



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFIC
CAMP H. M. SMITH, HI 96861-4139

IN REPLY REFER TO

5830

SJA

25 Feb 21

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ltr 5830 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Jan 21

From: Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
To: File

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE 15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT ASSAULT
AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON 30 JULY 2020

Encl: (207) MARCORSYSCOM Product Manager Infantry Combat Equipment
Product Information Sheet on the Assault Amphibious
Vehicle Waterborne Egress Capability
(208) CMC PPO PO Message, Change 1 to Guidance on Suspension of
Amphibious Assault Vehicles Water Operations of 7 Aug 20
(209) CMC PPO PO Message, Suspension of Amphibious
Assault Vehicles Water Operations of 31 Jul 20
(210) PEO LS SOUM for Hull Water Tight Integrity, Bilge Pumps,
and EELS Tests for the AAF Family of Vehicles of
21 Aug 20
(211) PM AAA MAM Plenum Technical Inspection and Hull Water
Tight Integrity Check Procedures of 26 Oct 20
(212) MARADMIN 673/20, Announcement of the Course Curriculum
Board for Underwater Egress Training
(213) Additional Excerpts from CG, I MEF Letter of Instruction
for 15th MEU Deployment 21-1 of 30 Dec 2019
(214) Email from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(215) AAV Readiness Data for USMC, I MEF, and III MEF from
1 Jan 19 to 1 Dec 20

1. At approximately 1815 on 30 July 2020, an assault amphibious vehicle (AAV) assigned to Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (BLT 1/4), 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15th MEU), sank in the Pacific Ocean en route from San Clemente Island (SCI) to U.S.S. SOMERSET (USS SOM). The AAV was manned by three AAV crewmen and had twelve Marines and one Sailor embarked aboard; all were assigned to Company B (Co B), BLT 1/4. This tragic mishap resulted in the deaths of eight Marines and one Sailor. I have thoroughly reviewed the command investigation conducted to inquire into the causes and circumstances of this mishap and, subject to comments provided in this endorsement, concur with the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations. The investigation reveals a confluence of human and mechanical failures caused the sinking of the mishap AAV and contributed to a delayed rescue effort, resulting in the deaths of eight Marines and one Sailor. Ultimately, this tragic mishap was

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preventable, and the actions directed in this document are intended to prevent future incidents of this kind.

2. I extend my deepest and most sincere condolences to the families and friends of Private First Class Bryan J. Baltierra, Lance Corporal Marco A. Barranco, Private First Class Evan A. Bath, Navy Hospital Corpsman 3rd Class (Fleet Marine Force) Christopher Gnem, Lance Corporal Jack-Ryan Ostrovsky, Lance Corporal Guillermo S. Perez, Corporal Wesley A. Rodd, Lance Corporal Chase D. Sweetwood, and Corporal Cesar A. Villanueva. These were outstanding young men, and their loss is felt not just by their families, but also by the scores of Marines and Sailors with whom they served and on whom they left lasting impressions. Amphibious operations are at the very center of the storied history and promising future of the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Navy, and it is vitally important for Marines and Sailors to participate in realistic training like the exercise in which this mishap occurred. These young men perished honorably in the line of duty, and the U.S. Marine Corps is grateful for their service and seeks to honor their legacy. While this investigation will provide little solace to the families of these fine young men, it will allow the U.S. Marine Corps to address the events resulting in this tragedy and ensure such a mishap never occurs again.

3. Contributing Factors. I provide the following additional analysis regarding factors contributing to the mishap and delayed rescue effort.

a. Training. In the letter of instruction for the 15th MEU deployment, contained in part at enclosures (13) and (213), Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (CG, I MEF) required units attaching to the MEU to receive a high level of training and evaluation to meet the MEU's challenging mission. Had the following training requirements been met as required, the AAV crew and embarked Marines may have been better prepared and responded more quickly as the mishap unfolded.

(1) Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE). I concur with CG, I MEF that CG, 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) was responsible for ensuring the AAV Platoon received a MCCRE before transfer to 15th MEU. Although the failure of the AAV Platoon to conduct a MCCRE was not a causal factor in the mishap, a MCCRE may have exposed the AAV Platoon's deficiencies in training and readiness identified in the investigation.

(2) Waterborne Training. The first time Co B, BLT 1/4 personnel embarked on AAVs during waterborne operations was on the morning of 30 July, when they conducted the ship to shore movement from USS SOM to SCI. Commanding Officer (CO), 15th MEU and CO, BLT 1/4 relied heavily on land-specific evolutions to evaluate the readiness of the AAV Platoon and Co B to conduct waterborne operations. Both stated the mechanized raid force's performance

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during land-based evolutions drove their assessments of both units. The confidence of both commanders that proficiency on land would translate to success in waterborne operations was misguided.

(3) Underwater Egress Training (UET). The U.S. Marine Corps maintains a program to train personnel to escape a submerged vehicle during a mishap. This program has three main components, described in depth in the investigation (finding of fact 281). Of the nine deceased personnel, eight had only completed the shallow water egress trainer (SWET) portion of UET, which is an individual seat-type device that does not effectively train egress from a submerged vehicle. In order to be UET complete, AAV Platoon and Co B personnel were required by enclosure (12) to complete the SWET and the submerged vehicle egress trainer (SVET), which is a submergible, mock vehicle specifically designed to train personnel on how to egress from a submerged AAV. Had the SVET been unavailable, AAV crewmen and Co B personnel would have been eligible to substitute with the modular amphibious egress trainer (MAET), which simulates a submerged aircraft rather than a ground vehicle but is otherwise similar to the SVET. Despite these requirements, Co B, BLT 1/4 personnel embarked on AAVs the day of the mishap without all personnel having completed SVET or MAET.

b. AAV Readiness. I concur with the Investigating Officer and CG, I MEF that the 14 AAVs provided to 15th MEU by 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion (3d AA Bn) were in poor condition. I MEF AAV readiness was consistent with AAV readiness U.S. Marine Corps-wide from April 2019 to April 2020 (enclosure 215). However, readiness standards in effect prior to the mishap did not accurately account for long-term deterioration in AAV readiness across the U.S. Marine Corps over time. Following the mishap, every AAV in the U.S. Marine Corps was inspected in accordance with the Safety of Use Message (SOU) published by Program Executive Office (PEO) Land Systems in August 2020, which added new post-mishap inspection requirements pertaining to watertight integrity, bilge pump function, and emergency egress lighting (enclosures 210, 211). A majority of the AAVs failed to meet the new inspection criteria. The leading causes of failure during these inspections were plenum leakage failures, inoperable Emergency Egress Lighting Systems (EELS), and bilge pump discrepancies. Maintaining the reliability of this platform requires consistent assessment over time to ensure vehicle readiness and safety.

c. Safety Boats. There were no safety boats in the water prior to or during the critical moments of the mishap. It is impossible to establish for certain that a safety boat in the water during the mishap would have prevented the loss of life, but a safety boat likely would have responded more quickly than the approximately 45 minutes it took for the mishap AAV to sink. Considering the mishap AAV commander was waving the November flag for approximately 20 minutes, it is likely safety boat crews could have observed the distress signal sooner, responded more quickly, and been better able to facilitate

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troop egress and transfer. The mishap AAV commander's calculus for initiating troop egress may have been different had a safety boat arrived on scene while the water inside the mishap AAV was at boot ankle level or higher.

d. Sea State. Reference (b) provides "AAVs have demonstrated the ability to negotiate sea states 1 through 3; will experience difficulty maintaining speed and maneuverability in sea state 4; and can survive operations in sea state 5, with reduced effectiveness. Troops should not be embarked aboard AAVs in sea state 5 and it is advisable not to conduct operations in sea state 5 or greater. In a training environment, AAVs will not operate in a sea state 4 or greater." A sea state assessment conducted at 1223 on 30 July 2020, prior to Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) operations, concluded the sea state was 1 to 2. There is no evidence an assessment of the sea state between SCI and USS SOM was requested or conducted immediately before the nine AAVs departed from SCI to USS SOM at approximately 1645. Statements by search and rescue crews, embarked Marines, and the mishap AAV crew all suggest the sea state west of SCI during the mishap was higher than expected, and may have exceeded the no-go decision criteria briefed for the training event.

e. Personal Flotation Devices. The enclosures indicate all but one of the deceased service members were able to egress from the AAV after it sank below the surface. Of the eight, only (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) returned to the surface.

(1) Each of the deceased service members still wore body armor as required by enclosure (7), with Life Preserver Unit 41 (LPU-41) personal flotation devices worn over their body armor as designed. The enclosures indicate some of the deceased service members attempted to remove their body armor by using the quick release, but that the LPU-41 likely impeded their ability to do so.

(2) The LPU-41 provides 65 pounds of buoyancy at the surface, which is sufficient to keep a Marine with personal protective equipment afloat at the surface. Its buoyancy decreases progressively with depth, providing 30 pounds of buoyancy at 33 feet below the surface. Ultimately, the LPU-41 provided insufficient buoyancy at depth to assist the deceased service members to the surface.

4. Findings of Fact and Opinions

a. Findings of Fact (FoF). I concur with FoFs 1-378, as endorsed by CG, I MEF, subject to the following modifications:

(1) FoF 13 is modified by adding the following language:
"Placing only one safety boat in the water for a movement of more than six AAVs violated reference (c), which requires a minimum of two safety boats in those circumstances."

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(2) FoF 14 is modified by clarifying the language as follows:
"Reference (b) provides 'while safety boats may be provided, AA units do not require them for amphibious operations.' It further provides 'In the event a safety boat is not assigned for use, an AAV in each wave should be designated as a safety boat.'"

(3) FoF 20 is modified by adding the following language at the end: "Key leaders of the AAV Platoon were given less than four hours of rest, and key leaders of Co B, BLT 1/4 less than five hours of rest, between the conclusion of the last scheduled event on 29 July and the beginning of the first scheduled event on 30 July."

(4) FoF 163 is modified by adding the following language prior to the first sentence: "The U.S. Navy RHIB from USS SOM rescued (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) from AAV 13. Personnel on AAV 14 attempted to signal the boat to pick up (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who was receiving CPR on top of AAV 14, but the boat did not respond."

(5) FoF 164 is modified by adding the following language at the beginning: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) received nonstop CPR from the time he came to the surface until his arrival on USS SOM, after which he received prompt, thorough, and aggressive advanced life support, including defibrillation, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(8) FoF 379 is added, to read as follows: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was hospitalized from 30 July to 3 August and was discharged from Naval Medical Center San Diego with an estimated four to six weeks recovery time (enclosure 10)."

(9) FoF 380 is added, to read as follows: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) remained in critical condition at the Intensive Care Unit at Scripps La Jolla Hospital; he began breathing without a ventilator on 8 August and was released on 15 August with an uncertain recovery time (enclosure 10)."

(10) FoF 381 is added, to read as follows: "Reference (c) provides that '[a]ll safety boat personnel are to be alert for AAV

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distress signals when AAVs are waterborne,' including visual distress signals such as the November flag. The November flag is a blue and white checkered flag that serves as the international maritime signal for 'no' or 'negative,' and is also used by AAV crewmen to signal distress."

b. Opinions. I concur with opinions 1-5, 7-14, and 16-30. My concurrence with the remaining opinions is subject to the following:

(1) Opinion 6 is approved with modification. Two witnesses stated they heard an order to remove their personal equipment prior to the mishap AAV sinking, which is consistent with the mishap AAV commander's statement that he gave such an order. However, the order was not heard by all Marines and, as noted in CG, I MEF's endorsement, the order was not given in a timely manner.

(2) I partially agree with Opinion 15 regarding sea state conditions. As discussed above, some evidence indicates the sea state may have been higher than sea state 3. Although a sea state assessment was conducted at 1223 on 30 July 2020, prior to the commencement of LCAC operations, no sea state assessment was conducted in support of AAV operations which began more than four hours later. Sea state assessments should be made closer in time to the execution of AAV waterborne operations.

(3) Opinion 31 is added to state: "Reference (b) provides 'While safety boats may be provided, AA units do not require them for amphibious operations. AA units will designate a bump/recovery plan to render aid and pick up personnel from disabled or sinking AAVs. In the event a safety boat is not assigned for use, an AAV in each wave should be designated as a safety boat.' Reference (c) provides 'Safety boats are mandatory during all waterborne operations. One safety boat is required for five or less vehicles; two safety boats when six or more vehicles are waterborne. If the ship cannot provide a sufficient number of safety boats, an unloaded AAV may be designated as a safety boat. Additional safety boats may be used at the discretion of the operational commander. Safety boat crews shall be manned by a standard boat crew (coxswain, boat engineer, bow hook) and a boat officer for each boat. If deemed necessary by the CO, a rescue swimmer should accompany the crew.' References (b) and (c) are inconsistent. Moreover, the imprecise use of the term 'safety boats' in these Service directives produces confusion about the requirement for safety boats during amphibious operations and the types of vessels authorized for employment as safety boats."

5. Accountability. I concur with CG, I MEF that appropriate administrative or disciplinary action is warranted to address leadership failures by CO, BLT 1/4; the former CO, 3d AA Bn; CO, Co B; the AAV Platoon Commander; and the mishap AAV commander. CG, I MEF may take action as he deems appropriate to address the failures of these and other I MEF personnel. I withhold authority to take

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appropriate action to address failures by CO, 15th MEU. Additionally, a copy of this investigation will be forwarded to CG, Training and Education Command (TECOM), to address the failures of the former CO, 3d AA Bn identified by this investigation.

a. Former CG, 1st MarDiv. I concur with CG, I MEF that former CG, 1st MarDiv had a responsibility to conduct a MCCRE of the AAV Platoon prior to transfer. Moreover, in enclosure (213), CG, I MEF also tasks CG, 1st MarDiv with ensuring all members of the mechanized raid force were UET complete prior to the MEU's composite date of 20 April 2020. Neither task was completed. CG, 1st MarDiv bears some responsibility for the failure to execute these tasks. However, enclosure (213) also tasks CO, 15th MEU with completing UET for any personnel who arrived to the MEU untrained, and CO, BLT 1/4 was responsible under both CG, 1st MarDiv and CO, 15th MEU for the execution of UET. CG, 1st MarDiv is not responsible for any failure that occurred after the MEU composite date, and he was not the on-scene commander during the mishap. Accordingly, I have decided not to take administrative or disciplinary action with respect to the former CG, 1st MarDiv.

b. CO, 15th MEU. While I concur with the Investigating Officer and CG, I MEF that platoon and company-level leaders are responsible for the absence of safety boats in the water during the mishap, I find CO, 15th MEU is also responsible. Additionally, although sea state was identified as no-go decision criteria during the confirmation brief for the training event, there is no evidence an assessment of the sea state between SCI and USS SOM was requested or conducted immediately before the nine AAVs departed SCI for USS SOM. During inherently dangerous military training such as waterborne operations, the presence of required safety structure is a commander's responsibility. I will take appropriate administrative action to address these failures.

c. Former CO, 3d AA Bn. I concur with CG, I MEF that the former CO, 3d AA Bn failed in his responsibilities to ensure the AAV Platoon had appropriate resources and training prior to transfer. A copy of this investigation will be provided to CG, TECOM for appropriate administrative or disciplinary action.

d. Mishap AAV Commander. I concur that the order to remove personal equipment and prepare for troop transfer should have been given by the mishap AAV commander when the water level reached the deck plates. However, prior to the arrival of AAV 14, there was nowhere for embarked troops to evacuate to other than open ocean in a rough sea state. While reference (b) requires preparation for troop transfer in this circumstance, it does not specifically contemplate a circumstance in which the AAV is in a rough sea state, no safety boats are in the water, and the AAV is slowly sinking. The mishap AAV commander was in a difficult position, and these extenuating

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circumstances should be considered by CG, I MEF when determining appropriate administrative or disciplinary action.

6. Recommendations and Directed Actions

a. The recommendations provided by the Investigating Officer and CG, I MEF are addressed as follows:

(1) CG, I MEF has taken action on recommendations 1 and 2, concerning line of duty determinations for deceased and injured personnel. I concur with his actions and will take no further action on recommendations 1 and 2.

(2) Per enclosure (210), Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations directed action with regard to recommendation 3, that "all AAVs be float tested for leakage."

(3) I approve recommendation 4, and direct CG, I MEF and CG, III MEF to ensure all AAV and mechanized company leaders review and are familiar with reference (d).

(4) I approve recommendation 5 regarding the need to ensure positive communications between AAV leaders and ship personnel, and the need for appropriate ship personnel to grant permission to launch to or from the ship. See paragraph 6.c.(1).

(5) Recommendations 6 through 9 are approved. CG, I MEF is directed to take appropriate action to ensure these recommendations are implemented. CG, I MEF non-concurred with recommendation 7, finding that the MCCRE requirement in enclosure (13) was already clear. To prevent confusion, CG, I MEF is directed to clarify this language in future iterations of the LOI.

(6) I modify recommendation 10, as endorsed by CG, I MEF to add that the inconsistencies in U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy policy in references (b) and (c) require reconciliation and review with respect to safety boat and sea state requirements. See paragraph 6.c.(1).

(7) Recommendations 11 and 12 are approved with respect to AAV personnel within MARFORPAC. CG, I MEF and CG, III MEF are directed to implement these measures.

(8) I approve CG, I MEF's endorsement of recommendation 13. CG, I MEF and CG, III MEF are directed to ensure initial waterborne operations training is accounted for in the evaluation of MEU units, whether by inclusion in EOTG training packages or by appropriate directive to major subordinate commands.

(9) Recommendations 14 through 16 are approved. CG, I MEF and CG, III MEF are directed to ensure implementation.

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(10) I partially concur with recommendation 17, as endorsed by CG, I MEF. The actions of CO, 15th MEU are addressed in paragraph 5.b.

(11) Recommendations 18 and 19 are approved. CG, I MEF may take appropriate administrative or disciplinary action to address the actions of CO, BLT 1/4.

(12) Recommendations 20 through 36 are approved. CG, I MEF is directed to take action on each of these recommendations as he believes appropriate.

b. CG, I MEF and CG, III MEF are directed to take the following additional actions:

(1) Review all safety practices and procedures associated with AAV waterborne operations. Ensure commanders are directly responsible for the presence of appropriate safety structure. Issue guidance regarding safety boat employment during waterborne operations. Require the first flag or general officer in the chain of command be notified if AAVs are being employed as safety boats, or if required safety structure is otherwise missing. Ensure sea state is assessed, continuously monitored, and disseminated to all units conducting AAV waterborne operations.

(2) Clarify the guidance by which subordinate commands provide equipment and personnel to MEUs. Issue guidance clearly requiring all units to conduct a MCCRE prior to transfer to the MEU, and clearly specifying who is responsible for conducting the evaluation.

(3) Ensure AAV waterborne operations are progressively trained and evaluated in the process of preparing mechanized units for deployments.

(4) Pending the results of the UET course curriculum review board convened by CG, TECOM in enclosure (212), issue interim guidance regarding UET requirements and ensure all personnel are appropriately trained prior to conducting AAV waterborne operations. Enclosure (12) provides that "SVET may be substituted by MAET for UET qualification," and that "SWET can be used as a substitute for MAET UET qualification." While it is clearly not the intent of the policy to dispose of both SVET and MAET and pronounce personnel fully UET-trained through SWET training alone, the ambiguity in the policy makes that a possible interpretation. CO, BLT 1/4 appears to have relied on this interpretation when defending the lack of UET training to the Investigating Officer (enclosure 183). The policy should be corrected to make the requirement unambiguous - members must complete both SWET and either SVET or MAET to be UET complete.

(5) Ensure Marines and Sailors receive an appropriate amount of rest prior to conducting high-risk training and operations.

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(6) Provide a written update on implementation of these tasks within 90 days of this endorsement, and periodic updates every 90 days thereafter until implementation is complete.

c. The following recommendations are provided for review and consideration by appropriate agencies:

(1) Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration.
I recommend the following:

(a) A review of the utility and effectiveness of the LPU-41, and whether a new personal flotation device is needed;

(b) A review of egress procedures, including directed action for crew and embarked personnel and the wearing of personal protective equipment in conjunction with a personal flotation device;

(c) In coordination with the U.S. Navy, a review of the employment of safety boats during waterborne operations to ensure consistent policies and doctrine among the services. This review should include whether the AAV is suitable for employment as a safety boat, a review of references (b) and (c), and doctrine on safety boat employment authority and responsibility;

(d) A review of the Common Standard Operating Procedure for Assault Amphibian Operations, which is currently jointly approved by AA School, 2d AA Bn, 3d AA Bn, and 4th AA Bn, and development into an applicable directive in conjunction with the U.S. Navy; and

(e) A review of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program to ensure lessons learned from prior AAV mishaps are incorporated into training, operations, and maintenance when the ACV is fielded, and to ensure current ACV safety features adequately support emergency egress by personnel.

(2) Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources. I recommend continued, sustained readiness and modernization funding of the AAV program to correct all deficiencies identified during inspections directed by enclosure (210) and to maintain readiness for as long as this vehicle is retained in service.

(3) CG, Marine Corps Systems Command/Program Manager Advanced Amphibious Assault. I recommend dissemination of standardized water integrity testing procedures based on the new inspection criteria discussed in enclosures (210) and (211). Testing procedures should include instructions to ensure the water source utilized is reliable and maintains the required gallon per minute flow and water pressure.

(4) CG, TECOM. In enclosure (212), CG, TECOM convened a course curriculum review board for UET. I recommend a complete review of UET, including directed actions for crew and embarked personnel,

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and the wearing of individual combat clothing and equipment and personal protective equipment.

d. A copy of this investigation will be furnished to Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command for review.

e. A copy of this investigation will be furnished to Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet for review.

7. Conclusion. A confluence of human and mechanical failures caused the sinking of the mishap AAV and contributed to a delayed rescue effort, resulting in the deaths of eight Marines and one Sailor. As situational factors and environmental conditions changed during the course of this training event, unit leaders at all levels failed to reassess the aggregate risk and implement revised controls. AAV waterborne operations are inherently dangerous, and we must rely on appropriately educated, trained, and experienced leaders to recognize and mitigate risks, and ensure disciplined adherence to established procedures. We must comprehensively review and address the human, material, and training failures identified in this investigation to ensure the safe conduct of AAV waterborne operations. I concur with the Investigating Officer the AAV is a safe vehicle and a viable platform for amphibious operations. As with all combat systems and equipment, strict compliance with maintenance standards is an essential prerequisite to safe and effective operation.

8. This investigation is closed.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

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IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

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14 JAN 2021

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 14 JAN 2021

From: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
To: Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific

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1. Readdressed and forwarded.
2. First and foremost, we mourn the tragic loss of our Marines and Sailor:

Private First Class Bryan J. Baltierra;
Lance Corporal Marco A. Barranco;
Private First Class Evan A. Bath;
Navy Hospital Corpsman 3rd Class Christopher Gnem;
Private First Class Jack-Ryan Ostrovsky;
Lance Corporal Guillermo S. Perez;
Corporal Wesley A. Rodd;
Lance Corporal Chase D. Sweetwood; and
Corporal Cesar A. Villanueva.

and offer our sincerest thoughts and concern for our injured:

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

On behalf of the Marines and Sailors of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), I wish to express my deepest sympathy and condolences to their families, friends, and loved ones. Our deceased Marines and Sailor will never be forgotten, and our seriously injured Marines will continue to be in our thoughts, prayers, and care.

3. I commend the efforts of the military and civilian personnel involved in the search, rescue, recovery, medical care, and dignified transfer operations. Their diligence, professionalism, and tireless devotion to duty in the midst of difficult and tragic circumstances were truly noteworthy.

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4. Findings of Fact. I concur with the findings of fact (1-378), as well as those factual assertions made in the preliminary and narrative statements.

5. Opinions. I fully concur with the investigating officer's Opinions 1-23, 25-27, and 29-30. I generally concur with Opinions 24 and 28 as outlined below. I also add the following comments which correspond directly to the investigating officer's numbered opinions:

a. Opinions 1, 4, and 6. Ultimately, this entire mishap could have been averted and lives saved if the vehicle commander had followed SOPs and ordered the embarked personnel to take off their gear and evacuate the mishap AAV (Track 5/Serial Number 523519) at the appropriate time. Troop evacuation should have been ordered no later than the time the water level reached boot ankle level, and personnel should have already been ordered to take off their gear when water reached deck plate level. Each of the other failures of training, maintenance, safety checks, deviations from SOPs, and poor leadership contributed to the tragic mishap in its own respective manner, and each of these failures must be addressed going forward. However, the vehicle commander's failure to evacuate personnel at the appropriate time was the ultimate tragic failure which resulted in the loss of life and injury.

b. Opinion 14. The statement, "The safety boats on the USS SOM were not requested for the AAV movement and the USS SOM personnel *assumed* the AAVs were providing their own safety boats" (emphasis added) requires clarification. All the facts indicate that USS SOMERSET (USS SOM) personnel reasonably relied upon the assertions of AAV platoon personnel that the AAV platoon was providing its own safety boats and did not require the USS SOM to provide one or more safety boats. USS SOM personnel did not assume, but reasonably relied upon these assertions.

c. Opinions 17 and 18. The failure of the AAV platoon to conduct thorough splash procedures and embarked personnel safety briefs is a significant piece of evidence that this platoon's discipline and combat effectiveness were seriously compromised. This serious failure of leadership contributed to the overall events that led to the loss of life and injury of our Marines and Sailor. This was likely a result of ineffective training and enforcement of SOPs and safety procedures at the platoon, company, and battalion levels within the assault amphibian battalion, and it was totally unacceptable.

d. Opinion 22. The former CO of 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion (AA Bn) bears responsibility for failing to provide the 15th MEU mechanically sound AAVs and for failing to provide mechanically sound vehicles to the AAV platoon before they transferred to the 15th MEU. Fully operational and mechanically sound AAVs should have been provided to the 15th MEU on the day the MEU composited (20 April 2020) and the AAVs selected should have been among his most reliable and well-maintained vehicles. The decision to select AAVs from the deadline lot showed extremely poor judgment. By some accounts these AAVs had not been operational for approximately one year and were in a very poor state of repair. Additionally, he knew that his AAV platoon needed to be ready to CHOP to the 15th MEU in a short timeline, and then left it to that AAV platoon to try to make the repairs themselves without necessary

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resources. He had a responsibility to position his AAV platoon for success by ensuring they had the training and equipment they required for a complex mission deployed at sea for several months. His leadership caused inexcusable stressors upon that platoon which set them up for failure. See Recommendation 19.

e. Opinions 23, 25, 26, and 27. The BLT 1/4 CO bears responsibility for not ensuring and more diligently verifying that members of Bravo Company were properly trained in underwater egress training and swim qualification requirements prior to CHOP. He also bears responsibility for not ensuring that Bravo Company participated in more waterborne training events and training integration with the AAV platoon prior to the date of mishap. Similarly, while he relied upon assertions that the AAV platoon was properly trained in certain areas, and this requirement fell upon the 3d AA Bn CO to accomplish prior to CHOP, his level of supervision and verification of AAV platoon training and operational readiness was insufficient. I believe the BLT 1/4 CO attempted in good faith to work diligently with the 3d AA Bn CO to have the operationally inoperative AAVs repaired and in full operational working condition prior to AAV transfer. I concur, however, with the investigating officer that the BLT 1/4 CO should have supervised and verified more closely the AAV maintenance corrective actions being taken, especially in light of how quickly those actions needed to be accomplished. The above assessment also applies to the Bravo Company CO. See Recommendations 18 and 20.

f. Opinions 24 and 28. The 15th MEU CO bears responsibility for all that his unit does or fails to do. Like any CO wielding such great responsibility, there are always matters that he or she could have done to optimize performance, mission accomplishment, supervision, discipline, and safety. I do, however, believe that the 15th MEU CO reasonably relied upon the assertions of his staff and subordinate BLT 1/4 CO, as well as representations made by EOTG, and his own observations in the field of the AAV platoon's and Bravo Company's acceptable level of performance, training, and combat readiness. The 15th MEU CO also reasonably relied upon the BLT 1/4 CO and the 3d AA Bn CO, who he knew were working directly together, that all AAVs would be appropriately repaired prior to their transfer to the 15th MEU. His staff provided regular progress reports. The 15th MEU CO also communicated the status of repairs to the I MEF G-3 Operations Officer. The 15th MEU CO did make the AAV maintenance deficiencies a priority, and based upon the coordinated repair actions taken by the 15th MEU and 1st Marine Division, he reasonably believed that necessary corrective actions were being taken. All AAVs that were transferred to the 15th MEU, to include the mishap AAV (Track 5/Serial Number 523519), passed final inspections prior to transfer and conduct of any operations using AAVs.

6. Recommendations. I generally concur with the investigating officer's recommendations except Recommendations 7 and 13, and add the following which correspond directly to those numbered recommendations:

a. Recommendation 5. Reference (b), 3d AA Bn Order P3000.1J must be revised to clearly address the apparent ambiguity that the investigating officer highlights. That order must also be staffed with U.S. 3d Fleet for their consideration and input. The relevant ship's authority to

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authorize splash operations is a U.S. Navy decision. The key point for I MEF and MEU leadership and personnel to know is exactly who on the relevant ship has that authority.

b. Recommendation 7. I do not concur that the different parts of Enclosure (13) contradict one another. In the "Concept" paragraph the requirement to conduct a MCCRE is clear, irrespective of the statement "GCE and ACE attachments are not required to conduct a stand-alone MCCRE." The next sentence states, "It is strongly encouraged that GCE and ACE attachments conduct their assessment with their associated battalion or squadron or in concert with a parent unit MCCRE, ITX, or other assessment event." Whether stand-alone or integrated, a MCCRE is required. In the "Action" paragraph the tasks to major subordinate command (MSC) Commanding Generals (CGs), in this case 1st Marine Division CG, are clear. Commanding generals must conduct a MCCRE of units and detachments prior to CHOP and report those results to the I MEF CG. Additionally, but related, the "Action" paragraph directs equipment such as AAVs to receive an operational inspection (JLTI) and be satisfactory for transfer, i.e., Condition Code 1 A (and other conditions), well in advance of CHOP to the relevant MEU. Other training requirements are found in Enclosure (13) and MSC CGs are required to ensure completion prior to CHOP.

c. Recommendation 10. I agree with the investigating officer's recommendation to change Reference (b) to state that, "if an AAV is used as a safety boat, it must have no embarked personnel." This change should be made immediately. Additionally, the AAV collisions noted in this investigation (one that occurred in the surf zone during a training event at a Camp Pendleton beach and one that occurred while AAV 14 maneuvered close to the mishap AAV in preparation to transfer personnel) raise questions about the maneuverability of AAVs and whether the AAV is a good option to serve as a safety boat. In the longer term I recommend that the assault amphibian community and Training and Education Command formally consider this question and what other options may meet the requirement. Rigid-hull inflatable boats and combat rubber raiding craft are certainly swifter and more maneuverable. An inflatable life raft attached to the AAV and the amphibious combat vehicle is another option to consider.

d. Recommendation 11. I assess the general operation of ground vehicles and associated training and safety standards to be inadequate. There should be a concerted Marine Corps effort to ensure ground vehicle safety procedures and checks are conducted in a manner more akin to the vigorous aviation procedures and checks. In short, there can be no laxity with regard to safety checklists of any kind. This will be a focus of effort within I MEF and its subordinate units, including MEUs.

e. Recommendation 13. I do not concur, and this responsibility should remain with MSC Commanding Generals and their relevant units prior to CHOP to the MEU.

f. Recommendation 15. I direct the I MEF G-7 / EOTG to develop this recommended checklist, and to staff it with U.S. 3d Fleet counterparts for input and recommendations.

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g. Recommendation 17 (15th MEU CO). I concur that the 15th MEU CO acted appropriately in accordance with his responsibilities, and should not receive administrative or disciplinary action.

h. Recommendation 18 (BLT 1/4 CO). I generally concur. I relieved BLT 1/4 CO for loss of trust and confidence for the reasons generally outlined by the investigating officer.

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(a), (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

I believe the BLT 1/4 CO acted conscientiously and truly attempted to correct the maintenance failures of the AAV platoon once he learned of them. He had the best interest of his unit, Marines and Sailors, and the mission at heart. However, his leadership oversight and failures in the training areas outlined by the investigating officer were significant departures from what is expected of a commander, especially one with his experience. This officer will face administrative and/or disciplinary action as appropriate.

i. Recommendation 19 (Former 3d AA Bn CO). I concur and recommend that this officer's current or next command carefully consider whether this officer should receive adverse administrative and/or disciplinary action. In my view, while this officer's actions are not the direct and proximate cause of the mishap, deaths, and injuries to our personnel, the decisions he made pertaining to maintenance and training greatly contributed to the overall chain of failures which had a direct bearing on the cause of this tragic mishap. Regarding the results of the former 3d AA Bn CO's decisions, I find inexcusable the inadequate training of the AAV platoon prior to CHOP (to include the lack of a MCCRE), the overall unsatisfactory state of AAVs that he and his staff designated to be transferred to the 15th MEU (12 of 13 operationally inoperative), the poor timing of that AAV transfer decision in close proximity to CHOP (a matter of weeks), and the insufficient resources he and his staff marshalled to assist the AAV platoon (the AAV platoon was under-resourced to make these repairs).

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(a), (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

j. Recommendation 20 (Bravo Company CO). I concur. I relieved the Bravo Company CO for loss of trust and confidence for the reasons generally outlined by the investigating officer.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

This officer will face either administrative and/or disciplinary action as appropriate.

k. Recommendation 21 (AAV Platoon CO). I concur. This officer will face either administrative and/or disciplinary action as appropriate. I do commend this officer's willingness to be forthright and cooperative with the investigating officer. This officer was not set up for success by the 3d AA Bn leadership.

l. Recommendation 23 (Mishap Vehicle Commander). I concur. This staff non-commissioned officer will face either administrative and/or disciplinary action as appropriate.

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7. The point of contact for this matter is the I MEF Staff Judge Advocate, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

K. S. HECK

Copy to:
File
CG, 1st MARDIV
COM, 3D FLT



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
US MARINE FORCES PACIFIC
BOX 555300
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5300

IN REPLY REFER TO
5830

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
8 Jan 2021

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
To: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force

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Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F with Change 3, dtd 30 Mar 2020 (JAGMAN)
(b) Standard Operating Procedure for Assault Amphibian
Operations (Common SOP for AAV Operations) BnO P3000.1J,
dtd 25 Oct 2019
(c) COMNAVSURFLANTINST/COMNAVSURFPACINST 3340.3C (Wet Well
Ops)
(d) Naval Postgraduate School Thesis: United States Marine
Corps Assault Amphibian Vehicle Egress Study: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(e) NAVMC 3500.2C Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) Training
and Readiness Manual, dtd 14 Mar 2017
(f) Technical Manual (TM) 07007/07267/07268-10/1: Volume 1 of
2, and 2 of 2, Operator Manual for Assault Amphibious
Vehicle 7A1 Family of Vehicles
(g) MCTP 3-10C, Employment of Amphibious Assault Vehicles
(AAVs), dtd 2 May 2016
(h) MCTP 13-10M Amphibious Embarkation, dtd 22 Nov 2019
(i) Joint Publication 3-02 Amphibious Operations, dtd 4 Jan
2019
(j) MCO 3502.3C, Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Pre-
Deployment Training Program, dtd 13 Sep 2019

Encl: (1) Appointing Order, dtd 3 Aug 2020
(2) Event Time Line Reconstructed by the Investigating Officer
(3) Sworn Statement of the Investigating Officer
(4) Military Abbreviation and Terminology Guide
(5) Table of Personnel Involved in Investigation
(6) AAV Platoon Vehicle Call Signs
(7) Standard Operating Procedure for Assault Amphibian
Operations: (Common SOP for AAV Operations) BnO P3000.1J,
dtd 25 Oct 2019
(8) COMNAVSURFLANTINST/COMNAVSURFPACINST 3340.3C (Wet Well
Ops) Chapter 9: Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV)
Operations
(9) Determination of Reserve Buoyancy of the Assault
Amphibious Vehicle (AAVP7A1 RAM/RS) (Version 1.0), dtd Dec
2012

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- (10) I MEF Incident Journal from 30 Jul 2020 to 11 Aug 2020
- (11) I MEF AAV Recovery Situation Reports (SitReps)
- (12) I MEF Policy Letter 1-20, Under Water Egress Training Requirement, dtd 23 March 2020
- (13) Excerpts from CG, I MEF Letter of Instruction for 15th MEU Deployment 21-1, dtd 30 Dec 2019 (This is a classified document and only pertinent unclassified portions are relevant to investigation.)
- (14) 1st Marine Division Order 3510.1E, Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE), dtd 18 Sep 2018
- (15) 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion Commanding Officer's Policy Letter 18-19, Conduct of Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE) for Assault Amphibian Platoons and Companies, dtd 1 Apr 2019
- (16) 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion Table of Organization for a MEU AAV Platoon
- (17) 15th MEU CPR-3 PMINT Confirmation Brief dtd 15 Jul 2020
- (18) 15th MEU Mechanized Raid (OPERATION GATOR SMASH) Confirmation Brief, dtd 29 Jul 2020 (This is a classified document and only relevant unclassified portions are contained. No classified material is relevant.)
- (19) 15th MEU PMINT 21-1 Embarkation Letter of Instruction (LOI)
- (20) 15th MEU PMINT Fragmentary Order, dtd 2 Jul 2020
- (21) Mechanized Raid Personnel Roster, dtd 30 Jul 2020
- (22) Mechanized Raid Execution Checklist with Timeline
- (23) Combined Log of Electronic Messages from the 15th MEU and MKIARG
- (24) BLT 1/4 Watch Officer/Watch Chief Turnover Folder: Appendix 3 Critical Thresholds/Appendix 4 Sea States
- (25) Letter of Instruction for BLT 1/4 Raid Course, dtd 17 Mar 2020
- (26) USS SOMERSET's GPS position 0005Z-0217Z 31 Jul 2020 (Due to the use of ZULU time this enclosure indicates the mishap occurred on 31 Jul 2020)
- (27) Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) to ZULU Time Conversion Chart
- (28) USS SOMERSET Ship's Deck Log Sheet, dtd 30 Jul 2020
- (29) USS SOMERSET ICODES Load Plan
- (30) BLT 1/4 Landing Force Operations Center Log, dtd 29-30 Jul 2020
- (31) San Clemente Island Weather Chart
- (32) U.S. Navy's Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV) San Diego Search Map Depicting Initial Position of AAV 523519
- (33) SUBSALV Video on AAV 523519 Location, Discovery, and Verification video, dtd 3 Aug 2020: External Hard Drive
- (34) SUBSALV Video of AAV 523519 Recovery, dtd 7 Aug 2020: External Hard Drive
- (35) SUBSALV Deputy Commander Email on AAV 523519 Location, dtd 11 Sep 2020
- (36) HSC-23.2 Search and Rescue Event Reconstruction and

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Flight Schedule

- (37) PowerPoint Presentation of U.S. Coast Guard's USMC Amphibious Assault Vehicle Response
- (38) Amphibious Assault School Class Rosters for Assault Amphibian Unit Leaders Course, Assault Amphibian Vehicle Commanders Course and Assault Amphibian Repairer Basic Course
- (39) AAV Nomenclature Guide with Photographs
- (40) Excerpt from Department of the Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, Specifications for Assault Amphibious Personnel Carrier (AAVP7A1) on Leakage Rates
- (41) AAV Platoon and USS SOM Track Route
- (42) AAV Water Speed Estimation provided by Naval Surface Warfare Center and PM, AAA
- (43) AAV Waterlines at Various Weight Conditions provided by PM, AAA
- (44) Watertight Integrity Checklist for AAV 523519, dtd 3 Apr 2020
- (45) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Field Service Representative PMAAVS) Limited Technical Inspection reports on AAV 523519, dtd 19 Aug 2020
- (46) AAV 523519 Upgrade Data: Email from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) PdM AAV, PM AAA, dtd 31 Aug 2020
- (47) Joint Limited Technical Inspection for AAV 523519 conducted on 14 Apr 2020
- (48) Joint Limited Technical Inspection for AAV 1
- (49) Joint Limited Technical Inspection for AAV 2
- (50) Joint Limited Technical Inspection for AAV 3
- (51) Joint Limited Technical Inspection for AAV 4
- (52) Joint Limited Technical Inspection for AAV 6
- (53) Joint Limited Technical Inspection for AAV 7
- (54) Joint Limited Technical Inspection for AAV 8
- (55) Joint Limited Technical Inspection for AAV 9
- (56) Joint Limited Technical Inspection for AAV 10
- (57) Joint Limited Technical Inspection for AAV 11
- (58) Joint Limited Technical Inspection for AAV 12
- (59) Joint Limited Technical Inspection for AAV 13
- (60) Joint Limited Technical Inspection for AAV 14
- (61) AAV Platoon Gunnery Synopsis Email from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Battalion Master Gunner, 3D Assault Amphibian Battalion, dtd 12 Aug 2020
- (62) AAV Platoon Pre-EXERCISE NATIVE FURY 2020 Training Records
- (63) AAV Platoon Post-CHOP Training Records
- (64) Swim Qualification Records for AAV Platoon Personnel
- (65) Underwater Egress Training Records for AAV Platoon Personnel
- (66) Swim Qualification for Bravo Company BLT 1/4 personnel
- (67) Underwater Egress Training Records for Bravo Company, BLT 1/4 Personnel
- (68) Underwater Egress Trainer Schedule Oct 2019-Sep 2020

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- (69) Signed Statement by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Chaplain I
MEF, dtd 2 Sep 2020
- (70) Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 8 Sep 2020: Email to the Investigating
Officer.
- (71) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 8 Sep 2020
- (72) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 11 Sep 2020
- (73) Emails from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to the Investigating Officer, dtd 8
and 11 Sep 2020
- (74) Summary of Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
1248121480/0302 USMC, dtd 9 Sep 2020
- (75) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 18 Aug 2020
- (76) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 11 Sep 2020
- (77) Second Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 20 Aug 2020
- (78) Article 31(b) Rights Advisements Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
dtd 20 Aug 2020 and 27 Sep 2020
- (79) Signed Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 11 Sep 2020
- (80) Signed Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 10 Sep 2020
- (81) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 11 Sep 2020
- (82) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 11 Sep 2020
- (83) Summary of Initial Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 3 Aug 2020
- (84) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement with Cleansing Warning
Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 17 Aug 2020
- (85) Summary of Second Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
dtd 11 Aug 2020
- (86) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 31 Aug 2020
- (87) Third Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 17 Aug
2020
- (88) Fourth Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 31 Aug
2020, Email from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to
Investigating Officer, dtd 24 Sep 2020
- (89) Training Synopsis of AAV Platoon provided by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- (90) Signed Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 13 Sep 2020
- (91) Summary of Second Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
dtd 4 Aug 2020
- (92) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 5 Aug 2020
- (93) Summary of Second Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

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dtd 11 Aug 2020
(94) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 18 Sep 2020
(95) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 18 Sep 2020
(96) Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 8 Sep 2020
(97) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 9 Sep 2020
(98) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 9 Sep 2020
(99) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 20 Aug 2020
(100) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 20 Aug 2020.
(101) Signed Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 11 Sep 2020
(102) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 23 Sep 2020
(103) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 17 Aug 2020.
(104) Second Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 23
Sep 2020
(105) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 31 Aug 2020.
(106) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 23 Aug 2020
(107) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 23 Aug 2020
(108) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 23 Aug 2020
(109) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 23 Aug 2020
(110) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 23 Aug 2020
(111) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 23 Aug 2020
(112) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 23 Aug 2020
(113) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 5 Aug 2020
(114) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Surf Observation Report 30 Jul
2020 (note: the report is legible, but the paper was
crumpled when he placed it in his pocket.)
(115) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 20 Aug 2020
(116) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 20 Aug 2020.
(117) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 3 Aug 2020

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(118) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 11 Sep 2020

(119) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 25 Sep 2020

(120) Second Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 25
Sep 2020

(121) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 2 Sep 2020.

(122) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 18 Aug 2020

(123) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 5 Aug 2020

(124) Summary of Second Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd
2 Sep 2020

(125) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 18 Aug 2020

(126) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 5 Aug 2020

(127) Summary of Second Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 19
Aug 2020

(128) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 5 Aug 2020

(129) Summary of Second Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 19
Aug 2020

(130) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 23 Sep 2020

(131) Second Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 23 Sep
2020

(132) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
dtd 2 Sep 2020.

(133) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 5 Aug 2020

(134) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 5 Aug 2020

(135) Summary of Second Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 19
Aug 2020

(136) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 5 Aug 2020

(137) Summary of Second Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd
19 Aug 2020

(138) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 11 Aug 2020

(139) Summary of Second Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 20 Aug 2020

(140) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 8 Sep 2020

(141) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 5 Aug 2020

(142) Summary of Second Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
dtd 19 Aug 2020

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(143) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 5 Aug 2020

(144) Summary of Initial Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 5 Aug 2020

(145) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 25 Sep
2020

(146) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 2 Sep 2020.

(147) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 11 Aug 2020

(148) Summary of Second Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd
20 Aug 2020

(149) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 24 Aug 2020

(150) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
dtd 24 Aug 2020.

(151) Emails from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to Investigating Officer, dtd 4
and 9 Sep 2020

(152) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 24 Aug 2020

(153) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 24 Aug 2020

(154) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 13 Aug 2020

(155) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 13 Aug 2020

(156) Summary of Second Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 24 Aug 2020

(157) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 24 Aug 2020.

(158) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 13 Aug 2020

(159) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 13 Aug 2020

(160) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 13 Aug 2020

(161) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 13 Aug 2020

(162) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 13 Aug 2020

(163) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 13 Aug 2020

(164) Summary of interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 13 Aug 2020

(165) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 13 Aug 2020

(166) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 13 Aug 2020

(167) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 13 Aug 2020

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- (168) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 24 Aug 2020
- (169) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 13 Aug 2020
- (170) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 24 Aug 2020
- (171) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 24 Aug 2020
- (172) Summary of Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 24 Aug 2020
- (173) I MEF Communication Strategy and Operations Press
Releases
- (174)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- (175) Signed Statement of 3rd AABn Maintenance Chief on AAV
Electrical System, dtd 15 Sep 2020
- (176) Signed Statement of 3rd AABn Operations Chief on
Time Required to Complete AAV Operations Checklists
- (177) Excerpt From AAV Operator Technical Manual (TM)
07007/07267/07268-10/1
- (178) Excerpt From AAV Maintainer Technical Manual
(TM) 07007/07267/07268-25-2 VOL 1
- (179) Email From Investigating Officer to Former 3rd AABn
Commanding Officer, Former 3rd AABn Operations
Officer, 3rd AABn H&S Company Commander, 3rd AABn
Maintenance Officer, and Former 3rd AABn Maintenance
Chief.
- (180) Recommended Brief for AAVs Embarking Onto U.S. Navy
Amphibious Ships, Produced by Investigating Officer and
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- (181)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 22 Sep 2020
- (182) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
dtd 22 Sep 2020
- (183) Signed Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 23 Sep 2020
- (184) Article 31(b) Rights Advisement Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 23 Sep 2020
- (185) Photo of AAV 523519 Starboard Forward Pontoon
- (186) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Video, dtd 30 Jul 2020: External
Hard Drive
- (187) Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 24
Sep 2020
- (188) Autopsy Report for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- (189) Autopsy Report for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- (190) Autopsy Report for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- (191) Autopsy Report for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

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(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(192) Autopsy Report for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(193) Autopsy Report for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(194) Autopsy Report for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(195) Autopsy Report for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(196) Autopsy Report for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(197) Email From (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(198) Statement From (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(199) Figure 1-6, Power Train System of an AAV, Technical
Manual (TM) 07007/07267/07268-10/1: Volume 1 of 2 and 2
of 2, Operator Manual For Assault Amphibious Vehicle 7A1
Family of Vehicles.

(200) Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(201) Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCCS-MC)
Transaction Report

(202) Investigating Officer extension request 1000/ff, dtd 30
Sep 2020

(203) CG, extension approval 5830/CG, dtd 16 Oct 2020

(204) Email From the 3rd AABn Operations Officer and
Maintenance Chief, dtd 5 and 8 Jan 2020

(205) Email From the I MEF Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff G-3,
dtd 5 Jan 2020

(206) I MEF Realistic Urban Training Exercise 20-1 Letter of
Instruction, dtd 25 Feb 2020

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Preliminary Statement

1. Pursuant to enclosure (1), and in accordance with reference (a), a
Command Investigation was conducted to inquire into the facts and

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circumstances surrounding the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) mishap on 30 July 2020 that resulted in the deaths of Private First Class Bryan J. Baltierra (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Lance Corporal Marco A. Barranco
Private First Class Evan A. Bath (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Navy Hospital Corpsman 3rd Class (Fleet Marine Force)
Christopher Gnem (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Private First Class Jack-Ryan
Ostrovsky (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Lance Corporal Guillermo S. Perez
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Corporal Wesley A. Rodd (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Lance Corporal Chase D. Sweetwood (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Corporal
Cesar A. Villanueva (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and the sinking of AAV-P7
serial number 523519 tactical number 3-15-05.

2. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) were seriously injured in
the accident and were flown ashore for medical treatment.

3. All personnel on AAV-P7 serial number 523519 were from Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/4, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The 15th MEU was conducting their pre-deployment training exercise Amphibious Squadron Marine Expeditionary Unit Integration Training (PMINT). PMINT was scheduled from 27 July to 9 August 2020. Due to the search and rescue/recovery operations, my investigation team and I arrived on the USS MAKIN ISLAND (USS MKI) on 3 August 2020. All of the ships were still involved in trying to locate the sunken AAV and the missing Marines and Corpsman. Discussions about the mishap to that point had been focused on trying to obtain information to assist in locating the AAV and missing Marines and Corpsman.

4. The Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) is a fully tracked amphibious landing vehicle, commonly called an "amtrac" or "track," an abbreviated term for "amphibious tractor." The AAV is designed to deliver assault troops and their equipment from ship to shore under combat conditions. For a complete vehicle description please see reference (Ref) (g) page 160: APPENDIX A. AAVP7A1 DATA.

5. AAV 523519 was built in 1984 and delivered to the United States Marine Corps on 25 October 1985. A Reliability, Availability and Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard (RAM/RS) upgrade was conducted on 2 August 1999 and an Inspect Repair Only As Necessary (IROAN) at Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow was completed on 21 December 2015.

6. Line of duty determinations for all deceased service members were made on 30 September 2020. These determinations were made and will be disseminated to the next of kin before completion of this report. Line of duty determinations for all injured service members were also made on 30 September 2020. The deaths and injuries of all personnel were determined to have occurred in the line of duty, and not due to misconduct.

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7. Several personnel outside of I MEF and not involved in the mishap were consulted for technical questions.

a. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Technical Director, Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch (AVTB) assisted in identifying specifications of the AAV-P7 not found in Technical Manuals.

b. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Commanding Officer of the Assault Amphibian School, and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Executive Officer of the Assault Amphibian School, were consulted with questions regarding the common SOP for AAV operation, reference (b) to this investigation.

c. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Program Manager, Advanced Amphibious Assault (PM AAA), Program Executive Officer (PEO) Land Systems was consulted to assist in identifying specifications of the AAV-P7 and assist with researching information in Technical Manuals.

d. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Office of the Secretary of Defense, former Commanding Officer of the Assault Amphibian School, was consulted with questions regarding the common SOP for AAV operation, reference (b) to this investigation.

e. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Field Service Representatives, PMAAVs, were consulted on technical questions about the AAV. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) are government contractors who are employed by Skylla Engineering, Ltd, and work for the Program Manager overseeing amphibious vehicles at Marine Corps Systems Command.

8. For clarity, a number of items will be referred to throughout the investigation by abbreviated titles. Many of the statements contain abbreviations, acronyms, or military terminology. Enclosure (4) is an abbreviation and terminology guide to assist the reader. The list below is not the complete list of acronyms, but contains the most frequently used acronyms and terms. Additionally, individuals were referred to by billet title and not by name throughout the report. The names of individuals who occupied these billets during the relevant period under investigation are identified in enclosure (5).

a. AAV(s): Assault Amphibious Vehicle(s) will be referred to as AAV(s).

b. AAV number: AAVs will be referred to by their 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion tactical number consisting of 3 for 3rd Amphibious Assault Battalion (AABn), 15 for 15th MEU, and the last two digits 1 thru 14. Enclosure (6) contains a full list of call signs and vehicle designations. In personal statements, vehicle names and identifiers have not been changed.

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c. AAV-P7 serial number 523519 tactical number 3-15-05: The AAV that sank. It will be referred to as AAV 523519, but in statements and other parts of the investigation it may be referred to as AAV 5 or track 5.

d. AAV C7: Assault Amphibious Vehicle Command Model 7A1 (AAVC7A1) is a command and control variant and will be referred to as AAV C7 or simply C7.

e. AAV NOTM: Assault Amphibious Vehicle AAVP-7A1 with the Network on the Move communications system (NOTM) will be referred to as AAV NOTM. In many statements it is called the "Pop."

f. AAV P7: Assault Amphibious Vehicle AAVP-7A1 is the standard model and will be referred to as AAV or AAV-P7.

g. AAV Plt: Assault Amphibious Vehicle Platoon, 15th MEU will be referred to as AAV Platoon or AAV Plt.

h. AVTB: Amphibious Vehicle Testing Branch will be referred to as AVTB. AVTB provided a maintenance garage that was safeguarded and access controlled.

i. Bravo Co. or B Co: Company B, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 will be referred to as Bravo Company.

j. BLT 1/4: Battalion Landing Team 1/4 will be referred to as BLT 1/4.

k. 15th MEU: 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit will be referred to as 15th MEU.

l. IVO: "In the vicinity of" will be abbreviated to IVO.

m. LCAVAT: Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Assignment Table will be referred to as a LCAVAT.

n. LPU-41: A yoke-style, inflatable personal flotation device designed to be worn over body armor. It is issued to personnel embarked on AAVs.

o. MOS: Military Occupational Specialty will be referred to as MOS.

p. Nautical terms: There are several terms that are nautical or Naval in character. The bow refers to the front of a ship, boat or AAV. The stern refers to the rear of a ship, boat or AAV. When looking forward on a ship, boat or AAV towards the bow, the port lies on the left side while the starboard side lies on the right side. In

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nautical terms, the bow or fore lies at the forward of the ship, while the stern or aft is the rear portion.

q. Plenum: The "grill and access assembly" is referred to in many statements by the informal term "plenums". The exhaust grill may be referred to as the "rear plenum", and the intake grill may be referred to as the "front plenum". The grill and access assembly may be referred to as the "plenum housing". Where specific language is necessary, the proper nomenclature is used by the Investigating Officer in accordance with the references.

r. PMCS: Preventive Maintenance Checks and Service will be referred to as PMCS.

s. PHIBRON: Amphibious Squadron will be referred to as PHIBRON.

t. SCI: San Clemente Island is a training island for the military and environmentally protected area administered by Naval Base Coronado. It is 41 miles off the coast of California and it is 21 miles (34 km) long and contains 147.13 km² (56.81 sq. mi) of land. San Clemente Island will be referred to as SCI.

u. SUROB: Surf Observation report will be referred to as SUROB.

v. USS MKI: USS MAKIN ISLAND (LHD-8) will be referred to the USS MKI.

w. USS SOM: USS SOMERSET (LPD-25) will be referred to as the USS SOM.

x. USS SDG: USS SAN DIEGO (LPD-22) will be referred to as the USS SDG.

9. All times in this investigation will use Pacific Daylight Time (PDT). Several logs and other documents use or reference ZULU time. Enclosure (27) contains a time conversion chart for PDT to ZULU time.

10. Several electronic logs are included as enclosures to this investigation. These logs have time stamps associated with events, but many of the operators entering the information into the logs stated that their entries may have been delayed due to the lag between receiving information verbally and their attempts to enter the information while engaging in rescue actions. The investigation team considered these logs, understanding that several entries were entered late, but finding that the substance of the logs is accurate. These delayed entries in no way hampered rescue operations.

11. The finding of facts will be separated into two (2) parts. The first part deals with the AAV accident and the second part covers

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maintenance history for the AAV Platoon and training history for the AAV Platoon and Bravo Company, BLT 1/4.

12. The Investigating Officer began the investigation without any knowledge of facts which indicated that the mishap was caused through dereliction of duty or other violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Accordingly, all initial statements were taken without Article 31(b) rights advisements or waivers. As the Investigating Officer examined more evidence and collected statements from personnel involved, this presumption changed with regard to the crew of AAV-P7 serial number 523519, the AAV Platoon leadership, Bravo Company BLT 1/4 leadership, 3rd AABn personnel and several others. Subsequent statements were made with Article 31(b) rights advisements and waivers were obtained.

13. All written statements were produced either from notes taken by the Investigating Officer during the interview, or were transcribed from the corresponding audio recording taken during the interview. When necessary, the Investigating Officer requested that certain individuals sign their written statements. These individuals were given a copy of their written interview in digital form and were asked to read their statement thoroughly and to make any changes they deemed appropriate before signing.

14. Interviews were conducted onboard the USS MAKIN ISLAND, the USS SOMERSET, Camp Pendleton, CA, and Naval Station San Diego, CA. The Investigating Officer requested statements from some personnel who had left the southern California area and the Investigating Officer received these documents via electronic mail. All interviews were conducted in person and no difficulties were encountered while interviewing witnesses.

15. The Investigating Officer decided to conduct in-person interviews wherever possible vice just receiving signed statements. This technique did take more time due to transcribing all information from verbal to written, but it gave the Investigating Officer a much clearer understanding of the incident.

16. The Event Time Line, Enclosure (2), was produced solely to provide a visual reference to assist the reader of the investigation.

17. Three requests for extensions were submitted by the Investigating Officer and granted by the Commanding General, I MEF. The first extension was approved in writing and is contained in this report as Encl (203). The remaining requests were approved verbally by the Commanding General, I MEF.

18. All reasonably available evidence pertaining to this incident was collected during the course of this investigation.

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NARRATIVE STATEMENT

1. At approximately 1815 Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) on 30 July 2020, AAV-P7 serial number 523519 tactical number 3-15-05 sank en route from San Clemente Island, CA to the USS SOMERSET (LPD-25). AAV 523519 had sixteen (16) personnel onboard, including three (3) AAV crewmen, twelve (12) infantry Marines, and one (1) Navy Corpsman. All personnel onboard were part of Battalion Landing Team 1/4, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Seven (7) of the personnel survived. Tragically, nine (9) personnel - eight (8) Marines and one (1) Sailor - were killed. AAV 523519 settled on the ocean floor off the west coast of San Clemente Island at a depth of 385 feet; its position was 33 deg 01.52244' N / 118 deg 38.93274' W; MGRS: 11SLS 46004 55307. One (1) Marine, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was pronounced deceased after his body was recovered on 30 July 2020 onto the USS SOMERSET. The remaining seven (7) Marines and one (1) Sailor were listed as missing after the mishap.

2. On 3 August 2020, the remains of all eight (8) missing personnel, as well as AAV 523519, were located via a U.S. Navy unmanned underwater vehicle.

3. On 5 August 2020, the dignified transfer of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware occurred with a ramp ceremony at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA. On 6 and 7 August 2020, the remains of the other eight personnel were recovered. On 8 August 2020, they were transferred to U.S. Naval Hospital Balboa. On 12 August 2020, the dignified transfer of the eight (8) remaining deceased personnel occurred, also commencing with a ramp service at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar and ending at Dover Air Force Base.

4. On 7 August 2020, AAV 523519 was recovered from the ocean floor. On 8 August 2020, it was transferred to Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch (AVTB) in Camp Pendleton, CA via Naval Air Station North Island, CA for technical examination. AAV 523519 was photographed during every stage of movement. These photographs were taken and are maintained by I MEF Communications Strategy personnel.

5. Post-mishap analysis on AAV 523519 revealed excess water leakage through both intake and exhaust plenum grills, excess water leakage through a missing headlight connector in the front bow, excess water leakage through the personnel door, a minor leak on the number two (2) port side road arm assembly to hull area, a minor leak in the number four (4) port torsion bar anchor area, and minor leaks in the port and starboard midship seals. The transmission had no visible oil and had seized up.

6. The investigation determined the cause of the mishap was a combination of maintenance failures due to disregard of maintenance

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procedures, AAV crewmen not evacuating personnel when the situation clearly demanded they be evacuated, and improper training of embarked personnel on AAV safety procedures.

7. The investigation also examined the maintenance conditions of the 14 AAVs in the AAV Platoon since April 2020, as well as the training that the AAV Platoon and Bravo Company, BLT 1/4 personnel received for amphibious operations.

8. The investigation does cover key events in the Search and Rescue and Recovery operations but does not go into every detail. In my opinion, the Search and Rescue and Recovery operations were conducted very professionally.

FINDINGS OF FACTS REGARDING THE SINKING OF AAV 523519

1. AAV-P7 serial number 523519 tactical number 3-15-05 sank at approximately 1815, 30 July 2020 and came to rest on the ocean floor at 33 deg 01.52244' N/ 118 deg 38.93274' W; MGRS: 11SLS 46004 55307 [Encl (35), (119), (126)]

2. AAV-P7 523519 was built in 1984, with a delivery date to the USMC (DD250) of 25 October 1985. AAV 523519 had the following upgrades conducted: a Reliability, Availability, Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard (RAM/RS) on 2 August 1999; and an Inspect and Repair On As Necessary (IROAN) on 21 December 2015. AAV 523519 had the following modifications installed: an Emergency Egress Lighting System (EELS) in January 2017; a Throttle Linkage in June 2018; and an Automatic Fire Sensing and Suppression System (AFSSS) in October 2018. [Encl (46)]

3. On 26 July 2020, Bravo Company, BLT 1/4 embarked on the USS SOM pier side at U.S. Naval Base San Diego, CA. [Encl (19)]

4. On 27 July 2020 at 0700, the USS SOM departed U.S. Naval Base, San Diego. [Encl (151)]

5. On 27 July 2020 at 1200, AAV Platoon launched fourteen (14) AAVs from the Del Mar Boat Basin, Camp Pendleton, CA en route to the USS SOM. [Encl (19), (87), (102)]

6. On 27 July around 1400, all fourteen (14) AAVs in the AAV Platoon were recovered onboard the USS SOM. [Encl (87), (102)]

7. During transit, AAV 14, the Network-On-The-Move (NOTM) vehicle, experienced a maintenance issue with its jet deflectors that forced AAV 14 to complete the movement in water track mode. [Encl (135)]

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8. During transit, AAV 12 had a maintenance issue with the port side lateral drive shaft that similarly compelled AAV 12 to complete the movement in water track mode. [Encl (102), (124)]

9. Water track mode is when the AAV is propelled in the water using its tracks, without the use of its water jets. [Encl (7)]

10. From 1300 on 27 July 2020 until 1800 on 29 July 2020, while onboard the USS SOM, the AAV Platoon conducted Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) and repaired AAV 14 by replacing the servos and AAV 12 by replacing the port side lateral drive shaft. At this time, there were no maintenance discrepancies on AAV 523519. [Encl (87), (124), (131)]

11. On 29 July 2020 at approximately 1200, the operations order was received on the USS SOMERSET and planning began for a mechanized raid on San Clemente Island. [Encl (76), (91)]

12. The confirmation brief for the mechanized raid was conducted at approximately 1930 and ended at 2100. [Encl (76), (91)]

13. During the confirmation brief, the Planning and Tactics Officer for the USS SOM stated that the USS SOM would provide one (1) safety boat. [Encl (87), (152), (181)]

14. References (b) and (c) state that safety boats are required for all waterborne AAV operations. [Encl (7), (8)]

15. The PHIBRON-3 Commodore, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the 15th MEU Commanding Officer, the BLT 1/4 Commanding Officer, and their staffs attended the confirmation brief via secure video teleconference because all of these individuals were aboard the USS MAKIN ISLAND at that time. The plan was approved at this time. [Encl (91), (181)]

16. During the confirmation brief, the following safety measures were discussed: Rehearsals & Pre-Combat Checks (PCCs) / Pre-Combat Inspections (PCIs), Safety Boats, No-go Criteria, Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), Communication and Operational Risk Management (ORM). [Encl (18), (181), (183)]

17. Upon completion of the confirmation brief, the AAV Platoon and Bravo Company personnel began well deck rehearsal serial call-away drills, which started at approximately 2100. [Encl (87), (104)]

18. At 2200, the Bravo Company leadership and AAV leadership conducted a rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill. The ROC drill ended around 2300. [Encl (87), (104)]

19. On 29 July 2020, during their PMCS procedures, the AAV Platoon discovered that the digital display module (DDM) on AAV 9 would not

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display the AAV engine water temperature. As a result, the decision was made that AAV 9 would stay onboard the USS SOM. [Encl (102), (124)]

20. On 30 July 2020, the AAV Platoon members had reveille at 0300 and were in the well deck on their vehicles at 0400. Bravo Company, BLT 1/4 set reveille at 0400 and serial call-aways began at 0500. [Encl (72), (102)]

21. On 30 July 2020, at approximately 0330, all crew members of AAV 523519 had reported to their vehicle and began preparations for waterborne operations. [Encl (119), (131)]

22. On 30 July 2020 at approximately 0530, the 1st and 2nd Section Leaders of the AAV Platoon conducted the splash team checks. [Encl (102), (104), (117)]

23. In accordance with paragraph 3004 the Common SOP for Amphibious Operations, splash checks must be conducted prior to launching AAVs and should include a safety brief for all crew and passengers. [Encl (7)]

24. The Common SOP states that safety briefs will be given to all embarked passengers explaining the AAV capabilities, safety, and egress/evacuation procedures prior to conducting any operations. [Encl (7)]

25. Appendix J of Enclosure 7 is the embarked troop brief that is supposed to be given to all embarked passengers. [Encl (7)]

26. The Vehicle Commander is responsible for briefing embarked personnel on their responsibilities as embarked troops. [Encl (7)]

27. The Vehicle Commander has the final decision if the safety of the AAV, crew, or embarked troops is in question. [Encl (7)]

28. During splash team checks vehicle commanders must conduct pre-operations checks and submit a pre-water operations checklist to the section leader. [Encl (7)]

29. Once the check lists are received, the section leader verifies the completion of the checklist and then either maintains the checklist or delivers it to the AA unit leader. [Encl (7)]

30. The mechanized raid force consisted of the AAV Platoon (13 AAVs) and Bravo Company, BLT 1/4. [Encl (18), (21)]

31. At approximately 0600 on 30 July 2020, the BLT 1/4 Executive Officer and the Bravo Company Commander went to the USS SOM bridge and discussed sea state with the USS SOM Officer Of The Day (OOD). They

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assessed the sea state to be a sea state one (1). Sea state levels are defined on page H-5 of enclosure (7). [Encl (72), (76)]

32. At some point that morning, the safety boat that was to be provided by the USS SOM was found to be inoperable due to the fact that the engine would not start. [Encl (149), (152)]

33. At 0630, the AAV Platoon Commander and the AAV Platoon Sergeant went to the USS SOM flight deck to observe sea state; they assessed sea state to be one (1) or two (2). [Encl (87), (102)]

34. At approximately 0720, the USS SOM Combat Cargo Officer informed the AAV Platoon Commander that the USS SOM's small boat was inoperable and they could not provide the safety boat. [Encl (87), (164)]

35. Two (2) safety boats are required for AAV waterborne operations with naval shipping when AAV unit composition is 6 or more AAVs. [Encl (7), (8)]

36. The AAV Platoon Commander designated AAV 12 as the safety boat, despite the fact that AAV 12 contained embarked personnel. [Encl (21), (102)]

37. Although the AAV Platoon Commander knew there was an AAV without embarked personnel onboard at that time, an AAV was not specifically identified to serve as the second safety boat to replace the U.S. Navy safety boat. [Encl (87)]

38. The mechanized raid from the USS SOM to San Clemente Island (SCI) was scheduled to launch from the USS SOM at 0700 and all forces were scheduled to return to the USS SOM by 1200. [Encl (18)]

39. The mechanized raid force was to land on the West Cove of SCI and then move administratively to the objective. Once at the objective the raid force would begin actions. [Encl (18)]

40. Landing Force Objective (LF OBJ) 1 was West Cove, SCI (MGRS 11S LS 509 542), and it was also the landing site for the AAVs. LF OBJ 2 was the airfield on SCI (MGRS 11S LS 515 548); this was considered key terrain in that it gave the AAVs observation of the airfield. LF OBJ 3 was the raid force objective on SCI (MGRS 11S LS 572465). [Encl (18)]

41. The mechanized raid force from the USS SOM to SCI launched from the USS SOM at 0745. Thirteen (13) AAVs launched. AAV 9 was inoperative and stayed aboard the USS SOM. [Encl (22), (87), (102), (124)]

42. The mechanized raid force from the USS SOM to SCI launched without the required number of safety boats. [Encl (7), (8)]

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43. The USS SOM Commanding Officer ordered the delivery crane that places the safety boats in the water to be changed from the broken safety boat to an operational safety boat. [Encl (149)]

44. The mechanized raid from the USS SOM to SCI was scheduled to land on SCI at 0730. [Encl (18)]

45. The mechanized raid from the USS SOM to SCI landed on West Cove, SCI at 0838. Thirteen (13) AAVs landed. [Encl (22), (72)]

46. Once on SCI, 15th MEU personnel guided the raid force to the objective. This was due to environmental concerns to ensure vehicles do not enter environmentally protected areas. [Encl (76), (80)]

47. At this time AAV 10 and AAV 11 moved IVO LF OBJ 2. [Encl (113)]

48. AAV 13 (C7) and AAV 14 (NOTM) stayed on the beach at West Cove and conducted command and control drills. [Encl (72)]

49. AAVs 1, 2, 3, 4, AAV 523519, 6, 7, 8, and 12 followed 15th MEU personnel to the raid objective. [Encl (76), (83)]

50. At 0908, the raid force commenced actions on the objective. [Encl (22)]

51. At 0945, the raid force actions were complete and the Bravo Company Commander directed Marines to begin Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE). [Encl (22), (76)]

52. At approximately 0948, AAV 12 reported that AAV 12 "blew a hub" and would need 20 minutes to repair. A hub is a term for the center part of AAV road wheel, when an AAV reports they "blew a hub" it means that the bearing inside the road wheel hub has failed and the vehicle cannot move. [Encl (72), (76), (104)]

53. Upon consolidation AAVs 1, 2, 3, 4, AAV 523519, 6, 7, 8, and 12 were IVO LF OBJ 3. AAV 10 and AAV 11 were IVO LF OBJ 2 and AAV 13 (C7) and AAV 14 (NOTM) were IVO LF OBJ 1 conducting command and control drills. [Encl (76), (83), (119)]

54. Between 0930 and 1000, fifteen (15) personnel who had been playing the roles of opposing force on LF Obj 3 and nine (9) personnel from the All Domain Reconnaissance (ADR) Force moved to the AAVs. 1st Section picked up the personnel who had been the opposing force and 2nd Section picked up the ADR personnel. No additional personnel were placed in AAV 523519. [Encl (21) (106), (118), (119)]

55. At 1000, the Bravo Company Commander discussed the maintenance delay with the BLT 1/4 Executive Officer (XO) and the Assistant

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Operations Officer (S3A). The decision was made go to an administrative posture wherein AAV 12 would be left on the LF Obj 3 and the remaining AAVs would move west and set up an assembly area IVO West Cove. [Encl (72), (76), (79)]

56. The AAV Platoon Maintenance Chief was left with AAV 12. [Encl (87), (124)]

57. Upon arrival IVO West Cove, there were some concerns about proper accountability of personnel due to the addition of opposing force personnel and ADR personnel and the exclusion of personnel left on AAV 12. [Encl (76), (118)]

58. At approximately 1200, personnel on SCI communicated a list of required parts needed to repair AAV 12. This communication was conducted via voice communication with the USS SOM. [Encl (73)]

59. The AAV Platoon Sergeant stated that between 1430-1500 he was told that the parts needed to repair AAV 12 would not be available until 31 July. [Encl (102)]

60. At approximately 1500, AAV Platoon leadership recommended to the Bravo Company Commander that, due to the delay of required parts for AAV 12, an AAV section of four (4) AAVs should remain on SCI. This was determined to be AAVs 2, 4, 11 and 12. These AAVs would independently return to the USS SOM later once AAV 12 was repaired. [Encl (72), (76), (102)]

61. At approximately 1515, a Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC) arrived at West Cove. Due to a miscommunication, AAV Platoon and Bravo Company personnel initially thought the LCAC was bringing repair parts. However, the LCAC had actually been sent ashore to transport AAV 12 back to the USS SOM. [Encl (80), (102), (124), (161)]

62. While the AAVs were staged at West Cove, the AAV 523519 driver checked the transmission oil level and found that it was low. [Encl (120), (131), (145)]

63. Upon discovering the transmission oil level was low, the AAV 523519 driver informed the rear crewman, who is a trained AAV mechanic, who then opened up the plenums and began to inspect the engine. [Encl (131), (145)]

64. Upon inspecting the engine, the AAV 523519 rear crewman discovered that there appeared to be a fluid leak coming from the area where the Power Take Off (PTO) marine drive unit meets the torque converter. [Encl (131), (145)]

65. Upon discovering the fluid leak, the AAV 523519 rear crewman inspected the mounting bolts for the gasket that sits between the PTO

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and the torque converter and found the mounting bolts to be loose, at which point he tightened all the bolts. [Encl (131), (145)]

66. After tightening the bolts, the AAV Driver added approximately six (6) gallons of oil to the transmission. [Encl (131), (145)]

67. The AAV Driver and Rear Crewman stated they informed the Vehicle Commander they had added six (6) gallons of oil to the transmission. [Encl (131), (145)]

68. An AAV transmission requires twenty three (23) gallons to operate properly. [Encl (177), (178)]

69. At 1530, a Surf Observation Report (SUROB) was conducted by AAV Platoon, 3rd Section Leader, with a corresponding report of mean surf index of 2.1. [Encl (113), (114)]

70. At 1600, the AAV Platoon, 1st Section Leader, established communications with the USS SOM via Boat Bravo net and began coordination for re-embarkation on the USS SOM. [Encl (117)]

71. At 1600, the AAVs began to line up in a column for splash and return to the USS SOM. The order of movement was led by AAV 10, followed by AAVs 14, 13, 8, 7, 6, 523519, 3, and 1. [Encl (113), (117)]

72. The AAV Platoon Commander could not state who conducted the Splash Checks. [Encl (88)]

73. The AAV Platoon Sergeant stated that he believed the 1st Section Leader conducted the Splash Checks. [Encl (104)]

74. Splash Procedures from ref (b) require that the section leader verify the pre-water operations checklists for each vehicle in their section, and either maintain a copy, or turn in the checklists to the AA unit leader. [Encl (7)]

75. As per Ref (b) the Pre-Water Operations checklist (Appendix L in the reference) must be submitted to the Section Leader for verification prior to amphibious operations. [Encl (7)]

76. The AAV Platoon, 1st Section Leader stated he collected all of the Pre-Water Operations checklists, however, when requested by Investigating Officer, the 1st Section Leader could not produce them. [Encl (117)]

77. The personnel who had served as the opposition force were all provided with LPU-41s prior to splash. The ADR personnel were not provided LPU-41s prior to splash. [Encl (106-112), (118)]

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78. At 1645, nine (9) AAVs began to splash and all vehicles were in the water by 1651. [Encl (22), (113), (117)]

79. The AAVs violated both Marine Corps and Navy SOPs and splashed without the required number of safety boats. [Encl (7), (88)]

80. The personnel who served as the opposition force and the ADR personnel were never given a safety brief from their AAV crew prior to splash. [Encl (106-112), (118)]

81. The Bravo Company Commander, Bravo Company First Sergeant, AAV Platoon Commander, and AAV Platoon Sergeant all stayed on SCI. [Encl (76), (99)]

82. The AAV Platoon Commander stated that he assumed the USS SOM would have safety boats in the water for the movement of the AAVs back to the ship because they had never told him that safety boats would not be in the water. However, this assumption was never confirmed and the presence of safety boats from the USS SOM for the movement back to the ship was never coordinated. [Encl (87), (156)]

83. A safety boat was available on the USS SOM at the time the AAVs splashed back from SCI, but it was never requested. [Encl (149)]

84. AAV 523519 was the seventh vehicle to splash from West Cove on SCI and splashed at approximately 1650. [Encl (113), (117), (119)]

85. AAV 10 led the AAV column and, once clear of the protected cove, the sea state increased. [Encl (113), (117), (119)]

86. Once the AAVs were approximately 1500 meters out, the AAV Platoon, 3rd Section Leader, departed the SCI boat lane and started heading in a westward direction towards the USS SOM. [Encl (41), (113)]

87. The prevailing winds and prevailing seas move from north to south on the west side of SCI. [Encl (31)]

88. At approximately 1725, AAV 3 reported a malfunction that prevented the vehicle from maneuvering in the water. The AAV Platoon, 1st Section Leader, then maneuvered AAV 1 to AAV 3 and prepared to rig for tow. [Encl (117)]

89. At approximately 1730, the AAV Platoon, 1st Section Leader determined that SCI was the nearest safe harbor and began to tow AAV 3 back to SCI. [Encl (117)]

90. At 1730, the USS SOM had to increase speed to five (5) knots to produce winds for one (1) UH-1Y helicopter and one (1) AH-1Z to take off. [Encl (161)]

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91. Due to the location of the rear lookout position and the dangers posed by helicopters landing, no rear lookout was posted on the USS SOM at that time due to flight operations. [Encl (161)]

92. At 1731, the AAV Platoon, 3rd Section Leader in AAV 10 reported being between 1500 and 2000 meters from the USS SOM. [Encl (113), (117)]

93. The AAV Platoon, 3rd Section Leader did not have communications with the USS SOM and was relaying information via the AAV Platoon, 1st Section Leader. [Encl (113), (117)]

94. Based on sea state two (2), an average AAV under full propulsion will cover one (1) nautical mile (1852 meters) in 9 minutes and 52 seconds. Based on sea state three (3), an average AAV under full propulsion will cover one (1) nautical mile in 10 minutes and 54 seconds. [Encl (42)]

95. At around this time, the AAV 523519 Rear Crewman notified the Vehicle Commander that water was above the deck plates at the ramp. The Vehicle Commander then acknowledged the message and stated "Thanks for letting me know." [Encl (119), (130)]

96. That water at "Deck Plate Level" would meet the requirement to begin "prep for embarked troop transfer." [Encl (7)]

97. The command to "prep for embarked troop transfer" was not given when water was at the deck plate level. [Encl (119), (130), (138), (147)]

98. At this time, the AAV 523519 Rear Crewman then decided to move to the A-Gunner position because he had no internal communications with the Vehicle Commander or Driver and was verbally communicating information. [Encl (92), (130)]

99. The AAV 523519 Driver noticed a falling voltage reading from the drivers display module from twenty seven (27) volts to nineteen (19) volts. [Encl (144), (145)]

100. When the volts dropped from twenty seven (27) volts to nineteen (19) volts, the radios and electric bilge pumps did not operate as optimally as they were designed to function. The radio's output and reception power was degraded and the electric bilge pumps did not discharge water at the rate they are designed to discharge. [Encl (175)]

101. Due to the AAV 523519 Rear Crewman's communications helmet not functioning and the AAV 523519 Vehicle Commander not responding on the

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internal communications system, the AAV 523519 Driver did not inform anyone that the voltage had dropped. [Encl (144), (145)]

102. The AAV 523519 Rear Crewman then notified the Vehicle Commander that the water had risen from deck plate level to ankle level. The Vehicle Commander then exited the turret and began waving the November flag. [Encl (119), (130)]

103. As per Ref (b), actions to be taken when water is at "Boot Ankle Level" are the following: Crew executes all emergency distress signals. Crew evacuates all embarked troops. Crew prepares to evacuate while trying to reach nearest safe haven. [Encl (7)]

104. The Vehicle Commander for AAV 523519 began to execute emergency distress signals by waving the November flag. The command to evacuate embarked troops was not given at this time. [Encl 119), (130), (138), (147)]

105. The Rear Crewman tried to tell the Vehicle Commander again about the water level, but the Vehicle Commander was not in the turret. The Rear Crewman asked the embarked Platoon Commander as to the whereabouts of the Vehicle Commander. The embarked Platoon Commander stated that the Vehicle Commander was waving the November Flag on top of the AAV. [Encl (92), (130)]

106. The AAV 523519 Vehicle Commander never fired any pyrotechnics. Both Red Star Cluster and White Star Cluster pyrotechnics were found on AAV 523519 during the post-mishap inspection. [Encl (187)]

107. At 1753, the USS SOM reported Green Well and began recovering AAVs. AAV 10 was recovered at 1753, AAV 8 was recovered at 1756, AAV 7 was recovered at 1759, and AAV 6 was recovered at 1803. [Encl (28), (30)]

108. Green well is a term used when the ship is ready to receive or disembark AAVs. Red well is a term used when the ship is not ready to receive or disembark AAVs. [Encl (8)]

109. At approximately 1755, the Vehicle Commander for AAV 6 informed the Bravo Company Executive Officer that he observed someone waving a November flag. [Encl (90), (91)]

110. The AAV 523519 Vehicle Commander stated that, while he was waving the November flag, he observed the starboard forward bilge pump and it was still functioning and expelling water. [Encl (119)]

111. The AAV 13 (C7) Vehicle Commander first became aware AAV 523519 was in distress when he heard the AAV 523519 Vehicle Commander state over the radio that his vehicle was taking on water. [Encl (128), (129)]

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112. Upon hearing this, the AAV 13 (C7) Vehicle Commander turned and saw the November flag waving on top of AAV 523519. [Encl (128), (129)]

113. At this time, the AAV 13 (C7) Vehicle Commander stated he was approximately 400 meters away from AAV 523519 and the AAV 14 (NOTM) vehicle was somewhere in front of him. [Encl (129)]

114. Upon hearing that AAV 523519 was in distress and seeing the November flag waving on top of AAV 523519, the AAV 13 (C7) Vehicle Commander turned his AAV around and went to assist AAV 523519. [Encl (128), (129)]

115. Around this same time, the AAV 14 (NOTM) Vehicle Commander stated he heard the AAV 523519 Vehicle Commander repeatedly trying to key out over the radio but he could not hear what the AAV 523519 Vehicle Commander was saying. [Encl (126), (127)]

