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**DROP CODES:**
- U/R = Unit Recall
- DOR = Drop On Request
- DNC = Did Not Complete
- DNR = Did Not Return
- MED = Medical Drop During Training
- DQ = Disqualified During Screening
- REM = Removed by Staff

For Safety
### Water Survival Training Facility

**Instructor:** (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)  
**Program:** USMC  
**Class Number:** 2419 B  
**Class Type:** SWET Only  
**Completed by:** (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

**Pool Day:** TUE  
**Time:** AM  
**Site:** CPEN  
**Class Type:** SWET Only  
**Completed by:** S/M Initials  
**# of Students:** 25

#### Classroom Date: 20 April 2020  
**Pool Date:** 22 April 2020

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- **REM** = Removed by Staff

*for Safety*

1 Aug 2017

ENCLOSURE (C7)
## Water Survival Training Instructors

**Program:** USMC

**Classroom Date:** 20 April 2020

**Pool Date:** 21 April 2020

**Class Number:** 249A

**Class Type:** SWET Only

**Completed by:** BLACK

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### Pool Day: Time:

**AAV SWET**

**# of Students:** 20

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FY20 I MEF UNDERWATER EGRESS TRAINING SCHEDULE

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4TH QTR

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September 2020

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EML CONTACT: MEF CAMPS/ UNDERWATER EGRESS TRAINING/ GBC08

ENCLOSURE 48
SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent of this form is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:
Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:
To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately recorded.
ROUTE USES:
Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE:
Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
CAMP PENDLETON

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
20200902

3. TIME
1500

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

6. SSN

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

7. GRADE/STATUS

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

At the direction of the MEF Commander, and with the assistance of the MCI-West Chaplain, I stood up the Family Reception Center (FRC) at Blinder Memorial Chapel on Friday, 31 July 2020 in response to the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) mishap that occurred on Thursday, 30 July 2020. The FRC was manned 24/7 by various Chaplains and Religious Program Specialists (RPs) to provide Religious Ministry (REL.MIN) support to the Marines, Sailors and family members impacted by this tragic event.

On Wednesday, 05 August 2020, I participated in the Ramp Ceremony at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar for the service member who was pronounced deceased upon arrival at the local hospital. The following day, Thursday, 06 August 2020, I flew with the Armed Forces Medical Examiner Team from Naval Air Station North Island (NASNI) to San Clemente Island (SCI). From there I was transported to the SUPSALV barge via rigged hull inflatable boat (RHIB) in order to provide RELMIN support during the human remains recovery, which occurred later that evening and early the next morning. Once all human remains were successfully recovered, I was transported back to SCI, where I departed for NASNI on Friday, 07 August 2020 at 1200.

On Saturday, 08 August 2020, the SUPSALV barge arrived pier-side as scheduled at NASNI with all human remains and I was present to provide RELMIN support and to ensure that the honorable carry and transfer of all human remains to Decedent Affairs was conducted with the utmost dignity and respect.

On Wednesday, 12 August 2020, I participated in the Ramp Ceremony at MCAS Miramar, in which all eight service members were transported via a C-17 military aircraft to Dover Air Force Base (AFB) in which a Dignified Transfer was conducted for those family members who were in attendance.

Lastly, on Friday, 21 August 2020, I attended the 15TH Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)/Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/4 Memorial Service conducted at Camp Homo in order to appropriately honor the deceased and to begin the healing process for the Marines, Sailors and family members within the unit.
I, [Name], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have read, or had read to me, this Statement which begins on page [Page 1] and ends on page [Page [Page Number]]. I fully understand the contents of the entire Statement made by me. The Statement is true. I have initialed all corrections and have initialed the bottom of each page containing the Statement. I have made this Statement freely without hope of benefit or reward, without threat of punishment, and without coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful influence.

Subscribed and sworn before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this [Day of] [Month] [Year], [State].

WITNESSES:

[Signature of Person Administering Oath]

[Authority to Administer Oath]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

PAGE 3

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPAV1.00
Mon 9/21/2020 10:55 AM
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
FW: Investigation
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS.pdf
114 KB

Re:
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sent: Tuesday, September 8, 2020 10:45 AM
To:
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Subject: Re: Investigation

Good morning Sir,

Thank you again for your patience through this. Please find attached my signed Article 31 form and the list of questions and answers as you had requested.

Sincerely,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
1. Did you know that 12 of 14 AAVs were deadlined when the 15th MEU AAV Plt joined the MEU?

Prior to the AAV platoon joining the 15th MEU the JLTI identified several AAVs that were either deadlined or degraded. My direction, through one on one meetings, Command and Staff meetings, and Maintenance Readiness Briefs was that no AAV would be Chopped to the MEU until it was replaced or 100% operational. (Present at these briefs were the H&S Co Cmdr, Bn Mn Officer, the Bn Mn Chief and the Bn MMO) Furthermore, to my knowledge a vehicle cannot be Chopped in the Global Combat Support System – Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) until it is 100% operational. Based on this information, while the JLTI did identify issues, no AAVs were deadlined when they were formally Chopped to the MEU.

2. What type of training did the 15th MEU AAV Platoon receive prior to joining the 15th MEU?

Prior to joining the 15th MEU the 15th MEU AAV Platoon was established as the 13th MEU AAV Plt in 2019. The platoon has been together and training since. At the end of August 2019 the platoon completed amphibious training, to include jetty ops and open ocean training and worked with the USS Comstock for the ship’s AMW Certification; in Sept/Oct 2019 they conducted gunnery training at R222; and from Oct-Nov 2019 they participated in AFX 1-20, completing offense, defense, recovery and other land based training. In Feb/Mar 2020, the platoon returned to R222 to conduct additional gunnery training. From February through March they conducted training and operations in support of Native Fury. (The Bn TEEP shows training of the 13th MEU AAV Plt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) can verify the MEU AAV Plt name change.)

3. Were the 15th MEU AAV Platoon’s training requirements codified in a 3rd AA Battalion Training Exercise and Employment Plan (TEEP)?

The battalion’s TEEP was updated to reflect actual training conducted and does not reflect required training planned.

4. Why wasn’t the 15th MEU AAV Platoon given a MCCRE prior to chopping to the 15th MEU?

Training required by the MCCRE was conducted to AAV T&R level standards. This metric was utilized because 1st Marine Division generally applies MCCRE standards to company through regimental-level units. (See Division Order 3501.1D, Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation, dated 30 April 2015) “1st Marine Division conducts MCCREs to standardize the training and evaluation of company through regimental-level units in core and/or assigned METs in order to ensure unit preparedness for operational deployments.”

Therefore, readiness at the platoon level was conducted to AAV T&R standards in accordance with MCO 3502.3C, Marine Expeditionary Unit Pre-Deployment Training Program, dated 13 September 2019). “On the composite date, each GCE element needs to be capable of executing platoon and company/battery level T&R standards.”

The training and capability of the 15th MEU AAV Plt was discussed during one-on-one conversations and small group meetings Training outlined in the MCCRE but required by the T&R Manual was conducted during various exercises and training such as those listed in question two’s answer. (The following individuals can provide additional information about these discussions: Bn Executive Office (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7))
5. Why was the 15th MEU AAV Platoon assigned to Exercise Native Fury?

The decision to send the 15th MEU AAV Platoon to Exercise Native Fury was predicated on two points. First, the platoon would be conducting the same training requirements throughout the exercise as they would here in CONUS for PTP (amphib/land operations and gunnery). Second, the platoon would be conducting the required training with their future supported unit, V14, in keeping with MCO 3502.3C, "In the months prior to composite, the battalion and its projected attachments should train together whenever possible during their conventional training period. This will allow concentrated individual and small unit training while integrating the GCE." Exercise Native Fury provided an opportunity for the two units to begin working and training together to build a more cohesive unit. This training exercise also provided opportunity upon their return to continue their PTP training requirements prior to CHoP.

6. Were all of the 15th MEU AAV Platoon Section Leaders qualified via the formal Assault Amphibian Unit Leaders Course?

Based on briefs I received from the Bn Operations Chief, all of the 15th MEU AAV Platoon Section Leaders were qualified via the formal Assault Amphibian Unit Leaders Course.

7. Were all of the 15th MEU AAV Platoon Vehicle Commanders qualified via the formal Assault Amphibian Vehicle Commanders Course?

Based on briefs I received from the Bn Operations Chief, roughly half (exact number unknown) of the Vehicle Commanders have attended the formal Assault Amphibian Vehicle Commanders course.
Name: [Redacted]

Activity: EDUCATION COMMAND

Unit: [Redacted]

Telephone numb: [Redacted]

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: 

and that:

I have the right to remain silent.

Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.

I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.

I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.

I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.

I expressly desire to make a statement.

I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.

I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.

This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used on me.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(Member signature/date) (Witness signature/date)
Synopsis of Interview conducted on 3 August 2020 with USMC, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 Executive Officer.

The investigating officer began the investigation without reason to believe that gross negligence or a violation of the UCMJ had been the cause of the sinking. All initial statements were taken without article 31 rights advisements or waivers.

Upon arriving on USS SOMERSET, the investigating team set up Commander of Troops office.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that reveille went at 0400 and call-aways began at 0500-0600. He was travelling in the C7 AAV and all personnel were loaded by 0630. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that there was no weather person on the USS SOMERSET so he and the Company Commander, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) went to the bridge and talked with the ship OOD (later identified (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and they agreed that the sea state was 1 or 2. The AAVs launched at 0745, 13 in total and there were no issues going ashore, the movement took about 1 hour. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that all 13 AAVs landed on West Cove on San Clemente Island and began operations. 11 of the AAVs went forward and conducted the raid inland and the C7 on which (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was on and the P7 with the Network of the Move (NOTM) system stayed on the beach and conducted command and control training. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that during the raid Track 12 had a hub seal come off and could not move. After some time, the decision was made to go to an administrative posture and the AAVs would move west and set up an assembly area in vicinity of West Cove. Vehicle 12 would stay where it was, the AAV mechanics ascertained that they would need additional parts to fix vehicle 12. They identified all of the needed parts and it was communicated out to USS Somerset to send in the parts. At 1400, the LCAC arrived with the parts and the parts were transported to vehicle 12. Upon further inspection, they would require additional parts and track 12 could not be repaired that day. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that the decision was made that track 12 would stay on the island along with 3 other AAVs. The remaining nine vehicles would travel to USS SOMERSET, around 1500 the AAV Platoon leadership conducted a surf report and assessed it to be a sea state of 2. At 1530, all of the vehicles were staged at West Cove and 1600 they were ready to launch. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) remembers difficulty getting communications with USS SOMERSET. At 1645, 9 AAVs launched from West Cove to USS SOMERSET and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was riding inside the C7 AAV. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he heard on the radio that they were moving into the current and into the winds and were making much slower progress. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he also heard that the first section leader who was leading the movement had communications with USS SOMERSET. About one hour into the movement he heard that 2 AAVs

ENCLOSURE (1)
were returning to San Clemente Island and one had been rigged for tow. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that they kept moving and in approximately 15 minutes later he heard that an AAV was taking on water but did not sound urgent. Since the vehicle that was taking on water was the last in movement the P7 and C7 turned around and began to shadow track five at that point he heard that they had floor level water. At this time (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who have been riding in the troop commander hatch on the C7) stated he saw somebody waving the flag. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he got out of his seat and told (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to start telling him what he is seeing. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he told (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to get a hold of the USS SOMERSET and get the lifeboats out here immediately. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did so and asked to move the ship closer to the vehicles. At this time (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) saw the flag being waved again and they were going to do an at sea transfer. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that they began to prep the C7 to take on additional personnel and then at some point (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said the AAAV was gone. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) got on top of the C7 AAV and was waiting for people to emerge. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated they saw gear and then saw, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) came up, they grabbed him and started CPR. Then (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) came up he was breathing but he was foaming and blood was coming out of his mouth. They started doing CPR and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) noticed that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) came up closer to the NOTM P7. At some point the Navy RHIB got to them and they transferred (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to the RHIB and back to the USS SOMERSET. At that point the sea state increased, it seemed the interval between swells had shortened and the wave height had increased. They buttoned the AAV back up and moved back to the ship.

The Investigating Officer had to specifically ask (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) if he jumped into the water to save (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he did jump in and pulled (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to the AAV.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recommended we interview the following personnel:

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I agree that this is a correct synopsis of the free and voluntary statements I made to whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap the 28th of Sept 2020.
Signature (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

[Signature]

Date 11 Sept 2020
From:  
Sent:  Wednesday, September 23, 2020 2:08 PM  
To:  
Subject: FW: medevac

From:  
Sent: Friday, September 11, 2020 2:30 PM  
To:  
Subject: RE: medevac

Sir,

Two separate flights-

Flight 1

Flight 2

S/F
From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sent: Monday, September 21, 2020 11:06 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Subject: FW: statements

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sent: Tuesday, September 8, 2020 6:08 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: statements

Sir,

1. Probably for your S-4 or MMO: When did all the AAVs officially come under your reporting/maintenance hierarchy? The EATO was initiated in GCSS on June 23, 2020. A GCSS software error prevented the full transfer of GCSS tracked equipment. To correct the software error, GCSS civilian IT professionals were notified via LSCO (uniform representative that works with GCSS). On August 11, 2020, the software error was remediated. Also on August 11, the batch transaction was received by BLT 1/4, fully completing the EATO process.

2. How were you talking with the USS SOMERSET from the beach? Specifically how did you pass the repair parts NSN numbers to the USS SOMERSET? Over what nets did you pass the information? We communicated to the USS SOMERSET by voice using a ground mounted PRC-117G. The net we used was MEU CMD 1 (SATCOM IW). The S-4/J1 received NSN numbers for parts from AAV platoon leadership. He then communicated the parts requirements to the USS SOMERSET LFOC. We were also able to communicate with the USS MAKIN ISLAND.

3. How did you coordinate the link up procedures with the USS SOMERSET from the beach. Over what nets did you pass the information? Who did the coordination? Who did coordination occur with on USS SOMERSET? We communicated to the USS SOMERSET by voice using a ground mounted PRC-117G. The net we used was MEU CMD 1 (SATCOM IW). The S-3/J1 conducted the coordination. However, throughout the day I also spoke to the USS SOMERSET LFOC regarding our parts requirements and link-up actions and I spoke directly to the LFOC Watch Officer throughout the day. We were our main touchpoint for coordination.

4. Were you forced to use cell phones to pass information? I cannot speak for everyone, but the Bravo Command did not use cell phones to pass information. All by radio.

Please let me know if you need anything else sir.

S/F

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sent: Tuesday, September 8, 2020 2:53 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Subject: statements
Welcome back, I hope you could enjoy your leave. Hopefully the SVET went well.

I have attached your initial statement to me as well as statements.

I have also included initial statement. This is from the interview on USS SOMERSET, the second statement under oath taken at the BN CP will be sent up shortly.

Please have the interviewee review the statement, correct any discrepancies and then sign them. Once they are complete, I will come up there and grab them from you.

I have a few questions:

1) Probably for your S-4 or MMO: When did all the AAVs officially come under your reporting/maintenance hierarchy?
2) How were you talking with the USS SOMERSET from the beach? Specifically how did you pass the repair parts NSN numbers to the USS SOMERSET? Over what nets did you pass the information?
3) How did you coordinate the link up procedures with the USS SOMERSET from the beach. Over what nets did you pass the information? Who did the coordination? Who did coordination occur with on USS SOMERSET?
4) Were you forced to use cell phones to pass information?

Thanks for your help.

S/F

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Synopsis of Interview

On Sept 9, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

was the Exercise Control Officer on the USS MAKIN ISLAND from 21 July - 5 August 2020.

-Initially there was pressure to recover the AAVs on time because the USS SOMERSET was scheduled to conduct replenishment at sea on the afternoon of 30 July 2020.

-Once AAV 12 broke, there was no pressure to recover on time. The USS SOMERSET also rescheduled her replenishment at sea which relieved the pressure to recover on time.

-Once he received word from that an AAV had sunk/was in trouble, he instructed to go to West Cove to assist with accountability efforts.

-At approximately 1839 called the US Coast Guard to request assistance. He gave them the location of the USS SOMERSET (Lat/Long) and they launched.

-COVID-19 identification, reporting, and removal of positive cases was the primary focus of the Navy staff. This created a significant increase in workload for the BLT and MEU administrative and operational staffs and became a significant competing interest to other PMINT events.

-The BLT Commander asked his leadership for greater focus during the mechanized raid because it was the first time that combined Navy and Marine staffs were conducting that type of exercise.

coordinated the backload from San Clemente Island which occurred on the following dates:

- 31 Jul: Flights to ships
- 1 Aug: Flights to ships and CPEN
- 2 Aug: 6xAAV trackers flight to SCI
- 3 Aug: LCAC backload of remaining personnel, AAVs and gear
- 4 Aug: Ammo LCAC movement to CPEN
- 5 Aug: Remaining EXCON personnel flight to MKI
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) make the following free and voluntary statement to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me.

I was in the Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC) when the incident occurred. Leading up to the incident I had not received many details before the accident happen. I established comm with the AAV’s using the ship onboard phone because they have the best comm with the Amtracks. It was a blue telephone on the LFOC. I believe it was boat Alpha we were talking on almost the entire time. We had crystal clear comm basically the entire time. We noticed they were hitting some choppy waves once they were within sight of the camera on the back of the LHD. The ship reoriented the camera over so we could see the AAV’s. While that was happening, I had comm with one of the Amtrackers and they were asking if we could get the ship to slow down. Although I am not certain who I was speaking to at that point, the Amtracker stated that they were really getting beat up by the waves.

At that time, I was going between the LFOC and the Combat Information Center (Combat) talking to my Navy counterpart. Around that time I received word that one of the vehicles was taking on water. I believe that was Track 7 or 8. I was receiving updates on how much water they are taking and what their plan was. They had rig the vehicle for tow and were taking it back to San Clemente Island.

This situation created some confusion as to which Track was going down because there was a lot of chatter going on as to which Track was taking on water, how much water they had taken on, and which one was trying to make it to San Clemente Island versus which one was still trying to make it to the ship. We identified that the one going back to San Clemente Island was still taking on water, but that they were rig for tow and were getting into an area that had a much calmer sea state.

We continued getting updates from Track 5. We heard that water was getting close to their knees. They seemed like they were in a decent spot but from there it escalated. If I had to guess I would say that it was 15 minutes from when I heard that the water was to their waist to when I heard that it was up to the chest. That was when I really began to hear panic over the radio. I don’t remember the voice over the phone. I think that the voice was coming from Track 5.

When I heard the water was to their waist I talked to the Ship’s Captain. I told him that I thought we needed to get some lifeboats in
the water. That is when they started preparations to launch their lifeboats. I talked to one of the Navy Lieutenant that was coordinating the lifeboats and told him I needed a timeline. He stated that it would be between 13 to 18 minutes. I relayed that back to the AAV's telling them that within 10 to 20 minutes we will have a boat to you guys and to be prepared, it will be coming off the starboard side. I do not know how much time it took to get a lifeboat in the water because it seemed like a very long time and there was still no boat in the water.

The Ship's Captain then came to me and asked if we, by which he meant the Marines, had anything that could get in the water faster. I then contacted who as with the All Domain Reconnaissance (ADR) Detachment in the Ship. I told him the situation and that I needed him to get out there as soon as possible. From what I remember, the ADR Marines were the first ones who were able to get in the water and respond to the scene of the incident.

As people start flowing in, that's when I started to get more situational awareness of what exactly happened and that a track went down. That's when the radio net got very cluttered. I was trying to understand which track went down and what exactly they meant when they said that it went down. I then started to relay information to and the MEU watch officer and watch chief. I then saw coming into the LFOC and he was gave me information on what he had seen. We began piecing the information together and worked on getting accountability of all personnel.

I do not specifically remember times involved in the incident, however, 10 to 15 minutes seems accurate from when I heard the report that the water was at waist level to when I heard that the water was at chest level.

During the time that the AAV's were on the island we were getting a decent amount of Requests For Information (RFI's) pushed down to us. I think this came from the fact that we had a downed vehicle on San Clemente Island. They ultimately made the decision that the downed Track was not recoverable at that time. I then passed that information to the 15 MEU. That was one of the things that delayed the timeline in that they had to take time explaining what was wrong and trying to arrange a way to get replacement parts delivered to the island.

I have some previous experience with AAV. My brother was an Am tracker and I splashed with his reserve unit in Tampa, FL. I have been in track that had splash before. I was never a Mechanized Company commander, but I do have experience with tracks.

Signa

Date 2906 09 23

2 of 2

ENCLOSURE (75)
Synopsis of Interview conducted on 3 August 2020 with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 Bravo company commander.

The investigating officer began the investigation without reason to believe that gross negligence or a violation of the UCMJ had been the cause of the sinking. All initial statements were taken without article 31 rights advisements or waivers.

Upon arriving on USS SOMERSET, the investigating team set up Commander of Troops office.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that during the previous day they conducted the R2P2 process and at 1930 they conducted the confirmation brief.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he was concerned about the sea state and they must know what the sea state would be in the morning because he realized the biggest risk was in the water. They sounded reveille and began serial call-aways beginning at 0500, and at 0529 the last Marine got through the MACO gate. Around 0430 or 0500, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he and the Battalion XO agreed that they must know what the sea state is and the BLT XO stated that the bridge had passed that the sea state was 1. The ADR team had gone in the night prior with small boats and had swam ashore to San Clemente Island. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he went to the LFOC to get a sea state and position report for the ADR team. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had been tasked to pick up the 9 ADR personnel and the 15 opposition force personnel, 24 additional personnel in total. After the AAVs splashed and they got out on the water they felt the sea state was higher than sea state 1. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he had AAV experience as a lieutenant and he never felt unsafe on the way into San Clemente Island.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated he had been in seas like that before as a Lt, but he was worried about the surf zone, but as they got closer to San Clemente Island, the seas calmed down and assessed the Company was capable of going ashore. All 13 AAVs landed on San Clemente Island and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) met them on the beach, then guided them onto the objective.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that at 0945 the mission was complete and they started TSE. He informed them that they had 15 minutes to complete the TSE. Then he heard that AAV 12 blew a hub and they would need about 20 minutes to fix it if the needed parts were on-hand. Once it was established the needed parts were not on-hand, there was discussion of a “combat fix” but the decision was made against that option and to request the needed parts to repair it. At this point he discussed the maintenance delay with the Battalion XO and S3A. They identified all of the needed parts to fix track 12 and it was communicated out to USS Somerset to send in the parts. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated later that afternoon a decision point had been reached on whether or not to keep the whole Company on the island while waiting on the parts or send part of the Company back to the ship. The decision was made that AAV 12 would stay on the island along with 3 other AAVs in order to allow
the remaining tracks to return to the ship as a section, once the maintenance was complete. The remaining nine vehicles would travel to USS SOMERSET before it got dark. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that then the decision was made to move all AAV's, except 12, to West Cove to supervise the movement back to the ship. This was around 1430-1500. An assembly area was established in vicinity of West Cove (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) got accountability of all personnel headed back to the ship. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) talked to the BLT XO and made sure that they got full accountability. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he saw the AAV Marines moving safety equipment; specifically three life vests to make sure they had all the needed safety equipment. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that the AAV's were staged at West Cove and after about a 30 minute delay while establishing communications with the ship, a splash time was confirmed at 1650. The AAVs splashed at 1650, he watched all 9 AAVs enter the surf and he could see the ship, but as the AAVs moved away and got closer to the ship they could not be seen. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that around 1730 he heard via the platoon net that an AAV was getting towed back but he knew that this was the first section leader and he was in AAV 1. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was towing AAV 3, once AAV 1 was feet dry, AAV 3 was on the sand but still in the water, the towing lines snapped and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was concerned that someone might have gotten hurt when the lines snapped. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) told (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that an AAV had sunk, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he thought that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had said an AAV "not stuck" and asked him to clarify. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) confirmed "sunk." (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and several other Marines made their way to AAV 4 and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he thought the first report could have been wrong, so he called to the ship to ask if all 7 AAVs were on USS SOMERSET. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that the Watch Officer stated that "a track sunk", (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) asked if the troop transfer happened. The Watch Officer did not respond and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) asked if there were Marines in the water? The Watch Officer stated that there were Marines in the water. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that the AAV platoon leadership re-positioned to improve their communications and were told via radio "working through some things right now" "a track had sunk" and the AAV platoon leadership was asking for information about the troop transfer. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated at this point he focused on the Marines around him and tried to pass information and get as much as possible. The following day (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) established 3 objectives for the day: 1-Don't assign blame. 2-Gather as much information as possible. 3-Get the Marines shelter, food, and water starting that evening. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that later that afternoon the BLT Operations Officer passed information on all the missing Marines. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that at 1530 on Friday he brought all of his Marines in and told him what it happened. That afternoon parts were flown onto the island and the Marines fixed AAV 12, then drove AAV 12 down to West Cove. The remainder of the Company's personnel were recovered via ENCLOSEMENT (76)
aircraft and the remaining AAVs were recovered via LCAC to USS SOMERSET.

I, agree that this is a correct synopsis of the tree and voluntary statements I made to whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020.

Signature

Date 2020-04-11
I, [Redacted], make the following free and voluntary statement to [Redacted] whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me.

The first infantry-AAV integrated training Bravo Company conducted during the 15th MEU pre-deployment training was at the Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG) Mechanized Raid Course in May 2020. The first EOTG scheduled event was on the morning of 4 May. The Company occupied Fire Base Gloria the afternoon of 3 May and I allotted time during that event for integration where infantry Marines became familiar with standard rules and best practices when conducting mechanized operations.

Similarly, two days prior to the San Clemente Island (SCI) raid, I issued guidance to the platoons to conduct pre-operational checks and inspections and review infantry-AAV procedures specific to waterborne operations because this was the first time the Company was to be embarked in the water in AAV’s. The day prior to the raid I deliberately waited until the confirmation brief with the MEU CO to bring the rifle platoon commanders into the planning space to ensure there was time for these tasks and the platoon commanders were available to supervise. I went to the well-deck after the confirmation brief to supervise “call-away” drills and ensure the Marines and vehicles were ready for the operation.

The training my Marines and Sailors received was consistent with established pre-deployment training and my previous experience. I previously served as a platoon commander in a mechanized company during the 22nd MEU with BLT 1/6 in 2014. If I felt the Marines were at risk or vehicles were not capable, I would have aborted the raid onto SCI. I was comfortable expressing concerns to BLT leadership and I am confident if any of my subordinates were concerned about safety they would have informed me.

During our Company Field Exercise (FEX) in early June, the AAV’s went to Gold Beach to conduct amphibious operations in which they trained in the water in order to establish proficiency. I was present for the AAV platoon’s night amphibious training. They conducted crew and section amphibious training earlier in the pre-deployment work-up. I had the AAV platoon commander walk me through the Surf Observation Report (SUROB) and plan for the training. I watched the AAV platoon sergeant conduct pre-operation inspections on the vehicles prior to
conducting training. That night two vehicles collided in the water due to a lack of dispersion between vehicles when headed back to the shore. I discussed the cause of the incident and how to prevent further accidents with the AAV platoon commander. I reported the incident to the BLT Commanding Officer and informed him of our plan to prevent further collisions. There were no indications of water-tight integrity issues with the AAV’s during this training.

The planning that took place the day before the operation included coordination between the Navy and the BLT and Company leadership. This happens between the Combat Cargo Officer, the AAV Platoon Commander and Platoon Sergeant, and the Navy Plans and Tactics Officer. The AAV Platoon Commander conducted coordination with the ship, for example what time the AAV’s would launch from the ship and how far we would be from the shore when we exited the ship. Additionally, the BLT Executive Officer and myself, along with members of both the Marine and Navy staffs, met and discussed the operation the day prior to execution.

While conducting the operation, an AAV became inoperable on land. We spent the afternoon identifying the parts needed to repair the issue and communicating that information to the Marines on the ship. After several hours waiting to see if the replacement parts could be sent ashore, we had reached a decision point where if we delayed any longer, we would not be able to get everyone back to the ship before nightfall. I decided to keep three tracks ashore with the inoperable AAV, four in total, so when the repairs were complete the AAV’s could go back to the ship as a section. There was no external pressure put on me by my higher command to get Marines back to the ship by a certain time that day. The BLT Bravo Command, who was also on shore at that point, concurred with my plan to keep four AAV’s on SCI and send the rest back to the ship before nightfall.

As the Company Commander, it’s my responsibility to be with the Marines that are in the field. I considered SCI to be a field environment and the ship to be a garrison environment, therefore, I decided that my company first sergeant and I would remain on SCI with the four AAV’s.

I was comfortable with the AAV platoon commander and platoon sergeant remaining on the island with the four remaining vehicles because I assessed the shore-to-ship movement had the appropriate level of leadership density with all three AAV section leaders, four platoon commanders, the Company Executive Officer, and BLT Executive Officer in vehicles going back to the ship. Additionally, there were no water-tight integrity issues reported during our ship-to-shore movement that morning.

The Surob was conducted before the AAV’s began the shore-to-ship movement that afternoon. I had not arrived at the beach from the
training area before the SUROB was conducted but the results were reported to myself and my first sergeant. The result of the SUROB was low and within the capability of the vehicles. When I arrived at the beach, I observed the surf zone prior to any vehicles entering the water and assessed a passable surf zone.

Signature__ (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)  Date_20200927_
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Activity: ___________________________ Unit: 3LT 1/4, B 60

Telephone number: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: **Derelection of Duty/Negligence** and that:

I have the right to remain silent.
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: 

Unit: COMPANY B BTL 1/4

Telephone number:

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: Dereliction of Duty/Negligence and that:

I have the right to remain silent.
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(Witness signature/date)

ENCLOSURE (77)
Synopsis of Interview conducted on 4 August 2020 with Battalion Landing Team 1/4 Assistant Operations Officer.

The investigating officer began the investigation without reason to believe that gross negligence or a violation of the UCMJ had been the cause of the sinking. All initial statements were taken without article 31 rights advisements or waivers.

Upon arriving on USS SOMERSET, the investigating team set up Commander of Troops office.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that reveille went at 0400 and call-aways began at 0500-0600. He was travelling in the C7 AAV and all personnel were loaded by 0630. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated there concern over sea state the BLT XO and Bravo Company Commander went to reconfirm that the sea state was acceptable. The 13 AAVs launched at 0745 and there were no issues going ashore, the movement took about 1 hour. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that all 13 AAVs landed on West Cove on San Clemente Island and began operations. 11 of the AAVs went forward and conducted the raid inland and the C7 on which (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was on and the P7 with the Network of the Move (NOTM) system stayed on the beach and conducted command and control training. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated he hear that one of the AAVs had a mechanical issue and they were working on repairing the AAV. Some time had passed and the AAVs set up an assembly area in vicinity of West Cove. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) really wanted to get the AAVs back to the USS SOMERSET. The decision was made that AAV 12, the disabled AAV and 3 other AAVs would stay on San Clemente Island and move to USS SOMERSET at a later time. At 1600 the 9 AAVs that would go back to USS SOMERSET were staged and ready at the beach, but there were no communications with USS SOMERSET. At some point Gator (the callsign for the AAVs) had communications with USS SOMERSET and at 1645 the 9 AAVs splashed. It was about 30-45 minutes and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) heard that an AAV was being towed back due to maintenance. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that it seemed that the radio frequency “Boat Alpha” was being “hot miked” (Hot miked is a term that is used when a radio frequency is being compromised because of a constant transmission on the frequency.) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated the sea state degraded and he was actually becoming sea sick in the back of the AAV C7. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he heard that AAV 5 was taking on water and this was the time that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (in AAV 10) was just about to recover onto USS SOMERSET. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) asked the USS SOMERSET to slow down and her a female voice stated that they (USS SOMERSET) was at zero knots. He heard the crew members of the AAV C7 and AAV 523519 discussing what to do. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he requested the USS SOMERSET to lower the sill to 6-8 feet to allow AAV 523519 to be towed on board. Events started happening very quickly and the situation on AAV 523519 were getting worse. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated he requested life boats to be sent from USS SOMERSET.
States he heard (H&S Company Commander, BLT 1/4 and senior Marine on USS SOMERSET at this time) come on the radio and requested distance and direction for the life boats to go.

Stated that the next thing he heard was "Marines in the water" and then the USS SOMERSET Executive Officer came on the radio and stated the safety boats will be in the water in 10 to 12 minutes.

Stated that he relayed the urgency for the safety boats.

Stated once safety boats got in the water, they came to the AAV C7 and got the casualties.

Stated that the USS SOMERSET seemed to be dealing with "competing priorities" of AAV operations and flight operations.

I , agree that this is a correct synopsis of the free and voluntary statements I made to whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020.

Signatu: Date

ENCLOSURE (79)
Synopsis of Interview conducted on 3 September 2020 with 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, Firepower Control Team Lead.

The investigating officer began the interview without reason to believe that gross negligence or a violation of the UCMJ had been committed by the interviewee. This statement was taken at 1" ANGLICO Headquarters and without article 31 rights advisements or waivers.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the Exercise Control Officer on San Clemente Island from 21 July- 5 August 2020. Her primary responsibilities included reporting accountability for all 15th MEU personnel, all logistics and operations and OIC of all ranges.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) worked for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who was located on the USS Makin Island.

-To the best of her knowledge, the LCAC sent to the beach from the USS Somerset on or about 1400 on 30 July was intended to recover a broken AAV and/or bring a part to fix the broken AAV.

-She was first informed of an AAV accident from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) around 1830. At 1830 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) instructed her to go to West Cove and to assist with communication and accountability.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) established initial communication with the USS Somerset through the LCACs through their text messaging system at about 2100.

-She maintained communication with the USS Somerset LFOC via cell phone with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) coordinated the backload from San Clemente Island which occurred on the following dates:

- 31 Jul: Flights to ships
- 1 Aug: Flights to ships and CPEN
- 2 Aug: 6xAAV trackers flight to SCI
- 3 Aug: LCAC backload of remaining personnel, AAVs and gear
- 4 Aug: Ammo LCAC movement to CPEN
- 5 Aug: Remaining EXCON personnel flight to MKI

I (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) agree that this is a correct synopsis of the free and voluntary statements I made to Lieutenant Colonel Tuten, whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020.

Signature ____________________________________________________________________________________________

Date 2020-09-10

ENCLOSURE (80)
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: 
Activity: Company Commander  
Unit: headquarters and Services Co., 3rd A.P.B.
Telephone num#: 
I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: possible negligence and possible dereliction of duty

I have the right to remain silent. Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:
I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(witness signature/date) 
30009

ENCLOSURE (81)
Understanding my rights under Article 31, UCMJ, I wish to make the following statement:

I wish to make a statement in connection with the investigation concerning the AAV mishap of 30 July 2020. To answer the questions set forth in the list on DA Form 2823, I will answer.

1. On 14 April, the day after the 15th MEU AAV Platoon came out of ROM following their deployment to UAE for Exercise Nature Fury, the I MEF Joint Limited Technical Inspection began. The inspection team identified 12 of the 13 vehicles as dead lined.

The 14th vehicle, a Network On The Move (NOTM) enabled AAV P7, was not inspected at the time because the 15th MEU leadership had not included it in their original AMHS message request. When the results of the inspection were disclosed, the vehicles were not transferred to the 15th MEU. I worked with the Battalion Maintenance Officer and the Battalion Logistics Officer to establish a plan to correct the identified maintenance issues by sending additional maintenance personnel oversight by the NAMP Chief.

All funding for repairs remained the responsibility of 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, and no vehicles were to be transferred to BLT V4 until the vehicles were in a fully operational status. Once this was achieved, the Battalion Supply Officer emailed the Supply Officer for BLT V4 to schedule an EATO transfer of the equipment. The EATO transfer began on 20 May.

2. I assumed command of Headquarters & Service Company on
19 February 2020. The 15th MEU AAV Platoon deployed to UAE for Exercise Native Fury, echeloning forces from 23 February to 9 March. The full platoon was unable to deploy due to cancelled flights, and 22 personnel arrived in UAE to provide eight AAV crews to support land training with the Infantry. On 29 March, the Marines returned to Camp Pendleton and immediately went into 14 days of restriction of movement (ROM) due to COVID-19. On 13 April, the Marines came out of ROM and on 20 April, the personnel joined the 15th MEU.

Prior to my assumption of command, I had no influence on what training the 15th MEU AAV Platoon conducted. I was informed by the Battalion Operations Officer, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that the 15th MEU AAV Platoon, Marine did complete all PTP training required for CENTCOM to deploy for Native Fury.

3. I do not know the means by which training was tracked by the 15th MEU AAV Platoon prior to my assumption of command. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

4. I do not know why the 15th MEU AAV Platoon wasn’t given a MCCRE prior to joining the 15th MEU. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

5. I had no involvement in the decision to send the 15th MEU AAV Platoon to Exercise Native Fury. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

6. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the only AAV Section Leader from the 15th MEU AAV Platoon that I am aware of who graduated from the Assault Amphibious Unit Leaders (AAU) Course. Currently, AAU is not a requirement for Marines to hold the billet of AAV Section Leader. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ENCLOSURE (82)
I was the only AAV Vehicle Commander from the 15th MEU AAV Platoon that I am aware of who graduated from the AAV Vehicle Commander Course (VCC). Currently, VCC is not a requirement for Marines to hold the billet of AAV Vehicle Commander.

20200911
Date

20200911
Date
Synopsis of Interview conducted on 3 August 2020 with Battalion Landing Team 1/4 AAV Platoon Commander.

The investigating officer began the investigation without reason to believe that gross negligence or a violation of the UCMJ had been the cause of the sinking. All initial statements were taken without article 31 rights advisements or waivers.

Upon arriving on USS SOMERSET, the investigating team set up Commander of Troops office. 

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated they had received the FragaO for the mech raid the day prior and they conducted all the pre-ops the night prior. Bravo Company had brought some day packs and some main packs down and the SNCOs took care of all of the pre-ops while he and the other leadership conducted the confirmation brief. The confirmation brief started at approximately 1930 and ended at 2100. The well deck serial call-aways started about 2100, then they conducted a ROC drill at 2200 and it was unknown what time they finished. The AAV platoon set reveille at 0300 and they were in the well deck at 0400. Serial call-aways began at 0500 and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) conducted a splash team check. There was a delay in the well deck cycle and then the CCO came down and informed (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that the ship could not provide the agreed upon one safety boat. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he had planned for this and they had two empty AAVs that would be the safety vehicles. They splashed at 0745, the USS SOMERSET was moving around 10 knots so the timing for AAVs to splash was every seven seconds. The plan was to swim about 4000 meters to West Cove on San Clemente Island. It was briefed as a sea state 1, but they don’t have any METOC capability on USS SOMERSET. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) thought it was sea state 2, but could have been sea state 3 when they launched. The AAVs splashed and got underway, all hatches were open and all vehicles ran fine. The plan was to land in sections but because of the kelp beds, they changed and landed individually in column. It was about a 45 minute swim. They met (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the coordinator for the event from the 15th MEU, on the beach. Because of environmental concerns all of the vehicles followed Gunner and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for an 8 km movement from LF OBJ 1 (which was West Cove) to LF OBJ 3 (which was the old airfield). Track 12, which was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) tracked, had (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) onboard. It broke down after the attack. They sent (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the maintenance chief, over to look at the vehicle and around 1000 they realized they were going to need parts to repair Track 12. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that they called the USS SOMERSET and requested parts using the NSNs to ensure the correct parts were ordered. Then they waited for the parts to come in. At approximately 1400, an LCAC landed with parts. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) wanted to get the Marines back to the ship, so the decision was made to leave 4 vehicles behind, Track 12 and 3
other AAVs so they would make a four vehicle section. They then moved
back to the beach and left Track 12 on LF OBJ 3 with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) There
were 2 vehicles on LF OBJ 2 (which was just to the north of West Cove
by the north airfield). * (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) asks: “Who were the
section leaders for the AAVs?” (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that 1st Section
is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 2nd Section is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and 3rd section is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
The C2 section was made up of the C7 AAV and the NOTM AAV,
that section was commanded by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Around 1500, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was doing SUROBS and at this point they started moving people around
to try to get people back on the 9 AAVs. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that
they picked up an additional 24 personnel, nine from the ADR/recon
team and 15 from the adversary force.
and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) were all going to stay on San Clemente Island with
Track 12 and the three other AAVs. They conducted an MSA and
considered it a 2.1 and a sea state of 1. They estimated once they
got past 1000 yards, the sea state would get higher but estimated no
more than a sea state of 2. At some point (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that
all checks were completed and they could see the ship about three
nautical miles away. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had a
good radio check on Boat Bravo and they began to move the 9 tracks in
column. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that the ship would be in the op box
between 1530 and 1630 and they splashed at approximately 1645(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he went to go set up communications on higher
ground and he kept back AAVs 2, 4, 11 and 12. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated
that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) reported that the ship was getting into position and
the sea state had increased. At approximately 1730 Track 3 went dead
in the water and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who was in Track 1 threw ropes and rigged
for tow, and they then brought Track 3 back to West Cove on San
Clemente Island. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated sometime shortly after that,
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) reported that Track 5 was taking on water(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that from the shore he could see the ship but did not
see the tracks. He knew (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was leading the movement and he
thought they were about 400 yards from the ship. At that point the
ship was the closest safe haven to the tracks. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated
that the AAVs were chasing the ship and reports that around 1800
somebody was waving the November flag and that the C7 was moving
towards the November flag. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he thought they
would possibly lose comm and was wondering why they didn’t pop pyro if
no one could see him. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated there was confusion over
whether they wanted (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to pop pyro because he was towing in
Track 3. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated he heard the call to ballast the ship
down to 6 feet and multiple people asking to slow the ship down.
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that there was a female voice that stated the
ship was moving at zero knots. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated he asked if
they knew where the AAVs and if any AAVs were on the ship. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he heard that 3rd Section was back on ship and
the Navy was deploying its safety boats, he remembers hearing (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) voice saying it will be 14-18 minutes before the safety
boats are in the water. Very shortly after that, stated he heard Track 5 had sank and three Marines were in the water. At this point (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) called looking for more information. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was talking with the C7 and Pop and they needed counts for the ship. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on vehicle 1 and vehicle 3 got to the shore shortly after that and they passed a by name roster of everyone on San Clemente Island. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated there was a lot of confusion trying to get numbers correct and he could see helos flying around the back of USS SOMERSET. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated he briefed his Marines and tried to ensure they were okay.
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS WITH CLEANSING WARNING

I have been advised that I am suspected of violating the following Articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: _Duty, Negligence_

I have been advised that:

I have the right to remain silent.

Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial or other administrative or disciplinary proceeding.

I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.

I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.

I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.

I expressly desire to make a statement.

I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.

I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.

This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

I understand that the statement I made previously to not admissible at court martial and cannot be used against me, and that I can still remain silent now if I want to.

\[200817\]

Understanding my rights under U.C.M.J. Article 31, I wish to make the statement attached on the following pages.

ENCLOSURE (§-1)
Summary of Interview

On August 11, 2020 the investigative team spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) regarding his recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

We formed the 15th MEU AAV Platoon on January 15th. I found out that we had been tasked to go to NATIVE FURY sometime in December just before the leave block.

Our first operation as a Platoon was crew level gunnery in February. I got my Platoon Sergeant assigned in February just before we went to the range. I remember there were a lot of personnel swaps going on before we went to UAE to support NATIVE FURY. The deployment to NATIVE FURY was scheduled to go from sometime in early March to sometime in early April. A lot of people ended up not going due to COVID-19 and so the only leadership that went was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I.

While we were in UAE for NATIVE FURY we operated 15 vehicles with 2 man crews. We had to steal Marines from other companies in order to have enough personnel. We only did land operations. We didn’t end up firing because we did not have any of the equipment that was supposed to come with the second wave of deployers, which was cancelled because of COVID.

Once we got back from UAE we immediately went into ROM for 14 days. After that we CHOP’d to the BLT on April 20th.

When we received our vehicles almost every one of them was deadlined. The EOTG Raid Package went either the first or second week of May and that was the first time we were able to operate as a full Platoon track-wise. However, we did not do any waterborne operations as part of that training.

After that we did the R2P2 course in the end of May, sometime in the last two weeks of the month. While the key leadership was at that course the Marines got the vehicles repaired.

In June we did RUT. We had range 227 and range 408a planned to do crew gunnery and then range 600 to do section gunnery. The ranges caught fire during that time though, so a lot of our training plans got disrupted.

Later on we were able to do some water operations on Gold Beach for two days including an amphib operation. We started with section for a day and a night and then we were supposed to do Platoon level training for a day and a night, but this got interrupted.
During RUT we had two Tracks collide in the surf zone during Platoon night training. It was my Track that collided with Track. (Tracks 4 and 5). There was some damage to the gypsy rack and the antennae mount on Track 5. This happened shortly after we went hatches down. The driver lost situational awareness and just kept going. We were wearing NVGs at the time.

We also did a night raid at range 408a. There was still no amphibious training, this was all land based training. There was no other training during the month of June.

The next training we did was a company night attack after the July 4th holiday. We had done crew level gunnery training prior to this event, but we still were not completely qualified at crew level gunnery. We had a day and a night splash planned but we had to cancel due to maintenance concerns. After that we went straight into PMINT.

We conducted egress training on the 27th when we embarked the ship. When we got on ship, everyone got settled and got with the infantry to let them know that we had to do egress training. I got involved in the planning for the mechanized raid on the 29th when we got the FRAGO for the raid. We did the planning on the USS SOM. I wasn’t engaged as much as I would have liked. I wasn’t there for the CAT I or CAT II brief. I kept getting kicked out by the BLT S-3a.

We did egress and evacuation drills on the 29th. I saw the training for 1st and 3rd Platoon. They were slick for the training. I was told that 2nd and 3rd sections did the training. The grunts didn’t have their weapons on them at the time. The grunts were also staging their main packs concurrent with the egress training. We don’t have any SOP’s on how to stage the gear. We left that on the section leaders to figure out how to stage the gear such that egress routes would not be blocked. I know that the grunts were told to waterproof their gear, although I don’t know how that word was passed to them.

Sometime around just after chow the night before the raid, all the packs were staged.

We did the planning in the jump room. I didn’t sit me down and give me a full 5 paragraph order brief, it was more an R2P2 style brief that we got in the jump room.

The MACO drill with the whole company happened at around 2100. The Confirmation brief went before that and all the squad and section leaders were there. The MACO drills then lasted 45 minutes to an hour. After that, I brought in the section leaders and drew out routes on tablets and showed them where the objectives were and what it looked like. At this time I had sent the Marines back to their berthing to get rest, but the section leaders still had to back brief everyone. My discussion with the sections leaders lasted until 2300.
We had a well deck watch and a berthing watch as well. With reveille at 0300 I think that the Marines got around 3 hours of sleep.

I don’t know if there was anything coordinated with the ship to have the chow hall open and food available the next morning. We did MACO drills the next morning at 0500 and the LCAC started to fly at 0620.

For the sea state call I spoke to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in the LFOC and he said that he got a sea state call from the METOC on the MKI. He said that the sea state was a 1. At 0630 I observed the sea state from the flight deck and thought that it was a 1 or a 2. I did not witness anyone doing an embark troop brief or a life jacket brief. I did not see it one way or another so I can’t speak to whether these briefs happened or not.

For the safety boats, a Navy Lieutenant Junior Grade had asked me if I could provide one, but as I was walking down into the well deck on the day of the incident I received word asking me if I could provide both and I said that I could. During the Confirmation brief the plan had been for the Ship to provide one, but they were not able to. I felt that we could provide both because we weren’t lifting the whole company. Track 12 was the vehicle that we had planned to be the safety vehicle since it only had 4-5 Marines embarked. I can’t recall if I identified who would be the second safety boat but I think that Track 11 was empty.

I think that it was a sea state 3 when we splashed that morning. The ship was going south to north and we were 4,000 yards out from the island. Once we got on the island, we did actions on the objective and recovered the ADR and OpFor Marines. We left Track 12 on the objective after we had spent an hour. We left 21 packs out of Track 12 on the objective.

We felt some pressure from Bravo Co. to get all the tracks back to the ship except for Track 12. We were given a timeline of one hour, but I told them that we couldn’t meet that timeline. They then said that was fine and the timeline didn’t matter.

The senior leadership stayed on the island because I was concerned someone would try to make Track 12 go back. There had been a lot of pressure as to why Track 12 couldn’t go back. I thought the GySgt could handle it but I wanted to stay back with a section even though most vehicles were going back to the ship. We agreed that Tracks 4, 12, 2, and 11 were the ones staying behind. I briefed (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on who was staying and he agreed with my decision.

I did not see whether the ADR or OpFor Marines got an embark troop brief. I also didn’t see any pre-ops checklist inspections happening on the beach. The splash team checks were done on the beach by the section leaders and verified by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) The section leaders would do the checks and then verbally report to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was the one who got comm with the boat before we splashed back to the ship. To my knowledge no one checked what the sea state was at the ship. We anticipated a sea state of 3 looking out from the shore.

The issue of safety boats going back to the ship hadn’t crossed my mind. My assumption was that there would be safety boats because we hadn’t been told that there wouldn’t be safety boats. Tracks 12 and 11 were our safety boats in the morning, but they were staying on the island in the afternoon. We never identified safety boats on the way back.

When they splashed back in the afternoon, the ship was farther out than they said it would be, and it was traveling faster than expected. I heard that Track 3 was coming back with Track 1, and I knew that the sea state had increased by that time. I then heard that Track 5 was taking on water. A few minutes after I heard that water was at the deck plate level I moved the Tracks to the hill top. I was in Track 11 at this time. I was trying to coordinate with the ship while talking to the Tracks. I was talking to a female voice initially before I switched to talking to a male voice that I think was the Ship’s Captain. He said that the ship was going zero knots and asked what we needed. The last I remember hearing from Track 5 was that the water was at the deck plate.

We had comm with the C7 and Pop vehicles. was directing them to go over and help Track 5. I next heard that Track 5 had sunk. I then asked if the troop transfer had occurred and was told that it had.

To my knowledge, everyone was swim and UET qualified although we had a handful that were going to expire during the float.
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Activity: ___________________________ Unit: BLT '74 BC AAV PLT

Telephone number: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: ________

and that:

I have the right to remain silent.
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by
court-martial.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This
lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense,
a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed
military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my
rights and fully understand them, and that:
I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer
retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without
cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me
during this interview.
This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and
voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been
made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used
against me.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

108 31

ENCLOSURE (86)
Third Statement (15 Aug 2020)

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

I, [Redacted], make the following free and voluntary statement to [Redacted] whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me.

I took over the platoon on or about 10 January. I took over from [Redacted] when I received the Platoon it was made up of some Marines from the previous 13th MEU Platoon. There were also some that came from old Bravo Co. A decent amount of Marines did not have the EAS date cutoff for Native Fury 20 (NF 20) or for the upcoming MEU. For a majority of the Marines this would be their first deployment.

When I arrived to the 15th MEU platoon it had a gear set. That gear set belonged to [Redacted] and was in the process of being transferred to Alpha Company 3rd Platoon. I didn't own the gear set. I did not own any AAVs that belonged to 3d AABn until April 13th. The AAVs I used at NF 20 were MPF offloads. April 13th was the first time I had eyes on the vehicles we would take for the 15th MEU. The week of the 13th is when we had done limited technical inspections and SL3 inspections, with [Redacted] for the MEU overseeing it. This was the week before we CHOP'd to the MEU. Our CHOP date to Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion 4th Marines (BLT 1/4) was April 20th.

I wasn't told we would be supporting NATIVE FURY 2020 until sometime in December right before the leave block. When I was told that I didn't have that Platoon yet. I was still with Charlie Company first platoon at that point. When we came back that first week, up until the 10th of January, I was still with Charlie Company. After the leave block while I was still apart of Charlie Company I did attend meetings at 1st Marine Regiment with [Redacted] in regards to NF 20. On or about January 10th is when I went over to H&S Company and did a turnover with [Redacted]

On January 10, The platoon was not T/O Or T/E complete. I went to the CMP range with the personnel I had on hand, but I was missing personnel that were away at formal schools or had not been assigned to the platoon yet.

I was assigned the personnel for NF 20 on January 18. I know that [Redacted] had not arrived yet and that our plan was to go to NF 20 without him. He was still with the 11th MEU platoon because they had be extended.
On or about February 3rd we CHOP’d to 1st Marine Regiment for NF 20. I don’t know when we actually administratively transferred over to 1st Marine Regiment for NF 20. I never actually walked the orders over, which is what I would normally do and have done in the past. The 1st Marine Regiment Adjutant never got back to me on when he wanted me to bring him the orders. Our S-1 worked through that with their S-1, but I don’t know exactly when that happened or if it was just done virtually. To my Knowledge we also chop’d to the regiment instead of 1st Battalion 1st Marines as we normally do.

Before I joined the platoon they had training planned for February 12-16 for gunnery. We ended up executing the training February 15-17. We did not own our own vehicles and had to borrow vehicles from General Support Platoon. We were delayed because because we were working on getting the GS vehicles fixed. The S3 and company staff were aware of this, I am unsure if they briefed the BN CO. We took them on maintenance runs and confirmed they needed work before bringing them to the range. Due to these circumstances to the best of my memory we had seven out of thirteen crews qualified at crew level gunnery, table six.

The platoon became T/O complete for the MEU with the RBE during the month of March. We had gotten (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and other Marines we were looking for. We were still waiting for the Point of Presence (POP) AAV and would be getting a data Marine to operate that system. We were officially T/O’d right before CHOP.

The Platoon was broken into two deploying sticks to support NF 20. The understanding was that we would be able to do land ops while we were out there, including gunnery training. There was a big push to do the co-use training with the Emiratis out there and that was the main focus of the Field Training Exercises (FTXs) portion of the exercise.

I deployed with the first stick. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) went right before me because he was part of the advance party as well as a few Marines we had given up for camp tax. The second sticks flight ended up getting cancelled due to COVID 19. Due to the shortfall of personnel and not being able to support the requirements 1st marine Regiment had for one AAV Platoon we gained personnel from 3rd AA Bn including people from Co A, Co D, and H&S Co that were enablers for the MPF offload. This influx of personnel enabled us to execute land training up to the Platoon level, but these personnel were not organic to the Platoon. As a result only about 20 Marines organic to my platoon participated in this exercise.

We returned from NATIVE FURY on March 29 and went into a restriction of movement status until April 12. From April 13 to 17 we did AAV JLTI’s to facilitate the CHOP to BLT 1/4. However, we were really doing two transfers at one time. We were taking equipment from the 11th MEU and GS Platoon while we were also transferring equipment to
the BLT. At least, that is what we were attempting to do. The EATO transfer did not end up going through the system until on or about the month of August.

Approximately 10 of 13 AAV's were deadlined for operations at the CHOP date. The BLT MMO, XO, Co, SUUPO and Bravo Company were all aware of this. I briefed them the day I checked in. I or myself would also attend weekly maintenance briefs with updates. We were short one AAV, we were supposed to have 14, but we didn’t get the POP AAV until after Raids and R2P2. We gained that vehicle on or about in early June. The original FOS did not include the POP AAV, I had to talk to (BLT 1/4) OPSO to work the request for a POP from 3rd AABn after I CHOP’d to the MEU.

May 3-8 we did the EOTG Raid package and this was the first training evolution where we could operate with all AAVs and assigned personnel. There were no water operations during this training, we only operated on land. This was our first operation together. We did the training with CO B BLT 1/4.

I attended the R2P2 Course with May ended up being the first time we were able to get AAVs in the water and we didn’t get to do Platoon level operations, it was just to the section level.

We did one day of waterborne recovery operations in the Del Mar Boat Basin and then we did one day of section level water operations at White Beach. We had originally requested Blue Beach, but we got kicked off over environmental regulations. So we did one day at the jetty on the 26 of May, and did a day and night section on the 28th or 29th of May at white beach.

June 1-4 we did the BZO range up in Camp Horn. After that we participated in RUT. We had planned to do crew and section level gunnery but for the first few days out there we didn’t have the ranges we needed for our gunnery so we were co-located with the rest of the company. The impact area had caught on fire the first couple of days and we had to go down to the 100 level ranges and that’s where we did the CMP and then we had requested to do our other amphib training where we would do section and platoon. We weren’t able to achieve any additional qualifications at this time. We executed the CMP shoot with M4s in lieu of AAV gunnery. We also did a dismount 50 shoot with weapons platoon. After that we returned to CO B to support RUT with 9 AAVs and executed a raid on the old Naval Hospital on or about 13 June.

In July we did Mechanized Company attacks at Range 600. We did our crew gunnery the first day at range 408a as a make up for what we couldn’t get done at RUT. We had gone through the rest of the crews however they did not receive an actual qualification because of certain admin procedures that could not be attained. The six crews
remaining to be qualified had not completed the prerequisite training within the 30 day window required. At the end of 408a we only had 7 of 13 crews qualified in crew gunnery.

After Range 600, waterborne operations were planned but not executed due to maintenance. We had gone down to the beach and were looking the vehicles over and, knowing PMINT was coming up, we called [Redacted] and told him that we didn’t want to get into the water because we had a lot of maintenance to do. He said that he agreed and we pushed back to the 21 area.

On the day of the incident, to the best of my knowledge, the Marines in my Platoon were wearing SAFI plates. I was wearing front and rear plates, but no side SAPis.

We went to the ship on the 27th of July. We had an issue where Track 12 had to go to water tracks. To what I can recall the lateral blew. Also Track 14 the POP had issues with its buckets, so it had to go to water tracks as well. I got on to the USS SOM on or about the two and a half hour mark. To the best of my knowledge movement was in excess of 4 nautical miles, and was farther and longer than normal. During that evolution there was one safety boat provided by the Navy. That had been pre-coordinated in the pre-sail brief aboard the USS SOM. They had asked if we could provide one safety boat and I said we could.

The day we went out to the ship when we embarked from the jetty, it was a mutual agreement as to when we would splash. The night before at the pre-sail brief we had estimated a 30 min swim, but I asked if we could splash 30 min prior to that we could get in a better position after having come out from the jetty. It would take longer to go the planned two nautical miles because of the no wake zone coming out of the jetty. That day I got the man pack, and then walked out onto the jetty by recon and the LZ and got a comm check with the USS SOM. I said I would lose comm right before we would splash because of the overheard wires but that we were going to splash at the time we agreed.

The comm with the ship was via single channel plain text. This was the same way that we communicated with the ship on the day of the incident. We met the safety boat a further out from the jetty. I am not sure why they could only provide one safety boat.

The rest of the day on the 28th we were doing maintenance and PMCS in the well deck of the ship. The morning of the 29th we received a FRAGO for the raid. I got that from the B. Co XO. We met in the LFOC with the other Platoon Commanders, they printed out the FRAGORD and then we all started reading it and going through the tasks that we had. I was not present for the CAT I or CAT II briefs although I tried to be there. I would try to go in, but [Redacted] would shake
his head indicating that they were in the middle of a meeting. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

wanted me in the meetings, but then when I went to go in
again indicated that they were in the middle of a meeting.

There were two times I tried to go into the briefs, but was turned
away. I eventually got in for the ADR brief because I wanted to make
sure they were doing a SUROB, but they never mentioned it. After that
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I brought it up with the OpsO.

On the 29th, I saw first section with 3rd Platoon conducting egress and
evacuation drills. I can’t remember if it was just section leaders or
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) but I remember being briefed from a SNCO or higher that
this was done across the whole platoon. We told Bravo Company to pre
stage their packs on the vehicles that afternoon/night. I also know
that the infantry personnel were told to water proof their gear prior
to the operation. Some of the packs were staged inside the vehicles
and some were staged outside the vehicles as well. There is not a
specific SOP on how to stage the packs as long as you are not
impacting the primary and secondary egress routes. We tried to
balance the packs between the gypsy racks and some inside so it
doesn’t block the cargo hatch or the egress routes inside the
vehicles. We didn’t develop any specific SOPs within the Platoon
though. We had identified this as a friction point though and that’s
why we had them stage the packs on the vehicles the night before.
There was some concern from the infantry Marines as to whether the
packs would get wet and we told them they might depending on where the
water line ended up being so we told everyone to waterproof their
packs. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Bravo XO pushed this down to the platoon
commanders as well and agreed with it.

That night I also attended a confirmation brief in the JUMP room after
dinner. After that we had MACO drills from 2100 to 2200. Water pre­
ops were done sometime before the MACO drills. Section leaders are
collect those pre-ops and then the Platoon Sergeant receives them
afterwards. At 2200 we did a ROC drill with the Marines and went over
the details of the operation more in depth. At 2300 we finished the
ROC drill and then secured the Marines. I would estimate that most of
the Marines got around 3 hours of sleep that night.

Reveille on the day of the incident was at 0300 and we were ungripping
the vehicles at 0400. I gave the Marines the hour from 0300 to 0400
to get ready and get chow. MACO procedures went at 0500 and at 0620
the LCACs flew out. At around this time I still didn’t know if ADR
had conducted a SUROB as requested. I’m not sure what time this was,
but I had gone to the LFOC and talked to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) about getting the
METOC analysis. He said that from the METOC analysis the sea state
would was a one. I think this came from the METOC on the MKI, but I’m
not certain. At around 0630 I observed the sea state from the flight
deck with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I assessed the sea state to be a one. Then
I got eyes on doing the checks with the team. The morning of the incident I did not witness embark troop briefs and life jacket briefs being conducted as I was moving around the ship. The Navy had said the day before that they would provide a safety boat that day, but they didn’t tell us that they couldn’t provide any safety boats that day until we were in the well deck about to splash.

We staged in the well deck at about 0700. At about 0730 the ships Combat Cargo Officer told me that there wouldn’t be any safety boats provided. She yelled down to me that they couldn’t provide any safety boats and asked me if I could provide another one and I said yes.

At 0745 we splashed from the ship, we were approximately 4,000 yards from the beach and the ship was maneuvering south to north. The swim in was uneventful, although I remember thinking that the sea state was higher than a one.

We conducted actions on the objective between 0930 and 1000. After that we picked up 9 packs from the ADR and 15 packs from the OpFor, which put an extra 24 packs on our vehicles. From 1100 to 1200 we consolidated our tracks on the beach, except for Track 12 which stayed in place with and the rest of the crew minus and An LCAC came ashore while we were consolidated on the beach. I decided to stay with and four vehicles on the beach because I anticipated the point of friction being on the beach with the Marines stuck there and there only being four vehicles. I knew that they could splash with that, but I wanted to stay there to ensure they got off the island safely and correctly and were able to get back on ship. I anticipated the difficult part between getting the parts coordinated for Track 12, getting it back up, and getting us back on ship. I didn’t feel any specific pressure from the company, but I did feel pressure to get every Track back on the ship that night. I didn’t know if that pressure came from the BLT or from the MEU, but that’s what I got overhearing them talking on comm. I was talking through and I could hear them saying “Okay just leave Track 12...” and then I heard them saying “No they need to leave another Track to chase it...” and then they said “Okay, then you’re just leaving two” and then we responded “No they won’t go with less than a section.” After that I decided that I wanted to stay on the island with them because I anticipated that being the point of friction. I don’t know who the company was talking to at that point.

I did not witness any of the people we picked up on the island got an embark troop brief or a brief on how to use the life jackets. I did not physically see the water pre-ops getting done. I was co-located with the company leadership coordinating the game plan for those
leaving and those staying. I saw the Section leaders go through some of the vehicles for splash team checks, and then I saw (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) go through some of the vehicles as well. I wasn’t present the whole time for that since I was going back and forth between the beach and the LZ.

