 15m behind him but not interacting with or distracting gunline. [Encl (18)]

94. 18 Oct 25: E BTRY leaders are spread throughout the gunline conducting additional independent checks on shell and fuze combinations on the gunline ready boards and watching for howitzer displacement from fired volleys. All energized fuzes on the ready boards are verified set to PD. [Encls (46), (47), (48), (57), (63)]

95. Battery Leadership Locations:

Gun 1	(b) (3) (A)	
Gun 2	(b) (3) (A)	
Gun 3	(b) (3) (A)	
Gun 4	(b) (3) (A)	
Gun 5	(b) (3) (A)	
Gun 6		

[Encl (36)]

96. 18 Oct 25: Most E BTRY personnel recall USSS and WHPO personnel moving around the gunline unobtrusively. No members of E BTRY report anyone outside of the Gun teams touching the weapons. [Encl (18)]



Figure 15 USSS and WHPO IVO Gunline on 18 Oct 25– Encl 77

97. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1309: 11th MEU LAAD Detachment participates in the Amphibious Capabilities Demonstration at (b) (3) (A) . The Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (L-MADIS) passive optic is on but without any electromagnetic emissions. [Encl (78)]

98. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1310: Gun 4 is placed out of action based on degraded capability and the issued fire order from the fire direction officer is changed from a battery 10 to a battery 11 requiring ammo redistribution. [Encls (104), (105, at Pg. 14)]

99. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1315: California Highway Patrol (CHP) traffic breaks are in place on I-5. [Encls (79), (93)]

100. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1344: WHPO Cameraman is filming to the right of artillery position during execution of AF2000. [Encl (80)]

Figure 16 WHPO Cameraman IVO Gun 1 on 18 Oct 25 – Encl 80

101. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1340: (b) (3) (A), Cannoneer #5, prepares and helps (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A), Cannoneer #4 on Gun 1 loads one round of M795 HE Fused with M767A1 fuze set to point detonating (PD) following verification from the Section Chief (b) (3) (A). (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) confirmed fire mission data from his recorder LCpl J.Q. Cordova. [Encl (66)]

102. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1340: (b) (3) (A), Cannoneer #5, prepares and helps (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A), Cannoneer #4, on Gun 2 loads one round of M795 HE Fused with M767A1 fuze set to PD following verification from Section Chief (b) (3) (A). (b) (3) (A) confirmed fire mission data from his recorder (b) (3) (A). [Encl (67)]

103. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1340: (b) (3) (A), Cannoneer #5, prepares and helps (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A), Cannoneer #4, on Gun 3 loads one round of M795 HE Fused with M767A1 fuze set to PD following verification from Section Chief (b) (3) (A). (b) (3) (A) confirmed fire mission data from is recorder (b) (3) (A). [Encl (81)]

104. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1340: Gun 4 does not load due to navigation system failure and is placed out of action prior to fire mission data being sent to the gunline. Encls (104), (105)]

105. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1340: (b) (3) (A), Cannoneer #5 prepares and helps (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), Cannoneer #4 on Gun 5 loads one round of M795 HE Fused with M767A1 fuze set to PD

following verification from Section Chief (b) (3) (A) . (b) (3) (A) confirmed fire mission data from his recorder (b) (3) (A) . [Encl (68)]

106. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1340: (b) (3) (A) , Cannoneer #5, prepares and helps (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A), Cannoneer #4, on Gun 6 loads one round of M795 HE Fused with M767A1 fuze set to PD following verification from Section Chief (b) (3) (A) . (b) (3) (A) confirmed fire mission data from his recorder (b) (3) (A) . [Encl (69)]

107. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1345: "SENATORS" (Airspace Cleared) is passed in (b) (3) (A) . [Encls (53), (54)]

108. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1346: A review of available imagery does not reveal the presence of drones along the gun-target line; however, a bird is present in the foreground of imagery during the time of the firing. [Encl (82)]



Figure 17 Bird Flying Left to Right Below the Gun Target Line– 18 Oct 25 – Encl 82

109. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1346: E BTRY fires four (4) rounds, Guns 1, 2, 5, & 6 conduct the fire mission. [Encls (102), (105, at Pg. 71)]

110. 18 Oct 25: Gun 3 experiences a fire linkage failure. [Encl (105, at Pgs. 9-11)]

111. 18 Oct 25: Gun 3 crew believes they have shot and only realize they have a firing linkage lever failure when they attempt to reload, and propellant powder falls out. [Encl (48)][13]

[13] Once the artillery round is loaded, the firing linkage, a component located on the exterior of the howitzer, is connected to a six-foot lanyard and is the mechanism that will initiate the howitzer firing process once the lanyard is

112. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1346: Based on video analysis 1.84 seconds pass from shot to function for Gun 5 and 1.74 seconds pass from shot to function for Gun 6. [Encl (103)]

113. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1346: At approximately 308m from the center of the firing position, with an altitude of 141m/462 feet mean sea level (MSL) from the center firing position (b) (3) (A)) after approximately 107 revolutions, 1000g's of set-back force, 1200-1700rpm, and .5s of flight time, the rounds arm. [Encl (83), (112)]

114. 18 Oct 25: Estimated time between Gun 5 and Gun 6 firing (video) is 0.10 seconds. [Encls (84), (103)]

Figure 18 Visual Evidence from Video 18 Oct 25 – Encl 85

pulled. This component of the howitzer has no interaction to the munition at any point of normal cannon operations. See, reference (i).

115. Calculated muzzle velocity at launch (simulation) is 680 m/s. [Encl (84)]

116. Distance from projectile 5 to projectile 6 at Gun 6 launch (calculated) is 68 m. [Encl (84)]

117. Required velocity difference for projectile 6 to intersect projectile 5 in 2 seconds (calculated) is 34 m/s. [Encl (84)]

118. Estimated average velocity difference between Gun 5 and Gun 6 is 5 m/s. [Encl (84)]

119. The allowed standard deviation for propelling charges during acceptance (specification) is 2 m/s (DA13 zone 5 ambient, DA12 zone 1 and 2 ambient). [Encl (84)]

120. Estimated intersection of trajectory of Gun 5 and Gun 6 (simulation from report of initial firing coordinates) is 8.9 km downrange. [Encl (84)]

121. Flight of projectiles from Gun 5 and Gun 6 does not show a discernable difference in speed. [Encl (84)]

122. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1346: One round is observed and heard as an early detonation, going high order as it detonates within the designated surface danger area. This munition functioned at an approximate altitude of 453meters / 1529 feet MSL and a distance of approximately 1014.1 meters from the firing point in vicinity of (b) (3) (A) [redacted]. [Encl (86)]

(Continues on the next page)

Figure 19 Early Function Screen Capture – 18 Oct 25 – Encl 87

123. 18 Oct 25: Sections 1, 2, 5, & 6 had loaded the second volley before the check fire call was received. [Encl (105, at Pg. 89)]

124. 18 Oct 25: NSWC engineers and other subject matter experts (SMEs) believe the premature detonation was either round 5 or 6. [Encl (88)]

125. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1346: The impact fuze of a M767A1 fuze functions via a crush mechanism that completes an electronic circuit after setback and centrifugal safety mechanisms provide safe separation from the gun. [Encl (110)]



126. Once armed, the crush switch is sensitive enough to initiate the firing chain through impact with a bird or sUAS. [Encl (88)]

127. The M767A1 fuze relies on electric circuits to initiate the firing chain. [Encl (114)]

128. The fuze incorporates protection from electro-static discharge (ESD). Pre-production models of the fuze suffered from early detonations when fired at high velocities through environmental conditions with relatively high particulate matter (clouds). These conditions generated electric charges across the round and initiated the firing circuit. Subsequent testing and re-designs of the faraday cage ESD prevention scheme ultimately passed several firing tests with Military Standard (MILSTD) Rough Handling tests and ultimately informed the current design. [Encl (111)]

129. The M767A1 design specification known as critical characteristics are held to a one in a million risk threshold. [Encl (114)]

130. The design of the fuze is such that any single point failure will result in a dud. [Encl (115)]

131. There is only one documented early detonation of the fuze.[14] This event occurred with a different shell combination from a 105mm M119A3 at Fort Drum, NY in 2017. Ultimately, engineers assessed the early detonation of the previous incident was caused by impact with an object in flight. [Encls (112), (113), (116)]

132. Post-incident X-Ray analysis of eight random unfired fuzes show no anomalies. [Encl (91)]

133. M767A1 is the only fuze approved for overhead fire. The enclosed document SUPPLEMENT 2012-OH010 lists the issued fuze lot number as functionally cleared for overhead fire. [Encl (117)]

134. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1346: Fragmentary debris (frag) falls in a pattern shown in Figure 21 indicating a high order explosion, but due to the trajectory of the round on its ascent, the frag falls in a relatively low energy state. [Encls (92), (105, at Pg. 80)]



[14] This is based on research of databases spanning approximately 50 years, including historical data that predates the fielding of the current NA15 fuze. Specific databases include the Naval System's Conventional Ordnance Resource Program (CORP) and the Army System's Munitions History Program (MHP). These databases are open to all services and data sharing is the standard when one service issues a suspension or reports a malfunction. All malfunctions and defects are required to be reported across the Military Services. See, enclosures (112) and (113).

135. 18 Oct 25: CHP Patrol vehicle #1618820, Ford PIUV (unoccupied) is parked on the Las Pulgas Road on-ramp to Interstate 5 southbound. The patrol vehicle is struck by falling shrapnel. [Encls (93), (94)]

Figure 22 CHP Damage Report -18 Oct 25 – Encl 94

136. 18 Oct 25: An approximately 2 inch by half inch piece of frag leaves a small dent/scratch on the hood of the patrol vehicle. [Encls (93), (94)]

137. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1346: BLT 3/5 Fire Support Officer (FSO) ((b) (3) (A)) observes smoke trails in the Whiskey impact area in the vicinity of 11 SMS 5725 9833. [Encl (95)]

138. 18 Oct 25: Due to the line of sight from the observation post to the impact area, the forward observers are unable to visually observe the actual impacts. [Encl (95)]

139. 18 Oct 25: Observers are able to see non-distinguishable smoke trails and hear non-discernable audio confirmation of impacts within the Whiskey impact area. [Encl (95)]

140. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1346: E BTRY is placed in check fire by Camp Pendleton Range Control. Received by the FDC and sent to the gunline. The command "Check Firing, to the rear of the piece fall in"[15] is given by the FDC. [Encls (19), (105, at Pg. 9-11)]

[15] When the command "Check Firing" is passed, the following actions will take place: Assemble all howitzer section personnel to the rear of the piece without interacting with any ordnance, the cannon, or data sheets. The FDC personnel will exit the FDC and only return when authorized.

141. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1400: The Vice President leaves the platform via motorcade to helicopters located at CPEN LHD Pad. [Encl (71)]

142. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1400: Flocks of birds are captured in COMMSTRAT B-Roll footage at Del Mar Beach Troop Rally (Approx. 6 miles south of Red Beach) as NMC 250 Aircraft conduct show of force. [Encl (96)]

Figure 23 Flock of Birds off Del Mar Beach, ~6miles South of Event Site – 18 Oct 25 – Encl 96

143. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1410: (b) (3) (A), 11th Marines Commanding Officer is notified of a cannon artillery accident while at the Del Mar Beach Rally and begins retrograding to Las Pulgas 43 area and to gather information. [Encl (105, at Pg. 3-7)]

144. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1418: "WHITESOCKS" passed on (b) (3) (A) (The Vice President and all VIPs depart for Del Mar Beach Troop Rally). [Encls (53), (54)]

145. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1420: I-5 is reopened. [Encl (71)]

146. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1530: (b) (3) (A) arrives at the battery position with the (b) (3) (A) to begin the gunline investigation checklist. [Encl (105, at Pg. 9-11)]

147. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1600: (b) (3) (A) arrives at the battery position to begin the fire direction center cannon investigation checklist. [Encl (105, at Pg. 3-7)]

148. 18 Oct 25: Battery personnel are 20-30 feet behind the Guns when he arrives. [Encl (97)]

149. 18 Oct 25: FDC does not have manual charts set up when Reg Ops Chief arrived because of constraints of the range safety card, the target box range, and the likely scale of the chart. [Encls (98), (105, at Pg. 63)]

150. 18 Oct 25: Battery has two independent means of computation through AFATDS and is therefore in compliance with policy. [Encl (98)]

151. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1645: (b) (3) (A) is assigned as the artillery investigating officer and begins movement to the battery position. [Encl (105, at Pg. 3-7)]

152. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1720: (b) (3) (A) arrives at the battery position, consolidates and reviews all filled out Appendix F documentation, and conducts Appendix N Cannon Ammunition Malfunction Checklist. [Encl (105, at Pg. 3-7)]

153. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1840: (b) (3) (A) completes his onsite investigation. [Encl (105, at Pg. 3-7)]

154. 18 Oct 25: The onsite investigation determines the volleys fired from the gunline cause displacement for each howitzer on 17 and 18 Oct 25. The table lists the difference between the AFATDS reported position and verified position during Cannon Artillery Accident Investigation:

Section	Grid Zone	AFATDS Location	Gun-line Location	Displacement
Gun 1	(b) (3) (A)			
Gun 2				
Gun 3				
Gun 4				
Gun 5				
Gun 6				

[Encl (105)]

155. 18 Oct 25: Following the 11th Marines' Cannon Artillery Accident Investigation, each of the following sections: 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 have the rounds removed from their breaches resulting in five (5) Grade 3 shells in addition to the three (3) Grade 3 fuzes previously identified. [Encls (23), (33)]

156. 18 Oct 25 o/a 2030: Ammo Techs transport ammunition back to ASP and stage ammunition in the guarded/locked ASP lot for turn-in on 20 Oct 25. Turn-in was complete 21 Oct 25. [Encl (23)]

157. 18 Oct 25: During their time on the site, investigators from 11th Marines manipulate the settings of at least two fuzes to demonstrate how the fuze works. [Encl (97)]

158. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1500: The fuzes used to demonstrate the time function were placed in the Grade 3 ammunition box that had contained the three fuzes previously opened and identified by the battery gunnery sergeant. [Encl (47)]

159. 18 Oct 25 o/a 1840: Investigation ends, E BTRY comes out of check fire as the event had concluded. [Encl (105, at Pg. 3-7)]

160. 18 Oct 25 o/a 2030: E BTRY retrogrades from firing position to 43 Area. Ammo Techs conduct ordnance pre-stage at ASP in preparation for turn-in on 21 Oct 25. [Encl (23)]

161. 18 Oct 25: The ammo is staged inside a designated parking lot behind barbed wire fence with a 24/7 armed guard. [Encl (23)]

162. 21 Oct 25: Unused and Grade 3 ammunition is returned to Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton Las Pulgas ASP by (b) (3) (A) who turns in (81) serviceable/(5) unserviceable HE 155mm rounds, (224) serviceable Hotel Charges, (28) serviceable/(60) unserviceable ET Time Fuzes, (84) serviceable/(6) unserviceable Primers, and (1100) .50 Cal Blank rounds. [Encls (23), (33)]

(Continues on the next page)



Figure 24 Ammunition Chain of Custody – Encl 99

163. 21 Oct 25: (b) (3) (A), E BTRY Executive Officer and Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Officer reviews and endorses the Class V (W) Expenditure Report. [Encl (33)]

164. Expeditionary Systems Engineering Division (ESED), Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division Detachment Fallbrook conducts inspection of all ammunition that was returned and had been opened [Encl 88]

165. Sixteen (16) NA15 fuzes that were returned in their factory sealed boxes were not inspected. Of the 88 fuzes returned to the ASP, 16 remained in factory sealed boxes and 72 fuzes provided to ESED, all but two are found set to "PD" the other two were set .2 and 9 seconds. This is explained through manipulation of fuzes during the investigation. [Encls (88), (100)]

Figure 25 Two Fuzes with Setting Used for Demonstration – Encl 100

166. 22 Oct 25: Cannon Artillery Accident Investigation is completed. (b) (3) (A) Commanding Officer, 11th Marine Regiment, endorses and forwards to the 1st Marine Division. [Encl (105)]

167. 23 Oct 25: Major General Savage, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, endorses Cannon Artillery Accident Investigation. [Encl (105)]

168. 23 Oct 25: MCI-West Operations inquires with offshore naval assets regarding the alleged sUAS incursion on the evening of 17 Oct 25 and is informed that they did not have any detections. [Encl (102)]

(Continues on the next page)

OPINIONS

1. The M795/M767A1 shell/fuze combination is exceedingly reliable, but some anomaly or chain of anomalies associated with that day could have led to the early detonation of the round. The most significant anomalies on 18 Oct 25 were the near simultaneous firing of Gun 5 and Gun 6 with a heavy charge, their proximity to each other, and the potential presence of anomalous electromagnetic energy. Some previously unknown interaction of those anomalies, potentially in conjunction with a small unknown manufacturing variance, possibly induced an electric charge on the firing circuit of the M767A1 fuze thereby causing early detonation. The IO finds no fault with any members of E BTRY. [FF 21, 29, 33-36, 38-40, 55, 85-87, 108, 111-121]

2. It is unlikely but not impossible that the round hit a bird or UAS. NSWC engineers and an independent review by the IO of PD fuze operation agree that impact with another object in flight would set off the round, though there is no evidence that such an impact took place. There was a sUAS swarm detected the night prior to the event, but none were witnessed during the event. A review of available imagery and witness statements reveals birds were present in the event area on execution day, but none were seen along the gun-target line. Figure 17 (Encl 82) shows a bird seemingly traveling along the gunline, but in the opinion of the IO the bird is actually in the foreground of the imagery, well away from the gunline. Further, clearer imagery from the perspective of the Guns does not reveal any bird activity, nor was any organic material noted on the recovered frag. [FF 6, 59-64, 66, 70, 84, 107-108, 112, 121, 123-125, 130, 142, 168]

3. The geometry of the surface danger zone was correct. The geometry, both planned and actual ballistics, and available imagery also preclude mid-air collision of rounds. The geometry was safe in procedure and outcome in that even though an extremely low probability event occurred, the artillery round was not in a phase of flight that allowed it to achieve the destruction for which it is designed. The geometry and procedural review of the surface danger zone was safe given established policy, ballistic calculations, and known variables of fuze reliability at the time of the event. [FF 5,10, 13, 15, 17-18, 22, 25, 28-30, 32, 40-41, 49, 51, 57, 79, 82, 91, 99, 101-106, 108, 111-120, 127-129, 132-134, 149-150]

4. The size of the firing position was small for the number of Guns and the charge fired for the event. Statements from multiple experienced Artillery Officers, members of the 11th Marines staff and the third-party review by the Marine Corps School of Artillery (MCSOA) share this opinion. However, the size of the firing position ultimately resulted from required backwards planning of the geometry, number of Guns to fire, and constraints for the event. Moreover, based on the lack of a minimum distance requirement between Guns in Field Manuals and Technical Manuals, there was no reason for participants to question the safety of the firing position during planning or execution. Here, the participants and leadership demonstrated adaptive decision-making in response to evolving circumstances, gave maximum effort, and displayed professionalism in executing the mission. [FF 13, 16-22, 25, 28-29, 32-33, 36, 38-40, 55, 58, 110; Ref (j)]

5. E BTRY's pre-firing inspection procedures were sound and appropriate for the situation. The rounds on the incident day were inspected almost to excess, though the scrutiny to which E BTRY has been subjected after the incident validates their approach. While the MCSOA third party review of artillery procedures does note irregularities in FDC and gunline procedures, both MCSOA and the IO independently arrived at the conclusion that these were ultimately not the cause of the early detonation. [FF 23-27, 34, 42-46, 55-57, 67-69, 72-78, 83, 91-96, 98, 101-106, 109-110, 131-133, 139, 147, 154-157, 159-164; Ref (j)]

6. Very minor damage occurred as a result of the incident. The upwards trajectory of the round and height at detonation significantly reduced the energy of fragmentary debris when it hit the ground. As of this writing, no organization has made claims that would result in any monetary liability by the government. [FF 79, 80, 81, 82, 133-136]

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Coordination. Coordinate with Marine Corps Systems Command Product Manager Ammunition (PMM-152), Expeditionary Systems Engineering Division (RS40) NSWC-C, Detachment Fallbrook, and associated agencies to evaluate the M767A1 fuze in scenarios replicating overpressure forces at the muzzle brake similar to those encountered by Gun 5 and Gun 6 on 18 Oct 25 and a notional electro-magnetic environment replicating those produced by fielded electronic warfare systems wavelengths, and power outputs.

2. Standardized Resourcing (Peltor Headsets). During interviews with artillery gunline personnel several Marines noted the importance of Peltor headsets allowing for communication on the gunline even while firing heavy charges in close proximity to one another. While noting the resource constrained environment, the IO recommends standardized resourcing of artillery personnel with Peltor hearing protection to both ensure the health of artillery personnel and improve gunline communications.

3. Review and Assess (Minimum Spacing). Review safety procedures for M777A2 battery operations and consider a minimum spacing for M777A2s given surface conditions, charge, and electro-magnetic environment.

4. Inform (MCI-West/Camp Pendleton). Camp Pendleton Range Control should invest in improvements to their range observation systems. During the investigation, Range Control offered cell phone-captured imagery of their camera-feed on 18 Oct 25 for use in the investigation that could not be used due to poor quality and lack of accurate source video time stamp. Currently their camera systems do not record data, and the systems' time is not correct. Therefore, the imagery was of no added value, did not assist in the investigation, and could have more dramatic consequences in a different range safety or security situation.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
BOX 555300
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5300

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5830
CG
29 Oct 25

From: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), USMC

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BATTERY E, BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5, 11TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT FIRING INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON 18 OCTOBER 2025

Ref: (a) JAGMAN, Chapter II
(b) Cannon Artillery Accident Investigation dtd 22 Oct 25
(c) JtRegtO P3570.1H (Marine Corps Artillery Safety SOP)

1. This appoints you, per reference (a), to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Battery E, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/5, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) firing incident that occurred on 18 October 2025.

2. Specifically, this investigation supplements the investigation in reference (b), which was conducted pursuant to reference (c) and was invaluable during the first-phase assessment. Here, you will inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the artillery firing incident involving Battery E, BLT 3/5, 11th MEU that occurred aboard Camp Pendleton, California in the vicinity (IVO) of training area (TA) Red Beach and I-5 Highway/Las Pulgas Exit on 18 October 2025, and determine whether the cause of the incident was a result of an ammunition malfunction as noted in reference (b) or by some other means.

3. Prior to starting the investigation, you are directed to review the references in their entirety and to consult with the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). In conducting your investigation, you may rely on the evidence already gathered in reference (b), but must explore and determine the following:

a. Was the geometry of fire (i.e., surface danger zone) safety planning to contain the effects of artillery firing done correctly to contain these effects within Camp Pendleton, absent malfunction? Was the execution of this plan done correctly?

b. How reliable is the M795/M767A shell fuse combination over its service life, and include any pertinent records documented and maintained by 11th Marine Regiment.

c. How many times was the ammunition that was used during the artillery firing incident on 18 October 2025 inspected and accounted for prior to the live fire operations. Specifically, find out how many times the fuse settings of the ammunition that was used during the live fire

operations was inspected and verified. Identify who conducted the inspection and verification of the fuse settings and how they did it.

d. How the artillery rounds and fuses that were to be used or used during the artillery firing incident on 18 October 2025 were handled and prepared. Here, identify whether any aspects of the handling and preparation of artillery rounds and fuses on 18 October 2025 may have contributed to the premature detonation of the 155mm round IVO the I-5 Highway/Las Pulgas Exit. At a minimum:

(1) Obtain written statements from all Battery E personnel that participated in the execution of the artillery firing demonstration, including those who were involved in the handling and preparation of the artillery rounds and fuses, had access to the artillery firing position on 18 October 2025, served as observers, or played other roles in the execution of the artillery firing demonstration.

(2) In the written statements, include their billet; their specific role on 18 October 2025; their observations of the handling, preparation, and inspection of the artillery rounds and fuses; their opinion (if any), based on personal knowledge and observations, on whether any aspect of the handling and preparation of the artillery rounds and fuses could have contributed to the premature detonation of the 155mm round IVO the I-5 Highway/Las Pulgas Exit and why; and any other information that may be relevant and material to the incident.

e. What specific damages or injuries resulted from the subject incident.

f. What if any Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) and Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS) capabilities were present and active IVO TA Red Beach and I-5 Highway/Las Pulgas Exit on 18 October 2025. Here, for all organizations that were present, including contract support, Department of War organizations and commands, federal interagency organizations, as well as state and local law enforcement and transportation agencies, ascertain whether any of these agencies had any ECM or C-UAS on-site, and whether these systems were active and operational during the subject incident.

g. What if any Small-Unmanned Aircraft System (S-UAS) or Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) capabilities were present and active IVO TA Red Beach and I-5 Highway/Las Pulgas Exit on 18 October 2025. Here, for all organizations that were present, including contract support, Department of War organizations and commands, federal interagency organizations, as well as state and local law enforcement and transportation agencies, ascertain whether any of these agencies had any S-UAS or UAS on-site, and if so whether these systems were active and operational during the subject incident.

4. Report your findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in letter form, no later than 29 November 2025, unless an extension of time is granted. Any request for extension shall be submitted via the SJA, I MEF. Any request and associated response shall be included as an enclosure to your report.

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BATTERY E, BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5, 11TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT FIRING INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON 18 OCTOBER 2025

5. You are authorized and encouraged to form an investigative team using additional service members from I MEF to provide any necessary expertise and supplemental investigative or administrative support in accordance with the reference. If you need the assistance of personnel outside of I MEF, please coordinate through the chain of command.

6. By copy of this appointing order, all members of I MEF are directed to assist you as needed in the investigation.

7. The point of contact is (b) (3) (A) SJA, I MEF at (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

C. F. WORTMAN

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
BOX 555300
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5300

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5830
CG
19 Nov 25

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on (b) (3) (A)s ltr 5830 IO/rsb of 15 Nov 25

From: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), U.S. Marine Corps

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION TO COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BATTERY E, BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5, 11TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT FIRING INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON 18 OCTOBER 2025

1. Returned, approved.

2. The point of contact is (b) (3) (A), SJA, I MEF, at (b) (3) (A).

(b) (3) (A)

C. F. WORTMAN

Enclosure (2)

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
BOX 555300
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5300

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5830
IO[redacted]
15 Nov 25

From: [redacted]
To: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION TO COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BATTERY E, BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5, 11TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT FIRING INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON 18 OCTOBER 2025

Ref: (a) JAGMAN, Chapter II
(b) Appointing Order 5830 CG of 29 Oct 25

1. In accordance with the references, I respectfully request a thirty (30) day extension to complete the investigation. Per reference (b), the investigation is currently due on 29 November 2025.

2. Various factors, including military operational requirements, current holiday schedule, and external coordination efforts beyond the investigation team's control, impact the timely and thorough completion of the investigation by the current due date. As of today, the investigation team has interviewed or generated statements from over 70 individuals and has reviewed over a thousand pages of technical and field manuals but will likely need to further interview another 30 individuals and is awaiting at least two more important technical reports from external agencies. Though the investigation team continues to work through holidays and weekends while prioritizing the investigation over other operational commitments, responses to query and interview completion has been delayed due to the nature of the calendar. The investigation team is further waiting for responses to various requests for information that are important to the investigation, including U.S. Marine Corps School of Artillery's independent review and analysis of the initial Artillery Accident Investigation of 22 October 2025. Responses from other external agencies and organizations have also not yet been received (e.g., state and federal law enforcement agencies).

3. Given these circumstances, additional time is essential to ensure that all relevant interviews are conducted, evidence is properly reviewed, and findings are presented with integrity and completeness. If this request is approved, the investigation team will complete and report its findings as soon as possible prior to 29 December 2025.

4. The point of contact is the undersigned at [redacted]

[redacted]

Enclosure (3)

Battery E MCCRE

Confirmation Brief

9–17 June 2025

(b) (3) (A), (b) (5)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (5)

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
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2D BATTALION, 11TH MARINES
1ST MARINE DIVISION
P. O. BOX 555524
CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA 92055-5524

3501
CO
22 JUL 2025

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, 11th Marines

Subj: RESULTS OF MARINE CORPS COMBAT READINESS EVALUATION, BATTERY E, 2D BATTALION, 11TH MARINES

Ref: (a) MCO 3501.1E Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation
(b) NAVMC 3500.7D CHG 1 Artillery Training & Readiness Manual

1. Per the references, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines conducted a Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE) of Battery E, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines in preparation for Change of Operational Control (CHOP) to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division in support of the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployment.

2. The evaluation was conducted in one iteration, over five training days. The evaluation primarily focused on Marine Corps Task 3.2.4.2, Conduct Indirect Fires, and the collective 6000-level training events contained in reference (b). Each evaluator also considered the battery's execution of numerous continuing actions including combat mindset, preparation for combat, and maintenance posture.

3. Battery E, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines performed all tasks in accordance with established standards and is prepared to CHOP. The battery was evaluated on the following tasks per reference (b):

TASK	Description of Event	Evaluation
ARTY-C2-6001	ESTABLISH A BATTERY OPERATIONS CENTER	GO
ARTY-C2-6002	PLAN FOR OPERATIONS	GO
CANN-LOG-6001	CONDUCT TACTICAL LOGISTICS	GO
CANN-OPS-6001	EXECUTE FIRE MISSION	GO
CANN-OPS-6002	CONDUCT AN EMERGENCY OCCUPATION FIRE MISSION	GO
CANN-OPS-6003	CONDUCT A TACTICAL MARCH	GO
CANN-OPS-6004	OCCUPY A POSITION	GO
CANN-OPS-6005	CONDUCT A HASTY DISPLACEMENT	GO
CANN-OPS-6006	CONDUCT AN EMERGENCY DISPLACEMENT	GO
CANN-OPS-6007	DEFEND THE BATTERY	GO
08XX-COND-1001	CONDUCT A FORCED MARCH	GO

4. Comments. Battery E sustainment training will build on lessons learned from the MCCRE to ensure peak readiness as Battery E deploys in support of the 11th MEU.

5. Point of contact for this matter is (b) (3) (A) Operations Officer, at (b) (3) (A) or (b) (3) (A).

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

Enclosure (6)

Interview with 2/11 Co: (b) (3) (A) .

1540 Friday 14Nov 2025

Questions for the 11th Marines CO:

1. Can you characterize the training and certification of E/2/11 prior to CHOP?
   Multiple live fire events
   Culminated in a Final live fire, which was Bn Firex. Camp Pendleton. Across various multiple AFAs. Lots of rounds

2. Did you change leadership after MCCRE? Any particular reason?
   Yes, I changed Btry COs after MCCRE
   a. Struggled with emergency fire position.
   b. 10 min. off standard, he didn't even realize he was off standard
   c. Multiple other things, road march tactics, succession of command, all kinds of things.
3. Is it safe to say this was more due to tactical as opposed to safety?

   Yes

   Bty Cdr struggled with basic leadership, communications, supervision, driving action. Not capable

   It was in my mind to relieve him during MCCRE , but held out so the battery could complete evaluation.

   The new Btry Commadner, (b) (3) (A) I Evaluated him during Bn Firex. Validated my intuition that he was correct leader for E Btry. He did well during Bn FIREX.

4. Do you have any imagery, videos, etc. of the site either before, during, or after the incident?

   No

From: (b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: FW: Prep for SECNAV USN/USMC 250 engagement 1300 Monday
Date: Monday, November 3, 2025 1:05:38 PM
Attachments: 20250810_v3WHPO ADD MARINES250 INFO PAPER.docx
CUI - NMC250 Amphib Demo.pdf
DRAFT I MEF Support to 250th Birthday w_Risk Assessment_CD edits 10 Aug.pptx
5x8 USMC 250 Risk 10 Aug 2025.docx

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, August 13, 2025 10:35 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: FW: Prep for SECNAV USN/USMC 250 engagement 1300 Monday

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From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Sunday, August 10, 2025 3:05 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: Rock LtGen Paul J JR (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) Bargeron LtGen Jay M (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >; Morris MajGen Jason L (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) ; Nakonieczny BGen Michael R (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) ; Garcia BGen Adolfo JR (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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Subject: Prep for SECNAV USN/USMC 250 engagement 1300 Monday

Gentlemen: INFO.

In advance of the subject SECNAV/CMC/ACNO meeting, I've attached (1) CD's UPDATED USMC 250 Campaign Information Paper that accounts for the White House Production Office's (WHPO) new initiatives involving POTUS. It provides a broad overview of where we're at in our campaign and how WHPO's initiatives fit in/expand the endeavor.

Arguably more important, I've attached (2) PP&O's information paper dtd 8 Aug on

subject as well as (3) I MEF's .ppt that illustrates and describes in detail the 11 October events on Camp Pendleton that have been verbally accepted by the WHPO team, while POTUS' decision remains pending.

As I understand it, **the meeting Monday is intended to provide opportunity for the Service Chiefs to address risk with the SECNAV prior to POTUS' final brief & decision** (TBD, but anticipated NLT Friday, per WHPO). For that purpose, I've aggregated (4) the attached **5X8 risk card**, derivative of PP&O's Info Paper and I MEF's .ppt, for CMC's quick reference. **The quick ref is purposely down and in (i.e., Mission and Force)**, versus accounting for everything to include external factors, such as "reputation management" associated with a potential mishap, or public displeasure with an I-5 closure during the demo/CAPEX execution.

(b) (1) (A) It accounts learnings and discussions with WHPO/I MEF/MCIWEST/3d Fleet/NASNI and other stakeholders during our 7-8 Aug site surveys in SoCal. It is SECRET, so I will forward it to you on SIPR momentarily. I have multiple printed copies on my desk, so I can deliver them to CMC's FO (and others on the Cc line here in the Pentagon) tomorrow morning if desired.

(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A), please advise what more is required prior to the engagement. I will be in attendance with RDML Duff. I MEF is tracking, and their G3 T3 has provided WARNO to his team and leadership in case CMC would like to discuss their plan & risk assessment prior to the 1300 SECNAV mtg.

Very Respectfully,
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

Director, Communication Directorate
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
3000 Marine Corps Pentagon, Suite (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) | Washington, DC
Office: (b) (3) (A)
Mobile: (b) (3) (A)
Tb: Director CD or (b) (3) (A)

From: Bargeron LtGen Jay M (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Friday, August 8, 2025 7:10 AM
To: Morris MajGen Jason L (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >; (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) Rock LtGen Paul J JR (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: INFO: Request. Navy 250 Risk

Thanks (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A). Look forward to seeing both assessments. R/

From: Morris MajGen Jason L (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Friday, August 8, 2025 5:02 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) Rock LtGen Paul J JR (b) (3) (A) >; Bargeron LtGen Jay M
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >
Subject: Re: INFO: Request. Navy 250 Risk

(+DC/PP&O)

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A), thanks. Appreciate the update. We will work the risk assessment now that the details are becoming clearer. SF/JLM

Get Outlook for iOS

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Thursday, August 7, 2025 9:02 PM
To: Rock LtGen Paul J JR <(b) (3) (A) ; Morris MajGen Jason L
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

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Subject: INFO: Request. Navy 250 Risk

Chief, DIROPS: INFO just in from OPNAV 5. He's tracking Monday's ACNO/CMC brief and discussion with SECNAV to be about risk.

OPNAV 5'a note below to all Navy DMO's characterized the engagement and ask for Fleet input to support broadly as follows: "As I am briefing, SECNAV will be looking to ACNO (and CMC) to share risks to the services. Included in that conversation could be negative / unmitigated impacts to work-up or maintenance cycles, safety, reputational risks or congressional interest that might need to be proactively addressed."

USMC's key events in support of POTUS-level events continues to track as follows:

1. 11 Oct amphibious assault / MAGTF demonstration on Camp Pendleton (IVO Red Beach) + troop rally (~10K Marines and families IVO Del Mar Beach).

2. 9 Nov participation in the 2-3hr televised event that will include ~60-min+ live NEF demonstration & Blue Angels performance within/IVO the San Diego Bay. Note: the amphibious assault/landing on the oceanside of NASNI is trending unlikely due to endangered species / environmental concerns and more importantly location—it would require an additional movement of POTUS and the large crowds around the bay won't be able to see the demonstration (they wouldn't know the difference between live simulcast or rebroadcast of footage from 11 October).

I MEF plans to generate for distribution a fairly detailed description of what they can do in support of the 11 October MAGTF demonstration on Pendleton by EOD Friday. It will include a risk assessment, as I understand it. I am unsure if PP&O has a higher level assessment they'd like layered on top.

Also discovered today, the WH production team has already presented their tentative ConOps above, plus Navy's Seapower demonstration and troop rally IVO Norfolk 3

October. POTUS was receptive. They plan to provide him with a more detailed run of show on/about Wednesday. We should see that plan sometime Monday.

(b) (3) (A), I MEF, has been on site with us all day during the site surveys and reviewed this correspondence for concurrence pre-transmission.

Very respectfully,
(b) (3) (A)

Director, Communication Directorate
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
3000 Marine Corps Pentagon, Suite(b) (3) (A) | Washington, DC
Office: (b) (3) (A)
Mobile:(b) (3) (A)

From: Duff, D Gavin (Deedle) RDML USN DCNO N3N5N7 (USA) (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Thursday, August 7, 2025 3:04:51 PM
To: Sciretta, Michael S (Scott) RDML USN USFFC (USA) (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) ; Eslich, Erik J RADM USN COMPACFLT N04 (USA) (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >; Mccoy, Max G (Pepper) RADM USN CNATRA (USA) (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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Subject: Request. Navy 250 Risk

Eric, Scott, Pepper

I am requesting your thoughts on execution risk for Navy250 events that ACNO should communicate to SECNAV on Monday.

As it is planned right now, I will brief SECNAV, ACNO, and CMC ICW USMC CD Monday on the White House level events involving the joint celebration of our birthdays. As I am

briefing, SECNAV will be looking to ACNO (and CMC) to share risks to the services. Included in that conversation could be negative / unmitigated impacts to work-up or maintenance cycles, safety, reputational risks or congressional interest that might need to be proactively addressed.

My current thoughts are:

For all of the events, Are there any Fg, Fe concerns? Funding issues (OMN) that SECNAV would need to know about (at least in context of his commitment to spend money on warfighting). Other service reputation concerns.

- Sea Power Demo. Complicated series of movements across domains. Range foulers. The assembled force is not a standing CSG. Live ordnance. GHWB/CVW-1 not C2X complete Mitigations are USFF and C2F leadership. CSG-4 OCE and CSG-10 OTC. Interagency coordination.

- backyard BBQ. OPSEC. Mitigation. Civilian clothing. Recorded with opportunity for review and control (this applies to all content collection except for the live event on November 9th)
- USNA Speech. No issues that rise to this level
- USMC Amphibious Assault Demo. BOX/MKI ARG/MEU teams early in their work-up cycle. Impact to traffic in and around I5 outside Pendleton if it has to be shut down (More on the USMC side). Combined operations of LCACs, GARCs and ACVs from ships and ACU5 Barn to achieve desired mass. Mitigations.
- naval Expeditionary Force Demo. NFDS - first execution in San Diego Bay; late in season. Complex and new airspace for all elements of naval aviation. Mitigations. FAA coord, CNATRA oversight of Blues OpTempo. Hire a professional airshow coordinator.

I recognize a number of these thoughts may need to transition to SIPR. I appreciate any thoughts you have.

Way Ahead.

- Mon, 11 Aug. brief to SECNAV
- following that brief SECDEF will be informed of the plan for alignment. Justin (the

senior special advisor to POTUS) speaks with him it his senior advisors regularly and he is aware of the current concept.

- In parallel, WH will provide their storyboard on Monday AM. I will push it as soon as I receive it.

- WH desire is to have this to POTUS on Wednesday.

I will push a full readout tomorrow PM or Saturday AM to the SIPR distro for this site visit. Thus far it is executing smoothly with today focused on USMC to now.

Very Respectfully , Deedle

RDML Gavin 'Deedle' Duff, USN

Director, Plans and Strategy
OPNAV N5
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

CAMP PENDLETON SITE SURVEY TRIP BOOK

WHITE HOUSE PRODUCTION TEAM - 7 AUG 2025

AS OF 5 AUG 2025

TRAVELERS:

NAME	BILLET	ORGANIZATION	VIP CODE
(b) (6)	PRODUCER	ESI, WHPO	
	PRODUCER	HARBINGER, WHPO	
	PRODUCER	HARBINGER, WHPO	
	PRODUCER	HARBINGER, WHPO	
	PRODUCER	HARBINGER, WHPO	
	PRODUCER	HARBINGER, WHPO (NO FLIGHT)	
(b) (3) (A)	DIRECTOR, PLANS AND STRATEGY	OPNAV N5 (USN)	
	DIRECTOR	USMC COMMUNICATION DIRECTORATE	
	DEP DIRECTOR	CHINFO (USN)	
	DIRECTOR, EXTERNAL ENGAGEMENTS	OFFICE OF THE SECNAV	
	DIRECTOR, COMMUNITY RELATIONS	USMC COMMUNICATION DIRECTORATE	
	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	OPNAV N5 (USN)	
	SITE VISIT PLANNING	OPNAV N59 LOG (USN)	

ATTIRE: CLOSED TOE SHOES, LONG PANTS, NO HEELS, NO SKIRTS/DRESSES
WEATHER: 79/68 NO PRECIP

TIMELINE

THURSDAY, 7 AUGUST, 2025

0830: NAVY/USMC MEET AT NAVY REGION SW (750 PACIFIC HIGHWAY, 92132)

Public parking garage adjacent to NRSW
RDML Duff parking spot D
Van pickup by Navy Region SW, movement to US Grant Hotel

0900: MEET IN HOTEL LOBBY (THE US GRANT HOTEL, 326 BROADWAY STREET)

Van pickup by Navy Region SW

VAN 1	VAN 2
(b) (6) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (6) (b) (3) (A)

0905-0930: MOVEMENT FROM HOTEL TO MCAS MIRAMAR BASE OPS

Greeted by:

0930-1000: OVERVIEW OF THE DAY, MAP RECON, SAFETY BRIEF, GEAR CHECK, MOVEMENT TO AIRCRAFT

Greeted by: (pilot, aircrew)

1000-1030: FIRST LEG OF FLIGHT TO LHD PAD

OVERFLIGHT OF ACU 5 RAMP
OVERFLIGHT OF RED BEACH, DEL MAR BEACH
OVERFLIGHT OF MOUT TOWN
OVERFLIGHT OF OLD 1STMARDIV HQ (WHITE HOUSE)

AIRCRAFT 1 (4 PAX)	AIRCRAFT 2 (4 PAX)	AIRCRAFT 3 (5 PAX?)
(b) (6) (b) (3) (A)		

1030-1045: ARRIVAL AT LHD Pad

Greeted by: (b) (3) (A), MCIWEST Ops & Plans Division Director
(b) (3) (A), I MEF G-3/5

1045-1100: MOVEMENT TO RED BEACH FROM LHD PAD (WALKING)

1100-1130: DISCUSSION, VIEW OF RED BEACH via LHD Pad

Greeted by: (ACV SME, Base Rep, Amphib Landing SMEs, Aviation SMEs)

1130-1150: VEHICLE MOVEMENT TO DEL MAR BEACH

Transpo stage at *yellow range access gate on the I-5s Las Pulgas exit offramp (Two 15-PAX vans via MCIWEST)*

VAN 1	VAN 2
(b) (6) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (6) (b) (3) (A)

1150-1220: DISCUSSION, VIEW OF PUBLIC ACCESS DEL MAR BEACH

1220-1315: NO HOST LUNCH AT RAMONE'S ON DEL MAR / BEACH CLUB

1315-1330: VEHICLE MOVEMENT TO PELICAN POINT LZ

TEAM CLEARS LZ FOR 1330 PICKUP

(TWO 15-PAX VANS FROM MCIWEST, DEPART)

1330-1400: FLIGHT CAMP PENDLETON AREA TO NAS NORTH ISLAND

1400-1415: ARRIVAL AT NAS NORTH ISLAND BASE OPS *(3X H-1s depart)*
Greeted by: ((b) (3) (A) , CNRSW CoS)

1415-1630: TOUR OF NORTH ISLAND BEACHES, VIEWERSHIP OF LOCATIONS

1630-ENDEX: TOUR OF I-BAR (ICONIC TOP GUN LOCATION)

ENDEX: VEHICLE MOVEMENT FROM NAS NORTH ISLAND TO US GRANT HOTEL
Movement via NRSE vans

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
BOX 555300
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5300

5800
G35
5 Dec 25

Subj: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) STATEMENT REGARDING THE COMMAND INVESTIGATION LOOKING IN TO THE ARTILLERY INCIDENT ON 18 OCTOBER 2025

1. On 7 August 2025, I participated in a site survey at Red Beach, Camp Pendleton, alongside representatives from the White House Personnel Office (WHPO). The purpose of the survey was to discuss the feasibility of conducting a large-scale amphibious demonstration at Camp Pendleton on or around 18 October 2025.

2. During the site survey, several conditions and limitations were discussed. Two key conditions were identified:

a. Drone Restrictions: It was agreed that no drones would be permitted to fly on the day of execution to mitigate safety concerns and ensure proper deconfliction with live aircraft. This restriction applied to drones operated by the White House production team, ESI, and/or the United States Secret Service (USSS). All content collection was to be conducted using manned aircraft or ground-based equipment.

b. I-5 Closure: The USSS planned to close Interstate 5 (I-5) due to security concerns for the Very Very Important Person (VVIP), specifically the President of the United States. The closure was deemed necessary due to multiple line-of-sight locations along the I-5 corridor and its proximity to the VVIP's intended viewing area for the demonstration.

3. The planning and execution of the event on 18 October 2025 incorporated these two conditions and limitations into the detailed planning process.

4. For additional questions regarding this statement, I can be reached at (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) or (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

Enclosure (10)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: 250th
Date: Friday, August 15, 2025 1:28:42 PM
Attachments: I MEF Support to 250th Birthday_cao 20250808.pptx

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(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A),

Looking at the draft SOE that was routed up. Want to put forward another COA to you and the I MEF team.

Conflicts with the current plan:
COM has inspections the week of 6OCT and would force them to be late to rehearsals.
PTL is conducting Basic Phase Events that cannot move any further right.
2x Amphibs are in San Francisco for Fleet Week.

Proposed COA:
Ships underway on 14Oct to execute rehearsals on 14-16Oct. Execute the demonstration on the 17th or 18th.

Ships have to return to port by 19Oct to support SWATT training beginning on 20Oct.

What this provides for Navy Support:
Full support from BOX ARG. COM & PTL will not have conflicts that week.
2x Amphibs from SFFW would be transiting the area around the time of the demonstration.
Possibility to include them as a backdrop to the demonstration.

Adding C3F & CPR-1 for SA.

Let me know any questions/concerns you have.

V/r,

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)
Future Operations Officer
Expeditionary Strike Group THREE
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: STRATEGIC OPERATIONS, INC. (STOPS) - STU SEGALL PRODUCTIONS (SSP)
Date: Monday, September 8, 2025 1:39:00 PM

Good afternoon (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (A)

1130-1400 Wednesday works for myself and MCI-West, does sometime in that window that work for your team?

+(b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) from MCI-West and (b) (3) (A) from Range Control. Let us know what other questions you have.

Will your team need help getting on base? We can have someone link-up if needed.

V/R,
(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Expo Ops, G-35
I Marine Expeditionary Force
Work: (760) 725-(b) (3) (A)
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, September 8, 2025 10:19 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: STRATEGIC OPERATIONS, INC. (STOPS) - STU SEGALL PRODUCTIONS (SSP)

Copy – thanks (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A) – please let me know a good day and time (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (A), and I can get up to CamPen and tour Red Beach and start to get a handle on the scheme of maneuver/plan of attack.

Standing by
Thanks
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, September 8, 2025 10:09 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: Re: STRATEGIC OPERATIONS, INC. (STOPS) - STU SEGALL PRODUCTIONS (SSP)

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A) -

Meet (b) (3) (A) - he is back in Cali this week and can assist in coordinating a visit to. Red Beach.

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A) -

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A) is on the pyro team - I would like to get him down to Red Beach to start discussing options for special effects.

Get Outlook for iOS

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, September 8, 2025 6:59 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: STRATEGIC OPERATIONS, INC. (STOPS) - STU SEGALL PRODUCTIONS (SSP)

I understand you just spoke with (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A).

Are you with I MEF? Will I MEF handle contracting requirements?

CamPen Range Operations has had (and as far as I know – maintained) significant restrictions regarding Special Effects Pyrotechnics (black powder). Have CamPen Range Operations authorizations been requested?

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A) is leaning forward with our SFX Pyro Department Supervisor (30+ years of experience).