116. At this time, the AAV 14 (NOTM) Vehicle Commander could not see where AAV 523519 was, so he radioed over to the AAV 13 (C7) Vehicle Commander to request an update from him. [Encl (126), (127)]

117. The AAV 14 (NOTM) Vehicle Commander continued to move forward towards the USS SOM until he visually observed the November flag, at which point he ordered his Driver to turn their vehicle around so they could assist AAV 523519. [Encl (126), (127)]

118. At approximately 1800, AAV 13 (C7) and AAV 14 (NOTM) were approximately two hundred (200) meters from the USS SOM, and then turned around and maneuvered to assist AAV 523519. [Encl (126), (127), (128), (129)]

119. At approximately 1800, using the radio to contact the USS SOM LFOC, the BLT S-3A requested that the USS SOM deploy safety boats. [Encl (79), (154)]

120. When AAV 13 (C7) got close enough to AAV 523519, the AAV 523519 Vehicle Commander signaled via hand and arm motions to the AAV 13 (C7) Vehicle Commander that he should position his vehicle behind AAV 523519. [Encl (119), (129)]

121. At this time, AAV 13 (C7) was about four hundred (400) meters from AAV 523519 and moved within fifty to one hundred (50-100) meters and heard the Vehicle Commander of AAV 523519 declare "possible troop transfer." [Encl (119), (129)]

122. At this same time, the BLT 1/4, H&S Company Commander (who was located inside the LFOC on the USS SOM) requested safety boats from the USS SOM and discussed water levels inside of AAVs with the USS SOM Tactical Actions Officer. The H&S Company Commander did not

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understand what level of water would require evacuation of the vehicle. According to the USS SOM TAO, the H&S Company Commander stated that water would have to be chest high (the Common SOP states Boot ankle level) in the troop compartment before evacuation of the vehicle was required. [Encl (7), (75), (155), (156)]

123. At 1805, the USS SOM manned the boat deck in preparation to launch safety boats. [Encl (28)]

124. Around this time, the AAV 523519 Rear Crewman informed the Vehicle Commander that water was at calf level and stated that they needed to evacuate the embarked troops. [Encl (92), (130)]

125. The AAV 523519 Rear Crewman directed an embarked Marine to check the rear, port-side bilge pump for water flow. The Marine did so and reported it was still functioning. [Encl (130)]

126. At this time, the AAV 523519 Rear Crewman stated that he heard water impact the generator belt and there was a loud screeching noise. [Encl (130)]

127. The AAV 523519 Rear Crewman observed the voltage regulator on the side of the engine panel and saw the voltage regulator was not charging. [Encl (130)]

128. The AAV 523519 Rear Crewman observed water spraying from the sides of the engine panel. [Encl (130)]

129. Water spraying from the sides of the engine panel indicated that the engine compartment was full of water and the pressure caused water to spray out of the sides of the engine panel. [Encl (175)]

130. The AAV 523519 Vehicle Commander returned to the turret and the Rear Crewman informed the Vehicle Commander that the water was at bench seat level. [Encl (119), (130), (131), (147)]

131. The AAV 523519 Vehicle Commander then instructed the Rear Crewman to open the starboard side cargo hatch and for everyone to "drop their stuff". [Encl (119), (120), (130)]

132. The AAV 523519 Rear Crewman then opened the starboard side cargo hatch forward handle; embarked personnel attempted to open the starboard side cargo hatch rear handle but struggled to properly position the handle to open the hatch. [Encl (130), (138), (147)]

133. At this time, embarked personnel were using personal cell phones as a light source due to the Emergency Egress Lighting System (EELS) not functioning and the fact that no chemical lights had been used to mark the hatch handles. [Encl (130), (131), (145)]

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134. It is the responsibility of the AAV crew to attach two (2) chemical lights to the inside cargo hatch locking handles before splashing with embarked troops onboard. [Encl (7)]

135. As AAV 14 (NOTM) moved to position itself for troop transfer, it was pushed into AAV 523519 by a wave and struck AAV 523519 on the forward starboard side. [Encl (126), (135)]

136. The Driver of AAV 14 (NOTM) stated that at this time AAV 523519 was about six (6) inches out of the water. [Encl (134)]

137. Once the starboard side cargo hatch was open, the AAV 523519 Rear Crewman positioned himself behind the turret on top of the AAV straddling the cargo hatch opening and the cargo hatch cover. He then assisted one embarked Marine out of AAV 523519. [Encl (130)]

138. AAV 523519 was then facing in a westward direction and was broadside to the sea swell. [Encl (154)]

139. Due to the increased water inside the vehicle, AAV 523519 was now lower in the water and was more vulnerable to sea state. [Encl (43)]

140. A wave then swept over the top of AAV 523519 and the starboard side cargo hatch was directly exposed to water intrusion. [Encl (119), (130), (145), (171)]

141. This wave rapidly filled the troop compartment with water and caused AAV 523519 to assume a nose high pitch angle and rapidly sink. [Encl (126), (145), (171)]

142. AAV 523519 then sank with the following personnel onboard; Private First Class Bryan J. Baltierra, Lance Corporal Marco A. Barranco, Private First Class Evan A. Bath, Hospital Corpsman 3rd Class Christopher Gnem, Lance Corporal Joshua Luis, Private First Class Jack-Ryan Ostrovsky, Lance Corporal Guillermo S. Perez, Corporal Wesley A. Rodd, Lance Corporal Chase D. Sweetwood, Lance Corporal Dallas Truxal and Corporal Cesar A. Villanueva. [Encl (125), (126), (128)]

143. AAV 14 (NOTM) recovered the AAV 523519 Vehicle Commander, the Rear Crewman, and three (3) embarked personnel. The recovered embarked personnel included:

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [Encl (92), (93), (126), (147)]

144. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) came to the surface and was recovered by AAV 13 (C7). (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) conducted CPR on (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [Encl (101), (128)]

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145. The AAV 523519 Driver came to the surface and the BLT Executive Officer dove into water to retrieve him and brought him onto AAV 13 (C7). The AAV 523519 Driver was given CPR. [Encl (72), (101), (128)]

146. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) came to the surface and was recovered by AAV 14 (NOTM). At this time he still had his kevlar helmet, rifle, and was wearing his LPU-41. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was placed on the top of the AAV and the AAV 523519 Vehicle Commander and the AAV 14 Vehicle Commander conducted CPR on (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [Encl (119), (126)]

147. At 1810, the USS SOM went to a Red Well status, raised the stern gate, and maneuvered to close the distance with the AAVs. [Encl (28)]

148. At 1812, the USS SOM's well deck had been initially ballasted down to four (4) feet at the sill IAW the ship's pre-op brief, but was ballasted down to six to eight (6-8) feet at the sill at the request of the BLT 1/4 S3A in his radio coordination, as they thought they could tow AAV 523519 onto the USS SOM. [Encl (28), (79)]

149. The USS SOM guiding document for wet well operations authorizes 3-6 feet of water at the sill for standard AAV recovery operations and does not require a face-to-face briefing with the AAV leadership so long as radio communication is established and there is limited coordination conducted prior to splash. [Encl (8)]

150. At 1815, the USS SOM restricted non-essential communication "River City 1." [Encl (28)]

151. At approximately 1825, the USS SOM launched one (1) eleven (11) meter Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB). [Encl (160)]

152. At 1830, 15th MEU personnel moved to West Cove and an ANGLICO Marine used a radio on the LCAC to establish communications with the USS SOM. The ANGLICO Marine passed cell phone numbers and coordination for accountability. [Encl (80)]

153. At 1833, the USS SOM entered Green Well status to recover the remaining AAVs. [Encl (28)]

154. At approximately 1834, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and the AAV 523519 Driver were transferred from AAV 13 (C7) to U.S. Navy eleven (11) meter RHIB for transportation to the USS SOM. [Encl (167)]

155. At 1839, the PHIBRON 3 Battle Watch Captain requested U.S. Coast Guard assistance for search and rescue operations. The USS MKI, the USS JOHN FINN (DDG-113), and the USS SDG positioned to support search and rescue operations. [Encl (23)]

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156. At 1843, BULLET 55 (HSC-23.2) was airborne and began search and recovery operations. BULLET 55 is a U.S. Navy HH-60R Seahawk helicopter that came from the USS MAKIN ISLAND. [Encl (23)]

157. At approximately 1846 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and the AAV 523519 Driver were transferred from the U.S. Navy eleven (11) meter RHIB to the USS SOM and medical personnel provided medical treatment. [Encl (167)]

158. At 1852, two (2) Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC) were launched from the USS SOM. [Encl (28)]

159. At 1853, the USS HOWARD (DDG-83) was directed to assist in search and rescue operations by the Battle Watch Captain, 3rd Fleet. [Encl (23)]

160. At approximately 1853, the USS SOM launched a second RHIB. [Encl (160)]

161. At 1853, AAV 13 (C7) recovered aboard the USS SOM. [Encl (28)]

162. At 1856, AAV 14 (NOTM) recovered aboard the USS SOM. [Encl (28)]

163. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was on AAV 14 (NOTM) and the Vehicle Commander determined the quickest way to get (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) onto the USS SOM was via the AAV. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was immediately transferred to medical personnel once onboard the USS SOM. [Encl (126)]

164. After over one (1) hour of continuous CPR and other life saving techniques, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was pronounced deceased. [Encl (10), (200)]

165. At 1908, U.S. Coast Guard Helicopter RESCUE 47 checked-in for search and rescue operations. [Encl (23)]

166. At 1958, sunset occurred. [Encl (28)]

167. At 2019, two (2) additional RHIBs from the USS JOHN FINN (DDG 113) joined the search and rescue operations. [Encl (23)]

168. At 2024, the USS SOM launched MEDEVAC aircraft with (b)(3) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and AAV 523519 Driver onboard. [Encl (23), (73)]

169. At 2056, the USS SOM launched a second MEDEVAC aircraft with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) onboard. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) evacuation was delayed due to medical personnel providing medical treatment on him in order for him to be stable enough to fly. [Encl (23), (73), (200)]

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170. From sunset on 30 July 2020 until 2358 on 1 August 2020, search and rescue operations were conducted by U.S. Navy, USMC, and U.S. Coast Guard air assets and surface vessels. [Encl (10)]

171. At 1620, 31 July 2020, Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS) DOMINATOR arrived on scene to assist with search and recovery operations. HOS DOMINATOR is a Military Sealift Command-chartered Offshore Supply Vessel and is used as a submarine rescue platform. [Encl (10)]

172. On 1 August 2020, at 2250, all Next Of Kin secondary notifications were completed. [Encl (10)]

173. At 2250, conditions were met to shift from search and rescue operations to recovery operations. Key leaders from 15th MEU, PHIBRON 3, I MEF, and 3rd Fleet agreed on 31 July that any transition from search and rescue operations to recovery operations would not commence until secondary notifications had been completed. [Encl (10)]

174. The Commanding Officer, 15th MEU, with concurrence of I MEF, made the decision to transition the rescue operation to recovery operations due to ocean water temperature and the time of exposure to those conditions. [Encl (173)]

175. At 2333, the HOS Dominator continued search operations to ascertain the mishap location, specifically the line between AAV 523519's initial insert/splash point and the location of the USS SOM during the time of the exercise. [Encl (10)]

176. At 2358, efforts transitioned from search and rescue operations to recovery operations. [Encl (10)]

177. On 2 August 2020, at 0015, I MEF COMMSTRAT issued a press release on Search and Rescue change to Recovery mission. [Encl (10), (173)]

178. At 0839, thirteen (13) personnel from Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV) with required equipment including the IVER4 Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) arrived on station at the HOS Dominator. The IVER AUV is an unmanned underwater vehicle with a variety of high resolution sonar options. [Encl (10)]

179. At 1430, IVER4 AUV began search operations. [Encl (10)]

180. At 2255, I MEF COMMSTRAT issued press release identifying the missing personnel. [Encl (10), (173)]

181. On 3 August 2020, at 0504, the HOS DOMINATOR employed the IVER AUVs and SIBITZKY remotely operated underwater vehicle (ROV) in a continuous and coordinated search operation. They covered four (4) of

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the seven (7) northern search boxes. The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV) team discovered a large diesel fuel sheen forming IVO the northern search boxes and considered expanding the search to the east and west before proceeding to the three (3) remaining southern boxes. Navy Information Warfare Center - Pacific (NIWC-P) mobilized the MK18 UUV to assist in expanding the search. Phoenix International Holdings produced the ROV. Upon delivery to the U.S. Navy, the ROV was designated SIBITZKY in honor of Boatswain Mate Second Class (BM2) Martin C. Sibitzky. [Encl (4), (10)]

182. At 1750, the SUPSALV IVER4 team located and positively confirmed the location of AAV 523519 with human remains in the vicinity. The team continued to survey the site to collect detailed information on the location of the human remains and the condition of AAV 523519 to inform further recovery plans. [Encl (10)]

183. At 1830, the I MEF Command Investigation team arrived aboard the USS MKI. [Encl (3)]

184. At 1929, SUPSALV discovered eight (8) human remains. SUPSALV recorded the location for follow on recovery operations. SUPSALV stated that AAV 523519 was located on the sea floor at a depth of three hundred and eighty five (385) feet. [Encl (10)]

185. The SUPSALV UUV made a video recording of AAV 523519 on the ocean floor and fully captured the disposition of AAV 523519, this video is Encl [33]. [Encl (33)]

186. At 2020, the SUPSALV Salvage Officer and IVER4 team departed the HOS Dominator to begin recovery equipment mobilization. HOS Dominator remained on station at AAV 523519's location until the SUPSALV barge crane returned. [Encl (10)]

187. On 4 August 2020, at 1258, HQMC Casualty Section reported that they had made notifications to all Next Of Kin for the Marines and Sailor from the updated Personnel Casualty Report (PCR) from 3 Aug 2020. [Encl (10)]

188. At 1459, personnel from I MEF, the 15th MEU, and C3F met with SUPSALV personnel on the barge to review the salvage layout and discussed plans for dignified transfer of remains once recovered. [Encl (10)]

189. At approximately 1700, the I MEF Command Investigation Team cross-decked from the USS MKI to the USS SOM. [Encl (3)]

190. On 5 August 2020, at 0830, the Dignified Transfer of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at MCAS Miramar was conducted. [Encl (10)]

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191. At 1330, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) Office team arrived in San Diego. [Encl (10)]

192. At 1743, the Safety Investigation team arrived aboard the USS MKI and subsequently cross-decked to the USS SOM. [Encl (10)]

193. At 1920, the Dignified Air Transfer for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) arrived at Dover AFB, DE. [Encl (10)]

194. At 2030, the Flyaway Deep Ocean Salvage System (FADOSS) ship was underway to the mishap site. The FADOSS had come from Port Hueneme, CA. It embarked required personnel and a twelve thousand (12,000) foot line and spooler that had been shipped from Williamsburg, VA. [Encl (10)]

195. On 6 August 2020, at 1023, the AFME team arrived at SCI and subsequently moved to the FADOSS ship. [Encl (10)]

196. At 1724, the FADOSS ship arrived at the mishap site. [Encl (10)]

197. At 1917, personnel recovery and equipment salvage commenced. [Encl (10)]

198. At 2221, four (4) of the deceased were recovered onto the FADOSS ship. [Encl (4), (10)]

199. On 7 August 2020, at 0049, four (4) additional deceased personnel were retrieved onto the FADOSS ship. [Encl (10)]

200. All deceased personnel were recovered wearing their SAPI plate carriers; seven (7) had their kevlar helmets on and two (2) still had their M-4 service carbines slung around them. [Encl (33), (34)]

201. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was present as all deceased personnel were recovered, he provided religious ministry and ensured that the movements were conducted with the utmost dignity and respect. [Encl (69)]

202. At 0110, HQMC Casualty Section was notified of the successful recovery of all missing personnel. [Encl (10)]

203. At 0152, Decedent Affairs at Naval Medical Center San Diego was notified of the successful recovery of all missing personnel. [Encl (10)]

204. Since the deceased personnel could not be positively identified, at 0226, a "Believed to Be" report identified seven (7) Marines and one (1) Sailor:

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

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(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

205. At 0248, AAV 523519 and equipment salvage began. [Encl (10)]
206. On 7 August 2020, at 0855, rigging for vehicle recovery began. [Encl (10)]
207. At 1347, AAV 523519 was fully prepared to be recovered. [Encl (10)]
208. At 1434, AAV 523519 was retrieved and secured to the FADOSS ship. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) aboard the FADOSS ship photographed the entire AAV recovery event to ensure preservation of evidence. [Encl (10), (96)]
209. At 1615, recovery and salvage operations were complete. [Encl (10)]
210. At 1912, all families were notified of recovery of all deceased service members. [Encl (10)]
211. At 2031, I MEF COMMSTRAT released a statement declaring recovery of all deceased service members. [Encl (10)]
212. On 8 August 2020, at 0814, the FADOSS ship arrived at Kilo Pier, Naval Air Station North Island (NASNI). [Encl (10)]
213. At 0902, the Honorable Carry of Marines and Sailor was conducted at Kilo Pier. [Encl (10)]
214. At 0952, Decedent Affairs departed Kilo Pier with eight (8) deceased personnel for Naval Medical Center San Diego (NMCSD). [Encl (10)]
215. At 1030, the Safety Investigation Team took custody of AAV 523519 and equipment. [Encl (10)]
216. At 1130, AAV 523519 was loaded onto a tractor trailer and covered for ground movement to Camp Pendleton. [Encl (10)]
217. At 1205, eight (8) deceased personnel arrived at NMCSD. [Encl (10)]
218. At 1357, AAV 523519 arrived at a secure maintenance facility at the Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch (AVTB), Camp Pendleton, CA. [Encl (10)]

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219. Immediately after AAV 523519 arrived at AVTB, the Safety Investigation Team began technical inspections on AAV 523519. [Encl (45)]

220. On 11 August 2020, at 1430, eight (8) deceased personnel departed NMCS. [Encl (10)]

221. At 1500, eight (8) deceased personnel arrived at Legacy Funeral Home. [Encl (10)]

222. On 12 August 2020, at 0700, Marine escorts arrived at Legacy Funeral Home. [Encl (10)]

223. At 0745, Bravo Company, BLT 1/4 Pall Bearers arrived at Legacy Funeral Home. [Encl (10)]

224. At 0907, the San Diego Police escort motorcade departed Legacy Funeral Home. [Encl (10)]

225. At 0915, the San Diego Police escort motorcade arrived MCAS Miramar. Provost Marshall Office, MCAS Miramar, escorted the motorcade from MCAS Miramar gate to airfield. [Encl (10)]

226. At 1015, the Dignified Transfer/Ramp Ceremony completed. [Encl (10)]

227. At 1143, the Dignified Transfer from Miramar to Dover AFB departed. [Encl (10)]

228. The cause of death for Private First Class Bryan J. Baltierra, Lance Corporal Marco A. Barranco, Private First Class Evan A. Bath, Hospital Corpsman 3rd Class Christopher Gnem, Private First Class Jack-Ryan Ostrovsky, Lance Corporal Guillermo S. Perez, Corporal Wesley A. Rodd, Lance Corporal Chase D. Sweetwood, and Corporal Cesar A. Villanueva was drowning. [Encl (188-196)]

229. Many of the deceased personnel had small abrasions, contusions, and lacerations on their bodies. [Encl (188-196)]

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

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(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

236. Post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519 determined that all vehicle controls and switches were in the correct position for water operations. [Encl (45)]

237. Post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519 determined that the Emergency Egress Lighting System (EELS) was in the disable position. [Encl (45)]

238. Post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519 determined that a port side headlight electrical thru-hull connector was not properly installed leaving an opening for water to get inside the hull. [Encl (45)]

239. Post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519 determined that the starboard bow pod had a twelve inch by twelve inch (12" by 12") metal piece missing. [Encl (45), (185)]

240. Post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519 determined that one (1) bolt on the plenum center plate was loose. [Encl (45)]

241. Post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519 determined that the DVE drivers hatch plug was missing. [Encl (45)]

242. Post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519 determined that the starboard rear hydraulic bilge pump was possibly not pumping due to the absence of oily residue on the cover. It was fully inspected and no discrepancies could be found. [Encl (45)]

243. Post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519 determined that the starboard cargo hatch seal needed to be replaced. [Encl (45)]

244. Post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519 determined that the transmission had no visible oil on the dipstick. This indicated that the transmission was almost empty of oil. [Encl (45)]

245. Post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519 determined that the engine and transmission drain lines were not correctly stored and were laying on the deck. [Encl (45)]

246. Post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519 determined that the transmission drain line was loose. [Encl (45)]

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247. Post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519 determined that the water pump belt was not at the correct belt tension. [Encl (45)]

248. Post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519 determined that the cooling tower was not correctly installed and was missing all mounting hardware to secure the cooling tower to the power plant. [Encl (45)]

249. Post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519 determined that the Power Take Off (PTO) marine drive clutch was seized and caused the propulsion shafts to be unable to turn. [Encl (45)]

250. A post-mishap water intrusion test was conducted on AAV 523519 and determined that a significant amount of water was leaking through the intake and exhaust plenum grills. Water leakage was minimal from the port and starboard cargo hatches. A significant amount of water leaked through the missing headlight connector on the front bow into the engine compartment. There was also a minor leak on the number two (2) port side road arm assembly to hull area, a minor leak in the number four (4) port torsion bar anchor area and minor leaks in the port and starboard midship seals. [Encl (45)]

251. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) conducted the post-mishap analysis of AAV 523519. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is a retired USMC Chief Warrant Officer 5 (CWO5) and has over forty one (41) years of AAV experience. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is a retired USMC Master Sergeant and has over thirty (30) years of maintenance experience. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) presented the following opinions regarding the cause of the sinking of AAV 523519: [Encl (45)]

a. There was not one single discrepancy that caused AAV 523519 to sink, but rather a sequence of mechanical failures.

b. The transmission failed due to leaking oil from a loose drain line plug.

c. The driver put the transmission into fourth gear to gain movement in the water.

d. After AAV 523519 completely lost momentum in the water because the engine went to an idle due to the transmission failure, the forward hydraulic bilge pump would not have pumped out water due to the low engine speed.

e. Water continued to come into AAV 523519 and, with reduced bilge capacity, the water level increased inside the vehicle.

f. The rising water level inside the engine compartment caused the generator belt to cast water out of the engine panel and on to the generator, ultimately causing the generator to fail.

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g. Because the generator failed, AAV 523519 was then only running on battery power and the electrical bilge pumps were running at a degraded level.

h. The water coming in was far greater than the bilge pumps could expel and, as a result, the vehicle sank.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

FINDINGS OF FACTS REGARDING AAV PLATOON TRAINING, AND BRAVO COMPANY,
BLT 1/4 TRAINING

253. In mid-January 2020, the AAV Platoon Commander and AAV Platoon Sergeant were formally assigned as the 15th MEU, AAV Platoon Commander and Platoon Sergeant. [Encl (87), [104]]

254. On 10 January 2020, the 15th MEU AAV Platoon formed with twenty four (24) Marines who had previously deployed with the 13th MEU AAV Platoon. Deployment dates were July 2018 to February 2019. The remaining Marines were sourced from within 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion (3d AABn) from Marines who had the time remaining on their enlistment contract to deploy with the 15th MEU. [Encl (87)]

255. The AAV Platoon Commander was told by the 3rd AABn Headquarters and Services Company Commander that his Platoon would participate in EXERCISE NATIVE FURY 2020 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) [Encl (87)]

256. On 16 and 17 January 2020, a Combat Marksmanship Program range for the AAV Platoon members was conducted in preparation for EXERCISE NATIVE FURY 2020. [Encl (62)]

257. On 18 January 2020, the AAV Platoon was fully manned to deployable strength in accordance with published 3rd AABn Table of Organization (T/O) requirements to support MEU Operations. An AAV Platoon assigned to a MEU includes a composition of fifty three (53) Marines and one (1) Sailor. [Encl (16), (87)]

258. On 3 February 2020, the AAV Platoon conducted a Change of Operational Posture (CHOP) to 1st Marine Regiment in preparation to support EXERCISE NATIVE FURY 2020. [Encl (87)]

259. From 15 to 17 February 2020, the AAV Platoon executed AAV gunnery training at Range 222. Only seven (7) of thirteen (13) crews qualified in crew level gunnery (Table VI). [Encl (61), (62)]

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260. On 20 February 2020, the AAV Platoon conducted CBRN training.
[Encl (62), (89)]

261. On 9 March 2020, approximately half the AAV Platoon deployed for EXERCISE NATIVE FURY 2020, including the AAV Platoon Commander and 2nd Section Leader. The AAV Platoon Sergeant and the remainder of the AAV Platoon did not deploy because their flight was canceled due to COVID-19 complications. [Encl (87), (104)]

262. On or about 15 March 2020, while in the UAE, and in support of EXERCISE NATIVE FURY 2020, the AAV Platoon was augmented with other 3d AABn personnel. The personnel had been sent over to assist in the offload of equipment. With the addition of these personnel, the AAV Platoon conducted basic land training up to the Platoon level. [Encl (87)]

263. On 29 March 2020, the participants from EXERCISE NATIVE FURY 2020 returned to CONUS and were placed in COVID-19 Restriction of Movement (ROM). [Encl (87)]

264. On 12 April 2020, the participants from EXERCISE NATIVE FURY 2020 completed their COVID-19 related ROM requirement and the AAV Platoon formed up again to its T/O strength. Then, on 20 April 2020, the AAV Platoon personnel executed CHOP, without assigned AAVs and equipment, to Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/4. [Encl (70), (87), (88)]

265. From 3 to 8 May 2020, the AAV Platoon with Bravo Company, BLT 1/4 conducted the EOTG, Raid Package. This was the first training evolution wherein the AAV Platoon operated with all organic personnel and equipment. There were no waterborne operations conducted during this evolution. [Encl (25), (87)]

266. From 11 to 22 May 2020, the AAV Platoon and Bravo Company, BLT 1/4 leadership attended the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group - Pacific, Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2) Course in Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado. [Encl (87)]

267. On 26 May 2020, the AAV Platoon conducted waterborne recovery operations in the Del Mar Boat Basin. Bravo Company, BLT 1/4 did not participate. [Encl (63), (87)]

268. On 27 May 2020, the AAV Platoon conducted Section level waterborne operations at White Beach. Bravo Company, BLT 1/4 did not participate. [Encl (63), (87)]

269. From 6 to 14 June 2020, the AAV Platoon supported the Realistic Urban Training (RUT) evolution. From 10 to 11 June 2020, the AAV Platoon conducted a live fire range at Range 227 in order to complete Crew level Gunnery qualifications and begin Section level Gunnery. On

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10 June 2020, Range 227 was accidentally set on fire and gunnery training was cancelled. No additional crews and/or sections qualified. [Encl (63), (87)]

270. On 10 June 2020, the AAV Platoon conducted a Combat Marksmanship Program shoot with M4s. [Encl (63), (87)]

271. On 11 June 2020, the AAV Platoon executed two (2) days of Platoon/Section level waterborne operation at Gold Beach. They conducted one (1) day and one (1) night of Section level operations. One (1) day and one (1) night of Platoon level Operations were also conducted. Bravo Company, BLT 1/4 did not participate. [Encl (63), (88)]

272. On 12 June 2020, during the night Platoon training, AAV 4 struck AAV 523519 in the surf zone. AAV 523519 sustained minor damage to the antenna mast and slope rack kit. The incident was reported to the BLT 1/4 and the 15th MEU Commanding Officers. No investigation was conducted and no remedial training was executed. [Encl 88, (104), (145)]

273. On 13 June 2020, the AAV Platoon returned to Bravo Company, BLT 1/4 to support training with 9 AAVs at R227. Four (4) AAVs were operationally inoperative and returned to the 3d AABn Ramp. [Encl (63), (87)]

274. From 14 to 16 June 2020, the AAV Platoon planned to execute waterborne operations at Gold Beach, however, this was cancelled due to maintenance issues. [Encl (63), (87)]

275. From 10 to 16 July 2020, the AAV Platoon conducted a live fire range evolution at Range 408a on Camp Pendleton to qualify Crew and section level gunnery training. The AAV Platoon submitted their training plans through BLT 1/4. The 3d AABn, Battalion Master Gunner was requested to support the training. When the Battalion Master Gunner arrived at the range, however, the AAV Platoon crews were changing and being re-assigned. Gunnery training is very deliberate in the AAV Community according to the AAV T&R Manual (Ref e). The five (5) crews remaining to be qualified were newly formed and did not qualify as they had not gone through the pre-requisite training. [Encl (61), (63)]

276. Prior to the execution of Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Integration Training (PMINT), including the AAV Platoon initial embarkation on the USS SOM, Bravo Company, BLT 1/4 had not conducted any waterborne operations in AAVs. [Encl (88), (90), (91)]

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277. The Platoon Sergeant and all three (3) Squad Leaders of 2nd Platoon, Bravo Company, BLT 1/4 were not present for PMINT. [Encl (92)]

278. The crew of AAV 523519 had not worked together prior to PMINT. Furthermore, the normal rear crewman had tested positive for COVID and could not participate in training. [Encl (120), (131)]

279. Prior to the execution of PMINT, all AAV Platoon personnel had completed training at the Underwater Egress Trainer (UET). [Encl (65)]

280. UET training includes completion of Shallow Water Egress Trainer (SWET) and either the Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer (MAET) or the Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer (SVET). [Encl (12)]

281. The Shallow Water Egress Training (SWET) is an individual seat-type device used prior to and in conjunction with the Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer (MAET) and Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer (SVET). The Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer (MAET) is an underwater escape trainer with a generic fuselage section representing specific aircraft, amphibious vehicles, cockpits and cabin emergency escape exits. The MAET functions closely to the general characteristics of an aircraft that has crashed into the water. The MAET is capable of being lowered into a pool and turned 180 degree rotation on its longitudinal axis. Its lifting systems (hoists, gantries) provide, at a minimum, a two-speed rate of descent and retraction. The students are able to practice underwater egress from the MAET when it is in an upright position, (zero degree rotation), an inverted position, (180 degree rotation), or in any position in between zero and 180 degrees. Current systems are able to simulate CH-46, CH-53, and MV-22 configurations and are adaptable to future platforms. The Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer (SVET) is a UET that has the same modular core and rotational capabilities as the MAET, but dedicated for ground vehicle simulation. It is equipped with modules for the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle and a generic amphibious track platform. [Encl (120)]

282. Prior to the execution of PMINT, seven (7) personnel assigned to the AAV Platoon did not have current swim qualifications. [Encl (64)]

283. Prior to the execution of PMINT, two (2) of thirteen (13) embarked personnel on AAV 523519 had fully completed all UET training. These two individuals were (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
The remaining eleven (11) of thirteen (13) embarked personnel only completed the SWET portion of the UET. [Encl (67)]

284. The CG, I MEF Letter of Instruction (LOI) for 15 MEU deployment 21.1 states that the CG, I MEF expects all Marines of the mechanized raid forces to be UET complete by composite date. [Encl (13)]

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285. From January 2020 to July 2020, the Underwater Egress Trainer on Camp Pendleton was operating. It closed the MAET/SWET trainer devices due to maintenance from 6 April to 2 May, but still operated the SVET portion of training. It also closed 20-22 May 2020 due to a student testing positive for COVID, however, all instructors were tested and came back negative. The training began again on 24 May 2020. [Encl (68)]

286. Prior to the execution of PMINT, eleven (11) of thirteen (13) embarked personnel on AAV 523519 had current swim qualifications. Two (2) of thirteen (13) personnel did not have current swim qualifications. [Encl (66)]

287. Prior to the execution of PMINT, the AAV Platoon had executed four (4) days of waterborne operations in a seven (7) month duration; one (1) day recovery operations, two (2) day/night section operations, one (1) day/night Platoon operations. [Encl (62), (63), (87), (89)]

AAV PLATOON COMMANDER STATEMENT CONCERNING TRAINING

288. The AAV Platoon Commander stated that at no point during his time in command of the 15th MEU AAV Platoon did 3rd AABn leadership ask him for a training plan or a training exercise employment plan. [Encl (88)]

289. The AAV Platoon Commander stated that, due to the demands of NATIVE FURY and CENTCOM training requirements, he did not have the opportunity to create or add additional training, including waterborne operations training, for the AAV Platoon prior to the MEU CHOP date. [Encl (88)]

290. The AAV Platoon Commander stated that the 3rd AABn leadership never asked him to provide a brief regarding the capabilities and limitations of the Platoon, or what the Platoon had accomplished toward preparing for deployment with the 15th MEU. [Encl (88)]

291. The portion of the AAV Platoon that deployed to EXERCISE NATIVE FURY 2020 returned on 29 March 2020 and were in Restriction of Movement (ROM) status until 12 April 2020. From 13 to 17 April, the I MEF Joint Limited Technical Inspections were conducted. [Encl (88)]

292. The AAV Platoon Commander stated that, while he claimed confidence in his Platoon's ability to go ship to shore leading up to PMINT, he did not want BLT 1/4 Bravo Co's first time in the water to be a ship to shore exercise. [Encl (88)]

293. The AAV Platoon Commander stated that, prior to the MEU CHOP date, he was able to raise his concerns about the lack of training with the BLT 1/4 Bravo Company Commander. [Encl (88)]

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294. The AAV Platoon Commander stated that he and the BLT 1/4 Bravo Company Commander discussed conducting additional waterborne operations training post-CHOP, but due to COVID-19 restrictions, Marines being placed on ROM, or other reasons, those training opportunities never materialized. [Encl (88)]

295. The AAV Platoon Commander stated that, while he was familiar with the MCCRE process, he was not aware that a MCCRE was required prior to the MEU CHOP date. [Encl (88), (200)]

H&S COMPANY COMMANDER, 3RD AABN, KNOWLEDGE ABOUT TRAINING PRE-CHOP

296. The H&S Company Commander stated that he did not know why the AAV Platoon was not given a MCCRE prior to the MEU CHOP date. [Encl (82)]

297. The H&S Company Commander stated that he had no involvement in the decision to send the AAV Platoon to NATIVE FURY which occurred immediately prior to the MEU CHOP date. [Encl (82)]

COMMANDING OFFICER, 3RD AABN, STATEMENT CONCERNING TRAINING PRE-CHOP

298. The 3rd AABn Commanding Officer stated that the AAV Platoon had been training together since 2019. [Encl (70)]

299. The 3rd AABn Commanding Officer, when asked about his understanding of the training conducted by the AAV Platoon since January of 2020, mentioned only gunnery training and training and operations in support of NATIVE FURY during February and March of 2020. [Encl (70)]

300. When asked why the AAV Platoon was assigned to EXERCISE NATIVE FURY 2020, the 3rd AABn Commanding Officer stated that the decision was based on two points. "First, the platoon would be conducting the same training requirements throughout the exercise as they would here in CONUS for PTP (amphib/land operations/and gunnery). Second, the platoon would be conducting the required training with their future sponsored unit, [1st Bn, 4th Marines], in keeping with MCO 3502.3C." [Encl (70)]

301. 1st Bn, 4th Marines was not involved in EXERCISE NATIVE FURY 2020 and did not participate in any way. [Encl (205)]

302. When asked why the AAV Platoon was assigned to EXERCISE NATIVE FURY 2020, the 3rd AABn Commanding Officer further stated that, "Exercise Native Fury provided an opportunity for the two units to begin working and training together to build a more cohesive unit. This training also provided opportunity upon their return to continue their pre-deployment training requirements prior to CHOP." [Encl (70)]

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303. When asked why the AAV Platoon was not given a required MCCRE prior to the MEU CHOP date, the 3rd AABn Commanding Officer stated, "Training required by the MCCRE was conducted to AAV Training and Readiness (T&R) level standards. This metric was utilized because 1st Marine Division generally applies MCCRE standards to company through regimental-level units . . . Therefore, readiness at the platoon level was conducted to AAV T&R standards in accordance with MCO 3502.3C, Marine Expeditionary Unit Pre-Deployment Training Program, dated 13 September 2019 . . ." [FF (268), Encl (14), (15), (70)]

304. The 3rd AABn Commanding Officer stated that he was informed by the Bn Operations Chief that all AAV Platoon Section Leaders were qualified via the formal Assault Amphibian Unit Leader's Course. [Encl (70)]

305. The 3rd AABn Commanding Officer stated that he was informed by the 3rd AABn Operations Chief that roughly half of the AAV Platoon Vehicle Commanders had attended the formal Assault Amphibian Vehicle Commanders Course. [Encl (70)]

BRAVO COMPANY COMMANDER, BLT 1/4, STATEMENT CONCERNING TRAINING POST-CHOP

306. The Bravo Company Commander stated that, although his Company did not participate in the AAV Platoon's waterborne operations training at Gold Beach in early June 2020, he was present during a night portion of the training. [Encl (77)]

307. The Bravo Company Commander stated that during this training event he had the AAV Platoon Commander walk him through the SUROB and plan for training, and he also watched the AAV Platoon Sergeant conduct pre-operation inspections on the vehicles prior to conducting training. [Encl (77)]

308. The Bravo Company Commander stated that two days before the mechanized raid on SCI, he instructed personnel under his command to conduct pre-operational checks, and to review infantry-AAV procedures specific to waterborne operations. [Encl (77)]

309. The Bravo Company Commander stated that he issued this instruction because the mechanized raid on SCI would be the first time personnel under his command would be engaged in waterborne operations in the AAV's. [Encl (77)]

310. The Bravo Company Commander stated that despite the fact that his Company had not been embarked in the water in AAV's prior to the SCI raid, he maintained "[t]he training my Marines and Sailors received was consistent with established pre-deployment training and my previous experience." [Encl (77)]

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COMMANDING OFFICER, BLT 1/4, STATEMENT CONCERNING TRAINING POST-CHOP

311. The BLT 1/4 Commanding Officer stated that he believed all subordinate elements, to include the AAV Platoon, had completed required pre-composite training. [Encl (183)]

312. The BLT 1/4 Commanding Officer stated that, following the Mechanized Raid Course in early May, which did not include waterborne operations, he became aware that I MEF EOTG instructors or evaluators indicated the 15th MEU Mechanized Company performed much higher than average and were deployment-ready. [Encl (183)]

313. The BLT 1/4 Commanding Officer stated that he relied on a 1 May report from the Bravo Company Commander that all Bravo Company Marines had completed swim qualification training. [Encl (183)]

314. The BLT 1/4 Commanding Officer stated that he believed UET training for Bravo Company was limited due to COVID-19 restrictions; that training equipment was undergoing maintenance during their scheduled training time; and that according to ". . . I MEF policy concerning underwater egress training requirements (Policy 1-20), units are instructed to substitute SWET for MAET when the MAET is down for unscheduled maintenance." [Encl (183)]

COMMANDING OFFICER, 15th MEU, STATEMENT CONCERNING TRAINING POST-CHOP

315. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer stated that his understanding of the AAV Platoon's training proficiency was based upon the pre-deployment personnel training/readiness briefs to I MEF that occurred prior to the MEU composite date on 20 April 2020. [Encl (181), (183)]

316. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer further stated that his understanding of the AAV Platoon's training proficiency was based upon his observation of the AAV Platoon during the EOTG Mechanized Raid Course, the Performance Evaluation Checklist (PECL) distributed by EOTG following the Mechanized Raid Course; and his observation of their performance during the final Scenario Based Training Exercise (STX) of Realistic Urban Training (RUT) Exercise. The EOTG Raid Course and the RUT Exercise did not include waterborne operations. [Encl (25), (88), (104), (181), (206)]

317. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer stated that at the pre-deployment personnel training/readiness briefs, the AAV Platoon was assessed as trained but not evaluated in their Core Mission Essential Tasks (METs). [Encl (181)]

318. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer stated that he visited Bravo Company during the final training event of their EOTG Mechanized Raid Course in early May. He understood that training personnel from EOTG assessed Bravo Company's performance as above average overall, and ".

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. . the best full mission profile raid (within the BLT) to that point in the Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP)." [Encl (181)]

319. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer stated that he also understood that Bravo Company's preparation for combat was noteworthy in the EOTG evaluation and that Bravo Company was ready to execute follow-on exercises. [Encl (181)]

320. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer stated that, "During the final STX of RUT, Bravo Company served as the Supporting Element to the Main Effort (All Domain Reconnaissance Detachment) and completed the mission without incident." [Encl (181)]

321. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer stated that, "The MEU's Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drill conducted prior to the final STX was noted by EOTG [training personnel] to have been very effective. Bravo Company played a large part in that ROC." [Encl (181)]

322. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer stated that his "overall impression of Bravo Company's ability to plan, brief and execute was favorable." [Encl (181)]

323. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer stated that he understood that Bravo Company had conducted their annual training requirements, to include swim qualification. [Encl (181)]

324. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer stated that he ". . . was told by BLT leadership that Bravo Company was 100% qualified on Underwater Egress Training." [Encl (181)]

FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING AAV PLATOON MAINTENANCE

325. In mid-January 2020, the AAV Platoon Commander and AAV Platoon Sergeant were formally assigned as the 15th MEU, AAV Platoon Commander and Platoon Sergeant. [Encl (87), [104]]

326. The Maintenance Chief for the AAV Platoon arrived at the Platoon on 6 January 2020. [Encl (123), (124)]

327. On 9 April 2020, during the 3rd AABn Maintenance Readiness Brief, the 3rd AABn Headquarters and Services (H&S) Company Commander reported that the 15th MEU AAV Platoon had a readiness of 92% with only one vehicle being reported as operationally inoperative. [Encl (94)]

328. At some point during March of 2020, the 15th MEU AAV Platoon was initially told that they would be given a set of 13 or 14 AAVs that were operational since they had just come off of a separate MEU

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deployment and were well maintained. However, half of those vehicles were sent to Alpha Company, 3rd AABn. [Encl (97), (124)]

329. On 14 April 2020, the I MEF inspection team commenced Joint Limited Technical Inspections (JLTI) on the 15th MEU AAV Platoon vehicles and twelve (12) of the thirteen (13) vehicles then attached to the Platoon were found to be operationally inoperative and could not be transferred within Global Combat System-Marine Corps. [Encl (47-60), (70), (81), (88), (94), (124), and (183)]

330. The CG, I MEF LOI for 15 MEU deployment 21-1 states that units must identify any equipment that cannot be sourced in Condition Code Alpha, SL-3/modification/PMCS complete/calibrations complete, and corrosion prevention and control (CPAC) Condition Code 1 or 2 from attaching units and will need to be sourced from other resources within the respective MSC. [Encl (13)]

331. On 14 April 2020, the 14th AAV to complete the MEU AAV Platoon equipment had not been assigned. This would become AAV 14 (NOTM). This AAV did not have a corresponding Joint Limited Technical Inspection until 23 June 2020. [Encl (60)]

332. The week the JLTI's were conducted and the vehicles were determined to be operationally inoperative was also the first time the 15th MEU AAV Platoon had received those vehicles and been able to work on them. [Encl (87), (88)]

333. On 20 April 2020, the AAV Platoon personnel executed CHOP to Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/4, but due to the maintenance condition of the AAVs, the AAVs and related equipment could not be transferred. [Encl (70), (88)]

334. The 3rd AABn Maintenance Chief stated that the original set of 13 or 14 operational vehicles that were originally intended to go the 15th MEU AAV Platoon were redirected to Alpha Company due to a 3rd AABn Reorganization Plan. [Encl (97)]

335. The 3rd AABn Maintenance Chief stated that this Reorganization Plan was engaged in without input from the Battalion Maintenance Officer or himself. [Encl (97)]

336. The 3rd AABn Maintenance Officer indicated that the decision to initiate the Reorganization Plan was made by the 3rd AABn Commanding Officer. [Encl (94)]

337. The 3rd AABn Maintenance officer indicated that the decision to initiate the Reorganization Plan was discussed at length within the Battalion. [Encl (94)]

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338. The 3rd AABn Maintenance Chief stated that he disagreed with the Reorganization Plan because the Battalion did not have the manpower to support the Plan. [Encl (97)]

339. Upon learning the AAV Platoon would not receive the vehicles from the previous MEU deployment, the AAV Platoon Maintenance Chief discussed the matter with the Maintenance Chief for 3rd AABn. [Encl (97), (124)]

340. The 3rd AABn Maintenance Chief then instructed his personnel to identify replacement vehicles to send to the 15th MEU AAV Platoon. [Encl (124)]

341. Sometime after this discussion, the 15th MEU AAV Platoon received seven (7) additional vehicles. They received these vehicles sometime in late March. [Encl (124)]

342. The vehicles identified to go to the AAV Platoon were taken from the Administrative Deadline Lot (ADL) and had not been operating for nearly a year minus quarterly startups. [Encl (97)]

343. Out of those seven (7) vehicles, six (6) had to be towed to the AAV Platoon Maintenance Chief's position to begin repairs on those vehicles. [Encl (124)]

344. Upon receiving the additional vehicles the AAV Platoon Maintenance Chief conducted his own inspection and discovered that they were all operationally inoperative. This inspection occurred prior to the I MEF JLTi. [Encl (124)]

345. The AAV Platoon Maintenance Chief then informed the 3rd AABn Maintenance Chief that the additional vehicles were operationally inoperative and that the 15th MEU AAV Platoon did not have the personnel available to conduct repairs due to personnel being in a Restriction of Movement (ROM) status until 12 April 2020. [Encl (124)]

346. The AAV Platoon Maintenance Chief stated that the 3rd AABn Maintenance Chief informed him there were no other vehicles available, however, three additional mechanics were sent to the AAV Platoon to provide support. [Encl (97), (124)]

347. The AAV Platoon Maintenance Chief then informed the 3rd AABn H&S Company Commander of the situation regarding the operationally inoperative vehicles. [Encl (124)]

348. The AAV Platoon Maintenance Chief stated that on 20 April 2020, during the JLTi, they discovered that twelve (12) of thirteen (13) vehicles were operationally inoperative. This occurred approximately a week and a half before the 15th MEU AAV Platoon was scheduled to conduct the EOTG Mechanized Raid Course with BLT 1/4. [Encl (124)]

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349. The 3rd AABn Maintenance Officer stated that on 23 April 2020 the readiness of the AAV Platoon was discussed at the 3rd AABn bi-weekly Maintenance Readiness Brief. [Encl (94)]

350. The 3rd AABn Maintenance Officer stated that the 3rd AABn H&S Company Commander, the AAV Platoon Commander, and the AAV Platoon Sergeant were all present at this meeting. [Encl (94)]

351. The 3rd AABn Maintenance Officer stated that the H&S Company Commander briefed that AAV Platoon's readiness was then at 54% with only six (6) of the thirteen (13) AAVs being operationally inoperative. [Encl (94)]

352. On 23 April 2020, at the 3rd AABn Maintenance Readiness Brief, the 3rd AABn Maintenance Officer stated they extensively discussed whether the 15th MEU had the support they needed to execute their next operational event on 3 May 2020. [Encl (94)]

353. At that time, there was no issue raised as to the ability to meet the timeline and complete the event on 3 May 2020. [Encl (94)]

354. When the AAV Platoon Commander learned that a majority of the vehicles were operationally inoperative, he briefed the BLT 1/4 leadership on the situation, including the BLT 1/4 Maintenance Management Officer, the Bravo Company Commander, and the BLT 1/4 Commanding Officer. [Encl (88), (183)]

355. After informing the BLT 1/4 leadership of the operationally inoperative vehicles, the AAV Platoon Commander met with the 3rd AABn H&S Company Commander and the 3rd AABn Commanding Officer to discuss the status of the vehicles. [Encl (88)]

356. During this conversation, the 3rd AABn Commanding Officer asked the AAV Platoon Commander if he could fix the vehicles and the AAV Platoon Commander responded that he would try. [Encl (88)]

357. The BLT 1/4 Commanding Officer stated that after the AAV Platoon Commander told him that twelve (12) of thirteen (13) vehicles were operationally inoperative he decided to meet in person with the 3rd AABn Commanding Officer. [Encl (183)]

358. The BLT 1/4 Commanding Officer stated that during that meeting he asked the 3rd AABn Commanding Officer to help fix the AAV Platoon's vehicles prior to the upcoming EOTG Mechanized Raid Course. [Encl (183)]

359. The BLT 1/4 Commanding Officer stated that the 3rd AABn Commanding officer showed him the latest maintenance status for the

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vehicles and told him that the vehicles would be fixed in time for the Mechanized Raid Course. [Encl (183)]

360. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer stated that he was made aware of additional time required to complete the JLTIs when the MEU composited due to the condition of the AAVs and elements of the AAV Platoon having recently returned from EXERCISE NATIVE FURY 2020. [Encl (181)]

361. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer further stated that the 15th MEU S-4 Officer kept him apprised throughout the JLTI process on the progress of those inspections. [Encl (181)]

362. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer stated that the 15th MEU S-4 Officer told him that he was working closely with 1st Marine Division and I MEF on the situation and did not need his assistance or intervention. [Encl (181)]

363. The AAV Platoon Maintenance Chief stated that they received minimal maintenance support from 3rd AABn during the repair process. [Encl (124)]

364. Because the vehicles were not CHOP'd (transferred) to the BLT during the repair process, the 15th MEU AAV Platoon experienced difficulty obtaining logistical support for the repairs, including obtaining welding support from Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) 15. [Encl (124)]

365. Because the vehicles were not CHOP'd to the BLT, their Force Activity Designator (FAD) Code did not upgrade. [Encl (88), (124)]

366. Because the FAD Code on the vehicles did not upgrade, the AAV Platoon did not receive an increased priority for ordering parts in Global Combat System Support Marine Corp (GCSS-MC). [Encl (88), (124)]

367. The fourteen AAVs were not CHOP'd to the BLT 1/4 until 11 August 2020. This was sixteen (16) weeks after the original CHOP date of 20 Apr 2020. [Encl (73), (201)]

368. From 20 April to 3 May 2020, the AAV Platoon maintenance personnel repaired all twelve (12) operationally inoperative AAVs for land-use only to ensure they could train in the Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG) Mechanized Raid Package training. [Encl (88), (104), (123), (124)]

369. From 8 May to 26 May 2020, AAV Platoon maintenance personnel repaired all thirteen (13) AAVs for both land and waterborne use. [Encl (124)]

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370. The 3rd AABn Maintenance Officer stated that on 7 May 2020, the 3rd AABn H&S Company Commander reported the AAV Platoon was at 100% readiness with no vehicles operationally inoperative. [Encl (94)]

371. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer stated that 1st Marine Division acknowledged a potential extended timeline to complete Joint Limited Technical Inspections (JLTIs) due to much of the AAV Platoon's manpower recently returning from their participation in NATIVE FURY. [Encl (181)]

372. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer stated that the AAV Platoon was able to complete the JLTIs in early May prior to the EOTG Mechanized Raid course, which was their first major integrated training exercise. [Encl 181]

373. The AAV Platoon Maintenance Chief stated that AAV 523519 had the Power Take Off (PTO) unit replaced at some time prior to PMINT. [Encl (123), (124), (145)]

374. Replacing the Power Take Off (PTO) unit does not ordinarily involve any manipulation of the drain line plug [Encl (204)]

375. AAV 523519 conducted several maintenance runs and two ship to shore movements after the replacement of the Power Take Off (PTO) unit, during which there were no mechanical concerns. [Encl (124), (145)]

376. 1st Marine Division Order 3510.1E and 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion Commanding Officer's Policy Letter 18-19 state that Platoons preparing to deploy must be evaluated by a Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE). It is the responsibility of the Commanding Officer, 3rd AABn to ensure that a Platoon that will be attached to a MEU is given a MCCRE evaluation [Encl (13), (14), (15)]

377. The I MEF LOI for 15 MEU deployment 21-1 states that all units and attachments must conduct a MCCRE prior to CHOP. [Encl (13)]

378. The 15th MEU AAV Platoon was never given a MCCRE. [Encl (70), (104)]

OPINIONS

1. The cause of the mishap was a combination of maintenance failures due to disregard of maintenance procedures, AAV crewmen not evacuating personnel when the situation clearly demanded they be evacuated, and improper training of embarked personnel on AAV safety procedures. The key moment in the mishap was when water was at ankle level inside AAV 523519 and the Vehicle Commander failed to order the evacuation of embarked troops as required by the Common SOP for AAV Operations.

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Instead, the Vehicle Commander was more focused on getting back to the ship vice evacuating the embarked personnel. Although the Vehicle Commander did not realize the AAV was suffering a transmission failure, he waited too long to evacuate the embarked personnel. By the time he did, the vehicle was too low in the water, had turned sideways into the waves, and when they opened the starboard side cargo hatch it exposed AAV 523519 to the direct intrusion of water. [FF (95-97), (102-104), (124), (130), (136-141)]

2. When the wave swept into AAV 523519, the embarked personnel had been standing on the bench seats in order to evacuate the vehicle. The force of the water rushing in knocked all personnel off their feet and the overwhelming physical forces experienced by the embarked personnel resulted in shock, disorientation and inadvertent physical responses. [FF (136-142)]

3. The wave immediately filled the rear compartment and caused a sudden and almost immediate shift to a nose high pitch angle. As a result, AAV 523519 rapidly sank. It is unlikely that the embarked personnel had time to react, and the physical forces overwhelmed them. [FF (139-142)]

4. Embarked personnel were not trained appropriately and did not realize how dire the situation was on AAV 523519 when the water was at boot ankle level. Even when the water had risen to beyond waist high, they still had on their SAPI plate carriers, helmets, and weapons. As per Ref (d), keeping their equipment on delayed their egress efforts and inhibited the embarked personnel's ability to escape. [FF (200), (283), (292-294)]

5. Embarked personnel struggled to open the starboard side cargo hatch handles due to a lack of training, AAV 523519's troop compartment being extremely dark due to the Emergency Egress Lighting System (EELS) not working, and because chemical lights were not in place as required by the Common SOP for AAV Operations. [FF (133), (237)]

6. During the mishap, the AAV 523519 Vehicle Commander stated that he repeatedly told the embarked personnel to get their gear off. That none of the embarked troops removed their gear casts significant doubts on the validity of the statements of the Vehicle Commander. [FF (131), (200)]

7. Although the small abrasions, contusions and lacerations on the bodies of the deceased personnel could have resulted from the mishap, such injuries are also in keeping with those that infantry Marines receive when conducting training, such as the training that occurred on SCI. [FF (229)]

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(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

9. In their attempt to assist AAV 523519, AAV 14 struck AAV 523519 and this caused AAV 523519 to turn from facing northward towards the USS SOM to facing westward. [FF (135), (138)]

10. The damage to the starboard front pontoon was caused at least partially by the impact of AAV 14 as it struck AAV 523519. Because the starboard front pontoon was underwater and no one was in a position to see the actual impact, there is no testimony to prove this point. However, there is no other reasonable explanation for this damage. This damage would not have caused the AAV to sink; the AAV sank in the nose up position, so the starboard front pontoon would have been the last part of AAV 523519 to go under the water. [FF (135), (138), (141) (239)]

11. I consider (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) experts in AAV maintenance. I agree with and endorse their opinions on why AAV 523519 sank. [FF (236-251)]

a. There was not one single discrepancy that caused AAV 523519 to sink, but rather a sequence of mechanical failures.

b. The transmission failed due to leaking oil from a loose drain line plug.

c. The driver put the transmission into fourth gear to gain movement in the water.

d. After AAV 523519 completely lost momentum in the water because the engine went to an idle due to the transmission failure, the forward hydraulic bilge pump would not have pumped out water due to the low engine speed.

e. Water continued to come into AAV 523519 and, with reduced bilge capacity, the water level increased inside the vehicle.

f. The rising water level inside the engine compartment caused the generator belt to cast water out of the engine panel and on to the generator, ultimately causing the generator to fail.

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g. Because the generator failed, AAV 523519 was then only running on battery power and the electrical bilge pumps were running at a degraded level.

h. The water coming in was far greater than the bilge pumps could expel and, as a result, the vehicle sank.

12. While on SCI and prior to splashing back to the USS SOM, the AAV 523519 Driver did check the oil on the transmission of AAV 523519. The AAV 523519 Rear Crewman, who is a trained AAV mechanic, did check some of the lines and tighten the bolts on the Power Take Off (PTO) marine drive clutch, but did not check or tighten the drain line plug. The AAV 523519 Driver and Rear Crewman stated that they informed the AAV 523519 Vehicle Commander, but the Vehicle Commander does not recall this conversation. However, when the AAV 523519 Driver added six (6) gallons of transmission oil to a twenty three (23) gallon transmission, it should have triggered a response that something was wrong with AAV 523519. [FF (62-68), (244-246)]

13. There is no evidence to suggest that replacing the PTO prior to PMINT contributed to the mishap. Replacing the PTO does not normally involve manipulation of the drain line plug. Additionally, several maintenance runs and two amphibious movements were conducted without incident after the replacement. [FF (64), (65), (249), (272-274)]

14. Actions or decisions made by the USS SOM were in keeping with established rules and did not contribute to the sinking. The USS SOM did have to increase speed for flight operations and was five thousand, seven hundred (5700) yards away vice the coordinated four thousand (4000) yards, but this is still within acceptable travel distance for AAVs. The USS SOM gave a green well for the AAVs and reacted as quickly as possible to the request for an increase to six (6) feet at the sill to support possibly towing in an AAV. The safety boats on the USS SOM were not requested for the AAV movement and the USS SOM personnel assumed the AAVs were providing their own safety boats. This assumption was reasonable due to the fact that the AAVs launched that morning without safety boats from the USS SOM. The USS SOM safety boats responded once they were requested. [FF (32), (34), (35), (43), (83), (123), (147-149), (151), (153)]

15. There were a lot of comments about sea state conditions. Several statements come from personnel who were inside the AAVs, but it is very difficult to ascertain sea state from inside the vehicle. There were six (6) AAVs that made it back to the USS SOM, and two (2) returned to SCI with one (1) being towed back. The sea state made the trip more difficult, but based on visual inspection of photographs, detailed weather reports, and statements from the crew of the USS SOM and AAV crews, it is my opinion that the sea state was three (3). AAVs can safely operate in sea state three (3). [FF (85) / Encl (31), (186)]

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16. Significant confusion was added to the event by the following:

a. The delay due to the maintenance issues of AAV 12 on SCI. [FF (52), (55), (58-60)]

b. The addition of personnel (ADR and opposition force) who embarked the AAVs on SCI. [FF (54), (57), (77), (80)]

c. The decision to leave four (4) AAVs on SCI and send nine (9) AAVs back to the USS SOM. [FF (60)]

d. The fact that all of the leadership (Bravo Company Commander, Bravo Company First Sergeant, AAV Platoon Commander, AAV Platoon Sergeant) stayed on SCI. [FF (81)]

e. The Bravo Company BLT 1/4 and AAV Platoon leadership's overall plan was ill conceived and did not cover all risk associated with the recovery of AAVs onboard an amphibious ship. They had not arranged for safety boats, and therefore they implicitly had not established an associated bump plan to render aid and pick up personnel from disabled or sinking AAVs; they had not set a succession of command; and they had not properly communicated their intentions to return to the USS SOM. [FF (60), (70), (72), (73), (76), (79), (82), (83) / Encl (7)]

f. AAV 3 broke down and had to be towed back to SCI by AAV 1. [FF (88), (89)]

17. The AAV Platoon's splash procedures were not conducted in accordance with the Common SOP for AAV Operations. Although the splash procedures they used on the day of the mishap seem to be in keeping with the standard business practices of the AAV Platoon, the practice of conducting the Common SOP checklist via memory removed the safety mechanism that these checklists are designed to install. [FF (72-77), (80) / Encl (7)]

18. The current Operations Chief of 3rd AABn, who I consider an expert in AAV operations, stated it takes on average one (1) hour and fifty eight (58) minutes to complete the pre-water checklist, in which forty (40) minutes are built in for a Troop Commander Brief, Manifest, Evacuation Drills and Embarked Troop Brief. Since none of the embarked troops recall getting a brief on SCI and some did not receive LPU-41s, it is my opinion that the AAV Platoon conducted these checks in an abbreviated and/or careless manner. [FF (72-77)]

19. While the AAVs were en route to the USS SOM from SCI and AAV 523519 reported taking on water, the BLT 1/4 H&S Company Commander made statements to the USS SOM TAO regarding when the water level inside the AAV would become a significant concern requiring the evacuation of the embarked personnel. Specifically, according to the

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USS SOM TAO, the H&S Company Commander stated that the water level would have to rise to chest level before evacuation was required, when in fact the Common SOP requires troop evacuation at boot ankle level. I find the USS SOM TAO to be a credible witness and credit his version of events. Although the H&S Company Commander's statements did not affect the recovery efforts, the information he provided was incorrect and irresponsible. [FF (122)]

20. Prior to CHOP, 3rd AABn did not properly train or equip this AAV Platoon for a very difficult MEU training cycle and deployment. They formed the Platoon late, the Platoon was not properly trained or evaluated to join the 15th MEU, and they were assigned AAVs in horrible conditions.

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(a), (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

[FF (253-255)

(259), (261-264), (329-331), (333) (377), (378)]

21. I found the AAV Platoon Commander to be a credible witness and very forthright. His statements were verified via training records, other witness statements, and other supporting documentation. In my opinion, however, he was not trained or prepared well enough by 3rd AABn to be a Platoon Commander for an AAV Platoon going on a MEU deployment. [FF (37), (72), (79), (82), (288-295)]

22. Prior to CHOP, the 3rd AABn Commanding Officer was responsible for evaluating and certifying the AAV Platoon for a MEU deployment via a Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE). He was also responsible for ensuring that all AAVs and equipment were fully operational. He failed to meet both of these requirements. Additionally, he either knew or should have known that the AAV Platoon was struggling to meet their training and maintenance requirements. When the AAV Platoon's training was disrupted by COVID-19 and other factors, the 3rd AABn Commanding Officer failed to reassess their capabilities and CHOP'd them to the 15th MEU unprepared. Ultimately, the 3rd AA Bn Commanding Officer failed to uphold his responsibility to prepare the AAV Platoon for deployment. [FF (329), (330), (376-378)]

23. At the time of CHOP, the BLT 1/4 Commanding Officer either knew or should have known of the maintenance and training deficiencies within the AAV Platoon. The BLT 1/4 Commanding Officer knew that twelve (12) of thirteen (13) AAVs were inoperative and no MCCRE had been given to the AAV Platoon. Moreover, it should also have raised suspicions that in a week and a half all vehicles were repaired and ready for the EOTG Mechanized Course. A reasonable BLT commander would have investigated these repairs given the circumstances. Additionally, due to the lack of training as it pertained to waterborne operations and unqualified gun crews, the AAV Platoon

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should have been returned to 3rd AABn for reevaluation and retraining. Under such circumstances, the BLT 1/4 Commander should have immediately reported these training and maintenance deficiencies to First Marine Division. [FF (259), (267-269), (271), (274), (275), (329), (377), (378)]

24. At the time of CHOP, the 15th MEU Commanding Officer either knew or should have known of the maintenance deficiencies within the AAV Platoon. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer knew that twelve (12) of thirteen (13) AAVs were inoperative. In my experience, it is highly unusual for any equipment to be CHOP'd to a MEU in anything less than Condition Code Alpha (i.e., fully operational). Under such circumstances, ideally the 15th MEU Commanding Officer should have made these maintenance deficiencies a higher priority to I MEF. However, in my opinion his reliance on his staff to report and follow up with this issue was reasonable under the circumstances. [FF (329), (360-362)]

25. Post-CHOP, AAV safety training for embarked personnel was woefully inadequate. All AAV safety training was conducted via impromptu classes while on land and the first time the embarked personnel got into an AAV for waterborne operations was the day of the mishap. UET training was only partially completed for eleven (11) of the thirteen (13) embarked personnel and never rescheduled. BLT 1/4 is located on Camp Horno, Camp Pendleton. The UET training facility is also located on Camp Horno and BLT 1/4 should have been able to reschedule this training. [FF (280), (281), (283-287)]

26. Prior to the mishap, the Bravo Company Commander knew that his personnel had never participated in AAV waterborne operations and should have known that his personnel were not fully UET qualified. When asked about this he specifically stated that "[t]he training my Marines and Sailors received was consistent with established pre-deployment training and my previous experience." I find this to be unacceptable. [FF (280), (281), (283-287), (310)]

27. Prior to the mishap, the BLT 1/4 Commanding Officer knew or should have known that Bravo Company personnel had not participated in AAV waterborne operations and knew or should have known that Bravo Company personnel were not fully UET qualified. His claimed reliance on the Bravo Company Commander's assurances as to training completion was not reasonable, and further he should have demanded Bravo Company and the AAV Platoon conduct combined waterborne operations prior to PMINT. Additionally, he should have prioritized his personnel for a full UET training. Ensuring Bravo Company personnel were appropriately trained was ultimately the BLT 1/4 Commanding Officer's responsibility. [FF (280), (281), (283-287)]

28. According to the 15th MEU Commanding Officer, his knowledge of the AAV Platoon's and Bravo Company's training proficiency comes from

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the pre-deployment briefs and his incidental observations of Bravo Company during the EOTG Mechanized Raid Course. In my experience, these pre-deployment briefs are generic in nature and are focused on personnel management and major end items. These are not briefs I would rely on to assess training capabilities or proficiencies of a BLT. Moreover, the EOTG Mechanized Raid Course did not include waterborne operations training. In my opinion, the 15th MEU Commanding Officer should have known that Bravo Company's waterborne operations training had been disrupted prior to PMINT. [FF (283-287), (315-318)]

29. It is my opinion that the AAV is a reliable vehicle, but it requires ruthless adherence to maintenance procedures, use of checklists, and operating policies and procedures. AAV units must be well-led, well-trained, and disciplined in their approach to maintenance and operations.

30. The 15th MEU composite date was 20 April 2020, in the midst of COVID-19 mitigation processes, and a great deal of focus was on how to conduct training during COVID-19. In my opinion, this distracted personnel from the attention to detail required to form a MEU. However, to the extent any such distractions occurred they should not have prevented the units involved from accomplishing their respective missions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That Private First Class Bryan J. Baltierra (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Lance Corporal Marco A. Barranco (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Private First Class Evan A. Bath
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Navy Hospital Corpsman 3rd Class (Fleet Marine Force)
Christopher Gnem (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Private First Class Jack-Ryan
Ostrovsky (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Lance Corporal Guillermo S. Perez
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Corporal Wesley A. Rodd (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Lance Corporal Chase D. Sweetwood (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Corporal
Cesar A. Villanueva (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) be found to have perished
in the line of duty, and not due to their own misconduct.

2. That the injuries sustained by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) were in the line of duty, and not due to their own misconduct.

3. All AAVs be float tested for leakage and ensure that leakage rates are within design specifications. No AAV should be allowed to enter the water without certifying water integrity.

4. All AAV and mechanized company leaders familiarize themselves with Ref (d), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Naval Postgraduate School
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study. A similar study must be conducted for the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV).

5. Ref (b) states "Ensure that positive communications has been established with controlling station, and that permission to splash has been granted." This statement is unclear and does not specify who grants permission. I recommend that when AAVs are embarking onboard amphibious ships, it should be the Ship's CO, XO or TAO who grants permission to splash. This will ensure the Ship is ready to receive the AAVs.

6. Future I MEF LOIs for MEU Deployments should use stronger, more direct language when tasking units to conduct safety training. CG, I MEF Letter of Instruction for 15 MEU Deployment 21-1 states on page 21, Paragraph 5.C.1.A: CG, "I MEF expects those forces listed...". It should state, "CG, I MEF tasks (the applicable unit) to complete all required training by composite date."

7. The CG, I MEF Letter of Instruction for 15 MEU Deployment 21-1 states on page 15, Paragraph 5.A.6.C.3.B.1, "GCE and ACE attachments are not required to conduct a stand-alone MCCRE." But on page 31, Paragraph 5.C.2.D in tasks to the CG, 1st MARDIV it states, "Conduct a MCCRE of all units and detachments prior to CHOP and report MCCRE results to CG, I MEF NLT E-204." These statements contradict each other and should be clarified to ensure all units that join the MEU have been certified by their parent unit as ready to join the MEU.

8. The I MEF Policy Letter concerning UET training [Enclosure (26)] has a full description of Underwater Egress Training and the requirements for all personnel. This I MEF Policy Letter is confusing and uses air crew, aircraft passengers, AAV crewmen, and AAV passengers interchangeably. Separate policy letters should be written for aircraft UET requirements and surface vehicles (AAVs, ACVs, RHIBS and CRRCS) UET requirements. It should clearly identify the Commanders who are responsible for ensuring all UET training is completed.

9. MCO 3502.3C (Ref j) page 10 Paragraph 11, Part a, states, "Category A training will be met by utilizing the one day Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer (MAET) for vertical lift air platforms or one day Submerged Vehicle Egress Training (SVET) for wheeled or tracked vehicles. MAET or SVET training, if successfully completed, is good for two years, if a passenger requires remediation training, Shallow Water Egress Trainer (SWET) will meet the training requirement." This should be changed to read, "All MEU personnel assigned to risk categories will successfully complete the full MAET or SVET prior to amphibious/waterborne operations regardless of prior UET training."

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10. Reference (b), Page 3-17, Paragraph 3015, Part 4 states, "Safety Boats. While safety boats may be provided, AA units do not require them for amphibious operations. AA units will designate a bump/recovery plan to render aid and pick up personnel from disabled or sinking AAVs. In the event a safety boat is not assigned for use, an AAV in each wave should be designated as a safety boat." This statement is confusing and must be clarified. It states AA units do not require safety boats in the first sentence and the last sentence states an AAV should be designated as a safety boat. It must be changed to state that, "if an AAV is used as a safety boat, it must have no embarked personnel."

11. All AAV personnel must fully understand and adhere to the Standard Operating Procedure for Assault Amphibian Operations (Common SOP for AAV Operations) BnO P3000.1J dtd 25 Oct 2019. The checklists enclosed in the Common SOP must be treated in the same fashion that pilots treat their checklists. Approved checklists must not be deviated from or disregarded for any reason.

12. All AAV personnel returning to the AAV community from B billets or other assignments should be tested on their knowledge of operational and safety procedures. This would be similar to the manner in which Range Safety officers are tested and re-certified prior to running live fire ranges.

13. I MEF G7, Expeditionary Operations Training Group, should oversee and ensure initial waterborne operations training for the MEU Mechanized Company and the AAV Platoon prior to any amphibious training.

14. I MEF, 1st Marine Division, all MEUs, and 3rd AABn must immediately require face-to-face briefing and attendance at the Ship's confirmation brief for all AAV leaders prior to amphibious operations. This will ensure proper coordination is done prior to launching or recovering AAVs from amphibious shipping; and it will also ensure all personnel understand emergency procedures and anticipated ballast response times.

15. 3rd AABn should adopt the use of a checklist when coordinating to embark onto U.S. Navy Amphibious Ships. A possible example is included as Encl (180).

16. 3rd AABn should ensure AAV crews are certified to train with embarked troops in waterborne operations. Once certified, the crew cannot be changed or they cannot embark troops.

17. The 15th MEU Commanding Officer is not recommended for administrative or disciplinary action. While in my opinion the MEU Commanding Officer knew about the inoperative vehicles during JLTI's and should have made this matter a higher priority, he reasonably

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relied on his staff who informed him that the matter was being addressed by I MEF and First Marine Division. Moreover, while the 15th MEU Commanding Officer should have known that Bravo Company's waterborne operations training had been disrupted, I believe the BLT 1/4 Commanding Officer was ultimately responsible for ensuring this training had been completed. In the absence of evidence that the BLT Commanding Officer or the MEU Commanding Officer's staff made him aware of the training and maintenance issues between CHOP and PMINT, I believe that the 15th MEU Commanding Officer acted reasonably.

18. I recommend appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for the Commanding Officer of BLT 1/4 for violation of Article 92 of the UCMJ (Dereliction in the Performance of Duties) for not ensuring all personnel were fully UET trained prior to CHOP/PMINT, and for not ensuring that Bravo Company and the AAV Platoon conducted combined waterborne operations prior to PMINT.

19. I recommend appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for the former Commander of 3rd AABn for violation Article 92 of the UCMJ (Dereliction in the Performance of Duties) for not ensuring all AAVs were sourced in Condition Code Alpha by the CHOP date, and because the AAV Platoon was sent to the 15th MEU not trained or certified via a MCCRE or other evaluation.

20. I recommend appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for the Commanding Officer of Bravo Company, BLT 1/4 for violation of Article 92 of the UCMJ (Dereliction in the Performance of Duties) for not ensuring all safety boats/vehicles were present prior to sending his Company back to the USS SOM, and for not ensuring all personnel were fully UET trained prior to CHOP/PMINT.

21. I recommend appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for the AAV Platoon Commander for violation of Article 92 of the UCMJ (Dereliction in the Performance of Duties) for the following:

a. Failing to ensure all safety boats/vehicles were present prior to sending his AAVs and personnel back to the USS SOM.

b. Failing to ensure all pre-water checks were complete.

c. Failing to ensure all AAVs had chemical lights affixed to release hatches.

d. Failing to ensure there were enough LPU-41 were present for all embarked personnel.

22. I recommend appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for the AAV Platoon Sergeant for violation of Article 92 of the UCMJ (Dereliction in the Performance of Duties) for the following:

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a. Failing to ensure all safety boats/vehicles were present prior to sending the AAVs and personnel back to the USS SOM.

b. Failing to ensure all pre-water checks were complete.

c. Failing to ensure all AAVs had chemical lights affixed to release hatches.

23. I recommend appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for the AAV 523519 Vehicle Commander for violation of Article 92 of the UCMJ (Dereliction in the Performance of Duties) for the following:

a. Failing to follow safety procedures for evacuating embarked personnel. When the water level was at the deck plates, he should have given the order for all embarked personnel to remove gear and equipment and prepare for evacuation. When the water level was at ankle level he should have begun evacuating embarked personnel.

b. Failing to ensure his or other AAVs in his section had chemical lights affixed to release hatches.

c. Failing to ensure the proper maintenance of his AAV.

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(a), (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

28. I recommend that all personnel involved in the recovery efforts from Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV) be commended for their quick response and incredibly professional handling of all the deceased personnel and recovery of AAV 523519.

29. I recommend that all personnel involved in the recovery effort from Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) Office be commended for their incredibly professional treatment of all the deceased personnel.

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30. I recommend (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) be commended for their courage in positioning AAV 14 and risking their own safety to rescue personnel.

31. I recommend (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) be commended for taking the initiative and ensuring all of his personnel received a proper AAV safety brief before departing SCI.

32. I recommend that all personnel who rendered CPR and other medical assistance to the survivors be commended.

33. The medical response of the USS SOM personnel should be commended.

34. The pilots and crews of HSC 21-2 should be commended for their efforts in SAR operations.

35. The crews of the RHIBs of the USS SOMERSET, the USS JOHN FINN, and the USS SAN DIEGO should be commended for their SAR efforts.

36. The 15th MEU ADR personnel who manned their CRRCs should be commended for their SAR efforts.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1 MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
US MARINE CORPS FORCES PACIFIC
BOX 555300
CAMP PENDLETON CA 92055-5300

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

CG

FIRST ENDORSEMENT or (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) It is 1000 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Sept 20

From: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force

To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE 15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT ASSAULT
AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 30 JULY
2020

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN), Chapter II

1. In accordance with reference (a), your request for an extension to submit your report into the subject titled matter is hereby approved.
2. You will submit your report no later than 1 November 2020, unless an additional extension of time is granted.
3. The point of contact for this matter is the I Marine Expeditionary Force Staff Judge Advocate,
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

K. S. HECKL

Copy to:
File



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
US MARINE FORCES PACIFIC
BOX 555300
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5300

IN REPLY REFER TO:

1000

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
30 Sep 2020

From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
To: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION ON COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN VEHICLE MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON 30
JULY 2020

1. I respectfully request an extension on the investigation to 20 Oct 2020 to
allow me to fully compile all of the information in the investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
US MARINE CORPS FORCES PACIFIC
BOX 555300
CAMP PENDLETON CA 92055-5300

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

CG

3 AUG 2020

From: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force

To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE 15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT ASSAULT
AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 30 JULY
2020

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN), Chapter II

1. This letter appoints you, per the reference, as the investigating officer to inquire into the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) mishap that occurred at or near San Clemente Island, CA on or about 30 July 2020.
2. You are directed to investigate the cause of the mishap, resulting injuries and damages, and where appropriate any fault, neglect, or responsibility therefore. Your investigation shall include inquiry into the AAV, its mechanical operation and applicable regulations; operator qualifications and competence; operations planning and execution; and any other factor that may have contributed to the incident. If the conduct or performance of duty of any servicemember in the command is found to be substandard, make recommendations regarding corrective, disciplinary and/or administrative action. Report your findings of facts, opinions, and recommendations in letter form no later than 30 September 2020, unless an extension of time is granted. Any request for extensions will be directed to the Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force, with detailed justification.
3. You are also directed to provide a recommendation regarding a line of duty/misconduct determination for each injured or deceased servicemember involved in this incident. This recommendation may be provided separately from the Command Investigation Report in order to ensure service members and their families receive the appropriate benefits in a timely manner.
4. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is appointed to serve as the Assistant Investigating Officer. Other investigative team members may be added to provide necessary expertise or administrative support as required. You are directed to seek legal advice from the Staff Judge Advocate, I Marine Expeditionary Force, prior to signing the Command Investigation Report.

ENCLOSURE (1)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE 15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT ASSAULT
AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE MISHAP THAT OCCURRED ON OR ABOUT 30 JULY
2020

5: During the conduct of this investigation, you are to observe the requirements of the Privacy Act, Article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and paragraphs 0209, Parts E and F of the reference.

6. Note that there is a concurrent safety investigation being conducted into this incident. A JAGMAN investigation in accordance with the reference is considered collateral to the safety investigation. You are directed to ensure your investigation does not violate the privileged nature of the safety investigation. Specifically, you are prohibited from using privileged statements provided in conjunction with the safety investigation. No witness will be questioned regarding information provided to the safety investigation team under promise of confidentiality. Finally, you may not use the opinions, analysis, or conclusions of the safety investigation or any subsequent endorsements thereof.

7. By copy of this order, all staff sections and subordinate commanders are directed to furnish all necessary assistance.


8. The point of contact at this command is the Staff Judge Advocate, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

K. S. HECKL


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TIMELINE




Encl (2)

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
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TIMELINE



Encl (2)

TIMELINE



Encl (2)

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) make the following statement
under oath:

I was verbally appointed the Investigating Officer on 30 July 2020 and officially tasked on 3 August 2020. I arrived on Camp Pendleton on 1 August 2020 and received an initial overview of the accident, future plans to recover our Marines and Corpsman and the plan for the remaining training for the 15th MEU. I requested an AAV expert and an SJA to be part of the investigation team.

I am an infantry officer, a former MEU Commander, a former BLT Commander and have considerable AAV experience.

The Investigation Team consisted of the following personnel:

- (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the Deputy Investigating Officer.
- (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the AAV Subject Matter Expert assigned to the Investigating team.
- (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the Judge Advocate assigned to the Investigating team.
- (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the Administration Chief for the Investigating team.

At 1700 on 3 August 2020 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I flew to USS MAKIN ISLAND (LHD-8). (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stayed ashore to set up spaces for the investigating team and to interview (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the AAV 523519 driver who had been flown ashore after being injured during the mishap and was then recovering in the hospital. Upon our arrival we knew that the search and rescue efforts had concluded on 31 July 2020 and recovery efforts were on going. The vehicle and remains of our Marines and Corpsman were located on 3 August 2020.

Upon boarding USS MAKIN ISLAND we were given an orientation (last know position, search patterns, etc.) by the 15th MEU Intel Officer and began the investigation without reason to believe that negligence, dereliction of duty, or any violation of the UCMJ had been the cause of the sinking. As such, all initial statements were taken without Article 31(b) rights advisements or waivers.

Initial Interviews on USS MAKIN ISLAND: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
began to talk with personnel who were on duty in the Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC) to assess if there was any information they could provide that would assist the investigation. I went to speak with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
the 15th MEU CO, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the Executive Officer of
the 15th MEU and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the Operations Officer
of the 15th MEU. Each relayed similar timelines and sequence of events. I then spoke to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the Operations Officer
for BLT 1/4, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) relayed a few more details of the events

on San Clemente Island and provided us with names of personnel that were involved in the accident. I asked (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for all training records for the AAV Platoon, Bravo Co 1/4, and individual training records for all personnel. We also spoke to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the 15th MEU Assistant Air Officer, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had been in the LFOC during the time of the accident. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provided us the locations of all ships and what the ships/ MEU forces were doing during the time of the accident. The USS MAKIN ISLAND, USS SAN DIEGO and USS JOHN FINN were conducting a fire support coordination exercise south west of SCI.

We then moved to USS SOMERSET on 4 August 2020 at 1600 and immediately began interviews.

Initial Interviews on USS SOMERSET: We interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the Executive Officer for BLT 1/4, who had been on the C7 AAV during the movement from San Clemente Island to USS SOMERSET. We then spoke to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who was in the Troop Commander hatch on the C7 AAV, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) relayed to us that he had taken videos on his cell phone on the movement back to the ship. We viewed and made copies of the videos. We then spoke to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had been in charge of the adversary force that had been positioned on San Clemente Island and upon completion of the training, he and his Marines went back to the USS SOMERSET via the AAVs (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in the P7 AAV that had the Network on the Move (NOTM) communications gear installed on it. We then spoke to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the Platoon Commander for the AAV Platoon, BLT 1/4. We then spoke to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the Bravo Company Commander, 1/4. Both (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provided a lot of background information, but both had stayed on San Clemente Island and did not make the movement back to USS SOMERSET. We then stopped and I decided that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) would continue the interviews in the ship's chapel. I would start gathering log books from the USS SOMERSET and other paperwork. We conducted interviews with the crew of AAV 523519, the crews of AAV 13 and AAV 14, USS SOMERSET personnel, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the BLT 1/4 Assistant Operations Officer, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the Bravo Co Executive Officer and several others and then returned to Camp Pendleton on 6 August 2020.

The investigation team then set up work spaces in the conference room at the Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch (AVTB) building on Camp Pendleton and continued to conduct interviews. We traveled to the USS SOMERSET while she was pierside at US Naval Base San Diego, BLT 1/4 headquarters, 15th MEU headquarters and various other locations.