The plan was to splash 9 vehicles in column back to the ship. I was working on getting comm with the ship via Boat Bravo. At that time I did not see any safety boats in the water to support the movement back to the ship. The sea state seemed calmer from what we could see from the beach. After the Tracks splashed I got back on Track 11 with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) to monitor comm between the platoon and the USS SOM.

At some point we heard that Track 3 had gone dead in the water and that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) was hooking up Track 1 to Track 3 for tow. I eventually heard him say that he was coming back to the beach instead of the ship, but I cannot recall where in the timeline I heard that. At some point during this timeframe I also heard a command for all vehicles to close their hatches.

I heard (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) say that Track 5 was taking on water. I tried to talk to him at this point, but the comm kept cutting in and out so we moved our Track to a better location in an attempt to get better comm with Track 5. When we got around hill we could only see two AAVs in the back of the formation, but we couldn’t see any of the other Tracks. At this time, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) had comm with the C7 and the NOTM and those vehicles could see Track 5 and were maneuvering to support.

My vehicle commander for Track 3 was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7). We had a standard manifest form for who was on each vehicle. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) and the platoon sergeants had one beforehand to track the pack count. We had done this on every training operation beforehand and it worked well for the company.

There were very good lines of communication between us and the company. If I ever had a situation where I needed to tell them something or let them know what our limitations were I always felt that they were ready to listen and they had listened in the past. I felt that if I had to identify a safety issue they would have listened to me. When we left track 9 on ship because it was deadlined they didn’t question anything and just worked to plan around one less vehicle.

Coming back from the beach I figured that the ship would have had safety boats in the water because they didn’t say that they wouldn’t. A lot of times you’ll have trouble seeing safety boats because they’ll stay 2000 yards out or further. Especially if they use the small ones that don’t come out of boat valley. They were good about bringing up safety boats when they couldn’t provide in the past.
To my knowledge we did not get a sea state call from the ship prior to splashing back to the ship that afternoon. We had made our sea state call from the shore and then requested to know when the ship would be in position and ready. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) relayed to me that the ship had said they were good to splash.

Signature _________________________ Date ____________
Fourth Statement (2 Sep 2020)

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

I, __________ , make the following free and voluntary statement to __________ whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me.

I felt that I was ready to be the Platoon Commander for the AAV Platoon for the 15th MEU based on the experiences I had during my short time with 3rd AA Bn. I had been CHOP'd away most of my time there. I came to the Battalion officially school trained on or about June 26 2019 and then a month later I went to support SPMAGTF Alaska with CLB-15. I had a little bit of supervision with Charlie Co. prior to that, and then I CHOP'd over and supported operations with them as the only AAV Officer. For the time I was with CLB 15 the platoon's main focus was amphibious operations, including ship operations. The SPMAGTF Operation included debarking the ship with Lima 3/4 and spending over a week on the island of Adak Alaska. We did not end up splashing except for getting on and off ship. We were supposed to splash onto Adak Island, but the ship never got close enough into the bay to the point where we felt comfortable. The closest they got was 7 nautical miles and the Navy didn't feel comfortable getting close and that was too far of a swim for us to do at the point in time given the area.

I am familiar with the MCCRE process, but I did not know that it was required prior to CHOP'ing to the BLT. The week before April 20 is when I first saw the vehicles after returning from the UAE and that was when I discovered a majority of the vehicles were deadlined. After that I briefed BLT 1/4 on the situation, letting them know how many vehicles were down. I first spoke to the BLT Maintenance Management Officer, about it because he had given me a phone call after he received the report. I then went over there and spoke to the H&S Co. Commander, brought me up to the Bn CO’s office with as well and he told to give me Tracks that were fully mission capable, after which said he would and then left. I then told the Bn CO that I didn’t think that the H&S Co. had any Tracks that were fully operational capable, or at least good enough to support a MEU Platoon. So the Bn CO asked if we could fix the tracks and I said that we would try, and we ended up getting them up for land operations in time for EOTG raids. During the same week met with the Bn CO for 3rd AABn at the time. They had a discussion which I am assuming was about the vehicles, but I’m not sure of the specifics. Everyone was aware
of the condition of the Tracks. I don’t know what decision was ultimately made about whether to switch them out, I just knew that as long as I had them we were going to work on them and not let them sit.

During my conversations with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) he said that they weren’t going to accept the gear set if the gear was deadlining. So up to a few weeks ago the EATO transfer on our AMTRACKs never went through, so for us to get priority was very difficult. The service request never transferred over either so we’ve been fighting that the whole time during the work up. The vehicles and service request were stuck in the EATO transfer and made access almost impossible on GCSS.

During the RUT there was a collision between AAV’s 5 and 4 during night surf operations. Track 4’s bow plane collided with Track 5 near the gypsy rack, which is on top, and the antennae mount. It was mostly cosmetic damage minus the antennae mount being important, we were able to fix everything within a few hours of getting back. We didn’t find anything structurally wrong with the vehicle. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) our maintenance chief, and I both looked at it and we could only see damage to the bow plane on Track 4 and the antennae mount and gypsy rack on Track 5.

I think that we went to the USS SOM from the Del Mar Boat Basin on the 26th of July. I know that the Marines came down around 0700 or 0800 in preparation for a departure time between 1100 and 1300. It took us around two and a half hours to get to the ship. I think the sea state when we splashed was about a one or a two, but it got up to around a 3 when we got further out. I think the sea state on the day of the incident was a little worse than it was that day.

During the swim to the USS SOM on that day, Track 12 had an issue that forced them to switch into water tracks mode. Track 14 also had an issue with its buckets, or the propulsion unit, which kept going in and out and they had to switch to water tracks as well. We later found out that this was due to an electrical issue.

Once we got on the ship we did maintenance on the vehicles every day. We had coordinated with the ship that every day, Monday through Friday, they would turn on the fans so that we could do our running checks. Before those running checks we would do everything else that we could do such as traversing the turrets both ways twice, both manually and electrically. They would also do their monthly checks. But the most important thing for us was the running checks.

During those checks we found that Track 9’s Driver Display Module (DDM) was not reading the water temp, which deadlines the vehicle. There is no other way to read the water temp without the DDM, which meant that the Track could be performing fine, but the driver wouldn’t be able to tell if the Track was overheating or not. Because of this we made the decision to leave Track 9 on the ship.
On the night of June 30th, to my knowledge the pre-ops and pre-water checks were completed but I did not physically go around and verify every vehicle. That was something I pushed down to my Platoon Sergeant and section leaders to make sure that was completed. This was the SOP for the Platoon.

The night prior I think the confirmation brief was supposed to go at 1930, but I think it actually started at around 2030. I was there for the confirmation brief with my platoon sergeant and section leaders. That same night the Bravo Co. Marines did some training on the AAVs. I wasn’t there for all of it, but I did witness some of it. They were supposed to go down to the well deck, stage their packs, and then go through with the crews to do dry land egress drills, get life jacket and embarked troop briefs. This was going to be their first time in the Tracks so I wanted to make sure they had a good understanding of everything. I saw first section with third platoon down there going through those actions.

The embark troop briefs were not part of the confirmation brief. That is something embarked personnel are supposed to get from the AAV crew every time they get on board. I don’t know if they did an embark troop brief the night before. The only thing I was able to witness was the egress drills since I was going back and forth between the well deck and the LFOC. The standard though is that you are supposed to do it every time before you go in the vehicle and all the hatches are closed. We also did call-away drills the night before.

The next morning the Marines woke up at 0300 and got on their vehicles at around 0400. The infantry got down at around 0500 to do serial call-aways. The no go criteria was sea state 4 or higher. There was a no go criteria for vehicles and one for embarked troops as well, but I can’t remember what the numbers were. It briefed during confirmation brief with my input.

We had agreed beforehand with Recon that they would do a sea state call for us, but they never did. I do still do not know why they did not do the SUROB. We at least wanted to get METOC data, so we went up to the flight deck and made a call from there as best we could. After that we got with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who briefed us that it was a sea state 1. We made a call that it was a sea state 1 or 2 I can’t recall what we decided. There was nothing that was concerning in our final judgment.

The ship gives us approval to splash, as far as whether they’re ready or not and then part of it comes down to the AAV Unit Leader if he’s ready. It’s more of a mutual agreement. The Navy has final say in everything, so if I’m good to splash and they’re not they can always supersede. I always viewed it as a mutual agreement with me giving the green side as far as the vehicles being good and the Navy saying the ship is ready and in positon. You cannot splash a track if the Navy is not ready, its impossible.
I don’t recall having any issues on the way into the beach that morning. I think it took my Track roughly 45 to 50 minutes to get from the ship to the beach. I think the sea state was a three by the time we had splashed, but I don’t remember their being any mechanical issues with the AAVs.

When we first stopped on the beach, the rear crewman and or crew chiefs hopped out and did their first at-halt checks while they are switching their tracks over to land. They did a suspension check on all their vehicles and made sure everything looked right and felt right. Also, every time we stopped they do an at-halt check and go through the vehicles.

I have had a lot of conversations with my maintenance chief in the past and that anytime there are any issues I get told. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)or (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is usually there or I’ll get back briefed on it later if I wasn’t co located with the vehicle.

On or about 1400 is when we consolidated on the beach after we conducted actions on the objective and at around 1650 is when all the AAVs had gone feet wet. A lot of this delay was the maintenance issue we experienced with Track 12. During this time I was communicating with the ship through (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I gave them the parts numbers for all the parts that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) needed, we had a small RBE on ship so we were trying to get the parts out of our quadcon. The Marine we were talking to didn’t think we had all the parts, but I’m not sure who that individual was. We were trying to have them coordinate with our personnel on ship to go scrounge around and see what parts we had. Really I was trying to see if we could get our parts to us that day and if not what the plan would be to order the parts because Track 12 would not be able to move without them.

The original plan was for an LCAC to drop of the parts. I know an LCAC landed, but I never saw anyone take any parts off the LCAC.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the one coordinating with the ship for us to splash back to the ship. He was talking on Boat Bravo via single channel plain text. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I were the ones who were standing hard in the sand saying that we needed at least a section to stay on the island. We also had full support form Bravo Company. I don’t know who it was from higher on the ship, but they wanted all the vehicles that were up on the island to go back. We had briefed them through (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that we needed at least a section to stay, and they responded that we could just leave one vehicle to chase Track 12. We told them that we roll everywhere with at least a section, especially for a swim. I’m not really sure why they wanted the rest of the Tracks back there, but we were comfortable with leaving a section back and splashing back with 9. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the one communicating with the ship, so I heard this conversation through him.
As for who ended up remaining on the beach, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stayed because Track 12 was his vehicle so he stayed. We agreed (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) would stay for maintenance purposes so we could get everything done correctly with regard to fixing Track 12. My thought process was that the point of friction was going to be on the beach with Track 12 and getting it back up. I thought this because of the communication we were having with higher and the pushback we were getting, I believed that the point of friction was going to be trying to get Track 12 back to the beach and then ultimately back to the ship. As far as the Bravo Co. leadership that stayed, I’m cannot speak to their decision, I am the AAV Platoon Commander.

Once the ship is ready to receive, the senior AAV unit leader on deck will give permission to splash after verifying all the vehicles are ready. The ship can deny us, so we always wait for the ship to give permission as well. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) got positive confirmation from the ship and then relayed that information down to me as I was next to him on the deck.

When I took the Platoon in January, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the Co. Commander for a few days before he went on an IA billet, then it was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for a few weeks and then (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) after that. The 3rd Bn CO from January when I took over the platoon was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

At no point did anyone ever from the Bn or the Co ask me to put together a training plan or a training exercise employment plan. I did this with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and the Section Leaders. This was driven by NF 20. Vehicle Gunnery was the only known training at this time. I feel like we were also never given the time or opportunity to create or add additional training prior to the CHOP date for the MEU. We had a lot of NF 20 requirements because they wanted us to do a full CENTCOM workup and because we did not have a gear set of vehicles I didn’t believe we would have the time to focus on the MEU workup. We were mainly focused on getting the Platoon TO’d and out the door for NATIVE FURY and then set what we could up for success so that when we got back we could have a quick turnaround. The requirements for the CENTCOM workup weren’t necessarily field training events, but we also had medical stand downs, admin stand downs, a week long theater brief, and other requirements that they had. There was also a huge amount of coordination that needed to be done.

I don’t know if there was any discussion at 3rd AA Bn as to why my Platoon was chosen to go on NATIVE FURY. This was my first MEU deployment. I had a conversation with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who was the 11th MEU Platoon commander when he got back. I asked him what he had to pass down and what his big lessons learned were. A lot of what we talked about had to do with getting the POP for the BLT, he said that was a great asset. I asked him about what coordination happened and what the big ticket items were, but I can’t remember anything.
specific. I did receive a lot of products and AARs from his MEU. I
know we had a couple of conversations on the ramp, trying to get the
gear set for the vehicles since he was the MMO afterwards. I also
talked to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) since she was the Platoon Commander before for
the 15th MEU since (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) didn’t have a lot to give me when we
turned over.

I also talked to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) about what the ship ops would be like and
what RUT would look like from the last MEU. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had also
emailed out the big TEEP and so from that I knew what the big
operations would look like. We planned our training in coordination
with what the MEU and or EOTG had pushed down.

The 3rd AA Bn leadership never asked for a brief from me on what the
capabilities and limitations of the Platoon was, or what our Platoon
looked like and what we had done as far as T&R task completion. I
never briefed the Bn CO or the Co. CO on the status of the Platoon and
such a brief was never asked for. The only time I briefed (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in regard to the Platoon was after the vehicles were deadlined
and that brief was centered on the maintenance readiness of the
vehicles. I don’t recall talking about the training readiness of the
Platoon.

When I briefed the Bn CO about the maintenance readiness of the
vehicles he seemed to angry and upset in my opinion. Not because the
vehicles were down but because they were given to us in that condition
and someone thought that was a good idea. He was upset about the
decisions that occurred. He directed that more towards (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
than myself though. He didn’t seem to blame me in anyway. After that
brief, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) asked me to attend the Bn’s weekly material
readiness brief to speak to the Platoon’s readiness. That was post
CHOP. After that we prepared a slide that spoke to the Platoon’s
readiness and I attended the brief in case there were any questions.
I only went to one brief that I can remember.

I had input into what went into the class 9 block along with
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). Before we went on the ship we didn’t have an opportunity to
conduct an inventory of the parts in the class 9 block though. I had
asked to do it about a month to a month and a half before hand and
never got back on it and didn’t hear anything from BLT 1/4 or the CLB.
When we tried to get the DDM for Track 9 we got with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(not
her full name), a CLB 15 supply Marine, she stated that all those
parts were for CLB 15 and she couldn’t sign out parts to anyone else,
so there was some friction there. But we looked at what they had and
they didn’t have anything we needed. I had coordinated with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) over at CLB 15 prior to chop on the 9 block. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had
created the 9 and SECREP block he had wanted and I looked it over. We
sent it up to him before we departed for Native Fury. He had sent out
a roster back from the MEU that included what they had, what they
could get before deployment, and what they didn’t think they could get. I sent back to him that the list we sent is what items and quantity we needed because we could not source them. He said he would work with the MEU. From what I can recall this was our last conversation about that before I asked to inspect the class 9 block.

We would always put chemlights on the hatch handles. We had a vehicle marking plan. Triangle was first section, diamond was second, square was third. We would also use chemlights on the antennas to mark the vehicles at night. We had considered putting together a Platoon SOP on paper but did not have the time to do it.

Going into PMINT I was confident in my Platoon’s ability to go ship to shore, but I didn’t want the Bravo Co.’s first time in the water to be going off ship to an island. I think I had a conversation with him that I wanted them to come down to our amphib to do some shore to shore operations, but I was still confident in my Platoon’s abilities. We had put some training dates on a board, but due to COVID and different Marines going on ROM on different occasions we were never able to get it done. These training opportunities were lined up post-CHOP. I can’t remember if it was COVID that interfered or if it was the fact that other training requirements, such as RUT, got changed around by higher.

Before we left the confirmation brief from what I can recall and the ARG Commander had briefed that we should try to adhere to the timeline but that that wasn’t the point of the training, to meet a time hack. That’s why when we splashed an hour late it was an easy call for us because the ship wasn’t ready either. So after knowing that we knew the timeline wasn’t going to be a factor for trying to push us on or off. I don’t know if the push to get all the tracks back was coming from the MKI or the SOM, I just knew that it wasn’t coming from the Company.

Prior to CHOP I was able to raise my concerns about the lack of training with We knew that time was running out and that we needed to get things done before July. Unfortunately, we just ran out of time with events getting cancelled or pushed for one reason or another.

During the confirmation brief I did not brief at all. No one asked me to brief and I didn’t prepare a slide either. I gave AAV inputs to on his slides. It was taught at R2P2 that the raid force commander prepare a few slides and brief from there. It was a standard. I know that I gave a hardcopy of the AAV Common SOP to A digital copy was also uploaded on the company’s share drive.
AAV 15th MEU Platoon

January 10: Took over the platoon. 15th MEU AAVs were transferred to Alpha Company 3rd Platoon.

January 16-17: CMP Range ISO NF 20.

January 18: T/O for NF 20.

Feb 03: Chop to 1st Marine Regiment for NF 20.

Feb 12-16: Crew Gunnery NF20 work up. Used GS AAVs. Actually executed February 15-17.

Feb 20: Gas Chamber ISO NF 20

March 09: Depart to UAE for NF20. Platoon became T/O with RBE during the month of March.

March 29: Return from UAE. ROM until April 12.

April 13-17: LTIs on 11th MEU and GS AAVs.

April 20: Chop.

April 27- May 1: EOTG Raid Planners.

May 3-8: EOTG Raids.


May 26-29: Platoons first amphib Op (section).

June 1-3: M4 BZO.

June 6-14: Bravo Fex (RUT). Planned to do dismount 50/crew gunnery/section gunnery/CMP/203 training and a company mechanized attack. Executed dismount 50/203 training/CMP range and another amphib op (section/platoon). Also got fragged to do a night raid on the old Naval Hospital on the 13th.

July 10-16: Crew gunnery 408A/Company day attacks R600.

July 14-16: Amphib (Canceled at Platoon Commanders recommendation to the Company).


ENCLOSURE (1)
Synopsis of Interview conducted on 3 August 2020 with Battalion Landing Team 1/4, Bravo Company Executive Officer.

The investigating officer began the investigation without reason to believe that gross negligence or a violation of the UCMJ had been the cause of the sinking. All initial statements were taken without article 31 rights advisements or waivers.

Upon arriving on USS SOMERSET, the investigating team set up Commander of Troops office.

___ stated that he was riding in the troop commander position on AAV 6 and as they leaving the beach at San Clemente the water was like glass. Then about 500 meters out it started getting bad and it looked like they were pushing against the current, the current looked like it was moving from the Northeast to the Southwest. At approximately 1730 or 1740, AAV 3 said he was taking on water and was rigging for tow. ___ told that the vehicle commander for AAV 6, ___ stated that the closest safe haven was the beach and they (AAV 1 and AAV 3) were going back to the beach. ___ stated that communications were not working as well as he thought they would be functioning. ___ stated that AAV 5 was directly behind them approximately 150 meters back and the water was very choppy. ___ stated that between 1730 and 1740, he looked back and he saw ___ still in the troop commander hatch on AAV 5. AAV 5 was moving slower but it was still moving. ___ stated that at approximately 1755 they were about 400 meters away from the USS SOMERSET and he estimated that they had to wait approximately 15 minutes for the stern gate to drop, the USS SOMERSET were conducting flight operations and he believed that the communications might have been “hot miked”. ___ stated at approximately 1755 Cpl Zubia told him that when ___ looked back he saw a November flag. ___ stated that this had been the first time that he had been in an AAV in the water. ___ stated that AAV 6 recovered aboard USS SOMERSET at 1803 and the waves were about 4 foot tall and the interval was about every 1 to 2 seconds. ___ stated that the training they received at the EOTG mechanized raid had a little bit of AAV familiarization; how to open some of the hatches, rear hatch, etc. During the Realistic Urban Training Package (RUT) they conducted land based training and land based troop transfer. *At this time, the investigating officer specifically asked “Do you think that was the first time that the personnel on track five had been in an AAV in the water?” ___ stated yes.*

I, ___ agree that this is a correct synopsis of the free and voluntary statements I made to ___ whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into
the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020.

Signatur

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Date 20200913

ENCLOSURE (90)
Summary of Second Interview

On Aug 5, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

On the day of the incident, the company got up at 0400. I think the AAV crews got up a little bit earlier so they could go down and prepare their vehicles for splashing. We had asked for a Surface Observation (SurOb) prior to starting the mission. Our plan was to get the SurOb from Recon Marines on the beach, but we were denied that because they were doing some other task on San Clemente Island.

I don’t know who made the decision to deny the SurOb, but I do know that we asked for it at the company level and it didn’t happen. That morning went up to the Ship’s Nav or somebody at the ship level and just asked them for a surf report for the splash and it was assessed as a sea state one.

After that, I went down to the tracks and participated in call away procedures which started at 0500. After that was done it then took about thirty minutes for everyone to get on the tracks and then we waited on the tracks. We were supposed to splash at 0700 but we did not actually get in the water until about 0800-0815. I am not sure why it took so long.

We finally get out there and were going to the beach on West Cove on San Clemente Island. In my opinion, the sea state was one, but it wasn’t anything that the track couldn’t handle. We got to the beach. We executed our raid and actions on the objective after which we heard that track twelve was down hard. My Track and Track 7 were going to pick up the Recon Marines and we saw that Track 12 couldn’t move.

We then waited for a while and ate some chow. At that point we went and linked up with the rest of the company down at West Cove. Once we got there, we were busy figuring out what was wrong with Track 12. Eventually we learned that something was wrong with one of the hubs, or something along those lines, and that it was completely down and that it couldn’t move.

The decision was then made that nine Tracks would go back to the ship as planned while four Tracks, including Track 12, would remain back on the island. This would allow the Tracks left on the island to travel back to the Ship in a section once Track 12 was fixed. and I went down to the beach to observe the sea state for probably an hour and a half to two hours.
and the sea state at the beach was glass. The ship was moving back and forth waiting for us to splash.

We made preparations for the four Tracks to stay on the beach and for the rest of to move back to the ship. We got the nine tracks lined up in preparation to splash back to the Ship. The order the Tracks were in was C-7 vehicle, the Pop, and then Track 10 down to Track 1. We then splash back into the water and get far enough out that we are given permission to open the hatches back up again. I remember that the further we got out, the rougher it got. However, it wasn't until we got six to seven hundred meters from the ship that it got pretty bad from sea state perspective. The intervals between waves were one to two seconds. The waves were around three and a half to four feet high and I just remember that every time we would come down a wave we would get hit with a lot of water.

Once we started to take waves the water started to come in the Track. The decision was then made to button up the hatches again. My comm helmet didn't work so my driver was yelling back to me to let me know what was going on. I got the message that Track 3 was taking on water and was going be towed back to the beach by Track 1.

Next I remember that we got to the stern gate and we followed the ship for what seemed like an eternity. We were behind the ship for probably twenty to thirty minutes while the stern gate was up. We saw helicopters coming and going so I'm sure they were doing flight operations at the time. I could also see that the ship was ballasted at the time due to the angle that it was sitting at.

As we were heading towards the ship, the C-7 and the Pop started to get pushed to the left of the ship by the current and Track 10 essentially by-passed those two vehicles so as not to lose momentum and got to the stern gate first. So the order the Tracks arrived at the Ship was Track 10, Track 8, Track 7, my Track (Track 6), and the C-7 and Pop got pushed over to the left of us.

So the stern gate finally came down, and once the stern gate came down we were at a comfortable pace and I kind of looked around and saw one of the other Troop Commanders come up from his hatch and so I wanted to get situational awareness on what was going on so I popped up out of my hatch as well. I looked around and I could still see all the tracks in a line and I saw that Track Five was around three to four hundred meters behind me. The C-7 and Pop vehicles were to the left of us trying to catch up at that point.

At that time, Track 10 recovered and then Track 8 recovered a few minutes later. Track 7 was in the process of recovering when my crew chief said that he could see a November flag. I turned and looked and I couldn't see anything when I turned around and we at that time we started to recover. I know from talking to people after the incident that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was waving the November flag and then would put it
down to give instructions, so I assume that is why I didn’t see him when I looked.

We get on the ship and pull into the well deck and we started to turn around so we can back up into our spot. I got off the Track because I knew at this point that Track 3 was in distress and was getting towed and that was the track I was worried about. I wasn’t aware at the time that Track 5 was in any distress because all of our comms were getting hot miked because of weather.

So I got off the track and I grabbed (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I told him that I needed to run to the Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC). I went upstairs to the LFOC to tell (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who was the Watch Officer at the time, about what was going on. I told him that Track Three was getting towed back by Track One the rest of the tracks are starting to recover. At that time he told me that I needed to get accountability of all the tracks because his understanding was that one track was getting towed and one was under water. This is when I first heard that one of the tracks was underwater.

I then ran back downstairs and was told that I needed to get back on the track and I told him that he needed to put the stern gate down now. I remember telling him that I had two tracks in distress and I needed to get them on the ship. I also spoke to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and told her the same thing. I found out after the fact that the stern gate was up because the ship was maneuvering to get in a better position to recover the tracks, but I did not know that at the time.

At this point the stern gate came down. I can't remember but I think it was the Pop that came the Ship next. That's when (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) came up to me and was visibly shaken. Then I saw (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and both of them were also visibly shaken. We then got everyone lined up because I was trying to get accountability so we can determine who is there and who is not. and that is when I saw the three Marines who were unconscious, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and one other Marine whose name I cannot remember. All the medical staff was there waiting for them so I started getting accountability. At some point I made the decision to move the company to the upper V because I did not want those Marines watching their friends get worked on. I went up to the upper V and we got accountability and determined who the missing Marines were. I then went back to the LFOC and we spent the evening there. Comm was very intermittent but I was trying to get with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to make sure he was aware of everything that was going on.

During the movement back to the ship we were wearing our flak jackets with front and back SAPI plates, but without the side SAPI plates in. We did a period of instruction with our crew chiefs the day before the exercise that covered rehearsals with opening all the hatches on the AAV, pulling the rip cord on the life vest with the CO2 cartridge that blows it up, and we did egress and evacuation drills. The whole company did the training together down in the well deck. It was done
collectively for the whole company. The training was run by the AAV section leaders.

The day prior to the exercise, we got a Warning Order dropped from the MEU and we immediately started our CAT I and CAT II planning process. The CO delivered the warning order to the platoon commanders so they could start preparing gear, and the trackers went down to the vehicles to get them ready. After receiving the order, most of the officers were up in the Ships jump room getting the confirmation brief ready. I was preparing the communications gear and other serialized gear that I knew we would need to take with us. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in the room as well preparing the big blue arrow type of details for the operation with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who was also preparing the surface movement from ship to shore. At around 1900 we went through the brief with all of the leadership present, to include the Battalion Commander, the Executive Officer, and OpsO. The MEU and ARG commanders attended via SVTC as well. This brief lasted about an hour due to some connectivity issues we were having with the SVTC.

Prior to this event, we had done some training with the AAVs that included concepts such as how to egress the vehicle, however that day was the first time that the Company had been in the AAVs in the water. We had done some drill such as troop transfer drills, but always on land. On the day of the incident, I wore my life preserver on top of my flak with the belt strapped around my waist.
On Aug 5, 2020, the investigative team spoke with [redacted] regarding his recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

The morning of the incident we got up at around 0300. I grabbed my stuff and went straight down to the berthing area. I knew that the mess hall was open early that morning so that guys could get chow, but I knew that most of them didn’t since they were splashing in an AAV for the first time. I went to the berthing area to check on the guys. I felt like I had to be a little bit more hands on with my leadership since all three of my squad leaders and my platoon sergeant were TAD to different courses. We had the guys getting their stuff ready, then went out to stage our gear. I remember going over a couple aspects of the plan with them. It had been a pretty late night, so I wanted to make sure that they understood everything.

I remember that when we got down to the AAVs we were staged according to the Track we would be riding on and when our Track got called we went over to our vehicle. Our gear had already been staged, so I was just hanging out in the Troop Commander’s hatch. I think most of the guys were just falling asleep at this point, there wasn’t much to see or do. I don’t remember where we were in the order of movement, but eventually we did splash. I think it was around 0730 when we finally splashed.

[redacted] was the driver of my vehicle. A few minutes after we splashed we opened up our hatches. I couldn’t get my hatch completely open, so I just left it partially open. I think it took us about 45 minutes to an hour to get to shore. Once we were on shore we got a short brief on how we were allowed to move around on the island in the vehicles. After about 30 minutes we pushed off from the beach toward the objective. There were about three to four tracks that came to our position. We were in a support by fire position to the south of the objective area. It took us about 30 minutes to get in position and then we were sitting there another 30-45 minutes.

Once we completed actions on the objective we started heading back to the beach. As we were heading back, one of the tracks broke down, so we held in position. I think it took around 2 hours to address the problems with the vehicle between trying to figure out what was wrong and then trying to coordinate getting the right parts from the ship. I mostly let the guys take a break while we waited.

At some point the decision was made to take all the tracks that were functional and go stage down by the beach. It was late morning to
early afternoon at this point. I think the company was trying to figure out who was going to stay back on the island and who was going to push to the ship. During this time, our driver and vehicle commander were checking the track. I know they kept saying something about the engine oil and that the driver kept checking the engine oil. They all got out and opened up the front of the vehicle. They called over a few of the other trackers to see if they could help with it, at some point they all hopped back in to stage for splashing back into the water. I remember that before I hopped back into my seat, I asked the vehicle commander if everything is good and he gave me the thumbs up. I also asked the driver if everything was ok and told him to take a minute if he needed to but he told me that everything was good.

Prior to entering the water I remember that someone was on top of our vehicle checking all the hatches. Eventually we splashed and the water was very calm for the first 15-20 minutes. We had opened up all of our hatches. Every so often a big enough wave would hit and get the driver wet, then there started to be waves that hit hard enough to get me wet. Mostly the waves were coming from the front at this point. Around the same time I started getting hit with waves and made the call to close the hatches back up.

At this time I wasn’t really too concerned. I was just trying to keep my eyes forward and was watching our progress through the vision blocks. I wasn’t wearing a CVC helmet. I had my Peltors helmet and was monitoring the company net. I was focused on coordinating with my adjacent elements and not talking to the AAV crew. I mainly talked to the driver if I needed to get information about what the AAV crew was doing and he would pass word to me as necessary.

I remember that the driver was becoming less collected at this time. I could hear him talking to and it seemed like he didn’t have control or may have been freaking out a little. I don’t recall specifically what he was saying, but I remember the tone of his voice and that he was expressing concern about the size of the waves.

I also remember that the rear crewman had come up to the driver at a certain point and was relaying information about the height of the water in the vehicle. At this time I remember that the rear crewman looked at me and asked “Where’s my Staff Sergeant?” This resonated with me because I thought it was odd and I began to notice that the crew was getting concerned. The rear crewman then went back into the rear of the vehicle and the driver continued to talk about how he wasn’t able to see. From my seat I could see the ship and could tell that it was still pretty far off. The driver didn’t seem like he could tell what direction he was headed in relation to the ship. The vehicle commander was trying to help talk the driver onto the ship.

At some point the rear crewman came up again and asked the same question, “where’s my Staff Sergeant?” I told him that he was still
in the turret. I could tell that he was freaking out still. I told him, “it’s alright, just calm down, we’re going to make it back to the ship, just do me a favor and take a deep breath.” He was talking about the water height and seemed even more concerned. I wasn’t sure if it was even my call to make as far as what to do about this concern, but I knew that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was aware of it at this point. I remember looking over to him through my closed hatch and could see him up waving the flag. By the time I realized that the decision to get out of the vehicle should be made, he was already up waving the flag.

I could see that we were still a good ways away from the ship at this time. I could also see that one of the Tracks had seen (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) waving the flag and had turned around to help. Once the vehicle was close enough, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) made the call to open our hatches. By the time I opened my hatch the cargo hatch was already open. I remember standing up and seeing that all of the other hatches were open. I saw that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had already made it out onto the top of the vehicle. I’m not sure if he was the first one up, he may have just been the first one I saw. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was still on top of the vehicle at this point. He and the rear crewman were both by the cargo hatch trying to coordinate getting the rest of the guys out through that hatch. I remember that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) seemed to be having difficulty processing what was going on, I was trying to get his attention to orient him onto the Track that had pulled up next to us. I was trying to point him to that Track when a wave hit and washed us into the water. When that happened I was standing right next to the Troop Commander’s hatch.

The last I remember seeing (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was when he was by the cargo hatch. The last I remember (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) he was still in the driver’s seat trying to drive the vehicle. I had my life preserver pulled and I had already dropped my flak when I stood up on top of the vehicle, I still had my Kevlar on though. The wave swept me into the water and I ended up in the water about 10 feet from the other vehicle with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) fairly close to me. I then started helping (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) get over to the other vehicle.

The next time I looked back toward Track 5 was when I had gotten on top of the other vehicle with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). I looked back expecting to see more of my guys and that is when I noticed that I couldn’t see Track 5 anymore. I did not see anyone else get out of the vehicle. There were a lot of guys on top of the other Track who were yelling at me to get on board and to get down through the cargo hatch because they were concerned about the water getting into their vehicle. We sat there for 5 or 10 minutes. I was trying to help calm (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) down, but I was also trying to process everything. The vehicle was taking on water, but it was still filtering it out. At some point the vehicle started to make its way forward again. I don’t remember how
much time it took us to get back onto the ship, but I remember I was one of the last guys to get out of the vehicle. The only people who made it into the other Track with me from my platoon were (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

From what I can remember Track 5 started to make weird noises at some point after we closed all the hatches. I don’t know if (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was flooring it and it just wasn’t responding or what was going on. The vehicle was still moving forward until just before it sank. I also remember that the other vehicle that came up to help us did come close enough that it made contact with us on our starboard side. This is the same vehicle that I swam to after I was swept off.

I have been the platoon commander since Apr 3, which was right after I came from IOC. This was my first time in an AAV in the water. I was briefed on how to use the life vest when I went through Underwater Egress Training. I don’t know if all of my Marines went through this training, but I know that a number of them did. I was able to get some of my guys through a UET training event during a one week period that the company had locked on, but then we were told that the MEU didn’t require the dunker, so that became less of a focus of effort for us since it was not a MEU requirement. On the day of the incident, no one briefed us on how to use the life vest. No one gave me a troop embark brief that day prior to getting on the vehicle, but I don’t know if everyone else did or not. I went out that day with my main pack. From what I remember, the packs were staged up near where I was sitting in the Troop Commander’s hatch, up against the bulkhead.
Summary of Second Interview

On Aug 11, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

During the incident I had my front and back SAPIs on. My life vest was worn over top of my flak. I never received a formal embark troop brief before the incident. The day prior my Marines had participated in some egress drills, but I was tied up in a planning meeting so I'm not completely sure what they were trained on. This was my first time in an AAV in the water. We had done some land based training as a unit prior to this incident. To get on board the Ship we loaded up via the pier in San Diego.

During the incident, from what I remember hatch remained closed. Once I opened my hatch I stood up on my seat. I remember interacting with I remember that was on top of the vehicle and so was I don't remember if was on top of the vehicle when a wave came and knocked me off.

During the incident, I first became aware that water was getting into the vehicle when I realized that water was splashing around as the vehicle rocked back and forth. From the time I became aware of the water in the vehicle to when I got swept off I think about 10 to 30 minutes had passed. I know that was telling that water was getting into the vehicle.

I was pulled out of the water and onto the NOTM vehicle. I don't know who else got on that vehicle other than that I remember seeing in the vehicle with me. I remember hearing telling people to take their gear off. He was shouting down to the guys in the back through the cargo hatch.
SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent of this form is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately recorded.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
CAMP PENDLETON, CA, 3D AABN, BNMAINT

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
2020-09-03

3. TIME
1100

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

6. SSN
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

7. GRAD/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
3D ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN BATTALION, HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY

9. I, __ (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN YOUR STATEMENT:

1. DID YOU KNOW THAT 12 OF 14 AAVS WERE DEADLINED WHEN THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON JOINED THE 15TH MEU?
A. IF YOU KNEW THAT, WHAT STEPS DID YOU TAKE TO CORRECT THIS?
B. IF YOU DID NOT KNOW, PLEASE STATE WHY THIS INFORMATION DID NOT GET TO YOUR ATTENTION.

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

PAGE L OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _______ PAGE _______ DATED _______."
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR INITIAlS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998
DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 IS OBSOLETE
USAPA V1.00

Scanned with CamScanner
STATEMENT (Continued)

-Yes, it was brought to my attention that the IMEF inspection team noted that 12 of the 13 (14th AAV was not identified to fulfill NOTM requirements at this point) AAVs were deadline or degraded to some extent during the week of the "pre-CHOP inspection" which started on 20200414. However, The battalion would NOT release these assets until readiness was addressed and we did just that.

-Timeline of events from my perspective are as follows and supported by documentation in form of Battalion Material Readiness Briefs (MRB) provided by the Maintenance Management Office (MNO) section and email discussions with battalion staff.

-On April 9th, 2020 the battalion took part in our bi-weekly MRB where readiness by section and commodity are reviewed and scrutinized. On this date which was 2 working days before the IMEF inspection was to start(3). (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

-The battalion would NOT release these assets until readiness was addressed and we did just that.

-On April 9th, 2020 the IMEF inspection began. Prior to their arrival I assigned our brightest and strongest SNCO MOS 2141 to head the AAV inspection for the IMEF team. He was hand selected due to his excellence AAV maintenance and attention to detail. I was fully prepared to have results similar to what we are discussing today. The CHOP Inspection in my experiences have yielded similar results such as these in the past. I planned for this and walked the battalion through the re-gain health process.

-On April 21st, 2020 I created and email for the battalion key leadership (S3 XO, S3, S4) explaining the situation we were handed by the IMEF inspection team. In that email I line out all of the events leading up to the inspection and a plan to ensure health is achieved. The information in the email was collected by having a snap-to discussion with the 15th MEU Platoon Commander, Platoon Sergeant and Platoon Maintenance Chief in my office. In attendance was the releasing Responsible Officer(2), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). Shortly after this in-person discussion he and I called (S4). After this discussion I called the Battalion Commander(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to discuss a pathway forward and scheduled a follow-up meeting the next morning with him. Facts provided to the staff were:

-Acceptance of tractors (H&S and 11th MEU) took place 2.5-3 weeks ago based on platoon leadership.

-MRB readiness for H&S Co AAVP7s is 87% (4 of 31 deadline are from GS) on 20200408. MRB readiness for 15th MEU is 92% (1 of 13 deadline) on 20200408. 11th MEU (RO unknown transferred (6) AAVP7s to 15th MEU. H&S Co (RO). (b)(6), (b) GS: Platoon transferred (6) AAVP7s and (1) AAVC7 to 15th MEU. NO JLTI was conducted to gain these tractors from H&S and to the 15th MEU. Native Fury returns to CONUS 20200328. ROM till 20200413. IMEF BLT CHOP inspection begins 20200414. 12 of 13 AAVs identified by inspection team as deadline. Listing of discrepancies will need to be validated. 15th MEU AAV Platoon next operation 20200503.

-Steps tied to this issue came in form of this narrative in the same email. "At this time the 15th MEU and myself will need till 1200 tomorrow (April 22nd) to make a sound maintenance decision. The tractors are not going to be virtually transferred until a substantial change in readiness is achieved. All funding for repairs will remain our responsibility until an acceptance agreement is attained. In speaking with the Maintenance Chief, he is planning on having a significant increase in readiness over the next 24 hours. I have ensured three available mechanics (2141s) to assist in his validation and Corrective Maintenance efforts indefinitely. The engineer section has a list of discrepancies to validate and begin working immediately. No major (e.g. power plant removal) maintenance is expected at this time. Maintenance runs should be conducted immediately to validate quality control. Daily hot washes will be conducted for the remainder of the week with my RAMPCOO (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)."

-The decision to field MODs on RCCA only platforms has created an environment that has inhibited our ability to provide the best assets in the battelfield. We were asked by the SNCO today if his decision to NOT put RCCAs on MEUs in order to assist in the MODs fielding was appropriation or not. The battalion has discussed this at length over the last few months and I would ask that we all shape the messaging together. It is getting hard to find comparable assets to a RCCA tractor in the battalion at this point. The RCCA production line has been producing tractors for over two years now. You can see the issues at hand when locating a legacy ROAN tractor for the MEU; they are all too old and worn out by now. If anybody has a more definitive response to this question, I am all ears."

-On April 23rd, 2020 the battalion took part in our bi-weekly MRB where readiness was discussed. On this date which was 3 working days after the IMEF inspection ended(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was accompanied by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and reported an AAV readiness of 54% with only 6 of 13 AAVs being deadline. During this brief it was discussed extensively if the Marines of the 15th MEU had everything they needed in order for them to execute the next operation that started to begin 20200503. I remember there being no issue to meeting this timeline and we moved on to the next topic for the meeting.

-On April 29th, 2020 the S3 Officer(3)(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) put together an extensive email describing the level of operations the 15th MEU had completed up to this point. The amount of operations was telling to the command that this platoon had operated AAVs extensively and maintenance/supply support was extensive and ultimately accomplished the require training up to this point despite "readiness concerns."

-On May 7th, 2020 the battalion took part in another MRB where readiness was discussed. On this date, which was thirteen work days after the inspection ended(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) reported a readiness of 100% with zero AAVs deadline. The Platoon Staff was not present for this MRB due to them being in the field operating with BLT 1/4 with ALL of their AAVs. During this meeting it was discussed with supply that it was now time for the platoon to formally "CHOP" to the MEU. The agreement we had as a battalion was to ensure the 15th MEU AAV platoon had fully operational AAVs before releasing the EATO transfer in GCSS-MC. We met this requirement and subsequently executed the transfer.

-To better answer the original question, when the AAVs joined the 15th MEU during the discussion at the MRB dated 20200507, none of them were deadline and were considered operational to the best of my knowledge. I cannot fully expect that I am provided all the details all the time and I am forced to make decisions with the information I have received. I am confident that this AAV platoon received the very best gearset and maintenance support we could have provided at the time.
During the period discussed above, there were next to zero major defects noted and repairs completed to the best of my knowledge. The majority of the discrepancies brought to my attention were resolved in fairly quick terms. While the maintenance actions were being addressed, Quality Control was done simultaneously in form of maintenance runs conducted by 15th MEU and Battalion Maintenance Marines. For a few weeks there were extensive maintenance actions conducted by 15th MEU AAV Marines as well as Marines from my Platoon, Battalion Maintenance. To ensure that each AAV received the appropriate attention, weekly discussions about readiness was had with either myself or (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c).

**AFFADAVIT**

I, ______________ (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ___________________________________, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE __________. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this day of __________, at __________.

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority to Administer Oath)
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: ____________________________
Activity: __________________________ Unit: 3d AABn
Telephone number __________________________

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: Possible negligence and possible dereliction of duty and that:

[✓] I have the right to remain silent.
[✓] Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
[✓] I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
[✓] I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
[✓] I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

[✓] I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

[✓] I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
[✓] I expressly desire to make a statement.
[✓] I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
[✓] I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
[✓] This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used on me.

(Witness signature/date)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Understanding my rights under Article 31, UCMJ, I wish to make the following statement:

Please refer to DA Form 2523 for statement.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
I WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was on board the barge used to recover an amphibious assault vehicle on 7 August, 2020. My task was to document the AAV with still imagery prior to any modifications. This statement will serve to identify changes from the ocean floor to when I took photos of the AAV.

First, I know the underwater drone had to remove a rope from the top rear of the AAV. This also caused some scrapes on the top rear where the rope was kept (Slides 33-35). I also was told that antennas were bent by the arm of the drone while it was attaching hoists to the AAV.

At approximately 1430 on 7 August, the AAV breached the service and it took approximately 30-40 minutes to be set down on the barge. Recovery personnel moved quickly to remove the hoists connected. I believe that this caused a piece to be bent. AAV Marines call this piece the "mushroom" on the top front of the AAV. From where I was standing, it looked to be up and unbent when the AAV surfaced (Slide 6).

In an effort to prevent further fuel and oil leaks and spills, the salvage sailors removed a fuel can from the forward most hatch (Slide 38).

The last modification made was opening of the rear hatch to allow remaining water to expel. I was able to take photos before they moved the hatch handle (Slides 12-16).

The only other information I can provide that is not resident in the imagery is that some MRE items came out and floated away as the AAV was initially surfacing.
**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent of this form is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2801; E.O. 9397 Dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)</td>
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<tr>
<th>PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:</th>
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<tr>
<td>To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately recorded.</td>
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<tr>
<th>ROUTINE USES:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.</td>
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<tr>
<th>DISCLOSURE:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **LOCATION**
   - II MEF G4 MRB, CAMP LEJEUNE NC

2. **DATE (YYYYMMDD)**
   - 2020-09-09

3. **TIME**
   - 1400

4. **FILE NUMBER**
   - (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

5. **LAST NAME**
   - (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

6. **FIRST NAME**
   - (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

7. **MIDDLE NAME**
   - (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

8. **SSN**

9. **GRAD/STAFF**
   - (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

10. **ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS**
    - II MEF CE G4 MRB, BLDG H-1 JULIAN C. SMITH ST CAMP LEJEUNE NC

11. **FILE NUMBER**
    - (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

**WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:**

**PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN YOUR STATEMENT:**

1. **DID YOU KNOW THAT 12 OF 14 AAVS WERE DEADLINED WHEN THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON JOINED THE 15TH MEU?**
   - **A. IF YOU KNEW THAT, WHAT STEPS DID YOU TAKE TO CORRECT THIS?**
   - **B. IF YOU DID NOT KNOW, PLEASE STATE WHY THIS INFORMATION DID NOT GET TO YOUR ATTENTION.**

   **I DID NOT KNOW THAT 12 OF 14 AAVS WERE DEADLINE WHEN THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON JOINED THE 15TH MEU.**

   **TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AT NO POINT WERE THERE 12 KNOWN DEADLINE VEHICLES.**

   **I DID KNOW THAT THEY WERE EXPERIENCING SIGNIFICANT ISSUES WITH THREE P7'S BUT THOSE VEHICLES WERE EXCHANGED FOR DIFFERENT VEHICLES WITHIN H&S COMPANY.**
9. STATEMENT (Continued)
TAKEN AT 11 MEF G4
DATED 2020909

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

0. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFADAVIT

I, __________________________________, have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on page 1, and ends on page 3. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me. The statement is true. I have initialed all corrections and have initialed the bottom of each page containing the statement. I have made this statement freely without hope of benefit or reward, without threat of punishment, and without coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement.

________________________________________________________
(Signature of Person Making the Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ______ day of ______, 20___ at ______.

________________________________________________________
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

WITNESSES:

________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

PAGE 9, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998
Battalion XO directed the H&S CO to exchange those three vehicles from within H&S Co.

From that point forward the 15th MEU vehicle situation seemed to stabilize. The Maintenance Chief did struggle receiving support from the Intermediate Maintenance Activity section from the BLT 15. The BMO and I talked about it and he contacted CLB 15 IOT express his concerns with support. According to the Maintenance Chief the IMA section did begin to show up but it was very selective. Lastly, the Enterprise Automated Transfer Organization, EATO process seemed to be poorly executed. Service Request (SR) were closed via 3D AAV BN supply before the transfer, creating reporting issues and the inability to order parts and conduct the appropriate Secondary Repairable (SecRep) exchange. In turn causing vehicles to be deadline and or degraded longer than normal. The morning of 31 July was my last day at 3d AAV Bn. to the best of my knowledge, on that day, the EATO still had not been executed.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

[Signature]

Date

Witness Signature

Date

ENCLOSURE
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Narr: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Rank/Rate: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Activity: Ground Ordnance Chief
Unit: II MEF MRB G4
Telephone numb: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: Possible negligence and possible dereliction of duty and that:

[X] I have the right to remain silent.
[X] Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
[X] I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
[X] I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
[X] I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

[X] I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:
[X] I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
[X] I expressly desire to make a statement.
[X] I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
[X] I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
[X] This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

LD200909
(Witness signature/date)
Understanding my rights under Article 31, UCMJ, I wish to make the following statement:

In my opinion this situation went south beginning with the Battalion Reorganization (ReOgr) Plan. The original plan was for the forming 15th MEU to fall in on the returning 13th MEU's vehicles and equipment. However, during the process the decision was made to reorganize the Battalion's equipment and personnel. The 13th MEU's vehicles were transferred to Co A and the 15th MEU staff was directed to pull the best vehicles from the Admin Deadline Lot (ADL) and H&S Company. To the best of my knowledge, this plan and decision was conducted without input from the Battalion's Maintenance Officer (BMO) nor Chief (BMC). Upon finding out via the 15th MEU Maintenance Chief, I asked the BMO if he knew about it and he said no. I asked the Operation Officer why the drastic change (13th MEU Vehicles to Co A) and he informed me about the decision to ReOgr the Battalion. Historically, the MEU platoons have always received the best vehicles or vehicles known to perform well, i.e., Return to Condition Code Alpha (RCCA) or the latest vehicles to arrive to the Battalion. In this instance, the MEU personnel didn't have a choice. The Platoon Commander, Platoon Sergeant, and Maintenance Chief voiced their concerns to me. I told them, just like them, I had no say or authority in that decision. I did express to them that I vehemently disagreed with the Battalion's Reorganization Plan and that it didn't make any sense to drastically ReOgr the Battalion. The Battalion didn't have the manpower to support the ReOgr, hence the need of the Admin Deadline Lot. As the 15th MEU began to train on the vehicles, they experienced more than normal repairs. I assume that was because the vehicles from the ADL had not been operating (minus quarterly start up) for nearly a year. They were experiencing significant issues with three P7's, so the BMO and I surged support to them in order to (IOT) to get them operational. Due to the operational tempo, the
Summary of Interview

On Aug 20, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

Once we landed on the beach that day everything looked good. My vehicle was Track 12 and it blew a hub, so there was a lot of time spent trying to decide how to fix the Track. There was a discussion among the leadership on what to do. It had become evident at that time that Track 12 would not be able to go back into the water. We consolidated all the vehicles back onto the beach head where we discussed what to do. My job as the 1stSgt is to have 100% accountability of all personnel and equipment at all time. So I felt it was my responsibility to be the last guy off of that island. As the senior enlisted advisor it is incumbent on me to ensure that my Marines are good to go and I don’t leave any Marines on any training site that we go to. I don’t know if I discussed this with anyone, I think it is just generally implied that anytime I go out to the field I’m going to be the last guy to get on the vehicle.

The Company Commander wanted to be down there as well. He wanted to be sure that we saw all the motions and did not want to be away from any potential friction points. We did not anticipate that Track 5 would go through what it ultimately went through. We had the Company Gunnery Sergeant back on the ship and I felt that he had the ability to see things through.

There was no concern that the Company Commander, Company First Sergeant, AAV Platoon Commander and AAV Platoon Sergeant, who was the most experienced AAV crewman were all staying back. This was not a comfort based decision to keep Marines back, it probably caused discomfort to the individuals that stayed back. There were three fully capable SNCO's that were out in the water for the Trackers. They had a lot of good leadership out on the water with them.

I don’t recall why the decision was made to send the Tracks back with people on them. There was no reason at that time to question that decision. There was no pressure to send vehicles back, it was more a matter of getting the guys an opportunity to get back on ship with good food and get out of the sun.

This was our first time outside of the Underwater Egress Trainer that we had gotten any training with the Tracks in the water. Before that we had only trained on land. This was our first time being in the AAV in the water. I was confident in the training that had been available
to us. I do feel like we had adequate training, but this was my first time operating with the AAVs.

I know that there was a training accident with the AAVs, but I wasn’t there and don’t know exactly what took place. I know that the Marines got briefed on the AAVs prior to heading out that morning. I think that water at the boot top level is when you notify the AAV Rear Crewman and he would relay that information to the vehicle commander.

The day prior to the incident I had gone down to the well deck to talk to the Marines and to see how they were doing. I don’t remember who specifically I interacted with but I wanted to make that the area was squared away. The days leading up to that event are foggy though.

I got an embark troop brief the morning of the incident. From what I heard from every Marine went and got an embark troop brief after having gone through the accountability process. I got instruction on how to use the life vest as well. I was told that all the Marines got this explanation as well.
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS WITH CLEANSING WARNING

I have been advised that I am suspected of violating the following Articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice:

I have been advised that:

I have the right to remain silent.
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial or other administrative or disciplinary proceeding.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.

This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

I understand that the statement I made previously to ______________ is not admissible at court martial and cannot be used against me, and that I can still remain silent now if I want to.

______________________________

(Witness signature/date)

Understanding my rights under U.C.M.J. Article 31, I wish to make the statement attached on the following pages.

ENCLOSURE
Synopsis of Interview conducted on 3 August 2020 with USMC, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 Communications Chief.

The investigating officer began the investigation without reason to believe that gross negligence or a violation of the UCMJ had been the cause of the sinking. All initial statements were taken without article 31 rights advisements or waivers.

Upon arriving on USS SOMERSET, the investigating team set up Commander of Troops office.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he had video from his camera phone of launch at West Cove and then approximately 10 to 15 minutes prior to the AAV sinking.

(Separate note: the investigating team recovered that video and it is part of the investigation.)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that this was the first time he had travelled in an AAV and had been excited that is the reason he had video recorded the event. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was traveling in the troop commander’s position on the C7 AAV. He began his story about 30 minutes into the movement from West Cove to USS SOMERSET. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that the seas seem to get worse as the moved out from San Clemente Island. As they were getting closer to the ship the seas seemed to be getting worse. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) estimated that his AAV was 30 yards in front of AAV 5. He remembered hearing that a vehicle was taking in water and telling (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that he saw someone waving a flag. He started relaying what he was seeing down to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and that the NOTM P7 was closer and they were near the vehicle when it sank. He and had gotten onto the top of their C7 AAV. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that came up and he got into the water and pulled , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) onto the C6, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had blood in his nose and he immediately started to conduct CPR on him, he was breathing and got a heartbeat. Then came up and the XO jumped in to get (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Shortly thereafter, the Navy RHIB came in and took (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) back to the ship. They continued looking around for survivors but did not see anything. But then the got back into the vehicles and moved back and recovered onto USS SOMERSET.

:recommended we interview the following personnel:

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), agree that this is a correct synopsis of the free and voluntary statements I made to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) whom
I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 20 July 2020.

Signature_ (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) _____ Date_ 2009____
First Statement (15 Aug 2020)

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

I, __________________________ whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me.

The date was 27 July. We came out of the Rain Room to go to the ship. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the last one on, so he was mainly in charge of doing all the splash team checks. He went from my vehicle, which was Track 12, all the way down to Track 1. I recall that splash time was 1200. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had gotten comm with the ship about an hour before hand. He had to walk out onto the jetty wall to get comm with a man pack, we couldn’t see the ship from where we were. We planned to swim for about an hour and recover at 1300.

I don’t remember who helped (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) do the splash team checks. My SOP for the splash team checks and the pre-ops is to have the section leaders keep the check list for the pre-ops. What we do is have the vehicles shut off and we check the hull plugs to make sure they are good. Then we fire up the vehicle and check it from the top to make sure the plenums are good and the indicators are up. I check the bilge pumps in the front and the cargo hatches and the bilge pumps in the back. Typically my assistant will check the bow plane, the back hatch, and the buckets. From what I saw that day, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was running through this process with two Marines.

When we splashed, I was in the first vehicle out. We had solid comm with the vehicles behind me, we had no issues heading out to the ship. Once I got beyond the jetty one of my port side lateral drive shafts broke so we pushed forward in water tracks. At that point, I had visual with the ship and comm on Boat Alpha. I did not see a safety boat but (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) called out on comm that the safety boat came up next to him during the movement, and we had also been briefed prior to splashing that there would be one.

I think we recovered onto the ship at around 1315. Comm was sporadic with the ship for a while. I would get a radio check from them on Boat A but would not get a response from them for quite some time(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) could get sporadic radio checks with them on Boat B. The ship was not maintaining comm on Boat A as briefed so the Lt and I were switching back and forth in an attempt to get solid, consistent communications with them. By what it sounded like over the radio the ship would get a radio check on either Boat A or Boat B but did not maintain communications with us right after. There was no consistent
comm with the ship during the majority of our movement to the ship. By the time we established a good two way conversation with them was about 10 minutes before we recovered. The ship initially suggested that we do some gator squares while they did some flight operations, but I let them know what we had some vehicles that were moving in water tracks. I told them that these vehicles we would follow close behind the ship until it was time to go green well. The vehicles that were not in water tracks conducted gator squares.

Eventually we got all the vehicles onto the ship. After that, we did our after ops. We kept the guns mounted and just cleaned them in place. After that we got situated in our berthing and secured our small arms and remaining serialized gear in the armories.

The next day we went through our vehicles again. Track 14 was getting worked on for the issue it was having with its buckets, and Track 11 was worked on for a broken actuating arm. Track 12 had replaced the broken lateral drive shaft. Track 9 was having issues with its transducer and its ability to read water temperature. The day after that was when we determined that it wasn't the transducer that was malfunctioning, but that it was actually the digital display module (DDM). Track 9 would need this replaced to be operational as an inability to read water temperature is dead-lining.

The 29th was when we were doing prep for going out the next day. We didn't know exactly what our timeline was so we were just trying to get ready. We got the confirmation brief that evening and gave that to the Marines and did MACO drills. We had all our section leaders above go up top to get the confirmation briefs.

After the pre-ops were done on the 29th, we had the section leaders get with their respective infantry Platoon Sergeants and they did emergency exit drills. The section leaders were in charge of this training. I was only present for the beginning of the training as I had a meeting to attend. I don't recall what gear they had with them at the time, but I think they were probably slick for the training.

We did pre-ops that day around 1300. I saw the section leaders looking over the pre operational checklists, but I don't know if they retained them or not. We did the MACO drills that night and then passed the word that reveille would be at 0300. I got in bed at around 2300 that night.

The next morning, reveille was at 0300. The Marines made their way down to the vehicles at 0330, and at 0400 they were supposed to be conducting their pre-ops and checking out their vehicles. Combat Cargo was supposed to be there at 0400 to help us un-gripe the vehicles but they didn't show up on time so we un-griped ourselves. Chow was supposed to start at 0400, and I believe there was a plan in
place to get Marines to chow. I know I saw some Marines go up to get chow, but I'm not sure that everyone got chow that morning.

At 0600 we did call-away procedures. It started out with the AAV Platoon first to make sure that everyone was present and then they went down to their vehicles and the crew chiefs stayed with me and the 1stSgt. We then did one Track at a time after that.

Prior to doing the call-away procedures, I did my pre-splash checks of the hull nacules before the vehicles started up with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Around that time I reminded the crew chiefs to do embark troop briefs before they loaded up. I can't confirm whether the section leaders collected their pre-ops checklists. I didn't collect any of the pre-ops. The section leaders have it and if they have any issues they come to me. I think I saw (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) with more than one so I assume he probably had his sections with him.

The splash team checks were conducted in the upper V where the vehicles were stowed. I didn't want to impede the timeline, so I started the running checks as soon as the vehicles were loaded up and all the hatches were shut. I started with Track 1 and worked my way all the way through. The only Track that didn't get a check was Track 9 because it wasn't going out.

At that point, about halfway through the splash team checks was when they started heading down towards the well deck. I finished all the way up to my vehicle and got on. There were about four to five vehicles still in the upper V at that point in time. So I got on comm and started seeing what the word was.

The original splash time was supposed to be 0700, but it was around 0740 by the time I got in my vehicle and I think the actual splash time was 0745 by the time we splashed.

I did go to the flight deck with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to get a sea state assessment prior to MACO. I think it was more than a sea state one, but it was also definitely less than a four. I think it was probably a sea state two. Once I actually got in the water I think it was actually more of a sea state three. It was nothing too crazy though.

There were no big issues coming in. Track 14 slowed down in the kelp bed but they made it out fine. It was about a 30 minute swim before we got on the beach, maybe a little more.

We paused a little bit on the beach to prepare for land operations. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) were also trying to figure out what was going on with a van that was supposed to be escorting us through the training areas. We then went to the objective. Third section stayed back in the vicinity of the landing beach site to establish a blocking position along with C-section. The objective was about 8 or 9 kilometers away. During the actions on the objectives some of the
ADR guys showed up and told us that they needed a ride and to adjust the pick-point as it had changed from what was briefed.

Around that time I had my rear crewman check out the vehicle and that’s when we discovered that the starboard number two road wheel hub had blown. We then started looking for parts. We tried to see if any of the other vehicles had spare parts but they didn’t. At that point we started talking to the ship to see if we could locate and acquire the parts. Prior to that, when we were on the ship, we found out that the reason CLB wasn’t getting back to us on the 9 Block was that it was almost nonexistent. We had been trying to work with her to get the DDM for the downed Track but her main answer was that she was there to support CLB and couldn’t release those parts to us. She said that she had to wait until she got confirmation from her Lieutenant who was on the MKI.

We passed our requests up and it took several hours for us to get the answer that the parts weren’t coming. We were initially told that there were some parts in an LCAC that were going to be dropped off. I think that around 1430 to 1500 was when we were told that our parts weren’t coming and that we needed to splash that afternoon or we would have to wait until the next day. I made my way to the beach on Track 4.

Once we got to the beach we found out that there was no parts on the LCAC and that we would have to splash back that afternoon. I talked to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and asked if the vehicles were good and if they were ready to go and he said yes. At that point I was getting accountability of the Marines that were going to ship with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

At that point we had already determined that we were going to keep four vehicles back. I recommended to the Lieutenant that at least Track 11 should stay since it didn’t have any packs on it. It sounded like the main goal was to get as many packs back on the ship that evening as possible. I know that the Lieutenant likes to be the last one out of the field. I think the CO may have wanted him to stay out in the field too because if any of the Marines were in the field he wanted to be out there too.

I then went down to the beach where (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was finishing his SUROB. I helped to make sure that it was being done right and assisted in the final calculations. We assessed the SUROB to be a 2.1 and the sea state was a one from.

After that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) immediately started doing splash team checks on his vehicles. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) vehicles were already parked and staged and he was already going through the sequence of splash team checks for his vehicles. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was pulling up behind him and was starting to do his as well. I asked (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) why he hadn’t done
his splash team checks prior to doing the SUROB since that would have saved some time. He finished his splash check shortly after that.

After that I went vehicle by vehicle with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to verify the counts. During that time they were finishing their splash team checks by section and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was trying to get comms with the ship. When we first started calling, we couldn’t see the ship yet. The ship wasn’t responding for about 15 minutes or so. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) finally got comms with them and I had him verify if they were ready for us to splash. He then gave me a thumbs up and said they were ready to splash. I was the one who actually guided the Tracks into the water.

Prior to splashing, I asked the section leaders if the splash checks were good. I saw (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) doing it, so I then checked with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who was sitting in his turret. I asked him if the splash team checks were good and he gave me a thumbs up. I think (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) collected the pre-ops checklist. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) kept his. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had the rest of them. After the incident, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) told me that he had collected them and that he had them in the vehicle, but he could not find them.