Standing by
Thanks

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, September 8, 2025 9:00 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: STRATEGIC OPERATIONS, INC. (STOPS) - STU SEGALL PRODUCTIONS (SSP)

(b) (3) (A),
Thanks for contacting Strategic Operations, Inc. (STOPS) regarding your training requirement. STOPS grew out of (b) (6) Productions (SSP) and (b) (6) is the President. STOPS does still employ Special Effects Pyrotechnics, although STOPS has not done so at CamPen for some time.

I believe (b) (3) (A) left a message on your voicemail.

You can give him a call back and/or let me know more about your requirement and we can work out a plan of attack.

Thanks

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Strategic Operations, Inc.
www.strategic-operations.com
4705 Ruffin Rd
San Diego, CA 92123
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

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From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: FW: UPDATE: INFO. NEF Demo Cancelled & Amphib/MAGTF Demo solidified aboard CPEN
Date: Wednesday, September 17, 2025 9:26:57 AM
Attachments: image001.jpg

Sir,

Latest news from (b) (3) (A) .

Planning with MEF/11th MEU and other organizations will go 18-19 Sep down in Del Mar.

S/F,
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, September 17, 2025 4:55 AM
To: Rock LtGen Paul J JR (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A); Bargeron LtGen Jay M (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A); Morris MajGen Jason L (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >; Nakonieczny BGen Michael R (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: Armas BGen Thomas M (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) Taylor BGen Daniel B (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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Subject: UPDATE: INFO. NEF Demo Cancelled & Amphib/MAGTF Demo solidified aboard CPEN

Generals: INFO & UPDATE.

Latest updates overnight from the White House.

- CPEN Amphib/MAGTF Demo is a go 18 October with POTUS.
- The 9 Nov NEF Demo has been cancelled.

Pending remains decisions associated with previously slated VPOTUS events.

(b) (3) (B) is attending a sync with OPNAV N5 around 1115 today where more details will be shared. Afterward, she'll work with PP&O POC to help generate MOD 2 to

the NMC 250 TASKORD, as appropriate.

Afterward, we'll ensure the latest table of events is updated and distributed for collective SA. We'll also work with I MEF to obtain the latest one-page ConOp Amphib/MAGTF Demo placemat CMC requested yesterday. I see this as a refresh of the summary slide he previously received in preparation for his NMC 250 discussion with SECNAV weeks ago.

Very Respectfully,
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

Director, Communication Directorate
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
3000 Marine Corps Pentagon, Room (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) | Washington, DC
Office: (b) (3) (A)
Mobile: (b) (3) (A)
Tb: Director CD or (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2025 5:32 PM
To: Rock LtGen Paul J JR (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A); Bargeron LtGen Jay M (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >; Morris MajGen Jason L (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >; Taylor BGen Daniel B (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: Armas BGen Thomas M <thomas.armas@usmc.mil>; (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

Director, Communication Directorate
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
3000 Marine Corps Pentagon, (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Washington, DC
Office: (b) (3) (A)
Mobile: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, September 15, 2025 10:23 AM
To: Rock LtGen Paul J JR (b) (3) (A) >; Bargeron LtGen Jay M (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) ; Morris MajGen Jason L (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: Armas BGen Thomas M (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >; (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: INFO. Tampa Site Visit

Generals: INFO.

OPNAV N5, 2d Flt, and WHPO plan to conduct site visits in Tampa this week (Thu – Fri full workdays). I will be there Wednesday evening following NY Media Symposium support Tuesday and Wednesday morning.

Engaged MFC's CoS on this last night, and he's engaged on topic today.

As I understand it, MFC is pulsing 2d Flt to see if they're sending their Fleet Marine Officer and potentially a II MEF operational planner, as WHPO team intends to get after NEF demo planning during the two-day site visit.

Recognize this is all in advance of the MEF's and MarFor's FOS submission due dates included in the attached MOD 1 to the NMC 250 TASKORD.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

Director, Communication Directorate
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
3000 Marine Corps Pentagon, Room (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A) | Washington, DC

Office: (b) (3) (A)
Mobile: (b) (3) (A)
Tb: Director CD or (b) (3) (A)

From: Duff, D Gavin (Deedle) RDML USN DCNO N3N5N7 (USA) (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2025 6:17 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(

the Marines and Navy had immediate access to Fleet and Region Leadership and Subject Matter Experts who exercised authority over the locations and commands we were visiting this is a very different visit from a planning perspective going to an Air Force installation and port location where we have no permanent presence.

Planning

- Wednesday is envisioned as a travel day, with Thursday and Friday as full workdays. I am generally assuming that we would not be able to get a flight back before 1800 on Friday at this point.
- Thursday will be production focused.
- Friday would invite participation from WHMO and USSS to assess assumptions and define limitations from Thursday's planning.
- I assess that we would like C2F / MFC / II MEF planners to facilitate the discussion and ensure flat and transparent comms.
- At this point there are no details and no SOE. We will work that in the coming days.

Assumptions

- The NFDS and Leap Frogs will still participate
- Navy Ceremonial Guard / Silent Drill Platoon, etc will be available
- The planning done to date for the event to take place in San Diego will be the base assumption for the start of our discussions.
- OPNAV and HQMC teams will attend. As will WH Production Team leadership.

Agencies with whom we need to communicate / visit

- Location and visitor viewing for "Battle in the Bay" (https://www.dvidshub.net/image/8393062/ussocom-presents-capabilities-demonstration-during-sof-week-2024)
- SOCOM Planners for 'Battle in the Bay' to gain insight into their process and access to their planning products
- Port Facilities (assume cruise terminal+) – facilitated by the State / County / Local leadership.
- Macdill AFB Leadership / Airfield Operations

Data Requested for the Visit

- Initial estimate from USFF of possible resources available
- Navigation Chart of Tampa Bay to assist with design and conceptual planning of the live action portion.

Our team will reach out starting tomorrow IOT to more fully scope how this event will take place with specifics on where we will meet.

Very Respectfully, Deedle

RDML Gavin 'Deedle' Duff, USN

Director, Plans and Strategy
OPNAV N5

(email) (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(SIPR)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(office) (b) (3) (A)
(cell) (b) (3) (A)
(personal cell) (b) (3) (A)
(VoSIP) (b) (3) (A)
(TB) (b) (3) (A)

NN250 logo

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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Subject: RE: RCO Special Brief Red Beach Artillery Live Fire NMC 250 I MEF 17 - 18 October 2025 No I-5 Closure
Date: Wednesday, October 15, 2025 5:21:10 PM
Attachments: Red Beach NMC 250 I MEF 17 - 18 October 2025 No I-5 Closure.pdf

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(b) (3) (A) – Thank you for catching that. Please see attached.

s/f

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2025 5:03 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: Re: RCO Special Brief Red Beach Artillery Live Fire NMC 250 I MEF 17 - 18 October 2025 No I-5 Closure

(b) (3) (A) ,

Looks like you may have forgotten the attachment. Not seen it on my end.

-(b) (3) (A)

Get Outlook for iOS

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2025 4:59 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(

(b) (3) (A) –

1. Your approved RCO special brief is attached.
a. Please ensure that your OIC and RSO have on hand.
b. Will be conditional reserved awaiting final notification that signage for I-5 has been coordinated.

///BREAK///

(b) (3) (A) – Asking PMO assistance with coordination for signage on both north and southbound I-5 with appropriate state agency.
Range Scheds –

1. Please post to calendar and annotate on range bulletin.
a. Please add OP-W to RCNI for I MEF.

Range Safety – Coordinate face-to-face (F2F) with (b) (3) (A) .

(b) (3) (A)
Range Control Officer
Marine Gunner - Retired
Range Operations Division
MCB Camp Pendleton
Marine Corps Air Station
Tower St. Bldg. (b) (3) (A)
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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From: (b) (3) (A)
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Subject: [Non-DoD Source] UPDATE: TFR Requests In Support of Navy and Marine Corps 250th Event
Date: Tuesday, October 14, 2025 11:07:32 AM
Attachments: image001.jpg

All,

The 91.145 TFR/NOTAMs are active for 15, 17, 18 October. The NOTAM numbers are: 5/0781 and 5/0784.

Still awaiting the 99.7 to be updated to include tomorrow. It is already active for the 17th and 18th. NOTAM 5/9991.

(b) (3) (A) is working with SOSC for the 99.7 tomorrow. Please do not call or contact the SOSC to ask for updates. They prefer dealing with one POC, and that's him.

v/r

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

Air Traffic Representative **(ATREP)** California and Yuma, AZ
Mission Support Services|AJV-W230 Western Service Center|Air Traffic Organization (ATO)
Federal Aviation Administration, 2200 S. 216th Street Des Moines, WA. 98198-6547

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FAA Logo with full text

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2025 09:27
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

Subject: RE: UPDATE: TFR Requests In Support of Navy and Marine Corps 250th Event

ALCON,

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (A), and I will be the sole POCs for FAA coordination moving forward today. CCing everyone for SA had the unintended consequence of bombarding SOSC. Apologies.

Thank you all for the support.

Very respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
1 MEF G-35 Planner / 3d MAW LNO
DSN: 760-763-6572

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2025 8:48 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

Subject: UPDATE: TFR Requests In Support of Navy and Marine Corps 250th Event

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Attached are the updated 91.145 TFR requests that did not reach the approval authority last week. Due to inclement weather, we have cancelled today's air rehearsal. We are requesting the (2) 91.145 TFRs for 15, 17, and 18 October.

Additionally, we are requesting a 24 hour shift right for the 99.7 TFR that was issued for today. Request issuance of the identical 99.7 for tomorrow, 15 October. Original 99.7 request with updated enclosure attached.

We sincerely appreciate your support for this event. Thank you.

Very respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
1 MEF G-35 Planner / 3d MAW LNO
DSN: 760-763-(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cell: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: INFO: 18 OCTOBER USMC DEMO / RALLY
Date: Wednesday, October 15, 2025 8:55:07 AM

Was still up in the air, but now decision is final.

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2025 8:45 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: FW: INFO: 18 OCTOBER USMC DEMO / RALLY

Sir,

Didn't know there was still a question, but definitely VPOTUS.

V/r,
(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2025 8:41 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: INFO: 18 OCTOBER USMC DEMO / RALLY

(b) (3) (A), teammates: Confirmation of VPOTUS, no POTUS.

Respectfully,
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

Director, Communication Directorate
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
3000 Marine Corps Pentagon, (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Washington, DC
Office: (b) (3) (A)
Mobile: (b) (3) (A)

From: Hoffman, Garrett R. BGen USMC WHMO/HQ <(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)>
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2025 9:43 AM

To: Taylor BGen Daniel B (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) Rock LtGen Paul J JR (b) (3) (A) >; Gering Gen Bradford J (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >; Bargeron LtGen Jay M (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >; (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) Nakonieczny BGen Michael R <(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >; Wortman LtGen Christian F <(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >
Subject: Re: 18 OCTOBER USMC DEMO / RALLY

NAIL, confirmed POTUS will not attend. VP still good to go.

RS
Rainman

BGen Garrett "Rainman" Hoffman
White House Military Office
C: (b) (3) (A)
W: (b) (3) (A)

On Oct 14, 2025, at 4:50 PM, Taylor BGen Daniel B <(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) > wrote:

Rainman,
See attached per the SECNAV's request to forward to the West Wing for staff review/POTUS decision:

- 18 Amphib Demo Placemat: Depicts run of show for Amphibious Demonstration and Beach Rally
- Troop Rally Stage: depicts two views of Troop/Beach Rally Stage

Please confirm POTUS decision. Unsure if there is a side bar discussion with POTUS/SECNAV on this event after today.

Thanks for everything.

SF,
NAIL

From: Hoffman, Garrett R. BGen USMC WHMO/HQ (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2025 3:27 PM
To: Bargeron LtGen Jay M (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >
Cc: Taylor BGen Daniel B <(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >; (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A); Rock LtGen Paul J JR (b) (3) (A) >; Gering Gen
Bradford J <(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >
Subject: Re: 18 OCTOBER USMC DEMO / RALLY

LtGen Bargeron, talked to Nail. Highly unlikely P will change his mind to attend (especially after his quick trip to the Middle East) but standing by for the slides. I will relay the desires of SECNAV and push the slides to the West Wing. Regardless, VP is excited about attending. Please let me know how I can help further.

SF
Rainman

BGen Garrett "Rainman" Hoffman
White House Military Office
C:(b) (3) (A)
W: (b) (3) (A)

> On Oct 14, 2025, at 3:15 PM, Smith Gen Eric M
> (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) > wrote:
>
> Rainman,
> I request that you engage with LtGen Bargeron at PP&O to obtain the current brief for the POTUS or VPOTUS event on 18 October at Del Mar Beach. SECNAV has been briefed, and he obviously wants POTUS to attend, but that's above my pay grade. We are pleased to host VPOTUS if POTUS can't make it. It will be a good show regardless of who shows up.
>
> Hope you're holding up OK. We will catch you when you come home and get you to a MAW.
> Semper Fi

EMS

General Eric M. Smith, USMC
Commandant of the Marine Corps
(b) (3) (A)
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

<Amphibious Demonstration (18 October)_placemat_cao 20251010.pdf>
<18 Oct USMC Troop Rally Stage.pdf>

V2

Battery CO / XO

Name, Rank, billet and unit.
(b) (3) (A)
-E Battery 2/11

What is your artillery background?
-Deployment 2019-2020
-XO
-TBS
-2 live fires as Btry CO at CPEN prior to ADEX live-fire (all L charges).
-Reflection on current unit: Saw MCCRE executed under previous CO, felt they were proficient. Battalion leadership believed a leadership change would be good for the battery,(b) (3) (A) took command. Btry XO remained the same during the CO change.

Who did you provide a confirmation brief too?
-Believes there was one but did not attend. Did attend planning conferences.

Were any changes made to the firing plan during the brief? C. Range control requests & tracking
-That was not the original firing point.
-Original plan: cannons come off LCACs. Due to DCG wanting live fire, change was made to cancel amphib ops and just do a static shoot to meet the timeline.
-Originally planned for 3 guns on the beach, but HHQ wanted 6 guns.
-Original firing point about 100m up the path. Changed the point due to Area E over I-5.
-14 Oct rehearsals = original firing point; this is when they realized that firing point would not work due to Area E.
-RCO sent new range card on 15 Oct at 1721.

Who prepared and who submitted the updated RCO special request to Range Control ((b) (3) (A) **(provide copy, email thread)**
(b) (3) (A) (received forwarded email)

What response did Range Control provide and in what form (email, call, signature)? (produce Range Control reply)
-See email traffic.

How was the new battery position chosen? Directed?
-Chosen to ensure Area E was not over I-5.

Were any range-safety or SDZ calculations re-run for the new position? (who performed them; provide outputs)
-Yes
(b) (3) (A) , FDO
-(b) (3) (A) , Ops Chief

What was the battery dispersion considerations or constraints given this training area?
-50x50 box (small for 6 guns). The guns were close. About 10m apart, maybe a little less.
-Never executed live-fire with guns that close.
-Previous box was slightly larger. After the change of the original firing point, the new firing point forced the box to decrease.

Have you done artillery unit level training since 18 Oct?
-No.

Did you use EPIAFS for this evolution?
-Not used on a round.

What time did E Battery occupy Red Beach on 16 Oct?
-Btry CO arrived at around 1000 on 16 Oct.
-Btry E arrived at around 1430 on 16 Oct.

What time did the unit accept the ammunition (receipt signature/time)? (show DD250/issue docs)
-Received ammunition issue documents via email, but time of battery accepting ammunition was not annotated.

Who physically accepted the ammunition and who signed for it? (name, billet)
(b) (3) (A) (BLT ammo officer). He is on the DOA and physically signed the document.
-Btry ammo techs were present: (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A)

Where and how was the ammunition stored from acceptance through loading? (photos, storage logs)
-15 Oct: Stored on back of 7-ton and was there overnight on the beach with ammo techs and driver.

Who is responsible for inspecting and certifying Grade-3 ordnance? (name, billet, authority)
-Section chiefs inspect the ammo

What is the procedure you followed to inspect Grade-3 rounds that day? (step-by-step)
-When ammo is removed from ammo cans, section chiefs inspect ammo. Another inspection prior to ammo going in weapon system. Additional check by SNCOs.

Who performed the final verification before rounds were issued to guns? (name, signature)
-Section chiefs

Was there any explicit or implicit command pressure to accept or use the new battery position? (describe)
-Did not feel pressured as it was the only option. Felt comfortable executing. Felt there were no limitations that would impact safety.
-Shot charge 4 (higher side of charges but still significantly less than charge 5)
-Never shot charge 4 with the guns that close but that it still felt "normal"
-Concerned of how close the guns were only because of the sand. Nobody has shot like that from the sand previously. Shot one gun at a time day prior to dig in and ensure displacement was safe. Dug in the guns completely to where you couldn't see any of the spade at all. Went a little bit up the arm but the whole spade was not visible. Cannot remember if the part closest to the carriage was level or facing down.

Battery Leadership

Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?)
-We verified position direction but guns were not re-laid.

Please provide a sketch of the firing position and mark each gun and the location of each Marine (write names).
-See Btry CO's email.

Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?
-Survey Marines did survey points
-(b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) laid and safed the circles.

Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?
-Mixed. Guns 1, 3, 4 each had 1 only on the 18th.
-Gun 1 replacement fuze was given to the gun by (unsure).
-All grade 3 fuzes stayed on gun but in separate ammo can. Time/Grade 3 written on fuze and can with DTG.

How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)
-Once received line data they start to "fuze everything up." Set all manually and that's when realized 3 were not doing it properly, realized that NET 1230.
-BG thought it was weird that there were three grade 3 the day after having 0 during rehearsals. BG ordered to take them off the line. PltSgts and BG checked all the rounds. "Eyeball LD screen"
-Outside of normal checks, only one additional check done (Plt Sgts and BG, unsure if PltCmdrs checked).

You added inspections with an SNCO and an Officer—who were they and what did they check?
-Unsure if officers checked. CO disagrees with artillery investigation statement that each round got normal 3 checks and then SNCO and officer did an additional check of each round together.
-At each gun there was a SNCO and officer which is not typical. Btry CO did this not to verify ammo but to ensure proper displacement throughout live-fire.

Was a safety circle / survey point established within the position? Who established it?
-(b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) established safety circle.

Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe)
-Cannoneer = No. It was a typical malfunction. Felt the other guns fire so did not know his gun did not fire but noticed when he saw red.
-Btry CO = heard a second "bang" and thought that was weird

Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently?
-No. It was a typical malfunction.

Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct?
-No. Was located behind gun 3. No Cammie netting over the guns. Open sky and was in a central position.

Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun?
-Yes. Secret service (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) , Denver Field Office) behind howitzer about 15m behind gun line, could possibly record entire gunline and was centrally located near gun 3. (Footage has been requested).
-WH media person located IVO right side of gun 1 (Footage has been requested).
-Not distracting because they were not interacting with gunline.
-Range control personnel were present, unsure of location.

Were any tactical exceptions or procedural deviations authorized for the ADEX? (reduced SDZ, non-standard PE, altered QE limits)
-No deviations from normal.

Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe.
-No.
-Would not normally array guns in that manner in a tactical shoot.
-Looked the same as when doing demo shoots at TBS with 2-3 guns.
-Was a deviation from normal tactical employment of his btry.

Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain.
-"Very very low likelihood. "
-Because of all the safety checks unlikely. Additionally, the very short time between the section chief checking correct shell/fuze setting and the cannoneer placing round into tube would make it unlikely that it could be manipulated in that time.

If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be?
-Nothing

Additional Comments:
-Check fire from someone over the radio (range safety?)
-First external person there was (b) (3) (A) .
-Reg CO did not show up, normal team arrived and began inspection.
-Believes 5 rounds were punched.
-Ammo is then marked for ASP for grade 3.
-Doesn't remember if they were returned into storage setting.
-Rounds are punched, rounds verified, investigation complete, OIC (XO) verified ammo counts with ammo tech. (b) (3) (A) took custody of ammo to ASP, unsure of who had it at ASP?
-At TBS charges were 1-2.
-Biv night of 16 and 17, recovered night of the 18th.
-Biv site 16 and 17th = cannoneers in and around their trucks near gunline. No ammo off trucks. FDC and HQ biv'd near edge of cliff. Not an admin bivouac
-CUAS and CIED on trucks, turned off both days. Prime movers about 75m away from each gun (see 250 layout via email).

Need the right privacy act disclaimer or whatever it is

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From: (b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: REQ:
Date: Wednesday, November 12, 2025 8:10:07 AM

Thank you!

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office: 760-725-6496
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2025 8:09 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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Subject: RE: REQ:

(b) (3) (A) –

Best recollection is on 15 October (b) (3) (A) approached myself at Red Beach to ask to shift artillery position fires into IMP-Whiskey.

(b) (3) (A)
Range Control Officer
Marine Gunner - Retired
Range Operations Division
MCB Camp Pendleton

Marine Corps Air Station
Tower St. (b) (3) (A)
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2025 1:23 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: REQ:

Gentlemen,

For the findings of fact and timeline, we request your best recollection of when Range Control was asked to build the new SDZ for firing over an active I-5.

We appreciate your continued support of the Commanding General's Investigation.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
G-3 Fires and Effects Coordinator
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

Interview with Range Control

1. Describe how you became involved in this incident?

-Was involved in planning from the beginning (sometime in late August) including the change of dates for execution.

2. Who built the original Firing Point and SDZ?

-All firing points and SDZ done by (b) (3) (A) team including (b) (3) (A) (Range Specialist). The SDZ must be built by a certifying authority and 2/11 is not a certifying authority.
-SDZ was built by (b) (3) (A) (Range Specialist) and approved by (b) (3) (A) .
-MCO3570.1D (Range Safety) requires ranges/firing points to be certified by the Range Control Officer.

3. Who built the second firing point and SDZ? Why, When?

-See above answer for who built second firing point and SDZ.
-Range control was informed late on Oct 15 that I-5 would not be shutting down. Understanding that Area E was over I-5 for the original firing point, E Btry CO and MEF action officer asked RCO if it was possible to shift firing points to a new location that would facilitate standoff from Area E and I-5. Range Control built second firing point and SDZ for updated position to ensure proper standoff of Area E and I-5.

4. Did you have any concerns with the SDZs or Geometry? Did you voice them? To whom?

-(b) (3) (A) approved them. All SDZs were developed IAW MCO 3570.1D Range Safety. No safety concerns.

5. What damages or injuries resulted from the early detonation that you know of?

-None range control is aware of.

6. I know you have provided this before, but how many times has this firing point been used?

-So far as anyone can tell, based on records, it has not been used since a demonstration in 1957 or 1958. Date estimate of previous demonstration is based on a YouTube video titled Assault Exercises 1950s. (IO's note: based on aircraft in the video (F-4 Phantom) this is likely not the case, rather it is probably from the early to mid-1960s).

7. How many times have we shot over a trafficked Interstate 5 based on range records?

-None recorded.

8. From range safety perspective, have you seen guns this close?

-Yes, seen it several times

This summary is a fair and accurate representation of the interview on 20251107 between IO Team and Range Control; (b) (3) (A), Director Range Operations Division and (b) (3) (A) , Range Control Officer.

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

This transmission contains information that is protected from disclosure by the Privacy Act (5 USC 552a) and exemption (b) (6) of the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552, as amended). Ensure that this information is used solely for the requested purpose. Further duplication and/or distribution without prior authorization from this office is not authorized. Civil and/or criminal penalties can apply for improper us.

From: (b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: Re: RCO Special Brief Red Beach Artillery Live Fire NMC 250 I MEF 17 - 18 October 2025 No I-5 Closure
Date: Thursday, October 16, 2025 7:06:37 AM
Attachments: image001.png

Please see below. These are approximates as we are not yet accounting for nonstandard conditions like the weather. It shouldn't change drastically though. We will be able to get the exact data once we apply the non-standards after we emplace this evening.

3H



4H



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From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Thursday, October 16, 2025 6:23 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
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(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: RCO Special Brief Red Beach Artillery Live Fire NMC 250 I MEF 17 - 18 October 2025 No I-5 Closure

Do not see any current issues with 4H.

Can you send me your firing data QE, etc.?

s/f

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2025 7:00 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: RCO Special Brief Red Beach Artillery Live Fire NMC 250 I MEF 17 - 18 October 2025 No I-5 Closure

(b) (3) (A) ,

No worries. Thanks for the work and quick turn on this.

Be advised, in order range the target area and prevent a (b) (3) (A) ordinate will we shoot charge 4H. Any issues with this?

Very Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
Battery Commander, Eazy Battery
Battalion Landing Team 3/5
11th MEU
Cell: (b) (3) (A)
Gov: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2025 5:21 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

Subject: RE: RCO Special Brief Red Beach Artillery Live Fire NMC 250 I MEF 17 - 18 October 2025 No I-5 Closure

(b) (3) (A) – Thank you for catching that. Please see attached.

s/f

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2025 5:03 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: Re: RCO Special Brief Red Beach Artillery Live Fire NMC 250 I MEF 17 - 18 October 2025 No I-5 Closure

(b) (3) (A),

Looks like you may have forgotten the attachment. Not seen it on my end.

(b) (3) (A)

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From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2025 4:59 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RCO Special Brief Red Beach Artillery Live Fire NMC 250 I MEF 17 - 18 October 2025 No I-5 Closure

(b) (3) (A) –

1. Your approved RCO special brief is attached.
a. Please ensure that your OIC and RSO have on hand.
b. Will be conditional reserved awaiting final notification that signage for I-5 has been coordinated.

///BREAK///

(b) (3) (A) – Asking PMO assistance with coordination for signage on both north and southbound I-5 with appropriate state agency.
Range Scheds –

1. Please post to calendar and annotate on range bulletin.
a. Please add OP-W to RCNI for I MEF.

Range Safety – Coordinate face-to-face (F2F) with (b) (3) (A) .

(b) (3) (A)
Range Control Officer
Marine Gunner - Retired
Range Operations Division
MCB Camp Pendleton
Marine Corps Air Station
Tower St. Bldg. 2399, Rm (b) (3) (A)
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	BLT 3/5 AMMO CHIEF
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

1. **Describe your role and primary responsibilities during the exercise.**

I WAS ISSUED THE AMMO AT THE ASP ON THURSDAY OCT 15 AND SIGNED IT OVER TO (b) (3) (A) .

2. **Who was assigned to your gun crew on the day of the event?**

I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.

3. **Did you observe any visitors or non-crew personnel on or near your gun? (list names and reason for presence)**

I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.

4. **Who are the members of your Cannon Ammunition Team?**

I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.

5. **Which Marines handled fuzes on your gun? (list names and duties)**

I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	BLT 3/5 AMMO CHIEF
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

6. **Who determines or confirms that a round is Grade 3 ammunition on your gun? (name and billet)**

I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.

7. **Describe any differences in procedures from a normal battery shoot. (what changed and why)**

I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.

8. **Are you aware of any Marines having issues with your section that weren't focused on the task at hand?**

I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.

9. **What time on 15 Oct was the ammunition drawn from the ASP?**

0730

10. **Who signed for the ammunition at the ASP? (name, billet, unit)**

(b) (3) (A) . BLT 3/5 AMMUNITION CHIEF.

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	BLT 3/5 AMMO CHIEF
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

11. Did you inspect the ammunition before accepting it? (visual check, lot numbers, condition)

I INSPECTED OUTER PACKAGING OF ALL AMMUNITION. ALL AMMUNITION WAS SEALED.

12. Was the ammunition crated, palletized, or loose? (describe packaging and markings)

ALMOST ALL AMMUNITION WAS CRATED AND PALLETIZED. THERE WAS 1 CAN OF M767A1 THAT WAS ASP SEALED.

13. Do you have documentation for acceptance?

YES.

14. Were there any discrepancies or damaged rounds noted at the time of draw? (describe)

NO.

15. What time was the ammunition transported from the ASP to Training Area Red Beach?

APPROXIMATELY 1300

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	BLT 3/5 AMMO CHIEF
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

16. What type of vehicle(s) were used for transport (7-ton, stakebed, MTVR, etc.)?

7-TON.

17. Who authorized and supervised the convoy movement?

I AM UNSURE I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.

18. Was the ammunition under armed guard during movement? (if yes, list security personnel)

NO.

19. Were any stops made en route to Red Beach? (if yes, where and why)

NO.

20. Was the transfer route pre-cleared by Range Control or PMO?

I AM UNSURE I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	BLT 3/5 AMMO CHIEF
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

21. To V35 Ammo: From whom did you receive the ammunition at the Camp Pendleton ASP? (name, billet, unit)

(b) (3) (A) . TEAM LEADER. 1ST CRR AMMO CO.

22. To E 2/11 Ammo Tech: From whom did you receive ammunition at Red Beach? (name, billet, time of transfer)

23. To ATC (by gun): Who did you inspect ammunition with after receiving it from the Battery Ammo Tech? (name, billet, time)

24. How was the ammunition staged, secured, and accounted for upon arrival?

I AM UNSURE I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.

25. Were any unserviceable or Grade 3 rounds identified at Red Beach? (describe findings)

I AM UNSURE I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	BLT 3/5 AMMO CHIEF
Rank	Last Name, First Name, MI.	Billet / Gun # / Section

26. Who is responsible for inspecting and certifying ordnance is not Grade 3 prior to issue to the gun line?

I AM UNSURE I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.

27. What is the inspection process for Grade 3 ammunition in your unit?

I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.

28. Were all inspections completed before the ammunition was distributed to each section?

I AM UNSURE I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.

29. Any additional comments related to the exercise/event?

NO.

30. Do you have any photos/videos from the exercise/event? (Describe content)

NO.

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	BATTERY AMMO CHIEF
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

1. **Describe your role and primary responsibilities during the exercise.**

SUPPLYING AND ISSUING AMMO TO ECHO BATTERY

2. **Who was assigned to your gun crew on the day of the event?**

IT WAS MYSELF AND (b) (3) (A) WHO WERE AMMO TECHS

3. **Did you observe any visitors or non-crew personnel on or near your gun? (list names and reason for presence)**

N/A

4. **Who are the members of your Cannon Ammunition Team?**

N/A

5. **Which Marines handled fuzes on your gun? (list names and duties)**

N/A

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	BATTERY AMMO CHIEF
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

6. **Who determines or confirms that a round is Grade 3 ammunition on your gun? (name and billet)**

IT WOULD BE MYSELF AND BATTERY (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A).

7. **Describe any differences in procedures from a normal battery shoot. (what changed and why)**

NO.

8. **Are you aware of any Marines having issues with your section that weren't focused on the task at hand?**

NO.

9. **What time on 15 Oct was the ammunition drawn from the ASP?**

AROUND 1300.

10. **Who signed for the ammunition at the ASP? (name, billet, unit)**

(b) (3) (A), 3/5 AMMO CHIEF, 3/5

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	BATTERY AMMO CHIEF
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

11. Did you inspect the ammunition before accepting it? (visual check, lot numbers, condition)

WE DID AND NOTHING WAS OFF, THE LOT NUMBERS MATCHED THE PAPERWORK, THERE WAS NO SCRATCHES OR DENTS, IT WAS ALL PROPERLY BANDED.

12. Was the ammunition crated, palletized, or loose? (describe packaging and markings)

EVERYTHING WAS PROPERLY SECURED AND PALLETIZED. THE ROUNDS WERE ON THEIR SKIDS WITH METAL BANDING AND THE AMMO CANS WERE SEALED SHUT BY THE ASP. THE HOTEL CHARGES WERE PROPERLY SECURED AND BANDED ON A PALLET AND SEALED BY THE ASP.

13. Do you have documentation for acceptance?

(b) (3) (A) HAS ALL DOCUMENTATION REGARDING THE AMMO.

14. Were there any discrepancies or damaged rounds noted at the time of draw? (describe)

THERE WAS NO DAMAGES, DENTS, OR SCATCHES ON THE ROUND, FUZES, OR HOTEL CHARGES. EVERYTHING WAS IN GOOD ORDER.

15. What time was the ammunition transported from the ASP to Training Area Red Beach?

THE AMMO WAS TRANSPORTED FROM THE ASP TO RED BEACH AROUND 1330.

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	BATTERY AMMO CHIEF
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

16. What type of vehicle(s) were used for transport (7-ton, stakebed, MTVR, etc.)?

IT WAS A 7 TON WITH A 593 TRAILER ATTACHED TO IT.

17. Who authorized and supervised the convoy movement?

(b) (3) (A) AUTHORIZED THE MOVEMENT AND I SUPERVISED THE MOVEMENT FROM ASP TO RED BEACH.

18. Was the ammunition under armed guard during movement? (if yes, list security personnel)

I WAS THE ARMED GUARD.

19. Were any stops made en route to Red Beach? (if yes, where and why)

NEGATIVE, NO STOPS WERE MADE. WE WENT DIRECTLY TOWARDS RED BEACH FROM THE ASP.

20. Was the transfer route pre-cleared by Range Control or PMO?

I WOULD NOT KNOW ABOUT THIS.

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	BATTERY AMMO CHIEF
Rank	Last Name, First Name, MI.	Billet / Gun # / Section

21. To V35 Ammo: From whom did you receive the ammunition at the Camp Pendleton ASP? (name, billet, unit)

(b) (3) (A), AMMO CHIEF, 3/5

22. To E 2/11 Ammo Tech: From whom did you receive ammunition at Red Beach? (name, billet, time of transfer)

MYSELF, BATTERY AMMO CHIEF, AROUND 1300.

23. To ATC (by gun): Who did you inspect ammunition with after receiving it from the Battery Ammo Tech? (name, billet, time)

THE AMMUNITION WAS INSPECTED BY MYSELF AND MY FELLOW AMMO TECH, (b) (3) (A), AROUND 1600 ON OCTOBER 16TH AFTER THE BATTERY ARRIVED AT RED BEACH.

24. How was the ammunition staged, secured, and accounted for upon arrival?

IT WAS STAGED ON RED BEACH CO-LOCATED WITH THE BATTERY POSITION WITH THE PROPER SL3. 4 CHOP BLOCKS, 2 ON THE 7 TON AND 2 ON THE 593. 2 FIRE EXTINGUISHER, 1 IN FRONT OF THE 7 TON AND 1 BEHIND THE 593. IT WAS MYSELF AND (b) (3) (A) WHO WERE ACCOUNTABLE FOR IT.

MYSELF, (b) (3) (A), AND (b) (3) (A) TOOK TURNS WATCHING THE AMMO. ONE WOULD BE UP ROVING MAKING SURE NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY OCCURED WITH THE AMMO VIC WHILE THE OTHER TWO WOULD REST/SLEEP.

25. Were any unserviceable or Grade 3 rounds identified at Red Beach? (describe findings)

PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT THERE WERE 2-3 FUZES THAT WERE GRADE 3.

AFTER THE THE INCIDENT OCCURED AND THE CHECK FIRE WAS CALLED WE IDENTIFIED FIVE GRADE 3 SHELLS AND FIVE GRADE 3 FUZES DUE TO THEM BEING PUNCHED OUT OF THE TUBE DEEMING THEM UNSERVICABLE.

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	BATTERY AMMO CHIEF
Rank	Last Name, First Name, MI.	Billet / Gun # / Section

26. Who is responsible for inspecting and certifying ordnance is not Grade 3 prior to issue to the gun line?

I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR INSPECTING THE AMMO BUT ONLY A MARINE FROM THE ASP THAT HAS COMPLETED THE SENTENCING COURSE IS CERTIFIED TO GRADE AMMO AS GRADE 3.

27. What is the inspection process for Grade 3 ammunition in your unit?

MYSELF AND BG (b) (3) (A) WILL TAKE A LOOK AT IT AND LOOK FOR DENTS, SCRATCHES OR ANY IRREGULAR MARKINGS. IF IT IS PUNCHED OUT FROM THE TUBE IT IS MARKED AS GRADE 3 DUE TO IT BEING IN INSIDE THE TUBE WITHOUT BEING FIRED.

28. Were all inspections completed before the ammunition was distributed to each section?

ALL INSPECTIONS AND PROPER STEPS WERE COMPLETED BEFORE HANDING OUT TO EACH SECTION. THE LOT NUMBERS MATCHED OUR PAPERWORK, THERE WERE NO DENTS OR SCRATCHES ON THE AMMUNITION AND THERE WAS NO LOOSE AMMUNITION.

29. Any additional comments related to the exercise/event?

AFTER THE INCIDENT OCCURED AND THE INVESTIGATORS FINISHED THEIR SIDE OF THINGS THE AMMO VIC WAS PUSHED BACK TO THE GUNLINE WHERE WE PICKED UP ALL THE AMMO ON THE DECK AND PROPERLY SECURED IT. THAT SAME NIGHT OCTOBER 18TH, AROUND 2030 WE PUSHED BACK TO THE ASP WHERE WE PRE STAGED THE AMMO FOR A TURN IN ON OCTOBER 20TH. THE AMMO WAS STAGED INSIDE A DESIGNATED PARKING LOT BEHIND A BARBED WIRE FENCE WITH A 24/7 ARMED GUARD. WE COMMENCED THE TURN IN THE OCTOBER 20TH AND FINISHED IT THE 21ST, BETWEEN THOSE DAYS IS WHEN THE ASP VERIFIES THE AMMO AND DEEMS AMMO AS GRADE 3 OR SERVICABLE. MYSELF AND (b) (3) (A) REMAIN ON SITE DURING WORKING HOURS WHILE THE ASP DOES THEIR JOB. ONCE THE TURN IN WAS COMPLETE WE HAND OVER THE PAPERWORK TO (b) (3) (A), 3/5 AMMO CHIEF, WHERE THEN HE TAKES IT BACK TO THE BATTALION AND GETS IT SIGNED BY THE A AND E OFFICER WHO REVIEWS AND VERIFIES IT.

30. Do you have any photos/videos from the exercise/event? (Describe content)

NO, THE AMMO VIC WAS PUSHED TO ROAD GUARD 1 SO WE DID NOT HAVE A VIEW OF THE EVENT.

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	Ammo tech
Rank	Last Name, First Name, MI.	Billet / Gun # / Section

1. **Describe your role and primary responsibilities during the exercise.**

handling and supplying the battery with ammo for the shoot

2. **Who was assigned to your gun crew on the day of the event?**

n/a

3. **Did you observe any visitors or non-crew personnel on or near your gun? (list names and reason for presence)**

i don't remember

4. **Who are the members of your Cannon Ammunition Team?**

n/a

5. **Which Marines handled fuzes on your gun? (list names and duties)**

n/a

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	Ammo tech
Rank	Last Name, First Name, MI.	Billet / Gun # / Section

6. **Who determines or confirms that a round is Grade 3 ammunition on your gun? (name and billet)**

The ammo chief (b) (3) (A)

7. **Describe any differences in procedures from a normal battery shoot. (what changed and why)**

it was the same as a regular shoot

8. **Are you aware of any Marines having issues with your section that weren't focused on the task at hand?**

i did not

9. **What time on 15 Oct was the ammunition drawn from the ASP?**

07-15

10. **Who signed for the ammunition at the ASP? (name, billet, unit)**

(b) (3) (A) battalion ammo chief 3/5

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A) [redacted]	Ammo tech
Rank	Last Name, First Name, MI.	Billet / Gun # / Section

11. Did you inspect the ammunition before accepting it? (visual check, lot numbers, condition)

yes everything was good

12. Was the ammunition crated, palletized, or loose? (describe packaging and markings)

the fuzes where crated and the rounds where on skids

13. Do you have documentation for acceptance?

no i do not

14. Were there any discrepancies or damaged rounds noted at the time of draw? (describe)

no

15. What time was the ammunition transported from the ASP to Training Area Red Beach?

1700-1800 on the same day as the ammo pull

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	Ammo tech
Rank	Last Name, First Name, MI.	Billet / Gun # / Section

16. What type of vehicle(s) were used for transport (7-ton, stakebed, MTVR, etc.)?

1 7-ton with a trailer

17. Who authorized and supervised the convoy movement?

i don't remember

18. Was the ammunition under armed guard during movement? (if yes, list security personnel)

no we did not get security rounds

19. Were any stops made en route to Red Beach? (if yes, where and why)

no we went to Red beach

20. Was the transfer route pre-cleared by Range Control or PMO?

i dont know the answer

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	Ammo tech
Rank	Last Name, First Name, MI.	Billet / Gun # / Section

21. To V35 Ammo: From whom did you receive the ammunition at the Camp Pendleton ASP? (name, billet, unit)

22. To E 2/11 Ammo Tech: From whom did you receive ammunition at Red Beach? (name, billet, time of transfer)

we where at the asp with the ammo

23. To ATC (by gun): Who did you inspect ammunition with after receiving it from the Battery Ammo Tech? (name, billet, time)

24. How was the ammunition staged, secured, and accounted for upon arrival?

we where at the pos the day before the rest of the battry they came the next day and xo counted for the ammo

25. Were any unserviceable or Grade 3 rounds identified at Red Beach? (describe findings)

4-5 rounds and fuzes that where taken out of the guns after the shoot

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)	Ammo tech
Rank	Last Name, First Name, MI.	Billet / Gun # / Section

26. Who is responsible for inspecting and certifying ordnance is not Grade 3 prior to issue to the gun line?

the ammo techs

27. What is the inspection process for Grade 3 ammunition in your unit?

check for cracks and rust on the ammunition and if the fuzes have been set

28. Were all inspections completed before the ammunition was distributed to each section?

we inspect the ammo before passing it off to the gun line

29. Any additional comments related to the exercise/event?

no

30. Do you have any photos/videos from the exercise/event? (Describe content)

no

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A) 20251117

From: (b) (3) (A)
To: Nakonieczny BGen Michael R
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: INFO: (SA ONLY) ARTY SDZ ISO
Date: Thursday, October 16, 2025 1:30:47 PM
Attachments: Red Beach NMC 250 I MEF 17 - 18 October 2025 No I-5 Closure.pdf

---

General,

BL: I GAVE VOCO APPROVAL FOR ARTY OVERHEAD FIRE OF I-5 ISO 250th ADEX

Attached: ARTY SDZ and RCO Special Brief for reference

BACKGROUND

1. Alternate Arty firing position eliminates I-5 being within the Area E enabling arty to fire without the I-5 CLosure
2. FECC SME's have reviewed as well as subordinate fires centers have reviewed attached SDZ
3. AT CPEN overhead fire of Basilone road is a regular occurrence
4. Most likely impact assessed that passing vehicles on I-5 may experience some form of vibration as the battery fires
5. Information provided for your awareness

Please let me know if you have any questions

R/S,
(b) (3)
(b) (3)
(b) (3)

From: (b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: ACTION: Recommend Approval of Overhead Fire
Date: Thursday, October 16, 2025 11:38:37 AM

(b) (3) (A),

No questions. Appreciate the work the TEAM executed in a short time to review and provide SME recommended approval.

Keep Attacking!

S/F,
(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Thursday, October 16, 2025 11:24 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: ACTION: Recommend Approval of Overhead Fire

(b) (3) (A)
Multiple fires professionals of the FECC and subordinate fires centers have reviewed the attached SDZ. Area ECHO is clear of I-5 based on the new firing position.
I recommend approval of overhead fire.
A couple other notes:

- At CPEN, overhead fire of Basilone is a regular occurrence
- At CLNC, overhead fire of US 17 from Sandy Run Training Area is also a regular occurrence
- Passing vehicles MAY experience some form of vibration from the blast of outgoing fire

Standing by for any questions you may have.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

I Marine Expeditionary Force

MOC Office: 760-(b) (3) (A)

MIOC Office: 760(b) (3) (A)

NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)

TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

FRAGO: FRAGO 2 - ISO NMC250 CAMPAIGN//

Originator: CG I MEF G THREE

TOR: 10/16/2025 00:45:18

DTG: 160006Z Oct 25

Prec: Routine

DAC: General

To: COMMARFORPAC G THREE, CG MCIWEST MCB CAMPEN, CG FIRST MARDIV G THREE, CG THIRD MAW G THREE, CG SECOND MAW G THREE, CG FIRST MLG G THREE, CG FIRST MLG, I MEF INFO GRP, ELEVENTH MEU, THIRTEENTH MEU, FIRST RECONBN, FIRST LARBN, THREE AABN, CG I MEF G EIGHT, CG I MEF G FIVE, CG I MEF G FOUR, CG I MEF G ONE, CG I MEF G SEVEN, CG I MEF G SIX, CG I MEF G THREE, CG I MEF G TWO

CC: CMC CMC WASHINGTON DC, CMC DMCS WASHINGTON DC, CMC PPO POC WASHINGTON DC, CMC CD WASHINGTON DC, CMC AVN ASCO WASHINGTON DC, COMMARFORPAC CMD OPS CNTR, CG II MEF G THREE, VMX ONE

Attachments: LOE 3 Troop Rally Beach Bash placemat version 15 Oct.pdf

RAAUZATZ RUJDAAA4324 2890045-UUUU--RHZATZA.
ZNR UUUUU ZDH
R 160006Z OCT 25
FM CG I MEF G THREE
TO COMMARFORPAC G THREE
CG MCIWEST MCB CAMPEN
CG FIRST MARDIV G THREE
CG THIRD MAW G THREE
CG SECOND MAW G THREE
CG FIRST MLG G THREE
CG FIRST MLG
I MEF INFO GRP
ELEVENTH MEU
THIRTEENTH MEU
FIRST RECONBN
FIRST LARBN
THREE AABN
CG I MEF G EIGHT
CG I MEF G FIVE
CG I MEF G FOUR
CG I MEF G ONE
CG I MEF G SEVEN
CG I MEF G SIX
CG I MEF G THREE
CG I MEF G TWO
ZEN/COMEXSTRIKGRU THREE
ZEN/COMNAVREG SW SAN DIEGO CA
ZEN/COMTHIRDFLT
INFO CMC CMC WASHINGTON DC
CMC DMCS WASHINGTON DC
CMC PPO POC WASHINGTON DC
CMC CD WASHINGTON DC
CMC AVN ASCO WASHINGTON DC
COMMARFORPAC CMD OPS CNTR
CG II MEF G THREE
VMX ONE
ZEN/HQ MARSOC M3 FPSCO CAMP LEJEUNE NC
ZEN/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI
BT
UNCLAS CUI
SUBJ/FRAGO: FRAGO 2 - ISO NMC250 CAMPAIGN//
REF A/MSG/PPO/051908Z JUN 24//
REF B/MSG/CMC CD/261538Z AUG 24//

REF C/MSG/COMPACFLT/160441 AUG 25//
REF D/EMAIL/I MEF/08 AUG 25//
REF E/EMAIL/I MEF/ 08 AUG 25//
REF F/CD/10 AUG 2025//
REF G/MSG/CMC CD/181757Z AUG 25//
REF H/MSG/MARFORPAC/222213Z AUG 25//
REF I/EMAIL/I MEF/03 SEP 25//
REF J/MSG/I MEF/090105Z SEP 25//
REF K/MSG/MARFORPAC/121718Z SEP 25//
REF L/MSG/I MEF/162265Z SEP 25//
REF M/MSG/MARFORPAC/200008Z SEP 25//
REF N/MSG/I MEF/230018Z SEP 25//
REF O/MSG/MARFORPAC/230114Z SEP 25//
REF P/LTR/OSD01559-25/24 SEP 25//
REF Q/MSG/MFP/250145Z SEP 25//
REF R/MSG/PPO/252105Z SEP 25//
REF S/EMAIL/11TH MEU/26 SEP 25//
REF T/PPT/I MEF/29 SEP 25//
REF U/MSG/I MEF/ 30 SEP 25//
REF V/MSG/C3F/ 03 OCT 25//
REF W/LTR/SECWAR/03 OCT 25//
REF X/MSG/I MEF/7 OCT 25//
REF Y/MSG/I MEF/9 OCT 25//
REF Z/MSG/I MEF/14 OCT 25//

RMKS/REF A IS MOD 1 - PP&O PLANNING ORDER (PLANORD) ISO MARINE CORPS 250 CAMPAIGN. REF B IS FOS FEASIBILITY OF SUPPORT FOR 250TH USMC BIRTHDAY/COMMEMORATION CAMPAIGN. REF C IS COMPACFLT NAVY'S 250TH BIRTHDAY PLANORD FOR WEST COAST EVENTS. REF D IS I MEF SUPPORT TO NAVY AND MARINE CORPS BIRTHDAY 250TH BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION. REF E IS DRAFT NARRATIVE FOR AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION. REF F IS COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTORATE INFORMATION PAPER-MARINES 250TH BIRTHDAY CAMPAIGN PLAN (WITH VVIP EVENTS). REF G IS MOD 6 - UPDATED FOS FOR 250TH USMC BIRTHDAY COMMEMORATION CAMPAIGN ISO WHITE HOUSE PRODUCTION TEAM FILMING AND CONTENT REQUEST. REF H IS MARFORPAC TASKORD ISO NAVY-MARINE CORPS 250 CAMPAIGN (NMC250). REF I IS I MEF POSITION PAPER/FOS ISO NMC 250. REF J IS I MEF PLANORD ISO THE NMC250 CAMPAIGN. REF K IS MARFORPAC NAVY-MARINE CORPS CAMPAIGN TASKING ORDER (NMC250 TASKORD). REF L IS MOD 1 TO I MEF PLANORD ISO NMC 250 CAMPAIGN. REF M IS MARFORPAC REQUEST FOR SUPPORT NAVY-MARINE CORPS 250 CAMPAIGN. REF N IS I MEF IS MOD 2 TO I MEF PLANORD ISO NMC 250 CAMPAIGN. REF O IS MARFORPAC REQUEST FOR SUPPORT NAVY-MARINE CORPS 250 CAMPAIGN. REF P IS UNITED STATES NAVY AND MARINE CORPS 250TH BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION 27 SEPT-9 NOV. REF Q IS MARFORPAC MOD 1 RFS NAVY-MARINE CORPS 250 CAMPAIGN. REF R IS PPO NAVY-MARINE CORPS 250 CAMPAIGN TASKING ORDER (NMC250 TASKORD). REF S IS 11TH MEU WARNO FOR NAVY-MARINE CORPS 250. REF T IS COMREL AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS (DRAFT) V2.2. REF U IS MOD 3 TO I MEF PLANORD ISO NMC 250 CAMPAIGN. REF V IS C3F FRAGO FOR NMC 250 EVENT 4. REF W IS DON 250 COMMEMORATIONS DURING LAPSE IN APPROPRIATED FUNDS. REF X IS MOD 4 TO I MEF PLANORD ISO NMC 250 CAMPAIGN. REF Y IS EXORD FOR I MEF SUPPORT OF NAVY-MARINE CORPS 250 CAMPAIGN EVENT #4. REF Z IS FRAGO-1 TO I MEF EXORD ISO NMC 250 CAMPAIGN.//

NARR/(U) IN ACCORDANCE WITH (IAW) REF C, THIS FRAGMENTARY ORDER (FRAGO)
DIRECTS I MEF MSC/E TO SUPPORT THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS 250TH BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION.//

1. (U) SITUATION. NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).

