Warfighter Culture OPT

“It is the responsibility of leadership to work intelligently with what is given, and not waste time fantasizing about a world of flawless people and perfect choices.”

Marcus Aurelius

19 Dec 2018
Culture – Defined

Culture is the non-physical operating environment that binds every human organization.

- Supports a wide range of informal rules and attitudes
- Profoundly affects how a particular unit works, trains, and fights

Marines
The Few. The Proud.
Marine Corps culture lags the civilian sector significantly WRT modern safety culture. This is highlighted within aviation. We have not evolved for several reasons.

- We are proud of our culture. Our culture wins battles. We don’t want to change.
- “Acceptable combat losses” may have colored tolerance for error.
- The idea that risk is “tactical” and safety initiatives are “non-tactical” may appeal to our warrior ethos.
- The military traditionally fears reporting.
- Military communication is top-down.
- The military focuses on who is causing the problem.

Civilian safety culture has evolved dramatically in the last 35 years:

- The civilian world asks; “What is the problem?”
- It encourages granular reporting and two-way communication which allows the commercial sector to more accurately answer this question.
2018 National Security Strategy Summary:

“Cultivate workforce talent. Recruiting, developing, and retaining a high-quality military and civilian workforce is essential for warfighting success. Cultivating a lethal, agile force requires more than just new technologies and posture changes; it depends on the ability of our warfighters and the Department workforce to integrate new capabilities, adapt warfighting approaches, and change business practices to achieve mission success.”

SECDEF
“Our Corps needs our officers to be forward thinking and forward looking agents of change; to see where current practices are either counterproductive or inefficient and not simply accept the status quo.”

CMC
Warfighter Culture – The Vision

- CMC (SD) will guide development efforts.

- Warfighter Culture initiatives will combine the best of Marine Corps culture and “just culture” fundamentals:
  
  - Input from the Lejeune Leadership Institute, CMC (SD) programs, various bottom-up reporting methods, and Culture Workshop experience
  
  - Elements of the 4th MAW SAFE Program which leverage the expertise of USMC reserve airline pilots and commercial aviation best practices
Warfighter Culture – Desire End State

- Warfighter Culture is:
  - Warlike
  - Mission effective
  - Force preserving
  - Open to dialogue
  - Focused on excellence not focused on blame
  - Encouraging of honest reporting
  - Open-minded
  - Forward looking

- Warfighter Culture accurately defines problems and works effectively to solve them.
Warfighter Culture – Program Background

- Commercial safety culture developed from airline cockpit resource management (CRM) methodologies:
  - The seminal event for CRM: United Airlines Flight 173 was a scheduled flight from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City to Portland International Airport in Portland, Oregon, with a scheduled stop in Denver, Colorado. On December 28, 1978, the aircraft flying this route ran out of fuel and crashed in a suburban Portland neighborhood.
  - Research following the crash determined that 80% of airline accidents involve human factors.
  - This crash forced efforts to evolve pilot culture.
35 years later, the results of efforts to change airline culture have produced an industry which leads every safety standard.

- If United Airlines was 99.999% safe, they would crash an airplane every 4 days.

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Commercial aviation human factors practices have permeated throughout industry because human nature is common and does not change.

Commercial aviation practices have not permeated Marine Corps aviation.
Our present culture tends toward the punitive.

- People make errors. Errors can cause mishaps.
- Our organizational approach has been to seek out errors and identify the responsible individual. Individual punishment follows. This punitive approach does not solve the problem.
- People function within systems designed by an organization. An individual may be at fault, but frequently the system is also at fault.
- Punishing people without changing the system perpetuates the problem rather than solving it.
What can we do about it?

- Safety can and should be used as a strategic lever for cultural change.

- The 4th MAW SAFE program is an example of a new initiative already influencing Marine thinking. It is based on almost four decades of human factors study by the aviation industry and NASA.

- This program has been presented at WTI, the School of Aviation Safety Commander’s Course, and the Cockpit Resource Management Instructor’s (CRMI) Course.

- The SAFE program teaches “just” culture fundamentals and emphasizes doing the “right thing” (Safety Theory 2/Safety Management Systems (SMS)) vice not doing “the wrong thing” (Safety Theory 1/Punitive Culture).
What can we do about it? (Cont’d)

- The SAFE Program is relational because culture is about people.

- Studies show programmatic approaches to cultural change are not fruitful.

  - WTI student critique (Capt): “While the material could be perceived to be idealistic, \( (b) \ (3) \ (A), \ (b) \ (6) \) conveyed it in a manner that made me feel like we could make a difference. It won't be popular in commands, it promotes speaking up and being a voice of reason. This presentation should be given at all levels of the SNCO/officer corps (not as a computer course; in person).”
Safety Theory 1 – Punitive Culture

- Safety is implicitly achieved when as few things as possible go wrong.

- Focus is on preventing negative actions.

- Safety Theory 1 says; “These guys did this bad thing. Don’t do that.”
Safety Theory 1 - Negative Training

- Poor Leadership
- Funding constraints
- Poor crew pairing
- Inadequate training
- Inexperience
- Fatigue and distractions
- Violating SOPs
- Pushing limitations

Latent Failures

Active Failures
Safety Theory 2 and Warfighter Culture generates the greatest probability of a desirable outcome with intentionality – “Do the right thing.”

- Focuses on positive actions to ensure that as many things as possible go right – Safety Management System (SMS).
- Acknowledges that people are not perfect without blaming.
- Traps errors with Threat Error Management (TEM)
- Creates a safety net with HF/CRM.
Marines fight battles.

- We can’t wait for perfect situations.
- We must attack based on Commander’s Intent.

Safety Theory 2 supports this.

- Let’s people know when they are outside the lines.
- Facilitates repairing actions or continued aggressive actions with risk mitigation.
Safety programs, leadership, training and SOPs create systematic windows which decrease in size as we progress toward an outcome.

- We must pass safely through these windows in order to continue.
- We focus on doing “right” things.
- Each passing gate increases probabilities of safe outcomes,
- We recognize deviations earlier.
Safety Theory 1 vs. 2

Safety theory 1 focuses on negative learning; “Don’t do that!”

- Default is to continue unless things are very bad.
- Does not explicitly put leaders to a continuation decision.
- USMC cultural predispositions and stigmas oppose stopping.

Safety theory 2 focuses on doing things correctly and positive reinforcement. It capitalizes on Marine Corps cultural discipline and integrity.

- Default is to stop unless certain conditions are met.
- The decision to stop is not personalized, it is institutionalized.
- Safety is the by-product of the pursuit of excellence.
- People learn better from positive reinforcement.
- Emphasis on conditions-based continuation supports aggressive execution.
- Emphasizes known human factors and relationships. Builds teams.
- Combats the “zero-defect” mentality and inspires innovation.
Safety Theory 2 – The Stabilized Approach
Stabilized Approach: System Of Systems

2500’
- Cleared Approach
- Approach confirmed

1500’
- A/S below 180
- Gear Down
- Landing Checklist

1000’
- Verbalize deviations
- Final Configuration
- A/S +15/-5
- On G/S

500’
- Go Around for deviations
- Final Configuration
- A/S +15/-5
- On G/S

Continue only if conditions are met.

Go Around?

Combat Effective!

Enclosure 94
The Stabilized Approach: Why it Works

- Get into the window and the system works for you.
- It points you at the next window and its parameters.
- Gives early recognition of any negative trends.
- Turns the “Stop” call into a positive.
- Examples of The Stabilized Approach: the carrier pattern; a live fire exercise.
- Intentional emphasis on excellence.
- Helps to accurately identify problems.
Stabilized Approach Failures

Reasons why we fail:

- We don’t know the “window.”
- We make it happen, reinforcing failure – normalization of deviance.
- We don’t know the truth – cognitive bias.
- We don’t understand the problem – lack of open dialogue.
- We don’t stop – “Hack it!”
The Stabilized Approach: A Metaphor

- Command Climate
- USMC Programs
- Training programs
- SOPs

- Leadership
- Planning
- Time to prepare

- Preparation
- Rest
- Nutrition/hydration
- Briefing
- Environmentals
- Equipment
- Rehearsals

- Focus
- Discipline
- Skill
- Adherence to policy

Success!
- Bombs on target
- Time on target

Let’s do it right!

Enclosure 94
Questions We Must Answer

Has the system failed the Marine or has the Marine failed the system?