After we splashed the vehicles, I left Track 11 on the beach to act as a safety vehicle in case we needed to recover anyone close to shore. I monitored the comm on the movement of the tracks to the ship on track 11 from the TC hatch. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was on the comm in the turret of that vehicle. Everything seemed fine, the ship was coming towards us either shortly after they splashed or right after. I think that it got around 3 KM away from the beach before it went to its portside and started heading north. I was monitoring comms and could hear (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) briefing the Platoon that the ship was in flight quarters and could not recover AAVs.

The ship came back around towards the AAVS and did a J-turn, but it was moving pretty quick. I could hear (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) switch over basically carrying on a conversation making sure everyone in the Platoon was good. Then I could hear that he was off the net for a little while so I assume he was talking to the ship. After that he came back on the Platoon Tac, and that’s when he said the ship was refueling aircraft and would not be able to recover AAVs during this time.

At that point they were far enough away that we could barely see them. That was when (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said that he was going to have to tow track two. He said that they had lost comm because they were using the November flag. He said that their engine was not running and that they were going to hook for tow. I asked him where they were going to tow them to. I thought the nearest safe haven was going to be the ship, but (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said something about not being able to get good comm with the ship and that they would head back to the beach.
It was about that time that we heard Track 5 call out saying that “I might have to do a troop to troop transfer.” At that point I knew that comm was fading so we had to move to a better location. So I had (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) start the vehicle and we moved down the beach a little bit to a cliff area. We could see the ship, but had difficulty seeing the AAVs due to the distance. We were about halfway there when the Lieutenant relayed to me that track 5 had water at the deck plate level. He was going back and forth between the Platoon Tac and the ship, I was staying mainly maintaining comm on the Platoon Tac.

They were not responding on comm at that point. We could hear conversations between Track 14 and Track 1. By the time we got onto the cliff, I could see (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) coming back, but I couldn’t see the rest of the Tracks heading out.

I remember that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was getting recovered basically right around the time that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said that he might need to do a troop to troop transfer. I think that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was recovered by the ship before (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) called out that he had water at the deck plate level, but I’m not sure.

From what I recall, we heard (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) say “I think I may need to do a troop to troop transfer” while we were still stationary on the beach. We then started moving and then while we were driving I heard that there was water at the deck plate.

At the cliff we were trying to get a visual of the AAVs, but we couldn’t really see them and comm was intermittent. Track 5 called out once, I could tell it was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) he said “Papa Sierra...” and then he cut out. Track 14 was the one we had the best comm with at that time and I was asking him where Track 5 was. I know that the last we heard, Track 5 might need a troop to troop transfer and might have rising water levels. Track 14 said that he couldn’t see him, and that he was getting closer to the ship. I told him that he was the only one I had comm with and that he should go find Track 5. From the radio conversation I heard, it sounded like Track 14 then took the C7 with him and finally found Track 5.

At that point Track 14 called back and said they were about 35 meters from Track 5 and that they were going to do a troop to troop transfer. After that I didn’t get comm with Track 14 again. About 10 to 15 minutes later we got comm with the C7 and they were already making their way back to the ship.

The Lieutenant was the one who heard through Boat Alpha that Track 5 had sank. I think that 10 to 15 minutes passed between when I heard (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) say that they might need to do a troop to troop transfer and when I heard from the Lieutenant that Track 5 had sank. I’m not sure exactly who told the Lieutenant that Track 5 had sank but I believe it was passed on the ship tac.
After that, once I got comm with the C7 I was trying to figure out if there was a complete troop to troop transfer. I could tell by the responses I was getting that the person I was talking to was pretty shook up. He said something like "conducted a troop to troop transfer." I asked what his position was and he said that he was right behind the ship. Right before they recovered I asked him where Track 14 was and he said that they were right behind them. Confirmed with the ship that Track 14 was recovered since I could not get the vehicle on platoon tac.

Tracks 1 and 2 had just made it back to the beach at that point and we were mainly trying to get accountability and trying to get comm with the ship. It was very difficult to get comm with the ship. We tried to use the LCAC, but even they were having a hard time. We ended up mainly relying on SATCOM. The big thing at that point was accountability. We made a byname roster of everyone who was on the island with us.

We were wearing SAPI plates that day. Front and back, no side SAPIs.

The command climate and communication between the AAV Platoon and Bravo Co was always very good. They did want to push the timeline that day, but we kept it as slow as we could to keep things safe. I don’t feel like they ever pushed so hard that day that they were going to create an unsafe condition.

I think there may have been some friction on the officer side during the planning phase. From what I had heard the S-3A may have been pushing some things that didn’t make sense.

The Lieutenant did bring up the night prior that there was no SUROB and that there was no plan for an accurate SUROB since ADR who was what we were planning on getting the SUROB would be dropped off at a different beach.

After the serial call-aways that morning on ship, I reminded the section leaders to do the embark troop briefs and I could visually see them doing it as lstSgt and I were conducting the MACO gate. On the way back to ship I saw one vehicle finishing up and everyone getting back in their vehicles as I was pulling up to the beach area. By the time I got to the beach they had already had two to three hours so they were mostly finished by that time.

I wasn’t there physically, but the briefs on the ship the night prior would have covered the proper use and wear of the life jackets. I wear the LPU41 on top of the flak.

The life jackets are designed to float you with all your gear, so if you have enough time you can ground your gear in the Track prior to getting out, but the life jacket is designed to float you with
everything so it doesn’t make sense to me to slow down the process in
in the vehicle to ground gear prior to getting out.

Signat: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)       Date 2006923
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Activity: ________________________  Unit: 15th MED, BCT 3/6, 6 CO AA, VPLT

Telephone number: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: D-eraaion of duty, Medige.

and that:

I have the right to remain silent.
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

0817
I make the following free and voluntary statement to __________ whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me.

I have deployed on three MEUs before this as part of an AAV Platoon. I did not feel that my Platoon was ready to become part of the 15th MEU, at least not right off the bat in January. Things were kind of all jumbled up when we first stood up as a Platoon. I talked to a few people about different aspects of this to express my concerns. My first issue in mid-January was manpower. We were trying to go support NATIVE FURY and we were undermanned from the products that I had seen. We were supposed to have a full MEU Platoon with 53 Marines, but we were roughly around 38 or 39 Marines and about 8 or 9 of them were short time Marines that were on their way out. Some of them could support NATIVE FURY, but they couldn't support the MEU with the time they had left in the Marine Corps. For that I went to both __________ to look over our manpower. For the vehicles it was very strange how, initially we had vehicles but they were slated to get turned over to Alpha Co. and we were supposed to take over 11th MEU Platoon vehicles, however they were also getting extended from returning from their deployment. So __________ and got up with Battalion maintenance as well as the key leaders in different companies to see what the most feasible plan would be to get vehicles. We were trying to figure out how we could set the Platoon up for success.

I was aware from my prior experience that MCCRE's were supposed to be done before we CHOP'd to the BLT. Scheduling was what stopped us from completing this. The first priority when we first stood up the platoon in January of 2020 was NATIVE FURY in March, and the priority for NATIVE FURY for the short PTP was CMP shoots, all the annual training needed to be complete for that like gas chamber and several PTP classes and training. We basically went from somewhere in the mid-30's personnel wise to 53 for Native Fury. We got rid of a few that couldn't make the entire deployment. The workup for NATIVE FURY was mostly CMP and annual training, we did do an AAV gunnery portion in that, but by that point it was already mid-February and we were getting ready to go to UAE at that point. In order to conduct the AAV gunnery training we had to borrow vehicles from H&S Company. We had to spend 2 days fixing the vehicles as only 1 was operational for us to use in gunnery when were assigned the vehicles we would take to the
range. I’m not sure why my Platoon was picked to go to UAE. As soon as I took over they just told me that was my next mission.

When we CHOP’d the MEU, the BLT training chief was aware of the shortfalls in training that we had. I talked to the training chief over there and told him that we were trying to play catch up. They had some training events lined up that coincided with some of the events that we had, the main push was getting SVET qualified and things like that. There was a plan to fix the training issues as some of the training planned would help with AAV training. A vast majority of things planned at this point were changed by the time of execution.

I was aware that there were 12 of 14 vehicles dead lined when we CHOP’d to the MEU. The plan to fix that situation was that we had a week to turn that around before BOTG Raid. We were able to get them operational, at least to support the raid for land. It did strike me as strange that we were CHOP’ing to a MEU with 12 of 14 vehicles dead lined. Six of the vehicles had to be towed the day we received them. We brought that up with Battalion maintenance and what we were told was that we weren’t supposed to get the vehicles with the new comm system because there wasn’t enough support behind that to replace any parts that were broken. So that kind of narrowed it down. They were also looking at some of the mods that were coming up. We were basically kind of key holed by this are these were the vehicles that we could take at that time. We brought Battalion maintenance together with I think the Lieutenant was still in ROM or in UAE when we had the initial conversation. put together some paperwork to support our argument, but when we showed up to meet with all those gentlemen, they told us that these were the only vehicles available to support the MEU at that time.

We showed up to the Platoon in the beginning of January maybe a week or two before I did.

There was a collision between Track 5 and Track 4 during RUT. Basically the damage was that some of the armor pieces were scraped and broken. The gypsy rack was cracked and a portion of the bow plane where it hinges was cracked. The bow plane got welded, the gypsy rack got replaced, and I think one piece of armor got replaced. The nature of the collision was basically a miscommunication. It was determined that was in the turret and he told his driver to turn left and he turned right instead,

The 27th of July was the day we swam to the USS Somerset. The show time for the platoon was 0700 and the splash time was 1200. I think the swim was an hour and a half to two hours. We did have a few maintenance issues. My vehicle, Track 12, had a drive shaft that broke so we had to go in water tracks the majority of the way to the ship. There were issues with two other vehicles as well. I believe it was Track 14 and Track 11, their buckets started malfunctioning so
they had to go in water tracks as well. We were able to get the replacement parts for those issues almost immediately out of the quadcon we had on ship.

Once we were on the ship we started doing pre-ops daily to make sure the vehicles were operational as well as daily PMCS sheets. That was how we determined the following day that vehicle 9 was dead lined because it wasn’t able to read water temp. The pre-ops are collected by the section leaders and the PMCS sheets stay in the vehicle discrepancy folders.

We did the pre-ops that evening prior to the morning of the 30th. I verified by going up to each section leader and asking them if there are any issues with their vehicles. The morning of the exercise we double checked with the section leaders to make sure their pre-ops were good and if there were any issues with the vehicles. I conducted the splash team checks myself on all the vehicles prior to launching off the ship. My SOP for the splash checks is to check the bilge pumps, check the plenum indicators to make sure they are in a raised position and locked, I check the hatches, the bow planes if the space permits, I check the back hatch. Prior to starting the vehicles I check the hull plugs as well. There were no issues that we found.

I was part of the confirmation brief the night prior. I think it started at around 2100. We conducted egress training with the Bravo Co. Marines in the well deck of the ship the day prior to splashing off of the ship. I saw one platoon coming down as I was going up for a meeting. Later on the section leaders confirmed to me that they conducted this training. The embark troop briefs were conducted by the crew chiefs by vehicle while myself and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) were doing the MACO drills and getting accountability. They conduct this by reading a list verbatim and then demonstrating how the life vest works and how to egress a vehicle. All the sections got that brief before splash. The night before we conducted call-away drills an hour after the confirmation brief.

That morning, at 0300 the AAV Marines were coming down to the vehicles. Serial Call-away drills started at 0600. The no-go criteria for the day was that sea state four is a no-go for splashing per the SOP. I think (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) went up to the LFOC and got a METOC report, which said that it was a sea state one. We went up to the flight deck and realized we were too high up, we ended up looking through one of the doors in the well-deck. I think it was a little bit more than a sea state one, maybe a two or a three. That is still within our capabilities though. My understanding is that the Lieutenant would make the call to splash because he is the senior AA commander.

During the confirmation brief, I don’t recall if the USS SOM said they could support with a safety boat. I know they said it in the pre-sail
brief though. I did not hear anyone come down and tell the Lieutenant that the ship could no longer provide a safety boat because it was broken.

I think it was a sea state three the majority of the way in to the island. Track 14 had issues getting through the kelp bed, about 800 meters from the beach. We had to slow down a little bit for it, but there were no other issues on the way in.

Track 12 went down for a road wheel hub. We were down at the objective when we found that out. I wasn’t aware of any other major discrepancies with the vehicles. During one of the interviews with the investigative team I was asked if I knew if Track 5 was out of transmission oil, I am not aware that Track 5 was out of transmission oil. I have not been told or had any indication that there was an issue with the transmission oil of track 5.

After the raid was complete we were trying to get parts for Track 12. At some point the ship said that they didn’t have all the parts. At that point we knew that Track 12 was not going to be splashing that day. By the time I got to the beach the vehicles there were already preparing to splash. I went around with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and verified who was going where to get accountability. When I first got to the LZ I saw (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and verified with him that his vehicles were ready to go. From what I saw I don’t think that there was any confusion getting accountability, we were just verifying and making sure that we had as many personnel going to the ship as possible. It seemed like when we got there the main priority was to get ADR and the OpFor out of there since they had already been out there for a while. I can’t say a specific person that was coming from, it was just kind of a general consensus.

We wanted to maintain a section’s worth of vehicles on the island in case they had to splash back to the ship on their own that they could do so safely and mutually support each other. Initially it seemed like they wanted us to take every single vehicle back except for Track 12, but that’s not how we operate. I think someone on the C7 was talking to the ship. We had comm with the ship through one of Bravo Co.’s data Marines while we were at the objective.

Typically I would be the one to remain behind since I am the Platoon Sergeant and it was my vehicle that went down. I know we picked Track 11 to stay back because it didn’t have any passengers on it and we were trying to get more people back to the ship. Track 4 was selected by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I didn’t question it too much. Typically that’s what the Lieutenant and the CO like to do. If there are Marines staying in the field they’re going to stay with them.

The splash team leader was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) He checked his vehicles and the section leaders check their own vehicles. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was
conducting a SUROB at the time and I assisted him in doing the math. He inspected his vehicle and I could see doing his checks on top of his vehicle and I could see doing the checks on the top of his vehicle.

Initially, when all the vehicles were staged and we had gotten accountability, I got with to make sure he had comm with the ship. We had some trouble getting comm and I think it took 10-15 minutes for us to get solid comm. At that point said the ship had said that we had thumbs up to splash and then he told that to the Lieutenant.

There were no command climate issues or communication issues between the AAV Platoon and Bravo Co.

I have been on three MEUs before this one. I was crew chief on the first and second ones, and then I was assistant section leader on the third. I have also deployed on AAVs for 3 UDPs. As a crew chief for my first UDP, then as a section leader for my second and a Platoon Sergeant for the last UDP in May of 2019. For this MEU I had a four month period to get the Platoon ready to CHOP. For the other MEUs I did we had at least 6 months to prepare prior to CHOP. We were definitely planning for a lot out of UAE to get some of the AAV training out of the way. That was the plan, to use NATIVE FURY to get some of the training in. But what ended up happening was that half of the Platoon went to UAE and half of the Platoon got stuck at March AFB and wasn’t able to go due to COVID-19 restrictions. There was some discussion about being able to do amphibious training, but we weren’t briefed very thoroughly on what we would be able to do. The feeling was mostly that we would get there and figure it out. That is what we got from higher at least.

Prior to NATIVE FURY I had talked to about the lack of training. The plan was to use NATIVE FURY to get the training out of the way, but we didn’t know what we could do at NATIVE FURY. We knew that gunnery was on the table since we were briefed on ranges and ammunition available. Prior to heading out we had a plan to get crew qualified. We got seven crews qualified. There was never a discussion about taking a master gunner with us so that we could get more crews qualified.

After the JLTI’s revealed that 12 vehicles were dead lined, we had a meeting with the Battalion Maintenance Officer, myself and the Battalion Maintenance Chief, which we talked about the status of the vehicles and how we were going to get them back up. We were able to get them back up within a week for land operations but without any change in status for priority of parts. The authorization had come from the Battalion CO at the time.
We came up with a plan for how we would get the Platoon ready for CHOP. The priority in January was NATIVE FURY, but we were trying to look ahead as well. We were plan was to get a lot out of NATIVE FURY.

Monthly PMCS's within the Platoon were done by the crew chiefs. The section leaders then provided a check on that process. I went through a PMCS sheet with the section leaders at one point to show them what I expected.

We had an SOP for using chem lights on the hatch handles of the hatches.

On the day of the incident, the LCAC did not bring us any parts. The last transmission we got before we arrived at the beach stated that there would be parts on the LCAC, but once we got there we found out that it didn’t have parts.

CLB had put together a class 9 block for the AAV Platoon but we found out that it was very deficient. We found that out when we had gotten on ship and were trying to get parts from them. We did not have an inventory of parts from CLB as to what was in the Class 9 Block and that was concerning to me. I was never given an opportunity to look through the whole Class 9 block. We had talked to the Sgt from CLB who ran the class 9 block, but she was told specifically that the parts she had on the ship was to support the CLB.

That afternoon, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the last vehicle to splash. He was about 4 or 5 kilometers out when he decided to turn back with the other vehicle in tow and returned to the beach. I checked in with him on comm to see how the towing was going with the other vehicle. This was approximately the same time that Track 5 was starting to have issues. I was on comm trying to figure out what the status of the vehicles were. There was some confusion as far as which vehicle was which over the comm. Prior to moving to high ground to get better comm, that’s when we heard that Track 5 might need to do a troop to troop transfer.
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: ___________________________  Unit: 15h MEU BLT Y4 B C AAV PLT

Activity: _________________________  Telephone number: ___________________________

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: Dereliction of Duty/Negligence

and that:

I have the right to remain silent.
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:
I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)  0831

ENCLOSURE (10S)
SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent of this form is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

1. LOCATION

1ST Recon BN

2. DATE (YYYY/MM/DD)

2020/08/23

3. TIME

1550 (LOCAL)

4. FILE NUMBER

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

G. LAST NAME

FIRST NAME

MIDDLE NAME

(g) (3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEARING STATEMENT TAKEN AT __________________ DATE __________

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

AUTHORITY:

TITLE 10 USC SECTION 301; TITLE 5 USC SECTION 2951; E.O. 9397 DATED NOVEMBER 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:

To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately recorded.

ROUTINE USES:

Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE:

Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEARING STATEMENT TAKEN AT __________________ DATE __________

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

POST - MISSION FOR CONDUCT OF RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE IN SUPPORT OF 13TH MEO AMINT, AT OR ABOUT 0900 MADE PHYSICAL LINK-UP WITH AN AAV TO EXPLAIN LOCATION OF QUAH RECON TEAM AND PERSONNEL

CONDITIONS FOR LINK-UP WITH WHICHEVER TRACK WAS DESIGNATED AS THE EXTRACT PLATFORM FOR THE TEAM WE HAD TRIED AND FAILED TO HAVE THE PLATFORM ON THE RADIO PRIOR TO LINK-UP

POST - ASSAULT THE AAVS MOVED NO H1S LS STZ 404 AND THE TEAM WERE LOCATED IN REAR FOR LINK-UP A CREW MEMBER STOPPED US OUTSIDE THE TRACK AND ASKED US TO PASS HIM OUR RUCKS SO HE COULD STAND THEM DOWN ON THE SIDES. THIS IT THE LAST TIME WE INDIVIDUALLY TOOK OFF PERSONAL EQUIPMENT. ALL OF OUR SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT WAS LOADED INSIDE THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT INSIDE WATER-PROOFING "BAGS". THE TOTAL PASSENGER COUNT WAS INITIALLY 21, AFTER SITTING INSIDE THE AAV FOR NO LESS THAN 35 MINUTES (NO LONGER THAN 45), WE WERE TOLD THAT "A TRUCK BEHIND US IS DOWN FOR MAINTENANCE" BY THE CREW MEMBER MANURING THE BACK HATCH. MOST PASSENGERS DISMOUNTED THE VEHICLE AND STAYED CLOSE, BUT EXTERNAL TO THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT. WE WITNESSED IN PLACE FOR APPROXIMATELY 2 HOURS BEFORE BEING TOLD TO LOAD BACK UP FOR MOVEMENT TO THE LAUNCH

POINT. AT THAT TIME, THE TEAM SPLIT INTO TWO GROUPS. GROUP I (COMPOSED OF AND 1) REMAINED IN THE INITIAL

VEHICLE. GROUP 2

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

FROM REAR MOVED

TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. GROUP 2 LEFT THEIR PERSONAL EQUIPMENT ON THE ROOF OF THE VEHICLE CONTAINING GROUP 1. ON THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT FOR GROUP 1 NEW CONTAINED 16 PEOPLE. PASSENGERS WERE UNABLE TO SOURCE LOCATION AND WERE SITTING ON EQUIPMENT AND IN THE ROW ON THE FLOOR CENTRELINE OF THE AAV.
STATEMENT OF DATED 18 JUL 2020

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
9. STATEMENT (Continued)

NO FURTHER COMMENT.

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AFFADAVIT

I, ________________________________, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on page 1, and ends on page 3. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me. The statement is true. I have initialed all corrections and have initialed the bottom of each page containing the statement. I have made this statement freely without hope of benefit or reward, without threat of punishment, and without coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement.

_ (Signature of Person Administering Oath) 

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of ____________, 20___ at ______.

________________________

WITNESSES:

________________________

________________________

________________________

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent of this form is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately recorded.
DISCLOSURE: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
   1st Recon BN

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
   20200729

3. TIME
   1539

4. FILE NUMBER
   (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
   (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

6. SSN

7. GRADE/STATUS
   (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
   1st Recon BN

9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

   LATER IN THE MORNING OF 20200729 AT 1530 572 HUB THE TEAM LINKED UP FOR EXTRACT ON THE AAVS. WE WERE TOLD TO STRIP OUR RUCKS AND STRAP THEM ON TOP OF THE CREW HATCH, WHICH WOULD HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ESCAPE UTILIZING THE HATCH. THE XO HAD TOLD US THAT WE WERE ALL RIDING IN THE ONE AAV WHICH BROUGHT US TO A TOTAL OF 21 MARINES IN THE BACK OF A SINGLE AAV AFTER A PERIOD OF WAITING EXSIDE WE WERE TOLD ONE OF THE AAVS WAS DOWN FOR MAINTENANCE. SO WE HAD ALL GOTT OUT TO WAIT AT WHICH POINT FOUR OF OUR TEAM

   (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

   WENT TO ANOTHER AAV TO SPREAD THE PERSONNEL LOAD. AT AROUND NOON WE ALL BOARDED BACK UP IN THE AAVS TO COLLOCATE WITH THE OTHER AAVS AT THE BEACH HAV 1154.5 TO 543. ONCE WE GOT THERE WE HAD BRIEFLY UNLOADED AND RELOADED WHERE WE PICKED UP 3 FOO TECHS. THE AAV CREW MAN DEPARTED TO DO HIS PRE-WATER CHECKS AT WHICH POINT HE WAS KNOWN AT TO STOP AND GET BACK IN (HE DID NOT PASS HIS CHECKS). I DID NOT SEE WHO TOLD HIM TO DO THAT. FROM THERE THE AAVS LAUNCHED AND GOT INTO THE WATER WHICH WAS ABOUT SEA STATE FOUR. NO POINT DURING ALL OF THIS DID I OR NO ONE FROM MY TEAM THAT I WITNESSED RECEIVE A SAFETY/PROCEDURE/ OR EMERGENCY BRIEF IN THE EVENT THAT SOMETHING SHOULD HAPPEN TO OUR AAV. THERE WERE TWO CRACKED CHEM-LIGHTS THAT WERE BARELY STILL ON THE HATCH FOR THE CREW IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY. INSIDE I NOTICED THAT THERE WEREN'T ENOUGH LIFE JACKETS TO GO AROUND AND THE

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
   (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

   ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT _______ DATED _______".

   THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.
9. STATEMENT (Continued)

ONES WHO WERE WEARING THE WEREN'T WEARING THEM CORRECTLY. THERE WASN'T ENOUGH SEATS FOR EVERYONE AND SOME RESORTED TO SITTING ON PACKS/A COOLER/ AND EACH OTHER. OUR TRANSIT IN THE OCEAN WAS ALMOST 2 HOURS ABOUT AND WHEN WE REACHED THE SOMERSET (AT AROUND MID EVENING), ONCE ABOARD THE SHIP EVERYONE IN OUR AAV WAS TOLD AND RESTRICTED FROM LEAVING IT UNTIL GIVEN THE INSTRUCTION. ONCE WE WERE ALLOWED TO LEAVE, ALL RECON WAS TOLD TO ASSIST WITH THE RETRIEVAL.
STATEMENT

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

NO FURTHER COMMENT

AFFADAVIT

I HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF EXPECTED REWARD, WITHOUT FEAR OR DUNGEON AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ____ day of ________, _____.

at

__________________________

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

WITNESSES:

________________________________

________________________________

________________________________

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent of this form is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:
Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:
To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately recorded.

DISCLOSURE:
Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval. Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
1st Recon Battalion

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
29/01/2020

3. TIME
1530

4. FILE NUMBER

7. GRADE/STATUS
ACTIVE

9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

WE MET UP WITH THE TRACKS IN THE EARLY MORNING OF 29 JUN 2020 AT 0657. WE THEN BOARDED THROUGH THE REAR HATCH. THERE WERE 21 INDIVIDUALS IN THE CREW COMPARTMENT, INCLUDING US. WE WERE TOLD ANOTHER AAV BROKE DOWN, SO WE FISHED OUR AAV ALONE UNTIL THE EARLY AFTERNOON.

WE WERE TOLD TO RE-BOARD. THERE WERE 16 INDIVIDUALS ON BOARD. WE THEN MOVED TO ANOTHER STAGING AREA AT 0921. WE SAT IN THE AAV FOR ABOUT AN HOUR BEFORE A CREW MEMBER TOOK US TO THE VEHICLE. THE CREW MEMBER TOLD US THEY WERE GOING TO CONDUCT "PRE-WATER CHECKS". WE WERE TOLD TO RE-BOARD ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. THE CREW MEMBER BROUGHT HIS SHOULDER AND I ASKED IF THEY WERE STILL PLANNING ON DOING THEIR "PRE-WATER CHECKS". WE SAT AROUND FOR A SHORT TIME, THEN MADE ABOUT AN HOUR AND 45 MIN TRANSIT TO THE SOMERSET. WE ARRIVED AROUND 1830.

NONE OF MY TEAM WERE GIVEN FLATATION DEVICES. WE WERE TOLD THERE WERENT ENOUGH. I COULD NOT SAY HOW MANY FLATATION DEVICES IN TOTAL WERE HANDED OUT. I SAW SOME MARINES WEARING THEIR FLATATION AROUND THEIR NECKS BUT NEGLECTING TO SECURE THEM AROUND THEIR WAIST. WE WERE NOT GIVEN A SAFETY/EMERGENCY EXITS BRIEF. THE CREW MEMBER IN THE BACK WITH US SHARED US HOW TO MANIPULATE THE EXIT DOORS.

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT ______ TAKEN AT ______ DATED _________."

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ENCLOSURE (108)
STATEMENT OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I, ____________, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT, THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

AFFIDAVIT

I, ____________, the person making this statement, have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on page 1 and ends on page __________. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me. The statement is true. I have initialed all corrections and have initialed the bottom of each page containing the statement. I have made this statement freely without hope of benefit, threat of punishment, and without coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement.

WITNESSES:

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

Page 2 of 2 pages

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WITNESSES:
REVENGE 4 LINKED UP WITH THE NAVS THE MORNING OF JULY 29TH 2020 IN VICINITY OF 115 LS 579.466 FOR EXIT FROM A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION. SHORTLY AFTER, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO WAIT OUTSIDE THE VEHICLE AS ANOTHER NAV WAS DOWN AND WAITING FOR REPAIR. AFTER APPROXIMATELY 30-45 MIN, WE RE-LOADED THE VEHICLE AND BEGAN MOVEMENT TO THE NAV LAUNCH PONT IN 115 LS 518543. FROM THIS STANDING AREA WE ADDED 3 MORE MARINES FOR A TOTAL OF 81 MARINES. DURING THIS TIME, WE WERE TOLD TO STAY IN THE VEHICLE, AS WELL AS THE CREW WAS TOLD TO NOT GET OUT. AFTER AN UNDETERMINED AMOUNT OF TIME, OUR VEHICLE MADE MOVEMENT TO ENTER THE WATER AND LINK UP WITH THE U.S.S. SOMMERSET AT NO POINT PREVIOUS OR DURING THE TRANSIT WAS A BRIEF GIVEN ON EGRESS FROM THE VEHICLE OR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES. THERE WAS ALSO NOT A CHECK FOR PROPER PREPARATION/EQUIPMENT ON ANY OF THE INDIVIDUALS IN THE VEHICLE. STRATEGICALLY, THROUGHOUT OUR TRANSIT IN THE WATER, THE SEAFARER WAS HIGH AS MULTIPLE SWELL PULLED WATER IN FROM ABOVE, IN THE VEHICLE OPERATOR AREA OF THE NAV. ONCE ABOARD THE U.S.S. SOMMERSET, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO WAIT IN THE VEHICLE. WE ATTEMPTED TO OPEN THE TOP HATCHES FOR AIR, BUT THEY WERE RESTRICTED BY ROCKS FROM THE OUTSIDE. AFTER THE CREW REMOVED THEM, WE EXITED THE NAV AND BEGAN FURTHER TASKING.
STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) TAKEN AT DATE OF STATEMENT DATED

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFADAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) _______________________________________ HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE __. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUC

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ______________________________________

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ____ day of _____________ ____, at

________________________________________

WITNESSES:

________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH
WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

ON the 24th of July 2020 ADR team H was conducting reconnaissance for a mechanized road on San Clemente Island. After the raid in the late morning we linked up a AAV for extract upon link up rucks were hastily stowed on the vehicle and we were loaded into the AV-109S vehicle. We sat inside for 45 minutes to a hour then unloaded due to another vehicle being broken down and repairs were being attempted. After some time we loaded the AAV. Team H consisted of 9 Pax, 4 of the team loaded into a second AAV to make more space due to the initial rood consisting of a total of 21 Pax inside the AAV, that were brought my AAV to 17 Pax. We then moved to a staging area, unloaded got team accountability the promptly reloaded. 

The AAV then moved to the launch ramp and halted the crew member elected to begin pre -water checks, 3 BOD were loaded in then I heard yelling and the crew member got inside without moving from directly behind the vehicle. At this time only 1 person was wearing flotation and we received no brief other than the placement of the roof hatch handles. The flotation device I observed was improperly worn. We waited for a while then launched into the water to begin our transit which lasted for roughly 1 hour and 45 minutes in sea state that caused the AAV to climb waves at almost a
9. STATEMENT (Continued)

I 45 degree angle. If I had to estimate the sea state, it would be
sea state 4 to 5. After reaching the USS Somerset we attempted
to open the roof hatch and could only open it up to approx. 6 inches
due to the amount of gear haphazardly stored on top.
It took the crew member about 5 mins to clear the top so we
could open it. At that time I observed HDR team 2 preparing
to launch CRRC's for what we later learned was search and
rescue operations. Team 4 immediately unloaded from our 2 AVS
and began to assist Team 4. Throughout this entire operation
I nor any of my team received a single of emergency procedure
brief. The conditions inside the AVS was so cramped that
Marines were sitting on the floor, MRE boxes, tools, and even a
water cooler's legs were entwined and it was nearly impossible
to exit the vehicle expeditiously it could have been near impossible.

At this time this concludes my statement.

AFFADAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ____________, have read or have had read to me this statement
understand the contents of the entire statement made by me.
The statement is true. I have initialed all corrections and have initialed the bottom of each page containing the
statement. I have made this statement freely without hope of benefit or reward, without threat of punishment,
and without coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful induce

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ________

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person
authorized by law to administer oaths, this ______
day of ______________, _______.
at

________________________________________

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

WITNESSES:

________________________________________

________________________________________

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT:

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent of this form is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:

ROUTINE USES:

DISCLOSURE:

LOCATION

1. LOCATION

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)

3. TIME

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

6. SSN

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

7. GRADE/STATUS

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

AFTER CONDUCTING AN RECONNAISSANCE PATROL ON SCI MY TEAM AND I MOVED TO LINK UP WITH THE NAV SECTION 150 1151S 572 460 MIDMORNING ON 20200729. AT THE TIME OF LINK UP MY TEAM WAS INSTRUCTED TO PASS RUCKS UP TO THE CREW MEN WHO ATTACHED THEM TO THE TOP OF THE NAV AFTER WE TOOK OUT ALL ESSENTIAL GEAR, THE (9) OF US WERE DIRECTED BY THE XO TO OCCUPY THAT NAV WITH THE (12) OCCUPANTS WHO WERE ALREADY SEATED INSIDE THE VEHICLE. AFTER ABOUT 30 MINUTES WE WERE TOLD TO EXIT THE CRAFT BECAUSE ANOTHER NAV HAD BROKEN DOWN. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LITTLE MORE THAN AN HOUR LATER WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO LEAD BACK UP. AT THIS POINT I TOOK (3) MEMBERS OF MY TEAM WITH ME TO RIDING ANOTHER NAV THAT ONLY HAD (12) OCCUPANTS NEARBY. AT NO POINT IN EITHER VEHICLE WERE MYSELF OR ANY OF MY TEAM MEMBERS GIVEN LIFE VESTS OR INSTRUCTIONS FOR SAFETY OR EGRESS. ONCE WE WERE INSIDE THE VEHICLE WE IMPROVED OUR OWN SEATS WITH MRE BOXES AND A WATER COOLER BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH ROOM; THE NAV'S THEN MADE MOVEMENT TO THE BEACH 150 1151S 510 51'S.

UPON REACHING THE BEACH ALL OCCUPANTS WERE INSTRUCTED TO DISCOURAGE WITH THE EXCEPTON OF THE CREW. A FEW MINUTES AFTER EXITING THE CRAFT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) WERE DIRECTED TO PACK BACK INTO THE NAV'S IMMEDIATELY WHERE WE WAITED FOR ABOUT ANOTHER HOUR WITHOUT DIRECTION. WITHOUT INSPECTION OF THE NAV WE WERE INTO THE WATER TO THE NAV (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) SUBMERSED; THE PITCH AND PULL OF THE CRAFT AS WELL AS WHAT WAS OBSERVED FROM THE SHIP AFTER WE REACHED IT I WOULD ESTIMATE THE NAV STATE TO BE AT LEAST (4). AFTER ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF OUR NAV REACHED THE SHIP WHERE WE DISMOUNTED THE VEHICLE TO ACCOUNTABILITY AND ATTEMPTED TO ADJ TO THE RESCUE EFFORTS, WITH THE EXCEPTON OF ONE TEAM MEMBER MY TEAM REMAINED ON THE SHIP AND WOKE INSTRUCTION FROM THE WELL DECK.

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING STATEMENT AS TAKEN AT__ DATED_.

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.
9. STATEMENT (Continued)

NO FURTHER COMMENTS.

AFFADAVIT

I, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ____, I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ____ day of ________, _____.

at

( sis u ture of Person Administering Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
The morning of 2007/07/29 my team linked up with AAV in vicinity of USS's 572 566. After waiting for approximately two hours we loaded into two AAV's to make movement to launch site. We had 16 individuals within the AAV I was riding in. I had to sit on an MRE box due to the lack of seats. Once at launch site we got out so the crew could do pre-water checks. However, once outside the AAV we were immediately told to get back in we were getting ready to splash. I asked the crewmen about the checks and in reply he gave me a shoulder shrug. We were never given an egress class or given any flotation devices. When I asked the crew member for flotation devices he said they only had one for the whole vehicle. Everyone who was wearing flotation has not wearing them properly. They only had them around their necks, not strapped around their waist. Once in the water the sea state was clearly very bad. I personally do not know what the sea state was; however, I believe it was at least seastate 5. The ride back to ship took approximately an hour and a half. Once back on the ship that is when we realized an accident had happened and proceeded to help where we could.
STATEMENT OF

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

No further comment.

AFFADAVIT

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 

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WITNESSES:

________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

ENCLOSURE (M)
Summary of Interview

On Aug 5, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regard to his recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

The morning of the incident started off when we came down to the vehicles and did our pre-ops again. At 0350 the MACO drill was done for the AMTRACKERS and then at 0400 the MACO drill was done for the grunts. After that, the Marines escorted their respective platoons and squads to their vehicles and that's when they conducted their embark troop briefs. For 1st Plt, which was my section, gave the embark troop brief, which included a description of how to wear and use the life vest.

From there we got in our stations and got ready to splash. Eventually we did splash and I remember that the sea state was pretty rough, but we eventually made it to the beach. We were supposed to land in waves, but we ended up landing in a column.

After landing on the beach we proceeded to our respective positions for the raid. I was in a blocking position in Track 10. The C-7 and Pop remained in the gravel lot by the beach where they set up their Command and Control position. They executed the mission and as I understand it one of the vehicles on the objectives had some sort of mechanical problem which caused a lot of delay.

While we were waiting for the mechanical problem to get sorted out, three vehicles approached our position from the south heading back towards the beach. I wanted to establish better comm with the rest of the platoon, so I pushed south with a chaser to get a better signal. Once I got comm I heard that everyone was pushing back to the beach, so I turned around and went back to our blocking position, gathered everyone, and then we headed back to the gravel lot where the CoC was located.

Once we got to the CoC we conducted our post ops. Once that was done, I took Track 10 down towards the water where I did the surface observation. The MSR was a 2.1, and I relayed that information to the Platoon Sergeant.

From there I went back to my vehicle and conducted my splash checks and then got in my hatch and got ready to go. conducted the pre-ops check. I don’t know what was said at that time though.
After that we got the go ahead to splash. As I recall, the order of march into the water was Tracks 10, 14, C-7, 7, 5, 3, 1, but I'm not positive that is accurate. We got out, passed the cove and as we were getting out into the open ocean the sea state seemed like it just kept getting worse. I kept telling the driver to aim for the bow, and we were just trying to catch up with the ship as best we could.

I remember that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had comm with the ship and that he asked them to execute a button hook, which they did eventually and that shortened the distance considerably. After that we were about 2 km away, but we were still chasing the ship. As we got closer to the Ship I could see that the stern gate was up so we just kept pushing.

Eventually we got about 100m behind the ship and the stern gate was still up. At this time, comm was very shaky. I heard that Tracks 1 and 3 had hooked up for tow and were headed back to the beach which was their nearest safe haven. I was still having trouble getting comm with everyone, I was trying to get a radio check, but I just kept getting a click sound. It looked like flight deck operations were happening at this time. I saw a helicopter touch down and then immediately take off. Originally, when we were transiting out from the beach, I remember that the Ship had said that they would be conducting flight ops.

The Ship finally dropped the stern gate and I told (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) my driver, "let’s hit it, let’s hit it, let’s go.” I wanted to get in as soon as possible. At first it looked like there was a large dispersion with the Tracks, but I couldn’t see all the vehicles and the sea state made distances hard to judge. We got in and the Navy folks pushed us all the way up the well deck. As soon as I could, I got out of the vehicle and started talking to the Combat Cargo Officer (CCO) to tell her that we needed to get safety boats into the water because I had vehicles in distress. At this time, the only vehicles I was tracking as being in distress were Tracks 1 and 3 as they headed back to the beach, but I still thought that we should get safety boats into the water since the sea state was so rough.

The CCO told me to talk to the Tactical Action Officer (TAO), so I told him we had distressed AAVs in the water and that we needed to get safety boats out there. I then looked out the stern gate and could see (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) waving the November flag. At this point I started yelling to the CCO and the well deck personnel who was there saying "look, that AAV is in distress.”

We then ran up to the LFOC and that’s when actions started happening. The stern gate got raised, they got the boats launched. It felt like they took a long time to re-ballast down and get the safety boats launched but eventually they did. I later ran back down to the well deck around the time that the C-7 vehicle came in. Once the C-7 and Pop vehicle came in we immediately started getting accountability. I
don't know why safety boats were not in the water when we splashed back to the ship. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) vehicle was the safety boat on the way back and then (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) vehicle became the safety boat when (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) turned back to the beach since he was the last in column at that point.

We had comm with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) all the way up until when we reached the stern gate. I didn't hear him pass over comm that he was taking on water but I did hear him pass information about the distance from the beach and whether we should be conducting gator squares and so on.
COMMON SOR FOR AA OPERATIONS

Appendix I

MODIFIED SURF INDEX (MSI) INSTRUCTIONS

1. Modified Surf Index (MSI). The MSI is an angle dimensionless number that provides a relative measure of the conditions likely to be encountered in the surf zone. It provides a guide for judging the feasibility of conducting landing operations for each type of landing craft. It is a guide, not definite go or no go criteria. When applied to a known or forecasted surf condition, the MSI calculation provides the commander with an objective method of arriving at a safe and reasonable decision with respect to committing landing craft and amphibious vehicles.

   a. Line Alpha (Significant Breaker Height). Refers to Line A of the SUROB and determines the significant breaker height factor. This number is transferred directly ever from the SUROB, and is not modified by any table. (A significant breaker height of 3.0 feet converts to a MSI factor of 3.0)

   b. Line Charlie (Breaker Period). Refers to Line C of the SUROB. Determined by using the "Breaker Period Modification Table."

   c. Line Delta (Breaker Types). Refers to Line D of the SUROB. Record the percentages of the types of breakers that occur rounded to the nearest tenth. There is no modification table for plunging breakers. Record the lower of the two numbers under the MSI factor column.

   d. Line Echo (Breaker Angle). Refers to Line E of the SUROB, and determines the breaker angle or the angle of breaker makes with the shoreline. To calculate, transfer data from the SUROB, rounding to the nearest tenth, using the "Wave Angle Modification Table" to determine the MSI factor.

   e. Line Foxtroto (Littoral Current). Refers to Line F of the SUROB. Littoral current is one of the most crucial factors in conducting the MSI, because it can severely elevate the overall MSI factor if inaccurate data is submitted. Determine MSI factor by converting data from "Littoral Current Modification Table."

   f. Line Hotel (General Data). Refers to Line H of SUROB.

      (1) Relative Wind. Transfer respective data from SUROB and use "Wind Modification Table" to determine MSI factor.

      (2) Secondary Wave Height. If another series of breakers exists further out past the main series of breakers, then the maximum height for that system is recorded. The SUROB data is transferred directly to the MSI factor.

   g. Total MSI. To get the total MSI factor add lines A through D, the highest of Line E or F, and Line H. The maximum safe MSI as per Reference G and M is 6.0.

2. Problems with MSI. Relatively minimal surf conditions can combine to make landing conditions unfeasible. It is important to remember that the MSI is a guide for judging the feasibility of landing operations. MSI tables often do not go high or low enough to calculate some wave conditions, additionally; tables were designed with conventional landing craft in mind. AAVs do not have the exact characteristics as conventional landing craft and often have traction well out in the surf zone. As such, AAVs are not as affected by littoral current and can often negotiate such conditions. Vehicle mechanical factors should be seriously considered, however, the final judgment should come from the AA Unit Commander with eyes on the actual surf conditions. In the absence of direct observation, all factors should be considered when planning a landing with a high MSI.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEA STATE</th>
<th>CONDITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>WIND SPEEDS BETWEEN 5 TO 9 MILES PER HOUR (3 TO 5 KNOTS). WAVE HEIGHTS CONSIDERED SMALL, BETWEEN 10.5 AND 1 FEET (0.60 TO 0.30 METERS). SMALL WAVELETS WITH GLASSY-APPEARING CRESTS AND NO BREAKING.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>WIND SPEEDS BETWEEN 10 TO 11 MILES PER HOUR (5 TO 10 KNOTS). WAVE HEIGHTS CONSIDERED LARGE, BETWEEN 14 AND 2 FEET (0.45 TO 0.60 METERS). LARGE WAVELETS, CRESTS BEGIN TO BREAK AND WHITECAPS ARE SCATTERED.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>WIND SPEEDS BETWEEN 16 TO 17 MILES PER HOUR (8 TO 15 KNOTS). WAVE HEIGHTS CONSIDERED SMALL, BETWEEN 8 AND 4 FEET (1.06 TO 1.21 METERS). SMALL WAVES BECOMING LONGER AND WHITECAPS ARE NUMEROUS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>WIND SPEEDS BETWEEN 19 TO 24 MILES PER HOUR (11 TO 15 KNOTS). WAVE HEIGHTS CONSIDERED MODERATE, BETWEEN 15 AND 4 FEET (2.44 TO 1.21 METERS). MODERATE WAVES FORMING NUMEROUS WHITECAPS AND SOME SPRAY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>WIND SPEEDS BETWEEN 24 TO 29 MILES PER HOUR (13 TO 16 KNOTS). WAVE HEIGHTS CONSIDERED LARGE, BETWEEN 8 AND 12 FEET (2.43 TO 3.65 METERS). LARGE WAVES FORM AND WHITECAPS ARE COMMON, ALONG WITH MORE SPRAY.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COMMON SOP FOR AA OPERATIONS

Appendix H

SURF OBSERVATION REPORT (SUROB) AND INSTRUCTIONS

1. **Line Alpha.** Line Alpha is the significant breaker height, or the average height of the highest one-third of all the waves observed during the report. Only the thirty-three (33) highest waves will be used to determine the significant breaker height. The significant wave height is recorded to the nearest one-half foot.

2. **Line Bravo.** The maximum breaker height, or highest recorded breaker, recorded to the nearest one-half foot.

3. **Line Charlie.** The breaker period, or average time interval in seconds between breakers observed in Line Alpha. Done by recording time began, to the last breaker counted, and dividing by one-hundred (100), or number of breakers recorded.

4. **Line Delta.** The percentage of various breaker types. Recorded using the worksheet circling “S” for spilling, “P” for plunging, or “X” for surging, the divided by one-hundred (100) to determine percentage for each.
   a. **Spilling Breakers.** Characterized by the top portion of the breaker becoming unstable at various points and forming foam, which then spills and expands down the front of the breaker in a mild action.
   b. **Plunging Breakers.** Characterized by the top portion of the breaker becoming unstable along the entire frontage very quickly, crashing over itself with a violent release of energy.
   c. **Surging Breakers.** Characterized by appearing as a combination of spilling and plunging breakers. Initially the breaker takes on the characteristics of a plunging breaker, and suddenly changes to appear as a spilling breaker. These occur mostly on steep gradients.

5. **Line Echo.** The breaker angle or the orientation of the breaker frontage in relation to shore. Done by calculating the acute angle formed between the breaker lines and the shoreline, and expressed in five (5) degree increments towards either right (R) or left (L) flank as the observer faces towards land from the seaward.

6. **Line Foxtrot.** The littoral current, or speed in knots of the water flowing parallel to the shore just inside the main line of breakers. Calculated by throwing an object into the surf zone as far as possible and observing the distance (in feet) to which the object travels for one (1) minute. The number of feet travelled is then divided one-hundred (100) to determine speed in knots. Recorded to the nearest tenth of a knot and towards which flank (R or L) the object travelled.

7. **Line Golf.** Concerns two pieces of information; the Depth of the Surf Zone, and Lines of Breakers present therein. The lines of breakers are determined by counting the number of well-defined breaker lines. Depth (distance) is conducted by estimating the distance from the outermost breaker line to the furthest limit of the up-rush of water on shore.

8. **Line Hotel.** Covers several miscellaneous items of information, to be passed in plain text.
**COMMON SFP FOR AA OPERATIONS**

**SURF OBSERVATION REPORT (SROB) FORMAT**

**NAME & RANK OF OBSERVER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>INFORMATION</th>
<th>SUROB DATA</th>
<th>MSI</th>
<th>NOTES:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>SIGNIFICANT BREAKER HEIGHT IN FEET.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>OBSERVE 100 WAVES. ONLY THE HIGHEST 33 WAVES WILL BE ADDED TOGETHER AND THEN DIVIDED BY 33 FOR THE SIGNIFICANT BREAKER HEIGHT. THE MSI FACTOR WILL ALWAYS BE THE SAME AS THE BREAKER HEIGHT WITH A DECIMAL POINT ADDED. EXAMPLE: 3 FEET = 3.0 MSI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>MAXIMUM BREAKER HEIGHT IN FEET.</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>THIS IS THE SINGLE HIGHEST WAVE OBSERVED DURING THE 100 WAVE COUNT. MSI IS NOT COMPUTED IN THIS LINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>BREAKER PERIOD IN SECONDS.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>THIS IS COMPUTED BY TAKING THE TOTAL TIME IN SECONDS THAT WAS RECORDED BY YOUR STOPWATCH AND DIVIDING IT BY 100 WAVES. EXAMPLE: 22 MIN = 1320 SECONDS DIVIDED BY 100 WAVES = 13.2 SECONDS. USE THE CHART BELOW TO FIND THE MSI FACTOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BREAKER PERIOD MODIFICATION TABLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BREAKER PERIOD IN SECONDS</th>
<th>MSI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<td>15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SIGNIFICANT BREAKER HEIGHT IN FEET**

**BREAKER TYPES:**

- PLUNGING, SPILLING OR SURGING

**SPILLING BREAKER MODIFICATION TABLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENT SPILLING BREAKERS</th>
<th>MSI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
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<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**SURGING BREAKER MODIFICATION TABLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENT SURGING BREAKERS</th>
<th>MSI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SIGNIFICANT BREAKER HEIGHT IN FEET**

---

*Enclosure (2)*
TOTAL NUMBER OF PLUNGING = 54 \div 100 = \% 

TOTAL NUMBER OF SPILLING = 51 \div 100 = \% 

TOTAL NUMBER OF SURGING = \_ \div 100 = \% 

TOTAL TIME IN SECONDS TO OBSERVE 100 WAVES = \_ \div 100 

WAVES = BREAKER PERIOD

**INSTRUCTIONS**

ADD SUROB LINES A, C, & D TOGETHER. NOW YOU WILL DETERMINE WHICH OF THE TWO LINES E OR F HAS THE LARGER MSI VALUE AND ADD IT. NOW FINALLY ADD LINES F AND H AND YOU WILL HAVE YOUR TOTAL MSI FACTOR.

A + C + D + E OR F + H = MSI TOTAL

**SIGNIFICANT BREAKER HEIGHT COMPUTATION**

(HIGHEST 33 WAVES OBSERVED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WAVE HEIGHT</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
<th>PRODUCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PRODUCT \div 33 = SIGNIFICANT WAVE HEIGHT</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**COMMON SOP FOR AA OPERATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>INFORMATION</th>
<th>SURF Data</th>
<th>MSI</th>
<th>NOTES:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>BREAKER ANGLE: IN DEGREES TOWARD THE RIGHT OR LEFT FLANK.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>THIS IS THE ANGLE WAVES BREAK ON THE SHORE. AND IT IS MEASURED IN DEGREES. IN MOST CASES IT WILL NOT EXCEED 5 DEGREES. THE MODIFICATION TABLE BELOW FOR THE MSI FACTOR, RIGHT OF LEFT FLANK IS DETERMINED AS IF YOU WERE LANDING ON THE BEACH.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### WAVE ANGLE MODIFICATION TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WAVE ANGLE IN DEGREES</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>35</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>5</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RIGHT FLANK</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEFT FLANK</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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</table>

### SIGNIFICANT BREAKER HEIGHT IN FEET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNIFICANT BREAKER HEIGHT IN FEET</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>35</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RIGHT FLANK</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEFT FLANK</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
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### LITTORAL CURRENT MODIFICATION TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KNOTS</th>
<th>MSI MOD</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### WIND MODIFICATION TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WIND SPEED IN KNOTS</th>
<th>ONSHORE WIND</th>
<th>OFFSHORE WIND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### WIND ANGLE RELATIVE TO THE BEACH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WIND ANGLE RELATIVE TO THE BEACH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0/90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### H (CONT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECONDARY WAVE HEIGHT: IN FEET</th>
<th>FEET</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### DEBRIS IN SURF ZONE: GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF OBJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### SEE STATE: CALM / MODERATE / ROUGH (CIRCLE ONE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CALM / MODERATE / ROUGH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary of Interview

On Aug 20, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I am the Second Platoon Sergeant. On the day of the incident I was on board Camp Pendleton attending the Infantry Unit Leaders Course. I checked into 1/4 in February. I believe it was February 21st of this year. When I checked in everyone was away at ITX. When they got back from ITX I think it was May 10. I received the Platoon a day or two after that and then I was with the Platoon until May 18, when I checked into the course.

No one really talked about AAV training to me. We had done the Mech Raid course, and I explained to them what AAVs are like when they splash. However, that was a conversation with just one squad that was in the AAV I was in.

I graduated from the Unit Leaders Course on August 4. I had held down the billet while I was gone. I think that had been with a Track company before.

I didn’t have any concerns that I could see during the limited time I had with the unit. The only thing I might have had an issue with was the underwater egress trainer that we did. The actual AAV dunker wasn’t working at the time, so we did just the SWET chair. I remember expressing that that didn’t really apply to a Track and that the training was kind of useless.

When I was with a Track unit before I did not get any training prior to working with the AAVs. The first time I got into a Track was when I splashed from the ship to SCI. I was last on Tracks from 2016 to 2018 when I was with 1/5 on the 15th MEU.
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: ____________________________
Activity: _______  Unit: ________

Telephone number: ____________________________

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of:
- Negligence

and that:

I have the right to remain silent.
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

- I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
- I expressly desire to make a statement.
- I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
- I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.

This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used.

Enclosure (116)
Summary of Interview

On Aug 3, 2020, the investigative team spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

The day of the incident started off pretty good. We had reveille and we did our normal operating procedures and spot checks. I think we did a little extra, but you can never be too safe or do enough to get ready. We had Marines doing pre water operations checks ops and we were generally preparing to splash. I know that every vehicle in my section did their pre-water operations checklist before we splashed that morning. The splash team checks were done by myself and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I had two Corporals help me out with this as well. We did the checks for the whole platoon.

We prepared to splash and then we got our vehicles into the well deck. Again, at that point everything was normal. It took 30 minutes to get the stern gate down and they finally gave us a green well. From what I remember, the plan was to go feet wet at 0700 and then go feet dry on the island at 0723. We hit center beach and then went through our raid. There were no issues with that portion of the day’s events.

We finished off the raid and then we started to retrograde. My vehicle had a bad clamp so we stopped briefly to fix that. We then went down to the assembly area, which was about 500 meters from center beach. We gathered at the assembly area and changed up a few things that led to me being the one that would take the Marines into the water. I was the acting Platoon Sergeant so I had to get accountability. I went through all the tracks with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and got a head count of everyone and ensured that everyone had what they needed.

Then came down with his Track, and along with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and the CO, we went through the numbers again to make sure we had accountability. Then we started to do our splash checks. We kind of did what we did before on the ship. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I did the pre-splash check. He was on top checking bilge pumps and I was on bottom with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) checking hatches, buckets, and bow planes. I remember at this time there was a Major who was reminding me that we had to go feet wet at a certain time, but I told him that I couldn’t make that time but that I would do what I needed to. This was the Battalion Executive Officer who was on the C-7 vehicle.

After we finished our splash checks, the last thing I need to do is get Comm with the ship. I was on Boat Alpha’s frequency. I couldn’t get them on comm so I got with the Major because he had comm with the
ship. I told the Major that I just needed a linkup grid to get to the ship and to establish conditions to linkup with the ship. At that point I rolled over to Boat Bravo and was able to get good comm with them. As I was talking to the ship through Boat Bravo, the Major was trying to get a hold of me let me know something. I really didn’t get what he was saying. I know the ship finally gave us the green light for permission to splash in the water.

In my opinion, condition set to get in the water means: the ship is tracking our movement. They acknowledge that we are going to be in the water. They never said to us that they would be conducting flight operations. They never gave us a sea state call either, but I don’t know if that was asked for or not. I do remember that I had specifically sent (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to do the surface observations. While we were in the assembly area, I told him to take your section to the beach and conduct a surface observation so we could get ahead of the game since I knew we had a four hour window before getting back into the water.

We finally got comm with the ship and we splashed. I remember the order of march being Track 9, the C-7, Pop, and then vehicles 8, 7, 6, 5, 3, and 1. I was the last one to splash. I had good comm with the ship at that point. I was asking them which way they were going to travel. From my perspective, it looked like they were heading north but they were going north east. I kept talking to my third section leader. I was asking him how far he was from the ship. I kept pulling out my kill switch and I see we are still in the boat lane. We got into our approach lane and I could see that the ship was getting further out. At that time I was the last vehicle, so I called in ship and asked them to execute a button hook so we could get closer. They did so, but they looked like they just pivoted on the spot. I kept asking my section leader how far he was from the ship. I think it was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I was talking to, he responded saying that he was about 2500 yards from the ship. I called the ship again and asked them to execute another button hook. At that point I was talking to a female voice who told me to stand by. I don’t know who it was, but shortly after that a male voice came on who I think was the Ship’s Captain saying that the ship could not go any slower because anything under 3 knots would be a problem. He said something else but he cut off. I do remember something about having a refuel helo inbound and he did say it will slow down for you guys to catch up.

As soon as he said that, I asked (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) how far he was from the ship. He said that he was making progress and that he was about 1500 yards away. When he said he was getting closer I told him I would do a gator square while the ship was refueling. At that point, someone started hot miking and comm became more difficult. I do remember hearing someone say “Oh Fuck” so I look to my right and I see track 3 was waving their November Flag.
At this point, I told my driver to head towards Track 3. At this point I think we were around 6000 yards from the beach. Waves were coming over the top of the vehicle at this point and we had all the hatches closed up.

We started the recovery process. It took us a good 7 turns to get the vehicle hooked up for tow because the waves were pushing us around so much. Once we finally got the vehicle hooked up for tow we started going back to beach. We determined that the beach was the nearest safe haven because at that point I couldn’t see the boat and I couldn’t see the rest of the tracks.

I lost comm with everybody at that point. I kept switching between the ship and the platoon tac. I know there was hot mic happening as well and that was making comm difficult. As I start getting closer to center beach that is when I started hearing the Lieutenant, Company GySgt and some transmission about LCAC’s being underway so I shifted left about 50 meters. When I came in and had a tow rope snap.

We made it back to beach. My driver heard over the radio and said I think a vehicle had sunk. I asked how did you hear that? But at that point I was trying to get comm with the ship to see if I could hear anything. As we moved up the beach, I popped my hatch open and asked 1stSgt and someone else and asked if we could get verification about a track that went down.

That morning, the vehicle commander for Track 4 and he gave the brief to all the infantry Marines who came to my section. I know that I saw bring in all of second section and do this for the Marines embarking on his vehicles as well. I know that had the life preserver on and that had briefed it, but I don’t remember much more than that. I don’t know if the use of the life preserver was briefed to the Marines in 2nd Platoon.

I collected the water pre-ops on the beach before we left. I know that I collected them and put them behind my turret with my kill switch. However, I have been unable to locate them since that time.

The issue with vehicle three ended up being a torn generator belt.
Synopsis of Interview conducted on 3 August 2020 with USMC, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 CAAT Platoon Sergeant.

The investigating officer began the investigation without reason to believe that gross negligence or a violation of the UCMJ had been the cause of the sinking. All initial statements were taken without article 31 rights advisements or waivers.

Upon arriving on USS SOMERSET, the investigating team set up Commander of Troops office. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

had been pre-positioned on San Clemente Island and was the aggressor force for the AAV raid. He stated the raid went well and then the end of exercise was called. He linked up with the Range Safety Officer and then had moved to the AAVs for transportation back to USS SOMERSET. He had 14 personnel from CAAT and 1 CHD Marine for a total of 15. They were spread loaded into different AAVs and then moved to a staging area. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Estimates that between 1100 and 1200, he had heard of one vehicle had broken down and noted there was a lot of confusion. He decided to teach his Marines some classes on the GPS and CASEVAC. Later, they moved to the West Cove beach. They waited for a LCAC to arrive with parts for the broke down AAV. After about 45 minutes of no sign of a LCAC he and the rest of the Marines loaded up and moved to the staging area for the AAVs. He was then told later that everyone was going to splash, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) believed it was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that told him, but he was not sure. But they wanted to get accountability so there was a lot of movement to ensure that they had 100% accountability. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) splashed in the P7 with the NOTM. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that they were in the water for awhile, but he didn’t know how long. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that he had served in a mech company before and had been in an AAV a lot. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that they were taking on waves but they didn’t seem too big. At 1743 he was told they were approximately 30 minutes from ship, he then said the next 5 to 15 minutes the AAV Marine in the back moved to the front of the AAV very quickly. He asked one of the crewman; “What’s going on?” The AAV crewman stated that an AAV was taking on water. A short time later, they opened the left troop hatch on his AAV. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) looked out, he said that he saw (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) from AAVs on top of his AAV getting a pole with a hook on it. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that it looked like there was 4 to 6 guys on the back of track 5 in life preservers. He stated that vehicle 5 possibly had an open hatch and they were 10 to 20 feet away from it. They moved their AAV within 10 feet from AAV 5 and Marine swam from another vehicle; he was a white male and he had no vest. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that there were Marines in the water but he was not sure how many there were in the water. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) pulled one Marine on board and then pulled in a second Marine, the second Marine was an (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) After helping the second Marine he lost sight of track 5. After assisting to pull the 2nd Marine from the ENCLOSEMENT (14)
water he did not see any one else in the water or the AAV. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was very complimentary of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) performance throughout. They continue to survey the area. They did not see any survivors at that point and they were taking on too much water so they had to close the hatches. They tried to open and close the hatch six or seven times and they finally got it closed. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said the driver still in the track and they lost the driver. Then everyone was trying to get counts for accountability. His AAV was the last AAV recovered that day and when he got out of the AAV onto the ship they were three guys getting worked on. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) offered great recommendations of things that his AAV platoon did in the past such as marking all AAVs with chem lights, running through safety drills, teaching everyone how to open all hatches on the AAV and more training at the UET and SVET trainers, training on the life preservers and the HAP bottles. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that at no point does he recall being given any type of safety brief by the AAV crews. He talked to the Marines in his AAVs about the chem lights on the handles and oxygen tanks attached to the vests they used to have with prior unit.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), agree that this is a correct synopsis of the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) statements I made to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred July 2020.
Signature (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Date 20200711

ENCLOSURE (116)
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT Aug 5, 2020

I make the following free and voluntary statement to whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me.

On the morning of the incident reveille was at 0300 and by 0330 we were down at the Tracks. The night before we had the Platoon down on the vehicles doing pre-ops and water pre-ops so when we got down to the vehicles that morning we were doing final preparations, getting the vehicles ready and doing final pre-ops so that at 0350 they could do the manifest with Combat Cargo. After that was done we got ready for the MACO drills with We then got everyone down and loaded one track at a time and the MACO went well. After the MACO was done we undogged whatever tracks that were left that needed to be undogged and then did final checks with the sections leaders. I was going through some refinements of the plan with and the infantry platoon commander over what each section would be doing. I also briefed my A-Slash, and my crew chief on the order that the vehicles would be coming off the ship.

Once we splashed, we noticed that the waves were a little bit rougher than what we had heard it might be. We had been told it would be a sea state one or a two, although I can’t remember who told us that. We were supposed to hit the cove in three waves, but we didn’t end up doing that because the cove was too small to fit everyone like that. Once we got on the beach we met the range safety officers who were in a van waiting for us. It was pretty much an administrative movement from there to get to the objective. The order of movement as we came up the beach was vehicles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13 (C-7), 14 (NOTM), and 12. We then started moving towards the objective with 3rd Section, which included vehicles 10, 11, C-7, and the NOTM, being left in the vicinity of the beach.