2. (U) MISSION. NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).

3. (U) EXECUTION
3.A. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).

3.B. (U) PLANNING FACTS. NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).
3.B.1. (U) FACTS: 18 OCT AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION ABOARD MCB CAMP PENDLETON HAS BEEN CONFIRMED.
3.B.2. (U) THE NMC 250TH AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION IS I MEF CG'S #1 NON-GFM PRIORITY.

3.C. (U) PLANNING ASSUMPTION. NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).

3.D. (U) AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION, TROOP RALLY, AND BEACH BASH PHASING.
3.D.1. (U) PHASE I: PLANNING. NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).
3.D.2. (U) PHASE II: SHAPING. NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).
3.D.3. (U) PHASE III: EXECUTION. NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).
3.D.4. (U) PHASE IV: TRANSITION. NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).

3.E. (U) TASKS
3.E.1. (U) TASKS COMMON TO ALL:
3.E.1.A. (U) AT THE DISCRETION OF MSC/E COMMANDERS ALL CAMP PENDLETON MARINES NOT PARTICIPATING IN OR SUPPORTING NMC 250 ARE ENCOURAGED TO BE GRANTED LIBERTY ON FRIDAY 17 OCT.
3.E.1.B. (U) EFFECTIVE 2359 15 OCT, POVS ARE PROHIBITED FROM ENTERING THE RED BEACH TRAINING AREA FOR ALL UNIFORMED MEMBERS. GOVERNMENT VEHICLES WILL STILL BE ALLOWED BUT ARE REQUESTED TO BE AT THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL LEVEL. NON-MILITARY MEMBER GOVERNMENT RENTALS WILL BE REDUCED TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE.
3.E.1.C. (U) SERVICE MEMBERS NEEDING TO TRAVEL VIA POV WILL PARK AT AFA-15, INSIDE THE LAS PULGAS GATE, AND IN THE GRAVEL AREA BEHIND THE LARGE SIGN THAT READS "EXCON PARKING." FROM THERE THEY WILL TAKE THE PROVIDED VAN SHUTTLES TO THE TRAINING AREA.
3.E.1.D. (U) EFFECTIVE 0001 16 OCT, ANY POVS PARKED UNDERNEATH I-5, OR ON ANY ON/OFF RAMP WILL BE TICKETED AND TOWED. VEHICLES PARKED THERE ON 15 OCTOBER RECEIVED A WARNING. THERE WILL BE NO FUTURE WARNINGS.
3.E.1.E. (U) 16 OCTOBER WILL BE THE REHEARSAL DAY FOR EXCON. ALL MEMBERS ASSIGNED TO EXCON WILL BE SEATED IN THE EXCON TENT, MANNING THE AMC VEHICLE, OR OTHER APPROPRIATE LOCATION NLT 0800. THE INTENT IT IS TO REHEARSE FULL EXCON ACTIONS PRIOR TO THE FIRST FULL LIVE REHEARSAL, AND TO ALLOW THE FOCUS OF THE LIVE REHEARSAL

TO BE ON THE EVENT EXECUTION, NOT THE INTERNAL WORKINGS OF EXCON.
3.E.1.F. (U) THE UNIFORM FOR MARINES SUPPORTING THE AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION IS WOODLAND MCCUU WITH SLEEVES DOWN. APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVIATIONS (CVC SUITS, FROG, FLIGHT SUITS) ARE AUTHORIZED.
3.E.1.G. (U) THE UNIFORM FOR MARINES AND SAILORS SUPPORTING THE TROOP RALLY AND BEACH BASH AS PART OF THE REQUIREMENT TASKED TO MSC/ES IS WOOLDAND MCCUU WITH SLEEVES UP OR SERVICE EQUIVALENT. EIGHT POINT COVERS, NO BOONIE COVERS. UNIFORMED PERSONNEL TO BE SEATED NLT 1200 AT DEL MAR BEACH FOR THE 18 OCTOBER FOR TROOP RALLY.

3.F. (U) I MEF
3.F.1.A. (U) I MEF G-1 - NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).
3.F.1.B. (U) I MEF G-3 - NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).
3.F.1.C. (U) I MEF G-6 - NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).
3.F.1.D. (U) I MEF G-4 - NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).
3.F.1.E. (U) I MEF G-8 - NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).

3.F.2. (U) 1ST MARINE DIVISION . NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).

3.F.3. (U) 3D MAW . NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).

3.F.4. (U) 1ST MLG . NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).

3.F.5. (U) 11TH MEU. NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).

3.F.6. (U) 13TH MEU. NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).

3.F.7. (U) I MIG.
3.F.7.A. (U) NLT 2359, 15 OCT, ERECT A VIP TENT BETWEEN THE VIEWING STAND AND THE MOST WESTERN EDGE OF RED BEACH COMBAT TOWN. THIS IS TO PROVIDE A "COLD AREA" FOR VIP MEETING / ENGAGEMENT FROM THE TIME OF ARRIVAL TO THE TIME STEPPING UP TO THE STAND. THIS NEEDS TO BE APPROXIMATELY 10' X 20' AND (4) TABLES AND (8) CHAIRS. IT NEEDS TO BE INSTALLED PARALLEL TO THE EASTERN MOST TELEPHONE POLE THAT IS LAYING ON THE GROUND, ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF IT (LONG SIDE PARALLEL TO THE POLE). THERE NEEDS TO BE ROOM FOR THE VEHICLE CONVOY TO BE ABLE TO TRAVERSE THE ROAD, MAKE THE CORNER AROUND THE WESTERN MOST BUILDING, AND THEN TO CONTINUE SOUTH TO DEPART. THERE NEEDS TO BE ABOUT A 2' SPACE BETWEEN THE SIDE OF THE TENT AND THE DOWNED TELEPHONE POLE THAT WILL BE USED AS A "PRESS CHUTE" TO ALLOW IDENTIFIED MEDIA / CAMERA OPERATORS TO MAKE MOVEMENT TO THE STAND (CONSIDER HOW TO ENSURE THE TENT LINES/ROPES CAN BE RIGGED TO ENSURE THAT REMAINS A CLEAR PATH. NO NEED FOR HVAC. BPT INSTALL LIGHTING. BPT MOVE/ADJUST THE TENT ONCE ERECTED. WE WILL GET FINAL APPROVAL FROM THE VIP TEAM ON LOCATION.
3.F.7.B. (U) NLT 2359 16 OCT, INSTALL CAMMIE NETTING FOR "VIP TRAILER" AND GENERATOR TO ARRIVE AT RED BEACH COMBAT TOWN ON 16 OCT.

THE VIP TEAM WILL BE PROVIDING A VIP TRAILER AND GENERATOR OF UNCONFIRMED SIZE BUT BELIEVED TO BE NO LARGER THAN THE SMALLEST STRUCTURE IN COMBAT TOWN. THE GENERATOR IS EXPECTED TO BE MUCH SMALLER THAN THE ONES AT THE EXCON TENT.
3.F.7.C. (U) NLT 2359 17 OCT, PROVIDE "SUPPORT TENT" IVO THE EXCON TENT. AS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED, THIS TENT, CURRENTLY OCCUPIED BY MSB MARINES IN SUPPORT OF THE ENDURING MISSION IS JUST NORTH OF THE EXCON TENT. THIS TENT WILL REMAIN FOR THE DURATION OF THE EVOLUTION. IT NEEDS TO BE EMPTIED AND CLEANED NLT 0700 ON SATURDAY, 18 OCT. IT WILL BE USED BY THE VIP TEAM AS A HOLDING AREA FOR ANYONE THEY NEED TO PLACE IN THERE. NEEDS TO HAVE (4) TABLES AND APPROXIMATELY (20) CHAIRS
3.F.7.D. (U) NLT 2359 16 OCT PROVIDE ELECTRICAL SUPPORT FOR "VIP

COMMUNICATIONS TRAILER" IVO EXCON TENT.

4.A. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).
4.B. (U) SHORTFALLS-NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).

5. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. NO CHANGE FROM REF (Z).

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL
5.A. (U) COMMAND. DIRLAUTH IS AUTHORIZED. KEEP THIS HEADQUARTERS INFORMED.

5.A.1. (U) KEY TOUCHPOINTS AND MILESTONES
5.A.1.H. 15 OCT: ADEX SURFACE REHEARSALS
5.A.1.I. 16 OCT: 11TH MEU REHEARSAL WITH ACVS
5.A.1.J. 17 OCT: ADEX FULL REHEARSAL
5.A.1.K. 18 OCT: AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION EXERCISE

5.B. (U) SIGNAL
5.B.1. (U) PLANNING PRODUCTS ARE LOCATED ON TEAMS AT I MEF, G-35, NMC 250TH.
5.B.2. (U) NMC 250TH POC ROSTER WILL BE USED FOR DISTRO OF WEEKLY UPDATES.
5.B.3. (U) RFI TRACKER IS LOCATED ON TEAMS PAGE.
BT
#4324

NNNN
Received from AUTODIN 160045Z Oct 25

From: (b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: ACTION: Artillery Incident Command Investigation
Date: Thursday, November 6, 2025 2:21:41 PM
Attachments: image001.png
FW 22 October Update Camp Pendleton Early Burst Malfunction (8.82 MB).msg
RE RCO Special Brief Red Beach Artillery Live Fire NMC 250 I MEF 17 - 1... (1.23 MB).msg
250 Layout.pdf
(b) (3) (A) Card.jpg
Ammo Documents.pdf

Good Afternoon Gentlemen,

Follow up items below and/or attached. Please let me know if I am missing something or if there are any questions.

-I arrived at the firing position mid-morning, 1000ish on the 16th. The rest of the battery arrived ~1430.
-Ammo documents attached.
-(b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) laid and safed the circles.
-Secret Service agent card attached.
-EDL attached.
-Sketch of battery position attached.
-I am not aware of a DD250.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
Battery Commander, Eazy Battery
Battalion Landing Team 3/5
11th MEU
Cell: (b) (3) (A)
Gov: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, November 3, 2025 4:40 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: ACTION: Artillery Incident Command Investigation

Great, we'll meet you there. Invitation updated.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: 760-725-(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office: 760-725-(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, November 3, 2025 3:17 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: Re: ACTION: Artillery Incident Command Investigation

Sir,

We can support in 43 area sir. 2/11 CP second deck conf room. If necessary, I can send a map chip of the location Wednesday afternoon.

(b) (3) (A)

Get Outlook for iOS

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >
Sent: Monday, November 3, 2025 1:45 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) >
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: ACTION: Artillery Incident Command Investigation

Where would be best for you to meet on the 6th? If possible, your location is preferred.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, November 3, 2025 12:08 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: Re: ACTION: Artillery Incident Command Investigation

Good afternoon sir,

6 Nov would be ideal for me to link up with you and (b) (3) (A). We are in the field until 5 Nov. We will start the location sketch via manual (chart) and digital (likely imagery) for options.

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

Get Outlook for iOS

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, November 3, 2025 10:52 AM

To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: ACTION: Artillery Incident Command Investigation

Good Day (b) (3) (A),

I am the Investigating Officer for the I MEF CI into the Artillery Incident on 18 Oct. There is no suspicion of wrongdoing. This is currently an administrative investigation. (b) (3) (A) and I need to speak with you either Wednesday or Thursday (5 or 6 Nov) this week to begin the process of gaining statements per the CG's direction (see attached para 3.d) from your battery and anyone else who was involved in the delivery, preparation, and ultimately firing of ammunition involved in the incident.

Further, we will begin what will be an ongoing discussion with you as to events leading up to that event and perspectives on causal factors. I will make it clear when discussions will be 'for the record' and likely will just memorialize it via separate email that makes it clear both to you and us what we're asking and its inclusion in the record.

In the meantime, we would find it particularly helpful if the battery prepared a sketch of the firing position. This will need to include such details as:

- Doctrinal and actual locations of each member of the battery. Pay particular attention to the location and identification of non-doctrinal position (additional Officer and SNCO inspectors/safety observers)
- Ammunition truck
- Ammunition pit
- Location of any grade 3 ammunition
- This sketch needs to be as clear and uncluttered as possible.

After verification, this will be admitted as an enclosure/reference to the investigation.
I look forward to meeting you. Please advise as to your availability Wednesday or Thursday and I will send you a meeting invitation with coordinating instructions.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5
11TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FMF
BOX 555361
CAMP PENDLETON CA 92055-5361

1000
(b) (3) (A)
22 Oct 25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: BATTERY E AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION PERSONNEL ROSTER

1. The Battery E, Battalion Landing Team 3/5 Marines and Sailors listed below were present at Training Area–Beach Red during the 250th Amphibious Demonstration artillery live fire event on 20251018.

RANK	NAME	EDIPI	PMOS	PMOS DESCRIPTION	BILLET	GUN #
(b) (3) (A)			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#2 CANNONEER	GUN #2
(b) (3) (A)			0802	PLATOON COMMANDER	POSITION RSO	
(b) (3) (A)			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	A-GUNNER	GUN #2
(b) (3) (A)			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	DRIVER	GUN #3
(b) (3) (A)			0811	AMMUNITION SPECIALIST	SECTION CHIEF	GUN #1
(b) (3) (A)			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	GUNNER	GUN #3
(b) (3) (A)			0811	FEILD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#4 CANNONEER	GUN #1
(b) (3) (A)			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#1 GUNNER	GUN #1
(b) (3) (A)			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#3 CANNONEER	GUN #2
(b) (3) (A)			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	RECORDER	GUN #1
(b) (3) (A)			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#3 CANNONEER	GUN #3
(b) (3) (A)			0811	AMMUNITION SPECIALIST	#4 CANONNEER	GUN #2
(b) (3) (A)			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	GUNNER	GUN #2
(b) (3) (A)			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	A-GUNNER	GUN #3
(b) (3) (A)			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#2 CANNONEER	GUN #3
(b) (3) (A)			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANONEER	#2 CANNONEER	GUN #1
(b) (3) (A)			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#1 CANNONEER	GUN #1
			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#4 CANNONEER	GUN #3
			0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#1 CANNONEER	GUN #3
			2131	ARTILLERY SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN	ARTILLERY MECHANIC	GUN #1
			0811	CANNONEER	# 3 CANNONEER	GUN #3

Enclosure (32)

(b) (3) (A)			
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	RECORDER	GUN #3
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	RECORDER	GUN #2
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#5 CANNONEER	GUN #3
0811	AMMUNITION SPECIALIST	#5 CANNONEER	GUN #1
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	ROAD GUARD	
0811	CANNONEER	SECTION CHIEF	GUN #3
0811	PLATOON SERGEANT	PLATOON SERGEANT	GUN #2
0802	FIELD ARTILLERY OFFICER (I)	PLATOON COMMANDER	GUN #6
0811	SECTION CHIEF	SECTION CHIEF	GUN #5
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	A/GUNNER & #1 CANNONEER	GUN #6
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	GUNNER	GUN #6
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#5 CANNONEER	GUN #5
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	RECORDER	GUN #5
2131	ARTILLERY SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN	ARTILLERY MECHANIC	GUN #5
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	GUNNER	GUN #4
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#5 CANNONEER	GUN #6
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#5 CANNONEER	GUN #5
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	A/GUNNER & #1 CANNONEER	GUN #5
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#2 CANNONEER	GUN #6
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#4 CANNONEER	GUN #4
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#4 CANNONEER	GUN #5
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	RECORDER	GUN #4
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	A/GUNNER & #1 CANNONEER	GUN #4
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANONEER	#4 CANNONEER	GUN #6
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	GUNNER	GUN #5
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	RECORDER	GUN #6
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#3 CANNONEER	GUN #6
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#2 CANNONEER	GUN #5
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#2 CANNONEER	GUN #4
0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	#3 CANNONEER	GUN #4
0811	SECTION CHIEF	SECTION CHIEF	GUN #6

(b) (3) (A)	0811	SECTION CHIEF	SECTION CHIEF	GUN #2
	0811	FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONEER	SECTION CHIEF	GUN #4
	0811	PLATOON SERGEANT	PLATOON SERGEANT	GUN #5
(b) (3) (A)	0802	EXECUTIVE OFFICER	POSITION COMMANDER	GUN # 3
	0802	FIELD ARTILLERY OFFICER	HQ PLT COMMANDER	GUN #1
(b) (3) (A)	8999	UNIT SENIOR ENLISTED LEADER	UNIT SENIOR ENLISTED LEADER	
	0802	PLATOON COMMANDER	FIRE DIRECTION OFFICER	
	0802	BATTERY COMMANDER	OIC OF FIRING	GUN #3
(b) (3) (A)	0621	TRANSMISSIONS SYSTEMS OPERATOR	RADIO OPERATOR	
	0621	TRANSMISSIONS SYSTEMS OPERATOR	ASSISTANT COMM CHIEF	
	0844	OPERATIONS ASSISTANT	AFATDS OPERATOR	
(b) (3) (A)	0847	SENSOR SUPPORT MARINE	SURVEY CHIEF	
	2311	AMMUNITION CHIEF	AMMO CHIEF	
	2311	AMMUNITION TECHNICIAN	AMMO TECH	
(b) (3) (A)	3531	MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR	MOTOR T OPERATOR	
	0869	BATTERY GYSGT	BATTERY GUNNERY SERGEANT	GUN #4
(b) (3) (A)	L03A	CORPSMAN	CORPSMAN	
	L03A	CORPSMAN	CORPSMAN	
	L03A	CORPSMAN	CORPSMAN	
(b) (3) (A)	0621	TRANSMISSIONS SYSTEM OPERATOR	RADIO OPERATOR	
	0844	FIELD ARTILLERY FIRE CNTL MARINE	RECORD OF FIRE OPERATOR	
(b) (3) (A)	0844	FIRE CONTROL MARINE	AFATDS OPERATOR	
	0844	FIELD ARTILLERY FIRE CNTL MARINE	ROAD GUARD	
	0847	SENSOR SUPPORT MARINE	SURVEY OPERATOR	
(b) (3) (A)	3521	AUTOMOTIVE MAINT TECHNICIAN	MOTOR T MECHANIC	
	3521	AUTOMOTIVE MAINT TECHNICIAN	MOTOR T MECHANIC	
	3531	MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR	MOTOR T OPERATOR	
(b) (3) (A)	3531	MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR	MOTOR T OPERATOR	
	3531	MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR	MOTOR T OPERATOR	
	0844	FIELD ARTILLERY FIRE CNTL MARINE	CHART OPERATOR	

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	3531	MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR	MOTOR T OPERATOR	
	0844	OPERATIONS ASSISTANT	ASSISTANT OPS CHIEF	
	3531	MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR	MOTOR TRANSPORT CHIEF	
	0629	ASSISTANT TRANSMISSIONS SYSTEMS CHIEF	COMM CHIEF	
	0848	FIELD ARTILLERY FIRE CNTL MARINE	BATTERY OPERATIONS CHIEF	
	0306	GUNNER	BLT GUNNER	
			RANGE CONTROL	
			SECRET SERVICE AGENT	

2. The point of contact for this matter is the Battery E Commander (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) by cell at (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) or by email at (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A).

(b) (3) (A)

Class V(W) Expenditure Report

From: (OIC/EOD)	Print Name:	Rank:	UIC:	Unit:
OIC	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	M11180	ECHO BATTERY, BLT 3/5

Phone Number: (b) (3) (A)

Ref: (a) MCO P4400.150 (b) MCO 3570.1 (c) DA Pamphlet 385-63

1. Per the references, the following Class V(W) expenditure report is completed:

Range/Training Area: Red Beach Date(s): Oct 17-18 2025

RECEIPT DOCUMENT NUMBER	DODIC	NOMENCLATURE	LOT NUMBER/ SERIALNUMBER (NOTE 1)	QTY RECEIVED (NOTE 1)	QTY EXPENDED	QTY TURNED IN (SERVICEABLE) (NOTES 2,3)	QTY TURNED IN (UNSERVICEABLE) (NOTES 2,3)
M20177527 6D001	D529	HE 155mm	IDP24H205-005	120	34	81	5
M20177527 6D002	DA13	HOTEL CHARGE	GDBIAC-031039	360	136	224	0
M20177527 6D003	NA15	ET TIME FUZE	BTF04M001-028	122	34	28	60
M20177527 6D004	N523	PRIMERS	LS-09A489-020	125	35	84	6
M20177527 6D005	A598	.50 CAL BLANK	LC-08C442-141	1100	0	1100	0

(b) (3) (A) NFE (b) (3) (A) 20251021

(If applicable) N/A (Number) unused propellant increments were burned on ranges per individual Training Standards, under the supervision of the

Position Commander: (If applicable) N/A N/A

(Print Name, Rank, Signature)

I certify the receipt/expenditure data listed above is accurate and the "Qty expended" as listed above was consumed on the range/training area as documented. That a range sweep/amnesty brief was conducted and all expended [illegible] was checked for dangerous/hazardous items.

OIC (Signature) (b) (3) (A) Date 21 OCT 2025

I certify that I have received the quantities of ammunition listed above and completed the turn-in documents (if applicable) for any unexpended Class V(W) per note 2 and returned the unexpended assets to an authorized storage activity.

Ammo Tech or Authorized Individual

(Print Name, Rank) (b) (3) (A)

Unit name 3/5

Phone number)

(Signature) (b) (3) (A) Date 20251021

NOTE 1: All serial numbers for serialized munitions are annotated on the issue/turn-in documents attached to this expenditure report with a copy of the expenditure message.

NOTE 2: Unexpended Class V(W) will be turned in using the same document number as the initial issue document using a suffix (Example M11000-8001-0001A).

NOTE 3: Serviceable Turn-in is ammunition with a condition code of A,B,C,N and Unserviceable Turn-in is ammunition with a condition code of E,F,G,H,J,K.

Retention: Expenditure reports are filed by fiscal year (FY) and retained for current year plus two FY's.

(A&E Audit and Verification Officer Only):

I certify that I have audited this expenditure report against all receipt and turn-in documentation (DD1348-1A's) and corrective action ☐ is ☐ is not required.

A&E Audit and Verification Officer (Rank/Print Name/Signature) Date

NAVMC 11381 (Rev. JUL-2015) (EF)
(Previous Editions will not be used)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Privacy sensitive when filled in

1 of 1 Pages

☐ Addendum Page Attached

Adobe LiveCycle Designer ES

Enclosure (33)

DD FORM 1348-1A, JUL 91 (EG) ISSUE RELEASE/RECEIPT DOCUMENT

PREVIOUS EDITION MAY BE USE

DI CODE	RI FROM	M&S	UNIT	ISS	QUANTITY	SER	SUPPLEMENTARY ADDRESS	SIG	FUND	DISTRIBUTION	PROJECT	PRI	REQD	DEL	DATE	ADV	RI	O/P	COND	MGT	UNIT PRICE DOLLARS	UNIT PRICE CTS	DOLLARS	CTS
D6A	EH00028																A							

2 SHIP FROM

3 SHIP TO
LAS PULGAS
ASP
MMCQ50

4 MARK FOR
TURN-IN

5 DOC DATE	6 NMFC	7 FRT RATE	8 TYPE CARGO	9 PS
5293				

10 QTY REC'D	11 UP	12 UNIT WEIGHT	13 UNIT CUBE	14 UFC	15 SL
28					

16 FREIGHT CLASSIFICATION NOMENCLATURE
NA15

17 ITEM NOMENCLATURE
M767A1ET FUZE

18 TY CONT	19 NO CONT	20 TOTAL WEIGHT	21 TOTAL CUBE

22 RECEIVED BY

23 DATE RECEIVED

24 DOCUMENT NUMBER & SUFFIX (30-44)
MJ0177527D003

25 NATIONAL STOCK NO & ADD (8-22)
1390004742 62

26 RIC (4-6) UI (23-24) QTY (25-29) CON CODE (71) DIST (55-56) UP (74-80)
BTF04M001-028(28)

27 ADDITIONAL DATA

(b) (3) (A)

COPY

SEGS TM (b) (3) (A)

SEGS TL (b) (3) (A)

UNIT TECH INFORMATION

RANK/ NAME: (b) (3) (A)

UNIT: 315

(b) (3) (A)

SEGS DESK: (b) (3) (A)

LOCATION: PMAG12

STORAGE TL:

Enclosure (33)

FormFlow (DLA)



DD FORM 1348-1A, JUL 91 (EG) ISSUE RELEASE/RECEIPT DOCUMENT

D6A

FA00060

H

M20177527D003H

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

1390014742 62

BTF04M001-028(60)

DIC: ZF2220

COPY

LAS PULGAS
ASP
MMCQ50

TURN-IN

5293

60

NA15

M767A1ET FUZE

SEGS TM (b) (3) (A)

SEGS TL

UNIT TECH INFORMATION:

RANK/ NAME: (b) (3) (A)

UNIT: 3/5

CONTACT #: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

SIGN: (b) (3) (A)

SEGS DESK (b) (3) (A) LOCATION: PMAG12 STORAGE TL:

FormFlow (DLA)

Enclosure (33)

DD FORM, 1348-1A, MAR 95 ISSUE RELEASE / RECEIPT DOCUMENT

DOC IDENT	RIC FROM	M&S	UNIT ISS	QUANTITY	SUPPLEMENTARY ADDRESS	SIG	FUND	DISTRIBUTION	PROJECT	PRI	REQD DEL DATE	ADV	RI TO	O/P	CONT	MGT
D7A	MCQ	U	EA	00122	M20177	M	ML	H0T	YSS	13	288			A	A	

1. TOTAL PRICE	UNIT PRICE DOLLARS CTS	DOLLARS CTS	2. SHIP FROM	3. SHIP TO
	130.00	15860.00	MMCQ50	M20177

4. MARK FOR

24. DOCUMENT NUMBER (30-44)

(b) (3) (A)

25. NATIONAL STOCK NO (8-22)

26. RIC (4-6) UI(23-24) QTY(25-29) CON CODE(71) UP(74-80)

27. ADDITIONAL DATA

5. DOC DATE	6. NMFC	7. FRT RATE	8. TYPE CARGO	9. PS
5282	064300		1	7

10. QTY REC	11. UP	12. UNIT WT	13. UNIT CB	14. UFC	15. SL
00122	16	41.3	0	05950	

16. FREIGHT CLASSIFICATION NOMENCLATURE
UN 0409 FUZES, DETONATING

17. ITEM NOMENCLATURE NA15
FUZE, ARTILLERY, ELECTRONIC TIME M767A1

18. TY CONT	19. NO CONT	20. TOTAL WEIGHT	21. TOTAL CUBE
BX	8	330.4	1.76

22. RECEIVED BY (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) 23. DATE

24. ISSUED BY (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) 25. DATE

30. PACKED BY / DATE 31. DATE SHIPPED

32. INSPECTED BY 33. DATE

34. WAREHOUSE BY 35. DATE

36. WHSE LOC	37. CAA	38. NEW
PMAG12		8.13008

39. GBL / TCN 40. PROJECT YSS

42. FIRST DEST ADDRESS

43. SHIP TO ADDRESS
DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT OFFICE
7TH AND A ST. BLDG 2262, M/F M20177 11TH MEU
CE
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5004 US

40. REMARKS
RDD: 15 Oct 2025
NAR:
AIN 077-2004, 070-2017

Shipment is a United States Munitions List (USML) Item. Shipment is property of the U.S. Government. Title remains with U.S. Government. Ultimate end user is agency of U.S. Government (Dept. of Defense).
Not intended for introduction to commercial economy. Shipment is for the exclusive end use of U.S. Military Forces.

COMPLETE 2-D BARCODE

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

Enclosure (33)



Enclosure (33)

DD FORM 1348-1A, JUL 91 (EG) ISSUE RELEASE/RECEIPT DOCUMENT

PREVIOUS EDITION MAY BE USED

DOC DMD	RI FROM	M&S	UNIT	QUANTITY	SUPPLEMENTARY ADDRESS	SIG	FUND	DISTRIBUTION	PROJECT	PRI	REQD DEL DATE	ADV	RI	O/P	COND	MGT	UNIT PRICE DOLLARS	UNIT PRICE CTS	DOLLARS	CTS
D6A			EA	00005											H					

1 TOTAL PRICE

2 SHIP FROM

3 SHIP TO: LAS PULGAS ASP MMCQ50

4 MARK FOR: TURN-IN

24 DOCUMENT NUMBER & SUFFIX (30-44): M20177527 6D0011H (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)

5 DOC DATE: 5293 | 6 NMFC | 7 FRT RATE | 8 TYPE CARGO | 9 PS

10 QTY REC'D: 5 | 11 UP | 12 UNIT WEIGHT | 13 UNIT CUBE | 14 UFC | 15 SL

15 FREIGHT CLASSIFICATION NOMENCLATURE: D529

17 ITEM NOMENCLATURE: M795HE

25 NATIONAL STOCK NO & ADD (8-22): 1320014953842

18 TY CONT | 19 NO CONT | 20 TOTAL WEIGHT | 21 TOTAL CUBE

22 RECEIVED BY | 23 DATE RECEIVED

SEGS TM: (b) (3) (A)

SEGS TL:

26 RIC (4-6) UI (23-24) QTY (25-29) CON CODE (71) DIST (55-56) UP (74-80): 10P24H205-005 (5)

COPY

UNIT TECH INFORMATION

RANK/ NAME: (b) (3) (A)

UNIT: 315

CONTACT #: (b) (3) (A)

SIGN: (b) (3) (A)

27 ADDITIONAL DATA: D/C: 2P520X

SEGS DESK: (b) (3) (A) LOCATION PMAG12 STORAGE TL:

FormFlow (DLA)

Enclosure (33)

DD FORM 1348-1A, MAR 95 ISSUE RELEASE / RECEIPT DOCUMENT

D7A MCQ U EA 00120 M20177 M ML HOT YSS 13 288 A A

MMCQ50 M20177

423.50 50820.00

5282 064300 I 7

00120 8 0.0 0 06030 0.0

UN 0168 PROJECTILES

D529

PROJECTILE, 155 MILLIMETER, HIGH EXPLOSIVE (HE), M795 W/SUPPLEMENTARY CHARGE UNITIZED

BX 15 0.0 0

(b) (3) (A)

REMARKS

RDD: 15 Oct 2025
NAR:
AIN

WSSE DOC PMAC12 CAA NEW 2892.0

CBL / TCN PROJECT YSS

FIRST DEST ADDRESS

SHIP TO ADDRESS
DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT OFFICE
7TH AND A ST BLDG 2262 MF M20177 11TH MEU CE
CAMP PENDLETON CA 92055-5004 US

Shipment is a United States Munitions List (USML) Item. Shipment is property of the U.S. Government. Title remains with U.S. Government. Ultimate end user is agency of U.S. Government (Dept. of Defense).
Not intended for introduction to commercial economy. Shipment is for the exclusive end use of U.S. Military Forces.

COMPLETE D D BARCODE

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

COPY

Enclosure (33)



DD FORM 1348-1A, JUL 91 (EG) ISSUE RELEASE/RECEIPT DOCUMENT

D6A

EA-00084

A

TURN-IN

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

M20177527GD004

13900148I2024

LS-09A489-020 (84)

COPY

5 DOC DATE	6 NMFC	7 FRT RATE	8 TYPE CARGO	9 PS
8293				

10 QTY REC'D	11 UP	12 UNIT WEIGHT	13 UNIT CUBE	14 UFC	15 SI
84					

16 FREIGHT CLASSIFICATION NOMENCLATURE: N623

17 ITEM NOMENCLATURE: M82 Primer

18 TY CONT	19 NO CONT	20 TOTAL WEIGHT	21 TOTAL CUBE

22 RECEIVED BY

23 DATE RECEIVED

SEGS TM (b) (3) (A)

SEGS TL (b) (3) (A)

UNIT TECH INFORMATION

RANK/ NAME (b) (3) (A)

UNIT 3/5

CONTACT # (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

SIGN (b) (3) (A)

24 DOCUMENT NUMBER & SUFFIX (30-44)

25 NATIONAL STOCK NO & ADD (8-22)

26. RIC (4-6)
UI (23-24)
QTY (25-29)
CON CODE (71)
DIST (55-56)
UP (74-80)

27 ADDITIONAL DATA

SEGS DESK (b) (3) (A)

LOCATION PMAG12

STORAGE TL

Enclosure (33)

DD FORM 1348-1A, JUL 91 (EG) ISSUE RELEASE/RECEIPT DOCUMENT

PREVIOUS EDITION MAY BE USE

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

DI OD CE N | RI FROM | M & S | UI SS LT | QUANTITY | SER | SUPPLE-MENTARY ADDRESS | SIG | FUND | DIS-TRI-BU-TION | PRO-JECT | PRI | REQD DEL DATE | ADV | RI | O/P | COND | MGT

D6A

EA 00006

H

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

M20177527 6D004H

1390014812024

N523-unknown (6)

D/C : 2CC260

24 DOCUMENT NUMBER & SUFFIX (30-44)

25. NATIONAL STOCK NO & ADD (8-22)

26. RIC (4-6) UI (23-24) QTY (25-29) CON CODE (71) DIST (55-56) UP (74-80)

27 ADDITIONAL DATA

SEGS DESK: (b) (3) (A) LOCATION: PMAG12

UNIT PRICE DOLLARS CTS | DOLLARS | CTS

1. TOTAL PRICE

2. SHIP FROM

3. SHIP TO: LAS PULGAS ASP MMCQ50

4. MARK FOR: TURN-IN

5. DOC DATE	6. NMFC	7. FRT RATE	8. TYPE CARGO	9. PS
5293				

10. QTY REC'D	11. UP	12. UNIT WEIGHT	13. UNIT CUBE	14. UFC	15. SL
6					

16. FREIGHT CLASSIFICATION NOMENCLATURE: N523

17. ITEM NOMENCLATURE: M82 PRIMER

18. TY CONT	19. NO CONT	20. TOTAL WEIGHT	21. TOTAL CUBE

22. RECEIVED BY | 23. DATE RECEIVED

COPY

SEGS TM: (b) (3) (A)

SEGS TL: (b) (3) (A)

UNIT TECH INFORMATION:

RANK/ NAME: (b) (3) (A)

UNIT: 3/5

CONTACT #: (b) (3) (A)

SIGN: (b) (3) (A)

STORAGE TL:

FormFlow (DLA)

Enclosure (33)

DD FORM, 1348-1A, MAR 95 ISSUE RELEASE / RECEIPT DOCUMENT

DOC IDENT	RIC FROM	M & S	UNIT ISS	QUANTITY	SER	SUPPLEMENTARY ADDRESS	SIG	FUND	DISTRIBUTION	PROJECT	PRI	REQD DEL DATE	ADV	RI TO	C/F	CCND	MGT	1. TOTAL PRICE	2. SHIP FROM	3. SHIP TO
D7A	MCQ	U	EA	00125		M20177	M	ML	H0T	YSS	13	288			A	A		UNIT PRICE DOLLARS CTS 1.00	MMCQ50	M20177
																		DOLLARS CTS 125.00	4. MARK FOR	

24. DOCUMENT NUMBER (30-44)	5. DOC DATE	6. NMFC	7. FRT RATE	8. TYPE CARGO	9. PS
(b) (3) (A)	5282	064300		F	4

10. QTY REC	11. UP	12. UNIT WT	13. UNIT CB	14. UFC	15. SL
00125	200	33.73	0	00000	0.0

25. NATIONAL STOCK NO (8-22)

26. RIC (4-6)
UI(23-24)
QTY(25-29)
CON CODE(71)
UP(74-80)

27. ADDITIONAL DATA

16. FREIGHT CLASSIFICATION NOMENCLATURE
UN 0376 PRIMERS, TUBULAR

17. ITEM NOMENCLATURE N523
PRIMER, PERSCUSSION, M82

18. TY CONT	19. NO CONT	20. TOTAL WEIGHT	21. TOTAL CUBE
BX	1	33.73	0.85

22. RECEIVED BY (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) 23. DATE

28. (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) 29. DATE

30. PACKED BY / DATE 31. DATE SHIPPED

32. INSPECTED BY 33. DATE

34. WAREHOUSE BY 35. DATE

36. WHSE LOC	37. CAA	38. NEW
PMAG12		0.385

39. GBL / TCN 40. PROJECT YSS

40. REMARKS
RDD: 15 Oct 2025
NAR:
AIN

42. FIRST DEST ADDRESS

43. SHIP TO ADDRESS
DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT OFFICE
7TH AND A ST BLDG 2262, MF M20177 11TH MEU
CE
CAMP PENDLETON CA 92055-5004 US

Shipment is a United States Munitions List (USML) Item. Shipment is property of the U.S. Government. Title remains with U.S. Government. Ultimate end user is agency of U.S. Government (Dept. of Defense).
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COMPLETE 2-D BARCODE

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

Enclosure (33)

DD FORM 1348-1A, JUL 91 (EG) ISSUE RELEASE/RECEIPT DOCUMENT

DI ODCE	RI FROM	M&S	UI UNIT	QUANTITY	SER	SUPPLEMENTARY ADDRESS	SIG	FUND	DISTRIBUTION	PROJECT	PRI	REQD DEL DATE	ADV	RI	O/P	COND	MGT
D6A			EA	000224													

1 TOTAL PRICE | 2 SHIP FROM | 3 SHIP TO: LAS PULGAS ASP MMCQ50

UNIT PRICE DOLLARS CTS | DOLLARS | CTS

4 MARK FOR: TURN-IN

24 DOCUMENT NUMBER & SUFFIX (30-44): M2Ø1775276DØØ2

25 NATIONAL STOCK NO & ADD (8-22): 132ØØ15266523

26 RIC (4-6) UI (23-24) QTY (25-29) CON CODE (71) DIST (55-56) UP (74-80): GDB10C-031039 (224)

27 ADDITIONAL DATA: NAR: 0717-2013

5 DOC DATE	6 NMFC	7 FRT RATE	8 TYPE CARGO	9 PS
5293				

10 QTY RECD	11 UP	12 UNIT WEIGHT	13 UNIT CUBE	14 UFC	15 SI
224					

16 FREIGHT CLASSIFICATION NOMENCLATURE: DA13

17 ITEM NOMENCLATURE: M232A1 Chrg Prop

18 TY CONT	19 NO CONT	20 TOTAL WEIGHT	21 TOTAL CUBE

22 RECEIVED BY | 23 DATE RECEIVED

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

COPY

SEGS TM (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

SEGS TL (b) (3) (A)

UNIT TECH INFORMATION

RANK/ NAME (b) (3) (A)

UNIT 3/5

CONTACT # (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

SIGN (b) (3) (A)

SEGS DESK (b) (3) (A) LOCATION PMAG12 STORAGE TL

1

Enclosure (33)

FORM, 1348-1A, MAR 95 ISSUE RELEASE / RECEIPT DOCUMENT

DOC IDENT	RIC FROM	M & S	UNIT ISS	QUANTITY	SUFFIX-MEDIARY ADDRESS	E I C	F J N E	DISTRIBUTION CODE	PRIORITY	P I	REQUISITION DATE	A D V	RI TO	C / C N D	M G T	UNIT PRICE	TOTAL PRICE	5. SHIP FROM	6. SHIP TO
D7A	MCQ	U	EA	00360	M20177	M	ML	H0T	YSS	13	288			A	B	100.00	36000.00	MMCQ50	M20177

7. DOCUMENT NUMBER (FSC-DIC)

(b) (3) (A)

8. DOC DATE	9. NMFC	9. FRT RATE	9. TYPE CARGO	9. FS
5282	064300		J	7

10. QTY REC	11. UI	12. UNIT WT	13. UNIT CU	14. UFC	15. CU
00360	5	55.0	1	00000	

16. FREIGHT CLASSIFICATION NOMENCLATURE
UN 0242 CHARGES, PROPELLING, FOR CANNON

17. ITEM NOMENCLATURE DA13
CHARGE, PROPELLING, M232A1 WITH PROPELLANT, M32A2

18. TY CONT	19. NO CONT	20. TOTAL WEIGHT	21. TOTAL CUBE
BX	72	3960.0	88.56

22. RECEIVED BY (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) 23. DATE

24. ISSUED BY (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A) 25. DATE

26. RIC (4-6) UI(23-24) QTY(25-29) CON CODE(71) UF(74-80)

27. ADDITIONAL DATA

28. NATIONAL STOCK NO (1E-22)

30. PACKED BY / DATE 31. DATE SHIPPED

32. INSPECTED BY 33. DATE

34. WAREHOUSE BY 35. DATE

36. WHSE LOC	37. CAA	38. NEW
PMAG12		1860.7393

39. GBL / TCN 40. PROJECT YSS

42. FIRST DEST ADDRESS

43. SHIP TO ADDRESS
DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT OFFICE
7TH AND A ST BLDG 2282, M/F M20177 11TH MEU
CE
CAMP PENDLETON CA 92055-5004 US

40. REMARKS
RDD: 15 Oct 2025
NAR: 0717-2013
AIN 039-2008, 033-2009, 090-2010, 046-2013, 011-2014, 024-2016, 037-2021

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Not intended for introduction to commercial economy. Shipment is for the exclusive end use of U.S. Military Forces.

COMPLETE 2-D BARCODE

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

Enclosure (33)

Enclosure (34)

Key Leader Locations:

(b) (3) (A) (Guns PC): Gun 6
(b) (3) (A) (XO/OIC): Gun 3
(b) (3) (A) (HQ PC): Gun 1
(b) (3) (A) FDO): FDC
(b) (3) (A) : Gun 3
(b) (3) (A) (BG): Gun 4
(b) (3) (A) (Ops Chief): FDC
(b) (3) (A) (PSG): Gun 5
(b) (3) (A) (PSG): Gun 2
(b) (3) (A) RSO): FDC

-Propellant pit: Rear and to the left of each howitzer
-Projectile pit: Rear and to the right of each howitzer
-Location of any grade 3 ammunition: 1x Fuze on Guns 1, 3, and 4. Separated ammo can and marked.
-All MFEWs were not on.

Enclosure (35)

G6
G5
G4
G3
G2
G1
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
sure (36)

Echo Battery
Name, Rank, billet and unit. (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) **What is your artillery background?** -1/12 2013-2017 -2/11 (G and F Btry as Sect Chief and PltSgt -Recruiting duty -2/11 E Btry PltSgt Jun 2024
When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? -4 weeks prior **Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?** -No **When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025?** -0700 **What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun)** -16 Oct: He was the one who set up the positions. Did the measurements of the FPs. -Most of the day was setting it up, which took a long time because of the size of the box. -Dug spades in pretty much all the way. -BG and CO gave a little push back but ultimately agreed. -Knowing how much the gun kicks back with Charge 4 Hotel, they checked everything multiple times. -Position improvement Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?) -Guns did not pick up and re-emplace. -Was verified **Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?** -(b) (3) (A) and possibly (b) (3) (A) **List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled.** -767A1, 795 and charge 4 Hotel **On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times).** -Unsure but maybe a couple minutes **Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?** -Did not personally see any gray-screened LCD screens **How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)** -Visually inspected the fuze setting **Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.** -Saw it once when a Marine left it on past its shelf-life -Checked it with EPIAFS but did not shoot **How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors)**

-Around 8 different people checked

Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)
-Very common; happens all of the time

Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe)
-Located in between Gun 2 and Gun 3
-Gun 3 did not fire but Gun 2 did
-Did not notice any unusual sounds because it was so loud due to proximity of guns

Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently?
-17 Oct: punched tubes, wiped breaches, CLP, normal PMCS

Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct?
-Heard people talk about seeing birds but did not observe any himself

Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun?
-WHPO cameraman on Gun 1

Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe.
-Felt pressure to ensure 6 guns were employed. Not that it was not allowed/safe
-Proximity of the guns makes it difficult for Marines to do their individual jobs

Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain.
-No

How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
-Seen it during static shoots before but that was with a lesser charge

If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be?
-Would not change anything. Did everything perfectly.

Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot?
-No

This summary is a fair and accurate representation of the interview on 20251117 between IO Team and (b) (3) (A).

(b) (3) (A)

This transmission contains information that is protected from disclosure by the Privacy Act (5 USC 552a) and exemption (b) (6) of the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552, as amended). Ensure that this information is used solely for the requested purpose. Further duplication and/or distribution without prior authorization from this office is not authorized. Civil and/or criminal penalties can apply for improper use.

Echo Battery
What is your artillery background? (b) (3) (A) [redacted] -Joined E Btry Aug 2024 -Initially PltCmdr of 6 guns until Aug 2025 and then became 2 gun PltCmdr
What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun) -16 Oct: Plt given safety box for firing point. Plotted it on MilGPS and found each 10 digit grid for each gun and verified with DAGR. Very slow and deliberate. **Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?)** -No. **Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?** (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) (set up OS Station) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) set up the aiming circles **List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled.** -Charge 4 H, PD, HE **On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times).** -Does not remember **How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors)** -He was between Gun 5 and 6 -He and PltSgt verified time/fuze setting two times, BG verified with them one of those 2 times. -Verified at least an additional 2 times for 4 times total. **You added inspections with an SNCO and an Officer—who were they and what did they check?** -Never done a shoot with this many inspections. First time where he and the PltSgt checked it twice. **Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)** -First time he ever saw firing-linkage or lever failure. **Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe)** -No. Did not hear anything that was concerning. -Everyone on the gunline was wearing Peltors, this is usually not the standard **Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct?** -No **Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun?** -One civilian cameraman near Gun 6

-3/5 Gunner IVO rear of Gun 3 and Gun 4

Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe.
-No. Normally occupying and laying in the guns happens a lot faster, but the battery was very deliberate and took their time to ensure safety.

Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain.
-No

How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
-Never seen the guns that close.
-Knows that they are allowed to be close/nothing in the TM saying they cant be that close

If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be?
-Nothing

This summary is a fair and accurate representation of the interview on 20251117 between IO Team and (b) (3) (A).

(b) (3) (A)

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From: (b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: REQ: Support for I MEF Command Investigation
Date: Thursday, November 13, 2025 11:57:01 AM

Good morning sir,

Responses to questions in-line below in blue. Please let me know if anything further is needed.

Very respectfully,
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
Comm: 760-725-(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
SVOIP: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)
Cell / Signal: (b) (3) (A)
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
JWICS: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2025 3:56 PM
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: REQ: Support for I MEF Command Investigation

Good Day Gentlemen,

I am (b) (3) (A) and on behalf of the Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force, I am leading the Command Investigation into the early detonation of an artillery round on 18 Oct 25. This is an administrative investigation. The Commanding General has directed me to pursue answers to very specific questions for the record. Your answers to the following questions based on your known and valued experience as an artillery officer will be of much benefit to the Commanding General's

investigation.