• Is the window right?
• Is the equipment right?
• Are the systems right?
• Is there a mechanism to call “Stop!”?
• Do Marines know it?
• Is there a stigma to saying “Stop!” i.e. doing the right thing?
A just culture balances the need for an open and honest reporting environment with the desired end of a quality learning environment and culture. While the organization has a duty and responsibility to our Marines and sailors, those same Marines and sailors are held responsible for the quality of their choices.

Just culture requires a change in focus from errors and outcomes to system design and management of the behavioral choices of all Marines and sailors.

Our culture and the systems we design to bring that culture to bear on the mission can better serve our warfighters and help to generate greater combat power.
Keys To Success

- Honest, two-way communication at all levels of leadership.
- People not programs.
- Leadership not management.
1. CMC (SD) has recently observed numerous cultural programs/initiatives across the MAGTF which have been developed to address a litany of destructive behavioral concerns which threaten the force.

2. The 39th Executive Safety Force Preservation Board (ESFPB) has directed an examination of this subject IOT standardize efforts. CMC (SD) has been directed to provide a comprehensive problem statement and Courses of Action to the 40th ESFPB scheduled for 16 May 2019.

3. IAW direction, CMC (SD) will host a Safety Culture OPT tentatively scheduled for 12-14 Feb 2019 to synchronize efforts. The OPT will study methods and implementation strategies to advance MAGTF culture as we develop Marines at all levels. Discussions will include organization, structure, data collection and analysis, “Just Culture” initiatives, curriculum development, education, training, assessment, and mentoring.
Our technology evolved. This caused our tactics to evolve from linear warfare to maneuver warfare and the MAGTF. Our culture must now evolve and mature. This is exciting and necessary. We should be open-minded and enthusiastic about finding ways to generate more combat power per capita while developing the well-being of our Marines.
Our efforts will be cost negative by directly addressing critical, systemic organizational and manpower issues. Decreasing negative manpower costs and increasing retention through improved morale/experience will lead to lower recruiting and training costs and a more mature force more capable of high-level decision-making. This will increase combat effectiveness with fewer accidents and less negligent behavior.
Problem Framing

- Punitive vs Just Culture
Warfighting has changed. Modern conflict is more complex. Failure of our culture to evolve beyond the punitive culture of old contributes to significant personal friction for our Marines and our leaders.

- Suicide
- PTSD
- Sexual Harassment
- Social Media Management
Warfighter Culture - Considerations

- Culture W/S output stops at the O-5 level. This does not inform higher WRT systemic issues. Dialogue is constipated. All COAs must communicate output above the O-5 level – de-identified, for use in aggregation, problem framing, data analysis, and solution-oriented outputs. (Current efforts do not identify and address systemic issues.)

- False sense of urgency prioritizes completing the training over the quality of the training.

- HHQ must show subordinates that quality is our priority through fitreps and promotion boards.

- Unless a Marine willfully violates policies and procedures, we must examine the system in the case of negative outcomes.
Warfighter Culture - Considerations

- Is aviation the easiest place to start? Beta in aviation? Low hanging fruit? Two beta tests?

- Would we like the average age of the force to increase? Is this possible?
Warfighter Culture – Naming Conventions

- Higher does not like “Safe and Just culture.”
  - Warfighting culture?
Warfighter Culture - COAs

- COA 1 – Current Culture W/S with better manning (i.e. do almost nothing)

- COA 2 – Current Culture W/S with better manning, with output to higher levels, with data aggregation, with better analysis, with problem framing entities which develop solutions and make recommendations for implementation through regular discussions with decision makers. Each element is necessary or a toothless entity will die over time as personalities change.
Warfighter Culture - COAs

COA 2 Cont’d:

2. Center For Warfighting Culture (CWC)
   • Curricula Development
   • Inter/Intra-Departmental coordination
   • Training Management
   • Data Analysis
   • OPT Coordination – problem framing and COA Dev

1. Input
   • ASAP
   • GSAP
   • Surveys
   • CIRRAS

“The creativity and talent of the American warfighter is our greatest enduring strength, and one we do not take for granted.” SECDEF

3. Education & Training
   • Engaging leaders
   • Facilitating Dialogue

4. Assessment - Culture Workshop
   • Assist Visits
   • Mentoring

Enclosure 94
Warfighter Culture - COAs

- COA 3 – Develop a department within an existing organization to make use of existing COMRELS, structure, and resources.
Warfighter Culture OPT - Participants

- CMC (SD)
- M&RA
- HQMC G-10
- TECOM
- EDCOM
- LLI
- Religious Programs
- Health Services
- MFR
- MARFORPAC
- MARFORs
- JAG?
- MCCLL
Warfighter Culture

Questions?
Warfighter Culture

- Publications/Video/QR Cards
- Education/Training
- Assessment
- Reporting
- Systemic Changes
- Information Operations
LLPC Kadena AB
April 27th – 30th 2016

Unclassified

Lite Level Planning Calendar

Lat/Lon: 26-21N 127-46E
Time Offset: +0900
clock, degree of circadian desynchrony (jet lag), physical health, additional duties, misuse of alcohol, caffeine, tobacco, or dietary supplements and adequacy of crew rest facilities. These factors must be understood by all concerned and appropriate countermeasures established to assure they do not reduce personnel readiness. FSs and AMSOs shall proactively establish an Aeromedical Adjunctive Training Program appropriate to their unit’s human factors risks. Appendix E provides minimum requirements for Aeromedical Adjunctive Training. Flight personnel should report any physical indisposition to superiors and assume flight duty only when fit to do so. Since an individual may frequently be the poorest judge of personal fitness, commanding officers shall ensure that flight personnel are adequately observed and appropriate temporary grounding action is taken when necessary. The following guidelines and requirements should be considered for all aspects of naval aviation.

8.3.2.1 Crew Rest and Sleep

8.3.2.1.1 Crew Rest for Flight Crew and Flight Support Personnel

Crew rest is the non-duty time before a flight duty period begins. Crew rest includes free time for meals, transportation, rest and shall include an opportunity for eight hours of uninterrupted sleep time for every 24-hour period. Crew rest does not begin until after termination of official duties and is required prior to reporting for preflight preparations. Flight crew shall not be scheduled for continuous alert and/or flight duty (required awake) in excess of 18 hours. However, if it becomes operationally necessary to exceed the 18-hour rule, 15 hours of continuous off-duty time shall be provided prior to scheduling the member for any flight duties. Flight and ground support personnel schedules shall be made with due consideration for watch standing, collateral duties, training, and off-duty activities. Crew rest can be reduced to less than 12 hours in order to maintain a 24-hour work/rest schedule, but a shortened crew rest period (for example to maintain circadian rhythm) shall always include an opportunity for 8-hours of uninterrupted sleep.

Note

If continuous awake duty time exceeds 16 hours, performance efficiency begins to drop. After 18 hours, performance efficiency rapidly declines to 75 percent of effectiveness or less. The loss of effectiveness is manifested by lapses in attention, slower reaction time, slowed information processing, decreased vigilance, and increased error frequency. Accident rates for just about every type of human activity increase after 12 hours of wakefulness, particularly during the night “circadian trough” when sleep would normally occur.

8.3.2.1.2 Circadian Rhythm

Circadian rhythms are cyclic fluctuations of numerous body functions that are set like a “biological clock” by daylight exposure and sleep/awake periods. Changing local sleep/awake periods or rapidly crossing more than three time zones disrupts circadian rhythms and can cause a marked decrease in performance. This condition, called “jet lag,” is compounded by illness, fatigue, dehydration, alcohol use, poor nutrition, or drugs, and is resolved only by accommodation to the new local time or sleep/awake period. The accommodation period can be estimated by allowing 1 day for every zone crossed in excess of 3. Accommodation begins when a new daily routine is established. During that period, aircrew are not grounded but can be expected to perform at a less than optimal level. Less intense flight profiles and close observation by the flight surgeon during the accommodation period may be desirable. Shift work, where individuals are required to work during the night for extended periods, requires even longer times for adaptation (up to 4 weeks). Individuals may never fully adapt to night shift work unless completely isolated from daylight exposure, and additional controls may be necessary for safe operations. Specific fatigue countermeasures to adapt to and minimize disruption of circadian desynchrony can be found in NAVMED P-6410 (01JAN00), Performance Maintenance During Continuous Flight Operations.