We carried on with the operation and conducted actions on the objective. Everything was going good at that point. I checked with Tracks 6 and 7 to make sure they were good. They replied that they were. After we completed actions on the objective we heard over comm that Track 12 was down due to an issue with their hub. We loaded the infantry back on the vehicles at that time in preparation to retrograde. Then called over the radio asking everyone to look in the back of their tracks for hub assembly parts. That held us up for a while as we all stopped to look for the parts Track 12
needed. We kept spare parts boxes in certain vehicles throughout the sections and that’s how we carry replacement parts. However, after we checked for the specific parts they needed we determined that none of the vehicles on the objective had the necessary parts, so we called back to the vehicles at the beach to see if they had it. We waited there for a while to see if we could get the replacement parts, but eventually we determined that we weren’t going to get them in time.

Around this same time I received word that my section would pick up the ADR Marines, so I stayed with Track 12 and sent Tracks 6 and 7 along the flight line to go pick up ADR Marines who were sitting across the flight line in the brush. After that we ended up waiting a few hours before we went back towards the beach. The Tracks that went back to the beach were Tracks 1, 7, 6, and then I was in the rear in Track 5.

Once we got back we staged the Tracks in an area just above the beach where the C-7 and NOTM vehicles had staged. I let them know that we needed to conduct a surf observation. Around that time we were also doing water pre-ops, we popped plenums on Track 5 and made sure everything was tightened down. We went down to the beach with someone to conduct the surf observation, I don’t remember who he was with though. After a while we got the vehicles staged in order and ready to splash we continued to do the pre-water ops checks. Then we were just sitting and waiting for the ship to give us the green light to splash. Comm were hard to establish at that point, we had a difficult time getting the Ship to give us the green light.

Eventually, said he got the green light from the ship to splash. The order we splashed in was Tracks 10, NOTM, C-7, 8, 7, 6, 5, 3, and 1. We splashed sometime between 1645 and 1650. Once we got out into the water a little ways I asked if he saw safety boats and he said that he did not. At some point, I remember hearing that the NOTM vehicle had lost buckets, I asked them if they were alright and they replied that they were fine. I remember that the water was definitely rougher than it had been in the morning. I radioed in and asked us how we were doing and I told him that we were fighting the swells.

After we had been going for a while I remember that kept asking how far he was from the ship. He replied that he was probably 3000 meters the first time he was asked, then he said he was 1,500 meters, then the third time he said he was 2,000 meters. asked if he should do gator squares when he got to the ship, I told him no because the sea state was bad and that he should just go straight for the ship and just tail it.

At that time Track 8 came over comm because the C-7 and NOTM were moving slower. They asked if they should slow down and do gator squares or just shoot past those two vehicles. Both myself and...
told Track 8 that they should just shoot past the C-7 and NOTM vehicles. I remember that around this same time there was talk over comm with the ship about trying to get them to slow down and do a button hook, but they responded that they were doing refueling operations and they couldn’t maneuver right then. Once I heard that I got on comm and told everyone that we needed to use this time to close dispersion with the ship while they were doing flight ops.

At this time I told everyone to button their hatches because we were eating waves at this point. I was sitting in the turret, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in the Troop Commanders hatch, and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the driver. I think I was about two and a half to three kilometers away from the ship when I gave the order to button up the hatches. I remember that around this time I asked (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) how he was doing and he said that everything was fine. I told him to keep an eye on the plenum indicators, and he said that the plenum indicators were up.

We were still moving toward the ship when (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said that he couldn’t see because of the swells. I popped my hatch so that I could direct him. The waves really smacking us at this point. I told (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to stay calm and that I had him and would guide him into the ship. At this point (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) came over comm and said that he is going to hook up for tow. I looked back and asked who he was towing and where to. He responded that he was towing Track 3 and was headed back to land. At that time, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) asked if we would be the safety vehicle for the two tracks headed back to the beach, but I said no because (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had it under control. Once Tracks 1 and 3 headed back I became the last track in line so I became the safety vehicle.

Around this time I radioed over to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to see if the stern gate was down and he said that it was. I also kept asking (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) if he was good, he said that he was but that he still needed help. I told him I got you.

At this point (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) came over, grabbed my leg, and told me that he could see water at the deck plates. I told him roger, I then got on the comm and tried to get in contact with anyone. I could hear myself keying out and talking, but no one was replying. I still think everything is ok at this point. I could see the water on the plenums and assumed that the water we did take on was from the swells and the hatches being open prior to having them shut. And that the water being seen over the deck plates was due to the motion of the track moving the water back and forth. I told (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that we had to throw some of the water out of the plenums and get to the ship. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said that he still needed help so I stood on the ring in the turret trying to direct him to the ship while still trying to key out over comm. At this point only my hatch is open.
I tried to radio over to Track 1 to see if they were good. I could hear them say something about "watch that swell" which I think was them talking to Track 3 as they headed back to the beach so I assumed they were alright. At that time Tracks 10, 8, 7, and probably 6 had already gotten on the ship but we were still a ways out. I asked if he wanted me to drive, but he said no and that he still had it but that if I wanted to drive that was ok with him. I thought he was still ok at that point, but I was getting ready to take over driving. At that point I got another pull on my leg from telling me that the water was getting a little higher and was moving up the boot. I responded by saying alright, just stay calm, I see the ship we just have to get closer. I then told that we had to get to the ship. I said there was some water in the back which I was sure was from all the waves that we ate. I just kept telling him to stay calm and that we had to get to the ship.

At that point I jumped out onto the top of the vehicle, grabbed the November Flag and started waving it. I was waving it probably 15-20 minutes trying to get someone to notice. I asked to see if he could get comm with anyone else and around the same time I heard asking what was going on. I then got on the radio and said “any track any track, this is Track 5, this is I’m going to need a troop transfer now.” After that transmission, I could hear myself click, but I couldn’t hear myself get out over the net. I asked if he could transmit he said no, so I told him to stay calm and that we just needed to get to the ship. I then started waving the flag again.

I think someone must have heard my last transmission because I saw the C-7 turn around. We were still moving in the water at this point. asked me how much farther, I said not far, just stay calm, we are about 1500 to 2000 meters away at that time. I asked if the bilge pumps were still on, he said that yes they were. I hopped up and looked at the front electric bilge pump and saw that it was still pumping out water.

Once the C-7 came up and I could see the driver I yelled “possible troop to troop transfer” and I told him to get behind me. I asked if he was ok and he said he was fine, so I said ok, let’s just get to the ship.

Around that time, came up and said that the water level was boot top him. I got back up on top of the vehicle and started waving the November flag again and started trying to key out again saying I need to do a troop to troop transfer right now. I then told to pop their hatches.

then came back and said that the water was getting a little bit high now. I said ok, calm down, we’re going to do an evac. He then popped the starboard side cargo hatch. They were having trouble
getting the hatch open, so I grabbed it and threw it open. I started telling the guys in the back let’s go, we’re going to evac. At this point the NOTM pulled up alongside and I told them that we were going to do a troop to troop transfer. I also told (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that we were going to transfer to another vehicle. I then told everyone to drop all their stuff and pop their life jackets. I looked down and saw that the water was still below the bench seat. I told everyone to calm down and that it was going to be ok, just pop your life jacket and we’re going to transfer, drop your stuff and get in the water.

At that point, I turned to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and asked if we were still good. He said yes, but that he thought we just lost power. The pitch of the engine had changed noticeably, so I asked him to put it in water tracks, which he did. One of the infantry Marines asked if they were supposed to drop everything, I said yes drop everything. Another one of the infantry Marines asked if he was supposed to drop his flak too, I said yes, drop everything.

At that time, a swell came over the vehicle. I remember saying “watch out” and that the Marine who was closest to the turret got pushed into the water. I said (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) “get out, get out, get out” and then everything starts to run together in my mind. I remember the Marines who are still in the back of the vehicle just looking at me. I remember that I got knocked off by a wave, and I remember swimming over to one of the other tracks which I think was Track 14. I helped one of the infantry Marines up onto that vehicle and then I climbed up and looked back and could not see any sign of Track 5. I think about 10-15 seconds had passed since I got knocked off the top of Track 5 and when I looked back from the top of Track 14.

The next thing I remember is looking at (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and he gave me a hand gesture of asking where and I gave him a hand gesture back pointing like in a vicinity of. And then I told the Marines on the NOTM that we needed to look for survivors. We were getting a lot of water into the vehicle at that point because we had the cargo hatch open so I went to help close it. We had some difficulty getting the hatch closed, but eventually we were able to get it. We then started looking for survivors. We saw one life jacket come up but there was no one in it. I saw the C-7 vehicle moving towards two Marines who had come up. We then saw a life jacket and a Kevlar, so we moved in that direction and found out that it was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) We managed to pull him out of the water, he still had his Kevlar and rifle with him at that point. We took that off and I started doing CPR on him. While I’m doing that, they keep looking for other Marines. Eventually, while I’m doing CPR on (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I saw some water come out and then I saw some foam and blood come out. We felt a light pulse, so I kept doing CPR until I started puking at which point I told (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to do CPR. We checked his pulse again and we couldn’t feel anything.
We kept checking for other Marines but we didn’t see anyone. The swells were getting bad at this point and almost knocked me off the ship, so I made the call to head back to the ship. At no point during this incident did I see the ship stop. As soon as we got on the ship, we stopped and handed down. I then went immediately to the C-7 and said that we needed to get accountability. I asked the C-7 how many did they take and they said two, I asked how many they took and he said 6 including myself. Based on their answers I knew we were missing 8 individuals. I asked if they had brought on and they told me that they hadn’t seen him. After that I was mainly involved in getting all the Marines together and checking on the infantry Marines that I had on my track.

I did the pre-water ops checks prior to splashing back towards the ship. We did this where we had consolidated with the C-7 prior to moving down to the beach and splashing. It was that did the surf observation. The splash team checks were done by because he was the last one to splash. I did topside checks with I checked the bilge pumps, hatches, and plenum indicators. I remember checking the bilge pumps because there was still fluid in the hull that got pushed out onto the ground when we checked.

Other tracks in the section have had issues before this, but Track 5 has always been a reliable vehicle. The only issue we have had with it is that we would often have to replace the fan belt, but we haven’t had to replace it in a while. We usually have ride with us instead of but he remained back because of COVID. The engine stayed running the entire time during the incident. Even though I heard the engine pitch change, I never heard it stop entirely.

During the incident I remember that the NOTM vehicle’s bow plane struck the front starboard side of our vehicle. When that happened, I was on top of the Track 5 with . There were probably four people total on top of the vehicle at that time, but I don’t remember who the others were. I felt like I was in control, no one was panicking, the vehicle wasn’t filling up with water in a rush or anything. I felt like I had complete control of everything. It was just that one swell that did it at the very end.

Signatur ate 20200925

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Second Statement

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT (2 Sep 2020)

I make the following free and voluntary statement to ________ whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me.

I did not have any experience with MEU’s prior to being CHOP’ed to the 15th MEU. I was in UAE when I first got the word that we were taking on a lot of bad vehicles. I went to UAE to conduct NATIVE FURY, but we weren’t assigned any vehicles prior to going on NATIVE FURY. Once we got back we fell in on the bad vehicles. When we CHOP’ed to the BLT I knew that we had some admin deadlines. I remember talking to ________ and saying that we needed to talk somebody because we can’t accept these vehicles like this. With the MEU we are supposed to be ready to go and be up. He said that he would go talk to ________ who told him that he would have to fix them anyway. After that I just stepped back and did my job. I told the Marines that we had vehicles to fix and the plan was to just LTI all the vehicles, start fresh, and get everything done that needed to be done on the vehicles.

During RUT my vehicle, Track 5, collided with Track 4 while in the surf zone. The only thing we replaced was the gypsy rack on Track 5 and they did welding on the bow plane on Track 4. There was also some damage on the antennae mount for Track 5 and they had to replace that as well.

I’m pretty sure that the day we moved from Del Mar to the ship was a Monday. There were no issues with that movement. Everything went smooth.

Once we got on the ship we did regular PMCS, pre-ops, and water pre-ops. There is nothing major that I can remember with Track 5. With Track 6 I know we did work with the plenums and hydro. I also know that they were trying to trouble shoot Track 8’s electric bilge pump. There was nothing major with my vehicle though.

The regular procedure for pre-ops and pre-water ops is that everybody does it. From the vehicle commander all the way down to the rear crewman. There is a pre-operations checklist that they have to follow. My biggest thing is that if it says something on the checklist like “check this front bolt” that you might as well check the whole assembly to make sure everything is good. We did that every day. The A-slashes then collect the checklist and then give them to the Section

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ENCLOSURE (20)
Leaders. We then go through it to identify any discrepancies. I’m pretty sure my vehicle had contaminated road wheels and something was wrong with the plenum indicators on Track 6. We gave the checklists to the Maintenance Chief and he would brief Gunny on what we had. The night before we did pre-ops and then the morning of the operation we went back through and made sure nothing crazy had happened overnight.

We brought the Bravo Co. Marines onto the vehicles the night before. I had give them the Vehicle Commanders brief, which covered the do’s and don’ts and the egress and evac drills. They came on the vehicles and saw what they’re allowed to touch, what they’re able to do, what they can’t do, what to pull what not to pull, and if we called this what they’re supposed to do once they’re on top of the vehicles and then trigger lines as far as water. The trigger lines are that if water gets to a certain point to notify the Vehicle Commander. I let do the actual briefing, but I was standing beside them.

The morning of the incident, there were no issues heading to the Island. After actions on the objective and everything was done we had the time so we went through the vehicles and checked everything. Usually during any training, once you stop you take time to check to make sure everything is still good. And then before you splash, when you’re in the staging area waiting, you do the pre-ops and the water pre-ops.

Once we got back to the beach, I said that the transmission oil was low. We had the plenums up already so I had him and work on it. They did not tell me how low it was. I can’t remember how much, I’m pretty sure he said not that much, but I’m not sure. He did add oil, but I’m not sure how much. I know that he got some oil from the oil jugs that we carry on the Track, and I remember asking one of the other Tracks for oil once we got staged.

After that we were getting accountability with all the ADR Marines that we added.

Once we got into the water to head back to ship, I had to keep an eye on the plenums to make sure they were good. He asked me what I said so I told him again and he looked over at the plenums and said they were up. After closed his hatch, I was talking to him and asking him if he was good. He told me that he couldn’t see anything, so I started to verbally direct him to the ship. During that time I had my hatch open in the turret and was standing up so that I could see better.

I’m not sure when comm helmet stopped working, because I had been talking to him earlier and just asking if things were good back there and he would respond “looking good SSgt.” I had worked with before. He has been my Vehicle Driver since we got
back from UAE. When we had the NOTM vehicle beside us, I thought we lost power. The Track went from idling high to idling low, which told me that water had hit the generators. This meant that the Track was running off the batteries. So I told the crew to throw it in second gear to see if the tracks would spin, which they did. This told me that we weren’t completely dead in the water. I had put it in neutral and tried to ease it because trying to fight the swells with the Track beside us wouldn’t have been good.

When the cart first told me there was water at the deck plate level we were still moving and, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) my thought was that the vehicle had water in it and that was because of the swells we were fighting and with the Track motion going with the swells, that the water was pushing back and forward. Even with that, I still called it over comm so that someone was still tracking. We still had power and we were still pushing, so we just kept going.

I’m not sure if the comm was still working at that point or not, I just know that he was coming over to me to tell me this. At this point there were no other problems or issues with the vehicle. At that point it was just me trying to reach out over comm. I could still hear everybody, and I could hear myself keying out. I said it and didn’t think it was anything major at that point. I just said we had water inside the vehicle, and we kept driving.

When the water got up to the boot I was still trying to get comm. The comm wasn’t working, I could still hear myself talking with the crew. I told him to see if he could get out over comm. At that point I jumped out because no one could hear me. I was the last vehicle in the water. So I grabbed the November flag to see if I could get anyone’s attention. I got back on comm while I was waving the flag and I could still hear everyone else talking. I could hear asking what was going on out there. I just kept trying to talk to the other vehicles saying that we needed to do a troop transfer. I asked the crew how it was looking and told him to keep pushing because we still had power and the nearest safe haven was the ship. I was still waving the November flag. The crew was asking me the distance to the ship, which I relayed to him. I’m also still driving and still trying to key out on comm.

I didn’t have any communication with the embarked personnel, other than telling them to stay calm and keep everyone calm. I told him we were good and were going to keep pushing and that the bilge pumps were still on and we still had power and we were still moving. I remember telling the crew that we were getting closer and that it was just a little bit longer.
I got the attention of the NOTM vehicle once they alerted me that water was boot top high. The C7 was behind me at that point and the NOTM was near the ship when it turned around and came back to me. As soon as they got close I yelled over that I needed to do a troop to troop transfer right now. They drove around me. At some point either right before or right after that I told the Lieutenant to pop their hatches. I let know we were about to do a troop transfer and to just pop one cargo hatch due to the sea state, but I told him to wait until the NOTM got around because I didn’t want a wave to come over.

So the NOTM came over. They were in water tracks. We popped the cargo hatch and we got the Marines up top. When the NOTM came in I was sitting on top of the turret telling the embarked Marines to drop their stuff. When they hit I looked over and checked their bow plane to make sure it didn’t snap. I then told the Lieutenant to calm down and they took over. At that time, I’m pretty sure that’s when the vehicle went from idling high to idling low. The NOTM backed up and you could see that was stressing. I still had Marines up top. At this point I’m still sitting on the turret. Both hatches were popped at this point the turret and the t.c. hatch. I think hatch was still closed. I know hatch was popped because I remember him asking me if we were going to do it or not and I said yes, we are about to get your guys to another track.

The C7 was in the back at this point. At that time the Marines in the back were dropping their stuff, life jackets were inflated and they were just waiting to come up. I could see the Marines looking up and I was saying just stay calm, stay calm, we are going to get you guys to another track.

Before this, the Marines in the back had had some trouble getting the cargo hatch open because of the weight of the hatch and the movement of the vehicle. So that’s when I grabbed the front of it and threw it open and then stepped on it to ensure it locked in place.

When Marines evac vehicles in this situation they are supposed to drop everything in the track and just leave it. They should then get in the water and pop their life vests.

had looked at me and asked “are we doing it?” At that point he started coming out of his hatch and I put my attention back on the Marines coming out of the back of vehicle. That happened at the same time as the NOTM hit us and I was talking to the NOTM vehicle crew and telling them to calm down. There was four people up top, the two LCpl's, and I think was there too. had come up as well and was on the starboard cargo hatch.
I was sitting on the turret trying to get the guys up top. As soon as
you said my flak too?” I said yes and as soon as I
said that a swell came over and it went in the vehicle and pushed it
down and pushed the Marines on top off. I was on the turret and got
pushed off. I grabbed one of the Marines up top that was sitting
closest to the turret and pushed him into the water and was telling
get out, get out, get out.” I think I got knocked off as well at this time. I didn’t get out, he went down with the
vehicle. I got knocked down by the wave as well. At this
point there was maybe 10 to 15 meters of distance between us and the
NOTM vehicle.

As soon as I got onto the NOTM, I started looking for other Marines
thinking that since they had popped their life jackets they would come
up soon. I think I was in the water for maybe 5 or 10 seconds before
going to the other vehicle. I think the waves were coming at
different intervals. We would get swells doubled up, almost right
behind one another, and then another swell would be 5 seconds apart.

Prior to this incident we had not done any amphibious training with
Bravo Co. One of our normal crewman was also not available for the
exercise. I don’t remember telling to do anything during
the incident besides we were going to do a transfer. I just remember
telling (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to pop his hatch and telling (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to pop his
hatch. I’m pretty sure I told him to get up top and saying “let’s go
sir, I’m going to get you and your boys off. You and your boys are
all going to do a troop transfer.”

When the water got up to boot top high, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said it’s climbing
up towards the bench seat, that’s when I knew that I needed to do a
troop transfer. My plan was to have them jump off the vehicle into
the water and be recovered by the other AAV.

The A-slash is my assistant section leader, which is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I had never done a MEU prior to this. Prior to coming out here I was
on recruiting duty for three years, and before that I was an 1833 in
Hawaii.

Signatu: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) _Date_ 20200925
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS WITH CLEANSING WARNING

Name: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)  
Rank/Rat: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)  
Activity:  
Unit:  
Telephone number: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I have been advised that I am suspected of violating the following Articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: 

Description of Duty, Negligence, False Official Statement

I have been advised that:

[Initial]  
I have the right to remain silent.

Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial or other administrative or disciplinary proceeding.

I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.

I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.

I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

I understand that the statement I made previously at court martial and cannot be used against me, and that I can sue or wish if I want to.

200902

Understanding my rights under U.C.M.J. Article 31, I wish to make the statement attached on the following pages.

ENCLOSURE (12)
Summary of Interview

On Aug 18, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I was the watch chief on duty the morning of the incident. I came on duty at 0800 that morning. My shift was 0800-1600, but I did stay on shift the entire time. I remember that there was a delay in them to getting to the island that morning. I believe that they did not meet certain objectives that they were supposed to. I think this was because there was something broken or something of that sort.

I wasn’t on the radio during the day, but I was monitoring the chats. My understanding is that they were trying to source parts from the Ship to fix whatever downed vehicle they had. We were trying to confirm who had what parts in the quadcons to see if we could gather the parts together and send it to the AAV.

I don’t remember any specific conversations about them asking permission to come back to the ship, but then I wasn’t monitoring the radios where they would have made that call. I was mainly focused on how to find the replacement parts and figure out exactly how those parts would get to them.

I do not remember the conversations that took place about how the AAVs would come back. was the watch officer who would have been handling that. I don’t recall the exact time but there was talk of an AAV getting a lot of water. Maybe 15-20 minutes later, I got on the radio and heard the call that an AAV had gone down. I passed that message on SIPR and also told that this is the radio message I got. I did not recognize the voice on the radio that said there was an AAV down.

As soon we got the call from the AAV, immediately went to the COC and started coordinating how we were going to help the Marines out there.
Summary of First Interview

On Aug 5, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I am the Maintenance Chief for the AAV Platoon. Once we hit the beach that morning, we did a quick suspension check on the vehicle and everything checked out. We then went through and started completing the objectives for the raid. After that, we went to the LZ where the helicopter was. Since everyone was in position for the raid, who was our rear crewman, to check the suspension around our entire track. That is when we noticed that the hub was blown out. Both the inner and outer bearings as well as the seal were gone.

Once mentioned that, I got out of the track to assess the situation. I realized that I didn’t have the replacement parts in the pelican case that I had in the Track with me. I then told what parts I needed to repair the vehicle in order to get it down to the beach.

Once the raid was completed, came over in his Track to assess the downed vehicle. He determined that it wasn’t repairable without getting the replacement parts from the Ship. From there I got the NINs that were going to be required to repair the vehicle. At that time, and were going through different COAs as far as leaving me there on the island with the vehicle. It was decided that I would stay with the vehicle on the island. I did not get the parts until the next day.

While I was there, I didn’t really have good communication with everyone on the beach. My understanding was that the rest of the Platoon would go back to the Ship and get the replacement parts that I needed.

That was the only maintenance issue that I was tracking the whole day. From the time we got into the water there was no other mechanical issue that I was aware of. Track 1 needed a clamp for their exhaust, but I had the replacement part in my pelican box so we were able to get that vehicle fixed and down to the beach with the rest of the vehicles. I know that Track 3 had issues on the swim back to the Ship. From what I understand they had an issue with their generator belt.

The only maintenance we had done on Track 5 was that we had replaced the PTO on it. This was done back at the ramp on Camp Pendleton.
Maintenance runs were conducted after that, and we had done at least two ship to shore movements, one when we got the Track onto the Ship and one when the Track had gone to San Clemente Island. From talking to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) after the incident, I am not aware of anything mechanically that failed on Track 5 until they got too much water in the vehicle and the engine started to fail.
Summary of Second Interview

On September 2, 2020 the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I got to the Platoon on January 6, 2020. I did not go to NATIVE FURY because I was pending going to the resident career course, although I ended up going to the seminar. I started at the end of February and graduated on May 23. I was in the career course when they CHOP’d to the BLT. We did the MEU LTI’s on April 20, which is when they were supposed to CHOP to the BLT and I was still in the career course at that time doing the seminar program once a week after hours.

When they did the LTI process I was not there. That is when 3rd AA Bn was doing the alpha team/bravo team switch-off due to COVID 19. The NATIVE FURY Marines had just gotten back off of ROM and I was put on the Bravo Team with and that week during that process we were told to remain in our residence.

I do know that 12 of 14 vehicles were deadlined on the CHOP date. When I first got to the Platoon we had our original gear set of 13 or 14 Tracks and those vehicles were getting CHOP’d over to Alpha Co. After that, we were told that we were supposed to be receiving the 11th MEU vehicles. My understanding was that those vehicles were operational since they had just sat for a few months while everyone was gone at NATIVE FURY. After talking to I discovered that half of those vehicles were scheduled to go to RCCA, which is the Return to Condition Code Alpha. RCCA is the process of completely refurbishing the vehicle, stripping it down and replacing whatever needs to be replaced. This happened in March. At that time the rest of the Platoon was over at NATIVE FURY. I spoke to and he instructed to identify more vehicles to send over to the MEU that were not scheduled to go to the RCCA program.

After that, we received 7 vehicles and out of those 7 they had to tow 6 to me. After they had towed those vehicles to me, I went through and LTI’d those vehicles and told Battalion maintenance and that the vehicles were deadlined and that we didn’t have the personnel available to get those vehicles up. We didn’t have the personnel available because we were supposed to CHOP to the BLT on April 20, and the Marines were supposed to be in ROM until April 20. I was told that they didn’t have any other vehicles to give to us and those were the vehicles we were going to get no matter what.

I brought this up to informing him that the vehicles were deadlined. We weren’t able to LTI the 11th MEU vehicles until April 20. That is when we were able to identify that 12 of 13 were...
deadlined. From that time we had a week and a half before we had to conduct the EOTG Mech Raid with BLT 1/4.

I was able to receive minimal support from Battalion maintenance to get those vehicles ready. They didn’t have a lot of maintainers available due to ongoing operations with MCM, GS, and the ongoing Alpha Team/Bravo Team set up made things difficult as well. So we came up with our own plan for how we were going to get the vehicles ready for troop embarkation as well as being able to shoot gunnery. We were able to repair those vehicles for that operation. They were still deadlined for any water operations, but we knew that we were not going to be doing any waterborne operations during that time. After that it was pretty much back to back with the work ups we were doing and repairing the vehicles throughout that timeframe.

I was able to get a few mechanics and repair parts from the Battalion. If the DSI had parts they were willing to give it to us. Since the vehicles weren’t CHOP’d to the BLT until they were off of deadline, the BLT wouldn’t support us with money to fix the vehicles, but 3rd AA Bn was able to provide us the funds. As far as welding support, there was zero support from CLB-15. CLB 15 is supposed to be a third and fourth echelon support for us. I don’t know why they didn’t provide support. Requesting welding support was like pulling teeth and we went back and forth on it. (b)(3). (b)(6). (b)(7)(c) saw that we weren’t getting support and he provided his engineer capabilities for us and we were able to get the welding done.

By the EOTG Raid Package, we had the vehicles repaired to the point where they could conduct land operations. I’m not sure when they were repaired to the point where they could do water operations. I know that we were continuously working on the vehicles.

The EDO transfer to get the vehicles over to the BLT took about a month due to the supply at 1/4 and 3rd Tracks. There was an error message that they were receiving in GCSS which did not allow 1/4 to receive that gear set. They didn’t start funding our parts and repairs until about two weeks before we did PMINT. For the entire work up cycle we were receiving money from 3rd AA Bn. Our FAD code did not increase until the vehicles were accepted by 1/4 so we weren’t getting any priority for parts or anything like that.

I definitely think that as far as how the vehicles were turned over to us, and the Marines being at NATIVE FURY, did not allow enough time to ensure that maintenance was done on those vehicles. We got our gear set and then a week and half later we were going out to the field. We came back, did maintenance, and then two weeks later we were going out to the field. That coupled with how much training we needed to do on top of the maintenance made things difficult.
By the time we did the exercise, the vehicles were cleared for water operations. When we swam to the USS SOM, we had been conducting maintenance the entire week before that event. When we swam to the USS SOM we had one lateral drive that exploded in half, so that vehicle had to continue in water tracks. I had the parts to repair that vehicle on the USS SOM and I was able to get the vehicle operational within 30 minutes. Another vehicle had a broken actuating arm for the buckets, but those were the only issues we had on the swim to the USS SOM.

We did not have a 9 Block on the USS SOM. Back in March I had sent a list to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) (c) and he had sent the list to the supply officer for CLB 15. But when we got to the USS SOM there were no parts available whatsoever. The only parts I had were the ones I had brought in my field sustainment kit that I stocked with parts based on my experience with the vehicles. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was trying to figure out why we didn’t have parts on the ship.

On the USS SOM there was a Track that needed a new Digital Display Module so we had to deadline that vehicle. We fixed the actuating arm on the Track that broke down on the way to the ship. We also had to repair a servo amp and the buckets on other Tracks.

On the swim to the island everything went well and no vehicles broke down. Once on the objective, the hub on Track 12 exploded. We had a lot of difficulties getting the parts to repair Track 12 because there was no 9 Block or SecRep list on ship. I knew I had the parts in my quadcon and that’s why I wanted to send (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) back to get the parts.

I stayed on Track 12 after that, which was located about 30 minutes from the beach. There were no other Tracks nearby. The other Tracks consolidated by the beach. I don’t have any direct knowledge of any maintenance issues that occurred on the beach that day since I wasn’t there.

If the volts in Track 5 went from 27 to 19 you would experience a degraded electrical system and the electric bilge pumps aren’t going to be able to bilge out the water as well. You would also experience a degraded power transmission for the radios. Basically the entire electrical system on the vehicle will be degraded.

It does not sound routine to me to put in 6 gallons of transmission oil. That would be a lot to put in the vehicle. There are a lot of different ways that you could lose 6 gallons of oil. The only maintenance that was done to Track 5 that could have affected the transmission oil is maybe the hoses going up to the PTO.

There were a few crews that were moved around. I know that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was still moving crews around as far as gunnery and what worked for the platoon. As far as my mechanics, I kept them on each section.
was my go to maintenance Marine and I knew that I could trust him to trouble shoot any gear set.

I fed mechanism to let Bn know what our maintenance issues were. I know that 3rd AA Bn used a Materiel Readiness Brief to track maintenance issues within the units. However, because we did not own the vehicles yet, the issues were hard to track. The vehicles that would eventually belong to the 15th MEU AAV Platoon belonged to multiple difference companies at that point. The 11th MEU vehicles still belonged to the 11th MEU, and the vehicles that would come from GS and MCM Platoon from H&S Co. still belonged to H&S Co. Because of this you couldn’t see all the maintenance issues that the 15th AAV Platoon was having unless someone specifically brought it up to the CO’s attention.

If Track 5 was completely out of transmission fluid and you put 6 gallons in it would still run and the vehicle would still float.
Summary of Interview

On Aug 18, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I was in the Troop Commander (TC) hatch of the Network on the Move (NOTM) vehicle during the incident.

That day was my only experience on the AAV. I was the radio operator for Bravo command, which is the command team that battle tracks everything, which meant that I needed to ride in the comm vehicle. I was the only passenger in the vehicle on the way to the beach. The water was rough on the way there to the beach but it was my first time on an AAV so I didn’t think anything of it. On the way back to the ship, when we were sitting on the beach, anyone who was on the beach and looking at that water would say I do not want to go in that water. That is just me being personal with my very limited experience. We sat on the beach for a while and I fell asleep in the hatch just waiting. After about an hour later we decided to start moving back to the Ship. I didn’t have a comm helmet on because the helmets they had in the vehicle did not fit my head, so I did not have internal comm during the incident. However, I could tell from the faces of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the crew chief and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the driver) that something was going on.

We were going to ship and everything seemed normal, but I noticed that it seemed to take a long time to get to the ship. I thought it was kind of weird that the ship kept going further and further. Then I asked (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) if it was normal to take this long to get to the ship. After approximately 15-20 minutes. I started seeing (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) turning back to look behind us and I heard him say “Get over there right now.” I looked back and saw that someone was on top of Track 5, and they were waving a flag around. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then turned our vehicle around and we headed back towards Track 5.

Once we got to Track 5, we accidentally bumped into their vehicle. The only person who was completely out of the vehicle was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I could see that the big hatch in the back on the right side of the vehicle was open. I could see inside the vehicle and I immediately knew that there was way too much water inside of it. At that time, some of the individuals jumped from Track 5 and made their way to our vehicle. I was on top of our vehicle at this point and was pulling people out of the water and helping them into our troop compartment. Once we got those individuals in, I turned around and that is when I saw Track 5 sinking. At the time I didn’t realize how
many people were still in Track 5 because they were not trying to get out of the hatch. I assume that the people inside the vehicle were either already drowned or drowning because they were not trying to get out. The individuals who got into our AAV knew what they were doing because they got out of the vehicle as quickly as they could. There did not seem to be anyone scrambling to get out of the vehicle after the first group of individuals exited.

After I got back down into the cargo area of the vehicle there was a moment of shock as everyone started taking in what had just happened. I started telling people to keep their heads in it and just do their jobs when I heard someone screaming that the hatch wouldn’t close. I started trying to help close the hatch, which we did eventually get closed. At that point I heard either yell that there were life vests in the water. I think it was and that had come up. We pulled into our vehicle and saw that he was foaming at the mouth. Then started performing CPR on him.

Prior to this event, I had gone through the helo dunker, but I had never done any egress or evacuation training that was specific to the AAVs. The night before we went to San Clemente Island we had done some safety training on how to egress the vehicle and operate our life vests. However, I feel like things were easier for me since I was in a seat with a hatch so all I would have had to do was open the hatch to egress the vehicle. From what I heard talking to some of the Marines in Bravo Company, their understanding was that if water rose to knee level that is when they would know there was cause for concern.

During the incident, as soon as we got over to Track 5, got over to our vehicle very quickly. He was probably one of the first ones on top of our vehicle since he was helping pull guys out of the water. I wasn’t too focused on who was where, but I know he was definitely on our vehicle helping pull people out of the water because he was the only one wearing desert cammies. While was on our vehicle pulling people out of the water, Track 5 was still on the surface. About three minutes passed between when we bumped into Track 5 until the time it sank. When we pulled up to Track 5 I could see down into the vehicle through the cargo hatch and noticed that the water had risen to mid-torso level of the Marines standing in the back.

When we first pulled up to Track 5, I remember that the TC hatch and the driver’s hatch were open. I remember that there was no one in the TC hatch, but I am not sure about the driver. I specifically remembered that I pulled out of the water and looked over and saw Track 5 still afloat. I remember that we had gotten everyone
who was in the water out and then into our vehicle before I turned back around and saw Track 5 going under.
Summary of First Interview

On Aug 5, 2020, the investigative team spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

On the morning of the incident, reveille was at 0300. We made our way down to the vehicles and got them ready. I think that the infantry came down at around 0500. We got our MACO drills down and then moved our vehicles down into the well deck at around 0745. We were supposed to splash at 0700 but there was a conflict with the Navy so we didn’t splash until around 0800.

I think that four vehicles had splashed off the ship before they started ground guiding us into the well deck where we splashed. We made our way to San Clemente Island. We noticed that it was a bit rough. There was some gear that got detached from the vehicle in front of us that we tried to recover but couldn’t. When we were about 800-1000 meters away from the beach my vehicle started having trouble with the buckets, so I passed that to the Pop vehicle over comm and then we proceeded in water tracks.

First section had already made it to the beach and were de-conflicting some issues with range control. We then had to wait for all the vehicles to get on the beach and then we proceeded to our positions. We were doing battle tracking while the raid continued. At some point we got word that there was a mechanical issue with Track 12’s hub so we were helping to coordinate to see if we could get replacement parts from within the Platoon or if we needed to get them from the ship.

Later on, the rest of the Platoon came back to where the CoC was staged at and we were getting ready to splash back to the ship. They were doing splash team checks and getting ready to head back. Eventually we splashed back into the water, at first everything seemed good, but the farther we went the worse the sea state got.

During the movement we got word that Track 3 was having issues, so they had to hook up for tow with Track 1. Their safest haven was the beach so they had to turn back. I was sitting in the turret at this point and could see that the water was going over the plenum. I was talking to my driver about what to do if the vehicle died because of the sea state. I told him to be prepared but to stay calm and restart the vehicle. At this point my driver’s hatch and the troop commander’s hatch were still open. Shortly after this I had my driver shut his hatch but we left the troop commander’s hatch open. I think that the waves were coming from west to east at this point.
From there we started having issues with the buckets again. I can't remember which one it was, but I think that the starboard side bucket kept closing. I had the rear crewman working on it, and he could get it working again, but it would only last about 30 seconds before it started malfunctioning again. After a few tries I made the decision to continue in water tracks.

At this time we were about 500 yards from the ship. I kept hearing Track 5 trying to key out over the radio. It sounded like they were trying to key out. I got comm with the C-7 and they said they were going to help the Track with the November Flag up. That was the first I was aware that someone was waving the November Flag so I started looking around. As soon as I spotted the flag, I told my driver to turn around. When we got close enough I lifted my comm helmet to hear what was saying and he said "we need to do a troop transfer." I started telling my crew to get ready to do the troop transfer.

When I got to the side of Track 5, the cargo hatch was up. I could see the grunts in the back. I could see the water almost to the bottom of the fuel cell. We got so close that we hit Track 5. We were trying to get close enough to do the troop transfer that the waves pushed us together. The Marines in the back of Track 5 were in about waist deep water.

At this point, I was on the top of my vehicle with my starboard side cargo hatch popped. The guys were already in the water at that point. I remember that was already behind me, and I was reaching to pull an infantryman up. I then looked up and saw the nose of the vehicle pointing at the sky and it was sinking. I remember that was still in the vicinity of the turret and he finally got off. I remember that was yelling his name and was very upset.

I stayed kneeling where I was for about 10-20 seconds stunned by what had just happened and waiting to see if anyone would come up from underwater. I think we got two gators and maybe four to five infantrymen into our vehicle. No one was able to jump to our vehicle from Track 5, they all had to swim over.

After that, we tried closing our hatch and there was something stopping it from closing. We were worried about this since we were starting to take on water, but was able to find an eyelet that had gotten stuck near the hinge and was preventing it from closing. Once we removed the eyelet we were able to get the hatch closed. From there we started looking for survivors.

We finally did see a survivor. We made our way over and got him onto our track onto the plenums over by the driver's station. Started doing CPR on him until eventually he stopped and I took over.
We kept looking for bodies in the water. The safety boat was in the water at that point and had gone to the C-7 and were heading back to the ship. We tried to signal them, but for some reason they didn’t stop. We made the decision to head back to the ship, so we headed that way. At this time we had the Marine that we pulled out of the water still on top of our vehicle.

We finally got back on the ship and gave the injured Marine to the Navy personnel who then started working on him. From there we worked on getting accountability.

I don’t know why we chose to do a rough sea transfer by getting so close to the vehicle. When I pulled up next to Track 5 my main concern was just getting everyone out as quick as possible.

For chow in the morning, we had established that we would send crewman to the chow hall first and then the crew chiefs afterwards. The chow hall was open early that day to accommodate everyone.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) conducted the pre-ops check that day. They would have turned their checklists in to Splash team checks were done by I normally do them before the SNCO’s go through just to make sure that everything was good so they don’t have to redo it. I did the splash team checks on the C-7 and Pop that day with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
On Aug 19, 2020, the investigative team spoke with [redacted] regarding his recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I turned my vehicle around to help Track 5 because I could hear them trying to get over the net, but I couldn’t actually visualize them due to the dispersion of the vehicle. Finally, at about 100 to 150 yards from the stern gate I saw what appeared to be Track 5’s November flag up. That’s when I immediately told [redacted] my driver to turn around. I couldn’t tell if he was waving it vigorously or if it was just the wind. I could see a Marine standing on top of Track 5 with the November Flag. Once we got closer, I knew it was [redacted] waving the flag. At that point in time, the vehicles in front of me were already in the stern gate. At this time, the C-7 was to the rear of Track 5.

Vehicles 10, 8, 7, and 6 bypassed my vehicle and recovered first because we had to go into water tracks during the movement from the shore to the ship. I can’t remember who I told this information to, I either told it to Papa Sierra (AAV Platoon Sergeant) or I just pushed it over the net generally.

Before I saw the November Flag, I didn’t know that there was any vehicle in distress. All I heard was Track 5 repeatedly trying to key out. I just kept hearing “This is Track 5...” and then I wouldn’t hear anything else. Then I remember hearing Papa Sierra trying to ask questions to paint his awareness of what was going on. At this point I couldn’t see where Track 5 was at so I radioed over to the C-7 to see how they were doing and that is when they told me that they were assessing the vehicle with the November Flag up. It was [redacted] that told me this. At that point, I started looking around to see if I could spot the November flag, but I still thought there was no way and that [redacted] would have told me a long time ago if there was a vehicle with a November flag up.

At this time I kept scanning while I had my driver continue pushing towards the ship. When I finally saw it and told my driver to turn around I think we were 100 to 150 yards away from the ship. When I saw the November flag, that’s when I finally realized that something serious was going on. I immediately rogered up to Papa Sierra [redacted] what was going on and that I was going back to help. [redacted] acknowledged and asked if it was Track 5. I told him that I couldn’t tell at that time. He then asked how far I was from the ship and from the track. I told him that I was a lot closer to the
distressed vehicle so I was going to go over there instead of going to the ship. I think that when I turned around I was 50 to 75 yards away from Track 5.

At this point in time, when I was talking to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I knew that it was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on the top of Track 5. I think I was about 30 yards away when I knew it was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on top of Track 5. He was standing in the turret with the flag. I'm guessing that he must have gotten the flag and then gotten back in the turret.

As we approached the vehicle there was no one on top of the vehicle. The driver’s station was closed, I think the Troop Commander’s hatch was closed as well, but I’m not sure. At the same time, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was asking me for more information, but I’m not sure what he was saying because at that time I had one earmuff up as I was trying to listen to what (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was saying. As soon as I got close enough he was yelling “troop transfer, troop transfer.” I think I was closer than 30 yards when (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was yelling this. We were port to port as this was going on maybe 10 meters apart.

I then told (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to get on the other side of Track 5 because the water was pushing us together. This was also when I could see their starboard side cargo hatch open when I came around. I think that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was preparing them to get out at this point, but I'm not sure. No one was in the water at this time. We then tried to turn because the swell started to push us, and this is when our bow plane hit Track 5.

After that the swells pushed us farther. The Pop was able to turn back towards the ship. I told my driver to put it in neutral and lock it. We had popped our hatch and the guys started swimming toward us. From there, I was up top with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and he was assisting me with the guys coming over from Track 5. I also had (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who had come out of the Troop Commander’s hatch to help on top of the vehicle as well. We were pulling personnel out of the water on the port side aft, helping Marines up by the gypsy rack. I don’t remember who we pulled out of the water. I remember that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the first gator to get on the Pop.

From there I remember helping someone else out when I heard this gargling sound. I helped the guy out of the water and then I looked up and saw Track 5 sinking. I think that three or four individuals in addition to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had made it to our vehicle before I saw Track 5 sinking. I remember that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the last one I helped up. He was the last one to jump off the turret.

After we got (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that is when we were having trouble closing our cargo hatch. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the one that helped us get the hatch close when he noticed that something was blocking it. After we got the hatch closed we stayed around to look for survivors.
We saw one person come up, so we went over and got that individual out of the water. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) helped me get the body out. That individual ended up being (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) The Marines I assisted aboard my vehicle were wearing just lifejackets, no flaks or kevlars, and the lifejackets were inflated.

When I got my vehicle close to Track 5, right around the time we got close enough to bump into Track 5, I was able to look down into the vehicle through the open cargo hatch. I saw the Marines in the back of the vehicle and the water was to the bottom of the fuel cell. At no point in time did anyone jump from the back of Track 5 to the back of my vehicle. Once we were parallel they started jumping into the water to get to my vehicle.

I remember that all the infantrymen were wearing green cammies, the gators were wearing woodland FROGs, and the ADR Marines were wearing desert FROGs. Once I saw Track 5 sinking, that is when I saw (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) jump off the turret and swim over to my vehicle. I actually helped him out of the water and onto my vehicle. Between the time that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) got onto my vehicle and the time that Track 5 sank I think that 2 to 3 minutes may have passed. I don’t specifically remember seeing (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) getting onto my vehicle. I can’t really remember his face though.

Before Track 5 went down, I don’t remember if anyone was directing the individuals in the back to get out of the back of the vehicle. I can’t recall if anyone was giving the command to get out (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) later told me that he had told them to get all of their stuff off and leave their life jacket on, but I don’t know when that would have happened.

When the vehicle sank, I saw (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) jump off the turret. He was standing on top of the turret and then jumped off.

The night before the exercise I know that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) gave an embark troop brief. I asked him about it that evening and he told me that he did.
On Aug 5, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

On the morning of the incident, reveille was about 0300. We changed over and got down to our tracks and made sure everything was good to go. We checked comm and got the gear stationed and stood by until it was time to pick up the sticks that were going onto our Tracks. I think we hit the rack the night before around 2200 to 2300. We were practicing onload drills until fairly late in the evening. We also got the briefs on what we would be doing the night before.

We started picking up our guys and it was chaotic. The timelines seemed to keep changing on us and we didn’t know when we would be pushing out. We finally pushed out of the back of the ship and it seemed pretty calm. We had very little issues on the way to the beach. One of the vehicles had to switch to water tracks, but we were able to get to the beach. We set up the CoC and the other tracks headed towards the objective.

We had some issues getting comm with the other vehicles during the exercise. We heard that Track 12 had some sort of problem with their hub. They were trying to do a quick fix and get the Track back to the beach. It took them a while to figure out what was going on with that Track.

Eventually everyone came back to the beach. I switched out drivers so that could drive onto a ship for the first time. The sea state looked calm to me from where we were. I could see white caps in the distance though. I think that it was around 1300-1400 when I was looking at the sea state.

After they got comm with the Ship, they decided to push out to the Ship with what we had. We lined up on the beach one at a time to splash towards the Ship. had comm with the ship and was asking for the go ahead to splash.

Eventually we did splash and everything was calm. We got out past the kelp bed and after that some of the Tracks started to struggle to stay in line. We all got a bit scattered and the sea state changed. The waves started getting a lot bigger and a lot choppier. I noticed that it got worse the closer we got to the ship. I noticed that the Pop was struggling. We were the third vehicle in line at that point.
I remember that we were around 4,000 yards away from the beach when I heard that that Tracks 1 and 3 were headed back to the beach. We kept moving, I could hear over comm saying that he was taking on water, although it sounded garbled. At that time, my impression was that he was just noting that it was happening just everyone would be advised as to what was going on.

We kept going and at some point I looked back and saw waving the November Flag. I got on comm and let everyone know what was going on. Track 5 was the last in line at this point. I said over comm that we were going to go set up for a troop transfer with vehicle.

We started heading over that way and got about 50 meters away. At about that time Track 5 started gunning their engine, which I think was them attempting to engage their hydro bilge pumps to get the water out of there. Track 5 did not look that low in the water at that point. I could see that the driver’s hatch and the Troop Commander’s hatch were both closed. I could also see that the Track’s jets were still engaged, and there were rooster tails coming out of the back of the vehicle, which indicated that they were still under full propulsion. From what I remember, we approached bow to port, with my vehicle off of his eleven o’clock.

We got off to his portside, about at his seven o’clock and were following at a distance of about 50-100 meters. was still on top of his vehicle trying to keep his track going. I think we were following like this for a few minutes. The vehicle seemed to be moving pretty fast at this point.

We kept pushing and eventually we ran into the Pop, we could see that the Pop was trying to get closer to Track 5. We slowed down and were trying to see if we could support them too. We saw two individuals get in the water. I think they were trying to get people out of Track 5, which had stopped at this point. We got on the port side of the Pop and had lost sight of Track 5. I saw two people in life vests come up on top of the Pop.

After Track 5 went down we saw debris start to come up. We saw things like main packs and life vests. Eventually we saw a person come up, so we went over to help. The Major and started debloosing and dropping their gear. I grabbed the boat hook and got ready to help. We got on the bow plane and pulled out of the water. All he had on was his Kevlar and his WEC. After we got him on board we started looking for more individuals to pull out of the water. We then saw one body come up without a WEC on, but you could see air coming out of him. I think this would have been about two minutes after the Track went down. We got the boat hook and were maneuvering to get him onto the Track when the Major jumped into the water and started to pull him towards us. We were able to pull him up.
on top of our Track. He seemed to be breathing alright. I don’t know who he was since he didn’t have name tapes on.

The rescue boat eventually came up right on top of our bow planes. It actually landed on top of our track and hit on his ankle hard enough to make him start screaming. I grabbed the boat’s rope and started pulling it to get the boat over to us. It took them a while to get into a position where we could do the transfer. We helped move over and then the other Marine as well. At some point after the boat came over I had take over as the driver and had stand by at the cupula to see if he could help in anyway.

After we got the two survivors into the boat, I took over as the driver. I stood by the Pop vehicle just to monitor them and make sure they were ok. Eventually, we moved back to the ship. Once we got back on board the ship, everyone got out and we were standing by to see if we could help in any way.
Summary of Second Interview

On Aug 19, 2020, the investigative team spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I was the C-7 vehicle commander during the incident. I knew that Track 5 was in distress when I heard (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) say over comm that he was taking on water. This was after Track 1 had gone back to the beach. At this point the Pop Vehicle was in front of me. When I heard (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) say that he was in distress I think I was about 400 meters away from Track 5. They were behind us to my right at that time. The Pop vehicle was closer to us than we were to Track 5 at that point.

Once I heard that Track 5 was taking on water, I looked back and saw the November Flag waving. I then had my driver turn our vehicle to starboard and started heading back to Track 5. At this point I could see (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on top of Track 5, on the exhaust plenums, vigorously waving the November Flag. I couldn't tell if any of the other hatches were open on the vehicle at this point.

I don't know exactly where the Pop vehicle was at this time. I know they were in front of me when I turned towards Track 5. I was closing with Track 5 with my port side to their port side, I didn't get close enough to do anything. I remember when I got close they started gunning it. I think that I got about 100 meters away. Once I got that close, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) started pointing forward towards the ship, and motioning me to get behind him. My impression at this time was that he was trying to engage the bilge pumps to save the Track as best he can. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was holding onto the turret at this point.

They started moving, so we got behind them. At some point they met up with the Pop Vehicle. We tried to move up slowly because they had started the transfer at this point. The Pop had tried to get close enough to them so that they could transfer the troops by having Marines jump from one vehicle to the next. I'm not sure if anyone transferred at this point. I remember seeing life vests popped, I think they were trying to jump but the water condition made it difficult.

I remember seeing three individuals on top of Track 5. I remember that the port side cargo hatch was open on Track 5. I also remember seeing (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and two others on top of the Pop trying to grab boat hooks to move the vehicles closer. I lost sight of them for a minute due to the waves and the fact that the Pop vehicle was blocking our view.
Although the Pop vehicle was obstructing my view, I could still see part of Track 5 as it went down. We then started to look for survivors. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the first one that we picked up. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) used the boat hook to get him close to the bow plane, and then we lifted him onto our track. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was doing CPR and we kept looking for other survivors. Sometime later we saw another individual come up without a WBC or any PPE on. From what I could see it looked like air was coming out, like he was still breathing. As soon as we got close enough, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) jumped in and moved him closer so that we could get him onto the track quicker.

As Track 5 went down, I couldn't get a really good angle to see who was standing where. I could see that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was standing on top of the Pop. I think that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and one other individual were in the water trying to get on the Pop at this time. Track 5 had not sunk at this point, but it was in the process of sinking. The Pop and Track 5 were about 15-25 meters apart at this time.

I think that about 5 minutes passed between the time that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) indicated that I should get behind him and when it sank. During the five minutes we were behind them, I think they were trying to close the gap with the Pop so that they could do a troop transfer. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) seemed like he was trying to coordinate with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to get the vehicles close together. I believe there were also two individuals sticking their heads out of the cargo hatch getting ready to move. I think they must have been standing on the benches. At this time I could see that the Drivers hatch and TC hatch were closed but that the turret was open. The two Marines sticking their heads out of the cargo hatch had kevlars on.

I did not see anyone else in the water as Track 5 was going down. I did not see a wave knocking anyone off of Track 5 or anything like that.
I, [redacted] , make the following free and voluntary statement to [redacted], whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me.

I have been in the fleet about 2.5 years, this is my first deployment. On the day of the incident we woke up around 0300 and started getting ready. I was assisting the maintenance chief, going vehicle to vehicle seeing if anything would come up but nothing did. We eventually got into our vehicles and then the grunts loaded up. I don’t remember getting briefed on the scheme of maneuver for the day or anything like that. I do remember the Lieutenant came to our rooms the night before and gave us the rundown on what was going to happen that day, but I don’t specifically remember the scheme of maneuver being briefed.

We then got the vehicles staged on the well deck and got ready to splash. I remember the sea state being rough when we went in the water, but it was nothing too crazy and the vehicle was pretty dry. We had a few drips coming in, but nothing terrible. I was in the rear crewman’s position at this point.

Eventually, we got to shore and then pushed to the objective. Sometime after we got there, I remember that Track 12 went down, so I got out of Track 5 to work on it. I think that the bearings had seized up, which caused the hub to heat up. When I looked at it, the hub was gone and the bearings were gone and it was just the support arm studs left. I was working on Track 12 for about two hours, mostly we were waiting for the replacement parts.

At some point I was told to get in the back of Track 5 so I did and we pushed back to the beach. Once we got there we were doing checks of the vehicle. At some point I let me know that the oil pressure was reading a little bit low, so we opened up the plenums and I climbed in to see if I could figure out what was causing it. When I got in there, I could see a lot of dirty grease and oil but I couldn’t tell where it was coming from, so I asked to turn the engine on so I could see if oil was squirting out anywhere. As soon as he did I noticed a PTO leak coming from the mounting bolts. I tightened the bolts down and that got the leak down to a very slight drip. We then put more oil into the transmission and checked the oil pressure level and determined that it was good to push since the pressure wasn’t dropping low. I was there working on this the whole
time, but came in at different points to help out.

While this was going on I did not help out with the rest of the pre-water ops checks for the vehicle. After they were done, I got back into the vehicle and we waited for a while. Eventually we splashed into the water again to head back to the ship. I felt that the sea state was worse than it had been in the morning. After a while I heard some splashing around so I looked down and saw water at the deck plates. At this point I didn’t think too much of it since water at the deck plates is something that Trackers are used to. However, I did want to let know what was happening. I was wearing a CVC helmet but the internal comm wasn’t working so I took the CVC helmet off, climbed over the infantrymen and went to tell what was happening. We had the back of the AAV configured with the rear center bench seat in place, but the front center bench seat was not. Some of the packs were at the back and were strapped down.

Once I got up to I tapped him on the boot to get his attention, and told him that we had water at the deck plate. He said good to go, thanks for letting me know. I don’t think that he thought too much of it since water at the deck plates is something Trackers have seen before.

After I told about the water coming in the vehicle, I made the decision to sit down in the A-gunners position so I could keep talking to the SSgt if I needed to. I borrowed a cell phone from one of the infantrymen so I could use the flashlight to monitor the water level. I noticed that the water moved from deck plate level to ankle level pretty quickly. However, I feel like it stayed at ankle level for a while without getting any higher. I let know that it was at ankle level and he said ok, thanks for keeping me updated. I kept seeing feet get out of the turret, I don’t know what he was doing, but he may have been up top waving the November Flag.

Eventually the water rose to boot top level and I let know again. I asked one of the grunts to feel one of the bilge pump tubes to see if he could still feel it vibrating and he said he could. This would have been the port side aft bilge pump tube which is one of the electrical bilge pumps. The Marine I asked to feel the tube is not a tracker though, so I’m not sure if it was really running or if he was just feeling vibrations from the engine. I asked him to check the electrical bilge pump because I could hear a squealing coming from the engine, which I thought could affect the electrical pumps. I think the electrical system was still working at this point but I don’t think the generator was charging anything, because I checked the voltage regulator and it was red. I remember that the rear dome light
was still on at this point, which is why I think the electrical system was still working.

The water then raised to boot top level. I think that between boot top and calf level was on top waving the November Flag. I had gone to let him know the status of the water level again, but he wasn't in the vehicle commander's hatch. I then went over to the Troop Commander's hatch and asked him where the was and he told me that he was on top of the vehicle waving the flag.

Once the water got to calf level was back in the turret again and I let him know that we had to get the troops out of here. He said he was tracking. I remember that the engines sounded rough at this time, although it felt like we still had water propulsion. I know that the vehicle was put in water tracks around this same time because I could hear it. I think that may have been a last ditch effort to get the Track to the ship.

At this point, yells down at me that we have to pop the hatch. The infantrymen had not gone through the egress training, they had only gone through the SWET trainer. I know this because I had been talking to them in the vehicle prior to everything happening. A couple of them were standing up at this point, so I told everyone to sit down. They were all kind of freaking out at this point. I told them all to tighten up the waist bands on the life preservers. At this time everyone is still wearing flaks and kevlars. I then directed a Marine to go over to the hatch handle and told him to be ready to turn it when I told him to. I then waited for the go ahead from the SSgt to open the hatch, but when I looked he wasn't there. I didn't want to make the final decision to pop the hatch because I know that puts the track in a very vulnerable position.

I then ran over to again and asked him where was and he told me that he was on top of the vehicle waving the flag. I said ok and ran over to the turret and yelled up to him asking whether we should pop the hatch. He told me to go ahead and pop the hatch. I went back down and got my forward hatch handle open but the grunts were having trouble opening their rear handle. There were six of them struggling to open it, I was yelling over at them trying to direct them how to open it. I could see that the problem was that they didn't have the latch handle turned over all the way. Once I was able to tell them how to do it they were able to get it open. From what I remember the hatch locked once it was open. I saw my SSgt up there. I lifted myself up and had my feet dangling down into the troop compartment. I pulled up by his flak. I don't know what SSgt was doing at this point. I think I saw get out of the track as well. Everyone was freaking out at this point. I heard saying don't worry about your rifle don't worry
about your pack because all the Marines were trying to grab their stuff.

At that point a wave came and crashed in. Prior to this happening, I think the water was at bench level. When the wave crashed over the vehicle started to pitch backwards into the water, rear-end down. I stood up and ran over to the driver’s hatch. I’m not entirely sure what happened next, but I remember grabbing onto the hatch handle trying to get it open. I think I got dragged down a few feet under water before I finally let go. I’m not sure if I managed to open the hatch or not, but I swam back to the surface and over to Track 14. By the time I made it over to the other Track 14 I couldn't see Track 5 anymore.

We then climbed onto Track 14. I remember that I got onto Track 14 last. We went into the troop compartment of the vehicle and I remember that the cargo hatch wouldn’t close, so I had to help them close it. There was an eyelet that had gotten stuck in the hatch and was preventing the hatch from closing. Once I got the hatch closed we grabbed someone out of the water and started doing chest compressions on him. I grabbed the Marines flak, but it was who actually pulled him up onto the track. Eventually I got back into the vehicle and was talking to a Sergeant who was telling me to keep my head in it.

We tried to yell to the safety boat as it passed by us to get it to stop and take off the injured Marine we had pulled out of the water, but they passed up by. So we proceeded back to the ship in water tracks. It seemed to take forever to get there, but eventually we did manage to get back on the ship. At that time I was on top of the vehicle helping to hand the injured Marine down off the top of the vehicle. There was a lot of confusion about what was happening.

At some point during the incident, around when the water was mid-calf level, I looked over at the engine panel and there was water spraying out from behind it. It was really hot water and it was continuously spraying out. I think this indicates that the exhaust plenum must have collapsed and allowed water to fill up the engine compartment. I don’t know if the intake plenums collapsed or not. This was after the SSgt had checked the plenum indicators and said that they were up.

During the incident, I was the only 2141/1833 in the back of the vehicle. The troops being embarked on the vehicle never received an embark troop brief at any point that day that I know of. They were also not briefed on how to use the life preserver that day, although I think they would have received that training during the training leading up to the event. No one gave them a formal brief on how to operate the hatch handles or exit the vehicle or anything like that. However, I made it a point to talk to the infantry Marines as we were
moving around that day and I spoke to them about what the different handles were for and what they did.

Signat: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)  

Date 2010 09/23
I, make the following free and voluntary statement to whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me.

I don’t specifically remember the date that we showed up at the Del Mar Boat Basin to splash out to the ship for the first time. I know that we showed up late in the morning, around 0800 or 0900, and that we splashed approximately at noon. I was on Track 5 at that time and B Co. was not with us during that movement. There were no issues during that movement that I’m aware of.

This was my first MEU deployment. Before attaching to the MEU, I had gone to EXERCISE NATIVE FURY 2020. I was originally an assistant maintenance chief, so for all of the other field operations we had I was on Track 12 with my maintenance chief. However, the second section mechanic had tested positive for COVID so I had to fill in his spot and ended up on Track 5.

We had a number of vehicles deadlined when we went to the MEU. I think we had 13 of 14 vehicles deadlined at one point. The plan to fix it was to just grind it out and fix it as quick as we can while still doing things the proper way. The way I felt about this was that our Platoon had always kind of gotten fucked over. We had some pretty bad vehicles before we got the vehicles from the previous MEU. We ended up getting rid of those and giving them to Alpha Co. We were going to have all of the 11th MEU’s vehicles, but the Oceanic Task Force that just pushed out ended up taking a bunch of vehicles from us. I feel like 3rd Tracks just said “fuck you, here’s a bunch of really horrible tracks and old vehicles.” We ended up doing LTI’s on those and they ended up being some of the worst tracks that we had seen, but we got dealt the cards we got dealt so we worked on the Tracks we were given.

Although I am usually the assistant maintenance chief, I have experience working in the back of an AAV and have done so many times. There were no issues on Track 5 when we went to the ship from the Del Mar Boat Basin, I think there were a few vehicles that lost water steering but we fixed it on ship. Usually, once we get vehicles staged whether it’s a land movement or a water movement, each mechanic will check in with their section and address any question or concern no matter how big or small. For the most part though once we got onto the ship there were no major concerns. We took a quadcon to the ship.
that had spare parts in it. The issues that we did have were that Track 9 stopped reading water temp so we ended up leaving that Track on the ship for the exercise. We never even had to turn a wrench on Track 5. Track 5 has always been our power Track, it was a pretty strong Track.

Pre-ops are mostly done by the operators, but I usually just wander around during the pre-ops to make myself available in case any of them have any questions.

The night before the exercise the Bravo Co. Marines all came down to the Tracks. I was off to the side along the bulkhead of the well deck just watching what was happening. From what I saw they gave embark troop briefs to the majority, not just one Track at a time. After that they were showing them around the Tracks although I couldn’t say what they did specifically. I think they may have shown them around the inside, showing them the hatches and everything. I know these guys didn’t do the egress training so maybe our guys were showing them that.