I decided to conduct the investigation by interviewing all personnel vice just receiving signed statements. This technique was more time consuming, but it gave the investigating team and I a much clearer understanding of the incident. The Investigation

Team interviewed all personnel individually and made audio recordings of interviews. We then transcribed the interviews to written form.

Throughout the investigation, we worked very closely with Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

On 3 August 2020, at 1450 PDT, the NAVSEA IVER4 team located and positively confirmed the location of AAV 523519 with human remains outside of the vehicle. This discovery was video recorded and confirmed the condition of AAV 523519 and the location of 8 personnel in vicinity of AAV 523519. Over the next few hours, the NAVSEA IVER4 team continued to survey the site to collect detailed information on the location of the human remains and the condition of the AAV to inform further recovery plans. The Flyaway Deep Ocean Salvage System (FADOSS) ship lift transported to Naval Air Station, North Island from Port Hueneme, CA. and the 12k foot line and spooler were shipped from Williamsburg, VA. All recovery assets were in place on 6 August and later that day, our Marines and Corpsman were recovered and cared for by personnel from the Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the I MEF Chaplain was on scene to ensure this was done with the utmost respect and provided religious ministry. On 7 August, AAV-P7 523519 was recovered and then brought back to Camp Pendleton via Naval Air Station, North Island for inspection. This movement was supervised by the Safety Inspection Team. AAV 523519 remained submerged for 7 days in salt water that caused damage to electrical/electronic components however the damage did not hamper the forensic analysis of the AAV. The Safety Inspection Team observed and photographically captured the entire movement off of the barge onto the tractor-trailer, then followed AAV 523519 on the ride from US Naval Air Station North Island to the Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch (AVTB) secured maintenance bay. Every time the AAV was moved or lifted, it was photographically captured. My team and I were able to visually inspect the entire vehicle at this time while accompanied by the Safety Inspection team. The Safety Team along with independent inspectors; (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who has 41 years of AAV maintenance experience and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who has 30 years of AAV maintenance experience, began technical inspections of the AAV.

After the first round of interviews, the Investigating Team discussed the accident with the crew of AAV 523519 in further detail. Although initial conversations were conducted without Article 31(b) rights advisements, all follow on interviews were conducted with rights advisements and cleansing warnings. The interviews were then summarized and each member of the AAV 523519 crew was asked to sign their statements. A majority of their testimony aligns with each other, however when questions were asked about if all checks were done and who completed them, if

all information about the transmission leak was passed, if the embarked personnel were told to remove gear; the crews' stories are different.

The Investigating team discussed the accident with the AAV leadership and their testimony was very forthright.

The Investigating Team discussed the accident with the Captain and crew of the USS SOMERSET. Initial conversations were kept to a minimum due to the fact that all legal coordination between I MEF and US Navy Third Fleet was not completed. The crew still provided us with printed versions of all electronic tactical chat logs, photographs of medical response and records of the Ship's GPS locations. On 8 August 2020, the investigating team went to the USS SOMERSET and interviewed the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Operations Officer (who was the Tactics and Operations Officer (TAO) during the time of the accident), personnel on the bridge, personnel in the Combat Information Center (CIC), well deck personnel and all lookouts. During her interview, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that she had been asked to shred documents after the incident, which she felt uncomfortable doing due to a desire to preserve any evidence that might be relevant to the investigation. She in fact did not shred those documents, but instead left them in the shred bin in the CIC. At the conclusion of the interview, the Investigating Officer went directly to the CIC, removed the contents of the shred bin, and reviewed the documents contained therein. The documents consisted of operations orders, LCAC backload information from SCI, and handwritten notes. None of these documents related to the accident.

Several times the Investigation Team and I would directly contact personnel via email that we had previously spoken with and ask for clarifying information. These emails were added as enclosures.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I discussed the fact that AAVs are not water tight and there is a standard amount of leakage that occurs inside an AAVs. I spoke to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Technical Director, Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch (AVTB) and he provided the data for the standard leakage rates for an AAV-P7 variant. Although all AAVs leak at standard rates with some variation due to wind and sea conditions, the bilge pumps always expel more water than is taken in. On each AAV there are two electrical bilge pumps, one located starboard forward and the other located port rear. Each electrical bilge pump can expel 100 gallons of water a minute. On each AAV there are also two mechanical/hydraulic bilge pumps, one located starboard rear and the other located port forward and each can expel 115 gallons of water a minute. Combined these four (4) bilge pumps can expel 430 gallons of water a minute. It takes 269 gallons of water to fill an AAV to

the deck plates, 322 gallons to fill an AAV to the ankle level and 539 gallons to fill an AAV to the bench seats.

Discussions with 3rd AA Bn and AVTB: I relied heavily on the 3rd AA Bn Operations Chief and Maintenance Chief to answer numerous technical questions regarding the capabilities and specifications of AAVs. Both of these Marines had recently assumed their billet and were not involved in any training or maintenance for the 15th MEU AAV Platoon. The Maintenance Officer at AVTB also provided insight on numerous questions.

Discussions with AAV community at large: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Commanding Officer of the Assault Amphibian Schools and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Executive Officer of the Assault Amphibian Schools were consulted with on technical questions regarding the common SOP for AAV operation. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Office of the Secretary of Defense, former Commanding Officer of the Assault Amphibian Schools was consulted with on technical questions regarding the common SOP for AAV operation. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Program Manager, Advanced Amphibious Assault, PEO Land Systems was consulted to assist in identifying specifications of the AAV-P7 and assist with researching information in Technical Manuals.

Discussions with I MEF G7: I had a conversation with I MEF G7, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and the Expeditionary Operations Training Group will now oversee and ensure initial waterborne training for the mechanized Company and the AAV Platoon prior to any amphibious training.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

15 Sept 2020
Date

MILITARY ABBREVIATION AND TERMINOLOGY GUIDE

3rd AA Bn: 3rd Amphibious Assault Battalion will be referred to as 3rd AA Bn.

AAV(s): Assault Amphibious Vehicle(s) will be referred to as AAV(s).

AAV number: AAVs will be referred to by their 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion tactical number consisting of 3 for 3rd Amphibious Assault Battalion (AABn), 15 for 15th MEU and the last two digits 1 thru 14. Please see Enclosure (12) for full list of call signs and vehicle designations. In personal statements, vehicle names and identifiers have not been changed.

AAV-P7 serial number 523519 tactical number 3-15-05: is the AAV that sank. It will be referred to as AAV 523519, but in statements and other parts of the investigation it may be referred to as AAV 5 or track 5.

AAV C7: Assault Amphibian Vehicle Command Model 7A1 (AAVC7A1) is a command and control variant and will be referred to as AAV C7 or just C7. The C7 may also be referred to as AAV 13.

AAV NOTM: Assault Amphibian Vehicle AAVP-7A1 with the Network on the Move communications system (NOTM) will be referred to as a AAV NOTM, in many statements it is called the "Pop" or AAV 14.

AAV P7: Assault Amphibian Vehicle AAVP-7A1 is the standard model and will be referred to as AAV or AAV-P7

AAV Plt: Assault Amphibian Vehicle Platoon, 15th MEU will be referred to as AAV Platoon or AAV Plt.

ADR: All Domain Reconnaissance

AFME: The Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner is the center of medical-legal investigations for the organization, and is responsible for determining the cause and manner of death for all active duty members who die within federal jurisdiction, as well as for identifying the decedent.

Angels: Dignified term used by the Marine Corps to identify fallen service members.

AVTB: Amphibious Vehicle Testing Branch will be referred to as AVTB. AVTB provided a maintenance garage that was safeguarded and access controlled.

Bravo Co. or B Co: Company B, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 will be referred to a Bravo Company or B Co.

Believe To Be Report: The specific verbiage that the AFME team uses prior to scientific verification of the remains. Once the remains have been verified through fingerprints, DNA, or dental records AFME transitions to different, more definitive language that remains are confirmed to be a specific person.

BLT 1/4: Battalion Landing Team 1/4 will be referred to as BLT 1/4.

C3F: Naval personnel assigned to the U.S. Third Fleet may be referred to as personnel from C3F.

CATF: The Commander, Amphibious Task Force will be referred to as CATF.

Chem lights: Florescence Chemical Light Sticks will be referred to as chem lights.

COMMSTRAT: Communication Strategy and Operations (COMMSTRAT) is a communication activity that provides timely, accurate information which informs and educates about the missions, organization, capabilities, needs, activities, and performance of the Marine Corps as an instrument of national defense.

CPEN: Camp Pendleton, CA

CLF: The Commander, Landing Force will be referred to as CLF.

CRRC(s): Combat Rubber Raiding Craft will be referred to as CRRC, also known as the "Combat Rubber Reconnaissance Craft," is a specially fabricated rubber inflatable boat. Commonly called "cricks".

Deadlined: Deadlined is a term used for an inoperable or broken vehicle or equipment.

Decedent Affairs: A department of NMCSO, The Decedent Affairs Office provides support for the identification, care, and disposition of remains of deceased persons for whom the Department of the Navy is responsible.

Deck plates: Deck plates refer to the metal floor plates of the AAV that personnel stand on when inside the AAV.

Dignified Transfer: A dignified transfer is the process by which, the remains of fallen military members are transferred from the aircraft to an awaiting vehicle. The remains are then transferred to the mortuary facility located at Air Force Mortuary Affairs Operations, Dover AFB, Delaware. The dignified transfer is not a ceremony; rather, it is a solemn movement of the transfer case by a carry team composed of military personnel from the fallen member's respective service. A dignified transfer is conducted for every U.S. military member who dies in the theater of operation while in the

service of their country. A senior ranking officer of the fallen member's service presides over each dignified transfer.

Dogged: In the closed position, the term undogged means to open or unlatch.

EAAK: Enhanced Appliqué Armor Kit will be referred to as EAAK.

FADOSS: Flyaway Deep Ocean Salvage System.

Feet Dry/ Feet Wet: Feet dry refers that an AAV is out of the water. Feet wet refers that an AAV is in the water.

15th MEU: 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit will be referred to as 15th MEU.

Grunts: Term used by AAV crewmen to refer to Infantry Marines.

Honorable Carry: A term to convey that the remains are being handled in a respectful manner.

HOS Dominator: HOS DOMINATOR is a Military Sealift Command-chartered Offshore Supply Vessel and is used as a submarine rescue platform.

HSC: Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron will be referred to as HSC.

Iron City: Call sign of the USS SOMERSET

IVO: "In vicinity of" will be abbreviated to IVO.

IVER4 UUV: An unmanned underwater vehicle capable of detecting and identifying objects on the ocean floor.

Kill switch: A term used for a computer tablet that runs software, known as Kilswitch and APASS. The software was developed by Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Digital Precision Strike Suite for use in small tactical handheld Android tablets and can be used for GPS locations.

LCAC: Landing Craft Air Cushion will be referred to as LCAC.

LCAVAT: Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Assignment Table will be referred to as a LCAVAT.

MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force

MACO: Marshalling Area Control Officer will be referred to as MACO.

MCAS Miramar: Marine Corps Air Station Miramar located in San Diego, CA

MCCRE: Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation will be referred to a MCCRE.

Mech: Mech can have two meaning; first meaning is mechanized forces i.e. an AAV operation can be called a mech operation. Second meaning is a term for a mechanic.

MK18 UUV: Family of unmanned underwater vehicles capable of performing low-visible exploration and reconnaissance in support of amphibious landing; mine countermeasures operations such as search, classification, mapping, reacquire, and identification.

MOS: Military Occupational Skill will be referred to as MOS.

Nautical terms: There are several terms that are nautical or Naval in character. The bow refers to the front of a ship, boat or AAV. The stern refers to the rear of a ship, boat or AAV. When looking forward on a ship, boat or AAV towards the bow, port refers to the left side while starboard refers to the right side. In nautical terms, the bow or fore lies at the forward of the ship, while the stern or aft is the rear portion.

NASNI: Naval Air Station North Island

NAVSEA: Naval Sea Systems Command

NMCSD: Naval Medical Center San Diego

NIWC: Naval Information Warfare Center

November Flag: A blue and white checkered flag that is the international maritime signal message: "No" or "Negative". Used by AAV crewmen to signal distress.

One (1) MC: 1 Main Circuit (1MC) is the term for the shipboard public address circuits on United States Navy and United States Coast Guard vessels.

Plenum: The "grill and access assembly", which is referred to in many statements by the informal term "plenums". The exhaust grill may be referred to as the "rear plenum", and the intake grill may be referred to as the "front plenum". The grill and access assembly may be referred to as the "plenum housing". Where specific language counts, the proper nomenclature is used by the IO IAW the TMs.

PMCS: Preventive Maintenance Checks and Service will be referred to as PMCS.

PMO: Provost Marshals Office

PHIBRON: Amphibious Squadron will be referred to as PHIBRON.

Ramp Ceremony: A memorial service for a fallen service member, held at the airport prior to the departure of the aircraft carrying the deceased person's body, or for the arrival of the same aircraft at the deceased's home base.

RAM/RS: Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard will be referred to as RAM/RS.

RHIB(s): The Rigid-Hulled Inflatable Boat will be referred to as a RHIB.

River City: A term used by U.S. Marines to refer to a situation when a unit's communication systems are temporarily shut down.

ROC Drill: Rehearsal of Concept drill.

SAPI: Small Arms Protective Inserts. Plates worn inside the Flak Jacket to enhance protection against small arms fire.

SDI: San Diego International Airport

SCI: San Clemente Island is a training island for the military and environmentally protected area administered by Naval Base Coronado. It is 41 miles off the coast of California and it is 21 miles (34 km) long and contains 147.13 km² (56.81 sq mi) of land. San Clemente Island will be referred to as SCI.

SitRep: Situation Report is a report sent to higher headquarters to bring them up to date on events.

Serial Callaway: An accountability measure to ensure all personnel are assigned to the correct AAV.

Stern Gate: The stern gate is a large metal gate that is lowered into the water to allow AAVs access to the Well Deck.

SUPSALV: Supervisor of Salvage and Diving

SUPSALV URC: Supervisor of Salvage and Diving Underwater Rescue Command

SUROB: Surf Observation report will be referred to as SUROB.

SWET: Swallow Water Egress Training (SWET) is an individual seat-type device used prior to and in conjunction with the Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer (MAET) and Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer (SVET) to introduce water submersion and the proper use of current Supplemental Emergency Breathing Devices, such as the Intermediate Passenger Helicopter Aircrew Breathing Device (IPHABD) and Survival Egress Air (SEA) and learn to operate the LPU-32 and newer versions of flotation devices.

Tac Chat: Tac chat is an abbreviated term for Tactical Chat. It is a data application for text message and file sharing among fielded and networked data terminals.

UET: UET training includes completion of Shallow Water Egress Trainer (SWET) and either the Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer (MAET) or the Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer (SVET).

USS MKI: USS MAKIN ISLAND (LHD-8) will be referred to USS MKI.

USS SOM: USS SOMERSET (LPD-25) will be referred to as USS SOM.

USS SAN: USS SAN DIEGO (LPD-22) will be referred to as USS SAN.

Well: Well is a reference to the Well Deck of a ship. The well deck is a hangar-like deck located at the waterline in the stern of an amphibious warfare ships. By taking on water the ship can lower its stern gate, flooding the well deck and allowing boats, AAVs and landing craft to dock within the ship. Green well is a term used when the ship is ready to receive or disembark AAVs. Red well is a term used when the ship is not ready to receive or disembark AAVs.

TABLE OF PERSONNEL

AAV PLATOON (this list does not include the entire Platoon, just those in investigation)

RANK	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	EDIPI	PMOS	BILLET	NOTES
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)					AAV PLATOON COMMANDER	AAV 4/SCI
					AAV PLATOON SERGEANT	AAV 12/SCI
					3RD SECTION LEADER	AAV 10
					1ST SECTION LEADER	AAV 1
					AAV 523519 VEHICLE COMMANDER, 2ND SECTION LEADER	AAV 5
					CHIEF MECHANIC	AAV 12/SCI
					VEHICLE COMMANDER	AAV 14
					AAV DRIVER	AAV 13
					MECHANIC/REAR CREWMAN	AAV 5
					AAV COMMUNICATIONS NCO	AAV 13
					AAV DRIVER	AAV 14
					AAV REAR CREWMAN	AAV 14
					AAV CREWMAN	AAV 13
					AAV DRIVER	AAV 5
					AAV CREWMAN	AAV 13

BRAVO COMPANY BLT 1/4 (this list does not include the entire Company, just those in investigation)

RANK	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	EDIPI	PMOS	BILLET	NOTES
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)					COMPANY COMMANDER	AAV 4/SCI
					COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER	AAV 6
					COMPANY 1STSGT	AAV 12/SCI
					2ND PLATOON COMMANDER	AAV 5
					2ND PLATOON SERGEANT	TAD
					EMBARKED MARINE	AAV 5
					EMBARKED MARINE	AAV 5
					EMBARKED MARINE	AAV 5
					EMBARKED CORPSMAN	AAV 5
					EMBARKED MARINE	AAV 5

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

EMBARKED MARINE	AAV 5
EMBARKED MARINE	AAV 5
EMBARKED MARINE	AAV 5
EMBARKED MARINE	AAV 5
EMBARKED MARINE	AAV 5
EMBARKED MARINE	AAV 5
EMBARKED MARINE	AAV 5

BLT 1/4 (this list does not include the entire BLT, just those in investigation)

RANK	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	EDIPI	PMOS	BILLET	NOTES
					BLT COMMANDING OFFICER	USS MKI
					BLT EXECUTIVE OFFICER	AAV 13
					BLT OPERATIONS OFFICER	USS MKI
					H&S COMPANY COMMANDER	USS SOM
					BLT ASST OPERATIONS OFF	AAV 13
					BLT COMMUNICATIONS CHIEF	AAV 13
					BLT CAAT PLATOON SERGEANT	OPFOR
					BLT ADMIN CHIEF	USS SOM
					COMMUNICATIONS NCO	AAV 14

15TH MEU (this list does not include the entire MEU, just those in investigation)

RANK	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	EDIPI	PMOS	BILLET	NOTES
					MEU COMMANDING OFFICER	USS MKI
					MEU EXECUTIVE OFFICER	USS MKI
					MEU OPERATIONS OFFICER	USS MKI
					EXERCISE CONTROL	USS MKI
					MEU ASST AIR OFFICER	USS MKI
					EXERCISE CONTROL	SCI
					ADR TEAM LEADER	
					ADR MEDICAL	
					ADR TEAM MEMBER	
					ADR TEAM MEMBER	
					ADR TEAM MEMBER	

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ADR TEAM MEMBER	
ADR TEAM MEMBER	

USS SOMERSET CREW (this list does not include the entire ship, just those in investigation)

RANK	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	EDIPI	BILLET
				CAPTAIN
				EXECUTIVE OFFICER
				PLANS AND TACTICS OFFICER
				OPERATION OFFICER (TAO)
				SWIC
				USS SOM FIRST LIEUTENANT
				TAO 1500-1800
				USS SOM BOATSWAIN
				JOOD
				TAO 1800-2100
	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			COMBAT CARGO OFFICER
				WELL DECK CONTROL OFFICER
				BOAT ENGINEER/LAUNCHED IN RESCUE RHIB
				ON WATCH MONITORING BOAT ALPHA RADIO
				WELL DECK CONTROL
				WATCH OFFICER IN CIC
				ON WATCH, PORT LOOKOUT
				ON WATCH, PORT LOOKOUT
				ON WATCH, PORT LOOKOUT

OTHER PERSONNEL

RANK	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	EDIPI	PMOS	BILLET
					FORMER CO OF 3RD AABN
					H&S COMPANY CO, 3RD AABN
					MAINTENANCE OFFICER, 3RD AABN
					FORMER MAINTAINENCE CHIEF, 3RD AABN
	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)				MEDICAL OFFICER, 3RD AABN
					I MEF COMMSTRAT Officer

15th MEU AAV Platoon

Vehicle (Vic) #	Nomenclature	Serial #	Tactical Designation	Section	Section Color	Vehicle Callsign Internal	Vehicle Callsign External
Vic 1	AAVP7	523445	3-15-01	1st Section	Red	Red 1	Gator 1
Vic 2	AAVP7	523195	3-15-02	1st Section	Red	Red 2	
Vic 3	AAVP7	522499	3-15-03	1st Section	Red	Red 3	
Vic 4	AAVP7	522768	3-15-04	1st Section	Red	Red 4	Gator Actual
Vic 5	AAVP7	523519	3-15-05	2nd Section	White	White 1	Gator 2
Vic 6	AAVP7	523100	3-15-06	2nd Section	White	White 2	
Vic 7	AAVP7	523612	3-15-07	2nd Section	White	White 3	
Vic 8	AAVP7	522932	3-15-08	2nd Section	White	White 4	
Vic 9	AAVP7	523311	3-15-09	3rd Section	Blue	Blue 1	Gator 3
Vic 10	AAVP7	522677	3-15-10	3rd Section	Blue	Blue 2	
Vic 11	AAVP7	522655	3-15-11	3rd Section	Blue	Blue 3	
Vic 12	AAVP7	522999	3-15-12	3rd Section	Blue	Blue 4	
Vic 13	AAVC7	522288	3-15-C7	C2 Section	N/A	C7	China Bravo
Vic 14	AAVP7 w/NOTM	522656	3-15-14	C2 Section	N/A	POP	POP

The Release Authority for Enclosure 7 is the Assault
Amphibian School.

Assault Amphibian School
P. O. Box 555041
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055-5061



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, NAVAL SURFACE FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
2841 RENDOVA ROAD
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92155-5490

COMMANDER
NAVAL SURFACE FORCE ATLANTIC
1751 MORRIS ST BOX 168
NORFOLK VA 23511-2808

IN REPLY REFER TO

COMNAVSURFPACINST/
COMNAVSURFLANT 3340.3E
28 AUG 2017

COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT INSTRUCTION 3340.3E

From: Commander, Naval Surface Force, Pacific
Commander, Naval Surface Force, Atlantic

Subj: WET WELL OPERATIONS MANUAL

Encl: (1) WET WELL OPERATIONS MANUAL

1. Purpose. To issue a consolidated Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVSURFPAC) and Commander, Naval Surface Force, Atlantic, (COMNAVSURFLANT) wet well operations manual.
2. Cancellation. COMNAVSURFPACTINST / COMNAVSURFPACTINST 3340.3D. This instruction has been completely revised and should be read in its entirety.
3. Discussion. The Wet Well Operations Manual is a single source document discussing in detail all facets of wet well operations. It provides the base information for the officers and crew assigned to amphibious ships and describes in detail those evolutions required to properly and safely execute wet well operations. The following procedures are representative and are not to be considered as covering all situations which might occur. As with any operation with a great number of variables, common sense, sound basic seamanship and on-scene decision making will be required, based on the circumstances as they occur.
4. Action
 - a. Commanding Officers will use the information contained in this manual as the basis for developing Wet Well, Ballasting and Deballasting Operations Bill.
 - b. Recommendations for improvements to this manual are solicited. Proposed changes should be submitted via the chain of command to COMNAVSURFPAC or COMNAVSURFLANT as appropriate.
5. Records Management. Records created as a result of this instruction, regardless of media and format, must be managed per Secretary of the Navy Manual 5210.1 of January 2012.
6. Review and Effective Date. Per OPNAVINST 5215.17A, COMNAVSURFPAC and COMNAVSURFLANT will review this instruction annually on the anniversary of its effective date to ensure applicability, currency, and consistency with Federal, DoD, SECNAV, and Navy

ENCLOSURE (8)

COMNAVSURFPACINST/
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policy and statutory authority using OPNAV 5215/40 Review of Instruction. This instruction will automatically expire 5 years after effective date unless reissued or canceled prior to the 5-year anniversary date, or an extension has been granted

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Releasability and Distribution:

This instruction is cleared for public release and is available electronically only, via COMNAVSURFOR Directives Web Site,
<https://www.surfor.navy.mil/directives0/pages/default.aspx>

CHAPTER 9

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE OPERATIONS

Ref: (a) MCWP 3-13
(b) NWP 22-3
(c) NSTM Chapter 584
(d) COMNAVSURFPACINST 3120.6A/FMFPACO 3120.6D
(e) FXP 5

9.1. General Safety

a. An important factor when operating with AAV is visibility. Due to the vehicle's height and length, the driver's visibility is severely reduced, particularly when objects are close to the vehicle. When the hatches are secured and the driver is looking through two inches of bullet proof glass, their visibility is reduced even further.

b. The AAV will not be loaded to a point reducing reserve buoyancy to under 5,000 pounds. The OIC of the AAV unit is responsible to ensure vehicle loading is safe and meets this requirement.

c. If an underway launch is planned, consideration must be given to not exceed maximum swim distance listed in reference (a).

d. Safety boats are mandatory during all waterborne evolutions. One safety boat is required for five or less vehicles; two safety boats when six or more vehicles are waterborne. If the ship cannot provide a sufficient number of safety boats, an unloaded AAV may be designated as a safety boat. Additional safety boats may be used at the discretion of the operational commander. Safety boat crews shall be manned by a standard boat crew (coxswain, boat engineer, bow hook) and a boat officer for each boat. If deemed necessary by the CO, a rescue swimmer should accompany the boat crew. Safety boats will be employed per reference (b). The senior boat officer is designated Boat Group Commander (BGC).

e. The AAV detachment OIC will designate one AAV as the primary safety and recovery vehicle.

f. The BGC is responsible for the safe navigation of the safety boats and AAV. The BGC must stay vigilant to other surface craft operating in the launch area or navigation hazards not briefed.

g. All safety boat personnel are to be alert for the AAV distress signals when AAV are waterborne. Radio communications concerning disabled, waterborne AAVs will take precedence over other communications. If the radio is inoperable, the disabled vehicle will use the following visual distress signals:

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SIGNAL

MESSAGE	LIGHT CONDITION	
Vehicle is sinking, in danger of sinking, or serious injury	Day	Wave flag November from a boat hook
Vehicle is sinking, in danger of sinking, or serious injury	Day or night	Red star shell or blinking headlights
Vehicle is disabled	Day	Flag November on a boat hook (not waving)
Vehicle is disabled	Night	Spotlight or battle lantern shown vertically (pointed up)

- h. All personnel onboard safety boats or embarked in AAV will wear authorized personal flotation devices.
- i. Safety observers should be assigned in sufficient numbers to ensure the safe handling of AAV within the well and vehicle decks.
- j. No AAV is to be spotted or left stationary on an energy absorbing ramp or vehicle ramp; there is no safe or approved way of securing an AAV on an incline.
- k. AAV detachment personnel should provide advice and be involved in staging craft for launch.
- l. Before launching AAV, all vehicle hatches and vents will be secured and telltales checked. Under no circumstances will an AAV splash unless complete watertight integrity has been confirmed by the AAV Platoon Commander/Platoon Sergeant.
- m. AAVs are not equipped with navigation lights for night or low visibility operations. To reduce the potential hazard to both AAV and shipping, the use of chemical lights (chem lites) attached to the AAV's antenna is recommended. **Any color but green may be used.** Green has been designated by the Navy, and U.S. Coast Guard, for man overboard.

9.2. Operations

a. **Advance Planning and Preparation.** While the Ship's Loading Characteristics Pamphlet (SLCP) and the Regulations for Embarked Troops published by each amphibious ship will provide AAV units with essential information, there is no substitute for personal liaison before joint AAV/amphibious ship operations. Advance liaison will ensure that both ship and AAV unit are in agreement concerning the sequence of events and objectives. Specific operational, embarkation, or personnel requirements should also be discussed. Figure 9-2 lists the minimum equipment required to conduct AAV operations. Additional guidance for advance planning and

preparation is available in reference (e), Chapter 5.

b. Communications. Early liaison between the ship and the AAV unit will ensure that the required frequencies for a joint operation are included in the operation order (OPORD) or operational task (OPTASK) and ship's Communications (COMM) Plan. In some operating areas (OPAREAs), frequency requests must be made several weeks prior to using those circuits. Early liaison will ensure deadlines are met.

c. Prior to conducting any shipboard AAV training, a safety and operations brief will be held for all participating ship's company and embarked personnel. The brief will include the following information:

- (1) Evolution timeline
- (2) Navigation hazards and aids
- (3) Weather, sea, and calculated surf conditions if available
- (4) Visual and radio communication procedures
 - (a) Primary and secondary control frequencies
 - (b) Call signs
 - (c) Authentication procedure
 - (d) Required reports
 - (e) Grid positioning (GRID POSIT) system
 - (f) Lost communications procedures
- (5) Standard safety precautions and emergency procedure
- (6) Vehicle formations or tactics

d. Securing AAV in the Well Deck

(1) The AAV crew will lash down their AAV (with ship's force supervision) using the lashing gear furnished by the ship. Four clevises, 1 1/8 inch screw-pin anchor shackles provided by the AAV crew, are attached to each towing eye to receive lashing cable eyes. Figure 9-1 shows an example of the lashing arrangement.

(2) Per reference (c), AAVs will be secured in place with a minimum of four 70,000-pound lashing assemblies. Combat-loaded AAV weighing in excess of 43,000 pounds shall be secured with additional lashing assemblies and shoring to meet the criteria listed in reference (c).

(3) Lashing assemblies will not be attached to the vehicle tracks, sprockets, or idler assemblies. An AAV will never be secured by passing lashing gear around the tracks.

(4) Rubber track pads will normally alleviate the necessity for dunnage when embarking AAV, but these are sometimes lost or loosened in transit.

(5) Although the AAV unit commander will inspect all lashing gear prior to securing the handling evolution, this does not relieve the CO of his responsibility for the proper securing of all embarked cargo and vehicles.




Figure 9-1.
AAV Stowage

e. Security

(1) Procedure for vehicle security will be contained in the Regulations for Embarked Troops. Should the AAV unit's standard operating procedures (SOP) conflict with Troop Regulations, the ship's CO will determine security requirements.

(2) The AAV unit commander may provide additional personnel for vehicle security from organic personnel as desired. These additional personnel will not be employed in a manner which interferes with the function of the standing security watch, as established by the ship's CO.

f. Vehicle Operation Testing

(1) The AAV unit commander must gain permission from ship's appointed representative when desiring to test run or move an AAV. Normally the ship's representative will be the OOD while underway and the Command Duty Officer (CDO) while in port.

(2) The ship's representative will ensure that all necessary ship's personnel are notified of the intended AAV operations and that all safety precautions have been taken.

g. Fuel

(1) AAVs use diesel fuel but are capable of operating with JP-5 or DFM fuel. The utilization of particular diesel fuel grades is dependent on operating environment temperature. Reference (d) provides specific information on fuel type utilization. Although some of these fuels are not normally available on amphibious ships, they are normally included as bulk onload items in drums as Landing Force Operational Reserve Material (LFORM).

(2) AAV units drawing bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) during exercises are required to provide the ship with the appropriate supply documentation (DD-1149) within 10 days.

(3) The AAV unit commander must request permission from the ship's appointed representative prior to commencing fueling. During the evolution, the AAV commander will keep the OOD or CDO informed of the status of fueling operation.

9.3. **Embarkation.** AAV may be embarked at anchor, while lying to or at bare steerageway, or by ramp from a quay wall while the ship is moored.

a. Considerations

(1) The embarkation of AAVs requires close coordination between debark control, well deck control, vehicle drivers, and vehicle handlers. The use of proper signals is essential in maintaining positive control over vehicle movement, ensuring complete understanding between handlers and drivers.

(2) To ensure maximum visibility and available power, AAV will always be driven aboard bow first, never backed onboard.

b. Standard Procedures

(1) Ships should ballast to four to six feet of water at the sill leaving minimal water forward. This creates a false beach which lets the AAV transition from waterborne to track drive inside the well.

(2) When all preparations in the well are complete, the ship will order the lead AAV to make its approach by signal flag or lights from the control station.

(a) A green light or waving a green flag indicates "Ready to receive AAV". A red

light or motionless red flag indicates "Not ready to receive AAV".

(b) For daylight operations, control lights and flags will be used. For night or low visibility operations, control lights and light wands will be used.

(3) The POIC will control craft from the aft end of wing wall catwalk on LHD 1, LPD 17, LSD 41 and LSD 49 class ships.

(4) The POIC will continue to direct the AAV in the well until the AAV has grounded out. On LSD 41 class ships, control will be passed to a traffic director stationed further forward on the wingwall catwalk for positioning in designated vehicle parking area. On all other ship classes, where the available stowage area is more confined and vehicle positioning is not as time consuming, the POIC will control the craft until spotted. When the AAV is in the proper position, the vehicle controller will signal the AAV driver to pivot 180 degrees and face the vehicle toward the stern. At no time will any personnel, including traffic directors, be allowed in the well deck while AAVs are being positioned.

(5) As soon as the AAV has been pivoted 180 degrees and is moving forward, another AAV may enter the well deck.

(6) As directed by the POIC, platoon commanders, platoon sergeants, and the Commanding Officer of Troops may be allowed to debark the AAV once it has been spotted; all other personnel must stay in the vehicle until the embarkation evolution is complete. Then, as directed by the POIC, troops and crew may debark. Troops will proceed to assigned berthing and vehicle crews will secure their vehicles. The ship will have a gripe detail available to assist in gripping AAVs if needed. AAVs will not be spotted for securing or left stationary on an incline including vehicle ramps and energy absorbing ramps.

(7) Disabled or damaged vehicles may require assistance to maneuver in the well. Reference (d) provides specific guidance on rigging lines and tackle to move disabled vehicles.

9.4. **Debarkation.** AAV may debark by either of two methods: administrative or tactical launch. Administrative launches may be conducted at anchor, pierside, or while lying to. Tactical or underway launches are conducted while the ship is making way, normally between 5 and 15 knots.

a. General

(1) Thirty minutes prior to starting AAVs, the well deck ventilation blowers must be energized and set to operate at high speed. Only after ventilation has been verified will AAV crews be allowed to start their vehicles.

(2) When conducting preoperational checks, AAVs should be operated in groups of four to ensure exhaust fumes are fully evacuated from the well by the exhaust blowers. Once the AAVs have been warmed up and shut down, the crews will stand by to embark troops.

(3) Troops should be embarked 60 minutes prior to launch time. Tight spacing between AAVs may prevent the opening of AAV ramp personnel hatches. The debarkation schedule should be designed to allow for such delays.

(4) Before the AAVs debark, all hatches, ramps, and vents must be closed. Under no circumstances will an AAV be splashed unless complete watertight integrity has been attained. Water tight integrity will be confirmed by the vehicle platoon leader and reported to the WDCO.

(5) If a casualty occurs during the launch phase, push or pull the disabled AAV to one side and drive the remaining AAV around it and off the stern gate.

b. Standard Procedure:

(1) In addition to the safety and operations brief, conduct a formal brief for well deck and AAV personnel of all visual signals to be used and where they will be displayed.

(2) Set Condition 1A for wet well operations.

(3) WDCO will direct the unlashing and movement of AAVs to the AAV launch line. An AAV launch line (12 inches in width) will be painted on the well deck bulkhead (both sides) one AAV length from sill.

(4) Ballast the ship to approximately 1 foot of water at the sill. Sill depths in excess of 1 foot will produce noticeably adverse effects on the vehicle's controls. These effects become more pronounced as water depths over the sill increase.

(5) Lower the stern gate to the horizontal position; the stern gate should not deviate from the horizontal more than three degrees during the launch.

(6) Ensure that all ventilation blowers are operating.

(7) Start, warm, and secure AAV engines before the arrival of troops in the well deck area. AAV crews will conduct all pre-launch operation checks at this time.

(8) When all personnel going ashore are embarked in the vehicles, the AAV unit commander will collect manifests from all AAV and submit them to the CCO for transfer to the DCO.

(9) At the direction of Well Deck Control, the first wave of AAVs will start engines, approximately 10 minutes prior to launch. All other crews (successive waves) will wait until ordered to start their vehicles.

c. Tactical Launch Specifics

(1) General

(a) Although AAV have the endurance and water tight integrity necessary for extended waterborne operations, they were not designed for maneuvers at sea. When correctly employed, there is a minimum amount of time devoted to wave assembly prior to crossing the Line of Departure (LOD).

NOTE: Prolonged waterborne employment increases the possibility of mechanical failure, vehicle casualties, and troop fatigue. Of primary concern is troop effectiveness, which degrades rapidly when AAVs are waterborne 2 hours or more; as sea state increases, fatigue increases.

(b) Underway launch tactics combine the elements of speed, surprise, and relative stealth. It represents the first major improvement in the surface ship-to-shore assault since World War II. The technique is considered doctrine and is used whenever minimum exposure time is desired, even to combat poor weather conditions. By utilizing underway launch tactics, it is possible to eliminate congested, vulnerable anchorages near the LOD and allow ships to freely maneuver close ashore.

(2) Considerations. The decision to conduct an underway launch rests with Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF). The following factors must be considered when conducting underway AAV launch:

(a) Launch Speed. The launch will be designated either "High Speed" (ship's speed in excess of 10 knots) or "Low Speed" (ship's speed 10 knots or less). The exact speed at which the launch will occur is the decision of the ship's CO. In the event of launches by more than one ship, launch speeds will be coordinated by CATF or the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC). Launch speed is a factor of:

1. Tactical situation (e.g., enemy concentration of shored-based artillery or tactical aircraft).
2. Sea conditions at the LOD.
3. LOD width and length (will affect vehicle spacing and individual launch time).
4. Navigation and hydrography of the area.
5. Distance from the launch point (ship's track) to the LOD.
6. Number of vehicles being launched.
7. Depth of water relative to squatting.

(b) Launch Track. Per reference (d), the launch track will normally parallel the beach; however, tracks may be U-turns or echelons. By design, the AAV LOD will normally be as close to the beach as is possible, and need not coincide with the LOD for landing craft. In any case, distance from the ship to the LOD and from the LOD to the beach should not exceed parameters listed in reference (a). The launch track should, if possible, avoid large variations in water depth,

especially at depths less than 100 feet.

(c) Launch Interval. Spacing between AAVs during underway launch is most important. After the ship's CO has determined the launch speed, the launch interval can be calculated to provide sufficient distance between craft to avoid collision once waterborne. When calculating the launch interval, the number of vehicles in each wave and the width of the LOD and beach should also be considered. The minimum interval, per reference (d), is five seconds. Longer intervals should be considered at speeds less than 10 knots to ensure a safe distance between vehicles (approximately 50 meters).

(3) Underway Launch Procedures

(a) Debarkation during an underway launch is done in the same manner as debarkation when a ship is at anchor or lying to. Note, that during an underway launch, the precision in launching individual AAVs in terms of time and position is critical, since these factors will drastically affect the wave's formation and overall tactical effectiveness of the landing.

(b) The major limiting factor in terms of ship handling is the requirement for adequate water depth to avoid undesirable bottom effects while steaming at high speed, ballasted down, and the stern gate lowered. Before conducting the launch, a careful examination of reliable hydrographic charts is essential.

(c) The major limiting factor relative to AAVs is the driver's ability to maintain steering control and affect a breakaway from the ship's wake once launched. Proper ballasting and positioning of the stern gate will alleviate this problem.

(d) If the stern gate mechanism is capable of withstanding the stress, underway launch is feasible and safe at any speed up to a maximum of 21.5 knots under the following conditions:

1. The stern gate is lowered and locked in a position level with the well deck.
2. The ship is properly ballasted to a depth of 1 foot over the sill, which provides the best conditions for a fast exit and rapid gain of vehicle control once waterborne. Wave action in the well should be reduced to a minimum by ship maneuvers and speed.
3. Vehicles are not loaded beyond reserve buoyancy conditions.

(e) While the control and execution of the underway launch is a ship function, AAV unit commanders are inherently responsible for coordinating with the ship's personnel to ensure all the above factors which affect the launch are addressed.

9.5. Emergency Procedures for Disabled or Sinking AAV. Reference (d) provides standard emergency procedures for the salvage and rescue of waterborne AAV. The direction of rescue efforts for any stranded vehicle is the responsibility of the AAV unit leader. The CATF, normally delegated to the Primary or Secondary Control Ships, shall be responsible for recovery efforts associated with a submerged AAV.

a. Assistance Procedures

(1) The designated safety boats will provide the initial support to an AAV in distress. Unless specifically called to assist, all other AAVs will continue on their current mission. Again, it is important that AAVs not be operated for extensive periods at sea; the chances of a second vehicle becoming disabled increases with time.

(2) When providing assistance, it is imperative the boat crew shall not secure the boat in any way to the AAV. Any lines which are used to lash the two vehicles together will be hand tended and have no more than one turn on a cleat. If an AAV must be towed to safety, a second AAV will provide the tow. If a second AAV is not available, an LCM or LCU may be used.

(3) If an AAV is swamped by waves or begins sinking for any other reason, the safety boat will immediately cast off lines and stand off to the windward side to rescue evacuees.

(4) Vehicles disabled in the surf zone are the responsibility of the AAV unit commander or his representative directing operations at the beachhead. At no time will a safety boat attempt to enter the surf zone to effect a rescue.

b. Emergency distress signals for disabled vehicles are provided in paragraph 9.1(g).

c. Vehicle Evacuation Procedures. The vehicle commander is responsible for the safe evacuation of all crew and embarked personnel. It is imperative all embarked personnel are briefed on evacuation procedures prior to embarking onboard an AAV. This brief should include:

(1) Standard safety procedures

(2) Evacuation procedures

(3) Proper egress routes

(4) Wearing and employing personal flotation devices

(5) Importance of following the instructions of the Vehicle Commander and Third Crewman in an emergency. Specific procedures for vehicle evacuation are listed in reference (d).

d. Recovering Disabled Vehicles. The following procedure describes the actions required to recover a disabled AAV to a well deck. Specific instruction on the towing of AAV is given in reference (d).

(1) Ballast down to a minimum of 5 feet at the sill, allowing the towing vehicle to operate freely in the well.

(2) Tow the disabled AAV to a safe distance from the stern of the recovery ship using a second AAV.

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(3) When ordered by the WDCO, the towing vehicle will tow the disabled vehicle as far forward in the well deck as possible.

(4) Once the embarked personnel and equipment are removed from the disabled vehicle, it should be towed to a location safe from wave action.

(5) As a last resort, the disabled AAV may be secured in the well deck in such a position that it offers the least interference with well deck operations.

(6) Safety of personnel will be the primary consideration when retrieving a disabled AAV.

(7) To debark a disabled AAV, it should be transported ashore in the well deck of an LCM, LCU, or LCAC.

The Release Authority for Enclosure 9 is the
Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch.

AVTB
Bldg 210536, Kraus St.
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055

Date	Time	12 Hour rollover brief	Event/Comments	Ref	Phone
30-Jul-20	1915	AAV moving shore to ship went underwater during 15th MEU PMINT event.		I MEU G3 Cell	(760) 583-6313
30-Jul-20	1930	Voices report from 15 MEU CHDR to I MEU G3.		15th MEU CHDR	DESK: (760) 725-9379 Cell: (760) 214-1712
30-Jul-20	1935	Phone call to I MEU CDO from I MEU G3.		MEU CDO	(619) 455-7884
30-Jul-20	1935	I MEU CDO voice report to MOC submitted by I MEU CDO, timestamp 310215ZJUL20.		I MEU G3	(760) 725-3615
30-Jul-20	1935	I MEU SMO posted the following information provided. Confirmed voice report from 1830. MEU G3 spoke with 1st WARDIV G3. SMO spoke with 1st WARDIV CDO. At 1815 PRT, an AAV enroute, from San Clemente Island to USS Somers set took on water and sank. Marines on board. SAR aircraft overhead reported Marines surfaced. MEU getting accountability. Second SAR aircraft and RIBs enroute to incident area.		I MEU G3	(760) 112-2521 (811) 920-0246
30-Jul-20	1940	MEU CO phone call to I MEU G3. Confirms 14 Marines total on board AAV. 3x Marine recovered by RIB (1x needed CPR). 1x Marine recovered by SAR aircraft. 15th MEU aviation assets in work.		COMSTRAT Col	(202) 550-8555
30-Jul-20	2000	I MEU SMO phone call to MEU CDO. MEU SMO confirms 3x Marines recovered and enroute to Scripps Memorial Hospital (exact location unknown AT).		MEU CDO	(703) 695-5454
30-Jul-20	2000	I MEU G33 phonecall to I MIG CO. Provided SITREP.		3DFP Battle Capt	(619) 884-4217
30-Jul-20	2014	COMSTRAT CO phone call I MEU CDO. I MEU G33 relays SITREP.		ESG-3 Battle Capt	(619) 556-1466
30-Jul-20	2033	I MEU G3 arrives to I MEU COFS floor. Relays conversation with 15th MEU CO confirming all previous data point entries (3x Marines recovered via RIBs, 1x Marine recovered via SAR aircraft, 1x Marine needed CPR).		COFS VTC Bridge	158 235 103 121
30-Jul-20	2040	I MEU VTC stood up on COFS floor for information exchange.		I MEU COMSTRAT	(760) 763-7047
30-Jul-20	2052	I MEU COG, DCG, G3 and 15th MEU CO dial into I MEU COFS VTC. 15th MEU CO confirms 16 total PAX aboard AAV. 8x missing, 3x MEDVAC (1x critical, 2x unknown), 5x recovered safely.			
30-Jul-20	2100	COMSTRAT reps arrive at COFS floor.			
30-Jul-20	2125	I MEU SMO contacts 3rd Fleet Watch Officer. Relays instructions to dial into standing COFS VTC to coordinate messaging.			
30-Jul-20	2215	PARAFAC contacts I MEU G3 COFS OOD for status update. Current status is given.			
30-Jul-20	2230	I MEU G3 relays status to primary staff.			
30-Jul-20	2300	SNO confirms distro with HQMC Op Center. ESG 3 MO, Div CDO, and MFP MO.			
30-Jul-20	2330	MEU SMO spoke with 15th MEU XO regarding OPREP. OPREP to be released within the hour.			
31-Jul-20	0006	OPREP released by 15th MEU.			
31-Jul-20	0035	I MEU COMSTRAT releases press release.			
31-Jul-20	0200	Casualty/DUSTWUN report received for PFC HATH.			
31-Jul-20	0226	Report received from USS Makin Island to I MEU SMO as follows: 1. There is currently a MH-60S from the HSC-23 on station conducting search until 0400T. They will be relieved by an MH-60R from HSC-23 who will remain on station from 0400-0600T. An MH-60S from HSC-23 will resume search at 0600T with a rescue swimmer embarked. 2. OPREP-3 was submitted to HQMC at 0035T. 3. Passes for all crew and passengers involved in mishap are currently being screened and updated. Ships conducting parallel search of the 8 unaccounted for. All RHIBs safely recovered on board naval shipping. No changes to status of recovered Marines on the 8 unaccounted for. In addition to the AAV's and Marines left ashore on SCI, 2 x LCAC and crews from SOM are on the beach overnight. Recovery of these craft and pax to SOM will need to be part of our concious planning.			
31-Jul-20	0313	Casualty/DUSTWUN report received for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
31-Jul-20	0329	Report received from USS Makin Island to I MEU SMO as follows: 1. No changes or updates from last report. 2. MH-60S from the HSC-23 continue station conducting search until 0400T; they will be relieved by MH-49, who will remain on station from 0400-0600T. An MH-60S from HSC-23 will resume search at 0600T with a rescue swimmer embarked.			
31-Jul-20	0332	Casualty/DUSTWUN report received for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
31-Jul-20	0347	Casualty/DUSTWUN report received for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
31-Jul-20	0348	Casualty/DUSTWUN report received for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
31-Jul-20	0349	Casualty/DUSTWUN report received for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
31-Jul-20	0350	Casualty/DUSTWUN report received for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
31-Jul-20	0352	Casualty/DUSTWUN report received for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
31-Jul-20	0359	Casualty/DUSTWUN report received for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
31-Jul-20	0402	All 8 x DUSTWUN reports have been sent to HQMC along with the PCR report for the deceased Marine. 2 x SIR reports pending for 2 injured Marines.			
31-Jul-20	0432	No changes from update at 0330.			
31-Jul-20	0443	Update from USS Makin Island. LCAC and 6 AAVs still on San Clemente Island.			
31-Jul-20	0509	SIR report received for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
31-Jul-20	0510	G3 updates I MEU CO.			
31-Jul-20	0523	SIR Report received for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
31-Jul-20	0525	Last two (2) SIR reports sent to HQMC.			
31-Jul-20	0521	15th MEU Update: 1. All OPREP submitted to HQMC. 2. 8x DUSTWUN/1x Deceased/2x Serious injury. No other updates than what was provided at 0330 and 0432.		AAS CO	(760) 725 2322
31-Jul-20	0525	3D AAV BN OOD contacted. Briefed and provided COMSTRAT phone number.		OOD	(760) 725-2005
31-Jul-20	0537	Col Bartlett called in and provided the COMSTRAT phone number for inquiries from media, family etc. It is the same phone number already provided by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). However, Col Bartlett did confirm the phone number has a call forwarding function to cell phone (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) cell number currently we're 23 to 1st Coast Guard Station. (130M60S and 130M-60R).		AAS OOD	760-421-7174
31-Jul-20	0538	Extending function to cell phone (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) cell number currently we're 23 to 1st Coast Guard Station. (130M60S and 130M-60R).		COMSTRAT Mobile	760-846-0356
31-Jul-20	0655	That we had 130M60S on station until 0400T. The MH-60R and MH-60S are coming from the HSC-49 and HSC-23 detachments embarked aboard LHD-8. -TACRON detachment aboard LHD-8 is coordinating to receive external assistance. Unconfirmed at this time, however, expecting 130M-60S from HSC-21 and 1x Coast Guard rescue helicopter at 1200T. More to follow once these assets are confirmed.		Military Police Watch Officer 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

[illegible]

01 30030303

Supervisor of
Salvage & Diving;
Director of Ocean
Engineering

[illegible]

[illegible]

Good morning,

I MEF update below.

(U//FOUO) I MEF CG AAV Mishap CCIRs:

1. Sunken AAV located.
2. Remains or other items related to mishap discovered on or below surface.
3. Any ship casualty or other status change (loss of salvage capability) negatively impacting recovery operations.
4. Any status change of our two hospitalized Marines.

(U//FOUO) Previous 12 Hours:

Casualty Branch reported NOK notification for all deceased Marines and Sailor. At 2358 PDT, 1 Aug 20 we unfortunately transitioned from search and rescue operations to recovery operations.

At approximately 1100 PDT today, the Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV) Salvage Officer and 3 other PAX arrived aboard the HOS Dominator with the two IVER4 AUVs. Many thanks to Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch for transporting the IVER4 personnel and equipment. The IVER4 AUV team developed a search plan covering seven search areas surrounding the AAV track and last known position. Each search area is 500 meters x 500 meters and will take approximately one hour to search with an IVER4 AUV. The team is preparing to launch the first IVER4 AUV now and will be ready to splash at approximately 1430 PDT to search Area #1. When Area #1 search is complete, the IVER4 AUV will be recovered, search data downloaded, and the batteries will be recharged. While that is occurring, the second IVER4 AUV will begin to search Area #2. The team will leapfrog the two AUVs in this manner until all seven search areas are complete. If the AAV is not found in one of the seven search areas, the search will be expanded to the east and west.

(U//FOUO) Next 24 Hours:

IVER4 and SIBITZKY ROV continue search operations. Deep Drone ROV system expected to arrive at NAS North Island on 03 Aug 20 to reinforce search operations. If the AAV is not found by the IVER4 AUV on 02 Aug 20, Naval Information Warfare Center will mobilize a MK18 UUV from San Diego on 03 Aug 20 ISO search operations.

(U//FOUO) Other / Additional Comments:

NAVSEA and SUPSALV are coordinating efforts for the Barge Crane, expected to be available by 06 Aug 20. We expect mobilization on 04 Aug 20, but SUPSALV is working with Crane provider to adjust the availability date. No expected impact to recovery mission timeline at this time.

I MEF is coordinating with SUPSALV to provide five personnel to assist with recovery of human remains, body bags, PPE for handling HR, and a reefer unit aboard the salvage barge to ensure dignified transfer.

ENCLOSURE (11)

Good morning,

I MEF update below.

(U//FOUO) I MEF CG AAV Mishap CCIRs:

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3. Any ship casualty or other status change (loss of salvage capability) negatively impacting recovery operations.
4. Any status change of our two hospitalized Marines.

(U//FOUO) Previous 12 Hours:

On 02 Aug 20 at 2255 PDT I MEF COMMSTRAT issued a press release identifying the deceased. The HOS Dominator employed the IVER4 AUVs and SIBITZKY ROV continuing coordinated search operations, covering four of the seven northern search boxes. The NAVSEA Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV) team discovered a large diesel fuel sheen forming in the vicinity of the northern search boxes and are considering expanding the search to the east and west before proceeding to the three remaining southern boxes. The Flyaway Deep Ocean Salvage System (FADOSS) ship lift was prepared for transport to North Island from Port Hueneme, while the 12k foot line and spooler are being shipped by ground from Williamsburg, VA with an ETA of 05 Aug 20.

(U//FOUO) Next 24 Hours:

Deep Drone ROV system expected to arrive at NAS North Island on 03 Aug 20 to reinforce search operations. NAVSEA requested Naval Information Warfare Center (NIWC) mobilize a MK18 UUV from San Diego to increase search capacity. 15th MEU will commence San Clemente Island backload 03 Aug 20. 2x LCAC from SOM and 1x LCAC from MKI will backload 6x AAVs to SOM with the remainder of the SACEX equipment.

The Investigating Officer and supporting team for the command investigation will fly to MKI this evening to begin the investigation.

I MEF is coordinating with HQMC Safety Division to assign an investigating officer and commence the safety investigation.

(U//FOUO) Other / Additional Comments:

Barge Crane is expected to arrive at North Island and to be available for load out on 04 Aug 20.

I MEF is coordinating with SUPSALV to provide personnel to conduct recovery of human remains. The supported command remains 15th MEU. SUPSALV has lead for salvage operations. I MEF has responsibility for recovery of remains. I MEF TASKORD will be published NLT 5 Aug.

ENDSTATE: I MEF's Marines and Sailor are recovered, handled, and transported with dignity in accordance with our naval traditions, orders, and directives. The AAV is recovered, secured, and transported to designated investigative location. Recovery resources are postured to support NLT 5 August, fully coordinated and synchronized with salvage operations, and deconflicted with investigative requirements.

ENCLOSURE (11)

Good evening,

I MEF update below.

(U//FOUO) I MEF CG AAV Mishap CCIRs:

1. Sunken AAV located.
At 1750 EDT, the NAVSEA IVER4 team located and positively confirmed the mishap AAV location with human remains outside of the vehicle. Over the next few hours, the team will continue to survey the site to collect detailed information on the location of the human remains and the condition of the AAV to inform further recovery plans.
2. Remains or other items related to mishap discovered on or below surface.
At 1929 EDT I MEF was notified by 15th MEU that SUPSALV URC eight human remains. SUPSALV has recorded the location of the human remains for follow on recovery operations. SUPSALV stated that the AAV is located on the sea floor at a depth of 385 feet.
3. Any ship casualty or other status change (loss of salvage capability) negatively impacting recovery operations.
4. Any status change of our two hospitalized Marines.

(U//FOUO) Previous 12 Hours:

Both CCIR #1 and CCIR #2 occurred during this reporting period, see above. NAVSEA coordination with I MEF for follow on recovery operations are ongoing. NAVSEA expects the Crane Barge to on site and prepared to begin recovery operations 6 – 8 Aug 20. Coordination between I MEF and the Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner to provide support for handling of human remains is ongoing with an expectation that the appropriate personnel will arrive at NLT 05 Aug 20. I MEF is coordinating with Decedent Affairs at Naval Medical Center San Diego for transport of the remains from San Diego to Dover AFB.

(U//FOUO) Next 24 Hours:

I MEF support to recovery operations and planning for the transfer of remains will continue. Final coordination with the Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner to ensure appropriate and dignified transfer of remains is expected to be complete NLT 04 Aug 20.

(U//FOUO) Other / Additional Comments:

04-07 AUG: Mobilize salvage equipment aboard crane barge
08 AUG: Transit to recovery site
09-12 AUG: Complete recovery operations
13 AUG: Transit to demobilization site
14-15 AUG: AAV offload, SUPSALV demobilization

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3. Any ship casualty or other status change (loss of salvage capability) negatively impacting recovery operations.
4. Any status change of our two hospitalized Marines.

(U//FOUO) Previous 12 Hours:

NAVSEA coordination with I MEF for follow on recovery operations are ongoing. SUPSALV Salvage Officer and IVER4 team departed the HOS Dominator to begin recovery equipment mobilization. The Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner confirmed they will provide support for handling of human remains. They expect to arrive at I MEF on 05 Aug 20, final coordination should be complete today. I MEF is coordinating with Decedent Affairs at Naval Medical Center San Diego for transport of the remains from San Diego to Dover AFB.

(U//FOUO) Next 24 Hours:

I MEF support to recovery operations and planning for the transfer of remains will continue. Final coordination with the Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner to ensure appropriate and dignified transfer of remains is expected to be complete NLT 04 Aug 20.

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3. Any ship casualty or other status change (loss of salvage capability) negatively impacting recovery operations.
4. Any status change of our two hospitalized Marines.
1 Marine was discharged from Naval Medical Center San Diego with one week of convalescent leave recommended. He was discharged to the care of his family and 3D AABn and has follow up medical referrals. Division Surgeon does not anticipate complications and he should heal over the next 4-6 weeks.

(U//FOUO) Previous 12 Hours:

Representatives from I MEF and ESG-3 met with SUPSALV aboard the Crane Barge to coordinate and synchronize recovery operations. SUPSALV expects the Crane Barge to depart for the recovery ahead of schedule, date and time are dependent on mobilization efforts. I MEF planning and coordination efforts for post-recovery of personnel and equipment continued. Coordination for the dignified transfer of 1x Marine is complete and will take place within the next 24 hours. I MEF continued coordination with Decedent Affairs at Naval Medical Center San Diego for transport of the remains from San Diego to Dover AFB.

(U//FOUO) Next 24 Hours:

Four personnel from The Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AMFE) will arrive on 05 Aug 20 to provide support for handling of human remains. Planning and coordination for the movement of AFME and other I MEF personnel to San Clemente Island and the Crane Barge to support recovery operations will continue. I MEF expects to move the personnel to San Clemente Island on 06 Aug. Life support and follow on movement to the Crane Barge have already been coordinated.

(U//FOUO) Other / Additional Comments:

04-07 AUG: Mobilize salvage equipment aboard crane barge
08 AUG: Transit to recovery site
09-12 AUG: Complete recovery operations
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On 03 Aug 20, 1 Marine was discharged from Naval Medical Center San Diego with one week of convalescent leave recommended. He was discharged to the care of his family and 3D AABn and has follow up medical referrals. Division Surgeon does not anticipate complications and he should heal over the next 4-6 weeks.

(U//FOUO) Previous 12 Hours:

The SUPSALV team has reported that the crane barge may depart earlier than scheduled, potentially late evening 05 Aug or morning of 06 Aug. Final coordination to receive The Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AMFE) team is complete.

(U//FOUO) Next 24 Hours:

Four personnel from The Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AMFE) will arrive at 1330 today, 05 Aug 20, to conduct final coordination and planning for follow on movement and handling of human remains. I MEF personnel and AFME team will conduct movement to San Clemente Island on 06 Aug. Life support and follow on movement to the Crane Barge have already been coordinated.

(U//FOUO) Other / Additional Comments:

04-06 AUG: Mobilize salvage equipment aboard crane barge

06 AUG: Transit to recovery site

07-10 AUG: Complete recovery operations

11 AUG: Transit to demobilization site

12-13 AUG: AAV offload, SUPSALV demobilization

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On 03 Aug at 1929 EDT I MEF was notified by 15th MEU that SUPSALV URC identified eight human remains. SUPSALV has recorded the location of the human remains for follow on recovery operations. SUPSALV stated that the AAV is located on the sea floor at a depth of 385 feet.
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4. Any status change of our two hospitalized Marines.
On 03 Aug 20, 1 Marine was discharged from Naval Medical Center San Diego with one week of convalescent leave recommended. He was discharged to the care of his family and 3D AABn and has follow up medical referrals. Division Surgeon does not anticipate complications and he should heal over the next 4-6 weeks.

(U//FOUO) Previous 12 Hours:

At 1915 EDT, one Marine from I MEF completed the Dignified Transfer to Dover AFB. Four The Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) personnel arrived at Camp Pendleton today to finalize coordination for recovery operations. The AFME team integrated with the MEF OPT and provided valuable information on the recovery and transfer of the remains. Members from the Command Investigation and Safety Investigative continued their respective investigations aboard the MEU/ARG. SUPSALV reported that they expect the crane barge to go underway by late evening on 05 Aug 20 with an expected arrival at the recovery site around 1200 06 Aug 20.

(U//FOUO) Next 24 Hours:

On 06 Aug 20 the I MEF / AFME team will depart for San Clemente Island and follow on movement to the SUPSALV crane barge in support of recovery operations. The SUPSALV recovery team is expected to begin recovery operations. I MEF OPT continues planning efforts in support of recovery operations once the SUPSALV crane barge piers.

(U//FOUO) Other / Additional Comments:

04-06 AUG: Mobilize salvage equipment aboard crane barge
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On 03 Aug at 1750 EDT, the NAVSEA IVER4 team located and positively confirmed the mishap AAV location.
2. Remains or other items related to mishap discovered on or below surface.
On 3 Aug SUPSALV URC identified and confirmed eight human remains, 7 outside of the AAV and 1 inside the AAV. SUPSALV recorded the location of each of the human remains for follow on recovery operations.
3. Any ship casualty or other status change (loss of salvage capability) negatively impacting recovery operations.
NSTR
4. Any status change of our two hospitalized Marines.
On 3 Aug (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was discharged from Naval Medical Center San Diego and is in the care of his command. Division Surgeon does not anticipate complications and the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) should heal over the next 4-6 weeks.
On 5 Aug it was reported by the Division Surgeon the remaining Marine in the hospital, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) showed slight improvement over the last 24 hours but remains in guarded/critical condition in the ICU at Scripps La Jolla.

(U//FOUO) Previous 12 Hours:

SUPSALV reported that the crane barge departed at 2030 PDT for the recover site. Expected arrival at the recovery site remains 1200 PDT 06 Aug 20. The Four Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) personnel arrived at Camp Pendleton and staged for onward movement to San Clemente Island (SCI) and the crane barge ISO of recovery and salvage operations.

(U//FOUO) Next 24 Hours:

The four AFME and I MEF recovery team personnel are enroute to NASNI for a flight scheduled to depart for SCI at 0915 06 Aug. Once at SCI they will conduct surface movement to the crane barge as needed. The SUPSALV recovery team is expected to begin recovery operations once the crane barge and crew boat arrive at the site with an expectation that they could be complete by early morning of 7 Aug 20. SUPSALV estimated arrival off San Clemente Island remains 6 Aug 1200 PDT.

(U//FOUO) Other / Additional Comments:

04-06 AUG: Mobilize salvage equipment aboard crane barge
06 AUG: Transit to recovery site
07-10 AUG: Complete recovery operations
11 AUG: Transit to demobilization site
12-13 AUG: AAV offload, SUPSALV demobilization

ENCLOSURE (11)

Once recovery operations are complete, the crane barge will return to the pier at NAS North Island. NMCS D Decedent Affairs will coordinate and manage the transfer of the remains to NMCS D, and I MEF will coordinate the transfer of equipment.

(U//FOUO) Crisis Action Team:

I MEF SWO and elements of a Crisis Action Team will remain on watch throughout the entire operation to monitor the recovery and dignified handling of our Marines & Sailor and salvage of the AAV.

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Good evening,

I MEF update below.

(U//FOUO) I MEF CG AAV Mishap CCIRs:

1. Sunken AAV located.
On 03 Aug at 1750 EDT, the NAVSEA IVER4 team located and positively confirmed the mishap AAV location.
2. Remains or other items related to mishap discovered on or below surface.
On 3 Aug SUPSALV URC identified and confirmed eight human remains, 7 outside of the AAV and 1 inside the AAV. SUPSALV recorded the location of each of the human remains for follow on recovery operations.
3. Any ship casualty or other status change (loss of salvage capability) negatively impacting recovery operations.
NSTR
4. Any status change of our two hospitalized Marines.
On 3 Aug (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was discharged from Naval Medical Center San Diego and is in the care of his command. Division Surgeon does not anticipate complications and the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) should heal over the next 4-6 weeks.

On 8 Aug it was reported by the Division Surgeon the remaining Marine in the hospital (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has improved considerably over the last 24 hours, but remains in guarded/critical condition in the ICU at Scripps La Jolla.

(U//FOUO) Previous 12 Hours:

The I MEF / Armed Forces Medical Examiners (AFME) team arrived by air at San Clemente Island at 1023 PDT 06 Aug and subsequently boarded the SUPSALV crane barge. The crane barge arrived at the recovery site at 1724 PDT. Personnel recovery and equipment salvage commenced at 1917 PDT 6 Aug.

(U//FOUO) Next 24 Hours:

Based on the operational planning timeline, recovery and salvage operations are expected to be completed by the late morning of 7 Aug, with an estimated late evening or early morning (8 Aug) arrival at Naval Air Station North Island. Upon arrival at NASNI, all recovered personnel will be transported to NMCS.

(U//FOUO) Other / Additional Comments:

Naval Medical Center San Diego (NMCS) Decedent Affairs w/I MEF support will coordinate and manage the transfer of the service members to NMCS. The Safety Investigative Board take custody and conduct the transport of the AAV and recovered equipment to Camp Pendleton.

(U//FOUO) Crisis Action Team:

ENCLOSURE (11)

I MEF SWO and elements of a Crisis Action Team will remain on watch throughout the entire operation to monitor the recovery and dignified handling of our Marines & Sailor and salvage and transportation of the salvaged AAV and equipment.

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(U//FOUO) Previous 12 Hours:

I MEF continues to provide support to planning for the Dignified Transfer, scheduled for 12 Aug 20. The Safety Investigative Board continued their investigation.

(U//FOUO) Next 24 Hours:

I MEF will continue to provide support, as needed, to planning for the Dignified Transfer.

(U//FOUO) Other / Additional Comments:

Based on the current operational planning timeline, all eight service members will remain at NMCSD until Tuesday 11 Aug 20 when they will be transported by Decedent Affairs to Legend Funeral Home before undergoing Dignified Transfer at and from MCAS Miramar to Dover AFB.

(U//FOUO) Crisis Action Team:

I MEF SWO and elements of a Crisis Action Team will remain on watch throughout the entire operation to monitor the recovery and dignified handling of our Marines & Sailor and salvage and transportation of the salvaged AAV and equipment.

ENCLOSURE (11)

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On 6 Aug it was reported by the Division Surgeon the remaining Marine in the hospital (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has improved considerably over the last 24 hours, but remains in guarded/critical condition in the ICU at Scripps La Jolla.

On 8 Aug, the Division Surgeon reported that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is conscious and breathing without a ventilator, but remains under observation in the ICU at Scripps La Jolla.

As of 9 Aug (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) made small but incremental progress over the last 24 hours, and remains in the ICU at Scripps La Jolla (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is conscious but intermittently confused with brief periods of agitation. Division Surgeon is hopeful that SNM will transfer to the medical ward on Monday or Tuesday; Division surgeon recommends continued VSI status until he is able to transfer from the ICU.

(U//FOUO) Previous 12 Hours:

Per CMC's request to SECNAV, additional time was required to coordinate, request, and approve funding for family transportation to Dover for the Dignified Transfer. Death certificates and transportation permits were also required before transfer of the eight service members' remains can be made.

(U//FOUO) Next 24 Hours:

Based on the current operational planning timeline, all eight service members will remain at NMCSD until Tuesday 11 Aug 20 when they will be transported by Decedent Affairs to Legend Funeral Home before undergoing Dignified Transfer from MCAS Miramar to Dover AFB on Wednesday 12 Aug 20.

ENCLOSURE (11)

(U//FOUO) Other / Additional Comments:

Phase 3 (Phase 3 Line 1) will begin when the Dignified Transfer from MCAS Miramar to Dover AFB on Wednesday 12 Aug 20 takes place. No changes or concerns with the timeline have been reported at this time.

(U//FOUO) Crisis Action Team:

I MEF SWO and elements of a Crisis Action Team will remain on watch throughout the entire operation to monitor the dignified transfer and custody of our Marines and Sailor.

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I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFIC
BOX 555300
CAMP PENDLETON CA 92055-5300

3502
G-37

MAR 23 2020

POLICY LETTER 1-20

From: Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
To: Distribution List

Subj: I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE POLICY CONCERNING UNDERWATER EGRESS
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Ref: (a) MARADMIN 293/18
(b) MCO 3502.3C
(c) MARFORPACO 3710.4B
(d) CNAF M-3710.7
(e) MCO 3500.2B Ch 2

1. Purpose. To establish the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) policy concerning Underwater Egress Trainer (UET) requirements for the conduct of over-water flights in tilt-rotor/rotary wing aircraft and waterborne operations in amphibious vehicles.

2. Background. The UET variants explained below prepare Service members to safely egress from submerged vehicles and aircraft. One underwater egress facility is available to train all I MEF (non-aircrew) personnel including those at Twenty-nine Palms, California and the students going through Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) School. This facility has one Mobile Amphibious Egress Trainer (MAET), one Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer (SVET), and the Shallow Water Egress Trainer (SWET). Reference (a), MARADMIN 293/18, requires UET training for all Marines at least once every four years. Reference (b), Marine Core Order 3502.3C Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Predeployment Training Program Order mandates UET training once every two years for personnel designated in the high risk category (Ground forces and non-aircrew personnel whose normal mission profile entails flying over or operating in close proximity to water). Reference (c) Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MarForPac) order 3710.4B (MarForPac Policy on Supplemental Emergency Breathing Devices (SEBD) and Helo Egress Systems for Passengers (HESP)) mandates UET training for personnel who "anticipate overwater flight", which further clarifies this requirement to a single MEU cycle, before refresher training is required.

3. UET Trainer Description and Definitions

a. MEU Cycle. For UET training a MEU cycle begins with training conducted prior to composite through deployment until de-composite.

b. MAET. The MAET is an underwater egress trainer with a generic fuselage section representing aircraft amphibious vessels cockpit and respective cabin emergency escape exits. The MAET device functions closely to the general characteristics of a ditched aircraft. Students are able to practice escaping the trainer with the fuselage submerged in an upright position, an inverted position, or any position between upright and inverted. Successful completion of the MAET is required for over-water flight qualification.

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ENCLOSURE (12)

c. SVET. The SVET is a full-featured device for training egress from submerged vehicles. Successful completion of the SVET is required prior to waterborne operations for amphibious vehicle crew and passengers. Reference (e) directs the requirements for AAV crew members to conduct UET training. For passengers, the SVET may be substituted by MAET for UET qualification.

d. SWET. The SWET has a specially-designed frame fitted with buoyancy pods that allows it to be easily handled and inverted by instructors for students to practice egress procedures while turned upside down in a shallow and controlled training environment. The SWET is a prerequisite for MAET or SVET. In the event that the MAET is down for unscheduled maintenance, the SWET can be used as substitute for MAET UET qualification.

e. Over-water flight. For rotary wing aircraft, those flights which take place beyond auto-rotational distance to land. For tilt-rotor aircraft, those flights where the aircraft enters Vertical Take Off and Landing (VTOL), defined as 85 Nacelle or greater per the Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization manual, over water or any ship board operations.

f. Passenger. An individual who is not part of the aircrew traveling in an aircraft designed or normally configured for passenger (non-aircrew) carrying capability on a point-to-point flight.

g. SEBD/HESP. Supplemental Emergency Breathing Device/Helicopter Egress System for Passengers or similar underwater breathing devices/floation devices which provide supplemental oxygen and a floatation device to passengers or aircrew in the event of a forced water landing.

h. Unit Commander. Commanding officers of battalion/squadron level commands or higher.

4. Training Requirements

a. Unit commanders are responsible for ensuring assigned personnel who fly as passengers overwater aboard rotary wing or tilt-rotor aircraft receive applicable UET in the MAET and SEBD/HESP training prior to being issued SEBD/HESP. This training is valid for a four-year period before refresher training is required. Seats for the MAET/SVET will be allocated in accordance with the MEF priority list (see paragraph 5).

(1) Ensure MEU personnel who anticipate overwater flight aboard rotary wing or tilt-rotor aircraft receive applicable UET in the MAET and SEBD/HESP training during the PTP cycle.

(2) Ensure personnel assigned to the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) who anticipate overwater flight aboard rotary wing or tilt-rotor aircraft receive applicable UET in the MAET and SEBD/HESP training prior to deployment.

b. Additionally, reference (c) directs all units deploying in support of Western Pacific MEUs, 31st MEU, and UDP to report (to MARFORPAC G-3, and info copy III MEF G-3) UET status 90 days and 30 days prior to deployment.

c. In accordance with reference (c), in the rare event a passenger (aircraft and AAV) is unable to attend appropriate training before overwater flight (e.g., late notice overwater flight not anticipated by the unit), this Order does not prevent the passenger from flying overwater aboard rotary wing

or tilt-rotor aircraft or waterborne operations. In this instance, the first O-5 level commander in the chain of command may issue a waiver to participate in the flight or waterborne operations. Aircrew are authorized to provide a SEBD/HESP to the untrained passenger provided this passenger is briefed prior to flight on the proper use and associated dangers of SEBD/HESP and rotary wing or tilt-rotor underwater egress. In the event the passenger attended but failed to complete UET, the waiver authority shall be the first O-6 commander in the chain of command. A separate waiver for each overwater flight or waterborne operation is required. This exception shall not eliminate the PTP requirement for MEU and UDP personnel, nor shall it be used to circumvent the intent of this order.

d. Ensure Plane Team Commanders or Stick Leaders identify untrained passengers to the aircrew.

e. Rotary Wing/Tilt-Rotor Squadron Commanders

(1) Ensure the appropriate number of Ready for Issue SEBD/HESP are provided to passengers for overwater flights.

(2) Ensure Squadron aircrew are performing pre-flight and post-flight inspections of SEBD/HESP and provide abbreviated SEBD/HESP instructions as part of the passenger safety brief. Exceptions to passenger briefing requirements are provided in reference (d). If aircraft passengers have not received SEBD/HESP training, aircrew shall, prior to flight, brief the untrained passengers on the proper use and associated dangers of SEBD/HESP, underwater egress, and provide priority seating. The brief should be approved locally by an Aero Medical Safety Officer.

f. Ensure the scheduling and tracking of initial and refresher UET and SEBD/HESP training. Training shall be tracked locally and documented in the individual's training jacket by their respective unit training managers using Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS), Unit Training Management (UTM) and Marine Corps Total Force System. Table 1-1 below outlines the UET codes to be used.

Training Code	UET Training	Definition
EA	Marine Corps Amphibious Egress Training (UNQUAL)	Marine has not undergone UET but requires it for upcoming operation, exercise, or training.
EB	Marine Corps Amphibious Egress Training (QUAL)	Marine participated and successfully completed the required training, SWET then MAET.
EF	Marine Corps Amphibious Egress Training (FAIL)	Marine attended and either failed to complete or dropped on request (DOR) and/or refuses to be recycled.
EC	Shallow Water Egress Training (UNQUAL)	Marine participated and unsuccessfully completed the required training in the SWET and cannot move on to the MAET.
ED	Shallow Water Egress Training (QUAL)	Marine participated and successfully completed the required training in the SWET

		and can move on to the MAET.
EF	Shallow Water Egress Training (FAIL)	Marine attended and either failed to complete or DOR and/or refuses to be recycled.
EE	Helo Egress Training (UNQUAL)	Marine participated in either SWET or MAET but has not achieved mastery and will be recycled.
EH	Helo Egress Training (QUAL)	Marine participated and successfully completed either SWET or MAET and commander.
EF	HELO EGRESS TRAINING (FAIL)	Marine attended and either failed to complete or DOR and/or refuses to be recycled.

Table 1-1.--UET Codes and Definitions.

g. Units that fail to show for training as scheduled will be reported to the I MEF G-3 and MSC G-3s for non-compliance.

h. Deployment late joins; service members that fail UET training; and non-aircrew personnel whose normal mission profile does not entail flying over or operating in close proximity to water, may conduct UET training at III MEF's UET facility in Okinawa, Japan.

5. Training Priorities. MSCs will attend the I MEF G-37 Quarterly Training Service Requirements Working Group to schedule and coordinate training based on the below priorities. The Camp Pendleton UET can support 240 students per training week, with a maximum capacity of 10,272 seats annually.

a. Unit priority for MAET

1. MEUs (Including 31 MEU MSEs)

- a. Maritime Raid Force
- b. Air Assault Company
- c. Trap Force (Air)
- d. Command Element Enablers
- e. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon
- f. Evacuation Control Center personnel
- g. Remaining MEU personnel

2. UDP Units

3. Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force and other deployments

4. Exercises

Note: Marine Corps Air Station Miramar is the primary location for aircrew UET training as governed by reference (d), and is not suitable or available for passenger training.

b. Unit priority for SVET:

1. AAV/ACV crew,
2. MEU Mech Company

6. Certification. Successful training completion will be recorded in MCTIMS and maintained by each Major Subordinate Commanders/Elements per paragraph

4b. UET completion numbers will be reported to I MEF G-37 Training, at the conclusion of training.

7. Coordination. Points of contact at I MEF G-37 Training regarding UET scheduling are the Training Officer at (760) 763-2608, or the Training Chief at (760) 725-5947.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

J. L. OSTERMAN

Distribution: I/II

Excerpts from CG I MEF Letter of Instruction for
15 MEU Deployment 21-1, dtd December 30, 2019
(this is a classified document and only pertinent
unclassified portions are relevant to
investigation.)

ENCLOSURE (13)

5.A.6.C.3. (U) 15 MEU MSEs shall attach to 15 MEU on the designated dates.

5.A.6.C.3.B. (U) MSC commanders shall conduct a Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE) of battalions and squadrons before they task organize (composite) with the MEU CE. Assessment criteria are established for battalion and squadron core and assigned mission essential tasks (METs). The assessment may be conducted during a pre-existing institutional training event or may be MSC generated.

5.A.6.C.3.B.1. (U) GCE and ACE attachments are not required to conduct a stand-alone MCCRE. It is strongly encouraged that GCE and ACE attachments conduct their assessments with their associated battalion or squadron or in concert with a parent unit MCCRE, ITX or other assessment event.

5.A.6.C.3.C. (U) MEU CE attachments, specifically from I MIG and the MEU CE augments, shall report ADCON to 15 MEU on the designated attachment date. MEU CE attachments, specifically from I MIG and the MEU CE augments, must report with MCEN-N garrison laptop. MEU CE will provide garrison MCEN-S, tactical SIPR, and tactical NIPR laptops during PTP and deployment. However, some functions such as billeting, messing, storage of personal effects and table of equipment (T/E) items shall remain with the parent command. This relationship is in effect NET R+10 and NLT than R+60.

5.A.6.C.3.D. (U) This conditional arrangement applies to MSE attachments as well. Commanders/officers-in-charge (OICs) of receiving and sourcing attachments are responsible for coordinating the conditions upon attachment.

5.A.6.C.4. (U) MSEs (GCE, ACE, and LCE) shall transfer ADCON to the MEU CE no earlier than E-30 and no later than E-day and remain ADCON NET R+10 and NLT than R+30 or the first Monday following R+30 as noted in paragraphs 5.B. and 7.A.4. MEU and MSE commanders shall determine and agree to the exact pre-deployment ADCON transfer date per para 5.B.1.C.

5.A.6.C.4.A. (U) ADCON also includes certain aspects of administration that require specific guidance.

5.A.6.C.4.A.1. (U) The MEU CE shall submit serious incident reports (SIRs) and OPREP-3 for qualifying events upon attachment of the MSE or MIG element. Para 5.C.3. and its subparagraphs list specific exceptions having to do with aviation mishaps and those specific reporting requirements. CG, I MEF intent is that the CO 15 MEU shall have primary responsibility for all administrative situations, especially incident/mishap reporting, once MSEs and MIG elements attach. Other routine administrative functions that require or more easily are accomplished by a MSE or MIG elements parent command shall be done by the parent command while keeping the MEU CE informed.

5.A.6.C.4.B. (U) As stated in para 5.A.5.C.1., ADCON includes support, which most commonly means logistics. Logistics support for MEUs is a naval solution, pooling the resources of the MEU, the MEUs

maintenance SNCOs/NCOs, communication officers, motor transport officers, DLC leadership, DLC NCOs, and CLB S-3 are required to attend. This audience is derived from a composited MEU to include all CE and MSE attachments (i.e., AAVs, LAVs, Tanks, Artillery, and EOD).

5.C. (U) Action

5.C.1. (U) CG, I MEF. CG, I MEF is the evaluative and certifying authority for 15 MEU.

5.C.1.A. (U) CG, I MEF directs MEU commanders to prioritize training participants for all MEU training events to include underwater egress training (UET). CG, I MEF considers the following as non-aircrew frequent flyers, with CO, 15 MEU having the authority to revise this listing and to set the specific priority. CG, I MEF expects those forces listed in paras 5.C.1.A.1, 5.C.1.A.2., 5.C.1.A.3., 5.C.1.A.4. and 5.C.1.A.5. to be UET complete by composite date. All others shall be UET complete by the first at-sea period, which is PHIBRON-MEU Integrated Training (PMINT).

5.C.1.A.1. (U) Commanders, key leaders, and key planners.

5.C.1.A.2. (U) Maritime Raid Force (MRF) assault element, security element and enablers.

5.C.1.A.3. (U) All Marines of the Heli/tiltrotor/long range raid force.

5.C.1.A.4. (U) All Marines of the mechanized raid force.

5.C.1.A.5. (U) ANGLICO detachment, Marines assigned to the MEU forward command element (FCE), and select Marines/Sailors (identified by the MEU CO) from across the CE, GCE, ACE and LCE involved in specific missions or with specific responsibilities.

5.C.1.B. (U) I MEF G-1

5.C.1.B.1 (U) Act as the principal facilitator for personnel and administrative actions that require MEF level oversight and reconciliation.