ORIGINAL

8-14

Enclosure 97
8.3.2.3 Nutrition

All flight and ground support personnel should be provided a positive program of information for the establishment and maintenance of good dietary habits. Failure to eat within 12 hours preceding end of flight may impair performance and ability to adequately control aircraft. Reducing diets should be under supervision of a flight surgeon. Nutrition and diet information is also available as NASTP Adjunctive Training (Appendix E) and can be provided by a Naval Aerospace Physiologist (NAP), AMSO, or FS.

8.3.2.3.1 Nutritional Supplements

A nutritional supplement is a product taken by mouth that contains a “dietary ingredient” intended to supplement the diet. The ingredients in these products may include vitamins, minerals, herbs or other botanicals, amino acids, protein, and substances such as enzymes, organ tissues, glandular extracts, and metabolites. Dietary supplements can also be extracts or concentrates, and may be found in many forms such as tablets, capsules, softgels, gelcaps, liquids, or powders, and food bars. Use of nutritional/dietary and other OTC supplements/products by flight personnel except those approved by BUMED is prohibited. Harmful effects are often associated when used in very high doses or in non-standard manner and virtually none are tested or assured safe in the aviation environment. The term “natural” does not mean it is safe. FSs shall be consulted to assist with making informed decisions regarding nutritional supplements. The use of nutritional supplements of all types shall be reported to the FS and recorded during every periodic physical examination or physical health assessment. See also policy in paragraph 8.3.2.5.a(6) for further information.

8.3.2.4 Exercise

Planned physical fitness programs promote health. All levels of command are encouraged to establish approved physical fitness programs for all personnel in accordance with OPNAVINST 6110.1. Aircrew shall ORM their recreational physical activities for risk of injury and/or fatigue and plan for adequate recovery time prior to resuming flying duties.

8.3.2.5 Drugs

Drugs are defined as any chemical that when taken into the body causes a physiological response. All flight and support personnel shall be provided appropriate information by a command drug abuse education program.

a. Legal drugs are those medically prescribed or legally purchased for treatment of illness. Guidance and flight restrictions are provided in the Naval Aerospace Medical Institute’s (NAMI) on-line Aeromedical Reference and Waiver Guide.

(1) Prescription drugs — Taking drugs prescribed by competent medical authority shall be considered sufficient cause for recommendation of grounding unless their use is specifically approved by a flight surgeon, or a waiver for specific drug use has been granted by CHNAPERS or the CMC. Consideration shall be given to the removal of ground support personnel from critical duties, for the duration of the drug effects, if appropriate. Medicines such as antihistamines, antibiotics, narcotic pain relievers, etc., obtained by prescription for short term use to treat a self-limited condition shall be discarded if all are not used during the period of medication. Unused quantities of performance maintenance drugs (amphetamines or sleeping pills) shall be returned to the flight surgeon or medical clinic for purposes of strict accountability.

(2) Over-the-counter drugs — Because of the possibility of adverse side effects and unpredictable reactions, the use of over-the-counter drugs by flight personnel is prohibited unless specifically approved by a flight surgeon. Ground support personnel shall be briefed on the hazards of self-medication and should be discouraged from using such drugs.

(3) Alcohol — The well-recognized effects of excessive alcohol consumption are detrimental to safe operations (i.e., intoxication and hangover). Consumption of any type of alcohol is prohibited within 12 hours of any
mission, brief, or flight planning. Adherence to the letter of this rule does not guarantee a crewmember will be free from the effects of alcohol after a period of 12 hours. Alcohol can adversely affect the vestibular system for as long as 48 hours even when blood-alcohol content is zero. Special caution should be exercised when flying at night, over water, or in IMC. In addition to abstaining from alcohol for 12 hours prior to mission brief or flight planning, flightcrews shall ensure that they are free of hangover effects prior to flight. Detectable blood alcohol or symptomatic hangover shall be cause for grounding of flight personnel and the restriction of the activities of aviation ground personnel.

(4) Tobacco — Smoking has been shown to impair night vision, dark adaptation, and increase susceptibility to hypoxia. Smoking is hazardous to nonsmokers, as the effects occur whether smoke is inhaled directly or secondarily. Further guidance on smoking is contained in paragraph 7.1.9 of this instruction.

(5) Caffeine — Excessive intake of caffeine from coffee, tea, cola, etc., can cause excitability, sleeplessness, loss of concentration, decreased awareness, and dehydration. Caffeine intake of 450 mg per day (3 to 4 cups of drip coffee) is the recommended maximum intake. Caffeine use when managed appropriately, can aid in maximizing performance during long sorts or periods of sustained operations, however, the caffeine effect is maximized in individuals who are not habituated to its effects as regular users.

(6) Nutritional/Dietary and other Over-The-Counter (OTC) Supplements and Products — The use of nutritional/dietary and other OTC supplements/products by flight personnel except those approved by BUMED is prohibited. Guidance and restrictions are provided in the Naval Aerospace Medical Institute’s (NAMI) on-line Aeromedical Reference and Waiver Guide.

b. The use of illicit drugs is prohibited.

8.3.2.6 Illness

Acute minor illnesses, such as upper respiratory infections, vomiting, or diarrhea can produce serious impairment of flight personnel. All illnesses shall be evaluated by competent medical authority. The submission of DD 2992, Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operational Duty, shall be accomplished placing flight personnel in a down status when the individual has been found disqualified by medical authority. While any medical authority may place flight personnel in a down status utilizing the DD 2992, returning flight personnel to an up status utilizing the DD 2992 shall be issued only by an FS. Where an FS is not available, DD 2992 shall be handled in accordance with BUMEDINST 6410.9. Flight personnel who are hospitalized shall be evaluated in accordance with MANMED and current BUMED directives and have a DD 2992 issued prior to flight. Ground support personnel should be similarly monitored. Aircrew shall not fly for at least 48 hours after general, spinal, or epidural anesthetic. Return to flying status thereafter shall be upon the recommendation of a flight surgeon and at the discretion of the commanding officer.

8.3.2.7 Dental Care

Dental procedures that involve the use of local injectable drugs (e.g., Novocain) shall be cause for grounding for a period of 12 hours. Use of intravenous sedatives require grounding for 24 hours. Dental Class III except for asymptomatic third molars is generally considered cause for grounding except on the advice of a Dental officer.

8.3.2.8 Pregnancy

a. Pregnancy is considered disqualifying for flying duties. Because of the real and unknown medical hazards of flight, flight personnel shall consult with their flight surgeon when they first suspect they are pregnant. Aircrew members who are confirmed to be pregnant are grounded. Notification shall be submitted to the aviation unit commanding officer via DD 2992 and to NAVOPMEDINST DET NAVAEROMEDINST (Code 342) (NAMI) via an abbreviated aeromedical summary. Aircrew members may request a waiver to continue their flying duties while pregnant. Following evaluation by the flight surgeon and obstetric care provider, and communication with NAMI, a Local Board of Flight Surgeons shall be convened to consider the aircrew member’s request for a
waiver to continue flying while pregnant. If the pregnancy is considered uncomplicated, NAMI concurs and the Local Board of Flight Surgeons determines the member meets requirements for a waiver, an aeromedical clearance notice shall be issued with the restrictions mandated in the following sections. The Flight Surgeon shall submit an aeromedical summary to Naval Operational Medical Institute (NOMI). The procedures and requirements for waiver submission are contained in Aeromedical Reference and Waiver Guide at the NAVOPMEDINST DET NAVAEROMEDINST (Code 342) website.

b. Designated Naval Aviators who are authorized to fly during pregnancy shall perform flight duties in a Medical Service Group 3 capacity only.

**Note**

A student naval aviator (SNA) shall not fly/assume flight controls with a Medical Service Group 3 pilot and therefore is prohibited from flying training missions with a pregnant pilot.

c. Flying during pregnancy is prohibited in single-piloted aircraft, ejection seat aircraft, high performance aircraft that will operate in excess of 2gs, aircraft involved in shipboard operations or flights with cabin altitudes that exceed 10,000 feet.

d. Clearance will be valid only until the start of the third trimester. Participation in NASTP or other survival programs is not permitted. If NASTP qualifications expire during the pregnancy, clearance for continued flying shall not be granted beyond the date of expiration of those qualifications.

e. Following completion of the pregnancy and return to full duty, a post-grounding physical shall be submitted to NAVOPMEDINST DET NAVAEROMEDINST (Code 342) for endorsement. This submission shall include information regarding any complications encountered during pregnancy as well as the health of the child and mother following delivery.

f. If the aircrew member becomes pregnant during aviation training prior to designation as an Aircrewman, Naval Aviator, Naval Flight Officer, or Aeromedical Specialist, she shall be grounded until after completion of the pregnancy and return to normal full duty.

g. Normal uncomplicated pregnancy in female air traffic controllers is not considered physically disqualifying in itself. Specific duty modifications during the pregnancy if required should be managed locally.

h. Additional guidance that applies is provided in OPNAVINST 6000.1 series Guidelines Concerning Pregnant Servicewomen.