The morning of the exercise we got on the vehicles early. I don’t remember if they did a pre-op that morning or not. I don’t really remember that morning very well. I remember that there were no issues moving from the ship to the shore. During the time we were on the island I remember that the driver, had mentioned that his transmission oil was running low. I remember thinking that we had time so we popped the plenums, I went inside and looked over at the PTO and there was a slight oil leak coming off of what looked like the PTO meets the torque converter. The PTO is the Power Take Off, it controls the hydraulic pump, the cooling fan, the left and right lateral which propels the water propulsion system. The PTO sits right on top of the transmission and there’s a gasket in between it and there are studs that go through the transmission to the PTO and you tighten down the nuts on the studs. When I went down there I saw some wetness, I know that Tracks leak a little bit, it’s a giant diesel engine so it will get oily, but there was a little bit more in there than should be accepted. So I checked the mounting bolts and they were a little bit loose, like they had backed off a little bit. So I grabbed my 9/16 wrench and torqued them all down. I double nutted one that I saw had backed off a little more than the rest. After that filled it back up with oil and after that I didn’t hear anything else about it. I don’t remember how low the levels were when I filled it up and I don’t remember how much we filled it up with once I fixed it.

I know that we checked this when we did the pre-ops on ship we would have checked the transmission oil. Somewhere in between there we must have lost the fluid. said that his transmission oil pressure was reading a little bit low, but nothing too crazy. After
tightening the nuts, I went and sat back down in the back of the Track and nothing else significant happened before we splashed.

Before all that happened I had been involved in helping Track 12. I helped them clean up as much as they could. Basically the bearing hub had welded itself to the support arm so I had to reshape it for the new set of bearings that we would have to put on that Track. We had seen that before on that Track so it wasn’t anything crazy.

When I was in the back of the Track as we pushed towards the ship, I lost comm pretty quickly so I couldn’t hear what they were saying on the Tracks internal comm. I was mainly communicating via voice. The only thing out of the ordinary at that time was that we were rocking back and forth a lot.

I know that at some point we might have ended up loosing electrical power. Once you take on water and it gets anywhere near the generator you’ll hear a lot of squealing from the belt that indicates you have water at the generator. Once I heard that I checked the voltage regulator and it was red, which indicates that the Track isn’t charging. I know that the marine clutch solenoid runs off electrical, and that runs the water propulsion drive. The Driver’s Display Module runs off electrical and that tells you all the volts and everything. The water propulsion switch is electrical. Comm is electrical. The parker valves, going back to the hydraulic, or the buckets, for water steering runs off the electrical system. So there’s a lot of stuff in the vehicle runs off the electrical system. However, a lot of those systems will still run at 19 volts. Just because the Track’s generator stops charging the four batteries can still be used.

I first noticed the water getting into the vehicle once it was at deck plate level. Once I saw that I dropped my comm helmet and climbed over all the grunts to get to the A-Gunner’s seat. I had the grunts pull out their cell phones and they were using them to create light. Once I got up to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I tapped him on the boot and let him know that there was water at the deck plate and he said “thank you, I’m tracking.” I then stayed in the A-Gunner’s spot because I didn’t want to be climbing back and forth so I stayed there and continued to monitor the water.

I don’t remember the exact time, but I think the water rose from the deck plate to the ankle level pretty quickly. It was hard to see exactly how high the water was because it was super oily and you couldn’t see through it. So I grabbed one of the grunt’s rifles and stuck it down into the water to see how high the water rose on the butt stock.

Once the water rose to ankle level I decided to let them know again. I told him that the water was at the ankle and he sort of just acknowledged again. He was still in his hatch at that point. I
believe that they were still in their hatches too.

The next time I spoke to him was when the water was at the boot top level. At that point I remember screaming up to him, "Water is at boot top, we need to start thinking about getting these guys out of here." I know that boot top level is when you do a troop transfer and get the embarked personnel out of the vehicle. I remember him saying that he was tracking.

I don’t remember exactly when it was done, but I know that at some point he got out of his turret and started waving the November flag on top of the vehicle. I know this because I went over to where was sitting in the troop commander’s seat and he looked out the sight glasses and though it was blurry said he was up there.

I know at some point I heard the generator squealing. I also know I heard water tracks kick on, but I don’t know if he did that because he lost water steering or if he had just put it on to help him. Other than that I’m not aware of any mechanical problems.

At that point we had water at the boot top level. I got back into the back of the Track and started talking to the grunts. I told them all to look at me and told them “These are the cargo hatches. These are the handles that will open in case we do end up opening them. We’re not going to open them yet.” I took the one with the lock on it since none of them had done the egress training and I thought this would mitigate any confusion. I then told them “I need one of you guys to grab onto that handle and practice turning it and opening it.” So one of the grunts grabbed onto the handle, gave it a turn, and then locked it back up. I then told them all to look at me and told them to grab onto their WEC’s and tighten their belts. I also had them look for the patch that should be on the outside.

After that I stood by and kept monitoring the water. I think that got back into the turret at some point. The water started raising even higher and it got to within a few inches of the bench seat level. When I had told that the water was boot top high there was no instruction given to open the hatch. Also, I knew that the grunts had not done the egress training because that is what they had told me. We had been talking all day and that was just one of the things they mentioned.

I was about to make the decision on my own to open the hatch but I was nervous to open it on my own because if I do so and something happens then that’s 100% on me. So I yelled up to through the turret and said, “The water is getting really close to the bench seat” and he told me to pop the hatch. So I went back to the grunts and said “Okay, we’re going to open the hatch.” I opened my handle.
all the way and the grunt opened his handle, but failed to open it all the way. He got to within two inches to where it would have opened and then they all started freaking out and pushing on the hatch trying to force it open. I screamed at them and told them to sit the fuck down. I then told one person to turn the handle an inch more, and they did so and it flew open and locked in the open position.

I then got out through the hatch and sat down on the edge with my feet hanging inside the Track. I then grabbed (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and pulled him up. At this point (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was standing on the cargo hatch. I pulled (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) up and he was sitting on the other cargo hatch as it was closed, and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was also sitting on top of the vehicle. I don’t know if they still had their gear on. I know some people were trying to drop their gear and some people were able to do so successfully and some people didn’t. I screamed at them to stop dropping their gear because a WEC can float a fully combat loaded Marine.

Within 50 seconds of us opening that cargo hatch a giant swell came in and flew right over the cargo hatch and into the back of the hatch. All those Marines back there were standing on either the center bench seat or the starboard bench seat and the water splashed in there and took out their feet. I looked down and saw all of them laying on the deck plate just looking up at me.

The back filled up and the Track started to go down in the back. I then stood up and ran to the front of the Track and grabbed onto the driver’s hatch handle. I knew that my driver was still giving the vehicle R’s because the Track was still running. I tried to open the handle and I could feel him trying to open it on the other end, but I couldn’t get it open. The next thing I remember, I swam over to Track 14.

When Track 5 started to sink I think that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was floating just off to the side. I have no idea how (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) got off the vehicle. When I was on top of Track 5, I think that Track 14 was 25 to 30 meters away from us so I didn’t really notice them or even worry about them. I wasn’t even looking over there. Once the Track went down though, I think I swam maybe 15 feet to get onto Track 14. When I got onto that Track, I think that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was still in the turret.

I have been in the Marine Corps for almost three years now and I have been in the water multiple times in an AAV before. I don’t remember putting any chemlights on any of the hatches. We may have had them and I just didn’t notice them because those chemlights are not that bright. I have seen the AAV Common SOP before, but I don’t think that I could quote from it.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the normal second section mechanic, but I had to fill in for him since he was out due to COVID.
I know that the cargo hatches were leaking on the way back to the ship, but it was nothing outside the norm. I do know that when I was sitting over near the turret I saw water spraying out from behind the engine panel. It wasn’t just leaking, it was a full pressurized spray all the way up to within a few inches from the top of the panel. At this time the water level was probably near boot top high.

During the incident I had green frog cammies on. I also had flak and Kevlar on. I know I dropped my Kevlar in the Track, but I don’t know if I dropped my flak inside Track 5 or Track 14. I don’t remember when (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) got off the vehicle, but I think that the vehicle just sank beneath him and he floated up. When I got over to Track 14, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in the back with one of the comm/data guys, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was driving, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in the turret, and I think (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in the TC. We ended up pulling (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) out of the water. We had a problem closing the cargo hatch, so I had to remove an eyelet in order to get the hatch closed.

Signature (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Date 2000
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS WITH CLEANSING WARNING

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Name
Activity: ________
Telephone number ________

Unit: 3RD TRPS

I have been advised that I am suspected of violating the following Articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: Deseretion & Duty, Negligence, False Official Statement

I have been advised that:

[Initial]

I have the right to remain silent.

Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial or other administrative or disciplinary proceeding.

I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.

I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.

I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.

I expressly desire to make a statement.

I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.

I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.

This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

I understand that the statement I made previously to is not admissible at court martial and cannot be used against me, and that I can still remain silent now if I want to.

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Understanding my rights under U.C.M.J. Article 31, I wish to make the statement attached on the following pages.

ENCLOSURE
Summary of Interview

On Aug 5, 2020, the investigative team spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I was riding in the back of the C-7 Vehicle during the incident. I have been through the UET trainer, and the last time I have done a swim qualification was two years ago. There were only three working comm helmets in the vehicle and all of them were given to people that needed them. Three helmets worked fully, and one helmet could only receive. I was seated in station four in the C-7 vehicle, at that time our driver was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in the cupula. Was in the Troop Commander’s hatch, I remember seeing (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) rushing up to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had been sitting in Seat Three. I saw him come back, and then (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) went up to talk to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

At that time we were told to make sure that all our equipment was on and secured properly. From that point it felt like a lot of time passed while we were trying to get ahold of Iron City (call sign for USS SOM). At that time, the majority of people went up top to help get people in the vehicle (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was on comm calling for life boats.

At some point, I went up top to see if (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had any word to pass or if they needed any help up top. On top of the vehicle at that time were (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I think three other people. I could see that we had taken one individual out of the water, and there was another Marine still in the water. We were trying to give direction to the driver to get the vehicle over to the Marine still in the water.

I remember that the life boats came over and we were trying to transfer the two Marines we pulled out of the water. I was going back and forth trying to pass word to the people who were on the comm. We were relaying information to Iron City and to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I remember that comm with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was fairly spotty and I had to ask him to repeat his last a few times. The life boat that came up to us was a small black boat. We stayed out for a while trying to look for other survivors, but we didn’t see anyone.
Summary of First Interview

On Aug 5, 2020, the investigative team spoke with [REDACTED] regarding his recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

On the morning of the incident, reveille was at around 0300. We woke up, got dressed and went down to the ramp. We went over our pre-ops to make sure everything was good to go. We went through our MACO drills, we had staged all the gear the night before so we were mainly just getting the guys onto the right track. We had one person on our track, he wasn’t a grunt, I think he was a comm guy, I gave him a brief on how to inflate his life jacket and so on. I told him everything you would need to know in order to get into the water.

Eventually we splashed. The water was fairly rough but I wasn’t too worried about it. We got to within 300 meters of the beach when our starboard bucket went out. We had the mechanic in the back trouble shooting it, but I just went into water tracks. We got onto the beach shortly after that and everyone went to their own positions. We set up the CoE near the beach and that’s pretty much all we did during the exercise was just monitoring comm. It took about an hour to an hour and a half for them to complete the raid. I know that Track 12 blew a hub and I heard them trying to coordinate getting the repair parts.

I’m not sure if they did get the parts, I wasn’t really tracking that part. Eventually we pushed back down to the beach later that day and conducted all our pre-ops and splash checks. When we determined everything was good to go we splashed. We were the second vehicle into the water.

We made it a decent ways out before our buckets went out again. While we had been in the CoC I had had my mechanic working on it. We thought we had it ready, but about halfway to the ship it went out again. We tried to fix it again, but it kept going out so I just decided to push in water tracks. We weren’t that far off, but the swells were pretty big at that point. It felt like we were in a roller coaster, you could be at the bottom of a swell and the top of the next one would cover the ship so you couldn’t see it. At one point we smacked down into a wave hard enough to kill the engine.

We were probably 200-300 meters from the ship when I heard something about there being a track that was sinking. We already knew that Track 1 had been towed back by Track 3, so we were confused about which Track was in trouble. We started looking around. We had our hatches closed when [REDACTED] finally spotted Track 5 and said to pop hatches and that we had to go back an help them.
By the time we got there, they already had the cargo hatch popped and were trying to get people out. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was on top of the vehicle, but I don’t remember who else, if anyone, was on top of the vehicle at that point. I could see that some of the guys in the back had their life vests popped and were trying to get out. I think that the Track was sitting very low at this point, maybe about six inches of water.

We couldn’t get right next to them because the swells were so bad so we went down current of them and people started going off the side and swimming over to us. Then it just turned all of a sudden and went down. Prior to it going down I don’t remember seeing Marines getting out. However, as it was going down I remember seeing (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and maybe a few other Marines getting off. I remember that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) didn’t get off and we were looking for him and it was long enough that we feared for the worst. We saw a few bodies come up with their life preservers so we went to pull them out of the water. I remember giving chest compressions to one of the Marines we pulled out of the water. I remember the safety boat come out of the ship and going to the other Track and then back to the ship.

After the safety boat went back to the ship, we decided to push back to the ship ourselves. As soon we could we passed the injured Marine down to the Navy personnel in the well deck. I didn’t have a whole lot of maneuverability when I got so close to Track 5, I was mainly just trying to get the transfer done quickly. I think it was probably a wave that hit Track 5 at the last moment that caused it to go down. It took maybe two to three seconds for it to go down.

I did the pre water op check on my vehicle at the beach with my crew chief. I turned the completed sheet in to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) For the splash team checks, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) checked a few things and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did the rest of it.
Summary of Second Interview

On Aug 19, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

From the time we left the beach until our buckets went out I think that maybe 20 to 25 minutes passed. I tried to fix it, and at first the fix worked, but the buckets kept going out. They went out three of four times before we decided to switch to water tracks the rest of the way. I think that 40 to 45 minutes passed between when we left the beach and when we switched to water tracks the last time.

In the splash out to the ship from the rain room on Camp Pendleton we had issues with the vehicle as well. It was still the same problem though, the buckets kept going out. It took longer before we lost the buckets that time. Once we got on ship we replaced the servo amp on the starboard side I think. I can’t remember if it was port or starboard, but I know we replaced the servo amp. After we replaced it we checked it a few times and every time we checked it was good.

I think that when told me to turn our track around and go back to help Track 5, our distance from the ship at that time was about the same distance as from the front of the Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch Building aboard Camp Pendleton to the stop sign where you turn left to go to the Rain Room. At that point told me to pop my hatch because we had a Track that was sinking. I think we turned to port to go help them.

I hadn’t heard anything over comm at this point. I had heard that Track 5 was taking on water, but I think that their comm was starting to go down by the time they decided to do a troop transfer. Their comm was cutting in and out at that point. As soon as I turned around I saw Track 5 and could see on top of the vehicle with the November Flag. I think that it took me a few minutes to get over to Track 5. I could tell that it was and I could see him standing on top of the vehicle right next to the turret in front of the cargo hatches.

As I continued to approach, eventually stopped waving the flag and I think he was yelling down to me to make sure that everyone was getting out. I am not sure, because I couldn’t hear what was going on. The port side cargo hatch was open. The driver’s hatch was closed. I don’t remember if the troop commander’s hatch was closed.
We passed Track 5 port to port and then came around them. When we passed port to port we were maybe 5 to 7 meters away from Track 5. When we came up, I don’t remember too much detail, I was mainly listening to as he directed me around Track 5. I remember going around Track 5 and taking it wide so I didn’t hit them. The swells kept pushing me so that I couldn’t turn. I was getting a little close when I put it in reverse. A swell pushed me and I tapped Track 5 with my bow plane. No more than 5 minutes later Track 5 went nose up and went down.

I don’t really remember how people got off the vehicle. I remember seeing jump off the vehicle. I saw actually jump off the vehicle. tried to jump off but he went down a little bit with the vehicle. I’m not positive that it was but I’m pretty sure it was. I also saw some of the infantry guys get off with.

When the vehicle sunk we were probably about 10 meters away. Track 5 was probably about parallel to my vehicle at about my 10 o’clock. After it sank I remember seeing some guys come up, and I knew that wasn’t everybody so I kept looking for more guys. I know that swam over to my vehicle, but I don’t know how they got on I was asking who we were missing and they told me that we were missing so I started looking around to see if I could find him.

I don’t really remember where the C-7 vehicle was when Track 5 went down. At no point in time during this incident did anyone jump from Track 5 onto my vehicle. I don’t think that anyone got off before Track 5 went nose up, but I’m not positive. There may have been a couple of grunts in the water, but I’m not sure.

The water level was above the bench seats right before the vehicle went down. I remember hearing saying “troop transfer. troop transfer” when we got close enough. I didn’t hear saying anything else.
Summary of Interview

On August 5, 2020 the investigative team spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) regarding his recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I was the driver on the C7 vehicle on the day of the incident. The crew consisted of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) as the rear crewman, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) as the Vehicle Commander, and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) as the communications expert. I conducted the water pre-ops checks with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) when we were on the beach waiting to go back to the ship. We used the appendix out of the manual to do the checks. I don’t remember who came to do the checks though. Before we splashed into the ocean, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) told us to close our hatches. I don’t remember who waved us to go into the ocean, and I don’t remember if that person had flags or not.

Once we got out into the ocean, we were driving for awhile. All the comm was up. I think maybe half an hour had passed when the waves started picking up. After maybe 30-45 minutes, the first major thing I remember happening is that a large wave came through the driver’s hatch and wiped out our communications. For the majority of the time after that I was looking back to my Vehicle Commander, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for direction. He was giving me hand and arm signals because this was the first time I had ever splashed on ship. The waves started picking up even more and we were taking on a little bit more than the normal amount of water, but nothing crazy.

I then remember looking at Track 5 with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) about halfway up the hatch. I remember seeing black smoke rolling and then I saw (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) giving me the hand and arm signal for troop transfer. We started taking on a lot of waves so we closed the hatches for a second so I could get to Track 5 faster. I don’t know if (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) hatch or the troop commander’s hatches were closed. I know that mine was closed though and it was hard for me to see.

Maybe 20 minutes after that I lifted up my hatch because someone told me to open it. I don’t know who it was that told me to open it, but it was whoever was in the troop commander’s hatch. I had turned and looked at Track 5 and we were about 150 meters away I noticed that it was riding lower than normal. I could hear yelling from the Track, but I couldn’t hear what they were saying. I think that he was yelling at either the driver or whoever was in the Troop Commander’s hatch. We didn’t have comm with them at that point. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said “I guess they’re going to push it to the ship.”

After that we transitioned back into the normal formation and dispersion that we have to go on ship. I didn’t notice that anything crazy was happening other than that Track 5 was riding a bit lower.
than normal. I was still getting hand and arm signals from Track 5. I remember that I was looking back at him for about 5 minutes straight while Track 5 was in front of us. I remember seeing a little bit of fear in his face, so I looked to where Track 5 was and I didn't see it. I saw WECs in the water. There was one Marine floating in the water with his WEC and his Kevlar on. He had gotten up and was working to pull that individual in. There were a few people on top of my Track at that point working to get people in while I was still driving. I was trying to make little adjustments so I didn't hit any of the individuals in the water. I think was giving CPR to one of the Marines on top of the plenums. While that was happening we saw another Marine floating about 15 meters to the port side of the Track and everyone started yelling at me to get over there.

Once I got closer to that Marine I could see that he was floating on his back but he didn't have a WEC, Kevlar, or flak. At that point, jumped into the water and got the individual out of the water. At that point I switched out with and he started driving the vehicle. I took off my flak so that I could have more mobility to help out on top of the track.

The next major thing I remember happening was that we were waiting for the safety boat. was driving towards the ship to try to get back onboard. We were slowly driving towards the ship when we saw the safety boat coming our direction so we stopped. The safety boat got to us pretty quickly and we got them close enough to where we could hold on to the rope that's on the side of it and pull it towards us. The first Marine that we got onto the safety boat was the one that we had on the plenums. The boat was parallel to our Track at this point.

After we got both individuals into the safety boat, the safety boat took off. then took over as the driver because he wanted to get back onto the ship as quickly as possible. I think got into the cupola at that point and I got in the back of the vehicle. I was passing information between who was on comm, and to the sir in the front of the vehicle.

I think that everyone was very collected and methodical in their reactions during this incident.

I don't know if the embarked personnel got an embark troop brief before they got on the vehicle that morning. I don't remember a lot from that morning though. I don't remember what we did for chow that morning. I do remember that we didn't eat MREs. I don't remember anyone giving an embark troop brief on the beach prior to heading back to the ship either.
Summary of Second Interview

On Aug 19, 2020, the investigative team spoke with [redacted] regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I was the driver for the C-7 vehicle during the incident. When [redacted] told me to turn the vehicle around we were probably 800 to 1000 meters away from the ship. I had never been in the ocean like that before and had never seen the ship from that perspective before. I couldn’t see details on the ship, I could make out the ship though.

When I turned my vehicle around I was mostly following the hand signals of my crew chief, [redacted]. Most of the time I was looking back at him and he was guiding me. The first time I could see Track 5 I am not sure how close we were. I did not see anyone on top of the vehicle. I think it was too far for me to see. The few times that I looked I don’t remember seeing anyone on the Track.

The only time I remember getting a good look at what was going on was when it had already sunk. Most of the time I was looking at my crew chief to give me hand signals because I had never been in the water before, this was my first time splashing. When the waves started getting really big I needed more guidance so most of the time I was looking back for hand signals. I never saw Track 5 while this was going on. I never saw anyone waving a November flag.

When I turned around to go help Track 5, I was looking at my crew chief and he was guiding me. I started looking at the water and I saw life vests in the water that were inflated.

I don’t have any memories of what was going on immediately before Track 5 sank. After [redacted] told me to head back to help Track 5 the next thing I remember was seeing life vests in the water. I didn’t even really know what something was going wrong until I saw the life vests. I remember that before the comm went out hearing [redacted] saying that we needed to close with Track 5, but I’m not sure.

At no point when [redacted] was directing me do I remember seeing Track 5. I had my hatch open at this point.

We pulled two Marines onto our vehicle, one was named [redacted] and the second one I’m not sure what his name was. At some point while we were getting Marines out of the water, I switched places with [redacted] since he was a more experienced driver. After that I got up and started helping to secure the individuals that we had pulled out of the water.
Summary of First Interview

On Aug 11, 2020, the investigative team spoke with [redacted] regarding his recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

Reveille was at 0400, we had staged packs on the AAV’s the previous night. Once we pushed out to splash from the ship it was around 0600. Everything seemed pretty smooth to me, the waves were pretty heavy, but I thought that was normal. We showed up on the shore, did the raid, and started heading back. When we were heading back to the beach, one of the Tracks broke down so we hung out with them for a bit. We did some classes while we waited then we got back into our Track and pushed out close to the shoreline. We moved nearer to the shoreline where all the other tracks were at as well as some of the higher ups. We hung out there a few minutes and were then told that we were going to push out towards the ship again.

On the way out towards the ship, I got really seasick so I just put my head down and tried to go to sleep. I finally noticed that we had been out there quite a while. We started seeing water seep into the track. It started out as a tiny puddle, but once it hit boot level we told the mechanic that it was rising pretty quick. He jumped up and told the vehicle commander. After that he said that we should be fine and that we should be able to make it because we were close to the ship. Before we knew it, the water was at lower-calf level. We told [redacted] again and he relayed it to the vehicle commander and his thought was that we were close enough to the ship and we should be able to make it. Once we told [redacted] that it was at mid-calf level that was when he got really concerned. He relayed the information to the vehicle commander and then told us to be ready in case we had to get out. He had us double check our floatation device and gave us a quick run-down of what we would have to do if we would have to evacuate.

During the time he gave us the run-down the water level rose even higher and that is when we started the process for evacuating. [redacted] waved the flag and told us that another track was coming. Some of the guys in the back had gone code black by that point. [redacted] told us to unlock the hatches. It was [redacted] and myself pushing up on the hatch. We would get it pushed open a little bit but the waves would push it back down again. We struggled with it for a while until one time when [redacted] was able to wedge something under it, then we counted three and all pushed at once.
At that time I heard a voice saying “drop everything.” Once I heard that I just got rid of all my gear. I got up on top of the vehicle and pulled the beads on my floatation device. Pretty soon after getting on top of the vehicle I was swept away by a wave. I had my flak and Kevlar on once I got on top of the vehicle but got rid of my Kevlar pretty quick. I remember getting swept away by a wave and then getting pulled into the other Track by someone.

That day I was wearing my SAPI plates in my flak jacket. I had my life jacket on top of the flak. We had done the egress trainer on base, or at least we had done the short version where you get in the chair. The AAV crew checked our life jackets in the morning on the ship before we got into the AAV just to make sure we were wearing them properly. I am tracking that the rest of the platoon got some training on the AAV’s the night before the incident, but I was on Ship’s tax at that time so I didn’t get the training. I was told to waterproof my pack, so everything in my pack was waterproofed. All the packs were stacked up inside the vehicle in packs of threes behind where the vehicle commander sits, and behind where the driver sits. I can’t recall if our packs were strapped down or not, but I don’t think they were.

From the time I saw that there was water in the vehicle to when we got swept off the vehicle I think that maybe 15 to 20 minutes passed. I remember that the engine was running the whole time throughout the incident, and I didn’t notice any weird noises. I remember that was talking to us about some of the handles and things inside the vehicle in the morning on the way to the beach. was claustrophobic and was asking non-stop questions and was answering him. No one formally brought us to the back of the vehicle and gave us a run-down of everything on the vehicles.

Before this incident, I had never been in an AAV in the water. I had been in an AAV twice on land before.
Summary of Second Interview

On Aug 20, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

The night prior to the incident I was on ship’s tax and did not get any safety briefs before getting in the AAV. I had full confidence getting in the vehicle that day even though this was my first time splashing in the AAV in the water.

On the ride into SCI from the ship that morning I did not notice anything concerning. Everything seemed good to me. From what I recall, the only mechanical issue that day was on another Track where a wheel broke down. I get seasick pretty easily, even on land, so I kept mostly to myself that day since I was trying not to get sick.

On the way to the island, we had a guy that was really claustrophobic, and he kept asking questions about what everything did. So we got a rundown on what everything did based off of his questions. There was no official brief though. There may have been a really quick discussion just before we got in by the guy in the back. He said basically don’t touch this latch, because that’s the latch that unlocks that back emergency hatch, and if anything goes wrong we’ll let you know.

I was confident I knew how to handle the life vest. I remember it from the previous training we did where they told us to pull the beads in case of emergency and then as we got on the tracks that morning they checked us to make sure we were wearing them the right way. They didn’t check us when we left to go back to the ship that afternoon, we just put them on and just said out loud “remember that the big side goes outward.”

I don’t know where the water was coming from when the AAV started to take on water. I know that we were getting some drips coming into the AAV from the top of the vehicle, but nothing that seemed abnormal. I think I first realized there was water coming into the AAV it was around ankle level. That is when we let know. He then relayed the information to the Vehicle Commander, but he didn’t seem too concerned about it at the time. He said he had seen AAVs before with water up to the boot high and they were fine. When the water got to mid to high calf level they made the decision to start opening the cargo hatch.

The cargo hatch was hard to open. controlled the latch right behind the Vehicle Commander’s hatch. It was and
myself towards the end trying to push up on the other end of the hatch. I think that with the waves coming over the water was pushing the hatch back down. By the time we got the hatch open I think the water level was past our knees. Every time we tried to prop the hatch open water would start seeping in, almost like a waterfall. This let a lot of water get into the vehicle.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the one who told us we would be getting out. He told us this before we got the hatch open. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the one who helped us open the hatch from the outside. He used the November flag as a pry bar to help us get the hatch open. I remember that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the one who told me to pull the beads on my life vest. Almost simultaneously as I did this a wave came and washed us away. I remember (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on top of the vehicle before I got swept off.

After that I remember my head wasn’t submerged but I had to wipe the water out of my eyes. Once I got my eyes opened again I realized that I couldn’t see Track 5 anymore and that’s when I realized it was gone. I could see the other Track, I don’t even remember what direction it was, and someone pulled my collar and pulled me up onto the other Track.

I think the wave that knocked me off of Track 5 was the one that sank it. When I got on top of the Track 5, I remember that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) were there. I think (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was there somewhere, but I’m not sure.

When I got pulled onto the other AAV I’m not sure who actually pulled me out of the water. When I first heard the command to drop gear I was halfway out of the vehicle. I don’t know who said it, but that is when (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) asked me if someone had said to drop kit, and I told him that yeah we were supposed to drop our kit. That’s literally the last thing I said to him.

I remember that while we were headed back to the ship the driver wasn’t too happy because he couldn’t see. I remember that the Lieutenant had to guide him to the ship because the driver couldn’t see where he was going.
Summary of Interview

On Sept 8, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

1. What AAV related training did you receive prior to the accident?

The only AAV related training that I received before the accident was the SWET as part of UET training. I did not do the SVET or MAET.

2. How did you get out of the vehicle?

The seas were rougher on the way back than on the way to the beach. The AAV started taking on water roughly 10-15 minutes into transit. The Rear Crewman was notifying the Vehicle Commander as the water rose. When the water was ankle high, we were told not to worry, that it was normal. The water continued to rise to seat level. My impression at this point is that the Vehicle Commander is still trying to get the AAV back to the ship. When the water rose to knee level, the decision to open the hatch was made. and I assisted the Rear Crewman in opening the hatch. We could not open the hatch until we were assisted from the top of the vehicle by the Vehicle Commander.

Once the hatch was open, and I climbed out of the vehicle. Someone told us to drop gear but I’m not sure who. Because my life jacket was on top of my flak, I started to take off my life jacket. Before that, I was able to get my sides off but I couldn’t get the whole flak off. Before I could get my life jacket off, a wave washed me off the vehicle. I started sinking. I was able to get the rest of my flak off under water. I pulled the beads on my life jacket and started rising to the top and then I blacked out.
Summary of First Interview

On Aug 5, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

On the morning of the incident, reveille was at 0300. We went to the well deck and started our morning routine, including vehicle pre-ops and squaring away all the gear. From there we rolled into last minute briefs, section leaders were talking to the crew chiefs who were talking to the rear crewman. After that we splashed from the Ship to San Clemente Island.

On the island we set up in the CoC. At some point, we heard that the other vehicles were coming back, so we double checked our vehicles because we knew we were getting back into the water. Once the platoon got back, I got back into the vehicle and got ready to splash. I had my comm helmet on, but for the most part from the rear crewman’s seat you can only hear the vehicle commander and the driver. However, I could hear a lot of radio chatter coming through.

We finally splashed back into the water. From what I could tell the water was rougher than what I had seen before. We started having some issues with the buckets on our vehicle, so I was getting up a lot and talking to the rear crewman about what was going on. I know that switched it into water tracks at some point. I could hear saying that the water was pretty rough.

I don’t remember how long we were in the water at that point. It may have been an hour or an hour and a half, maybe longer. But around that point I know that heard over comm that Track 5 was starting to take on water. I could only hear the updates that was giving and I. At some point, told me to get ready because we were going to hook up for tow. Sometime later, I heard tell me to get on top so I got on top of the vehicle through the turret.

I was up topside of our vehicle with I could see on the top of his vehicle and he was saying “troop transfer, troop transfer.” I don’t remember if there were other people on top of Track 5 at this point. I know that the driver’s hatch and the troop commander’s hatch were both closed at this point.

Once I heard “troop transfer” I got back down inside our vehicle and worked with to get our cargo hatch open. We popped the cargo hatch, and I got back topside with and we started
grabbing the boat hooks to get ready for the transfer. We had our port side cargo hatch open.

We tried to get close to Track 5, but the sea state was working against us. It kept pushing us apart. At some point, they opened the cargo hatch on Track 5. I don’t remember when exactly they did this, but I remember were on top and a wave came in and started filling up the back of the Track. The water was past the rear mooring cleats when this happened. I remember there was a lot of water going into the back of the vehicle. As soon as they opened the cargo hatch I saw people start coming out.

I remember specifically two waves that were very big hitting the vehicle. The first one went into the cargo hatch and knocked people back into the vehicle. The second wave that hit immediately filled the vehicle and it sank. The time between the waves seemed to be a couple of seconds.

When the vehicle went down, the Marines that were topside jumped into the water. We started grabbing people out of the water and I made sure that everyone was down inside our vehicle. When I didn’t see any more people I went down through our cargo hatch. That was when I noticed that we couldn’t get our cargo hatch closed. We were eating a lot of water through the cargo hatch every time a wave hit. Finally was able to get the cargo hatch closed.

After that we started heading back towards the ship and I started getting a head count. Everyone was in the back freaking out. At some point as we were heading back someone called for the boat hook, so we passed it up from the back of the vehicle. I assume this was when they found the Marine who had floated to the service. After that I was mainly focused on make sure everyone was good in the back.

Once we got back on the ship we immediately got out and got accountability to find out who was missing.
Summary of Second Interview

On Aug 19, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I was told to come topside of my vehicle by when he identified that Track 5 needed help. We had eyes on the vehicle and he said get up here." I went up through the turret. I had been sitting in the port side rear crewman’s seat before this. I had my comm helmet on, but I was on intercom so I could only hear the crew on my vehicle.

Once I got on top of the vehicle, I scanned and saw Track 5, which was to our starboard and kind of aft of us. I grabbed onto we were next to the turret, but I don’t remember exactly where we were on top of the vehicle. As soon as I came up I heard yell, “troop transfer, troop transfer.” was near the turret on his vehicle when I heard this. As soon as I heard that I got back down into my vehicle and opened up the port side cargo hatch. I got and one of the CAAT guys to help me throw it open.

After that, I went back up through the cargo hatch to the top of the vehicle. From there, we proceeded with the troop transfer. Track 5 was squatting very low, but it was still in the water. There were no Marines in the water at this point. and I think were on top of Track 5. I don’t remember if the cargo hatch on Track 5 was open yet or not.

As soon as I came up through the cargo hatch, I looked over at Track 5 and then turned back to grab the boat hook. When I turned back around I saw a couple of Marines come up and then that’s when a wave came over the vehicle and that’s when the vehicle went down. I don’t remember which cargo hatch they opened. I think it was the starboard side, but I’m not 100% certain. The Marines that had already come topside were still on top when the wave came, but then the vehicle sank from underneath them. I think maybe one or two may have jumped. There was maybe two seconds between when the wave came over the vehicle and when the vehicle went down. I had eyes on the vehicle the whole time this happened.

After that I remember that we were pulling people out of the water. We were grabbing people out of the water after Track 5 went down. Track 5 had already gone down before we pulled anyone out of the water. I think the first person we pulled out was one of the infantry guys, but I’m not sure. I don’t know the names of anyone we pulled on, but I remember their faces.
I don’t remember how far away we were from Track 5 when I was yelling “Troop Transfer.” The waves and the sea state made it very hard to judge distance. I think that maybe a minute passed between when I heard that and when I got back on top of the vehicle after opening the cargo hatch. I’m not exactly sure, but I know it wasn’t very long. Track 5 was facing away from us at that point and we were trying to come up close enough to get the guys. I distinctly remember that Track 5 was facing away from us and that I looking at the back of the vehicle when the nose went up. When it went nose up, I could see the top of the vehicle. The Troop Commander’s hatch and driver’s hatch were closed. The cargo hatch and turret hatches were open. I remember seeing a Lieutenant in the back of our vehicle, so I know he was able to get out, but I don’t know how he got out of the vehicle.

We were not able to get anyone onto our vehicle before Track 5 went down.
Summary of Interview

On Aug 5, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

On the morning of the incident, reveille was at 0300. I went to bed around 2200 the night before. For breakfast that morning I had a granola bar and a bag of chips. Prior to getting on the vehicles that morning we did a safety brief. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) gave a brief to everyone riding in the troop compartment. Additionally I gave a quick brief to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on how to open the hatch for the seat he was in. I do not remember if anyone explained the functionality of the life jacket.

After we completed the raid on the island, I switched with who became the driver and I became the third crewman. We did this before we splashed back to the ship. Before we splashed back to the ship I did the pre-water operations checklist with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) but I did not write anything down or fill out a checklist. I remember that I checked the bolt plugs and contact plugs. I know that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) checked the POLs and the driver’s station, but what he checked after that I’m not sure. After that I got accountability of everyone in our vehicle. At that time we had four AAV personnel and six infantrymen in our vehicle. The night prior I had written down the first and last name of everyone who would be riding in our vehicle as well as their EDIPI and blood type. The morning of the incident I verified everyone’s EDIPI prior to departing the Ship. On the way back I got accountability by checking everyone’s name.

On the way back to the ship I was positioned as the vehicle’s third crewman. Right after we splashed back towards the ship I noticed that the sea state was not too bad at first, but I felt like it got much worse all of a sudden. We had been experiencing a slight up and down motion and then that changed to a much bigger up and down motion. At that time I remember that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was guiding (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on how to get through the water while I was in the back checking seals and performing other systems checks.

At some point I remember hearing (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) say that he saw Track 5 waving a November Flag. We then turned around and went to help and I told (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) so that he could get in touch with Iron City. As we were approaching, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) came over the intercom and said that Track 5 had gone down and that he only saw four life preservers (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had popped open his hatch, so I moved up and popped open the hatch as well. When I looked I saw that Track 5 was gone. I then took off my flak so that I only had my life preserver on and prepared to pull people out of the water.
By the time we had pulled two people out the safety boat came over and pulled up next to us. When the safety boat arrived I switched out with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to become the driver. The safety boat pulled up so close that it actually landed on top of the ankle of one of the Marines we had pulled out of the water. The Marine hadn't been very reactive before that point, but he became very reactive once that happened which I thought was a good sign. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) helped get the two Marines into the safety boat.

After that happened we saw the stern gate going down and we made the call to move back to the Ship. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) switched with me to be the driver and I moved into the Troop Commander's position. I think that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in the cupola at this time.

When we saw debris come up from Track 5, I remember seeing POL bottles, empty MRE boxes, and inflated life jackets. I remember that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had a life preserver on when he came to the surface but that the second Marine did not have one. The second Marine was not responsive when we pulled him out. Either (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) began to do CPR on this second Marine.
Summary of Initial Interview

On Aug 5, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

They did pre-ops and pre-water night before, which he claimed was good for 24hrs. Nothing significant found.

No issues with movement to beach. They did the raid and prepared to return to ship.

9 vehicles returned. 4 stayed on beach

All required safety briefs were done on beach prior to leaving shore. Marines knew to drop kit when conducting troop transfer.

Return splash started good. After they got past the shore surf, he thought to himself that they shouldn’t be out there because of the sea state. The swells were ten to fifteen foot swells. was taking lots of waves in the face.

They had been out for an hour. is the mechanic and was serving as the rear crewman. He was in the back of track and signaled to that water was up to the deck plates and they needed to prepare for troop transfer.

stated the following:

- Deck plate level - prepare for troop transfer
- Ankle level - conduct troop transfer
- Bench seat level - crew gets out

At this point they realized that they had no comms. tried to radio for help. noticed the volts dropped from 27 to 19. He lost electrical power which means electric bilge pumps no longer worked. He states that water rose to ankle level and then started waving the November flag.

He estimates the ship was 500-800 meters away. They believe they can push on to the ship if they can get the troops out of the back.

Vehicle 14 responds to November flag. Vehicle 14 comes near to begin troop transfer and then hears a loud bang. He assumed the loud bang was the plenums failing. Plenums keep water from coming in through the exhaust when the vehicle is in water mode. They are
hydraulically controlled. He said the plenums failure allowed a lot of water to enter front of the vehicle.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) claimed vehicle 14 was not right next to his vehicle but close. They did not get too close because of rough seas. He did not feel vehicles bump or touch.

At this point, he believes that they were conducting troop transfer. The starboard hatch was open. They opened that hatch so Marines could use radio cage to climb out of vehicle. Some Marines were climbing out but (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) does not know how many. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is on top of track assisting with troop transfer. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) informed him that plenums have failed.

At this point, vehicle experiences complete power failure, and has no propulsion. They decide that they will have to get towed to ship. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) looks back to inform (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that they have no power. He then sees a huge wave come over the back of the vehicle in through the open troop hatch. The vehicle tilts vertically by the stern and starts to sink.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is still in driver's seat with his hatch closed. He had already taken off his flak off. The vehicle is fully submerged at this point. He felt bodies as he was climbing out. He pulled one Marine out of vehicle and inflated his life vest. He claims he felt him float. He felt someone else behind him suctioned to the top. He tried to release him and pulled his life vest. He exited the vehicle, pulled his life vest and started swimming towards the surface. He could see the vehicle that had come to assist (vehicle 14) with troop transfer and several bodies floating. He blacked out as he swam to the surface and woke up on well deck of Somerset.
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT (Sept 2, 2020)

I, make the following free and voluntary statement to whom I know to be a member of the command investigation team inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me.

I have been an AAV driver for about 2 years. I have had a lot of experience driving in the water since my first two field ops were ship ops. I was also part of the group that went to UAE for NATIVE FURY. When I came back from there, we were assigned the vehicles that we would take with us to the 15th MEU. Most of the vehicles were deadlined in every category. We literally spent two to three weeks going to work at 0500 and getting off at midnight every single day working on those vehicles. I think that some of the Battalion maintenance guys were coming in some days to help out, but I’m not sure.

My vehicle, which was Track 5, was one of the vehicles that came off the 11th MEU deployment and it only had 12-13 discrepancies. None of them were major concerns except for maybe the hydro leak I had. It was a soft line going from the hydro pump into the hydro manifold. The line was frayed, so all we had to do was replace the hydro line and it worked great. There were no other big concerns with Track 5 outside of that one.

We were able to fix every single vehicle so that they were able to make it to ship from the Del Mar Boat Basin.

I am aware that Track 5 collided with another vehicle during a training evolution during RUT. It was around 2330 and we had been running the vehicles all day and everything was going well. We then decided to do a Platoon splash and everyone got out into the ocean and did a couple of gator squares. We may have been about 500 to 1000 meters out. After that we all got online and started coming back when we pushed to battle speed. Maybe about three minutes into battle speed I just remember feeling something bump me. Initially I thought that maybe my tracks had hit the ground when I heard over the intercom saying that Track 4 had just hit us. After we drove onto the beach we stopped and checked the vehicle. All we could see was beauty damage at that point, it was all non-essential items that were affected. It was just the gypsy rack and the antennae that needed to be replaced. were the crewman in the back at that time.
I think we splashed from the Del Mar Boat Basin to the USS SOM on a Sunday. There were no mechanical issues from Track 5 on the way to the ship. Once on ship I didn’t do any maintenance other than to do the PMCS, and oiling some of the moving parts inside the vehicle and making sure I had the proper amount of fluids in the engine and transmission. Earlier that week the PTO had gone out. We could drive and everything, but we couldn’t raise our ramp or use anything with hydro. So we spent three days that week thinking it was a hydro pump, which we replaced but it still wasn’t working. So we had to put in a whole new PTO the next day. After that we took the vehicle out and everything was working ok and everything was reading fine. After that I checked the transmission oil pressure and it was at 220. Usually Track 5 sits at 230 or higher, which is high but she always sat that high and she ran perfectly so I just thought it would be ok. I didn’t really do any maintenance on the ship other than normal maintenance.

We did briefs with the grunts about three times including how to climb out of the vehicle, how to properly use their WECS, how to use it, and how to inflate it. I was doing all the pre-ops and pre-water ops checks. I checked the suspension, tightened down all the bolts, and I made sure nothing was contaminated. Once I completed that I turned in my sheets to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

There were no issues with the vehicle on the way to the beach that morning. Once we had completed the actions on the objectives and were heading back to the beach I noticed that my transmission pressure was at 190. That would be completely fine for a normal track. The normal range is between 170-220. But for my vehicle to be at 190 was really low, but that was still in normal range so I kept driving. However, once I got to the assembly point, stopped, and then (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) started trying to ground guide me and I realized that I couldn’t even turn. I looked down and realized that the oil pressure had dropped to 170.

At that point I told (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that I couldn’t steer so we lifted up the plenums and were in there looking. He couldn’t see where it was leaking from so I turned on the vehicle and then he could immediately see that it was leaking from the PTO bolts. He asked me if I had tightened those bolts down, but I told him that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had tightened them. He talked to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for awhile and then determined that all we had to do was tighten the bolts down and then fill the vehicle back up. We did that and once we turned the vehicle back on it was running at 230 again. We used about 6 to 7 gallons of transmission oil to fill it back up. We got the transmission oil from Track 6, 7, and 11. There were no other issues with the vehicle that I’m aware of.
I think the splash team leader was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) because usually the last Track that splashes has the splash team. I’m not entirely sure though.

After we splashed we had to button up the hatches and then (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was helping me to drive because I couldn’t see that well. Sometime after that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) noticed that he couldn’t talk out over comm, I then noticed that I couldn’t talk out either and that our volts had dropped down to 19 as well.

At some point I think that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) tapped (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on the leg to talk to him about the water level, but I was almost completely focused on driving so I’m not sure. The first thing I remember is hearing (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) saying that he was going to wave the November flag. I also remember hearing (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) telling me to tell (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to pop his hatch and get ready to get out of the vehicle. I am not sure how much water was in the vehicle at that point.

At some point I think that the plenums failed because I heard a loud bang and I looked to my right and didn’t see the plenum indicators up. Later on they told me that Track 14 had hit us, so that may have been the noise that I heard. I never actually saw Track 14, I had a very limited view from where I was in the driver’s position with the hatch down. I remember asking (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) if he was going to get the guys out of the back and him saying that he was working on it. A short time after that I remember seeing the cargo hatch open and thinking that we were getting the guys out. I don’t remember when (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) got out. I never saw him get out.

I was driving and saw the cargo hatch open up. At that point I had lost power to the propellers so I put the vehicle in water tracks. I could hear the tracks engage and could feel it hitting the water so I at least knew the track wasn’t going backwards. I floored it and then turned around to see what was going on and how far into the troop transfer we were. At that point I saw a giant wave come in and felt the vehicle start to pitch backwards. I immediately tried to open my hatch, but for some reason it wouldn’t open. I knew (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was on top at that point, and I’m pretty sure (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was there as well.

I had a small bubble of air, so I took one breath and then climbed out of the back of the vehicle. I put my hand out and felt cloth at one point. I pulled that individual over to the cargo hatch and pulled his beads. After I did that I felt his feet hit me so I knew that he had floated up. After that I got ready to pull my own beads when I felt someone else. So I pulled that individual over and pulled his beads as well. At that point about 45 seconds had gone by so I was out of air, and I pulled my own beads. I got to within 20 feet of the top and I felt that I wouldn’t make it, and then I blacked out. The next thing I remember when I woke up on the ship.
I do not remember putting chemlights up on the vehicle the night prior to the exercise or on the day of the exercise.

When I looked back at the last moment and saw the wave filling up the vehicle I did not see (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in the Troop Commander’s hatch.

When I tried to pull the handle on my hatch it wouldn’t even turn. I have turned that handle many times before so I don’t know why it wouldn’t turn that time. When the vehicle sank it went stern down into the water.

When I was on the beach we did a pre-op check on the vehicle. We had done at halt checks where I had checked the suspension and then I had also checked the oils and the lines. The last time we had done a deliberate pre-op check in accordance with the technical manuals was on the ship. We got the vehicle the Emergency Egress Lighting System working, but at some point it stopped working so I assumed the batteries must have died. I had talked to my section mechanic about it and they were tracking on it. I think the plan was to replace the batteries on all of the vehicles at once after that field op.

Before I told (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that we needed to get out of the vehicle he was mainly just sitting in his seats. The only other interaction I had with him was to tell him when to close his hatch. He was not wearing a CVC helmet because we only had three working comm helmets. One worked, but you couldn’t talk out of it, so he just used his own helmet so that he could talk over the company tac. We actually had five working CVC helmets, but only three on which the microphones worked.

When I assumed the plenum had failed I couldn’t see the plenum indicators so I assumed they were down, but there was a lot of water so I’m not sure they were down. I don’t remember (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) asking me if the plenum indicators were up. I do remember asking (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) what I wasn’t comfortable driving and that I could barely see where I was going. I was relying on him to guide me through the water. I had never been in conditions like that before. Before leaving the beach, the sea state did not seem that bad, but once we got past a certain point the sea state just seemed crazy to me.

When we started doing the troop transfer I started taking my flak off and dumped it in the seat beside me. When the wave came into the back of the vehicle I couldn’t actually see (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on top of the vehicle, so I’m not positive he was there.

During the egress training, I wasn’t the one who was actually giving the training. Usually the brief covers who is going to be in the vehicle, how to listen to the rear crewman, demonstration of who will sit where, where the cargo latches are and how to pop the cargo hatch. After that they showed them how to climb out using the radio cage and then how to egress the vehicle and get in the water. They actually
had the grunts open the latches at that point. They also briefed what
to do if the water gets to deck plate level, ankle level, boot top
level, and bench seat level. At ankle top they pop the hatch and get
the guys out of the back. At bench seat is when the crew gets out. I
know the guys in my vehicle got this information because you give them
embark troop briefs every time you get in the water. I gave this
brief at around 0430 when we got in the well deck that morning. I
made sure everyone was wearing their WECs correctly as well. I gave
the same brief on the way back to the ship as well.

When I put the oil in the vehicle on the beach that day both
were aware that I had done so.

Signatu:  

Date 2020-04-25
Nan
Activity: _____  Unit: ________
Telephone number: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I have been advised that I am suspected of violating the following Articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice:

[Redacted]

I have been advised that:

\[\text{Initial}\]

- I have the right to remain silent.
- Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial or other administrative or disciplinary proceeding.
- I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
- I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
- I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

**WAIVER OF RIGHTS**

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

\[\text{Initial}\]

- I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
- I expressly desire to make a statement.
- I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
- I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.

This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

Understand that the statement I made previously is not admissible at court martial and cannot be used against me, and that I can still remain silent now if I want to.

\[\text{Initial} \]

[Signature]

Understanding my rights under U.C.M.J. Article 31, I wish to make the statement attached on the following pages.

ENCLOSURE (HB)
Summary of First Interview

On Aug 11, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

We woke up at around 0400, got all our stuff ready and got accountability. After that we made our way down to the Tracks and loaded up. After that we sat there and waited for a few hours before splashing. That was my first time ever splashing so I guess it went according to plan. From what I recall I don’t think we took on any water on the way to the island. Someone had said it would take around two to three hours to get to the island, which I wasn’t looking forward to because I tend to get seasick, however I know that it only took 28 minutes because I was timing it on my watch.

We got to the island and stayed in the tracks for another hour or so before we went to do the actual attack. After the attack we drove back and I remember that one of the Tracks had broken down. We waited a few hours for them to get the replacement parts, but they never did so we ended up heading back to the beach and meeting up with everyone. We went over the Track to make sure everything was good and then splashed again.

As soon as we splashed again you knew almost immediately that the sea state was worse. We were rocking back and forth really hard. I was sitting right behind the Vehicle Commander’s hatch. We were getting so much water through the hatches on top that I thought it was raining. I knew that was nothing unusual for a Track to take in some water. I remember that we were taking on water and communicating the water level to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

The water just kept getting higher and higher. It was about to calf level when (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said something to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) which I couldn’t hear due to the noise level, and then he looked at us and told us to make sure our life vests were tight. We all tightened our life vests as much as we could and then he said that we were going to switch tracks. Just before he told us we were going to get out, he unlocked his hatch and then crawled over to help the other Marines open their hatch in the back.

We were having trouble opening the hatch. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had unlocked the hatch and was pushing on it to open it up, but it wouldn’t open. I think this was because the waves kept pushing the hatch closed every time we would get it open a little bit. I got up and tried to help, and then (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) started trying to help as well and we couldn’t get it open. I think (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was trying to help as well. I got a
little bit of tunnel vision at this point so I'm not sure. Eventually, I had to get everyone to push all at once and it finally opened. From what I remember, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) helped by pulling it open from the top and it was his help that finally got it open.

Right after that I started trying to get out. I think that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I were the first ones to get out. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stayed down below and was pushing people out. I had my flak on when I started getting out. When I was about halfway up I popped my vest and then went back and grabbed my rifle. I don't know who it was, but someone shouted “Leave your shit” so I went up on top and took all my kit off. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was un there as well, but I can’t remember what he was doing. I think that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) helped (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) out as well. I don't remember where (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was at this time.

At this point I was trying to help (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) out. I remember that he was freaking out and kept saying that he couldn't swim. I was trying to help him get his gear off, but I couldn't get one of the buckles to work. I turned to say something to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and started to say “sir, what's going on?” but I couldn’t even finish that statement before a wave came up and blindsided us. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was standing up in the Troop Commander’s hatch when that happened.

The wave knocked me off the vehicle. I went underwater and when I came back up I was right against the other Track. All I saw was Track 5 going up and sinking. One of the guys on the other track grabbed me and got me on top, and then pretty quickly pushed me through the cargo hatch. When I got in there all I could hear was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) which I think must have been (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I think (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was next to me as well as (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I think (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in there too, but I’m not sure. I remember that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) helped them close the cargo hatch on the second track as well.

I'm not sure when we first started taking on water. I kept moving my feet around to see if I could feel the splash but I couldn't. I didn't realize we were taking on water until (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said he couldn't find his glasses and I reached down to see if I could feel them and my whole hand went underwater. I honestly don’t know how much time passed between when we started taking on water to when the vehicle finally sank. I think the water was coming in pretty quick though.

Someone told me to dump all my gear, but when they told us that I was halfway out of the cargo hatch so I kept moving out to keep the hatch clear. I got my gear off when I was on top of the vehicle. I had both my front and rear SAPI plates in my flak jacket.

I had been in an AAV two or three times before on land, but this was my first time in an AAV in the water. From what I remember the engine sounded the same the whole way through up to the point it sank. We
all took our main packs and all of our packs were in the back of the vehicle stacked towards the front. They were all strapped down.

The night before the incident, we all practiced egress drills on the ship. They got us all into the track and sat where we would be sitting and they shouted "egress. egress" and then we practiced getting out of the vehicle. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had trouble getting his flak off because he had wired his quick release differently. I'm not sure if we were told to wear the life vests on top of the flak jacket or if we all just wore them that way. That morning we didn't get an embark troop brief from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) We got one the night before though when we did the egress drill.

When we got the cargo hatch open the water level in the vehicle was under my knee, close to bench seat level. The top of the vehicle was sitting almost flush with the water line. The egress training the night before consisted of sitting in a vehicle with our life vests on, we popped the hatch, then we practiced getting on top of the vehicle. They had one of the AAV crewman opening the hatch, but they showed us how to unlock it and open it. They also walked us through what to do if water got to the deck plate level, or what to do if it got to boot top level and so on.
Summary of Second Interview

On Aug 20, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I always been afraid of water so I was nervous going out on this training event because I am afraid of water. But I didn’t think anything was going to happen either so I didn’t feel like I had any particular reason to be nervous or to doubt the training that we had received up to that point.

The day prior to this event, they ran through what we had to do in order to get out of a vehicle so I was fairly confident in what I had to do if I needed to get out of the vehicle. I was told that if the water level reached boot top level that is when you should get out. The water was about below the knee, to the mid-calf level when I got on top of the vehicle.

When we finally got the cargo hatch open, I was the first one to get out, then got out and then I hopped out. I got out and shifted to the other side to clear the way. I couldn’t get his flak off so I tried to help him but I couldn’t get the buckle undone. At that point I turned around to see what was going on with and I heard everybody yell and that is when the wave came.

When I got on top of the vehicle, was in his turret, standing on his seat. I don’t remember any of the other tracks getting that close to us they were all a good distance away when I saw them. I also don’t remember anyone telling us to get off the track and get onto the other track. I don’t specifically remember seeing at that time, however, I know that he helped us to open the cargo hatch by prying it open from the top as we pushed it from underneath.

When the wave hit, it swept me off the vehicle. I think that it must have swept off as well. I remember that had been in the back of the vehicle, but that he came up and sat by me once he knew that water was entering the vehicle because he was trying to communicate with me.

I don’t remember how much time passed between when I started seeing water at the deck plates and when I started getting out of the vehicle. I am not sure where the water was coming from, I don’t remember seeing any water enter the vehicle when we rode to the island that morning.
Summary of Interview

On Aug 24, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

The planning for the Mechanized Raid on SCI was attended primarily by our Plans and Tactics Officer, He, the XO, and I, as well as some others that I can’t recall, attended the confirmation brief. We discussed using the ships safety boats for the movement in to SCI, but at some point on the morning of the raid it was discovered that the safety boat was inoperable and couldn’t move. I remember that the AAV Platoon Commander passed word that there were two AAVs that were empty and could be used as safety boats. I was observing the ships safety boat as it was being lowered into the water. They generally start the boat before they lower it completely into the water to make sure that it works, but the boat wouldn’t start. They trouble shot it quickly and then relayed the word down to the AAVs that we couldn’t get the safety boat in the water and how long it would take us to get the boat back into place and get the safety boat into the water. The word then came back up that the AAVs had two that they could use and they were willing to accept using them.

I gave the order to re-stow the safety boat and trouble shoot it. I also ordered them to take the knuckle boom crane, which is in boat valley, and stage it on the 11 meter RHIB. I assumed that was a known, good boat, but you don’t know until it gets in the water and starts up. I didn’t know what the status of the 7 meter would be, I wanted to get the 11 meter staged because it can take a little while to get the crane in position so we had it staged and ready to go in case we needed it. At no point was there a call from the beach or from the Marines in the LFOC to get a safety boat placed in the water.

I knew that the AAVs had splashed back towards the ship when I got a notification from the TAO, that the AAVs were splashing. This was at the end of a series of delays for maintenance during the day. The Marines never let me know that they wanted to splash the AAVs at a certain time.

I specifically don’t recall the last time before PMINT that the USS SOM had done AAV recovery ops. I know that we have done it since I have been in command. I took command in November and we got underway in December and did some work. I can’t remember when we did AAV operations versus when we did ACV operations since we did testing operations with both.
During the search and rescue operations the safety boat we had tried to use that morning was still not operable so we put in the staged 11 meter RHIB and we put in one of the MRF boats as well. We didn’t put the third one in because I made the conscious decision that if we needed to swap out a boat or a crew we would have one ready to go.
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: ____________________________

Activity: ____________________________  Unit: ____________________________

Telephone number: ____________________________

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: ____________________________

and that:

I have the right to remain silent.
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

__________________________  ________________________
Signatures  Date

ENCLOSURE (150)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I am getting 0000, 27 Jul.

vkr

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

--- Original Message ---
From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Date: Wednesday, September 09, 2020 2:18 PM
Subject: RE: Interview with PRAHED1 LEAD SCHEMES presented

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Hi [Name],

What time/day did you go out for Flight 1?

vkr
Summary of Interview

On Aug 24, 2020, the investigative team spoke with [redacted] regarding his recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

In the confirmation brief for the exercise, the ship's representative was predominately [redacted] as the ship's Plans and Tactics Officer. I know that Ops was involved as well, but he was kind of in and out with watch. During the confirmation brief it was mentioned that the ship would provide a safety boat for the initial off load, but it was also mentioned that the AAV's could provide two as well. It seemed a little strange, but I know that the wet well manual had changed. In retrospect I guess I should have asked that question.

On the day of the incident, I don't specifically remember what time it was discovered that the ship’s safety boat would not be able to launch. I remember that once it was discovered that word was passed down to the AAV Platoon Commander. I also remember that once the AAV Platoon Commander was informed that the ship couldn’t provide a safety boat, he said he had two empty vehicles that could serve as safety boats.

Once the AAVs got on shore there were constant delays, but that was to be expected since part of PMINT was the process of learning to work together. I do think that the communications between the Marines who were on the shore and the ship was garbage. I think this was also part of the PMINT process, but I don’t think we had very good comm's and the interaction between the CoC and LFOC were not the best either.

When I was called into Combat during the incident the Ship’s Captain was already there. I didn’t even look at the LFOC since the Captain was already there running the show. So at that point I just went to the bridge.

I don’t know how anyone heard that the AAVs had left the beach.

I don’t recall when we knew that the ship’s RHIB was repaired that day. My focus when I became aware of the situation was just to get a boat in the water as quickly as possible. I was not on board the SOM when it was certified for AAV ops. I know that it was a while ago so I would be surprised if anyone was still on board from that time period.

The only other thing that sticks out in my head about this incident was that comm were not there. I think that comm's should have been better. The night before we had done CRRCs at night over the horizon,
and comms were a problem there too. We didn’t have a good recovery plan, and then we went straight into AAV ops the next day. There was a lot of churn leading up to the AAV ops. When the AAVs started having issues when they hit the beach I wasn’t too surprised since they always seem to have some issue. When things started going bad it seemed like it would just be a command call as to whether we would just tow the AAV back to the beach or to the ship. I think this caused a delay in us realizing how serious it was. It wasn’t until we started maneuvering to launch the boat and got people up on the big eyes and everyone was trying to figure out what was going on that we realized this was a much more serious issue than just an AAV that was stopped and needed a tow.

When I walked into the LFOC during the incident it seemed like there was a lot of churn for even simple functions like getting an Alpha roster for who was on the AAVs.

Starting with the confirmation of the planning, I do remember the planning representative was our Plans and Tactics Officer and Ops was involve. Ops was kind of in and out. The PTO was the point man and CCO was involve here and there.

During the confirmation brief, safety boats were mentioned and also was mention that the vehicles can rig and tow themselves. Once again, I know thing have change and I know the wet well manual have change. In theory, I should ask that question.

I do not remember the time of the safety boats was not going to get launched that morning.

I did hear delays. The delays were constant. That was kind of expected. Delays were constant during the CRRCs insert the night before.

The communications going back from the ships were garbage. The night before we had comms with the CRRCs. It wasn’t clear with the comms. I did not feel like we did not have good comms with the AAVs. I don’t feel like it was great interactions with the LFOC.

I walked into combat and the Captain had beat me there. At that point I did not look at the LFOC because the Captain was there running the show. I would be better watch for the bridge.

I did not hear anything how the AAVs left the beach.

I remember that we needed to get one of the boats in the water.

I was not on board when SOM was certified to do AAVs ops. That was a significant time ago. We were significant longer cycle than the other ships.
The state of the LFOC was not organized. It was a lot of churn and simple things like trying to get an Alpha Roster of the Marines was difficult.
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: ______________________

Activity: ____________________ Unit: ______________________

Telephone number: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: _ ______________

and that:

I have the right to remain silent.
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by
court-martial.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This
lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense,
a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed
military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my
rights and fully understand them, and that:

I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer
retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without
cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me
during this interview.
This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and
voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been
made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used
against me.

Aug 2020

ENCLOSURE (15)
Summary of Interview

On Aug 13, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I am the Plans and Tactics Officer aboard the ship, so I did a lot of the planning with the Marines. I would be in the Combat Information Center (Combat) a lot to make sure that things were being done correctly as far as controlling everything and so on. When I went into Combat the day of the incident the AAV’s had already splashed back into the water headed back to the ship. I think that I got into Combat at around 1745, I know that when I got in we were about ready to recover the first AAV. I walked over to the chart table, which is where Boat Alpha was on the PIC Phone. Was on the PIC phone at that point, monitoring Boat Alpha. There actually wasn’t much chatter going on Boat Alpha at that point. The fact that it was hard to hear on Boat Alpha got my attention. I noticed that it was hard for us to hear them making reports. Then, another voice came on over Boat Alpha, it was garbled and then I hear "... Taking on water." I don’t remember the exact time, but I think we had recovered between two and three AAVs by that point.