5.C.1.B.1.A. (U) Provide close oversight of the use of the deployment staffing report (DSR) process by the MSCs for the 15 MEU MSEs.

5.C.1.B.2 (U) Ensure MEU CE augments are identified NLT 30 days prior to their report date. Source and fill 15 MEU CE augments per the standardized CG, I MEF MEU CE augmentation list. Notify CO, 15 MEU NLT E-217 of current status of CE augmentation and actions required to mitigate discrepancies. Info all I MEF staff sections and MSCs.

5.C.1.B.3. (U) ICW with I MEF G-35 expeditionary operations task I MEF MSCs to source personnel requested by CO, 15 MEU and approved by CG, I MEF for personnel requirements not outlined in this LOI. Additional personnel beyond what has been agreed to by this LOI and I MEF policy should not be expected.

5.C.1.B.4. (U) Per ref (at) coordinate with I MEF G-2, I MEF G-6, I MEF G-3, MSCS and I MIG for sourcing of SOFLE communications Marine augments. Specifically, one (1) 2651 Marine and one (1) 06xx Marine.

5.C.1.B.5. (U) Task MSCs to provide required role players ISO 15 MEU ARG/MEUEX and COMPTUEX. Coordinate all requirements with I MEF AC/S G-7.

identifies troop and equipment lists for the BLT.

5.C.2.A.1. (U) Attach all detachments to BLT 1/4 and then attach BLT 1/4 to CO, 15 MEU on E-204 with the exception of Btry I (rein), 3rd Bn, 12th Marines, which shall attach to BLT 1/4 on 11 May 20.

5.C.2.B. (U) Per ref (aj) submit man, train and equip messages for the GCE, to include detachments, at E-270 and E-240. Identify any equipment that cannot be sourced in Condition Code A, SL-3/ modification/PMCS complete, calibrations complete, and Corrosion Prevention and Control (CPAC) Condition Code 1 or 2 from attaching units and will need to be sourced from other resources within the respective MSC. Forward list to I MEF G-4 for coordination.

5.C.2.B.1. (U) Provide close oversight of the use of the Deployment Staffing Roster (DSR) process for the 15 MEU GCE. The goal is to be 90 percent stabilized across the GCE by composite date.

5.C.2.C. (U) Per ref (a), submit force/troop and equipment density lists to I MEF G-33 current operations (COPS), I MEF G-4 and 15 MEU NLT E-204. Lists must include verified SSDM level IV data.

5.C.2.C.1 (U) Per ref (aj) submit commence PTP message for the GCE, to include detachments, at E-204.

5.C.2.D. (U) Conduct a MCCRE of units and detachments prior to chop and report MCCRE results to CG, I MEF NLT E-204. This fulfills refs (a) and (ai) assessment requirements. See para 5.A.6.C.3.B.1.

5.C.2.E. (U) Ensure all required equipment identified per chapter 6 of ref (a) is available and prepared for the MEF JLTi conducted per the I MEF generated JLTi schedule to be published via SEPCOR. Ensure all remedial actions are complete by E-204.

5.C.2.E.1. (U) Provide personnel (identified by via SEPCOR) in support of I MEF supervised JLTis in support of 15 MEU.

5.C.2.F. (U) Ensure BLT 1/4 reports for planning to the 15 MEU upon NLT E-302, to include GCE detachment OICs.

5.C.2.G. (U) Attach one (1) Reconnaissance Detachment (-)(rein) from 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (1st Recon Bn) to CO, 15 MEU NLT E-204. Two (2) Marines MOS 0451 must be qualified to pack (static line/freefall) all configurations of the Multi-Mission Parachute System (MMPS) and serve as a PIPI. The reconnaissance element shall include a minimum of three freefall jumpmasters and six JTACS (one per team).

The reconnaissance detachment shall have Marines who are qualified and certified Camp Pendleton and Marine Air-Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC), 29 palms range safety Officers (RSOs). CG 1st MARDIV will coordinate with I MEF G-3 Air to provide the reconnaissance element priority 1A support to their pre-composite HALO/HAHO advanced tactical infiltration training.

5.C.2.G.2.A. (U) DIRLAUTH between 1st Recon Bn and I MEF G-7/EOTG is granted to facilitate G-7/EOTG PTP courses being conducted prior to MEU composite.

5.C.2.G.3. (U) Attach one (1) tank platoon from 1st Tank Battalion (1st Tank Bn) to CO, BLT 1/4 NLT E-2044. The tank platoon vehicles and personnel do not initially physically relocate and remain ADCON to their parent battalion.

5.C.2.G.4. (U) Attach one (1) artillery electronics tech, Cpl, MOS 2887, to CO, CLB-15 NLT E-204 with a toolkit, an A7597 VIPER/T and all required material (see para 5.C.4.X).

5.C.2.G.5. (U) Ensure the artillery battery has one (1) Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO) attached.

5.C.2.G.6. (U) BPT to attach one (1) HIMARS firing unit (exact personnel and equipment composition TBD) to CO, BLT 1/4 NLT E-184.

5.C.2.H. (U) Designate 1st MARDIV, 1st Bn/4th Mar, and unit points of contact, via message within five (5) days of receipt of this LOI.

5.C.2.I. (U) Ensure MEU special skills equipment suite is complete and serviceable. Coordinate a JLTl of the special equipment suite with CO, 15 MEU and report deficiencies to I MEF G-35, G-7 and 15 MEU S-3/S-4 via message NLT E-241. Transfer this equipment suite to 1st Bn, 4th Mar upon completion of the JLTl.

5.C.2.J. (U) As required, coordinate with CO, 15 MEU and CG MCI-W/MCB Camp Pendleton for billeting of 1st MARDIV personnel attached to 15 MEU IOT deconflict periods when multiple MEUs are CONUS-based.

5.C.2.K. (U) Coordinate MEU GCE medical readiness activities per refs (v), (w), (aw), and (ba). Ensure GCE personnel complete individual medical readiness requirements prior to E-204.

5.C.2.K.1. (U) Identify medications that are prohibited for use in INDOPACOM and CENTCOM AORS NLT E-210. ICW the I MEF Surgeon and 15 MEU Surgeon determine if medication use waivers are required. Replace GCE personnel that are non-waiverable for medication use NLT composite date.

5.C.2.L. (U) Ensure BLT 1/4 and 1st MARDIV attachments report to 15 MEU with a capability set (CAPSET) IV and all supporting equipment (computers, telephones, radios) to support the establishment of the GCE Combat Operations Center (COC) ashore.

→ 5.C.2.M. (U) Ensure BLT 1/4 Assault Amphibian (AA) Bn attachment is provided with sufficient LPU-41 ensembles to outfit the AAV crew members and the task organized mechanized infantry company associated with the AAV platoon. Organizational maintenance of LPU-41 assemblies is a GCE responsibility as coordinated by MEU CE and with other elements of the MEU.

5.C.2.N. (U) If available, provide four (4) M45A1 .45 cal pistols, four (4) M4A1 5.56 carbines w/silencer, four (4) EOTech optics, and four (4) ACOG optics to CO CLB-15 for EOD use during EOTG course.

5.C.2.O. (U) Ensure BLT 1/4 has at a minimum of one (1) 04xx who possesses the certifications to certify hazardous material and air load plans for the duration of deployment.

5.C.2.P. (U) Ensure GCE attachments report at the commencement of JTLI with validated and stocked Demand Supported Items (DSI) to be used throughout PTP and deployment. GCE and attachments submit DSI list by NATO Item Identification Number (NIIN) to 15 MEU CE S4 and CLB-15 NLT E-270.

5.C.2.P.1. (U) Ensure appropriate quantities of DSI in support of mission essential equipment is transferred during the Enterprise Automated Task Organization (EATO) process IAW UM-4000-125, GCSS-MC users manual.

5.C.2.Q. (U) Coordinate with 1st MLG to provide tactical vehicle licensing quotas for equipment not organic to 1st MLG (MATV, mineroller, etc.) to ensure CLB-15 is licensed prior to E-204.

5.C.2.R. (U) In coordination with 15 MEU CE, ensure compliance with

the provisions of refs (bv), (bw) and (bx).

5.C.2.S. (U) Ensure UET is complete for CG, I MEF and CO, 15 MEU prioritized GCE frequent flyers NLT composite date. Ensure all other GCE Marines who may conduct overwater flight or surface-borne ship to shore movement are afforded the opportunity to conduct UET NLT than the beginning of the first at-sea training period, which is PMINT. See para 5.C.1.A.

5.C.2.T. (U) Provide personnel per attachment 1 TAD to I MEF G-7/EOTG to support RUT, ARGMEUEX, and COMPTUEX exercises. I MEF G-1 will provide detailed coordinating instructions via SEPCOR NLT 60 days prior to start of exercise.

5.C.2.T.1. (U) Provide one rifle company (-), one LAR platoon, and one CAAT platoon with associated T/O equipment as OPFOR TACON to I MEF G-7 to support execution of COMPTUEX. I MEF G-7 will provide detailed coordinating instructions via SEPCOR NLT 30 days prior to start of exercise.

5.C.2.U. (U) NLT E-280 Coordinate with I MEF G-6 to identify key dates for BLT 1/4 to receive MCH-ECR training.

5.C.2.U.1. (U) NLT E-230 identify material shortfalls precluding the BLT 1/4 from integrating advanced comms/Digital Interoperability ISO assigned MEU METs.

5.C.2.V. (U) Provide S-4s, S-4As, logistics chief, supply officer, supply chief, supply admin clerks (E4-E5), maintenance management officer, maintenance management chief, maintenance management clerks (E4-E5), maintenance officers, maintenance chiefs, maintenance SNCOs/NCOs, communication officer, and motor transport officer for the execution of the Deployed Logistics Chain Management Leadership and Operator/Manager Course. This audience is derived from a composited MEU to include all CE and MSE attachments (i.e., AAVs, LAVs, Tanks, Artillery, and EOD).

5.C.3. (U) CG, 3d MAW

5.C.3.A. (U) Task organize VMM-164 (rein) per this LOI. Ref a identifies the troop and equipment lists for the ACE.

5.C.3.B. (U) Per ref (aj) submit MTE messages for the ACE, to include detachments, at E-270 and E-240. Identify any equipment that cannot be sourced in Condition Code A, SL-3/modification/PMCS complete, calibrations complete, and CPAC Condition Code 1 or 2 from attaching units and will need to be sourced from other resources, including the returning squadron. Forward a list to I MEF G-3 and G-4 for coordination with the returning MEU (if applicable).

5.C.3.B.1. (U) Provide close oversight of the use of the DSR process for the 15 MEU ACE. The goal is to be 90 percent stabilized across the ACE by composite date.

5.C.3.C. (U) Per ref (a), appendix F, milestone 25, submit force/troop lists and EDLs to I MEF G-33, I MEF G-4 and 15 MEU NLT E-184. Lists must include verified SSDM Level IV data.

5.C.3.C.1. (U) Per ref (aj) submit commence PTP message for the ACE, to include detachments, at E-184.

5.C.3.C.2. (U) Coordinate MEU ACE medical readiness activities per refs (v), (w), (aw), and (ba). Ensure ACE personnel complete individual medical readiness activities prior to E-184.

funds are very limited and the majority of TSC funding is provided by CG, I MEF.

6.B.1.B. (U) CDRUSINDOPACOM also maintains Title 10 funding for Traditional Commander Activities (TCA). CDRUSINDOPACOM funding of pre-deployment site visits for MEU staffs can be arranged through COMMARFORPAC G-5.

6.B.1.C. (U) MSCs will ensure all equipment provided to CO, 15 MEU is Condition Code A and SL-3 complete or, if approved by MEF G3/G4, equipment is transferred with either the parts or the funding to get it to Condition Code A or is replaced.

6.B.1.C.1. (U) CG, I MEF G-4 will coordinate with CO, 15 MEU to identify any equipment that cannot be sourced from attaching units and will need to be sourced from the returning MEU to ensure all corrective maintenance actions are complete.

6.B.1.C.2. (U) The EATO process is authorized for CE, GCE and LCE attachments. Guidance will be provided via SEPCOR.

6.B.1.C.3. (U) CO, 15 MEU conducts equipment readiness assessment at E-45 on all MARES reportable equipment and specially designated end items that are reported as combat deadline to determine if corrective maintenance actions can be completed prior to embark or if equipment will be requested for exchanged with equipment from the sourced command. Exchanged equipment JLTIs will be completed NLT E-35.

6.B.1.C.4. (U) Provide a list of PEIs (if any) that would be determined to be LBE NLT E-60 and equipment requiring JLTIs for redistribution back to the respective MSC NLT E-30.

6.B.1.C.5. (U) PEIs determined to be LBE that is the MEU proper equipment, coordinate with I MEF G-4/MMO for induction of LBE equipment into the I MEF G-4 Administrative storage Program (ASP).

6.B.1.C.6. (U) CO, 15 MEU shall provide a list of equipment at R-30 that would not be recommended for use by the next deploying MEU due to equipment condition. Submit this list to I MEF G-4 for a determination of replacement equipment sourcing.

6.B.1.C.7. (U) Upon completion of deployment, and prior to transfer of MSEs/detachments back to parent commands, CO, 15 MEU shall ensure all ground equipment is operable or has valid requisitions for required repair and SL-3 parts (per the original JLTIs) and is available and prepared for the MEF JLTIs conducted at R+5 through R+25.

6.B.1.C.8. (U) Per ref (bk), M1114 HMMWVs do not have a deep water fording capability. All vehicles assigned to a MEU must have a deep water fording capability for operations in the surf zone (disembarking surface connectors (LCU)) and for fording other waterways. M1114 HMMWVs shall not be assigned to forces deploying with 15 MEU. Non-MRC variant communications vehicles not capable of being equipped with the deep water fording kit are exempt from this requirement.

6.B.1.D. (U) I MEF G-4 shall coordinate with CO, 15 MEU and appropriate naval agencies to update current LFORM classes of supply, to include munitions mix and functionality, per ref (u).

6.B.1.E. (U) Per ref (a), CO, 15 MEU shall submit cargo manifests and ICODES deck diagrams to COMMARFORPAC NLT E+4, info copies to I MEF G-35 Expo Ops, I MEF G-4 MDDOC, and I MEF G-5 plans.



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN)
BOX 555380
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3501.1E
G3
18 Sep 18

DIVISION ORDER 3501.1E

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: MARINE CORPS COMBAT READINESS EVALUATION (MCCRE)

Ref: (a) MCO 3501.1E, Marine Corps MCCRE Order
(b) I MEFO 3501.2, I MEF MCCRE Order
(c) Division Tactical SOP
(d) MCO 3000.13A Marine Corps Readiness Reporting
(e) MCO 1553.3B Unit Training Management Program
(f) ATP 3-21.18 (FM 21-18) Foot Marches
(g) DIVBUL 1553.3 FY 19 Blue Diamond Training Guidance

Encl: (1) Conduct of a MCCRE
(2) MCCRE Unit Support Matrix Template
(3) After Action Report Template
(4) M-30 MCCRE Brief Template

1. Situation.

a. General. In compliance with references and enclosures this document provides 1st Marine Division Commanders with guidance for conducting and evaluating Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluations (MCCREs).

b. Special. The MCCRE will be a physically demanding immersive scenario, incorporating a minimum of 96 hours of a force-on-force, during day and night operations. Regiments and separate battalions will serve as the higher headquarters and evaluate units. Regiments and separate battalions executing MCCREs should attempt to be assessed during a Service Level Training Exercise (SLTE), large scale training exercise or another training activity as approved by the Assistant Chief of Staff (A/CS) G3.

2. Cancellation. DivO 3501.1D.

3. Mission. On order, 1st Marine Division requires the formal evaluation of all units based on approved Marine Corps Training and Readiness (T&R) standards derived from core and/or assigned Mission Essential Tasks (METs) to ensure standardization and combat readiness in preparation for operational deployments in order to certify that unit's preparedness to deploy in support of Global Force Management (GFM) requirements.

ENCLOSURE (14)

4. Execution

a. Commander's Intent and Concept of Operations

1. Commander's Intent.

a. Purpose. The purpose of the MCCRE is to evaluate and certify, via a MET-based assessment, the combat readiness, and proficiency of a deploying unit and their anticipated attachments prior to Change of Operational Control (CHOP) or deployment in support of GFM requirements. Successful completion of a MCCRE will ensure that unit(s) deploying will be capable of executing their mission in the theatre to which resourced.

b. End State. After completing the MCCRE, CHOP'd or deploying units will be:

i. Evaluated in their capability to conduct core and/or assigned METs.

ii. Certified as combat-ready units in support of GFM requirements.

iii. Prepared to conduct combat operations across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO).

2. Concept of Operations.

a. All regiments, battalions, batteries, companies, and other independently deploying organizations will conduct a MCCRE of a unit's core and if possible assigned METs at least once every two years, based on a biennial fiscal year requirement, or once per deployment cycle - whichever is more frequent. For example, a unit deploying for a six month deployment every 18 months will conduct a MCCRE at least once during the 18 month cycle.

b. A MCCRE will be conducted as part of the Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP) as the minimum requirement for a unit to deploy in order to ensure combat readiness of the unit's core and/or assigned METs.

c. Unit commanders are responsible for analyzing their Training Exercise and Employment Plan (TEEP) and determining the appropriate venue for MCCRE execution.

d. Challenge the Exercise Force (EXFOR) mentally and physically for the duration of the exercise. Include structured improvisation between the Opposing Force (OPFOR) and EXFOR.

e. Present the EXFOR with an immersive, near-peer/peer threat scenario that challenges it to seek and utilize innovative solutions in defeating current threat Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).

f. Unit commanders will implement force on force into the MCCRE exercise. The size of OPFOR resourced for the MCCRE will be based off of the realistic current threat in which the unit is likely to encounter based on mission analysis.

g. When a MCCRE is conducted in conjunction with a SLTE (Integrated Training Exercise (ITX), Mountain Training Exercise (MTX), or

Talon Exercise (TLX)), the MCCRE may be conducted after the SLTE or during the SLTE. If the MCCRE is conducted following a SLTE, those T&R events evaluated as trained by the Service, and still within their respective sustainment period, may be waived by the Exercise Commander (EC) during the subsequent evaluation of the MCCRE. A MCCRE may be conducted during the SLTE with approval and prior coordination with MAGTF Training Command (MAGTFTC), provided the unit's higher headquarters provides the MCCRE evaluator staff and the MCCRE does not interfere with the conduct of the SLTE.

h. The MCCRE will be conducted prior to the deployment or CHOP of a subordinate unit to a task-organized unit, including units preparing to conduct a CHOP to a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Units deploying separately for UDP or similar deployments will conduct the MCCRE after the conclusion of the core training period and no later than 60 days prior to deployment.

i. The results of a MCCRE will assist the unit commander in identifying unit strengths and weaknesses in relation to the unit METL and focus training and remediation in preparation for the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commander's unit deployment readiness certification.

j. The results of the units most recent MCCRE will serve as the foundation of its training assessment in DRRS-MC, including the assessment of whether tasks were observed.

k. Although each MCCRE will be unique in its execution, all 1st Marine Division MCCREs will be planned and conducted in four basic phases:

i. Phase I: Exercise Design and Structure. This phase begins once the date for the MCCRE has been placed on the Division TEEP (via the Quarterly Division Operations Summit) and ends when the EXFOR receives its Operation Order. Key events within this phase include the Initial, Main, and Final Planning Conferences, initiating the MCCRE in Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS), the release of the Feasibility of Support (FOS) message, and response/tasking related to the FOS.

ii. Phase II: Execution. This phase begins with the EXFOR receiving its Operation Order and ends upon the completion of the tactical portion of the exercise (to include retrograde, accountability, and any necessary remediation). Key events within this phase include EXFOR planning, EXFOR order issue, tactical execution, and evaluation of the EXFOR.

iii. Phase III: After Action Review. This phase begins upon full accountability and recovery of all personnel and equipment from the field and ends once all after-action requirements are fulfilled. Key events within this phase include consolidation of evaluation data, the completion of all required after-action briefs (AABs), and after-action reports (AARs) (to include best practices) submitted to MCTIMS. This will be submitted prior to out brief with 1st Marine Division Commanding General.

iv. Phase IV: Certification. This phase begins once all after action requirements have been completed and ends once the MCCRE has been certified and closed out in MCTIMS. The MCCRE will not be certified until all remediation has been completed, post initial 96 hour MCCRE window. Key events in this phase include uploading evaluator comments in MCTIMS, approval of the Performance Evaluation Checklist (PECL) by the Exercise

Director (ED) and EC, and the final certification by the I MEF Commanding General.

b. Tasks

1. Commanding Officer(s) of Evaluating Unit(s)

a. Schedule and execute MCCREs in accordance with references and this order. MCCREs will be scheduled no less than two years in advance in order to align with the Division's two-year TEEP. Scheduling will be conducted and validated via the Division Quarterly Operations Summit.

b. Send MCCRE Feasibility of Support (FOS) messages to Division G3 Training Officer and Current Operations Officer NLT 120 days prior to the exercise start date.

c. Formally assign in MCTIMS a Tactical Exercise Control Officer-In-Charge (TEC OIC) and create a subordinate Tactical Exercise Control Group (TECG) to coordinate and liaise with Division staff and supporting agencies. Ensure the TEC OIC coordinates with the G-3 Training Officer and Current Operations Officer no later than 120 days before the MCCRE.

d. Provide, organize, and train evaluators and OPFOR from the TECG to assist in the evaluation and conduct of the MCCRE.

e. Develop and disseminate a detailed "Road to War", exercise scenario, operation order, and evaluation program utilizing applicable S-2/G-2 resources. Provide finished product to unit conducting MCCRE NLT 96 hours prior to start of MCCRE in order to assist in MCCRE'd unit's planning.

f. Conduct an AAR of each MCCRE, enter the assessment results via MCTIMS.

g. Incorporate branch and/or sequel Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) into the MCCRE to enable continuous staff planning for follow-on operations.

h. Ensure all required actions in MCTIMS are completed NLT 10 days following the end date of a MCCRE.

i. Commanders will ensure that all units conducting a MCCRE schedule and TEEP a dedicated remediation period separate from the initial 96-hour MCCRE.

j. Serve as the ED for the evaluated unit MCCRE.

k. Utilize only approved T&R manual standards, as posted in MCTIMS, T&R Module for the conduct of a MCCRE.

l. Use Operations and Tactics Instructors (OTIs), Intelligence and Tactics Instructors (ITIs), Weapons and Tactics Instructors (WTIs), and Expeditionary Logistics Instructors (ELIs) in the development and evaluation of a MCCRE where/when applicable.

m. Remediate, as required, to correct any deficiencies identified during the MCCRE, followed by selective and separate follow on evaluation by the same evaluators which conducted the initial MCCRE.

n. Provide T&R improvement recommendations via point paper, to ensure the T&R standards evaluated during the MCCRE are accurate and up to date via 1st Marine Division G-3 Training Office.

o. Use MCTIMS Unit Training Management (UTM), MCCRE modules and MCCLL to develop training and evaluation plans in support of Ground Combat Element (GCE) unit's METL per reference (e), MCO 1553.3B Unit Training Management Program.

2. G-3 Training Officer

a. Serve as the EC, responsible for the conduct of a formal MCCRE.

b. Include the schedule of MCCREs in the Division TEEP and Division Campaign Plan. Ensure Division units are evaluated at least once every two years or prior to every deployment.

c. Ensure all Division units meet the requirements prescribed by this order and the references.

d. Ensure the scheduling of MCCREs does not conflict with other critical TEEP'd events.

e. By direction, approve all PECLs and forward to I MEF for final approval and certification within 45 days.

c. Coordinating Instructions

1. A unit METL will be developed in MCTIMS UTM. If a core and/or assigned METL exists in MCTIMS Task Master Database for a given unit type, such METL will be initially populated as the default METL. Based on the unit commander's mission analysis of the deployment, the unit METL may be modified as required. The unit's METL must be submitted to their higher headquarters for approval.

2. Based on the unit's METL, commanders must develop a corresponding training plan. E-coded, prerequisite, and supporting T&R events will be linked to each MET within MCTIMS UTM. Based on the commander's mission analysis, T&R events may be added to this initial list. E-coded, prerequisite, and supporting T&R events may be waived only if the individual or unit has satisfactorily completed and evaluated those events during the current training cycle.

a. Infantry Regiments/Battalions, Reconnaissance Battalions and Force Recon Companies, or units assigned a Provisional Infantry Battalion mission / METL, will incorporate execution of T&R event INF-COND-7001/8001 "Conduct a forced march," into the MCCRE within the following parameters:

i. Forced march will be conducted as an integral part of the MCCRE, not as a stand-alone event. Design of the integration shall be directed by the Division Commander.

ii. Units are encouraged to use reference (f) ATP 3-21.18, as the guiding document in which to aide in planning of hike in austere conditions. Waivers will be required 45 days pre-MCCRE, if units believe environmental conditions require a deviation from the standard. Waivers will be briefed to 1st Marine Division Commanding General, before an exemption or deviation from the standard is permitted.

iii. Forced march will culminate and transition directly into an evaluated tactical event such as an offensive or defensive exercise, Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) exercise, patrolling exercise, or related events that supports the unit's METL, and tests the unit's ability to execute an extended foot movement under load and remain combat effective.

iv. Elements of non-load bearing units who are attached to Infantry units (specifically Combat Engineer Line Companies/Platoons, Artillery Fire Support Teams and Forward Observers) will execute the respective Infantry T&R event with the Infantry unit (Regiment or Battalion) to which they are attached.

v. Reconnaissance Battalions and Force Reconnaissance Companies will conduct a forced march as a load bearing unit as part of their MCCRE. Due to the unique nature of these units, the Battalion and Force Reconnaissance Companies forced marches may be conducted as a stand-alone event if those units are not scheduled for a deployment. However, deploying Reconnaissance Battalion Companies or Platoons, and Force Company Platoons will conduct their forced march as an integral part of their pre-deployment MCCRE, not as a stand-alone event, culminating and transitioning directly into an evaluated tactical event.

b. Division Headquarters Battalion, Artillery Battalions, Assault Amphibian Battalions, Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalions, and Tank Battalions will incorporate execution of MCCS-COND-1003 "Conduct a forced march", into the MCCRE within the following parameters:

i. Forced march will be conducted as an integral part of the MCCRE, but may be executed as a stand-alone event. Design of the integration shall be directed by the Division Commander.

ii. Units are encouraged to use reference (f) ATP 3-21.18, as the guiding document in which to aide in planning of hike in austere conditions. Waivers will be required 45 days pre-MCCRE if, units believe environmental conditions require a deviation from the standard. Waivers will be briefed to 1st Marine Division Commanding General, before an exemption or deviation from the standard is permitted.

3. Based on the unit's METL and training plan identified in the previous step, commanders of evaluating unit must develop a corresponding evaluation plan. The evaluation plan will contain all E-Coded T&R events and all supporting 6000 level and above, as outlined by the unit's METL. The evaluation plan will also contain the corresponding level E-coded and supporting T&R events for any attachments, which fall under the attachments' respective unit's METL. By exception, those T&R events that are unsupportable during the evaluation, due to geographical constraints or lack of resources, may be waived by the 1st Marine Division Commanding General.

4. The M-30 Brief with selected METL must be provided to 1st Marine Division G3 Training Office NLT 30 days prior to the start of the MCCRE.

5. The MCTIMS UTM and MCCRE Modules will be utilized to generate the training tasks in support of the training plan and the PECL in support of the evaluation plan.

6. Record the training completion in MCTIMS UTM Module.

7. Record the evaluation results on the PECLs for each T&R event evaluated; and utilizing the results of the evaluated T&R events, determine if the unit is "Trained," "Partially Trained," or "Untrained" to execute each MET contained in the unit's core and/or assigned METL. Results will then be published via the MCCRE EC in the MCTIMS MCCRE Module NLT 45 days after completion of the MCCRE. Enclosure (1) provides further detail on the evaluator reporting responsibilities within MCTIMS.

8. Conduct remediation in order to correct any deficiencies identified during the MCCRE.

9. Reporting of unit readiness via Defense Readiness Reporting System - Marine Corps (DRRS-MC) will continue to be in accordance with reference (d).

10. Units must attempt to utilize attachments or enablers during their MCCRE. These attachments will be formally evaluated by their higher headquarters providing subject matter experts to evaluate their attachments.

11. Regiments will conduct a MCCRE of subordinate battalions and may delegate the responsibility for conducting a MCCRE of a Company/Battery to subordinate battalions. Separate battalions will conduct a MCCRE of subordinate units.

12. Units should seek to incorporate aviation, amphibious shipping/connectors, Radio Bn, Law Enforcement Bn, MIG/MCIOC, NRO, UAS, etc., into their MCCRE design to support the METs required for deployment.

13. The MCCRE will evaluate all of a unit's functional areas in a tactical setting, to include their ability to conduct logistics/supply in the field and operate in a CBRNE environment.

14. The tactical order for the first MCCRE event will be delivered to the evaluated unit no earlier than 96 hours before execution in order to facilitate rapid planning.

15. Units that remain "untrained" will receive remedial training and be re-evaluated before they CHOP/deploy. A synopsis of the training standards not met and remediation plan will be provided in the MCCRE AAB to the Commanding General (Encl 4).

16. By warfighting function, each unit will identify the following in their AAR:

a. Its "best practices" from the MCCRE.

b. Areas where the T&R Manual standards are lacking in accordance with their assigned or core METs; specifically focusing on counter-UAS, information warfare and operations.

c. Recommended updates to the Division Tactical SOP.

17. The headquarters responsible for planning and evaluating a MCCRE should utilize the TECOM Training Support Center (TSC) at Camp Pendleton, (760) 763-8244, TSC 29 Palms (760) 830-8468, and the MCB Camp Pendleton Training Support Division at (760) 763-7057.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. MCCRE results will be submitted, via MCTIMS, to G3 Training no later than 10 days after the conclusion of the evaluation.

b. MCCRE AAB of battalion and higher units will be conducted with the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division no later than 30 days after the conclusion of the exercise.

c. Provide recommended AAB dates to the Division Training Officer, Current Operations Officer, and the Aide-de-Camp as soon as possible to facilitate the Commanding General's schedule.

d. Battalion and higher unit AAB attendees will include:

1. Evaluated unit Commander, SgtMaj, Company/Battery Commanders, Operation Officer, Ops Chief, Gunner, and principal staff.

2. Evaluated unit Higher Headquarters Commanding Officer, Operation Officer, Ops Chief, Gunner, and principal staff.

3. Division primary staff / deputy and Gunner.

4. TEC OIC, EXCON OIC, Division Training staff and principle evaluator staff.

e. MCCRE evaluators will present the AAB to the Commanding General with the evaluated unit in attendance.

f. Waivers for evaluation of T&R events require 1st Marine Division Commanding General approval and are due to the 1st Marine Division G3 Training Office NLT 45 days prior to unit MCCRE execution.

g. Waivers for evaluation of T&R events that were planned but unexecuted due to extraneous situations are due to the 1st Marine Division G3 Training Office NLT 10 days prior to unit's AAB.

h. All enclosures for this document can be found on the MCTIMS G-3 Training Tab, under Unit Documents.

6. Command and Signal

- a. Command. This order is applicable to all 1st Marine Division units.
- b. Signal. This order is effective the date signed.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

R.F. CASTELLVI

DISTRUBUTION: A

CONDUCT OF A MCCRE

1. General. The MCCRE personnel structure outlined below is general guidelines (examples) and can be modified based on the type and size of the unit for a formal MCCRE. The initiation of the MCCRE and assignment of the Exercise Commander will be the responsibility of the MCCRE Manager as determined by the MEF CG or COMMARFORRES.

2. The Evaluation Structure. The following are the key staffs charged with implementing a MCCRE.

- a. Exercise Commander (EC).
- b. Exercise Director (ED).
- c. Tactical Exercise Commander (TEC).
- d. Tactical Exercise Control Group (TECG).
- e. Senior Evaluator.
- f. Evaluators.

3. Exercise Commander (EC). The EC is responsible for the conduct of a formal MCCRE. Responsibilities and functions of the EC include:

- a. Establishing schedules and providing resources.
- b. Designating the ED.
- c. Reviewing and publishing the MCCRE results in the MCTIMS MCCRE Module. This reporting requirement is exempt from reports control according to reference (i), part IV, paragraph 7k.
- d. Instilling quality control over the MCCRE, to ensure the exercises of subordinate units are reported per this Order.

4. Exercise Director (ED). The ED is designated by the EC to prepare for, ensure the conduct of, and report all evaluations. Responsibilities and functions of the ED include:

- a. Publishing a letter of instruction (LOI) delineating

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the T&R events per the unit's METL to be evaluated, timeframe of the exercise, and responsibilities of various elements participating in the exercise, remediation, follow-on evaluations, and coordinating instructions. A copy of the exercise LOI will be provided to the EC 15 days prior to the MCCRE date.

b. Designating the TEC to operate as the central control agency for the exercise.

c. Assigning evaluators, to include the senior evaluator, and ensuring evaluator training is planned for and conducted.

d. Prescribing the general exercise scenario, taking into account any objectives/scenario events prescribed by the EC.

e. Ensuring the evaluated scenario reflects the evaluated unit commander's training program goals and objectives.

f. Arranging for training areas, airspace, aggressor forces, and other required support.

g. Supervising the evaluation as required, compiling and analyzing the data, and submitting the MCCRE report to the EC.

h. Keeping the EC apprised of the evaluation.

i. Prescribing exercise objectives and desired scenarios, tasks, or events.

j. Coordinating with external commands or agencies to support the evaluation, when required.

k. Evaluate the execution of exercises based on the appropriate T&R Manual.

l. Affect corrective action for deficiencies identified during the exercise, which are beyond the subordinate commander's capability to resolve.

5. Tactical Exercise Commander (TEC). The TEC is responsible to the ED for ensuring the MCCRE is conducted following the instructions contained in this order, the T&R

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events, and in support of the unit's METL and any other directions prescribed by the ED. Based on a review/analysis of information/data provided by the senior evaluator, the TEC identifies trends, strengths, and weaknesses of the unit's performance; and provides the MCCRE report to the ED and unit commander per instructions.

6. Tactical Exercise Control Group (TECG). The ED will establish a nucleus TECG to provide continuity for evaluations across the command. The responsibilities and functions of the TECG include:

- a. Developing a detailed exercise scenario to include objectives and events prescribed by the EC/ED and LOI.
- b. Conducting evaluator training.
- c. Coordinating and controlling actor/agent input and aggressor response to unit action or inaction in support of the exercise scenario.
- d. Compiling and analyzing data submitted by individual evaluators, and submitting required evaluation information to the ED.
- e. Preparing and conducting a detailed exercise debrief for the unit being evaluated and the ED.

7. Senior Evaluator. The senior evaluator coordinates and supervises all evaluators' activity during the exercise and debrief, and must be aware of the overall effectiveness of the evaluation, to include scenario effectiveness and the unit's performance in the exercise. The senior evaluator compiles the data sheets from all evaluators at the end of the exercise and conducts the post exercise debrief. Due to the fact that tactical scenarios are used at different levels of a unit's organization at different phases of an exercise, some T&R events may be scored more than once. In these instances where a single T&R event is evaluated multiple times and when calculating the rating for a given MET, the senior evaluator will follow the steps outlined in Figure 1.

8. Evaluators. During the formal MCCRE, evaluators must be prepared to perform the following functions:

- a. Ensure the evaluation proceeds as planned. The evaluators will use a combination of prescribed, pre-planned,

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and inserted events to control and maintain the flow of the exercise evaluation while ensuring the unit is evaluated in a meaningful manner against all designated T&R events. They increase or decrease the tempo of operations and maneuver rates through the use of aggressor maneuver/actions, by inserting actors/agents and by passing intelligence input to cause changes in the plan. They provide necessary information from the scene of action by voice, radio or other means when applicable.

b. Resolve any disagreement between the evaluated force and aggressor forces. They make a determination of, and assess, casualties by analyzing the relative combat power of the forces involved through their own judgment and experience or by utilizing external assets.

c. Apply the prescribed standards to the unit's performance and evaluate the level of performance as outlined in Figure 2. Evaluators must possess a complete and thorough understanding of the T&R events that are undertaken in the exercise. Evaluators must review in detail the tasks and standards of the T&R for which they are responsible and must be aware of when and where in the scenario these standards and tasks are to be evaluated. They must then determine whether the activity or performance observed fulfills the performance criteria as stated in the standard. When this determination is made, evaluators simply indicate on the Performance Evaluation Checklist (PECL) "YES", a performance step was met, "NO", a performance step was not met, or "N/A", a performance step was not applicable. "N/A" marks will require explanation when it was originally anticipated that those areas would be accomplished. At the same time the evaluators are observing what is happening, they must also be alert to scheduled events that do not occur, tasks and standards not attempted, and the reasons why. In assigning "YES" or "NO" or "N/A" marks, evaluators must be closely attuned to the tactical play of the exercise and scheduled scenario events. The evaluators will evaluate overall performance against the task, condition, and event components by indicating "Trained", "Partially Trained", "Untrained", or "N/A". All "Untrained" marks will require an explanation in the MCCRE report to highlight later corrective action. All "N/A" marks will require an explanation in the comments section annotating why the event was not evaluated. All events annotated a "N/A" will not be calculated into the units overall rating for a given MET. Evaluator remarks must be geared toward assisting the unit in building training

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programs in the future. Evaluators record their notes on the PECLs, as necessary, to support the exercise. Evaluators continue this process throughout the exercise. At the conclusion of the exercise, evaluators review their data and supporting notes to ensure they are a true reflection of the performance they have observed. A PECL example is provided in Figure 3.

9. Evaluator Training. Training must be provided to ensure a complete understanding of evaluator functions after identification and selection of the most qualified Marines available. Participants will include all evaluators, the ED's representative, the TEC or appropriate representative, key TECG staff members, officer in charge of the aggressor force, and representatives from all units participating in the evaluation. Listed below are those key items which should be covered:

- a. It is recommended that the Evaluators are Operations and Tactics Instructors, Intelligence and Tactics Instructors, Weapons and Tactics Instructors, and Expeditionary Logistics Instructors to ensure the evaluator is qualified to conduct the evaluation.
- b. Brief/verification of exercise support requirements.
- c. Specific assignment of evaluators to units.
- d. Detailed brief of exercise scenario to include all major TECG driven events and planned aggressor force actions.
- e. Detailed brief of planned aggressor force actions.
- f. Detailed brief of T&R events to be evaluated and how they relate to the exercise scenario, TECG (higher headquarters input), and aggressor actions.
- g. Specific evaluator responsibilities.
- h. EC, TEC, and senior evaluator instructions/guidance.
- i. Brief on the roles all evaluators must fill.
- j. Administrative instructions pertaining to the conclusion of the evaluation and the constructive requirements of the debrief/critique.

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10. Exercise Debrief. One of the most important elements of the MCCRE is the debrief and the training feedback that is provided to the unit commander. How the ED organizes and conducts the required debrief may vary by type command. The debrief may be conducted in conjunction with the senior evaluator's debrief or the ED may choose to conduct it as a subsequent event. Notwithstanding the organization and the timing of the debrief, the following should be included in all debriefs:

a. Participation/attendance of the following personnel:

(1) ED or appropriate representative.

(2) TEC and key TECG staff members.

(3) All evaluators.

(4) The evaluated unit commander, key staff members and subordinate commanders, and attached unit commanders/noncommissioned officers in charge.

(5) Aggressor force commander.

b. Detailed debrief by the senior evaluator, and other evaluators, as required, of each T&R event as it occurred in the exercise scenario.

c. Detailed comments on positive and negative trends.

d. Detailed comments on tasks and standards that were scheduled, but were not evaluated, to include reasons why.

e. Detailed debrief by the TEC, or representative, concerning TECG support, support/interaction with the evaluated unit, and aggressor forces control/support.

f. The unit commander's general comments concerning the validity and effectiveness of the evaluation.

g. TEC's comments concerning the validity and effectiveness of the evaluation.

11. Evaluator Staffing

a. The ED is responsible for the selection and training of evaluators. The number of evaluators is not prescribed and

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varies with the size and type of unit and the T&R events to be tested. It is desirable that evaluators be obtained from commands not directly related to the organization(s) being evaluated. Recommend that when possible, evaluators be a post-command/post-billet holder as appropriate to the element being evaluated.

b. Evaluator staffing will be determined by the ED based on the unit type being evaluated. For general guidance and not a set requirement, examples of possible evaluator staffing assignments for selected ground, aviation, and logistics components are listed below:

(1) Evaluator Staffing for a Ground Combat Element:

Evaluator Type	Officer	Enlisted
Senior Evaluator	1 LtCol	5 SNCOs
Command & Control Evaluator	1 Maj	
Fire Support Coordination Evaluator	1 Maj	1 SNCO
Rifle Company Evaluator	4 Cpts	4 SNCOs
H&S Company Evaluator	1 Capt	
Artillery Evaluator	1 Capt	2 SNCOs*
Acquisition, MET, Survey Evaluator	1 CWO3/4	
Reconnaissance Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO (0326)
Communications Evaluator		1 SNCO
Cannoneer Evaluator		1 SNCO
Fire Direction Evaluator	2 Cpts	2 SNCOs
Engineer Evaluator	1 Capt	
Tank Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO or NCO (AMOS: 1867)**
Electronic Warfare Evaluator	1 Lt	
Assault Amphibian Evaluator	1 Capt	1 MGySgt
Nuclear Biological Chemical Evaluator	1 CWO	
Rifle Platoon Evaluators		9 SNCOs
81 Mortar Platoon Evaluator	1 Lt	

* MGySgt (Battalion FAC) to evaluate a Rocket Battery and a MSgt (Bn FAC) to evaluate a Cannon Battery.

** Recommended if conducting tank live fire during evaluation.

(2) Evaluator Staffing for ACE Units:

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Evaluator Type	Officer	Enlisted
Senior Evaluator	1 LtCol*	
Flight Evaluator (per T/M/S)	1 WTI/FLSE*	
ACE Ground Evaluator	1 WTI	
Aviation C2 Evaluators	1 Maj**	1 MSgt
Maintenance Evaluators	1 MMCO***	1 MSgt
NBC Evaluator	1 CWO	

*Pilot/naval flight officer:

- Weapons and Tactics Instructor.
- Flight evaluator shall be current and qualified in the aircraft type for unit being evaluated.

** 7277 Military Occupational Specialty preferred.

*** Maintenance Training Instructor.

(3) Evaluator Staffing for a Logistics Combat Element:

Evaluator Type	Officer	Enlisted
Senior Evaluator	1 LtCol	
Supply Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO
Maintenance Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO
Logistics Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO
Engineer Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO
Services Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO
Transportation Evaluator	1 Capt	1 SNCO
Medical Evaluator	1 LT USN	1 HM

12. Duration of Formal Evaluation. The EC will ensure the MCCRE is completed in a timely manner. Evaluations will be of sufficient length to allow for a realistic scenario with sufficient time for the evaluated unit to act and react to higher headquarters orders, to follow the troop leading steps, to develop orders and to execute orders and plans, and to adequately be evaluated on all T&R events designated by the ED. Logistics support for the tactical exercise should be an integral part of the exercise and should not exercise disproportionate influence in determining the length of the MCCRE. It is recognized, however, that constraints beyond the unit's control (weather, range non-availability, lack of ordnance, lack of transportation, safety, etc.) may require flexibility.

13. MCTIMS

- a. The EC will via MCTIMS MCCRE Module:

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(1) Initiate the MCCRE and assign a start date for the evaluated unit.

(2) Import and approve the appropriate METs and T&R Events to be evaluated. Aviation units will utilize M-SHARP for generating appropriate T&R Events and then upload supporting documentation in the documents section of MCTIMS MCCRE Module to identify standards evaluated.

(3) Provide comments for and publish the MCCRE Mission Statement.

(4) Assign the Exercise Director.

(5) Publish the MCCRE NLT 45 days after exercise completions.

b. The ED will via MCTIMS MCCRE Module:

(1) Assign the TEC, Senior Evaluator, and Evaluators.

(2) Upload the LOI and all pertinent documentation.

(3) Provide comments for the overall conduct of the MCCRE.

(4) Forward the MCCRE report/results with all comments to the EC.

c. The TEC will via MCTIMS MCCRE Module:

(1) Assign T&R Events to appropriate Evaluators. Aviation units will utilize M-SHARP for generating appropriate T&R Events and then upload supporting documentation in the documents section of MCTIMS MCCRE Module to identify standards evaluated.

(2) Provide comments for the overall conduct of the MCCRE.

(3) Forward the MCCRE report/results with all comments to the ED.

d. The Senior Evaluator will via MCTIMS MCCRE:

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(1) Review and validate all PECLs submitted by Evaluators. Aviation units will utilize M-SHARP for generating appropriate T&R Events and then upload supporting documentation in the documents section of MCTIMS MCCRE Module to identify standards evaluated.

(2) Conduct Evaluator duties as required.

(3) Upon review and validation of all PECLs, forward MCCRE results to the TEC.

e. The Evaluators will via MCTIMS MCCRE:

(1) Complete all PECLs.

(2) Forward PECLs to the Senior Evaluator for approval.

In order to determine the "Trained", "Partially Trained", or "Untrained" rating for the same T&R Event evaluated multiple times, or when calculating the rating for a given MET, a "Summative" scale will be utilized as outlined below:

1. Assign the following numerical value for each T&R event evaluated:
 - o "Trained" = 100
 - o "Partially Trained" = 50
 - o "Untrained" = 0
2. Divide the sum of all assigned values by the total number of T&R events evaluated.
3. Use the following scale to determine the rating:
 - o "Trained" = 67 - 100 percentile
 - o "Partially Trained" = 35 - 66 percentile
 - o "Untrained" = 0 - 34 percentile

Example 1:

T&R event 1 has been evaluated on (10) separate occasions resulting in (4) "Untrained"; (2) "Partially Trained"; and (4) "Trained" therefore utilizing the above numerical scale:

- "Untrained" would be calculated as $4 \times 0 = 0$
- "Partially Trained" would be calculated as $2 \times 50 = 100$
- "Trained" would be calculated as $4 \times 100 = 400$
 - o The sum of the above would be $0 + 100 + 400 = 500$
- Since the total number of events evaluated is (10), the corresponding percentile would be $500 / 10 = 50$ percentile
- Utilizing the above rating scale the T&R event would be rated as "Partially Trained"

Example 2:

MET 1 has (2) T&R events evaluated as "Untrained"; (2) T&R events evaluated as "Partially Trained"; and (6) T&R events evaluated as "Trained" therefore utilizing the above numerical scale:

- "Untrained" would be calculated as $2 \times 0 = 0$
- "Partially Trained" would be calculated as $2 \times 50 = 100$
- "Trained" would be calculated as $6 \times 100 = 600$
 - o The sum of the above would be $0 + 100 + 600 = 700$

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- Since the total number of events evaluated is (10), the corresponding percentile would be $700 / 10 = 70$ percentile
- Utilizing the above rating scale MET 1 would be rated as "Trained"

Figure 1. Calculating Ratings

☐ = Untrained ☐ = Partially Trained ☐ = Trained

Mission Essential Task List

Type	Title	Readiness
C	Conduct Amphibious Ops	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	Conduct Defensive Ops	<input type="checkbox"/>
A	Conduct Humanitarian Assistance	<input type="checkbox"/>

Conduct Amphibious Ops

E-Coded T&R Events

INF-INT-7001	Conduct Intelligence Support Planning	<input type="checkbox"/>
INF-FSPT-7001	Conduct Fire Support Coordination	<input type="checkbox"/>
INF-CSS-7002	Conduct Combat Service Support	<input type="checkbox"/>
INF-C2-7005	Conduct Planning	<input type="checkbox"/>
INF-C2-7010	Execute Command and Control (C2) of an Operation	<input type="checkbox"/>

INF-C2-7005 Conduct Planning

Event Components	Yes	No	N/A
1. Conduct problem framing.	X		
2. Determine the planning process.		X	
3. Establish a timeline for planning and preparation.			X
4. Issue warning order.		X	
5. Create Orders.	X		
6. Issue Orders.	X		
7. Implement feedback mechanisms.		X	
8. Coordinate planning with higher, adjacent, and supporting units.		X	
9. Supervise.	X		

Evaluator Comments (Required): _____ Evaluator Assesses T&R Event based on Performance

Check Box: ☐ Trained ☒ Partially Training ☐ Untrained ☐ N/A

Figure 2. Evaluation Process

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Performance Evaluation Checklist	
MCT 1.1.2 Provide Task Organized Forces	
T&R Event: AAV-CMDC-7XXX	
TASK: Provide Assault Amphibian Unit(s) In Support of Expeditionary Operations.	
CONDITION: Given a higher headquarters' operation order and commander's guidance,	
STANDARD: to provide the commander with mechanized, amphibious capability.	
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST (EVENT COMPONENTS)	
1. Conduct mission analysis	YES / NO / NA
2. Task organize	YES / NO / NA
3. CHOP control / command AA Unit to supported command	YES / NO / NA
Evaluator Comments (Required):	
Evaluated as:	Check Box
<input type="checkbox"/> Trained	
<input type="checkbox"/> Partially Trained	
<input type="checkbox"/> Untrained	
<input type="checkbox"/> N/A	
Evaluator Name/Rank: _____	

Figure 3. PECL Example

1st Marine Division MCCRE Support Tracker							
Planned							
Unit				V34	V14	V35	2/23
Deployment / Dates				SPMAGTF / Oct 18	31st MEU / Dec 18	11th MEU / Apr 19	UDP
Location of MCCRE				29 Palms	CPEN	Bridge Port	29 Palms
Billet	Rank	Source	4-8 Jun 18	20-29 Jun 18	1-11 Aug 18	06-10 Sep 2018	
Bn Evaluators	EVALUATOR OIC	Col	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar / 5th Mar	7th Mar
	7000 MANUEVER/ C2	Maj+	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar / 5th Mar	7th Mar
	Enlisted Evaluator	Gysgt +		7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar / 5th Mar	7th Mar
	7000 FIRES	Capt+	Support Bn	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar / 5th Mar	7th Mar
	7000 INTELLIGENCE	Capt+	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar / 5th Mar	7th Mar
	Enlisted Evaluator	Gysgt +		7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar / 5th Mar	7th Mar
	7000 COMMUNICATIONS	Capt+	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar / 5th Mar	7th Mar
	Enlisted Evaluator	Gysgt +		7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar / 5th Mar	7th Mar
	7000 FORCE PROTECTION	LT+	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar / 5th Mar	7th Mar
	7000/6000 CBRN	CWO	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar / 5th Mar	7th Mar
	7000 LOGISTICS (CSS)	Capt+	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar / 5th Mar	7th Mar
	Enlisted Evaluator	Gysgt +		7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar / 5th Mar	7th Mar
	7000/6000 MEDICAL	LT+	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar / 5th Mar	7th Mar
	7000/6000 Engineer	LT+	CEB	CEB	CEB	CEB	CEB
	Chaplain Evaluator			7th Mar	1st MAR	1st Mar / 5th Mar	7th Mar
Support Battalion Tasks	6000 COMPANY OPERATIONS	Capt+	Support Bn	V27	V11	V15	V17
	Enlisted Evaluator	SSgt+		V27	V11	V15	V17
	6000 COMPANY OPERATIONS	Capt+	Support Bn	V27	V11	V15	V17
	Enlisted Evaluator	SSgt+		V27	V11	V15	V17
	6000 COMPANY OPERATIONS	Capt+	Support Bn	V27	V11	V15	V17
	Enlisted Evaluator	SSgt+		V27	V11	V15	V17
	CAAT Eval	Lt+		V27	V11	V15	V17
	CAAT Enlisted Eval	Sgt+		V27	V11	V15	V17
	81s Eval	Lt+		V27	V11	V15	V17
	81s Enlisted Eval	Sgt+		V27	V11	V15	V17
	TACTICAL EXERCISE CONTROL (14)		Support Bn	V27	V11	V15	V17
	EXCON (22)		Support Bn	V27	V11	V15	V17
	CO (x3 Plts+Wpns Plt+ CLIC/ CLOC)		Support Bn	V27	V11	V15	V17
	Div EXCON Cadre						
	OPFOR LAVs (x3 25s/ x1 L)			None	N/A	None	None
Separate Bns	Tanks- Plt			Plt 3, Co B	Plt 1, Co C	None	1st Plt, C Co
	AAVs- Plt			2, D Co	2 C Co	None	None
	Engineers- Plt			4th Plt, C Co	4th Plt, A Co	3rd Plt, B Co	4th CEB
	Arty- Btry/Response Cell			I 3/11	E 2/11	None	TBD
	Recon- Tm			None	None	Force Det Co (-)	
	LAR- OPFOR or Plt			n/a	Plt 3, C Co	Plt, C Co, 1st LAR	TBD C Co?
	Trucks- Plt			2d Plt	3d Plt	2d Plt	TBD
MAW	VMU x4 Sorties + Ground Control Station						
	ASSLT SPT (1) Co lift (insert only)						
	RW CAS x2 Sorties						
	FW CAS x2 Sorties						
MLG	CLB DET (Truck Support, MHE, Generators)						
	EOD Tm						
	LE Det						
MHG	SST x1						
	Electronic Attack Capability						
	GROUND SENSOR PLT (Det)						

1st Marine Division MCCRE Support Tracker							
Planned							
Unit				V17	V21	V11	V24
Deployment / Dates				UDP / Oct 18	31st MEU	MRF-D	31st MEU/ Apr 19
Location of MCCRE				Bridge Port	Bridge Port	CPEN	CPEN
Billet	Rank	Source		15 - 20 Oct 18	15 - 21 Feb 19	27 Feb - 8 Mar 19	2019 Aug?
Bn Evaluators	EVALUATOR OIC	Col	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar	5th Mar
	7000 MANUEVER/ C2	Maj+	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar	5th Mar
	Enlisted Evaluator	Gysgt +		7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar	5th Mar
	7000 FIRES	Capt+	Support Bn	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar	5th Mar
	7000 INTELLIGENCE	Capt+	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar	5th Mar
	Enlisted Evaluator	Gysgt +		7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar	5th Mar
	7000 COMMUNICATIONS	Capt+	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar	5th Mar
	Enlisted Evaluator	Gysgt +		7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar	5th Mar
	7000 FORCE PROTECTION	LT+	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar	5th Mar
	7000/6000 CBRN	CWO	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar	5th Mar
	7000 LOGISTICS (CSS)	Capt+	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar	5th Mar
	Enlisted Evaluator	Gysgt +		7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar	5th Mar
	7000/6000 MEDICAL	LT+	Regt	7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar	5th Mar
	7000/6000 Engineer	LT+	CEB	CEB	CEB	CEB	CEB
	Chaplain Evaluator			7th Mar	1st Mar	1st Mar	5th Mar
Support Battalion Tasks	6000 COMPANY OPERATIONS	Capt+	Support Bn	V27	1st Mar	V31	V24
	Enlisted Evaluator	SSgt+		V27	1st Mar	V31	V24
	6000 COMPANY OPERATIONS	Capt+	Support Bn	V27	1st Mar	V31	V24
	Enlisted Evaluator	SSgt+		V27	1st Mar	V31	V24
	6000 COMPANY OPERATIONS	Capt+	Support Bn	V27	1st Mar	V31	V24
	Enlisted Evaluator	SSgt+		V27	1st Mar	V31	V24
	CAAT Eval	Lt+		V27	1st Mar	V31	V24
	CAAT Enlisted Eval	Sgt+		V27	1st Mar	V31	V24
	81s Eval	Lt+		V27	1st Mar	V31	V24
	81s Enlisted Eval	Sgt+		V27	1st Mar	V31	V24
	TACTICAL EXERCISE CONTROL (14)		Support Bn	V27	1st Mar	V31	V24
	EXCON (22)		Support Bn	V27	1st Mar	V31	V24
	CO (x3 Plts+Wpns Plt+ CLIC/ CLOC)		Support Bn	V27	1st Mar	V31	V24
	Div EXCON Cadre						
	OPFOR LAVs (x3 25s/ x1 L)			None	None	V31	None
Separate Bns	Tanks- Plt			Tow Plt	D Co	TBD	Plt 3, A Co
	AAVs- Plt			None	B2 3D AABn	Plt 2, A Co	15th MEU Plt
	Engineers- Plt			1st Plt, C Co	2nd Plt, A Co	1st Plt, A Co	1st Plt, B Co
	Arty- Btry/Response Cell			None	G 2/11	I 3/11	C 1/11
	Recon- Tm			None	None	TBD	A Co (-)
	LAR- OPFOR or Plt			None	B 3rd LAR	Plt TBD, A Co	Plt, B Co, 1st LAR
	Trucks- Plt			None	TBD	TBD Plt	TBD Plt
MAW	VMU x4 Sorties + Ground Control Station						
	ASSLT SPT (1) Co lift (insert only)						
	RW CAS x2 Sorties						
	FW CAS x2 Sorties						
MLG	CLB DET (Truck Support, MHE, Generators)						
	EOD Tm						
	LE Det						
MHG	SST x1						
	Electronic Attack Capability						
	GROUND SENSOR PLT (Det)						



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
UNIT
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN)
BOX 5555555
CAMP CALDONIA, CA 92555-5555

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3504.1
Date

From: Commanding Officer (or Operations Officer), Unit
To: Commanding General (or if from OpsO AC/S G-3 Operations)

Subj: "EVENT TITLE" AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR)

Ref: (a) MCO 3504.1
(b) DivO 3504.1

1. General. Enter an introductory statement outlining the background, mission statement, Commander's Intent, and task organization for the event reported on.

2. Functional Area. (Ops, Log, Admin etc.)

a. Topic. Provide a short descriptive title of the topic, issue or lesson to be addressed.

1) Discussion. Discuss the Issue. Who, What, Where, When, Why & METT-TS-L) Provide a thorough and detailed explanation of the Topic/Issue.

2) Recommendation. What is your recommendation for improvement? Provide any recommendation to rectify or mitigate the issue if applicable.

3. Functional Area.

a. Topic.

1) Discussion.

2) Recommendation.

b. Topic.

Discussion.

Recommendation.

c. Topic.

Discussion.

Recommendation.

ENCLOSURE (3)


4. Functional Area.

11. Conclusion/Summary of Event. Summarize the event from the broader unit perspective. Include the Commander's comments and his overall assessment of events. Highlight topics/issues of worthy of additional command emphasis.

12. Point of Contact. Include unit representative contact information for questions and inquiries pertaining to the AAR.

Signature


Copy to:
CG MCWL, MCCLL



X Marine Regiment X/X MCCRE AAR

Date

ENCLOSURE (4)




Agenda

- MCCRE Summary
- EXCON Org Chart
- Event Roll-up
 - Road to War
 - Tactical situation
- Phase I
- Phase II
- Phase III
- Phase IV
- Battalion Evaluations
 - Intel
 - Maneuver (COC operations)
 - Fires
 - Logistics
 - Force Protection
 - C2 (Comm specific)
- External Support

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ENCLOSURE (4)



MCCRE Summary

- This MCCRE is a 5-day (24/7) force-on-force exercise that evaluates X/X in all its Core METs.

Key events are:

1stMARDIV Requirements
Per DivO 3501.1C CRE Encl 1

X/X MCCRE

Conduct a day attack (Bn)

Conduct a night attack

Conduct a deliberate defense at night (Bn)

Conduct a helicopter-borne/tiltroter-borne assault

Conduct a mechanized assault

Conduct a dismounted MTC

-Physically demanding tactical mvmt

-Echeloning C2 & Fire support

Conduct operations in a CBN environment


MOUT attacks

**For Non-infantry Bn units, replace with respective
Key Events from DivO 3501.1**

ENCLOSURE (4)


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EXCON Organization Chart/Requirements



Evaluator Support: 36
 Exercise Control: 24 (8 from 2/4)
 OpFor: Co (+) (9 for SIMS)
 RSOs: 8 from 2/4
 TSC: White OIC and Enablers

ENCLOSURE (1)



Evaluation

- Associated with Infantry T&R tasks
 - 7000 to 5000 (Bn – Co – Plt)
 - Evaluated event components with each T&R task
 - Goal: Provide an objective evaluation grounded in doctrine and shared experiences

Example: 60% - Partially Trained


INF-C2-7001: Employ C2 System	Observed	S	I
Plan C2 systems architecture	Y	X	
Design C2 systems architecture	N		
Engineer C2 systems architecture	Y	X	
Prepare C2 systems access requests	Y	X	
Implement C2 systems architecture	Y		X
Rehearse C2 Systems interactions	Y	X	
Maintain C2 systems architecture	Y		X

- Evaluators from X/X
 - Class room instruction (2-day course)
 - Reviewed Infantry T&R
 - Terrain study / Recon with EXCON
 - Evaluators / EXCON team assigned to a corridor (MET)
 - Breeds consistency with evaluations and builds SMEs
 - Stability Operations
 - Defense/MTC
 - Offensive Operations (Supported Atk – Rng 800)

Untrained 0%-49%	Partially Trained 50% - 79%	Trained 80%-100%
---------------------	--------------------------------	---------------------

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ENCLOSURE (4)




Road to War

- Situation for the exercise (One Slide)



Event Roll-up

- #Hours of continuous operations covering down on Core METs
- # participants (ExFor/OpFor/ExCon)
- # FragOs
- Amphibious landing utilizing LCAC/LCU/AAVs
 - Comments
- Offensive Operations
 - Bn Ground Attack
 - Movement to Contact
 - # x Heli/Tilt-rotor assaults
 - # x Mech assaults
- Defense
 - # hours in the Defense
 - CBRN
 - Planning
- Stability
 - # MSELs injects with civilian role players
 - KLE with civilian SMEs



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PHASE I: Shaping (D-1, XX XXX)

CONOPS:

Begins:

Ends:

Key Tasks

-X

-X

-X

Insert COA Graphics Here

ENCLOSURE (4)



Phase I

Co X

Sustains:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Improves:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Co Y

Sustains:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Improves:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Co Z

Sustains:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Improves:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

ENCLOSURE (4)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



PHASE II: Secure a Foothold (D-Day, XX XXX)

CONOPS :

Begins:

Ends:

Key Tasks

- X
- X
- X

Insert COA Graphics Here

ENCLOSURE (4)



Phase II

Co X

Sustains:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Improves:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Co Y

Sustains:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Improves:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Co Z


Sustains:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Improves:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

ENCLOSURE (4)



UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

PHASE III: Secure Regt OBJ 2 (D+1, XX XXX)

CONOPS :

Begins:

Ends:

Key Tasks

-X

-X

-X

Insert COA Graphics Here

ENCLOSURE (4)



Phase III

Co X

Sustains:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Improves:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Co Y

Sustains:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Improves:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Co Z

Sustains:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Improves:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

ENCLOSURE (4)



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PHASE IV: Secure Regt OBJ 3 (D+2, XX XXX)

DECISIVE PHASE

CONOPS :

Begins:

Ends:

Key Tasks

- X
- X
- X

Insert COA Graphics Here

ENCLOSURE (4)



Phase IV

Co X

Sustains:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Improves:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Co Y

Sustains:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Improves:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Co Z


Sustains:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

Improves:

1. XX
2. XX
3. XX

ENCLOSURE (4)



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PHASE V: Stability Operations (D+3, XX XXX)

CONOPS :

Begins:


Ends:

Key Tasks

-X
-X
-X

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
ENCLOSURE (4)



Maneuver Trends

COC / Battle Tracking

- Sustain:
 - XX
 - XX
- Improve:
 - XX
 - XX
 - XX



Intelligence Trends

- Sustain:
 - XX
 - XX
 - XX
- Improve:
 - XX
 - XX
 - XX

A diamond-shaped logo with a black background. Inside, there are five white stars arranged in a circle around a central vertical line. The word "GUANTANAMO" is written vertically in white capital letters along the central line.

Fires Trends

- Sustained:
 - XX
 - XX
 - XX
- Improved:
 - XX
 - XX
 - XX



Logistics Trends

- Sustained:

- XX
- XX
- XX.


- Improved:

- XX
- XX
- XX



Communications Trends

- Sustain:
 - XX
 - XX
 - XX
- Improve:
 - XX
 - XX
 - XX



Force Protection Trends

- Sustained:
 - XX
 - XX
- Improved:
 - XX
 - XX
 - XX



Untrained 0%-49%

Partially Trained 50% - 79%

Trained 80%-100%

Bn Evaluation Criteria 1 of 2

7000 level tasks from Infantry T&R Manual

Infantry Bn Task	Observed Y/N	Eval
INF-C2-7003: Conduct Command Post (CP) Operations	Y	
INF-C2-7004: Conduct Combat Operations Center (COC) Operations	Y	
INF-C2-7005: Conduct Planning	Y	
INF-C2-7006: Conduct Assessment	Y	
INF-C2-7010: Execute Command and Control of an Operations	Y	
INF-CSS-7002: Conduct Combat Service Support	Y	
INF-FP-7001: Conduct Force Protection	Y	
INF-CSS-7004: Process Detainees	N	
INF-CSS-7005: Process Casualties	Y	
INF-FSPT-7001: Conduct Fire Support Planning	Y	
INF-FSPT-7002: Conduct Fire Coordination	Y	
INF-INT-7001: Conduct functional intelligence	Y	

ENCLOSURE (4)



Untrained 0%-49%

Partially Trained 50% - 79%


Trained 80%-100%

Bn Evaluation Criteria 2 of 2

7000 level tasks from Infantry T&R Manual

Infantry Bn Task	Observed Y/N	Eval
INF-MAN-7001: Conduct a Ground Attack	Y	
INF-MAN-7002: Conduct a Movement to Contact	Y	
INF-MAN-7101: Conduct a Position Defense	Y	
INF-MAN-7209: Consolidate and Reorganize	Y	
INF-MAN-7213: Operate in a CBRN Environment	Y	
INF-MAN-7214: Employ Scout Snipers	Y	
INF-MAN-7215: Control an Area	Y	
INF-MAN-7401: Conduct Civil Military Operations	Y	

ENCLOSURE (4)



Co Evaluation Criteria 1 of 2

6000 level tasks from Infantry T&R Manual

Infantry Co Task	Co X	Co Y	Co Z
INF-C2-6001: Employ Command and Control (C2) Systems			
INF-C2-6002: Conduct Company Combat Operation Center (CCOC) Operations			
INF-C2-6003: Conduct Planning			
INF-C2-6004: Conduct Assessment	N/A	N/A	
INF-C2-6009: Prepare for Combat Operations			
INF-CSS-6001: Conduct Tactical Logistics			
INF-CSS-6002: Process Casualties			
INF-CSS-6003: Process Detainees			N/A
INF-FP-6001: Conduct Force Protection	N/A		
INF-FP-6004: Conduct CBRN			
INF-FSPT-6001: Conduct Fire Support Planning		N/A	N/A
INF-FSPT-6002: Conduct Fire Support Coordination		N/A	
INF-FSPT-6006: Conduct Fire Support Team (FiST) Operations		N/A	
INF-INT-6001: Conduct Intelligence Operations	N/A		N/A

ENCLOSURE (4)




Co Evaluation Criteria 2 of 2

6000 level tasks from Infantry T&R Manual

Infantry Co Task	Co X	Co Y	Co Z
INF-MAN-6001: Conduct a Ground Attack			
INF-MAN-6002: Conduct a Movement to Contact	N/A	N/A	
INF-MAN-6003: Conduct Helicopter/Tiltrotor-borne Operations		N/A	N/A
INF-MAN-6004: Conduct a Raid	N/A		N/A
INF-MAN-6101: Conduct a Position Defense			
INF-MAN-6202: Conduct a Tactical March	N/A	N/A	
INF-MAN-6209: Consolidate and Reorganize			
INF-MAN-6212: Conduct Patrolling Operations			
INF-MAN-6217: Employ Scout Snipers	N/A	N/A	
INF-MAN-6301: Participate in an Amphibious Assault			
INF-MAN-6406: Conduct Civil Military Operations		N/A	

ENCLOSURE (4)




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External Support/Issues

- X/X (Co+ w/ staff evaluation)
 - 194 Company for OpFor
 - CE is prepared to evaluate Bn Staff
- ACU-1 X XXX(0700-1600)
 - 2 LCUs
- ACU-5 X XXX(0700-1600)
 - 4 LCACs
- BMU-1
 - Beach Party Team
 - Craft Landing Zone Team
- INTEL Bn
 - ExFor – 9 Pax
 - OpFor – 4 Pax
- RAD Bn
 - 2 X 4 man SSTs for ExFor
 - 1 X 4 man SST for OpFor
- Civilian Roll Players
 - San Clemente Mayor
 - Orange County Fire, ATEP, Law Enforcement
 - Dana Point Water Works
- 1st LAR (2 Plts)
 - 4 VICs, 28 PAX to both ExFor and OpFor
- 3D AA Bn
 - 1 PLT with C-7
- 1st CEB
 - Plt (+) ExFor
 - Squad OpFor
- MED Bn ~25 Pax
 - STP located with Reg FWD
- PAO (1) and ComCam (2)
- CLB-X - 35 PAX
 - (3) HMMWV
 - (9) MTRV
 - (4) M105 TRLRs (attached to MTRVs)
 - (3) M149 (waterbull, towed to AFA 16 by MTRV)
 - (2) LVS w/ 3 SIXCON each (one bulk water/one bulk fuel)
 - (1) MK36 Wrecker for D-Day beach ops
- TSC

ENCLOSURE (4)



QUESTIONS & GUIDANCE

ENCLOSURE (4)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3D ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN BATTALION
1ST MARINE DIVISION, (1MARDIV)
BOX 555574
CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA 92055-5574

IN REPLY REFER TO
3000
S-4
1 Apr 19

COMMANDING OFFICER'S POLICY LETTER 18-19

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution list

Subj: CONDUCT OF THE MARINE CORPS COMBAT READINESS EVALUATION (MCCRE) FOR
ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN PLATOONS AND COMPANIES

Ref: (a) DIVO 3501.1C MARINE CORPS COMBAT READINESS EVALUATION
(b) NAVMC 2500.2B ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE TRAINING AND READINESS
MANUAL (SHORT TITLE: AA T&R MANUAL)
(c) 3D AABN COMMANDER'S TRAINING GUIDANCE DTD 19 JUNE 14

Encl: (1) AAV T&R Performance Evaluation Checklist.

1. Purpose. Per the references, the purpose of this policy letter is to establish an internal policy for 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion (3d AABn) for the procedural conduct of assault amphibian unit MCCREs.

2. Background. Per reference (a), in order to certify that its major subordinate elements (MSE) are prepared to deploy and execute their Mission Essential Tasks (MET), the 1st Marine Division (1MARDIV) has directed that its subordinate commands conduct a MCCRE prior to any deployment and no less than every two years. Accordingly per reference (a), 3d AABn will be evaluated on six mission essential tasks from the AA platoon to the battalion level. Although DIVO 3501.1C provides a comprehensive means to assess an AA unit's combat readiness, it is not synchronized with AA T&R Manual which also mandates the conduct of annual formal evaluations in the form of "E" coded events. Therefore, this policy letter will outline how AA unit MCCREs will be conducted in a manner that ensures the fulfillment of both AA MCCRE and AA T&R evaluation requirements.

3. Applicability. This policy is applicable to all AA platoons and companies in the battalion.

4. DIVO 3501.1C Requirements Overview and Evaluation.

a. Per DIVO 3501.1C the following METs must be evaluated prior to that unit's deployment or no less than every two years:

Evaluated Event	Size of AA Unit Evaluated	Embarked Infantry Required
Conduct amphibious planning	CO or BN	No
Support amphibious assault	Platoon	Yes
Support amphibious raid	Platoon	Yes
Support a mechanized attack	Platoon	Yes
Support an infantry defense	Platoon	Yes
Conduct operations in a CBRN environment	CO or BN	No

Figure 1

Subj: CONDUCT OF THE MARINE CORPS COMBAT READINESS EVALUATION (MCCRE) FOR ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN PLATOONS AND COMPANIES

b. DIVO 3501.1C states that infantry units may incorporate separate battalion attachments into their battalion MCCREs so long as those separate battalions provide evaluators to assess those MCCRE events. Further, those separate battalions may add additional evaluation events as deemed necessary, based on the assigned unit's mission. Therefore, provided that 3d AABn sources the evaluators, there are opportunities to evaluate division AA MCCRE events and T&R "E" coded events during a larger infantry battalion MCCRE. Furthermore, four of the six MCCRE events cannot be evaluated without embarked infantry and every effort must be made to ensure these events are incorporated to the infantry battalion MCCRE.

5. NAVMC 3500.2B AA T&R Manual Overview and Requirements.

a. Per the AA T&R Manual, the AA Company's sole "E" coded event is:

T&R Event	Description	Embarked Infantry Required
AAV-CSS-6002	Conduct Recovery and Evacuation Operations	No

Figure 2

b. Given the appropriate coordination it is possible to incorporate the AA T&R "E" coded event AAV-CSS-6002 into an infantry battalion MCCRE. However, AAV-CSS-6002 along with two MCCRE METs that do not require embarked infantry (Conduct Amphibious Planning and Conduct Operations in a CBRN Environment) may be evaluated outside of an infantry battalion MCCRE during an AA Company MCCRE.

6. Methodology for AA Unit MCCRE and AA Company T&R "E" Coded Event Evaluation.

a. Given the amount of evaluation events required in references (a) and (b), the following process will ensure the timely accomplishment of all required evaluations:




Figure 3

Subj: CONDUCT OF THE MARINE CORPS COMBAT READINESS EVALUATION (MCCRE) FOR ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN PLATOONS AND COMPANIES

- b. Despite the fact AAV-CSS-6002 will be evaluated at an AA Company MCCRE, it will continue to be the responsibility of the evaluated AA company to ensure all of its 1000-5000 "E" coded T&R events are evaluated according to the sustainment intervals outlined in NAVMC 3500.2B.

7. Evaluation Cells.

- a. In order to appropriately evaluate those MCCRE and T&R events outlined in Figure 3, 3d AABn will source the following MCCRE Evaluation Cells:

Type of MCCRE	Scope of Evaluation	Evaluation Cell
Infantry Battalion MCCRE	Evaluation of Platoon Level MCCRE Events	<u>Company Evaluation Cell:</u> The evaluated AA Platoon's parent AA Company HQ (embedded into the infantry battalion's MCCRE evaluation cell)
AA Company MCCRE	Evaluation of Company Level MCCRE and T&R E-Coded Events	<u>Battalion Evaluation Cell:</u> 3d AABn HQ (conducting an independent evaluation)

Figure 4

8. Composition of Evaluation Cells.

- a. Company and Battalion Evaluation Cells will at a minimum be composed of the following personnel:

Company Evaluation Cell	Battalion Evaluation Cell
<u>(3) Marine Cell containing:</u> -Company Commander -Company Ops Chief or Log Chief -Driver/Radio Operator	<u>(4) Marine Cell containing:</u> -OpsO or Ops Chief -BN Maintenance Rep (2149 or 2110 with prior AAV background) -(2) NBC Reps

Figure 5

9. Performance Evaluation Checklist (PECL).

- a. See enclosed PECLs.

10. Action. All companies will coordinate with the Battalion S-3 to facilitate incorporation of AA Company Evaluation Cells into Infantry

Subj: CONDUCT OF THE MARINE CORPS COMBAT READINESS EVALUATION (MCCRE) FOR
ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN PLATOONS AND COMPANIES

Battalion MCCREs as well as requests for battalion evaluations of AA Company
MCCREs.

11. Promulgation. The point of contact for this matter is the Battalion
Operations Officer at 725-2581. This order is effective the date signed.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

CHAPTER 1

ORGANIZATION

1001. TABLE OF ORGANIZATION (TO).

Billet	Rank	MOS	Quantity
HEADQUARTERS			
Platoon Commander	1stLt	1803	1
Platoon Sergeant	GySgt	1833	1
Corpsman	HM3	8404	1
Cook	LCpl	3381	1
FIRST SECTION			
Section Leader	GySgt	1833	1
Assistant Section Leader	Sgt	1833	1
Vehicle Commander	Cpl	1833	3
Vehicle Crewman	LCpl	1833	4
Vehicle Crewman	PFC	1833	3
SECOND SECTION			
Section Leader	SSgt	1833	1
Assistant Section Leader	Sgt	1833	1
Vehicle Commander	Cpl	1833	3
Vehicle Crewman	LCpl	1833	4
Vehicle Crewman	PFC	1833	3
THIRD SECTION			
Section Leader	SSgt	1833	1
Assistant Section Leader	Sgt	1833	1
Vehicle Commander	Cpl	1833	3
Vehicle Crewman	LCpl	1833	4
Vehicle Crewman	PFC	1833	3
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION			
Section Leader	Sgt	1833	1
Vehicle Commander	Cpl	1833	1
Vehicle Crewman	LCpl	1833	2
Vehicle Crewman	PFC	1833	2
MAINTENANCE SECTION			
Maintenance Chief	SSgt	2141	1
Assistant Maintenance Chief	Sgt/Cpl	2141	1
Vehicle Repairman	LCpl	2141	2
Vehicle Repairman	PFC	2141	1
Radio Technician	LCpl	2841	1
Radio Operator	Cpl	0621	1
Total:			53 (1/51/0/1)

43 1833's


MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

1002. TABLE OF EQUIPMENT (TE).

Equipment	Quantity
<i>Vehicles</i>	
AAVP7A1	13
AAVC7A1	1
 <i>Weapons</i>	
M4 Carbine w/ optics suite (PEQ-15, RCO, NVGs) and bayonet	53 ea
M9 Pistol, 9mm	7 (1 per Officer, SNCO, Corpsman)
Grenade Launcher, 40mm (M203)	4 (1 per 1833 Sgt)
M240G	2
Mk 19	13
M2 HB	13 (26 barrels)
HMG Tripod	13
MMG Tripod	2
Eagle Mount (C7)	2
PAS-28 Thermal Sights	4
PVS-17 Thermal Sights (M240)	2
Boresight Kit	2
 <i>Communications Equipment</i>	
PRC-153	6
PRC-152	5
DAGR	6
Test Set, Radio	1
SKL	2
OE-254	2
Communications Tool Kit	1
 <i>Miscellaneous</i>	
Compass	6
Tough Book (Maintenance)	5
Multimeter	5
General Mechanic Tool Kit	5
General Computer	6
Quadcon Container	4
CVC Helmet	70
Binoculars	6
Power Inverter	2
Med Bag	13 (1 per AAV)
Water Egress Capability(WEC)	330
<i>Assemblies</i>	
Mobile Refilling Stations(MRS) II	3
Camouflage Nets	14 sets (1 set per AAV)

Note: Individual gear list for deployment will be determined by the BLT. The Training Allowance Pool (TAP) Equipment will be determined by the MEU and AOR specific SOPs and directives and can be issued from 3d AA Bn or once with the BLT.