### 8.3.2.9 Emotional Upset/Excessive Stress

Stress is a component of normal living, but excessive stress levels can manifest as mood and behavior changes and lead to deteriorating performance and chronic health effects. Commanding officers must remain alert to the emotional and physical status of assigned personnel and take corrective action as may be necessary either for individuals or particular groups (i.e., referral for professional evaluation, short standdown from flight duties, rest and recreation, leave, etc.).

**Note**

Commanding officers and flight surgeons shall comply with applicable directives pertaining to mental health evaluation of servicemembers (see SECNAVINST 6320.24, Mental Health Evaluations of Members of the Armed Forces). Individuals who fall under "Military Whistleblower Protection" guidelines (SECNAVINST 5370.7) may require additional administrative procedures in conjunction with evaluation. Commanding officers are encouraged to consult with local flight surgeons and legal officers.
CNAF M-3710.7

8.3.2.15 Dehydration

Of all causes of fatigue, one of the most treatable is dehydration. Early stages of dehydration can lead to emotional alterations and impaired judgment. Ingestion of plain water throughout the day will reduce probability of dehydration and resultant fatigue. Heat and dehydration information is available as NASTP Adjunctive Training (Appendix E) and can be provided by an NAP, AMSO, or FS.

8.3.2.16 Simulator Sickness

 Simulator exposure can cause perceptual sensory changes that may compromise safety. The experience of symptoms such as nausea, disorientation, and sweating has occurred in fighter, attack, patrol, and helicopter simulators. Symptoms of simulator sickness may occur during simulator flight and last several hours after exposure. In some cases, the onset of symptoms has been delayed as much as 18 hours. The symptoms have occurred in both full motion and fixed simulators to pilots and other aircrew as well as instructors. Preliminary data suggest that more experienced flight personnel may be at greater risk, as well as individuals who are new to the simulator. Flight personnel exhibiting symptoms of simulator sickness should consult with a Flight Surgeon prior to returning to flight duties.

8.3.2.17 Anthropometric Requirements

Applicants and designated flight personnel shall meet the anthropometric standards per OPNAVINST 3710.37 series. Refer to NAVAIRINST 3710.9 series for specific aircraft cockpit anthropometric measurement limitations.

**WARNING**

- Any person flying in an ejection seat aircraft whose nude body weight is below or above the COMNAVAIRSYSCOM-certified crew member weights for an ejection seat is at increased risk for serious injury or death from ejection. COMNAVAIRSYSCOM-certified weights are depicted in Figure 8-9.

- Any person flying in a rotary wing or tiltrotor aircraft whose nude body weight is below or above the COMNAVAIRSYSCOM-certified crew member weights for a crash force attenuating seat is at increased risk for serious injury or death during hard/crash landing. COMNAVAIRSYSCOM-certified weights are depicted in Figure 8-10.

8.3.3 Performance Maintenance During Continuous and Sustained Operations

Operational commitments may necessitate continuous and/or sustained operations in which sleep and circadian rhythms are disrupted, leading to potentially hazardous fatigue. NAVMED P-6410 (01 Jan 2000), Performance Maintenance During Continuous Flight Operations, A Guide for Flight Surgeons, provides background on the subject, strategies for fatigue reduction, and guidance in the use of sleep-inducing and anti-fatigue medications ("no-go pills" and "go-pills") in aircrew. Commanding officers, in consultation with their Flight Surgeons, are authorized to use any of the strategies described in the guide when mission requirements and operational risk management indicate use would be appropriate. The use of stimulants and/or sedatives shall only be authorized following the commanding officer’s consultation with the wing commander or equivalent, and the flight surgeon. The flight surgeon, furthermore, shall have consulted with his/her supervisor in the aeromedical chain of command. See also paragraphs 8.3.2.1 and 8.3.2.2. Optimally, aircrew should be pre-tested using specific medications to determine
3.6 EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL AVIATORS BY CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS

Civilian contractors to the Federal Government cannot legally employ a naval officer on the active list to give flight demonstrations of aircraft intended for the United States Government.

3.7 COMMAND

A naval aircraft or formation of naval aircraft shall be flown under the command of a pilot in command, mission commander, or formation leader, as appropriate, and so designated by the reporting custodian or higher authority. The status of each individual participating in the mission or formation shall be clearly briefed and understood prior to takeoff and must be indicated as required by DOD FLIP General Planning. When a flight schedule is published, the pilot in command, mission commander, or formation leader shall be specifically designated for each aircraft or formation, as appropriate. Reporting custodians shall establish minimum requirements of initial qualification and requalifications for each model aircraft in their custody and for each flight phase and/or mission normal to the aircraft models (e.g., day solo, night solo, functional check, FCLP, air combat maneuvers (ACM), night combat air patrol (CAP), intercepts, airborne early warning (AEW), barriers, etc.). They shall be guided by the requirements of this instruction where applicable and by appropriate NATOPS manuals. Flight personnel meeting those requirements may be considered qualified in model and phase and are eligible for designation as pilot in command, mission commander, or formation leader for a specific mission.

3.7.1 Pilot in Command

Pilot in command refers to the pilot of an individual aircraft. The pilot in command is responsible for the safe, orderly flight of the aircraft and well-being of the crew. The pilot in command may also be the mission commander or formation leader when so designated. Pilot in command should not be confused with the various qualifications defined in Chapter 12. If there is no NATOPS manual for a particular model aircraft or if an existing manual fails to set forth specific initial qualifications and currency requirements, a pilot shall not be designated as pilot in command unless the pilot has made at least two takeoffs and landings and logged 5 hours of pilot time in the same model aircraft within the preceding 90 days. Also, lacking NATOPS guidance for a specific aircraft, 10 hours first pilot time in model is required for initial qualification. Pilots meeting the criteria may be considered qualified in model and phase and are then eligible for designation as pilot in command. In the absence of direct orders from higher authority cognizant of the mission, responsibility for starting or continuing a mission with respect to weather or any other condition affecting the safety of the aircraft rests with the pilot in command. The authority and responsibility of the pilot in command shall not be transferred during flight. It shall not be transferred to another individual except as required by emergency, operational necessity, or as directed by the commanding officer of the unit to which the aircraft is attached. The authority and responsibility of a pilot in command is independent of rank or seniority in relation to other persons participating in the mission or flight except for the following.

3.7.1.1 Officer in Tactical Command Embarked

Wing, group, or squadron commander, if embarked on a mission involving aircraft of their command, retains full authority and responsibility regarding command, including the mission in which participating.

3.7.1.2 Flag or General Officer Embarked

The pilot in command of an aircraft with a flag or general officer eligible for command at sea or in the field embarked as a passenger shall be subject to the orders of such flag or general officer in accordance with U.S. Navy Regulations. When such an embarked passenger exercises authority to command the aircraft, that passenger thereby assumes full responsibility for the safe and orderly conduct of the flight. The embarked passenger shall give due consideration to the judgment of the pilot in command regarding items of flight safety such as hazardous weather and aircraft/crew limitations. Flying rule violations, accident reports, and any other actions arising out of the flight will be referred to the embarked passenger as the responsible commander of the aircraft.
CNAF M-3710.7

Note

The provisions of paragraphs 3.7.1.1 and 3.7.1.2 shall not be used to circumvent normal NATOPS qualification procedures if the officer desires to physically pilot the aircraft. Flights that require a NATOPS-qualified crew shall not be physically piloted by any individual not so qualified; however, the flight may be directed by an officer in tactical command embarked who is not NATOPS qualified.

3.7.1.3 Flight Control Station

The pilot in command shall occupy a flight control station during critical phases of flight (i.e., takeoff, landing, formation flight, functional checkflight (FCF), degraded aircraft performance regimes, etc.). During an Instructor Under Training (IUT) flight in a multi-piloted aircraft, the pilot in command or a qualified/qualifying IUT Instructor pilot shall occupy one of the flight control stations during critical phases of flight, provided the pilot in command remains in the flight station.