- How many years have you been an artillery officer? 16 years (completed FABOLC in Fall of 2009).
- How much of that time has been with formations employing cannon artillery? Oct 2009 – Nov 2010 (Cannon Platoon FDO), Aug 2012 – May 2014 (Gunnery Instructor), Feb 2017 – Jun 2018 (Cannon Battery Commander), Nov 2022 – May 2023 (Cannon Battalion Operations Officer).
- How often have you seen or employed a battery of 6 guns in a firing position 50 meters wide or smaller? I have employed three, and possibly four, howitzers within 50 meters of each other. I have never seen more than four howitzers conducting live fire within 50 meters of each other.
- Regardless of battery composition, how often have you seen or employed M777s fired within 2 meters of each other? Were they fired simultaneously? I have never seen M777s fired within two meters of each other.
- Besides the tactical survivability concerns of dispersion, would you have any safety concerns with a battery employed in that small of a position? If so, please elaborate. The primary safety concern would relate to communication. With six howitzers within 50 meters of each other, it may become difficult for the section crew chiefs to clearly and unambiguously communicate with their respective sections without noise and commands from adjacent howitzers interfering. Secondary concerns would relate to displacement (e.g., howitzer positioning shifting during firing, which can be pronounced in soft or sandy terrain and at higher charges) and section crew exposure to adjacent howitzer muzzle blast pressure (again more pronounced at higher charges).

Thank you for your assistance with this investigation. Your response by Monday 17 November will be much appreciated. Please let me know if you have any questions.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: 760-725(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office: 760-725(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: REQ: Support for I MEF Command Investigation
Date: Wednesday, November 12, 2025 1:35:01 PM

Sir,

- How many years have you been an artillery officer?
  - 15.5 years, graduated from Ft. Sill April 2010.

- How much of that time has been with formations employing cannon artillery?
  - About 4 years total.

- How often have you seen or employed a battery of 6 guns in a firing position 50 meters wide or smaller?
  - Bluntly, never. It is rare to have 6 guns operational for training exercise. Camp Pendleton has some small AFAs and some restricted by terrain, so I have seen some configurations of a few guns stacked within 10-15 meters then other guns at a greater distance away. Or during an emergency fire mission, where control is needed, the howitzers will typically employ a tight formation (10-20 meters apart).

- Regardless of battery composition, how often have you seen or employed M777s fired within 2 meters of each other? Were they fired simultaneously?
  - I have not.

- Besides the tactical survivability concerns of dispersion, would you have any safety concerns with a battery employed in that small of a position? If so, please elaborate.
  - Yes, overpressure from other guns firing in proximity
  - Displacement of the physical howitzer as it gets settled into its position over the first several rounds fired
  - Safe operating space for the crews and storage of ammunition

v/r,

(b) (3) (A), USMC
(b) (3) (A)
Fires and Effects Coordination Center

I Marine Expeditionary Force
Camp Pendleton, CA
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2025 3:56 PM
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: REQ: Support for I MEF Command Investigation

Good Day Gentlemen,

I am (b) (3) (A) and on behalf of the Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force, I am leading the Command Investigation into the early detonation of an artillery round on 18 Oct 25. This is an administrative investigation. The Commanding General has directed me to pursue answers to very specific questions for the record. Your answers to the following questions based on your known and valued experience as an artillery officer will be of much benefit to the Commanding General's investigation.

- How many years have you been an artillery officer?
- How much of that time has been with formations employing cannon artillery?
- How often have you seen or employed a battery of 6 guns in a firing position 50 meters wide or smaller?
- Regardless of battery composition, how often have you seen or employed M777s fired within 2 meters of each other? Were they fired simultaneously?
- Besides the tactical survivability concerns of dispersion, would you have any safety concerns with a battery employed in that small of a position? If so, please elaborate.

Thank you for your assistance with this investigation. Your response by Monday 17 November will be much appreciated. Please let me know if you have any questions.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: 760-725-(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office: 760-725(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
SIPR:(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: REQ: Support for I MEF Command Investigation
Date: Wednesday, November 12, 2025 3:20:36 PM

Received, (b) (3) (A) Thank you.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: 760-725-(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office: 760-725-(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2025 1:01 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: REQ: Support for I MEF Command Investigation

Sir,

Answers below to your questions:

- How many years have you been an artillery officer? Almost 17 years.
- How much of that time has been with formations employing cannon artillery? For 12 of the 17 years, I have been a part of an artillery Battery/Battalion/or Regiment that employed cannon artillery.
- How often have you seen or employed a battery of 6 guns in a firing position 50 meters wide or smaller? Never
- Regardless of battery composition, how often have you seen or employed M777s

fired within 2 meters of each other? Were they fired simultaneously? I never saw this before.

- Besides the tactical survivability concerns of dispersion, would you have any safety concerns with a battery employed in that small of a position? If so, please elaborate. My concern would be the blast overpressure associated with the Marines on the gunline in close proximity to howitzers on their left and right during fire missions especially when firing higher chargers.

If you have any additional questions, please let me know.

S/F

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division
Office: (b) (3) (A)
Cell Work: (b) (3) (A)
Cell Personal: (b) (3) (A)
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2025 3:56 PM
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
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(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: REQ: Support for I MEF Command Investigation

Good Day Gentlemen,

I am (b) (3) (A) and on behalf of the Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force, I am leading the Command Investigation into the early detonation of an artillery round on 18 Oct 25. This is an administrative investigation. The Commanding General has directed me to pursue answers to very specific questions for the record. Your answers to the following questions based on your known and valued experience as an artillery officer will be of much benefit to the Commanding General's investigation.

- How many years have you been an artillery officer?
- How much of that time has been with formations employing cannon artillery?

- How often have you seen or employed a battery of 6 guns in a firing position 50 meters wide or smaller?
- Regardless of battery composition, how often have you seen or employed M777s fired within 2 meters of each other? Were they fired simultaneously?
- Besides the tactical survivability concerns of dispersion, would you have any safety concerns with a battery employed in that small of a position? If so, please elaborate.

Thank you for your assistance with this investigation. Your response by Monday 17 November will be much appreciated. Please let me know if you have any questions.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: 760-725(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office: 760-725(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: I MEF CI - response
Date: Tuesday, November 11, 2025 7:30:13 PM

(b) (3) (A)

I am departing tomorrow to take my daughter to a swim meet in Korea and want to get my responses in, so you aren't waiting on me to finish the CI.

My responses are below in red, but wanted to ask if you could give any additional insight into very specific language of the questions. I understand the rules of the CI and don't want to get sideways with the process, but the questions seem to address factors that are unrelated to a bad lot of PD fuzes (causation vs correlation).

- How many years have you been an artillery officer?
- 21 Years
- How much of that time has been with formations employing cannon artillery?
- 9 (if counting 2 years as 5/11(HIMARS) CO working alongside the cannon battalions during Regimental exercises)
- How often have you seen or employed a battery of 6 guns in a firing position 50 meters wide or smaller?
- During my time as the TBS Artillery Instructor Battery CO, we conducted live fire artillery training using M198 and M777 howitzers in a position approx. 50m wide. However, we only employed 3-4 howitzers in that firing position, not a full battery of 6. Howitzer spacing was staggered (lazy W), to account for the limited space of the gun position.
- Regardless of battery composition, how often have you seen or employed M777s fired within 2 meters of each other? Were they fired simultaneously?
- Never.
- Besides the tactical survivability concerns of dispersion, would you have any safety concerns with a battery employed in that small of a position? If so, please elaborate.
- Outside of survivability and dispersion, suitable terrain for the positioning and employment of the M777 howitzer is a key consideration. Suitable terrain considers the space required to position/maneuver the howitzer, prime mover, establishment of the ammo pit, ammo truck location, and optical instruments used for aligning artillery fire control systems (Collimator). The space needed for all these individual components of a single howitzer gun grew suggests that 2m spacing between howitzers is insufficient. The mechanics of gun-line operations has Marines constantly moving on the howitzer and around the gun position ,

which would be inhibited by only 2m of separation between howitzers. Lastly, 2m separation is close enough that verbal commands from the section chief to the gun crew (shell, fuze, powder increments, special instructions, etc) could be heard (and potentially confused) by the howitzer sections on either side. Example, Gun 2 chief yells commands to his section and those commands are heard by Gun 1 or 3 and mistakenly applied to their mission.

Hope this helps. Yell if you need more or want to discuss my responses in more detail.

(b) (3) (A)

Semper Fi,

(b) (3) (A) , USMC
(b) (3) (A)
III Marine Expeditionary Force
DSN: (b) (3) (A)
Work Cell: (b) (3) (A)
SVOIP: (b) (3) (A)
USMC NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
USMC SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
JWICS: Upon Request

From: (b) (3) (A)
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: REQ: Support for I MEF Command Investigation
Date: Tuesday, November 11, 2025 5:03:51 PM
Attachments: image001.png

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A),

Answers in **Green font.**

- How many years have you been an artillery officer? **22 years**
- How much of that time has been with formations employing cannon artillery? **7 years. I have been a platoon commander, Fire Direction officer, Battery XO, Battery CO, Battalion OpsO, and Battalion Commander.**
- How often have you seen or employed a battery of 6 guns in a firing position 50 meters wide or smaller? **Never. While I have employed howitzers in small gun positions in Camp Lejeune and Fort Bragg the smallest was likely 300 meters across for a 6 gun battery.**
- Regardless of battery composition, how often have you seen or employed M777s fired within 2 meters of each other? Were they fired simultaneously? **Never.**
- Besides the tactical survivability concerns of dispersion, would you have any safety concerns with a battery employed in that small of a position? If so, please elaborate. **I would be concerned with safety hazards of the adjacent crews from each other's howitzers firing and the blast pressure/debris kicked up from firing, confusion with firing commands being mixed up by section, confusion with aiming stakes, and just the physical danger of moving vehicles and equipment in such a confined space.**

V/r,
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A), USMC
Commanding Officer
12th Marine Littoral Regiment
3D MARDIV, III MEF, FMFPAC
Okinawa, Japan
Desk: (b) (3) (A) (DSN)
Work Cell: (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A))
Cell: (b) (3) (A)
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2025 8:56 AM
Cc: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)(

Thank you for your assistance with this investigation. Your response by Monday 17 November will be much appreciated. Please let me know if you have any questions.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: 760-725-(b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office: 760-725(b) (3) (A)
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

Enclosure (44)

Enclosure (45)

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)

17 Nov –

A.

1. When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? About a month prior to the execution.
2. What is your billet? (b) (3) (A)
3. Summer of '23 @ H 2/11 - 3 years TBS AIB / MCBCL 2/10
   Positions at 2/10 – Fire control man (AFATDS Operator)
4. What was your exact role on 18 Oct 2025?
5. Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?
6. When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025? 0730-0800

B.

4. What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun) RSOP 15th and 16/ Found a good place for FDC / Found new spot to the right of the gunline – How's this going to sound / what is the best way for clear communication to the gunline. Down line data / What Method of Control – Line Data By piece by round at my command. (17th) on the 18th (AMC)
5. Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?) No
6. Please provide a sketch of the firing position and mark each gun and the location of each Marine (write names).
7. Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?

C.

8. List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled.
9. On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times).
10. Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?
11. Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)
12. Who set replacement fuzes to PD and who inspected those replacements? (name & method)
13. How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)
14. Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.

D.

15. How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors)
16. You added inspections with an SNCO and an Officer—who were they and what did they check?
17. Was a safety circle / survey point established within the position? Who established it?

E.

18. Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)
19. Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe) sounded normal based on charge and how close….20 yards from Gun 1 - *Net setup

20. Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently? Was EPIAFS used in your last field exercise? If not where are they stored?

F.

21. Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct? stayed in FDC
22. Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun? USSS came into the FDC, but didn't remember where he went. WHP came by as well.

G.

Were any tactical exceptions or procedural deviations authorized for the ADEX? (reduced SDZ, non-standard PE, altered QE limits)

23. Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe. NO pressure

H.

25. Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain.
26. How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
27. If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be? No
28. Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot? No

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)

17 Nov –

A.

7. When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? July / August – Felt he had two months prep time
8. What is your billet? (b) (3) (A)
9. What was your exact role on 18 Oct 2025? Duties: (b) (3) (A) Logistics focus and help Xo

accomplish his duties. Background: May '25 – E 2/11 / Arrived to 11MAR Sept '23 11th MAR / Wounded Warrior Staff prior to PCS /
K 3/12 Dec 07 – Jan 2010 / B 1/11 –> 1/12 section chief and ran ATS 2012 / 2013

10. Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames? Fire watch roster / Platoon sergeant to COG / SOG
11. When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025? Early / plenty

B.

8. What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun) early/mid afternoon – emplaced guns within the firing box / administrative process / guns set by stake / not a typically artillery shoot. Seen as a ceremonial shoot. Focused was maintain charge on the guns. Keep trucks close on the 16 / 17, but not the 18th. Scenario based - production
9. Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?) Position direction verified not relayed
10. Please provide a sketch of the firing position and mark each gun and the location of each Marine (write names).
11. Who set up the aiming circles and survey points? SSgt Gruber & Lt Garcia

C.

15. List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled. 795 / 767A1 (no nars out for overhead) 232A2 Hotel charge
16. On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times). ~5 minutes
17. Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns? 3 fuzes pulled from gun line
18. Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)
19. Who set replacement fuzes to PD and who inspected those replacements? (name & method) Bgunz
20. How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.) visual verification – Bgunz – no need, EPIAFS used for ET fuzes, used for MOFA and Excalibur – No manual way to set those fuzes. Serviceability good on each gun.
21. Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain. Walkthrough of cannon process – AT will fuze fuzes to shell… section chief will visually verify the shell/fuze combo with recorder. Recorder is looking straight down at his sheet.

D.

18. How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors)
19. You added inspections with an SNCO and an Officer—who were they and what did they check?
20. Was a safety circle / survey point established within the position? Who established it?

E.

21. Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)

22. Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? no

23. Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently? Punch tubes / breach mx / cleaned guns / wiped them down. Post shooting mx

23. Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct? stayed in FDC / didn't see anything but saw a picture of a bird
24. Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun? WH Long beard guy on gun 1 – USSS dude somewhere on the gunline – range control on top of hill

G.

Were any tactical exceptions or procedural deviations authorized for the ADEX? (reduced SDZ, non-standard PE, altered QE limits)

24. Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe. No. Most intentional and controlled event.

H.

29. Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain. Not that he has ever seen.
30. How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
31. If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be? No
32. Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot?

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)

A. August 29 2024 – (b) (3) (A) 1.5 years
B. MAOBC - Ft Sill

1. When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? Middle 15 September
2. What is your billet? (b) (3) (A)
3. What was your exact role on 18 Oct 2025? (b) (3) (A)
4. Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?
5. When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025?

B.

12. What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun) Given a box (b) (3) (A)) provided a safety box / milgps plot and were able to find a exact grid of

each gun and verified with DAGR / Trucks single file into position. Tape and stake to go slow and deliberate

13. Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?) No
14. Please provide a sketch of the firing position and mark each gun and the location of each Marine (write names).
15. Who set up the aiming circles and survey points? Survey (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) / OS Station (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) worked on aiming circle

C.

22. List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled. 4H / PD TI / HE
23. On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times). ~not sure on time.
24. Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?
25. Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)
26. Who set replacement fuzes to PD and who inspected those replacements? (name & method)
27. How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)
28. Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.

D.

21. How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors) Between Gun 5 & 6 / Ammo inspected by Platoon Commander / Platoon Sergeant at least did it twice and BG did it one of those times. Chief / Cannoneer #4 & #5…at least 4 times. This wasn't standard in his experience.
22. You added inspections with an SNCO and an Officer—who were they and what did they check?
23. Was a safety circle / survey point established within the position? Who established it?

E.

24. Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe) Hasn't seen firing linkage failure.
25. Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe) nothing heard.
26. Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently? Was EPIAFS used in your last field exercise? If not where are they stored?

F.

25. Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct? nothing seen
26. Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun? Camera crew near gun 6 / V35 gunner in the middle

G.

Were any tactical exceptions or procedural deviations authorized for the ADEX? (reduced SDZ, non-standard PE, altered QE limits)

25. Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe. No pressure … As administrative as possible. Slow and deliberate

H.

33. Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain. No, …identified faulty fuzes prior to the mission.
34. How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
35. If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be?
36. Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot?

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)

1/12 – First unit

2/11 – Golf and Fox battery as section chief and platoon chief

Recruiting and back in June 2024 / E 2/11

A.

12. When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? 3-weeks prior / Maybe a month
13. What is your billet? (b) (3) (A)
14. What was your exact role on 18 Oct 2025?
15. Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?
16. When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025? 0700

B.

16. What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun) measurements of the firing points and set up where the guns were going to be. Getting the guns turned around right by the ocean. Give the guns room to pick up displacement and not get hit by water. Had the help / setup the guns / dug spades in all the way / double tapping to ensure there was space. Tripled checked everything based on the planned charge they were going to fire.
17. Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?) aiming circles relayed
18. Please provide a sketch of the firing position and mark each gun and the location of each Marine (write names).
19. Who set up the aiming circles and survey points? (b) (3) (A)

C.

29. List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled. M767a1 and 795 / 4H (232a1)
30. On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times). About a couple of minutes
31. Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?
32. Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)
33. Who set replacement fuzes to PD and who inspected those replacements? (name & method)
34. How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.) visual checks
35. Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.

D.

24. How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors) 8 people checked the ready boards
25. You added inspections with an SNCO and an Officer—who were they and what did they check?
26. Was a safety circle / survey point established within the position? Who established it?

E.

27. Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe) common (6ft lanyards) intbetween gun 2 and 3
28. Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe) negative
29. Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently? Punch tubes / breach wipe down (nothing out of the ordinary)
    Was EPIAFS used in your last field exercise? If not where are they stored?

F.

27. Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct? Birds based on other people seeing a video
28. Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun? WH on Gun 1

G.

Were any tactical exceptions or procedural deviations authorized for the ADEX? (reduced SDZ, non-standard PE, altered QE limits)

26. Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe. Constraint of the firing point / felt there was pressure to get it done safely

H.

37. Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain. No that he believes
38. How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th? Nothing related besides dog and pony…
39. If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be? Nothing
40. Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot? COMSTRAT

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)

Background: Jan 2025 – Aug 2025 FDC / (b) (3) (A) /

A.

17. When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? Heard about a month ahead
18. What is your billet? (b) (3) (A)
19. What was your exact role on 18 Oct 2025? Administrative accountability in HQ and field / details on change and communications / Motor T / Coordinate with Local Security / Keep people away from FDC / Watching for displacement on 17th and 18th between gun 1 and 2.
20. Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?
21. When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025?

B.

20. What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun)
21. Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?)
22. Please provide a sketch of the firing position and mark each gun and the location of each Marine (write names).
23. Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?

C.

36. List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled.
37. On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times).
38. Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?
39. Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)
40. Who set replacement fuzes to PD and who inspected those replacements? (name & method)
41. How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)
42. Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.

D.

27. How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors)
28. You added inspections with an SNCO and an Officer—who were they and what did they check? Did not verify fuzes …
29. Was a safety circle / survey point established within the position? Who established it?

E.

30. Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)
31. Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe)
32. Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently? Was EPIAFS used in your last field exercise? If not where are they stored?

F.

29. Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct? Sea birds
30. Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun? Gun 1 – White House camera man location / Facial hair / t-shirt and flak and Kevlar

G.

Were any tactical exceptions or procedural deviations authorized for the ADEX? (reduced SDZ, non-standard PE, altered QE limits)

27. Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe. Range control restricted to keep guns close / AFAs are sufficient ~50m dispersion per gun on std shoot / wasn't typical on those days.

H.

41. Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain.
42. How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
43. If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be? Everything was done right and verified at every level
44. Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot? Link the MC posted – B roll

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)

Background: 2014 SIGINT Marine / Army National Guard cannoneer 4.5 years / Army ROTC UT @ Arlington / Fellowship to DC / Cold call OSO / - Ft Sill – 3 Aug 25

A.

22. When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? Rumored / 2 weeks prior / safety conducted (pre-occ)
23. What is your billet? (b) (3) (A)
24. What was your exact role on 18 Oct 2025?
25. Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?

26. When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025?

B.

24. What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun) 16 to the left and rear of the gunline, but were informed they were moving / they were located to the right rear of the gun line – 10-20 meters
25. Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?)
26. Please provide a sketch of the firing position and mark each gun and the location of each Marine (write names).
27. Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?

C.

43. List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled.
44. On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times).
45. Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?
46. Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)
47. Who set replacement fuzes to PD and who inspected those replacements? (name & method)
48. How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)
49. Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.

D.

30. How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors)
31. You added inspections with an SNCO and an Officer—who were they and what did they check?
32. Was a safety circle / survey point established within the position? Who established it?

E.

33. Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)
34. Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe)
35. Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently? Was EPIAFS used in your last field exercise? If not where are they stored?

F.

31. Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct?
32. Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun?

G.

Were any tactical exceptions or procedural deviations authorized for the ADEX? (reduced SDZ, non-standard PE, altered QE limits)

28. Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe.

H.

45. Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain.
46. How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
47. If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be?
48. Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot?



XO – Apr 2024 MAOBC – May 2024 E 2/11
Served as FDO, and HQ Platoon Commander, Sept 2024 – August 2025 XO

1.
2. Didn't attend confirmation brief
3. Wednesday
4. Saw the range card but didn't receive it.
5. Roughly 1500
6. Ammunition arrived in the position on the 15th / stayed on the ammo vic until battery arrived on 16th / prior to firing the XO
Sgt Baker signature is on the 1348 / XO signed for it on the 16th.

Ammo stored on back of 7ton banded and palletized and covered with tarp / maintained on the trail leading to beach. Ammo distributed to gun line on the 17th before ULT. ~1300 but shoot was delayed due to signs not being out. Enough time for rounds to be on the deck, store at modified ammo pit. Roughly a couple hours.

Grade-3 Ordnance –
XO was coordinating with EXCON – EOD scenario / where they were setting off modify bomb – were showing him the SDZ that would require the ammo truck needed to be moved away to support pyrotechnics. Approximately a couple hours before
Approached by section chief – "some of the fuzes don't work" screens are not turning on. "we can't shoot these rounds" XO discussed with BG to get fuzes from other ammo box with factory fuze. Segregate the "bad" fuzes and marked. XO went to the gunline to inspect the fuzes / 1 per ammo can / Grade 3 written on fuzes / asked for what was wrong and was told the screen would not back light and show PD.

Ammo truck pulls up to each specific gun / Platoon leadership verifies ammo loadout.

A.

27. When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? Late August early september
28. What is your billet? [redacted]
29. What was your exact role on 18 Oct 2025?
30. Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?
31. When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025? 0600-0700

B.

28. What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun) administrative emplace of guns 1 by 1 and dug in / cannoneers went through normal procedures /
29. Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?)
30. Please provide a sketch of the firing position and mark each gun and the location of each Marine (write names).
31. Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?

C.

50. List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled. M795 / m767a1 / 4h / m82
51. On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times). Gun 3 – 5-10
52. Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?
53. Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)
54. Who set replacement fuzes to PD and who inspected those replacements? (name & method)
55. How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)
56. Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.

D.

33. How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors) 7-8 visuals (XO checked replacements)
34. You added inspections with an SNCO and an Officer—who were they and what did they check?
35. Was a safety circle / survey point established within the position? Who established it?

E.

36. Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)
37. Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe) nothing out of the ordinary.
38. Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently?
Was EPIAFS used in your last field exercise? If not where are they stored?

F.

33. Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct? sea birds -

34. Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun? USSS BLT Gunner / WH on Gun 1

G.

Were any tactical exceptions or procedural deviations authorized for the ADEX? (reduced SDZ, non-standard PE, altered QE limits)

29. Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe. No

H.

49. Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain. No
50. How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th? 5-10m between bodies, During hip shoot / azimuth backlay
51. If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be? No
52. Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot?

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)

March 2024 – H 2/11 Jan 2025 E 2/11

A. Between Gun 3 & 4
B. Closeness of guns – length of table about 80 inches
C. 81mm background – 25 ft dispersion

32. When were you told you would participate in the ADEX?
33. What is your billet? (b) (3) (A)
34. What was your exact role on 18 Oct 2025?
35. Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?
36. When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025?

B.

32. What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun)
33. Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?)
34. Please provide a sketch of the firing position and mark each gun and the location of each Marine (write names).
35. Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?

C.

57. List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled.
58. On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times).
59. Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?

60. Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)
61. Who set replacement fuzes to PD and who inspected those replacements? (name & method)
62. How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)
63. Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.

D.

36. How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors)
37. You added inspections with an SNCO and an Officer—who were they and what did they check?
38. Was a safety circle / survey point established within the position? Who established it?

E.

39. Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)
40. Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe) no
41. Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently?
    Was EPIAFS used in your last field exercise? If not where are they stored?

F.

35. Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct?
36. Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun?

G.

Were any tactical exceptions or procedural deviations authorized for the ADEX? (reduced SDZ, non-standard PE, altered QE limits)

30. Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe.

H.

53. Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain.
54. How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
55. If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be? No
56. Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot? No

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

Background: 2d Fleet tour / DI tour 2021 – March 2025 / E 2/11
G Btry 2/11 – Apr 9th 2015 / A 1/11 2018-2021

A.

37. When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? 3 weeks prior to execution
38. What is your billet? (b) (3) (A)
39. What was your exact role on 18 Oct 2025?
40. Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?
41. When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025? 0530 up by 0600 and moving

B.

36. What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun) later in day / mid-day
37. Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?) no
38. Please provide a sketch of the firing position and mark each gun and the location of each Marine (write names).
39. Who set up the aiming circles and survey points? (b) (3) (A)(b) (3) (A)

C.

64. List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled. M767A2 / ~m1122 / 4h
65. On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times). 5-10 minutes.
66. Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns? (b) (3) (A) notified the LCD screen wasn't coming on. (b) (3) (A) went to BG to get confirmation on use of the fuze. BG didn't want to shoot them and they did a walkthrough and got (2) More. Chiefs were instructed to verify the fuzes.
67. Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)
68. Who set replacement fuzes to PD and who inspected those replacements? (name & method) BG talked to ammo tech who pulled from separate can to get new fuzes.
69. How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.) Visual / EPIAFS – Gun 1 / 2 & 3
70. Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain. Reissue fuze potentially out of ASP.

D.

39. How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors) 5 times at minimum
40. You added inspections with an SNCO and an Officer—who were they and what did they check?
41. Was a safety circle / survey point established within the position? Who established it?

E.

42. Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)
43. Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe) no (gun 4-5)
44. Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently? Standard mx – breach taken apart / lubricated / punch tube and cable ports and fire linkage / cables and prongs
    Was EPIAFS used in your last field exercise? If not where are they stored?

F.

37. Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct? there were birds on and off ridgeline ivo EOD as well
38. Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun? USSS / WH

G.

Were any tactical exceptions or procedural deviations authorized for the ADEX? (reduced SDZ, non-standard PE, altered QE limits)

31. Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe. Negative

H.

57. Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain. No/
58. How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th? Not optimal / not ideal but has seen before / hip shoot
59. If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be? No
60. Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot? Airdropped to Col Bunn

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

Background: April 2025 – Present - E 2/11
Printed products required by RSO
Located at FDC.

A.

42. When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? Month out from exercise / RSO
43. What is your billet?
44. What was your exact role on 18 Oct 2025?

45. Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?
46. When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025?

B.

40. What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun)
41. Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?)
42. Please provide a sketch of the firing position and mark each gun and the location of each Marine (write names).
43. Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?

C.

71. List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled. 767a1 795 and 4H
72. On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times). Less than 5 minutes
73. Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?
74. Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)
75. Who set replacement fuzes to PD and who inspected those replacements? (name & method)
76. How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)
77. Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.

D.

42. How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors)
43. You added inspections with an SNCO and an Officer—who were they and what did they check?
44. Was a safety circle / survey point established within the position? Who established it?

E.

45. Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)
46. Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe)
47. Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently?
    Was EPIAFS used in your last field exercise? If not where are they stored?

F.

39. Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct? suas out the previous night (LR recording)
40. Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun? WH Media Older / facial hair / long pony tail / shades on / had camera and didn't interact much

G.

Were any tactical exceptions or procedural deviations authorized for the ADEX? (reduced SDZ, non-standard PE, altered QE limits)

32. Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe. Negative

H.

61. Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain.
62. How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
63. If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be? No
64. Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot? No

Echo Battery
Name, Rank, billet and unit. (b) (3) (A) [redacted] **What is your artillery background?** -First enlistment and duty station -Been in the battery for 6 months -Was initially in India Btry before it disbanded -Completed section chief course in September -2 shoots as section chief including 250th which was the first one by himself (not bird dogging) -Has received a couple of new Marines (1 right before 250th that did not shoot and one more in September)
When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? -Around August. **What is your billet?** -Sect Chief **Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?** (b) (3) (A) paired with someone from another gun **When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025?** -Does not remember **What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun)** -Believes it was afternoon of 16 Oct -Did a couple of emplacements -Recalls entire battery emplacing at the same time -Emplaced zulu order **Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?)** -Does not remember -Usually battery does relay every day but does not remember doing it for the 18th **Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?** -(b) (3) (A) does not remember Lt **List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled.** -767A1s, HE, H charges **On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times).** -Less than 5 min **Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?** -Yes, gray screened. Asked BG to set with EPIAFS, it showed PD but BG said he did not want to use them . -Put grade 3 fuze in ammo can. Believes he marked it, placed it in ammo can about 5 ft behind ready board. After incident showed grade 3 fuze to MGuns. -If truck was behind the howitzer on the 18th, the grade 3 fuze would have been placed in the back of the truck away from the ready board.

Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)
-(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (A) , (b) (3) (A)
-Press butotn, rotate counterclockwise straight to PD.

Who set replacement fuzes to PD and who inspected those replacements? (name & method)
-BG brought 3 replacement fuzes for the guns who had grade 3 fuzes

How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)
-He looked at all screens to verify PD

Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.
-Prior experience: Never seen it

How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors)
-Verified way more than usual: self, recorder, cannoneer 4 and 5, (b) (3) (A) and BG

Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)
-Yes. It has happened almost every field exercise. Happens a lot.

Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe)
-No.

Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently?
-Oct 17: breach maint, punched tube, shutdown chief section display
Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct?
-No

Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun?
-Cameraman on his gun. Caucasian, civilian clothing, flak and Kevlar, beard

Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe.
-No. Battery staff and o told them it was a day to take their time and not speed things up.

Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain.
-No
How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
-He has seen the guns in a similar manner to the 18th during a hip shoot with I Btry during ITX.

If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be?

-That the incident didn't happen and they could have finished the fire mission.

Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot?
-Staged photo of crew

How did you set the fuzes?
-At his gun, sets counterclockwise straight to PD

This summary is a fair and accurate representation of the interview on 20251110 between IO Team and (b) (3) (A) .

(b) (3) (A)

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Echo Battery
Name, Rank, billet and unit. (b) (3) (A) Gun 3 Out of action 18 Oct **What is your artillery background?** -LatMove from supply -1/11 Sep 2023 -Section Chiefs course Feb 2024 -4 months from latmove to section chief -2/11 for 1.5 years
When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? -Around September. **What is your billet?** - (b) (3) (A) **Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?** -Yes but does not remember who **When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025?** -0600 **What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun)** -Arrived 16 Oct in the morning. -BG, CO, leadership figured out where they want the guns -Dug in for high charge **Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?)** -No **Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?** -(b) (3) (A) and(b) (3) (A) **List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled.** -Charge 4 hotel M232A1, M795, M767A1 **On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times).** -Entire crew thought the gun shot because of how close the guns were -10 min **Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?** -Yes, one. Knew when he went to set the fuze and LCD screen did not turn on. Notified chain of command. Wrote grade 3 on fuze and it was placed in ammo can a few feet behind the gun. **Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)** -(b) (3) (A) and(b) (3) (A) (ammo team) -Press button, rotate straight to PD -Did not know of clockwise method

Who set replacement fuzes to PD and who inspected those replacements? (name & method)
-BG

How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)
-He looked at all screens to verify PD
-EPIAFS was working during the 18th and checked the grade 3 fuze but did not fire it.
-Never had issues with EPIAFS.
Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.
-Prior experience: Yes during Australia deployment.

How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors)
-Self, ammo team (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A)), (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (A)

Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe)
-No.

Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently?
-Oct 17: Standard breach maint, punched the tube, PMCS per the TM, made sure all components were working, verified firing mech, magazine check, etc.

Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct?
-No

Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun?
-17 Oct COMMSTRAT Marines. None on the 18th

Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe.
-No.

Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain.
-No.

How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
-Yes during live-fire emergency missions and during ITX.

If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be?
-Nothing. Believes they did everything right.

Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot?
-Sect photo

How did you set the fuzes?
-At his gun, sets counterclockwise straight to PD
-Unaware of another method to set fuze

This summary is a fair and accurate representation of the interview on 20251113 between IO Team and (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

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(b) (3) (A)




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
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
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


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(b) (5), (b) (7)(F)

(b) (5), (b) (7)(F)

(b) (5), (b) (7)(F)


(b) (5), (b) (7)(F)


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
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(b) (5), (b) (7)(F)



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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RCO Special Brief

Date Revised – 15 October 2025




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

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

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

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Enclosure (1)

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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(b) (3) (A), (b) (5), (b) (7)(F)

(b) (5), (b) (7)(F)

CONFIDENTIAL

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PROJECT OVERVIEW

[Event Strategies Inc]
[Marine Corps 250]
[10.18.25]

PROJECT DETAILS

CLIENT NAME
Event Strategies Inc.

DROP DATE
SUNDAY, October 12, 2025

PROJECT DATE
SATURDAY, October 18, 2025

PROJECT TIME
0700 BEGIN
1700 CONCLUDE

VENUE
DEL MAR BEACH
Marine Corps Base
Camp Pendleton

PROJECT NARRATIVE

Ironwood Protection Group will provide guest management, security support, and emergency action planning for the Marine 250 Celebration at Camp Pendleton on October 18, 2025. Our team will ensure safe and efficient guest movement, site security, and coordinated response capabilities in partnership with base officials. All operations will be executed with professionalism, precision, and strict adherence to Marine Corps protocols and contingency procedures.

PRINCIPALS
ESI Staff, Corporate Magic Staff and Harbinger Staff

MASTER CONTACT LIST

ROLE	ENTITY	NAME	PHONE	EMAIL
Project Manager	ESI	(b) (6)		
IRONWOOD LEAD	Ironwood Protection Group			
IRONWOOD - [ROLE]	Ironwood Protection Group			
IRONWOOD - [ROLE]	Ironwood Protection Group			
IRONWOOD - [ROLE]	Ironwood Protection Group			
IRONWOOD - [ROLE]	Ironwood Protection Group			
IRONWOOD - [ROLE]	Ironwood Protection Group			
POLICE	USMC Military Police			
FIRE	Camp Pendleton Fire HQ			
EMS	Camp Pendleton Naval Hospital			

TIMELINE

LOCAL TIME (EDT)	ACTION	NOTES
0430-0645	Press Pre-set	
0630	USSS Equipment Arrives	
TBD	USSS Sweeps	
0700	Ironwood Arrives on site	IPG will stage at mags
0800	First Buses arrives	IPG will give clear guidance for when mags open
0930	Soft Open	2 IPG will fold inside for GM, 4 stay at mags
1000	Doors Open	
1130	VIPs arrive	
1200	Pre-Program begins	2 more IPG agents fold in, 2 stay at mags
1300	Amphib broadcast begins	1 IPG there for EAP?
1400	Troop Rally begins	6 IPG inside
1530	Airshow begins	
TBD	EDENX	

EMERGENCY ACTION DETAILS

RALLY POINT: PRIMARY

Press Riser

RALLY POINT: SECONDARY

LCAC Oceanside/ Rear Bleachers

EVACUATION ROUTES

VP Motorcade route post VPOTUS ExFil

EVACUATION PROTOCOL

Hold until motorcade leaves. Meet at designated rally points. Once all accounted for move to VPOTUS route

CLOSEST HOSPITAL

Camp Pendleton Naval Hospital
200 Mercy Cir
Camp Pendleton, CA
Distance from Site: 2.8 Miles

CLOSEST POLICE STATION

Joint EOC
OSA

CLOSEST FIRE STATION

Fire will be on site

EMERGENCY ACTION DETAILS

ON-SITE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

First Aid kits for IPG
US Navy Corpsman

ON-SITE AMBULANCE

Yes
Behind 6 O’clock bleachers

FULL SITE DIAGRAM

PARKING DIAGRAM

NOTES

[Incidents with no injuries will move to Staff Parking once the all clear is given and you have been accounted for by staff leads]

INTERIOR DIAGRAM



MASCAL Staging



NOTES

Five, seven tons for MASCAL staged. One MP will be a primary screener. We will have 12 MPs on the clean side of MAGS prior to VIP arrival

EMERGENCY EGRESS DIAGRAM

SITE MAP - "CLEAN"



NOTES

Hold in place at press riser or LCAC Oceanside until VPOTUS Exfills and all clear is given

EVENT CREDENTIALS



NOTES

[Notes]


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USMC Slides



USMC Slides




(b) (3) (A), (b) (5), (b) (7)(F)

INCIDENT REPORTING

INCIDENT REPORT #1

INCIDENT TIME (EDT)	RESPONDING AGENT	INCIDENT TYPE
XX:XX XM		

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT
[Describe Incident]

STATUS OF INCIDENT
[Ongoing, Closed, Other]

RESOLUTION OF INCIDENT
[Describe Resolution]

INCIDENT REPORT #2

INCIDENT TIME (EDT)	RESPONDING AGENT	INCIDENT TYPE
XX:XX XM		

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT
[Describe Incident]

STATUS OF INCIDENT
[Ongoing, Closed, Other]

RESOLUTION OF INCIDENT
[Describe Resolution]

IRONWOOD
PG


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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
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(b) (5)


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
(b) (3) (A), (b) (5)

RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX		Probability *(Expected frequency)*				
		Frequent: Continuous, regular, or inevitable occurrences	**Likely:** Several or numerous occurrences	**Occasional:** Sporadic or intermittent occurrences	**Seldom:** Infrequent occurrences	**Unlikely:** Possible occurrences but improbable
Severity *(expected consequence)*		A	B	C	D	E
Catastrophic: *Mission failure, unit readiness eliminated; death, unacceptable loss or damage*	I	EH	EH	H	H	M
Critical: *Significantly degraded unit readiness or mission capability; severe injury, illness, loss or damage*	II	EH	H	H	M	L
Moderate: *Somewhat degraded unit readiness or mission capability; minor injury, illness, loss, or damage*	III	H	M	M	L	L
Negligible: *Little or no impact to unit readiness or mission capability; minimal injury, loss, or damage*	IV	M	L	L	L	L

LEGEND: **EH -** Extremely High Risk **H -** High Risk **M -** Medium Risk **L -** Low Risk

13. RISK ASSESSMENT REVIEW *(Required when assessment applies to ongoing operations or activities)*

a. DATE	b. LAST NAME	c. RANK/GRADE	d. DUTY TITLE/POSITION	e. SIGNATURE OF REVIEWER

14. FEEDBACK AND LESSONS LEARNED

15. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS OR REMARKS

Instructions for Completing DD Form 2977, "Deliberate Risk Assessment Worksheet"

1. Mission/Task Description and Execution Date(s): Briefly describe the overall Mission or Task and execution date(s) for which the deliberate risk assessment is being conducted.

2. Date Prepared: Enter date form was prepared.

3. Prepared By: Information provided by the individual conducting the deliberate risk assessment for the operation or training.
Legend: UIC = Unit Identification Code; **CIN** = Course ID Number; **OPORD** = operation order; **DSN** = defense switched network; **COMM** = commercial

4. Subtask/SubStep of Mission/Task: Briefly describe all subtasks or substeps that warrant risk management.

5. Hazard: Specify hazards related to the subtask in block 4.

6. Initial Risk Level: Determine initial risk level. Using the risk assessment matrix (preceding block 13), determine level of risk for each hazard specified. Use probability and severity to determine risk level; enter risk level into column.

7. Control: Enter risk mitigation resources/controls identified to abate or reduce risk relevant to the hazard identified in block 5.

8. How to Implement / Who Will Implement: Briefly describe the means of employment for each control (i.e., OPORD, briefing, rehearsal) and the name of the individual, unit or office that has primary responsibility for control implementation.

9. Residual Risk Level: After controls are implemented, determine resulting probability, severity, and residual risk level.

10. Overall Risk After Controls are Implemented: Assign an overall residual risk level. This is equal to or greater than the highest residual risk level (from block 9).

11. Supervision Plan and Recommended Course of Action: Completed by preparer. Identify specific tasks and levels of responsibility for supervisory personnel and provide the decision authority with a recommend course of action for approval or disapproval based upon the overall risk assessment.

12. Approval/Disapproval of Mission/Task: Risk approval authority approves or disapproves the mission or task based on the overall risk assessment, including controls, residual risk level, and supervision plan.

13. Risk Assessment Review: Should be conducted on a regular basis. Reviewers should have sufficient oversight of the mission or activity and controls to provide valid input on changes or adjustments needed. If the residual risk rises above the level already approved, operations should cease until the appropriate approval authority is contacted and approves continued operations.

14. Feedback and Lessons Learned: Provide specific input on the effectiveness of risk controls and their contribution to mission success or failure. Include recommendations for new or revised controls, practicable solutions, or alternate actions. Submit and brief valid lessons learned as necessary to persons affected.

15. Additional Comments or Remarks: Preparer or approval authority provides any additional comments, remarks, or information to support the integration of risk management.

Additional Guidance: Blocks 4-9 may be reproduced as necessary for processing of all subtasks/substeps of the mission/task. The addition and subtraction buttons are designed to enable users to accomplish this task.

AIRBORNE UNIT ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONNEL INJURY AND EQUIPMENT DAMAGE ON DZ

DROP ZONE SURVEY

1A. DZ NAME	1B. ZAR INDEX NO.	2A. COUNTRY	2B. STATE
DZ Red Beach Center	U--USADZ------U	United States of America	California

3. MAP SERIES/SHEET NUMBER/EDITION/DATE OF MAP: (b) (3) (A)

4. SURVEY APPROVAL/DISAPPROVAL DATA

4A1. DATE SURVEYED	4A2. TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF SURVEYOR	4A3. PHONE NUMBER *(DSN)*	4A4. UNIT
05 Sep 2025	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	1st Reconnaissance Bn, Camp

4B. DROP ZONE APPROVAL/DISAPPROVAL
A = APPROVED
D = DISAPPROVED

FOR	CDS/CRL/CRS	PER	HE	MFF	SATB	CRRC	HSLLADS	HVCDS
DAY	D	D	D	A	D	D	D	D
NIGHT	D	D	D	A	D	D	D	D

4C. DATE APPROVED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS	NAME, GRADE AND SERVICE OF APPROVAL AUTHORITY	PHONE NUMBER *(DSN)*	SIGNATURE
14 Oct 2025	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)
	UNIT AND LOCATION: 1st Reconnaissance Bn, Camp Pendleton, CA		

4D. DATE SAFETY OF FLIGHT REVIEW APPROVED	NAME AND GRADE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	PHONE NUMBER *(DSN)*	SIGNATURE
15 Oct 2025	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)
	UNIT AND LOCATION: VMGR-352, KNKX		

4E. DATE OF MAJCOM APPROVAL	NAME AND GRADE OF APPROVAL AUTHORITY	PHONE NUMBER *(DSN)*	SIGNATURE
14 Oct 2025	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)
	UNIT AND LOCATION: I MEF, CE		

5. COORDINATING ACTIVITIES

A. DZ CONTROLLING AGENCY O UNIT	B. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING/LAND USE	C. PHONE NUMBER *(DSN)*
MCB Camp Pendleton Range Control (b) (3) (A)	YES ☐ NO ☒ ATTACHED ☐	(b) (3) (A)
D. RANGE CONTROL: C(b) (3) (A)		E. PHONE NUMBER *(DSN)*: (b) (3) (A)

6. DZ DIMENSIONS *(YDS/MTRS) (FOR CIRCULAR DZ, ENTER RADIUS ONLY)*

A. LENGTH	B. WIDTH	C. RADIUS
(N/A)	(N/A)	150 yds / 137.16 m

POINT OF IMPACT DISTANCES FROM DZ LEADING EDGE	D. CDS PI	E. PE PI	F. HE PI
	(N/A)	150 yds / 137.16 m	(N/A)

7. DZ AXIS DATA *(OPTIONAL FOR CIRCULAR DZ)*

A. MAGNETIC	B. GRID *(MGRS)*	C. TRUE	D. SOURCE/DATE OF VARIATION DATA
(N/A)	(N/A)	(N/A)	WMM 2025

8. GROUND POINT ELEVATION	A. CDS PI	B. HE PI	C. PE PI	D. HIGHEST
	(N/A)	(N/A)	(b) (3) (A)	

9. DZ COORDINATES

A. SPHEROID	B. DATUM	C. GRID ZONE	D. EASTING	E. NORTHING
WGS84	WGS84	11 S	04	36

F. GPS DERIVED COORDINATES	G. POINT OF ORIGIN
YES ☒ NO ☐	(N/A)

H. POINT	MGRS COORDINATES	WGS84 LATITUDE *(D-M.MM)*	WGS84 LONGITUDE *(D-M.MM)*
DZ CENTERPOINT	(b) (3) (A)		
CDS PI			
PE PI			
HE PI			

I. DZ CORNERS MGRS COORDINATES

LEFT LEADING EDGE	RIGHT LEADING EDGE
(N/A)	(N/A)
LEFT TRAILING EDGE	**RIGHT TRAILING EDGE**
(N/A)	(N/A)

DZ NAME

DZ Red Beach Center

10. DZ DIAGRAM

See Attached Diagram

11. REMARKS

(b) (3) (A)

12. PHOTOGRAPH AVAILABLE

YES ☒ NO ☐

LOW LEVEL ROUTES

☒ NONE AVAILABLE

☐ ROUTE NAME/DESIGNATOR

AF IMT 3823, 20021001, V2 / PDF COPY OF ORIGINAL V2.0 (REVERSE)

DZ NAME

DZ Red Beach Center

11. REMARKS (CONTINUED)

2. SOM
   a. Departure Airfield
      i. 16 October: MCAS CPEN
      ii. 17 October: MCAS Mirimar
      iii. 18 October: MCAS Mirimar
   b. Executing Personnel
      i. 6x Military Free Fallers
      ii. 1x Tandem Passenger
   c. Supporting Aircraft
      i. VMGR-352 (Callsign: Raider)
      ii. 1x KC-130J
   d. Timeline
      i. 16 October: TOT 1300
      ii. 17 October: TOT 1255
      iii. 18 October: TOT 1255

N
90°
DZ
300 m

Palm Tree
PVC Pole
PVC Pole
Barrier
Logs and Hide
MAGVAR
500 m
1000 ft

(b) (3) (A)

N

[redacted] (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

N

N
(b) (3) (A)

N
(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

N

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

2025 Amphibious Demonstration V.27 18 Oct (FINAL)

Event Line	Codeword	Time	ACTUAL TIME	Time off H-hour	Duration	Event	Phase/stage	Alt (ft M/A)	Location	Remarks	From	To	Via	Net	Effects2
(B) (A)	(D) (3) (A)														

(54) [redacted]

2025 Amphibious Demonstration Mid Show V.26 17 Oct

Event Line	Codeword (D) (S) (A)	Time	ACTUAL TIME	Time off H-hour	Duration	Event	Phase/stage	Alt (ft M/A)	Location	Remarks	From	To	Via	Net	Effects2

[redacted]

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

Event Line	Codeword	Time	ACTUAL TIME	Time off H-hour	Duration	Event	Phase/stage	Alt (ft M/A)	Location	Remarks	From	To	Via	Net	Effects2

(b) (3) (A)

[redacted] (54)

(b) (3) (A)

Event Line	Codeword	Time	ACTUAL TIME	Time off H-hour	Duration	Event	Phase/stage	Alt (ft M/A)	Location	Remarks	From	To	Via	Net	Effects2
[redacted]															



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PLACE HOLDER ENCL (55)

VIDEO REHERSALS B-ROLL 17 OCT 25



Enclosure (56)

Echo Battery
Name, Rank, billet and unit. (b) (3) (A) **What is your artillery background?** -3/11 prior to E Btry (first enlistment) -Joined Btry Jun 2024 (E Btry) -Been a sect chief for 3 years
When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? -Around August. **What is your billet?** - (b) (3) (A) **Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?** -No Marines on fire watch **When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025?** -Does not remember **What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun)** -Arrived mid-day -Did 3-4 emplacements **Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?)** -No **Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?** - (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) **List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled.** -795 w/ time fuze M767A1, H charges **On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times).** -At least 15 min **Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?** -No **Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)** -Ammo team: (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) -Press button, rotate counterclockwise straight to PD. -Has not heard of clockwise method **How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)** -He looked at all screens to verify PD, no EPIAFS

Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.
-Prior experience: Never had it go out as getting a mission. Received a grade 3 before and interrogated it

How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors)
-Verified way more than usual: self (4x), ammo team #4 and #5, recorder (does not know if (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) inspected it but its plausible he did.

Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)
-Yes. It happens often.

Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe)
-No.

Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently?
-Oct 17: arty mechs checked gun with (b) (3) (A). Check firing mech, close breach, prime weapon, pull lanyard and ensure firing lever clicks, etc.

Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct?
-No

Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun?
-No

Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe.
-Not at all

Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain.
-No

How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
-10-15 ft between guns. Previous experience with guns this close during hip shoots. Static shoot with guns that close as well.

If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be?
-No

Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot?
-No

How did you set the fuzes?
-At his gun, sets counterclockwise straight to PD

This summary is a fair and accurate representation of the interview on 20251113 between IO Team and (b) (3) (A).

(b) (3) (A)

This transmission contains information that is protected from disclosure by the Privacy Act (5 USC 552a) and exemption (b) (6) of the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552, as amended). Ensure that this information is used solely for the requested purpose. Further duplication and/or distribution without prior authorization from this office is not authorized. Civil and/or criminal penalties can apply for improper use.

From: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
To:
Cc:

Subject: RE: RFIs for ACU 5 ICO 250th Amphibious Demonstration
Date: Wednesday, November 5, 2025 5:40:00 PM

Received, (b) (3) (A). Much appreciated.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office
NIPR:
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, November 5, 2025 1:55 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Subject: Re: RFIs for ACU 5 ICO 250th Amphibious Demonstration

Good Afternoon Sir,

- I was ACU-5 Command Duty Officer on October 17th. I spotted approximately 15 UAS between approx. 1940 local with continuous observation till approx. 2300 local on the 17th. Last observation was around 0100 local 18 OCT 2025. The UAS had a flight pattern from North to South over MCCTSA, over ACU-5 to Red Beach, we would lose visual of the UAS and see them returning approximately 2- 3 NM off the coast in a South to North, as if they were in a circular flight pattern. PMO, NCIS, CID and USSS were notified and observed the UAS between approx.. 1940 to 2300 local on 17 OCT2025.

No, LCAC were operating during this time. The tower was not manned during the observation of UAS. Chief Cole will have more information on surveillance equipment located in the tower. (b) (3) (A)

Very Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, November 5, 2025 8:08 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: RFIs for ACU 5 ICO 250th Amphibious Demonstration

Your help is much appreciated. Thank you.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office:
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)
SIPR:
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)

TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, November 5, 2025 7:44 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: RFIs for ACU 5 ICO 250th Amphibious Demonstration

(b) (3) (A)

I was underway on BOXER during those times. However (b) (3) (A) is currently grabbing the logbook from the tower to answer the questions you have below as she and her people run the tower. Additionally, I do know that ACU-5 was aware and did report the UAS's to base security and the secret service. POC would be (b) (3) (A) who was standing Command Duty Officer that day, he is CC'd above.

V/r,

(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, November 5, 2025 7:27 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: RFIs for ACU 5 ICO 250th Amphibious Demonstration

(b) (3) (A)

Adding (b) (3) (A) (ACU-5 NMC 250th OIC) and (b) (3) (A) (Craft Control/Tower LCPO) to assist with your questions.

V/r

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

Assault Craft Unit FIVE (ACU-5)

Office: (b) (3) (A)

Cell: (b) (3) (A)

NIPR: (b) (3) (A)

SIPR:

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2025 4:40 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

Subject: RFIs for ACU 5 ICO 250th Amphibious Demonstration

Good Afternoon Gentlemen,

I am the Investigating Officer for the I MEF CI into the Artillery Incident of October 18th. This is an administrative investigation. I have a few questions with regards to ACU-5 activities on October 17th and 18th.

- Were there any craft besides those participating in the demonstration operating outside of their designated hangers from 1900L to 2100L on October 17th, 2025?
- If so, what was their estimated location in MGRS Grid?
- At what times on October 17th and 18th was the ACU-5 tower manned and by who?
- Did any of the personnel manning the tower observe sUAS or abnormally large groups of birds at any time on October 17th and 18th? If so, when and at what estimated location in MGRS Grid?
- Is there cameras or recordings devices on the tower and if so, how do I request that data?

Your support of our CI is most appreciated. A prompt response NLT 1200 Friday 7 November will greatly aid in our investigation.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

I Marine Expeditionary Force

MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC Office: (b) (3) (A)

NIPR: (b) (3) (A)

SIPR:

MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)

TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: [redacted]
To:
Cc:

Subject: RE: PMO RFIs ICO 250th Amphibious Demonstration
Date: Tuesday, November 11, 2025 1:45:44 PM
Attachments: image001.png
250th CI PMO Inputs.docx

Sir,

Enclosed is a word document that contains the answers to almost all of your RFIs. The only one we do not have an answer for yet is the question on frequencies; we are awaiting the official answer to this question tomorrow from MCI-W G-6.

Additionally sir, below you will find a link to the video from the Las Pulgas Gate from 18 Oct (1335-1355). If you have trouble accessing the link sir, we also have a DVD of the footage as well that we can provide.

Las Pulgas ECP 2 PTZ-2025-10-18_13h35min00s000ms.mp4

I will close the loop on frequencies ASAP tomorrow, sir. In the meantime, please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

Very Respectfully,
[redacted]
[redacted]
MCB Camp Pendleton
Office: [redacted]
Cell/Signal/WhatsApp: [redacted]
NIPR:
SIPR: [redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2025 4:35 PM
To: [redacted]
[redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
[redacted]
Subject: PMO RFIs ICO 250th Amphibious Demonstration

Good Afternoon, Gentlemen,

I am the Investigating Officer for the I MEF CI into the Artillery Incident of October 18th. This is an administrative investigation.
I have a few questions with regards to PMO support of the 250th Amphibious Capabilities Demonstration on October 17th and 18th.

- What was the disposition of PMO forces across CPEN on October 17th at 2000L to 2100L in MGRS Grid?
- What are the capabilities of a PMO Storm Team, where were they located on October 17th and 18th in MGRS Grid? Did they respond to the UAS sighting report on October 17th?
- Were there any suspicious vehicles IVO the San Onofre Gate and State Beach, and were vehicles/ campers allowed to remain at San Onofre State Park during the I-5 closure?
- Did the personnel manning the Las Pulgas Gate observe any large formations of birds or sUAS at any point during October 17th and 18th?
- Were there any reports of vehicles civilian or military with antennas or other abnormal equipment, and if so where in estimated MGRS grid?
- Do local civilian law enforcement agencies field cUAS technologies? If so, what?
- What frequencies does PMO utilize for internal communications?
- Were there any reports of disrupted communications at any time on October 18th?
- On October 18th what was the laydown of PMO and Civilian Law Enforcement Vehicles IVO Red Beach Training Area?

Your support of our CI is most appreciated. A response NLT 1200 Tuesday 11 Nov will greatly aid in our investigation.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office
NIPR:
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

TO: CMC WASHINGTON DC PPO
CC: COMMCICOM
SUBJECT: OPREP-3SIR/MCB CAMP PENDLETON//
MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC PPO POC//
SUBJ/OPREP-3SIR/ SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM INCURSION //
REF/A/DOC/CMC/MCO 3504.2A//
REF/B/VOICE REPORT TO MCOC/180435Z OCT 25//
NARR/REF A IS MCO ON OPREP-3SIR: SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT. REF B IS VOICE REPORT TO THE MCOC AT 180435Z OCT 25//
POC/MCIWEST MCB CAMPEN COMMAND DUTY OFFICER, (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) //
(U)LINE 1: BASE OR FACILITY NAME; STATE/COUNTRY: MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON/ CALIFORNIA/ UNITED STATES
(U)LINE 2: DATE-TIME GROUP (DTG): 172020L OCT 2025 (180420Z OCT 2025).
(U)LINE 3: REPORTING GEOGRAPHIC AREA: USNORTHCOM.
(U)LINE 3A: REPORTING SERVICE/ COMPONENT: UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.
(U)LINE 4: UNIT/ORGANIZATION CONTACT INFORMATION (UNIT/ORGANIZATION, NAME, RANK/GRADE, EMAIL, PHONE NUMBER): PROVOST MARSHAL OFFICE, CAMP PENDLETON, MCI-WEST, (b) (3) (A) .
(U)LINE 5A: GEO-LOCATION OF INCURSION (LATITUDE-LONGITUDE OR MILITARY GRID REFERENCE SYSTEM (MGRS) OF THE OBSERVER/SENSOR TO THE UNMANNED AIRCRAFT): (b) (3) (A)
(U)LINE 5B: LOCATION NAME OF INCURSION: (b) (3) (A) ASSAULT CRAFT UNIT 5), LOCATED WEST OF INTERSTATE 5 (I-5) ADJACENT TO THE COASTLINE.
(U)LINE 6: INCURSION ENVIRONMENT: INSTALLATION.
(U)LINE 7: TOTAL NUMBER OF SUAS DETECTED (TYPE AND QUANTITY): APPROXIMATELY 20 TOTAL – (18) QUADCOPTERS AND (2) FIXED-WING.
(U)LINE 8: FIRST DETECTION: WITHIN INSTALLATION (RESTRICTED AREA).
(U)LINE 9: DETECTION METHOD: VISUAL/ PHOTO/ VIDEO
(U)LINE 10: SUAS AIRFRAME: (18) QUADCOPTER AND (2) FIXED WING
(U)LINE 11: SUAS DETAILED DESCRIPTION: BLINKING RED, WHITE, AND GREEN LIGHTS, CHANGING INTERMITTENTLY BETWEEN RED AND GREEN
(U)LINE 12: C-SUAS EQUIPMENT OPERATIONAL: N/A
(U)LINE 13: SUAS ENGAGED: NO
(U)LINE 14: SUAS INCURSION HAS A MISSION IMPACT: N/A
(U)LINE 15: SUAS INCURSION NARRATIVE: ON 17 OCT 2025 AT 2020L, MILITARY POLICE RESPONDED TO MULTIPLE DRONE SIGHTINGS AT (b) (3) (A) (ASSAULT CRAFT UNIT 5), LOCATED WEST OF INTERSTATE 5 (I-5) ADJACENT TO THE COASTLINE AT MCB CAMP PENDLETON. REPORTING PARTIES OBSERVED APPROXIMATELY 20 DRONES FLYING FROM THE NORTHWEST TOWARD THE EAST, HOVERING OVER ACU-5 AND ALONG THE COASTLINE. SOME REMAINED AT HIGH ALTITUDE WHILE OTHERS SWARMED IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS, INCLUDING OVER THE OCEAN. NO DRONES HAVE BEEN RECOVERED. NO OPERATORS HAVE BEEN FOUND. DRONES WERE LAST SEEN MOVING NORTH ALONG THE COAST AS FAR AS SAN ONOFRE GATE. CID, NCIS, AND USSS WERE NOTIFIED.
(U)LINE 16: SUAS SERIAL NUMBER(S): UNKNOWN (VISUAL SIGHTING ONLY).
(CUI)LINE 17: OPERATOR INFORMATION: N/A
(U)LINE 17A: NATIONALITY: UNKNOWN, NO CONTACT
(CUI)LINE 17B: CRIMINAL HISTORY: UNKNOWN, NO CONTACT
(CUI)LINE 17C: TERRORIST WATCH LIST STATUS: UNKNOWN, NO CONTACT

(CUI)LINE 17D: REPEAT OFFENDER: UNKNOWN
(U)LINE 18: ACTIONS TAKEN AGAINST INDIVIDUAL(S): N/A

From: (b) (3) (A)
To:
Cc:
Subject: RE: RFI: C-UAS Systems
Date: Thursday, November 20, 2025 11:01:36 AM

Sir,

We are trying to confirm now, but my understanding is that during the period specified (1300-1400 18 Oct), USSS C-UAS efforts were focused on Del Mar, while they were augmented by Border Patrol C-UAS capabilities IVO Red Beach.

For the evening of the 17th, our STORM Team reached out direct to USSS personnel to confirm that they were not operating UAS or C-UAS IVO the drone incursion.

We are asking Border Patrol when their capabilities were emitting on 18 Oct, sir. I'll let you know what they send back to us. Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
MCB Camp Pendleton
Office (b) (3) (A)
Cell/Signal/WhatsApp: (b) (3) (A)
NIPR:
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Thursday, November 20, 2025 8:34 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: RFI: C-UAS Systems

(b) (3) (A)

We are reviewing old emails as we finish fact analysis. Have you already confirmed with USSS that they were not emitting during the period 1300-1400 18 Oct? Looks like you did for the night of 17-18 Oct? How was that done?

They have not returned our queries, so we are looking for alternate methods to plug holes in facts/references.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)
SIPR:
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2025 4:15 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: Data Requirements (extra)

Sir,

On the night of the incident, PMO ran queries with NCIS, USSS, ACU-5, and Range Control IRT UAS employment. All entities reported back that they were not employing any UAS assets at the time of the incursion.

(b) (5)
.

Please let me know if this generates any follow-on RFIs, sir. Happy to help.

Very Respectfully,
(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)
MCB Camp Pendleton
Office: (b) (3) (A)
Cell/Signal/WhatsApp: (b) (3) (A)
NIPR:
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
To:
Cc:

Subject: RE: RFI USSS Spectrum Request
Date: Wednesday, November 19, 2025 4:50:53 PM
Attachments: image001.jpg

(b) (3) (A),

To ensure I accurately address your question, I considered the two most reasonable interpretations and have provided clear responses to each:

1. If you are asking whether the U.S. Secret Service submitted any formal or informal frequency (spectrum) request for their own communications during the 250th Amphibious Demonstration, the answer is no.

2. If you are asking whether the U.S. Secret Service submitted any formal or informal request for the frequencies planned for use by I MEF to command and control the demonstration; specifically for the purpose of deconfliction or preventing electromagnetic interference with USSS communications, the answer is also no.

These considerations were discussed internally within the Communications Coordination planning team to ensure all required frequencies were identified and ready for deconfliction had a request been made. Two days prior to execution, our direct coordination with USSS representatives centered primarily on data support at Del Mar. I hope this information is useful and adequately answers the question. Cc'd is (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A), who had direct contact with the USSS communications team and may be able to provide any additional insights to support the investigation.

V/R,

(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2025 3:25 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)

Subject: RFI USSS Spectrum Request

Good Afternoon Sir,

I am assisting (b) (3) (A), I Marine Expeditionary Force Command Investigating Officer, with relation to the early detonation of an artillery round on 18 Oct 25.

At any time did the United States Secret Service request frequencies for the 250th Amphibious Demonstration?

Any help would be greatly appreciated.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion
MACG-38, 3d MAW
MCB Camp Pendleton, CA
Cell: (b) (3) (A)

Image

Echo Battery
Name, Rank, billet and unit. (b) (3) (A) **What is your artillery background?** -Enlisted Jul 2022 -Ft. Sill Nov 2022 grad Feb 2023 -2/11 Feb 2023 -31st MEU with E Btry -Sect chief course May 2025 -Original sect (gun 1) served as recorder -Field exercises as chief: 3 including the 250th
When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? -Around early September. **What is your billet?** - (b) (3) (A) **Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?** (b) (3) (A) (Sp?) and (b) (3) (A) **When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025?** -0600 **What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun)** -Arrived 16 Oct in the morning. -Dug in -Traced trail arms -Told switch from dirt to the sand -Switched to the sand -First time shooting hotels (bigger charge), practiced digging in -Does not typically shoot hotels **Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?)** -No **Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?** - (b) (3) (A) **and** (b) (3) (A) **List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled.** -Charge 4 hotel M232A1, M795, M767A1, M18 primer **On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times).** -10-15 min **Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)** - (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) (ammo team) -Press button, go straight to PD.

How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)
-He looked at all screens to verify PD
-Did not use EPIAFS because cable is unserviceable
-Trucks moved out of the way and trucks had EPIAFS in them
-Rather do it by hand to show his Marines how to do it in case EPIAFS is not available

Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.
-Prior experience: Never

How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors)
-Self, ammo team, 3 man, arty mech ((b) (3) (A)), (b) (3) (A) others may have checked but he does not remember seeing

Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)
-Yes. Pretty common.

Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe)
-No.

Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently?
-Oct 17: Punched tube, breach maintenance, arty mech made sure everything was done correctly

Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct?
-No

Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun?
-BLT Gunner

Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe.
-No. Even though it was a big event, it felt like any other exercise/shoot.

Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain.
-No

How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
-Very close. Never seen the guns that close.
If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be?
-Nothing

Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot?
-Sect photo

How did you set the fuzes?
-At his gun, sets counterclockwise straight to PD
-Unaware of another method to set fuze

This summary is a fair and accurate representation of the interview on 20251113 between IO Team and (b) (3) (A).

(b) (3) (A)

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Echo Battery

Name, Rank, billet and unit.
(b) (3) (A)

What is your artillery background?
-2nd enlistment
-5th year in service (year in 2nd enlistment)
-Originally in HI as cannoneer (2 years) became recorder then moved when 1/12 disbanded. Sent to Lejeune 2022-2023 as rocketeer. HIMARS in Lejeune.
-Third duty station in 5 years.
-Checked into 2/11 Aug 10, 2024, as a Cpl. Served as cannoneer #1. Went to gunner's course, picked up Sgt and became a chief.
-At gunner's course (2 weeks) they learn how to lay the gun using optical fire control (OFC). Learned fire missions and different ways to conduct fire missions.
-Spent about 1 month as a gunner.
-Went to section chief course (4-5 weeks). Graduated around Mar/Apr 2025.
-As section chief, shot 3 times prior to 18 Oct.
-Last time E Btry had 6 guns was in July.

When were you told you would participate in the ADEX?
-Around early September.

What is your billet?
-(b) (3) (A)

Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?
(b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) (pending time)

When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025?
-Probably around 0600.

What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun)
-1600

Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?)
-No

Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?
- (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A)

List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled.
-767A1s, HE, H charges

On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times).
-4-5 min

Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?
-No

Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)
-Ammo team: (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) (Sp?)

-Verified by [redacted] (b) (3) (A)

How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)
-Verified not gray screened (fault with the battery inside the fuze) by himself, BG, and [redacted] (b) (3) (A)
-Did not have grade 3 fuzes to his knowledge until second round that had to be punched
Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.
-Prior experience: has seen a fuze gray screened, told him to grab the EPIAFS, interrogated it and it was set to PD, shot it

How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors)
-ready board inspected 4 times
-Ammo team, self, recorder, BG, PltSgt, PltCmdr

Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)
-Yes. The arty mech would come fix it.
Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe)
-No. Pelators helped muffle the sounds of the guns but still hear the Marines.

Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently?
-Oct 17: breach maint, punched tube, firing mech on, hooked up 25ft and 6ft lanyards and both worked, checked comms with FDC.

Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct?
-Small birds flying around (seagulls)

Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun?
-Nobody on 18 Oct, but did have a WHPO media person on the 17th. Just walking around the gun, asking for advice on placement for best shots.

Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe.
-No.

Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain.
-Feels like they did everything the right way. If there were any fuzes that were set improperly, it would have had to happen during loading which he believes did not happen.

How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
-He has seen the guns in a similar manner to the 18th in Hawaii. Some guns in Hawaii had to be set closer due to available space (Scofield).

If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be?
-Would not change anything

Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot?
-No

How did you set the fuzes?
-At his gun, sets counterclockwise straight to PD since it's a 767A1

This summary is a fair and accurate representation of the interview on 20251113 between IO Team and (b) (3) (A) .

(b) (3) (A)

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
Fuze with blank LCD and evidence of activation
(hatch mark not aligned)
Box: 4
Fuze: 3

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	Cannoneer #4 Gun 1
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

1. **Describe your role and primary responsibilities during the exercise.**

As a cannoneer #4 i was in charge of loading the projectile onto to the loading tray. I was also in charge of making sure cannoneer #5 and myself physically set the time fuze was set on the right setting for the fire mission that was going to occur

2. **Who was assigned to your gun crew on the day of the event?**

Section chief: (b) (3) (A)
Gunner: (b) (3) (A)
A- Gunner: (b) (3) (A)
Cannoneer #1 (b) (3) (A)
Cannoneer #2
Cannoneer #3
Cannoneer #4
Cannoneer #5

3. **Did you observe any visitors or non-crew personnel on or near your gun? (list names and reason for presence)**

The Photographer was recording.

4. **Who are the members of your Cannon Ammunition Team?**

Cannoneer #4 (b) (3) (A)
Cannoneer #5
Recorder and Section Chief as well as the Ammo team all verify that the Ammo is good to go before firing any mission that may come down.

5. **Which Marines handled fuzes on your gun? (list names and duties)**

Cannoneer# 4 (b) (3) (A)
Cannoneer #5

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	Cannonneer# 4, Gun 1
Rank	Last Name, First Name, MI.	Billet / Gun # / Section

6. **Who determines or confirms that a round is Grade 3 ammunition on your gun? (name and billet)**

The Ammo techs.

7. **Describe any differences in procedures from a normal battery shoot. (what changed and why)**

Nothing was done differently than what the gun section would do during any other fire misson when it comes to proper procedures for operating the howitzer.

8. **Are you aware of any Marines having issues with your section that weren't focused on the task at hand?**

No

9. **Any additional comments related to the exercise/event?**

No

10. **Do you have any photos/videos from the exercise/event? (Describe content)**

No

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	CANNONER #4/GUN 2
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

1. **Describe your role and primary responsibilities during the exercise.**

MY RESPONSIBLITY DURING THIS FIELD OP WAS SETTING THE FUZES AND LOADING THE ROUND

2. **Who was assigned to your gun crew on the day of the event?**

(b) (3) (A) WAS OUR CHIEF, (b) (3) (A) WAS OUR A.CHIEF/ #1 CANNONIER, (b) (3) (A) WAS OUR CANNONIER #2, (b) (3) (A) WAS CANNONIER #4, (b) (3) (A) WAS CANNONIER #5 AND (b) (3) (A) WAS OUR RECORDER

3. **Did you observe any visitors or non-crew personnel on or near your gun? (list names and reason for presence)**

THERE WERE ABOUT 4/5 CAMERA MEN WEARING CIVILIAN CLOTHES BUT WITH FLAKS AND KEVLARS WALKING THROUGHOUT THE GUN LINE. THEY WALKED IN BETWEEN GUNS AS WELL AS BEHIND GUNLINE.

4. **Who are the members of your Cannon Ammunition Team?**

(b) (3) (A) ALONG WITH (b) (3) (A)

5. **Which Marines handled fuzes on your gun? (list names and duties)**

I FUZED THE ROUNDS AND HAD THEM CHECKED BY OUR CHIEF (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	CANNONER #4/GUN2
Rank	Last Name, First Name, MI.	Billet / Gun # / Section

6. **Who determines or confirms that a round is Grade 3 ammunition on your gun? (name and billet)**

I DONT KNOW

7. **Describe any differences in procedures from a normal battery shoot. (what changed and why)**

THE ONLY DIFFERENCE FROM A REGULAR BATTERY SHOOT WAS THE LOCATION BEING ON THE BEACH, EVERYTHING ELSE WAS PRETTY STANDARD. THE GUNS WERE CLOSER THAN THEY USUALLY ARE.

8. **Are you aware of any Marines having issues with your section that weren't focused on the task at hand?**

NO

9. **Any additional comments related to the exercise/event?**

N/A

10. **Do you have any photos/videos from the exercise/event? (Describe content)**

N/A

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	CANNONEER 4/ GUN 5/ 2ND PLT.
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

1. **Describe your role and primary responsibilities during the exercise.**

MY ROLE AS AN ARTILLERY CANNONEER CREWMAN POSITION NUMBER 4 IS TO BRING THE PROJECTILE TO THE SECTION CHIEF TO VERIFY THE ROUND AND FUZE AND SETTING FOR THE FUZE AND LOAD THE PROJECTILE ONTO THE LOADING TRAY AND THAN RAM THE PROJECTILE WITH DRIVER. MY PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES DURING THE EXCERCISE WAS TO LIFT THE PROJECTILE BRING IT TO THE CHIEF TO VERIFY THE PROJECTILE AND FUZE AND SETTING THEN CHIEF WILL TAP MY SHOULDER ONCE VERIFICATION IS GOOD TO GO AND THAN I WOULD LOAD THE PROJECTILE ONTO THE LOADING TRAY AND THAN RAM THE PROJECTILE INTO THE TUBE WITH DRIVER.

2. **Who was assigned to your gun crew on the day of the event?**

THE FOLLOWING MARINES THAT I CAN RECALL ON THE GUN CREW WHERE THE FOLLOWING (b) (3) (A)

3. **Did you observe any visitors or non-crew personnel on or near your gun? (list names and reason for presence)**

I DID NOT OBSERVE ANY VISITORS OR NON-CREW PERSONNEL.

4. **Who are the members of your Cannon Ammunition Team?**

(b) (3) (A)

5. **Which Marines handled fuzes on your gun? (list names and duties)**

(b) (3) (A) CANNONEER NUMBER 5

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	CANNONEER NUMBER 4/ GUN 5/ 2ND PLT.
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

6. **Who determines or confirms that a round is Grade 3 ammunition on your gun? (name and billet)**

AMMO TECHNITION
I DO NOT REMEBER THE NAME OF THE SAID MARINE.

7. **Describe any differences in procedures from a normal battery shoot. (what changed and why)**

NOTHING CHANGED

8. **Are you aware of any Marines having issues with your section that weren't focused on the task at hand?**

I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY ISSUES WITH ANY MARINES.

9. **Any additional comments related to the exercise/event?**

NONE

10. **Do you have any photos/videos from the exercise/event? (Describe content)**

NO.

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	CANNONEER 4/ GUN 6/ 2ND PLATOON
Rank	Last Name, First Name, MI.	Billet / Gun # / Section

1. **Describe your role and primary responsibilities during the exercise.**

MY ROLE DURING THIS EXERCISE WAS FUZING THE PROJECTILES AND LOADING THEM ONTO THE HOWITZER

2. **Who was assigned to your gun crew on the day of the event?**

(b) (3) (A)

3. **Did you observe any visitors or non-crew personnel on or near your gun? (list names and reason for presence)**

I DONT RECALL ANY VISTORS ON THE DAY OF THE SHOOTING WE HAD ONE VISITOR THE DAY PIOR WHO WAS WITH THE WHITEHOUSE MEDIA

4. **Who are the members of your Cannon Ammunition Team?**

IT WAS MYSELF (b) (3) (A) CANNONEER 4 AND (b) (3) (A) CANNONEER 5

5. **Which Marines handled fuzes on your gun? (list names and duties)**

MYSELF CANNONEER 4 AND CANNONEER 5 (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	CANNONEER 4/GUN 6/ 2ND PLATOON
Rank	Last Name, First Name, MI.	Billet / Gun # / Section

6. **Who determines or confirms that a round is Grade 3 ammunition on your gun? (name and billet)**

IT WOULD BE THE AMMO TECHS

7. **Describe any differences in procedures from a normal battery shoot. (what changed and why)**

I HAVE NOT SHOT ON THE BEACH BEFORE. NOTHING ELSE WAS DIFFERENT ON THE DAY OF SHOOTING WE DID EVERYHTING BY THE TM

8. **Are you aware of any Marines having issues with your section that weren't focused on the task at hand?**

NOBODY HAD ANY ISSUES

9. **Any additional comments related to the exercise/event?**

NO ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

10. **Do you have any photos/videos from the exercise/event? (Describe content)**

I DO NOT HAVE ANY PHOTOS OR VIDEOS

(b) (3) (A)

I-5 Closure Camp Pendleton Area

Published: Oct 18, 2025

Date: October 18, 2025

District: Headquarters

Contact: Matthew Rocco

Phone: (916) 501-3547

UNSCHEDULED CLOSURE OF I-5 IN THE REGION OF CAMP PENDLETON

OCEANSIDE, Calif.— Due to safety concerns, a section of Interstate 5 will be closed today, Saturday, October 18, due to a White House-directed military event at Camp Pendleton involving live ammunition being discharged over the freeway.

For public safety, a section of Interstate 5 today from Harbor Drive to Basilone Road will be closed between approximately noon until the end of the event.

Because of the event and closure, drivers should expect delays on Interstate 5 and other state routes throughout Southern California before, during, and after the event.

Before traveling through the region, drivers are encouraged to visit http://quickmap.dot.ca.gov/ for real-time traffic information.

Passenger rail service on the adjacent rail line will also be disrupted for a time this afternoon. For more details on Pacific Surfliner and Metrolink service adjustments and latest information, visit *pacificsurfliner.com/alerts* or *metrolinktrains.com* .

In San Diego County, the detour to head north will begin at State Route 15 in southeast San Diego. Travelers west of SR-15 along the I-5 corridor in San Diego are advised to use SR-94, SR-52, SR-56, or SR-78 to I-15 north.

Travelers from San Diego heading to Los Angeles County are advised to use I-15 north to State Route 91 west into Los Angeles. Travelers starting in Los Angeles heading south to San Diego should use SR-91 east to I-15 south.

To get to Orange County from San Diego, travelers are advised to take I-15 north to SR-91 west then SR-55 south. Travelers from Orange County heading south to San Diego, will use SR-55 north to SR-91 east to I-15 south.

Travelers to and from Riverside County are advised to take I-15 and SR-91.

###

CleanCA.com | CleanWaterCA.com | #BeWorkZoneAlert

Search (Ctrl+E)

Luedtke answers 250th Beach Rally FAQs Chat

Some people in this chat are outside your org. It's possible they have message-related policies that will apply to the chat. Learn more

South bound is closed now

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 11:33 AM

Do we have a timeframe for how long the I-5 will closed and in which directions?

and location of closure. Where does it start and where does it end

RFI from 1stMarDiv CoS

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 11:37 AM

> (b) (3) (A) 10/18/2025 11:33 AM
> Do we have a timeframe for how long the I-5 will closed and in which directions?

UPDATE

Due to an event at Camp Pendleton today, October 18th, Interstate 5 will be closed from Harbor Drive to Basilone Road between 11:00 am and 3:00 pm. Drivers should expect delays on Interstate 5 and other state routes throughout Southern California before, during, and after the event.

Before traveling through the region, drivers are encouraged to visit https://quickmap.dot.ca.gov/ for real-time traffic information. Thank you for your patience; please drive safely.

#CHP #Caltrans #I5 #CampPendleton #Traffic #SafetyServiceSecurity

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 11:39 AM

Standing next the 5 now and it is dead quiet

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 11:43 AM

Thank you

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 11:45 AM

BOBCAT at RON. Van open.

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 11:46 AM

3dMAW still has 123PAX awaiting pickup at 41 area. Any essay on pickup time?

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 11:51 AM Edited

3 buses are there now and the Marines are loading. they will depart in the next 5-10min

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 11:54 AM

3x CH-53s W/D at Del Mar.

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 12:02 PM

CHP will temporarily reopen the I-5. Working now.

Search (Ctrl+E)

Luedtke answers 250th Beach Rally FAQs Chat

Some people in this chat are outside your org. It's possible they have message-related policies that will apply to the chat. Learn more

3x CH-53s W/D at Del Mar.

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 12:02 PM

CHP will temporarily reopen the I-5. Working now.

(b) (3) (A) added (b) (3) (A) to the chat and shared all chat history.

(b) (3) (A) added I MEF CDO to the chat and shared all chat history.

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 12:13 PM

> (b) (3) (A) 10/18/2025 11:37 AM
> UPDATE Due to an event at Camp Pendleton today, October 18th, Interstate 5 will be closed from Harbor Drive to Basilone Road...

https://traffic.511sd.com/#incidentAlerts?timeFrame=TODAY&layers=incidentReports%2CgoogleTraffi...

(b) (3) (A) added (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) to the chat and shared all chat history.

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 12:41 PM

BOBCAT O/M to Red Beach

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 12:51 PM

At 1310. Traffic will halt on the I-5. Will call when reopened.

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 1:54 PM

Arty Fire has been turned off. We are working with CHP to confirm not debrief on the 5 before they open

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 2:00 PM

Demo complete. Bobcat preparing to move.

(b) (3) (A) 10/18 2:16 PM

Bobcat W/U

I-5 reopened

Bobcat W/D.

Monday, October 20

(b) (3) (A) left the chat.

Monday, October 27

(b) (3) (A) left the chat.

Friday

(b) (3) (A) left the chat.

Type a message

Enclosure (71)

S
MP
ICP
EOD
NCIS
SRT
CID
VIP
Enclosure (72

Enclosure (73)


(b) (3) (A)
Enclosure (74)

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	A/COMM CHIEF/ COMM
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

1. **Describe your role and primary responsibilities during the exercise.**

I WAS ASSIGNED TO ASSIST THE COMMUNICATIONS CHIEF WITH ANY TASKS THAT WERE SENT DOWN. I WAS CHARGED TO ENSURE COMMUNICATION WAS OPERATIONAL ACROSS THE BATTERY AND ALL ADDITIONAL UNITS (IE: RANGE CONTROL AND FORWARD OBSERVERS).

2. **Who was assigned to your gun crew on the day of the event?**

MY CHIEF WAS (b) (3) (A), I WAS THE ASSISANT CHIEF, AND I HAD (b) (3) (A) AND (b) (3) (A) AS MY RADIO OPERATORS.

3. **Did you observe any visitors or non-crew personnel on or near your gun? (list names and reason for presence)**

THERE WAS A CAMERA MAN IN CIVILIAN ATTIRE THAT WAS NEAR OUR TENT HOWEVER HE NEVER WENT INSIDE THE NET. I WAS ASSUMING HE WAS JUST THERE TO FILM FOR THE BIRTHDAY VIDEO.

4. **Who are the members of your Cannon Ammunition Team?**

N/A

5. **Which Marines handled fuzes on your gun? (list names and duties)**

N/A

(b) (3) (A)	[redacted]	A/ COMM CHIEF / COMM
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

6. **Who determines or confirms that a round is Grade 3 ammunition on your gun? (name and billet)**

N/A

7. **Describe any differences in procedures from a normal battery shoot. (what changed and why)**

WE BROUGHT OUT THE STANDARD RADIOS WE USE FOR A BATTERY SHOOT. FOR EXAMPLE, PRC-117G, PRC-163, PRC-153. THE PRC-117G WAS USED VIA POINT TO GROUP VIA SATALITE COMMUNICATIONS TO THE FORWARD OBSERVERS. THE PRC-163 WAS UTILIZED FOR RANGE CONTROL AND EXERCISE CONTROL. THE PRC-153 WERE USED FOR INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS ACROSS THE BATTERY. THE DAY PRIOR WE HAD ISSUES WITH HF DURING REHEARSALS BUT NO ISSUES ON THE 18TH.

8. **Are you aware of any Marines having issues with your section that weren't focused on the task at hand?**

NEGATIVE.

9. **Any additional comments related to the exercise/event?**

N/A

10. **Do you have any photos/videos from the exercise/event? (Describe content)**

NEGATIVE.

[redacted]

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	RADIO OPERATOR(FDC)
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

1. **Describe your role and primary responsibilities during the exercise.**

I SERVED AS A SECONDARY RADIO OPERATOR FOR THE FDC, KEEPING POSITIVE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE GUNLINE AND FDC VIA PRC153 AND ANW2 DIGITAL WITH THE AFATDS.

2. **Who was assigned to your gun crew on the day of the event?**

(b) (3) (A) COMM CHIEF/ A SLASH), (b) (3) (A) COMM CHIEF), (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) PRIMARY RADIO OPERATOR) AND MYSELF WERE ASSIGNED TO THE COMMUNITCATION TEAM IN THE FDC.

3. **Did you observe any visitors or non-crew personnel on or near your gun? (list names and reason for presence)**

THERE WAS A VISTOR IN CIVILIAN ATTIRE, THAT WAS PRESENT DURING THE 250TH SHOOT. HE WAS WEARING A BLACK T-SHIRT AND BLACL FLAK. THERE WAS ALSO A PHOITOGRAPHER WALKING AROUND BUT NEVER SET FOOT INSIDE THE FDC TENT.

4. **Who are the members of your Cannon Ammunition Team?**

I DO NOT KNOW WHO THESE MARINES ARE.

5. **Which Marines handled fuzes on your gun? (list names and duties)**

I DO NOT KNOW WHO THESE MARINES ARE.

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	RADIO OPERATOR(FDC)
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

6. **Who determines or confirms that a round is Grade 3 ammunition on your gun? (name and billet)**

I DO NOT KNOW.

7. **Describe any differences in procedures from a normal battery shoot. (what changed and why)**

I DO NOT RECALL ANY DIFFERENCES IN PROCEDURES FROM A NORMAL BATTERY SHOOT.

8. **Are you aware of any Marines having issues with your section that weren't focused on the task at hand?**

I WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY ISSUES.

9. **Any additional comments related to the exercise/event?**

DURING THE 250TH SHOOT, THERE WAS POSITIVE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE GUN LINE, FDC AND EXCON. PROPER COMMUNICATION CHECKS WERE DONE BEFORE HAND AND THE DAY PRIOR DURING THE REHERSAL.

10. **Do you have any photos/videos from the exercise/event? (Describe content)**

I DO HAVE PHOTOS FROM THE PREPERATION FOR THE 250TH, BUT DID NOT TAKE ANY DURING THE EXECUTION OF THE EVENT.

(b) (3) (A
(b) (3) (A
(b) (3) (A
(b) (3) (A
Enclosure (77)

LAAD Leadership

1. **Name, Rank, billet and unit.**
   (b) (3) (A)
2. **What is your Ground Based Air Defense background?**
   One year
3. **Where were you located during the exercise?**
   At home of record
4. **When you notified LAAD was to participate in the exercise?**
   September 30th
5. **Were any other MACCS Agencies involved in the exercise?**
   There was a Marine Mobile Team at LZ HOLF
6. **Who did you provide a confirmation brief too?**
   No confirmation brief was required, attended a meeting October 1st where she was notified they would fall under 3/5 CAAT platoon and fulfil a static display with the L-MADIS and Field Handling Trainers (FHTs) a stinger training aid that emits nothing.
7. **Who was the supported unit and what was the command relationship?**
   3/5 CAAT Platoon, Direct Support but LAAD was not involved within a tactical scenario just fulfilling static display functions.
8. **What time did the LAAD Marines occupy Red Beach?**
   0800 October 17th
9. **What frequencies if any were allocated and used during the exercise?**
   No
10. **During the exercise was there any authority or capability to go "buzzer on"?**
    No
11. **What was the team's information requirements and to who?**
    No
12. **Were the RPS-62s emitting at any time during the exercise?**
    No
13. **Did the Marines report any sightings of sUAS, abnormally large groups of birds, or any other abnormalities in the airspace?**
    No
14. **Were there any additional cUAS systems present in the exercise?**
    Not to her knowledge

Additional Comments

They were there in a display function not tactically employing or emitting.

This summary is a fair and accurate representation of the interview on 20251117 between IO Team and (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

This transmission contains information that is protected from disclosure by the Privacy Act (5 USC 552a) and exemption (b) (6) of the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552, as amended). Ensure that this information is used solely for the requested purpose. Further duplication and/or distribution without prior authorization from this office is not authorized. Civil and/or criminal penalties can apply for improper use.

From: [redacted]
To:

Subject: FW: REQUEST: I MEF Command Investigation
Date: Thursday, November 20, 2025 4:50:01 PM
Attachments: image001.png
Camp Pendleton - Damage Report.pdf

Just got this response. Nothing new, but a better source document for CHP locations.
I will dump the email and the pdf into the folder “damage or injuries from incident.”
I will look to update footnotes tomorrow afternoon if no one else beats me to it.

Respectfully,

[redacted]
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: [redacted]
MIOC Office:
NIPR: [redacted]
SIPR:
MOC SIPR Tandberg: [redacted]
MIOC SIPR Tandberg:
TSVOIP:[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, November 20, 2025 4:37 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: REQUEST: I MEF Command Investigation

Good evening, [redacted]

The California Highway Patrol completed an “Incident Report” of the event which has already been provided; however, I attached it here for your quick reference. The report answers most of your questions, and for the two questions not answered within the report, please note that no electronic countermeasures were employed, nor do we possess any video footage of the detonation.

Thank you for your patience and I hope the above helps with your investigation.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2025 4:18 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: REQUEST: I MEF Command Investigation

(b) (6),

Happy to talk now if that's ok.
Today's desk phone: (b) (3) (A)

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)

[redacted]
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office
NIPR:
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg:
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2025 4:16 PM

To: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Re: REQUEST: I MEF Command Investigation

Evening (b) (3) (A)
The request has gone through channels and I have received feedback today. If you'd like we can chat later this evening or tomorrow.

(b) (6)

Get Outlook for iOS

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2025 16:12
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: REQUEST: I MEF Command Investigation

(b) (6)
We spoke on 10 Nov that my requests for information were being handled by CHP legal channels. Very understandable, as I expressed on the phone. With that said, I am beginning to draft the final report of investigation and a response from CHP is one of the few outstanding currently on checklist. Do you have an estimate as to when CHP will be able to respond?
On a separate note, we have seen from media that there was a CHP report about the incident. Can you share that report with me or direct me where to look?

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office:
NIPR:
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, November 10, 2025 11:36 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] REQUEST: I MEF Command Investigation

Good morning (b) (3) (A)
I am (b) (6) with the California Highway Patrol. I am the Division Commander for all Highway Patrol jurisdictional responsibilities for the lower portion of Southern California. I was forwarded your request and just tried to give you a call to converse over the phone. Before I respond to this request I will have to pass it through our legal affairs, but I wanted to clarify one item first. Please see below. Thank you (b) (3) (A) in advance and I appreciate your time as I know you are extremely busy in I MEF.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Friday, November 7, 2025 15:08
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Subject: REQUEST: I MEF Command Investigation

Good Afternoon (b) (3) (A),

I am (b) (3) (A) and on behalf of the Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force, I am leading the Command Investigation into the early detonation of an artillery round on 18 Oct 25. This is an administrative investigation. The Commanding General has directed me to pursue answers to very specific questions for the record. I recognize you have answered some of these before, but our intent is to capture and consolidate information in an official document to reduce future correspondence.

* What damaged was incurred by California Highway Patrol as a result of the early detonation of the artillery round?
* Were there any electronic countermeasures employed by your agency on the 18th of Oct? Define electronic countermeasure
* Do you have any Dash Cam, Body Cam, or other video footage of the detonation; even if only debris hitting the road or CHP property? This will be provided to technical experts for analysis of potential malfunctions and potentially increase safety. The time of the detonation was on or about 1:45pm Pacific Daylight Time, Saturday 18 Oct 2025.
* What specific locations did CHP close Interstate 5. When did this decision occur and when was it in place?

Thank you for your assistance with this investigation. Please let me know if you have any questions

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)
SIPR:
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg:
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

Enclosure (80)

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	GUNNER GUN #3 1ST PLT
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

1. **Describe your role and primary responsibilities during the exercise.**

MY ROLE AND PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES IS TO BE THE GUNNER, THIS INCLUDES LAYING THE GUN WITH ASSISTANCE OF THE SECTION CHEIF. GETTING MY MAX LEFT AND MAX RIGHT OF THE GUNS TRAVERSING LIMITS, AND TO ENSURE THE WEAPON SYSTEM IS LAYED ON THE CORRECT DEFLECTION BEFORE SHOOTING THE WEAPON.

2. **Who was assigned to your gun crew on the day of the event?**

(b) (3) (A)

3. **Did you observe any visitors or non-crew personnel on or near your gun? (list names and reason for presence)**

ONLY PERSONNEL I OBSERVED THAT WAS NOT CREW RELATED WAS THE CAMAERA MAN, WHO WAS THERE TO RECORD THE SHOOT THIS WAS TWO MARINES IN UNIFORM BEHIND THE GUN LINE RECORDING FROM A DISTANCE, THESE MARINES IN NO WAY TOUCHED THE WEAPON SYSTEM, AND DID NOT HAVE ANY INTERACTIONS WITH THE CANNONERS OR MARINES ON THE WEAPON SYSTEM.

4. **Who are the members of your Cannon Ammunition Team?**

CANNONER NUMBERS 3, 4, 5, AND THE RECORDER

5. **Which Marines handled fuzes on your gun? (list names and duties)**

(b) (3) (A) CANNONER NUMBER 4

(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	GUNNER GUN#3 1ST PLT
Rank	**Last Name, First Name, MI.**	**Billet / Gun # / Section**

6. **Who determines or confirms that a round is Grade 3 ammunition on your gun? (name and billet)**

THE AMMUNITION TECHS I DO NOT RECALL THERE NAMES OR RANKS

7. **Describe any differences in procedures from a normal battery shoot. (what changed and why)**

ONLY DIFFERENCES WAS BEING PLACED ON THE BEACH AND HAVING HOWITZERS CLOSSER THAN USUAL.

8. **Are you aware of any Marines having issues with your section that weren't focused on the task at hand?**

NO. ALL MARINES ON GUN 3 ARE ALWAYS PRIORITIZING THE MISSION FIRST

9. **Any additional comments related to the exercise/event?**

N/A

10. **Do you have any photos/videos from the exercise/event? (Describe content)**

NO.

Enclosure (82)

Investigation Diagram - Overview





Description	Meters
Range to Fire mission *Should Hit Data* from BTRY Pos	(b) (3) (A)
Range to Did Hit Data / Early Burst from BTRY	
SB CHP Offset from SDZ	
NB CHP Offset from SDZ	

(b) (3) (A)

Early Burst Video Capture

E BTRY FDC
Perspective from Range Control personnel

E BTRY Gun 3
E BTRY Gun 2

(b) (3) (A)

Artillery Ammunition Chain of Custody 15-21 Oct 2025

15 Oct 1300 Approx.
-(b) (3) (A) BLT 3/5 Ammo Chief Draws Ammo from CPEN ASP. Ammunition was inspected prior to accepting. No scratches or dents. Everything was properly secured, banded, and palletized. Ammo cans were sealed by ASP. (1)

15 Oct 1330 Approx.
-BLT 3/5 Ammo is staged on ammunition truck and transported to Red Beach by Ammo Techs on 7-Ton with 593 Trailer. (b) (3) (A) was armed guard. No stops made enroute. (1)

15 Oct
-BLT 3/5 Ammo remains staged on ammunition truck at Red Beach. Ammo Techs. Ammo Techs and Driver remain with ammunition loaded on the truck, banded and unopened under cover of tarp. Ammo Techs establish firewatch with additional rover patrolling around vics. (1)

16 Oct 1430
-Bty E occupies TA BCH RED.
-Ammunition is transferred from (b) (3) (A) to (b) (3) (A)
-All ammunition was inspected, accounted for and remained on truck unopened until 17 Oct rehearsal.
-Bty E bivouacked on site

17 Oct 1200
Bty E broke out:
- (30) M795 HE rounds
- (32) M767A1 fuzes
- (150) M232A1 propellants
- (36) M82 primers

17 Oct
-Ammo was inspected by Ammo Techs prior to being distributed to each section on the gunline. (1)

17 Oct-
-(30) rounds of M795/M767A1 expended during live fire rehearsal. (2)

18 Oct 1100
Bty E broke out:
- (60) M795 HE rounds
- (60) M767A1 fuzes
  - LOT#BTF04M001-028
- (210) M232A1 propellants
- (89) M82 primers

-Upon inspection (3) M767A1 fuzes were identified and marked as Grade 3 w/DTG and placed in marked containers to the rear of the gunline away from ammo pit. (2)

18 Oct
-Three additional fuzes were then moved from Ammo Truck to gunline. Once all ammo was inspected and accounted for the remaining fuses were manually set to "PD" and verified by section chiefs, platoon sergeant, platoon commander, executive officer and battery commander at least four times . (2)

18 Oct
-1345 "Senators" (Airspace cleared)
-1346 Bty E fired first volley at priority target AF2000. (Only 5 howitzers were operational. Gun 3 experienced linkage lever failure and did not fire).
-1346 Range Control calls check fire after observing airburst IVO I-5. (3)

18 Oct: 1346 FDC/Battery Leadership Commanded "Check fire to the rear of the piece fall in" (1)

18 Oct 1530 Approx Reg Field Artillery Chief arrives at battery and beings gunline cannon investigation checklist. (1)

18 Oct 1600 Approx Reg Ops Chief arrives at battery and begins FDC cannon investigation checklist

18 Oct 1720 Approx Reg OPSO arrives at battery, consolidates and reviews all Apdx F documentation and conducts Apdx N Cannon Ammo Malfunction Checklist. All tubes are punched and inspected to ensure "PD"

18 Oct 1840
Investigation complete. Determination was made that the cause of the incident was ammo malfunction of the M767A1 fuze causing premature airburst. (1)

18 Oct 2030
Ammo returned to ASP and staged in secured ammo lot. (1)

20-21 Oct
Ammo Techs conduct turn-in w/ASP personnel. (1)

21 Oct
2/11 Ammunition and Explosives officer (b) (3) (A) reviews ASP Paperwork (1), (4)

21 Oct
All fuzes that had been opened are inspected by ESED

From: (b) (3) (A)
To:
Cc:

Subject: RE: CI: Fuze Damage Hypotheses
Date: Tuesday, November 25, 2025 5:03:36 PM
Attachments: Flight Intersection Theory.pptx

(b) (3) (A),

While our initial modelling did indicate the trajectories could cross, attached is the information used to determine a low probability for projectiles from gun 5 and 6 striking each other in flight. A couple of assumptions in the modelling were that projectiles had stable flight, there was no other issues like improper loading of extra propellant or other human induced defects. Also, our coordinates were taken from the original data so if there had been any revisions we would have to revisit.