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15th MEU
CPR-3
PMINT
Confirmation Brief

15 July 2020

ENCLOSURE (17)

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

Agenda



- Task Organization
 - Organization for Embarkation & Assignment to Shipping
 - Orientation
 - Situation
 - Scenario SOE Overview
 - Mission
 - Sequence of Events Overview
 - Training Roll-Up
 - 15th MEU DRRS "Reps & Sets"
 - PMINT Concept of Operations
 - SACCEX Concept of Operations
 - Risk to Mission
 - Risk to Force
 - Questions / Comments
 - Back-Up Slides
-


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Task Organization



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




USS MAKIN ISLAND (LHD-8)		USS SOMERSET (LPD-25)		USS SAN DIEGO (LPD-22)	
Capability Strike, ISR, Medium Lift, TRAP, FHA, NEO, Ground Based Fires, MIO		Capability (EAB Fires) -Ground Based Fires, MIO, FARP, NEO		Capability (EAB Sustainment) -FARP EAB, NEO, Heavy Lift, Ground Based Fires	
Units -VMFA Det -VMM -MWSS Det -LAAD Sect -CLD -Infantry Co (C-Vert Aslt) -Arty Btry (-) -LAR Co (-)		Units -HMLA -HIMARS DET -ADR -MWSS DET -CLD -Infantry Co (B-Mech)		Units -MWSS -CLD -Arty Btry (-) -LAAD Sect -HMH -Infantry Co (Motorized / Boat-enabled -VMU Det -LAR Plt	
USMC Equipment ACE (7) F-35 (10) MV-22 (2) MRZR (L-MADIS) (2) MISSILE BATTERY BLT (2) JLTV (CCWC) (3) JLTV (HGC) (1) JLTV (GP) (3) JLTV (UTL) (8) LAV 25 (2) LAV LOG (1) LAV R (1) LAV C2 (1) Ambulance (2) MRZR (2) AMK 23/25 (ARTY) (3) AMK 27/28 (ARTY) (3) L/W Howitzer (1) Q54 Radar (1) HMMWV (NOTM) CE (1) LAV-EW (2) JLTV (GP)(S-6) (2) JLTV (HGC) (2) JLTV (UTL)(S-6) (3) JLTV (NOTM)	CE (CONT) (6) CRRC (6) MRZR (1) VSAT-L CLB (1) JLTV (GP) (1) JLTV (HGC) (2) JLTV (UTL) (1) AMK 27/28 (2) AMK 23/25 (1) AMK36 wrecker (1) M997 Ambulance (1) TRAM (1) 5k Forklift (2) MTL (1) Contact Truck (1) Arty Maint Shelter (2) Fuel SIXCON (1) SGRS (1) FAWPSS (2) LWPS (10) Generators USN Equipment (3) LCAC (3) MH-60S (2) MH-60R	USMC Equipment ACE (4) AH-1 (4) UH-1 (3) HMMWV (1x FSS) (2) TACE (1) HERS (2) MRZR (TACE) BLT (2) JLTV (GP) (3) JLTV (CCWC) (5) JLTV (HGC) (14) JLTV (UTL) (2) JLTV MRC-148 (1) JTLV MRC-145 (1) MTS HMMWV (1) HMMWV (HIGHBACK) (1) HIMAR SUPPORT KIT (14) AAV (1) Ambulance (2) MRZR (2) HIMARS Launchers (2) MTVR (RSV) (1) M9 ACE (1) Backhoe (CEB) (9) M1102 TRLR (2) M142 (1) MTVR	CE (2) SST HMMWV (6) CRRC (2) M1102 TRLR CLB (1) JLTV (GP) (1) JLTV (HGC) (2) JLTV (UTL) (2) AMK27/28 (4) AMK23/25 (1) AMK36 (1) Ord Contact Truck (1) AAV R7 (1) TRAM (1) 5K Forklift (2) M593 Trailer (1) M149 (3) Fuel SIXCON (3) MGRS (2) SGER (2) Water SIXCON (2) LWPS (2) Generators (1) Waterbull USN Equipment (2) LCAC (PTM) (2) 11M RIBs	USMC Equipment ACE (4) CH-53 (1) HERS (1) TAGRS (1) EMFAC (2) 20K Bladder (8) HMMWV (1x FSS) (1) RQ-21 Det (5x UAV) (2) MRZRrs (L-MADIS) (2) MISSILE BATTERY BLT (1) Highback (3) JLTV (CCWC) (4) JLTV (HGC) (3) JLTV (UTL) (1) JLTV MRC-148 (1) JLTV MRC-145 (4) LAV 25 (2) LAV AT (1) LAV-LA2 (1) M1152 SURVEY VIC (1) MTS HMMWV (1) MK593 (3) AMK 23/25 (ARTY) (2) AMK 27/28 (ARTY) (5) M1102 TRLR (3) L/W Howitzer (1) Waterbull	BLT (CONT) (1) Q54 Radar (2) MRZR CLB (6) JLTV (3) AMK27/28 (7) AMK23/25 (1) AMK36 (1) Ambulance (1) MMV (1) TRAM (1) D6K (1) Backhoe (1) MCTWS (1) Contact Truck (4) M593 Trailer (1) M149 (2) MGRS (2) SGRS (6) Fuel SIXCON (2) Water SIXCON (2) LWPS (2) Shower (10) Generators (1) Waterbull USN Equipment (2) LCAC (2) 11M RIBs
C2 - MEU CE, ACE, BLT (A) Cmd Fires - F-35, 81mm, L/W Howitzer Force Protection - LAAD, LE Det, STS, CBRN Information - CommStrat, IO/Cyber Intelligence - CHD, RRT, F-35, MH-60R, ADR Logistics - CLD (LS/HST, mx contact team, vehicle recovery, general engineering, MHE, ER doc) Maneuver - MV22, JLTV, LAR, MRZR, RIB		C2 - BLT (B) Cmd Fires - HIMARS, HMLA, 81mm Force Protection – CBRN Information - CommStrat, Intelligence - BSII (UH-1), SST, CHD, ADR, GSP Logistics - CLD (HST, vehicle recovery, general engineering, MHE, ER doc) Maneuver - UH-1, JLTV, MRZR, RIB		C2 - CLB HQ Fires - L/W Howitzer Force Protection - CBRN, LAAD, STS Information - CommStrat, Intelligence - CHD, RQ-21 Logistics - AD Sec, CLD (LFSP, HST, heavy ordnance mx, maintenance contact team, general engineering, MHE, IDC) Maneuver - Motorized/Boat Co, CH-53, LAR, RIB	



Camp Overview
Scale 1:3,500,000
Date: 5/29/2020

Orientation



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Situation




From 27 July – 9 August 2020, the 15th MEU will conduct PMINT 20-1 aboard Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) shipping, San Clemente Island and Camp Pendleton, California. PMINT is a ship-based exercise that involves the full embarkation of the MEU, Deployable Group Systems, Interoperability Test (DGSIT) afloat, defense of the Amphibious Task Force, a Supporting Arms Coordination Exercise (SACEX), various full mission profile repetitions, and a full amphibious landing. This exercise provides an opportunity for the Command Element (CE) to develop its ability to rapidly plan, brief, and execute complex operations in an unfamiliar environment.

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Scenario SOE Overview

PMINT 2020 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS (SOE) VS SCENARIO / MISSION OVERVIEW



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Mission



- From 27 July through 9 August 2020, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15th MEU) & Amphibious Squadron 3 (CPR-3) conduct PHIBRON/MEU Integration Training (PMINT) IOT enhance the integration & collective capability of the ARG/MEU team as informed by Mission Essential Tasks.

Purpose:

- Ensure each element & member of the ARG/MEU team is familiar with their individual & collective responsibilities as it pertains to shipboard operations. Expectations for subsequent at-sea training periods must be established based upon PMINT lessons learned.

Method:

- Execute an at sea period designed to demonstrate proficiency in MEU Mission Essential Tasks and experiment with emerging concepts outlined within strategic guidance.

End State:

- A more proficient & prepared ARG/MEU team postured for subsequent at-sea training periods. Necessary training required to enable success include the following:
 - Exercise of C2 afloat, ashore & during ship to shore movement.
 - Exercise of R2P2 & the refinement/validation of the 15th MEU SOP.
 - Exercise control of fires afloat, during ship to shore movement & passage of control of fires ashore (SACEX).
 - Conduct DGSIT afloat.
 - Validate the OE&AS.
 - Maximize repetitions on Mission Essential Tasks.
 - *Strengthen ARG/MEU relationships & build shared understanding.*
-


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MKLARG 20 PMINT Sequence of Events

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Training Roll Up




USMC Exercise Events

- DGSIT Afloat (27 July – 1 August 2020)
 - 26 July DGSIT Embark
 - 1 August Contractor Fly Off
 - Front Side CQ/DLQs
 - 3 days allotted for initial quals
 - Minimal interruptions or support requirements during initial phase
 - SACEX
 - 2 days of live fire (NSFS/Aviation/Surface Fires)
 - Transition of Control of Fires Afloat to Ashore and Back
 - OTH movement planned for initial footprint to give redundancy in preparation for Wx/Mx delays
 - Mechanized Raid
 - VBSS
 - Small Boat Raid
 - Air Assault, FARP, HA/ST
 - F-35 Strike
 - Amphibious Landing
 - Air/Surface Aslt
 - C2 Afloat transition to C2 Ashore
 - Transition to MSE MET Training (Live Fire), support to landing/follow on training, and post exercise maintenance (ACE Fly Off-8 or 9 August)
-

Additional Events

- Call Away Drills for standing missions
- General Quarters, Man Overboard, Abandon Ship Drills
- Blue Side Mine Warfare Exercise
- Blue Side Freedom of Navigation Operations
- Blue Side Ship Small Caliber Live Fire
- Straits Transit (DATF Event) (Supported by CRRC Raid)
- Anti-Submarine Warfare Event (Supported by FARP)
- Underway Replenishments
- CASEVAC TTX during Surface Raid
- EMCON Reps
- Ground R&S Reps (Surface Raid & Amphib Assault)



15th MEU PMINT Mission Matrix

MCT/MET	PLANNED – P EXECUTED – X	MISSION	EOTG	R2P2	RUT	PRE- PMINTEX	PMINT	ARGMEUEX	COMPTUEX	CERTEX	TOTAL
1. MCT 6.2.1 CONDUCT TACTICAL RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT PERSONNEL		TRAP (A)		P	X	X	P				2P, 2X
		TRAP (B)		P							1P
2. MCT 5.5.1 INTEGRATE AND OPERATE WITH JOINT INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND MULTINATIONAL (JIIM) ORGANIZATIONS				P	X		P				2P, 1X
3. MCT 1.12.1.8 CONDUCT MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPS (MIO)		VBSS		P		X	P				2P, 1X
		GOPLAT		P							1P
4. MCT 1.12.1.2 CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS RAID		VERTICAL ASSAULT RAID		P	X		P				2P, 1X
		MECHANIZED RAID		P	X	X	P				2P, 2X
		LAR/CAAT RAID		P							1P
		MOTORIZED RAID		P		X	P				2P, 1X
		ADR PRECISION RAID		P	X						1P, 1X
5. MCT 1.12.1.3 CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT				P			P				2P
6. MCT 6.1.7 CONDUCT EMBASSY REINFORCEMENT		AIR		P							1P
		SURFACE		P							1P
7. MCT 1.13.2 CONDUCT NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO)		FCE		P							1P
		NEO		P							1P
8. MCT 1.15.1.2 FACILITATE FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE				P			P				2P
9. MCT 3.2.8 MCT CONDUCT EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE				P	X		P				2P, 1X
10. MCT 5.5.5.1 CONDUCT/SUPPORT THEATRE SECURITY COOPERATION (TSC)				P	X						1P, 1X
11. MCT 1.12.8 ESTABLISH AND OPERATE EXPEDITIONARY ADVANCED BASES					X	X	P				2X, 1P

Legend:

P- Planned
X- Executed

ENCLOSURE (17)

Concept of Operations

Task Organization

USS MAKIN ISLAND	USS SOMERSET	USS SAN DIEGO
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CE ADR ACE HQ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> VMFA VMM MWSS Det LAAD BLT Det <ul style="list-style-type: none"> C Co (Vertical Assault) LAR Co (-) Artillery Battery (-) (M777A2) CLB Det 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ACE Det <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HMLA MWSS Det BLT HQ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> B Co (Mechanized Assault) Artillery Battery (-) (HIMARS) CLB Det 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ACE Det <ul style="list-style-type: none"> MWSS HMH VMU LAAD BLT Det <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A Co (Boat Company) Artillery Battery (-) (M777A2) LAR Pit CLB HQ

Phase I – Planning and Preparation

Begins with: Conduct of PMINT IPC

Ends with: Port Operations Group (POG) is established at 32nd Street Naval Station

Critical Events: IPC, MPC, and FPC, Assignment to Shipping Working Groups, Monthly Syncs, Pre-embarkation ROM period, Inspection of Gear and Equipment prior to completion of RUT, etc.

Phase II – Movement and Occupation

Begins with: POG is established

Ends with: All gear and equipment embarked upon ARG shipping

Stage A: Movement to and Staging at NBSD

Stage B: Pierside Embarkation

Stage C: SACEX movement and In-Stream On-Load

Critical Events: Est. POG, pier-side embarkation onto MKIARG, Est. the Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC), SCI OTH Movements, In-stream on-load.

Phase III – PMINT Conduct

Begins with: Completion of In-stream on-load

Ends with: Amphibious Landing complete

Stage A: SACEX

Stage B: FMP & DATF evolutions

Stage C: Amphibious Landing

Critical Events: SACEX, FMP, DATF evolutions, and Amphibious Landing.

Phase IV – Retrograde

Begins with: Amphibious Landing complete

Ends with: Pier-side offload is complete

Critical Events: Return of all personnel, gear, and equipment to home station or pre-staged aboard ships.


Phase V – Reconstitution and Transition to ARG/MEU Exercise

Begins with: All personnel, gear, and equipment accounted for at home station or pre-staged aboard ships at Naval Base San Diego.

Ends with: All maintenance requests submitted via GCSS and AARs submitted

Critical Events: Post exercise maintenance, Exercise AAR, and planning.


MISSION: From, 27 July – 9 August 2020, Amphibious Squadron Three (CPR-3) and 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conducts PHIBRON/MEU Integration Training (PMINT) IOT enhance the integration and collective capability of the ARG/MEU team.



(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

SACEX CONOPS				
Task Organization				
CE FECC (Afloat) COMMSTRAT ANGLICO	ACE F-35 AH / UH-1 ASE	GCE HIMARS Det 81s (1xSect) A&B FSCE (Ashore)	LCE LFSP	EXTERNAL VMGR-352 VMFA-232 DDG / CG
Phase I: Planning and Preparation Begins with: Conduct of PMINT IPC (30 Jan) Ends with: Port Operations Group (POG) is established at Naval Base San Diego Critical Events: PMINT MPC, monthly SACEX OPTs				
Phase II: Movement and Occupation Begins with: POG is established Ends with: SACEX Equipment Ashore SCI and Pre-Boats embarked Critical Events: Jul 21 – Rolling stock loaded onto barge at NBSD Jul 26 – OTH, LCAC RSV/ammo movement Red Beach to SCI				
Phase III, Stage A, Part 1: Occupation (29-30 Jul / TD 3-4) Begins with: All SACEX gear established aboard San Clemente Island Ends with: Check round complete Critical Events: Communications rehearsal, occupation of OP 3, MFP-3, HIMARS MIR				
Phase III, Stage A, Part 2: Live Fire (30-31 Jul / TD 4-5) Begins with: Check round complete Ends with: Range Cold (31 Jul / TD 5) Critical Events: EWTGPAC MSEL complete, internal training complete				
Phase III, Stage A, Part 3: SACEX Retrograde (31 Jul / TD 5) Begins with: Range Cold (31 Jul / TD 5) Ends with: All SACEX personnel and equipment staged for backload Critical Events: Personnel staged at LZ OP-3, personnel and equipment staged at West Cove				
Phase III, Stage A, Part 4: SACEX Backload (31 Jul-01 Aug / TD 5-6) Begins with: All SACEX personnel and equipment staged for backload Ends with: All SACEX personnel postured back on ARG shipping Critical Events: Personnel and equipment backloaded on respective ARG shipping				
SACEX OIC / RSOs EXCON OIC OP 3 RSO: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MFP 3 RSC HIMARS R:				


MISSION: From 30 Jul – 01 Aug 2020 the 15th MEU and CPR-3 will conduct SACEX, a combined arms integration exercise held aboard San Clemente Island (SCI) IOT exercise the fire support coordination and air coordination agencies afloat and ashore.



Ammo Allocation				Range Control			
81mm: 200 HE, 24 ILLUM HIMARS: 12 RRPR NSFS: 150 HE/CVT, 20 ILLUM				Camp Pendleton (LONG RIFLE) (b)(2)			
Movement	Occupation	Live Fire	Retrograde	Backload			
SACEX ESTABLISHED	ADON ARRIVES AT SCI	SACEX COMEX OCCUPATION	RANGE HOT	PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT RETROGRADE			
21 Jul	21 Jul	29 Jul	29 Jul	30 Jul	31 Jul	31 Jul	1 Aug

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Risk to Mission



Overall Assessment: Moderate

Hazard	Assessed RAC	Mitigation Method	Residual RAC
Weather disrupting surface movement/damaging equipment	Probability: C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pre-stage critical gear for required missions Alternate movement plans Proper stowage/tie-down of equipment 	Probability: D
	Severity: II		Severity: II
	RAC: Moderate		RAC: Minor
Casualty to the assault force during embarkation/debarkation operations	Probability: C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proper ground guide procedures Safety brief conducted prior to movement Driver training with surface connectors 	Probability: D
	Severity: I		Severity: I
	RAC: High		RAC: Moderate
Command and control systems degraded/non-functional	Probability: C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Communication redundancies DGSIT SME's on-hand to troubleshoot issues MISTC courses 	Probability: D
	Severity: II		Severity: II
	RAC: Moderate		RAC: Minor
Vehicle Mishap	Probability: C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adherence to driver rest Day time operations Route planning/convoy brief 	Probability: D
	Severity: II		Severity: II
	RAC: Moderate		RAC: Moderate


Probability	A: Likely to occur immediately or within a short period of time B: Probably will occur C: May occur in time D: Unlikely to occur
Severity	I: May cause death, loss of facility/asset, mission failure II: May cause severe injury, illness, property damage, mission degradation III: May cause minor injury, illness, property damage, mission degradation IV: Minimal threat, no impact to mission success

		PROBABILITY			
SEVERITY		A	B	C	D
	I	1	1	2	3
	II	1	2	3	4
	III	2	3	4	5
	IV	3	4	5	5

<u>RAC</u>	
1	EXTREMELY HIGH
2	HIGH
3	MODERATE
4	MINOR
5	NEGLECTIBLE

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Risk to Force



Overall Assessment: Moderate

Hazard	Assessed RAC	Mitigation Method	Residual RAC
Equipment not properly secured in assault support aircraft/tactical vehicles during movement resulting in Marine/Sailor struck	Probability: C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IAW I MEF Policy letter 12-17 (Policy concerning securing equipment in aircraft dtd 11 Oct 2017) Personnel segregated from unsecured/loose gear during transportation 	Probability: C
	Severity: III		Severity: III
	RAC: Minor		RAC: Minor
Reduced visibility landing conditions in zone resulting in hard landing/Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)	Probability: C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Standardized ANTTP approach/landing procedures Elevation, composition, slope study on JMPS (prior to departure) and KILLSWITCH (en route) Reduced Visibility Landing (RVL) proficiency for crews assigned to alert 	Probability: D
	Severity: I		Severity: I
	RAC: High		RAC: Moderate
COVID-19	Probability: C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wearing of masks at all times Social distancing when possible 	Probability: D
	Severity: I		Severity: I
	RAC: High		RAC: Moderate
IDF or Aviation delivered Ordinance impacting Fire Support Teams	Probability: C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adhering to Range regulations JTAC-I safety backstop Personnel wear proper PPE SPINS adherence Redundant clearance procedures (SACC/FSCC) 	Probability: D
	Severity: I		Severity: I
	RAC: High		RAC: Moderate
Ammunition Malfunction or Mishap	Probability: C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ammunition brief Cease fire/unsafe condition procedures Handling procedures for weapons and munition 	Probability: D
	Severity: I		Severity: I
	RAC: High		RAC: Moderate

Probability	A: Likely to occur immediately or within a short period of time B: Probably will occur C: May occur in time D: Unlikely to occur
Severity	I: May cause death, loss of facility/asset, mission failure II: May cause severe injury, illness, property damage, mission degradation III: May cause minor injury, illness, property damage, mission degradation IV: Minimal threat, no impact to mission success

PROBABILITY					
S		A	B	C	D
E	I	1	1	2	3
V	II	1	2	3	4
E	III	2	3	4	5
R	IV	3	4	5	5
I					
T					
Y					

RAC	
1	EXTREMELY HIGH
2	HIGH
3	MODERATE
4	MINOR
5	NEGLECTABLE


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Questions?


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Backup Slides

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
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Execution

Phase III: PMINT Conduct		
Task Organization		
USS MAKIN ISLAND CE ADR ACE HQ • VMFA • VMM • MWSS Det • LAAD BLT Det • C Co (Vertical Assault) • LAR Co (-) • Artillery Battery (-) (M777A2) CLB Det	USS SOMERSET ACE Det • HMLA • MWSS Det BLT HQ • B Co (Mechanized Assault) • Artillery Battery (-) (HIMARS) CLB Det	USS SAN DIEGO ACE Det • MWSS • HMH • VMU • LAAD BLT Det • A Co (Boat Company) • Artillery Battery (-) (M777A2) • LAR Pit CLB HQ

MISSION: From, 27 July – 9 August 2020, Amphibious Squadron Three (CPR-3) and 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conducts PHIBRON/MEU Integration Training (PMINT) IOT enhance the integration and collective capability of the ARG/MEU team.



Phase III: PMINT Conduct

Begins with: Completion of In-stream on-load

Ends with: Completion of various training evolutions leading up to the Amphibious Landing.

Stage A: SACEX


Stage B: FMP/DATF Training Events

Stage C: Amphibious Landing

Critical Events:

- DGSIT Afloat
- SACEX
- Mech Raid IVO West Cove & IVO VC-3
- VBSS x 1
- Air Assault CPEN HOLF
- HA/DR Operation CPEN HOLF
- R&S Opsx2 (Surface Raid, Amphib Assault)
- Small Boat Raid
- F-35 Strike
- Defense of Amphibious Task Force (DATF)
- Amphibious Assault
- Standing Mission planning and execution (TRAP, QRF, CASEVAC, and Expeditionary Strike)


MAIN EFFORT will shift according to mission requirement



ESG3 EXCON
EXCON AFLO
EXCON SCI:
EXCON CAMF

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Kev POCs




Phase III, Stage A, Part 1: Occupation

Task Organization

CE FECC (Afloat) COMMSTRAT ANGLICO	ACE F-35 AH / UH-1 ASE	GCE HIMARS Det 81s (1xSect) A&B FSCC (Ashore)	LCE LFSP	EXTERNAL VMGR-352 VMFA-232 DDG / CG
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MISSION: From 30 Jul – 01 Aug 2020 the 15th MEU and CPR-3 will conduct SACEX, a combined arms integration exercise held aboard San Clemente Island (SCI) IOT exercise the fire support coordination and air coordination agencies afloat and ashore.



Phase III, Stage A, Part 1: Occupation (29-30 Jul / TD 3-4)

Begins with: All SACEX gear established aboard San Clemente Island

Ends with: Check round complete

Critical Events:

NLT 29 Jul / TD 3

- FECC postured aboard USS Makin Island ready to command and control
- All forces stay North of TAR-16 until Island Fury units clear SHOBA
- HIMARS occupies Missile Impact Range (MIR)
- 81mm Mortars section occupies MFP-3
- ANGLICO and A Co FIST occupy OP-3
- A/B FSCC and ASE occupy position N of OP-3 and establish command and control ashore
- Communications rehearsal between FECC and all firing agencies
- Pre-Live Fire Range inspection with STARBURST
- Conduct link up with EWTGPAC white cell aboard MKI and SCI

30 Jul / TD 4

- Communications check with NSF shooter

Ammo Allocation

81mm: 200 HE, 24 ILLUM
HIMARS: 12 RRPR
NSFS: 150 HE/CVT, 20 ILLUM

Range Control


Camp Pendleton (LONG RIFLE)

(b)(2)

SACEX OIC / RSOs

EXCON OIC
OP 3 RSO:
MFP 3 RSC
HIMARS R

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



Phase III, Stage A, Part 2: Live Fire

Task Organization

CE FECC (Afloat) COMMSTRAT ANGLICO	ACE F-35 AH / UH-1 ASE	GCE HIMARS Det 81s (1xSect) A&B FSCC (Ashore)	LCE LFSP	EXTERNAL VMGR-352 VMFA-232 DDG / CG
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Phase III, Stage A, Part 2: Live Fire (30-31 Jul / TD 4-5)

Begins with: Check round complete

Ends with: Range Cold (31 Jul / TD 5)

Critical Events: EWTGPAC MSEL complete, internal training complete

30 Jul / TD 4

- FECC in control of fires
- Call Range Hot
- Execute SACEX training objectives as prescribed by EWTGPAC
- Execute MCTSSA training objectives utilizing F-35 passing targeting data to the SACC
- Execute MCTSSA training objectives utilizing JADOCs
- FECC conducts passage of control with FSCC
- FSCC conducts passage of control with FECC

31 Jul / TD 5


- Call Range Hot
- Execute MCTSSA training objectives utilizing F-35 passing targeting data to HIMARS utilizing LMADIS / SFF
- Execute JTAC qualification training
- Range Cold NLT 1600
- Conduct ammunition expenditure report
- Conduct post live fire range clean up and inspection with STARBURST

SACEX OIC / RSOs

EXCON OIC
OP 3 RSO:
MFP 3 RSC
HIMARS R:

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

MISSION: From 30 Jul – 01 Aug 2020 the 15th MEU and CPR-3 will conduct SACEX, a combined arms integration exercise held aboard San Clemente Island (SCI) IOT exercise the fire support coordination and air coordination agencies afloat and ashore.



Ammo Allocation

81mm: 200 HE, 24 ILLUM
HIMARS: 12 RRPR
NSFS: 150 HE/CVT, 20 ILLUM

Range Control

Camp Pendleton (LONG RIFLE)

(b)(2)

Movement	Occupation	Live Fire	Retrograde	Backload
SACC ESTABLISHED	ADON ARRIVES AT SCI	SACEX COMEX	OCCUPATION	RANGE HOT
21 Jul	21 Jul	29 Jul	29 Jul	30 Jul
				31 Jul
				31 Jul
				1 Aug

ENCLOSURE (7)

Phase III, Stage A, Part 3: SACEX Retrograde

Task Organization

CE FECC (Afloat) COMMSTRAT ANGLICO	ACE F-35 AH / UH-1 ASE	GCE HIMARS Det 81s (1xSect) A&B FSCC (Ashore)	LCE LFSP	EXTERNAL VMGR-352 VMFA-232 DDG / CG
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Phase III, Stage A, Part 3: SACEX Retrograde (31 Jul / TD 5)

Begins with: Range Cold (31 Jul / TD 5)


Ends with: All SACEX personnel and equipment staged for backload

Critical Events: Personnel staged at LZ OP-3, personnel and equipment staged at West Cove

31 Jul / TD 5

- Conduct handoff of all trash and dunnage with Ops/Log Team
- Units staged at west cove
 - HIMARS Det
 - Mortars Sect
 - B FSCC
 - LFSP
- Units staged at LZ OP-3 NLT 1730
 - A FSCC
 - ANGLICO
 - COMMSTRAT
 - MCTSSA
 - ASE
 - A FIST

MISSION: From 30 Jul – 01 Aug 2020 the 15th MEU and CPR-3 will conduct SACEX, a combined arms integration exercise held aboard San Clemente Island (SCI) IOT exercise the fire support coordination and air coordination agencies afloat and ashore.



Ammo Allocation

81mm: 200 HE, 24 ILLUM
HIMARS: 12 RRPR
NSFS: 150 HE/CVT, 20 ILLUM

Range Control

Camp Pendleton (LONG RIFLE)

(b)(2)

SACEX OIC / RSOs

EXCON OIC
OP 3 RSO:
MFP 3 RSO
HIMARS RS

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Movement	Occupation	Live Fire	Retrograde	Backload
SACC ESTABLISHED	ARMY ARRIVES AT SCI SACEX COMDEX	OCCUPATION RANGE HOT RANGE COLD	PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT RETROGRADE	ALL UNITS POSTURED ON ARG SHIPPING
21 Jul	21 Jul 29 Jul	30 Jul 31 Jul	31 Jul	1 Aug

Phase III, Stage A, Part 4: SACEX Backload

Task Organization

CE FECC (Afloat) COMMSTRAT ANGLICO	ACE F-35 AH / UH-1 ASE	GCE HIMARS Det 81s (1xSect) A&B FSCC (Ashore)	LCE LFSP	EXTERNAL VMGR-352 VMFA-232 DDG / CG
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Phase III, Stage A, Part 4: SACEX Backload (31 Jul-01 Aug/TD 5-6)

Begins with: All SACEX personnel and equipment staged for backload

Ends with: All SACEX personnel postured back on ARG shipping

Critical Events: Personnel and equipment backloaded on respective ARG shipping

USS Makin Island – Backloaded via assault support on 31 Jul

- A FSCC
- ANGLICO
- COMMSTRAT
- MCTSSA
- ASE Equipment
- Ops-Log Team (01 Aug air movement)


USS San Diego – Backloaded via assault support on 31 Jul

- A FIST

USS Somerset – Backloaded via surface on 01 Aug

- HIMARS Det
- Mortars Sect
- B FSCC
- LFSP
- ASE Personnel

MISSION: From 30 Jul – 01 Aug 2020 the 15th MEU and CPR-3 will conduct SACEX, a combined arms integration exercise held aboard San Clemente Island (SCI) IOT exercise the fire support coordination and air coordination agencies afloat and ashore.



Ammo Allocation

81mm: 200 HE, 24 ILLUM
HIMARS: 12 RRPR
NSFS: 150 HE/CVT, 20 ILLUM

Range Control

Camp Pendleton (LONG RIFLE)

(b)(2)

SACEX OIC / RSOs

EXCON OIC
OP 3 RSO:
MFP 3 RSO
HIMARS RS

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Movement	Occupation	Live Fire	Retrograde	Backload
SACC ESTABLISHED	ADON ARRIVES AT SCI SACEX COMEX OCCUPATION	RANGE HOT RANGE COLD	PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT RETROGRADE	ALL UNITS POSTURED ON ARG SHIPPING
21 Jul	21 Jul 29 Jul 29 Jul	30 Jul 31 Jul	31 Jul	1 Aug

ENCLOSURE (17)

Phase III Stage A: SACEX Concept of Logistic Support

OPS/LOG Team Task Organization

CE	GCE	LCE (LFSP)
(1) MO (3) ME	(1) ME	(1) MO (5) ME

Endstate: Equipment and personnel participating on SACEX are recovered aboard MKIARG with 100% accountability.

Transportation: Non-tactical ground transportation requirements for SCI include (3) 12 Pax Vans and (3) 6 Pax Trucks. Tactical vehicles will provide personnel lift to firing points. Tactical vehicles cannot drive on paved roads, they need to use existing dirt road network.

Supply: CL I: Potable water will be sourced from the water treatment plant aboard SCI via 5 Gal water jugs provided by the exercise force. Marines will receive (2) hot meals from the Chow hall and (1) MRE per day. MRE brought ashore by EXFOR. Water point: OPS/LOG team will facilitate hot chow, and water deliveries.


CL III: Access to the Fuel Farm has been granted via NAVFAC. Fuel farm will be used to resupply rental vehicles as contingency for tactical vehicles prior to recovery from SCI. Fuel key will remain with OPS/LOG team.

CL V: In accordance with the SOE ammunition will be staged at firing points.

Maintenance: Dead-lined equipment will be flat towed to West Cove on completion of SACEX for recovery aboard SOM.

Services: Chemical Toilets and dumpsters have been reserved for HIMARS firing point and OP-3/MFP-3 with required servicing. Dunnage will be retained and brought to the ship upon completion of all activities.

MISSION: From 30 Jul – 01 Aug 2020 the 15th MEU and CPR-3 will conduct SACEX, a combined arms integration exercise held aboard San Clemente Island (SCI) IOT exercise the fire support coordination and air coordination agencies afloat and ashore.



Ammo Allocation

81mm: 200 HE, 24 ILLUM
HIMARS: 12 RRPR
NSFS: 150 HE/CVT, 20 ILLUM

Range Control


Camp Pendleton (LONG RIFLE)

(b)(2)

Key POCs

Embark Officer:



MEU S-4: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
MEU OPS/LOG



Phase III Stage B: Full Mission Profile & DATF		
Task Organization		
USS MAKIN ISLAND • CE • ADR • ACE HQ • VMFA • VMM • MWSS Det • LAAD • BLT Det • C Co (Vertical Assault) • LAR Co (-) • Artillery Battery (-) (M777A2) • CLB Det	USS SOMERSET • ACE Det • HMLA • MWSS Det • BLT HQ • B Co (Mechanized Assault) • Artillery Battery (-) (HIMARS) • CLB Det	USS SAN DIEGO • ACE Det • MWSS • HMM • VMU • LAAD • BLT Det • A Co (Boat Company) • Artillery Battery (-) (M777A2) • LAR Pit • CLB HQ
Phase III: PMINT Conduct Begins with: Completion of In-stream on-load Ends with: Completion of various training evolutions leading up to the Amphibious Landing. Critical Events: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mechanized Raid IVO West Cove & IVO VC-3 • VBSS x 1 • Small Boat Raid • Air Assault CPEN HOLF • Forward Arming & Refueling Point CPEN HOLF • HA/DR Operation CPEN HOLF • R&S Opsx2 (Surface Raid, Amphib Assault) • F-35 Strike – CHOCOLATE MOUNTAINS • Defense of Amphibious Task Force (DATF) • Amphibious Assault • Standing Mission planning and execution (TRAP, QRF, CASEVAC, and Expeditionary Strike) <p>MAIN EFFORT will shift according to mission requirement</p>		
Key POCs ESG3 EXCON EXCON AFLC EXCON SCI: EXCON CAMI		

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

MISSION: From, 26 July – 9 August 2020, Amphibious Squadron Three (CPR-3) and 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conducts PHIBRON/MEU Integration Training (PMINT) IOT enhance the integration and collective capability of the ARG/MEU team.



Planning And Preparation	Movement and Occupation	PMINT Conduct	Retrograde	Reconstitution
IPC, MPC, FPC Pre Embarkation ROM	POG Established	Instream Onload SAGEX FMP 1 DATE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING	Disembarkation / Preloading	AMEX Transition
30 Jan 10-24 July	13 July	27 Jul 29 Jul 29 Jul – 5 Aug	7-9 Aug	9 Aug 10 Aug

Concept of Operations Surface Raid

Mech Raid T/O: ~176 PAX
Mech Raid TE: (10) AAVP7A1
BLT 1/4 and enablers: ~164 PAX
ADR: ~6-12 PAX

Phase I – Shaping

Begins with: Insert of R&S.
End with: Raid force postured for surface assault.
Critical Events: R&S Insert (CRRC/Swim/Para), well deck operations

Phase II – Insertion

Begins with: Raid force departure from SOM.
End with: All Raid force elements feet dry and consolidated at the BLS.
Critical Events: AAVs splash from OP BOX (2.5-3 NM) and proceed to West Cove

Phase III – Actions On

Begins with: Movement from BLS to OBJ 1.
End with: Destruction of ASCM and/or ADA assets on OBJ 2.
Critical Events: Contact IVO ANVMA-Old Rifle Range (Destroy EWR),
 Breach, Destroy ASCM and/or ADA asset IVO ANVMA-VC-3

Phase IV – Withdrawal

Begins with: Raid force movement from the OBJ to BLS.
End with: Raid force recovered aboard SOM.
Critical Events: Consolidate, water checks, recover R&S (TBD), recover to shipping

Phase V – Reconstitution

Begins with: Reception aboard SOM.
End with: Raid force repostured for follow on action.
Critical Events: Debrief/AAR, Post Action MX

SOM: BLT conducts surface assault. MEU recon teams (SE1) provides enemy C/D/S IVO objective areas and landing sites. ME (B/1/4) destroys assessed physical hardware (EWR/C2) IVO OBJ 1 and destroys ENY IVO OBJ 2 (assessed ASCM). RW/CAS neutralizes enemy CSW and motorized assets IOT enable insert. Upon completion, raid force withdraws to amphibious shipping (USS Somerset) to prepare for follow on operations.

TASKS

ME (B/1/4)
 T1: Destroy EWR and ASCM
 P1: Enable Sea Control Operations



SE1 (Recon Teams)


T1: Recon OBJ 1,2 and BLS
 P1: Locate EWR, ASCM platform and enable ME attack

POCs

V 1/4 Bravo Company Co: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Training Areas: WEST COVE, Capitaine MA, AVMA-NALF
TA 1-4, ANVMA-Old Rifle Range, ANVMA-VC-3
Airspace: Surface to 1500 sUAS
ARSO: E-6;
ADFOR: 15 PAX

MISSION: O/O 15th MEU destroys Azurian Kinjan surface to air missile capability IVO SCI
 IOT allow freedom of movement within the joint operating area.



Concept of Operations VBSS		MISSION: O/O 15th MEU conducts seizure of target M/V ATLAS IVO SCI SHOBA IOT deter illicit smuggling within the joint operating area.																
ADR T/O: ~25-35 PAX ADR T/E: ADR:																		
<u>Event(s)</u> - VBSS 1 - VBSS 2																		
<u>Date(s)</u> - 31 July VBSS 1 - 03 August VBSS 2																		
<u>Location(s)</u> - SHOBA – CSG-15																		
<u>METs Facilitated</u> - MCT 1.12.1.8 CONDUCT MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS																		
<u>Site Lead</u> - VBSS 1 - VBSS 2 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)																		
<u>Training Objectives</u> - Pre-mission planning, preparation - Integration of Navy/MEU forces (Staff functions) - Interpreter requirements for hailing CCOI - RHIB immediate actions to contact - Opposed boarding of MRF - Specialized Limited Scale Raid with VBSS tactics, techniques, and procedures - CASEVAC procedures - TSE/Exploitation - Re-integration - Debrief																		
POCs ADR Co: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Training Areas: SHOBA OPBOX 2852 Airspace: UPDATE ARSO (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Class V(W): 120 Rd SESAM for ADFOR Open Water Safety Craft: Provided by EOTG, MKI RHIB as backup Safety Swimmer: Provided by EOTG, ADR safety swimmer as backup		<table><tr><th>Shaping</th><th>Insertion</th><th>Actions On</th><th>Withdrawal</th><th>Reconstitution</th></tr><tr><td>Warning Order CAT I, II, and Confirmation Data Naval Geomatics Ref</td><td>Launch BAF Launch HAF Launch Prize Code</td><td>Clear Enemy Forces Seize Host Vessel/Engine Room Facilitate Sub Exploitation</td><td>Recover Personnel</td><td>AAR/Debrief</td></tr><tr><td>TD-4 0900 TD-4 1800 TD-5 1300</td><td>TD-5 1300 TD-5 1305 TD-5 1330</td><td>TD-5 1430 TD-5 1445 TD-5 1530</td><td>TD-5 1600</td><td>TD-5 1700</td></tr></table>		Shaping	Insertion	Actions On	Withdrawal	Reconstitution	Warning Order CAT I, II, and Confirmation Data Naval Geomatics Ref	Launch BAF Launch HAF Launch Prize Code	Clear Enemy Forces Seize Host Vessel/Engine Room Facilitate Sub Exploitation	Recover Personnel	AAR/Debrief	TD-4 0900 TD-4 1800 TD-5 1300	TD-5 1300 TD-5 1305 TD-5 1330	TD-5 1430 TD-5 1445 TD-5 1530	TD-5 1600	TD-5 1700
Shaping	Insertion	Actions On	Withdrawal	Reconstitution														
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TD-4 0900 TD-4 1800 TD-5 1300	TD-5 1300 TD-5 1305 TD-5 1330	TD-5 1430 TD-5 1445 TD-5 1530	TD-5 1600	TD-5 1700														

Concept of Operations Airfield Seizure/FARP/HA/ST

Airfield Seizure T/O: ~160 PAX
HA/ST T/O: ~ 15 PAX
Airfield Seizure T/E: 2 x MRZR
HA/ST T/E: PRC 150, 10xPRC 153

Event(s)

- Airfield Seizure
- FARP
- HAST

Location(s)

- HOLF

METS Facilitated

- MCT 1.15.1.2 Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Site Lead

- Airfield Seizure: TBD
- FARP: TBD
- HAST: 1stLt Zendejas

Training Objectives

- Pre-mission planning, preparation
- Integration of Navy/MEU forces (Staff functions)
- Insert of the HAST
- Coordination with DART/CMAC/CMOC
- RFI feedback and coordination with planners
- Support to detailed planning

Hurricane IVO HOLF caused significant damage to local infrastructure and access to food, water, and utilities. The Office of Foreign Disaster Relief, Disaster Assistance Response Team is on the ground conducting surveys and identifying requirements to support the local populous. Due to the instability, a local VEO seized the opportunity to take over key distribution nodes in the region limiting the flow of needed supplies to the local villages.

HAST required to determine full array of support needed by local government through the DoS personnel on the ground

Initial indications: debris at airfield limits access, transportation of water, subsistence, shelters, and hygiene kits, and medical centers are overwhelmed with needs of local population

CMOC is established but has limited support due to VEO threat.

FARP: Enemy submarine identified IVO ARG. HHQ tasks P-8 asset to fly on station to locate and close with enemy contact. P-8 requires additional fueling IOT remain on station.

POCs

C Company (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 HA/ST OIC: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Training Areas: CPEN HOLF

Airspace: ACA Talega, ACA HOLF

ADFOR RSO: V 1/4 Update


Class V(W): ADFOR GCE Draws and transports

ADFOR: 15 PAX

Role Players: CLR-17 & CLB-15

HAST Role Players (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 8 PAX from LCE

MISSION: O/O, 15th MEU conducts clears enemy presence and secures the airfield on CPEN HOLF IOT allow unimpeded humanitarian assistance operations .



Shaping		Insertion		Actions On		Withdrawal		Reconstitution
Warning Order CAT I, II, and Confirmation Brief		Launch Haco Company CPEN HOLF Secured Launch HAST		Coordinate with CMOC/DART Des/RE Survey Local Military CMOC Request Personnel				AAR/Debrief
TD-5 0900	TD-5 1800	TD-5 1300	TD-5 1600	TD-7 1400	TD-7 1500	TD-7 1800	TD-7 2000	TD-8 1000
TD-6 0900	TD-6 1800							

Concept of Operations Strike

Strike Package: 4x F-35, 4x F-18, 1x KC-130
Trap Alert: 2x MV-22

Phase I – Shaping

Begins with: Receipt of WARNO
Mission planning and Intel assessment
Target package and weaponeering
End with: Decision to strike

Phase II – OAAW

Begins with: Strike package launched
Pre-mission tanking in the W-291
Strike push 4 ship wall with F-18s long trail
28.2 message sent via L16 to CAC2S for ingress
F-35s destroy SA-11 and SA-3, Avoid SA-10
End with: Penetrate & Neutralize enemy air defense systems

Phase III – Attack

Begins with: Target acquisition
12.6 message sent via L16 to F-18s to strike a Network Switch Facility and Command HQs element
F-35s support with standoff SEAD and mutual support
F-35s/F-18s provide BHA
End with: Target struck

Phase IV – Egress

Begins with: Strike package outside of enemy airspace
28.2 message sent via L16 to CAC2S for Millertime/Egress
F-35s provide escort for F-18s
End with: Strike package on deck LHD-8

Phase V – MISREP

Begins with: S-2 debrief
Video download/Debrief
End with: AAR sent to HHQ

Targets

Target Site 1 (IVO Punch Bowl)
Network Switch Facility enabling high-speed data transfer to enhance C3
Threat: SA-3



Target Site 2 (IVO Blue Mountain)
Command HQ providing directives and situational awareness down to echelon air/ground units
Threat: SA-11

SA-10 Site (IVO Blythe AF)

POCs

MEU Air-O
VMFA-122(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
VMGR-352: TBD
VMFA-232: TBD
Training Areas: Kane E, ABEL N/S, R-2507N/S
Class V(A): F-35s - 1xGBU-12 each aircraft (simulated GBU-32s)
F-18s - 1xGBU38 each aircraft

MISSION: O/O, 15TH MEU sources strike sorties to the JFC.



ENCLOSURE (17)

Phase III Stage B: Full Mission Profile & DATF Concept of Logistic Support

Task Organization

USS MAKIN ISLAND	USS SOMERSET	USS SAN DIEGO
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CE • ADR • ACE HQ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • VMFA • VMM • MWSS Det • LAAD • BLT Det <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C Co (Vertical Assault) • LAR Co (-) • Artillery Battery (-) (M777A2) • CLB Det 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ACE Det <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HMLA • MWSS Det • BLT HQ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • B Co (Mechanized Assault) • Artillery Battery (-) (HIMARS) • CLB Det 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ACE Det <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MWSS • HMLA • VMU • LAAD • BLT Det <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A Co (Boat Company) • Artillery Battery (-) (M777A2) • LAR Plt • CLB HQ

Stage B:

Critical Events:

- Mechanized Raid IVO West Cove & IVO VC-3
- Air Assault CPEN HOLF
- HAVDR Operation CPEN HOLF
- Amphibious Assault

Transportation:

Mech Raid: ADFOR movement to SCI has been coordinated through the air planning cell for ship-to-shore movement. OPS/LOG team will aid in ADFOR movement IAW SOE.

Retrograde of ADFOR will be done via MECH Co. AAVs on return to the SOM.

HOLF: All transportation requirements supporting ADFOR movement aboard CPEN will be facilitated via MSE RBE elements or PMINT EXCON coordination.

Supply: CL I: MREs/Water are available for issue from MKIARG Shipping, requirement and resupply determined by planning process.
ADFOR: MRE/Water supported by parent command, with OPS/LOG support as requested.

CL III: Fuel requirements are to be coordinated through the TACLOG per the planning process.

ADFOR: Fuel will be provided by parent command as required.

CL V: Elements going ashore will be issued ammunition per mission requirements from the Ammunition Training Allowance. Dunnage is to be disposed of IAW SOP. No CL V for the MECH RAID.




ADFOR: Ammunition for the ADFOR will be supported by the parent command, with allotment being pushed from the CE account.

Maintenance: See coordinating instructions for maintenance reporting requirements.

Health Services: See Medical Plan.

Services: Chemical Toilets and dumpsters reserved for use at the HOLF. On confirmation of LF Objective sites for the Amphib Assault and subsequent off-load, Chemical Toilets will be confirmed via EXCON.

MISSION: From, 26 July – 9 August 2020, Amphibious Squadron Three (CPR-3) and 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conducts PHIBRON/MEU Integration Training (PMINT) IOT enhance the integration and collective capability of the ARG/MEU team.






OPERATION GATOR SMASH

29 JUL 20

Overall Classification: [REDACTED]

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Enclosure (18)



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Higher Mission & Intent



1. Mission: NLT 302359JUL20, Destroy Azurian Kinjaz (AK) Forces and training camp on San Clemente Island (SCI), Azure IOT disrupt AK operations against Azure Security Forces.
2. Commander's Intent:
 - A. Purpose: Disrupt AK operations against Azurian Security Forces
 - B. Method: CTF-136 will execute a rapid operation that takes advantage of our amphibious force's speed and combat power. We will execute this operation with overwhelming combat power. We will be judicious in our application of force to limit collateral damage and maintain trust with the Azurian population and government.
 - C. Endstate: AK forces and training camp destroyed, HVI Ajang Ajang captured or killed, Azurian stability increased, and U.S. relationship with Azurian government maintained.

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Assumptions



1. ENVIRONMENT (S-2)

- ☐ PERMISSIVE
- ☐ UNCERTAIN
- ☒ HOSTILE

2. HOST NATION (S-2/S-3)

- ☐ SUPPORTIVE
- ☐ NON-SUPPORTIVE
- ☒ INCAPABLE OF SUPPORT

3. LOCAL GOVERNMENT (S-2/S-3)

- ☐ SUPPORTIVE
- ☐ NON-SUPPORTIVE
- ☒ INCAPABLE OF SUPPORT
- ☐ UNKNOWN

4. HOST NATION MILITARY (S-3)

- ☐ SUPPORTIVE
- ☐ NON-SUPPORTIVE
- ☒ INCAPABLE OF SUPPORT
- ☐ UNKNOWN

5. LOCAL POPULACE (S-2)

- ☐ WILL INTERFERE
- ☒ WILL NOT INTERFERE

6. RESISTANCE EXPECTED (S-2)

- ☐ NONE
- ☐ LIGHT
- ☒ MEDIUM
- ☐ HEAVY

7. OBJECTIVE (S-2)

- ☒ CAN BE LOCATED
- ☐ CAN'T BE LOCATED

8. SPECIFIC BLS/HLZ/AF (S-2/S-3)

- ☒ USABLE
- ☐ UNUSABLE
- ☐ UNKNOWN

9. OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS (S-3)

- ☒ GRANTED
- ☐ PENDING
- ☐ DENIED

10. MEDIA (PAO)

- ☐ IMPACT
- ☒ NO IMPACT

11. FECC (S-3)

- ☒ FIRES
- ☒ IO

12. ORGANIC SUSTAINMENT (S-4)

- ☒ SUFFICIENT
- ☐ INSUFFICIENT

13. EXTERNAL SUPPORT AVAIL

- ☐ INTEL/ISR
- ☐ LOGISTICS
- ☐ COMM
- ☐ FIRE SUPPORT
- ☐ MANEUVER
- ☐ FORCE PROTECTION

14. WEATHER WILL PERMIT (S-2)

- ☒ AIR
- ☒ SURFACE

15. CONCURRENT TASKING(S) (S-3)


- ☐ WILL IMPACT
- ☒ NO IMPACT

16. FRIENDLY FORCES (S-3)

- ☒ ARG/MEU UNILATERAL OP
- ☐ JT/COMBINED FORCES AVAIL
- ☐ CSG IS AVAIL

17. TARGET SHIPS CREW

- ☐ COMPLIANT
- ☐ NON COMPLIANT
- ☒ N/A



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RFIs



RFI #	From	To	Subject	RFI	Answer	Date
001	MEU S3	HHQ	PID	Does AK have any identifying features for PID? (i.e. uniforms)	CHD has been tasked to identify and report on the specific uniforms, equipment and appearance of AK personnel to support PID requirements. Expect a response following source link-up and intelligence reporting. AK are known to utilize soviet small arms and possibly operate in desert camouflage uniforms.	29th
002	MEU S3	HHQ	Civ	Any Civilian or Civilian infrastructure on a. SCI b. Around obj area	<u>Civilian activity/POL on SCI unknown at this time.</u> Collection requirement has been forwarded to the R&S for collection in preparation for raid force execution.	29th
003	MEU S3	HHQ	Contingency	Task is destroy, but contingent is limit collateral damage. Authorized to destroy infrastructure if used by AK?	All AK fighters should be killed or captured. Any AK weapons or explosives will be destroyed on site. Since the AK fighters are utilizing Azurian civilian structures, do not destroy any infrastructure or buildings. <u>Limit collateral damage.</u>	29th
004	BLT S2	HHQ	GEOINT	Requesting soil composition of BLS, and route study for vegetation and trafficability of routes from BLS to airfield.	<u>No further information regarding obstacles ivo beach/objective.</u> Will forward intelligence requirements to CE S-2 for R&S for implementation into the collections plan. Recommend also identifying opportunities for SSP, Puma, beach reconnaissance of boat platoon, etc. Attempt to employ organic collection capabilities as the situation permits.	29th



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RFIs



RFI #	From	To	Subject	RFI	Answer	Date
005	BLT S4	HHQ	NGO	What NGO's are in the AO and working with the local populous?	USAID is currently supplying IDP's between LA and San Diego, providing food, water, blankets, tarps and medical kits. OFDA has tasked a DART to assist the USAID and the ambassador in assessing the situation in Camp Pendleton.	29th
006	CE S-4	HHQ	DART	Where is the DART team located and who is their POC?	* DART Leader (POC) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) * Deputy Team Leader (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) * DART Logistics Section (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) * DART Operations Section (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) * (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) * (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) * NGO's in Azure: USAID is currently supplying IDP's between LA and San Diego, providing food, water, blankets, tarps and medical kits. OFDA has tasked a DART to assist the USAID and the ambassador in assessing the situation in Camp Pendleton.	29th
007	CE S-2	HHQ	AAV OPs	What are the small boat threats to AAVs IVO San Clemente Island from 29Jul-31Jul 2020	<u>Assume intent to be high</u> based on current reporting	29th
008	BLT S-3	HHQ	Route Study	Request route study of the mobility corridors from the water through the beach. Natural and man-made obstacles and buildings IVO the BLS should be called out. Imagery of the vehicle and foot mobility corridors is requested.	RFI appears to be two separate product requests. Looking at both a landing beach study and a route study from the landing beach to the airfield. Please provide center grid for the desired beach, start point from the beach, and endpoint at the objective area.	29th
009	BLT S-3	HHQ	Boundaries	Boundaries of the training camp		29th

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6

Enclosure (18)



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RFIs

COMPLETE
REFINE
PENDING

RFI #	From	To	Subject	RFI	Answer	Date
012	BLT S-3	HHQ	IDF	IDF authorization for friendly forces	IDF is authorized IAW ROE. IDF authorized against PID AK forces on SCI. Forces will make best effort to limit collateral damage IOT prevent unnecessary damage/destruction to Azurian civilian infrastructure. IDF request process is IAW CTG-136.3/136.5 SOP. No external fire support is available.	29 th
013	BLT S-3	HHQ	Friendly location	Location of friendly Azurian Forces? So we can target enemy specifically and ground forces can identify specific combatant and noncombatants	Re-direct RFI to BLT S-2.	29 th
014	BLT S-3	HHQ	Ajang Ajang	What does Ajang Ajang look like? So we can target him specifically and ground forces can identify specific HVI	Ajang Ajang baseball card available with CHD, provided by sub-team source operations. Deferring to OIC for response	29 th
015	BLT S-3	HHQ	IED	requesting any more information on previous IED attacks in San Clemente Island to determine what is used as the activation method for the IEDs. More specifically the components that make up the IEDs	Recommend conducting research of Philippines-based NPA organization for specific capabilities pertaining to IED employment. No historical data exists as the militia has only recently increased activity on the island in conjunction with the volcanic eruption. Collection requirement has been forwarded to the CHD sub-team currently ashore, conducting source operations. SDR referred to the OIC for potential feedback via IIRs.	29 th
018	BLT S-2	HHQ	Height of berms on LF Obj 1	We are respectfully requesting if possible to know the height of the berm IVO LF OBJ 1. IOT better the understanding of FF who are on the ground or insert in those areas.		29 th



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RFIs


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RFI #	From	To	Subject	RFI	Answer	Date
016	COMMSTRAT	HHQ	Azurian gov't	1. (Priority) Does the Govt of Azure want to message unilateral US actions against AK or do they prefer if the US does not release information about operations to maintain narrative of the Azurian Govt being in control? 2. Exord states CTF-36 is release authority. Does information release require State Dept Press Attaché review? Is there any additional guidance from state dept?		29 th
017	BLT S-3	HHQ	Use of CVRJ and MODI	Is the Use of CVRJ and MODI recommended/required in the Obj area		29 th
018	SJA	HHQ	Detain Crimson forces	For the Op Gator smash, are we authorized to detain Crimson forces IVO objective area on SCI?	Not advisable	29 th
010	BLT S-2	HHQ	Location for aid distribution	It is suspected that the subversive activities to be perpetrated by the Azurian Kinjaz (AK) will include interrupting the limited aid provided by GoA. What are the locations for aid distribution?	Crimson aid to Azure has been delivered and distributed from the Los Angeles International Airport in LA, Azure and an additional distribution point is being established at the LA Convention Center. There are currently indications that AK have begun to exploit the situation by targeting individual aid recipients throughout the affected area.	29 th
011	BLT S-2	HHQ	Route Study	ROUTE STUDY FROM BLS TO SCI N AIRFIELD		29 th



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Area of Interest




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Area of Influence



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Area of Operations




(b)(3)




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Objective Area Overview





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PIM



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MEU Force Laydown



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ARG/MEU Hotsheet




HOTSHEET 29 JUL 20

Prepared by
7512

Reviewed by

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



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Airspace



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CCIR



FFIR#	FFIR	Tripped? Y/N
1	Significant media attention that may generate unfavorable media attention	
2	Any change to or receipt of mission orders (FRAGO, WARNO, PLANORD, EXORD)	
3	Elevated changes in Force Protection Conditions, Defensive Posture, or Watch Conditions	
4	Change in Alert Status of Standing Missions	
5	Failure, or projected failure, to meet directed timelines or mission objectives	
6	Capability readiness that will prevent on-going or planned operations	
7	Any loss or significant degradation of critical systems or communications capabilities that will prevent on-going or planned operations	

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17



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Transition to N2/S2



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Enclosure (18)



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Mission & Intent



1. Mission: NLT 302359UJUL20, CTG 136.5 destroys Azurian Kinjaz (AK) forces IVO AF Obj A IOT prevent AK forces ability to conduct operations against Azure Security Forces.

Destroy-To physically render an enemy force combat ineffective unless it can be reconstituted.

2. Intent


- A. Purpose: prevent AK forces ability to conduct operations against Azure Security Forces.
- B. Method: Conduct Amphibious raid.
- C. Endstate:
 - 1) Enemy: AK Forces and facilities IVO AF Obj A destroyed and HVI AJANG AJANG killed or captured.
 - 2) Friendly: CTG 136.5 reconstituted and prepared for follow on operations, while facilitating Azure Security Force Operations.
 - 3) Terrain: Collateral damage minimized, stability increased, and U.S. relations with Azurian Government maintained.

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
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Mission TASKORG




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Mission Timeline/Sync



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Standing Missions



PROPOSED MISSION		ALERT	AUTHORITIES	LAUNCH-TO-OBJ TIME ESTIMATES	PRIORITIES
TRAP (A)		STBY	MEU CO / S3	20 MIN	TBD
UNIT 81's (A)	LOCATION MKI	2 X MV-22B			
SPARROWHAWK (A)			MEU CO / S3	20 MIN	TBD
UNIT C Co (-)	LOCATION MKI	2 X MV-22B			
BALD EAGLE (A)		120	MEU CO / S3	20 MIN	TBD
UNIT C Co (A)	LOCATION MKI/SDG	4 X MV-22			
CHERRYPICKER/ERCT		STBY	MEU CO / S3	20 MIN	TBD
UNIT VMM-164 (REIN)	LOCATION MKIARG	2 X MV-22B			
STRIKE			MEU CO / S3	5 MIN	TBD
UNIT VMFA-122	LOCATION MKI	2 X F-35B			

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Concept of Operations			
Task Organization			
ME • BEC/2 • Co Gy/10 • 3rd Plt/33 • MMG/6 • EOD/2	SE 1 • XO/4 • FIST/6 • 60mm/12 • 2nd Plt/15 • MMG/12	SE 2 • 1st Sgt/3 • 1st Plt/15	Standing Missions • QRF: Bald Eagle and Sparrow Hawk (A) Alt now Pri • TRAP
Total Pax: 53	Total Pax: 49	Total Pax: 18	
Stage A – MKI to Insert LZ Begins with: Change in Alert Status Ends with: BE inserted to LZ Critical Events: Staging, Deck Cycle, Ammunition Distribution, MACO, ITG of Insert LZ Stage B – Insert LZ to OBJ Begins with: Insert LZ Secure Ends with: Employment Plan FRAG-O from Supported Unit SE2: 1st Plt: Link Up with Supported Unit SE1: 2nd Plt: Support 1st Plt by fire IOT facilitate L/U ME: 3rd Plt: Follow and support "supported unit" IOT reinforce unit in objective area Stage C – Actions on the OBJ Begins with: Reinforcing Actions Ends with: Consolidation on Objective SE2: 1st Plt: Isolate OBJ IOT facilitate reinforcing actions SE1: 2nd Plt: Support 3rd Plt by fire IOT facilitate reinforcing actions ME: 3rd Plt: Follow and support "supported unit" IOT reinforce unit in objective area Stage D – OBJ to the Extract LZ Begins with: Coordination of Extract Plan with Supported Unit Ends with: MACO Established at Extract LZ SE 2: 2nd Plt: Displace to Extract LZ IOT posture for extract SE1: 1st Plt: Secure LZ IOT allow Extract ME: 3rd Plt: Displace to Extract LZ IOT posture for extract. Stage E – Extract LZ to MKI Begins with: BE Extract to MKI Ends with: Accountability and Post-Combat Actions Complete Critical Events: Accountability, All Marines / weapons cleared out, Turn-over detainees/evidence, Reception Plan			
Risks: 1. Due to aircraft maintenance, Bald Eagle launch exhausts all aerial QRF assets 2. 3.			
Go Criteria: 1. 72 PAX (4) MV-22 or Equivalent 2. 3.		No-Go Criteria: 1. Any further loss of A/C 2. 3.	

MISSION: O/O, Company C, BLT 1/4, conducts follow and support to 15th MEU operations IOT exploit opportunity and support decisive operations.



MAJOR ITEMS	
ITEM	TOTAL
MV-22	4
CH-53	0
Escort Flight	0
EOD	2
Javelin	1

MKI to Insert LZ	Insert LZ to OBJ	Actions on the Objective	OBJ to the Extract LZ	Extract LZ to MKI

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


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POC: XXXX
EMAIL: Phone #




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Phase I Marshalling




Scheme of Maneuver:

- (1) MSE S1s verify manifests
- (2) Ammo Tech issues CL V per standing mission package/CL V loadout
- (3) Test Fire supervised by MSE RSO/Armorer on-site to troubleshoot
- (4) Comm Checks
- (5) LE Det provides detainee/SSE procedure brief
- (6) MACO lanes established by MSE SNCOIC
- (7) Stage in serials/sticks led by CCO/CCA



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Concept of Fires - EFSTs




During phases II – IV our fires will focus on disrupting the Enemy's ability to C2 and provide observation and early warning of raid force movement. Collateral damage will be minimized to a point consistent with mission accomplishment and security of friendly forces.

Essential Fire Support Task Matrix				
Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase IV	Phase V
	EFST 1 T: Disrupt EN observers IVO LF Objs 1, 2, 3, and 4 ability to C2 and provide early warning P: IOT allow raid force to destroy AK forces IVO AF Obj A M: POF CAS (in extremis) to R&S Tms Preplanned targets IAW TLWS E: 100% of En C2 networks jammed	EFST 2 T: Disrupt EN static defensive positions IVO LF Obj 1 & 2 ability to provide mutual support and defend in depth P: IOT allow raid force to destroy AK forces IVO AF Obj A M: POF mortars to raid force E: Enemy unable to mount coordinated defense above the fire team level		



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Fire Support Overlay



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Target List Worksheet




TARGET LIST WORKSHEET								
LINE NO	TARGET NO	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION	ALT (FT MSL)	ATTITUDE	SIZE		SOURCE/ ACCURACY
						L	W	
1	AC8000	Defensive Pos	11S LS 51076 54183	49				CAT II
2	AC8001	Fighting Pos	11S LS 51826 54646	174				CAT II
3	AC8002	Fighting Pos	11S LS 51902 54516	175				CAT II
4	AC8003	Line of Comm	11S LS 57314 46371	883	1700	150		CAT II
5	AC8004	Fighting Pos	11S LS 56539 46329	840				CAT II
6	AC8005	Fighting Pos	11S LS 56886 46348	863				CAT II
7	AC8006	Line of Comm	11S LS 57510 46016	906	1700	150		CAT II

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO Phase I Sea



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PHASE I			
Task Organization			
Assault <ul style="list-style-type: none">3 d PlatoonLE 2COMSTRAT 1EOD 3CHD 2	Support <ul style="list-style-type: none">2d PlatoonMMG SquadAslt TeamCASEVAC	Security <ul style="list-style-type: none">1st PlatoonSSTMMG Squad	Standing Missions <ul style="list-style-type: none">Bald EagleSparrow HawkTRAP (A)CHERRYPICKERSTRIKE
Total Pax: 46	Total Pax: 47	Total Pax: 17	

Phase I – Shaping
Begins with: Navy geometries established

End with: Raid Force Postured aboard SOM

Critical Events: Confirmation Brief, R&S insert and reporting, rehearsals, PCC/PCI, serial call-aways.

Risks:
1. Vulnerable in the water to FAC/FIAC
2. Audible compromise
3. Limited routes to and from AK Camp

Go Criteria:
1. 85 Personnel
2. 8 AAV's
3. SOM within 5miles of shore

No-Go Criteria:
1. Sea-state 4
2. BLS trench 8ft long or 3ft vertical wall
3.

MISSION: NLT 302359JUL20 Destroy AK forces IVO 11SL5 577 466 IOT disrupt AK operations against Azurian security forces. Capture/kill Ajang Ajang IOT disrupt AK operations.

MAJOR ITEMS

ITEM	TOTAL
AAVP7	12
AAVC7	1
.50 cal HMG	12
Mk-19 HMG	12
60mm MTRS	3

Shaping **Insertion** **Actions on Objective** **Extraction** **Reconstitution**

29 July 30 July 0700 0730 0930 1000 1030 1130 TBD

POC: XXXX
EMAIL: Phone #


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
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO Phase I Fires



FSEM	Phase I - Shaping				
Control	SACC				
EFST i/e					
B Co – Mech	SOM				
RECON	SCI IVO LF OBJ 3				
FW CAS	ISO SACEX				
RW CAS	ISO SACEX				
NSFS	ISO SACEX				
HIMARS	ISO SACEX				
Artillery	Embarked	Artillery India Btry – MKI/SDG	Mortars 1x Sect 60mm 1x Sect 81mm	CAS 1x Sect F-35 & 1x Mixed Sect H-1 ISO SACEX (In Extremist Only)	NSFS USS JOHN FINN – FSA II ISO SACEX
81mm	1x Sect	FSCMs RFA 01-No cratering NFA01- RVG 4 RFL 01- IVO LF OBJ 3	High Pavoff Targets Observers, C2, HVI's,	Attack Guidance Des: Obs, C2 Neu: HVI	Ammo Availability Arty - HE Mtrs – HE 100, Illum 24 NSFS – HE/MOFA 150 Illum 25 HIMARS-RRPRs 12
60mm	1x Sect				
EW	USS John Finn (Request Permission)		Engagement Criteria Inf Sqd size	Control/Location Pri: SACC (MKI) Alt: FSCC	
FSCMs	RFA 01 – No cratering Munitions NFA 01 – RVG 4 RFL 01 – IVO LF OBJ 3				




UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO Phase II Sea



UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO



UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO Phase II Sea



UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO




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


PHASE II SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT PLAN

30 Jul 2019 PMINT20




Wet Well Ops Begin
CCA
Wet Well Ops End
Crew Day
SOM
SC
ACU
Feet Wet
Feet Dry
Ballast/De-ballast
Complete
-Craft with load
Water Barrier UP/DOWN
GO - NO GO
AAV - MSI > 6 / SS = 3 / VISIBILITY < 1NM
LCAC - SWH > 6.9 FT (SS = 4) / VISIBILITY < 1NM



UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO Phase II Fires




FSEM	Phase II - Insertion				
Control	BHO TO FSCC				
EFST i/e	1				
B Co – Mech	Landing at LF Obj 1				
RECON	Inserted on SCI				
FW CAS	ISO SACEX				
RW CAS	ISO SACEX				
NSFS	ISO SACEX				
HIMARS	ISO SACEX				
Artillery	Embarked				
81mm	1x Sect				
60mm	1x Sect				
EW	USS John Finn (Request Permission)				
FSCMs	RFA 01 – No cratering Munitions NFA 01 – RVG 4				

Artillery India Btry – MKI/SDG	Mortars 1x Sect 60mm 1x Sect 81mm	CAS 1x Sect F-35 & 1x Mixed Sect H-1 ISO SACEX (In Extremist Only)	NSFS USS JOHN FINN – FSA II ISO SACEX
FSCMs RFA 01-No cratering NFA01- RVG 4 RFL 01- IVO LF OBJ 3	High Payoff Targets Observers, C2, HVIs,	Attack Guidance Des: Obs, C2 Neu: HVI	Ammo Availability Arty - HE Mtrs – HE 100, Illum 24 NSFS – HE/MOFA 150 Illum 25 HIMARS-RRPRs 12
Engagement Criteria Inf Sqd size	Control/Location Pri: SACC (MKI) Alt: FSCC		



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Phase III Sea



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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

Phase III Ground



UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO



UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO Phase III Ground



UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO



UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO Phase III Fires




FSEM	Phase III – Actions on Obj		
Control	FSCC		
EFST i/e	1		
B Co – Mech	Landing at LF Obj 1		
RECON	SCI IVO LF OBJ 3		
FW CAS	ISO SACEX		
RW CAS	ISO SACEX		
NSFS	ISO SACEX		
HIMARS	ISO SACEX		
Artillery	Embarked		
81mm	1x Sect		
60mm	1x Sect		
EW	USS John Finn (Request Permission)		
FSCMs	RFA 01 – No cratering Munitions NFA 01 – RVG 4 RFL 01 – IVO LF OBJ 1		

Artillery India Btry – MKI/SDG	Mortars 1x Sect 60mm 1x Sect 81mm	CAS 1x Sect F-35 & 1x Mixed Sect H-1 ISO SACEX (In Extremist Only)	NSFS USS JOHN FINN – FSA II ISO SACEX
FSCMs RFA 01-No cratering NFA01- RVG 4 RFL 01- IVO LF OBJ 3	High Payoff Targets Observers, C2, HVIs,	Attack Guidance Des: Obs, C2 Neu: HVI	Ammo Availability Arty - HE Mtrs – HE 100, Illum 24 NSFS – HE/MOFA 150 Illum 25 HIMARS-RRPRs 12
	Engagement Criteria Inf Sqd size	Control/Location Pri: SACC (MKI) Alt: FSCC	



UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO Phase IV Sea



UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO




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PHASE IV SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT PLAN

30 Jul 2019 PMINT20





UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Phase IV Ground



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PHASE IV																			
Task Organization																			
Assault <ul style="list-style-type: none">3d PlatoonLE 2COMSTRAT 1EOD 3CHD 2	Support <ul style="list-style-type: none">2d PlatoonMMG SquadAslt TeamCASEVAC	Security <ul style="list-style-type: none">1st PlatoonSSTMMG Squad	Standing Missions <ul style="list-style-type: none">Bald EagleSparrow HawkTRAP (A)CHERRY PICKERSTRIKE																
Total Pax: 46	Total Pax: 47	Total Pax: 17																	
Phase IV – Extraction Begins with: Feet wet Ends with: AAV Feet Dry aboard SOM Security: Conduct movement to SOM Support: Conduct movement to SOM Assault: Conduct movement to SOM OOM: Assault Support Bravo Command Security																			
Risks: 1. Vulnerable in the water to FAC/FIAC 2. Audible compromise 3. Limited routes to and from AK Camp																			
Go Criteria: 1. 85 Personnel 2. 8 AAV's 3. SOM within 5 miles of shore		No-Go Criteria: 1. Sea-state 4 2. BLS trench 8ft long or 3ft vertical wall 3.																	
MISSION: NLT 302359UJUL20 Destroy AK forces IVO 11SL5 577 466 IOT disrupt AK operations against Azurian security forces. Capture/kill Ajang Ajang IOT disrupt AK operations.																			
MAJOR ITEMS																			
ITEM		TOTAL																	
AAVP7		12																	
AAVC7		1																	
.50 cal HMG		12																	
Mk-19 HMG		12																	
60mm MTRS		3																	
Shaping 29 July				Insertion 30 July 0700				Actions on Objective 0730 0930 1000 1030				Extraction 1130				Reconstitution TBD			
Feet Wet				1st Hour				Camp Destroyed Begin Exfil				Feet Wet				Feet Dry			

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

POC-XXXX
EMAIL: Phone #



FSEM	Phase IV - Retrograde				
Control	BHO TO SACC				
EFST i/e	1				
B Co – Mech	Retrograde to SOM				
RECON	Retrograding with B Co				
FW CAS	ISO SACEX				
RW CAS	ISO SACEX				
NSFS	ISO SACEX				
HIMARS	ISO SACEX				
Artillery	Embarked	Artillery India Btry – MKI/SDG	Mortars 1x Sect 60mm 1x Sect 81mm	CAS 1x Sect F-35 & 1x Mixed Sect H-1 ISO SACEX (In Extremist Only)	NSFS USS JOHN FINN – FSA II ISO SACEX
81	1x Sect	FSCMs RFA 01-No cratering NFA01- RVG 4 RFL 01- IVO LF OBJ 3	High Payoff Targets Observers, C2, HVIs,	Attack Guidance Des: Obs, C2 Neu: HVI	Ammo Availability Arty - HE Mtrs – HE 100, Illum 24
60mm	1x Sect				
EW	USS John Finn (Request Permission)		Engagement Criteria Inf Sqd size	Control/Location Pri: SACC (MKI) Alt: FSCC	NSFS – HE/MOFA 150 Illum 25 HIMARS-RRPRs 12
FSCMs	RFA 01 – No cratering Munitions NFA 01 – RVG 4				

PHASE V

Task Organization

Assault	Support	Security	Standing Missions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3 d Platoon LE 2 COMSTRAT 1 EOD 3 CHD 2 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2d Platoon MMG Squad Aslt Team CASEVAC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1st Platoon SST MMG Squad 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bald Eagle Sparrow Hawk TRAP (A) CHERRY-PICKER STRIKE
Total Pax: 46	Total Pax: 47	Total Pax: 17	

Phase V – Reconstitution

Begins with: Raid Force aboard SOM

Ends with: All forces back aboard ARG shipping and postured for follow on ops

Critical Events: Intel download, HVI hand-off, debriefs, ammo download, enabler cross-deck.

Risks:

1. Vulnerable in the water to FAC/FIAC
2. Audible compromise
3. Limited routes to and from AK Camp

Go Criteria:

1. 85 Personnel
2. 8 AAV's
3. SOM within 5miles of shore

No-Go Criteria:

1. Sea-state 4
2. BLS trench 8ft long or 3ft vertical wall
- 3.

MISSION: NLT 302359JUL20 Destroy AK forces IVO 11SL5 777 466 IOT disrupt AK operations against Azurian security forces. Capture/kill Ajang Ajang IOT disrupt AK operations.

MAJOR ITEMS

ITEM	TOTAL
AAVP7	12
AAVC7	1
.50 cal HMG	12
Mk-19 HMG	12
60mm MTRS	3

Timeline:

Shaping	Insertion	Actions on Objective	Extraction	Reconstitution
29 July	30 July 0730	0730 - 1030	1030 - 1130	1130
	Feet Wet	W/ Hour Camp Destroyed Begin Drift	Feet Wet	Feet Dry



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Phase V Fires




FSEM	Phase V - Reconstitution		
Control	SACC		
EFST i/e			
B Co – Mech	Reconstituted on SOM		
RECON	Reconstituted on MKI		
FW CAS	ISO SACEX		
RW CAS	ISO SACEX		
NSFS	ISO SACEX		
HIMARS	ISO SACEX		
Artillery	Embarked	Artillery India Btry – MKI/SDG	Mortars 1x Sect 60mm 1x Sect 81mm
81	1x Sect	FSCMs RFA 01-No cratering NFA01- RVG 4 RFL 01- IVO LF OBJ 3	CAS 1x Sect F-35 & 1x Mixed Sect H-1 ISO SACEX (In Extremist Only)
60mm	1x Sect	High Payoff Targets Observers, C2, HVIs,	Attack Guidance Des: Obs, C2 Neu: HVI
EW	USS John Finn (Request Permission)	Engagement Criteria Inf Sqd size	Control/Location Pri: SACC (MKI) Alt: FSCC
FSCMs	RFA 01 – No cratering Munitions NFA 01 – RVG 4 RFL 01 – IVO LF OBJ 3		NSFS USS JOHN FINN – FSA II ISO SACEX
			Ammo Availability Arty - HE Mtrs – HE 100, Illum 24 NSFS – HE/MOFA 150 Illum 25 HIMARS-RRPRs 12



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Phase V Reception Plan



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SI/EW Concept of Support



Concept of Support (Cmdr's Intent): Reconnoiter enemy C2 networks and provide Force Protection and Indications and Warnings			(S/REL) ARG SHIPPING IW POSTURE			
SI / EW Objectives: 1. Passive SI Collection sets conditions for CTG 136.5 to destroy AK forces 2. AK forces are unable to coordinate operations against Azure Security Forces (ASF) 3. Provide I&W to friendly forces and minimize collateral damage				MKI	SOM	SDG
Effects: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provide awareness on EN C2 and communications networks• Counter enemy ability to conduct operations against CTG 136.5 and ASF• Provide follow on EN C2 and communications targets of opportunity			TACSIT	1	1	1
APPROVAL AUTHORITY			EMCON	DELTA	DELTA	DELTA
ACTIVE SIGINT	PASSIVE SIGINT	ELECTRONIC ATTACK	RIVER CITY	2	1	1
NSA, CTF-136	NSA, IP, CTF-136	CTF-136	Additional information: -Electronic Attack has been authorized via CTF 136. -RRT will provide 2x Marines with a 1301c to provide passive SI collection and FP/I&W -SST will provide 2x Marines with a 1301c to provide passive SI collection and FP/I&W			
Ship/Team						
PH I – Shaping						
PH II – MVMT To OBJ						
PH III – Actions On OBJ						
PH IV – Extraction						
PH V - Reconstitution						
MKI	Focused SI Collection					
OCE	C2/SIGDEV/Passive SI Collection					
RRT	Passive SI Collection					
LAV-EW						
SOM	EA/ ASMD / I&W / Focused SI					
SST	Passive SI Collection					
IT-II						
SDG	Focused SI Collection					




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COMMSTRAT CoS




<u>Narrative</u> "Marines with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit have deployed forces to conduct operations to deter Azurian Kinjaz aggression at the request of the Government of Azure. Specific details of the operation are being withheld to maintain operational security. We stand with the Government of Azure and will assist their efforts to establish stability in key areas necessary to provide relief after the recent volcanic eruption." ➤ This is a base narrative that will be supplemented by additional talking points as required by operations. PA Posture: RTQ. ACTIVE on mission completion and return to SOM (Release Authority falls with CTF-136)					<u>Visual Information</u> Priority VI: Exchange of fire between Marines and AK, Medical aid provided to any injured civilians, Overview of all areas, evidence of illegal activity & support to TSE post mission Transmission Method <table><tr><td>PRIMARY</td><td>SECONDARY</td></tr><tr><td>Hand Delivery</td><td>MUOS</td></tr></table> Products ISO Operations: Press release (CTF-136 and GOA), video/ images for archive and release. Key Publics: US/GOA Govt and military leadership, Azurian citizens, regional media outlets in the SOCAL AO					PRIMARY	SECONDARY	Hand Delivery	MUOS
PRIMARY	SECONDARY												
Hand Delivery	MUOS												
29 July	30 July, 0700	0730	0930	1000	1100	1130	TBD						
I: SHAPING		II: Insertion		III: ACTIONS ON OBJ		IV: EXTRACTION	V: RECONSTITUTION						
Documentation													
30 July, 0700		Media Monitoring											
<div><div>★ Press Release x1</div><div><ul style="list-style-type: none">• Post mission production: storyboards (<6 hours post mission) and visual imagery to CTF-136</div></div>													
• 1x COMMSTRAT attaches to B Co		• 1x COMMSTRAT insert w/B Co via AAV to BLS		• Documentation at AK training site		• 1x COMMSTRAT return to SOM							



(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



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Concept of Medical Operations: Ship to Role 3



PURPOSE: Establish Health Service Support (HSS) network to provide Role 1 to 3/Higher care to CTG-136 forces.

METHOD

GENERAL: Provide Role 1 POI care at objective, with En-Route Care provided from LZ to Role 2 afloat and integrate with joint forces for Role 3/Higher and patient movement IOT sustain the lethality of the force.

Role 1/POI: Units responsible for En-Route Care Team (CLB-15)

Role 2: USS MKI (10min from SCI) (FST)

Role 3: Naval Hospital Camp Pendleton, Azure (35min)

Role 4: Naval Medical Center San Diego, Azure (45min)

CASEVAC

- **Ground:** Ground Forces vehicles of opportunity: 997, JLTV

- **RW:** CTF-136 forces lift of opportunity: H-60s, H-53s, MV-22s

- **Surface:** CTG-136 Surface Connectors

MEDEVAC

- CTG-136 forces postured to provide transportation to Role 3/Higher; joint forces for transport back to CONUS

En-Route Care/CASEVAC

- Available to provide stabilization care en-route from the LZ to MKI and higher echelons of care

- (1)HM, (1) ERC RN on MV-22 Platform

CL VIII: Unit/Ship AMALS over 90%

CLVIII: 100% across the ARG


END STATE: CTG-136 units are postured to provide HSS to forces ashore and integrated with joint forces for patient movement across the continuum of care

Coordinating Instructions

- Ship's Medical stood upon confirmation of mission; walking blood bank will be initiated at H-2; 2 chairs for 4 units low titer O whole; triage prepped; air BDS prepped

- ERC stood up upon confirmation of mission

- Units responsible for movement from POI to CCP/LZ



Facts: 1) HN Support not available

2) Urgent/Surgical will need to be flown from SOM/SDG to the MKI; or bypass to mainland facilities for Role 3+ care

Force Health Protection:

Risks: COVID-19, Heat, GI illness,

Mitigation: Hand washing, Sunscreen, Hydration, Personal Hygiene, and No consumption of local food and water

Casualty Est: F:E 120:30; 4:1; 5%:85% Mech/Capabilities reduce to 3%:90% Total: 4:27

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EMCON: D
RIVER CITY: 2
CRYPTO R/O: 5590 7/30 at 1700 local (IW)
CHALLENGE: TIME
PASSWORD: CAKE
RUNNING: WINE


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Communications Concept of Support



LEGEND
(P) = PRIMARY
(A) = ALTERNATE
(C) = CONTINGENCY
(E) = EMERGENCY
(CT) = COVERED (CRYPTO)
(PT) = UNCOVERED

(b)(2)



(b)(2),

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Rules of Engagement



1. AK on SCI are **Declared Hostile Force**
 - A. **Only need PID**
 1. AK use Soviet small arms, M-16s, drive white trucks. Fire team sized patrols conducted at dusk and dawn.
 - B. RCAs **NOT** authorized
2. Electronic Attack **NOT** authorized
 - A. CTF- 136 for approval
3. Network exploitation / Attack is **NOT** authorized
4. Minimize Collateral Damage
 - A. Respect life, property and local customs of Azure
5. **Authorized to detain civilians** IVO Obj area only to prevent mission accomplishment
 - A. **Not authorized to detain Crimson Forces**, UoF in self-defense only, de-escalate as time and circumstances permit.