3.7.2 Formation Leader

A formation of two or more naval aircraft shall be under the direction of a formation leader who is authorized to pilot naval aircraft. The formation leader may also be the mission commander when so designated. The status of each member of the formation shall be clearly briefed and understood prior to takeoff. The formation leader is responsible for the safe and orderly conduct of the formation.

3.7.3 Mission Commander

The mission commander shall be a properly qualified naval aviator or NFO designated by appropriate authority. The mission commander may exercise command over single naval aircraft or formations of naval aircraft. The mission commander shall be responsible for all phases of the assigned mission except those aspects of safety of flight that are related to the physical control of the aircraft and fall within the prerogatives of the pilot in command. Mission commander qualifications shall be outlined in appropriate NATOPS manuals. The mission commander shall direct a coordinated plan of action and be responsible for effectiveness of the mission.

3.7.4 Instructors

In those aviation commands where training is conducted, the commanding officer is authorized to designate highly qualified naval aviators and NFOs as instructors. Instructor duties shall be specifically delineated by the unit commanding officer (CO) in formal directives. The instructor will be charged with authority and responsibility to provide appropriate direction to students (naval aviation or NFO) to ensure safe and successful completion of each training mission. The exact function, authority, and responsibility of the individual flight instructor are dependent upon the training mission and the crew assigned as issued in approved training syllabuses. On those training missions where a pilot under instruction is the pilot in command, instructor guidance shall be advisory in nature and under no circumstance shall pilots in command be relieved of their authority and responsibility as outlined in paragraph 3.7.1. Termination of the training or evaluation portions of the flight for reasons of safety, unsatisfactory performance, or material discrepancy shall be the instructor’s prerogative.

3.8 CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The objective of the Crew Resource Management (CRM) Program is to integrate the instruction of specifically defined behavioral skills throughout Navy and Marine Corps aviation training, and to integrate the effective application of these behavioral skills into operational aviation procedures wherever appropriate. CRM training will increase mission effectiveness, minimize crew preventable error, maximize aircrew coordination, and optimize risk management.
3.8.1 Critical Behavioral Skills

The critical behavioral skills that form the basis of CRM training are:

a. Decision making. The ability to choose a course of action using logical and sound judgment based on available information. Effective decision making requires:
   (1) Assessing the situation.
   (2) Verifying information.
   (3) Identifying solutions.
   (4) Anticipating decision consequences.
   (5) Making the decision.
   (6) Telling others of the decision and rationale.
   (7) Evaluating the decision.

b. Assertiveness. An individual’s willingness to actively participate, state, and maintain a position, until convinced by the facts that other options are better. Assertiveness is respectful and professional, used to resolve problems appropriately, and to improve mission effectiveness and safety.

c. Mission Analysis. The ability to develop short-term, long-term, and contingency plans and to coordinate, allocate, and monitor crew and aircraft resources. Effective planning leads to flight conduct that removes uncertainty, increases mission effectiveness, and enhances safety.

d. Communication. The ability to clearly and accurately send and acknowledge information, instructions, or commands, and provide useful feedback. Effective communication is vital to ensure that all crewmembers understand aircraft and mission status.

e. Leadership. The ability to direct and coordinate the activities of other crewmembers or wingmen, and to encourage the crew to work together as a team. There are two types of leadership:
   (1) Designated Leadership — Leadership by authority, crew position, rank, or title. This is the normal mode of leadership.
   (2) Functional Leadership — Leadership by knowledge or expertise. Functional leadership is temporary and allows the most qualified individual to take charge of the situation.

f. Adaptability/Flexibility. The ability to alter a course of action based on new information, maintain constructive behavior under pressure, and adapt to internal and external environmental changes. The success of a mission depends upon the crew’s ability to alter behavior and dynamically manage crew resources to meet situational demands.

g. Situational Awareness. The degree of accuracy by which one’s perception of the current environment mirrors reality. Maintaining a high level of situational awareness will better prepare crews to respond to unexpected situations.
CNAF M-3710.7

3.8.2 Effective CRM Training

Optimal CRM training is integrated, research-based, and skill-oriented, incorporating the Information, Demonstration, Practice, and Feedback Instructional Methodology. The success or failure of Crew Resource Management rests ultimately with each individual performing duties as an aircrew member in naval aircraft. Naval Aircrew shall exhibit thorough knowledge of self, aircraft, team, environment, the seven critical skills, and risk to employ sound and logical judgement in the prevention of human errors. Human error is the leading causal factor in aviation mishaps. Additional human error-based training should complement CRM training. More information is available through the U.S. Navy CRM website at https://www.netc.navy.mil/nascweb/crm/crm.htm.

3.9 OPERATIONAL-RISK MANAGEMENT

Operational-Risk Management (ORM) is a systematic, decision making process used to identify and manage hazards that endanger naval resources. ORM is a tool used to make informed decisions by providing the best baseline of knowledge and experience available. Its purpose is to increase operational readiness by anticipating hazards and reducing the potential for loss, thereby increasing the probability for success to gain the competitive advantage in combat. The integration of the ORM process into the planning and execution of everyday operations is required by OPNAVINST 3500.39 and is useful not only in naval aviation, but applies throughout the warfighting spectrum.

3.9.1 ORM Process Description

a. ORM employs a five-step process:

(1) Identify hazards.
(2) Assess hazards.
(3) Make risk decisions.
(4) Implement controls.
(5) Supervise.

b. The ORM process is utilized on three levels based upon time and assets available.

(1) Time-critical: A quick mental review of the five-step process when time does not allow for any more (i.e., in-flight mission/situation changes).
(2) Deliberate: Experience and brain storming are used to identify hazards and is best done in groups (i.e. aircraft moves, fly on/off).
(3) In-depth: More substantial tools are used to thoroughly study the hazards and their associated risk in complex operations (i.e., Weapons Det).

c. The ORM process is guided by the four principles:

(1) Accept risk when benefits outweigh the costs.
(2) Accept no unnecessary risk.
(3) Anticipate and manage risk by planning.
(4) Make risk decisions at the right level.
CHAPTER 8
Aeromedical and Survival

8.1 GENERAL

To improve the survivability of flight personnel, CNO (N98) has implemented the aircrew survivability enhancement program (ASEP). Sub-elements of this program are aviation life support systems (ALSS), CBRND, safety, human performance, and training. Guidelines and requirements contained here are considered minimum. Recommendations for changes or improvement in equipment, procedures, or training shall be addressed via the chain of command to COMNAVAIRFOR (N455) for evaluation and, if appropriate, implementation.

8.2 AVIATION LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS

The safety and survival equipment/requirements specified in paragraphs 8.2.1, 8.2.2, 8.2.3, and 8.2.4 of this manual are minimum requirements. Systems description, limits, procedures, deviations and authorization requiring a flight clearance shall be specified in an Interim Clearance (IFC), NATIP or NATOPS flight manual for the individual T/M/S aircraft. The latest equipment for use by aircrew personnel and passengers for flight in all naval aircraft is listed in Aviation Crew Systems manuals, NAVAIR 13-1-6.1 through NAVAIR 13-1-6.10, and NAVAIR Publications: NA 16-30PRC90-2, NA 16-30PRC149-1, NA 16-35PRC112-1, NA 16-35PRC112-1-1, NA 16-30URT140-1, and NA 16-35AVS9-4.

8.2.1 Aircrew Personal Protective Equipment Requirements

8.2.1.1 Aircrew

Note

- All Aircrew shall perform a Pre-Flight and Post-Flight Inspection of their Aircrew Personal Protective Equipment.

- Items below marked * may be omitted by flight personnel flying in rotary wing executive transport mission aircraft and those in fixed-wing cargo/transport class aircraft if such flight does not involve shipboard operations and omission is approved by the commanding officer.

*a. Protective helmet — The helmet shall be 100 percent covered with white reflective tape except as modified by approved aircrew system changes. Up to 30 square inches of light-colored reflective tape may be applied so long as the white tape remains visible from all directions. The use of reflective tape may degrade night vision device (NVD) performance. Temporary, nonreflective cloth covers may be worn over the reflective tape.

*b. Aircrew safety/flyer boots.

*c. Fire-resistant (aramid) flight gloves.

*d. Fire-resistant flight suit (aramid) — Aramid or cotton-type undergarments shall be worn. Suitable fire-resistant unit issue clothing (aramid) may be substituted for the flight suit for flight personnel in non-ejection seat aircraft.