We finally told them to repeat their last transmission, and I put the phone to my ear at that point and I could tell that it was the C-7 Vehicle. They said we have an AAV taking on water, boot top high, get boats in the water immediately. I now know that the person I was talking to at this time was We didn’t know which vehicle was taking on water, so there was an exchange that went back and forth as we tried to determine which vehicle it was. I asked the C-7 how far they were from the ship and what their bearing was. When responded that he was in the back of an AAV and couldn’t see anything it finally clicked in my mind as to which vehicle I was talking to.

At that point, we called “man the boat deck.” I then left Combat to go up to the Bridge so that I could look and see where the distressed vehicle was. I went up to Port side bridge way, aft, and looked out using the Big Eyes there. At that point it was broad side to the waves with the front side of the vehicle facing towards us. When I looked through the big eyes I could see one of the AAV crewman waving the November Flag.

After that, the Ship started maneuvering. At some point I lost sight of the AAV as the Bridge covered my view. Once the Bridge was no
longer in my way I looked and saw that the AAV was gone. I don’t remember when the CRRC’s got into the water.
Summary of First Interview

On, Aug 13, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I was on watch when the incident happened. I had the 1500 to 1800 watch. When I started, we were doing flight ops and AAV ops simultaneously. I think the helo was a Navy 60. At about the same time we were maneuvering to do flight ops, I was getting calls from debark control asking when the AAVs were going feet wet. I didn’t have the answer at the time but there was a Marine officer in the LFOC, I believe his name was he was my point man for getting comm with the AAV. He said there was some delay with the AAVs and they were having some issues, so I told him we were maneuvering to support the aircraft recovery.

Sometime after we had that conversation, at around 1715-1730, I got the report that they were going feet wet. I received the report from I received a report from that the AAVs were starting to fight the seas and that it was getting rough out there. I let him know that we were still maneuvering to recover the helo. Right before the helo got off deck there was a report from the AAV that they were starting to take on water. was telling me that they were getting water up to somewhere between the ankles and the knees. He told me that once the water level gets to chest level, that’s when they have to egress the AAV.

When I got the report that the AAV was taking on water, I relayed that information to the Officer of the Deck. With passing up that information, I automatically assumed that the CO would get notified and we would immediately start recovery ops.

After that everything happened very quickly. My relief, came on at that point. I wasn’t really concerned with changing over since I was dealing with the situation as it unfolded. He asked if the CAPT knew about this and I told him that I had relayed the information to the OOD. We then made the decision to call the CAPT to Combat and to call “Man the Boat Deck.” This would have been around 1745.

After that we manned the boat deck and the CAPT came up to Combat and we started actions to recover the Marines. We had the boat deck manned, and we had some water in the well deck. We also decided to launch the CRRCs to aid in the recovery of the Marines.

Simultaneously, I was making reports via SIPR chat to other units in the area and up to PHIBRON. We had a MKI/ARG chat room that I was
making reports in. The other units started asking if we required assistance and I responded that they should send anything they had to our area right now.

We had some initial issues establishing comms with the AAVs on the beach. I believe they were using a POTS line from the LFOC.
Summary of Second Interview

On Aug 24, 2020, the investigative team spoke with [redacted] regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

For the evolutions that were going on during PMINT there were a lot of confirmation briefs, so it is difficult for me to recall specifically what happened during the confirmation brief for this specific operation. I can’t recall whether the safety boats the ship was supposed to provide in the morning were supposed to be authorized all the way through the operation.

I was not aware that the safety boat was discovered inoperable in the morning and that a message went down to the AAV Platoon Commander that the ship would not be able to provide a safety boat.

When I was on watch that afternoon, the Tracks had not left the beach when I came on. One of the questions I got from one of the controlling stations at debark was that they wanted to know when the Tracks would launch from the beach. At that time I said that I didn’t know, but that I would speak to the Marines in the LFOC to see if I could get that information. I asked the Marines in the LFOC and they said that they didn’t know. They said they were working through either some comm issues or some issues with the mobility of the Tracks. Shortly after that they gave me an estimated time after which the Tracks would go feet wet. I can’t recall what the specific amount of time was. Shortly after that I got a report from the LFOC that the Tracks were feet wet en route back to the ship. They never requested permission from the ship to go feet wet.

The comms with the AAVs were being worked as a joint effort between the Marines in the LFOC and one of my watch standers in the CoC. I don’t remember the frequency we had comms with them on. The word from the LFOC was that they had comms with them, but again I’m not sure what frequency they were using.

When the Tracks were headed back to the ship, we didn’t have a specific location at which we were going to recover the AAVs, we had a general location within which we were going to recover the AAVs. We were conducting flight ops with the helicopters at the time and we were balancing the efforts between dealing with the flight ops and recovering the AAVs. Generally when we recover the AAVs we like to do what’s called a J Hook. This gets the stern facing the beach and then the craft can come into the well deck.
I was aware that the AAVs got out of their boat lane as they came back to the ship.

Before the Marines on shore splashed back to the ship they did not at any time request a safety boat from the ship. I know that an AAV can be used as a safety boat. I don’t recall being told that the safety boat had been fixed that day.

I remember that I was not personally on board the USS SOM when it was qualified for AAV operations.

I realized that the AAVs were moving towards the ship sometime between the 1615 to 1645 timeframe. I remember the Marine watch officer coming in and discussing water levels in the AAV. The initial report that I got from him, that the AAV was taking on water, was that the water was somewhere between the ankle and the knee. Shortly after that he told me that once the water gets up to the chest level that that’s going to be the bailout threshold. That was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that told me that.
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: 
Activity: __________ _ Unit: USS SOMERSET LPD-25
Telephone number: 

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: Negligence/Dereliction of Duty and that:

I have the right to remain silent.
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both. I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:
I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

4 Aug 2020

ENVELOPE (157)
Summary of Interview

On Aug 13, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I was in debark control when the incident occurred, which is starboard side aft below the flight deck. I was helping to coordinate the flight ops and the amphibious ops. My original understanding was that the AAVs were supposed to return before noon that day. At the time the AAVs decided to go feet wet, we were doing flight ops and were a little bit farther away than we wanted to be. We had to turn around and I remember the AAVs were head on and the ship made a maneuver right as the first AAV was ready to come in the well deck.

At that point, I was aware there was an AAV getting towed and heading back to the beach. At some point around this time I heard “Man the Boat Deck.” As soon as I heard that I left debark control and went up to the bridge. I remember hearing the OOD saying that there was an AAV sinking. I then went and got eyes on the AAVs and saw three AAVs around 300 yds away. Not even two minutes later I looked back and saw only two AAVs and a bunch of life preservers in the water. From the time I heard “man the boat deck” to the time I got on the bridge was less than a minute. I would say about 5 minutes passed between when I heard the call to man the boat deck and when I was able to get on the big eyes and saw three AAVs.

I remember that after the AAV broke down on the island it wasn’t really clear what the way forward was to get parts to the island. We sent the LCACs back out on a crew day waiver, which is a big deal. My understanding was that we were just going to deliver parts and maybe transport the AAV back to on the LCAC. I’m not sure who made the decision for the AAVs to splash, but it was a matter of minutes between when the LCACs landed on the beach and when the AAVs splashed back to the ship. It just wasn’t very clear on what the plan was going forward for sending the LCAC back and recovering the AAVs.

For the safety boats, we agreed in the confirmation brief that we would provide one safety boat and the AAVs would provide a second safety boat. However, that morning our safety boat was down and wasn’t working. So we talked to the AAV Platoon Commander and he was aware that we couldn’t put the safety boat in in the morning and we weren’t going to delay the launch any longer. I didn’t pass this information to the AAV Platoon Commander personally though so I don’t know what his reaction was.
Summary of Interview

On Aug 13, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I am the force Surface Warfare Information Officer (SWIC). My role is to defend the surface picture for the ARG. So my watch is 0400 to 0800 and then 1600 to 2000, so I was on watch when we launched the AAVs and in the evening during the incident.

In the morning, normally when we do AAV operations we want to have our RHIBS as safety boats. However, there were some complications with our RHIBs so we couldn't get them in the water so we had to empty out two AAVs so they could act as safety boats.

Later on, I came back on watch at around 1600. I was there when the AAVs went feet wet to go back to the ship, but I don't remember exactly what time that was. The first time I really realized what time it was happened around 1745 when came up for turnover.

When the AAVs reported in as feet wet, was on Boat Alpha communicating with one of the AAVs. We found out later that she was communicating with a different AAV then the one that went down as they originally thought. She was actually communicating with the AAV that was towing one of the other AAVs back to the island. This meant that there viewpoint was a little skewed when trying to get details on everything that was going on. They were trying to get details from afar and from within, so there was difficulty in that communication line to say the least.

As they were going in, normally we like to know how many personnel are on board, so I asked to get that information and she relayed that request out and the person she was speaking to responded that they didn't know. So at that point we didn't know how many people were in the AAVs.

They all launched, as we were tracking the first one broke down and we heard over Boat Alpha that one would rig for tow and head back. The remaining AAVs proceeded to the ship. When we first started the goal was to pick them up at the 4000 yard mark. However, in the midst of all of this we found out that we needed to either recover or launch a helo. So we went back on a course to make wind for flight operations. Once we did that, we started to pull away from the AAVs.
I remember that I was working with Ops and the TAO to do the math on where we were going to recover the AAVs. By the time we finished with flight operations we were probably at about 5000 yards out. We eventually started recovering at about 5700 yards. By the time we got the last one in we were around 5800 yards out.

As we were getting the reports in and communicating with the AAVs, the Marine Captain kept coming over to us and trying to get updates from us as well as giving updates to us. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) We were getting information that the AAVs were taking some pretty good waves. Around this time is when everything gets a little foggy because, although the reports were going to TAO as they should, I also remember the Marine Captain coming in and saying that although they were taking on water, the amount of water was normal.

At that point in time, I remember the EMO was right behind the TAO and they said that we needed to tell the CAPTAIN, which we did. At that time we got the order out to get the RHIB in the water. At this time we were mainly focused on getting as much information out as possible.

When the RHIB got in the water, I remember we got the report that there were three AAVs. Shortly after that, however, we got the report that there were only two AAVs. That is when I first realized that the AAV had completely sunk. After that we worked on getting the number of personnel recovered. I remember hearing first that there were four people recovered, but then we heard that there were only three people recovered. I think this may have been due to some double reporting.

As we were in communication with the RHIB we were getting more information on how many people they could recover. At this time I was trying to report information and coordinating with Bravo to get the SAN DIEGO and the JOHN FINN. We were just trying to get everyone available to help out. The MKI sent their helo over. We were mainly in search and rescue mode at that point and I was relaying information to Bravo.

During the beginning of the incident, I was mainly passing information by voice. However, I quickly realized that I needed to be passing some of the information by chat. For that reason, I may have been a little bit late when I was passing some of the information on chat.
Summary of Interview

On Aug 13, 2020, the investigative team spoke with [redacted] regarding his recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I was in debark control during the incident. I initially got word that a vehicle was disabled and had water coming in. I was standing in the background sometime later when I heard "man the boat deck." Automatically I went down to the boat deck and got that manned up. That's when we launched the 11 meter RHIB. I was on the boat deck the whole time after we heard the call to man the boat deck.

Around 10 to 12 minutes passed between the time when we got the 11 meter RHIB in and the MRF RHIB went in. [redacted] got the CRRCs in the water. He was in well deck control at the time.

At the time we heard that water was getting into the disabled vehicle it didn't sound like the situation was that bad. However, by the time we heard the call to man the boat deck I knew that it had gotten a lot worse. I think that it was a short amount of time that passed before we heard the call to man the boat deck. As soon as we launched the two 11 meters I ran down to the well deck. At that time I saw the AAVs come in with the one Marine that passed away. We also opened up the side ports so we could pass some comm equipment to the 11 meters and be on standby in case we needed to bring on Marines through the side port.
Summary of Interview

On Aug 13, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding her recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, she related the following information to me.

I was the Bridge Officer of the Day (OOD) when the incident happened. When I was turning over to take the watch, we weren’t sure if the any AAVs were going to be staying on land or if they were coming back via LCAC. We had heard that there was an AAV broken down on the island, but we weren’t sure what would happen. When I first took the watch it was understood that an LCAC would bring them back as the last load. That did change later and they would stay on the island with the other AAVs, but that came up later during my watch. I know that Combat was working on how to get repair parts to them.

When I took the watch we were heading north because we were doing flight ops and amphib ops at the same time. It was later discovered that we didn’t actually have permission for water space and airspace. We had only gotten permission for water space, so we didn’t have permission to land one of the helos that we had already out. One of the helos needed to land because it was only 45 minutes from splash, so they were almost out of fuel.

We were heading to windward one when I first got on watch. We got out of the area and landed the helo and then floated back around as soon as we were able to and went to red deck. We made our way back down to windward one because I knew that the AAVs needed to go feet wet, but I didn’t know when they needed to go feet wet. When we went further north to refuel the aircraft, these were not the same aircraft that were on deck when the AAVs were later trying to recover onto the Ship.

We then turned back around and were heading back in when I was told that there was another aircraft that needed to land. I told the tower that we didn’t have permission for airspace but then Combat told me that we had airspace permissions.

At this time I was working with Combat to figure out when the AAVs would go feet wet. Combat was trying to coordinate a time with them but before that coordination happened I visibly saw the AAV’s go feet wet. I saw this happen through the big eyes. I don’t know if Combat just didn’t know they had gone wet. I know this happened before 1700 but I’m not sure specifically what time it was.

At 1705 I got a call from the Tower saying that, even though they hadn’t mentioned it to me before, they had a helo that needed to land at 1715. This definitely wasn’t in the air plan. At this point all 9
AAVs had gone feet wet, and I noticed that they had gone out of the boat lane. So what I did was I drove past the AAVs so that when I turned around I would be pretty close to the AAVs so I could pick them up faster.

I then turned around. We had set up for both green deck and green well, we were going into the seas and into the wind. We were going about five knots, we landed the helo but we were outpacing the AAVs. So as soon as we got red deck we went all stop so that the AAVs could catch up faster.

At around 1715 I received word that one of the AAV's was getting rigged for tow. I got passed this word from Combat. First it was being rigged for tow and would recover on the ship. Later, at around 1740 I was told that another AAV was being rigged for tow and that one would be towed back to the ship and another would be towed back to shore. However, I didn’t have specific guidance on which was coming back to ship and which was going back to shore.

We went all stop around 1720-1730. If I remember right, the helicopters landed and they needed gas, so the helos were on deck when we had the red deck. I then got notification that we needed to go green deck so they could take off. At that point, because we were all stop, I didn’t have steerage way because I didn’t have any wash going over the rudder. Because of this we couldn’t maintain our course. So I kept increasing the thrust control to the starboard side because we were drifting in that direction. I first did 2 knots to the starboard side and it wasn’t catching. I then increased to 4 knots to the starboard side and it still wasn’t catching. I then did all engines ahead 1/3 for three knots and it still didn’t catch so we went to 5 knots to catch the steerage way so we could get the helo off.

After the helo took off we slowed back down to 3 knots so the AAVs could get in. At that point it was discussed between Combat and the bridge about whether we should flip the ship around to get closer to the AAVs. But at that point the AAVs were close enough that if I had flipped the ship around it would have taken longer for the AAVs to get in. So we maintained our course and speed.

At around 1745, the oncoming OOD showed up to relieve me. While he was up on the Bridge we were discussing the AAV’s and the third AAV had gone feet dry. I left the bridge at around 1803. While I was walking down to get in the mess line I heard “Captain to Combat” and “Man the Boat Deck.” I heard this call at around 1805. Per the watch bill, the OOD for the 1500-1800 also is the boat officer for 1800-2100. So when I heard the call to Man the Boat Deck, I went straight down to the boat deck. I got geared up to man the 11m boat. I went back up to the bridge and grabbed a radio. I tried to ask the bridge what specifically was going on. I understood that there may have been an AAV that went down.
I then went back down to boat valley, loaded up on the 11m boat, and got the bearing and range that we needed to go over to the AAV. We got over to the AAV and saw 12-16 people on top of the AAV, two people were lying down. I only saw one AAV there, but I didn’t know if that was the AAV that was having issues. I didn’t recognize any of the people on top of the AAV.

We went alongside the AAV, but were having issues staying alongside. We were able to keep steady enough that we could get the two unconscious people over into the boat. We then started doing medical assessments on them because we had two SAR swimmers with us we were able to do the assessments. We wrapped up the first individual, the one with the broken ankle, because he looked like he was in a worse condition. He was also bleeding from the ears. The other guy was unconscious, but was mumbling something and wasn’t bleeding.

As we went back to the ship we were directed to the starboard side port door. When we got there, there was no one there to meet us. I called up to the bridge and got people down there to help us. We then passed the injured personnel up to the ship. We then went back out to see if we could find more survivors. I think we stayed out there past midnight looking for people.
Summary of Interview

On Aug 13, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

At the time of the incident, I was the Junior Officer Of the Deck. I remember that we were coordinating air ops and AAV ops at the same time, so that made things a little bit more complicated. At one point I remember hearing that there were two AAVs going back to San Clemente Island. I think that this was around 1730. We have done flight ops and AAV ops at the same time before, so it’s not completely abnormal. I think we were a little bit further than we would have liked to be, but we were not outside of the range of an AAV. I don’t think that anything was outside of the normal range of operations at that point though.

I think the sea state at the time of the incident was about a two at that point, which is within the normal operating range of an AAV. Comms with Combat leading up to the incident were decent, although things got a little scrambled once the incident occurred.

I remember hearing that there was ankle deep water at around 1730. I don’t remember the exact times though. It wasn’t abnormal for us to hear that an AAV was having mechanical difficulties, but when we realized there were two AAVs that were struggling it was a bit more concerning for us from a logistical standpoint trying to figure out how we would help both. I think we took the first AAV in at around 1740. At around 1800 we had the OOD turnover. At that time, I was mostly monitoring the AAV’s as we recovered them.

At some point I heard the call “man the boat deck.” At that point I don’t think we had good comm with boat deck. I remember that got on comm and started talking to the TAO and the OOD and was asking them what was going on.

I never actually saw Track 5. When I got out to look on the Big Eyes, I could see two tracks next to each other and there was debris in the water. I could see a Marine on top of one of the AAVs waving a November Flag, but I don’t think it was his AAV he was waving it for. I think the AAV had already gone down at that point. At that time I became focused on feeding information to the bridge and coordinating the small boats.
Summary of Interview

On Aug 13, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I was the oncoming TAO when the incident was occurring. I walked onto the Bridge at around 1730. I talked to there was a helo on deck that she had just recovered. She had the ship dead in the water. I walked out onto the starboard bridge wing and looked and the AAVs were probably about 1000 to 1500 yard out to our starboard quarter. We were dead in the water to let them get closer to us.

I got a quick view of what was going on from up top and then I walked down into Combat at around 1743. I started looking around to see what was going on in Combat and the off going TAO, was busy deconflicting an issue with some more helos that were wanting to come in.

Sometime later we received word that one of the AAVs had water coming into the vehicle. I don’t think that this word came from the vehicle that sank, I think this must have come from one of the other AAVs. A little bit later, right around the top of the hour, we got word that it had gone dead in the water. I don’t know if we received that word when it went dead in the water, or if we were only just receiving that information. We then got the word that it was flooding and that they were seeing life vests in the water. That is when Ops called the CO to the CIC and called “Man the Boat Deck.” We then started preparations to get us back over to the AAVs. We still had AAVs that were coming on board, so we recovered those four AAVs and then turned to go back.

This all happened in the space of 10 to 15 minutes. Once we got turned around we got the boat in the water. We launched two CRRCs. I mainly stayed in the COC and provided back up to the CO and Ops as they needed it.
Summary of Interview

On Aug 13, 2020, the investigative team spoke with [redacted] regarding her recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, she related the following information to me.

Initially during the incident I was in the well deck. I went down there right after chow, but I don't remember exactly what time it was. I remember a couple of AAVs coming in and everything was fine, but then there was a lapse of time during which no AAVs were recovering on the ship and I wasn't sure why that was. So I went up to debark control to figure out what was going on. That's when I looked out and I could see two Tracks coming up beside a third. I don't know the exact distance, but it was far enough where it was hard to make out individual people. I think maybe it was 500 yds. I don't think it took me more than a few minutes to get up to debark control and when I got up there is when I saw the three Tracks.

I remember at one point I lost sight of them because the ship was turning. When I looked back I could only see two. So at that point I ran back down to the well deck. The RHIBs were being sent at that point. I'm not sure at what point the RHIBs were called for, but the first two casualties were being brought to the side port. My Marines assisted with getting the casualties on board and getting everything moved out of the way so that the medical personnel could provide care.

After we got that set up my sense of time was completely off. At some point we had one Track come in and we didn't bother with the usual administrative process to get them in, we just brought them straight on. After that a second Track came in and they had a body on top. We quickly got the injured person off the trap and that is when the Marines and Sailors started providing compressions.

The only other thing I can think of that is important is the safety boat situation. I know that in one of the tracks there was only crew, so it counted as a safety boat, but the secondary was already inside the well. Everything went fine leaving, it was just that the ship's safety boat wasn't working. I don't know which Track was rogered up to be a safety boat though.

In the morning, the ship's CAPTAIN radioed me directly asking if I could find out if the AAVs could provide a second safety boat because the ship's safety boat didn't work. So I ran to the AAV Platoon Commander to ask him that question. He couldn't hear me so I tried writing on my hand. I was yelling at him and I think he heard me say "safety boat" and he said "I already rogered up. We're good on Boat Alpha."
Summary of Interview

On Aug 13, 2020, the investigative team spoke with [redacted] regarding his recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I was the well deck control officer during the incident. I remember hearing about an AAV that was having issues as it was coming back. We recovered a few vehicles and were then waiting because I think we were doing flight operations or something along those lines. While we were waiting I heard that one of the AAVs was taking on water. As soon as I received that information I reported it to debark control. When they reported they were taking on water, it sounded like there was an alarm going on in the background, but it didn’t sound too frantic. It just sounded like they were trying to report that they were taking on water and needed assistance.

As soon as I heard that I reported to debark control that I was hearing over Boat Alpha, which should have been [redacted] that there was an AAV taking on water. I think we had taken four AAVs on board the ship at this point. There was a delay between when we took on the first initial four and when we recovered the last two. I don’t know when, but somewhere in that delay was when I heard that there was an AAV taking on water and when I reported that to debark control.

After that I didn’t play much of a role. I was mainly trying to figure out where they were and what was going on and also trying to figure out when we would recover the last AAVs. At around that time is when everything went south quick. Everything got blurry after that and I don’t remember much from that time period.

When the tracks loaded onto the ship for the first time, there was a call that was made on Boat Alpha that some of the tracks were having issues. I don’t know which one or even what the issues were though. I asked at that time if they were ok because normally if an AAV is having a problem we would prefer to leave them on shore instead of taking them on an exercise, but they said they were fine.
Summary of Interview

On Aug 13, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding her recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, she related the following information to me.

I was in the CIC and listening to Boat Alpha during the incident. I stood two watches that day, so I was actually on duty that morning when the AAVs launched as well. I stayed past my first watch just I could do the launch because it was my first time doing it. I came back on watch at 1545 and stayed until 1945. After the two AAVs went back to the island I remember that the AAVs asked us to slow down because they were fighting against the waves. I told this to the TAO, and he said that we couldn’t because we had to land the aircraft. About 20 minutes later, the AAVs asked if we could turn around, but again the TAO said no because we were refueling the helo at that time so we couldn’t do anything without securing the helo down. However, we did slow down at that point and I passed that information to the AAVs.

About 15 minutes after that I got the first word that Track 5 was having the malfunction. I actually didn’t know that it was Track 5 at this point, I only knew that one of the AAVs was having a malfunction. I feel like no one in Combat responded to me telling them that the AAV was having a problem. was there and I told him that maybe he could tell them what was going on because they weren’t listening to me. He then went over to the TAO and they had a conversation about what was going on. Shortly after that we got another call that they were taking on water.

After we heard they were taking on water everything started happening quickly. It seemed like they went from taking on water to being underwater very fast. We received another message that they were going under and that they needed a boat to get in the water. About 20 minutes later we had a boat in the water.

There was not a lot of talking going on over Boat Alpha and comms were pretty clear from what I remember. After we got the boat in the water I was talking with the AAVs on the island to get accountability.
Summary of Interview

On Aug 13, 2020, the investigative team spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

Between 1700 and 1730 I was on boat deck doing some trouble shooting on one of our standby RHIBs. Shortly after I finished that I heard the call over the 1MC saying "Man the boat deck." I’m a boat engineer so I made the decision to stay up there to see if I could help. I didn’t know what was going on at that point so I asked one of the Boatswain Mates, but they didn’t know. After that I asked (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and she said that one of the AAVs was taking on water.

We launched in the RHIB, and then we went out to where the AAVs where. At that time, there were two AAVs in the water that we could see. We pulled up and were notified that there were two casualties. We got both of those casualties off safely. We then delivered them back to the boat, and then went right back out to see if there was anyone else in the water. We looked for survivors but couldn’t find any. We stayed out there until about midnight before we got called back to the ship. It wasn’t until two days later that we found out there was an AAV that sank completely. When we got out there we only saw two AAVs so we didn’t even know that there was one that sank.

I did not recognize any of the Marines that were on top of the AAV we took the two injured Marines off of. I think the sea state at the time we went out in the RHIB was about a 3 or 4. I think the Coxswain mentioned that we were doing possibly 10 foot swells that day, which is pretty high. I think that when we got alongside the AAV, we could still see the drivers hatch pretty clearly.

When we approached the AAV we pulled up on the starboard side. We took between 10 and 20 minutes to get there. We got the more seriously injured Marine on board ship first and then we had to ask for another litter to transfer the second Marine since we only had one on the RHIB. After that, we immediately turned around and got back out there to look for more survivors.
Summary of Interview

On August 24, 2020 the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

On the day of the incident, I had just gotten relieved from watch and I was in the office when I heard them say over the 1MC that the Commanding Officer presence was requested in the Combat Information Center. After that, I heard them say to man the boat. Once I heard that I ran up to boat valley. I was trying to relieve the current Boatswains Mate on watch. Then I took over the watch.

I got relieved around from watch at around 1730 and then went down to eat. Once I heard the call to man the boat deck I immediately went down there. I relieved the person who had just relieved me on watch so that he could operate the crane. I had no idea what was going on so I asked the lookouts and they told me that one of the AAVs had gone down. We were on watch at that time.

As Boatswains Mate of the watch I was making the calls. The OOD was giving me direction as to where to position the medical personnel. I don’t remember that any of the lookouts saw personnel in the water. After that I got the three boats into the water, our 11 meter and the two Marine boats. After that you could see two AAVs on the port bow. We then maneuvered the ship so that they would be on our starboard side.

They brought the personnel via small boats to the starboard side of the ship and brought them on through the side port. After that we brought the AAVs back on the ship through the well deck.

I remember hearing some chatter on the bridge and seeing one of the people on top of the AAVs performing CPR on someone.
Summary of Interview

On Aug 13, 2020, the investigative team spoke with [redacted] regarding her recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, she related the following information to us.

I was a watch officer under instruction in the Combat Information Center (Combat) at the time the incident occurred. At the time the incident occurred, [redacted] was on the headset talking to the AAVs, but she had the headset on speaker so I could hear what they were saying. At around 1730 she received a call that one of the AAV's was taking on water. I think they had broken down a little bit before that, but it was around 1730 that we heard they were taking on water. One of the Marines in the LFOC came over and asked what was going on with the AAV. [redacted] then said that one of the AAVs broke down, and asked him what his impression of the scenario was. He said that if they were taking on water that wouldn't be a good thing.

After that, we continued to monitor the radios and we kept hearing reports that they were still taking on water. [redacted] continued to let people in Combat know what was going on, but I feel like no one was talking to us or replying to [redacted] for about 30 minutes. [redacted] told the Tactical Action Officer (TAO) that something was wrong and then the TAO finally paid attention and told the Bridge to contact the Commanding Officer (CO) and then the CO came into Combat and that is when everything started rolling and people started to react much faster.

After that, we remained on watch and continued to monitor the situation. Sometime later we worked on establishing what the last known position of the ship would have been around the time the incident occurred so that we could backtrack the location of the AAV around the time it sank.

The next day after the incident, the Watch Cheif came in and asked us to shred some documents because he was trying to clean out Combat. We felt this was weird because we thought that everything in Combat should be kept exactly as it was after such a big incident. Because of this we did not shred the documents and we left them in the shred bin in Combat. There was also some confusion over some of the manual plots we had used to track the last known location of the AAV.
Summary of Interview

On Aug 24, 2020, the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

I was on the 6 to 9 watch. I went into duty around 1730. I had already eaten by the time I went on watch. When I went first got on watch, I started out as the messenger on the bridge level. Normally, we rotate every hour, so after I was on messenger, I was going to go to the port look out position. It was right around the beginning of my watch though that things started to happen. I noticed that a lot of people started to show up and it was mainly the XO there running the show.

I remember a lot of people started to come up and then I heard Ops say "man the boat deck" which I thought it was kind of weird because it's usually the Boatswain's Mates of the Watch who says that. Then I jumped on the comms and I heard reporting back and forth.

We didn't rotate. No one was going to rotate during that time. I heard someone request permission to put down the boat. Then 3 hours passed before I knew it and I was still on the port look out and I still hadn't gotten relieved. After that everyone was on the port side looking. There were no extra binoculars to use since everyone was using them. I don't remember hearing anyone describing anything, everyone looked kind of calm.
Summary of Interview

On Aug 24, 2020, the investigative team spoke with [redacted] regarding his recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to us.

I was on the port lookout on the USS SOM when the accident happened. I was watching the AAVs as they came back to the ship. I noticed that they had kind of gone off course. It looked like the course they were going on would have them end up side by side with the ship. They were all together at one point, but then one of the AAVs started floating away and I was told that was the one I needed to keep an eye on. I saw debris floating in the water, but I couldn’t really make out what it was. They told us to pay attention to make sure there were no bodies in the water.

At first, I really didn’t know what was going on. I knew we had flight operations and well deck operations. I was eager to know what was going on, but the next thing I knew there were boats being dropped into the water and it was a real life situation.

The AAVs were still a good distance away from the ship when I first started paying attention to them. I think the ship was about 4000 meters from shore when we started to do flight operations. I showed up for my watch at around 1730. I think that the incident happened somewhere around an hour or two after that. I remember there being three AAVs when I started watching them. I never saw any AAVs head back to SCI.

The three AAVs that I saw were maybe a couple thousand yards away from the ship when I first saw them. They were kind of circling. They weren’t directly aft of the ship, they were more to the port side aft of the ship. They were all moving in unison at first, but then the broken AAV started to drift to the port side, and then the other AAVs started circling.

Around this time is when everything started to heat up. I noticed that the AAV went from a horizontal orientation to a vertical one. I actually observed the AAV as it sank. I remember that there were two individuals on top of the AAV. Both the individuals were in green colored cammies. I saw a wave sweep over the vehicle and knock these two individuals off the vehicle. I think that the two Marines on top of the vehicle were looking down into the cargo hatch talking to people at the last moment before they were swept off.

The only other thing I remember from this time period is that there seemed to be an issue with the speed of the ship. I think they were
trying to get the ship to an appropriate speed, but at the time I don't think we were going faster than 3 knots. When the CO made his appearance at the port bridge everything started to happen in the right place.

I didn't see anyone on top of any of the AAV's waving a flag at any point. I didn't observe anyone in the water before the AAV sank. I don't remember seeing any wearing a desert uniform or any uniform other than the green cammies. The two Marines that I saw on top of the AAV before it sank had their helmets and their gear on when I saw them.
Summary of Interview

On August 24, 2020 the investigative team spoke with regarding his recollection of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap that occurred on 30 July 2020. During that interview, he related the following information to me.

On the day of the incident I was the aft lookout. We were doing flight ops earlier so I was in the pilot house. I think I went to use the head at around 1800 to 1830. When I came back I saw that everyone was panicking and moving around. Then when I looked outside I saw stuff floating in the water maybe 200 to 300 yards away on the portside. I looked out the big eyes and saw people floating in the water and standing on top of the AAVs. I only saw two AAVs at that time. I didn’t recognize any of the people on top of the AAVs although I could tell the drivers were still inside. There was one person on top of one of the AAVs that looked unresponsive.

The sea state that day looked pretty bad, but it wasn’t knocking people off of the vehicle.
1 Marine dead, 8 missing after AAV mishap off California coast

MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. (July 31, 2020) -- One Marine with 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), I Marine Expeditionary Force, was pronounced dead at Scripps Memorial Hospital La Jolla following an amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) mishap off the coast of Southern California on July 30, 2020.

Two Marines were transported to local hospitals where one was listed in critical condition and the other in stable condition.

Fifteen Marines and one Sailor were inside the AAV at the time of the incident, eight of whom have been recovered.

The name of the deceased Marine will be withheld until 24 hours after next of kin have been notified.

"We are deeply saddened by this tragic incident. I ask that you keep our Marines, Sailors, and their families in your prayers as we continue our search," said Col. Christopher Bronzi, 15th MEU Commanding Officer.

Search and rescue efforts are ongoing to recover the remaining eight service members. Assisting in the search efforts are the USS John Finn, three U.S. Navy MH-60 helicopters and multiple small boats from the USS Makin Island, USS Somerset, and USS San Diego, as well as the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Forrest Rednour and a Coast Guard MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter from Coast Guard Sector San Diego. At approximately 5:45 p.m. PST, Marines in the AAV reported taking on water.

The incident occurred during a 15th MEU and Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group routine training exercise in the vicinity of San Clemente Island.

The incident is under investigation.

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Media queries can be directed via e-mail to imefcommstrat@usmc.mil.
Search and Rescue for missing Marines, Sailor concludes

MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. – After an extensive 40-hour search, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) concluded their search and rescue operation for seven missing Marines and one Sailor, today.

All eight service members are presumed deceased. The 15th MEU and the ARG leadership determined that there was little probability of a successful rescue given the circumstances of the incident.

On July 30, 15 Marines and one Sailor were participating in a routine training exercise off the coast of San Clemente Island, California, when the amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) they were riding in began to take on water and sank. Of the 16 service members, eight Marines were rescued, one died, and two others are in critical condition at a local hospital.

“It is with a heavy heart, that I decided to conclude the search and rescue effort,” said Col. Christopher Bronzi, 15th MEU Commanding Officer. “The steadfast dedication of the Marines, Sailors, and Coast Guardsmen to the persistent rescue effort was tremendous.”

Over the course of the at-sea search, Marine Corps, Navy, and Coast Guard helicopters, ships, and watercraft searched more than 1,000 square nautical miles.

Assisting in the search efforts were the USS John Finn, the USS Makin Island, the USS Somerset, and the USS San Diego. Eleven U.S. Navy SH-60 helicopters and multiple Navy and Marine Corps small boats were also involved. The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Forrest Rednour and a Coast Guard MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter from Coast Guard Sector San Diego assisted as well.

“Our thoughts and prayers have been, and will continue to be with our Marines’ and Sailor’s families during this difficult time,” said Bronzi. “As we turn to recovery operations we will continue our exhaustive search for our missing Marines and Sailor.”

Efforts will now turn to finding and recovering the Marines and Sailor still missing. Assisting in the recovery efforts is the offshore supply vessel HOS Dominator, as well as Undersea Rescue Command, utilizing their Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) to survey the sea floor.

The circumstances surrounding the incident are being investigated. The names of the Marines and Sailor will be released 24-hours after next of kin notification.
MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. — Officials with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), identified on Aug. 2 the one Marine who was killed and seven Marines and one Sailor who are presumed dead after an amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) mishap July 30.

Lance Cpl. Guillermo S. Perez, 20, of New Braunfels, Texas, was pronounced dead at the scene before being transported by helicopter to Scripps Memorial Hospital in San Diego. He was a rifleman with Bravo Company, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/4, 15th MEU.

Presumed dead are:

Pfc. Bryan J. Baltierra, 19, of Corona, California, a rifleman with Bravo Company, BLT 1/4, 15th MEU.

Lance Cpl. Marco A. Barranco, 21, of Montebello, California, a rifleman with Bravo Company, BLT 1/4, 15th MEU.

Pfc. Evan A. Bath, 19, of Oak Creek, Wisconsin, a rifleman with Bravo Company, BLT 1/4, 15th MEU.

U.S. Navy Hospitalman Christopher Gnem, 22, of Stockton, California, a hospital corpsman with Bravo Company, BLT 1/4, 15th MEU.

Pfc. Jack Ryan Ostrovsky, 21, of Bend, Oregon, a rifleman with Bravo Company, BLT 1/4, 15th MEU.

Cpl. Wesley A. Rodd, 23, of Harris, Texas, a rifleman with Bravo Company, BLT 1/4, 15th MEU.

Lance Cpl. Chase D. Sweetwood, 19, of Portland, Oregon, a rifleman with Bravo Company, BLT 1/4, 15th MEU.

Cpl. Cesar A. Villanueva, 21, of Riverside, California, a rifleman with Bravo Company, BLT 1/4, 15th MEU.

Injured were:

A Marine rifleman with Bravo Company, BLT 1/4, 15th MEU. The Marine was transported from the scene to Scripps Memorial Hospital by helicopter and was in critical condition.
Press Release: 15th MEU identifies personnel killed in AAV mishap

A Marine assault amphibious vehicle crewmember with Mechanized Company, BLT 1/4, 15th MEU. The Marine was transported from the scene to Scripps Memorial Hospital by helicopter and was in critical condition. He has since been upgraded to stable condition per a competent medical authority.

In total, 16 personnel were aboard the AAV when on July 30 around 5:45 p.m. they reported taking on water while conducting shore-to-ship waterborne operations training in the vicinity of San Clemente Island off the coast of Southern California. Five Marines were rescued and brought aboard USS Somerset.

The incident is under investigation.

Photos of the deceased are not immediately available.

Imagery of the search and rescue efforts, as well as the current recovery efforts, are available at https://www.dvidshub.net/feature/15thmeurecovery.

For more information, email all media inquiries to imefcommstrat@usmc.mil.

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Instagram: @1_mef_marines  Facebook: @1stMEF  Twitter: @1stMEF
Location of sunken AAV, remains found off San Clemente Island

MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. – Officials with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) positively identified on Aug. 3 the location of the amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) that sunk off the coast of San Clemente Island on July 30.

The U.S. Navy’s Undersea Rescue Command confirmed that human remains have also been identified using their underwater remotely-operated video systems from the merchant vessel HOS Dominator, a ship specializing in undersea search and rescue.

The Navy has expedited the movement of assets to recover the remains of the Marines and Sailor, as well as raise the AAV. The equipment to properly and safely perform the recovery from the sea floor will be in place at the end of this week, and a dignified transfer of our Marines and Sailor will occur as soon as possible after the conclusion of recovery operations.

The AAV sunk to a depth of approximately 385 feet after it began taking on water during a shore-to-ship maneuver approximately 1,500 meters off the coast of San Clemente Island. One Marine was pronounced dead at the scene, and seven missing Marines and one Sailor were subsequently presumed dead Aug. 2 as search and rescue efforts ceased.

A previous press release had estimated the depth as 600 feet.

The cause of the July 30 incident is under investigation.

We will continue to communicate to the public and media as more information is available.

Imagery of the search and rescue efforts, as well as the current recovery efforts and the HOS Dominator, are available at https://www.dvidshub.net/feature/15thmeurecovery.

Underwater video imagery from the ROV is not available.

For more information, email media inquiries to imefcommstrat@usmc.mil.

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Instagram: @1_mef_marines Facebook: @1stMEF Twitter: @1stMEF
Remains of missing Marines, Sailor successfully recovered

MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. – The remains of seven Marines and a Sailor were successfully recovered Aug. 7, 2020, after underwater salvage operations following the July 30 mishap involving an amphibious assault vehicle off the coast of San Clemente Island.

The recovered Marines and Sailor will soon be transferred to Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, for preparation by mortuary affairs teams for burial. Marine and Navy pallbearers will place the remains aboard an aircraft bound for Dover AFB in a solemn transfer. From Dover AFB, their remains will then be released to their families in accordance with their wishes.

The transfer of remains will not be open to the public, and we ask that the privacy of the families be respected as they make final arrangements for their loved ones.

“Our hearts and thoughts of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit are with the families of our recovered Marines and Sailor,” said Col. Christopher Bronzi, commanding officer of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. “We hope the successful recovery of our fallen warriors brings some measure of comfort.”

The U.S. Navy has led the underwater search and salvage efforts. Specialized equipment on a diving and salvage ship to recover the remains and AAV arrived Aug. 6 to relieve the crew of HOS Dominator, who stayed in position after locating the site.

Lance Cpl. Guillermo S. Perez, 19, of New Braunfels, Texas, also died in the AAV mishap and was pronounced dead at the scene July 30. His remains were transferred Aug. 5 to Dover AFB.

The sunken AAV has been successfully recovered. The cause of the July 30 incident is under investigation.

Imagery of the recovery efforts are available at https://www.dvidshub.net/feature/15thmeurecovery.

For more information, email media inquiries to imefcommstrat@usmc.mil.

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Instagram: @i_mef_marines Facebook: @1stMEF Twitter: @1stMEF
Remains of Marines, Sailor from 15th MEU transferred to Dover AFB

MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. – The remains of seven Marines and a Sailor recovered Aug. 7 off the coast of San Clemente Island following a July 30 assault amphibious vehicle mishap were transferred Aug. 12 to Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, from Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California.

Six pallbearers of Marines and Sailors escorted each casket aboard a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III bound for Dover AFB for final preparation for burial before being released to their families for final arrangements.

Transferred were:

Pfc. Bryan J. Baltierra, 18, of Corona, California

Lance Cpl. Marco A. Barranco, 21, of Montebello, California

Pfc. Evan A. Bath, 19, of Oak Creek, Wisconsin

Navy Hospital Corpsman 3rd Class (Fleet Marine Force) Christopher Gnem, 22, of Stockton, California

Pfc. Jack-Ryan Ostrovsky, 20, of Bend, Oregon

Cpl. Wesley A. Rodd, 22, of Harris, Texas

Lance Cpl. Chase D. Sweetwood, 18, of Portland, Oregon

Cpl. Cesar A. Villanueva, 21, of Riverside, California

The remains of Lance Cpl. Guillermo S. Perez, 19, of New Braunfels, Texas, who also died in the AAV mishap July 30, were transferred to Dover AFB on Aug. 5 from MCAS Miramar.

The ages of the deceased have been updated, as a previous press release listed them incorrectly.

Gnem was posthumously advanced to the rank of petty officer third class and
PRESS RELEASE: Remains of Marines, Sailor from 15th MEU transferred to Dover AFB

posthumously awarded his enlisted Fleet Marine Force Warfare Specialist qualification, having met the criteria set by the Navy for both before his death.

We ask that the privacy of the families be respected as they make final arrangements for their loved ones.

The cause of the July 30 incident is under investigation.

Imagery of the recovery efforts and transfer of remains will be available at https://www.dvidshub.net/feature/15thmeurecovery.

Media should direct all queries to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit Communication Strategy and Operations Office at kassie.mcdole@usmc.mil.
MEDIA ADVISORY
August 20, 2020
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(760) 763-3505

15th MEU to hold memorial service honoring fallen Marines, Sailor

MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. – The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit is scheduled to hold a memorial service on Aug. 21 at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, to honor the eight Marines and a Sailor of Company B, Battalion Landing Team 1/4, who died July 30th off the coast of Southern California.

The memorial service is closed to the public and media.

Imagery of the memorial service will be available as early as Aug. 22 at https://www.dvidshub.net/feature/15thmeurecovery.

Media should direct all queries to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit Communication Strategy and Operations Office at stephanie.leguizamon@usmc.mil.

-30-

Facebook: 15thMarineExpeditionaryUnit Twitter: 15thmeuofficial Instagram: 15thmeu
From: Mondav. August 31, 2020 7:45 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Cc: Subject: RE: Medical Officer

Good morning Sir,

Please let me know if there are any further questions.

Very respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Good evening. Please see request below from the investigating officer for the AAV incident.

Let's talk more about it in the morning.

Thanks.

CO
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
What if anything would happen if you were driving an AAV in the water and your volts suddenly went from 27 to 19? What would happen with all of you electrical systems? Would your radios, bilge pumps etc. be affected?

The TM states: 330 ampere, 24 Vdc, negative ground, air-cooled generator

The output voltage is controlled by a remote mounted, solid-state, transistor-type voltage regulator. Generator current output is self-regulating to meet vehicle current demands.

Output voltage while engine is running at 1800 RPM should be 27.3 to 28.1 Vdc.

Under maximum electrical load, generator should produce 26.9 VDC. Output current should hold steady at no less than 310 amperes in ½ hour.

In my opinion: As for the "volts suddenly went from 27 to 19", only those low-amp circuits would remain operational (i.e. dome lights, dash panel lights, etc.). The radios and bilge pumps demand a significant amount of amperage, and in my limited time in this community, do not believe that those systems would remain fully operational under those conditions.
STATEMENT OF TAKEN AT CPCAB Bldg 210567 DATED 2020/09/15

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(continued)

AFFADAVIT

I HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _1_. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION. UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

Making the Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 17 day of September 2020.

WITNESSES:

________________________________________

________________________________________

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

________________________________________

________________________________________

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE __2__ OF __2__ PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00
ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE (AAV7A1) Pre-Operation Checklist is a 11 page checklist that takes how long to complete?
The appendix "K" pre-operation checklist takes approximately 2 hours 30 minutes to complete (average).

ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE (AAV7A1) Pre-Water Operation Checklist is a 6 page checklist that takes how long to complete?
The appendix "L" pre-water operation checklist takes approximately 1 hour 18 minutes to complete (without embark troops), 1 hour 59 min to complete (with embark troops), 40 minutes built in for troop commander brief, manifest, evacuation drills, embark troop brief.

ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE (AAV7A1) During Water Operation Checklist is a 2 page checklist that takes how long to complete?
The appendix "N" during water operation checklist takes approximately 8 minutes total per observation (2 minutes per area to observe). Observation frequency should be for the entire duration while conducting water operations.

**Privacy Act Statement**

Authority: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

Principal Purpose: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately recorded.

Routine Uses: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

Disclosure: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.
STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) TAKEN AT CPCAB Bldg 210567 DATED 2020/09/14

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFADAVIT

I, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998
APPENDIX K
PRE-OPERATION CHECKLIST

K-1. SCOPE. This appendix shows the Pre-Operation checklist for the AAV.

Table K-1. Pre-Operation Checklist.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE (AAV7A1) Pre-Operation Checklist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MODEL (CIRCLE ONE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAVP7A1 RAM/RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAVC7A1 RAM/RS (Also perform tasks listed in TM 07268C-10/1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAVR7A1 RAM/RS (Also perform tasks listed in TM 07267C-10/1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREW CHIEF (PRINT: RANK, NAME)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRIVER (PRINT: RANK, NAME)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS (PRINT: RANK, NAME, BILLET)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS (PRINT: RANK, NAME, BILLET)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE

The following inspection sheet is divided into ten columns. The inspector will place a check in the column which best describes the condition of the item inspected. For those items that cannot be inspected for any reason, the inspector will make an appropriate annotation in the Remarks column.

25 hours
Table K-1. Pre-Operation Checklist. — Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Reference Paragraph</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Serviceable</th>
<th>Unserviceable</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>On Service Request</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Not Mission Capable if:</th>
<th>Exception to Non-Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GENERAL NOTES.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4a</td>
<td>(a) As you check each area, check for fuel, oil, hydraulic and coolant leaks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any fuel or coolant leak at all. Any Class III hydraulic or oil leak (resulting in a drop that fails).</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Properly stow all loose equipment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Exterior Checks:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bow.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4b</td>
<td>(a) Check bow portion of hull for damage.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any damage that exceeds the criteria in para. 2-4.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4a</td>
<td>(b) Check that the forward hull plugs are installed and that there is no evidence of leakage.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hull plugs cannot be installed or evidence of leakage past installed hull plugs.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4c</td>
<td>(c) If installed, check that headlights are securely mounted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Starboard Side.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4g</td>
<td>(a) Check for loose bolts on the sprockets, universals, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any hardware that cannot be tightened (e.g. stripped) or any damage that exceeds the criteria in para. 2-4.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4f</td>
<td>(b) Check final drive for oil leaks and loose fasteners.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any Class III leak.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

K-2
Table K-1. Pre-Operation Checklist. — Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Reference Paragraph</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Serviceable</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Not Mission Capable if:</th>
<th>Exception to Non-Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-4a</td>
<td>(c) Check for hull, suspension, shocks and final drive damage.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Any damage that exceeds the criteria in para. 2-4.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4m(1)</td>
<td>(d) Visually inspect the road arms for leaking/protruding seals or road arms out of alignment relative to the hull and with other road arms. Look for failed or failing bearing indicators, which can be identified by canted road arms.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Any damage that exceeds the criteria in para. 2-4.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4h</td>
<td>(e) Check the oil level and condition in the road wheels, idler wheels and the support rollers.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Any Class III oil leak.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-7d</td>
<td>(f) Check for proper track tension 1/4 in. to 1/2 in. above rear support roller.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Proper track tension cannot be achieved or maintained.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Aft.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4z</td>
<td>(a) Check that the aft hull plugs are installed and that there is no evidence of leakage.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hull plugs cannot be installed or evidence of leakage past installed hull plugs.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4s</td>
<td>(b) If tow cable is installed on ramp, check condition and check that clevis pins are secure.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4t</td>
<td>(c) Grease tow pintle and check for proper operation.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Any loose hardware or inoperative tow pintle.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

K-3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Reference Paragraph</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Serviceable</th>
<th>Unserviceable</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>On Service Request</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Not Mission Capable If:</th>
<th>Exception to Non-Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-4w</td>
<td>(d) Grease ramp hinges before operation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any missing mounting hardware.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>5 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Port Side.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-7d</td>
<td>(a) Check for proper track tension 1/4 in. to 1/2 in. above rear support roller.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proper track tension cannot be achieved or maintained.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4h</td>
<td>(b) Check the oil level and condition in the road wheels, idler wheels and the support rollers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any Class III oil leak.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4m(1)</td>
<td>(d) Visually inspect the road arms for leaking/protruding seals or road arms out of alignment relative to the hull and with other road arms. Look for failed or failing bearing indicators, which can be identified by canted road arms.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any damage that exceeds the criteria in para. 2-4.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>5 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>(c) Check for hull, suspension, shocks and final drive damage.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any damage that exceeds the criteria in para. 2-4.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>10 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4f</td>
<td>(d) Check final drive for oil leaks and loose fasteners.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any Class III leak.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4g</td>
<td>(e) Check for loose bolts on the sprockets, universals, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any hardware that cannot be tightened (e.g. stripped) or any damage that exceeds the criteria in para. 2-4.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>5 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Reference Paragraph</td>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
<td>Unsuitable</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>On Service Request</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Not Mission Capable if:</td>
<td>Exception to Non-Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-20b</td>
<td>(f) Check the external fire extinguisher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fire extinguisher wire seal missing or unserviceable.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 min/30 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>manual pull handle wire seals.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Topside Checks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4ai</td>
<td>(a) Check coolant level and condition.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contaminated coolant.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 min/30 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-11a(13)</td>
<td>(b) Check fuel level.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If locking device is missing or will not secure.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 min/30 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5k</td>
<td>(c) Check that front plenum seal is serviceable.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plenum seal missing, torn, cracked, or broken. Seal not seating correctly.</td>
<td>Land/Gun-nery Only</td>
<td>2 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5f</td>
<td>(d) Check oil level and condition of starboard right angle drive. Check for serviceability, visible damage, lock wire.</td>
<td>Contaminated oil. Missing hardware. Broken or missing lock wire.</td>
<td>Land/Gun-nery Only</td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e) Check lateral and longitudinal drive shaft U-joints for visible signs of cracks, damage, lock wire.</td>
<td>U-joint caps/flange cracked or broken. Broken or missing lock wire.</td>
<td>Land/Gun-nery Only</td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5a</td>
<td>(f) Check oil level and condition of starboard final drive. Check for serviceability, visible damage, lock wire.</td>
<td>Contaminated oil. Missing hardware. Broken or missing lock wire.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5c</td>
<td>(g) Check the coolant fan belt for condition and proper tension.</td>
<td>Belt is broken or clearly worn. Proper tension cannot be maintained.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5g</td>
<td>(h) Drain fuel water separator.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 min</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table K-1. Pre-Operation Checklist. — Continued
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Reference Paragraph</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Serviceable</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>On Service Request</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Not Mission Capable If:</th>
<th>Exception to Non-Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-4aa</td>
<td>(i) Check that exhaust grill cover is secured and that the front grill cover can be secured in the closed position.</td>
<td>Either grill cover cannot be secured in the closed position.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4ab</td>
<td>(j) Ensure cargo hatch(s) lock in the open position.</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7b</td>
<td>(a) Turn on the manual fuel shutoff valve at the driver's station.</td>
<td>Valves frozen in the closed position. Any evidence of fuel leaks.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Turn on the manual fuel shutoff valve at the fuel cell.</td>
<td>Valves frozen in the closed position. Any evidence of fuel leaks.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-9a</td>
<td>(c) Drain fuel tank sediment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-6g</td>
<td>(d) Check hydraulic reservoir fluid level and ensure that the hydraulic filter lock wire is in place.</td>
<td>Contaminated fluid. Broken or missing lock wire.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-11a(10)</td>
<td>(e) Check the lamp/test warning cancel switch, turn it to LAMP TEST first. All lights should flash. Next, turn it to CANCEL and all lights should stop flashing.</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5f</td>
<td>(f) Check oil level and condition of port right angle drive. Check for serviceability, visible damage, lock wire.</td>
<td>Contaminated oil. Missing hardware. Broken or missing lock wire.</td>
<td>Land/Gunnery Only</td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Reference Paragraph</td>
<td>Task</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1</td>
<td>2-5a</td>
<td>(g) Check lateral and longitudinal drive shaft U-joints for visible signs of cracks, damage, lock wire.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(h) Check oil level and condition of port final drive. Check for serviceability, visible damage, lock wire.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-6k</td>
<td>(i) Check level and conditions of engine oil.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-6i</td>
<td>(j) Check level and condition of transmission oil.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4al</td>
<td>(k) Check the M27E periscope and vision block for signs of damage.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7e</td>
<td>(l) Check all six of the fixed fire extinguishers. Compare ambient temperature to temperature/pressure scale on bottle. Check pressure gauge for correct reading. Check that all wire seals are intact.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Not Mission Capable If:**

- U-joint caps/flange cracked or broken. Broken or missing lock wire. **Land/Gun- nery Only**
- Contaminated oil. Missing hardware. Broken or missing lock wire. **None**
- Contaminated oil. **None**
- Contaminated oil. **None**
- More than 50% loss of visibility through the M-27 periscope. More than 50% loss of visibility through vision blocks, which inhibits safe operation of the vehicle. **None**
- Any one gauge has incorrect reading. Any one wire seal not intact or missing. **None**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Reference Paragraph</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Serviceable</th>
<th>Unserviceable</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>On Service Request</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Not Mission Capable if:</th>
<th>Exception to Non-Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-20</td>
<td>(m) Check AFSSS</td>
<td>fire extinguishers and sensors. Ensure all electrical cables are</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electrical harnesses not able to connect to the sensor or fire extinguisher valve.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>5 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fire extinguishers</td>
<td>connected to the bottle valves, CEP and the nozzles and shipping</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and (n) Check MFSS</td>
<td>caps have been removed or installed as required for an operational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fire extinguisher.</td>
<td>system.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure manual</td>
<td>discharge components are intact and hooked up.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-20a</td>
<td>(o) Check the</td>
<td>portable fire extinguisher.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MFSS fire</td>
<td>extinguisher.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>extinguisher.</td>
<td>Ensure fire extinguishers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>manual discharge</td>
<td>incapable of being manually discharged.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>components are</td>
<td>intact and hooked up.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7d</td>
<td>(p) Check the</td>
<td>generator and coolant pump drive belts for condition and proper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any belt is broken or clearly worn. Proper tension cannot be maintained.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>portable fire</td>
<td>extinguisher.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>extinguisher.</td>
<td>drive belts for condition and proper tension.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7t</td>
<td>(q) Check battery</td>
<td>terminal for tightness and corrosion.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7u</td>
<td>terminal for</td>
<td>tightness and corrosion.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7w</td>
<td>(r) Check all seats</td>
<td>for proper operation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Driver's seat will lock into desired position.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-6</td>
<td>(s) Ensure parking</td>
<td>brake is set as follows:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7x</td>
<td>(t) Press hard on</td>
<td>brake pedal.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>brake pedal.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-6b</td>
<td>(u) Pull handle aft</td>
<td>and turn to the left until it locks into place.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and (v) Release</td>
<td>handle and let up on brake pedal.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>handle and let up</td>
<td>on brake pedal.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

K-8
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Reference Paragraph</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Serviceable</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>On Service Request</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Not Mission Capable if:</th>
<th>Exception to Non-Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Tap the brake pedal. The handle should not move when brakes are fully locked.</td>
<td>Parking brake does not remain engaged.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(t) Start the engine using normal procedures. Allow it to warm up at least three minutes at 1000 to 1200 RPM.</td>
<td>Fails to maintain proper idle.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-4u 2-4c</td>
<td>(u) Check operation of taillights and headlights (if installed).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency Egress Lighting System (EELS).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-22a</td>
<td>(a) Conduct a visual inspection of the lights, wires and sensors ensuring all parts are properly secured and free of damage and debris.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-21a</td>
<td>(b) At the Control Panel, gently pull on the ENABLE/DISABLE Switch, and move it up to the ENABLE position.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Reference Paragraph</td>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
<td>Unserviceable</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>On Service Request</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Not Mission Capable if:</td>
<td>Exception to Non-Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-22c</td>
<td>(c) From Forward Controller, actuate and hold switch to TEST/RESET position to initiate system self-test. After approximately 5-10 seconds, verify lights illuminate. (NOTE: lights may not all illuminate at the same time. If all lights illuminate, system passes self-test. If lights do not illuminate or lights flash three times, indicating low battery charge, report to Maintenance.) Release switch. Verify all lights extinguish. Report to Maintenance.</td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-22d</td>
<td>(d) From Forward Controller, toggle the switch to the ON position. Verify all lights illuminate. (NOTE: If lights do not illuminate or lights flash three times, indicating low battery charge, report to Maintenance.) Report to Maintenance.</td>
<td>1 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-22e</td>
<td>(e) From Forward Controller, toggle switch to TEST/RESET position. Verify all lights extinguish.</td>
<td>1 min</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table K-1. Pre-Operation Checklist. — Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Reference Paragraph</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Serviceable</th>
<th>Unserviceable</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>On Service Request</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Not Mission Capable if:</th>
<th>Exception to Non-Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-1b</td>
<td>2-1c</td>
<td>(1) Transmission oil pressure 170 to 230 PSIG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fails to maintain a min of 150 PSIG at an idle.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>15 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1b</td>
<td>2-1c</td>
<td>(2) Engine oil pressure at 2800 RPM 55 to 75 PSIG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fails to maintain at least 10 PSIG at an idle.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>15 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1b</td>
<td>2-1c</td>
<td>(3) Air restriction indicator 0 to 25 in. of Hg.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Air restriction exceeds 25 in. Hg.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>15 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1c</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Battery volts indicator 25 to 29 VDC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Less than 18 or more than 31 VDC indicated on gauge.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>15 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Check the transmission oil level with the engine idling and the gear selector in Neutral. Oil should be on the FULL mark.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fails to maintain proper oil level.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Perform intercom check between driver and vehicle commander.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No intercom between the driver and vehicle commander.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>30 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(e) Perform intercom check between driver, vehicle commander and rear crewman.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No intercom between the driver, vehicle commander and rear crewman.</td>
<td>Land/Gun- nery Only</td>
<td>30 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(f) Perform radio check between vehicles.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Less than two radios fully operational.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>30 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-30a</td>
<td>(3), (4)</td>
<td>(g) Inability to raise and lower the ramp under vehicle power.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unable to raise and lower the ramp under vehicle power.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-30a</td>
<td></td>
<td>(h) Check that ramp is properly secured.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ramp locking hooks (dogs) will not engage.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 min</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table K-1. Pre-Operation Checklist. — Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Reference Paragraph</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Serviceable</th>
<th>Unserviceable</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>On Service Request</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Not Mission Capable If:</th>
<th>Exception to Non-Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-22f</td>
<td>(f) From Aft Controller, actuate and hold switch to TEST/RESET position to initiate system self-test. After approximately 5-10 seconds, verify lights illuminate. (NOTE: lights may not all illuminate at the same time. If all lights illuminate, system passes the self-test.) Release switch. Verify all lights extinguish.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-22g</td>
<td>(g) From the Aft Controller, toggle the switch to the ON position. Verify all lights illuminate.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-22h</td>
<td>(h) From the Aft Controller, toggle the switch to the TEST/RESET position. Verify all lights extinguish.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>After Starting Engine.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1b 2-1c</td>
<td>(a) Check the oil pressure. If there is no oil pressure after 15 seconds, stop the engine immediately.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fails to maintain engine oil pressure: 625-675 RPM: 10 PSI 2800 RPM: 55-75 PSI</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1b 2-1c</td>
<td>(b) Check the driver's display module and auxiliary pressure gauges for correct readings:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any one or more indicators on the DDM or auxiliary pressure gauges are inoperative.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Reference Paragraph</td>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
<td>Unserviceable</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>On Service Request</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Not Mission Capable if:</td>
<td>Exception to Non-Use</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervised by:</td>
<td>(Rank, Last, First, MI)</td>
<td>Date Verified:</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Print:</td>
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<td>Signature:</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX L
PRE-WATER OPERATION CHECKLIST

L-1. SCOPE. This appendix shows the Pre-Water Operation checklist for the AAV.

Table L-1. Pre-Water Operation Checklist.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE (AAV7A1) Pre-Water Operation Checklist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MODEL (CIRCLE ONE)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAVP7A1 RAM/RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAVC7A1 RAM/RS (Also perform tasks listed in TM 07268C-10/1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAVR7A1 RAM/RS (Also perform tasks listed in TM 07267C-10/1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>UNIT:</strong></th>
<th><strong>MILES: (SPEEDOMETER) (LOGBOOK)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TAC NO.</strong></td>
<td><strong>USMC NO.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HOURS: (TACHOMETER)</strong></td>
<td><strong>CREW CHIEF (PRINT: RANK, NAME) DATE:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DRIVER (PRINT: RANK, NAME)</strong></td>
<td><strong>CREWMAN (PRINT: RANK, NAME)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHERS (PRINT: RANK, NAME, BILLET)</strong></td>
<td><strong>OTHERS (PRINT: RANK, NAME, BILLET)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHERS (PRINT: RANK, NAME, BILLET)</strong></td>
<td><strong>OTHERS (PRINT: RANK, NAME, BILLET)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE**

The following inspection sheet is divided into ten columns. The inspector will place a check in the column which best describes the condition of the item inspected. For those items that cannot be inspected for any reason, the inspector will make an appropriate annotation in the Remarks column.