Was there ever a final statement on how many rounds impacted in the range. That would certainly help lower the probability even further if there were 3 rounds that impacted.

(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2025 9:18 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: CI: Fuze Damage Hypotheses

(b) (3) (A),

The attached was just recently made available to me.

Marine Corps School of Artillery notes in 2.f.(2) the possibility of in-flight collision. I though you all had ruled that out based on technical data and analysis of the firing sequence. Can you confirm if and how inflight collision was ruled out?

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office
NIPR:
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, November 24, 2025 5:26 PM
To:
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: CI: Fuze Damage Hypotheses

(b) (3) (A),
Comments on your questions below:

Is it plausible that the overpressure force exiting the muzzle brake from a proximate gun could have damaged a nearby fuze as it emerged from the barrel?
We believe this scenario is low probability relative to the next scenario where pressure from adjacent weapon could cause unstable flight. Only scenario that could have occurred would be fuze damage due to the projectile striking the muzzle brake on exit. This would have caused damage to the muzzle brake and from the post firing LTI there was no noted damage.

Is it plausible that the overpressure force exiting the muzzle brake from a proximate gun could have induced yaw on a nearby shell as it exited from the barrel?
Yes, this is possible. How probable has yet to be determined but based on literature and gun position this is a scenario we have not been able to rule out.

In the case of the induced yaw scenario, could the subsequent unstable flight potentially impart forces on the fuze for which it was not designed?
Yes, if the projectile experienced unstable flight it would create forces on the fuze

outside its design envelope. How severe is yet to be determined.

Is it plausible that those forces could have induced a failure of the fuze that resulted in an early detonation?
Yes. The mechanism that could cause initiation is unknown at this point but it is possible that the unstable flight creates forces that could damage fuze and create a failure mechanism which could cause an early detonation.

Can you speak to if it will be feasible to test these hypotheses in the near future and comment on any hurdles that would need to be overcome? This will aid detailed recommendations from my report that could result in resourcing advocacy for near term testing.
Our belief is that there is someone in the Army who could 1) Either confirm or reject the theory that unstable flight was caused by the pressure wave from the adjacent weapon and 2) Either confirm or reject the theory unstable flight could cause damage or forces significant enough to cause the early fuze functioning.
Additionally, modelling or testing the hypothesis would be feasible. Costs and timelines are to be determined.

Out of curiosity, did you have any other items in your fault tree you are trying to narrow in on? If you would like to discuss any of the above tomorrow, please feel free to reach out to my cell (b) (3) (A).

Thanks,
(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, November 24, 2025 7:38 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: FW: CI: Fuze Damage Hypotheses

(b) (3) (A),

Is this your email address? If so, can you address the questions posed to (b) (3) (A) below? We are trying to source the latest hypotheses and go into report finalization. Your adjustments/confirmation will be very helpful for us staying on timeline.

Respectfully,

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Saturday, November 22, 2025 8:09 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: CI: Fuze Damage Hypotheses

(b) (3) (A),

The following questions are to capture for the record our mutual hypotheses as to how the M767A1 may have been compromised (including Faraday Cage ESD protections) due to the close proximity of the muzzles from each other in the artillery firing position on 18 Oct 25. A consolidated response will support opinions in the Command Investigation as we transition to writing and publishing our report. Please feel free to elaborate or correct terminology, adjust qualifiers, etc. in your responses.

Is it plausible that the overpressure force exiting the muzzle brake from a proximate gun could have damaged a nearby fuze as it emerged from the barrel?

Is it plausible that the overpressure force exiting the muzzle brake from a proximate gun could have induced yaw on a nearby shell as it exited from the barrel?

In the case of the induced yaw scenario, could the subsequent unstable flight potentially impart forces on the fuze for which it was not designed?

Is it plausible that those forces could have induced a failure of the fuze that resulted in an early detonation?

Can you speak to if it will be feasible to test these hypotheses in the near future and comment on any hurdles that would need to be overcome? This will aid detailed recommendations from my report that could result in resourcing advocacy for near term

testing.

It continues to be a privilege to work with such a dedicated and knowledgeable teammate. Thank you for all the assistance so far.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)
SIPR:
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

Enclosure (85)

Preliminary Trajectory Analysis Summary



(b) (3) (A), (b) (5)

[redacted]



[redacted]

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only; technical information (20 October 2025). Other requests for this document shall be referred to Product Manager Ammunition, Marine Corps Systems Command (PMM-152), 59 Tech Parkway, Stafford VA 22556

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

Enclosure (87)

Questions for NSWC Engineers

1. When and how did you first become involved in this incident?

-Heard via news reports after the incident, began prep-work on Sunday. Looked at specifications waiting for malfunction report which came in on Monday.
-Prep-work was a standard baseline for any ammo malfunction which included reviewing specifications of the item, item history, previous malfunction reports (if any).

2. What evidence/exhibits do you have in your possession? How and when did you acquire them?

-Standard malfunction reporting process, requested documents from using unit, ASP, basically just asked for all documentation of all involved parties. Not in the business of doing investigative work, as far as asking specific questions, etc.
-Went to ASP to look at the fuzes on 21 Oct.

3. Have any tests been run on the fuzes in your possession?

-Only visual and manual manipulation in a sample of 8 that were taken. Pendleton EOD helped safe the fuzes.
-Why 8 fuzes: factory packaging is 8. Was not a mathematical sample, just convenient. The rest of the fuzes remained at ASP and may still be co-located within same lot but should still be segregated. The whole lot is suspended, and the ones returned by 2/11 are segregated after turn-in.
-Need POCs of personnel at ASP who did the segregation.
-MLG may be the one covering down on ASP OIC duties/ownership.

4. Can you state for the record why two fuzes are listed as being set to .2s and 9.0s in one of the documents you sent us?

-See answers from 11th Reg OpsO and Ops Chief.

5. Can you, will you provide us with reliability data for this shell fuze combination for the record via separate correspondence?

-Combined reliability is not tracked (shell/fuze). No mathematical tracking of that shell/fuze combo, there has not been anything that has indicated issues with this shell/fuze combo.
-Pending official document to use as source.

6. Explain to us the history of this fuze with regards to early detonations?

-Sensitivity (note from (b) (3) (A).

-Early 80s there were early dets which led to the development of the current model to correct the early det failures within the fuze.

7. How susceptible are faraday cage and other ESD protections to 'rough handling?'

-C9: Capacitor added to eliminate crush switch ESD potential (DAAE30-98-C-1086 Doc Pg. 8)
-Without chemical battery being activated…?
-Duds are most common failure (DAAE30-98-C-1086 Doc Pg.___)
-If round hit an object mid-flight (drone, bird, etc.), it is plausible that would set off the round.
-Rough handling – Fuzes go through standard tests. Rough handling to NW is "gross mishandling".
-MIL-STD-810 (mishandling doc?)

8. Would unusual firing shocks be considered 'rough handling?'

-Also running down hypothesis that the shock from the proximity of the guns could cause a pre-mature detonation.
-Also believes it is likely gun 5 or 6.

9. Are you aware of how close the guns were to each other and the charge they were shooting on the incident day?

-Was aware of how close the guns were. NW went through the pubs to see if there are any requirements of distance between guns but could not find anything. Situationally dependent for tactical employment.
-Agreed that the guns were close.

10. Do you have any imagery, videos, etc. from before, during, or immediately after the incident?

-Received video of POV facing gunline.

11. We are working on information from the Forward Observer. We will now have to interview him in person. What specifically would you like to know from him?

-Were there 3 impacts?
-Timing of the impacts?
-Order of the impacts?
-Were impacts on/off target?

Additional Comments:

-DAAE30-98-C-1086 (document pg 5 fig 2)
-New M762A1 can be rotated bi-directionally to provide quicker manual setting.
-DAAE30-98-C-1086 par 5.13: Need setback (Gs fore and aft), interval (Gs rotational spinning), and signal simultaneously to achieve min-arming distance.
-There is an HE and pyro variant of this fuze, NA 17 and NA15. NA15 has 1 less booster.
-If fuze is set to PD, it locks out time and vice versa.
-(b) (3) (A) at PMCAS (requesting report?)
-Confirm/deny: Did they fire a check-fire round on the 18th prior to execution?

This summary is a fair and accurate representation of the interview on 20251110 between IO Team and NSWC Engineers.

(b) (3) (A)

This transmission contains information that is protected from disclosure by the Privacy Act (5 USC 552a) and exemption (b) (6) of the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552, as amended). Ensure that this information is used solely for the requested purpose. Further duplication and/or distribution without prior authorization from this office is not authorized. Civil and/or criminal penalties can apply for improper use.

(b) (3) (A)

From: [redacted]
To:
Cc:

Subject: RFI: Reliability for M767A1/NA15 and M795/D529
Date: Thursday, November 13, 2025 10:23:36 AM
Attachments: MCO 8000.8.pdf
MARCORSYSCOMO 8020.2B SIGNED.pdf
231004 DA49 DA54 NA15 NA17 Service Life Update Memo Final.pdf
190605 D529 Service Life Update - Signed.pdf
2022 Ro SLP Update NA15 NA17 DA49 DA54.pdf
DM18-252 D529.pdf
48078.pdf

Good day Gentlemen,

Below is the answer to the RFI on reliability.

Request: Please provide a characterization or source for the M767A1 Fuze reliability. I understand reliability probabilities can be expressed in terms of functioning and safety. Please provide a recommendation on the most appropriate characterization knowing the intent of our investigation.

****

Answer: Reliability and Service Life Projection are developed for in-service assets for the Marine Corps through an on-going total life cycle surveillance and service life modernization program, called Service Life Accelerated Age Test. See Marine Corps Order 8000.8, Chapter 3, Research, Development, Acquisition and Fielding (pg13/3-2) and MARCORSYSCOM Order 8020.2 (attached).

For NA15 M767A1 fuze and D529 M795 projectile, the Ro and SLP are produced independently, as both can be used with different projectiles and fuze combinations, respectively.

- The item specification establishes the as built minimum performance and safety characteristics. Safety related features known as critical characteristics are held to a 1/million and I/E risk threshold for all munitions as a standard practice. MIL-STD-882 is the system safety standard and MIL-STD-1916 is the standard for production acceptance with specific provisions for critical characteristics. [redacted]
- Safety is reviewed independently from reliability to ensure [redacted] & I/E risk is the threshold
- Reliability is reviewed in relation to functional performance
- PdM Ammunition is the authority for approving Operational Reliability (Ro) and Service Life Projection (SLP). Safety analysis is a part of reviewing the item's Ro and SLP. Any higher risks from baseline are adjudicated IAW with Marine Corps

policies with higher levels of approval if risks cannot be contained and mitigated back to thresholds of (b) (3) (A) and I/E and above an item's minimum reliability. Containment/mitigation actions can include downgrades/restrictions, rework/maintenance/screening, demilitarization, etc. depending upon the issue.

- See attached memos for NA15 (and NA17) fuze and D529 projectile:
  - (b) (3) (A)
  - [redacted]
  - ESED, NSWC Corona Det Fallbrook as PdM Ammunition's in-service engineering agent conducts the surveillance and produces the reports with recommendations on Ro/SLP derived from a holistic review of the item's performance per its requirements/specification, in-service issues (malfunction and defects), condition-based testing and fleet usage.
  - See attached reports for NA15 and D529 that support the memos with the technical basis to establish Ro/SLP
  - The NA15/17 and D529 have been continually evaluated over the years for Ro/SLP:
    - NA15/17: 2012, 2018, 2022 (current data), and on-going active fleet monitoring in training (2024/2025)
    - D529: 2011, 2018 (Ro/SLP current data), 2021(no change), and on-going active fleet monitoring in training (2024/2025)

V/R,

(b) (3) (A)

Expeditionary Systems Engineering Division (RS40)
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division Detachment Fallbrook
(b) (3) (A)

Disclaimer: This message should NOT in any way be considered direction or an alteration of contractual obligations. Pursuant to FAR 1.402-1, only the Contracting Officer has authority to bind the Government.

From: (b) (3) (A)
To:
Cc:

Subject: X-Ray Verification of Samples
Date: Thursday, November 13, 2025 2:47:57 PM
Attachments: NA15 X-Ray Verification .pdf

Good Afternoon,

Attached is a brief on the X-Ray verification conducted on a sample of 8 deboostered fuzes.

V/R,
(b) (3) (A)

Expeditionary Systems Engineering Division (RS40)
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division Detachment Fallbrook
(b) (3) (A)

Disclaimer: This message should NOT in any way be considered direction or an alteration of contractual obligations. Pursuant to FAR 1.402-1, only the Contracting Officer has authority to bind the Government.

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Thursday, November 6, 2025 2:22 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)

Subject: Re: Investigation Meeting

Sounds and we appreciate it!

V/R,
(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Thursday, November 6, 2025 1:21 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)

Subject: RE: Investigation Meeting

That's really helpful, (b) (3) (A) Thank you.
I'm still tracking down the Forward Observer name. Will get that to you soon.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office
NIPR: (b) (3) (A)
SIPR:
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg:
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Thursday, November 6, 2025 12:00 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: Re: Investigation Meeting

(b) (3) (A),

Please see attached response to question below. I hope it clarifies how we came across the .2 and 9 seconds fuzes. In a nutshell, from what we were verbally told, fuzes were turned in by the unit in PD mode. ASP personnel realized this and reset fuzes to time mode; however, they were unable to reset two fuzes. This occurred prior to ESED arriving on-site for the visuals on 21 October. We have documented a timeline of events on our engagement with the field returned assets. Additional attachments referenced in the write up are noted below and attached:

- DODIC NA15 and D529 Visual Inspection Report 23 Oct 25
- Fuze return process from a prior 2012 TM revision (directed to set fuzes to 000.0)
- Fuze return process from current 2023 TM revision (directed to set fuzes to 199.9)

[the current turn in procedure]

- Ammunition Information Notice from 2017 (directed to set fuzes to 199.9)

If you need the whole TMs (2012 and 2023 versions) they are fairly large files and would have to DoD Safe Exchange them to you. Please let me know if you need further clarification to address any questions or we can follow up in our discussion on Monday.

V/R,

(b) (3) (A)

Expeditionary Systems Engineering Division (RS40)

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division Detachment Fallbrook

(b) (3) (A)

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From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, November 5, 2025 7:46 AM
To
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: Investigation Meeting

My comments in Blue regarding your questions (which we share)

In general, all information needs to start flowing through me and my CI team. Please cease direct liaison with I MEF units. We will coordinate until our CI is published. The CI will by name direct your office as the hub for technical analysis and investigation if that's how you want it to read.

Question for you:

> Noting the fuzes you received set to PD except one at .2s and 9s. I need the story on who, what, where, when, why your office received and began manipulating those fuzes. We are running into chain of custody issues and need very exact details. The

bottom line being, I'll need to answer why those fuzes were found in a time setting, at the very least to recommend proper turn in procedures. This response will be for the record and will go into findings of fact.

Again, thanks for your help.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)

I Marine Expeditionary Force

MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC Office

NIPR: (b) (3) (A)

SIPR:

MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC SIPR Tandberg

TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2025 6:11 PM
To:
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: Re: Investigation Meeting

Sir,

Received and we will prepare to address them with what we know.

We are continuing to collect information on various technical aspects of the malfunction investigation and do not have any cause(s) identified, as such our technical baseline continues to evolve as we gain more facts.

We sent the following questions through the MEF's ammo representatives ([redacted]) this morning on information we're seeking to address some gaps in our knowledge. The following is standard technical information we pursue for malfunction investigation (weapon baseline, video/audio of incident, environmental factors, etc.):

1. Downrange impact data, in order of impacts at target to complete the ballistic trajectory analysis. This would help us isolate which gun fired the early burst round. We know who the observer is. Let us collect that data. Please generate detailed Requests for Information (RFIs) which we will coordinate.
2. Limited Technical Inspection (LTI) pre and post fire and relevant maintenance information of the howitzers involved to establish weapon system baseline. Let us take over interactions with the battery/BN/MEU/Regt, etc. Provide your RFIs through me and [redacted] and we will get the information for you.
3. There may have been PAO/Combat Camera/someone on-site with a camera by first gun (landside/eastern most position). Higher resolution video/audio would significantly improve modelling over the two cellphone videos we have right now. We have a COMMSTRAT/PAO rep on our team combing the socials, imagery, etc. for this information. [redacted] will pass that information as soon as we find it and map it out.

4. If any system were emitting in EM energy in the area, it would be helpful to know where the system was located in relation to the howitzers, or any other information on emissions in the environment. We have an Air Defense WTI ([redacted]) on our team. He is deciphering what, if anything was present and what COULD be present in terms of energy/waveforms to counter UAS. We will build that technical data and send it to you.

Thank you!

V/R,

(b) (3) (A)

Expeditionary Systems Engineering Division (RS40)

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division Detachment Fallbrook

(b) (3) (A)

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From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2025 5:52 PM
To:
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: Investigation Meeting

(b) (3) (A)

I'm writing this email to capture the question. No need to answer it immediately.

What would happen if the round with .2 as the Time was shot?

My hypothesis is at .2 the ET electric firing pulse would fire, but the round would not have achieved the g forces required to arm yet so would actually dud, but there are a lot of variables.

Second question that we will ask: What forces are required to set off the PD fuze once the round is armed? Could impact with a large bird or drone set off the round? My hypothesis based on the sensitivity required to prevent round burial on impact with soft ground is yes, especially since prior versions of the fuze were being set off by heavy rain.

Again, not asking for immediate answers just capturing for future exploration.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)

I Marine Expeditionary Force

MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC Office

NIPR: (b) (3) (A)

SIPR:

MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC SIPR Tandberg

TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2025 5:33 PM
To:
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Subject: Re: Investigation Meeting

Good Evening Sir,

Yes, we are available to meet at your convenience late morning/early afternoon on Monday, 10th of November.

V/R,

(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2025 4:49 PM
To:
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Subject: REQ: Investigation Meeting

(b) (3) (A)

Thank you for the initial discussion today. We would like to meet with you early next week to discuss failure modes and areas where we can share data.

What does your Monday late morning/early afternoon look like?

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)

I Marine Expeditionary Force

MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC Office

NIPR: (b) (3) (A)

SIPR:

MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC SIPR Tandberg

TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2025 3:48 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: Email address

Sir,

Full contact information including address/location is in my signature below. Happy to answer any questions you may have.

Very Respectfully,

[redacted]

[redacted]

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division Detachment Fallbrook

[redacted]

Duty Station:

[redacted]

[redacted]

Disclaimer: This message should NOT in any way be considered direction or an alteration of contractual obligations. Pursuant to FAR 1.402-1, only the Contracting Officer has authority to bind the Government.

(b) (3) (A)

☐ SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT (REFER TO G.O. 100.98) ☐ DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (REFER TO HPM 100.69) ☐ MISSING PERSON (REFER TO HPM 100.69) ☐ HATE CRIME (REFER TO HPM 100.69)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL

ARREST – INVESTIGATION REPORT

CHP 216 (Rev. 12-24) OPI 061

☐ Misdemeanor ☐ Felony ☒ Other ☐ GC 910

COURT	FILE NUMBER	EVIDENCE/PROPERTY
Vista Superior Court		☒ YES ☐ NO

AREA	BEAT	CRASH REPORT NUMBER	BODY WORN CAMERA
650	003	N/A	☐ YES ☒ NO

DATE/TIME OF ARREST REPORT	DATE/TIME OF INCIDENT	LOCATION OF ARREST/INCIDENT	WMVARS/MVARS
10/18/2025 1346	☒ SAME	Interstate 5 northbound at Las Pulgas Road ☐ INDIAN COUNTRY	WMVARS ☒ YES ☐ NO

CAD NUMBER	CITATION NUMBER	OFFENSE(S) CHARGED OR INVESTIGATED	JUS 8715 REQUIRED
251018BC0154 ☐ NONE	N/A	Incident Report only	☐ YES ☒ NO NUMBER:

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, AND MIDDLE INITIAL: N/A

SUBJECT NO 1 OF 1

NAME (last, first, middle)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS
N/A	N/A

AKA	HOME PHONE	MAILING ADDRESS
		☐ SAME

RACE	ETHNICITY	SEX	BIRTHDATE	DISPATCH NOTIFIED
				☐ YES ☐ NO TIME:

DRIVER LICENSE NUMBER	STATE	DDL STATUS	HAIR	EYES	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	PLACE OF BIRTH (city, state, country)

EMPLOYER	BUSINESS PHONE	BUSINESS ADDRESS	MISC. (SSN, INS #, ETC.)
			ID:

BOOKING, CII, FBI, ETC., NUMBER(S)	WHERE BOOKED/CONFINED	DATE/TIME	FINGERPRINTED
			☐ YES ☐ NO

NOTIFICATION (Who, How, When), EXPLAIN IN NARRATIVE ☐ JUVENILE ☐ FOREIGN NATIONAL ☐ IMMUNITY CLAIM

NOTIFIED BY

VEHICLE

LICENSE	STATE	REG. YEAR	VIN/EN NUMBER	VEHICLE WAS ☐ STORED ☐ PARKED ☐ RECOVERED ☐ RELEASED ☐ IMPOUNDED	STORAGE AUTHORITY

VEH YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	COLOR	BODY TYPE	LOCATION OF VEHICLE/RELEASED TO/ADDRESS/TELEPHONE NUMBER

NAME OF REGISTERED OWNER	☐ SAME AS SUBJECT	ADDRESS	☐ SAME AS SUBJECT

NAME OF LEGAL OWNER	☐ SAME AS R/O	ADDRESS	LOCATION OF KEYS

WITNESS/PASSENGER

BIRTHDATE	SEX	NAME			ADDRESS/AGENCY	PHONE
			☐ WITNESS	☐ PASSENGER		RES: BUS:
			☐ WITNESS	☐ PASSENGER		RES: BUS:
			☐ WITNESS	☐ PASSENGER		RES: BUS:
			☐ WITNESS	☐ PASSENGER		RES: BUS:

VICTIM INFORMATION

1	NAME	ADDRESS

BIRTHDATE	SEX	DRIVER'S LICENSE	STATE	DAY PHONE	EVENING PHONE

VEH. LIC. #	STATE	YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	COLOR	BODY TYPE

2	NAME	ADDRESS

BIRTHDATE	SEX	DRIVER'S LICENSE	STATE	DAY PHONE	EVENING PHONE

VEH. LIC. #	STATE	YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	COLOR	BODY TYPE

MISDEMEANOR INCARCERATION (To be completed upon physical arrest for any misdemeanor, pursuant to Section 853.6 of the Penal Code.)

As determined by the arresting officer, the person arrested:

1. ☐ was so intoxicated as to be a danger to themself or others.
2. ☐ required medical examination or medical care or was otherwise unable to care for their own safety.
3. ☐ was arrested under one or more of the circumstances listed in Sections 40302 and 40303 of the California Vehicle Code (Note 5 and 8 if also applicable).
4. ☐ had one or more outstanding arrest warrants issued.
5. ☐ could not provide satisfactory evidence of personal identification.
6. ☐ if released immediately, would jeopardize the prosecution of the offense or offenses for which arrested or the prosecution of any other offenses.
7. ☐ would be reasonably likely to continue the offense or offenses, or the safety of persons or property would be imminently endangered if immediately released.
8. ☐ demanded to be taken before a magistrate or refused to sign the citation.
9. ☐ would not appear at the time and place specified in the notice.
10. ☐ Other:

ARRESTING/INVESTIGATING OFFICER (Print name/rank)	ID NUMBER	REVIEWED BY (Print name/rank)	ID NUMBER	DATE
(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	10/18/2025

ARREST – INVESTIGATION REPORT NARRATIVE (CONTINUED)

ADMONITION OF RIGHTS

1. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT.
2. ANYTHING YOU SAY CAN AND WILL BE USED AGAINST YOU IN A COURT OF LAW.
3. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO TALK WITH AN ATTORNEY AND TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY PRESENT BEFORE AND DURING QUESTIONING.
4. IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD AN ATTORNEY, ONE WILL BE APPOINTED FREE OF CHARGE TO REPRESENT YOU BEFORE AND DURING QUESTIONING, IF YOU DESIRE.

THE ABOVE STATEMENT WAS READ TO THE ARRESTEE BY:
☒ NOT ADVISED ☐ ARRESTING OFFICER ☐ OR: ID: TIME:

DO YOU UNDERSTAND EACH OF THESE RIGHTS I HAVE EXPLAINED TO YOU?	HAVING THESE RIGHTS IN MIND, DO YOU WISH TO TALK TO US NOW?	WAIVER STATEMENT
☐ YES ☐ NO	☐ YES ☐ NO	N/A

On October 18, 2025, at 1251 hours, the California Highway Patrol Protective Services Detail (PSD), escorted the United States Vice President, JD Vance, to Interstate 5 and Las Pulgas Road for an event occurring at Camp Pendleton. The event celebrated the Marines Corps and Navy's 250th anniversary. After securing the Vice President, PSD units were directed to stand by on the Las Pulgas Road on-ramp to Interstate 5 southbound.

At 1315 hours, the California Highway Patrol-Oceanside Area coordinated two traffic breaks on Interstate 5 in response to the United States Marines Corps (USMC) and Navy's 250-year celebration at Camp Pendleton. The traffic breaks were for public safety due to the USMC firing artillery over Interstate 5. The traffic break was conducted on Interstate 5 southbound, and motorists were held at the Vista viewpoint. Motorists on Interstate 5 northbound were held at the Aliso Creek rest area. The traffic breaks were in place at 1315 hours. The motoring public was cleared of the immediate area around Red Beach prior to artillery rounds being fired by the military. These restricted locations were determined at the Del Mar Beach command post (command post #1), overseen by Oceanside Area Captain B. Palmer, ID 18109, and with the recommendation of the USMC Explosive Ordinance Disposal Team (EOD) that is responsible for the artillery. The USMC EOD team advised these locations were the safest locations for the public. The artillery was scheduled to be fired at 1346 hours and concluding at 1351 hours, with approximately 60 rounds being fired.

At 1346 hours, the United States Military fired an artillery round from White's Beach which is approximately 3 quarters of a mile south of Las Pulgas Road. At this time an artillery round failed to clear the roadway and detonated midflight near Interstate 5 southbound. After the failed round, the exercise was terminated and no additional munitions were fired. The explosion sent shrapnel toward the location of the PSD units. PSD Motor Officer (b) (6), recalled that he heard what sounded like "pebbles" falling on his CHP BMW motorcycle, #3014660, and approximately three feet around his location. CHP patrol vehicle #1618820, Ford PIUV, (unoccupied) was also parked on the Las Pulgas Road on-ramp to Interstate 5 southbound. The patrol vehicle was struck with shrapnel. The unoccupied patrol vehicle was being driven by PSD Officers (b) (6), (b) (6), and passenger (b) (6) (b) (6) saw an approximate two inch by ½ inch piece of shrapnel on the hood of the patrol vehicle. The shrapnel left a small dent/scratch on the hood of their patrol vehicle from the shrapnel. They took a photograph of the damage and notified PSD (b) (6) (b) (6). (b) (6) found a metal piece of shrapnel, approximately one inch in length and ½ inch wide near his patrol motorcycle. (b) (6) notified PSD (b) (6), of the shrapnel that struck his motorcycle. There was no damage to (b) (6) patrol motorcycle. Notifications were also made to (b) (6), who was located at command post #2, which was located on Las Pulgas Road, east of Interstate 5. No officers were injured as a result of the shrapnel.

ARREST – INVESTIGATION REPORT NARRATIVE (CONTINUED)

At 1355 hours, CHP [redacted (b) (6)], conducted a safety sweep of Interstate 5 northbound in the immediate area where the artillery round detonated and did not locate any additional pieces of metal (shrapnel) in freeway lanes. Additionally, CHP [redacted (b) (6)], conducted a safety sweep of Interstate 5 southbound and did not locate any additional pieces of metal.

At approximately 1420 hours, Interstate 5 northbound and southbound traffic lanes were opened and declared safe.

Recommendations:

Recommend Border Division complete an After Action Review of the event to include: planning, communication, and coordination between state and federal partners related to the freeway closure and public safety.

N/A | N/A

PHOTOGRAPHS

Photograph 1

Photograph 2

Photograph 3

Photograph 4

Enclosure (94)

Interview with Observer Team:

Billet / Background:

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

1. When did you find out you were supporting this live fire event?

H: BN found out in Sep. For fire support specifically, FCC decided on who would be the FiST for the ADEX. (b) (3) (A) was there for the rehearsals and then was there for the live-fire on the 18th.

W: FRAG-O in Sep. I Co identified as the company providing the FiST.

2. Can you characterize the conditions on the 17th?

H: Originally supposed to go to OP A, then moved to OP W due to Area E over I-5. Went up to OP W, good conditions, made sure everything was clear prior to any rounds fired.

W: It was bad. Bomb box was about 100m x 100m but was down in a draw. Could only pull a grid for the front side of the hill as the bomb box was down in defilade. Believed they would not be able to see the impacts clearly.

3. Did the fire mission provide a sufficient reference point in low light conditions?

W: Could tell exactly where the bomb box was, but with it in defilade they were unable to see the entire 100m x 100m bomb box.

4. Where the rounds observed in defilade? Or the western facing portion of whiskey?

-H: Confirmed could not see the exact individual impacts, but all the smoke trails were safely inside the bomb box.

-W: On the 17th, only thing they could observe was the smoke trails after impact. They were unable to adjust any of the rounds because that would have put them outside the bomb box. Adjusted by piece by round on the 17th.

5. Have you observed from OP W previously?

-H & W: No

6. What were the visual conditions like on the 18th at OP? Cloud cover? Haze? Shadows?

W: Retrograded off the OP on the 17th. Occupied with full comms at 0800 on the 18th.
Visual conditions were the same as the day prior, clear.
Slight left cross winds.

7. From *shot* for Tgt # AF2000, how many rounds did you observe impact?

-H: Because of the number of guns down and only having visual of the smoke trails, it was difficult to determine individua impacts.

-W: Because of it being a FFE, could not determine impacts based on individual rounds but could determine by visual of the smoke trails.
Characterizes the impacts via visual of smoke trails as converged.
All impacts relatively simultaneously, unable to count individual rounds and could not audibly determine.

8. Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the observation post or the impact area, and of the initial impacts on the day of the 17th or 18th?

-W: One picture from OP

Personnel on OP: (b) (3) (A)

Anything different you would do:

-W: If he could, he would change the bomb box location.

-Constrained by SDZ and geometries given

This summary is a fair and accurate representation of the interview on 20251118 between IO Team and (b) (3) (A).

(b) (3) (A)

This transmission contains information that is protected from disclosure by the Privacy Act (5 USC 552a) and exemption (b) (6) of the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552, as amended). Ensure that this information is used solely for the requested purpose. Further duplication and/or distribution without prior authorization from this office is not authorized. Civil and/or criminal penalties can apply for improper use.

Enclosure (96)

Interview with (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) on 20251110.

1. Describe how you became involved in this incident?

-W: Initially located at the Del Mar Beach Rally. Saw the first volley go out and not the second, started making phone calls because he knew something was going on. Assigned as artillery investigating officer for suspected artillery incident. Went out to firing points at Red Beach. Once he arrived at firing points, (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) were already there. (b) (3) (A) reviewed the documentation of the investigation that (b) (3) (A) already started, they then synchronized and finished up the investigation.

-S: During the demonstration he was at the CP as one of the senior S3 reps. Informed that something occurred, CO directed him to go to firing points.

2. Can you describe the actions taken upon arrival?

-W: Arrived, went through the investigative work that (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) started. Spoke with Btry Cmdr and Btry Gunny. Went through gun line with (b) (3) (A), spoke with section chiefs, ammo techs, FDC, FDO, and Btry Cmdr. Confirmed one gun dropped GPS, one had linkage lever failure. Felt that ammo tech was confident in accountability of rounds and fuzes and provided full documentation.

3. From your experience, upon seeing the position, did you have any concerns with regards to the dispersion of the howitzers?

-W: Proximity of guns was non-standard. Very close.

-S: The proximity of the guns was irregular, guns typically not laid that close together. Have not seen a battery that close together in 21 years.
-Have not seen guns this close because it is typically spread out for survivability purposes.

4. Is there an outbrief from 2/11 on the Battery MCCRE prior to composite to the 11th MEU?

-Provided to investigation team in follow on correspondence.

5. Understanding this is likely 2/11 internal business, Following the Battery Commander swap, do you know if the Battalion conducted a second MCCRE? (Is the battery conducting business the right way)

-W: Btry CO was changed by BC. Did not do another MCCRE because the battery was signed off, but did go to the field with new Btry CO to ensure he knew battery procedures.

6. Describe from your experience and expand upon the use of the M767A1 electronic time fuze for use in overhead fire…any concerns?

-W: Has shot this shell/fuze combo (only combo approved for overhead fires. Never seen any malfunctions or anomalies.

-S: Has shot this shell/fuze combo (only combo approved for overhead fires. Never seen any malfunctions or anomalies.

7. Did you have any concerns with the SDZs or Geometry? Did you voice them? To whom?

-W: Initial concern (16 Oct / day before rehearsal) was that the SDZ was small, not unsafe but was non-standard.

8. What damages or injuries resulted from the early detonation that you know of? External or internal to the battery

-W: Only damage aware of is CHP vehicle, no injuries.

9. Describe what turn-in procedures should occur for the Fuzes upon completion of the investigation

-Was not present for turn in process.

10. How does 11th Marines socialize AA&E changes to the ASP turn-in process? (Storage and shipping change from 000.0 to 199.9 when did it happen? Was there a MCBUL?)

-W: If there are any changes, Reg Ops pushes down to Battalion Ops to push to the batteries.

11. Can you in any way explain how, of the 60 fuzes turned back in and subsequently inspected by Engineers from NSWC two showed times reflection 9s and .2s respectively?

-W: Was not aware of this.

-S: (b) (3) (A) was showing them how difficult it is to manipulate the fuzes. Showing all the steps to do to put it on time setting.

12. Do you have any imagery, videos, etc. of the site either before, during, or after the incident? Where did you get the photo of that purportedly shows the early detonation of the incident round?

-Received video of behind gunline and provided it to the investigation team.

13. Did you voice any concerns/issues:

-W: Once received from (b) (3) (A), called Battery cmdr and BC to ask if they had any concerns and they said no.

-S: Saw it on 16 Oct with the OpsO, looked "ridiculous" because the AZ is 1 mil. You can achieve that azimuth of fire, and that's what range control gave to shoot. They can compute that, and it is safe, just non-standard.

Additional Comments

-Range control directed position because it was the only position feasible to deconflict with all of the other moving parts of the amphibious demonstration.

This summary is a fair and accurate representation of the interview on 20251110 between IO Team and (b) (3) (A).

(b) (3) (A)

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From: (b) (3) (A)
To:
Cc:
Subject: RE: FDC Setup - 18 October 2025 - CI RFI
Date: Monday, December 1, 2025 8:01:57 PM
Attachments: image001.png

Sir,

Based on the restrictions of the range safety card, the target box range, and the scale of the chart, the battery was not going to shoot off charts. The two independent means of computation were two AFATDS and manual was not a method we were going to utilize.

FYSA, we are currently aboard the (b) (3) (A) for PMINT and will have limited connectivity.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
Battalion Landing Team 3/5
11th MEU
(b) (3) (A)



From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, December 1, 2025 1:05 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: FDC Setup - 18 October 2025 - CI RFI

(b) (3) (A),

Can you provided justification for why "FDC did not have manual charts set up" on the day of

the incident?

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
[redacted]
CE 13th MEU, I MEF
(b) (3) (A)
[redacted]

Artillery Ammunition Chain of Custody 15-21 Oct 2025

15 Oct 1300 Approx.
-(b) (3) (A) BLT 3/5 Ammo Chief Draws Ammo from CPEN ASP. Ammunition was inspected prior to accepting. No scratches or dents. Everything was properly secured, banded, and palletized. Ammo cans were sealed by ASP. (1)

15 Oct 1330 Approx.
-BLT 3/5 Ammo is staged on ammunition truck and transported to Red Beach by Ammo Techs on 7-Ton with 593 Trailer. (b) (3) (A) was armed guard. No stops made enroute. (1)

15 Oct
-BLT 3/5 Ammo remains staged on ammunition truck at Red Beach. Ammo Techs. Ammo Techs and Driver remain with ammunition loaded on the truck, banded and unopened under cover of tarp. Ammo Techs establish firewatch with additional rover patrolling around vics. (1)

16 Oct 1430
-Bty E occupies TA BCH RED.
-Ammunition is transferred from (b) (3) (A) to (b) (3) (A)
-All ammunition was inspected, accounted for and remained on truck unopened until 17 Oct rehearsal.
-Bty E bivouacked on site

17 Oct 1200
Bty E broke out:
- (30) M795 HE rounds
- (32) M767A1 fuzes
- (150) M232A1 propellants
- (36) M82 primers

17 Oct
-Ammo was inspected by Ammo Techs prior to being distributed to each section on the gunline. (1)

17 Oct-
-(30) rounds of M795/M767A1 expended during live fire rehearsal. (2)

18 Oct 1100
Bty E broke out:
- (60) M795 HE rounds
- (60) M767A1 fuzes
  - LOT#BTF04M001-028
- (210) M232A1 propellants
- (89) M82 primers

-Upon inspection (3) M767A1 fuzes were identified and marked as Grade 3 w/DTG and placed in marked containers to the rear of the gunline away from ammo pit. (2)

18 Oct
-Three additional fuzes were then moved from Ammo Truck to gunline. Once all ammo was inspected and accounted for the remaining fuses were manually set to "PD" and verified by section chiefs, platoon sergeant, platoon commander, executive officer and battery commander at least four times . (2)

18 Oct
-1345 "Senators" (Airspace cleared)
-1346 Bty E fired first volley at priority target AF2000. (Only 5 howitzers were operational. Gun 3 experienced linkage lever failure and did not fire).
-1346 Range Control calls check fire after observing airburst IVO I-5. (3)

18 Oct: 1346 FDC/Battery Leadership Commanded "Check fire to the rear of the piece fall in" (1)

18 Oct 1600 Approx Reg Ops Chief arrives at battery and begins FDC cannon investigation checklist

18 Oct 1530 Approx Reg Field Artillery Chief arrives at battery and beings gunline cannon investigation checklist. (1)

18 Oct 1720 Approx Reg OPSO arrives at battery, consolidates and reviews all Apdx F documentation and conducts Apdx N Cannon Ammo Malfunction Checklist. All tubes are punched and inspected to ensure "PD"

18 Oct 1840
Investigation complete. Determination was made that the cause of the incident was ammo malfunction of the M767A1 fuze causing premature airburst. (1)

18 Oct 2030
Ammo returned to ASP and staged in secured ammo lot. (1)

20-21 Oct
Ammo Techs conduct turn-in w/ASP personnel. (1)

21 Oct
2/11 Ammunition and Explosives officer 1stLt Fulton reviews ASP Paperwork (1), (4)

21 Oct
All fuzes that had been opened are inspected by ESED

Enclosure (99)

Enclosure (100)

From: (b) (3) (A)
To:
Subject: FW: Statement regarding SUAS detections aboard Camp Pendleton
Date: Monday, November 24, 2025 12:33:19 PM

There was nothing more in the original response than what I copied into my response to the chief. See below.

(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2025 10:36 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: Statement regarding SUAS detections aboard Camp Pendleton

The JHL APL sensors located aboard Camp Pendleton did not detect any relevant aerial vehicles during the 17th or 18th inside the installation's Special Security Instruction.

MCI-West operations inquired with offshore naval assets regarding the alleged incursion on the evening of the 17th and was informed that they did not have any detections.

No inquiry was made with naval assets regarding SUAS operations on the 18th as MCI-West was not aware of any alleged incursions on that date.

Respectfully sent,

(b) (3) (A)
Marine Corps Installations West
G-3/5 Aviation Division
(b) (3) (A)

PLACE HOLDER ENCL (102)

VIDEO BEHIND GUNLINE POV 18 OCT 25



(b) (3) (A)

Echo Battery
Name, Rank, billet and unit. (b) (3) (A) **What is your artillery background?** -Enlisted 4.5 years ago -Initially in G Btry (2 years) -Transitioned to E Btry (2 years): Gunner and sect chief -Sect chief course grad sept 2024 -Reenlisted in May
When were you told you would participate in the ADEX? -Around August. **What is your billet?** - (b) (3) (A) **Do you have a roster of fire watch personnel and time frames?** -No **When was reveille on 18 Oct 2025?** -0600 **What time did the battery arrive/prepare the firing positions? (times for each gun)** -Because of how small pos was, had to be more deliberate with emplacement. -Normal emplacement: RSOP. Doing drills of emplacing howitzers based on AZ of fire given. -250th: Had to be very precise. Usually have 50 mils to work with, but with this they had to be exact. **Were the guns re-laid between 17 Oct and 18 Oct? (which guns?)** -No **Who set up the aiming circles and survey points?** - (b) (3) (A) **List the ammunition and fuze lot/serial numbers you handled.** -Charge 4 hotel, M795, M767A1 **On the 18th, How long was each round in the tube before firing? (record times).** -Out of action: determined 2 min before command to fire. No round in tube, out of action before command to load. -Command to shoot was given around 1345L, received data to fire about 30 min before firing -Shot on the 17th. Gun operated normally. -Out of action due to cable on howitzer that has been given him issues for a while. Did not shoot OFC due to not being able to obtain 1 mil deflection. **Were Grade-3 fuzes from the same howitzer or mixed between guns?** -1 grade 3 fuze. His gun and gun 3 had 1 grade 3 fuze each, informed BG, BG did not want them to shoot it at all and he collected them and Bg gave them new fuzes.

Who installed fuzes at each gun and in what order were fuze settings inspected? (name sequence)
-Press button, go straight to PD.

How was the fuze setting verified? (tool, visual, cross-check, EPIAFS, PGK readout, etc.)
-He looked at all screens to verify PD

Could the fuze battery have lost power after loading and before firing? Explain.
-Prior experience: Never

How many times total was each round/ammunition inspected from receipt to firing? (list inspectors)
-Self, recorder, BG (who looked over every gun's ammo), plausible that a SNCO/officer checked it but did not see

Have you ever seen a firing-linkage or lever failure before? (describe)
-Yes. Pretty common.

Did you note any unusual sounds, recoil, or mechanical behavior during the volley? (describe)
-No.

Were any PMCS or maintenance discrepancies on the guns recorded recently?
-Oct 17: Standard breach maintenance and punching the tube

Was EPIAFS used in your last field exercise? If not where are they stored?
-No. Equipment reliability.

Did you observe birds, sUAS, aircraft, or other aerial activity at Red Beach on 18 Oct?
-No
Were there any non-battery personnel (COMMSTRAT, WHPO, media) operating around your position? Were they or Could they have been distracting gun crew? Which gun?
-No

Did you experience command pressure to speed up, change procedures, or alter the battery layout? Describe.
-No.

Based on what you saw and did, could any handling, preparation, or fuze setting have contributed to an early burst? Explain.
-No

How would you characterize the spacing between guns. Were there any issues noted on the rehearsal shoot and or shoot on the 18th?
-5-10 ft apart. Seen it before in AFA on CPEN, but typically does not do it that close.

If you could change one thing that day to prevent this, what would it be?

-Nothing. Extra safety precautions were taken this day, everything was more precise for this shoot.

Do you have any multi-media (imagery, video, etc.) of the battery position or the actual shoot?
-Sect photo 17 Oct

How did you set the fuzes?
-At his gun, sets counterclockwise straight to PD

This summary is a fair and accurate representation of the interview on 20251113 between IO Team and (b) (3) (A).

(b) (3) (A)

This transmission contains information that is protected from disclosure by the Privacy Act (5 USC 552a) and exemption (b) (6) of the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552, as amended). Ensure that this information is used solely for the requested purpose. Further duplication and/or distribution without prior authorization from this office is not authorized. Civil and/or criminal penalties can apply for improper use.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF
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5830
CG
23 Oct 25

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on (b)(3)(A) [redacted] CI ltr 3570 dtd 22 Oct 25

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
To: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force

Subj: CANNON ARTILLERY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE BATTERY E, BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5, 11TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT FIRING INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON 18 OCTOBER 2025

1. Having thoroughly reviewed the investigation, I concur with the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of both the Investigating Officer and the Regimental Commander.

2. I am requesting a third-party review by the United States Marine Corps School of Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to be completed no later than 10 November 2025. The request for this review will be submitted separately to the Commanding General, Training and Education Command.

3. The point of contact for this matter is the 1st Marine Division Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, [redacted] (b) (3) (A), at [redacted] (b) (3) (A) or [redacted] (b) (3) (A).

[redacted] (b) (3) (A)
T. B. SAVAGE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
11TH MARINES
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF
BOX 555503
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5503

3570
CO
OCT 2 2 2025

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on (b) (3) (A) ltr 3570 IO of 22 Oct 25

From: Commanding Officer, 11th Marine Regiment
To: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
Via: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

Subj: CANNON ARTILLERY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE BATTERY E, BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5, 11TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT FIRING INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON 18 OCTOBER 2025

1. I fully agree with the Investigating Officer's findings, the expert insights incorporated, and the comprehensive nature of the investigation conducted. As a career artillery officer with nearly 27 years of experience commanding at all levels up to the Regiment, I am confident in the findings, opinions and stand behind the recommendation of the Investigating Officer.

2. After a careful review of the investigation, I have concluded that no additional inquiry is necessary to determine misconduct. There are no known facts that would constitute misconduct, mishandling, or violation of procedure by members of Battery E, Battalion Landing Team 3/5 or the Battalion Landing Team 3/5 Ammunition Section.

3. Further investigation is necessary to determine what caused the M795/M767Al malfunction. The M795/M767Al shell-fuze combination is safe and highly reliable. 11th Marine Regiment shot 438 of these projectiles in the past twelve months, and 6,657 of these projectiles in the past ten years without malfunction. The suspected malfunction of the M795/M767Al projectile on 18 October 2025 warrants further investigation by Marine Corps Systems Command, PM CSS, PdM Ammunition to determine the cause of the malfunction. A defect determination is necessary to confirm safety of use and make a determination regarding suitability of DODIC 529 Lot IOP24H205-005 and DODIC NA15 Lot BTF04M001-028 for overhead fire of friendly troops.

4. The point of contact for this matter is the Regimental Adjutant (b) (3) (A) at (b) (3) (A) or (b) (3) (A).

(b) (3) (A)

B. B. HARRISON

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
11TH MARINE REGIMENT
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF
BOX 555503
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5503

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3570
IO

OCT 2 2 2025

From: [redacted]
To: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
Via: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
Commanding Officer, 11th Marine Regiment

Subj: CANNON ARTILLERY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE BATTERY E, BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5, 11TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT FIRING INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED 18 OCTOBER 2025

Ref: (a) JRegtO P3570.H

Encl: (1) Personal Statement of [redacted]
(2) Personal Statement of [redacted]
(3) Personal Statement of [redacted]
(4) Record of Fire, DA Form 4504
(5) Record of Missions Fired, DA Form 4513
(6) Computer MET Message, DA Form 3677-R
(7) AFATDS Unit Workspace Screenshots
(8) Gunline Safety T's
(9) Cannon Investigation Checklist, Appendix F, JRegtO P3570.H
(10) Cannon Ammunition Malfunction Report Checklist, Appendix N, JRegtO P3570.H
(11) RCO Special Brief TA-BCH RED
(12) EOD Information Management System Report
(13) Pictures of M795/M767A1 Shell/Fuze that were punched from the bore to show PD setting
(14) Battery E Firing Incident Graphic
(15) Artillery Investigation Appointment Letter

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Commanding Officer, 11th Marine Regiment appointed an artillery Investigating Officer (IO) to conduct the Cannon Accidents/Investigation into the circumstances surrounding an artillery firing incident involving Battery E, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/5, 11th MEU that occurred aboard Camp Pendleton, California in training area (TA) Red Beach on 18 October 2025. This included Appendix F Cannon Investigation Checklist and Appendix N Cannon Ammunition Malfunction Checklist within the JtRegtO P3570.1H. There were no significant difficulties encountered during the conduct of the investigation.