*e. Identification tags — Two tags on a chain worn around the neck; alternately one tag may be laced into the boot, and the other carried elsewhere on the person.
CNAF M-3710.7

*f. Survival knife — Do not wear exposed or attached to the life preserver.

*g. Personal survival kit — Appropriate to the area of operations.

*h. Signal device — Required for all night flights and flights over water or sparsely populated areas.

*i. Survival Vest — The incorporation of inflatable life preservers shall be worn in accordance with item n. and o.

j. Survival radios and beacons.

(1) Survival radios.

(a) An approved voice-capable survival radio shall be carried by each aircrewman on all flights, unless otherwise directed by aircraft NATOPS manuals.

(b) A voice-capable radio shall be packed with all multiplace rafts.

(2) Emergency beacons.

(a) An approved automatically actuated line-of-sight emergency beacon shall be installed in all ejection seats. Emergency beacon shall remain automatically actuated unless the aircraft will be operated in hostile fire areas.

(b) Beyond-the-line-of-sight, emergency beacon shall be packed with all multiplace rafts carried on board aircraft when performing extended overwater flights outside of normal oceanic air traffic routes.

k. Flashlight — Required for all night flights.

l. Antiexposure suits — Final determination with regard to actual wearing of antiexposure suits shall be made by the commanding officer (CO) or officer in charge (OIC) of the aviation unit concerned. The decision will be based on an operational risk management (ORM) analysis and take all pertinent factors into account (e.g., class aircraft, type and duration of assigned mission, ambient cockpit temperatures and environment factors, suit wearability, combat versus noncombat environment, availability of SAR resources, and ALSS accessible to all personnel onboard the aircraft); refer to Figure 8-1. The latest available type continuous-wear or quick-donning antiexposure suits, as appropriate, shall be provided for flight personnel of naval aircraft when in the event of a mishap there would be a significant risk of water entry and when either of the following two conditions prevail:

(1) The water temperature is 50 °F or below.

(2) The outside air temperature (OAT) is 32 °F or below (based on the wind chill factor corrected temperature (see Figure 8-2)).

Note

- Actual determination as to when anti-exposure suits must be worn by flight personnel shall be determined by the CO or OIC. However, it is strongly recommended that anti-exposure suit use be mandatory when either of the above two criteria are met. The threat of lethal cold shock is very significant under these conditions and occurs within the first two to three minutes following immersion.

- Flight personnel have the option to wear the provided anti-exposure suits as a personal decision whenever they deem circumstances merit their use.
# COLD WATER IMMERSED FUNCTIONAL EXPOSURE LIMITS BY TYPE OF EXPOSURE PROTECTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CWU-86 or CWU-62/P SERIES</th>
<th>MULTICLIMATE PROTECTION SYSTEM</th>
<th>OTS-600&lt;sup&gt;1,2&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CWU-86 or 62/P Dry Suit</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTS-600 Dry Suit</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWU-62/P Underwr</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWU-33/P Liner</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP Iwrs Underwr</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<th>Water Temp °F</th>
<th>8% Body Fat</th>
<th>11 to 14% Body Fat</th>
<th>15 to 18% Body Fat</th>
<th>19 to 26% Body Fat</th>
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<td>90 ≤ 105</td>
<td>105 ≤ 105</td>
<td>120 ≤ 120</td>
<td>135 ≤ 135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: All clothing configurations include aircrew safety boots, standard wool socks, HGU-84/P helmet, CWU-27/P flight coverall.

Note 2: OTS ensembles are configured for tactical flight and also include CMU-33/P survival harness, PCU-56/P torso harness, CSU-13B/P anti-G suit.

Figure 8-1. Antiexposure Suit Requirements (Sheet 1 of 2)
CAUTION

This table shows estimated Immersed Functional Exposure Limits based on laboratory tests and simulations. Actual functional Exposure limits will vary based on the individual personal fitness including rest, meals, activity level, injuries and mental attitude and factors such as sea state, ambient air temperature, and total immersed time.

Note

- This table depicts predicted Functional Exposure Limits and not Survival Time.
- Predictions are based on body fat / weight combinations of:
  8% @ 155 lbs, 11-14% @ 166 lbs, 15-18% @ 177 lbs,
  19-26% @ 193 lbs, 27% @ 216 lbs.

USING TABLE TO MAKE OPERATIONAL DECISIONS

1. Consult with Operations to determine likely alert-to-rescue time. Allow for rescue of all aircrew.
2. Determine the coldest water temperature (rounding down) of which you will be flying.
3. Choose the body fat range that most closely resembles you, underestimating rather than overestimating.
4. Determine functional exposure limit by matching the water temperature row with the type of individual exposure protection available.

Example:

An 18% body fat aircrewman is scheduled for an unescorted night flight with a total of five personnel that will depart NAS Norfolk and terminates approximately three hours later on a carrier at sea. The coldest water temperature over which the crew will fly is 53 degrees. Operations estimates SAR time to be approx 1 hour and 30 minutes to arrive on station. Taking into account 1 hour to locate the survivors and an additional 1 hour and 15 minutes to rescue all five crew members, the total in water time would be 225 minutes for the last crew member. Thus, he needs to select clothing that will protect him for no less than 225 minutes. The aircrewman has been issued the CWU-62/P, CWU-23/P liner and CWU-43, CWU-44 underwear.

The aircrewman selects the “15-18%” body fat data range and 50 degree water temperature (rounding down). Based on the table, he determines that he can wear the underwear without the liner under the CWU-62/P to last for the 225 minutes estimated it will take for the SAR rescue.

Figure 8-1. Antiexposure Suit Requirements (Sheet 2)
8.2.4.2 Pressurized Aircraft

Figure 8-7 governs the use of oxygen equipment in pressurized aircraft other than tactical jet aircraft flown above 10,000 feet aircraft altitude. Oxygen shall be used when cabin altitude exceeds 10,000 feet except as modified by paragraph 8.2.4.3.

8.2.4.3 Ejection Seat Aircraft

Oxygen shall be used by all occupants from takeoff to landing. If mission duration exceeds LOX availability, aircrew may secure the oxygen system as necessary. Emergency bailout bottles, when provided, shall be connected prior to takeoff.

WARNING

- Ejection without the oxygen mask or visor connected to the helmet may result in significant injury or death.
- Cabin altitude must be checked to ensure aircraft is following pressurization schedule prior to removing the mask at flight altitudes exceeding 10,000 feet.

Note

The oxygen mask may be removed for brief periods of time for adjustment or intake of water/food.
8.2.5 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Defense (CBRND) Protective Equipment

Appropriate CBRND protective equipment (to include theater/regionally prescribed medical counter-measures) shall be available for all flight personnel on flights into, from, or in the vicinity of identified CB threat and/or CB weapons use. Refer to NAVAIR 00-80T-121, Chemical and Biological Defense NATOPS Manual. CBRND training is a Level B — Recommended Deployment Work-Up Training found in Appendix E.

8.3 HUMAN PERFORMANCE AND AEROMEDICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR FLIGHT AND FLIGHT SUPPORT

8.3.1 General

Operational readiness and aviation safety are enhanced by assuring that flight crew and flight support personnel achieve and maintain an optimal state of physical and emotional health. It is important that personnel are adequately rested and that conditions which contribute to fatigue, impair health, decrease performance and increase mishap potential are reduced or eliminated. This section outlines basic guidelines that individuals and all levels of supervision and command can use to attain and monitor personnel performance.

Note

- The senior aviation commander responsible for conduct of air operations may exceed these guidelines, should operational necessity dictate. Exceeding the guidelines increases the probability of crew fatigue, causing impaired judgment and reduced performance. When exceeding the guidelines, commanders shall manage the increased risk created by crew fatigue. Consultation with the Flight Surgeon (FS) or Aeromedical Safety Officer (AMSO) is strongly recommended in the development and implementation of appropriate risk controls.

- Landing signal officers (LSOs) shall meet the physiological standards required for aircrew in a flight status to perform the duties of a controlling or backup LSO. Maladies or injuries that do not impair mental acuity (such as minor sprains, etc.), but that preclude normal flight status may be waived by the flight surgeon on a case-by-case basis.

- Commanding officers and flight surgeons shall comply with applicable directives pertaining to mental health evaluation of servicemembers. (See DoD Directive 6490.1, Mental Health Evaluations of Members of the Armed Forces that is implemented by SECNAVINST 6320.24). Individuals who fall under “Military Whistleblower Protection” guidelines per SECNAVINST 5370.7 may require additional administrative procedures in conjunction with evaluation. Commanding officers are encouraged to consult with local flight surgeons and legal officers.