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Authority



EVENT	COMMAND AUTHORITY				
	I (SHAPING)	II (INSERT)	III (ACTIONS ON OBJ)	IV (EXTRACT)	V (RECONSTITUTE)
ABORT	CPR-3 DELEGATED TO SOM CO	MEU CO	RFC	RFC	MEU CO
DELAY	MEU CO	MEU CO	RFC	RFC	MEU CO
CHERRY PICKER	MEU CO	RFC	RFC	RFC	MEU CO
EMERGENCY EXTRACT	MEU CO	MEU CO	RFC	MEU CO	MEU CO

Kinetic Fires Approval

EVENT	COMMAND AUTHORITY				
	I (SHAPING)	II (INSERT)	III (ACTIONS ON OBJ)	IV (EXTRACT)	V (RECONSTITUTE)
CAS	R&S	R&S	R&S BHO to RFC	RFC	LFOC
DAS	SCAR/AR	SCAR	SCAR	SCAR	SCAR/AR

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Risks to Mission



Risk to Mission	Assessed RAC	Mitigation Method	Residual RAC
Compromise of mission prior to H-hour	Probability: C Severity: II RAC: 3	1. Clandestine insertion 2. Sufficient time for insertion/infil	Probability: C Severity: II RAC: 4
Counter-mobility	Probability: C Severity: II RAC: 3	1. Routine Maint 2. Route Selection 3. EOD for obstacle reduction	Probability: D Severity: II RAC: 4
No go weather criteria	Probability: C Severity: II RAC: 3	1. None	Probability: C Severity: II RAC: C
	Probability: Severity: RAC:		Probability: Severity: RAC:
	Probability: Severity: RAC:		Probability: Severity: RAC:
	Probability: Severity: RAC:		Probability: Severity: RAC:
	Probability: Severity: RAC:		Probability: Severity: RAC:

HAZARD SEVERITY	MISHAP PROBABILITY					Risk to Mission assessment	Moderate to Low
	A	B	C	D			
	I	1	1	2	3		
	II	1	2	3	4		
	III	2	3	4	5		
HAZARD SEVERITY	IV	3	4	5	5	Overall Assessment	Moderate

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Risks to Force



Risk to Force	Assessed RAC	Mitigation Method	Residual RAC
Enemy contact during insertion	Probability: D Severity: II RAC: 4	1. Overwhelming Combat Power 2. Craft insertion TTPs/rehearsals 3. Pri/alt landing sites/distance from OBJ	Probability: D Severity: II RAC: 4
Mass casualty on objective	Probability: C Severity: I RAC: 2	1. ERCTT alert status 2. Threat reconnaissance on OBJ area 3. TCCC proficiency/corpsmen present	Probability: C Severity: II RAC: 3
Man overboard during insertion	Probability: C Severity: I RAC: 2	1. Crew training/man overboard rehearsal 2. Life jacket worn by all personnel 3. Swim proficiency	Probability: C Severity: II RAC: 3
Fratricide on link-up between Recon and Raid force	Probability: C Severity: I RAC: 2	1. Known location/time/control measures 2. Rehearsal/ROC 3. Known contingencies	Probability: D Severity: 1 RAC: 3
	Probability: Severity: RAC:		Probability: Severity: RAC:
	Probability: Severity: RAC:		Probability: Severity: RAC:
	Probability: Severity: RAC:		Probability: Severity: RAC:

HAZARD SEVERITY	MISHAP PROBABILITY					Risk to Mission assessment	Moderate to Low
	A	B	C	D			
	I	1	1	2	3		
	II	1	2	3	4		
	III	2	3	4	5		
HAZARD SEVERITY	IV	3	4	5	5	Overall Assessment	Moderate

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R&S EXECUTION CHECKLIST FOR OPERATION GATOR SMASH							
#	EVENT/SITUATION	NET	FROM	TO	CODEWORD	SCH TIME	ACT TIME
R&S INSERT							
1	R&S CRRCS LAUNCHED	MUOS	REV 4	LFOC	ALBANIA	1900U	
2	FEET DRY - R&S ASHORE	MUOS	REV 4	LFOC	ARGENTINA	2130U	
3	INSERT COMPLETE	MUOS	REV 4	LFOC	BAHAMAS	2200U	
R&S INFIL							
4	R&S ARRIVE ORP	MUOS	REV 4	LFOC	BARBADOS	0015U	
R&S AOO							
5	R&S COMMENCED ACTIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE	MUOS	REV 4	LFOC	BELARUS	0030-L HOUR	
R&S EXFIL							
6	R&S DISPLACE OP	MUOS	REV 4	LFOC	BELGIUM	2000U	
7	R&S L/U COMPLETE	MUOS	REV 4	LFOC	BELIZE	2300U	
R&S EXTRACT							
8	R&S STAGED FOR EXTRACT	MUOS	REV 4	LFOC	BOLIVIA	2345U	
9	DISPLACE EP	MUOS	REV 4	LFOC	BOSNIA	0100U	
10	COMMENCING EXTRACT	MUOS	REV 4	LFOC	BRAZIL	0200U	
11	EXTRACT COMPLETE	MUOS	REV 4	LFOC	BULGARIA	0300U	

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MECH RAID EXECUTION CHECKLIST FOR OPERATION GATOR SMASH							
#	EVENT/SITUATION	NET	FROM	TO	CODEWORD	SCH TIME	ACT TIME
INSERTION							
21	AAVs LAUNCHED	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	CAVALIERS	0700U	
22	AAVs FEET DRY	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	CELTICS	0730U	
23	MOVEMENT TO BLS	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	CLIPPERS	0730U	
ACTIONS ON OBJECTIVE							
24	BLS SEIZED	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	GRIZZLIES	0800U	
25	COMMENCED ACTIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	HEAT	0830U	
26	OBJECTIVE SECURED / COMMENCING TSE	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	HORNETS	0930U	
EXTRACTION							
27	TSE COMPLETE	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	JAZZ	1000U	
28	RB/R&S L/U COMPLETE	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	KNICKS	1015U	
29	MACO COMPLETE / READY FOR EXTRACT	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	LAKERS	1030U	
30	AAVs FEET WET	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	MAGIC	1100U	
31	AAVs FEET DRY	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	MAVERICKS	1130U	
RECONSTITUTION							
32	RAID FORCE ABOARD SOM	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	NUGGETS	1130U	
33	ALL FORCES ABOARD ARG SHIPPING	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	PACERS	1200U	
CONTINGENCIES							
90	QRF LAUNCHED			LFOC	JIM BEAM		
91	STRIKE LAUNCHED			LFOC	WHISTLE PIG		
92	CASEVAC LAUNCHED			LFOC	CASEVAC		
93	RAID FORCE EMERGENCY EXTRACT			LFOC	MAKERS MARK		
94	RAID FORCE IMMEDIATE REEMBARK			LFOC	PAPPY VAN WINKLE		

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Succession of Command



1. MEU CO
2. MEU XO
3. BLT CO
4. MEU OPSO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

61



UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Succession of Command



UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

62



UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Commander's Comments



UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



SCI Mechanized Raid Limitations

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ADFOR: BLT

Communications with Range Control /
Range Safety – SCI Range Safety radios

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Enclosure (18)



SCI Land Training Areas (TAs)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO




TAs Reserved

(1900, 29 Jul – 2200, 30 Jul):

1. TA-1
2. TA-2
3. TA-3
4. TA-4
5. TAR-14

1. TAR-5 (West Cove): 1900-2200, 29 Jul / 0600-1200, 30 Jul
2. TAR-17 and TAR-13: 1900-2200, 29 Jul / 1800-2200, 30 Jul




Assault Vehicle Maneuver Corridor (AVMC)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO




1. AVMC is a series of linked training areas on SCI.
2. **All tactical vehicles and AAVs only permitted on AVMR and AVMA.**
3. AVMA – within TAR-14 (IVO MOUT objective)
4. AVMR – unimproved dirt road. Crossing points are cement.

****Not permitted on asphalt road****



1. Restricted Areas have been found to contain risks to personnel due to discovery of UXO and MPPEH.

2. Site 14 RAA:
3. 11S LS 57347 45192
4. 11S LS 57433 43416
5. 11S LS 56442 42419
6. 11S LS 56193 44998
7. Eel Point RAA:
8. 11S LS 56315 43088
9. 11S LS 56194 42447
10. 11S LS 55933 42551
11. 11S LS 55977 42994




UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO




VC-3 Area

- ## 1. No training in VC-3 Range Support Compound



SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND CASEVAC PLAN





UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT
BOX 555363
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5363

IN REPLY REFER TO
4600
MOBO
XX XXX 20

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: 15th MEU PMINT 21-1 EMBARKATION LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

Ref: (a) 15th MEU WESTPAC 21-1 PTP OPERATION ORDER
(b) 15th MEU PMINT 21-1 WNGO
(c) 15th MEU WESTPAC 21-1 Embarkation LOI
(d) PHIBRON/MEU Integration Training Port Operations Group Guard Force Letter of Instruction

Encl: (1) STRIP MAP to Naval Base San Diego (NBSD)
(2) 15th MEU Embark Placards

1. Situation. The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) will participate in the conduct of PHIBRON/MEU Integration Training (PMINT) as part of the pre-deployment training program (PTP) for the upcoming Western Pacific (WESTPAC) 21-1 deployment. The purpose of this letter of instruction is to provide guidance and direction for staging, movement and embarkation of personnel, vehicles, equipment and cargo in support of PMINT execution.

2. Mission. From 13-26 July 2020, designated 15th MEU personnel and equipment will conduct phased movement from Camp Pendleton, MCAS Miramar and MCAS Yuma to Naval Base San Diego (NBSD) and Naval Amphibious Base Coronado (NABC) in order to embark USS MAKIN ISLAND Amphibious Ready Group (MKIARG) shipping and conduct follow on debarkation and retrograde in order to achieve successful completion of PMINT.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. PMINT will be conducted in five phases: Planning and Preparation, Movement and Occupation, PMINT Conduct, Retrograde, and Reconstitution and AAR.

(1) Phase I, Planning and Preparation (30 Jan-13 July 2020). Begins with the conduct of the PMINT IPC and ends with the establishment of the Port Operations Group (POG) at NBSD. Key events include the establishment of Unit Marshaling Areas (UMA), cargo inspections and POG establishment. During this phase all cargo and equipment will be clean and free of debris, staged in UMAs located at Camp Pendleton, MCAS Miramar or MCAS Yuma, and prepared for follow on movement to NBSD in preparation for loading onto MKIARG shipping. Movement timelines will be released via separate correspondence.

(2) Phase II, Movement and Occupation (13-26 July 2020). Begins with the establishment of the POG and ends with all gear and equipment embarked onto amphibious shipping. Critical events during this phase include the movement of cargo, equipment and personnel to the port, and the embarkation of cargo, equipment and personnel on MKIARG ships. From 15-26 July 2020 MKIARG ships will conduct pier side on-load of all cargo, equipment and personnel. USS MAKIN ISLAND will require stern gate marriage with equipment loaded from NABC for the on-load of oversized cargo not able to fit through

ENCLOSURE (19)

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the side hatch (e.g. MTRV and TRAM). Loading via LCU at NABC will require rolling stock to move to NABC from Camp Pendleton and NBSD via Imperial Beach and the Coronado strand IAW movement timeline.

(3) Phase III, PMINT Conduct (27 July-9 August 2020). Begins with all ships underway from NBSD and ends with the completion of MSE white space training after the amphibious assault. Critical events during this phase include pre-boated equipment and AAVs conducting an in-stream on-load IVO Red Beach and Del Mar Boat Basin (DMBB), 15th MEU aircraft will conduct Aviation Combat Element (ACE) fly-on, Supporting Arms Coordination Exercise (SACEX) personnel, cargo and equipment will be back-loaded onto MKIARG shipping IVO San Clemente Island, and 15th MEU will conduct amphibious assault.

(4) Phase IV, Retrograde (9-11 August 2020). Begins with the conclusion of the amphibious assault and MSE white space training and ends with the completion of the pier side offload at NBSD. This phase commences at the completion of the confirmation brief and includes the debarkation of all personnel and equipment from MKIARG ships. This phase is completed with retrograde from NBSD and/or Camp Pendleton training areas to unit home stations. Further instructions on staging and method of movement for debarkation will be issued via Operations Order during PMINT.

(5) Phase V, Reconstitution and AAR (11-30 August 2020). Begins with all personnel, gear and equipment accounted for at home station or pre-staged at NBSD and ends with all maintenance requests submitted via Global Combat Supply System-Marine Corps and submission of all after action topics. Critical events during this phase are post exercise maintenance, PMINT AAR submission and follow on planning for future pre-deployment training program (PTP) events.

b. Tasks

(1) MEU CE

(a) All CE detachments and CE sections:

1. Prepare, stage, and muster designated cargo, equipment, and personnel per the movement timeline.

a. Stage all general cargo at the 21 Area parade deck NLT 13 July 2020.

b. Pack classified and/or sensitive material into containers NET 24 hours prior to movement to the SPOE. These materials will be loaded in the containers during the embarkation inspections with 15th MEU Mobility and may be removed at the completion of the inspection and returned prior to movement if required to be containerized during movement to the port.

c. Stage all vehicles being embarked on MKIARG shipping at the 15th MEU motor pool NLT 13 July. All vehicles will depart from the 15th MEU motor pool IAW the movement timeline that will be published via separate correspondence.

2. Assign drivers and vehicle commanders for vehicles assigned to convoys.

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3. Provide (9) Marines for a working party to assist with the combat cargo inspections from 14 July 2020 until completion of all inspections. Working parties will prepare equipment to be inspected and take action to correct discrepancies identified during inspections. The working party will report to Lots 4F or 40 at NBSD based on equipment types located at each lot. Personnel are to report to the TEO of the MKIARG ships in which the cargo will be embarking, at the respective staging lot IAW inspection timings and are to have access to all equipment to be inspected.

4. Provide Marines to the Driver Pool that supports a ratio of (1) driver per (1) specialized vehicle (e.g. MHE, LAVs, tacked vehicles MRZR, etc.) and (1) driver per (3) general vehicles (eg. MTRVs, JLTVs and HMMWVs). The Driver Pool will consist one non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) that will maintain accountability of all CE drivers. Drivers will report to the POG NLT 0700 daily from 14 July 2020 until all CE vehicles are embarked onto ARG shipping. Parent commands will maintain accountability of driver pool Marines for the duration of the onload. A driver pool roster will be submitted to the MEU Embarkation Chief NLT 13 July 2020.

Provide Marines to the Driver Pool that supports a ratio of (1) driver per (1) specialized vehicle (e.g. MHE, LAVs, tacked vehicles MRZR, etc.) and (1) driver per (3) general vehicles (eg. MTRVs, JLTVs and HMMWVs). The Driver Pool will consist one non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) that will maintain accountability of all CE drivers. Drivers will report to the POG NLT 0700 daily from 14 July 2020 CE vehicles are embarked onto ARG shipping. Parent commands will maintain accountability of driver pool Marines for the duration of the onload.

(b) S-1

1. Assign a CE SNCO as Bus Team Commander for each bus.

2. Submit a bus manifest to the MEU unit movement control center (UMCC) NLT 14 July 2020 for ADVON and NLT 23 July 2020 for main body movement from home stations to NBSD.

(c) S-2

1. Ensure the LAV-EW is staged at NBSD IAW the movement timeline for pre-embarkation inspection. A qualified driver is to be on standby to enable loading onto USS MAKIN ISLAND.

2. Prepare and coordinate transportation of classified material.

(d) S-4

1. Establish the UMCC for all stages of movement and embarkation/debarkation.

2. Develop and release a movement timeline in support of the embarkation and debarkation plan.

3. Coordinate the staging of designated cargo and equipment in accordance with the staging plan and movement timeline.

4. Coordinate all TOT/TOP requirements.

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5. Establish Embarkation/Debarcation Control Office (ECO/DCO) at the Point of Embarkation (POE) with the POG during Phases II and IV.

6. Submit a Logistic Support Request (LSR), requesting Naval Facilities support as well as POG support from MLG at Lot 4F and 4O from 10-26 July 2020.

(2) MSEs

(a) Ensure all requirements regarding convoys and movement control are followed per the 15th MEU UMCC SOP. Each convoy will be assigned a convoy commander. Upon arrival at NBSD Lots 4F and 4O and NABC, convoy commanders are to present the following information to the POG OIC:

1. Convoy Number
2. List of vehicles by type and serial numbers
3. List of drivers and A-drivers
4. Vehicles not arriving due to breakdown or other reasons

(b) Ensure tactical vehicle convoys have flat-tow recovery capabilities.

(c) Designate a SNCO/officer as Bus Team Commander for each bus movement.

(d) Bus and convoy commanders are to deliver a convoy / movement brief prior to departing UMA lots. Topics include, but are not limited to, vehicle breakdown/accident procedures, separation between vehicles, location of corpsman, communication procedures, CASEVAC procedures, driving speeds, points of contact in case of an emergency, etc.

(e) Provide (9) Marines for a working party to assist with the Combat Cargo inspections from 14 July 2020 until the completion of all inspections. Working parties will prepare equipment to be inspected and take action to correct discrepancies identified during the inspection. The working party will be broken into three groups and report to the USS MAKIN ISLAND, USS SOMERSET, and USS SAN DIEGO TEOs at the respective staging lot at 0700 during days of inspection and will have access to all equipment to be inspected.

(f) All frustrated cargo will be transported back to home station by MSEs. Units will have a vehicle on stand-by that is not embarking available to transport items from NBSD to the home station.

(g) Provide Marines to the Driver Pool that supports a ratio of (1) driver per (1) specialized vehicle (e.g. MHE, LAVs, tacked vehicles MRZR, etc.) and (1) driver per (3) general vehicles (eg. MTRVs, JLTVs and HMMWVs). The Driver Pool will consist one non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) that will maintain accountability of all unit drivers. Drivers will report to the POG NLT 0700 daily from 14 July 2020 until all owning unit vehicles are embarked onto ARG shipping. Parent commands will maintain accountability of driver pool Marines for the duration of the onload. A driver pool roster will be submitted to the MEU Embarkation Chief NLT 13 July 2020.

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(h) From 14-24 July 2020, establish a maintenance contact team at Lot 4F and 40 capable of performing 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance, the capabilities to de-fuel vehicles, and have a HAZMAT material emergency spill kit.

(3) GCE

(a) NLT 0630 on 27 July 2020, stage pre-boat loads in accordance with the 15th MEU Organization for Embarkation & Assignment to Shipping at Red Beach.

(b) On order, launch (14) AAVs from DMBB, Camp Pendleton to be recovered by USS SOMERSET. Provide RSO/OIC as required for AAV launch at DMBB.

(4) ACE

(a) NLT 2 July 2020 identify all cargo to be loaded via crane lift.

(b) NLT 20 July 2020, provide aircraft personnel and cargo manifest for all aircraft flying onto MKIARG shipping. This manifest will include all crew, passengers and cargo embarking during the ACE fly-on.

(5) LCE

(a) Provide a recovery plan for movement to 32nd Street.

(b) NLT 1600 13 July 2020, establish a POG at Lots 4F and 40 to coordinate pier-side loading of the MKIARG. Upon establishing the POG at NBSD, the POG OIC will report to the MEU Mobility Officer/ECO.

(c) Receive and employ the guard force IAW Ref (d)

(d) NLT 27 July 2020, stage the AAV R7 at DMBB for shore to ship movement to the USS SOMERSET.

(e) NLT 27 July 2020, establish a Landing Force Shore Party (LFSP) IVO Red Beach ISO the in-stream onload of pre-boated cargo. Provide RSO/OIC for this evolution.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Vehicle, Cargo and Personnel Movement

(a) Transportation Requests. MSEs will submit transportation movement requests (TMR) and ground transportation requests (GTR) utilizing Transportation Capacity Planning Tool (TCPT) to the 15th MEU UMCC. MSE UMCCs and MEU UMCC are responsible for coordinating GTRs. TMR and GTR submissions are due by 1600, 29 June 2020.

(b) UMCC Procedures. MSEs will establish a UMCC NLT two hours prior to the execution of the first movement. Report all movements (Convoy, TOT, and TOP) from arrival of external assets i.e. SWRFT, departure from the UMA and arrival at the POE to the MEU UMCC. MSE UMCCs are to report the total number of vehicles, passengers and name of the convoy commander. Convoy commanders and unit embarkation representatives will report arrival times at the POE to the MEU Embarkation Officer.

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(c) Cargo Movement. MSEs are to prepare, stage and muster designated cargo, equipment and personnel in accordance with the movement timeline. A confirmed EDL will be submitted one day prior to convoy movement to the MEU UMCC. Convoy and bus commanders are to include what security rounds, classified material and HAZMAT is being transported on the convoy/bus. Convoys and busses cannot leave UMAs without being released by the MEU UMCC.

(d) Roadmaster Insepctions. Roadmaster inspections are to be completed 48 hours prior to departure in order to allow for follow-on inspections prior to the scheduled departure time from home stations. MSEs are to ensure unit embarkation representatives are present at the POE during all phases of embarkation.

(e) Convoys. Convoy Orders will be prepared for each large scale movement by the convoy commander. Convoy orders will include at a minimum; serial commanders, serial departure time, route, checkpoints, convoy speed, accident procedures, breakdown procedures, bump plan, lost marine plan, convoy order, halts, casualty plan, hospitals along route, and points of contact. Convoy Commanders are to ensure every road-marched vehicle has a licensed operator and A-driver.

(f) Garrison Mobile Equipment (GME). GME vehicles will have a driver and A-driver. A NCO or above must be in the vehicle at all times. Drivers must adhere to posted speed limits; no vehicle will exceed 65 mph when traveling on the freeway.

(g) POG Billeting. MSEs are responsible for coordinating transportation for drivers and A-drivers from NBSD back to unit home station. MSEs are to coordinate movement for Marines assigned to the POG working party and driver pool. Those Marines supporting POG operations and guard force requirements will billet aboard MKIARG shipping for the duration of their requirement to support.

(h) Palletized and Non-Palletized Cargo. Troop stow and hand carried items will be brought to the ships from 14-24 July 2020 IAW the loading schedule. Working parties are required to move equipment from drop locations to allocated organizational workspaces. Palletized items, in coordination with the ship CCOs/TEOs and ship forklifts will be stowed in pre-designated locations on the ship. Non-palletized items are to be moved aboard the ship by hand and troop stow items will not be accepted after the allocated time period. Prior to bringing any equipment to the ships, units must coordinate with the respective ship's TEO. All hand carried items will be brought onto the ship either before the start of loading operations or after the completion of loading operations each day.

(i) Ship's Tax. Personnel identified for ships' taxes (e.g. laundry, cooks and messman) will report to their respective ship's TEO at 1200, 21 July 2020.

(j) Personnel Movement. Main body personnel movement to MKIARG shipping will occur 25 and 26 July 2020. Movement to NBSD will be conducted in accordance with the movement timeline. Phasing in of MSEs will be as follows:

1. USS SAN DIEGO (25 July 2020)

a. GCE will report from 0800 to 1200.

- b. LCE will report from 1200 to 1500.
 - c. ACE will report from 1500 to 1700.
 - d. CE will report from 1500 to 1700.
- 2. USS SOMERSET (26 July 2020)
 - a. GCE will report from 0800 to 1200.
 - b. LCE will report from 1200 to 1500.
 - c. ACE will report from 1500 to 1700.
 - d. CE will report from 1500 to 1700.
- 3. USS MAKIN ISLAND (23-24 July 2020 daily)
 - a. GCE will report from 0800 to 1100.
 - b. LCE will report from 1100 to 1300.
 - c. ACE will report from 1300 to 1500.
 - d. CE will report from 1500 to 1700.

(k) POG and POG Supporting Elements. The POG OIC will coordinate messing, berthing and weapons storage for all POG and enablers to include the POG, guard force and drivers pool. Coordination will be made through the USS SAN DIEGO TEO for the period of 13-18 July and respective ships TEOs from 18-26 July per shipping assignments.

(l) Ammunition. Ammunition in support of SACEX will be coordinated via separate correspondence. Convoys and bus movement safety rounds are to be issued to convoy commanders and bus team commanders. Safety ammunition will be returned to respective MSE ammunition technician on board designated MKIARG shipping once secure at NBSD.

(m) Embark Procedures

1. The 15th MEU Mobility Officer (MOBO) and CPR-3 CCO maintain overall coordination of loading the MKIARG ships. Command and signal in the form of land line, cell phone and radio communication will be established at the POE for each embark evolution. The MEU MOBO will provide command and control of movements, staging, and port operations at the POE. All changes regarding equipment and placement of equipment must be submitted through the respective TEO to the MEU MOBO. All change requests will be vetted through the MEU S3 for MEU CO approval.

2. The POG in consultation with the MEU MOBO will coordinate and control staging of items in Lot 4F and 40. The POG is responsible for traffic control and movement of all items from the entry point at NBSD into the staging lots through to the ships.

3. A Maintenance Contact Team will be on location for the duration of the loading process. When required, the contact team will conduct 1st and 2nd echelon repairs on any downed vehicles. Case by case

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review will determine whether downed vehicles will embark. If vehicles do not embark, the "duty wrecker" will recover the vehicle to the unit's home station.

4. Weapons Transportation and Embarkation

a. Transportation. MSEs are responsible for the transportation of personal and crew-served weapons and optics from their respective home station to the ship. MSEs are to identify the types and quantity of weapons that will be transported in conjunction with personnel movements when submitting TMRs.

b. Bus Security. MSEs are responsible for providing their own force protection while transporting weapons from their UMAs to designated POEs. MSEs are to return security rounds to their respective MSE logistics section for storage onboard MKIARG shipping.

c. Crew Serve Weapons. Crew serve weapons will be hand carried onto the ships and taken directly to the appropriate armory. Crew served weapons will not be allowed to be transported on busses.

d. POG Weapons. POG, driver pool, and guard force personnel will not bring personal weapons to MKIARG ships prior to or during the on-load. MSEs will coordinate transportation for those weapons to MKIARG shipping at a later date.

e. Custodians. MSEs will ensure a custodian is embarked to receive and store all weapons and optics.

f. Weapons Cards. MSEs will issue separate 10520 custody receipt cards (labeled in the upper left as: MKI, SOM, SDG) for use aboard the respective ship.

g. Daily sight counts will be conducted.

5. The TEO for each ship is responsible for the correct placement of cargo, vehicles and equipment in accordance with approved load plans. The TEOs and TEAs for each ship are as follows:

- USS MAKIN ISLAND: (TEO Surface)(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(GCE), (TEO Air) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(ACE), (TEO Air) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(ACE), (TEA) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(CE)

b. USS SOMERSET: (TEO) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(GCE), (TEA) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(GCE)

c. USS SAN DIEGO: (TEO)(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(ACE), (TEA) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(LCE)

6. Each Marine will be allowed (1) sea bag, (1) main pack, (1) assault pack, (1) computer bag or small carry-on bag.

7. Marking and placarding procedures for all equipment will be IAW Ref (C). MSEs are to ensure these preparations and procedures are followed prior to departure from home station.

8. Safety. Paramount throughout all phases and stages of movement and embarkation is safety. The 15th MEU MOBO is responsible for the

Subj: 15th MEU PMINT 21-1 EMBARKATION LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

overall safe conduct of staging, movement and loading of equipment aboard NBSD. Organizational Risk Management (ORM) will be applied by all MSEs while conducting embarkation. The POG OIC will enforce all safety regulations within Lots 4F and 4O. The TEOs and TEAs will assist the Combat Cargo Officers and Combat Cargo Assistants aboard their respective ships.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Messing. Marines supporting as POG, Guard Force or Driver Pool personnel will utilize messing facilities on board MKIARG ships.

b. Billeting. Billeting will be available aboard MKIARG ships for all POG, Guard Force, and Driver Pool Marines at Lot 4F and 4O.

c. Transportation. Units will provide and utilize organic transportation assets and GME vehicles to support on-load operations. Shortfalls to organic transport is to be provided to the MEU S4.

d. MSEs are to consider the use of organic logistic capabilities prior to submitting a request for external logistical support. MSEs are to utilize CLC2S or TCPT, as applicable, when submitting logistic support requests. The secondary method is the electronic or hard copy submission of the Logistic Support Request, the template is located in reference (b).

e. Reference (c) provides further detailed guidance with regards to embarkation activities in support of PMINT.

5. Command and Signal

a. S-4 Officer:

b. Embark Officer (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

c. Embark Chief

SIGNED

Copy to:

15th MEU CE S-1

15th MEU CE S-2

15th MEU CE S-3

15th MEU CE S-4

15th MEU CE S-6

15th MEU CE All Domain Reconnaissance Detachment

BLT 1/4 S-3

BLT 1/4 S-4

VMM-164 S-3

VMM-164 S-4

CLB 15 S-3

CLB 15 S-4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNIT: 15th MEU FRAGO:	DTG: 2 July 2020 MAKIN ISLAND AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT INTEGRATION TRAINING	LOCATION: CPEN
<p>REFERENCES:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) COMTHIRDFLTINST/I MEFO 3502.1 (b) NAVMC 3500.116A, MAGTF T&R Manual (c) MCO 3120.13 Policy For MEU and MEU(SOC) (d) MCO 3502.3C MEU and MEU (SOC) Pre-deployment Training Program (e) MCO 3570.1C Range Safety (f) MCO 3500.27B Operational Risk Management (g) CNAF M-3710.7, NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions Manual (h) IMEFO 3120.9A I MEF MEU and MEU(SOC) SOP (i) IMEFO 1500.75 Policy and Procedures for High Risk Training (j) Operations Order 0001-20 (Pre-deployment Training 21-1) (k) MCIWEST-MCB CAMPENO 3500.1 Ch 1 RANGE AND TRAINING AREA STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES (l) NALFSCIINST 1720.2B NALF SCI SOP (m) LHD 8 Ship's Loading Characteristics Pamphlet (n) LPD 25 Ship's Loading Characteristics Pamphlet (o) LPD 22 Ship's Loading Characteristics Pamphlet (p) I MEF FRAGO 10 to OPORD 20-001 		
<p>ENCLOSURE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Task Organization (2) Organization for Embarkation and Assignment to Shipping (3) MKIARG PMINT Classified Synchronization Matrix (4) MKIARG PMINT Sequence of Events (5) Embarkation Letter of Instruction (6) Guard Force Letter of Instruction (7) Supporting Arms Coordination Center Exercise Letter of Instruction (8) Required Personal Gear List (9) Shipboard Reception Plan Letter of Instruction (10) System Access Authorization Request Process Instructions (11) Communication Electronic Operating Instruction (12) Afloat MAGTF C4 Overview (13) Exercise Control Letter of Instruction (14) Draft Defense of the Amphibious Task Force Memorandum of Understanding (15) Medical & Force Health Preservation (16) Ship Live Fire Confirmation Brief Template 		
<p>TASK ORGANIZATION: See Enclosure (1)</p> <p>1. Situation. From 27 July – 10 August 2020, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Amphibious Squadron Three (CPR-3) conduct Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON)/MEU Integration Training (PMINT) 20-1 aboard the MAKIN ISLAND Amphibious Ready Group (MKIARG), San Clemente Island (SCI), California (CA), Yuma, Arizona (AZ), and Camp Pendleton (CPEN), CA. PMINT is a ship-based exercise that involves the full embarkation of the MEU, Deployable Group Systems Interoperability Test (DGSIT) afloat, Defense of the Amphibious Task Force (DATF), a Supporting Arms Coordination Center Exercise (SACCEX), various full mission profile repetitions, and a full amphibious landing. This exercise provides an opportunity for the Command Element (CE) to develop its ability to rapidly plan, brief, execute, and debrief complex operations in an unfamiliar environment.</p> <p>a. Friendly Units</p> <p>(1) Higher Headquarters. Expeditionary Strike Group-3 (ESG-3) will serve as the office conducting the exercise. ESG-3 and the 15th MEU will also plan and control the exercise in accordance with the</p>		

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ENCLOSURE (20)

information contained in reference (a) and all references, enclosures, and other exercise documents. The locations and other specific details for the sequence of events can be found within the classified synchronization matrix on the 15th MEU SIPR SharePoint PMINT page. The exercise design is event driven in order to allow 15th MEU to successfully embark and debark amphibious shipping, execute the at sea battle rhythm and validate the organization for embarkation and assignment to shipping (OE&AS).

(2) Adjacent

(a) CPR-3 will be embarked with the 15th MEU during the conduct of PMINT.

(b) 5th Marines will be conducting Exercise ISLAND FURY on SCI during portions of the preparation and execution of PMINT.

(3) Supporting. ESG-3 will submit and validate all requests for Southern California Operational Area (SOCAL OPAREA) water space, airspace and surface land based training on SCI. ESG-3 will coordinate the target vessel request for a Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) full mission profile event. Additionally, ESG-3 will coordinate adversary aviation assets to support an air defense exercise. The Training Support Center will augment 15th MEU with white cell support at the 15th MEU Command Post for the duration of PMINT. I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) G-7 Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG) will provide the safety structure and observer support for VBSS events to include an open water safety craft, corpsman, safety swimmer and high-risk supervisory personnel. Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility (FACSFAC) SCI will support exercise control personnel with billeting, rental vehicles, SCI specific communication equipment and range access requirements on SCI.

2. Mission. From 27 July through 10 August 2020, 15th MEU & CPR-3 conduct PMINT aboard the MKIARG IVO CPEN IOT enhance the integration & collective capability of the ARGMEU team as informed by Mission Essential Tasks (METs).

3. Execution

a. Commander's Intent

(1) Purpose. Ensure each element & member of the ARGMEU team is familiar with their individual & collective responsibilities as it pertains to shipboard operations. Expectations for subsequent at sea training periods must be established based upon PMINT lessons learned.

(2) Method. Conduct and supervise the integrated sequence of events alongside CPR-3.

(3) Endstate. A proficient & prepared ARGMEU team postured for subsequent at sea training periods. Necessary training required to enable success includes the following:

- Exercise of Command and Control (C2), afloat, ashore, and during ship-to-shore movement.
- Exercise of Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2) refinement/validation of the 15th MEU Standard Operating Procedures.
- Exercise control of fires afloat, during ship-to-shore movement, and passage of control of fires ashore (SACCEX).
- Conduct DGSIT afloat.
- Validate the OE&AS.
- Maximize repetitions of METs.
- Strengthen ARGMEU relationships & build shared understanding.

b. Concept of Operations. The exercise is 14 training days that will occur in the Southern California amphibious operations area, SCI and CPEN. 15th MEU will be distributed across USS MAKIN ISLAND, USS SOMERSET, USS SAN DIEGO, SCI and CPEN. ESG-3 & 15th MEU will serve as Exercise Control (EXCON) from Naval Base San Diego (NBSD), the USS MAKIN ISLAND, SCI and

CPEN. 15th MEU will conduct a variety of scenario driven full mission profile (FMP) events throughout the duration of the exercise. This exercise will be conducted in five phases. Phase I is "Planning and Preparation" which will consist of the initial, main and final planning conferences (IPC, MPC, and FPC), various operational planning teams, and the preparation of personnel and equipment to move from CPEN to NBSD in support of PMINT. Phase II is "Movement and Occupation" which will consist of establishment of the guard force; inspection and pier side embarkation of personnel, gear, and equipment; establishment of the Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC); and the over the horizon movement of personnel, gear, ammunition and equipment to SCI in support of the SACCEX. Phase III is "PMINT Conduct" which will consist of SACCEX, MET-related full mission profile and Defense of the Amphibious Task Force (DATF), an amphibious assault on CPEN, and Major Subordinate Element (MSE) white space training. Phase IV is "Retrograde" which will consist of the return of all personnel, gear and equipment to home station. Phase V is "Reconstitution and Transition to ARG/MEU Exercise + Composite Unit Training Exercise (COMPTUEX)" which will consist of post exercise maintenance, submission of PMINT After Action Reports (AAR) and follow on planning evolutions.

Phase I, Planning and Preparation (30 Jan-13 July 2020): Begins with the conduct of the PMINT IPC and ends with the establishment of the Port Operations Group (POG) at NBSD. Key events during this phase are the IPC, MPC, FPC, assignment to shipping working groups, bi-monthly sync meetings, release of the PMINT Warning Order, inspection of gear and equipment after completion of RUT 20-1, Pre-PMINT MEU Exercise, a communications exercise and information flow exercise to validate shipboard communications architecture. Ends with the conditions set for establishment of the POG on 13 July which is the physical emplacement of the POG command and control node at Naval Base San Diego

Phase II, Movement and Occupation (13-26 July 2020): Begins with the establishment of the POG and ends with all gear and equipment embarked onto amphibious shipping. Critical events during this phase are the establishment of the guard force, inspection and pier side embarkation of personnel, gear and equipment, occupation and establishment of the LFOC and the completion of the over the horizon movement containing personnel, ammunition, gear and equipment in support of SACCEX from CPEN to SCI.

Phase III, PMINT Conduct (27 July – 9 August 2020): Begins with all ships underway from NBSD and ends with the completion of MSE white space training after the amphibious assault. Critical events during this phase are SACCEX, FMPs, DATF, amphibious assault and MSE white space training.

Phase IV, Retrograde (9-11 August 2020): Begins with the conclusion of the amphibious assault and MSE white space training and ends with the completion of the pier side offload at NBSD. Critical events during this phase are the return of all personnel, gear and equipment to home station or supporting pre-staging for follow on evolutions at NBSD.

Phase V, Reconstitution and AAR (11-30 August 2020): Begins with all personnel, gear and equipment accounted for at home station or pre-staged at NBSD and ends with all maintenance requests submitted via Global Combat Supply System-Marine Corps and submission of all after action topics. Critical events during this phase are post exercise maintenance, PMINT AAR submission and follow on planning for future pre-deployment training program (PTP) events.

c. Tasks

XO, 15TH MEU	T1: Oversee staff planning efforts in support of PMINT P1: To ensure exercise requirements are fulfilled
HQ Commandant, 15TH MEU	T1: In coordination with each ship's commanders' of troops, provide personnel to serve as ship's augments P1: To support requirements aboard amphibious shipping T2: In coordination with the CE S-1 and CE S-4, coordinate CE passenger and cargo lift requirements for both advanced party and main body P2: In order to support the echeloning of forces in support of PMINT

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	<p>T3: Ensure CE staff directorates and MSEs are provided the appropriate "green spaces"</p> <p>P3: IOT facilitate planning and operations afloat</p> <p>T4: Coordinate berthing & messing requirements for all external entities participating in PMINT (MCOTEA, EOTG, EWTGPAC)</p> <p>P4: IOT support units not organic to the 15th MEU supporting PMINT</p> <p>T5: NLT 13 July, Via SEPCOR, publish additional guidance to the MEU CE and all MSEs regarding ships' augments/tax requirements that will work in barbershops, messing and laundry facilities</p> <p>P5: IOT codify requirements listed within the ship's loading characteristics pamphlets</p>
15TH MEU S-1	<p>T1: No Later Than (NLT) 10 July 2020, submit a consolidated roster of all Marine Corps exercise personnel to CPR-3, USS MAKIN ISLAND, USS SOMERSET and USS SAN DIEGO</p> <p>P1: To account for all personnel participating in the exercise</p> <p>T2: NLT 1 July 2020, develop a detailed plan for the reception of personnel to NBSD and embarkation of all personnel aboard ARG shipping; retrograde to home station and NBSD between PMINT and ARGMEU Exercise (AMEX); transition to AMEX</p> <p>P2: To promulgate guidance regarding personnel reception during and after PMINT</p> <p>T3: Identify (1) Staff Non-Commissioned Officer or Officer to serve as a "trusted agent" within the white cell during full mission profile planning events.</p> <p>P3: IOT facilitate dissemination of information from the white cell related to personnel, casualties and reporting requirements IAW the scenario.</p> <p>T4: NLT 11 July, release enclosure (9) via SEPCOR</p> <p>P4: IOT promulgate guidance regarding the shipboard reception plan upon embarkation of personnel</p>
15TH MEU S-2	<p>T1: NLT 13 July 2020, in coordination with ESG-3 N2, develop a USINDPACOM focused exercise scenario in support of PMINT</p> <p>P1: To support planning efforts of FMP evolutions during PMINT</p> <p>T2: NLT 13 July 2020 develop MSEL intelligence injects for each FMP evolution</p> <p>P2: To facilitate staff response actions to intelligence updates during the planning process.</p> <p>T3: Identify (1) SNCO or Officer to serve as the Exercise Control (EXCON) white cell lead afloat during PMINT</p> <p>P3: To support EXCON requirements</p> <p>T4: Identify (1) SNCO or Officer to serve as a "trusted agent" within the white cell during full mission profile planning events</p> <p>P4: IOT facilitate the dissemination of information from the white cell related to the intelligence disciplines.</p> <p>T5: NLT 22 July 2020, develop a force laydown plan for the simulated Adversary Force (ADFOR)</p> <p>P5: To support force on force role play during PMINT</p> <p>T6: Identify (1) 0211 to serve as a high value individual role player in support of the surface raid on TD4 and coordinate movement to SCI with MEU S-4</p> <p>P6: IOT provide role player support for the surface raid</p>
15TH MEU S-3	<p>T1: Lead all planning efforts for PMINT</p> <p>P1: To synchronize staff and MSE action ISO PMINT</p> <p>T2: Provide (1) Officer familiar with the employment of ground based fires assets to serve as the PMINT SCI EXCON OIC and the event officer in charge aboard SCI from 21 July – 1 August 2020</p> <p>P2: To support EXCON requirements</p>

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	<p>T3: Provide (1) Staff Non Commissioned Officer (SNCO) to serve as the PMINT SCI EXCON SNCOIC aboard SCI from 21 July – 1 August 2020.</p> <p>P3: To support EXCON requirements</p> <p>T4: Provide (1) Officer to serve as the PMINT CPEN EXCON OIC and the event officer in charge aboard Camp Pendleton from 27 July – 9 August 2020.</p> <p>P4: To support EXCON requirements</p> <p>T5: Provide (1) SNCO to serve as the PMINT CPEN EXCON SNCOIC aboard Camp Pendleton from 27 July – 9 August 2020</p> <p>P5: To support EXCON requirements</p> <p>T6: In coordination with the CE S-2, develop and promulgate scenario injects to the MEU Operations Officer</p> <p>P6: To ensure a dynamic and realistic training environment that satisfies identified training objectives</p> <p>T7: Provide a PMINT confirmation brief to the 15th MEU Commanding Officer</p> <p>P7: To confirm the conduct of PMINT to the Commanding Officer of 15th MEU</p> <p>T8: Provide a PMINT confirmation brief to I MEF NLT 17 July 2020</p> <p>P8: To confirm the conduct of PMINT to the Deputy Commanding General, I MEF</p> <p>T9: Ensure all ranges aboard CPEN are reserved in support of PMINT for the 15th MEU and MSEs NLT 1 July 2020</p> <p>P9: To provide appropriate training space and areas for the exercise</p> <p>T10: Develop an hourly synchronization matrix with associated ship movement plan to support the sequence of events NLT 1 July 2020</p> <p>P10: To synchronize and align units activities within PMINT</p> <p>T11: NLT 1 July 2020, develop and disseminate a required gear list to all CE and MSE personnel</p> <p>P11: To provide guidance on required personal gear during PMINT</p> <p>T12: NLT 1 July 2020, confirm the supportability of a Service Availability (SERVAL) request with the I MEF G-3 Expeditionary Operations section</p> <p>P12: To support the SACCEX over the horizon movement from CPEN to SCI</p> <p>T13: Coordinate with FACSFA, Detachment SCI to provide air lift for the SCI EXCON Operations/Logistics Team with a departure date of 21 July 2020 and a return date of 1 August 2020</p> <p>P13: To facilitate EXCON support for PMINT</p> <p>T14: Ensure ranges external to CPEN to support an F-35 strike event are reserved</p> <p>P14: To support execution of the sequence of events</p> <p>T15: Coordinate with ESG-3 to ensure all SOCAL OPAREA water space, airspace is reserved in addition to land based training aboard SCI</p> <p>P15: IOT facilitate the conduct of PMINT</p> <p>T16: Coordinate with EOTG to ensure all required support is available to execute a VBSS full mission profile event</p> <p>P16: IOT facilitate training for the MEU/ARG team related to VBSS</p> <p>T17: Identify (1) Officer to serve as the EXCON OIC afloat</p> <p>P17: IOT facilitate the training and dissemination of exercise related information during PMINT</p>
15TH MEU ANTI-TERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION OFFICER	<p>T1: NLT 1 July 2020, develop the PMINT Guard Force Letter of Instruction</p> <p>P1: In order to protect and preserve equipment and the force</p>
15TH MEU S-4	<p>T1: NLT 1 July 2020, develop a detailed scheme of maneuver for the movement to NBSD and embarkation of all gear and equipment aboard ARG shipping; retrograde to home station and staging of gear and equipment aboard ARG shipping and NBSD between PMINT and AMEX; and transition to AMEX</p>

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	<p>P1: To facilitate the movement of personnel and equipment in support of PMINT</p> <p>T2: NLT 1 July 2020, publish the movement plan through a Letter of Instruction and BPT standup the Unit Movement Control Center to account for the transportation of personnel and equipment to NBSD</p> <p>P2: To control and supervise the movement of personnel and equipment in support of PMINT</p> <p>T3: Ensure proper coordination of all logistical matters between the MEU, ARG and necessary training sites</p> <p>P3: To facilitate logistical requirements for participating units</p> <p>T4: Coordinate with FACSAC, Detachment SCI for billeting, rental vehicles, potable water and chow for both EXCON personnel and participating units aboard SCI from 21 July – 1 August 2020</p> <p>P4: To provide life support on SCI during PMINT</p> <p>T5: In coordination with the CE S-3, NLT 1 July 2020, create a load plan for submission with the SERVAL request in support of SACCEX</p> <p>P5: To support the over the horizon movement from CPEN to SCI</p> <p>T6: No later than 1 July 2020, identify alternate means of supporting the over the horizon movement in support of SACCEX if the SERVAL is not approved</p> <p>P6: IOT facilitate the movement of personnel, ammunition and equipment from CPEN to SCI ISO SACCEX</p> <p>T7: Provide (1) Marine to serve as the logistical representative within the Operations/Logistics Team aboard SCI from 21 June – 1 August in support of SACCEX and full mission profile evolutions</p> <p>P7: To provide life support to EXCON personnel and training personnel aboard SCI during PMINT</p> <p>T8: Provide (2) Marines to serve in the SCI mess hall from 21 June – 1 August in support of the Operations/Logistics Team & SACCEX personnel</p> <p>P8: To provide messing and subsistence support for forces aboard SCI</p> <p>T9: Provide EXCON with (2) 4x4 rental vehicles for utilization aboard MCB CPEN ranges</p> <p>P9: To support EXCON requirements</p> <p>T10: Identify (1) SNCO or Officer to serve as a "trusted agent" within the white cell during full mission profile planning events</p> <p>P10: IOT facilitate the dissemination of information from the white cell related to logistics.</p>
15th MEU MEDICAL	<p>T1: Coordinate with each ship's senior medical officer to identify medical screening requirements for ship's tax and augments</p> <p>P1: To meet medical screening requirements for assigned personnel to perform required duties</p> <p>T2: Coordinate with ship's medical and Fleet Surgical Team – 1 for MEU Medical integration</p> <p>P2: To provide medical care for all the 15th MEU personnel embarked on ARG shipping</p> <p>T3: Coordinate with the Medical Regulating Control Officer to identify all ship to shore Casualty Evacuation Plan requirements</p> <p>P3: To transport real world casualties off of ARG shipping to the appropriate level of care</p> <p>T4: Identify and develop a COVID-19 mitigation plan</p> <p>P4: To support the mitigation of risk to force to COVID-19</p>
15TH MEU S-6	<p>T1: NLT 1 July 2020, publish guidance on the submission of System Access Authorization Request forms and any other network access requirements</p> <p>P1: To facilitate information exchange on amphibious shipping</p> <p>T2: NLT 1 July 2020, publish the Communications Electronic Operating Instruction (CEOI)</p>

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	<p>P2: To facilitate voice communication between the CE and subordinate MSEs.</p> <p>T3: NLT 17 July 2020, establish communication services aboard amphibious shipping</p> <p>P3: To facilitate digital information exchange aboard amphibious shipping</p> <p>T4: NLT 26 July 2020, establish communication services helpdesk aboard the USS MAKIN ISLAND</p> <p>P4: To assist users with communication issues</p> <p>T5: Provide (2) Marines to the EXCON/safety OIC aboard SCI</p> <p>P5: To establish safety communications hierarchy to support operations</p> <p>T6: Provide (2) Marines to EXCON/safety OIC aboard Camp Pendleton</p> <p>P6: To establish safety communications hierarchy to support operations</p> <p>T7: NLT 1 July 2020, submit Annex K, Communications, to the 15th MEU PMINT AO</p> <p>P7: To support the orders development process</p> <p>T8: Identify (1) SNCO or Officer to serve as a "trusted agent" within the white cell during full mission profile planning events</p> <p>P8: IOT facilitate the dissemination of information from the white cell related to communications.</p> <p>T9: Via SEPCOR, publish additional guidance regarding any communications grooming requirements prior to Phase III</p> <p>P9: IOT posture the force to conduct operations</p>
15TH MEU COMMSTRAT	<p>T1: Document the exercise in accordance with the 15th MEU PTP production plan</p> <p>P1: To document the exercise for potential publication</p> <p>T2: Provide Public Affairs support as required. The roles, responsibilities, and policy guidance are outlined in reference (i). I MEF CommStrat will be the lead for real-world Public Affairs</p> <p>P2: To support overall execution of PMINT</p>
ADR DET	<p>T1: BPT support a VBSS on TD5 and/or TD8 per the sequence of events</p> <p>P1: To rehearse and execute full mission profile events</p> <p>T2: BPT support Ground Reconnaissance and Surveillance for each FMP event during PMINT</p> <p>P2: To support execution of each FMP event</p>
GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT (BLT 1/4)	<p>T1: In coordination with each ship's commander of troops, provide Marines to serve as ships' augments. Ensure ships' augments report with necessary medical documentation in hand. Ships' augments report dates will be promulgated by the 15th MEU HQ CMDT</p> <p>P1: To support requirements aboard amphibious shipping</p> <p>T2: NLT 1 July 2020, identify white space training to occur on TD13 and TD14 of PMINT to occur after the tactical scenario ends during the amphibious assault</p> <p>P2: To facilitate follow on/additional training for the GCE</p> <p>T3: NLT 13 July 2020, provide complete training packages (ORM, SDZs, ConOps) to the CE S-3 for all MSE-led white space training evolutions taking place throughout PMINT</p> <p>P3: To meet CPEN training requirements within reference (k)</p> <p>T4: NLT 29 July 2020, ensure mortar, artillery and rocket systems are firing capable aboard SCIs</p> <p>P4: To support SACCEX</p> <p>T5: NLT 1 July, identify ADFOR elements, to include a mission capable Corpsman, to serve aboard SCI in support of the Surface Raid on TD4</p> <p>P5: To provide force on force exercise capabilities during PMINT</p> <p>T6: NLT 1 July 2020, identify ADFOR elements to serve aboard CPEN from 27 July – 9 August</p> <p>P6: To provide force on force exercise capabilities during PMINT</p>

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	<p>T7: BPT support ADFOR requirements aboard VBSS target vessels on TD5 and/or TD8</p> <p>P7: To provide force on force exercise capabilities during PMINT</p> <p>T8: Ensure CPEN ADFOR is comprised of at least (2) CPEN Range Control certified Range Safety Officers</p> <p>P8: IOT comply with CPEN Range Control regulations</p> <p>T9: Provide organic ground transportation and sustainment support for ADFOR elements remaining on CPEN during PMINT</p> <p>P9: IOT sustain and preserve the force</p> <p>T10: Provide, at a minimum (3) Camp Pendleton Range Control Certified Range Safety Officers to serve aboard Camp Pendleton during the duration of PMINT from 27 July – 9 August</p> <p>P10: IOT meet CPEN Range Control safety requirements</p> <p>T11: Provide ammunition technicians and ammunition driver capabilities to draw ammunition from the Camp Pendleton ammunition supply point</p> <p>P11: IOT provide ammunition for the CPEN ADFOR</p> <p>T12: Provide, at a minimum, (3) corpsman and (3) safety vehicles to serve aboard Camp Pendleton during the duration of PMINT from 27 July – 9 August</p> <p>P12: IOT meet CPEN Range Control Safety requirements</p>
LOGISTIC COMBAT ELEMENT (CLB-15)	<p>T1: NLT 0700, or as directed if at a later time, on 21 July 2020, establish a Beach Operations Group (BOG) at Red Beach</p> <p>P1: To support Landing Craft Air Cushion Operations.</p> <p>T2: NLT 1 July 2020, identify white space training to occur on TD13 and TD14 of PMINT to occur after the tactical scenario ends during the amphibious assault</p> <p>P2: To facilitate follow on/additional training for the GCE</p> <p>T3: NLT 13 July 2020, provide complete training packages (ORM, SDZs, ConOps) to the CE S-3 for all MSE-led white space training evolutions taking place throughout PMINT</p> <p>P3: IOT maintain visibility on MSE white space training</p> <p>T4: In coordination with CE S-4, establish the POG at NBSD and provide a POG officer in charge</p> <p>P4: To facilitate the reception and embarkation of all gear and equipment</p> <p>T5: In coordination with each ship's commander of troops, provide Marines to serve as ships' augments. Ensure ships' augments report with necessary medical documentation in hand. Ships' augments report dates will be promulgated by the 15th MEU HQ CMDT</p> <p>P5: To support requirements aboard amphibious shipping</p>
AVIATION COMBAT ELEMENT (VMM-164 REIN)	<p>T1: Embark all aircraft within the 15th MEU on to the USS MAKIN ISLAND, USS SOMERSET and USS SAN DIEGO IAW phasing plan established by the MEU Air Officer</p> <p>P1: To support the functions of Marine Corps Aviation</p> <p>T2: Ensure all pilots receive appropriate carrier qualifications during PMINT</p> <p>P2: To facilitate aviation operations</p> <p>T3: In coordination with each ship's commander of troops, provide Marines to serve as ships' augments. Ensure ships' augments report with necessary medical documentation in hand. Ships' augments report dates will be promulgated by the 15th MEU HQ CMDT</p> <p>P3: To support requirements aboard amphibious shipping</p>
<p>d. Coordinating Instructions</p> <p>(1) All units shall embark all personnel and equipment aboard amphibious shipping during PMINT IOT validate the OE&AS. Exceptions will be made on a case by case basis, at the discretion of the Commanding Officer, 15th MEU.</p>	

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(2) Ships' augments that will work in the barbershops, messing, and laundry will report to the ships with appropriate medical screening documentation. Details will be promulgated via SEPCOR from the MEU HQ CMDT.

(3) Confirmation brief for PMINT will be conducted to the MEU Commanding Officer on or about 10 July 2020 at a location to be determined.

(4) Live-fire aboard ships require ship commander's approval, and all requisite packages will be submitted IAW ships' SOPs and briefed IAW enclosure (17).

(5) MEU activities unrelated to PMINT such as MSE "whitespace" training occurring aboard MCB CPEN, will be self-coordinated and self-supported by the MSEs. The CE S-3 will support scheduling ranges for all "whitespace" training with CPEN Range Control. The PMINT sequence of events will have priority. Any case involving a conflict of interest, between PMINT and "whitespace" training requires approval by the CE S-3. All "whitespace" training will be complete NLT 1800 10 August 2020.

(6) Uniform. The exercise uniform is the Woodland Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform (MCCUU). The ADFOR uniform is the Desert MCCUU.

(7) All CE sections will be prepared to provide Watch Officers / Assistant Watch Officers / Watch Chiefs in support of the 15th MEU LFOC. Point of contact is the 15th MEU Operations Chief.

(8) Provide a roster of required personnel attending PMINT to the CE S-1 NLT 13 July 2020.

(9) NLT 1 July 2020, submit range requests to CE S-3 for MSE whitespace training, include an MSE POC in range request. CE S-3 will submit RFMSS request for MCB CPEN. Point of contact is 15th MEU Operations Chief.

(10) Submit requests for communications services and assets to the CE S-6 NLT 13 July 2020.

(11) Submit power requirements to CE S-4 NLT 13 July 2020.

(12) MSEs will ensure they possess their own Range Safety Officer/Officer in Charge (RSO/OIC) trained personnel sufficient to support their internal white space training.

(13) Corrections or updates to the SOP will be submitted to the CE S-3, Points of Contact (POC) NLT 14 July 2020.

(14) Written After Action Reports (AAR) for PMINT will be submitted to the CE S-3, POC (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) via Unclassified SharePoint NLT 28 August 2020 for consolidation

(15) All forces participating in SACCEX will adhere to the timelines and instructions within enclosure (7).

(16) 15th MEU Disbursing will facilitate the use of Navy Cash cards. Enlisted Marines across all (3) ships will automatically have the funds for meals deducted from their pay. Officers will be required to pay for provided meals while aboard the USS Makin Island. On the USS Makin Island the officer funds will be collected by the Disbursing Officer (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) via Navy Cash at the end of each month and the funds will be paid to the USS Makin Island mess officer. Aboard the USS San Diego and USS Somerset, the Food Service Officer (FSO) will collect the mess bill payments directly from the officers.

(17) Liberty for any forces participating in the port operations group, to include the guard force, beginning on 13 July, will be restricted to NBSD, IAW I MEF COVID Order. Liberty will be secured at 2200 with a muster and report to the POG OIC required per day.

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(18) Plan to Plan and Significant Events Timeline:

- 2 July – PMINT Order Released
- 8 July – Exercise Control Sync Meeting
- 9 – Confirmation Brief to Commanding Officer, 15th MEU
- 13 July – Master Scenario Event List Inject Rehearsal of Concept
- 13 July – Port Operations Group established at Naval Base San Diego
- 15 July – Confirmation Brief to Deputy Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
- 22 July – Exercise Control Rehearsal of Concept
- 25-26 July – Embarkation of Personnel
- 27 July – PMINT Training Day 1

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Administration

(1) While underway, CE & MSE morning reports are due to the CE S-1 NLT 0800 local time, daily. Reporting mechanism will be per 15th MEU SOP.

(2) Personally Owned Vehicles are not authorized for use to NBSD or aboard Camp Pendleton in the training areas unless authorized by CO, 15th MEU.

(3) The public affairs posture for this event is passive until the dissemination of a news advisory, after which point the posture will change to active. The 15th MEU COMMSTRAT section is authorized to answer news media queries regarding training and to facilitate a media day with the support of I MEF COMMSTRAT.

b. Logistics

(1) The gear list can be located in enclosure (8). MSEs shall refine gear list as appropriate.

(2) MSEs will submit Transportation Capacity Planning Tool requests as required to support movement of personnel and equipment between NBSD and home station NLT 10 July 2020.

(3) Requests for rental vehicles shall be submitted to the CE Supply section NLT 1 July 2020 with clear justifications for use of the vehicle. Only 4x4 vehicles are authorized to enter training areas aboard Camp Pendleton, and require a range deviation waiver unless it is a government issued 4x4 vehicle.

(4) Personnel will flow into NBSD IAW CE S-4 published embarkation/ movement plan within enclosure (5).

5. Command and Signal

a. Command

(1) CO, 15th MEU, CO, V 1/4, CO, CLB-15, CO, VMM-164 REIN, Operations Officer, 15th MEU, Operations Officer, V 1/4, Operations Officer CLB-15 and Operations Officer VMM-164 REIN will be located aboard USS MAKIN ISLAND.

(2) Commander, ESG-3 is the Exercise Director.

b. Signal

(1) CEOI will be provided via SEPCOR.

(2) Commanders' Significant Notification Events (CSNEs) remain in effect throughout this time.

(3) All PMINT participants shall regularly monitor the 15th MEU PMINT SharePoint page where they can access important documents and stay informed:

https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/15thmeu/_layouts/15/start.aspx#/Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?RootFolder=%2Fsites%2F15thmeu%2FShared%20Documents%2FMKIARG%2020%20PMINT%20Products&FolderCTID=0x0120002E1871D418961D458858AA7ADA8AADF1&View=%7B13302B5F%2D7F16%2D4C77%2D9965%2DED91CC4EDD02%7D

(4) The 15th MFI I Operations Officer is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 email: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(5) The 15th MEU Air Officer is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(6) The 15th MFI I PMINT I Lead Planner is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 email: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

OFFICIAL

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Signature

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Date:

	UNIT	#	PERSONNEL	7AD	SERIAL/TAC
ME	A4V				1201-01
ME	A4V				1201-01
ME	A4V				1201-01
ME	A4V				1201-01
ME	3RD				1201-01
ME	3RD				1201-01
ME	3RD				1201-01
ME	3RD		(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		1201-01
ME	3RD				1201-01
ME	3RD				1201-01
ME	3RD	1			1201-01
ME	3RD	1			1201-01
ME	3RD	1			1201-01
ME	COMSTR.	1			1201-01
		15			
		16			
		17			
		18			
		19			
		20			
		21			
		22			
		23			
		24			
		25			
MO	0		CERRY PICKER		
ME	12		MACO GO		
NO	0		MACO RETURN		
NE	1		EPW		
TOTAL	13		GATORS: PAX:		

171
9

SN:522499 ELEMENT: ASSULT					
	UNIT	#	DESCRIPTION	DATE	SERIAL/TOTAL
ME	AAV				1203-03
ME	AAV				1203-03
ME	AAV				1203-03
ME	3RD				1203-03
ME	3RD				1203-03
ME	3RD				1203-03
ME	3RD				1203-03
MO	3RD				1203-03
ME	3RD				1203-03
ME	3RD	1	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		1203-03
ME	WPNS	1			1203-03
ME	WPNS	1			1203-03
ME	WPNS	1			1203-03
ME	WPNS	1			1203-03
ME	WPNS	1			1203-03
ME	WPNS	1			1203-03
ME	WPNS	1			1203-03
ME	WPNS	1			1203-03
ME	WPNS	1			1203-03
ME	WPNS	1			1203-03
		20			
		21			
		22			
		23			
		24			
		25			
MO		1	CHERRY PICKER		
ME		17	MACO GO		
NO		0	MACO RETURN		
NE		0	EPW		
TOTAL		18	GATORS: PAX:		

11/20/20

SN:523519 ELEMENT: SUPPORT				
UNIT	#	PERSONNEL	ZAP	SERIAL/TAT
ME	AAV	1		1205--05
ME	AAV	2		1205--05
ME	AAV	3		1205--05
ME	2ND	4		1205--05
ME	2ND	5		1205--05
ME	2ND	6		1205--05
ME	2ND	7		1205--05
ME	2ND	8		1205--05
ME	2ND	9		1205--05
ME	2ND	10		1205--05
ME	2ND	11		1205--05
ME	2ND	12		1205--05
MO	2ND	13		1205--05
ME	2ND	14		1205--05
ME	2ND	15		1205--05
ME	2ND	16		1205--05
		17		
		18		
		19		
		20		
		21		
		22		
		23		
		24		
		25		
MO	1	CHERRY PICKER		
ME	15	MACO GO		
NO	0	MACO RETURN		
NE	0	EPW		
TOTAL	16	GATORS: PAX:		

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

SN:523612 ELEMENT: SUPPORT					
	UNIT	#	PERSONNEL	ZAP	SERIAL/T
ME	AAV	1			1207-07
ME	AAV	2			1207-07
ME	AAV	3			1207-07
ME	2ND	4	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		1207-07

ENCLOSURE (21)

ME	HQ	11			1212-12
ME	HQ	12			1212-12
ME	WP/HS	13			1212-32
ME	2ND	14			1212-32
ME	2ND	15			1212-32
ME	2ND	16			1212-12
ME	2ND	17			1212-12
ME	2ND	18			1212-12
		19			
		20			
		21			
		22			
		23			
		24			
		25			
MO	0	CHERRY PICKER			
ME	16	MACO GO			
NO	0	MACO RETURN			
NE	2	EPW			
TOTAL	18	GATORS: PAX:			

MO	4	CHERRY PICKER		
ME	5	MACO GO		
NO	0	MACO RETURN		
NE	0	EPW		
TOTAL	10	GATORS: PAX:		

MO	12	CHERRY PICKER		
ME	162	MACO GO		
NO	0	MACO RETURN		
NE	6	EPW		
TOTAL	180	GATORS; PAX:		

[illegible]

Outbound

SN: 522656 ELEMENT:				
	UNIT	#	PERSONNEL	SERIAL/TAC
ME	AAV	1	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	1200--14 (POP)
ME	AAV	2		1200--14 (POP)
ME	AAV	3		1200--14 (POP)
ME	AAV	4		1200--14 (POP)
ME	AAV	5		1200--14 (POP)
ME	H&S	6		1200--14 (POP)
		7		
		8		
		9		
		10		
		11		
		12		
		13		
		14		
		15		
		16		
		17		
		18		
		19		
		20		
		21		
		22		
		23		
		24		
		25		
MO	0		CHERRY PICKER	
ME	6		MACO GO	
NO	0		MACO RETURN	
NE	0		EPW	
TOTAL	6		GATORS: PAX:	

SN: 523445 ELEMENT: ASSAULT				
	UNIT	#	PERSONNEL	SERIAL/TAC
ME	AAV	1	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	1201-01
ME	AAV	2		1201-01
ME	AAV	3		1201-01
ME	AAV	4		1201-01
ME	3RD	5		1201-01
ME	3RD	6		1201-01
ME	3RD	7		1201-01
ME	3RD	8		1201-01
ME	3RD	9		1201-01
ME	3RD	10		1201-01
ME	3RD	11		1201-01
ME	3RD	12		1201-01
ME	COMSTR	1		1201-01
		1		
		16		
		17		
		18		
		19		
		20		
		21		
		22		
		23		
		24		
		25		
MO	0		CHERRY PICKER	
ME	12		MACO GO	
NO	0		MACO RETURN	
NE	1		EPW	
TOTAL	13		GATORS: PAX:	

SN: 523195 ELEMENT: ASSULT				
	UNIT	#	PERSONNEL	SERIAL/TAC
ME	AAV	1	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	1202-02
ME	AAV	2		1202-02
ME	AAV	3		1202-02
ME	AAV	4		1202-02
ME	3RD	5		1202-02
ME	3RD	6		1202-02
ME	3RD	7		1202-02
ME	3RD	8		1202-02
ME	3RD	9		1202-02
ME	3RD	10		1202-02
ME	3RD	11		1202-02
ME	3RD	12		1202-02
ME	3RD	13		1202-02
ME	3RD	14		1202-02
ME	CHD	15		1202-02
ME	EOD	16		1202-02
ME	EOD	17		1202-02
ME	EOD	18		1202-02
ME	HQ	19		1202-02
		20		
		21		
		22		
		23		
		24		
		25		
MO	0		CHERRY PICKER	
ME	19		MACO GO	
NO	0		MACO RETURN	
NE	0		EPW	
TOTAL	19		GATORS: PAX:	

SN: 522499 ELEMENT: ASSULT				
	UNIT	#	PERSONNEL	SERIAL/TAC
ME	AAV	1	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	1203-03
ME	AAV	2		1203-03
ME	AAV	3		1203-03
ME	3RD	4		1203-03
ME	3RD	5		1203-03
ME	3RD	6		1203-03
ME	3RD	7		1203-03
MO	3RD	8		1203-03
ME	3RD	9		1203-03
ME	3RD	10		1203-03
ME	WPNS	11		1203-03
ME	WPNS	12		1203-03
ME	WPNS	13		1203-03
ME	WPNS	14		1203-03
ME	WPNS	15		1203-03
ME	WPNS	16		1203-03
ME	WPNS	17		1203-03
ME	WPNS	18		1203-03
		19		
		20		
		21		
		22		
		23		
		24		
		25		
MO	1		CHERRY PICKER	
ME	17		MACO GO	
NO	0		MACO RETURN	
NE	0		EPW	
TOTAL	18		GATORS: PAX:	

SN: 522768 ELEMENT: C2				
	UNIT	#	PERSONNEL	SERIAL/TAC
MO	AAV	1	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	1204-04
ME	AAV	2		1204-04
ME	AAV	3		1204-04
ME	AAV	4		1204-04
ME	AAV	5		1204-04
ME	HQ	6		1204-04
MO	HQ	7		1204-04
ME	HQ	8		1204-04
ME	HQ	9		1204-04

SN: 523519 ELEMENT: SUPPORT				
	UNIT	#	PERSONNEL	SERIAL/TAC
ME	AAV	1	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	1205-05
ME	AAV	2		1205-05
ME	AAV	3		1205-05
ME	2ND	4		1205-05
ME	2ND	5		1205-05
ME	2ND	6		1205-05
ME	2ND	7		1205-05
ME	2ND	8		1205-05
ME	2ND	9		1205-05

ENCLOSURE (21)

ME	HQ	10	LCPL BERRY, STEVEN	BS99168	1204--04
		11			
		12			
		13			
		14			
		15			
		16			
		17			
		18			
		19			
		20			
		21			
		22			
		23			
		24			
		25			
MO	2		CHERRY PICKER		
ME	8		MACO GO		
NO	0		MACO RETURN		
NE	0		EPW		
TOTAL	10		GATORS: PAX:		

ME	2ND	10			1205--05
ME	2ND	11			1205--05
ME	2ND	12			1205--05
MO	2ND	13			1205--05
ME	2ND	14	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		1205--05
ME	2ND	15			1205--05
ME	2ND	16			1205--05
		17			
		18			
		19			
		20			
		21			
		22			
		23			
		24			
		25			
MO	1		CHERRY PICKER		
ME	15		MACO GO		
NO	0		MACO RETURN		
NE	0		EPW		
TOTAL	16		GATORS: PAX:		

SN:523100 ELEMENT: SUPPORT					
	UNIT	#	PERSONNEL	ZAP	SERIAL/TAC
ME	AAV	1			1206--06
ME	AAV	2			1206--06
ME	AAV	3			1206--06
MO	HQ	4			1206--06
ME	WPNS	5			1206--06
ME	WPNS	6			1206--06
ME	WPNS	7			1206--06
ME	WPNS	8	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		1206--06
ME	WPNS	9			1206--06
ME	WPNS	10			1206--06
NE	WPNS	11			1206--06
ME	FIST	12			1206--06
MO	FIST	13			1206--06
ME	HQ	14			1206--06
		15			
		16			
		17			
		18			
		19			
		20			
		21			
		22			
		23			
		24			
		25			
MO	1		CHERRY PICKER		
ME	11		MACO GO		
NO	0		MACO RETURN		
NE	1		EPW		
TOTAL	13		GATORS: PAX:		

SN:523612 ELEMENT: SUPPORT					
	UNIT	#	PERSONNEL	ZAP	SERIAL/TAC
ME	AAV	1			1207--07
ME	AAV	2			1207--07
ME	AAV	3			1207--07
ME	2ND	4			1207--07
ME	2ND	5			1207--07
ME	2ND	6			1207--07
ME	2ND	7			1207--07
ME	2ND	8			1207--07
ME	2ND	9			1207--07
ME	2ND	10	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		1207--07
ME	2ND	11			1207--07
ME	2ND	12			1207--07
ME	WPNS	13			1207--07
ME	WPNS	14			1207--07
ME	WPNS	15			1207--07
ME	WPNS	16			1207--07
ME	WPNS	17			1207--07
		18			
		19			
		20			
		21			
		22			
		23			
		24			
		25			
MO	0		CHERRY PICKER		
ME	17		MACO GO		
NO	0		MACO RETURN		
NE	0		EPW		
TOTAL	17		GATORS: PAX:		

SN:522932 ELEMENT: SUPPORT					
	UNIT	#	PERSONNEL	ZAP	SERIAL/TAC
ME	AAV	1			1208--08
ME	AAV	2			1208--08
ME	AAV	3			1208--08
ME	WPNS	4			1208--08
ME	WPNS	5			1208--08
ME	WPNS	6			1208--08
ME	WPNS	7			1208--08
ME	WPNS	8			1208--08
ME	WPNS	9			1208--08
ME	WPNS	10	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		1208--08
ME	WPNS	11			1208--08
NE	WPNS	12			1208--08
MO	WPNS	13			1208--08
ME	WPNS	14			1208--08
ME	WPNS	15			1208--08
ME	WPNS	16			1208--08
ME	WPNS	17			1208--08
		18			
		19			
		20			

SN:523311 ELEMENT: VIC DOWN					
	UNIT	#	PERSONNEL	ZAP	SERIAL/TAC
		1			1209--09
		2			1209--09
		3			1209--09
		4			1209--09
		5			1209--09
		6			1209--09
		7			1209--09
		8			1209--09
		9			1209--09
		10			1209--09
		11			1209--09
		12			1209--09
		13			1209--09
		14			1209--09
		15			1209--09
		16			1209--09
		17			1209--09
		18			1209--09
		19			1209--09
		20			1209--09

Water Temp gauge Inop

MO	12	CHERRY PICKER		
ME	162	MACO GO		
NO	0	MACO RETURN		
NE	6	EPW		
TOTAL	180	GATORS: PAX:		



UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



MECH RAID EXECUTION CHECKLIST FOR OPERATION GATOR SMASH

#	EVENT/SITUATION	NET	FROM	TO	CODEWORD	SCH TIME	ACT TIME
INSERTION							
21	AAVs LAUNCHED	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	CAVALIERS	0700U	0750
22	AAVs FEET DRY	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	CELTICS	0730U	0833
23	MOVEMENT TO BLS	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	CLIPPERS	0730U	
ACTIONS ON OBJECTIVE							
24	BLS SEIZED	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	GRIZZLIES	0800U	0900
25	COMMENCED ACTIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	HEAT	0830U	0916
26	OBJECTIVE SECURED / COMMENCING TSE	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	HORNETS	0930U	0957
EXTRACTION							
27	TSE COMPLETE	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	JAZZ	1000U	
28	RB/R&S L/U COMPLETE	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	KNICKS	1015U	1123
29	MACO COMPLETE / READY FOR EXTRACT	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	LAKERS	1030U	1600
30	AAVs FEET WET	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	MAGIC	1100U	1645
31	AAVs FEET DRY	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	MAVERICKS	1130U	
RECONSTITUTION							
32	RAID FORCE ABOARD SOM	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	NUGGETS	1130U	
33	ALL FORCES ABOARD ARG SHIPPING	LFTAC1	MC	LFOC	PACERS	1200U	
CONTINGENCIES							
90	QRF LAUNCHED			LFOC	JIM BEAM		
91	STRIKE LAUNCHED			LFOC	WHISTLE PIG		
92	CASEVAC LAUNCHED			LFOC	CASEVAC		
93	RAID FORCE EMERGENCY EXTRACT			LFOC	MAKERS MARK		
94	RAID FORCE IMMEDIATE REEMBARK			LFOC	PAPPY VAN WINKLE		

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

ENCLOSURE (2)

Combined Log

D=Deck C=CIC Log S= SCC CAT=CATSKILL
 CMD=CMD NET W=Well deck log

Log	Time	
CAT	1044	SOM_TAO_: 1744:52Z CATSKILL de RED CATSKILL, 1 AAV OOC on shore. Expected time for repair update is 1115, k
CAT	1047	CPR3_CCO_: 1747:25Z de CATSKILL, Solid Copy. Is intent from GATOR to delay FW for all AAVs until OOC is repaired? k
CAT	1048	SOM_TAO_: 1748:50Z de RED CATSKILL, affirm, k
CAT	1049	CPR3_CCO_: 1749:32Z de CATSKILL, r ar
CAT	1111	SOM_TAO_: 1811:12Z CATSKILL de RED CATSKILL, Update on the OOC AAV: ETR 30mins. Expect FW at 1200, k
CAT	1111	CPR3_CCO_: 1811:41Z de CATSKILL, r ar
CAT	1141	CPR3_CCO_: 1841:36Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL,
CAT	1142	CPR3_CCO_: 1842:29Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, What is int with OOC AAV if picked up by LCAC? Can it be driven from LCAC to Main-v?
CAT	1144	CPR3_CCO_: 1844:07Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, Does the AAV require another AAV to tow on/off the LCAC?
CAT	1150	CPR3_CCO_: 1850:26Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, What is anticipated extension needed for LCAC crew day? k
CAT	1212	SOM_TAO_: 1912:49Z de RED CATSKILL, LC79 will recover an FMC AAV first, LC39 will recover the NMC AAV, the FMC AAV will tow in the NMC AAV, k
CAT	1216	CPR3_CCO_: 1916:40Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, Copy all. Is intent to offload both LCACs on the beach? k
CAT	1217	CPR3_CCO_: 1917:07Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, requesting current seastate update
CAT	1220	SOM_TAO_: 1920:39Z de RED CATSKILL affirm, both LC will offload on the beach. Once the NMC AAV is recovered, both LC will retrieve their gear from the beach, k
CAT	1222	CPR3_CCO_: 1922:16Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, solid copy, please provide updates to the timeline when available. k
CAT	1223	SOM_TAO_: 1923:09Z de RED CATSKILL, updating SOM CO now, will head to SYRUP now to position closer to beach for boat ops
CAT	1223	SOM_SUWC_: 1923:23Z CATSKILL de RED CATSKILL, seastate 1 - 2, k
CAT	1223	CPR3_CCO_: 1923:56Z de CATSKILL, r ar
CAT	1237	SOM_TAO_: 1937:20Z CATSKILL de RED CATSKILL, conduct flight ops at 1300, then will be in position to begin LC ops and AAV recovery ~1330
CAT	1320	CPR3_CCO_: 2020:09Z de CATSKILL, so at this time, Intent is to transfer repair part and NOT offload LCACs. Correct? k
CAT	1320	SOM_TAO_: 2020:34Z de RED CATSKILL, affirm, k
CAT	1321	CPR3_CCO_: 2021:04Z de CATSKILL, How long is window for repair before we decide to unload LCACs?
CAT	1324	SOM_SUWC_: 2024:43Z de RED CATSKILL, 30 mikes, k
CAT	1342	CPR3_CCO_: 2042:59Z de CATSKILL, Copy 30 mikes. Standing by for LCAC launch report.
CAT	1359	CPR3_CCO_: 2059:41Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, have we launched LCACs or has launch time shifted? k
CAT	1401	SOM_SUWC_: 2101:51Z de RED CATSKILL, we haven't launched yet, still standing by, k
CAT	1405	SOM_TAO_: 2105:09Z de RED CATSKILL, launch time now 1415, k
CAT	1405	SOM_TAO_: 2105:34Z we are conducting simultaneous FLOPS which their take off delayed, k
CAT	1406	CPR3_CCO_: 2106:18Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, r ar
CAT	1427	SOM_TZ: 2127:44Z CATSKILL de RED CATSKILL, launching LCAC's at 1430, k
CAT	1428	CPR3_CCO_: 2128:46Z de CATSKILL, r ar
CAT	1436	CPR3_CCO_: 2136:44Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, have we launched LCACs? k
CAT	1437	SOM_SUWC_: 2137:28Z de RED CATSKILL, neg, k
CAT	1437	SOM_TAO_: 2137:51Z de RED CATSKILL, launching now, k
CAT	1440	CPR3_CCO_: 2140:14Z de CATSKILL, r ar
CAT	1443	CPR3_CCO_: 2143:37Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, standing by for LCAC launch reports, k
W	1447	Sterngate is in the water
W	1447	Sterngate is at 10 degrees below the horizontal
CAT	1448	SOM_SUWC_: 2148:59Z CATSKILL de RED SKILL, in progress, next few minutes, k
OJC	1448	Green well
W	1449	LCAC 79 started main engines
	1450	Set Hero Cond II
W	1451	LCAC 79 came up on cushion, backed down and crossed sill
	1452	LC 79 crossed the sill
W	1453	LCAC 79 reports FTW OPS normal, 16 Souls, 4 vehicles
CAT	1456	SOM_SUWC_: 2156:50Z DEPARTING
CAT	1456	CATSKILL de IRON CITY,
CAT	1456	LINE 1. LC 79
CAT	1456	LINE 2. FW 2152z
CAT	1456	LINE 3. SOM
CAT	1456	LINE 4. ENR RED BEACH SOUTH
CAT	1456	LINE 5. FD TIME

ENCLOSURE (23)

CAT 1456 LINE 6. 16 SOULS
 CAT 1456 LINE 7. 1
 W 1456 LCAC 39 started main engines
 W 1457 LCAC 39 came up on cushion, backed down and crossed sill
 CAT 1458 CPR3_CCO_: 2158:46Z de CATSKILL, r ar
 W 1458 LCAC 39 reports FW OPS normal, 1 pac, 7 Souls, 4 vehicles
 CAT 1459 SOM_SUWC_: 2159:32Z DEPARTING
 CAT 1459 CATSKILL de IRON CITY,
 CAT 1459 LINE 1. LC 39
 CAT 1459 LINE 2. FW 2157z
 CAT 1459 LINE 3. SOM
 CAT 1459 LINE 5. FD TIME
 CAT 1459 LINE 6. 7 SOULS AND 1 PAX
 CAT 1459 LINE 7. 1
 W 1459 Sterngate out of the water
 W 1459 Red Well
 CAT 1500 CPR3_CCO_: 2200:08Z de CATSKILL, r ar
 W 1500 Sterngate is at 45
 D 1501 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) properly relieved (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 D 1503 Set Hero Cond II
 1506 C/S 4 Kts
 1507 Green Deck
 D 1507 Green Deck
 CAT 1513 CPR3_CCO_: 2213:42Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, why is LC39 off cush? k
 CAT 1515 SOM_SUWC_: 2215:49Z CATSKILL de RED CATSKILL, reported that LC39 will not touch land, will stay 1nm from land
 CAT 1519 SOM_TAO_: 2219:56Z de RED CATSKILL, working with ACE to fly techs and required parts to fix AAV tomorrow morning, k
 CAT 1521 CPR3_CCO_: 2221:38Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, To confirm. No LCACs planned to land on West Cove. 12x FMC AAVs swim to SOM, followed by LCACs.
 CAT 1524 SOM_TAO_: 2224:43Z de RED CATSKILL, the original plan was to recover the AAV with LCACs; Without the repairs, we would be unable to recover the AAV, k
 D 1524 Red Deck
 1525 Red Deck
 1525 C/C 135 C/S 10 Kts
 CAT 1526 SOM_TAO_: 2226:01Z de RED CATSKILL, new update: we will recover 9x FMC AAVs, followed by LCACs. 3x FMC AAV will stay behind with the down AAV for overnight support, k
 1534 C/C 155 C/S 13 Kts
 CAT 1534 SOM_SUWC_: 2234:06Z de RED CATSKILL, LC 39 & 79 report 30-45 min before return, K
 CAT 1537 CPR3_CCO_: 2237:53Z REDCATSKILL de CATSKILL, are LCACs on beach or off cushion at CCA?
 1538 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) properly relieved as TAO by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 CAT 1544 SOM_SUWC_: 2244:55Z DEPARTING
 CAT 1544 CATSKILL de IRON CITY,
 CAT 1544 LINE 1. LC 79
 CAT 1544 LINE 2. FW 2152z
 CAT 1544 LINE 3. SOM
 CAT 1544 LINE 4. ENR RED BEACH SOUTH
 CAT 1544 LINE 5. FD 2203TIME
 CAT 1544 LINE 6. 16 SOULS
 CAT 1544 LINE 7. 1
 W 1551 Commenced Ballasting 4-6 ft above the sill
 1557 C/C 165
 CAT 1559 CPR3_CCO_: 2259:05Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, r ar
 W 1601 Report 3.5 ft above the sill
 W 1604 Cease Ballasting
 1606 C/C 120
 1609 C/S 5 Kts
 CAT 1609 SOM_SUWC_: 2309:41Z de SOM, est splash time 10 m, k
 CAT 1610 CPR3_CCO_: 2310:35Z de CATSKILL, Copy Gator splash in 10m, k

ENCLOSURE (23)