1 hour 18 min - Without Embark Troops

1 hour 58 min - With Embarked Troops

(40 min built in for troop commander brief, embark troop brief, manifest, Embark Drill)
Table L-1. Pre-Water Operation Checklist. — Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Reference Paragraph</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Serviceable</th>
<th>Unserviceable</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Not Mission Capable if:</th>
<th>Exception to Non-Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Appx K</td>
<td>Perform general Pre-operational Checks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any missing or loose hardware, or visual damage identified during the pre-op that will impact water-tight integrity.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2-4a 2-4z</td>
<td>Check that the forward and aft hull plugs are installed and that there is no evidence of leakage.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hull plugs cannot be installed, or evidence of leakage past installed hull plugs.</td>
<td>None 4 min</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Appx K</td>
<td>Check that contact cooler plugs are installed and that there is no evidence of leakage.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contact cooler plugs not installed or leaking.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only If the contact cooler bypass is connected.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Appx K</td>
<td>Check ramp plugs and pontoon lugs to ensure they are tightly installed, and that there is no visible signs of damage to the pontoon.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any missing or loose hardware, or visual damage that will impact water-tight integrity.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only 5 min</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2-4r(1)</td>
<td>Check that track channel, propulsion unit and deflectors are free of debris, and have no visible signs of damage.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reverse flow duct missing. Any visible damage that will affect water operations.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only 5 min</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2-4aa</td>
<td>Ensure intake grille handles and exhaust grille lugs are in place and secure.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any grill that cannot be secured in the closed position.</td>
<td>None 2 min</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Reference Paragraph</td>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Not Mission Capable If:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2-4aj 2-4am</td>
<td>Check that all topside hatch seals are serviceable and that each hatch can be secured in the closed position.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any topside hatch that cannot be secured in the closed position.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only 5 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2-8e</td>
<td>Check that ramp and personnel hatch seals are serviceable.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Seal missing or any visual defect that may result in a water leak.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only 2 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2-4ak 2-4al</td>
<td>Check that the driver's vision adapter plug and the M27 periscope is serviceable and properly installed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Driver vision adapter plug and/or M27 periscope missing.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only 1 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2-6f</td>
<td>Check ventilator aspirator valve for proper operation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ventilator aspirator seized, or sticky operation.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only 1 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Appx K</td>
<td>Close heater exhaust outlet(s).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Heater exhaust cannot be fully closed.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only 1 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2-8d</td>
<td>Ensure ventilation outlet valve control is OPEN and works freely and close vent air bypass door. Ensure ventilation fan switch is on LOW.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Outlet valve cannot be opened and/or vent fan is inoperative.</td>
<td>No Embarked Troops 1 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>Check ventilation fan for proper operation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ventilation fails to operate in either HI or LOW positions.</td>
<td>No Embarked Troops 30 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>2-7q</td>
<td>Ensure cooling system is connected to contact cooler.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contact cooler not connected.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only 1 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Appx K</td>
<td>Check hydraulic bilge pumps for the following:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More than one of four bilge pumps inoperative.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only 10 min</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

L-3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Reference Paragraph</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Serviceable</th>
<th>Unserviceable</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>On Service Request</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Not Mission Capable if:</th>
<th>Exception to Non-Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2-8c</td>
<td>(a) Fluid leaks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any hydraulic fluid dripping to the hull.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Tightness of mounting screws.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Tightness of hose clamps.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Bilge pump screens are free of debris.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-8c</td>
<td></td>
<td>(e) (Start Engine) Place mode selector switch in WATER/TRACKS. Increase engine RPM to 2000 RPM to ensure hydraulic bilge pump indicator lights are ON.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fails to indicate operation of electric bilge pumps.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-8c</td>
<td></td>
<td>(f) Lift outlet covers on hydraulic bilge pump outlet ports and check for airflow.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More than one of four bilge pumps inoperative.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2-8c</td>
<td>Check electric bilge pumps for the following:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More than one of four bilge pumps inoperative.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Tightness of mounting.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Tightness of hose clamps.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Bilge pump screens free of debris.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Tightness and/or corrosion on electrical connections.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-8c</td>
<td></td>
<td>(e) Place bilge pump switches to ON and ensure indicator lights are ON.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fails to indicate operation of electric bilge pumps.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table L-1. Pre-Water Operation Checklist. — Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Reference Paragraph</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Serviceable</th>
<th>Unsuitable</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Not Mission Capable if:</th>
<th>Exception to Non-Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-8c</td>
<td>(f) Lift outlet covers on electric bilge pump outlet ports and check for airflow.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More than one of four bilge pumps inoperative.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2-8b Place mode selector switch to WATER/JETS and check operation of water/jet deflectors (buckets). Accelerate to between 800 rpm and 1000 rpm; water jets should not turn. Accelerate to over 1000 rpm; water jets should turn. Steer left and right to ensure full range of steering operation opening/closing, then check reverse steer of 5/8&quot; to 3/4&quot; of movement.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Water jet inoperative. Bucket inoperative. Reverse steer inoperative. Water jets do not stop below 1000 RPM.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>2-8g Check bow plane operation and ensure that there are no visible hydraulic leaks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bow plane leaking. Bow plane inoperative.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>2-8b Check to see that plenum doors are closed and locked, and that indicators (mushrooms) are in the UP position.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Either plenum door not closed and locked.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>2-15e Stop engine.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30 sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Appx K Ensure ramp and personnel hatch are closed and locked.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>2-7ab Check ramp vision block. Ensure it is clean and allows a clear view to the outside.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The view through the vision block is not clear.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Appx K Ensure cargo hatches are closed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Reference Paragraph</td>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
<td>Unserviceable</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>On Service Request</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Not Mission Capable if:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Appx K</td>
<td>Inventory and position the following safety equipment:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Tow ropes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Boat hooks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) November flag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Pyrotechnics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(e) Axe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(f) Searchlight (Check operation at both driver station and turret.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>2-4ap</td>
<td>When tow ropes are positioned, check sea tow quick-release for proper operation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sea tow quick-release fails to operate properly.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Appx K</td>
<td>Ensure all crew members and embarked personnel are issued serviceable life preservers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Appx K</td>
<td>Give pre-water operations safety brief (para. 4-13).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Appx K</td>
<td>Brief the Troop Commander of hatch operations, and of duties for opening and securing of troop commander’s and driver’s hatch.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Appx M</td>
<td>Complete and submit personnel manifest.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>4-14</td>
<td>Time permitting, practice vehicle waterborne evacuation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Reference Paragraph</td>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
<td>Unserviceable</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>On Service Request</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Not Mission Capable If:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<td>------</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supervised by:</td>
<td>(Rank, Last, First, MI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Print:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Signature:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
M-1. **SCOPE.** This appendix shows the personnel manifest for the AAV.

### Table M-1. Personnel Manifest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE:</th>
<th>VEHICLE SER #:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>DoD No/SSN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-1/(M-2 blank)
APPENDIX N
DURING WATER OPERATION CHECKLIST

N-1. SCOPE. This appendix shows the During Water Operation checklist for the AAV.

Table N-1. During Water Operation Checklist.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODEL (CIRCLE ONE)</th>
<th>REFERENCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAVP7A1 RAM/RS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAVC7A1 RAM/RS (Also perform tasks listed in TM 07268C-10/1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAVR7A1 RAM/RS (Also perform tasks listed in TM 07267C-10/1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNIT: MILES: (SPEEDOMETER) (LOGBOOK)

TAC NO. USMC NO. HOURS: (TACHOMETER)

CREW CHIEF (PRINT: RANK, NAME) DATE:

DRIVER (PRINT: RANK, NAME) CREWMAN (PRINT: RANK, NAME)

OTHERS (PRINT: RANK, NAME, BILLET) OTHERS (PRINT: RANK, NAME, BILLET)

OTHERS (PRINT: RANK, NAME, BILLET) OTHERS (PRINT: RANK, NAME, BILLET)

NOTE

The following inspection sheet is divided into ten columns. The inspector will place a check in the column which best describes the condition of the item inspected. For those items that cannot be inspected for any reason, the inspector will make an appropriate annotation in the Remarks column.

- 8 min total per observation
  (2 min observation per area)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Reference Paragraph</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Serviceable</th>
<th>Unserviceable</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>On Service Request</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Not Mission Capable if:</th>
<th>Exception to Non-Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>During water operations, check the following area for water ingress:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Ramp Seal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any water leak below the waterline.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only 2 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Ramp Personnel Hatch Seal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any water leak below the waterline.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only 2 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Midship Bearing Seals (check for excessive water on sponson below midship bearing seal locations.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any water leak below the waterline.</td>
<td>Land / Gunnery Only 2 min</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Supervised by:  
(Rank, Last, First, MI)  

Date Verified:

Print:

Signature:
Table 1-1. Technical Data — FOVs — Continued

Displacement: ............................................................................................................. 903 Cubic Inches
Compression Ratio: .................................................................................................... 15.5:1
Fuel: ........................................................................................................................... Multifuel
Rated Horsepower: ..................................................................................................... 525 ± 5% at 2800 rpm with F24
Rated Torque: ............................................................................................................. 1127 ft-lbs ± 5% at 2200 rpm with F24
Oil Capacity (Dry): ...................................................................................................... 10 Gallons
Oil Capacity (Wet): ...................................................................................................... 8 Gallons
Coolant System Capacity: ............................................................................................ 30 Gallons

4. POWER TRAIN

Transmission: ................................................................................................................. NAVSEA HS-525
Type: ............................................................................................................................... Hydraulic Torque Converter, Parallel Shaft Gear Arrangement
Maximum Converter Torque Multiplication: ....................................................................... 2.83:1
Gear Ratios Forward:
   First Speed: ............................................................................................................. 8.27:1
   Second Speed: ......................................................................................................... 4.63:1
   Third Speed: ............................................................................................................ 2.25:1
   Fourth Speed: ......................................................................................................... 1.27:1
(Reverse uses First and Second Speed Ratios)
Final Drive Ratio: ......................................................................................................... 3.06:1
Overall Maximum Torque Ratio (Engine to Sprocket): ..................................................... 70.8:1
Transmission Oil Capacity: ............................................................................................ 23 Gallons (with Oil Coolers, Filters, Lines)
Improved Transmission Upgrade for Torque Converter and Speed Change Assy.

5. RUNNING GEAR

Type: ............................................................................................................................... Torsion Bar, Front Sprocket, Raised Rear Idler
Number of Wheels: ........................................................................................................ 24 per Vehicle, 12 per Side, 6 Rubber Tired, Dual per Side, 24 Inch Diameter
Number of Return Idlers: .............................................................................................. 1 per Side, 20 Inch Diameter Wheels
Support Rollers: ............................................................................................................ 2 Single and 1 Double per Side
Sprocket:
   Number of Teeth: .................................................................................................... 11
   Feet per Revolution: ................................................................................................. 5.5
Number of Shock Absorbers: .......................................................................................... 4 per Side
Track: ............................................................................................................................. Steel, Single Pin, Rubber Bushed, with Replaceable Pads
Number of Blocks: ........................................................................................................ 85 Maximum per Side
Pitch: ............................................................................................................................. 6 inches
Weight per Block: ....................................................................................................... 35.1 Pounds Maximum
Weight per Side: .......................................................................................................... 2983.5 Pounds Maximum
### Table 1-2. Technical Data - Transmission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manufacturer</strong></td>
<td>Twin Disc, Inc./A. Bee Corp./Ronal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model</strong></td>
<td>HS 525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td>Power shift hydraulic control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rating:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum input torque</td>
<td>1127 ft-lb at 2200 rpm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum input speed</td>
<td>2800 rpm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maximum input horsepower:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land (with fan disengaged)</td>
<td>600 hp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water (full engine power through power takeoff)</td>
<td>600 hp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight (dry, without power takeoff)</td>
<td>2036 lb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Length, front to rear</strong></td>
<td>45 1/8 in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Height, top to bottom</strong></td>
<td>44 1/2 in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Width, left to right (overdrive measured)</strong></td>
<td>47 in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mounting</strong></td>
<td>3 points (attached to engine and 2 mounting pads)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Drive ranges</strong></td>
<td>4 speeds forward and 2 speeds reverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gear ratios, forward:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First speed</td>
<td>8.27:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second speed</td>
<td>4.63:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third speed</td>
<td>2.25:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth speed</td>
<td>1.27:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gear ratios, reverse:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First speed</td>
<td>8.27:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second speed</td>
<td>4.63:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Steer ratios:</strong></td>
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<td>Neutral</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second speed</td>
<td>1.50:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third speed</td>
<td>1.22:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth speed</td>
<td>1.12:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hydraulic torque converter</strong></td>
<td>single-stage multiple phase with lockup clutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maximum converter torque multiplication at stall</strong></td>
<td>2.83:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clutches engagement</strong></td>
<td>fluid pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clutches disengagement</strong></td>
<td>spring pressure</td>
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<td><strong>Brakes (combination service and parking):</strong></td>
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<td>Number</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>multiple disk, wet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applied</td>
<td>manual pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Release</td>
<td>spring pressure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooling</td>
<td>oil</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Power takeoff</strong></td>
<td>input driven</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fluid pumps:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>positive displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drive</td>
<td>3 input driven, 1 output driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oil filter type</strong></td>
<td>replaceable element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transmission oil:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil specification (normal or cold weather)</td>
<td>MIL-L-2104, 15W-40, or MIL-L-21260, grade optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil change schedule</td>
<td>See TI-4731-14/1B for oil analysis interval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>23 gal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooled by</td>
<td>external heat exchanger</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1-20
From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sent: Friday, September 18, 2020 9:11 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Subject: FW: Investigation
Attachments: Article 31 Rights Form for lOs.doc; DA-Form-2823 with questions.doc

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sent: Friday, August 28, 2020 10:42 AM

Subject: Investigation

My name is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I am the Investigating Officer for the 15th MEU AAV accident that occurred on 30 July 2020.

I have been informed that you were the Commanding Officer for 3rd AA Bn when the AAV Platoon was preparing and training to chop to the 15th MEU.

Attached is an Article 31(b) Right Form and a DA Form 2823.

Please fill out and sign the Article 31(b) Rights Advisement form prior to making any statement. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the MCU SJA can assist you if you have any questions about your rights.

On the DA Form there are 7 questions, if you chose to make a statement then answer the questions as part of your official sworn statement.

S/F

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
I, ____________________________, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN YOUR STATEMENT:

1. DID YOU KNOW THAT 12 OF 14 AAVS WERE DEADLINED WHEN THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON JOINED THE 15TH MEU?
   A. IF YOU KNEW THAT, WHAT STEPS DID YOU TAKE TO CORRECT THIS?
   B. IF YOU DID NOT KNOW, PLEASE STATE WHY THIS INFORMATION DID NOT GET TO YOUR ATTENTION.

2. WHAT TYPE OF TRAINING DID THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOONS RECEIVE PRIOR TO JOINING THE 15TH MEU?

3. WERE THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON'S TRAINING REQUIREMENTS CODIFIED IN A 3RD AA BATTALION TRAINING EXERCISE AND EMPLOYMENT PLAN (TEEP)?

4. WHY WASN'T THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON GIVEN A MCRE PRIOR TO CHOPPING TO 15TH MEU?

5. WHY WAS THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON ASSIGNED TO EXERCISE NATIVE FURY?

6. WERE ALL OF THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON SECTION LEADERS QUALIFIED VIA THE FORMAL ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN UNIT LEADERS COURSE?

7. WERE ALL OF THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON VEHICLE COMMANDERS QUALIFIED VIA THE FORMAL ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN VEHICLE COMMANDERS COURSE?
AFFADAVIT

I, ____________________________________________, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE ___. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making the Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of __________, at ____________________________

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

WITNESSES:

________________________________________

________________________________________

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

________________________________________

________________________________________

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

________________________________________

________________________________________

(Authority to Administer Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES
From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sent: Thursday, September 3, 2020 11:02 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Cc: 
Subject: Investigation
Attachments: DA-Form-2823_Ops.doc; Article 31 Rights Form for IOs.doc

My name is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I am the Assistant Investigating Officer for the 15th MEU AAV accident that occurred on 30 July 2020.

I have been informed that you were the Operations Officer for 3rd AA BN when the AAV Platoon was preparing and training to chop to the 15th MEU.

Attached is an Article 31(b) Rights Form and a DA Form 2823.

Please fill out and sign the Article 31(b) Rights Advisement form prior to making any statement. The Defense Services Organization at the 22 Area can assist you if you have any questions about your rights.

On the DA Form there are 7 questions. If you chose to make a statement then answer the questions as part of your official sworn statement.

R/S
I, ____________________________, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN YOUR STATEMENT:

1. DID YOU KNOW THAT 12 OF 14 AAVS WERE DEADLINED WHEN THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON JOINED THE 15TH MEU?
   A. IF YOU KNEW THAT, WHAT STEPS DID YOU TAKE TO CORRECT THIS?
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3. WERE THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON'S TRAINING REQUIREMENTS CODIFIED IN A 3RD AA BATTALION TRAINING EXERCISE
   AND EMPLOYMENT PLAN (TEEP)?

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   LEADERS COURSE?

7. WERE ALL OF THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON VEHICLE COMMANDERS QUALIFIED VIA THE FORMAL ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN
   VEHICLE COMMANDERS COURSE?
9. STATEMENT (Continued)
STATEMENT OF __________________________ TAKEN AT __________________________ DATED __________________________

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFADAVIT

I, __________________________, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ___. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making the Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of ____________, at __________________________.

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

WITNESSES:

__________________________

__________________________

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

__________________________

__________________________

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

__________________________

__________________________

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE ______ OF ______ PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998
From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sent: Thursday, September 3, 2020 10:50 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Cc: 
Subject: Investigation
Attachments: Article 31 Rights Form for IOs.doc; DA-Form-2823_Ops.doc

My name is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I am the Assistant Investigating Officer for the 15th MEU AAV accident that occurred on 30 July 2020.

I have been informed that you were the Company Commander with 3rd AA Bn when the AAV Platoon was preparing and training to chop to the 15th MEU.

Attached is an Article 31(b) Rights Form and a DA Form 2823.

Please fill out and sign the Article 31(b) Rights Advisement form prior to making any statement. The Defense Services Organization at the 22 Area can assist you if you have any questions about your rights.

On the DA Form there are 7 questions. If you chose to make a statement then answer the questions as part of your official sworn statement.

R/S

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
**SWORN STATEMENT**
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent of this form is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2851; E.O. 9397 Dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately recorded.

**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. LOCATION</th>
<th>2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)</th>
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<th>4. FILE NUMBER</th>
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<th>6. SSN</th>
<th>7. GRADE/STATUS</th>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS</th>
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</thead>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I, ___________________________ WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN YOUR STATEMENT:**

1. **DID YOU KNOW THAT 12 OF 14 AAVS WERE DEADLINED WHEN THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON JOINED THE 15TH MEU?**
   A. **IF YOU KNEW THAT, WHAT STEPS DID YOU TAKE TO CORRECT THIS?**
   B. **IF YOU DID NOT KNOW, PLEASE STATE WHY THIS INFORMATION DID NOT GET TO YOUR ATTENTION.**

2. **WHAT TYPE OF TRAINING DID THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOONS RECEIVE PRIOR TO JOINING THE 15TH MEU?**

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7. **WERE ALL OF THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON VEHICLE COMMANDERS QUALIFIED VIA THE FORMAL ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN VEHICLE COMMANDERS COURSE?**

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<tr>
<th>10. EXHIBIT</th>
<th>11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT</th>
<th>PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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**ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _________ TAKEN AT _________ DATED _________."**

**THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.**
AFFADAVIT

I, ________________________________________________, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ___. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

__________________________
(Signature of Person Making the Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ______ day of _________________, at _______________________.

________________________________
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

______________________________
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

________________________________
(Authority to Administer Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998
My name is [redacted] and I am the Assistant Investigating Officer for the 15th MEU AAV accident that occurred on 30 July 2020.

I have been informed that you were the Battalion Maintenance Officer for 3rd AA Bn when the AAV Platoon was preparing and training to chop to the 15th MEU.

Attached is an Article 31(b) Right Form and a DA Form 2823.

Please fill out and sign the Article 31(b) Rights Advisement form prior to making any statement. The Defense Services Organization at the 22 Area can assist you if you have any questions about your rights.

On the DA Form there is 1 question. If you chose to make a statement then answer the questions as part of your official sworn statement.

R/S
**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent of this form is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately recorded.

**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

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<tr>
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<tr>
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<th>6. SSN</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. **ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS**

9.

I, ________________________________, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

**PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN YOUR STATEMENT:**

1. **DID YOU KNOW THAT 12 OF 14 AAVS WERE DEADLINED WHEN THE 15TH MEU AAV PLATOON JOINED THE 15TH MEU?**
   
   A. **IF YOU KNEW THAT, WHAT STEPS DID YOU TAKE TO CORRECT THIS?**
   
   B. **IF YOU DID NOT KNOW, PLEASE STATE WHY THIS INFORMATION DID NOT GET TO YOUR ATTENTION.**

10. **EXHIBIT**

11. **INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT**

PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES

**ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _______ TAKEN AT _______ DATED _______."**

**THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.**

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 IS OBSOLETE

USAPA V1.00
AFFADAVIT

I, ____________________________________________________________, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ___. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making the Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ____ day of __________________, at _________________________________.

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority to Administer Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES
From: [Name]
Sent: Thursday, September 3, 2020 10:41 AM
To: [Recipient Name]
Cc: [CC Names]
Subject: Investigation
Attachments: Article 31 Rights Form for IOs.doc; DA-Form-2823_Maint.doc

My name is [Name] and I am the Assistant Investigating Officer for the 15th MEU AAV accident that occurred on 30 July 2020.

I have been informed that you were the Battalion Maintenance Officer for 3rd AA Bn when the AAV Platoon was preparing and training to chop to the 15th MEU.

Attached is an Article 31(b) Rights Form and a DA Form 2823.

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I, _________________, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN YOUR STATEMENT:

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   B. IF YOU DID NOT KNOW, PLEASE STATE WHY THIS INFORMATION DID NOT GET TO YOUR ATTENTION.
STATEMENT OF TAKEN AT DATED

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

I, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ___. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME.

THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making the Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ___ day of ____________, at ________________________.

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

WITNESSES:

________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

________________________________________

________________________________________

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

________________________________________

________________________________________

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT PAGE ___ OF ___ PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998
RECOMMENDED BRIEF FOR AAVS EMBARKING ON US NAVY AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS

Line 1: Positive communications established and frequencies: ________

Line 2: Recovery location: _________________________________________

Line 3: Sea State at recovery location: ________________________________

Line 4: Weather/current direction at recovery location: ________________

Line 5: Ship heading during recovery: _________________________________

Line 6: Ship recovery maneuver for recovery; button hook; parallel or
other: ____________________________________________________________

Line 7: Estimated time of splash and recovery: _______________________

Line 8: Numbers of AAVs and total number of personnel to be
recovered: _________________________________________________________

Line 9: All Safeties in place? Safety boats from ship? Which AAVs are
safety boats? _____________________________________________________

Line 10: Concerns: other ships in area, commercial vessels in area,
incoming weather, water hazards, etc. _______________________________

**Prior to splash, senior AAV leader must have positive confirmation
from Ship and they confirm that AAVs are splashing and Ship is
prepared to receive them.**

Produced by Investigating Officer and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:**
Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:**
To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately recorded.

**ROUTINE USES:**
Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

**DISCLOSURE:**
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE (YYYYMMDD)</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>FILE NUMBER</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>2020-09-22</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>01</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**LAST NAME** | **FIRST NAME** | **MIDDLE NAME** | **SSN** | **GRADE/STATUS** |
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) |

**ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS**
15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT

---

**ENCLOSURE (181)**
9.

1. What was your understanding of the training proficiency of the AAV platoon that was assigned to BLT 1/4, 15th MEU?

   My understanding of our AAV Platoon's proficiency was based upon the E-211 and E-270 Briefs provided to I MEF, my observation of them during the EOTG Mechanized Raid Course, the Performance Evaluation Checklists (PECL) distributed by EOTG following the Mechanized Raid Course, and my observation of their performance during the final Scenario Based Training Exercise (STX) of Realistic Urban Training (RUT) Exercise.

   At the E-211 and E-270 Briefs, the AAV Platoon was assessed as trained but not evaluated in their Core Mission Essential Tasks (MESTS). Their Supply and Readiness Ratings (SRRS) were briefed as S1 and R2 respectively. 1st Marincs Division acknowledged a potential extended timeline to complete Joint Limited Technical Inspections (JLTIs) due to much of the AAV Platoon's manpower recently returning from MEF's participation in Exercise NATIVE FURY 20.

   I visited Bravo Company during the final STX of their EOTG Mechanized Raid Course in early May. EOTG assessed their performance as above average overall and the best full mission profile raid (within the BLT) to that point In the Pre-deployment Training Program (PDP). Their preparation for combat was also noteworthy in the EOTG evaluation and it was noted the Company was more than ready to execute follow-on exercises.

   During the final STX of RUT, Bravo Company served as a Supporting Element to the Main Effort (All Domain Reconnaissance Detachment) and completed the mission without incident. The MEU's Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drill conducted prior to the final STX was noted by EOTG to have been very effective. Bravo Company played a large part in that ROC. My overall impression of their ability to plan, brief and execute was favorable.

2. What was your understanding of the maintenance condition of the AAVs that were assigned to BLT 1/4, 15th MEU?

   As mentioned earlier, the Supply and Readiness Ratings (SRRS) were S1 and R2 as of the E-211 Brief. I was also made aware of additional time required to complete the JLTIs upon composite due to the condition of the AAVs and elements of the Platoon recently returning from Exercise NATIVE FURY 20. My S-4 Officer kept me appraised throughout the JLTI process on the progress of those inspections. I remember he noted on at least two occasions (I believe during our routine Command & Staff Meetings) that he was working closely with Division and MEF and did not need my assistance or intervention. We were able to complete the JLTIs prior to the first major integrated training exercise for Bravo Company, which was their EOTG Raid Course in early May.

3. What was your understanding of the swim qualifications of Bravo Company, BLT 1/4, 15th MEU?

   I understood Bravo Company to have conducted their annual training requirements similar to the other elements of the BLT - to include swim qualification.

4. What was your understanding of the Under Water Egress (UET) training for Bravo Company, BLT 1/4, 15th MEU?

   I understood that Bravo Company had conducted Underwater Egress Training for their Marines and Sailors. I was told by BLT leadership that Bravo Company was 100% qualified on Underwater Egress Training.

5. During the confirmation brief for the mechanized raid on San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020, what safety measures were discussed for AAVs travelling to and from San Clemente Island?

   PHIBRON-MEU Integration (PMINT) was designed by 15th MEU planners with input from our Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) Three counterparts. We intentionally scheduled a Mechanized Raid on San Clemente Island during the day (30 July 2020) as we knew it would be Bravo Company's first mechanized raid conducted from the USS Somerset. The safety measures discussed during the confirmation brief for this raid included the following:

   1. Rehearsals & Pre-Combat Checks (PCCs) / Pre-Combat Inspections (PCIs) - This is an enduring theme in our confirmation briefs for all of the Major Subordinate Elements (MSEs). This was scheduled to take place during Phase I (Shaping).

   2. Safety Boats - During Phase II and Phase IV (Ship to Shore Movement & Shore to Ship Movement), the timeline briefed indicated two separate time windows when safety boats (Rigid Inflatable Boats or RIBs) would be in the water. These time windows were scheduled to cover the launch and recovery of the AAVs.

   3. No-go Criteria - Throughout the Confirmation Brief, the no-go criteria for launch and recovery was briefed as a sea state of 4.

   4. CASEVAC - ARG / MEU Surface Connectors were briefed as a surface CASEVAC platform.

   5. Redundant Communication - Multiple communication nets were briefed in case of contingencies.

   6. Operational Risk Management (ORM) - An ORM matrix was developed and briefed for the risk to mission and the risk to the force. In the risk to mission ORM matrix, the assessment was moderate to low based on our ability to cancel the mission if weather conditions did not permit the launch or recovery of AAVs. In the risk to force ORM matrix, the assessment was moderate due to the risk to AAV crew, man overboard rehearsals, swim proficiency, and the wearing of life jackets by all Marines and Sailors.

   7. Commander's Comments - In the confirmation briefs, I routinely emphasize the requirement to safely get to the objective in order to seize the objective. I also emphasize not rushing to failure, but being deliberate, precise, and disciplined in our approach to training and execution of any mission.

6. On 30 July 2020, were you aware that the mechanized raid force was almost 5 hours behind schedule?

   The Raid Force launched later than scheduled from USS Somerset on the morning of 30 July 2020. I remember it was on or about 0751 when the Execution Checklist indicated "feel wet" or launch from the Primary Control Ship (Somerset). The original scheduled time of launch was 0700. As the day progressed, I was aware Bravo Company was behind schedule. I was briefed by my S-3 that the AAV Platoon was experiencing some mechanical issues. I made it clear I was not in a rush to get the company back on the USS Somerset. If Bravo Company needed to remain on San Clemente Island overnight, I commented it would be a good opportunity for the Bravo Company Commander to conduct training ashore and make good use of the time. I have been stranded on San Clemente Island more than once - and understood we might have to look for an alternate time window to recover Bravo Company. To the best of my memory, (MEU Executive Officer) a(n) (3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(MEU S-3) were present when I made that statement.

The loss of our 8 Marines and 1 Sailor is tragic and as the Commanding Officer, my heart aches over this incident. I sincerely feel that our training progression attempted to enable the success of this unit. I do not feel that we as a Command Element or me as the Commanding Officer exerted any undue pressure to get the Marines back on ship or force them into an uncomfortable situation. Our Commodore purposely cancelled an underway replenishment for the USS Somerset on 30 July to allow them whatever time was needed to launch and recover the AAVs.
STATEMENT OF ______________________________ TAKEN AT ______________________________ DATED ______________________________

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFADAVIT

I, ______________________________, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE_1_. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF REWARD OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCE.

__________________________
(Signature)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

__________________________
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

______BOX 55031 Camp Pendleton, California 92055____

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

PAGE ___ OF ___ PAGES

PA DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

ENCLOSURE (181)
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: 

Activity: 

Unit: 15th MEU

Telephone number 

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense of: Article (92) of the UCMJ (Failure to obey order or regulation) and that:

[X] I have the right to remain silent.

[X] Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.

[X] I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.

[X] I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.

[X] I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

[X] I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

[X] I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.

[X] I expressly desire to make a statement.

[ ] I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.

[X] I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.

[X] This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

Understanding my rights under Article 31, UCMJ, I wish to make the following statement on the DA Form 2823.

22 Sept 2020
SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent of this form is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately recorded.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
CAMP Horno, CAMP PENDLETON, CA

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
2020-09-23

3. TIME
1800

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

6. SSN

7. GRADE/STATUS
ACTIVE

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
BATTALION LANDING TEAM 1/4, 15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT

9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN YOUR STATEMENT:

1. What was your understanding of the training proficiency of the AAV platoon that was assigned to BLT 1/4, 15th MEU? To my knowledge all subordinate elements, to include the AAV platoon, completed their directed pre-composite training. On 8 May, at the conclusion of the Mech Raid Course, the I MEF EOTG instructors/evaluators indicated the company performed much better than the average company in the MEF and that it was ready to go on deployment.

2. What was your understanding of the maintenance condition of the AAVs that were assigned to BLT 1/4, 15th MEU? On the morning we composited (Mon 20 Apr), I had an in-call with the AAV platoon commander and he told me 12 of 13 AAVs were down for maintenance. He also indicated he would have them repaired by the following week. As a result of the conversation with the Platoon Commander, I decided to go talk with the AAV Bn Cmdr. In that meeting I asked the AAV Bn Cmdr to help fix the platoon’s AAVs prior to the upcoming EOTG Mech Raid Course. He showed me the latest maintenance status and confirmed the AAVs would all be ready before the Mech Raid Course starting Monday 4 May. At my Battalion Command and Staff Meeting on Fri 24 Apr AAV maintenance readiness was reported as: 7 full mission capable, 1 partially mission capable, and 5 deadlined. The following Friday before the Mech Raid course there were 12 Full Mission Capable and 1 deadlined: this one deadlined vehicle was reported to have no impact on the Mech Raid course training. The one remaining deadlined vehicle was repaired during the week of the Mech Raid Course.

3. What was your understanding of the swim qualifications of Bravo Company, BLT 1/4, 15th MEU? To my knowledge, and as reported by the Bravo company commander on May 1st, all the Marines had completed swim qualification training.

4. What was your understanding of the Under Water Egress (UET) training for Bravo Company, BLT 1/4, 15th MEU? Due to COVID-19 restrictions, we were limited with what we can do; the contractor could not provide the normal amount of training capacity. Also, the helo dunker training tank (Camp Homo Pool) was down for unscheduled repair during our scheduled training time. Per the I MEF policy concerning underwater egress training requirements (Policy 1-20), units are instructed to substitute SWET for MAET when the MAET is down for unscheduled maintenance.

5. During the confirmation brief for the mechanized raid on San Clemente Island on 30 July 2020, what safety measures were discussed for AAVs travelling to and from San Clemente Island? During the confirmation brief it was discussed that there would be a safety brief in the well deck for all hands. Additionally, all personnel (crew and passengers) would wear their Life Preserver Unit while in the AAVs. Also, it was briefed that there would be safety boats from the USS Somerset in the water to support all AAV well deck operations. Finally, during the brief, AAVs were instructed to monitor the "Boat Net" which is the ship's safety boat radio net.

6. On 30 July 2020, were you aware that the mechanized raid force was almost 5 hours behind schedule? We were closely tracking that the mechanized raid force was 5 hours behind schedule. A single AAV was broken at the raid objective on San Clemente Island and we wanted to repair it so we could recover the entire raid force back aboard the USS Somerset. Due to the timeline for how long the USS Somerset welldeck would be open, a time limit for repair and recovery was imposed. The hour of the decision point was reached. The broken AAV was directed to wait on the island overnight until the next day when the repairs could be safely performed and the USS Somerset welldeck would again be open.

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITI

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998
STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) TAKEN AT Camp Homo, Camp Pendleton, CA DATED 23 Sept, 2020

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFADAVIT

I, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

Su lawto
administer oaths, this ___ day of ___, ___, ___
at ______________

WITNESSES:

_____________________________________________  (Signature of Person Administering Oath)

_____________________________________________  (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

_____________________________________________

_____________________________________________

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

_____________________________________________

_____________________________________________

INITIALS

Page 2 of 2 Pages

ENCLOSURE (13)
ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Rank/Rate: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Activity: ____________________________

Unit: BLT 1/4, 15th MEU

Telephone num: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense of: Article (92) of the UCMJ (Failure to obey order or regulation) and that:

I have the right to remain silent.
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

Understanding my rights under Article 31, UCMJ, I wish to make the following statement on the DA Form 2822.

(Witness signature/date)

ENCLOSURE (184)
Photo taken by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of AAV 523519 starboard forward pontoon.
I, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Where were the red and white star cluster pyrotechnics located when you assumed control of AAV 53519?

The pyrotechnics were located in the drivers compartment of the vehicle, in the bottom of the hull area. They were not able to be located initially at the pier due to the amount of gear and debris in that area of the vehicle. The ammo can was located lying in the debris with the lid open. Once we got the vehicle back to Camp Pendleton and started removing things is when the pyro was located. At this point we contacted base EOD to come and remove them from the vehicle for disposal.
AFFADAVIT

I, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1.
I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

WITNESSES:

______________________________________________

______________________________________________

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

______________________________________________

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

______________________________________________

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT:

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998
The Release Authority for Enclosures 188 - 196 is the Armed Forces Medical Examiner

Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner
Attn: Autopsy Examination Report Request
115 Purple Heart Drive
Dover Air Force Base, DE 19902

Email: usarmy.dover.medcom-afmes.mbx.opertions@mail.mil
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Figure 1-6. Power Train System.

LEGEND

1. Right Angle Drive (2)  7. Midship Bearing and Seal (2)
2. Hydrostatic Steer Unit  8. Longitudinal Drive Shaft (4)
3. Power Takeoff  9. Final Drive (2)
4. Engine  10. Universal Joint (2)
5. Water Propulsion Unit (2)  11. Lateral Drive Shaft (2)

External view of longitudinal driveshaft exiting the hull.

Encl (199)

Internal view of midship bearing and seal.
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
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From: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force

To: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION ON COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN VEHICLE MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON 30 JULY 2020

1. I respectfully request an extension on the investigation to 20 Oct 2020 to allow me to fully compile all of the information in the investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
From: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE 15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE Mishap THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 30 JULY 2020

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN), Chapter II

1. In accordance with reference (a), your request for an extension to submit your report into the subject titled matter is hereby approved.

2. You will submit your report no later than 1 November 2020, unless an additional extension of time is granted.

3. The point of contact for this matter is the I Marine Expeditionary Force Staff Judge Advocate,

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

K. SCHECK

Copy to:
File
Sir,

I asked around to the seasoned professionals on the RAMP. The transmission drain plug and transmission drain line are both located at the bottom of the speed change assembly (see picture). The surface that the PTO mounts to is on top of the torque converter, a separate assembly from the drain line and drain plug. My apologies for the crudity of the drawing. I can provide a better picture if necessary.
Can you please provide your subject matter expertise and wisdom to the question posed below?

A response from yourself is desired.

wanted me to send you the following question:

When conducting a repair that involves replacing the Power Take Off Unit or a repair that requires tightening the bolts on the PTO is there any reason to manipulate to the transmission drain plug?

Thanks for the help.

Very Respectfully,
From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sent: Friday, January 1, 2021 7:28
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Subject: Native Fury question

It was 1/1.

r/s

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sent: Jan 5, 2021 07:28
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: Native Fury question

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Did 1/4 participate in NATIVE FURY 2020?

V/R

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Sent with BlackBerry Work (www.blackberry.com)
From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-7  
To: Distribution List  

Subj: REALISTIC URBAN TRAINING EXERCISE 20-1 LETTER OF INSTRUCTION  

Ref: (a) MCO 3120.13 Policy For MEU and MEU(SOC)  
(b) MCO 3502.3C MEU and MEU (SOC) Pre-deployment Training Program  
(c) MCO 3570.1C Range Safety  
(d) NAVMC P3500.55C Reconnaissance Training and Readiness Manual  
(e) MCO 3500.27B Operational Risk Management  
(f) MCO 3500.42C Marine Corps HRST Policy and Program Administration  
(g) I MEF CommStrat EOTG Support SOP  
(h) CNAP M-3710.7, NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions Manual  
(i) IMEFO 3120.9A I MEF MEU and MEU(SOC) SOP  
(j) DoDI 1322.28 Realistic Military Training Off Federal Real Property  
(k) MARADMIN 278/14 Realistic Military Training Off Federal Real Property  
(l) IMEFO 1500.75 Policy and Procedures for High Risk Training  

Encl: (1) Ammunition Requirements  
(2) Actor Gear List  
(3) 15th MEU Augment Requirements  
(4) Plan of Action and Milestones  
(5) SOE (EOTG & MEU LNO)  
(6) Site Support Roster  

1. Situation  

   a. Realistic Urban Training Exercise (RUT) takes place aboard Camp Pendleton. The exercise is twelve training days across sites in the South West United States. 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) will base at MCAGCC Camp Talega for the entire exercise from 04-15 Jun. I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) G-7, Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG) will conduct Exercise Control (EXCON) from the I MEF G7 building for the duration of the exercise and will establish an Exercise Operations Center (EOC) from 04-15 June 2020. 15th MEU will conduct seven scenario driven STXs, in accordance with (IAW) enclosure (5).  

   b. Friendly Supporting Units  

      (1) U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) G-7 will be located at the Las Flores 41 area, Camp Pendleton for the duration of the exercise.  

      (2) Alpha Company, 1st Marine Raider Bn, will support from home station ISO the exercise from 4-15 Jun 2020. The Joint Operations Center will be located within the 1st Raider Battalion headquarters building for the duration of operations.
2. **Mission.** EOTG conducts 15th MEU RUT in the Southwest U.S. from 04 to 15 June 2020, in order to increase the 15th MEU’s proficiency, as an integrated MAGTF, in rapid response planning and execution of expeditionary operations in challenging and unfamiliar urban environments.

3. **Execution**
   a. **Commander’s Intent.**

   (1) Purpose: The purpose of this Letter of Instruction (LOI) is to provide information and administrative guidance for G-7 sections, 15th MEU, and other units supporting RUT 20-1. Per references (b) and (i), RUT is intended to:

   (2) Method: I MEF G-7 will plan and control the exercise IAW the information contained in this LOI and all references, enclosures, and other exercise documents. The locations and other specific details for the situational training exercises (STX) will be released during execution IAW the training scenario. The exercise design is scenario driven in order to allow 15th MEU to utilize their internal intelligence collections assets to develop the scenario.

   (3) End State: Enable the MEU CE to establish a Combat Operations Center (COC) and conduct shore-based staff planning and Command and Control (C2). Integrate the CE, Aviation Combat Element (ACE), All Domain Reconnaissance (ADR), designated elements of the Ground Combat Element (GCE), and Logistics Combat Element (LCE) during the execution of STXs in unfamiliar urban environments. Enable the MEU to gain proficiency in performing long-range, non-illuminated raids. Utilize the MEU’s organic equipment and sustainment capabilities in the deployment, execution, and redeployment of the exercise, leveraging tactical assets to support full mission profiles to the greatest extent possible.

   b. **Concept of Operations.** I MEF G-7, EOTG will conduct RUT 20-1 in support of 15th MEU Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP) per ref (a). The Exercise will occur 04 Jun 2020 - 15 Jun 2020. RUT will occur in three phases:

   (1) Phase 1: This phase is characterized by the establishment of the EOC. Phase one ends upon STARTTEX.

   (2) Phase 2: This phase begins upon STARTTEX and is characterized by the execution of the STXs and ends upon the completion of the final STX.

   (3) Phase 3: This phase begins upon ENDEX and is characterized by the retrograde of personnel and equipment. This phase ends once all personnel and equipment are accounted for at their respective home stations and EOTG AAR has been submitted.

   c. **Tasks**

   (1) **EOTG S-1**

   (a) Facilitate the check in and check out of all augments to the G-7 IAW reference (b).
Subj: REALISTIC URBAN TRAINING EXERCISE 20-1 LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

(b) Coordinate with I MEF G-1 to source all augmentation personnel listed in enclosure (3).

(c) Coordinate with the EOTG S-3, EOTG S-4 UMCC to establish reporting formats and release schedules from each site to the EOC, in order to maintain accountability of personnel, equipment and to maintain situational awareness.

(d) Ensure accountability of all EOTG and assigned augment personnel throughout the exercise beginning on the day ADVON departs Camp Pendleton, and ending only when all PAX have returned to their assigned duty station.

(2) EOTG S-2

(a) Develop and complete the Master Sequence of Events List (MSEL) NLT 16 Apr 2020.

(b) Develop intelligence injects.

(c) Support Exercises Cell by developing situation paragraph for inclusion in all warning and execution orders.

(d) Prepare the scenario briefs for all augments and role players taking part in the exercise.

(e) Brief intelligence oversight considerations prior to STARTEX.

(f) Provide personnel to provide daily intelligence updates/briefs and answer Requests for Information (RFIs) during execution of exercise.

(g) Provide all framing documents to the 15th MEU for the scenario-based Road to War Brief.

(3) EOTG S-3

(a) Operations

1. Support Exercises Cell with the planning, coordination, and facilitation of all EOTG activities during the exercise.

2. Provide input to AC/S G-7 for daily Situation Report (SITREP) to the I MEF CG.

3. Compile and present an After Action Report and Assessment brief to the 15th MEU CE to ensure they improve upon lessons learned.

(b) EOTG Exercises

1. Plan, coordinate, and facilitate all EOTG activities during the exercise.

2. Develop the RUT Schedule of Events (SOE).
3. Coordinate with the Administration Chief and EOTG S4 UMCC to establish reporting formats and timings from each site to the EOC, in order to maintain accountability of personnel and equipment and to maintain situational awareness. Brief these requirements to Site Leads and OICs/RSOs at the OIC/RSO in brief on 27 May 2020.

4. Establish the EOC in order to facilitate the command and control of the exercise NLT 2 Jun 2020. Control the exercise and sync actions between EOC, ExFor, and EXCON on sites.

5. Conduct EOC rehearsals including (but not limited to) Daily Brief, CASEVAC, and MEU Confirmation Brief information breakdown and relay to Site Leads NLT 2 Jun 2020.

6. Provide the duty schedule for 24 hour manning of the EOC commencing NLT 0800, on 04 Jun 2020.

7. Receive and brief all augment OICs and RSOs on the overall scenario and situation.

8. Publish a constraints and restraints brief prior to each mission to include medical facility locations and phone numbers in order to facilitate emergency medical response at RUT training sites. Brief should be given immediately following CAT 1 by MEU staff.

9. Provide Welcome Aboard Brief to augment OICs and RSOs.

(c) Raids Branch / Special Training Branch / Site Leads

1. Attend the augment OIC/RSO in brief on 27 May 2020.

2. Based on the template to be provided by Exercises Cell, develop site specific Confirmation Briefs, Medical/CASEVAC plans, Operational Risk Management (ORM) and Constraints and Restraints Briefs NLT 8 May 2020.

3. Coordinate and supervise all actions on assigned sites per ref (c), (e), and (h).

4. Maintain accountability of all support equipment, opposition forces (OPFOR), actors, role players, evaluators and other EXCON personnel at each site.

5. Ensure OPFOR, actor and role player actions are IAW site specific MSELs.

(d) EOTG Air Shop

1. Develop and provide aviation input to the Constraints and Restraints Briefs for each event NLT 8 May 2020.

2. Assist Exercise Branch with integration of live fire CAS during appropriate STXs aboard MCAGCC, Twentynine Palms.
Subj: REALISTIC URBAN TRAINING EXERCISE 20-1 LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

3. Survey and recommend Landing Zones (LZs) in conjunction with 3d MAW IAW reference (i) prior to execution of each event.

4. Oversee the coordination of all aviation facilities, airspace, and support from external agencies necessary to provide training to the 15th MEU ACE involved in RUT 20-1.

5. Submit Air Support requests as required for 3d MAW aviation support, to include C-130 participation.

6. Schedule the course rules brief to the ACE ready room and to the MEU Air Officer prior to the first exercise flight operations.

7. Provide personnel to provide safety backstop at applicable sites per re (c), (e), (h), (l).

(4) EOTG S-4

(a) Develop and supervise the logistical plan to support movement of required support personnel to and from the training areas.

(b) Coordinate with I MEF G-4 to source all augmentation equipment required.

(c) Provide corpsman for each site as required. Provide names NLT than 02 Apr 2020.

(d) Coordinate all ammunition requirements for OPFOR, as outlined in enclosure (1), in order to create and submit ammunition requests.

(e) Ensure all required military, SWRFT and rental vehicles and trailers are available to support the exercise requirements. Determine number of augment drivers required to support the Site Control Teams. Augment drivers will be required to be available for tasking NLT 1 Jun 2020.

(f) Establish the UMCC for the EOC from ADVON to ENDEX and completion of retrograde, and provide oversite for all movement of equipment and personnel.

(g) Validate and confirm medical plans and points of contact NLT Final Planning Conference.

(h) Provide construction materials and engineer support to improve target sites.

(i) Coordinate with Special Training Branch (STB) and Training and Support Division to provide Special Effects Small Arms Marking Systems (SESAMS) upper receivers, and face masks as required for G-7 personnel and OPFOR augments. STB will sign for equipment.

(5) EOTG S-6

(a) Develop the RUT 20-1 Exercise Control (EXCON) communication plan.
(b) Coordinate with the 15th MEU S-6 and MEF G-6 all EXCON communications requirements, to include requesting frequencies to be used during RUT 20-1.

(c) Coordinate with the Administration Chief and Operations Section to establish reporting formats and release schedules from each site to the EOC, in order to maintain accountability of personnel and equipment and to maintain situational awareness.

(d) Conduct proficiency training for all augment Radio Operators on applicable communications equipment (SATCOM, HF, VHF, SKL, etc.) and verify the communication architecture NLT 1 Jun 2020.

(e) Brief Site Controllers and OICs/RSOs on the communication plan for the exercise and for each event at the augment OIC/RSO in brief.

(f) Support the S-3 Ops Section to establish the EOC NLT 1 Jun 2020.

(g) Maintain accountability and control the issue and receipt of all controlled cryptographic equipment throughout the exercise.

(h) Submit to I MEF G-6 for all communication gear requirements to support internal G-7 operations for the duration of RUT 20-1.

(6) 15th MEU

(a) Per encl (3), provide Marines to serve as actors/ Opposition Forces (OPFOR) with gear per enclosure (2). These Marines will report to I MEF G-7 NLT 0800, 26 May at the I MEF G-7 building aboard Camp Pendleton, CA. These Marines will detach 16 June 2020. All lodging, transportation, food and expenses will be sourced by I MEF G-7. Provide roster of names NLT 10 May.

(b) Provide ADR personnel taking part with requisite SESAMS kits and appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE).

(c) Establish a Camp Commandant to supervise the Camp Talega billeting.

(d) Establish an Ammunition Holding Area (AHA) and holding site at Camp Talega for RUT. Provide an ammunition technician, vehicles, and qualified drivers to account for, deliver, and turn in ammunition and dunnage.

(e) Provide Public Affairs support as required. The roles, responsibilities, and policy guidance are outlined in reference (g). I MEF CommStrat will be the lead for real-world Public Affairs.

(f) Establish a messing facility aboard Camp Talega for all RUT participating personnel. Requirements will include providing a Mess Chief, cooks, immersion heaters, and producing a feed plan. All requirements will be coordinated with Camp Talega staff.

(g) Provide daily sick call procedures for all RUT participants.
(h) Establish a Combat Operations Center (COC) aboard Camp Talega that is capable of conducting the Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2) and C2 of all STXs.

(i) Provide the MEU Communications Electronics Operation Instruction (CEOI) to the G-7 Comm Chief POC listed below NLT COB, 15 May 2020.

(j) Submit COMSEC key and equipment request to I MEF G-6 to support MEU encrypted communication for the duration of RUT.

(k) Provide (1) SIPR Tactical terminal for EOTG use at Camp Talega within the MEU COC area.

(l) Provide one exercise control email account on the MEU SIPR domain for all identified G-7 personnel.

(m) Ensure appropriate key leaders and staff from the 15th MEU attend the Welcome Aboard brief on 03 June at a time TBD aboard MCAGCC Twentynine Palms. ACE aircrew are required to attend an aviation course rules brief, date and time are TBD. Additionally, 15th MEU will conduct Standing Mission Briefs.

(n) Provide signed copies of the next day’s flight schedule to the G-7 EOC and Twentynine Palms SELF operations daily.

(o) Identify a qualified Marine as the MEU “trusted agent” during RUT. This individual will act as the liaison between G-7 and the MEU.

(7) I MEF CommStrat

(a) Participate in exercise planning conferences in order to advise on the exercise scenario development.

(b) Provide (2) combat camera personnel at each site in order to capture the exercise execution.

(c) Be prepared to liaison with the surrounding DOD installation and civilian communities near the exercise sites, per ref (g).

(8) G-7 TAMACOR. Coordinate the implementation of agreements for all non-DOD and non-federal property and facilities.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) ADR personnel participating in the STXs must have fast-rope currency prior to RUT, per ref (f).

(2) ADR personnel participating in the parachute operations must have jump currency.
Subj: REALISTIC URBAN TRAINING EXERCISE 20-1 LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

(3) ADR and BLT Units involved in RUT must complete MCAGCC Twenty-nine Palms safety requirement training and submit a completion roster to Range Control.

(4) All OICs/RSOs must be certified IAW MCAGCC Twenty-nine Palms requirements for the conduct of any training aboard MCAGCC Twenty-nine Palms.

(5) Exercise air flows will be submitted separately from this LOI. Air flow updates must be provided by the EOTG Air Officer to the 15th MEU Air Officer and the ACE Operations Officer.

(6) ACE representatives shall attend daily coordination meetings with Twentynine Palms SELF base operations and Range Control when required to coordinate closed field operations and range requirements for unit level training.

(7) I MEF EOTG is the sole coordinating agency for all activities connected with RUT aboard MCAGCC Twenty-nine Palms and at all STX sites. Any issues or requirements related to RUT 20-1 will be coordinated through EOTG.

4. Administration and Logistics

   a. EOTG is responsible for coordinating and funding at Camp Talega: facilities, internal G-7 staff billeting, and transportation in and around host bases, ground fuel, and battlefield effects. G-7 is not responsible for funding any training not sponsored by EOTG.

   b. 15th MEU is responsible for funding TOT and TOP, AVGAS, and billeting for 15th MEU personnel at Camp Talega.

   c. All arrangements for billeting, messing, and contracting of required facilities and facilities support will be conducted by G-7 Logistics. External vendor support, including dumpster and porta-john support, will be financed by RUT 20-1 appropriation data.

   d. Purchase Requests will be generated in PR Builder by the G-7 Fiscal Officer and forwarded to Base Regional Contracting Office to process all contracts necessary for external vendors.

   e. The G-7 will submit financial after-action reports to the I MEF Comptroller NLT 15 Jul 2020.

   f. Small Arms Ammunition will come from I MEF G-7’s allotment per enclosure (1).

   g. G-7 has scheduled all ammo requirements through TAMIS IAW enclosure (1). G-7 will coordinate any required transportation to/from the exercise site for this ammunition only. Transportation of any supplemental ammunition to/from the exercise site is the responsibility of 15th MEU. Custody of exercise ammunition will be transferred from G-7 to 15th MEU at exercise site, who will then provide storage at FASPs/AHAs. 15th MEU will operate and provide security for the required FASPs and AHAs. 15th MEU Ammunition Technicians will fulfill all exercise requests. 15th MEU will transport all ammunition during the exercise execution. G-7 will make coordination with
Subj: REALISTIC URBAN TRAINING EXERCISE 20-1 LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

15th MEU to process all non-expended exercise ammunition at the end of exercise.

h. Armory. 15th MEU will secure all weapons not maintained by individuals in a field armory at Camp Talega. Weapons are not authorized in facilities not allocated for 15th use.

i. A post-exercise walk through of the Camp Talega facilities will be conducted NLT 15 June with the Camp Talega facility manager, G-7 and 15th MEU representatives to verify condition/cleanliness of the facility and any damages or other issues involving fiscal reimbursement.

j. Billeting for all participants will be located at Camp Talega or at other sites as appropriate. G-7 S-4, working with 15th MEU Headquarters Commandant, will coordinate room assignments. Personnel will be assigned by billeting fund. Cost per room will be paid by individual GTCC or 15th MEU UTC. Any damaged or lost items will be billed to the associated unit or individual for adjudication/reimbursement.

k. Disposal of hazardous materials will be coordinated by the 15th MEU S-4 through the appropriate Camp Pendleton environmental offices.

5. Command and Signal

a. Command

(1) The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-7, I MEF is the Exercise Director.

(2) I MEF G-7 maintains OPCON and accountability of augmenting personnel during CERTEX. ADCON remains the responsibility of the parent units.

b. Signal

1. The I MEF G-7 operations Officer is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

2. The I MEF G-7 operations Chief is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

3. The I MEF G-7 S-1 Chief is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

4. The I MEF G-7 S-2 officer is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

5. The I MEF G-7 S-4 OTC is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

6. The I MEF G-7 S-4 logistics Planner is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

7. The I MEF G-7 S-6 Chief is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
**Subj: REALISTIC URBAN TRAINING EXERCISE 20-1 LETTER OF INSTRUCTION**

| (18) The I MEF G-7 Special Training Branch OIC is | (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) |
| (19) The I MEF G-7 Special Training Branch SNCOIC is | (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) |
| (20) The I MEF G-7 Amphibious Raids Branch OIC is | (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) |
| (21) The I MEF G-7 Amphibious Raids Branch SNCOIC is | (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) |
| (22) The I MEF G-7 TAMACOR Liaison is | (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) |
| (23) The MARSOC G-7 Planner is | (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) |

**DISTRIBUTION:**
- AC/S G-7
- I MEF G-7 ALL
- I MEF G-3
- I MEF COMMSTRAT
- 15th MEU (S-3)
Overview: The Assault Amphibious Vehicle Waterborne Egress Capability (AAV-WEC) is being acquired due to an Urgent Statement of Need (USON) that addresses shortfalls identified in a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) platoon’s ability to conduct waterborne egress in a rapidly sinking AAV. There is an unfunded quantity of 2,120.

Features: The life preserver unit is capable of providing 65 pounds of buoyancy at the surface, and 30 pounds of buoyancy at 33 feet below the surface of the water, while also providing a supplementary emergency breathing device should a Marine need to egress a submerged AAV. The AAV-WEC system also includes a mobile refill station to refill the Breathing Apparatus Self-Contained (SRU-43/P). Pelican cases are used to store 22 ensembles onboard the AAV.


Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO): The AAV-WEC quantity authorized for peacetime and wartime requirements to equip and sustain the force in accordance with current DoD plans and policies is listed in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AAO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I MEF</td>
<td>1,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II MEF</td>
<td>1,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III MEF</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARFORRES</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPT EST</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAR RESERVE</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5,120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fielding Status: Fielding complete

Requirements Document: USON dated 13 Feb 2012

Training: Underwater Egress Training (UET) offered by Training and Education Command (TECOM) is required for the crew and embarked Marines. New equipment training and on-the-job training will be provided for crew maintainers.

Manuals: NAVAIR 13-1-6.1-2 LPU-41/P Chapter 18, NAVAIR 13-1-6.5 SRU-43/P Chapter 7, NAVAIR 19-1-270- MRS III, SL-3-12347A PCN 123123470 00

Supply/Logistics:
TAMCN: C01742B
ID No: 12347A
NSN: 4220-01-613-8128

Manufacturer: Aerial Machine and Tool Corp, VA and Switlik, NJ

Contact information: Email: pdmice@usmc.mil

December 2014
CHANGE 1 TO GUIDANCE ON SUSPENSION OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT

Originator: CMC PPO POC WASHINGTON DC//POC/F//
DTG: 111717Z SEP 20 Precedence: R DAC: General
To: CMC CMC WASHINGTON DC, COMMARFORSOUTH, COMUSMARCENT,
   COMUSMARCENT MACDILL AFB FL, More...
   CG I MEF, CG II MEF, CG III MEF, COMUSMARCENT G3 MACDILL AFB FL,
   More...
CC: RAAUZYUW RUIQAAA2173 2551814-UUUU--RUIQAAA.
   ZNR UUUUU ZDH ZUI RUEOMCI8184 2551815
   R 111717Z SEP 20
   FM CMC PPO POC WASHINGTON DC//POC/F//
   TO RUJIAAA/CMC CMC WASHINGTON DC
   RUIDAAA/COMMARFORSOUTH
   RUJIAAA/COMUSMARCENT
   RUJIAAA/COMUSMARCENT MACDILL AFB FL
   RUJIAAA/COMMARFORNORTH
   RUJDAAA/COMMARFORPAC
   RUJIAAA/COMMARFOREUR
   RUJIAAA/COMMARFORAF STUTTGART GE
   RUJIAAA/COMMARFORRES
   RUJIAAA/COMMARFORCOM
   RUJIAAA/COMMCICOM
   RUJIAAA/COMMARFORSYSCOM QUANTICO VA
   RUJIAAA/PEO LS QUANTICO VA
   RUJIAAA/MCOTEVA QUANTICO VA
   RUJIAAA/CMC L WASHINGTON DC
   INFO RUJDAAA/CG I MEF
   RUJIAAA/CG II MEF
   RUJDAAA/CG III MEF
   RUJIAAA/COMUSMARCENT G3 MACDILL AFB FL
   RUJIAAA/COMMARFORNORTH G THREE G FIVE G SEVEN
   RUJDAAA/COMMARFORPAC G THREE
   RUJIAAA/COMMARFORRES G THREE G FIVE
   RUJIAAA/COMMARFORCOM G THREE G FIVE G SEVEN
   RUJIAAA/COMMCICOM G THREE G FIVE
   RUJDAAA/CG I MEF G THREE
   RUJIAAA/CG II MEF G THREE
   RUJDAAA/CG III MEF G THREE
   RUJDAAA/CG FIRST MARDIV
   RUJDAAA/CG FIRST MLG
   RUJIAAA/CG SECOND MARDIV
   RUJIAAA/CG SECOND MLG
   RUJDAAA/CG THIRD MARDIV
   RUJIAAA/CG THIRD MLG
   RUJIAAA/CG FOURTH MARDIV
   RUJIAAA/CMC CDI WASHINGTON DC
SUBJ/CHANGE 1 TO GUIDANCE ON SUSPENSION OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLES (AAV) WATER OPERATIONS.

2. CHANGE PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE REF TO READ "FOR REASONS OF OPERATIONAL NECESSITY, THE FIRST 3 STAR GENERAL OR FLAG OFFICER IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND MAY WAIVE THE SUSPENSION ON AAV WATER OPERATIONS. WAIVER AUTHORITIES WILL ENSURE BOTH THE INSPECTIONS DETAILED IN PARAGRAPH 4 AND A RISK MANAGEMENT (RM) ASSESSMENT (PERFORMED IAW REF A) ARE COMPLETED."