- UAS flightcrews should comply with all sections of paragraph 8.3.

8.3.2 Factors Affecting Aircrew Performance

Numerous complex factors affect the performance of flight and support personnel. Commanders and mission planners must assess the impact of factors that contribute to operational fatigue and reduce aircrew performance. The principle factors include: weather, extremes of temperature, nighttime operations, use of vision imaging systems, mission delays, personal equipment & ALSS, duration of the duty period, quality and duration of sleep (prior to duty), number of hours flown during the previous several duty periods, time of day relative to the body’s internal circadian
primary flight instruments, call a “knock it off (with reason),” and conduct an IMC nosehigh recovery. (T-1).

3.28.3.3. After approximately 5 seconds, or sooner if airspace or altitude restrictions require, the flight lead will command “roll left (or right), 30 down”. (T-1). All aircraft will roll inverted and accomplish the military power, 3-4 G wings-level pull to place the bore cross at the 30 degree nose-low, then roll upright on the reference heading. (T-1). Once intra-flight deconfliction is assured, pilots will repeat the horizon crosscheck and visibility assessment while maintaining the 30 degree-nose low attitude. (T-1).

3.28.3.4. If during any portion of the maneuver a flight member determines that the visibility or horizon reference is unsuitable for tactical maneuvering per AFI-11-214 guidance, the flight lead will modify the training profile and either transition to non-NVG formations or NVG formation tactics limited to AFI-11-214 “Restricted Maneuvering” guidelines. (T-1). Pilots will continually modify profiles or airspace utilization throughout the sortie if conditions change and no longer permit the planned maneuvering. (T-1). Flight training modification includes: restricted maneuvering limitations (with or without NVGs) per AFI-11-214, a non-NVG formation IMC game plan, or accomplishing a briefed alternate mission without NVGs.

3.28.3.5. Pilots will continually cross-check visually perceived attitude aided by NVGs with frequent cross-checks of primary flight instruments throughout the mission. (T-1).

3.28.4. NVG Qualifications. Pilots will not wear NVGs in flight unless they are NVG qualified or a qualified NVG IP is in the flight (ratio of one NVG IP per non-NVG qualified pilot). (T-1). F-16B/D Familiarization flights are authorized but the unit must ensure appropriate academics are accomplished and an NVG IP is in the front seat. (T-1).

3.28.5. Radio Calls. All flight members will make a radio call when donning, raising, or stowing NVGs. (T-1).

3.28.6. Obstacle/Intra-Flight Deconfliction. When flying in route, only one flight member per element will don/raise/stow NVGs at a time. (T-1). Flight leads will call turns if forced to maneuver while flight members are donning/raising/stowing NVGs. (T-1).

3.28.7. Takeoffs/Landings. Pilots must stow or raise NVGs during takeoff until at or above 2,000 feet AGL in climbing or level flight and only in VMC. (T-1). Pilots must stow or raise NVGs no later than 5 minutes prior to landing unless NVGs are necessary to handle an emergency or mission requirements dictate. (T-1).

3.28.8. NVG Use during Air to Air Refueling (AAR). Pilots must stow or raise NVGs no later than the stern position and resume NVG use no earlier than boom disconnect. (T-1).

**Section 3F—Other**

3.29. Targeting Pod Operations. Pilots will not use the TGP for anything other than navigational SA below 1,000 feet AGL (e.g., Only VID aircraft, designate for weapons delivery, etc. above 1,000 feet AGL). (T-1). (USAFWC, Test, and AATC: Minimum altitudes for TGP operations are established in WIC or test syllabus requirements, continuation training plans or operational test and evaluation requirements).
(5) Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM) is prohibited while wearing NVGs.

(6) Tanking while using NVGs is prohibited.

(7) External lighting shall be set as appropriate for wingmen.

(8) If NVG degradation occurs, and switching to the alternate battery does not immediately rectify the problem, NVG operations for that aircrew must cease. In this case the following will immediately apply:

(a) The aircraft lighting of other aircraft in the flight is set to allow all aircrew to maintain visual contact.

(b) Cockpit lighting shall be set to a level satisfactory to both aircrew.

(c) MINALT >3000’ AGL.

(9) Formation Flights. NVGs assist the aircrew in situational awareness during formation and rendezvous operations. There exists several severe limitations to NVG performance that all aircrew must brief. The following are restrictions to NVG formation and rendezvous operations:

(a) Rendezvous:

1. NVGs may be worn during rendezvous operations; however, they shall not be used as the primary source of range, bearing, and closure rate information. The rendezvousing aircraft, especially during initial acquisition using the NVGs, shall closely monitor cockpit instruments for closure, bearing, altitude indications, and visual image correlation.

2. Avoid rendezvousing directly into a low-angle moon or bright cultural lights as the illumination from these sources significantly reduces NVG performance. Maximum closure for running rendezvous is 25 KCAS inside of 1 NM. Aircraft Carrier (CVN) rendezvous shall be conducted with a maximum of 25 KCAS excess airspeed decreasing to co-speed within 0.5 NM.
PMA-202 Night Vision Cueing and Display 500th unit delivery

From Amie Blade AIR-1.0 Public Affairs Officer  Feb 28, 2019

A common tenet from Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Richardson's Four Lines of Effort is increasing the speed of getting capability to the fleet. In the current geo-political climate, taking a measured risk approach in order to accelerate capability delivery is imperative to maintaining strategic and tactical superiority over adversaries. The Night
Vision Cueing and Display (NVCD) program, managed by the Aircrew Systems program office (PMA-202), is an example of one such program willing to take measured risks in order to accelerate capability.

The history behind the execution of the NVCD program is a testament to the Aircrew Systems program office’s ability to innovate and think outside the box. The NVCD program was first transferred to NAVAIR when the Air Force withdrew from the joint effort in 2013. It is a Rockwell Collins Elbit Vision Systems product that provides nighttime capability for Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System in all F/A-18 variants and the EA-18G.

The improvements provided by the NVCD over the legacy night vision system equate to a fivefold improvement between the target acquisition to engagement component of the Kill Chain. When the Navy assumed full control of the program, NVCD was billed as ready for near-term Full Rate Production. It turns out, it was not. Multiple hardware and reliability issues drove the program to delays, budget reductions and a tenuous execution profile. The Aircrew Systems program office had to flex, and that flexibility involved additional testing, innovative approaches to solutions, and taking on risk to acquire what has become a night vision system highly favored by the fleet today.

The team solved these technical, reliability and funding issues by taking measured risks. And, on January 16, 2019, those measured risks proved to be worthwhile as Capt. David Padula accepted the 500th delivery of the fleet-favored NVCD system on behalf of the government. Padula spoke to the audience, largely made up of the Rockwell Collins Elbit Vision Systems employees at their facility in Merrimack, New Hampshire, “The capability
that is provided for our aviators is unprecedented," Padula told the audience. "We fight our wars today differently from an aviation perspective because of this system, the system you all had a very, very intimate part of."
### A3SSHHP

#### AIRCRAFT DATA (RECORD TYPE 7B)

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Enclosure 104

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
## UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
### NAVAL AIRCRAFT FLIGHT RECORD

#### X371LHX

### AIRCRAFT DATA (RECORD TYPE 7B)

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### WEAPONS PROFICIENCY DATA (RECORD TYPE 7G)

Enclosure 105

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Enclosure 105
It's 1335 on Wednesday the 23rd of January 2019. I'm [redacted]. I've got [redacted] and [redacted] with me and we are interviewing -- is it [redacted] or how?

[redacted]: [redacted].

[redacted]: Please, [redacted], please, state your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

[redacted]: [redacted].

[redacted]: And, [redacted], what do you go by?

[redacted]: [redacted] or [redacted]. Any of those.

[redacted]: Okay. I'll just call you [redacted], is that all right?

[redacted]: Yes, sir.

[redacted]: Okay. Thanks [redacted].

[redacted], what is your military Occupational Specialty?

[redacted]: Mine is 7525 or a weapons systems officer for the F-18 at Delta.

[redacted]: That's great. And when did you finish your training?

[redacted]: I completed my fleet replacement squadron in -- it was either about end of July of 2017.
July of '17?

Yes, sir.

So you have been at 242 about a year and a half then?