1622 C/C 325
 1628 Three minute fix
 CAT 1630 CPR3_CCO__: 2330:42Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, ETA on GATOR FW?
 1636 C/C 280
 1638 Amber Deck
 CAT 1639 SOM_SUWC_: 2339:32Z de RED CATSKILL, currently deconflicting GATOR FW time with flight ops, no current ETA
 CAT 1641 SOM_SUWC_: 2341:03Z update, GATOR FW time 2m, k
 CAT 1650 CPR3_CCO__: 2350:06Z de CATSKILL, r ar
 1650 Green Deck
 CAT 1651 SOM_SUWC_: 2351:25Z de RED CATSKILL, total of 9 GATORS FW
 1657 Red Deck
 CAT 1657 CPR3_CCO__: 2357:37Z de CATSKILL, r ar
 1657 Red Deck
 CAT 1700 SOM_SUWC_: 0000:32Z TZ de SOM, ME 30 airbourne, ops normal, 5 souls, 2+10, close air support,
 CAT 1700 TZ de SOM, ME 40 airbourne, ops normal, 2 souls, 2+10, close air support, k
 CAT 1701 SOM_TZ: 0001:57Z de TZ, r ar, make further air reports in SCC chat
 CAT 1702 SOM_SUWC_: 0002:56Z TZ de SOM, rgr
 1703 C/S 13 Kts
 1706 C/S 18 Kts
 1711 C/C 290 C/S 10 Kts
 1714 C/C 305 C/S 5 Kts
 1720 Green Deck
 1720 C/S 3 Kts
 CAT 1720 CPR3_CCO__: 0020:52Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, Requesting ETA on GATOR FD
 1720 Green Deck
 1724 C/S 0 Kts
 1724 Red Deck
 CAT 1731 SOM_SUWC_: 0031:52Z CATSKILL de RED CATSKILL, GATORS are 1nm for FD, k
 1738 STBD Engine ahead 4 Kts
 1742 C/C 342
 1745 Green Deck
 1746 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CONN
 1747 Red Deck
 1749 Green well
 W 1749 Sterngate in the water
 1750 Green well
 W 1753 Gator 1 (AAV) crossing sill
 W 1753 Gator 1 (AAV) FD
 CAT 1754 SOM_SUWC_: 0054:37Z de RED CATSKILL, GATOR 1 FD, 1253Z, k
 CAT 1754 CPR3_CCO__: 0054:57Z de CATSKILL, r ar
 CAT 1756 SOM_SUWC_: 0056:00Z de RED CATSKILL, One GATOR DIW rigging for tow, k
 W 1756 Gator 2 (AAV) crossing sill
 W 1756 Gator 2 (AAV) FD
 CAT 1758 CPR3_CCO__: 0058:39Z de CATSKILL, r ar
 W 1759 Gator 3 (AAV) crossing sill
 W 1759 Gator 3 (AAV) FD
 CAT 1800 SOM_SUWC_: 0100:38Z de RED CATSKILL, GATOR 3 FD, 0100Z, k
 1800 Gator 3 feet dry
 1802 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the deck
 CAT 1803 SOM_SUWC_: 0103:20Z de RED CATSKILL, GATOR 4 FD, 0103Z, k
 1803 Gator 4 across the sill
 1803 Gator 4 feet dry
 W 1803 Gator 4 (AAV) crossing sill
 W 1803 Gator 4 (AAV) FD
 W 1803 Sterngate out of the water

ENCLOSURE (23)

W 1803 Sterngate at 45
W 1803 Red Well
W 1803 Commenced Ballasting 6-8 ft above the sill for recovery of downed AAV, taking on water reported
1804 CO in CIC
1805 XO in CIC
D 1805 Man the boat deck
D 1810 CO presence is requested in CIC
1812 Man the boat deck
D 1812 Stern Gate is out of water
D 1812 Red Well
D 1812 Commence ballasting 6-8'
1815 Set River City I
D 1815 Set River City I
S 1815 SOM_TZ: 0115:44Z TB de TZ, currently have 1 AAV DIW taking on water...launched SAR bird from MKI, k
S 1816 SOM_TZ: 0116:24Z TB de TZ, DIW AAV is approx. 1nm from SOM, k
S 1817 SOM_TZ: 0117:05Z de TZ, SOM is preparing launch of RHIB, k
1819 Three Marines passed out in the water
S 1820 SOM_TZ: 0120:25Z TB de TZ, currently have three Marines in water...
S 1820 SOM_TZ: 0120:51Z de TZ, 2 AAVs are currently near DIW AAV to support until RHIB arrives on station,
S 1821 SOM_TZ: 0121:24Z de TZ, SOM is also coordinating to launch CRRCs as well to support, k
CAT 1823 CPR3_CCO__: 0123:22Z de CATSKILL, r ar
D 1824 Digital Flux Gate Magnetic Compass
1827 CO out of CIC
CAT 1827 SOM_SUWC_: 0127:06Z DIW AAV last location: 33 01 52 N 118 39 22 W
S 1827 SOM_TZ: 0127:55Z de TZ, DIW AAV location: 3301 52N 11839 22W
CAT 1828 CPR3_CCO__: 0128:32Z de CATSKILL, did we lose visual of DIW AAV?
1829 CO in CIC
CAT 1829 CPR3_CCO__: 0129:06Z de CATSKILL, How many AAVs still in water?
CMD 1829 CPR3_BWC: 0129:25Z SDG de TB, if you can get winds to support 53 launch close SOM, be prepared to render assistance. AAV crew had to abandon craft, Maarines in the water, k
S 1829 SOM_TAO_: 0129:16Z de SOM: we have 4 AAV's on SCI, 4AAV's on SOM, 2 good AAVS IVO sunken AAV, 2 AAV'S enr West Cove. k
CMD 1830 SDG_CICWO: 0130:38Z TB de SDG, 53 enroute to CP, we are turning and coming to best speed enroute SOM, k
CAT 1831 SOM_TZ: 0131:26Z de SOM we have 4 AAV's on SCI, 4AAV's on SOM, 2 good AAVS IVO sunken AAV, 2 AAV'S enr West Cove. k
CAT 1832 CPR3_CCO__: 0132:21Z de CATSKILL, Why did 2 AAVs return to West Cove? k
CMD 1832 SOM_TAO_: 0132:14Z SDG de SOM int w/c/s
CMD 1832 MKI_TAO_: 0132:30Z de MKI, BL01 under BVR control, BT BL02 refueling and will be enroute to assist, k
D 1832 Stern Gate is in the water
W 1832 Cease Ballasting
W 1832 Sterngate in the water
W 1832 Green well for launch of CRRC's
W 1832 Red well for CRRC's
CMD 1833 SDG_CICWO: 0133:17Z SOM de SDG 3240N 11818W 310 @8
D 1833 Stern Gate at stop
D 1833 Green well
1834 Secure from HERO Cond II
D 1834 Two casualties aboard AAV
S 1834 SOM_TZ: 0134:53Z de TZ, currently have 1 RHIB and launching 2 CRRCs for support,k
C3F 1835 CPR3_BWC: 0135:21Z C3F de CPR3, During SOM AAV recovery IVO west cove 1 craft went DIW and is taking on water. Crew abandoned craft. SAR helo enroute, k
CAT 1835 CPR3_CCO__: 0135:29Z de CATSKILL, Has the 'Sunken' AAV been submerged? k
1835 Stern Gate to 45 degrees
CMD 1836 SOM_TAO_: 0136:37Z r ar
CMD 1836 CPR3_TQ_: 0136:55Z TB de TQ, River City 1 set for the force, k
CAT 1837 SOM_TZ: 0137:24Z de SOM, still have visual that it has not submerged....
CAT 1837 CPR3_CCO__: 0137:47Z de CATSKILL, r ar
W 1837 Sterngate out of the water
W 1837 Sterngate at 45

ENCLOSURE (23)

W 1837 Two CRRC's in the well
 D 1838 Stern Gate is at 45
 1839 Two Marines recovered headed back
 C3F 1839 CPR3_BWC: 0139:06Z C3F de CPR3, request COAST GUARD assistance, k
 D 1839 Two casualties reported on Summit
 CAT 1840 MEU_WC__: 0140:39Z somtz, can you confirm AAV has not submerged?
 CMD 1840 SOM_TAO_: 0140:28Z boat recovered two marines, unknow status of casualty
 D 1840 Medical away stbd side port
 CAT 1841 CPR3_CCO__: 0141:37Z de CATSKILL, SOM reports AAV has not submerged, they still maintain visual on it. k
 CAT 1841 MEU_WC__: 0141:51Z copy
 CMD 1842 SOM_TAO_: 0142:30Z update: two marines previously mentioned are breathing and concious
 CMD 1842 TACCWO: 0142:58Z SOM de TACCWO: BL02 tasked to provide additional assitance. Will advise on launch.
 CAT 1843 SOM_TZ: 0143:17Z de SOM, 1 AAV completly submerged
 CMD 1843 SOM_TAO_: 0143:10Z de SOM r ar
 S 1843 SOM_SUWC_: 0143:14Z TZ de SOM, BULLET 55 airborne, checking in, 4 souls, 3+15, Up for SAR, k
 CAT 1844 CPR3_CCO__: 0144:03Z de CATSKILL, r ar
 D 1844 weather decks are secured for non-essential personnel
 CMD 1846 SOM_TAO_: 0146:32Z placing first CRRC in well for recovery efforts
 D 1846 Summit coming along side
 D 1846 Helo inbound
 CMD 1847 SOM_TAO_: 0147:17Z visual on BL 01
 CMD 1847 TACCWO: 0147:48Z de TACCWO, rar
 CMD 1847 SOM_TAO_: 0147:54Z second CRRC in well for recovery efforts
 D 1848 Second CRIC in the water
 CAT 1849 MEU_WC__: 0149:19Z This is MEU OPSO. Do you have accountability of all AAVs by location?
 CMD 1849 SOM_TAO_: 0149:04Z BL01 making approach, see gear in water but no personnel
 CMD 1849 TACCWO: 0149:58Z de TACCWO, BL02 offdeck, enroute SOM
 D 1849 Medical stbd side port
 C3F 1850 NROCS_O14: 0150:24Z <NICAT_Jacob> Standing by for GEOINT support, if requested.
 CAT 1850 MEU_WC__: 0150:48Z SOMTAO, this is MEU OPSO in LFOC. Please route all traffic to me in this room.
 CAT 1850 CPR3_CCO__: 0150:58Z de CATSKILL, last report was 4 AAV's on SCI, 4AAV's on SOM, 2 good AAVS IVO sunken AAV, 2 AAV'S enr West Cove. at 1831 k
 CMD 1850 SOM_TAO_: 0150:33Z 2 AAV's feet dry on SCI
 D 1850 Green well
 W 1850 Two CRRC's U/W, Green Well
 CAT 1851 SOM_TZ: 0151:17Z We do sir. 6 AAV's located on SCI. 4 AAV's are feet dry on SOM. 2 are currently floating around SOM and 1 has sunk
 C3F 1852 CPR3_ABWC: 0152:32Z C3F de CPR3 N00, we had TACON of JFN for SACEX, diverting to posit in support of SOM, k.
 CMD 1852 CPR3_BWC: 0152:08Z de TB r ar
 D 1852 Two CRICs away STBD Side
 C3F 1853 HOW_TAO: 0153:08Z C3F de HOW, do you require us to break DLQ tasking to support SOM, k
 C3F 1853 SOM_TAO_: 0153:47Z request HOW to render assistance
 CAT 1853 MEU_WC__: 0153:30Z SOMTAO, can you confirm small boat has recovered two Marines?
 D 1853 First AAV across the Sill
 S 1853 SOM_TZ: 0153:09Z de TZ,
 S 1853 SOM_TZ: 0153:21Z de TZ, currently bring in 2 remaining AAVs in water
 C3F 1854 C3F_BWC: 0154:47Z HOW de C3F, negative
 CAT 1854 MEU_WC__: 0154:05Z SOMTAO, Coast Guard needs you to call 619-278-7031 to coordinate link up
 CAT 1854 SOM_TZ: 0154:05Z de SOM, that is affirm, two marines have been recovered, k
 CAT 1854 SOM_SUWC_: 0154:18Z de RED CATSKILL, GATOR 5 FD, 0154Z, k
 CAT 1854 MEU_WC__: 0154:24Z Can you confirm how many more are in the water?
 CAT 1854 MEU_WC__: 0154:58Z SOM SUWC, is that recovered AAV on SOM or SCI?
 CMD 1854 SDG_TAO: 0154:01Z CPR3 de SDG, flight deck is manned and ready to refuel as necessary, k
 CMD 1854 SOM_TAO_: 0154:07Z we have another AAV across the sill
 CMD 1854 CPR3_BWC: 0154:29Z de TB r ar
 C3F 1855 HOW_TAO: 0155:35Z de HOW rar
 CAT 1855 SOM_TZ: 0155:19Z de SOM, we received report that there was 16 total pax. and 2 have been recovered

ENCLOSURE (23)

CAT 1855 SOM_TZ: 0155:43Z recovered on SOM
 CAT 1855 SOM_SUWC_: 0155:58Z de SOM SUWC, Recovered AAV on SOM
 CMD 1855 CPR3_BWC: 0155:45Z SOM de TB JFN and SDG enroute to assist
 CAT 1856 MEU_WC_: 0156:17Z SOM_TZ, copy one of two AAVs that was still in the water is now FD on SOM.
 CAT 1856 Second AAV crossing the Sill
 W 1856 Sterngate is out of the water, commence deballast
 C3F 1857 CPR3_BWC: 0157:26Z C3F de CPR3, AAV has sank, 2 of 16 pax recovered, k
 C3F 1857 JFN_CICWO_: 0157:39Z BVR de JFN we will be transitting through SOAR South, enroute to SOM positition, k
 CAT 1857 MEU_WC_: 0157:02Z Is the last AAV in the water moving back to SOM?
 CAT 1857 SOM_SUWC_: 0157:37Z de RED CATSKILL, GATOR 6 FD, 0157Z, k
 CMD 1857 SOM_TAO_: 0157:43Z 1 more marine recovered
 CAT 1858 SOM_TZ: 0158:17Z de SOM, one more recovered by AAV
 CAT 1858 MEU_WC_: 0158:17Z Copy, please confirm new location of all AAVs: 6x @ SCI, 6x @ SOM, and 1 submerged?
 CAT 1858 CPR3_CCO_: 0158:30Z de CATSKILL, Does 16 pax include crew or only PAX
 CMD 1858 Watch_O: 0158:14Z MKI copies
 CMD 1858 SOM_TAO_: 0158:16Z total 3 recovered wit 4th in helo
 CMD 1858 CPR3_BWC: 0158:17Z de TB, r ar
 W 1858 Sterngate at 45
 CAT 1859 MEU_WC_: 0159:27Z SOM_SUWC, can you provide call sign of AAV that submerged?
 CMD 1859 TACCWO: 0159:41Z TB de TACCWO, FACSAC has shut down the range. We are clear to operate as needed.
 CMD 1900 CPR3_BWC: 0200:27Z de TB r ar
 S 1900 SOM_TZ: 0200:04Z de TZ, all AAVs accounted for, 6x @ SCI, 6 @ SOM, 1 sunk
 S 1900 SOM_TZ: 0200:38Z de TZ, all efforts are currently for search and rescue for personnel in water... compiling total PAX count in water
 W 1900 6ft above the sill
 CMD 1901 SOM_TAO_: 0201:26Z all AAV's accounted for
 S 1901 SOM_TZ: 0201:01Z de TZ, 4 Marines have been recovered,
 C3F 1902 CPR3_ABWC: 0202:37Z JFN de CPR3, set river city 1, k
 1903 CO out of CIC
 W 1904 5ft above the sill
 C3F 1905 CPR3_BWC: 0205:10Z C3F de CPR3, 4 pax recovered, k
 CAT 1905 MEU_WC_: 0205:37Z SOM_SUWC, can you provide call sign of AAV that submerged?
 CMD 1905 MKI_TAO: 0205:13Z CPR3 de MKI, Medical is manned and ready to receive patients, as required, k
 D 1905 Sounded two short blasts
 CMD 1906 TACCWO: 0206:29Z SOM de TACCWO, do you have visual/position of Marines in the water?
 CMD 1906 SOM_TAO_: 0206:48Z two CRRCS and two 11M RHIBS in water
 CMD 1907 SOM_TAO_: 0207:05Z no updated headcount
 W 1907 4ft above the sill
 1908 CO in CIC
 CAT 1908 SOM_TZ: 0208:23Z de SOM, not at this time
 1908 SOM_SUWC_: 0208:40Z TZ de SOM, RESCUE 47 checking in, ops normal, 4 souls, 3+00, up for SAR, k
 CAT 1909 MEU_WC_: 0209:50Z SOM_TZ, copy. do you have comm with SOMCCO? if so, have him send MKI LFOC the manifests for the raid.
 CMD 1909 CPR3_BWC: 0209:28Z SOM de TB, coast guard sending helo, k
 1910(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) med SAR Commander
 CAT 1910 MEU_WC_: 0210:21Z send tc (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 D 1910 Digital Flux Gate Magnetic Compass
 CAT 1911 SOM_TZ: 0211:06Z de SOM, r ar
 CMD 1911 SOM_TAO_: 0211:31Z rgr
 S 1912 Four feet above the Sill
 W 1914 3ft above the sill
 1915 XO in CIC
 CMD 1915 JFN_CICWO_: 0215:38Z CPR3 de JFN we have river city 1 set. we are approx 20mins out from posit. we do not have an embarked air det, but we have our RIBs available. and a ready deck for helo ops. Standing by for tasking, k
 1915 SOM_TZ: 0215:42Z TB (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) currently onboard, not a casualty
 1916 CO / XO out of CIC
 CMD 1916 CPR3_BWC: 0216:17Z de CPR3 r ar
 CMD 1916 SOM_TAO_: 0216:57Z JFN de SOM request you remain 2NM away from 33:01:53N 118:38:58W

ENCLOSURE (23)

1916 Stern gate three feet above the Sill
 CMD 1918 JFN_TAO_: 0218:08Z de JFN, rar
 CMD 1918 SDG_TAO: 0218:34Z CPR3 de SDG, currently down hard on TACAN, techs troubleshooting both stacks, k
 1919 CO in CIC
 1919 XO in CIC
 CMD 1919 JFN_TAO_: 0219:30Z de JFN, is there a working channel you would like us to establish comms on, k?
 1919 CPR3_BWC: 0219:04Z de TB, rar
 CMD 1920 NROCS_O22: 0220:28Z <NSOC DSA BUICE> Is there a frequency we can track for support besides 121.5?
 CMD 1920 SOM_TAO_: 0220:42Z 3 casualties, one appears hypothermia, breathing on own, medical signs looking good
 CAT 1921 MEU_WC_: 0221:46Z SOM_TAO, do you have comm with jonn finn?
 CMD 1921 SOM_TAO_: 0221:16Z one on oxygen, survival looks good
 CMD 1921 CPR3_BWC: 0221:26Z de TB r, is this 3 additional personnel, k
 CMD 1921 MEU_WO: 0221:35Z On board SOM?
 CMD 1921 SOM_TAO_: 0221:38Z third CPR being conducted, status is not looking optimal
 CMD 1921 SOM_TAO_: 0221:44Z all three marines on SOM
 CMD 1921 SOM_TZ: 0221:55Z JFN de SOM, when you approach position yourself at 33:00:40N, 118:39:40W
 1922 XO out of CIC
 CAT 1922 SOM_TZ: 0222:42Z de SOM, that is affirm, have COMMs on MKIARG CMD chat
 CAT 1922 SOM_TZ: 0222:55Z de SOM, currently approx. 5nm out
 CMD 1922 SOM_TAO_: 0222:04Z As of now three marines total on SOM
 CMD 1922 CPR3_BWC: 0222:26Z de TB, rar
 CMD 1922 JFN_TAO_: 0222:53Z de JFN, rar enroute
 W 1922 2ft above the sill
 CAT 1923 MEU_WC_: 0223:25Z Please have them launch their RHIBs to assist in recovery.
 CMD 1923 JFN_TAO_: 0223:01Z rgr*
 CMD 1923 JFN_TAO_: 0223:13Z de JFN, how many total marines are still in the water, k?
 CMD 1923 SOM_TAO_: 0223:29Z estimated 11 marines still in water
 CMD 1923 SOM_TAO_: 0223:49Z when you put your boat in water use nvgs and chem lights
 1923 SOM_TZ: 0223:36Z de TZ, currently we have an estimated 11 marines in water, k
 CAT 1924 SOM_TZ: 0224:56Z de TZ, copy already coordinated
 CMD 1924 CPR3_BWC: 0224:18Z SOM de TB do you have visual on 11 personnel
 CMD 1924 SOM_TAO_: 0224:34Z no visual on the 11
 CMD 1924 CPR3_BWC: 0224:41Z rar
 CMD 1924 JFN_TAO_: 0224:51Z de JFN, copy on NVG's and CHEM lights. would you like us to launch both RIBS, k.
 D 1924 secure CHT
 D 1924 two feet above the Sill
 S 1924 SOM_TZ: 0224:18Z de TZ, JFN is approaching from south approx. 5nm out..they will be supporting with RHIB
 CMD 1925 SOM_TAO_: 0225:09Z JFN de SOM yes
 CMD 1925 MEU_WC_: 0225:17Z de bullrush 3, can you get an approximate depth of the water?
 CMD 1925 MKI_TAO: 0225:50Z SOM de MKI, Int are you spooling up hueys for medevac at this tim?, k
 CMD 1926 SOM_TAO_: 0226:25Z MKI de SOM, negative
 CMD 1926 MKI_TAO: 0226:57Z de MKI, are you able to spool up huey for medevac, k
 CMD 1927 CPR3_BWC: 0227:06Z bull rush de CPR3, water depth approx 1040 meters
 CMD 1927 MEU_WC_: 0227:18Z SOM, get H-1 det OIC to get hueys ready for casevac if able.
 CMD 1927 SDG_TAO: 0227:23Z MEU_WC de SDG 100 fathoms, k
 CMD 1927 JFN_TAO_: 0227:27Z de JFN, if we do find personnel, do you want them brought about SOM and by what means? Or do you want them brought aboard JFN, k.
 S 1927 CPR3_ABWC: 0227:08Z TB rar
 CMD 1928 MEU_WC_: 0228:03Z JFN, take them to the SOM
 CMD 1928 SOM_TAO_: 0228:29Z 10 marines unaccounted for
 CMD 1928 MKI_TAO: 0228:30Z SOM de MKI, we are 30nm south of you posit and closing at best speed after MV22 recovery, k
 CMD 1929 SOM_TAO_: 0229:12Z de SOM making preps to get hueys ready for CASEVAC
 CMD 1929 CPR3_ABWC: 0229:15Z TB, rgr, 10 unaccounted for.
 CMD 1929 MEU_WC_: 0229:18Z Copy
 CMD 1929 MEU_WC_: 0229:54Z SOM_TAO, do you still have visual of Marines in the water?
 W 1929 1ft above the sill

ENCLOSURE (23)

CMD 1930 SOM_TAO_: 0230:30Z spooling up to medevac three marines
 CMD 1930 SOM_TAO_: 0230:33Z 9 unaccounted for
 CMD 1930 SDG_TAO: 0230:35Z CPR3 de SDG, SDG medical is manned adn ready to support as required, k
 [REDACTED] 1930 Sounded two short blasts
 CMD 1931 MEU_WC_: 0231:06Z SOM_TAO, how many total have been recovered and what is their current location. Also, if able, please send their ZMIST?
 CMD 1931 SOM_TAO_: 0231:42Z MKI de SOM, where is the closest MEDVAC location, my medical is saying balboa?
 [REDACTED] 1932 Water Temperature 74 degrees, four more hours hypothermia, shark attack hazard
 CMD 1932 MEU_WC_: 0232:15Z SCRIPPS is closer
 CMD 1932 SOM_TAO_: 0232:38Z de SOM r ar
 [REDACTED] 1932 XO has the CONN
 CAT 1933 SOM_TZ: 0233:26Z de SOM, preparing to MEDEVAC three marines, k
 CMD 1933 SDG_TAO: 0233:40Z CPR3 de SDG, we intend to launch small boat once we get closer, k
 [REDACTED] 1934 Green Deck
 C3F 1934 SSD_JHOC: 0234:28Z C3F de SSD: Do you have a position of where the AAV sank?
 CAT 1934 CPR3_CCO_: 0234:21Z de CATSKILL, r ar
 CMD 1934 SDG_TAO: 0234:04Z CPR3 de SDG, we are currently 14NM from SOM, k
 CMD 1934 CPR3_BWC: 0234:14Z de CPR3 rar
 CMD 1934 MKI_TAO: 0234:34Z SOM de MKI, where do you want us to position to assist, k
 CMD 1934 SOM_TAO_: 0234:54Z 3 total recovered
 [REDACTED] 1934 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CONN
 C3F 1935 ESG3_EWO: 0235:33Z C3F de ESG-3, AAV posit 330152N 1183922W, k
 CMD 1935 CPR3_BWC: 0235:19Z SOM de CPR3 do you have another freq dedicated to SAR other than 121.5, k
 CMD 1935 MEU_WC_: 0235:24Z SOM_TAO, were those 3 recovered by small boat?
 CMD 1935 SOM_TAO_: 0235:41Z affirm
 [REDACTED] 1935 Green Deck
 [REDACTED] 1936 XO off the Bridge
 [REDACTED] 1936 XO in CIC
 CMD 1936 TACCWO: 0236:01Z de TACCWO, 282.8 is SAR Common
 CMD 1936 MEU_WC_: 0236:14Z SOM_TAO, can you confirm that 1 was recovered by a/c?
 CMD 1937 SOM_TAO_: 0237:26Z Is that SCRIPPS La Jolla the closest medvac location?
 CMD 1937 TACCWO: 0237:44Z Affirm SCRIPPS is the closest
 CMD 1937 CPR3_BWC: 0237:48Z Bring up SAR Common when we have solid comms across the ARG shift to SAR Common, k
 CMD 1937 SOM_TAO_: 0237:58Z MKI de SOM int w/c/s
 [REDACTED] 1937 SOM_TZ: 0237:42Z SDG de TZ, on your approach setup up southwest of JFN at approx. 32:59:16N, 118:41:34W, k
 [REDACTED] 1938 Helo on Deck
 CMD 1938 SDG_TAO: 0238:24Z CPR3 de SDG, rar
 CMD 1938 SOM_TAO_: 0238:41Z MKI we have three inbound to SCRIPPS, plz coord for us, we'll send the status once airborne
 [REDACTED] 1938 SOM_TZ: 0238:42Z SDG de TZ, wait to launch RHIBs on your arrival because we will use to cycle with current boats in water
 CAT 1939 CPR3_CCO_: 0239:06Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, what is location of LCACs? is it still one on SCI and one off cushion? k
 CMD 1939 SOM_TZ: 0239:24Z de SOM, 32:59:13N, 118:41:34W / 190 @ 3kts
 CMD 1939 MEU_WC_: 0239:26Z SOM_TAO de Bullrush 3, copy 3 inbound. MEU Medical will coordinate.
 CMD 1939 SOM_TAO_: 0239:35Z de som r ar
 CMD 1939 SOM_TAO_: 0239:44Z will pass status as soon as able
 CAT 1940 SOM_TZ: 0240:18Z de SOM, LCACs are on SCI and will be staying overnight, k
 CMD 1940 MKI_TAO: 0240:32Z de MKI, which aircraft is conducting medevac, k
 CMD 1940 TACCWO: 0240:35Z SOM de TACCWO, coordinating with SCRIPPS
 CMD 1940 SOM_TAO_: 0240:51Z de SOM r ar
 [REDACTED] 1940 SDG_TAO: 0240:32Z TZ de SDG, rar
 CAT 1941 CPR3_CCO_: 0241:17Z RED CATSKILL de CATSKILL, Both LCACs on SCI, check. At what point did second LCAC go to SCI? k
 CMD 1941 SOM_TAO_: 0241:26Z is there a lat/long and range to their helo pad from mysta?
 CMD 1941 SOM_TAO_: 0241:48Z currently at 33:00:16N 118:39:32W
 [REDACTED] 1941 SOM_TZ: 0241:36Z SDG de TZ, do you have helo available for SAR, k
 [REDACTED] 1941 1ft below the sill
 CMD 1942 JFN_TAO_: 0242:41Z SOM de JFN, we are trying to reach you on Navy Red, k.
 CMD 1942 SOM_TAO_: 0242:56Z rer

ENCLOSURE (23)

1942 SDG_TAO: 0242:24Z TZ de SDG, negative, 3 53s are OOC and 1 is at camp pendleton, we are currently down on TACAN, both stacks, techs troubleshooting, k
 CMD 1943 JFN_TAO_: 0243:08Z de JFN, is there a channel for rib coordination and confirm you JANAP is Iron City, k.
 CMD 1943 SOM_TAO_: 0243:20Z JANAP is iron city
 CMD 1943 SDG_TAO: 0243:24Z JFN de SDG, SDG JANAP is gargoyle
 CMD 1943 SOM_TZ: 0243:25Z JFN de SOM, do you have helos available?
 CMD 1943 SOM_TAO_: 0243:49Z coord on BTB 72
 CMD 1943 JFN_TAO_: 0243:51Z de JFN, we have no HELOs but have a ready deck if needed, k.
 CMD 1944 SOM_TAO_: 0244:16Z we have a helo from MKI on deck for CASEVAC, working to get a huey spun up
 CMD 1944 SOM_TAO_: 0244:35Z huey is one of ours
 CMD 1945 SDG_TAO: 0245:16Z CPR3 de SDG, we are patched into SAR common, k
 CMD 1946 CPR3_BWC: 0246:14Z SOM and JFN what is your status on patching SAR common
 CMD 1946 MEU_WC_: 0246:40Z SOM_TAO, can you confirm that 1 was recovered by a/c?
 CMD 1946 JFN_TAO_: 0246:53Z de JFN, we are also patched into SAR common, attempting comms chec,k
 CMD 1947 MKI_TAO: 0247:24Z SOM de MKI, we are 22NM south of you and closing, where do you want us to station relative to you, k
 1947 SOM_TZ: 0247:35Z SDG de TZ, r ar
 CMD 1948 SOM_TZ: 0248:17Z JFN de SOM, r ar
 CMD 1948 SOM_TAO_: 0248:26Z MKI de SOM do you have an alert SAR?
 C3F 1949 SSD_JHOC: 0249:13Z C3F de SSD: Could we get a roster of assests currently on scene
 CMD 1949 TACCWO: 0249:41Z SOM de TACCWO, we are launching an MH60R from our deck. When they will be on station will be TBD
 CMD 1950 SOM_TZ: 0250:03Z MKI de SOM, wait one for position on approach, k
 CMD 1950 MKI_TAO: 0250:05Z SOM de MKI, BL01 and BL02 are on station BT we are bring another MH60S out, however, it will take some time before available for launch, k
 CMD 1950 JFN_CICWO_: 0250:28Z SOM de JFN Coast guard helo checked in on SAR common, requesting the freq the helo's are operating on, k
 CMD 1951 SOM_TAO_: 0251:35Z MKI de SOM_TZ will pass posit to you
 CMD 1951 MKI_TAO: 0251:43Z de MKI rar
 CMD 1951 SDG_TAO: 0251:46Z CPR3 de SDG, sat comms check on SAR common, k
 CMD 1952 CPR3_BWC: 0252:02Z SDG de CPR3 rar
 CMD 1952 SOM_TAO_: 0252:02Z 8054 is SAR Common
 CMD 1952 SOM_TZ: 0252:17Z MKI de TZ, upon approach setup at approx. 32:56:17N, 118:38:00W, k
 CMD 1952 MEU_WO: 0252:34Z SCRIPPS can be reached on RFRADIO2
 CMD 1952 SDG_CSO: 0252:58Z TB, TZ de SDG, Back up ONE TACAN, k
 C3F 1953 C3F_BWC_: 0253:25Z SSD de C3F, we have three helos, 2 rhibs, 2 CRRCs (like rhibs), 1 warship on scene, another about 6nm away
 CMD 1953 TACCWO: 0253:43Z SOM de TACCWO, MH60R will be on station in 60 minutes
 CMD 1953 SOM_TAO_: 0253:43Z TB de SOM we currently have 19 marines unaccounted for. Units are going name by name for sat muster
 1953 SDG_TAO: 0253:15Z TZ de SDG, TACAN restored, k
 C3F 1954 SSD_JHOC: 0254:46Z C3F de SSD: rgr, ty
 CMD 1954 JFN_CICWO_: 0254:11Z SOM de JFN Coast guard helo checked in on SAR common, requesting the freq the helo's are operating on, k
 CMD 1954 SOM_TAO_: 0254:58Z BVR de SOM are fuel trucks available for helos in SCI airfield?
 1954 SOM_TZ: 0254:19Z de tz, r ar
 C3F 1955 JFN_TAO_: 0255:06Z C3F de JFN, JFN onscene assisting with SAR ops, k.
 CMD 1955 SDG_CSO: 0255:19Z TB, TZ de SDG, back up BOTH TACAN stacks, k
 CMD 1955 CPR3_ABWC: 0255:20Z JFN de TB freq is 282.8 SAR COMMON, k
 CMD 1955 CPR3_ABWC: 0255:36Z de TB, rar
 CMD 1955 TACCWO: 0255:44Z JFN de CPR3 TACCWO, SAR Common is 282.8
 1955 Cease deballasting
 1955 SOM_TZ: 0255:03Z de TZ, do you have the ability to launch birds when required
 1955 SDG_CSO: 0255:23Z TZ de SDG, back up BOTH TACAN stacks, k
 CMD 1956 SOM_TAO_: 0256:08Z MKI de SOM advise scripps that 47 is in bound
 CMD 1956 JFN_CICWO_: 0256:24Z TACCWO de JFN the CG helo is requesting the Freq the helos are working on. I have comms with them on SAR Common, k
 CMD 1956 MKI_TAO: 0256:34Z de MKI, our deck is available for lilypad or refueling, as needed, our TACAN is 14X, k
 1956 SDG_CICWO_: 0256:53Z de negative, 3 onboard OOC, 1 at pendleton. standing by to refuel as required, k
 CMD 1957 CPR3_BWC: 0257:32Z MKI de CPR3 come up SAR Common 282.8
 CMD 1957 TACCWO: 0257:37Z JFN de TACCWO, the helos will either be up SAR Common or SOM's L/L which is 328.225
 CMD 1957 SDG_TAO: 0257:41Z ALCON de SDG, SDG TACAN 062X, k
 1957 SOM_TZ: 0257:06Z de TZ, rar
 1958 Observed Sunset

ENCLOSURE (23)

1959 XO out of CIC
 CMD 1959 CPR3_BWC: 0259:47Z SOM de CPR3 the MKI Navigator will reach out to you to coordinate boxes for all the ships heading in to assist, k
 1959 Energize navigation lights
 2000 CO out of CIC
 CMD 2000 SOM_TAO_: 0300:01Z r ar
 2000 SOM_TZ: 0300:32Z Z de TZ, establish COMMs via SAR common as well as ST812D, k
 CMD 2001 JFN_TAO_: 0301:45Z SOM de JFN, is there a particular sector or coordinate you want our RIBS to search, k?
 CMD 2002 SDG_CSO: 0302:45Z MKI de SDG, someone from MKI is clobbering SAR COMMON, request you reach out, k
 CMD 2003 TACCWO: 0303:07Z de TACCWO, San Clemente Island Airfield opened to support SAR effort
 CMD 2003 SOM_TAO_: 0303:18Z JFN de SOM search SSE of 33:01:51N 118:38:24W (090-180)
 2003 Man Overboard Red over Red pulsating
 2003 SDG_TAO: 0303:24Z TZ de SDG, rar
 CMD 2004 SOM_TAO_: 0304:22Z does SCI airfield have re-fuel capability?
 CMD 2004 TACCWO: 0304:27Z SOM de TACCWO, request fuel state for helos
 CMD 2004 TACCWO: 0304:35Z SOM de TACCWO, affirm
 CMD 2004 TACCWO: 0304:39Z fuel pits are opening up
 2005 CO in CIC
 2005 SDG_CSO: 0305:41Z TZ de SDG, we have SAT CC on ST812D, k
 C3F 2006 TACCWO: 0306:04Z BVR de CPR3 TACCWO, confirm all W-291 is clear in our vicinity in support of SAR effort, k
 C3F 2006 SDG_CSO: 0306:33Z BVR de SDG, request permission to turn on IFF within 100 nm to help identify A/C, k
 CMD 2006 SOM_TAO_: 0306:08Z fuel state iaf: RESCUE 47 2+00
 2007 MKI_CICWO: 0307:31Z TZ de MKI, going out to you now over ST812D, k
 CMD 2008 Shady_Intel_: 0308:11Z This is RQ-21 PED on the san-diego, we are getting GPS fixed and are working to get in the air. Will update with estimated launch time
 CMD 2008 TACCWO: 0308:15Z SOM de TACCWO, copy all
 2008 SOM_TZ: 0308:42Z de TZ, responded
 CMD 2009 TACCWO: 0309:07Z SDG de TACCWO, from TR do not launch RQ-21 we need SDG deck clear to support helo search effort
 CMD 2009 SOM_TAO_: 0309:22Z MKI de SOM can you create altitude blocks for a/c deconfliction?
 CMD 2009 MEU_WC_: 0309:25Z BULLRUSH Air concurs w/ TACCWO
 CMD 2009 SDG_CSO: 0309:54Z TACCWO de SDG, RQ-21 provides FLIR. Will only impact flight deck upon launch and recovery, k
 2009 SOM_TZ: 0309:57Z Z de TZ, SM233 is the link track of last known
 2010 Six RHIBS in water two from USS John Finn
 CMD 2010 Shady_Intel_: 0310:36Z who else is up right now?
 2010 SOM_TZ: 0310:05Z spot of sunken AAV
 2010 MKI_CICWO: 0310:12Z de MKI, t/s att, i did not hear you, k
 2010 SOM_TZ: 0310:48Z de TZ, we RCV'd SAT COMMs w/ SDG...can hear you
 CMD 2011 MEU_WC_: 0311:19Z SDG de Bullrush Air. We currently have a full aircraft stack. Priority is to create ready decks. Standing next to me is Knightrider 6.
 2012 Create Surface search area
 2013 Green well
 CMD 2013 SDG_TAO: 0313:34Z Bullrush air de SDG, copy, we are manned and ready to refuel as required, k
 CMD 2013 SOM_TZ: 0313:35Z TACRON de TZ, create altitude block for A/C deconfliction
 2013 MKI_CICWO: 0313:39Z TZ de MKI, recommend boxes cybertron, jazz, optimus prime and bumblebee for placement of ships, k
 W 2013 Sterngate in the water
 CMD 2014 TACCWO: 0314:31Z TZ de TACCWO, copy all
 W 2014 Sterngate at the stops
 2015 1A 2A MPDE
 2015 MKI two helo medivac if needed
 CMD 2015 MKI_TAO: 0315:51Z de MKI, we will maintain two open a/c spots available through the night for refueling
 BT we are making an MV22 available for MEDEVAC, as required BT we are working to be able to provide 2x helo coverage through the night, as required, k
 W 2015 Two CRRC's recovered, sterngate at 90
 C3F 2016 TACCWO: 0316:32Z BVR de CPR3 TACCWO, copy all aircraft will be squawking assigned PMINT squawks or as assigned by BVR, k
 2016 SOM_TZ: 0316:07Z TZ have those box posits been pushed to NAVs?
 2017 47 helo report to helicopter
 2017 SDG_CSO: 0317:30Z SOM/TZ de SDG, we are still driving to that previous point to the NW of you. Do you want us to continue proceeding towards that point or move closer to JFN?, k
 CMD 2018 TACCWO: 0318:04Z TZ de TACCWO, keep CG helo & Navy MH-60S at 200 feet and below in search area, stack MH60R in the search area 500 feet and above, k
 W 2018 Sterngate is at 45

ENCLOSURE (23)

2019 two CRICS in well deck feet dry
CMD 2019 SOM_SUWC_: 0319:15Z JFN de SOM, how many RIBS are FW?, k
CMD 2019 JFN_TAO_: 0319:43Z de JFN, we have two ribs in the water: Hawaiian Warrior and Irish Gunner, k.
CMD 2019 BVR_MRICO_: 0319:44Z ALCON de BVR i have 3 helos airborne over the SAR area ensure you have contact with those A/C to deconflict BULLET 55, RESCUE 47, and USCG RESCUE 6603
CMD 2020 SOM_TAO_: 0320:37Z 2 RIBS from SOM fw
2020 SOM_TZ: 0320:28Z SDG de TZ, we are currently establishing boxes with Navigator, will provide shortly
2021 Bridge has eyes on two RHIBS, Revenge 71 and Summit
2021 SDG_CICWO_: 0321:06Z de SDG r ar
2021 SDG_CSO: 0321:25Z SOM/TZ, request working channel for all the RHIBs, k
CMD 2022 SDG_TAO: 0322:03Z SOM de SDG, request your RHIB call signs, k
CMD 2022 SDG_CSO: 0322:16Z SDG de SOM, AZTEC, TRITON and PADRE, k
CMD 2022 SDG_CSO: 0322:32Z SOM de SDG, will let you know which RHIB we put in the water, k
CMD 2022 SOM_TAO_: 0322:50Z REVENGE 71 and SUMMIT are SOM's RHIBS
2022 1A 2A MPDE started engaged clutch
CAT 2023 CPR3_CCO_: 0323:10Z de CATSKILL, standing down CATSKILL Watch.
CMD 2023 SDG_CSO: 0323:43Z SOM/TZ, request working channel for all the RHIBs, k
2023 SOM_TZ: 0323:45Z MKI de TZ, we can hear you go out but you still can't hear us, k
2024 CO asks PTO whether we push towards Island or away from current
CMD 2024 SOM_TAO_: 0324:13Z BTB 72 is working channel
CMD 2024 SOM_TAO_: 0324:45Z launching bird with 2 casualties
2025 CO receives call from First LT
CMD 2025 SOM_TAO_: 0325:07Z requesting critical care nurse from MKI to come to SOM
CMD 2025 SOM_SUWC_: 0325:22Z SDG de SOM request status of RHIBs in water, k
CMD 2025 MKI_TAO: 0325:50Z de MKI, copy on nurse, stby, k
CMD 2025 BVR_MRICO_: 0325:51Z SOM de BVR can i get details on casualties so i can rely to the hospital
CMD 2026 SDG_CSO: 0326:07Z SOM de SDG, we have not launched any RHIBS, k
CMD 2026 SOM_TAO_: 0326:14Z 2 RHIBS in water, lowering third RHIB into water
CMD 2026 SOM_TAO_: 0326:21Z CRRC's are getting beat up
CMD 2026 TACCWO: 0326:40Z SOM de TACCWO, which bird is going to where with the 2 critical patients?
2026 MKI_CICWO: 0326:55Z de MKI, neg still t/s att, k
CMD 2027 SDG_CSO: 0327:06Z SOM de SDG, we are talking to the CO right now, k
CMD 2027 CPR3_BWC: 0327:29Z SOM, MRCO working critical care nurse with MKI now, k
CMD 2027 SOM_SUWC_: 0327:44Z SDG de SOM, good copy, k
CMD 2027 SDG_TAO: 0327:45Z SOM de SDG, do you want our RIB in the water, we are standing by, k
CMD 2027 SOM_TAO_: 0327:46Z de SOM r ar
CMD 2027 BVR_MRICO_: 0327:53Z de BVR rgr
CMD 2027 TACCWO: 0327:56Z SOM de TACCWO, in addition to the critical care nurse is there anyone else require?
2028 XO in CIC
CMD 2028 SDG_TAO: 0328:24Z SOM de SDG, do you want our RIB in the water, we are standing by, k
CMD 2028 SOM_TAO_: 0328:42Z SDG de SOM please launch RHIB
2029 If not airborne we should turn around back to AAV
CMD 2029 SOM_TAO_: 0329:08Z BULLET 55 inbound for MEDEVAC
CMD 2029 SDG_TAO: 0329:19Z SOM de SDG, launching RHIB, ar
CMD 2029 SOM_TAO_: 0329:30Z TACCWO critical nurse will suffice
2030 Reach out to the boats have them reach to South and Southeast
CMD 2030 TACCWO: 0330:05Z SOM de TACCWO, critical care nurse will be on the MV22 on the way to your unit, k
CMD 2030 MKI_TAO: 0330:16Z SOM de MKI, critical care nurse, battalion CO, SGT Major on MV22 preparing to crossdeck to your unit, k
CMD 2030 SOM_TAO_: 0330:27Z de SOM r ar
CMD 2030 BVR_MRICO_: 0330:29Z SOM de BVR how many casualties and what are the symptoms
CMD 2030 SOM_SUWC_: 0330:34Z SDG de SOM, which RHIB are you launching?, k
2031 Both small boats on channel 72
CMD 2031 SDG_CSO: 0331:09Z SOM de SDG, PADRE (11M RHIB) is I/P, k
CMD 2031 CPR3_BWC: 0331:24Z SOM de CPR3 BWC critical care nurse ready to assist
CMD 2031 SOM_SUWC_: 0331:27Z de SOM, copy, k
CMD 2031 SOM_TAO_: 0331:35Z rgr

ENCLOSURE (23)

CMD 2031 SOM_TAO_: 0331:52Z 3 casualties evac'd from SOM to SCRIPPS
 CMD 2031 SOM_TAO_: 0331:57Z so far
 2031 MKI_CICWO: 0331:06Z CYBERTRON:
 2031 325913N 1183824W
 2031 330042N 1183737W
 2031 330003N 1183546W
 2031 325834N 1183712W
 2031
 2031 JAZZ:
 2031 325559N 1184608W
 2031 325716N 1184200W
 2031 325408N 1183900W
 2031 325106N 1184106W
 2031
 2031 OPTIMUS:
 2031 325408N 1183900W
 2031 325412N 1183434W
 2031 325104N 1183358W
 2031 325106N 1184106W
 2031
 2031 BUMBLEBEE:
 2031 325020N 1184258W
 2031 324658N 1184713W
 2031 325233N 1185252W
 2031 325554N 1184756W
 2031 MKI_CICWO: 0331:24Z TZ de MKI, posits for boxes listed above, k
 2031 SOM_TZ: 0331:52Z MKI de TZ, please have your METOC start working drift models, if unable to support please notify me, soonest
 CMD 2032 BVR_MRICO_: 0332:42Z de BVR rgr
 CMD 2032 TACCWO: 0332:49Z SOM de TACCWO, confirm 3 casualties evac'd on Bullet 55 to SCRIPPS. Say status of Bullet 47
 2032 MKI_CICWO: 0332:14Z de MKI, rgr
 CMD 2033 SOM_TAO_: 0333:18Z 2 casualties evac'd to SCRIPPS, 1 needs to be stabilized by critical care nurse
 2033 MKI_CICWO: 0333:20Z de MKI, can you provide an email, we will send it to you, k
 2033 MKI_CICWO: 0333:25Z via email
 2033 SOM_TZ: 0333:37Z tao@lpd25.navy.smil.mil
 2034 XO out of CIC
 2034 Creating search box (Night Steam Box)
 CMD 2034 SDG_CSO: 0334:36Z SOM de SDG, do you want us to send them to the last known location of the AAV? is that where the other RHIBs are, k
 CMD 2034 TACCWO: 0334:54Z SOM de TACCWO, confirm that search effort being coordinated on your L/L or SAR Common?
 CMD 2034 SOM_TAO_: 0334:55Z MEDEVAC Update: 2022L BULLET 55 off deck SOM ENR to SCRIPPS 7 souls 4 crew 2 casualties one corpsman
 2034 MKI_TAO: 0334:01Z sent
 2036 Nav has a MOB plotted moving with current
 CMD 2036 TACCWO: 0336:11Z SOM de TACCWO, copy all on Bullet 55's status, k
 2037 One RHIB in water (Padre)
 CMD 2037 BVR_MRICO_: 0337:00Z SOM de BVR RESCUE 47 is medevac with 2 casualties BULLET 55 is still on deck
 CMD 2037 CPR3_BWC: 0337:27Z SOM de CPR3 BWC please provide an updated status when able to in order to re-baseline everybody as you continue to work through this, k
 CMD 2038 MEU_WC_: 0338:21Z SOM can you confirm only 2 casualties evac'd w/ one remaining on SOM?
 CMD 2038 SOM_SUWC_: 0338:39Z SDG de SOM, affirm last known 33 01 52N 118 38 28 W
 2038 SDG_TAO: 0338:07Z SOM de SDG, we hold set at 340T, k
 C3F 2039 SSD_JHOC: 0339:47Z C3F de SSD: Want to confirm that you are SMC?
 CMD 2039 SOM_TAO_: 0339:01Z BULLET 55 ETA to MKI @ 2200L BULLET 55 still on deck
 CMD 2039 MKI_TAO: 0339:31Z SOM de MKI, currently 2nm south of 3256n, 11838w BT intend to loiter IVO posit to provide flight deck support, k
 CMD 2039 SOM_TAO_: 0339:48Z MEU de SOM affirm 2 casualties evac'd
 CMD 2040 SOM_SUWC_: 0340:14Z SDG de SOM, last known position for RHIBs, k
 CMD 2040 SOM_TAO_: 0340:27Z One casualty still on SOM will req critical care nurse
 CMD 2041 MEU_WC_: 0341:34Z SOM TAO critical care nurse will be en route. Confirm the destination of that casualty.

ENCLOSURE (23)

CMD 2041 MEU_WC_: 0341:53Z When able, pass ZAP Numbers of casualties evacuated and remaining.
 CMD 2042 SOM_TAO_: 0342:04Z is there an updated ETA of the MV-22 ENR to SOM?
 CMD 2043 SOM_TAO_: 0343:00Z SOM is taking the one marine that is onboard to UCSD Trauma center for LEVEL 1 treatment
 CMD 2043 TACCWO: 0343:20Z SOM de TACCWO, MV22 still on deck MKI. Will advise when off deck, k
 CMD 2043 CPR3_BWC: 0343:56Z SOM please verify this was the marine originally reported to require critical care?
 CMD 2043 SOM_TAO_: 0343:57Z is the MV22 spinning? or is it still folded?
 CMD 2044 MKI_TAO: 0344:04Z SOM de MKI, MV22 spinning on deck, expect it to be overhead SOM in approx min, k
 CMD 2044 MKI_TAO: 0344:17Z SOM de MKI 10 min, k
 CMD 2044 TACCWO: 0344:18Z SOM de TACCWO, getting word that a Marine was pulled from the water by CG helo please confirm, k
 CMD 2044 BVR_MRICO_: 0344:27Z can i have a call sign for the MV22
 CMD 2044 TACCWO: 0344:27Z SOM de TACCWO, MV22 is spinning
 CMD 2044 SOM_TAO_: 0344:29Z BWC de SOM yes, that marine cannot wait for the critical care nurse
 CMD 2044 CPR3_BWC: 0344:46Z de BWC, copy.
 CMD 2044 TACCWO: 0344:50Z BVR de TACCWO, SN12
 [REDACTED] 2045 Critical Carrier is still on MKI
 CMD 2045 BVR_MRICO_: 0345:01Z de BVR rgr
 CMD 2045 SOM_TAO_: 0345:07Z do we have a BULLET 45 ENR to SOM?
 CMD 2045 SOM_TAO_: 0345:43Z Marine DOC and Corpsman are going with marine to UCSD Trauma in the 60 that is currently on deck SOM
 C3F 2046 SSD_JHOC: 0346:15Z C3F de SSD: Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator
 CMD 2046 MKI_TAO: 0346:05Z SOM de MKI, BL45 is on deck, not enroute to SOM, k
 CMD 2046 MEU_WO: 0346:23Z Can I get phone number to SOM?
 [REDACTED] 2048 Bridge creating night steam boxes
 [REDACTED] 2049 Patient loaded getting ready to take off
 CMD 2049 SOM_TAO_: 0349:36Z MEU de SOM do you have a number you want us to call?
 CMD 2050 MEU_WO: 0350:28Z 6195457584
 [REDACTED] 2050 SOM_TZ: 0350:31Z MKI de TZ, turn ST812D over to your Radio for t/sing...maintain comms over SAR common... refrain from going over the net every 20sec.... it is stepping on essential traffic
 [REDACTED] 2051 Coast Guard is requesting frequency for ARG 21 update contact info from MKI and Coast Guard
 C3F 2051 C3F_BWC_: 0351:56Z SSD de C3F, SOMERSET is the on scene commander
 CMD 2051 SOM_TAO_: 0351:05Z MEU de SOM, calling you now
 CMD 2051 MEU_WO: 0351:56Z Copy
 [REDACTED] 2052 Negative R221 being airborne
 [REDACTED] 2052 Currently working tech run on MKI
 CMD 2052 SOM_TAO_: 0352:01Z Shady_Intel de SOM, do you have Q-21's airborne?
 CMD 2052 Shady_Intel_: 0352:29Z negitave, told to stb can be air borne in 25min
 CMD 2053 SOM_TAO_: 0353:06Z rgr
 CMD 2053 SOM_SUWC_: 0353:32Z SDG de SOM, I a tracking your 11m Padre in the water. is there any other RHIBS from your ship FW?, k
 CMD 2053 SOM_TZ: 0353:32Z TACCWO de TZ, coast guard is requesting sectors for air search
 CMD 2053 Shady_Intel_: 0353:55Z If we get clrnce now, we can be arbne in 20 min or less, need clrnce from SDG
 CMD 2053 SOM_TAO_: 0353:56Z MEU WO de you can call us at 619-545-7905
 [REDACTED] 2053 MKI_CICWO: 0353:25Z de MKI, r ar
 CMD 2054 SOM_TAO_: 0354:05Z that number goes to our LFOC
 CMD 2054 SDG_CSO: 0354:32Z SOM de SDG, not at this time. but we can put more in the water if need be. just let us know if you want us to launch or wait to relieve others, k
 [REDACTED] 2055 XO in CIC
 CMD 2055 MEU_WC_: 0355:01Z SOM_TAO, Spot "Knight rider 6" says: keep RQ-21 on deck.
 CMD 2055 SOM_TAO_: 0355:19Z SDG more RHIB'S in the water?
 CMD 2055 SOM_SUWC_: 0355:22Z SDG de SOM, copy, k
 CMD 2055 SOM_TAO_: 0355:27Z MEU_WC copy
 [REDACTED] 2056 Eight souls, one casualty, three medical personnel, one DOC
 [REDACTED] 2056 Red Deck power head back to where 030 AAV went down getting word from MKI
 [REDACTED] 2058 Red Deck
 [REDACTED] 2058 030 has Amber Deck come around
 CMD 2058 SDG_CSO: 0358:05Z SDG de SOM, having issues with our knuckle boom. actively troubleshooting, k
 CMD 2058 SOM_TAO_: 0358:15Z Bullet 55 off deck 2055L 8 souls: one casualty, one doctor, one corpsman, 5 crew
 CMD 2058 SOM_TAO_: 0358:29Z SDG de SOM rgr
 CMD 2058 MEU_WC : 0358:37Z SOM TAO sav destination of BULLET 55

ENCLOSURE (23)

CMD 2059 SOM_TAO_: 0359:30Z Request possibility of landing MV22 on SOM pick up SSGT to send to landing strip where AAV's are on SCI to support muster
 CMD 2059 MEU_WC_: 0359:45Z In addition, LHD LFOC Medical team needs to know what ZAP numbers went to Scripps and what ZAP numbers went on BULLET 55
 CMD 2059 SOM_TAO_: 0359:51Z If that is not feasible, we'll launch Huey from SOM
 2059 Red Deck
 2100 11 Souls in water
 2100 LFAC taking muster
 CMD 2100 SOM_SUWC_: 0400:03Z MKI de SOM, shortly we will be turning around on course 030 headed back to the last known location of the AAV that went down, k
 CMD 2100 SOM_TAO_: 0400:13Z BULLET 55 ENR UCSD Medical Center
 CMD 2100 MEU_WC_: 0400:58Z SOM_TAO, hold on sending SSGT ashore. MV-22 w/ BLT CO is en route.
 2100 PHIBRON 3 assumed SAR Commander
 2102 PHIBRON 3 assuming duties at 2100T, search sector from ice pack
 CMD 2102 SOM_TAO_: 0402:43Z MARines still working muster on Marines unaccounted for
 CMD 2102 SOM_TAO_: 0402:57Z MKI de SOM r ar
 CMD 2103 MEU_WC_: 0403:17Z CSOM_TAO, copy all. BLT CO is en route to take command and control of the accountability efforts.
 CMD 2103 SOM_TAO_: 0403:38Z MEU de SOM r ar
 CMD 2104 SDG_TAO: 0404:23Z SOM de SDG, troubleshooting KB crane, ETR unknown, k
 CMD 2104 SOM_TAO_: 0404:30Z SDG de SOM r ar
 CMD 2104 SOM_SUWC_: 0404:37Z MKI de SOM, were are steering c 030 @ 15 kts headed towards the last know location of the downed AAV, k
 CMD 2104 SOM_TAO_: 0404:49Z MKI de SOM r ar
 CMD 2105 MKI_TAO: 0405:08Z de MKI, rgr currently on 320 at 5, once I launch MV22 will be coming stbd and turning south
 CMD 2105 MEU_WC_: 0405:13Z UCSD has been alerted for one patient inbound.
 CMD 2105 JFN_TAO_: 0405:29Z CPR3 de JFN, will there be opboxes for surface ships to operate in to deconflict maneuvering, k?
 CMD 2105 TACCWO: 0405:34Z SN12 airborne with BLT CO en route SOM
 2106 Requesting to come up 330
 2106 We are bringing in a MV-22
 CMD 2106 MKI_TAO: 0406:08Z SOM de MKI, MV22 is en route with CCN, BLT, k
 CMD 2106 SOM_TAO_: 0406:18Z TACCWO copy, our tower is tracking
 CMD 2106 CPR3_ABWC: 0406:41Z JFN de CPR3 we are working on opboxes, will be promulgated shortly, k
 2108 CO/XO out of CIC
 2108 Well deck is closed
 CMD 2108 CPR3_ABWC: 0408:50Z T de TB, Baseline sitrep to follow. Tracking 3 MEDEVACs, 2 to SCRIPPS and 1 to UCSD Trauma.
 Additional 5 personnel recovered from water. Medical status unreported. 8 marines remain unaccounted for. SOM, please verify accurate, k
 CMD 2109 SOM_TAO_: 0409:24Z CPR 3 de SOM we have 5 boats in water, 3 from SOM and 2 from JFN and holding MKI and SDG's boats in reserve.
 CMD 2109 SOM_SUWC_: 0409:51Z JFN de SOM are both your RHIBS still in the water?, k
 CMD 2109 CPR3_ABWC: 0409:56Z de TB rar
 CMD 2110 JFN_TAO_: 0410:20Z de JFN, both of our ribs are in the water, k.
 CMD 2110 SOM_TAO_: 0410:26Z Last order to RHIBS was to commence searching at last known posit (LINK # SM 233) and search SSE towards SCI
 CMD 2110 SOM_SUWC_: 0410:34Z de SOM copy, k
 2111 Stand Clear of MT 301 and 302 while training and elevating
 CMD 2112 SOM_SUWC_: 0412:12Z SDG de SOM, just to confirm PADRE is still in water? k
 CMD 2112 CPR3_BWC: 0412:19Z At time 2100 CPR3 has assumed SMC. TACRON will assign helo control sectors. Navy Blue released. k
 CMD 2112 SDG_CSO: 0412:39Z SOM de SDG, no SDG boats are currently in the water. we are troubleshooting the KB crane, k
 CMD 2112 SDG_CSO: 0412:55Z SOM de SDG, TRITON will be boat in the water, k
 CMD 2112 MEU_WC_: 0412:58Z All, 5 remaining casualties can return to USS MKI for stabilization.
 2113 STBD Spot green
 2113 Green Deck
 CMD 2113 MEU_WC_: 0413:12Z via MV-22 en route w/ BLT CO and CCT
 CMD 2113 SDG_CSO: 0413:18Z SOM de SDG, correction we are I/P of launching TRITON (7M rhib), k
 CMD 2113 SOM_SUWC_: 0413:58Z SDG de SOM, copy, k
 CMD 2115 MKI_TAO: 0415:05Z MEU de MKI, we have notified medical and are standing by, k
 2118 Staff SGT to SIH to get muster on beach
 2118 Visual at 028T on camera
 CMD 2118 SOM_TAO_: 0418:19Z MV-22 On Deck SOM
 CMD 2118 TACCWO: 0418:58Z SOM de TACCWO, copy SN12 on deck, k
 CMD 2118 MEU_WC_: 0418:58Z C. ensure to bring the 5 casualties on SOM w/ SNOOP back to LHD-8

ENCLOSURE (23)

2119 Red Deck
 2119 0101 San Diego
 CMD 2119 SDG_TAO: 0419:54Z SOM de SDG, coming to 010T to launch Triton, k
 CMD 2120 SOM_TZ: 0420:12Z de SOM, rgr
 CMD 2120 MEU_WC_: 0420:30Z Also, request names of corpsmen that accompanied casualties on Bullet 55
 2120 Red Deck
 2121 CO in CIC
 2121 Negative on launching
 2121 MKI is coming to 330
 2121 028T turned out to be a buoy
 2121 MKI_CICWO: 0421:51Z TZ de MKI, we are coming to course 330 for flight ops
 CMD 2122 SOM_TAO_: 0422:06Z MKI de SOM are you able to send chaplains, the psychologist, and the resiliency counselor to SOM?
 2122 SOM_TZ: 0422:03Z de TZ, r ar
 2123 MKI is coming out to 015
 2123 Coming to 230 for Green Deck
 CMD 2123 MEU_WO: 0423:33Z SOM TAO de MKIWO, working that now.
 CMD 2123 MKI_TAO: 0423:34Z de MKI, w1, k
 CMD 2123 SOM_TAO_: 0423:48Z de SOM r ar
 2124 No exact location
 2125 Bridge asked for Lat and Long
 2125 We have JFN RHIB on IAS 351 at 7 kts
 CMD 2125 SOM_TAO_: 0425:04Z CPR3 de SOM check whisper for casualty update
 CMD 2125 MKI_TAO: 0425:49Z de MKI, working chaplains and psych, unable to send resiliency counselor ATT, k
 2126 C/C 330
 CMD 2126 SOM_TAO_: 0426:00Z MKI de SOM r ar
 CMD 2126 CPR3_BWC: 0426:59Z SOM de CPR3. Chaplains and psychologist will be ready to assist as soon as we can get them there at daylight, k
 2127 Requesting frequency from Coast Guard Helo
 CMD 2127 MEU_WC_: 0427:27Z @SOM_TAO check whisper
 CMD 2127 MEU_WC_: 0427:40Z correction, @SDG_TAO check whisper
 CMD 2127 Shady_Intel_: 0427:52Z RQ21 still on standby
 CMD 2128 SDG_TAO: 0428:30Z MEU_WC de SDG, no whisper, k
 2128 MKI_TAO: 0428:27Z SOM de MKI, once we launch will be coming stbd to 150, k
 2129 Two short blast turn to port
 CMD 2129 MEU_WC_: 0429:04Z SHady_Intel copy all, reach out to MEU Medics (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 Have him call LHD LFOC - 619-545-7584 to update status of surgical patient and COVID patients that were not evacuated earlier.
 CMD 2129 MEU_WC_: 0429:32Z @SDG_TAO see message above.
 2130 Once launched MKI will come STBD to 150
 CMD 2130 SDG_TAO: 0430:38Z de SDG, rar
 CMD 2130 TACCWO: 0430:39Z Shady_Intel de TACCWO, requesting authorization from TB for you to launch off of SDG. How quickly can you launch?
 CMD 2130 Shady_Intel_: 0430:50Z 20 min
 2130 Sounded two short blasts
 2130 SOM_TZ: 0430:04Z de SOM, r ar
 2131 C/C 120 break Bridge asks for MKI intentions
 CMD 2131 TACCWO: 0431:13Z BVR de TACCWO, do we have authorization to launch an unmanned vehicle in our vicinity to assist with SAR effort?
 2132 XO in CIC
 CMD 2132 MEU_WC_: 0432:47Z Do not launch the RQ21. This is coming from Bullrush Air, Bullrush 6, and Knightrider 6.
 CMD 2132 BVR_MRICO_: 0432:51Z SOM de BVR who is the SAR MISSION coordinator
 2133 XO out of CIC
 CMD 2133 CPR3_BWC: 0433:05Z BVR, CPR3 is the SMC
 CMD 2133 SOM_TAO_: 0433:08Z CPR3 is SAR MISSION Commander
 CMD 2133 JFN_TAO_: 0433:17Z CPR3 de JFN, intentions are to maintain 2 rhibs in water until 2200,
 recover 1 rhib to maintain constant boat operations BT int SAR operations timeline and op boxes for planning purposes.
 CMD 2133 SOM_TZ: 0433:34Z de TZ, new updated last known track is SM036, k
 CMD 2133 MEU_WC_: 0433:58Z @SHADY_INTEL. From MEU CO and VMM-164 REIN CO. STAND DOWN RQ-21. We need the deck open and available for RW assets.
 CMD 2133 CPR3_BWC: 0433:58Z JFN de CPR3 copy all. On boxes in progress. Will push shortly. k

ENCLOSURE (23)

2134 SDG_CICWO: 0434:46Z TZ de SDG TRITON FW, k
2135 Turning to STBD, one short blast
CMD 2135 SOM_SUWC_: 0435:27Z de SOM, locations of our RHIBS are as follows Revenge 7-1 33 00 02N, Revenge 7-5 33 00 N 118 38m 37s W, SUMMIT 32 35N 118 35, k
2136 C/S 10 kts
2136 XO off the Bridge
CMD 2136 SDG_TAO: 0436:57Z SOM de SDG, Triton is u/w, 4 souls onboard, k
2136 Digital Flux Gate Magnetic Compass
2136 Sounded one short blast
2136 MKI_TAO: 0436:46Z SOM de MKI, could the chaps and psych be transferred via small boat tonight?
2137 Fuel Rev 75-100%, 70%, 75%
CMD 2137 SOM_TZ: 0437:47Z de SOM, r ar
2137 MKI_TAO: 0437:46Z Unable to fly them at night, k
CMD 2138 BVR_MRICO_: 0438:23Z CPR3 de BVR i need a contact for coast guard sd
CMD 2139 MEU_WC_: 0439:15Z @SDG_TAO or @SHADY_INNTEL, please acknowledge receipt of previous message. or pass a call-back number
CMD 2139 SDG_LFOC_WO: 0439:52Z Shady Intel copies
CMD 2140 BVR_MRICO_: 0440:08Z CPR3 de BVR where are you embarked
CMD 2140 CPR3_BWC: 0440:24Z BVR de CPR3 we are embarked on MKI
2140 SOM_TZ: 0440:00Z de SOM, r ar
CMD 2141 BVR_MRICO_: 0441:52Z de BVR rgr ty
2141 SOM_TZ: 0441:39Z MKI de SOM, neg on boat ops pax transfer, reengage in morning, k
CMD 2142 CPR3_BWC: 0442:28Z SDG de CPR3 please acknowledge stand down RQ21, k
CMD 2142 SDG_CSO: 0442:28Z MEU_WC de SDG DOC, all patients from SDG were MEDEVAC'ed earlier today, k
CMD 2143 SDG_TAO: 0443:33Z CPR3 de SDG, tracking no RQ-21, ar
CMD 2143 CPR3_BWC: 0443:44Z thanks
CMD 2143 MEU_WC_: 0443:58Z SDG DOC confirm there is no Appendicitis patient
2144 Two short blast
CMD 2144 SDG_CSO: 0444:24Z MEU WC de SDG, there NO appendicitis patient onboard SDG, k
CMD 2144 MEU_WC_: 0444:32Z Copy all. Thank you.
CMD 2144 MEU_WC_: 0444:55Z @SOM_TAO can you please pass a dial-in number for MEU Medical to contact SOM Medical
2144 Sounded two short blasts
2144 SOM_SUWC_: 0444:08Z MKI de SOM, how long do you intend to maintain this course?, k
2144 MKI_TAO: 0444:23Z de MKI, r ar
CMD 2145 SOM_TAO_: 0445:44Z MEU de SOM, r w1, ar
2145 MKI_TAO: 0445:12Z de MKI, until launch of all A/C then will be coming stbd
2146 San Diego is swapping out with MKI to bring our RHIB back in
2146 Bridge asked for updated location of the RHIB
CMD 2146 CPR3_ABWC: 0446:32Z BVR de CPR3 6192787000, Coast Guard #
CMD 2146 BVR_MRICO_: 0446:57Z de BVR rgr ty
2147 Digital Flux Gate Magnetic Compass
2147 SOM_SUWC_: 0447:45Z MKI de SOM, we are going to turn around to reset, then come to 315 to launch A/C, k
2150 C/C 180
2150 Set and Drift 246 degrees T / 0.6 Knots
2150 Digital Flux Gate Magnetic Compass
2150 Sounded one short blast
2151 First LT bringing in our RHIB
2151 MKI_TAO: 0451:34Z de MKI, r ar
CMD 2152 TACCWO: 0452:29Z ALL UNITS de CPR3 TACCWO, Air Search Sectors as follows: Primary - 1185030W to SCI Coastline, 3300N to 3256N. Secondary - 1185030W to SCI Coastline, 3304N to 3300N
2152 SOM_TZ: 0452:23Z SDG de SOM, is there a number we can call or can your OPS/CSO come up on standing bridge, k
2152 SDG_CSO: 0452:40Z We can come SVTC, k
2152 SDG_CSO: 0452:42Z We are on ENR
2153 Bridge asks for range and bearing on MKI. Have on AIS
2153 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(F) the CONN
2153 SOM_TZ: 0453:14Z rgr, so is my ops/pto
2154 Standby for fuel status
CMD 2154 TACCWO: 0454:14Z Sending a diagram of the air search sectors on SIPR to SDG and SOM OPS email.

ENCLOSURE (23)

CMD 2154 CPR3_BWC: 0454:32Z TACCWO please include CPR3 BWC as well.
 2154 MKI_CICWO: 0454:21Z TZ de MKI, intend to come to 270 after we launch A/C, k
 2155 Have last known position
 2155 CO out of CIC
 2155 Four souls 3+ 45
 2156 C/C 330
 2156 Turn to STBD
 2156 CO on the Bridge
 CMD 2156 SOM_TAO_: 0456:41Z TACCWO de SOM, please send to TAO's@lpd25.navy.smil, k
 2156 Sounded one short blast
 2156 SOM_TZ: 0456:05Z de TZ, r ar
 2157 XO out of CIC
 CMD 2157 TACCWO: 0457:13Z SOM, CPR3 BWC de TACCWO, copy all, k
 CMD 2157 MEU_WC_: 0457:29Z @TACCWO, please confirm what aircraft are currently on station
 2157 CO on the Bridge
 2157 SOM_SUWC_: 0457:06Z de SOM, coming to 330T, k
 2158 Team identified and on standby in case of relief
 2200 C/C 331
 CMD 2200 TACCWO: 0500:21Z MEU_WC de CPR3 TACCWO, RS11, BL44, USCG RESCU 6603 onsta, k
 CMD 2200 SOM_TAO_: 0500:42Z MEU de SOM, SOM Medical dial-in taf (619) 545-7969, k
 CMD 2200 MEU_WC_: 0500:44Z @SOM_TAO, please send a call-back number. Need medical coordination
 CMD 2200 MEU_WC_: 0500:49Z C
 CMD 2200 ESG3_EWO: 0500:55Z TACCWO, please send to ESG-3 EWO as well, ESG3.EWO.fct@navy.smil.mil. k
 2201 Green Deck
 2201 Digital Flux Gate Magnetic Compass
 2201 CO on the Bridge
 CMD 2202 MEU_WC_: 0502:46Z @TACCWO or @SOM_TAO say status of SNOOP 12
 2203 CO makes 1MC announcement
 2203 Green Deck
 CMD 2204 JFN_TAO_: 0504:03Z CPR3 de JFN, int is there a rhib rotation plan or is the intent for all ships to keep a rhib in the water at all times, k.
 CMD 2204 CPR3_AOPS: 0504:31Z B de TB, following sector assignments as follows: SOM-230-270 (3-6 NM), MKI: 270-320 (3-6NM), SDG: 320-350 (3-6NM), JFN: 350-030 (3-6 NM), k
 2205 C/C 340
 CMD 2205 CPR3_BWC: 0505:27Z JFN, de CPR3, once we get all ships in sectors, we will pass direction on RIB rotation plan, k
 CMD 2205 CPR3_AOPS: 0505:37Z Center of assignments based up L/L, datum, 3302N 11839W
 CMD 2205 TACCWO: 0505:44Z MEU_WC, w1, k
 CMD 2205 SDG_TAO: 0505:59Z TB de SDG, rar
 CMD 2206 JFN_CICWO_: 0506:56Z CPR3, de JFN, rar
 CMD 2206 TACCWO: 0506:57Z MEU_WC de TACCWO, SN12 still on deck SOM, k
 2207 C/C 350
 2207 SOM_TZ: 0507:15Z de SOM, coming to 340T, k
 2207 SOM_SUWC_: 0507:52Z de SOM, coming to 350T, k
 CMD 2208 MKI_TAO: 0508:02Z CPR3 de MKI, are sectors an immediate execute?, k
 CMD 2208 SOM_TZ: 0508:12Z TB de SOM, rar
 CMD 2208 CPR3_ABWC: 0508:50Z MKI de CPR3 rar
 2209 Coast Guard Port 83 standby at 3300N 118, 37W, 6 miles southwest of field
 2210 XO in CIC
 CMD 2210 SDG_CSO: 0510:51Z SOM de SDG, currently briefing SDG's MRF crews, k
 2210 Green Deck
 2211 CO off the Bridge
 2211 SDG_CICWO: 0511:43Z de SDG coming to 000 to set up for sector, k
 CMD 2212 SDG_CICWO: 0512:11Z JFN de SDG, currently on a BTB call, changing course to 000 to set up for sector, k
 2212 SOM_TZ: 0512:59Z de TZ, r ar
 2213 San Diego coming to 300
 CMD 2213 CPR3_BWC: 0513:05Z SDG de CPR3, launch your RIBs. Once Launched, JFN, recover yours, k
 CMD 2213 JFN_CICWO : 0513:24Z SDG de JFN. rar

ENCLOSURE 23

2214 Red Deck
 CMD 2214 BVR_MRICO_: 0514:23Z MKI de BVR int w
 CMD 2214 SOM_TZ: 0514:51Z SDG de SOM, r ar
 CMD 2214 JFN_CICWO_: 0514:58Z CPR3 de JFN, rar
 CMD 2214 TACCWO: 0614:44Z de TACCWO, copy. Will also be searching for strobes and chem lights, k
 2214 Red Deck
 CMD 2215 SOM_TAO_: 0615:31Z de SOM, r ar
 CMD 2216 SDG_CSO: 0516:00Z CPR3 de SDG, we are unable to launch any more RIBs. We have launched our 7m RIB (TRITON). We have coordinated with SOM to swap out MRF crews
 . MRF crew was just briefed by CO and Ops. They are headed down. We are coordinating with SOM for their 2 11m MRF RIBs to come alongside and swap crews, k
 CMD 2216 JFN_TAO_: 0516:52Z CPR3 de JFN, int recover both rhibs, k.
 CMD 2216 MKI_TAO: 0516:58Z BVR de MKI, 32:59:01N 118:41:28W, 300T 2 kts, k
 CMD 2216 SDG_CSO: 0616:19Z TB de SDG, will be displaying RED OVER RED to guide the rhib to us, k
 CMD 2216 CPR3_BWC: 0616:34Z SDG, de TB, rar
 2216 Received Draft Report FWD Draft 7.14 / Mean Draft 7.18 / Aft Draft 7.22
 2217 Two blasts all power stop
 CMD 2217 SDG_CSO: 0517:13Z CPR3 de SDG, correction to last - we are still troubleshooting our KB crane, k
 2217 Sounded two short blasts
 2218 Hydraulic casualty on one of the RHIBs
 2218 XO out of CIC
 CMD 2218 SDG_CSO: 0518:31Z CPR3 de SDG, as soon as KB crane is corrected, we will launch RIBs, k
 2219 MKI has lost steering
 2219 MKI_CICWO: 0519:40Z TZ de MKI, we have a loss of steering, k
 2220 MKI 300 at 2 kts
 CMD 2220 MKI_TAO: 0520:30Z All units de MKI, we have a loss of steering, currently on 300 at 2 kts, k
 2220 SOM_TZ: 0520:13Z de TZ, r ar
 2220 MKI_CICWO: 0520:14Z TZ de MKI, SNOOP12 on deck, k
 2222 MKI regained steering
 CMD 2222 MKI_TAO: 0522:56Z de MKI, we have regained steering, k
 CMD 2223 SOM_TZ: 0523:38Z de SOM, r ar
 2224 XO off the Bridge
 CMD 2224 CPR3_AOPS: 0524:08Z de TB, r ar
 CMD 2224 JFN_CICWO_: 0524:40Z de JFN, r ar
 CMD 2224 CPR3_BWC: 0524:43Z SDG, de CPR3, rar
 2225 MKI proceeding on course 300
 2225 MKI_CICWO: 0525:31Z TZ de MKI, my course is 300, k
 2226 SOM_TZ: 0526:03Z de MKI, r ar
 CMD 2227 JFN_TAO_: 0527:43Z CPR3 de JFN, intentions to recover 1 rhib, int do you want us to wait until SDG crane is corrected to recover 2nd rhib, k.
 2227 SOM_TZ: 0527:21Z de TZ* r ar
 2228 CO in CIC
 CMD 2228 SDG_TAO: 0528:17Z CPR3 de SDG, do you intend for MKI to hold ACU through the night? Working watch rotation for my SCAC, k
 CMD 2229 CPR3_BWC: 0529:03Z JFN, de CPR3, yes, we'd like you to wait. How are the conditions for the RIBs? Want to ensure safe to remain in water, k
 CMD 2229 BVR_MRICO_: 0529:08Z SOM de BVR i need a contact number
 CMD 2229 SOM_TZ: 0529:23Z TB de SOM, Revenge 71 has a small lube oil leak, currently enroute for recovery, k
 CMD 2229 CPR3_BWC: 0529:59Z de TB rar
 CMD 2230 SOM_TAO_: 0530:20Z BVR de SOM, int contact number for which personnel, k
 CMD 2230 CPR3_AOPS: 0530:35Z B de TB, stby for adjustments to sector assignments
 CMD 2231 SOM_TZ: 0531:14Z de SOM, r
 CMD 2231 SDG_CSO: 0531:48Z de SDG, r
 CMD 2231 JFN_TAO_: 0531:57Z CPR3 de JFN, 1 rhib recovered, 1 rhib remains in the water, ops normal, safe to remain in the water, k.
 2232 Insert sectors for ships lat and long into SSDS
 CMD 2232 CPR3_AOPS: 0532:03Z SOM: 200-230, MKI: 230-270, JFN: 270-320, SDG 320-000
 CMD 2232 CPR3_BWC: 0532:14Z JFN de CPR3, rar
 CMD 2232 SDG_TAO: 0532:27Z JFN de SDG, call sign for RIB still in water?, k
 CMD 2232 BVR_MRICO_: 0532:30Z SOM de BVR SEALS on SCI are offering assistance do you have a POC i can contact
 CMD 2232 CPR3_BWC: 0532:45Z JFN de CPR3 recover your other 7m RIB k

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CMD 2307 SOM_TZ: 0607:02Z TB de SOM, Summet is astern, waiting for recovery, k
 CMD 2307 CPR3_AOPS: 0607:32Z de TB, r ar
 CMD 2309 TACCWO: 0609:33Z SOM de TACCWO, interrogative from BL03: What exactly are they looking for in the water? Personnel, wreckage, personal gear?
 CMD 2310 TACCWO: 0610:06Z When the first survivors were pulled out the water, what did they see?
 CMD 2312 SOM_TAO_: 0612:39Z TACCWO de SOM, look for personnel, gear, floatation devices, possible wreckage, k
 2314 XO in CIC
 2315 SDG_CICWO: 0615:51Z TZ de SDG, will be displaying RED OVER RED to guide the rhib to us, k
 2316 SOM_TZ: 0616:18Z SDG de TZ, r ar
 2318 XO out of CIC
 2318 SOM_SUWC_: 0616:42Z de SOM, r ar
 2340 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has the CONN
 2341 XO in CIC
 2346 XO out of CIC
 2351 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was properly relieved of TAO by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
 2357 CO off the Bridge

Need:
-Confirmation and validation
from BLT

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Appendix 1 - Mission Matrix

Mission	Primary	Alternate	Tertiary
Bald Eagle - Air	Lima Charlie	India Alpha	
Bald Eagle - Surface	LAR Co (M) (+)	Kilo CAAT 3	CAAT 2 Pit or LAR Pit
Sparrowhawk - Air	Lima C Pit	India C Pit	
Sparrowhawk - Surface	CAAT 2 Pit or LAR Pit	LAR Co (-)	CAAT 1 Sect 2
TRAP - Air	81's Sect	India CAAT 1	CAAT 2
TRAP - Surface	CAAT 2 Pit	LAR Pit	LAR Co (-)
Raid - Air	Lima Charlie	India Alpha	
Raid - Motor	India	LAR Pit or CAAT 2 Pit	LAR Co (-)
Raid - Mech	Kilo		
Airfield Seizure	Lima	Kilo	LAR Co (-)
NEO Sec - Air	Lima	I Btry (777)	
NEO Sec - Surface	CAAT 2 Pit or LAR Pit	LAR Co (-)	
NEO ECC	CLB-15	I Btry (777)	
HADR Sec - Air	Lima	I Btry (777)	
HADR Sec - Surface	CAAT 2 Pit or LAR Pit	I Btry (777)	
EMB REIN-Air	Lima	India	Kilo
EMB REIN- Surface	CAAT 2 Pit or LAR Pit	CAAT 1 Sect 2	LAR Co (-)
HAO	CLB COM		
FCE	CE SD		
MAGTF CM CBRN	CBRN LHD		
HAST	CLB / PHIB		
MCRT	LHD	PHB	
CASEVAC/MASCAS/STP	CLB	PHB	
VBSS/GOPLAT	ADR LPD	ADR LHD	
Deep Recon - Air	Recon LHD	Recon LPD	BLT Scout Snipers
Deep Recon - Surface	Recon LHD	Recon LHD	BLT Scout Snipers
Deep Recon - Subsurface	Recon LPD	Recon LHD	
Amphib Recon - Air	Recon LPD	Recon LHD	
Amphib Recon - Surface	Recon LPD	Recon LHD	
Hydro Recon	Recon LPD	Recon LHD	

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Appendix 2 - Amphibious Operations Primary Decisions

1. Amphibious Force Mission: (Mutual Decision)
 - a. Amphibious Force commanders may decide on a coordinated mission statement or develop separate but supporting mission statements. The determination of a coordinated amphibious force mission statement is a mutual decision.
2. Amphibious Force Objective(s): (Mutual Decision)
 - a. Amphibious force objectives are physical objectives, terrain, infrastructure, or forces, that must be seized, secured, or destroyed in order to accomplish the mission. Amphibious force objectives are designated in alphabetical order. (e.g. Amphibious Force Objective A or AF Obj A).
3. Course of action (Determine/select): (Mutual Decision)
 - a. Amphibious force planners develop COAs based on guidance from Amphibious Force Commanders. Normally, LF Planners will provide an LF COA for ATF Planners to develop a supporting COA.
4. Landing Areas: (Mutual Decision)
 - a. The landing area is that part of the operational area within which the landing operations of an amphibious force are conducted. It includes the beach, the approaches to the beach, the transport areas, the fire support areas, the airspace occupied by close supporting aircraft, and the land included in the advance inland to accomplish the initial objectives.
5. Landing Beaches: (Mutual Decision)
 - a. Portion of the shoreline usually required for the landing of a BLT. May also be that portion of a shoreline constituting a tactical locality over which a force may be landed. Landing beaches are selected from within the selected landing areas.
6. Sea Echelon Plan: (PHIBRON Determines)
 - a. The sea echelon plan is the distribution plan for amphibious shipping in the transport area to minimize losses due to threat attacks and to reduce the area swept by mines.
7. Landing Force Objective(s): (CO MEU Determines)
 - a. LF Objectives facilitate the attainment of amphibious force objectives and/or ensure continuous landing of forces and material. Designated by LF and a number. (e.g. Landing Force Objective 1 or LF OBJ 1)
8. Landing Zones/Drop zones: (CO MEU Determines)
9. Date and hour of Landing: (Mutual Decision)
 - a. The date and hour of the landing are selected unless they are specified in the order initiating the amphibious operation. H-Hour and L-Hour are confirmed prior to beginning of the landing based on weather, enemy, situation and other factors.