2. Situation Overview

a. On 15 Oct in preparation for live fire operations the BLT 3/5 ammunition chief [redacted] drew (120) M795 HE rounds, (122) M767A1 fuzes LOT#: BTF04M001-028, (360) M232A1 propellant, and (125) M82 primers from the Camp Pendleton Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) which were staged on the ammunition truck and driven to Training Area (TA) BCH RED. Once staged at Red Beach [redacted] and [redacted] ammunition technicians from BLT 3/5, and their driver remained on site with the ammunition loaded on the truck, banded, unopened, and under cover of a tarp to prevent exposure prior to live fire operations occurring on 17 Oct. The three Marines remained on site

overnight in preparation for transfer to Battery E on 16 Oct.

b. On 16 Oct Battery E occupied TA BCH RED grid (b) (3) (A) with (6) M777A2 Howitzers, (7) MTVRs, and (3) JLTVs in preparation for live fire operations on 17 and 18 Oct. The ammunition was then transferred from (b) (3) (A) to (b) (3) (A), the Battery E Executive officer, in preparation for live fire operations. All ammunition was inspected, accounted for, and remained on the truck unopened until 17 Oct. There was no live fire conducted on 16 Oct and the battery bivouacked in place for the night.

c. On 17 Oct at approximately 1200 Battery E broke out (30) M795 HE rounds, (32) M767A1 fuzes, (150) M232A1 propellants, and (36) M82 primers in preparation for the live fire rehearsal. The remainder of the ammunition was on the ammunition truck and was not opened. The ammunition was then distributed to each gun throughout the gunline. During the live fire rehearsal, the battery expended (30) rounds of M795/M767A1 safely and without incident. The target number AF2000 was recorded as a priority target for execution the next day. The battery remained in place and the howitzers were not moved for the remainder of the day. Howitzer maintenance was conducted by the sections in accordance with standard operating procedures.

d. On 18 Oct at approximately 1100 the battery broke out additional ammunition from the ammunition truck including: (60) M795 HE rounds, (60) M767A1 fuzes LOT#: BTF04M001-028, (210) M232A1 propellant, and (89) M82 primers which were then distributed across the gunline. This resulted in (30) M795 HE rounds and (32) M767A1 fuzes LOT#: BTF04M001-028 remaining staged on the ammunition truck. Upon inspection of the ammunition, three M767A1 fuzes were identified as Grade 3 inoperable due to the display not turning on after being set. These three fuzes were immediately marked as Grade 3 with a date/time group, separated into marked containers, and placed to the rear of the gun away from the ammunition pit. Three additional fuzes were then moved from the ammunition truck to the gunline as replacements leaving (29) M767A1 fuzes on the ammunition truck. Once all ammunition was inspected and accounted for, the remaining fuzes were manually set to "PD" verified by the section chiefs, platoon sergeant, platoon commander, executive officer, and battery commander at least four times prior to live fire operations. Following ammunition distribution and inspection, at least one SNCO and Officer remained on each gun through the duration of the exercise.

e. At 1346 in accordance with the prescribed exercise timeline, Battery E fired its first volley of the priority target, target number AF2000. At the time only five howitzers were operational due to Gun 4 being out of action for losing GPS connectivity requiring re-initialization. The call was made by the battery leadership to drop Gun 4 from the mission due to safety concerns with not being able to re-acquire GPS connectivity in the limited time window resulting in only five howitzers executing the mission. At 1346 range control called CHECK FIRING over the radio due to an observed airburst in the vicinity of interstate 5. Only four howitzers were able to shoot the first round before CHECK FIRING was called over the radio due to Gun 3 experiencing a misfire involving a firing linkage lever failure causing the weapon to not fire because the firing mechanism had not engaged.

f. The battery was then commanded "Check Firing, to the rear of the piece fall in" by the Fire Direction Center (FDC) and battery leadership.

g. The BLT 3/5 Battalion Fire Support Officer (b) (3) (A) located on OP W reported three rounds were observed safe in the Whiskey Impact Area. After the first volley, the OP received "Check Firing" from EXCON and remained in place waiting amplifying information.

h. The Regimental Commander was immediately notified and a formal cannon artillery investigation utilizing Appendix F and Appendix N of the JRegtO P3570.H was conducted. The (b) (3) (A) was assigned as the artillery investigating officer assisted by the (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A).

i. Upon investigation of the incident, it was determined that all operations in the Fire Direction Center were conducted in accordance with standard operating procedures. The Regimental Operations Chief interviewed both the Fire Direction Officer and the Battery Operations Chief concluding that all technical firing data was calculated correctly utilizing appropriate procedures and communicated to the gun line without error. It was further determined that all operations on the gun line were conducted in accordance with standard operating procedures. The Regimental Field Artillery Chief interviewed all section chiefs and Marines responsible for setting the fuze concluding that all prescribed procedures were followed to include four independent verifications of the "PD" fuze setting by SNCO and Officers prior to execution.

j. The incident resulted in no injuries to personnel but did result in minor damage to a California Highway Patrol Vehicle. Fragmentation was collected in the vicinity of the airburst and documented by EOD in an Information Management System Report.

k. Further information has been collected from NAVSEA regarding reported incidents involving the M795/M767A1 shell/fuze combination. This data shows that to date there have been no reported incidents involving this shell/fuze combination. When analyzing the M767A1 LOT# BTF04M001-028 specifically, there has been one report by the US Army of a pre-mature airburst involving a M767A1 fuze however it was not used with the M795 projectile. NAR 0460-2019 was released for LOT#BTF03M001-024 moving the NA15 fuze DODIC to Code B for training with an ammunition notice warning of potential for airburst. None of this lot currently resides aboard Camp Pendleton and it has been confirmed that none of this lot was used during the event. There are no documented firing incidents for the M795/M767A1 Lot# BTF04M001-028 used in conjunction with the M777A2 howitzer.

l. 11th Marine Regiment also collected information regarding incidents involving the M795/M767A1 shell/fuze combination. To date, there have been no incidents involving this shell/fuze combination and more specifically the LOT# BTF04M001-028 used during this exercise.

3. Sequence of Events

a. At approximately 1300: (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A).

b. 1300: The FDO plotted and confirmed the target safe and issued a fire order of: (b) (3) (A)

c. 1346: Guns #1, 2, 5, and 6 fired the initial round and the battery was immediately placed in to check firing from range control as there was an air burst observed approximately 800m in front of the gunline along the azimuth of fire in the vicinity of Interstate 5.

d. 1410: (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A) retrograde from the Del Mar Beach Rally to Las Pulgas 43 Area to begin gathering information about the incident.

e. Approximately 1530: [redacted] arrives at the battery position with the [redacted] to begin the gunline cannon investigation checklist.

f. 1545: [redacted] is recalled back to 43 Area Las Pulgas and begins movement from the Del Mar Beach Rally.

g. Approximately 1600: [redacted] arrives at the battery position to begin the fire direction center cannon investigation checklist.

h. 1645: [redacted] is assigned as the artillery investigating officer and begins movement to the battery position.

i. 1720: [redacted] arrives at the battery position, consolidates and reviews all filled out Appendix F documentation, and conducts Appendix N cannon ammunition malfunction checklist. All tubes are punched that had rounds loaded prior to the check firing call and rounds inspected to ensure "PD" fuze setting.

j. 1840: Investigation was completed. Determination was made, based on the data collected, that the cause of the incident was due to an ammunition malfunction of the M767A1 fuze causing a premature airburst.

4. Facts

a. All ammunition handling procedures were followed in accordance with standard operating procedures.

b. All gunline operations were conducted in accordance with standard operating procedures.

c. All fire direction center operations were conduct in accordance with standard operating procedures.

d. The BLT 3/5 Battalion Fire Support Team on OP W observed three rounds impact safely in the Whiskey impact area within the impact box and all observed rounds functioned in point detonating mode as expected.

e. Only four howitzers fired the mission.

f. Gun 3 experienced misfire due to a firing linkage lever failure and did not fire the mission.

g. Gun 4 was put out of action by battery leadership due to losing GPS connectivity and did not fire the mission.

h. The Regimental FAC inspected all fuzed rounds in the position and verified all were correctly set to "PD".

i. The Regimental FAC inspected the rounds loaded and then punched out of Guns 3 and 4 and verified both fuzes were set to "PD".

5. Opinions

a. Based on multiple independent checks from the section chief, platoon sergeant, platoon commander, executive officer, and battery commander there is no evidence of mishandling of ammunition.

b. All M767A1 fuzes were correctly set to "PD" prior to firing the mission and independently verified.

c. It is extremely unlikely that the M767A1 fuze was manually set to a Time fuze setting given the requirements to make this happen. [redacted]

d. There was no misconduct associated with operations and procedures executed in either the ammunition section, fire direction center, or on the gunline during this mission.

e. There was no misconduct associated with Battery E and the mission was executed safely and proficiently according to standard operating procedures.

6. Cause of Incident. The cause of this incident is assessed to be a result of an ammunition malfunction involving M795/M767A1 shell/fuze combination with a fuze setting of "PD". The following are the defining firing incident data results:

[redacted]

7. Corrective Actions and Recommendations. It is recommended that PM AMMO conducts an analysis of the M795/M767A1 shell fuze combination to validate safety of use for overhead fire.

8. Point of Contact. The point of contact for this matter is the [redacted] and can be reached at [redacted] or [redacted].

[redacted]

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
11TH MARINES
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CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5503

3570
(b) (3) (A)

OCT 2 2 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: (b) (3) (A)
To: Files

Subj: STATEMENT REGARDING THE CANNON ARTILLERY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE BATTERY E, BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5, 11TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT FIRING INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON 18 OCTOBER 2025

1. As the Investigating Officer I attest that the findings in this report are true and accurate. As a career artillery officer with nearly 17 years of experience currently serving as the (b) (3) (A) and (b) (3) (A), I am confident in the findings, opinions and data within.

2. Based on the findings of the investigation I have concluded that no additional inquiry is necessary to determine misconduct. There are no known facts that would constitute misconduct, mishandling, or violation of procedure by members of Battery E, Battalion Landing Team 3/5 or the Battalion Landing Team 3/5 Ammunition Section.

3. The point of contact for this matter is the (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) at (b) (3) (A) or (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)

(Enclosure 1)

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
11TH MARINES
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BOX 555503
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5503

1000
(b) (3) (A)
OCT 2 2 2025

From: (b) (3) (A)
To: Commanding Officer, 11th Marine Regiment

Subj: PREMATURE DETONATION INCIDENT INVESTIGATION FINDINGS BY (b) (3) (A).

Ref: TM 10407C-OR/1
JtRegtO P3570.1H
TM 43-0001-28

1. Based on my findings compiled in this investigation and my nearly 25 years as an artillery professional and subject matter expert and having served as a Field Artillery Chief at the both the battalion and regimental level I am confident that all prescribed safety and firing procedures were properly followed by the gun sections and supervisory personnel.

2. On 18 October 2025, I arrived at the gun line location at approximately 1445. Upon arrival, my initial observation was that the area was well organized. The Marines were positioned to the rear, and the gun line appeared undisturbed since firing operations had ceased. (b) (3) (A) and I commenced the investigation. (b) (3) (A) completed Appendix F of JtRegtO P3570.1H, documenting the howitzer and ammunition information. I interviewed personnel directly involved in the incident, specifically the Section Chief and the Number Four Cannoneer, the Marine responsible for setting the fuze. The intent of these interviews was to assess each Marine's level of knowledge and to determine their specific actions prior to the incident. I was informed that four howitzers had fired, and one experienced misfire and Howitzer Number 4 had its navigation system turn off on its own prior to firing, prompting the battery leadership to pull it from the mission. Howitzer Number 3 experienced a firing linkage lever failure; when the lanyard was pulled, the weapon did not fire because the firing mechanism had not engaged.

3. I conducted individual interviews with each Marine involved and tested their proficiency in setting the M767A1 electronic time fuze. All Marines demonstrated proficiency except for one Lance Corporal, who subsequently received additional instruction and hands-on training from his NCOs to ensure proper understanding of the fuze-setting procedure. (b) (3) (A) was the Number Four Cannoneer assigned to Howitzer Number 4, with (b) (3) (A) serving as his Section Chief. During the investigation, it was determined that (b) (3) (A) lacked confidence in properly setting the M767A1 fuze by hand to the time setting "PD." As a result, he received remedial instruction and hands-on training from his NCOs to ensure proper understanding of the fuze-setting procedure. This howitzer was out of action during the live-fire event, and none of the cannoneers assigned to Gun 4 participated in the firing operations.

(Enclosure 2)

4. Based on statements and observations, all prescribed procedures were followed. SNCOs and officers from the battery inspected the fuzes after they were set to "PD" (Point Detonating) and verified the settings prior to firing. Specifically, [redacted] and [redacted] verified that all M767A1 time fuzes were properly set to "PD" before the commencement of the live-fire mission.

5. In addition, I personally conducted a visual inspection of every operational fuze on gun line to ensure each was correctly set to "PD." I also inspected every round that had been extracted from the howitzers after they were pulled from the mission and confirmed that all were properly set to "PD" mode. These inspections confirmed that fuze settings were consistent and in accordance with prescribed procedures across all guns and ammunition on site.

6. Although it is not standard operating procedure for SNCOs or officers to verify fuze settings after the gun sections have set them, this additional step was conducted due to the high visibility of the operation and the fact that rounds were being fired over the I-5 corridor. This extra layer of oversight was implemented as a precautionary measure to ensure maximum safety and accountability during the mission. All gun sections were setting the fuzes by hand; however, only one howitzer section verified the fuze settings using the Enhanced Portable Inductive Artillery Fuze Setter (EPIAFS) after hand-setting them. This additional verification ensured the fuze setting matched the required configuration prior to firing, though it was not required by standard procedure.

7. During the investigation, three fuzes from the same lot were identified as faulty. Their display screens, which indicate the fuze settings, failed to power on. These defective fuzes were discovered prior to being installed on any rounds and were immediately segregated and marked as Grade 3. All Grade 3 fuzes were consolidated and stored at Gun 4, as that section was already out of action for the duration of the live-fire mission.

8. During inspection, one ammunition box was noted to contain only three fuzes, indicating it had been previously opened before issue. This observation was documented for accountability purposes but determined not to be a contributing factor. While attempting to set the three faulty fuzes with the EPIAFS, the device displayed a "PD" setting; however, the fuze displays remained off. This discrepancy occurred with all defective fuzes, confirming the malfunction was isolated to the fuzes themselves and not the EPIAFS. Further assessment determined that the M767A1 fuze has a 15-day operational battery life once activated. It is possible that these two defective fuzes had previously been powered on, stored, and exceeded the 15-day battery shelf life prior to use, which would explain the power failure observed during inspection.

9. Based on the findings of this investigation, all prescribed safety and firing procedures were properly followed by the gun sections and supervisory personnel. The premature detonation that occurred approximately 800 meters from the howitzer does not appear to be the result of operator error or procedural deviation. Considering the evidence and observations collected, the most probable cause of the incident is a malfunction within the fuze itself. While the exact failure mechanism could not be conclusively determined, all indicators suggest the fuze did not function as intended. It is recommended that all fuzes from the same lot be inspected and tested to prevent recurrence and to ensure the continued safety and reliability of firing operations.

10. The point of contact for this is (b) (3) (A) at (b) (3) (A).

(b) (3) (A)

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
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3570
(b) (3) (A)
OCT 2 2 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: (b) (3) (A)
To: Files

Subj: STATEMENT REGARDING THE CANNON ARTILLERY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE BATTERY E, BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5, 11TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT FIRING INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON 18 OCTOBER 2025

1. As the (b) (3) (A) I attest that the findings in this report are true and accurate. As a career artillery Fire Direction Control Specialists with over 20 years of experience serving in the Fire Direction Center and currently serving as the (b) (3) (A) I am confident in the findings, opinions and data within.

2. Based on the findings of the investigation I have concluded that no additional inquiry is necessary to determine misconduct. There are no known facts that would constitute misconduct, mishandling, or violation of procedure by members of Battery E, Battalion Landing Team 3/5 or the Battalion Landing Team 3/5 Ammunition Section.

3. The point of contact for this matter is the (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A) at (b) (3) (A) or (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

(Enclosure 3)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: [redacted] (b) (3) (A)
To: Files

Subj: DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE 4 - RECORD OF FIRE, DA FORM 4504

Ref: JRegtO P3570.H

1. This enclosure shows the specific data calculated for target number AF2000. It details the fire command established by the Fire Direction Officer and the data passed to the gunline. This document details the fire order issued by the Fire Direction Officer and the deflection, and quadrant of each gun firing the mission. This document is not completely filled out due to check firing being called and the mission not being completed in accordance with established safety regulations in the JRegtO P5370.H. All data on this document was recorded accurately and demonstrates the mission was processed properly.

[redacted] (b) (3) (A)

RECORD OF FIRE

CALL FOR FIRE

Observer _____ AF/FFE/S/S _____ Tgt AP2000

Grid: (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)

Polar: Dir _____ Dis _____ U/D _____ VA _____

Shift _____ : Dir _____ L/R _____ +/- _____ U/D _____

FS

100/R

/R

20/R

HOB Corr

X Si + 10 | 10m Si

| | | |

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: [redacted]
To: Files

Subj: DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE 5 – RECORD OF MISSIONS FIRED, DA FORM 4513

Ref: JRegtO P3570.H

1. This enclosure shows the data transmitted from the Fire Direction Center to the gunline and written down by the recorder of each howitzer for each mission. All data matches the Record of Fire, DA Form 4504 showing that all fire mission data was calculated and transmitted to the gunline correctly. This document is not completely filled out due to the check firing response to the incident being called and the mission not being completed by all howitzers in accordance with established safety regulations in the JRegtO P5370.H. If the mission was completed by all howitzers the DA Form 4513 would be completed in entirety. All data on this document was recorded accurately and shows the mission was processed properly.

[redacted]

[redacted]

RECORD OF MISSIONS FIRED

For use of this form, see FM 6-50; the proponent agency is US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

SECTION #1 6881 | DATE 20251018 | PAGE | OF

AMMUNITION/FUZES ON HAND

M795			M232 A1			M767 A1			M82
HE			H			TI			PRS MER
11			45			11			17

STND DATA: ADJ PIECE: SH: LOT: FZ:

PIECES FOLLOW PIECES FIRE MOF	SP INSTR	SH	LOT	CHG	FZ	TI	DF	QE	METHOD FFE	AMMUNITION EXPENDED										
AMMO TRANSFER FRM	GUN 1 TO	GUN3											-1							
TOTAL										11			44				11			17
AMMO TRANSFER																	+1			
TOTAL										11			44				12			17
D (11)	[redacted]																			

DA FORM 4513, MAY 76 REPLACES DA FORM 4199, 1 JAN 74, WHICH IS OBSOLETE. USAPPC V1.00

(Enclosure 5)

RECORD OF MISSIONS FIRED For use of this form, see FM 6-50; the proponent agency is US Army Training and Doctrine Command.	SECTION #2/0041	DATE 20251018	PAGE 1 OF

AMMUNITION/FUZES ON HAND										
M795			M782				M232			M762
A			T1				H			HE
11			11				44			18

STND DATA: ADJ PIECE: SH: LOT: FZ:

PIECES FOLLOW PIECES FIRE MOF	SP INSTR	SH	LOT	CHG	FZ	TI	DF	QE	METHOD FFE	AMMUNITION EXPENDED
3 (11)	[redacted] (b) (3) (A)									

DA FORM 4513, MAY 76 REPLACES DA FORM 4199, 1 JAN 74, WHICH IS OBSOLETE. USAPPC V1.00

(Enclosure 5)

RECORD OF MISSIONS FIRED

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SECTION	DATE	PAGE	OF
#3/0835	20251018	1	

AMMUNITION/FUZES ON HAND

M165			M782		M783					M762
A			H		[illegible]					DR
11			4M		17					16

STND DATA: ADJ PIECE: SH: LOT: FZ:

PIECES FOLLOW PIECES FIRE MOF	SP INSTR	SH	LOT	CHG	FZ	TI	DF	QE	METHOD FFE	AMMUNITION EXPENDED
30	[redacted]									

(b) (3) (A)

DA FORM 4513, MAY 76 REPLACES DA FORM 4199, 1 JAN 74, WHICH IS OBSOLETE. USAPPC V1.00

(Enclosure 5)

[redacted] (b) (3) (A)

RECORD OF MISSIONS FIRED For use of this form, see FM 6-50; the proponent agency is US Army Training and Doctrine Command.	SECTION	DATE	PAGE 1 OF	AMMUNITION/FUZES ON HAND
	#4/0845	20251018		

STND DATA: ADJ PIECE: SH: LOT: FZ:

PIECES FOLLOW PIECES FIRE MOF	SP INSTR	SH	LOT	CHG	FZ	TI	DF	QE	METHOD FFE	AMMUNITION EXPENDED

DA FORM 4513, MAY 76 REPLACES DA FORM 4199, 1 JAN 74, WHICH IS OBSOLETE. USAPPC V1.00

(Enclosure 5)

RECORD OF MISSIONS FIRED

For use of this form, see FM 6-50; the proponent agency is US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

SECTION: #5/0852 | DATE: 20251017 | PAGE 1 OF

STND DATA: | ADJ PIECE: | SH: | LOT: | FZ:

AMMUNITION/FUZES ON HAND

M795	M223	M767	M382				
A	H	T1	PRIM				
0	0	0	1				

PIECES FOLLOW PIECES FIRE MOF	SP INSTR	SH	LOT	CHG	FZ	TI	DF	QE	METHOD FFE
	AMMO SHUFFLE								
	TOTAL								
Line AB (11)	(b) (3) (A)								

AMMUNITION EXPENDED

M795	M223	M767	M382				
+5	+20	+5	+6				
5	20	5	7				

DA FORM 4513, MAY 76 — REPLACES DA FORM 4199, 1 JAN 74, WHICH IS OBSOLETE. — USAPPC V1.00

(Enclosure 5)

[redacted]

RECORD OF MISSIONS FIRED

For use of this form, see FM 6-50; the proponent agency is US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

SECTION	DATE	PAGE / OF
#6/0039	2025 10 [redacted]	

AMMUNITION/FUZES ON HAND

7/15				2/32		9/64				M83
A				H		tj				PR IM
11				~~45~~ 44		11				~~45~~ 17

STND DATA: ADJ PIECE: SH: LOT: FZ:

PIECES FOLLOW PIECES FIRE MOF	SP INSTR	SH	LOT	CHG	FZ	TI	DF	QE	METHOD FFE	AMMUNITION EXPENDED
Line A: [redacted]										

DA FORM 4513, MAY 76 REPLACES DA FORM 4199, 1 JAN 74, WHICH IS OBSOLETE. USAPPC V1.00

Lot: GDB10C-031039

(Enclosure 5)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: [redacted] (b) (3) (A)
To: Files

Subj: DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE 6 – COMPUTER MET MESSAGE, DA FORM 3677-R

Ref: JRegtO P3570.H

1. This enclosure shows the most current meteorological data that was available and used to process firing data in support of this fire mission. It captures meteorological data to account for non-standard meteorological conditions including wind direction, wind speed, temperature, and air pressure. Meteorological conditions can impact the flight path of the projectile and must be accounted for. This meteorological data is then input into the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System computer for the calculation of firing data to be sent to howitzers from the Fire Direction Center. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System saves to the installed hard drive all meteorological data input to the computer. This enclosure demonstrates that the most current meteorological data was accounted for during the fire mission.

[redacted] (b) (3) (A)

COMPUTER MET MESSAGE

For use of this form, see FM 6-15; the proponent agency is TRADOC.

IDENTIFICATION	OCTANT	LOCATION	DATE	TIME (GMT)	DURATION (HOURS)	STATION HEIGHT (10's M)	MDP PRESSURE MB
METCM	Q	$L_aL_aL_a$ or xxx $L_oL_oL_o$ or xxx	YY	$G_oG_oG_o$	G	hhh	$P_dP_dP_d$
METCM	1	(b) (3) (A)					

ZONE HEIGHTS METERS	LINE NUMBER	ZONE VALUES: WIND DIRECTION (10s M)	WIND SPEED (KNOTS)	TEMPERATURE (1/10°K)	PRESSURE (MILLIBARS)
	ZZ	ddd	FFF	TTTT	PPPP
SURFACE	00	[redacted]			
200	01				
500	02				
1000	03				
1500	04				
2000	05				
2500	06				
3000	07				
3500	08				
4000	09				
4500	10				
5000	11				
6000	12				
7000	13				
8000	14				
9000	15				
10000	16				
11000	17				
12000	18				
13000	19				
14000	20				
15000	21				
16000	22				
17000	23				
18000	24				
19000	25	NFE	(b) (3) (A)		
20000	26	20251018			USMC

FROM SURVEY	DATE AND TIME (GMT)	DATE AND TIME (LST)
TO FDL	20251018 1900	20251018 1200
MESSAGE NUMBER 1	RECORDER (b) (3) (A)	CHECKED (b) (3) (A)

DA FORM 3677-R, MAY 92 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED. USAPPC V1.00

(Enclosure 6)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: [redacted] (b) (3) (A)
To: Files

Subj: DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE 7 -- AFATDS UNIT WORKSPACE SCREENSHOTS

Ref: JRegtO P3570.H

1. This enclosure shows screen shot printouts displaying the data input into the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System that calculates technical firing data for each mission. These printouts are utilized by the investigating officer to determine that accurate physical gun location, azimuth of fire, ammunition data, and muzzle velocity utilized during fire mission processing were accurately input by Marines into the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System. This was used during the investigation to verify accurate fire direction center procedures. All data was accurate and up to date during this fire mission.

(b) (3) (A)

(Enclosure 7)



(Enclosure 7



(Enclosure 7)



(Enclosure 7)

(b) (3) (A)

(Enclosure 7)



(Enclosure 7)



(Enclosure 7)



(Enclosure 7)

(b) (3) (A)

(Enclosure 7)



(Enclosure 7)



(Enclosure 7)



(Enclosure 7)

(b) (3) (A

(Enclosure 7)



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

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

(Enclosure 7)

(b) (3) (A)



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

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

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

(Enclosure 7)

(b) (3) (A)

(Enclosure 7)



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

(Enclosure 7)

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

(Enclosure 7)

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(Enclosure 7)



(Enclosure 7)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: [redacted] (b) (3) (A)
To: Files

Subj: DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE 8 – GUNLINE SAFETY T'S

Ref: JRegtO P3570.H

1. This enclosure shows the safety data calculated from the issued range card which ensures the safe firing of the howitzers. This data is then written on a document called a Safety T. The Safety T displays in a simple and visual manner the authorized shell, angle of fire, charge, and established azimuth of fire for the position that the battery was in. In the Safety T enclosed the the maximum quadrant, left and right lateral limits, and minimum quadrant directed by the range card are visible. This is utilized in the Fire Direction Center, gunline, and with key leaders to verify firing data is safe prior to sending data to the gunline and loading a round. The enclosure shows that the processed firing data fell within the safety box and was safe for execution.

[redacted] (b) (3) (A)

GP: REDBEACH DATE: 20251018

(b) (3) (A)

COMPUTED BY: (b) (3) (A)

VERIFIED BY:

APPROVED BY:

GP: REDBEACH DATE: 20251018

(b) (3) (A)

COMPUTED BY: (b) (3) (A)

VERIFIED BY:

APPROVED BY:

GP: REDBEACH DATE: 20251018

(b) (3) (A)

COMPUTED BY: (b) (3) (A)

VERIFIED BY:

APPROVED BY:

GP: REDBEACH DATE: 20251018

(b) (3) (A)

COMPUTED BY: (b) (3) (A)

VERIFIED BY:

APPROVED BY:

(Enclosure 8)

GP: REDBEACH DATE: 20251018

(b) (3) (A)

COMPUTED BY (b) (3) (A)

VERIFIED BY:

APPROVED BY

GP:REDBEACH DATE:20251018

(b) (3) (A)

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GP:RED BEACH DATE:20251018

(b) (3) (A)

COMPUTED BY (b) (3) (A)

VERIFIED BY:

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GP:REDBEACH DATE:20251018

(b) (3) (A)

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VERIFIED BY:

APPROVED B

(Enclosure 8)

GP: RED BEACH DATE: 20251018

(b) (3) (A)

COMPUTED B

VERIFIED BY:

APPROVED BY

GP: RED BEACH DATE: 20251018

(b) (3) (A)

COMPUTED B

VERIFIED BY:

APPROVED BY

(b) (3) (A)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: [redacted] (b) (3) (A)
To: Files

Subj: DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE 9 – CANNON INVESTIGATION CHECKLIST, APPENDIX F, JREGTO P3570.H

Ref: JRegtO P3570.H

1. This enclosure shows the checklist used by personnel when conducting a firing incident investigation. It details data recorded between the Fire Direction Center and the gunline capturing all data applied to process a fire mission to include ammunition, unit location, Fire Direction Center procedures, and gunline procedures. It also includes interview information to capture statements and test proficiency of Marines involved in mission processing.

Appendix F - Cannon Investigation Checklist

Note: This checklist is for use by personnel conducting firing incident investigations and will be submitted with the completed investigation. Investigating Officer will follow appropriate technical manuals and reference publications to complete the Cannon Investigation Checklist.

1. Investigating Officer Name: [redacted] Rank: [redacted]
   EDIPI: [redacted] Billet: [redacted]
2. Description of Incident: PREMATURE AIR BURST OF M795/M767A1

Firing Unit

3. If Observed from Battery/Platoon Position:

Azimuth of Burst: 0024 Height of Burst: 250 (ESTIMATED)

Estimated Location Of Burst: 5690 8410 - BASED ON FRAGMENTON LOCATION

Time Of Flight: 1-2 SECONDS

Numbers of Howitzers Firing: 6 Damage In Position: YES (NO)

Nature of Damage in Position: NONE

4. Record date/time group (DTG) the command "CHECK FIRING" was announced and who announced "CHECK FIRING". 18/10 1346

5. Immediately obtain and secure the following:

   a. All safety T's marked with user's identification. YES

   b. All Records of Fire, DA Form 4504. YES

   c. All Records of Missions Fired, DA Form 4513. YES

   d. All Firing Charts, AFATDS/CENTAUR database, and journals as appropriate. YES

6. Without moving any equipment, record the following for each howitzer:

   a. Verify fire control alignment test was conducted prior to firing. YES

   b. Quadrant Data: COMPLETE

Wpn	QE on DA 4504	QE on DA 4513	QE on Weapon	Bubbles Level	Special Corrections	QE using Gunner Quadrant
1	(b) (3) (A)					
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						

c. Deflection Data:

Wpn	DF on DA 4504	AZ Counter Reading	QE on DA 4513	Special Corrections	Sight Picture Correct
1	(b) (3) (A)				
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					

d. Record on Gunners Reference Card:

Wpn	Az of Lay	DF to AC	DF to Safety Circle	DF to Collimator	DF to AP
1	(b) (3) (A)				
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					

e. Shell/Fuze Data:

Wpn	SH on DA 4504	SH on DA 4513	Ti on DA 4504	Ti on DA 4513	FZ on DA 4504	FZ on DA 4513
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						

(b) (3) (A)

f. DFCS Data:

Wpn	Piece Location	AOF	Alt/Elev
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

(b) (3) (A)

Wpn	Commanded DF	Actual DF	Commanded QE	Actual QE	Chg	Fz	Ti
1							
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							

(b) (3) (A)

g. Charge Data:

(1) MACS - Count the remaining propellants in the firing position and the propellants that should and have been fired. 224 ON HAND

7. The OIC of Firing or the investigating officer will accomplish the following. He may require the assistance of the Position Commander.

a. Turn Pantels to the lay circle and record the DF of each tube and the AZ it is oriented.

(1) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)

(2) _____ (b) (3) (A)
(3) _____
(4) _____
(5) _____
(6) _____

(b) (3) (A)

b. Record the deflection readings from the lay circle to the pantel of each piece.

(1) _____ (b) (3) (A)
(2) _____
(3) _____
(4) _____
(5) _____
(6) _____

c. Conduct computations as necessary between gun and circle readings.

d. ~~Do reciprocal check between lay and safety circles.~~

(1) Lay circle (b) (3) (A)

(2) Safety circle DF _____ (b) (3) (A)

8. Compare safety "T" data with data on:

a. FDC record of fire, is the data safe? YES

b. Section chief record of missions fired, is the data safe? YES

9. Compare FDC record of fire with section chief record of missions fired. YES

10. Was correct safety "T" used for the charge fired? YES

11. If a time fuze was fired, determine: M767A1

a. Time set PD MODE

b. Who verified it? SECTION CHIEF

12. Have the Marine who actually set the fuze demonstrate it to you. YES

13. Have the section chief demonstrate the following:

    a. Verify a fuze setting. YES

    b. Verify lay. YES

    c. Verify boresight. NA

14. Did the section chief:

    a. Verify the charge fired? YES

    b. Perform an end-for-end test with his gunner's quadrant? YES

    c. Check shell/fuze/time? YES

    d. Check DF/QE on last round fired? YES

15. If incident appears to be a range error, perform an end-for- end test.

16. Count and record all projectiles, propellant canisters and fuzes remaining on each section.

Ammo Model	Long Lot	1	2	3	4	5	6
[redacted]							

17. Were any fuzes preset? YES

a. Type M767A1 YES

b. Setting PD

18. Was all ammunition cleared for overhead fire? YES

19. Was ammunition properly segregated? YES

20. Boresight weapons - verify the boresight of each gun. NA

21. Were all personnel out of the FDC when you arrived? YES

22. Did the FDO verify his check rounds? YES

23. Could the FDO specify which elements of the 5 requirements for accurate predicted fire that were/were not being met? YES

24. Collect records of fire for the:

a. Mission involving the incident. YES

b. Last complete mission. YES

c. Registration. N/A

d. Current met. YES

e. AFATDS/CENTAUR database. YES

f. Muzzle velocity records. YES

25. Was all pertinent data on the ROF filled in? If the M777A2 has software version 5.0 or newer the ROF from the OPERATIONAL main menu will allow the investigator to view the firing data and select records of historical fire missions from the CSD-R. The DFCS will retain a maximum of 25 historical fire missions. ROFs at the CSD-R cannot be deleted by the operator. YES

26. Check safety computations.

a. Were they done correctly? Pre and post-occ? YES / PRE-OCC

b. Min QE 439

c. Min Ti PD ONLY

d. Min VT PD ONLY

27. Was a copy of the XO's report on hand? YES

a. Min QE 439

b. Min VT NA

c. Min Ti NA

28. Was a copy of the Position/Range Safety Card in the FDC? YES

a. Was it signed by the Battalion Commander? NO, AN RLO SPECIAL BRIEF WAS PREPARED BY (b) (3) (A) RANGE CONTROL OFFICER AT RANGE OPERATIONS DIVISION, CAMP PENDLETON. AN FACE TO FACE BRIEF WAS CONDUCTED AT THE BATTERY LOCATION PRIOR TO LIVE FIRE SATISFYING THIS REQUIREMENT.

b. Was a PSO assigned? YES

29. Did the safety card authorize the shell, charge and fuze just fired? YES

30. Was the mission fired using AFATDS/CENTAUR/manual? AFATDS

31. What means was used to backup or check the primary mission data? AFATDS

32. If data was computed manually, determine from the chart: DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE LIVE FIRE MANUAL DATA WAS NOT CONSIDERED AS A COMPUTATION MEANS

a. Did the grid lines match map?

b. Battery position plotted correctly (base piece at a minimum)?

(1) Grid

(2) (b) (3) (A)

c. Las ocation.

(1)

(2) Alt

(b) (3) (A)

d. Target fired u

e. Previous pin

f. Target grid o

g. Df indices set properly?

h. Chart laid on proper azimuth of fire?

AZ:_____

i. VI and Site properly determined.

(1) VI:_____

(2) Site:_____

j. Verify Rg and DF to last round.

(1) Rg:_____

(2) DF:_____

k. If observer's position is plotted, were azimuth indices constructed properly?

l. Was FDC using a GFT setting?

(1) Derived From:_____

(2) DTG Determined:_____

(3) GFT_____, CHG_____/___, RG_____, EL_____, TI_____,

GFT DF CORR_____ CORR_____

(4) Does AFATDS/CENTAUR dat[redacted] mils?

m. Muzzle velocity variation of batter[redacted]

n. Special corrections?

(1)_____

(2)_____

(3)_____

(4)_____

(5)_____

(6)_____

33. What was difference in "chart" range and deflection between the primary and backup mission data?

a. Range: N/A

b. Deflection: N/A

34. Digitally archived available? NO If No, why not? FIRE MISSION WAS NOT FIRE DIGITALLY

35. Verify following data by entering CENTAUR files:

a. MV's guns 1 thru 6 GUNS 1 THROUGH 6 WERE -5.7 MV

b. When MV's obtained? PREDICTED AT 1000 ON 17 OCT

c. MV's correctly entered? YES

d. Current met? YES

e. Met correctly entered (to include altitude?) YES

f. Current prop temp? GUN 1-63 GUN 2-64 GUN 3-61 GUN 4-60 GUN 5-60 GUN 6-64

g. Prop Temp correctly entered? YES

h. Correct Target Location? (b) (3) (A) [redacted]

i. Tgt Plots within safety diagram? YES

j. Altitude correctly determined? YES

k. Intervening crests? NO

36. If AFATDS data, check the following

a. View applicable MET. YES

b. View unit data, ammunition, munitions, verify projectile Wt. YES

c. View unit data, detail, detailed data verify the following:

(1) Weapon model M777A2

(2) Azimuth of lay 0084

d. View unit data, detail, weapon verify the following: AFATDS PRINT OUTS INCLUDED

(1) Weapon number YES

(2) Group YES

(3) Location YES

e. View unit data, detail, calc weapon loc: verify the following:

(1) Center of battery location (b) (3) (A) [redacted]

(2) Orienting station A location if applicable NA

(3) Orienting station B location, if applicable NA

f. View AWSM window if end of mission has not been given, verify the following:

(1) Tgt number AF2000

(2) KnPt, if applicable NA

(3) Location (b) (3) (A)

(4) Grid zone 11S MS

(5) Shell M795 (HE)

(6) Fuze M767A1

(7) Charge 4

(8) Fire units/adjusting units NA

(9) Observer, if applicable (b) (3) (A)

g. AFATDS Cannon Tech Solution

(1) Wpn BTRY

(2) Cap 6

(3) MOC AMIL

(4) # Rounds 11

(5) Shell category HE

(6) Shell model M795

(7) Shell lot IAP24H205-005

(8) Prop color WHITE

(9) Prop lot GDB10L-031039

(10) Prop charge 4

(11) Fuze category PD

(12) Fuze model M767A1

(13) Fuze lot BTFD4M0001-028

(14) Fuze (b) (3) (A)

(15) DF

(16) QE

(17) Est

37. What were the fire commands recorded by the FDC on the ROF:

a. AMC

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

f. _____

38. Was there any abnormal sound, flashes or any unusual characteristics upon firing? YES

39. Were the weapons fully operational and properly maintained? YES

40. Record names of:

a. OIC of Firing (b) (3) (A)

b. Position Commander (b) (3) (A)

c. FDO (b) (3) (A)

d. Operations Chief (b) (3) (A)

e. PSO (b) (3) (A)

f. 1st howitzer Section Chief (b) (3) (A)

g. 2nd howitzer Section Chief (b) (3) (A)

h. 3rd howitzer Section Chief (b) (3) (A)

i. 4th howitzer Section Chief (b) (3) (A)

j. 5th howitzer Section Chief (b) (3) (A)

k. 6th howitzer Section Chief (b) (3) (A)

l. RSO (b) (3) (A)

m. BG (b) (3) (A)

Narrative sequence of events:

REFERENCE ATTACHED REPORT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: [redacted]
To: Files

Subj: DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE 10 – CANNON AMMUNITION MALFUNCTION REPORT CHECKLIST, APPENDIX N, JREGTO P3570.H

Ref: JRegtO P3570.H

1. This enclosure shows the checklist used by personnel conducting ammunition malfunction reports to prevent future malfunctions. It is turned into the Artillery Regimental headquarters and forwarded to the Naval Surface Warfare Center – Corona for analysis and follow on action.

Appendix N - Cannon Ammunition Malfunction Checklist

General: This appendix provides the checklist used by the command for Cannon ammunition malfunctions and is required to be submitted to the Battalion S-3 and NSWC-Corona (Fallbrook DET).

Note: This checklist is for use by personnel conducting ammunition malfunction reports to prevent future malfunctions. This checklist does not negate the requirement for units to report mishaps via MCO P5102.1B w/Ch 1-2 (Navy and Marine Corps and Safety Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping Manual).

1. INVESTIGATING OFFICER:

Name: (b) (3) (A) Rank: (b) (3) (A)

Billet: (b) (3) (A)

2. AMMUNTION DATA, PROJECTILE, FUZE, AND PROPELLANT:

DODIC: NA15 Lot Number: BTF 04M001-028

Nomenclature: M767A1

Date/Time of Malfunction: 20251018 1346

Brief statement as to the condition of the round and packaging prior to the firing/employment: No indicators for damage all boxed and sealed

(b) (3) (A)

Total number of rounds from the malfunctioning lot(s) remaining on hand or returned to the local ASP:

1	2	3	4	5	6	OD Ammo Truck	Total
10	10	11	11	4	10	36	86

Total number of rounds fired (or attempted) from the lot(s) on the day of the malfunction: 4

Total number of rounds which malfunctioned: 1

Was a local suspension of the lot(s) imposed: Yes (No)

3. UNIT DATA:

Unit name, UIC, DODAAC: E, Battery 3/5

Unit POC, contact phone number, e-mail: [redacted] (b) (3) (A)

4. WEAPON DATA:

Weapon Nomenclature, Weapon Serial Number: [redacted] (b) (3) (A)

Condition of the weapon prior to the malfunction: Operational, Degraded digital

Description of the weapon after malfunction: not change

Quadrant of tube, Azimuth of Fire (include the number of propellant charges used), length of recoil, and range to target [redacted] (b) (3) (A)

Location/grid of malfunctioning ammunition/weapon: [redacted] (b) (3) (A)

Number of weapons firing the reported ammunition lot on the day of the malfunction/number of malfunctions per weapon: 6 Firing, 2 not fire (3/4), 1 Ammunition malfunction on 1, 2, 5, or 6. Unsure at this time.

5. DESCRIPTION OF THE MALFUNCTION:

Provide a complete narrative description of what occurred:

Include the following if applicable.

1. Any improper procedures observed. NONE.
2. Describe the location of the malfunction in relation to the weapon and/or any personnel involved.

See Next Page II-101

A2 0024, 800m to the front of the Gun Line the malfunction occured resulting to a prematurly detonated HE round. The Shell/Fuze combination was HE 795 TNT / M767A1 ti Setting PD

Indicate the number of casualties sustained, Report in three categories using NUMBERS ONLY (NOT NAMES):

1. Minor injuries requiring only field or outpatient treatment. N/A
2. Major injuries requiring hospitalization. N/A
3. Fatalities. N/A

(e.g., 2 minor injuries, 1 major injury, 0 fatalities)

If the malfunction was a premature detonation indicate:

1. Distance from the muzzle: ~800 meters
2. Obstructions in the line of fire or in the weapon tube: None
3. Fuze setting: - PD
4. Evidence of unburned propellant or residue in the tube: None
5. Deviations from instruction in the Technical Manual(s): None

6. PREVAILING CONDITIONS:

Base and range, where malfunction(s) occurred: CPEN / Red Beach South-e / TA Beach Red

Type of target: Point Target

Weather conditions: ~75° Sunny

Terrain at the scene of the malfunction: Sandy, flat, and adjcent to wate line.

7. STORAGE CONDITIONS:

Prior to operation: Ammunition location (i.e., stored outside under a tarpaulin, etc.)

Stered outside on ready board with 6' clearnce 18' overhead and Covered.

Prior to firing/employment:

Was ammunition unpacked and subjected to adverse elements? (i.e., rain, snow, etc.)

N/A

RCO Special Brief



(Enclosure 11)

(b) (3) (A)

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Information Management System

(b) (3) (A)

U 155mm Projectile Malfunction - Air Burst - Analysis

U Pick Up and/or Disposal UXO - Dismounted

U 2025-10-18-1345 (Local)

M0000M014101920250314358Z

GENERATED REPORT

(EODIMS)
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
2025-10-19 0525(Z)

STORYBOARD REPORT
(Enclosure 12)

U Incident Type: Pick Up and/or Disposal UXO - Dismounted
U Grid To Incident: (b) (3) (A) [redacted]
U Geo Location: Red Beach Camp Pendleton, CA 92055 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
U Lat/Long: (b) (3) (A) [redacted]
U EOD Responding Unit: Marine Corps Installations West Camp Pendleton
U Support: United States Marine Corps
U Task Force:

INCIDENT TIMELINE

U Discovery: 2025-10-18-1345 (Local)
U Notification: 2025-10-18-1345 (Local)
U Start: 2025-10-18-1345 (Local)
U Departed Scene: 2025-10-18-1630 (Local)
U Returned to Base:
U Stop: 2025-10-18-1730 (Local)

(Enclosure 12)

NARRATIVE

U On 18 October 2025 I Marine Expeditionary Force in conjunction with Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton executed an amphibious demonstration aboard Red Beach Training Area, Camp Pendleton California. During the execution of the amphibious demonstration Eazy Battery, Battalion Landing Team 3/5, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit conducted live fire operations firing from Red Beach IVO 11S (b) (3) (A) into the Whiskey Impact Area (IVO (b) (3) (A)). At approximately 1345 PST during the first volley of (6) rounds a detonation was observed approximately 1000m forward of the gun line in the air over Interstate 5. The detonation resulted in fragmentation being spread over an area of approximately 300m, which impacted multiple vehicles to include (1) Camp Pendleton Provost Marshal's Office vehicle, (1) California Highway Patrol vehicle, and (1) California Department of Transportation vehicle. The fragmentation resulted in minor damage to the California Highway Patrol vehicle. No injuries were sustained by any personnel.

Upon observing the detonation over interstate 5, Camp Pendleton Range Control personnel placed Eazy Battery into a check-fire status halting live fire operations. Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel aboard Red Beach Training Area in conjunction with Camp Pendleton Range Control Range Inspector began to search the area resulting in the location of multiple pieces of fragmentation spread between the Red Beach Training Area Perimeter Fence and the rail line. Camp Pendleton EOD and Range Control Personnel photographed and recorded the locations of the fragmentation via Military Grid Reference System. Multiple pieces of fragmentation consistent with a 155mm artillery projectile were recovered.

Camp Pendleton Range Control informed EOD the fuze utilized by Eazy Battery was either a (DODIC NA15) M767A1 Electronic Time Fuze or a (DODIC NA17) M762A1 Electronic Time Fuze. At this time no nomenclature or DODIC for the 155mm projectile has been received.

(Enclosure 12)

TEAM LEADER ANALYSIS

UFacts - Interstate 5 Closure: During the time of the amphibious demonstration and live fire event, Interstate 5 was closed to all traffic from Lantern Point (b) (3) (A)) to Aliso Creek Rest Area (b) (3) (A)) and Las Pulgas Road was closed to non-essential traffic from Red Beach Training Area to the intersection of Stuart Mesa Road and Las Pulgas Road aboard Camp Pendleton.

(Enclosure 12)

Fragmentation Locations

(b) (3) (A)

(Enclosure 12)

Fragmentation



(Enclosure 12)

Fragmentation

East Elevation

287°W (T) 11S MS 56634 84518 ±49ft ▲ 66ft

South East Elevation

315°NW (T) 11S MS 56663 84485 ±9ft ▲ 66ft

(Enclosure 12)

Fragmentation

North East Elevation

243°SW (T) 11S MS 56659 84485 ±974ft 65ft

South East Elevation

328°NW (T) 11S MS 56786 84587 ±13ft 61ft

(Enclosure 12)

Fragmentation

South East Elevation

314°NW (T) 11S MS 56798 84581 ±32ft ▲ 68ft

North West Elevation

146°SE (T) 11S MS 56794 84579 ±22ft ▲ 70ft

(Enclosure 12)

Fragmentation

(Enclosure 12)

California Highway Patrol Car



(Enclosure 12)

California Highway Patrol Car Fragmentation

(Enclosure 12)
Enclosure (105)

Enclosure 11 - Pictures of M795/M767A1 Shell/Fuse that were removed from the bore utilizing a tool that pushed the round out of the bore and through the breach (rear) demonstrate PD setting was utilized.