3. RELEASED AUTHORIZED BY BGEN P.D. HUNTLEY, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS FOR PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS.
311804Z JUL 20 SUSPENSION OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLES (AAV) WATER OPERATIONS
******************************************************************************************
**UNCLASSIFIED**************************************************************************
******************************************************************************************
311804Z JUL 20 SUSPENSION OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLES (AAV) WATER OPERATIONS

RAAUZYYUW RUIQAAA0673 2131828-UUUU---RUIQAAA.
ZNR UUUU ZDH ZUI RUEOMCI6199 2131829
R 311804Z JUL 20
FM CMC PPO PO WASHINGTON DC
TO RUJIAAA/CMC CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUIDAAA/COMMARFORSOUTH
RUJIAAA/COMUSMARCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUJIAAA/COMMARFORTH
RUIDAAA/COMMARFORPAC
RUJIAAA/COMMARFOREUR
RUIAAA/COMMARFORAF STUTTGART GE
RUIAAA/COMMARFORRES
RUJIAAA/COMMARFORCOM
RUJIAAA/COMMCCOM
RUJIAAA/COMMARCORSYSCOM QUANTICO VA
RUJIAAA/PEO LS QUANTICO VA
RUJIAAA/MCOTEA QUANTICO VA
INFO RUJIAAA/COMUSMARCENT G3 MACDILL AFB FL
RUJIAAA/COMMARFORTH G THREE G FIVE G SEVEN
RUIDAAA/COMMARFORPAC G THREE
RUIAAA/COMMARFORRES G THREE G FIVE
RUIAAA/COMMARFORCOM G THREE G FIVE G SEVEN
RUIDAAA/CG I MEF
RUIDAAA/CG I MEF G THREE
RUJIAAA/CG II MEF
RUJIAAA/CG II MEF G THREE
RUIDAAA/CG III MEF
RUIDAAA/CG III MEF G THREE
RUIDAAA/CG FIRST MLG
RUJIAAA/CG SECOND MARDIV
RUJIAAA/CG SECOND MLG
RUIDAAA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUIIAA/CG THIRD MLG
RUIIAA/CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUJIAAA/CG MCCDC QUANTICO VA
RUJIAAA/CG TECOM QUANTICO VA
RUJIAAA/CG TRNGCMD QUANTICO VA
RUIDAAA/CG MAGTF TRNGCOM TWENTYNINE PALMS CA
RUIDAAA/SCOLOINF MCB CAMP PENDLETON CA
RUJIAAA/CMC CDI WASHINGTON DC
RUJIAAA/CMC L WASHINGTON DC
RUJIAAA/CMC PPO WASHINGTON DC
RUJIAAA/CMC PPO PO WASHINGTON DC

Page 1
GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. THIS MESSAGE DIRECTS ALL MARINE CORPS UNITS TO IMMEDIATELY CEASE AAV WATER OPERATIONS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.
2. ON 30 JUL 20, THERE WAS A CLASS 'A' AAV MISHAP DURING WATER OPERATIONS. CAUSE OF THE MISHAP IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME. THIS SUSPENSION OF AAV WATER OPERATIONS IS IN EFFECT UNTIL CAUSAL FACTORS OF THE MISHAP ARE BETTER UNDERSTOOD.
3. AAV LAND OPERATIONS, TO INCLUDE LIVE FIRE GUNNERY TRAINING, MAY CONTINUE.
4. NLT 7 AUG 20, UNITS POSSESSING AAVS ARE DIRECTED TO CONDUCT PRE-WATER OPERATIONS CHECK LIST INSPECTIONS IOT IDENTIFY MECHANICAL OR SAFETY-RELATED DISCREPANCIES.
4.A. REPORT UNIT COMPLETION OF INSPECTIONS TO PP&O AND PEO-LS VIA OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND.
4.B. PROVIDE SUMMARY OF INSPECTION FINDINGS TO PM-AAA IOT IDENTIFY POTENTIAL TRENDS.
5. FOR REASONS OF OPERATIONAL NECESSITY, THE FIRST GENERAL OR FLAG OFFICER IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND MAY WAIVE THE SUSPENSION ON AAV WATER OPERATIONS. WAIVER AUTHORITIES WILL ENSURE BOTH THE INSPECTIONS DETAILED IN PARAGRAPH 4 AND A RISK MANAGEMENT (RM) ASSESSMENT (PERFORMED IAW REF A) ARE COMPLETED.
6. PP&O DIRECTS READDRESSAL OF THIS MESSAGE TO SUBORDINATE COMMANDS FOR WIDEST DISSEMINATION TO AFFECTED UNITS.
7. FURTHER GUIDANCE WILL BE PUBLISHED VIA SEP COR UPON COMPLETION OF MISHAP ANALYSIS.
8. RELEASE AUTHORIZED BY BGEN P.D. HUNTLEY, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS FOR PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS.
BT//
311804Z JUL 20 SUSPENSION OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLES (AAV) WATER OPERATIONS

NNNN
Received from AUTODIN 311829Z Jul 20
FM PEO LS QUANTICO VA//FM AAA//
TO RUJIAAAA/COMMARFORCOM G FOUR
RUJIAAAA/COMMARFORCOM G THREE G FIVE G SEVEN
RUJDAAAA/COMMARFORPAC G FOUR
RUJDAAAA/COMMARFORPAC G THREE
RUJIAAAA/COMMARFORRES G FOUR
RUJIAAAA/COMMARFORRES G THREE G FIVE
RUJIAAAA/CG MCCDC G THREE QUANTICO VA
RUJIAAAA/CG MARCORLOGCOM ALBANY GA
RUJIAAAA/CG TECOM QUANTICO VA
ZEN/AIG 11192
RUJIAAAA/CBIRF
RUJDAAAA/CG FIRST MARDIV
RUJDAAAA/CG FIRST MAW
RUJDAAAA/CG FIRST MLG
RUJIAAAA/CG II MEF
RUJDAAAA/CG III MEF
RUJDAAAA/CG MAGTF TRNGCOM TWENTYNINE PALMS CA
RUJDAAAA/CG MCB CAMP BUTLER JA
RUJIAAAA/CG MCCDC QUANTICO VA
RUJIAAAA/CG MCRD ERR PARRIS ISLAND SC
RUJDAAAA/CG MCRD WRR SAN DIEGO CA
RUJIAAAA/CG SECOND MARDIV
RUJIAAAA/CG SECOND MAW
RUJIAAAA/CG SECOND MLG
RUJDAAAA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUJDAAAA/CG THIRD MAW
RUJDAAAA/CG THIRD MLG
RUJDAAAA/CLB THREE ONE
RUJIAAAA/CLB TWO FOUR CLR TWO SEVEN SECOND MLG
RUJIAAAA/CLB TWO TWO CLR TWO SEVEN SECOND MLG
RUJIAAAA/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUJIAAAA/CO BLOUNT ISLAND CMD
RUJIAAAA/CO MCLB ALBANY GA
RUJIAAAA/COMMARCORSYSCOM QUANTICO VA
RUJIAAAA/COMMARFORCOM
RUJDAAAA/COMMARFORPAC
RUJIAAAA/EIGHTH MAR
RUJDAAAA/ELEVENTH MAR
RUJDAAAA/FIFTH MAR
RUJIAAAA/FIFTHBN TENTH MAR
RUJDAAAA/FIRST CEB
RUJDAAAA/FIRST MAR
RUJIAAAA/FIRST MCD GARDEN CITY LI NY
RUJDAAAA/FIRST RECONBN
RUJDAAAA/FIRST STINGER BTRY
RUJIAAAA/FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUJIAAA/FIRSTBN TENTH MAR
RUJIAAA/HQBN HQMC ARLINGTON VA
RUJIAAA/HQBN SECOND MARDIV
RUJIAAA/HQSPTBN MCB CAMP LEJEUNE NC
RUJDAAA/I MEF HQ GROUP
RUJIAAA/INSF INSTR STF ALAMEDA CA
RUJIAAA/INSF INSTR STF LEXINGTON KY
RUJIAAA/INSF INSTR STF QUANTICO VA
RUJDAAA/MACG EIGHTEEN
RUJIAAA/MACG FOUR EIGHT
RUJDAAA/MACG THREE EIGHT
RUJIAAA/MACG TWO EIGHT
RUJDAAA/MACS FOUR
RUJDAAA/MACS ONE
RUJIAAA/MACS TWO
RUJIAAA/MACS TWO FOUR
RUJIAAA/MACS TWO FOUR ATC DET ALFA
RUJDAAA/MAG ELEVEN
RUJIAAA/MAG FOUR NINE
RUJIAAA/MAG FOUR ONE
RUJIAAA/MAG FOURTEEN
RUJDAAA/MAG SIXTEEN
RUJIAAA/MAG THIRTEEN
RUJIAAA/MAG THREE NINE
RUJIAAA/MAG THREE ONE
RUJDAAA/MAG THREE SIX
RUJDAAA/MAG TWELVE
RUJDAAA/MAG TWO FOUR
RUJIAAA/MAG TWO NINE
RUJIAAA/MAG TWO SIX
RUJIAAA/MALS FOURTEEN
RUJIAAA/MARBS WASHINGTON DC
RUJIAAA/MARCBTSVCSPTSCOL CAMP LEJEUNE NC
RUJIAAA/MARCOREP ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND MD
RUJIAAA/MARCORSYSCOM ALBANY GA
RUJIAAA/MASS ONE
RUJDAAA/MASS THREE
RUJDAAA/MASS TWO
RUJIAAA/MATSG TWO ONE PENSACOLA FL
RUJIAAA/MATSS ONE MERIDIAN MS
RUJIAAA/MCAS BEAUFORT SC
RUJIAAA/MCAS CO CHERRY POINT NC
RUJDAAA/MCAS FUTENMA JA
RUJDAAA/MCAS IWAKUNI JA
RUJIAAA/MCAS NEW RIVER NC
RUJDAAA/MCAS YUMA AZ
RUJDAAA/MCCES TWENTYNINE PALMS CA

ENCLOSURE (210)
SUBJ/SAFETY OF USE MESSAGE (SOUM) FOR THE HULL WATER TIGHT INTEGRITY, BILGE PUMPS, AND EMERGENCY EGRESS LIGHTING SYSTEM (EELS) TESTS FOR THE ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE (AAV) FAMILY OF VEHICLES (FOV) [TAMCN E08467K, E07967K, E08567K]

REFERENCE A/ MCO 5100.34A DTD 19 JUN 2017
REFERENCE B/ MSG/GUIDANCE TO SUSPENSION OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE (AAV) WATER OPERATIONS DTD 31 JUL 20
REFERENCE C/ MSG/UPDATED GUIDANCE TO SUSPENSION OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLES (AAV) WATER OPERATIONS DTD 07 AUG 20
REFERENCE D/ TM 07007/07267/07268-10/1
REFERENCE E/ TM 07007/07267/07268-25/1, VOLUMES 1-4
REFERENCE F/ TECHNICAL DRAWING 2600170
REFERENCE G/ MCO 3500.27C DTD 26 NOV 14

NARR/REFERENCE A IS MARINE CORPS ORDER FOR DEADLINE SAFETY OF USE MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS TO SUSPEND OPERATIONS OF MARINE CORPS GROUND EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS, SAFETY OF USE MESSAGES AND MAINTENANCE ADVISORY MESSAGES. REF B IS DC, PP&O GUIDANCE FOR SUSPENSION OF AAV WATER OPERATIONS. REF C IS DC, PP&O UPDATE TO GUIDANCE FOR SUSPENSION OF AAV WATER OPERATIONS. REF D IS THE OPERATOR’S MANUAL FOR THE ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, MODEL 7A1 FAMILY OF VEHICLES. REF E IS THE HULL MAINTENANCE MANUALS FOR THE ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, MODEL 7A1 FAMILY OF VEHICLES. REF F IS THE TECHNICAL DRAWING FOR THE AAV VEHICLE SPECIFICATION. REF G IS MARINE CORPS ORDER FOR RISK MANAGEMENT.

GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. THIS IS A COORDINATED PEO LS, MARCORSYSCOM, MARCLOGCOM, HQMC SD, HQMC PP&O, AND HQMC I&L MESSAGE. THIS SAFETY OF USE MESSAGE (SOUM), PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, IS OF IMPORTANCE TO UNITS OPERATING AAVS.

2. THIS SOUM PROVIDES SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON AAV INSPECTIONS. THE INSPECTION RESULTS WILL BETTER INFORM HQMC, PP&O CONCERNING THE WATERBORNE OPERATIONAL READINESS OF THE AAVS THROUGHOUT THE FLEET. THIS SOUM DOES NOT SUPERSEDE DC, PP&O MESSAGES REF B AND C.
3. BACKGROUND: REF B TASKED AAV UNITS TO CONDUCT PRE-WATER OPERATIONS CHECK LIST INSPECTIONS IOT IDENTIFY MECHANICAL OR SAFETY-RELATED DISCREPANCIES. INSPECTION ACTIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 4 BELOW DETAIL ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS UNITS ARE REQUIRED TO PERFORM TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO ASSIST PM AAA IN DEVELOPING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AS NEEDED. THESE INSPECTION ACTIONS, ICW FINDINGS FROM THE ONGOING MISHAP INVESTIGATIONS WILL HELP INFORM A PP&O DECISION ON RESUMPTION OF WATERBORNE OPERATIONS WITH THE AAV.

4. ACTIONS: ALL AAV UNITS WILL CONDUCT THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:

A. TOP DECK WATER FLOOD TEST AND INSPECTION FOR GRILLE ACCESS COVER ASSEMBLY.

I. VEHICLE PREPARATION FOR WATER INGRESS COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENT:
A. FOR EACH TEST, THE HULL MUST BE DRAINED TO ENSURE ACCURACY OF WATER COLLECTION.
B. REMOVE ENGINE COMPARTMENT ACCESS PANELS IAW REF D.
C. REMOVE AIR CLEANER INTAKE ASSEMBLY IAW REF E.
D. UPON COMPLETION OF EACH TEST, THE VEHICLE WILL BE ANGLED IN SUCH A POSITION TO ALLOW BILGE WATER TO EXIT THE HULL DRAIN PLUG(S) (FORWARD OR AFT).
E. USE A SUITABLE CONTAINER CAPABLE OF COLLECTING A MEASURABLE AMOUNT UP TO 18 GALLONS.

II. WATER FLOOD TEST AND INSPECTION:
A. SECURE INTAKE AND EXHAUST GRILLES IAW REF D AND C.
B. CLOSE INTAKE AND EXHAUST PLENUMS IAW WITH REF D. ENSURE BOTH PLENUM DOORS ARE LOCKED AND INDICATORS ARE IN THE UP POSITION.
C. WATER HOSE: USE NO GREATER THAN 50 PSI WATER PRESSURE. DO NOT USE HIGH PRESSURE. WATER SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO FLOOD THE GRILLE ACCESS COVER ASSEMBLY ENSURING WATER IS MOVING ACROSS THE PERIMETER OF THE GRILLES AND INTAKE AND EXHAUST PLENUM LOUVERS.
D. WITH WATER FLOWING FOR A PERIOD OF TEN MINUTES IAW REF F, INSPECT FOR WATER INGRESS FROM THE INTAKE PLENUM DISCHARGE TUBE AND THE EXHAUST PLENUM DISCHARGE PORT. ADDITIONALLY, INSPECT FOR WATER INGRESS IN THE AREA OF THE GRILLE ACCESS COVER ASSEMBLY SEAL TO HULL. ANY WATER LEAKAGE IS AN INDICATOR THAT WATER IS BYPASSING THE INTAKE PLENUM DOOR SEAL AND THE INTAKE AND EXHAUST ACCESS COVER SEALS.
E. WATER INGRESS AGGREGATE SHALL NOT EXCEED 18 GALLONS WITHIN 10 MINUTES PER REF F FOR THE GRILLE ACCESS COVER ASSEMBLY SEALS AND PLENUM DOOR SEALS.

III. ENGINE COMPARTMENT WATER LEAKAGE TEST.
A. CONDUCT ENGINE COMPARTMENT WATER LEAKAGE TEST IAW WITH REF E, CHAPTER 8, PAGE 8-22, SECTION I, SPECIAL PROCEDURES.

IV. GRILLE ACCESS COVER ASSEMBLY AND PLENUM DOOR SEAL INSPECTION.
   A. PLACE VEHICLE IN LAND MODE IAW REF D.
   B. RAISE INTAKE AND EXHAUST GRILLE ACCESS COVERS IAW REF D AND C.
   C. INSPECT INTAKE AND EXHAUST GRILLE ACCESS COVER SEALS FOR PROPER INSTALLATION, TEARS, BREAKS OR OTHER DAMAGE THAT MAY IMPEDE A PROPER SEAL.
   D. INSPECT INTAKE AND EXHAUST PLENUM DOOR SEALS FOR PROPER INSTALLATION, TEARS, BREAKS OR OTHER DAMAGE THAT MAY IMPEDE A PROPER SEAL.

B. CARGO HATCHES AND CENTER BEAM WATER LEAKAGE TEST.
   I. SECURE CARGO HATCHES IAW REF D.
   II. USING WATER HOSE METHOD AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, FLOOD OVER THE CARGO HATCHES AND CENTER BEAM ENSURING WATER IS MOVING ACROSS THE PERIMETER OF THE CARGO HATCHES.
   III. INSPECT FOR WATER INGRESS BYPASSING THE CARGO HATCH SEALS. TOTAL AGGREGATE OF WATER INGRESS SHALL NOT EXCEED NINE GALLONS WITHIN 12 MINUTES IAW REF F.

C. HULL SUSPENSION, RAMP SEAL AND PERSONNEL HATCH SEAL INSPECTION.
   I. REMOVE MIDSHIP SEAL ACCESS COVERS IAW REF E.
   II. REMOVE TROOP COMPARTMENT DECK PLATES IAW REF D.
   III. SECURE RAMP AND RAMP PERSONNEL HATCH IAW REF D.
   IV. MOVE VEHICLE TO BOAT RAMP. BACK VEHICLE IN TO THE WATER UNTIL THE MIDSHIP SEALS ARE FULLY SUBMERGED.

   WARNING
ONE INDIVIDUAL WILL HAVE TO BE INSIDE THE VEHICLE TO VERIFY THE FOLLOWING CHECKS. TAKE ALL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT LIFE AND EQUIPMENT.

   A. INSPECT SUSPENSION FOR ANY WATER INGRESS.
   B. INSPECT MIDSHIP SEALS FOR ANY WATER INGRESS.
   C. INSPECT RAMP SEAL FOR ANY WATER INGRESS AND FOR VISIBLE DAYLIGHT AT THE TOP OF RAMP SEAL.
   D. INSPECT PERSONNEL HATCH SEAL FOR WATER INGRESS.
   E. WATER INGRESS SHOULD NOT EXCEED ONE GALLON PER MINUTE WITHIN 10 MINUTES.

D. BILGE PUMPS OPERATION AND INSPECTION CHECKS.
   I. OPERATOR CHECKS. TEST OPERATIONS OF BILGE PUMPS IAW
REF D. CHECK FOR AIR FLOW FROM ALL FOUR BILGE OUTLETS.

II. MAINTENANCE CHECKS.

A. ELECTRIC BILGE PUMPS.
   1. INSPECT BILGE PUMP INSTALLATION IAW WITH REF E.
   2. ENSURE ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS ARE SERVICEABLE AND INSTALLED CORRECTLY IAW REF E.

B. HYDRAULIC BILGE PUMPS.
   1. INSPECT BILGE PUMP INSTALLATION IAW WITH REF E.
   2. ENSURE NO HYDRAULIC LEAKS EXIST AND ENSURE LINES ARE TIGHT AND NO DAMAGE EXIST.

III. BILGE PUMP FLUID OUTPUT CHECK.

A. FLOOD BILGE IN ANY MANNER SAFE AND IN COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL SOP, OSHA AND EPA REGULATIONS.

B. OPERATE ELECTRIC BILGE PUMPS AND CHECK FOR VISIBLE OUTPUT OF FLUID FROM THE BILGE OUTLETS.

C. OPERATE HYDRAULIC BILGE PUMPS AND CHECK FOR VISIBLE OUTPUT OF FLUID FROM THE BILGE OUTLETS.

E. EMERGENCY EGRESS LIGHTING SYSTEM (EELS).

I. UNITS WILL CONDUCT A 100 PERCENT INSPECTION OF THE EELS FOR PROPER OPERATION. SYSTEMS NOT OPERATIONAL WILL BE DIAGNOSED AND REPAIRED IAW REF E. REPAIR PARTS WILL BE IMMEDIATELY REQUISITIONED THROUGH GCSS-MC.

II. UNITS WILL ENSURE ALL CREWS FOLLOW THE OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS AND ENSURE EELS IS ENGAGED AND OPERATIONAL DURING ALL MODES OF OPERATION.

F. ALL DISCREPANCIES IDENTIFIED IN 4.A THRU 4.E SHALL BE CORRECTED.

5. REPORTING: ALL AAV UNITS WILL DOCUMENT RESULTS FROM 4.A THRU 4.E IN A VEHICLE STATUS REPORT CAPTURING THE INFORMATION USING MS EXCEL IN THE BELOW FORMAT. COMMANDS WILL SUBMIT VEHICLE STATUS REPORTS TO POCs LISTED ABOVE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VEHICLE SERIAL NUMBER</th>
<th>DATE COMPLETED</th>
<th>TAMCN</th>
<th>IDN</th>
<th>DISCREPANCIES FOUND</th>
<th>MILES</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A. ALL VEHICLE INSPECTIONS WILL BE COMPLETED WITHIN 14 DAYS UPON PUBLISHING OF THIS SOUM WITH THE EXCEPTIONS DETAILED IN B. THRU D. BELOW.

B. USMC PREPOSITIONING PROGRAMS WILL COMPLETE ACTIONS IN PARAGRAPH 4 AS SOON A PRACTICAL AND BICMD SHALL IDENTIFY
THE ACTIONS THAT COULD NOT BE PERFORMED IN THE COMMENTS SECTION OF THE VEHICLE STATUS REPORT. PRIOR TO USE IN ANY EXERCISE OR CONTINGENCY, THE GAINING UNIT MUST CONDUCT ALL INSPECTIONS IN PARA 4. PER REF C.

C. MARINE DEPOT MAINTENANCE COMMAND ASSETS IN THE DEPOT MAINTENANCE CYCLE WILL BE INSPECTED PRIOR TO POOL TESTING AT PRODUCTION PLANT ALBANY AND PRODUCTION PLANT BARSTOW. VEHICLE STATUS REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED TO POC LISTED ABOVE AFTER FINAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE VEHICLE AND INCLUDED IN THE FINAL INSPECTION PACKAGE.


6. COMPLETION OF THESE ACTIONS AND THE RESULTING REPORTS FROM PEO LS WILL BE PROVIDED TO DC PP&O IN SUPPORT OF FUTURE DECISIONS TO CONDUCT WATERBORNE OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, PP&O WILL NEED TO CONSIDER RESULTS OF THE ONGOING SAFETY INVESTIGATION AND ANY IDENTIFIED MATERIAL AND/OR NON-MATERIAL RELATED ACTIONS PRIOR TO RESCINDING SUSPENSION OF WATER OPERATIONS DIRECTED IN REF B.

7. COMPLETION OF THE ACTIONS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 WITH SUCCESSFUL RESULTS WILL VALIDATE EACH AAV IS MECHANICALLY SAFE, BUT DOES NOT CLEAR A VEHICLE TO CONDUCT WATERBORNE OPERATIONS WITHOUT A GO WAIVER IAW REFS B AND C. FOR THOSE UNITS WITH A GO WAIVER FOR WATERBORNE OPERATIONS PROVIDED IAW REFS B AND C, COMPLETION OF ACTIONS IN PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO A VEHICLE CONDUCTING WATERBORNE OPERATIONS. DC PP&O WILL RESCIND RESTRICTIONS ON WATERBORNE OPERATIONS ONCE ALL INVESTIGATIONS, ANALYSES, AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE COMPLETED.

8. CONTACT MESSAGE POCs WITH ANY QUESTIONS OR FOR MORE INFORMATION.
FM PM AAA QUANTICO VA
TO RUJIAAA/COMMARFORCOM G THREE G FIVE G SEVEN
RUJDAAA/COMMARFORPAC G FIVE
RUJDAAA/COMMARFORPAC G FOUR
RUJDAAA/COMMARFORPAC G THREE
RUJIAAA/COMMARFORRES G FOUR
RUJIAAA/COMMARFORRES G THREE G FIVE
RUJIAAA/COMMARFORRES G THREE G FIVE G SEVEN
RUJIAAA/CG TECOM G THREE G FIVE G SEVEN
RUJIAAA/CG MARCORLOGCOM ALBANY GA
RUJIAAA/CO BLOUNT ISLAND CMD
INFO RUJIAAA/CMC PPO POG WASHINGTON DC
RUJIAAA/CMC PPO POC WASHINGTON DC
RUJIAAA/COMMARCORSYS.COM OOT QUANTICO VA
RUJIAAA/CG MCIEAST MCB CAMLEJ
RUJIAAA/CG MCIEAST MCB CAMLEJ G FOUR
RUJIAAA/CG MCIEAST MCB CAMLEJ G THREE G FIVE
RUJDAAA/CG MCIWEST MCB G FOUR
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RUJIAAA/CG SECOND MARDIV G FOUR
RUJIAAA/CG SECOND MARDIV G THREE
RUJIAAA/CMDCR MAINTENANCE CENTER ALBANY GA
RUJDAAA/ELEVENTH MEU
RUJIAAA/TWO TWO MEU
RUJDAAA/FIFTEENTH MEU
RUJDAAA/THIRTEENTH MEU
RUJDAAA/THREE ONE MEU
RUJIAAA/TWO FOUR MEU
RUJIAAA/TWO SIX MEU

ENCLOSURE (211)
RUJIAAA/SECOND ASLTPHIBBN
RUJDAAA/THREE AABN
RUJDAAA/DELTACO THIRD ASLTPHIBBN
RUJDAAA/AVTB CAMP PENDLETON CA
RUJIAAA/PM AAA QUANTICO VA
BT
UNCLAS
SUBJ/MAINTENANCE ADVISORY MESSAGE (MAM) AAV7A1 FOV RAM/RS PLENUM TECHNICAL INSPECTION AND HULL WATER TIGHT INTEGRITY CHECK PROCEDURES/

REF/A/MCO 5100.34A DTD 19 JUN 2017//
REF/B/SOUM R 2020-MCSC-1173 OF 20 AUG 2020//
ATTACHMENT/1/PLENUM TECHNICAL INSPECTION CHECKLIST//
ATTACHMENT/2/HULL WATER TIGHT INTEGRITY CHECKS//
ATTACHMENT/3/WATER INTRUSION QUALITY CONTROL CHECKLIST//

NARR/REF A IS DEADLINE SAFETY OF USE MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS TO SUSPEND OPERATIONS OF MARINE CORPS GROUND EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS, SAFETY OF USE MESSAGES AND MAINTENANCE ADVISORY MESSAGES.

REF B IS THE SAFETY OF USE MESSAGE FOR THE VEHICLE HULL WATER TIGHT INTEGRITY CHECK AND INSPECTION.
ATTACHMENT 1 IS THE CHECKLIST FOR PLENUM TECHNICAL INSPECTIONS.
ATTACHMENT 2 IS THE HULL WATER TIGHT INTEGRITY CHECK PROCEDURES.
ATTACHMENT 3 IS THE CHECKLIST FOR WATER INTRUSION QUALITY CONTROL.//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. THIS MAINTENANCE ADVISORY MESSAGE (MAM), PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, IS OF IMPORTANCE TO UNITS OPERATING THE ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE (AAV). THIS MAM PROVIDES CHECKLISTS AND REFINED PROCEDURES FOR CHECKING HULL WATER TIGHT INTEGRITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF B.

2. CHECKLISTS AND PROCEDURES
2.A. PLENUM TECHNICAL INSPECTION. PLENUM LEAKAGE FAILURES WERE IDENTIFIED DURING EXECUTION OF REF B. SUBSEQUENTLY, PM AAA DEVELOPED A CHECKLIST, ATTACHMENT 1, TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON SPECIFIC INSPECTIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO ADDRESS THESE FAILURES. ATTACHMENT 1 PROVIDES SPECIFIC INSPECTION LOCATIONS AND CRITERIA FOR SERVICEABILITY OF THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:

A. FORWARD INTAKE PLENUM GRILLE CAM LOCKING HANDLES.
B. AFT EXHAUST PLENUM GRILLE RETAINING STRAPS.
C. FORWARD AND REAR PLENUM GRILLE SEAL CHANNELS.
D. PLENUM CENTER DECK PLATE.
E. AIR ASPIRATOR.
F. COOLING TOWER.
G. FORWARD INTAKE GRILLE COVER.
H. INTAKE PLENUM GRILLE INNER DOOR.
I. INTAKE GRILLE INNER DOOR TESTING.
J. AFT EXHAUST GRILLE COVER.
K. EXHAUST GRILLE INNER PLENUM DOOR.
L. EXHAUST GRILLE INNER DOOR TESTING.

2.B. HULL WATER TIGHT INTEGRITY CHECKS. Refined procedures for checking hull water tight integrity were developed to standardize the checks across the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF). Attachment 2 includes the refined procedures. Attachment 3 contains the quality control checklist for the testing.

3. ACTIONS. The FMF will utilize Attachments 1 through 3 as guidance in performing future plenum and hull water tight integrity checks and inspections.

3.A. Upon completion of initial test, units shall create a note within GCSS-MC Install Base per vehicle serial number. All subsequent entries will be annotated on annual PMCS checklist and/or corrective maintenance entries.

3.B. Select 'Inspect Equipment' from the notes drop down menu within GCSS-MC and insert the following note: "Inspected Ser#XXXXX per SOUM 2020-MCSC-1173 of 20 Aug 2020, results are: (Example) "No Discrepancies" or "XX gallons of water were collected; repairs are in progress". Upload checklist to GCSS-MC.

4. A publication control number will be assigned to this message and it will be accessible using the SL-1-2 on the Albany Technical Publications MCEITS SharePoint site, HTTPS://MCEITS.USMC.MIL/SITES/PUBS/DEFAULT.ASPX.

5. Direct all questions regarding this message to the Message POCs.
# PLENUM TECHNICAL INSPECTION CHECKLIST

## Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV7A1) PLENUM TECHNICAL INSPECTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODEL (CIRCLE ONE)</th>
<th>REFERENCES</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAVP7A1</td>
<td>TM 07007/07267/07268-25/1</td>
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<td>HULL NO.</td>
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</table>

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<tr>
<th>INSPECTOR’S NAME/RANK/SIGNATURE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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NOTE: The following inspection sheets are divided into seven columns. The inspector will place a check in the column which best describes the condition of the item being inspected. For those items that cannot be inspected for any reason, the inspector will make an appropriate annotation in the remarks column.

## NOTES:

1. Intake and Exhaust plenum seals (inner/outer) chalk tests can be conducted at the same time on both sides.
## NOMENCLATURE/LOCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remarks MUST be included if unserviceable.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### I. Topside of Vehicle (Forward Port Starboard)

#### 1. Forward Intake Plenum Grille Cam Locking Handles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remarks MUST be included if unserviceable.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- a. Port Cam Locking Handle.
  - 1. Bent or Damage Handle.

- b. Starboard Cam Locking Handle.
  - 1. Bent or Damage Handle.

#### 2. Aft Exhaust Plenum Grille Retaining Straps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remarks MUST be included if unserviceable.</th>
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</table>

- b. Check for missing Grill (dog) Retaining Straps.
- c. Check for Correct and/or Missing Retaining Hardware.

#### 3. Forward and Rear Plenum Grille Seal Channels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remarks MUST be included if unserviceable.</th>
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</table>

- a. Foreign Debris in channels.

#### 4. Plenum Center Deck Plate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remarks MUST be included if unserviceable.</th>
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</thead>
</table>

- a. Check for Correct Mounting Hardware. (Grade 8 Steel Bolts)
  - No Stainless-Steel Bolts.
- b. Check Center Deck for Proper Seal to Hull.
- c. Check Center Deck for Alignment to Hull and Cooling Tower.
- d. Check Forward Grille Door Hinge Mounts for side welds and proper Shimming per TM Instructions.
- e. Check for correct Shimming of Center Deck to Cooling Tower per TM instructions.
- f. Check both Front and Rear Plenum Grille Door Support Braces and welded Brace mounts for Damage – Serviceability and Mounting Hardware.
- g. Check Radiator Cap Neck Alignment and Gasket Seal around Radiator Cap Inlet for leakage and Damage.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOMENCLATURE/LOCATION</th>
<th>Satisfactory</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Adjust</th>
<th>Repair</th>
<th>Replace</th>
<th>Request for Higher LOM Support</th>
<th>Remarks MUST be included if unserviceable.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Air Aspirator</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Check Air Aspirator for Sticking or Frozen Valve.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Cooling Tower</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Check Cooling Tower rubber mounts for serviceability and proper Installation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Check Cooling Tower for proper alignment and Correct shimming to Plenum Center Deck Plate. Adjust per TM instructions.</td>
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<td>c. Check Radiator Seal Frame for Serviceability and correct configuration.</td>
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<td>d. Check Fan Air Seal for Damage and Serviceability.</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Check Radiator Air Seal for Damage and Serviceability.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Forward Intake Grill and Inner Plenum Door</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Check Screen for Damage.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Check for Missing Cam Lock Strike Plates.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Check Cam Locking Plates for Correct Installation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Plug Welded Only) No Retaining Screws.</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Check Torsion Bar Assembly for Damaged / Missing or Incorrect Mounting Hardware.</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Check Intake Plenum Grille Seal for Serviceability</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Rips - Tears - Pliability and Retention in Seal Channel).</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Check Grille Channel for Gouges and Deformities that will Hamper Sealing and Seal Installation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>g. Check Intake Plenum Grille Mushroom for free Movement and Serviceability</td>
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<tr>
<td>h. Check Strike Catch for Serviceability, Proper Adjustment and Correct Mounting Hardware.</td>
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<tr>
<td>i. Check Hydraulic Hard Lines for Leaks and Missing or Unserviceable Mount Hardware.</td>
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## NOMENCLATURE/LOCATION

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
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### j. Check Upper inner Plenum Door Hinges for Broken hinges - Cracks - Oblong Mounting Holes and Worn or Loose Bushings.

### 2. Intake Grille Inner Plenum Door.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
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</table>

a. Check Inner Plenum Door for excessive side to side and up and down movement. *(Plenum Door should have very little side to side or up and down movement).*

b. Check Inner Door for Cracked or Broken Hinges.

c. Check Hydraulic Cylinder for Serviceability and Leaks.

d. Check Hydraulic Cylinder overall length per the TM instructions. Adjust as necessary.

e. Check for Missing or incorrect Hydraulic Cylinder Mounting Hardware.

f. Check Inner Plenum Door Locking Hardware for Serviceability and Missing or Damaged Parts.

g. Check that Locking Roller is Serviceable and Fully Engages Strike Catch. *(No Air Gap).*

h. Check Hydraulic Cylinder Hoses for Leaks – Chaffing – Stiff and Rusted Hydraulic Fittings.

i. Check Inner Door Seal for Serviceability *(Rips – Tears – Pliability and Retention in Seal Channel).*
3. Intake Grille Inner Door Testing

Completely cover the intake grille seal (outer) combing with a layer of chalk.

Completely cover the plenum door seal (inner) combing with a layer of chalk.

Once grille and door combings have been covered, lower intake plenum and lock/dog down in accordance with TM.

Start the vehicle and place the mode selector into water tracks.

Allow the door to fully close and lock. Once door has been confirmed fully closed and locked, let stand for 2 minutes.

Move mode selector back to land position and open doors fully.

Shut vehicle down.

Raise intake plenum assembly and secure in accordance with TM instructions.

Inspect outer and inner seal for a visible chalk line all the way around the seal. If gaps in the chalk line are present, the door combing is not making proper contact with the seal.

Adjust intake grille locks and/or make repairs to correct gap/gaps in seal (outer) and retest.

Adjust plenum door and/or make repairs to correct gap/gaps in door seal (inner) and retest.

8. Exhaust Grille and Inner Plenum Door

**NOTE**

Make sure exhaust grille is secured properly in raised position using braces and correct hardware

1. Aft Exhaust Grille Cover
   a. Check Screen for Damage.
   b. Check for Missing Cam Lock Strike Plates.
   c. Check Cam Locking Plates for Correct Installation (Plug Welded Only) No Retaining Screws.
   d. Check Exhaust Plenum Grille Seal for Serviceability (Rips – Tears – Pliability and Retention in Seal Channel).
   e. Check Grille Channel for Gouges and Deformities that will Hamper Sealing and Seal Installation.
## NOMENCLATURE/LOCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remarks MUST be included if unserviceable.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>f. Check Exhaust Plenum Grille Mushroom for free Movement and Serviceability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Check Strike Catch for Serviceability, Proper Adjustment and Correct Mounting Hardware.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Check Hydraulic Hard Lines for Leaks and Missing or Unserviceable Mounting Hardware.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Check Upper Inner Plenum Door Hinges for Broken Hinges – Cracks - Oblong Mounting Holes and Worn or Loose Bushings.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2. Exhaust Grille Inner Plenum Door.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remarks MUST be included if unserviceable.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Check Inner Plenum Door for excessive side to side and up and down movement. <em>(Plenum Door should have very little side to side or up and down movement)</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Check Inner Door for Cracked or Broken Hinges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Check Hydraulic Cylinder for Serviceability and Leaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Check Hydraulic Cylinder overall length per the TM instructions. Adjust as necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Check for Missing or incorrect Hydraulic Cylinder Mounting Hardware.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Check Inner Plenum Door Locking Hardware for Serviceability and Missing or Damaged Parts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Check that Locking Roller is Serviceable and Fully Engages Strike Catch. <em>(No Air Gap).</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Check Hydraulic Cylinder Hoses for Leaks – Chaffing – Stiff and Rusted Hydraulic Fittings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Check Inner Door Seal for Serviceability <em>(Rips – Tears – Pliability and Retention in Seal Channel).</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Exhaust Grille Inner Door Testing

Completely cover the exhaust grille seal (outer) combing with a layer of chalk.
Completely cover the plenum door seal (inner) combing with a layer of chalk.
Once grille and door combings have been covered, lower exhaust plenum and lock/dog down in accordance with TM.
Start the vehicle and place the mode selector into water tracks.
Allow the door to fully close and lock. Once door has been confirmed fully closed and locked, let stand for 2 minutes.
Move mode selector back to land position and open doors fully.
Shut vehicle down.
Raise exhaust plenum assembly and secure in accordance with TM instructions.
Inspect outer and inner seal for a visible chalk line all the way around the seal. If gaps in the chalk line are present, the door combing is not making proper contact with the seal.
Adjust exhaust grille and/or make repairs to correct gap/gaps in seal (outer) and retest.
Adjust plenum door and/or make repairs to correct gap/gaps in door seal (inner) and retest.
HULL WATER TIGHT INTEGRITY CHECKS

1. GENERAL. This section tells how to check the Top Deck and Hull for Water Tight Integrity for the following areas and bilge pump operation during an Annual Service:
   a. Grille Cover Access Assembly Seals
   b. Plenum Door Seals
   c. Suspension
   d. Midship Seals
   e. Ramp Seal
   f. Ramp Personnel Hatch Seal

2. GRILLE COVER ACCESS ASSEMBLY SEALS.
   a. Vehicle preparation for water ingress collection and measurement:
      (1) For each test, the hull must be drained to ensure accuracy of water collection.
      (2) Remove engine compartment access panels per TM 07007/07267/07268-10/1.
      (3) Remove air cleaner intake assembly per TM 07007/07267/07268-25/1.
      (4) Close the ventilation air outlet per TM 07007/07267/07268-10/1.
      (5) Upon completion of each test, the vehicle will be angled in such a position to allow bilge water to exit the hull drain plug(s) (forward or aft).
      (6) Use a suitable container capable of collecting a measurable amount up to 18 gallons.
   b. Grille access cover assembly and plenum door seal inspection.
      (1) Place vehicle in land mode per TM 07007/07267/07268-10/1.
      (2) Raise intake and exhaust grille access covers per TM 07007/07267/07268-10/1.
      (3) Inspect intake and exhaust grille access cover seals for proper installation, tears, breaks or other damage that may impede a proper seal.
      (4) Inspect intake and exhaust plenum door seals for proper installation, tears, breaks or other damage that may impede a proper seal.
   c. Engine compartment water leakage test.
      (1) Conduct engine compartment water leakage test per TM 07007/07267/07268-25/1, Chapter 8, page 8-22, Section I, Special Procedures.
   d. Water flood test and inspection:
      (1) Secure intake and exhaust grilles per TM 07007/07267/07268-10/1.
      (2) Close intake and exhaust plenums per TM 07007/07267/07268-10/1. Ensure both plenum doors are locked and indicators are in the up position.
      (3) Test will be performed for a period of 12 minutes. Time starts once water is applied. Initiate test procedures by immediately applying ~10 gallons of water to each of the grille access covers (above the plenum doors) simultaneously. Use a water source with a minimum of 6 gallons per minute water flow and no more than 50 psi of water pressure. Continue to apply water to plenum assembly ensuring water is moving across the perimeter of the grilles (where they contact the hull), center plate and intake/exhaust plenum louvers.
      (4) Per TM 07007/07267/07268-25/1, inspect for water ingress from the intake plenum
discharge tube and the aft exhaust plenum drain tube. Additionally, inspect for water ingress in the area of the grille access cover assembly seal to hull. Any water leakage is an indicator that water is bypassing the intake plenum door seal and the intake and exhaust access cover seals.

(5) Water ingress aggregate shall not exceed 18 gallons within 12 minutes for the grille access cover assembly seals and plenum door seals.

3. CARGO HATCHES AND CENTER BEAM WATER LEAKAGE TEST.
   a. Inspect cargo hatches and center beam for proper installation, tears, breaks or other damage that may impede a proper seal.
   b. Secure cargo hatches per TM 07007/07267/07268-10/1.
   c. Using water hose method as described above, flood over the cargo hatches and center beam ensuring water is moving across the perimeter of the cargo hatches.
   d. Inspect for water ingress bypassing the cargo hatch seals. Total aggregate of water ingress shall not exceed 9 gallons within 12 minutes.

4. HULL SUSPENSION, RAMP SEAL AND PERSONNEL HATCH SEAL INSPECTION.
   a. Remove midship seal access covers per TM 07007/07267/07268-25/1.
   b. Remove troop compartment deck plates per TM 07007/07267/07268-10/1.
   c. Inspect ramp and personnel hatch seals for proper installation, tears, breaks or other damage that may impede a proper seal.
   d. Secure ramp and ramp personnel hatch per TM 07007/07267/07268-10/1.
   e. Move vehicle to boat ramp. Back vehicle into the water until the midship seals are fully submerged.

   One individual will have to be inside the vehicle to verify the following checks. Take all safety precautions to protect life and equipment.
   f. Inspect ramp seal for any water ingress and for visible daylight at the top of ramp seal.
   g. Inspect personnel hatch seal for water ingress.
   h. Inspect suspension for any water ingress.
   i. Inspect midship seals for any water ingress.
   j. Water ingress should not exceed 10 gallons within 10 minutes.

5. BILGE PUMPS OPERATION AND INSPECTION CHECKS.
   a. Operator Checks.
      (1) Test operations of bilge pumps per TM 07007/07267/07268-10/1. Check for airflow from all four-bilge outlets.
   b. Maintenance Checks.
      (1) Electric bilge pumps.
          (a) Inspect bilge pump installation per TM 07007/07267/07268-25/1.
          (b) Ensure electrical connections are serviceable and installed correctly per TM 07007/07267/07268-25/1.
      (2) Hydraulic bilge pumps.
          (c) Inspect bilge pump installation per TM 07007/07267/07268-25/1.
(d) Ensure no hydraulic leaks exist and ensure lines are tight and no damage exist.

c. **Bilge Pump Fluid Output Check.**

   (1) Flood bilge in any manner safe and in compliance with local SOP, OSHA and EPA regulations.

   (2) Operate electric bilge pumps and check for visible output of fluid from the bilge outlets.

   (3) Operate hydraulic bilge pumps and check for visible output of fluid from the bilge outlets.
## WATER INTRUSION QUALITY CONTROL CHECKLIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VEHICLE SERIAL NUMBER</th>
<th>DATE COMPLETED</th>
<th>TAMCN</th>
<th>IDN</th>
<th>MILES</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
<th>DISCREPANCIES FOUND</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
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### Row 1

**1**

**TOP DECK WATER FLOOD TEST AND INSPECTION FOR GRILLE ACCESS COVER ASSEMBLY.**

**NOTE**

WATER INGRESS AGGREGATE SHALL NOT EXCEED 18 GALLONS WITHIN 12 MINUTES FOR THE GRILLE ACCESS COVER ASSEMBLY SEALS AND PLENUM DOOR SEALS.

**GALLONS OF WATER**

### Row 2

**DISCREPANCIES FOUND**

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<tr>
<th>RANK/NAME (LAST, FIRST M.)</th>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
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### Row 3

**CARGO HATCHES AND CENTER BEAM WATER LEAKAGE TEST.**

**NOTE**

TOTAL AGGREGATE OF WATER INGRESS SHALL NOT EXCEED 9 GALLONS WITHIN 12 MINUTES.

**GALLONS OF WATER**

### Row 4

**DISCREPANCIES FOUND**

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### Row 5

**HULL SUSPENSION, RAMP SEAL AND PERSONNEL HATCH SEAL INSPECTIONS.**

**NOTE**

WATER INGRESS SHOULD NOT EXCEED 10 GALLONS WITHIN 10 MINUTES.

**DISCREPANCIES FOUND**

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BILGE PUMPS OPERATION AND INSPECTION CHECKS AND EMERGENCY EGRESS LIGHTING SYSTEMS (EELS).

**NOTE**
FOLLOW ALL CRITERIA FOR OPERATOR CHECKS, MAINTENANCE CHECKS, AND BILGE PUMP FLUID OUTPUT CHECK AND ENSURE EELS IS ENGAGED AND OPERATIONAL DURING ALL MODES OF OPERATION.

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<tr>
<th>DISCREPANCIES FOUND</th>
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<tr>
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<td>RANK/NAME (LAST, FIRST M.)</td>
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ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE COURSE CURRICULUM REVIEW BOARD FOR THE UNDERWATER EGRESS TRAINING NOVEMBER 2020

Date Signed: 11/9/2020 | MARADMINS Number: 673/20

1. Situation. This message announces the convening of the Course Curriculum Review Board (CCRB) for the Underwater Egress Trainer (UET). UET is part of the five critical capability areas outlined within Training and Education Command's (TECOM) 21st Century Learning plan to support the 2030 force design. The UET portfolio provides the ability to execute and assess training in egressing from a ground vehicle mishap or submerged ground vehicle or aircraft using the latest technology and learning methodologies.

1.a. The UET portfolio consists of simulated vehicle configurations for the training of egress on both land and in water. The on land vehicle configurations consist of the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the water borne configurations consist of Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), HMMWV and vertical lift-rotor aircraft.

2. Mission. From 17 – 18 November 2020, Synthetic Training Integration and Management Branch will convene the UET CCRB in order to inform, discuss and provide recommendations to, resourcing and requirements sponsor, ensuring the UET has the ability to support Marine Corps standards-based training requirements and enables the operational readiness of the Fleet Marine Forces.
individuals/units.

3. Execution. (Concept of Operations)
   3.a. The Family of Egress Trainers CCRB will be conducted virtually and in
   person for those able to attend within the National Capital Region (detailed
   instructions and read aheads to be provided via sepcor NLT 9 November 2020).

4. Administration and logistics.
   4.a. Working group fee. None.
   4.b. Joint personnel adjudication system requests. No visitor access requests
   are required; briefs and discussions will be held at the unclassified level.
   4.c. Uniform. Uniform of the day or business casual as appropriate
   4.d. Attendees: Requesting action officer (O5/E9/GS13) representatives from
   AAV/Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) community, Light Armored Vehicle community,
   Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) Program Manager (PM) Infantry Combat
   Equipment, MARCORSYSCOM PM Training Systems, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC)
   Safety, HQMC Ground Combat Element Branch (POG30), HQMC Plans, Policies, and
   Operations, TECOM Safety, TECOM G3/5, TECOM Policy and Standards Division, US
   Navy Naval Survival Training Institute, and G-3/7 representatives from I Marine
   Expeditionary Force (MEF), II MEF, III MEF, and MARFORRES.

5. Coordinating instructions
   5.a. NLT 9 November 2020, request attendees forward name, rank, unit, billet,
   email, and phone number to the point of contact listed
   5.b. Amplifying instructions (to include the virtual collaboration information)
   and read aheads will be provided via sepcor NLT 9 November 2020.

6. Release authorized by Lieutenant General Lewis A. Craparotta, Commanding
   General, Training and Education Command.//
maintenance SNCOs/NCOs, communication officers, motor transport
officers, DLC leadership, DLC NCOs, and CLB S-3 are required to
attend. This audience is derived from a composited MEU to include
all CE and MSE attachments (i.e., AAVs, LAVs, Tanks, Artillery, and
EOD).

5.C. (U) Action
5.C.1. (U) CG, I MEF. CG, I MEF is the evaluative and certifying
authority for 15 MEU.
5.C.1.A. (U) CG, I MEF directs MEU commanders to prioritize training
participants for all MEU training events to include underwater egress
training (UET). CG, I MEF considers the following as non-aircrew
frequent flyers, with CO, 15 MEU having the authority to revise this
listing and to set the specific priority. CG, I MEF expects those
and 5.C.1.A.5. to be UET complete by composite date. All others
shall be UET complete by the first at-sea period, which is
PHIBRON-MEU Integrated Training (PMINT).
5.C.1.A.1. (U) Commanders, key leaders, and key planners.
5.C.1.A.2. (U) Maritime Raid Force (MRF) assault element, security
element and enablers.
5.C.1.A.3. (U) All Marines of the Heli/tiltrotor/long range raid
force.
5.C.1.A.4. (U) All Marines of the mechanized raid force.
5.C.1.A.5. (U) ANGLICO detachment, Marines assigned to the MEU
forward command element (FCE), and select Marines/Sailors (identified
by the MEU CO) from across the CE, GCE, ACE and LCE involved in
specific missions or with specific responsibilities.
5.C.1.B. (U) I MEF G-1
5.C.1.B.1. (U) Act as the principal facilitator for personnel and
administrative actions that require MEF level oversight and
reconciliation.
5.C.1.B.1.A. (U) Provide close oversight of the use of the
deployment staffing report (DSR) process by the MSCs for the 15 MEU
MSEs.
5.C.1.B.2. (U) Ensure MEU CE augments are identified NLT 30 days
prior to their report date. Source and fill 15 MEU CE augments per
the standardized CG, I MEF MEU CE augmentation list. Notify CO, 15
MEU NLT E-217 of current status of CE augmentation and actions
required to mitigate discrepancies. Info all I MEF staff sections
and MSCs.
5.C.1.B.3. (U) ICW with I MEF G-35 expeditionary operations task I
MEF MSCs to source personnel requested by CO, 15 MEU and approved by
CG, I MEF for personnel requirements not outlined in this LOI.
Additional personnel beyond what has been agreed to by this LOI and I
MEF policy should not be expected.
5.C.1.B.4. (U) Per ref (at) coordinate with 1 MEF G-2, I MEF G-6, I
MEF G-3, MSCS and I MIG for sourcing of SOFLE communications Marine
augments. Specifically, one (1) 2651 Marine and one (1) 06xx Marine.
5.C.1.B.5. (U) Task MSCs to provide required role players ISO 15 MEU
ARG/MEUEX and COMPTUEX. Coordinate all requirements with I MEF AC/S
G-7.
5.C.2. (U) CG, 1st MARDIV
5.C.2.A. (U) Task organize BLT 1/4 per this LOI NLT E-204. Ref (a)
identifies troop and equipment lists for the BLT.

5.C.2.A.1. (U) Attach all detachments to BLT 1/4 and then attach BLT 1/4 to CO, 15 MEU on E-204 with the exception of Btry I (rein), 3rd Bn, 12th Marines, which shall attach to BLT 1/4 on 11 May 20.

5.C.2.B. (U) Per ref (aj) submit man, train and equip messages for the GCE, to include detachments, at E-270 and E-240. Identify any equipment that cannot be sourced in Condition Code A, SL-3/ modification/PMCS complete, calibrations complete, and Corrosion Prevention and Control (CPAC) Condition Code 1 or 2 from attaching units and will need to be sourced from other resources within the respective MSC. Forward list to I MEF G-4 for coordination.

5.C.2.B.1. (U) Provide close oversight of the use of the Deployment Staffing Roster (DSR) process for the 15 MEU GCE. The goal is to be 90 percent stabilized across the GCE by composite date.

5.C.2.C. (U) Per ref (a), submit force/troop and equipment density lists to I MEF G-33 current operations (COPS), I MEF G-4 and 15 MEU NLT E-204. Lists must include verified SSDM level IV data.

5.C.2.C.1 (U) Per ref (aj) submit commence PTP message for the GCE, to include detachments, at E-204.

5.C.2.D. (U) Conduct a MCCRE of units and detachments prior to chop and report MCCRE results to CG, I MEF NLT E-204. This fulfills refs (a) and (ai) assessment requirements. See para 5.A.6.C.3.B.1.

5.C.2.E. (U) Ensure all required equipment identified per chapter 6 of ref (a) is available and prepared for the MEF JLTI conducted per the I MEF generated JLTI schedule to be published via SEPCOR. Ensure all remedial actions are complete by E-204.

5.C.2.E.1. (U) Provide personnel (identified by via SEPCOR) in support of I MEF supervised JLTIIs in support of 15 MEU.

5.C.2.F. (U) Ensure BLT 1/4 reports for planning to the 15 MEU upon NLT E-302, to include GCE detachment OICs.

5.C.2.G. (U) Attach one (1) Reconnaissance Detachment (-) (rein) from 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (1st Recon Bn) to CO, 15 MEU NLT E-204. Two (2) Marines MOS 0451 must be qualified to pack (static line/ freefall) all configurations of the Multi-Mission Parachute System (MMPS) and serve as a PIPI. The reconnaissance element shall include a minimum of three freefall jumpmasters and six JTACS (one per team).

The reconnaissance detachment shall have Marines who are qualified and certified Camp Pendleton and Marine Air-Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC), 29 palms range safety Officers (RSOs). CG 1st MARDIV will coordinate with I MEF G-3 Air to provide the reconnaissance element priority 1A support to their pre-composite HALO/HAHO advanced tactical infiltration training.

5.C.2.G.2.A. (U) DIRLAUTH between 1st Recon Bn and I MEF G-7/EOTG is granted to facilitate G-7/EOTG PTP courses being conducted prior to MEU composite.

5.C.2.G.3. (U) Attach one (1) tank platoon from 1st Tank Battalion (1st Tank Bn) to CO, BLT 1/4 NLT E-2044. The tank platoon vehicles and personnel do not initially physically relocate and remain ADCON to their parent battalion.

5.C.2.G.4. (U) Attach one (1) artillery electronics tech, Cpl, MOS 2887, to CO, CLB-15 NLT E-204 with a toolkit, an A7597 VIPER/T and all required material (see para 5.C.4.X).
5.C.2.G.5. (U) Ensure the artillery battery has one (1) Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO) attached.
5.C.2.G.6. (U) BPT to attach one (1) HIMARS firing unit (exact personnel and equipment composition TBD) to CO, BLT 1/4 NLT E-184.
5.C.2.H. (U) Designate 1st MARDIV, 1st Bn/4th Mar, and unit points of contact, via message within five (5) days of receipt of this LOI.
5.C.2.I. (U) Ensure MEU special skills equipment suite is complete and serviceable. Coordinate a JLTI of the special equipment suite with CO, 15 MEU and report deficiencies to I MEF G-35, G-7 and 15 MEU S-3/S-4 via message NLT E-241. Transfer this equipment suite to 1st Bn, 4th Mar upon completion of the JLTI.
5.C.2.J. (U) As required, coordinate with CO, 15 MEU and CG MCI-W/MCB Camp Pendleton for billeting of 1st MARDIV personnel attached to 15 MEU IOT deconflict periods when multiple MEUs are CONUS-based.
5.C.2.K. (U) Coordinate MEU GCE medical readiness activities per refs (v), (w), (aw), and (ba). Ensure GCE personnel complete individual medical readiness requirements prior to E-204.
5.C.2.K.1. (U) Identify medications that are prohibited for use in INDOPACOM and CENTCOM AORS NLT E-210. ICW the I MEF Surgeon and 15 MEU Surgeon determine if medication use waivers are required. Replace GCE personnel that are non-waiverable for medication use NLT composite date.
5.C.2.L. (U) Ensure BLT 1/4 and 1st MARDIV attachments report to 15 MEU with a capability set (CAPSET) IV and all supporting equipment (computers, telephones, radios) to support the establishment of the GCE Combat Operations Center (COC) ashore.
5.C.2.M. (U) Ensure BLT 1/4 Assault Amphibian (AA) Bn attachment is provided with sufficient LPU-41 ensembles to outfit the AAV crew members and the task organized mechanized infantry company associated with the AAV platoon. Organizational maintenance of LPU-41 assemblies is a GCE responsibility as coordinated by MEU CE and with other elements of the MEU.
5.C.2.N. (U) If available, provide four (4) M45A1 .45 cal pistols, four (4) M4A1 5.56 carbines w/silencer, four (4) EOTech optics, and four (4) ACOG optics to CO CLB-15 for EOD use during EOTG course.
5.C.2.O. (U) Ensure BLT 1/4 has at a minimum of one (1) 04xx who possesses the certifications to certify hazardous material and air load plans for the duration of deployment.
5.C.2.P. (U) Ensure GCE attachments report at the commencement of JTLI with validated and stocked Demand Supported Items (DSI) to be used throughout PTP and deployment. GCE and attachments submit DSI list by NATO Item Identification Number (NIIN) to 15 MEU CE S4 and CLB-15 NLT E-270.
5.C.2.Q. (U) Coordinate with 1st MLG to provide tactical vehicle licensing quotas for equipment not organic to 1st MLG (MATV, mineroller, etc.) to ensure CLB-15 is licensed prior to E-204.
5.C.2.R. (U) In coordination with 15 MEU CE, ensure compliance with
the provisions of refs (bv), (bw) and (bx).

5.C.2.S. (U) Ensure UET is complete for CG, I MEF and CO, 15 MEU prioritized GCE frequent flyers NLT composite date. Ensure all other GCE Marines who may conduct overwater flight or surface-borne ship to shore movement are afforded the opportunity to conduct UET NLT than the beginning of the first at-sea training period, which is PMINT. See para 5.C.1.A.

5.C.2.T. (U) Provide personnel per attachment 1 TAD to I MEF G-7/EOTG to support RUT, ARGMEUEX, and COMPTUEX exercises. I MEF G-1 will provide detailed coordinating instructions via SEPCOR NLT 60 days prior to start of exercise.

5.C.2.T.1. (U) Provide one rifle company (-), one LAR platoon, and one CAAT platoon with associated T/O equipment as OPFOR TACON to I MEF G-7 to support execution of COMPTUEX. I MEF G-7 will provide detailed coordinating instructions via SEPCOR NLT 30 days prior to start of exercise.

5.C.2.U. (U) NLT E-280 Coordinate with I MEF G-6 to identify key dates for BLT 1/4 to receive MCH-ECR training.


5.C.2.V. (U) Provide S-4s, S-4As, logistics chief, supply officer, supply chief, supply admin clerks (E4-E5), maintenance management officer, maintenance management chief, maintenance management clerks (E4-E5), maintenance officers, maintenance chiefs, maintenance SNCOs/NCOs, communication officer, and motor transport officer for the execution of the Deployed Logistics Chain Management Leadership and Operator/Manager Course. This audience is derived from a composited MEU to include all CE and MSE attachments (i.e., AAVs, LAVs, Tanks, Artillery, and EOD).

5.C.3. (U) CG, 3d MAW

5.C.3.A. (U) Task organize VMM-164 (rein) per this LOI. Ref a identifies the troop and equipment lists for the ACE.

5.C.3.B. (U) Per ref (aj) submit MTE messages for the ACE, to include detachments, at E-270 and E-240. Identify any equipment that cannot be sourced in Condition Code A, SL-3/modification/PMCS complete, calibrations complete, and CPAC Condition Code 1 or 2 from attaching units and will need to be sourced from other resources, including the returning squadron. Forward a list to I MEF G-3 and G-4 for coordination with the returning MEU (if applicable).

5.C.3.B.1. (U) Provide close oversight of the use of the DSR process for the 15 MEU ACE. The goal is to be 90 percent stabilized across the ACE by composite date.

5.C.3.C. (U) Per ref (a), appendix F, milestone 25, submit force/troop lists and EDLs to I MEF G-33, I MEF G-4 and 15 MEU NLT E-184. Lists must include verified SSDM Level IV data.

5.C.3.C.1. (U) Per ref (aj) submit commence PTP message for the ACE, to include detachments, at E-184.

5.C.3.C.2. (U) Coordinate MEU ACE medical readiness activities per refs (v), (w), (aw), and (ba). Ensure ACE personnel complete individual medical readiness activities prior to E-184.
5.C.5. (U) CO, 15 MEU
5.C.5.A. (U) Form 15 MEU per refs (a), (d), (f), and this LOI.
5.C.5.A.1. (U) Provide close oversight of the use of the DSR process for the 15 MEU CE. The goal is to be 100 percent stabilized across the CE by E-240.
5.C.5.A.2. (U) Be prepared to conduct integrated pre-deployment training with SOF forces, as required. Further guidance will be promulgated via SEPCOR.
5.C.5.A.2. (U) BPT to support advanced naval base (ANB) and expeditionary advanced base (EAB) operations, particularly Maritime Patrol/Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) (P-8 and P-3) rearming and refueling, and delivery and resupply of ground-based fires, primarily rocket artillery.
5.C.5.B. (U) Ensure GCE, ACE, and LCE update DRRS-MC at attachment to reflect attachment (OPCON) to 15 MEU (M20177) and ensure all attached elements of 15 MEU are included in MEU immediate DRRS report.
5.C.5.B.1. (U) Submit a weekly situation report (SITREP) per ref (a) via SIPR AMHS commencing the first Friday after compositing and continuing weekly until day of deployment. Upon deployment submit a daily SITREP via SIPR AMHS. Upon return from deployment submit a weekly SITREP until decomposited.
5.C.5.C. (U) 15 MEU shall deploy with a maritime raid capability (MRC) comprised of a maritime raid force (MRF) and associated equipment. The MRF shall be capable of conducting day opposed top-down, bottom up VBSS and day top-down, bottom up secure and hold of a static maritime platform. The MRF shall also be capable of conducting day/night limited scale maritime precision raids, either from the sea or from ashore, against targets afloat or ashore. The purpose of this force is to provide the geographic combatant commander with a variety of options for maritime response. MRF HQ Marines shall be TS-SCI eligible upon attachment.

5.C.5.D. (U) Ensure CG, I MEF (G-3) is persistently aware of PTDO and call forward considerations. One element of the MEU task organization is on PTDO, namely, AD from the LCE.
post-deployment brief with COMTHIRDFLT and CG, I MEF.

5.C.5.N.1. (U) BPT deliver a confirmation brief to DCG, I MEF or appropriate I MEF CE representative for the MEU training plan/schedule of events for the following PTP events: (1) RUT ICW I MEF AC/S G-7/EOTG, (2) PMINT, (3) ARG/MEUEX and COMPTUEX. These briefs will be presented NLT seven (7) days prior to the start of the event.

5.C.5.N.2. (U) Provide a 100 day after action report to CG, I MEF and I MEF MCCLL representative per ref (bh).

5.C.5.R. (U) Submit an after action report on EOTG training courses and RUT to I MEF G-7 NLT E-10.
5.C.5.U. (U) Para 5.C.2. lists CG, I MEF recommended frequent flyers to inform CO, 15 MEU as the prioritized frequent flyer list is developed. CO, 15 MEU shall coordinate with MSCs to ensure all CO, 15 MEU prioritized frequent flyers are scheduled to receive non-aircrew underwater egress training. The MAGTF (MEU) CO determines frequent flyer status for individual personnel, detachments, and MSEs. Every effort should be made to qualify as many deploying personnel as possible in addition to frequent flyers.

5.C.5.U.1. (U) Ensure UET is complete for CO, 15 MEU prioritized CE frequent flyers NLT composite date. Ensure all other CE Marines who may conduct overwater flight or surface-borne ship to shore movement are afforded the opportunity to conduct UET NLT than the beginning of the first at-sea training period, which is PMINT.
5.D.9. (U) Training
5.D.9.A. (U) MSEs and detachments complete required block I & II PTP (per refs (d), (af) and TECOM PTP tool kit) prior to attaching to the MEU.
5.D.9.B. (U) Elements comprising the maritime raid force will complete all preliminary training requirements prior to participating in EOTG courses (e.g., HABD, FRMC/HRST, swim qual, secret security clearances etc.).
5.D.23. (U) Upon attachment ensure all Marines deploying with 15 MEU possess full CIF issue to include a gas mask.

5.D.24. (U) Per ref (bw) ensure Marines deploying with 15 MEU have completed applicable underwater egress training and are properly reported in MCTIMS. Report qualification numbers for the CE to G-3 training at E-180 and for the entire MEU (CE and MSEs) at the E-90 IPR and the pre-deployment brief.

5.D.25. (U) Ensure all Marines deploying with 15 MEU have completed all FY training requirements to include rifle and pistol qualification, and Marine Corps Combat Fitness Test (CFT).

5.D.26. (U) Ensure compliance with the provisions of refs (bv), (bw) and (bx).
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**Range = Last 24**

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## Historical Measures (UNCLASSIFIED)

**UIC = M13000  III MEF**

**TAMCN = E0846**

**Interval = Monthly**

**Range = Last 24**

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