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ENCLOSURE (2A)

Appendix 3 – Critical Thresholds

UNIT	No-Go	INITIATOR	EXECUTOR	ACTION
AAV Ref: Employment of AAV COMNAV/SURFPACINST 3340.3C	Vis <100m (Ops) Vis <500m (Trng) SS4 (Loaded), SS5 (Empty) (Ops) SS3 (Trng) 2 of 3 conditions: (Ops) Wave Height <6 Wave Interval <9 Seconds Littoral Current <8.5 knots MSI <6 (Trng) Safety Boats: Navy Requirement	-METOC -AAV Plt Cdr -LFSP -PCS -R & S	-LFOC Watch O in conjunction with AAV Platoon Cdr recommendation -CPR/MEU Cdr Final Authority	Postpone landing craft movement, Utilize Harbor/Boat Basin for Insert
LCU Ref: - COMNAV/SURFPACINST 3340.3C -ACUONEINST 3120.4 & 3120.1A -BMUONEINST 3500.1C & 5400.1C -Well Deck Ops	Phibron Level Waiver VIS < 1nm MSH > 10 ft SWH > 6 (Trng) > 12(Ops) Wind > 35 kt SS sill	-Well deck officer -LCU craft- master -METOC	- Flagplot watch officer, in conjunction with the CPR/MEU Commander	- Postpone loading and movement of LCU into well deck
LCAC Ref: Sea Ops, Manual for Landing Craft, Air Cushion Series -BMUONEINST 5400.1C -Dry Well Ops -Surf Zone	> +/- 2 ft at the sill VIS <1nm SS >= 4 (5-8 ft) -LCS Wind >35 kt (Temp/load dependent) SWH > 6.9 SWH > 5ft at Sill Breakers > 4-8 ft	-METOC -LCS -LCAC Craft Master	- CPR Commander	- LCAC cease movement ashore/to ship
LARC	MSI >6 (Trng) >9 (Oper) Current > 4 kt Wind > 25 kt SWH > 6 ft Chop >4 ft	-METOC -PCS -LCU Craftmaster	- PCS recommends to CPR /MEU Commander for decision	- Postpone
CRRC (see Limits Table)	SS > 3 -Breaker Height v. Period Table 8' with 14 second period	- METOC - CRRC OIC - R&S ashore	- Flagplot Watch Officer in Conjunction with CPR/MEU Commanders	- Postpone
Swimmers	Current >2kt -Dangerous Marine Life	- METOC - Unit Cmdr - R&S ashore	- LFOC watch officer in conjunction with the CPR/MEU Commander	- Postpone
RHIB Launch/ Recovery	>4 ft seas SS >3	- METOC - NSWTO OIC	- CPR Commander	- Postpone



Appendix 4 - Sea State Chart

Sea State	Description	Wind Force (Beaufort)	Wind Description	Wind Range (kt)	Wind Velocity (kt)	Average Wave Height (ft)	SIGNIFICANT WAVE HEIGHT
0	The sea is like a mirror. Ripples with the appearance of scales are formed, but without foam crests.	0	Calm	<1	0	0	0
1	Small wavelets, still short but more pronounced; form, crests have a glassy appearance but do not break.	1	Light air	1-3	2	0.05	0.08
2	Large wavelets form; crests begin to break. Foam of a glassy appearance forms; there may be scattered whitecaps.	2	Light breeze	4-6	5	0.19	0.29
3	Small waves form; becoming longer; whitecaps are fairly frequent.	3	Gentle breeze	7-10	8.5	0.6	1.0
4	Moderate waves appear, taking a more pronounced form; there are many whitecaps and a chance of some spray.	4	Moderate breeze	11-16	12	1.4	2.2
5	Large waves begin to form; white foam crests are more extensive everywhere. There is some spray.	5	Fresh breeze	17-21	18	3.8	6.1
6	The sea heaps up and white foam from breaking waves begins to be blown in streaks along the direction of the wind. Sprindrift begins.	6	Strong breeze	22-27	22	6.4	10
7	Moderately high waves of greater length form; edges of crests break into spindrift. The foam is blown in well-marked streaks along the direction of the wind. Spray affects visibility.	7	Moderate Gale	28-33	28	11	18
8	High waves form. Dense streaks of foam appear along the direction of the wind. The sea begins to roll. Visibility is affected.	8	Strong Gale	34-40	34	19	30
		9			38	21	35
					37	23	37
					38	25	40
					40	28	45
					42	31	50
					44	36	59
					46	40	64

Appendix 5 - Standing Rules of Engagement (ROE)

- Unit commanders always have the inherent right and obligation to use force up to and including deadly force in response to hostile acts and demonstrations of hostile intent.
 - A hostile act is an attack or other use of force against U.S. forces, e.g. firing on U.S. forces, throwing rocks at U.S. forces, or force used to impede the mission or duties of U.S. forces. Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force, considering capability and preparedness and all other facts known at the time, e.g. loaded weapon pointed at U.S. forces.
 - If I, or other U.S. Forces, may be killed or seriously injured due to the actions of another, I may immediately use deadly force.
 - If time and circumstances permit, I will attempt to control the situation without the use of force, e.g. verbal warnings or demonstrations of force.
 - If the use of force is required, I will use only that degree of force necessary to stop the attack or eliminate the threat.
 - If a force or group has been declared hostile, once positively identified with a reasonable certainty, I may engage that force without observing a hostile act or hostile intent.
 - I will use no more force than is necessary to accomplish the mission.
 - When dealing with civilians, I will treat them with dignity and respect.
- Basic Principles of the Law of War:**
(From MCO 3300.4A)
- Entry-Level Training Objectives. Entry-level training will teach the following:
 - Basic Principles of the Law of War:
 - Marines fight only enemy combatants.
 - Marines do not harm enemies who surrender. Marines disarm them and turn them over to their superiors.
 - Marines do not torture or kill prisoners of war or detainees.
 - Marines collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
 - Marines do not attack protected persons or places such as medical personnel, facilities, equipment, or chaplains.
 - Marines destroy no more than the mission requires.
 - Marines treat all civilians humanely.
 - Marines do not steal; they respect private property and possessions.
 - Marines do their best to prevent violations of the law of war, and report all violations to their superiors.

Law of Armed Conflict

- Do not attack noncombatants. Fight only hostile forces. All persons participating in military operations or activities are combatants. Remember that only combatants may be targeted.
- Destroy no more than required by your mission. Attack only military targets. Do not attack, mistreat, or harm wounded hostile forces or hostile forces who surrender.

ENCLOSURE (2)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
U. S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFIC
BOX 555321
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5321

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3000
EOTG/RAIDS
17 Mar 20

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines

Subj: LETTER OF INSTRUCTION FOR 1ST BATTALION, 4TH MARINES AMPHIBIOUS
RAID COURSE (4 TO 22 MAY 2020)

Ref: (a) MCO 3502.3C, Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Pre-Deployment
Training Plan (PTP) dtd 30 Apr 2012
(b) NAVMC 3500.99, MEU Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual dtd 13 Nov
2012
(c) NAVMC 3500.44B, Infantry Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual dtd
4 Nov 2016
(d) BO 3500.1A, Range and Training Regulations
(e) MCRP 3-30.1, Raid Operations

Encl: (1) Training Schedules
(2) Raid Force Requirements
(3) Amphibious Raid Performance Evaluation Checklist
(4) Raid Force Key Unit Leader Point of Contact Information
(5) Support Detachment Requirements
(6) Sample Communications Electronics Operating Instructions
(7) Aviation Requirements
(8) Ammunition Requirements
(9) EOTG Points of Contact

1. Situation. Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG), Amphibious Raids Branch (ARB) conducts the Amphibious Raids Course (ARC) for 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (V14). During the conduct of ARC, V14 raid forces will test and refine unit standard operating procedures, conduct planning for and be evaluated during the execution of multiple company level, battalion landing team supported raids.

2. Mission. From 4 May to 22 May 2020, Amphibious Raids Branch trains V14 aboard Camp Pendleton in raid force tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to build company size raid proficiency and conduct expeditionary operations.

3. Execution

a. Commander's Intent

1) Purpose.

(a) To increase proficiency in their ability to conduct expeditionary operations while forward deployed.

(b) V14 is prepared for pre-deployment training and certification.

ENCLOSURE (25)

Subj: LETTER OF INSTRUCTION FOR 1ST BATTALION, 4TH MARINES AMPHIBIOUS
RAID COURSE (4 TO 22 MAY 2020)

2) Method.

(a) V14 Raid Forces will conduct deliberate planning with supporting and attached units for both day and night raid situational training exercise (STX).

(b) V14 Raid Forces will execute both STXs and receive deliberate debriefs founded in standards pulled from the references (b) and (c) and enclosure (3).

(c) V14 Battalion staff will have the opportunity to facilitate notional supporting arms through their FSCC, command and control through a modified Landing Force Operations Center and integrate real-time information updates into the plan through either a Reconnaissance Operations Center or a Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC).

3) End State.

(a) V14 has increased proficiency and refined unit standard operating procedures (SOPs) for Raid operations.

b. Concept of Operations

(1) Scheme of Maneuver. The Amphibious Raid Course is structured to support one week of training for each raid force; for a total of three raid forces (Mechanized, Primary Air, and Alternate Air). The mechanized raid force will conduct training from 4 to 8 May 2020. The alternate helicopter borne raid force will conduct training from 11 to 15 May 2020. The primary helicopter borne raid force will conduct training from 18 to 22 May 2020. The one week training package for each raid force will be conducted in three phases:

(a) Phase I - Planning

1. This Phase begins at 0800 on T-1 with a welcome aboard, safety brief, and lineout.

2. After the line out, key unit leaders will conduct final planning and a Rehearsal of Concept (ROC). Upon completion of the ROC the raid force will have time to conduct additional planning and SOP refinement with EOTG instructor oversight. All Situation Training Exercises (STX) products are provided at Raid Planner's Course.

3. This Phase ends on T-2 the company conducting small unit level ROCs, rehearsals, and SOP refinement with EOTG instructor oversight.

(b) Phase II - Execution

1. This Phase begins with STX 1. Each raid force will conduct two STXs. The first STX will be conducted during daylight hours and the second STX conducted at night.

2. The raid force will execute a STX that incorporates Opposing Forces (OPFOR), aviation assets, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S), and Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) as applicable. The STXs will increase in difficulty as the course progresses. Each STX will be followed

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by a detailed debrief led by the training unit with oversight from the Raids Branch Instructor Cadre.

3. After the first STX, the training unit will have until the following night to refine their plan for STX 2 and make adjustments as necessary. The night raid will be conducted at the same site as the day raid, but with an increase in complexity.

4. This Phase ends with a final debrief following the conclusion of STX 2.

(c) Phase III - Retrograde

1. This Phase begins with the Raid Force turning in all gear, police of the bivouac area, and check-out with Amphibious Raids Branch SNCOIC. Upon release by the Amphibious Raids Branch SNCOIC, the raid force will retrograde.

2. The support detachment will break down, clean the FASP, return unexpended ammunition to the Camp Pendleton ASP, and dispose of dunnage, in accordance with training unit procedures. The remainder of the support detachment will clean up raid sites and then retrograde.

3. This Phase ends with all training areas turned back to range control, gear accounted for, Fire Base Gloria clean and units departing.

(2) Fire Support Plan. For STXs, the raid force will plan for fire support assets that are organic to the MEU. The 15th MEU will source close air support from its ACE and/or 3D MAW aviation planners. EOTG simulates all other notional aviation assets when appropriate. A combined arms rehearsal should be conducted during planning while ACE representatives are available. ACE planners should make themselves available to assist with Fire Support Planning at 0900 on T-1 per enclosure (1).

c. Tasks

(1) 1st Battalion, 4th Marines

(a) No later than (NLT) 20 April 2020, submit the Raid Force Key Unit Leader Point of Contact Information for the Company to the Amphibious Raids Branch, per encl. (4).

(b) Develop and publish an unclassified version of 15th MEU's SOP for the training audience to use during the course.

(c) Provide a support detachment with associated training requirements, per encl. (5).

(d) Provide transportation support assets and personnel for training unit's movement to and from Fire Base Gloria.

(e) Coordinate MTRV support for helicopter borne raid companies for insert and extract during STXs. This secondary means of transportation needs to be executable in one wave and remain at designated place.

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(f) Request appropriate frequencies and provide a communications plan for the course, modeled with the same capabilities per the sample Communications-Electronic Operation Instructions (CEOI) found in encl. (6).

(g) Provide the raid force and support detachment with class I supplies throughout the training evolution.

(h) Provide battalion staff members to assist the company raid forces with planning. At a minimum this should include Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) personnel and intel staff members.

(i) NLT 16 March 2020, schedule a Final Planning Conference (FPC) with the Amphibious Raids Branch SNCOIC.

(j) NLT 16 March 2020, submit the names and contact information for all training unit ammunition technicians to EOTG's Ammunition Chief so that they can be listed on the EOTG delegation of authority permission in the Total Ammunition Management Information Systems (TAMIS).

(k) Provide Instant Eyes Small Unmanned Aerial System (SUAS) capability and associated personnel for threat replication.

(l) There is Command and Control (C2) capability within an air platform for air raid weeks. The mission commanders should come from the battalion staff. NLT 2 March 2020 inform Amphibious Raids Branch on feasibility of Mission Commanders for each raid.

(m) Provide 60 rounds of 5.56 (A059) for security ammunition. Thirty rounds of this ammunition will be used to escort munitions provided by role players from the Las Pulgas Gate to the raid site. The other 30 rounds will be used for the armed guard at the Forward Ammunition Supply Point (FASP). OIC needs to have this security ammunition in his possession NLT 0900 on T-1 and will be turning it back in NLT 1300 on T-5 of each week. Transportation and coordination with the role players for this event will be handled by EOTG staff.

(2) EOTG, S-3, Air Shop. Request aviation per encl. (7).

(3) EOTG, S-4

(a) Request ammunition and coordinate with designated battalion ammo techs to schedule drop off, pick-ups, and turn-ins, per encl. (8)

(b) Contract portable toilets for each training site from 4 to 8 May 2020, 11 to 15 May 2020, and 18 to 22 May 2020. (40 Marines)

(c) Contract portable toilets for Fire Base Gloria from 4 to 8 May 2020, 11 to 15 May 2020, and 18 to 22 May 2020. (200 Marines)

(d) Contract portable toilet for the FASP located 11S MS 58688 84344 from 4 to 8 May 2020, 11 to 15 May 2020, and 18 to 22 May 2020.

(e) Provide fuel key to training audience to support AAVs.

(f) Coordinate one four wheel drive 15' (at minimum) flatbed pickup truck from 4 to 8 May 2020, 11 to 15 May 2020, and 18 to 22 May 2020.

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This will be retained and used by EOTG during these times to move supporting gear and equipment to and from the raid site.

(g) Coordinate corpsman support from 4 to 8 May 2020, 11 to 18 May 2020, and 18 to 22 May 2020. Two corpsman will be needed at all times during prescribed dates.

(4) EOTG, Amphibious Raids Branch

(a) Develop, coordinate, and supervise all components of the Amphibious Raid Course.

(b) Coach, mentor, and provide instruction throughout the duration of the raid course.

(c) Schedule all ranges and training areas required for this course.

(d) Verify status of weapon systems prior to training unit submitting request for ammunition.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Amphibious Raids Branch is located at Fire Base Gloria (FBG), building 41420 in the 41 Area aboard Camp Pendleton, California. This building serves as the administrative assembly area for classes and planning. FBG also serves as the notional amphibious shipping from which each exercise launches for their respective raids. Students bivouac in the vicinity of FBG while attending the course. Raid forces will arrive to FBG on T-1 with all raid force requirements, per encl. (2).

(2) A performance summary will be sent to the V14 Operations Officer at the end of each course, per encl. (3).

(3) Command visits are encouraged. Coordinate all command visits with the Amphibious Raids Branch OIC 24 hours prior to the visit.

(4) Planning computers are not available for use. There is Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) computer access available for administrative matters, but not for raid planning. Personal computers and printers are authorized to assist in the planning process.

(5) FBG is not authorized to handle classified information. All products generated must be unclassified.

(6) A detailed course schedule is outlined in encl. (1)

(7) At a minimum, a raid force should consist of the following personnel:

(a) Company Commander.

(b) Company Staff.

(c) Fire Support Team, to include JTAC or FAC, with an established and rehearsed FIST SOP.

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- (d) Subordinate platoons with leadership.
 - (e) Company Level Intelligence Cell (CLIC).
 - (f) Enablers (e.g. amphibious assault vehicle platoon, combat engineer platoon, explosive ordnance disposal team, signals support team, law enforcement detachment, etc.).
 - (g) As desired, independent platoons to support raid forces (e.g. CAAT, 81mm mortar, LAR, etc.).
 - (h) Members of the battalion staff to support raid force planning efforts, primarily the FSCC and S-2.
 - (i) Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) elements with supporting personnel for planning, coordination, and administrative requirements. It is recommended that the infantry battalion's scout sniper platoon commander and platoon sergeant are included in this element to set up a SARC. A minimum of two R&S teams are required to conduct training; however, four R&S teams are ideal to maximize training. R&S teams should be prepared to conduct landing zone reconnaissance, route reconnaissance, serve as guides, integrate with the fire support plan, and conduct initial terminal guidance for helicopter/tilt rotor aircraft and landing craft. R&S teams will be inserted by tactical vehicle and will require appropriate PPE during insertion and extraction. If a tactical vehicle is to be used, then it must be provided by the training unit and is not accounted for in the logistical requirements.
- (8) Intelligence representatives are required to:
- (a) Build planning products for the raid force such as collections plans, imagery, Line Of Sight (LOS) studies, Landing Zone (LZ) studies, and develop modified combined obstacle overlay based on the raid force commander's requirements.
 - (b) Ensure all intelligence products remain unclassified.
- (9) For the final coordination meeting with Amphibious Raids Branch it is recommended that the support detachment SNCOIC, a V14 S-4 representative, and a V14 S-3 representative attend.
- (10) An infantry battalion Command Operations Center (COC) recommended to battle track operations, which enhances the raid forces training.
- (11) Explosive breaching operations will be incorporated in STXs for all raid forces. Ensure assaultmen and attached engineers are prepared to conduct explosive breaching operations.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Administration

- (1) Parent command retains administrative control of training unit.
- (2) Raid force and support detachment personnel will report NLT 0800 on T-1.

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b. Logistics

(1) Ammunition is requested by EOTG and will come from EOTG's allotment. Drawing and transportation of the ammunition is the training unit's responsibility, per encl. (8).

(2) V14 will transport ammunition to the raid force FASP (grid 11SMS 5868 8434) NLT than 0900 on T-1 for each raid week. Ammunition will be signed for by the field ammunition supply point (FASP) OIC on T-1 and guarded by personnel from the support detachment. The FASP will be set up in an area designated by EOTG. Specific instructions for the FASP will be provided to the senior Marine from the support detachment during the coordination meeting with EOTG.

(3) V14 is responsible for the transportation, guarding and turn-in of unexpended ammunition and dunnage upon completion of training.

(4) V14 is responsible for all Class I during training. The water at FBG and is not potable.

(5) Portable toilets are contracted by EOTG for use by the exercise force. There are no other facilities available.

(6) V14 is responsible for coordinating all Class III resupply during training of Mechanized Raid Courses. Petroleum Oil Lubricants resupply needs to be coordinated for boat companies at the Del Mar Boat Basin as applicable.

5. Command and Signal. EOTG points of contact are listed in encl. (9).

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

By direction

Copy to:
CG, I MEF (G-3T)
CG, 1st MARDIV (G-3T)
CO, 1st Marines (S-3)
AC/S G-7 Staff Sections
Files

Training Schedule

Mechanized Raid Week 1: (4-8 May 2020)			
T-1: Monday, 4 May			
Time	Event	Location	Audience
0800-0900	Welcome Aboard / Safety Brief	CR 1	All Hands
0900-COMP	ACE planning cell with Raid Leadership	CR3	Raid Force Leadership
1000-1130	CIED employment, consideration, and maintenance refresher	CR1	Thor Operators, Tm Ldrs, Sqd Ldrs
1500-COMP	Company ROC STX 1	Terrain Model	Raid Force Leadership
T-2: Tuesday, 5 May			
0900-1200	Platoon ROC STX 1	Terrain Model	Plt Leadership
1200-COMP	Platoon Rehearsals	FBG	Plt/ Designated ARB Instructor
1900-COMP	R&S Insert	TA	Raid Force
T-3: Wednesday, 6 May			
0600-COMP	Insert Raid Force	TA	Raid Force
0800-COMP	STX 1 Execution	TA	Raid Force
TBD	STX 1 Debrief	CR1	Platoon Leadership & Above
T-4: Thursday, 7 May			
1700-COMP	Insert Raid Force	TA	SE1
1900-TBD	STX 2 Execution	TA	Raid Force
TBD	STX 2 Debrief	FBG	Platoon Leadership & Above
T-5: Friday, 8 May			
0900-1200	FBG Clean Up and Gear turn in.	FBG	Company Gunny and working party.

Enclosure (1)

Training Schedule

Air Raid Week 1: (11-15 May 2020)			
T-1: Monday, 11 May			
Time	Event	Location	Audience
0800-0900	Welcome Aboard / Safety Brief	CR 1	All Hands
0900-COMP	ACE planning cell with Raid Leadership	CR3	Raid Force Leadership
1000-1130	CIED employment, consideration, and maintenance refresher	CR1	Thor Operators, Tm Ldrs, Sqd Ldrs
1500-COMP	Company ROC STX 1	Terrain Model	Raid Force Leadership
T-2: Tuesday, 12 May			
0900-1200	Platoon ROC STX 1	Terrain Model	Plt Leadership
1200-TBD	Platoon Rehearsals	FBG	Plt/ Designated ARB Instructor
1900-COMP	R&S Insert	TA	Raid Force
T-3: Wednesday, 13 May			
0600-COMP	Insert Raid Force	TA	Raid Force
0800-COMP	STX 1 Execution	TA	Raid Force
TBD	STX 1 Debrief	CR1	Platoon Leadership & Above
T-4: Thursday, 14 May			
1700-COMP	Insert Raid Force	TA	Raid Force
1900-TBD	STX 2 Execution	TA	Raid Force
TBD	STX 2 Debrief	FBG	Platoon Leadership & Above
T-5: Friday, 15 May			
0900-1200	FBG Clean Up and Gear turn in.	FBG	Company Gunny and working party.

Enclosure (1)

ENCLOSURE (25)

Training Schedule

Alt Air Raid Week 1: (18-22 May 2020)			
T-1: Monday, 18 May			
Time	Event	Location	Audience
0800-0900	Welcome Aboard / Safety Brief	CR 1	All Hands
0900-COMP	ACE planning cell with Raid Leadership	CR3	Raid Force Leadership
1000-1130	CIED employment, consideration, and maintenance refresher	CR1	Thor Operators, Tm Ldrs, Sqd Ldrs
1500-COMP	Company ROC STX 1	Terrain Model	Raid Force Leadership
T-2: Tuesday, 19 May			
0900-1200	Platoon ROC STX 1	Terrain Model	Plt Leadership
1200-TBD	Platoon Rehearsals	FBG	Plt/ Designated ARB Instructor
1900-COMP	R&S Insert	TA	Raid Force
T-3: Wednesday, 20 May			
0600-COMP	Insert Raid Force	TA	Raid Force
0700-COMP	STX 1 Execution	TA	Raid Force
TBD	STX 1 Debrief	CR1	Platoon Leadership & Above
T-4: Thursday, 21 May			
1700-COMP	Insert Raid Force	TA	Raid Force
2030-TBD	STX 2 Execution	TA	Raid Force
TBD	STX 2 Debrief	FBG	Platoon Leadership & Above
T-5: Friday, 22 May			
0900-1200	FBG Clean Up and Gear turn in.	FBG	Company Gunny and working party.

Enclosure (1)

Raid Force Requirements

1. Copy of the CEOI and communications equipment to support the CEOI. A sample CEOI is listed in encl. (6).
2. Individual gear, weapons, equipment to conduct raid operations and to bivouac in a field environment throughout the duration of the course. Personnel must have all personal protective equipment (PPE) and issued weapon with BFA.
3. Transportation to/from the course.
4. Chow and water to subsist throughout the course.
5. Units will be expected to perform the following actions during the course of each STX IAW unit standard operating procedures:
 - a. Explosive Breaching.
 - b. ITG during day and night for CASEVAC aircraft.
 - c. Stretcher/litter movement of casualties.
 - d. Detainee handling.
 - e. Employment of dismounted Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) systems.
6. In order to accomplish the preceding tasks, the following gear/equipment is recommended:
 - a. Pole-less litters.
 - b. Poled litters.
 - c. Colored and IR Chem-lites, as needed, for marking IAW unit SOPs.
 - d. EPW kits (flex-cuffs and POW tags).
 - e. IR Strobes, fire flares or VIPR lights for use IAW unit SOPs.
 - f. Air panels.
 - g. Ear protection and eye protection.
 - h. Consumables for marking IAW Units signal/marketing plan.
 - i. Consumables for marking vehicles/aircraft.
 - j. BFAs for all organic weapons systems. This includes .50 caliber BFAs for units with that weapon system.
 - k. Mechanical breaching kits, provided by EOTG.
 - l. Training THOR suites, limited number provided by EOTG.
 - m. Compact Metal Detectors.
 - n. Engineer tape.
7. EOTG can provide the unit with most of the gear/equipment listed in bullet (6) upon request due to unit shortfalls.

Enclosure (2)

ENCLOSURE (25)

PECL Amphibious Raid

Performance Evaluation Checklist

Task: INF-MAN-6004: Conduct a raid

Condition: Given the order to conduct a limited objective attack with a planned withdrawal, a unit, and equipment

Standard: To accomplish the mission, meet commander's intent, and maintain accountability of all personnel.

References:

1. MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations
2. MCRP 3-10A.1 Infantry Company Operations
3. MCRP 3-16.6B Fire Support Team (FIST) Techniques and Procedures
4. MCTP 3-01B Air Assault Operations
5. MCWP 3-1 Ground Combat Operations
6. MCWP 3-11.6 Marine Rifle Platoon
7. MCWP 3-16.2 Procedures for the Marine Corps Fire Support

Performance Step

1. Conduct planning

Determine phasing of operation

Determine conditions and end state of each phase

Develop a scheme of maneuver that is simple, detailed, and clearly understood by all

Issue Warning Order

2. Conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield

Collection planning (ISR, reconnaissance and STA team usage)

Identify High Value Targets

Identify, track and receive answers to RFIs.

Detailed terrain analysis

Detailed weather analysis

Detailed Threat analysis (weapons, cultural IPB, MLCOA, MDCOA)

Identify NAIs/TAls and develop event template

Identify CCIRs, FFIRs, EEFs, PIRs, IRs

3. Task organize

Identify specified and implied tasks

Link sub-tasks with forces detainee teams, demolition teams, TSE teams)

Task organize platoons and squads into raid force elements by phase

Designate and weight the Main Effort

4. Integrate attachments, as required

Task Organize EOD, CI/HUMINT, Military Working Dogs, etc.

Request assets for resource and SME shortfalls

PECL Amphibious Raid

5. Conduct fire support planning
Develop Fire Support plan
Develop EFSTs that are clearly understood and support your plan
Determine necessary control measures (routes, AA, BPs, EA, objectives, LOD, Unit boundaries)
Determine necessary aviation support
Integrate aviation and ground based fires into organic capabilities
Develop an Objective Area Diagram (Air Planner)
Determine and deconflict geometries of fire
6. Integrate fires
Refine Fire Support plan
Ensure Fires support RFC SOM
Deconflict aviation and ground based fires
Deconflict direct fires and maneuver
7. Prepare for Combat
Develop Manifests
PreCombat Checks
PreCombat Inspections
Conduct a rehearsal of concept
8. Execute Command and Control
Establish Communications Ashore
Conduct BHO of Fires
Receive Battlefield Updates
Communicate battlefield updates
Correctly maneuver and control flow of force in and around objective area
9. Move to the Objective
Conceal movement by route selection, stealth, or speed
Cover movement by Support and Security Elements, Air and Fires Asset
10. Execute Actions on the Objective
Establish blocking positions that prevent reinforcement and withdrawal.
Establish procedures to allow for EOF and defensive actions IAW the ROE
Keep both Enemy and Neutrals from reaching the objective.
Objective is reconnoitered
Objective is isolated
Objective is suppressed
Foot hold is gained
Objective is secured
Establish Security Posture

Enclosure (3)

ENCLOSURE (25)

PECL Amphibious Raid

11. Conduct Information Collection
Conduct TSE
Tactical Debrief Detainees/EPWs
12. Conduct Tactical Casualty Care, as required
Establish Company CCP
Receive casualties from Aid and Litter Teams
Identify ZMIST for each casualty
Identify casualty evacuation by precedence
Coordinate with FST/FAC/Air Assets for CASEVAC
Evacuate casualties through appropriate CASEVAC platform
13. Process Detainees, as required
Identify Detainee procedures throughout the event
Plan for space availability for Detainees to extract with Raid Force
Plan for air lift of Detainees in absence of boat space availability
14. Send and Receive Required Reports
Send planned execution checklist reports in a timely manner
Send contingency execution checklist reports in a timely manner
Communicate with casevac assets in a expeditious manner
Communicate with fire support assets/reconnaissance assets
Maintain communication with subordinate units
Maintain good radio discipline on main tactical nets.
15. Gain Accountability
Identify MACO procedures throughout the event.
Maintain 100% accountability of personnel and equipment.
Develop plan ICO lost Marine
Execute plan ICO lost Marine.
Ensure link-up with R&S and non-organic forces occurs.
Ensure blue on blue does not occur during link ups
16. Execute Withdrawal
Conceal movement by route selection, stealth, or speed
Cover withdrawal by Support and Security Elements, Air and Fires Assets
17. Conduct Post Combat Actions
Conduct Debrief on Company, Platoon, Squad Levels
Addresses deficiencies and successes. Identifies actions to correct or sustain them.

Raid Force Key Unit Leader Point of Contact Information

Raid Force Task Organization		
Support Unit	Name	Phone #
Company:		
Site OIC:		
Site RSO:		
FASP OIC:		
Training Unit	Name	Phone #
Company Commander:		
Company Executive Officer:		
Company 1stSgt:		
Company GySgt:		
Enablers	OIC/SNCOIC/NCOIC	Phone #
EOD		
CHD		
Combat Camera		
Crash Fire Rescue		
UAS POC		
Communications Rep:		
Intelligence Rep:		

Enclosure (4)

ENCLOSURE (25)

Support Detachment Requirements

1. Each Raid Course is supported by a support detachment consisting of at least 51 Marines. It is highly recommended that one T/O rifle platoon serves as the base of this unit with appropriate augmentation to meet the below requirements. This support detachment cannot be sourced from the raid forces taking part in the training.

2. The support detachment is a dedicated unit and remains dedicated for no less than one week. Special cases require approval from both the Battalion and Amphibious Raids Branch OIC.

3. The support detachment consists of:

Role during raid week	Rank Requirement	Number
Raid Site OIC	≥ GySgt	(1)Primary (1)Alt
Raid Site RSO	≥ SSgt	(1)Primary (1)Alt
FASP OIC	≥ SSgt	1
OPFOR/Role player	PFC to Sgt	30
Ammo Guard	PFC to Sgt	2 present at all times recommend minimum of 6
HMMWV Drivers (One ammo qualified)	PFC to Sgt	3
HMMWV A-Drivers	PFC to Sgt	3
MTVR Drivers	PFC to Sgt	2
MTVR A-Drivers	PFC to Sgt	2
Safety Corpsman	HA to HM2	1

a. Site Support:

(1) Two Marines with current Camp Pendleton RSO certifications. These personnel function as the OIC and RSO, for the training sites during objective site set up and STX execution. In accordance with the base orders, due to the use of explosive breaching, the training site OIC will be a GySgt or above and the RSO a SSgt or above.

(2) Road guards in concurrence with range regulations.

(3) Opposing enemy force role players.

(4) Two Marines to operate the Instant Eyes system.

b. Field Ammunition Supply Point:

(1) One Marine with a current Camp Pendleton RSO certification to serve as the FASP OIC. Due to the requirement of a FASP, A SSgt or above serves as the FASP OIC.

(2) Two Marine ammunition guards must be present at all times at the FASP. They will be tasked with guarding the ammunition in the Oscar 2 Training Area for the duration of the course. Senior Marine present will be responsible for watch rotation.

(3) The ammunition guard detail must have requisite weapons and security ammo.

c. Drivers and Vehicle Support:

Support Detachment Requirements

(1) Three M-1123 HMMWVs with drivers and A-drivers (one of the drivers must be an ammunition qualified driver) to serve as safety vehicles. Two vehicles for training site safety vehicle and one vehicle for the FASP safety vehicle.

(2) Two MTVRs with drivers and A-drivers to transport support detachment throughout the week.

(3) One M353 trailer with ammo placards and tie downs, pallets, and one ammunition technician (2311). All HMMWVs, M353 trailer, tie downs, and drivers will remain with EOTG throughout the conduct of the course. The ammo tech will be required for pre-staging, daily delivery to training sites, and turn-in of all ammunition.

4. Every Marine in the support detachment must be in a full duty status, without injury or illness, and must not be pending legal proceedings or administrative action. Support detachment Marines will not be able to attend any appointments during their duty period.

5. All members of the support detachment must have their individual gear and equipment to conduct operations and bivouac in a field environment throughout the duration of the week. Personnel must have:

- a. Flak and Kevlar.
- b. Eye Protection, Ear Protection, Gloves.
- c. One pair of rugged civilian attire and closed toe footwear for employment as OPFOR.
- d. One pair of utilities for guard and miscellaneous duties.
- e. Personal weapons with BFAs might be needed if role players weapons are unable to be contracted. Support Det SNCOIC needs to confirm if weapons will be needed prior to being brought out the Thursday prior to T-1.
- f. The following organizational gear/equipment is required for the support detachment:

(1) Five DOS chow for all personnel.

(2) Ten 5-gal water cans.

6. The support detachment and all motor transport support will be assigned duties by Amphibious Raids Branch, EOTG. When not tasked, the support detachment may work on small unit training goals.

7. Ammunition issue to the OIC will go at EOTG Forward Ammunition Supply Point (FASP) then be transported directly to Fire Base Gloria for issue to the company prior to each training evolution. An ammo driver and handler are necessary for this logistical requirement to happen. No ammunition or pyrotechnics are authorized at the bivouac site. All weapons will remain Condition-4 until departure from Fire Base Gloria (FBG) or the boat basin. The FASP will be located IVO FBG (grid 11S MS 58618 84384). Following execution of each STX, upon return to Fire Base Gloria, all unexpended ammunition must be collected, counted, and returned to the FASP pending the next STX execution.

Enclosure (5)

ENCLOSURE (25)

Sample Communications Electronics Operating Instructions

RAID COURSE CEOI	
UNIT / MODULATION	NETID
MEU CMD 1 (SATCOM)	Optional
Air Mission Common (UHF)	Optional
TAD 1 (UHF)	Required
TAD 2 (UHF)	Required
LZ Control (VHF)	Required
NGF Air Spot (VHF)	Optional
Raid Force Tactical (VHF)	Required
1st Platoon TAC (VHF)	Required
2nd Platoon TAC (VHF)	Required
3rd Platoon TAC (VHF)	Required
Wpns Platoon TAC (VHF)	Optional
LF Recon (HF)	Required
Recon Tactical (VHF)	Required
THESE ARE EXAMPLE FREQUENCIES; THE BLT IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE/REQUEST THEIR OWN FOR USE DURING THE COURSE.	

Aviation Support Requirements

MONTH	DAY	DOW	# ACFT	REQ UNIT	START (L)	END (L)	MISSION	OP AREA	REMARKS
MAY	6	Weds	2 x H-1	EOTG	1000	1300	ESCORT/ SIMCAS	CAMPPEN	ISO V14 Mech Raid Course. ESCORT, SIMCAS, and cherrypicker support.
MAY	7	Thurs	2 x H-1	EOTG	2030	2359	ESCORT/ SIMCAS	CAMPPEN	ISO V14 Mech Raid Course. ESCORT, SIMCAS, and cherrypicker support.
MONTH	DAY	DOW	# ACFT	REQ UNIT	START (L)	END (L)	MISSION	OP AREA	REMARKS
MAY	13	Weds	4 x MV-22	EOTG	1000	1300	CHYPICK / ASLT SUP	CAMPPEN	ISO V14 Air Raid Course. Insert / Extract and cherrypicker support.
MAY	13	Weds	2 x CH-53	EOTG	1000	1300	CHYPICK / ASLT SUP	CAMPPEN	ISO V14 Air Raid Course. Insert / Extract and cherrypicker support.
MAY	13	Weds	2 x H-1	EOTG	1000	1300	ESCORT/ SIMCAS	CAMPPEN	ISO V14 Air Raid Course. ESCORT and SIMCAS support.
Month	Day	DOW	ACFT	REQ UNIT	START (L)	END (L)	MISSION	OP AREA	REMARKS
MAY	14	Thurs	4 x MV-22	EOTG	2030	2359	CHYPICK / ASLT SUP	CAMPPEN	ISO V14 Air Raid Course. Insert / Extract and cherrypicker support.
MAY	14	Thurs	2 x CH-53	EOTG	2030	2359	CHYPICK / ASLT SUP	CAMPPEN	ISO V14 Air Raid Course. Insert / Extract and cherrypicker support.
MAY	14	Thurs	2 x H-1	EOTG	2030	2359	ESCORT/ SIMCAS	CAMPPEN	ISO V14 Air Raid Course. ESCORT and SIMCAS support.
MONTH	DAY	DOW	# ACFT	REQ UNIT	START (L)	END (L)	MISSION	OP AREA	REMARKS
MAY	20	Weds	4 x MV-22	EOTG	1000	1300	CHYPICK / ASLT SUP	CAMPPEN	ISO V14 Air Raid Course. Insert / Extract and cherrypicker support.
MAY	20	Weds	2 x CH-53	EOTG	1000	1300	CHYPICK / ASLT SUP	CAMPPEN	ISO V14 Air Raid Course. Insert / Extract and cherrypicker support.
MAY	20	Weds	2 x H-1	EOTG	1000	1300	ESCORT/ SIMCAS	CAMPPEN	ISO V14 Air Raid Course. ESCORT and SIMCAS support.
MONTH	DAY	DOW	# ACFT	REQ UNIT	START (L)	END (L)	MISSION	OP AREA	REMARKS
MAY	21	Thurs	4 x MV-22	EOTG	2030	2359	CHYPICK / ASLT SUP	CAMPPEN	ISO V14 Air Raid Course. Insert / Extract and cherrypicker support.
MAY	21	Thurs	2 x CH-53	EOTG	2030	2359	CHYPICK / ASLT SUP	CAMPPEN	ISO V14 Air Raid Course. Insert / Extract and cherrypicker support.
MAY	21	Thurs	2 x H-1	EOTG	2030	2359	ESCORT/ SIMCAS	CAMPPEN	ISO V14 Air Raid Course. ESCORT and SIMCAS support.

ENCLOSURE (25)

Enclosure (7)

Ammunition Requirements

DODIC	DESCRIPTION	Mech Aslt Company	Primary Air Aslt Company	Alt Air Aslt Company
A080	CTG, 5.56MM BLNK	15000	15000	15000
A111	CTG, 7.62MM BLNK LNKD	14,000	14,000	14,400
A598	CTG, .50 CAL BLNK LNKD	6,400	0	0
G940	HG, GREEN SMOKE	10	10	10
G945	HG, YELLOW SMOKE	10	10	10
GG20	HG, STUN	50	50	50
G982	HG, SMK TNG	10	10	10
L594	SIM, PROJ GRND BURST M115A2	50	50	50
M456	CORD DETONATING 50 GR/FT	100 ft	100 ft	100 ft
MN52	INITIATOR DUAL SHOCK TUBE W/CAPS	5	5	5
MN08	IGNITER M81	5	5	5
DATE/TIME REQUIRED:		PRE-STAGE AT ASP NLT FRIDAY, 1 MAY 2020. DELIVER TO OSC-2 FASP NLT 0900 ON 4 May 2020	PRE-STAGE AT ASP NLT FRIDAY, 8 MAY 2020. DELIVER TO OSC-2 FASP NLT 0900 ON 11 MAY 2020	PRE-STAGE AT ASP NLT FRIDAY, 15 MAY 2020. DELIVER TO OSC-2 FASP NLT 0900 ON 18 MAY 2020
OSC 2 FASP: 11S MS 58688 84344		TURN IN 1200/ 8 May 2020	TURN IN 1200/ 15 May 2020	TURN IN 1200/ 22 May 2020

EOTG Points of Contact

BILLET	NAME	EMAIL	WORK
UNCLASSIFIED			
DIRECTOR			
DEPUTY			
SNCOIC			
S-2			
S-2A			
S-2 CHIEF			
SIGINT CHIEF			
CI/HUMINT CHIEF			
S-3			
S-3A			
S-3 CHIEF			
AIRO			
A-AIRO			
AIR CHIEF			
S-4			
S-4A			
S-4 CHIEF			
AMMO CHIEF			
RAIDS OIC			
RAIDS AOIC			
RAIDS SNCOIC			
RAIDS CHIEF			

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

**ALL AREA CODES ARE 760 UNLESS OTHERWISE LISTED
 COMM 725 = DSN 365
 COMM 763 = DSN 361

ENCLOSURE (25)

Enclosure (9)

Ship's GPS Position

0005Z - 0217Z

31JUL20

ENCLOSURE (2)

UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED

MOB

STD

ScrCap


Reveal

Overlay

Dangers

Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



Navigation Data

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SOG	13.0kts	NAVSSI	Primary
STW	10.6kts	NAVSSI	Primary
Wind	15.6kts	NAVSSI	Primary
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Dpth	136fath	NAVSSI	Primary
OSD	0fath		
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Window

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Offset

Center Ship

Coord

New Chart

Auto

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31-JUL-20

Start

Set Time


20X RATE

Nav Data

Features

UNCLASSIFIED APPROVED MOD STD ScrCap Reveal Overlay Dangers Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



Navigation Data

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HDG	315.0°T	NAVSSI	Primary
SOG	5.9 kts	NAVSSI	Primary
STW	4.6 kts	NAVSSI	Primary
Wind	17.6 kts	NAVSSI	Primary
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OSD	0 fath		
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Z In Z Out Window Default Offset Center Ship Oporo New Chart ☒ Auto

00:13:40

31-JUL-20

Start

Set Time

20X RATE

Nav Data

Features

ENCLOSURE (2)

UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED

JOB

STD

ScrCap


Reveal

Overlay

Dangers

Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



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Window

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Offset

Center Ship

Coord

New Chart

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31-JUL-20

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Set Time


20X RATE

Nav Data

Features

UNCLASSIFIED APPROVED MOB STD ScrCap Reveal Overlay Dangers Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



Navigation Data

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SOG	1.1kts	NAVSSI	Primary
STW	0.3kts	NAVSSI	Primary
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ENCLOSURE (26)

UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED

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STD

ScrCap


Reveal

Overlay

Dangers

Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



Z In

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Window

Default

Offset

Center Shp

Coord

New Chart

Auto

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31-JUL-20

Start

Set Time


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Nav Data

Features

UNCLASSIFIED APPROVED ☐ POS ☐ STD ☐ ScrCap ☐ Reveal ☐ Overlay ☐ Dangers ☐ Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



Navigation Data

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STW	1.1 kts	NAVSSI	Primary
Wind	18.3 kts	NAVSSI	Primary
	313.7°T		
Dpth	96 fath	NAVSSI	Primary
OSD	0 fath		
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☐ Z In ☐ Z Out ☐ Window ☐ Default ☐ Offset ☐ Center Ship ☐ Coord ☐ New Chart ☐ Auto

00:46:02 31-JUL-20 Start

Set Time 20X RATE ▼ Nav Data Features

ENCLOSURE (2)

UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED

JOB

STD

ScrCap


Reveal

Overlay

Dangers

Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



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STW	0.9 Kts	NAVSSI	Primary
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OSD	0 fath		
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Z-In

Z-Out

Window

Default

Offset

Center Ship

Coord

New Chart

☐ Auto

00:52:20

31-JUL-20

Start

Set Time


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Nav Data

Features

UNCLASSIFIED APPROVED MOB STD ScrCap Reveal Overlay Dangers Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



Navigation Data

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SOG	2.8 kts	NAVSSI	Primary
STW	0.7 kts	NAVSSI	Primary
Wind	18.9 kts	NAVSSI	Primary
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☒ Auto

00:57:29 31-JUL-20 Start

Set Time 20X RATE Nav Data Features

ENCLOSURE (46)

UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED

MOB

STD

ScrCap


Reveal

Overlay

Dangers

Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



Z In

Z Out

Window

Default

Offset

Center Ship

Coord

New Chart

Auto

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31-JUL-20

Start

Set Time


20X RATE

Nav Data

Features

UNCLASSIFIED APPROVED ☐ ☐ STD ☐ ScrCap ☐ Reveal ☐ Overlay ☐ Dangers ☐ Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



Navigation Data


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SOG	3.2 kts	NAVSSI	Primary
STW	0.5 kts	NAVSSI	Primary
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	315.0°T		
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 01-07-14 31-JUL-20 Start
 Set Time 20X RATE Nav Data Features

ENCLOSURE (2)

UNCLASSIFIED APPROVED

PLAYBACK WINDOW



Navigation Data

POS	33°02.083'N	GPS1	Primary
	118°39.105'W	PCOM	
Set	329.1°T	COMPUTED	Primary
Drift	0.5kts		
HDG	338.4°T	NAVSSI	Primary
SOG	3.8kts	NAVSSI	Primary
STW	1.2kts	NAVSSI	Primary
Wind	17.8kts	NAVSSI	Primary
	313.4°T		
Dpth	62fath	NAVSSI	Primary
OSD	fath		
Time	01:12:11	NAVSSI	

Z in	Z Out	Window	Default	Offset	Center Ship	Coord	New Chart	<input type="checkbox"/> Auto
01-12-20		31-JUL-20		Start				
Set Time		20% RATE		Nav Data		Features		

UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED

MOB

STD

ScrCap


Reveal

Overlay

Dangers

Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



Z In

Z Out

Window

Default

Offset

Center Ship

Coord

New Chart

Auto

01:14:59

31-JUL-20

Start

Set Time

20X RATE

Nav Data

Features

ENCLOSURE (26)

UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED

PDE

STD

ScrCap


Reveal

Overlay

Dangers

Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED

MOB

STD

ScrCap


Reveal

Overlay

Dangers

Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



Z In	Z Out	Window	Default	Offset	Center Ship	Coord	New Chart	Auto
01:26:29		31-JUL-20		Start				
Set Time		20X RATE		Nav Data		Features		

ENCLOSURE (26)

UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED

MOB

STD

ScrCap


Reveal

Overlay

Dangers

Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



Z In

Z Out

Window

Default

Offset

Center Shift

Coord

New Chart

Auto

01:39:29

31-JUL-20

Start

Set Time

20X RATE

Nav Data

Features

UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED

VGA

STD

ScrCap


Reveal

Overlay

Dangers

Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



Navigation Data

POS	33°01.788'N	GPS1	Primary
	118°38.901'W	COM1	
Set	035.6°T	COMPUTED	Primary
Drift	1.0 kts		
HDG	009.0°T	NAVSSI	Primary
SOG	2.9 kts	NAVSSI	Primary
STW	0.8 kts	NAVSSI	Primary
Wind	16.0 kts	NAVSSI	Primary
	303.6 T		
Dpth	60 fath	NAVSSI	Primary
OSD	0 fath		
Time	01:52:56	NAVSSI	

Z In

Z Out

Window

Default

Offset

Center Ship

Coord

New Chart

☐ Auto

01:53:14

31-JUL-20

Start

Set Time

20X RATE

Nav Data

Features

ENCLOSURE (2)

UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED

MOB

STD

ScrCap


Reveal

Overlay

Dangers

Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



Z In

Z Out

Window

Default

Offset

Center Ship

Coord

New Chart

Auto

12-06-29

31-JUL-20

Start

Set Time

20X RATE

Nav Data

Features

UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED

VOB

STD

ScrCap


Reveal

Overlay

Dangers

Alarms

PLAYBACK WINDOW



ENCLOSURE (ac)

PACIFIC DAYLIGHT TIME (PDT) TO ZULU TIME CONVERSION CHART

PACIFIC DAYLIGHT TIME	ZULU TIME
0000 (midnight) or 1200 am	0700 or 7:00 AM
0100 or 1:00 am	0800 or 8:00 am
0200 or 2:00 am	0900 or 9:00 am
0300 or 3:00 am	1000 or 10:00 am
0400 or 4:00 am	1100 or 11:00 am
0500 or 5:00 am	1200 or 12:00 pm
0600 or 6:00 am	1300 or 1:00 pm
0700 or 7:00 am	1400 or 2:00 pm
0800 or 8:00 am	1500 or 3:00 pm
0900 or 9:00 am	1600 or 4:00 pm
1000 or 10:00 am	1700 or 5:00 pm
1100 or 11:00 am	1800 or 6:00 pm
1200 or 12:00 pm	1900 or 7:00 pm
1300 or 1:00 pm	2000 or 8:00 pm
1400 or 2:00 pm	2100 or 9:00 pm
1500 or 3:00 pm	2200 or 1000 pm
1600 or 4:00 pm	2300 or 1100 pm
1700 or 5:00 pm	0000 (midnight) or 1200 am
1800 or 6:00 pm	0100 or 1:00 am
1900 or 7:00 pm	0200 or 2:00 am
2000 or 8:00 pm	0300 or 3:00 am
2100 or 9:00 pm	0400 or 4:00 am
2200 or 10:00 pm	0500 or 5:00 am
2300 or 11:00 pm	0600 or 6:00 am

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: READY Tools
- Time Conversion Table: www.ready.noaa.gov

ENCLOSURE (2)

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP
SECURITY MARKING HERE

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE		HULL NUMBER		YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY
D	A	L, P, D	0, 1, 2, 5	0	0, 7	T	3, 0
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

USS SOMERSET

AT / PASSAGE FROM SOLAL OF AREA

TO

CLASS	HANDL
U	
78	79

POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	LEGEND
0800			1200			2000			1 - CELESTIAL
L		BY	L	32° 56.2	N BY 2	L		BY	2 - ELECTRONIC
A		BY	A	118° 36.7	W BY 2	A		BY	3 - VISUAL
									4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
18 - 21	23 - 29	30 - 32	33 - 36	37 - 40	41
1200 - 1500					
1158					ASSUMED THE WATCH UNDERWAY AS BEFORE
1200					FLIGHT QUARTERS
1210	R30R	310			
1214		314			207BFGMC
					AMBER DECK
1242	AA1		3		
1248					RED DECK
1300					AMBER DECK
1310					GREEN DECK
1317					MAU SCAT
1318					HEW AWAY STB SIDE
1319					HEW AWAY PORT SIDE
1320	AA2		10		
	R30R	070			
1327	R5R	080			
1329	AA1		5		
1331					15 HURT
1332	R30R	110			
1334		110			290BFGMC
1335	AA1		4		
1342	R30R	125			
1356	AA2		10		
1357	R30R	305			293 DFGMC
1406					AMBER DECK
1407	AA1		3		
1427	AA1		4		
1428	R10R	327			
1429					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) HAS THE CONV
1435	AA1		5		
1438	AA2		10		

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP
SECURITY MARKING HERE

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE		HULL NUMBER	
D	A	L P D	0 1 2 3 4 5
1	2	3	4
YEAR		MONTH	ZONE
0	1	2	3
12	13-14	15	16-17
DAY		E	
22			

USS SOMERSET

AT / PASSAGE FROM 30 CAL OP AREA

TO

CLASS	HANDL
U	
78	79

POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	LEGEND
0800			1200			2000			1 - CELESTIAL
L		BY	L		BY	L		BY	2 - ELECTRONIC
λ		BY	λ		BY	λ		BY	3 - VISUAL
									4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
18 - 21	23 - 29	30 - 32	33 - 36	37 - 40	41
					77
					1200 - 1500 (CONT'D)
1440	AA3		16		
1444	AA2		10		
1448				GREEN	WELL
1451				AWAY	THE VIPER TEAM PORT SIDE
1452				LC1A	CROSSED THE SILL
1500	AA5		13		
1501				WATCH	PROPERLY RELIEVED BY
					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					1500 - 1800
1501					ASSUMED THE WATCH U/W AS BEFORE
1503					SET HERO CONDITION 2
1505	AA1		4		
1507				GREEN	DECK
1524				RED	DECK
1530	AA2		10		
	R15R135				
1535	R15R155				
1555	R30R				
	RAM10				
1556	L102165				
1601	R16R				
1602	RAM10				
	L174				
1606	L15R120				
1609	AA1		5		
1614	L15R000				
1619	R10B				
1622	L30R325				

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP
SECURITY MARKING HERE

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE				HULL NUMBER		YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY
D	A	L	P	D		0	0	T	3
1	2	3	4		5	12	13-14	15	16-17

USS SOMERSET

AT / PASSAGE FROM SO CAL OP AREA

TO

CLASS	HANDL
78	79

POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	LEGEND
0800			1200			2000			1 - CELESTIAL
L		BY	L		BY	L		BY	2 - ELECTRONIC
A		BY	A		BY	A		BY	3 - VISUAL
									4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
18 - 21	23 - 29	30 - 32	33 - 36	37 - 40	41
					1500 - 1800 (CONT'D)
1633	L15R280				
1642	R15R290				
1647	R305				
1650					GREEN DECK
1651					RED DECK
	AA2		10		
	L30R110				
1703	AAS		13		
1705	AAF		18		
1709	L15R				
1714	SAYG305				
	AA1		5		
1715	SAYG302				
1719	AA1		3		
1720					GREEN DECK
1724					RED DECK
1737	ASTOP				
	SA		2		
1738	SA		4		
1739	AA1		3		
1740	AA1		5		
1742	CL	340			
1743	SAYG0	338		325	
1745					GREEN DECK
1746					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) HAS THE COMM
1748	AA1	3			
1754					GREEN WELL
1800					GATOR 3 FEET DRY
1802					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) HAS THE DECK
					A X (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP
SECURITY MARKING HERE

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE				HULL NUMBER		YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY
D	A	L	P	D	025	00	07	T	30
1	2	3	4	5	6	12	13-14	15	16-17

USS SOMERSET

AT / PASSAGE FROM SO CALOPANA

TO

CLASS	HANDL
U	V
78	79

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0800		
L		BY
A		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
1200		
L		BY
A		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
2000		
L		BY
A		BY

LEGEND
1 - CELESTIAL
2 - ELECTRONIC
3 - VISUAL
4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
18 - 21	23 - 29	30 - 32	33 - 36	37 - 40	41
1800					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
1802					1800 - 2100
1803					ASSUMED THE WATCH U/W AS BEFORE
1805					GATOR 4 ACROSS THE SILC
1810					GATOR 4 FEET DRY
1812					MAX THE BOAT DECK
1815					CO PRESENTS IS REQUESTED IN CIC
1818					POSSIBLE AAV DOWN
1820					STERN GATE IS OUT OF WATER
1822					RED WELL
1825	AA2		10		
1830	L30R				
1832					COMMENCE BALLASTING 6 TO 8 FEET
1835	L10R				
1840	AA1		5		
1845					SET RIVER CITY 1
1850	RAWD				
1855	L30R				
1900	L30R	170			
1905	AA2		10		
1910	AA1		5		
1915					
1920	L10R				
1925	L30R	155			
1930	R30R	155			
1935	STDY	160		147	D F G M C
1940	AA1		3		
1945	CR	165			
1950					STERNGATE IN THE WATER
1955					STERNGATE AT STOP
2000					GREENWELL

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP
SECURITY MARKING HERE

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE		HULL NUMBER		YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY	USS <u>USS SOMERSET</u>	CLASS	HANDL
D	A	L	P	D	2	5	0	07	T	3
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	12	13-14	15	16-17
							E	AT/PASSAGE FROM <u>JC CAL OF ALCA</u>		78
							22	TO		79

POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	LEGEND
0800			1200			2000			1 - CELESTIAL
L		BY	L		BY	L		BY	2 - ELECTRONIC
A		BY	A		BY	A		BY	3 - VISUAL
									4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
18 - 21	23 - 29	30 - 32	33 - 36	37 - 40	41
					1800 - 2100 (CONT'D)
1834					TWO CASUALTIES ABOARD AAV.
1835					STERN GATE TO 45.
1836	RISR				
1837	AAL		10		
1838	R3OR				
1839	AAJ		15		
1839					STERN GATE IS AT 45
1840	RISR				2 CASUALTIES REPORTED ON SUMMIT
1840	L3OR				
1840					MEDICAL AWAY STBD SIDEPORT
1843	L3OR				
1843	AAI		5		
1844	SAYL				
1844					WEATHER DECKS ARE SECURED FOR NON ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL
1845	AAI		3		
1846					SUMMIT COMING ALONGSIDE
1846					HELICO COMING IN
1846					2ND CRC IN WATER
1849					MEDICAL STBD SIDEPORT
1850					GREENWELL
1852					TWO CRC'S AWAY STBD SIDE
1853					1ST AAV ACROSS THE SILL
1854					2ND AAV CROSSING THE SILL
1902	CL350				
1904	AAI		5		
1904	AAZ		10		
1905	L3OR				
1905					SOUNDED TWO SHORT BLAST

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP
SECURITY MARKING HERE

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE		HULL NUMBER		YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY
D	A	L	P	0	07	5	30
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

USS _____

AT / PASSAGE FROM _____

TO _____

CLASS	HANDL
78	79

POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	LEGEND
0800			1200			2000			1 - CELESTIAL
L _____ BY _____			L _____ BY _____			L _____ BY _____			2 - ELECTRONIC
A _____ BY _____			A _____ BY _____			A _____ BY _____			3 - VISUAL
									4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
18 - 21	23 - 29	30 - 32	33 - 36	37 - 40	41
					1800 - 2400 (CONT'D)
1906	AAS		15		
1909	ROR				
1910	RAND				
	CL205			142	DPGME
1911	AA1		5		
1912	AA1		3		
					4 FEET ABOVE THE SILL
1916					STERN GATE 3 FEET ABOVE THE SILL.
	AA1		5		
1924					SECURE CHT
					2 FEET ABOVE SILL
1934					SOUND 2 SHORT BLASTS.
1931	AAS		15		
1932					XO HAS THE CONN.
	SAYC				
	AA1		5		
1933	SAYC	198			
1934					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) HAS THE CONN
1935					GREENDECK
1955					CEASE DEBALLASTING.
1958					OBSERVED SUNSET.
1959					DEEXERGIIZED NAVIGATION LIGHTS.
2003					MAN OVERBOARD RED OVER RED PULSATING.
2022					1A 2A MPDE STARTED ENGAGE
					CLUTCH
2057					RED DECK
	LISL				
2102	AA2		10		
2101	AAS		15		
* 2100					ENTERED 3 ASSIGNED SOUR COMMANDER

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP
SECURITY MARKING HERE

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE		HULL NUMBER		YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY
D	A	1	2	3	4	5	6
		1	2	3	4	5	6
		1	2	3	4	5	6

USS SCMERST
AT / PASSAGE FROM SCAL CARM
TO _____

CLASS	HANDL
78	79

POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	LEGEND
0800			1200			2000			1 - CELESTIAL
L		BY	L		BY	L		BY	2 - ELECTRONIC
A		BY	A		BY	A		BY	3 - VISUAL
									4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
18 - 21	23 - 29	30 - 32	33 - 36	37 - 40	41
					1800-2100 (CONT'D)
2108	L30R				
	AA2		10		
2109	R30R				
	RAND				
2110	AA2				
	AA1		3		
2120				1420 DECK	
	AA2		10		
	11151032				
2123	L30R330				
2128	L30R				
2129	AA5		15		
2130					SOUNDED TWO SHORT BLAST
2131	L30R120				
2136	R30R300				287 DECK
					SOUNDED ONE SHORT BLAST
	AA2		10		
2143	L30R				
2144					SOUNDED TWO SHORT BLAST
	AA5		15		
2147	R30R120			100 DECK	
2149	AA5		20		
2150					SET AN DART 240 T/O 0.6 KTS
	R10R18			100 DECK	
					SOUNDED ONE SHORT BLAST
2153					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) HAS THIS COME
2155	AA2		10		
2156	R15R330				
					SOUNDED ONE SHORT BLAST
2157					ON THE BRIDGE

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP
SECURITY MARKING HERE

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG


SHIP TYPE		HULL NUMBER		YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY
D	A	L	P	0	0	1	30
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

USS SOMERSET
AT / PASSAGE FROM _____
TO _____

CLASS	HANDL
U	/
78	79


POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	LEGEND
0800			1200			2000			1 - CELESTIAL
L		BY	L		BY	L		BY	2 - ELECTRONIC
A		BY	A		BY	A		BY	3 - VISUAL
									4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
18 - 21	23 - 29	30 - 32	33 - 36	37 - 40	41
					1200-2100 (CONT'D)
2201	L10R331			318	DEGMC
					CO ON THE BRIDGE
2203					GREEN DECK
	AA1		5		
2206	R3R340				
2207	CR350				
	R3R350				
2209	AA1		3		
2210					GREEN DECK
2211					CO OFF THE BRIDGE
2214					RED DECK
2216					RECEIVED DRAFT REPORT FWD DRAFT 7-14
					MEAN DRAFT 7-18 AFT DRAFT 7-22
	AA2		E		
2217	L1514				
					SOUNDED TWO SHORT BLAST
2222	SAVG	240			
2228	AA1		5		
2224	AA1		3		
2247					WATCH PROBABLY RECEIVED 14 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
2247					ASSUMED THE WATCH O/W AS PERM
2303					SECURE FROM FLIGHT QUARTERS
2340					ENS OYLER HAS THE CONN
2357					CO OFF BRIDGE
					NPCTP



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


ENCLOSURE (29)



ENCLOSURE (24)



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FR 201

WDXX

WDXS

FR 142.5

FR 137.5

CAM3

FR 127.5

LVSA

FR 95

LVSF

FR 62.5

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ENCLOSURE (29)

20200729-30

1057

Current RFI's are as follows:

BLT 1/4 S2: Route Study from BLS to SCI N Airfield

ex: Trafficability of Roads from BLS - Airfield,

Obstacles, vegetation, slope/gradient

CE S-4: What NGO's are in the AD^{to} working w/ local pop.

CE S-4: Where is DART team located & who is POC

CE S-2: Small boat threats to AAV op NO SCI

BLT 1/4/CE S-2: Routes coming off BLS/Obstacles

1416

CODEWORD ALBANIA

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

~~1143~~

2256

CODE WORD ARGENTINA

0004

CODE WORD BAHAMAS

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

0652

NO ACTIVITY IN LF OBS 2, LF PLANNED ROUTE HIGHLY

TRAFFICKED AREA, NO OBSTRUCTIONS. REPORTS TO FOLLOW

0652

REV 4 CURRENT LOCATION: IIS LS 5691 4669

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

0711

HEAVY AM MARITIME LAYER HAS CUT VISIBILITY TO 25-30M

MOISTURE IS DISRUPTING THE MCOS.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

0738

NO VISUAL ON AIRFIELD IF THE SUN BURNS

THRU THE MIST THEN THEY WILL. PUSHING AN

ELEMENT THRU COVERED TERRAIN CLOSER TO LF OBS 2

TDC RELAY ANY MOVEMENT WILL PASS EL POS

FOR RELAY TO LF VIA IW.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

0741

Projected AAV feet wet time 0745

0745

updated grid for LF L/V CB CO C/S ("Banshee")

CHANGING L/V POINT TO AVOID CROSSING THRU

TOUCH. NEW L/C IIS 3699 46493. Supports MACHS

EXFIL. FROM S END OF LF OBS 2. WILL RELAY REQUEST POC
Cavaliers, VIA GREEN SMOKE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (30)

2020 0730

0754	10-13 AAV INSERTED
0757	ALL AAV IN THE WATER
0804 spw	
0821	GATOR 1 FEET DRY
0824	WAVE 1 TOUCHDOWN (2) WHITE TRUCKS & (1) BLACK TRUCK LVO LZ
0827	6/13 GATORS FEET DRY
0835	10/13 GATORS FEET DRY
0838	13/13 GATOR FEET DRY - CELTICS
0850	LC39 & LC79 INTENDED TO BE RECOVERED ONCE SEAROOM HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED
0906	GRIZZLY
0916	CODEWORD HEAT
0948	HORNETS
0957	JAZZ
1041	KNICKS
1641	CODE WORD MAGIC
1819	(1) AAV DOWN LT
1950	COAST GUARD AIRCRAFT ON LOCATION
0332Z	(3) RHIBS IN WATER
0337Z	Bullet 55 inbound for MEDEVAC
0338	Critical care nurse, BLT CO, SGT Maj on V22 Cross Decking.
0329	3 Casualties evacuated so far from SAN to Scripps, bullet 55.
0333	2022Z bullet 55 off deck SOM ENR to SCRIPPS 7 souls 4 crew 2 casualties one Corpsman.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ENCLOSURE (30)

20200730

0335	Rescue 47 is medevac with 2 casualties Bullet 55 still on deck. _____	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0336	last know 330152N 1183828W, _____	
0336	2 NM South of 3256N 11838W BT intent to loiter IVO posit to provide flight deck support. _____	
0341	SOM taking (1) Marine to UCSD trauma Center for level 1 treatment. _____	
0343	Marine DOC out corpsman going with marine to UCSD in 60 on deck. _____	
0357	Bullet 55 off deck 8 souls, one casualty, one doctor, one corpsman, 5 crew. _____	
0401	BLT CO en route for accountability efforts. _____	
0403	UCSD alerted for one patient inbound. _____	
0403	Snoop 12 enroute with BLT CO to SOM. _____	
0404	(3) medevacs, (2) to SCRIPPS, (1) to UCSD 5 personnel recovered from water, 8 unaccounted for. _____	
0410	at 2100L CPR-3 assumed SMC. Tacron will assign control sectors. _____	
0411	(5) remaining casualties can return to MKI for stabilization. _____	
0417	Snoop 12 on deck. _____	
04312	CPR-3 is SAR mission commander. _____	
0432	intentions to remain 2 RHIBS in water until 2200L, recover 1 RHIB to maintain constant operations. _____	✓

ENCLOSURE (30)

20200730

0435z	SOM Je SDG Triton is v/w 4 Souls onboard. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)
0450	air Search sectors Primary 1185030W to SCI Coastline, 3300N to 3256N. Secondary - 1185030W to SCI Coastline, 3304N to 3300N.
0458	RS11, BL44, USCG RESCU 6603 on Station.
0502	Sector assignments: SOM 230-270 MKC: 270-320 SDG 320-350 JFN: 350-030 bases up 3302N 11839W. SNOOP 12 still on SOM.
0511	SDG launch RHEBS, once launcher JFN recover yours.
0514	SDG unable to launch more RHEBS. Coordinate with SOM to swap out MRF crews.
0515	SDG troubleshooting KB Crano. once fixed launch RHEBS.
0518	MKE loss of steering, currently on 300 at 2 Kts.
0519	MKE regained steering.
0530	JFN - 2 RHEBS recovered, 1 in water, ops normal safe to remain in water.
0530	SOM: 200-230, MKC: 230-270, JFN: 270-320, SDG 320-000 updated sector assignments.
0533	BLT confirms 8 marines unaccounted for.
0536	CPR3 BWC - B de TB immediately recover all RHEBS in water. Will assign a ready ship for RHEBS if need to execute RHEBS at daylight.
0538	MKE remain ACU through night.
0550	MKE NEW SECTORS: 230-300 (5-10NM), JFN NEW SECTORS 300-340, SDG: 340-020, 14.
0757	ARG Coordinates updated. ENCLOSURE (30) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)

20200730

- 0722 LAST RHIB HAS BEEN RECOVERED. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- 0731 MKI, PLANS TO RECOVER LOGS AND PROMPTLY BEGIN CONDUCTING PARALLEL SEARCHES WITHIN SECTOR AS DIRECTED.
- 0735 SDG INTEND TO DRIVE TO SE CORNER OF SECTOR AND COMMENCE PARALLEL SEARCH.
- 0932 MKI, JFN, SDG NEW SECTOR ASSIGNMENTS FROM AAV DATUM ARE AS FOLLOWS. MKI 200-340 5-10nm, JFN 340-020 4-10nm, SDG 020-060 6-10nm, &
- 1030 ARG COORDINATES UPDATED.
- 1530 THE BELOW FEEDS / ENTRIES ARE FROM 20200730 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
FROM OSSO ON.
- 17442 SDG crews have food/water staged along with 850 gallons of fuel for AAV's on beach.
- 1755 STANDBY FOR CH-53 LAUNCH.
- 1809 SDG request guidance for the following, have 1 MV22 ENR with required part from MKI, LSO repairing CH53, 1 CH53 at the beach in CP, waiting to T/O at 1300 with a possible O/H at 1345.
- 1811 Biggie 23 on standby to transport AAV maintenance parts.
- 1944 Dominator will be on scene 1645 local time. the ROV is on board capable of depths 2000 feet with camera and lifting lines.
- 2000 Request if technical drawings can be sent to Dominator or any technical specifications such as weight.
- 2006 RFI'S will be sent over to CPR3 once answered.

ENCLOSURE (30)

20210330

- 2041 CH-53 resupply not needed at this time. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)
- 2041 BH712 commencing Sector Search at 330507N 1183431W.
- 2059 SDG-MEU APRO - PLACE CH53 on alert 30 to pull Marines and sailors off SCI.
- 1530L BREAK. ALL ENTRIES BELOW ARE NOW CURRENT TIME.
- 1531 15 MEU submits Sitrep to MEF SWO.
- 1603 BLT LNO turnover. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) new LNO.
- 1610 Snoop 12 is airborne looking to talk to someone about tasking at 1700 at Nuc.
- 1613 SOM established comms with Dominator.
- 1628 SOM requesting RFI for plan to move personnel from SCI to SOM. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)
- 1623 Snoop 12 is expecting a 30-40 minute delay until landing on SCI. ETA on SCI 1730-1748.
- 1635 NO comm with SDG or 53 from CPEN with mechanics.
- 1648 ARL location updated.
- 1703 Manifest is being broken into sticks and manifested by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) acting as MACD on SCI
- 1703 SNOOP 21 ON DECK MKI. Refueling then back to SDG for drop off. SDG's deck was not ready for them to land and get fuel.
- 1715 SNOOP 21 still has 8 Pax remaining. Post refueling on MKI depart of SDG to drop off all pax then to SCI. ESTIMATE for pax ~~pick~~ pick up on SCI is 21 right now. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- 1717 Correct on last 2 lines. Snoop 12 not 21.
- 1722 Snoop 12 off deck MKI. Enroute to SDG

ENCLOSURE (10)

20200730

- 1727 SDG Deck is full. Snoop 12 coming back to MKI
With remaining 6 pax. _____
- 1734 SNOOP 12 on deck MKI. _____ (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- 1751 SNOOP 12 off deck MKI to SCI for extract. _____
- 1801 OPCON requesting initial point of AAV when it left
land and POSIT of the ship it was driving towards
So DOMINATOR can search along it. ~~OF~~ (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- 1801 URC launched ROV at 1753, Commencing initial Search. _____
- 1823 LATE ENTRIES: SITREP SUBMITTED AT 1630, 1730. _____
- 1835 SNOOP 12 ON DECK MKI. _____
- 1848 SNOOP 12 ~~OFF~~ DECK MKI 7 PAX DROPPED OFF. _____
- 1919 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) aboard SOM. _____
- 1928 SNOOP 12 OFF DECK AT SCI TO SOM W 13 PAX. ALL
PAX to BE OFFLOADED AT SOM. _____
- 1940 SN 1400 element command element personnel in stick 1
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- 1942 SN 1401 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) _____ (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- 1954 SNOOP 12 ON DECK. _____
- 2018 Left over SACEX ammo will move to red beach then
to ASP. _____
- 2030 The craft does not have a beacon and there were
no munitions onboard. _____
- 2049 OPCON requests transit lane for AAV and RW point
per 1A plan. request approx time of loss, times
personnel were recovered, and locations so URC
can use estimated drift data to start marking
up a high probability search box. _____

ENCLOSURE (3p)

20200731

0315Z

MEU ARO DE SDG, repairs in progress, trending towards a 1100 overhead time tomorrow, will provide updates as repairs progress.

2210

OPCON de CPR3, are working reconstruction based on blue force tracker and will provide update estimate of where they believe the AAV may have sunk based on assessments.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)

2209

OPCON DE TZ THE BOAT LANE DETAILS IS AS FOLLOWS: FIRST FIELD IS THE CENTER REFERENCE POINT ON THE MAP. SECOND FIELD IS THE LENGTH OF THE BOAT LANE. THIRD FIELD IS THE WIDTH OF THE BOAT LANE. LAST FIELD IS THE RETURN LANE FOR THE AAV'S. HOWEVER, THE AAV WAS NOT WITHIN THE BOAT LANE AT TIME OF LOSS. THE AAV WAS LAST KNOWN AT 33°01.49N 118°39.23W (279° AT 3NM NORTH WEST FROM BEACH CENTER UPON RETURN TO SUM.)

2222

OPCON de CPR3, BEST ASSESMENT BASED ON RECONSTRUCTION OF TIMELINE AND BLUE FORCE TRACKER IS APPROX 33°00'12.6N, 118°30'13.6W. RECOMMEND RETASKING DOM TO BEGIN SEARCH THERE.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)

2258

2238

CPR3 de JFN, WE ARE READY TO SEND ENCLOSURE (30) CONTINUING SAR EFFORT, INT ARE THERE
AIC. 1. TALKING TO AIC FOR JFN ATT

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)

20200731

2244 CPR3 de SDG, STANDING BY FOR UPDATED
SEARCH SECTORS

2246 SDG, JFN de CPR3 REMAIN IN CURRENT
SECTORS.

2247 de CPR3, WE'LL NOTIFY

2247 de CPR3, WE'LL MODIFY UPON RECEIPT OF
UPDATED METOC REPORT.

2303 OPCON de CPR3, has last POSIT WE PASSED
BEEN PUSHED TO DOMINATOR? (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

- 2304 CPR3 de OPCON LAST POSIT HAS BEEN
PASSED TO DOM

2305 OPCON de CPR3 DO THEY INTEND TO
SEARCH NEAR THAT POSIT?

2306 CPR3 de OPCON, DOM INTENDS TO
SEARCH NEAR THAT POSIT.

2343 OPCON de TZ, INT W/C/S,

2347 CPR3 de OPCON, FROM DOM: HOS DOMINATOR IS A
DP-2 Capable ship able to maintain position
up to Sea State 4. No Sonar Capabilities
on board. ROV is a remote operated
vehicle with a maximum depth of
2000ft. It is equipped with 2 manipulator
arms, and small Sonar suite with a
range of 300ft. HOS Dominator is not
required

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
equipped with 2 to salvage AAV nor
tow. NO items of interest have been ENCLOSURE (80)
found at this time. DOM currently transitioning
to last known position Based on a B (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

20200801

2350 OPCON de CPR3, What is all after
Position based on a? —————

0000 ARG COORDINATES UPDATED —————

OUT
20200801
OUT

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)

0000 DOM CURRENTLY TRANSITING TO LAST KNOWN POSITION
BASED ON B. THIS WAS YOUR LAST SENTENCE—
OPR CPR3 de OPCON, DOM CURRENTLY TRANSITING
TO A LAST KNOWN POSITION BASED ON
BLUE FORCE LOCATOR POSIT FOR AAV. DOM—
HAS A DIVE TEAM ONBOARD CERTIFIED —
FOR DEPTH OF POSIT, WITH ABILITY TO —
OBTAIN DIVE EQUIPMENT IF NEEDED —

0300 ARG COORDINATES UPDATED —————

0300 CPR3 de OPCON, REQUEST STATUS OF
RFI'S STILL OUTSTANDING —————

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)

~~0308~~
0505 NICAT ECHO > JUST FINISHED SCANNING 0950Z
RADAR. NOTHING REMARKABLE —————

0547 BWC de TACCWO, BLO2 AIRBOURNE
IN SUPPORT OF SAR. INTEND TO SEND
BLO2 TO EXECUTE AVS AT DATUM PROVIDED
AND THEN SEARCH THE WESTERN COASTLINE FROM
SOUTH TO NORTH IN SECTOR 9 OF SCT —————

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

0714 TB de TACCWO REQ JFN AND SOM
PASS SECURITE calls ADVISING NEARBY FISHING
VESSELS THAT SAR OPS ARE IN PROGRESS THE
NUMBER OF VESSELS I/O BOTH SHIPS ENCLOSURE (30)
IMPEDING SEARCH EFFORTS —————

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

San Clemente Island Weather Chart

Produced by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) METOC Platoon Commander, 1st Intel Bn,

DATE OF MISHAP: 20200730

LOCAL TIME OF MISHAP: 1645

LOCATION: SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND (NORTH WEST END OF ISLAND IVO THE NAAIRFIELD) AND BUOY 46086 (APPROX 30MI TO THE SE OF THE MISHAP)

TIME 1556 PST

MISHAP ENVIRONMENT: SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND NAVAL AUX LANDING FIELD (KNUC) AND BUOY 46086 TIME 1556

- A. SEA STATE AND DIRECTION: SS3 (WAVE HEIGHT 3.5FT), DIRECTION: 275° (FROM THE WEST)
- B. WIND DIRECTION AND SPEED: WEST-NORTHWESTERLY (300 DEGREES) AT 14 KNOTS (16 MPH)
- C. AIR TEMPERATURE IN DEGREES FAHRENHEIT: 66°F
- D. WATER TEMPERATURE: N/A
- E. VISIBILITY: 10SM
- F. VISIBILITY REDUCED BY: N/A
- G. LIGHTNING PRESENT (PRODUCED BY STORM)? (Y/N): N
- H. CUMULATIVE PRECIPITATION: N/A
- I. LIGHTING CONDITIONS/AVAILABILITY AT SITE OF MISHAP: Adequate

TIME 1656 PST

MISHAP ENVIRONMENT: SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND NAVAL AUX LANDING FIELD (KNUC) AND BUOY 46086 TIME 1656

- A. SEA STATE AND DIRECTION: SS3 (WAVE HEIGHT 3.5FT), DIRECTION: 270° (FROM THE WEST)
- B. WIND DIRECTION AND SPEED: WEST-NORTHWESTERLY (300 DEGREES) AT 14 KNOTS (16 MPH)
- C. AIR TEMPERATURE IN DEGREES FAHRENHEIT: 66°F
- D. WATER TEMPERATURE: N/A
- E. VISIBILITY: 10SM
- F. VISIBILITY REDUCED BY: N/A
- G. LIGHTNING PRESENT (PRODUCED BY STORM)? (Y/N): N
- H. CUMULATIVE PRECIPITATION: N/A
- I. LIGHTING CONDITIONS/AVAILABILITY AT SITE OF MISHAP: Adequate

TIME 1756 PST

(18) MISHAP ENVIRONMENT: SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND NAVAL AUX LANDING FIELD (KNUC) AND BUOY 46086 TIME 1756

- A. SEA STATE AND DIRECTION: SS3 (WAVE HEIGHT 3.5FT), DIRECTION: 275° (FROM THE WEST)
- B. WIND DIRECTION AND SPEED: WEST-NORTHWESTERLY (290 DEGREES) AT 12 KNOTS (14 MPH)
- C. AIR TEMPERATURE IN DEGREES FAHRENHEIT: 63°F
- D. WATER TEMPERATURE: N/A
- E. VISIBILITY: 10SM
- F. VISIBILITY REDUCED BY: N/A
- G. LIGHTNING PRESENT (PRODUCED BY STORM)? (Y/N): N
- H. CUMULATIVE PRECIPITATION: N/A
- I. LIGHTING CONDITIONS/AVAILABILITY AT SITE OF MISHAP: Adequate