This is a picture of one of the five rounds that were loaded but not fired due to the battery being put in a Check Fire status. This required the round to be physically removed from the bore utilizing a tool that pushed the round out of the bore and through the breach (rear). Five howitzers participated in the mission, guns 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. Guns 1, 2, 5, and 6 are the only howitzers that fired a first round. Guns 1, 2, 5, and 6 loaded another round, which led to the five rounds loaded in howitzers 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 when a Check Fire status was entered to have to have a round physically removed. Gun 3 still had not fired the first round. This picture specifically showed the M795 HE Projectile fused with the M767A1 fuze. All five rounds removed from howitzers 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 were found with a fuze in a PD setting. All 56 remaining fused rounds in the position were verified in the same manner and were found with a fuze in a PD setting.

Enclosure 11 Pictures of 795 767A1 hell Fuse that were removed from the bore utilizing a tool that pushed the round out of the bore and through the breach (rear) demonstrate PD setting was utilized.

This picture shows the verified M767A1 fuse setting to "PD." All five rounds removed from howitzers 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 were found with a fuze in a PD setting. All 56 remaining fused rounds in the position were verified in the same manner and were found with a fuze in a PD setting.

Enclosure 11 Pictures of 795 767A1 hell Fuse that were removed from the bore utilizing a tool that pushed the round out of the bore and through the breach (rear) demonstrate PD setting was utilized.

This picture shows a confirmation of the fuze M767A1 nomenclature.

Enclosure 11 Pictures of 795 767A1 hell Fuse that were removed from the bore utilizing a tool that pushed the round out of the bore and through the breach (rear) demonstrate PD setting was utilized.

This picture shows confirmation of the LOT#BTF04M001-028

Battery E Firing Incident Graphic

Enclosure (105)
(Enclosure 14)

Battery E Firing Incident Graphic

Page 406 of Tubular Firing Tables for Howitzer, 155mm, Firing Projectile, HE, M795. An artillery tubular firing table (TFT) is a document that provides standardized data for firing artillery projectiles. It contains fire control information based on standard conditions and includes corrections for non-standard conditions. These tables are essential for accurate artillery fire, as they present data in a tabular format that can be used to determine the trajectory and effects of projectiles in various firing conditions. The highlighted portions show the correlation of a 1.2s-1.5s Time of Flight to 800m-1000m range.



CHARGE 4H M232A1 | TABLE F BASIC DATA | FT 155-AR-2 PROJ, HE, M795 FUZE, PD, M739A1

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
RANGE	ELEV	FS FOR GRAZE BURST FUZE M582	DFS PER 10 M DEC	DR PER 1 MIL D ELEV	FORK	TIME OF FLIGHT	AZIMUTH CORRECTIONS	
							DRIFT (CORR TO L)	CW OF 1 KNOT
M	MIL			M	MIL	SEC	MIL	MIL
(b) (3) (A)								

406

Enclosure (105)
(Enclosure 14)

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
11TH MARINES
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF
BOX 555503
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5503

3570
CO
OCT 20 2025

From: Commanding Officer, 11th Marine Regiment
To: [redacted]

Subj: CANNON ARTILLERY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE BATTERY E, BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5, 11TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT FIRING INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON 18 OCTOBER 2025

Ref: (a) JtRegtO P3570.1H

1. In accordance with reference (a), you are hereby appointed to conduct a thorough investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Battery E firing incident that took place on 18 October 2025.

2. You are required to ensure the completion of both a Cannon Firing Incident Report and an Artillery Ammunition Incident Report as specified in the referenced guidance. You have full authority to reference any applicable standing orders or documents necessary to gather comprehensive and accurate information to support a detailed and conclusive investigation.

3. Perform all duties as required of the Regimental Artillery Safety Officer in accordance with reference (a).

4. This investigation shall be your primary responsibility until all deliverables outlined in paragraph 2 are fully completed.

5. The point of contact for this matter is the Regimental Adjutant [redacted] at [redacted] or [redacted].

[redacted]

(Enclosure 15)
Enclosure (105)

Appendix H - Check Rounds

1. General. Ensure one check round is fired after initial occupation of a position.

2. Purpose. To ensure that the initial round fired impacts safe within the confines of the defined safety limits.

3. Procedure

a. Select a check round target location. Selecting a target for check rounds may be made by the FDC or the observer. The location of check rounds should meet the following criteria:

(1) Located in center of the target area.

(2) Located as accurately as possible. Surveyed, recorded, or targets located by laser or radar, are considered accurate. If unable to accurately locate a target for check rounds, the observer's accuracy in locating the target and spotting rounds must be incorporated into assessing the validity of the check rounds.

b. Once check round target is identified and both the observer and the FDC know the grid to that target, the FDC will fire **ONE** initial round with **ONE** gun to that target. (If specified by local range regulations, an additional round may be fired *after* the first round was observed safe.)

c. If the round is observed safe, the observer will immediately radio back to the FDC and inform them by stating: "Check round observed safe".

d. If the round is not observed, or if the round is observed unsafe, the firing unit will immediately be placed in a "check firing" status. Unit SOP, and Chapter 4 of this part, will then apply (as far as procedures for investigating a firing incident). No further firing will take place until clearance is given from the investigating officer, range control, and the Battalion Commander.

4. Accuracy. The following procedures **may** be used to mathematically determine the accuracy of check rounds.

a. Fire a second round at the check round target.

b. Take the average of the refinements/corrections for the two rounds and apply them as a subsequent adjustment in a dry fire mission.

(1) If using AFATDS compare the adjusted location field with the initial target location to determine the number of meters of error. Go to step (c).

(2) If other:

(a) Compare the initial data fired with the data from the dry fire mission and determine the change in QE (DQE) and change in DF (DDF).

(b) Determine the range correction from the DQE using column 5 Table F from the TFT. Determine the lateral correction from the DDF by using the mil relation formula.

(c) If the data is within 4 PER of the aimpoint, and 50 meters (or 4 PED) laterally of the aimpoint (whichever is greater), the check rounds are valid.

5. Validity. If the data is not within the above stated tolerances, there are three possibilities: firing data error, target location error, or nonstandard conditions which are unaccounted for (such as MET, MVV's, etc.). The unit must recheck all data within the battery position for possible errors. The FDO/Ops Chief must determine where the error exists. If no error can be found, improve firing data according to Chapter 11 of reference (n) by performing either a subsequent MET technique or the five steps to improved firing data.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (5)

RATELO: Announces (or records on mission board) the CFF to the FDC (loud readback to FO).

HCO: Reads back target location, plots target, and determines chart range and deflection.

VCO: Plots target and determines chart range and deflection.

FDO AND SECTION CHIEF:

1) Plot the target on the situation map and verify it is safe and does not violate any FSCMs.

2) Determine the fire order and issue it to the computer.

COMPUTER:

1) Reads back the fire order and records it on ROF.

2) Records initial fire commands up to and including fuze on the basis of the FDO's fire order.

3) Announces initial fire commands to the guns. (FDO and section chief monitor.)

RATELO: Composes and transmits the MTO on the basis of the fire order. (FDO and section chief monitor.)

COMPUTER: Requests range; for example, **RANGE, ONE ALPHA.**

HCO: Announces chart range to the computer; for example, **ONE ALPHA, RANGE 5980.**

VCO: Announces **CHECK** or **HOLD** (±30 meters) to HCO.

COMPUTER:

1) If the VCO announces **CHECK,** places announced range under MHL on appropriate GFT. If the VCO announces **HOLD,** has the section chief verify charts and determine which range to use.

2) Records and reads back range placed on GFT; for example, **RANGE 5980.**

3) Requests deflection; for example, **DEFLECTION.**

HCO: Announces chart deflection to computer; for example, **DEFLECTION** 3286.

VCO: Announces **CHECK** or **HOLD** (±3 mils) to HCO.

COMPUTER:

1) Records chart deflection on ROF and reads back chart deflection.

2) Records elevation on ROF.

3) If time or VT fuze is used, determines time setting.

4) If time or VT fuze is used, announces **FZ TI (or VT), TIME (such-and-such)** to gun line and records on ROF.

5) Determines deflection correction and records it on ROF.

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-01-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
March 2002	Final	

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

M767 ARTILLERY ELECTRONIC TIME FUZE DESIGN EVOLUTION TO ELIMINATE SUSCEPTIBILITY TO ATMOSPHERIC ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE (ESD)

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHORS

David Gudjohnsen

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

ARDEC, CCAC
Fuze Division (AMSTA-AR-CCF-D)
Picatinny Arsenal, NJ 07806-5000

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

ARDEC, WECAC
Information Research Center (AMSTA-AR-WEL-T)
Picatinny Arsenal, NJ 07806-5000

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
TACOM/ARDEC

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
Technical Report ARCCD-TR-02001

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Distribution limited to DoD and DoD contractors only; critical technology; March 2002. Other requests shall be referred to ARDEC, ATTN: AMSTA-AR-WEL-T, Picatinny Arsenal, NJ 07806.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

The M767 Artillery Electronic Time (ET) Fuze experienced an early function deficiency late in the development phase and in the initial production phase of the program. Early functions were attributed to atmospheric induced electrostatic discharge. A Faraday shield solution in tandem with electrical solutions were incorporated and refined throughout several design and test iterations. This report chronicles the multifaceted investigation performed over several years culminating in a resolution of the M767 early function deficiency.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

M767 artillery electronic time (ET) fuze
Electrostatic discharge (ESD)

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			David Gudjohnsen
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified	SAR	105	19B. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(Include area code)* DSN 880-3608

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US Army Joint Munitions Command
Rock Island, IL 61299-6000
Program Executive Office for Ammunition
Picatinny Arsenal, NJ 07806-5000

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, DC 20350-2000
Naval Sea Systems Command
Washington Navy Yard, DC 20376-0001
Marine Corps Systems Command
Quantico, VA 22134-5010

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
US Air Force Ogden Air Logistics Center
Hill AFB, UT 84056-5824

JOINT ORDNANCE COMMANDERS GROUP

Joint Agreement
On
Data Sharing

We, the undersigned, agree that data sharing is critical in supporting and maintaining a safe and effective munitions environment. We advocate that our Service organizations collect, maintain and, upon request, share munitions test data, evaluations and other technical data with all Military Services.

Gustave F. Perna
Brigadier General, United States Army
Chairman, Joint Ordnance Commanders Group

Kathleen M. Dussault
Rear Admiral, United States Navy
Principal Navy Member

Andrew E. Busch
Major General, United States Air Force
Principal Air Force Member

Jonathan A. Maddux
Brigadier General, United States Army
Principal Army Member

James P. McManamon
Rear Admiral, United States Navy
Principal Navy Member

Francis L. Kelley, Jr
Brigadier General, United States Marine Corps
Principal Marine Corps Member

Date Signed: FEB 02 2011

Enclosure (112)

From: (b) (3) (A)
To:
Cc:

Subject: RE: Request for Clarification in Support of Investigation
Date: Wednesday, December 10, 2025 11:29:08 AM
Attachments: Joint_Agreement_on_Data_Sharing.pdf

Good Morning (b) (3) (A),

All malfunctions and defects are required to be reported across the Military Services. There are two primary databases that track all reported malfunctions and defects for the Army and Marine Corps as it relates to ground ammunition.

Marine Corps Process:

- Per Marine Corps Order 8025.1 [https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCO%208025.1E.pdf?ver=2012-10-11-163654-787], all malfunctions and defects require reporting, and they come to PdM Ammunition MARCORSYSCOM and ESED. If there is a Mishap involving munitions, in addition to malfunction reporting, the Navy and Marine Corps are required to follow OPNAV 5102.1/MCO 5100.29 [https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/SECNAV%20Manuals1/5102.1.pdf].
- It is the using unit's responsibility to report malfunctions and defects.
- When reported, these are tracked, evaluated, and adjudicated in the Naval System (shared by the Navy and Marine Corps) known as Conventional Ordnance Resource Program (CORP). [https://corp.dc3n.navy.mil/]
- The CORP database is owned by the Navy's Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS), managed by Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head and Crane. It is a joint Naval database as Naval Supply Systems Command uses it to process all sentencing actions for ammunition (Notices of Ammunition Reclassification, Cleared for Overhead Fire, Ammunition Information Notices) submitted by the various Navy and Marine Corps programs for their items of responsibility. As such, the database covers all Navy surface (2T), Marine Corps ground (0T) ammunition.

Army Process:

- Similar to the Marine Corps, per the Army AR 75-1 [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN32927-AR_75-1-000-WEB-1.pdf], malfunctions and defects are reported to Army's Joint Munitions Command for conventional ammunition.
- It is the using unit's responsibility to report malfunctions and defects.
- When reported, these are tracked, evaluated, and adjudicated in the Army system

called Munitions History Program (MHP) [https://mhp.redstone.army.mil/].

- MHP also houses other primary records, such as all conventional ammunition Ammunition Data Cards (birth certificates of lots), Energetic Material Description Sheets, Lot Acceptance Test results, Depot Surveillance Records, and more.
- Since the Army is the DoW Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition, they will also often open joint investigations with the miliary service partners across the Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force if needed.

CORP and MHP have histories on ground ammunition. The databases have records that go back decades (~50 years) that well predates the fielding of the current NA15 fuze. The databases are open to all services and data sharing is the standard as when one service issues a suspension or reports a malfunction, due to joint use of common items (such as the NA15 fuze), and common logistics footprints (vast majority of joint stocks are housed in Army depots), transparency and sharing of data is vital to be able to effectively manage these stocks across Army, Navy, and Marine Corps ordnance footprints. This is captured under how the Single Manger (Army) and Miliary Services (Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, SOCOM) cooperate under DODI 5160.68 [https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/516068p.pdf?ver=2018-11-16-080336-307] and the attached Joint Ordnance Commanders Group data sharing memorandum.

For this investigation:

CORP and MHP were the primary databases that were leveraged to identify if there were other early bursts for the NA15 fuze and any other reported defect. We also looked through the NA17 fuze, which is the NA15 without the high explosive booster. We can also see suspension history of all the services on their Notices of Ammunition Reclassifications, Cleared for Overhead Fire, Ammunition Information Notices, as such, any sentencing actions are also visible, not just the reported malfunction. We also looked through all surveillance testing information of in-service assets (also housed in MHP and CORP) that was routinely conducted to identify any issues, including early bursts of assets in-service. For an item's developmental history prior to fielding, we scoured through technical report libraries such as Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) and conducted broad searches across all these systems to ensure we found any reported issue and placed requests for information to the Army's Joint Program Executive Office, Project Manager for Convectional Ammunition Systems (PM-CAS) who is the design and acquisition agent for the artillery ammunition. Through DTIC and the Army is how we obtained the developmental history that identified the baseline fuze (N290) sensitivity to ESD prior to fielding, and more detailed notes on their early burst incident.

Based upon a review of these sources, we were able to identify only the Army's reported early burst incident in the fuze history.

Please let me know if the above explanation of the process and data sources is sufficient.

V/R,
(b) (3) (A)

Expeditionary Systems Engineering Division (RS40)
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division Detachment Fallbrook
(b) (3) (A)

Disclaimer: This message should NOT in any way be considered direction or an alteration of contractual obligations. Pursuant to FAR 1.402-1, only the Contracting Officer has authority to bind the Government.

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, December 9, 2025 7:02 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: HOT: Request for Clarification in Support of Investigation

Gents,
Current Finding of Fact reads:

131. There is only one documented early detonation of the fuze. This event occurred with a different shell combination from a 105mm M119A3 at Fort Drum, NY in 2017. Ultimately, engineers assessed the early detonation of the previous incident was caused by impact with an object in flight

Our Convening Authority would like to know and provide a bit more background as to how are we sure this is the only document case?
Please help me articulate what 'databases' are reviewed to come to this conclusion, who manages them and how they are searched/maintained.

Support in the next 24 hours is highly desirable as the Convening Authority would like to go final on the report.

Bottom line, I need more background, data to support the 'claim' that there is only one documented early detonation of the fuze.

Thank you for all the help and response to date.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)
[redacted]
I Marine Expeditionary Force
MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC Office
NIPR:
SIPR: (b) (3) (A)
MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)
TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Friday, November 21, 2025 4:56 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: Re: Investigation Meeting

(b) (3) (A),

No worries and thank you for the appropriate reference!

V/R,

(b) (3) (A)

Expeditionary Systems Engineering Division (RS40)

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division Detachment Fallbrook

(b) (3) (A)

Disclaimer: This message should NOT in any way be considered direction or an alteration of contractual obligations. Pursuant to FAR 1.402-1, only the Contracting Officer has authority to bind the Government.

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Friday, November 21, 2025 10:26 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: Investigation Meeting

(b) (3) (A),

Apologies on the delayed response.

In the TM 9-1025-215-10 2019 Authenicated Sep 19, you will find the Crew maintenance instructions for during firing operations. Pages 825 – "PMCS for M777/M777A2 Howitzer – before and after"; Pages 917 – "PMCS for M777/M777A2 Howitzer during" are the prescriptive requirements for the 0811s maintenance on the M777A2 Howitzer.

I've attached the subsections out of the Technical Manual as reference.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)

CE 13th MEU, I MEF

Office: (b) (3) (A)

Cell: (b) (3) (A)

NIPR: (b) (3) (A)

SIPR: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2025 6:11 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: Re: Investigation Meeting

Sir,

Received and we will prepare to address them with what we know.

We are continuing to collect information on various technical aspects of the malfunction investigation and do not have any cause(s) identified, as such our technical baseline continues to evolve as we gain more facts.

We sent the following questions through the MEF's ammo representatives ((b) (3) (A)) this morning on information we're seeking to address some gaps in our knowledge. The following is standard technical information we pursue for malfunction investigation (weapon baseline, video/audio of incident, environmental factors, etc.):

1. Downrange impact data, in order of impacts at target to complete the ballistic trajectory analysis. This would help us isolate which gun fired the early burst round.
2. Limited Technical Inspection (LTI) pre and post fire and relevant maintenance information of the howitzers involved to establish weapon system baseline.
3. There may have been PAO/Combat Camera/someone on-site with a camera by

first gun (landside/eastern most position). Higher resolution video/audio would significantly improve modelling over the two cellphone videos we have right now.

4. If any system were emitting in EM energy in the area, it would be helpful to know where the system was located in relation to the howitzers, or any other information on emissions in the environment.

Thank you!

V/R,

(b) (3) (A)

Expeditionary Systems Engineering Division (RS40)

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division Detachment Fallbrook

(b) (3) (A)

Disclaimer: This message should NOT in any way be considered direction or an alteration of contractual obligations. Pursuant to FAR 1.402-1, only the Contracting Officer has authority to bind the Government.

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2025 5:52 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: Investigation Meeting

(b) (3) (A),

I'm writing this email to capture the question. No need to answer it immediately.

What would happen if the round with .2 as the Time was shot?

My hypothesis is at .2 the ET electric firing pulse would fire, but the round would not have achieved the g forces required to arm yet so would actually dud, but there are a lot of variables.

Second question that we will ask: What forces are required to set off the PD fuze once the round is armed? Could impact with a large bird or drone set off the round? My hypothesis based on the sensitivity required to prevent round burial on impact with soft ground is yes, especially since prior versions of the fuze were being set off by heavy rain.

Again, not asking for immediate answers just capturing for future exploration.

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)

I Marine Expeditionary Force

MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC Office:

NIPR: (b) (3) (A)

SIPR:

MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)

TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2025 5:33 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

[redacted] (b) (3) (A)

Subject: Re: Investigation Meeting

Good Evening Sir,

Yes, we are available to meet at your convenience late morning/early afternoon on Monday, 10th of November.

V/R,

(b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2025 4:49 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)

Subject: REQ: Investigation Meeting

(b) (3) (A),

Thank you for the initial discussion today. We would like to meet with you early next week to discuss failure modes and areas where we can share data.

What does your Monday late morning/early afternoon look like?

Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)

I Marine Expeditionary Force

MOC Office: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC Office: (b) (3) (A)

NIPR: (b) (3) (A)

SIPR: (b) (3) (A)

MOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)

MIOC SIPR Tandberg: (b) (3) (A)

TSVOIP: (b) (3) (A)

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2025 3:48 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: Email address

Sir,

Full contact information including address/location is in my signature below. Happy to answer any questions you may have.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)

Chief Engineer, Expeditionary Systems Engineering Division (RS40)

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division Detachment Fallbrook

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)


(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

MIF #: MIF-A-0041-2018 DATE: 17 NOV 17 Status: CLOSED
UPDATED: 25 JAN 19

DODIC: NA15

Lot #: BTF03M001-024

Nomenclature: FUZE, ELECTRONIC TIME (ET), ARTILLERY. M767A1 WITH PBXN-5 BOOSTER

Closing Comments (when applicable): MIF WAS CLOSED IAW AMSJM-QAS PROCEDURES. Army NAR 19-0071 was issued to release lot back to its current condition code.

REPORT SUMMARY:

Location: FT DRUM, NY

Date: 17 November 2017

Reported By: (b) (3) (A)

Brief Description of Incident: Unit reports 1 out of approximately 125 early burst. Fuze set on PD and air burst approx. 200 meters from firing point.

Other information considered pertinent: This is the first reported incident for this lot. QTY of 4,587 remain of 11,909 produced.

Unit later reported that 4 fuzes from the same lot were unsettable.

Recommendation/Basis for Proposed Action: Issued Army NAR 18-0061 to reclassify NA15 lot BTF03M001-024 to CC-J pending malfunction investigation.

02 APR 18: Updated email correspondence on status of investigation.

10 MAY 18: Updated email correspondence.

25 JAN 19: Added Army NAR 19-0071 releasing the lot. Updated email correspondence and closed MIF.

(b) (3) (A)
QASAS
AMSJM-QAS DSN (b) (3) (A)

Concurrence for proposed action:

	Name	Date
ARDEC Engineering -	(b) (3) (A)	1/18/2019
JMC Quality Engineers -	(b) (3) (A)	1/18/2019

JMC Inventory- (b) (3) (A) 1/18/2019

Encl

Initial Notification
Assets On Hand
Component Information
NAR
Email
Reports
Photos
ADC

Initial notification:

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Friday, November 17, 2017 11:13 AM
Subject: JMC AMMUNITION INITIAL NOTIFICATION REPORT-MIF-A-0041-2018

ALCON,

THIS IS AN INITIAL NOTIFICATION. THIS OFFICE RECEIVED A PRELIMINARY REPORT AND DETERMINED THAT THE EVENT IS SIMILAR TO PREVIOUS MIFS FOR THIS DODIC, WILL NOT REQUIRE A TEMPORARY SUSPENSION, AND THOUGHT TO BE DUE TO KNOWN CAUSE(S) OR THE REPORTED DUDS/MISFIRES ARE BELOW THE REPORTABLE RATE.

INCIDENT REFERENCE SUBJECT MIF# IN THE E-MAIL SUBJECT LINE.
THIS MIF HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO JMC QAS MIF ANALYST: (b) (3) (A)

JMC AMMUNITION INITIAL NOTIFICATION REPORT

MIF NUMBER ASSIGNED:MIF-A-0041-2018

RELATED REPORT:W16R5K-7321-001

REPORTED BY: (b) (3) (A)

REPORTING MSC:FORSCOM

LOCATION:FT DRUM, NY

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:EARLY BURST

DEATHS/INJURIES/DAMAGES:0 / 0 / NONE

DATE:11/16/2017 TIME:14:00

INITIAL RESPONSE/ACTIONS:
UNIT REPORTS 1 OUT OF APPROXIMATELY 125 EARLY BURST. FUZE SET ON PD AND AIR BURST APPROX. 200 METERS FROM FIRING POINT. THIS IS THE FIRST REPORTED INCIDENT FOR THIS LOT. QTY OF 4,587 REMAIN OF 11,909 PRODUCED.

DODIC/NOMEN/LOT(S): NA15 FUZE, ELECTRONIC TIME (ET), AR BTF03M001-024

WEAPON:M119A3 HOWITZER

NOTICE: This information is considered sensitive information and should be distributed only to those with a valid need-to-know. Do not further disseminate without proper security and legal review. Personnel who fail to protect sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure may be subject to administrative, disciplinary, contractual, or criminal action.

On hand Assets/Impacts:

DODI	STK_NO	RI	CMD_	LOT_NO	COND_	LOT_QTY	OBLIG_Q	MFG_	DODAAC_U
NA15	1390014742262	B14	853	BTF03M001-024	A	280	0		W25G1R
NA15	1390014742262	B14	860	BTF03M001-024	A	3375	0		W67G23
NA15	1390014742262	B14	994	BTF03M001-024	A	14	0		W9119Z
NA15	1390014742262	B14	741	BTF03M001-024	A	5	0		W91CRE
NA15	1390-014742262	B14	300	BTF03M001-024	A	16	0		W42X02
NA15	1390014742262	B14	614	BTF03M001-024	A	224	0		W53XMD
NA15	1390014742262	B14	615	BTF03M001-024	A	528	0		W44XMF
NA15	1390014742262	B14	851	BTF03M001-024	A	28	0		W22PVK
NA15	1390014742262	B14	994	BTF03M001-024	C	18	0		W9119Z

ENTIRE STOCKPILE total serv A/B/C/D/N =	(b) (3) (A)
SUSPECT LOT IS % OF THE ENTIRE SERV	
TOTAL SUSPECT LOT SERV CC (A/B/C/D/N) =	

Component Information:

N/A

NAR:

Paragraphs in the NAR messages below that do not pertain to this MIF have been removed.

//UNCLASSIFIED//
242014Z Jan 19

AMSJM Form 702-21, FEB 2013

FROM USAJMC NICP ROCK ISLAND IL //AMSJM-QAS//
(75-1A)
SUBJ: ARMY NAR 19-0068 THRU NAR 19-0071
LAST ARMY NAR 19-0066 THRU NAR 19-0067 232029Z Jan 19

REF A: TB 9-1300-385, MUNITIONS RESTRICTED OR SUPPLIED

POC IS (b) (3) (A) AT JMC, AMSJM-QAS, DSN (b) (3) (A)
[redacted]

1. AMMUNITION SUSPENSION/RESTRICTION/RELEASE DIRECTED AS FOLLOWS:

D. NAR 19-0071. 1390-014742262 NA15 FILE MIF-A-0041-2018
FUZE, ET, M767A1 W/ PBXN-5 BOOSTER
LOT:

/ BTF03M001-024

RLSE
RELEASE FOR ISSUE AND USE
THIS NAR SUPERSEDES NAR 18-0061.
RSN: MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION COMPLETE

2. UPON POSTING OF NAR, TB 9-1300-385 PART I IS UPDATED ACCORDINGLY WITHIN THE MUNITIONS HISTORY PROGRAM (MHP) https://mhp.redstone.army.mil.

//SIGNED//
[redacted] (b) (3) (A)
CHIEF, AMMUNITION SURVEILLANCE DIVISION
//UNCLASSIFIED//

-----Original Message-----
From: USARMY RIA JMC Mailbox AMSJM-QAS
Sent: Friday, November 17, 2017 1:50 PM
To: USARMY RIA JMC Mailbox QAS-NAR [redacted]
Subject: ARMY NAR 18-0059 THRU NAR 18-0061

//UNCLASSIFIED//
152029Z Nov 17
FROM USAJMC NICP ROCK ISLAND IL //AMSJM-QAS//
(75-1A)
SUBJ: ARMY NAR 18-0059 THRU NAR 18-0061
LAST ARMY NAR 18-0056 THRU NAR 18-0058 152029Z Nov 17

REF A: TB 9-1300-385, MUNITIONS RESTRICTED OR SUSPENDED

POC (b) (3) (A) AT JMC, AMSJM-QAS, (b) (3) (A)

1. AMMUNITION SUSPENSION/RESTRICTION/RELEASE DIRECTED AS FOLLOWS:

C. NAR 18-0061. 1390-014742262 NA15 FILE MIF-A-0041-2018
FUZE, ET, M767A1 W/ PBXN-5 BOOSTER
LOT:

/ BTF03M001-024

TSIU
RECLAS TO COND CODE JULIET
RSN: PENDING MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION, EARLY BURST
DEFECT CODE: CAAAZZ

2. UPON POSTING OF NAR, TB 9-1300-385 PART I IS UPDATED ACCORDINGLY WITHIN THE MUNITIONS HISTORY PROGRAM (MHP) https://mhp.redstone.army.mil.

//SIGNED//
(b) (3) (A)
CHIEF, AMMUNITION SURVEILLANCE DIVISION

Email:

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2019 1:55 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)

Subject: RE: question about AIN 048-18? Request for Concurrence to Close: MIF-A-0041-2018 NA15 Early Detonation

,

It should be added to the root cause sheet for completeness but it is an unlikely root cause because according to the QASAS at Ft Drum, the quantity of that lot that they had on hand came from McAlester and the only packaging that was opened prior to the incident were for a periodic inspection. The quantity of the lot at Ft Drum had never been issued previously. So a resetting error could not be possible.

I'll update the root cause sheets and provide updates.

As for why this occurs, 0.0 seconds is an invalid setting in the EPIAFS and causes the setter to default to 0.5 seconds which is the minimum valid time setting in EPIAFS.

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)
Mechanical Engineer
RDAR-EIL-LA, Bldg 93, 1st floor Picatinny Arsenal
Picatinny, NJ 07806-5000
O: (b) (3) (A)
DSN: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

"A man's got to do what a man's got to do." - John Wayne

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2019 5:08 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: question about AIN 048-18? Request for Concurrence to Close: MIF-A-0041-2018 NA15 Early Detonation

(b) (3) (A),

Please go over how AIN 048-18 might not add another possible cause for this early function?

Specifically, under 7.A, second paragraph:

(b) (3) (A)

Could this be a possible cause for an early burst, reported around 200 meters in front of the gun? A 0.5 second early burst might be hard to estimate how far it was in front of the gun, the early function could have been further away to correspond to function at 0.5 seconds? Why does fuze default to 0.5 seconds, is this considered beyond safe separation distance?

While this may not be likely cause, would it not be a possible cause?

Please send me a copy of Root Cause Analysis. Do not recall seeing RCA summary/conclusions?

Thank-You,

V/R

(b) (3) (A)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Friday, January 18, 2019 1:13 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: Request for Concurrence to Close: MIF-A-0041-2018 NA15 Early Detonation

Concur

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Friday, January 18, 2019 12:56 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: Request for Concurrence to Close: MIF-A-0041-2018 NA15 Early Detonation

(b) (3) (A)

This office concurs.

Respectfully,
(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)
Mechanical Engineer
RDAR-EIL-LA, Bldg 93, 1st floor Picatinny Arsenal
Picatinny, NJ 07806-5000
O: (b) (3) (A)
DSN: (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

"A man's got to do what a man's got to do." - John Wayne

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Friday, January 18, 2019 12:55 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: Request for Concurrence to Close: MIF-A-0041-2018 NA15 Early Detonation

QAS concurs.

(b) (3) (A)
QASAS, Surveillance Branch
HQ JMC, AMSJM-QAS
Combat Ammunition Systems Team
DSN: (b) (3) (A)
COMM: (b) (3) (A)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Friday, January 18, 2019 12:53 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: Request for Concurrence to Close: MIF-A-0041-2018 NA15 Early Detonation

All,

Root cause analysis of the attached malfunction resulted in the most probable cause of the early detonation was an impact with an object in flight. Malfunction history research of the NA15 (M767A1) shows that this is the first reported early detonation for this fuze. Additionally, 62% of the lot has been expended with no prior incidents to date. JMC-QAE concurs with this analysis and recommends NA15 lot BTF03M001-024 be released for issue and use to its previous serviceable condition code. This action would also close the MIF.

Please provide your concurrence or comments NLT COB Friday 25 January 19. No response will be considered concurrence.

V/r,

(b) (3) (A)
Quality Engineer
Ammunition Malfunctions
HQ, U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command
COMM: (b) (3) (A)
DSN: (b) (3) (A)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, December 10, 2018 7:12 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: FW: MIF-A-0041-2018

(b) (3) (A)

Can you please provide me with an update on the attached MIF?

(b) (3) (A)
QASAS, Surveillance Branch
HQ JMC, AMSJM-QAS
Combat Ammunition Systems Team
DSN: (b) (3) (A)
COMM: (b) (3) (A)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2018 9:11 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: FW: MIF-A-0041-2018

(b) (3) (A)

Just sending a reminder on the subject MIF.

(b) (3) (A)
QASAS, Surveillance Branch
HQ JMC, AMSJM-QAS
Combat Ammunition Systems Team
DSN: (b) (3) (A)

COMM: (b) (3) (A)
-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, October 2, 2018 8:58 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: MIF-A-0041-2018

(b) (3) (A)

Have you had time to sit down with the fuze engineer for M767A1 to review each of these for applicability to this malfunction? I'm reviewing my open MIFs and I'm trying to update statuses.

(b) (3) (A)
QASAS, Surveillance Branch
HQ JMC, AMSJM-QAS
Combat Ammunition Systems Team
DSN: (b) (3) (A)
COMM: (b) (3) (A)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Tuesday, September 25, 2018 2:14 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: MIF-A-0041-2018 UPDATE

(b) (3) (A),

Please check on the status of the attached MIF. Last I heard was the path forward was going to be to close the MIF and release the lot.

(b) (3) (A)
QASAS, Surveillance Branch
HQ JMC, AMSJM-QAS
Combat Ammunition Systems Team
DSN: (b) (3) (A)
COMM: (b) (3) (A)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, May 9, 2018 2:43 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)

[redacted]

Subject: RE: MIF-A-0041-2018 - RCA (UNCLASSIFIED) M767A1 (NA15) Fuze early burst (UNCLASSIFIED)

[redacted]

I can send out the FMECA that I made comments on again. I do not have anything at this time. [redacted] is going to be going through the failure modes that I identified previously as potential root causes for an early function. If he sends me anything I will send it out. I will probably also try to setup a DCS link so that everyone not here can see the root cause sheets as we go through them.

[redacted]

[redacted]
Mechanical Engineer
RDAR-EIL-LA, Bldg 93, 1st floor Picatinny Arsenal
Picatinny, NJ 07806-5000
O: [redacted]
DSN: [redacted]

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, May 9, 2018 2:17 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: MIF-A-0041-2018 - RCA (UNCLASSIFIED) M767A1 (NA15) Fuze early burst

[redacted]

Is there updated information about MIF-A-0041-2018 we can review at JMC, as background information before meeting next week?

<<...>>

V/R

[redacted]

-----Original Appointment-----

From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Wednesday, May 09, 2018 1:34 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: MIF-A-0041-2018 - RCA (UNCLASSIFIED)
When: Tuesday, May 15, 2018 2:00 PM-3:00 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).
Where:

All,

I am sending this out as and invite to put it on your calendars. I will update with a meeting location as soon as I secure a conference room.

Thanks,

(b) (3) (A)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 1:57 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: Army Mif # MIF-A-0041-2018 - 90 Day Notice, 01:16:15

Thank you (b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)
CACI, Inc. - Federal
Logistics Analyst
NSWC IHEODTD Det Picatinny (G22)
(b) (3) (A)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 11:08 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: Army Mif # MIF-A-0041-2018 - 90 Day Notice, 01:16:15

(b) (3) (A)

The MIF IPT has almost completed the root cause analysis. The last branch that we need to investigate a little further is the FMECA for the electronics. I have gone through the FMECA to identify all of the previously identified possible early functions. I need to sit down with the fuze engineer for the M767A1 to review each of these for applicability to this malfunction. The past few weeks we have been delayed due to inclement weather and illness. I am hoping to have a meeting with the engineer later this week. Once that is completed, the MIF IPT can meet again and rank the identified root causes and determine a path forward.

Respectfully,
(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)
Mechanical Engineer
RDAR-EIL-LA, Bldg 93, 1st floor Picatinny Arsenal
Picatinny, NJ 07806-5000
O: (b) (3) (A)
DSN: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

"A man's got to do what a man's got to do." - John Wayne

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Thursday, March 08, 2018 11:26 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: FW: Army Mif # MIF-A-0041-2018 - 90 Day Notice, 01:16:15

(b) (3) (A)

Can you help (b) (3) (A) with her request. I do not have any updates.

Respectfully,
(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)
QASAS, Surveillance Branch,
HQ, JMC (AMSJM-QAS)
Combat Ammunition Systems
COM: (b) (3) (A)
DSN: (b) (3) (A)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Sent: Monday, March 5, 2018 7:03 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: FW: Army Mif # MIF-A-0041-2018 - 90 Day Notice, 01:16:15

(b) (3) (A)
I'm looking for an update for MIF-A-0041-2018 that was opened on 17 Nov 2017
when the ALN was reclassified to C/C J.
Thank you.
r/
(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)
CACI, Inc. - Federal
Logistics Analyst
NSWC IHEODTD Det Picatinny (G22)
(b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)

-----Original Message-----
From: CORP_NoReply@Navy.Mil [mailto:CORP_NoReply@Navy.Mil]
Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2018 1:16 AM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: Army Mif # MIF-A-0041-2018 - 90 Day Notice, 01:16:15

2T Rs Number - 2018-0315, Dodic - NA15, Lot Number - BTF03M001-024, Reclass To CC - J, SAMC - , POC Name - , POC Phone - , POC Email - , Current Status -
****
This is a quarterly automated message from the Program Management Office for
Navy 2T Conventional Ammunition Systems (PM NCAS).
Our records indicate that this action has been in process since 11/21/2017.
Please provide an updated status summary, including an
anticipated completion date at your earliest convenience.
Please reply to (b) (3) (A)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Friday, November 17, 2017 1:00 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: JMC AMMUNITION INITIAL NOTIFICATION REPORT-MIF-A-0041-2018

(b) (3) (A)

As it stands, I'm treating this as a category "A" malfunction;

"Malfunctions that result in death or lost-time injury or, are SIMILAR TO PREVIOUS MALFUNCTIONS that have resulted in death or lost-time injury or, are judged as having had an APPRECIABLE PROBABILITY of causing death or lost-time injury, or that have adverse political implications".

I intend to issue a CC-J NAR to suspend NA15 lot BTF03M001-024.

Respectfully,
(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)
QASAS, Surveillance Branch,
HQ, JMC (AMSJM-QAS)
Combat Ammunition Systems
COM: (b) (3) (A)
DSN: (b) (3) (A)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Friday, November 17, 2017 12:28 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
Subject: FW: JMC AMMUNITION INITIAL NOTIFICATION REPORT-MIF-A-0041-2018

Hi (b) (3) (A),

I see this malfunction was originally opened as a "-T" and then the email below was sent out without the "-T". I just want to clarify if the malfunction is not a "-T" and if there is a suspension on the lot?

Thank you,
(b) (3) (A)

Reports:

AMMUNITION MALFUNCTION REPORT
For use of this form, see AR 75-1; the proponent agency is DCS G4

1. Report No: W16R5K-7321-001

2. Malfunction Item If field is unknown use UNK
Enter information in fields below and then click Add Items button to add the malfunction item.

DODIC	FSC	NIIN	Lot Number	Serial Number	NOMEN
NA15	1390	014742262	BTF03M001-024		FUZE, ELECTRONIC TIME (ET), ARTILLERY, M767A1 WITH PBXN-5 BOOSTER, PACKAGED 8 PER M2A1 AMMO BOX, 2 M

3. Item Components: USED WITH C445, KN-815-67B

4. Malfunction Description: FUZE SET ON PD AND AIR BURST APPROX 200 METERS FROM FIRING POINT

5. Site of Malfunction: 17B FT DRUM, NY

8a. Date Malfunction Occurred: 11/16/2017

8b. Time: 14:00

6. Unit Controlling Site: 2-15 FA FT. DRUM, NY

7. Unit Using Ammunition: A CO. 2-15 FA FT. DRUM, NY

9a. Casualties (No. Killed): 0

9b. Casualties (Hospitalized): 0

9c. Casualties (Other Injuries): 0

9d. Description: N/A

10. Damage
a. Weapon Damaged? No
b. Damage Repairable at Unit Level? NA

10c. Description: N/A

11. Detonation
a. NONE

c. M From Weapon: 200 METERS

d. M From Nearest Person: 200 METERS

12. Quantity Remaining
a. Firing Site: UNK AT THIS TIME
b. Local Storage: NONE
c. Suspended: Yes

13. Exhibits Available (Hold Exhibits Pending Disposition Instructions per AR 75-1, para 2.1)
No a. Fragments No b. Intact Components
No c. Weapon No d. None

14. Firing Conditions for Malfunction Lot

a. Weapon: M119A3 HOWITZER

b. Target: IMPACT AREA

c. Range (M): UNK

d. Azimuth: 1400

e. Elevation: UNK

f. Zone: UNK

g. Fuze Setting: PD

h. Fired How Many Rounds Per Minute From Weapon: UNK

i. For How Many Minutes Before Malfunction: UNK

j. Total Fired From Weapon On Day Of Malfunction: 12

k. Total Malfunctioned: 1

l. Total Fired: 125 APPROX

m. Malfunction Rate (%)

15. Terrain

a. Firing Site: OPEN

b. Down Range: OPEN

c. Possible Obstructions: NONE

d. Clear View Of Flight Path (M): 500M

16. Weather Conditions

a. Visibility: CLEAR

b. Precipitation: RAIN

c. Temperature: 36

d. Prior 24 Hours: High (F) 42, Low (F) 32

e. Relative Humidity: 87%

17. Malfunction Lot Storage Conditions

a. Firing Site: Open

b. Local Storage: Enclosed

c. Unpacked How Many Hrs. Before Malfunction: 1 HOUR

d. Magazine Type: ECM

e. Stored How Many Months: 63 MONTHS

18. Packaging of Malfunction Lot

	YES/NO
a. Original Package?	Yes
b. Original Seal?	Yes

AMSJM Form 702-21, FEB 2013

c. Package Adequate?	Yes
d. Package Damaged?	No

19. Additional Data
FIRING CREW SET NA15 FUZE TO PD AND WAS VERIFIED BY SECTION CHIEF AND PLT SGT. CREW LOADED ROUND, FIRED THE ROUND AND APPROX 200M FROM FIRING POINT THE FUZE FUNCTIONED AND CAUSED THE C445 TO DETONATE IN THE AIR BEFORE REACHING THE IMPACT AREA. FT. DRUM REC'D 816 RDS OF NA15, BTF03M001-024 FROM MCALESTER AAP, OK ON 27 JUNE 2012. PI WAS CUNDUCTED 2016. UNIT WAS ISSUED ALL 816 RDS ON 29 SEP 2017, DOCUMENT IS STILL OPEN AND HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO 13 DEC 2017. NA15, BTF03M001-024 HAS BEEN LOCALLY SUSPENDED FROM ISSUE AND USE. UNIT AND RANGE CONTROL WAS NOTIFIED OF SUSPENSION UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE PENDING MALFUNCTION INVESITGATION. ASP IS WAITING FOR 2-15 FA TO TURN IN THE REMAINING NA15S TO GET AN EXACT COUNT THAT ARE REMAINING AT FT. DRUM.

20a. For Additional Data, Contact	21a. Person Completing Report	
(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	
b. Telephone No (Include Area Code) (b) (3) (A)	b. Telephone No (Include Area Code) (b) (3) (A)	c. Date 11/17/2017

File Name	
ADC NA15 BTF03M001-024.pdf	INCLUDED IN PDF
ADC C445 KN-815-67B.pdf	INCLUDED IN PDF

DA FORM 4379-SG, FEB 2017

Photos:

N/A

ADC:

AMMUNITION DATA CARD
NSN: 1390014742262 NA15
Nomenclature: FUZE, , M767A1, ET
Lot Number: BTF03M001-024
Contractor: DAY & ZIMMERMAN
Net Quantity: 11909
Packing: 8 FUZES PER CAN / 2 CANS PER WOODEN BOX
Contract/Order Num: 3001C1101
Purchase Order Num:
Drawing Number: 12991767
Drawing Tab:
Drawing Rev: 3
Spec Num: DTL12991767
Spec Rev:
Spec Amend:
Date Started: 03/16/2004
Date Completed: 03/23/2004
Date Inspected: 03/23/2004
Line: 16
Zone Weight: 0

Charge Weight:
Index of Powder:
MAX Pack Depth (US):
MAX Pack Depth (Metric):
Prod Pack Depth:
Net Explosive Wt (US):
Net Explosive Wt (Metric):
Test Samp: 0
Test Site:
TS Date Shipped:
TS Mode Shipped:
UN Proper Shipping Name: FUZES, DETONATING
Hazard Class: 1.2.2D
Gov't QA Activity: 008
Disposition: AC
Gov't Inspector: (b) (3) (A)
Date Signed: 03/25/2004

SERIALS

None

COMPONENTS

	COMPONENT	DRAWING NO.	REV	MANUFACTURER	DATE	LOT NUMBER	QTY
1	ASSY LESS BOOSTER	12991766		BT FUZE	1203	BTF03M001-024	11909
2	CUP, BOOSTER	12991763		BT FUZE	UNK	BC-07	7358
3	CUP, BOOSTER	12991763		BT FUZE	UNK	BC-08	4551
4	PELLET, BOOSTER	12991764		D & Z	0204	DAE04B136-009	11909
5	SEALANT	MIL-A-46146		CAMIE CAMPBELL	0903	03J003	1

REMARKS

	REMARKS
1	THIS LOT HAD A GROSS QUANTITY OF 11966 MINUS 57 LAT SAMPLES SENT IN ON A PREVIOUS AMMO DATA CARD FOR A NET QUANTITY OF 11,909. DAY & ZIMMERMANN LOT NUMBER DAE04A128-011.

WAIVERS

No Waivers

(b) (3) (A)

"A man's got to do what a man's got to do." - John Wayne

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Friday, January 18, 2019 12:55 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Subject: RE: Request for Concurrence to Close: MIF-A-0041-2018 NA15 Early Detonation

QAS concurs.

(b) (3) (A)
QASAS, Surveillance Branch
HQ JMC, AMSJM-QAS
Combat Ammunition Systems Team
DSN: (b) (3) (A)
COMM: (b) (3) (A)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b) (3) (A)
Sent: Friday, January 18, 2019 12:53 PM
To: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Cc: (b) (3) (A)
(b) (3) (A)
Subject: Request for Concurrence to Close: MIF-A-0041-2018 NA15 Early Detonation

All,

Root cause analysis of the attached malfunction resulted in the most probable cause of the early detonation was an impact with an object in flight. Malfunction history research of the NA15 (M767A1) shows that this is the first reported early detonation for this fuze. Additionally, 62% of the lot has been expended with no prior incidents to date. JMC-QAE concurs with this analysis and recommends NA15 lot BTF03M001-024 be released for issue and use to its previous serviceable condition code. This action would also close the MIF.

P071950ZFEB12
FM NAVAMMOLOGCEN MECHANICSBURG PA//413.54//
TO AIG 7613
AIG 6911
AIG 11005
AIG 11253
AIG 11480
AIG 181
BT
UNCLAS //N08025// **POSTED 03/07/2012**
MSGID/GENADMIN/NAVAMMOLOGCEN MECH PA//
SUBJ/SUPPLEMENT 2012-OH010. LOTS FUNCTIONALLY CLEAR /OR NOT CLEAR FOR OVERHEAD FIRE//
REF/A/DOC/NAVSUP P-801/1 OCT 11//
AMPN/NAVSUP P-801 DTD 1 OCT 11//
POC/ANNA LUCAS/GS12/49935/LOC:BLD407/TEL:DSN 430-2107
/TEL:717-605-2107/FAX: 430-5390/EMAIL: ANNA.LUCAS@NAVY.MIL
RMKS/1.LAST OVERHEAD FIRE MSG 131955Z JAN 12

2. CLEARED LOTS:
THE FOLLOWING **LOTS ARE FUNCTIONALLY CLEAR FOR OVERHEAD FIRE** AND WILL BE INCLUDED IN APPDX B OF THE NEXT EDITION OF REF A:

A. 1320-D550
PROJECTILE,155 MILLIMETER SMK,WP,M110A1/M110E2,W/O FUZE
LOTS:
PB-09J007-001A
PB-11G013-004
PB-11L014-001
PB-11L014-002

B. 1320-DA13
CHARGE,PROPELLING,155 MILLIMETER M232A1 W/PROPELLANT M31A2
LOTS:
GDB11D-031049
GDB11F-031050

C. 1390-NA15
FUSE,ELECTRONIC TIME M767A1.
LOT:
BTF04M001-028

D. 1390-NA17
FUZE,ELECTRONIC TIME M762A1
LOTS:
KDP11J003-001
KDP11J003-002

BT
NNNN