About, sir.

When did you get to Iwakuni exactly, what month and year? The table can exactly where.

It should have been the end of August of 2017. I want to say roughly the 29th is when I showed up, I believe.

August of '17. And who was the commanding officer then?

It was [ph]., very good. How many hours do you have in the Hornet?

Somewhere between two and 300. I haven't really checked my logbook for too recently for that, but I think it's just a little closer towards the 200.

When is -- where were you in December of 2018?

Here, in Iwakuni for the most part at the beginning. Leave in the second half.

Okay. So were you here for the
Yes, sir.

Okay. What role did you have in it?

Day crew, so non night crew and just aircrew.

Okay. And who else was on day crew, roughly?

Was he your pilot?

He was supposed to be a pilot on the day prior, or, excuse me, the day after I believe.

Okay.

First names were and then , .

Who was the senior officer on day crew?

I believe it was either the commanding officer or the executive officer. I believe they were both day crew, from what I remember.

You think the CO and XO -- and who's the XO?

So you were day crew, which was what, like, eight to 1600is or something?
Roughly.

And the CO and XO were both on day crew, as your recall?

From what I remember. It might not be completely accurate. It might be, like, mid-crew or swing shift or whatever that, like, mid-crew is referred to as.

Okay. Are you night systems qualified?

As in complete with the night systems syllabus, Yes, but not as, like, an instructor if that's what --

No, I'm just asking. So you're NSQ?

Copy, sir. Yes, sir.

Have you been in the Tanker before?

Yes.

Been in the Tanker in the day time?

Yes.

Tanker at night?

Once.

Tell me about that.

We were doing a section lead syllabus event for and down in Okinawa. I was flying with [ph] who are then Pilot Training Officer.

This was back in, I want to say, about a year ago when they were
doing their section lead syllabus. Give or take a year.

I believe it was with a C-130. I'm pretty sure it was with a C-mount or a 152 C-130 --

What do you remember about the Tanking evolution?

Not much other than the fact that it went relatively as briefed and I remember it was an easier join-up than we thought because we ended up seeing them coming across our nose while we were coordinating the meet-up. Tanked on the right hand side, and that's all I really remember, a least, like, over all of that event.

Do you remember how you departed the Tanker?

I believe it was to the right, since we were on the right hand side.

What about the other jet?

I believe it was the same. I'm trying to remember exactly. I don't remember the exact nature, but if it was anything as everything else that I'm used to, which I believe it wasn't so it just made it stand out otherwise. We should have
departed, gone to echelon right after we were waiting, and then depart to the right after that. Either straight ahead or high and to the right, as coordinated with the Tanker the whole time.

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

[O] [3] (A), [O] [3] (A). No I was wearing the ANVIS 9's or the non joint helmet mounted key wing system.
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

[O] [3] (A), [O] [3] (A). Why is that?
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

I'd have to double check, but from what I remember I think it was regular NVG's.

[O] [3] (A), [O] [3] (A). Have you -- do you have it now? Do you have ANVIS 11's now?
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

[O] [3] (A), [O] [3] (A). Have you flown with them very much?
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

[O] [3] (A). Relatively. I prefer to fly with those over the older type.
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

[O] [3] (A), [O] [3] (A). Why is that?
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

[O] [3] (A). It gives us -- or it gives me a little bit more essay so I can have not have my heads up display take up one of my
DDI's but still -- or one of my displays in the cockpit, but still have situational awareness to my air speed and altitude, my angle of attack, set the parameters, and also see where certain sensors are slated.

[redacted]: Where did you get your ANVIS 11 training?

[redacted]: From -- should have been from one of our night systems instructors. I don't remember details of it.

[redacted]: What are some of the differences between the ANVIS 9 and the ANVIS 11 that you remember being trained to?

[redacted]: Biggest difference is you now have symbology by your right eye, eye ball. And then other than that, it's just letting -- that and then you now have, I guess, the calibrating before you fly. It's only one item that you're calibrating per eye as opposed to the older system where it involved three adjustments per eye. Other than that, pretty much the same as, in terms of symbology, the same as flying with JAHAMIC's during the day, in terms of symbology.

[redacted]: Were you -- so the benefit is its got the symbology in the HUD and it's easier to adjust; is that what I heard you say?

[redacted]: For the most part, yes. I know that there is talk about sometimes the symbology getting inverted when flying with
the JAHEMIC's NVG's. I have not seen that myself though. Usually -- from my understanding it's with under, like, high G maneuvers or some type of -- something dynamic though.

Have you ever heard of it happening. You ever met anyone --

Yes. I have heard of it; I have not seen it myself though.

And what's the word around the ready room? What causes that and how do you fix it?

Not sure of the cause, or then the possibly G or some type of unusual attitude maybe. The fix has been to, from my understanding, was just to unplug it, the JAHEMIC's from the aircraft so you're not getting any symbology at all, but you're still getting the night vision benefit of the goggles.

Any negative about the ANVIS 11? Anything the 9 does better than the 11?

Not that I can really tell for myself, but I've heard that the ANVIS 11, excuse me, the 9's have a little better, I guess, fidelity in what you're seeing. But, not enough for me to really notice too much without doing it side by side, which would be, kind of, tough to do since it's on the helmet. It would be -- switching helmets would be, kind of, awkward.
Have you -- what's your day job in the squadron?

The S-1, sorry, the Administration Assistant Officer.

Admin officer. Okay.

Are you ever around -- is your office near the CO's office?

Yes.

So you handle paperwork that comes to the CO?

A bit. My focus in the shop is more for the DTS, or the Defense Travel System. I'm one of the guys that's been doing -- is smarter on that, so I handle most of that within the shop.

You ever stood ODO?

Yes.

Did -- what are some of the response -- do you still stand ODO sometimes?

Yes.

What are some ODO responsibilities?

Checking weather, NODOMS, coordinating fuel, coordinating with maintenance, mainly being the point of contact for
also coordinating with other squadrons if there's changes or anything like that where we need to coordinate with the other squadrons for that.

(b) (3) (A).: You ever have a flight schedule change while you were standing duty?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A).: Yes.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A).: Tell me about that.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A).: We got the request from, usually ops or maintenance. If it's not a cancelation, it wouldn't necessarily require a CO approval since it can be done -- it's pretty basic. But, for the actual changes to the flight schedule, if the CO's around, then we'll try and catch him and let him know what's going on with that, and then he'll either give the OK or the no-go on the change. And if the CO's not around, then sometimes it can be delegated to the executive officer or the operations officer if really needed. But, it should be going up to the CO.

(b) (3) (A).: Once the CO approves a flight schedule change, how do you record that?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A).: On our electronic or Excel version. We'll put it in red, the change, whatever the change is in red, and then do, like, a space and then "CO OK". And then on the paper flight schedule, I'll make the change in red ink and annotate it there.
11

(b) (3) (A): Does the Co, like, sign the paper copy, or do you put your initials on there, or anything like that?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): No I don't think -- at least -- no, I don't think I've ever really got the signature. I haven't really seen much of the flight schedule changes recently, so, I haven't been standing a whole lot recently for obvious reasons.

(b) (3) (A): Did you have any involvement in the mishap at all? Were you, like, around when it went down or around during the SAR effort or anything?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Myself and and were the SAR, or the search and rescue aircraft that went out after and got back.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): So you assumed on scene commander?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Tell me about that.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): I got a call around, from what I remember the time was like 0249. Got a call from the squadron duty officer, asking me to come in. I came in. I was informed that Profane 12 and AC-130 were down, that I was flying with,, going to go out and go look for them. Went down to flight equipment, calibrated my NVG's. There was some miscoordination with myself and my pilot, but we eventually got down. Started up the
jet, took off runway 20, went out on the route that took us up higher so that we could save some fuel. Got out to the area, I remember hearing the sea beacons.

: About what time? Was it still dark when you got out there?

: Still dark. I don't remember exactly, I'm trying to remember from the take off times. I don't remember that -- I couldn't give you a very good estimate. It was somewhere between three and four I want to say, or maybe five, I'm not sure. And then landing sometime between, I want to say, 0500ish.

: Still dark when you landed?

: Yes. And then after we landed, I was told by the XO to go to get into my office for the CACO, or the Catch Assistance Coordination Officer, I believe. That's one of the things I've never known.

: Okay. Did you guys talk to while you were out there looking for them?

: No. We didn't have any radar communications with them. We flipped between -- on our auxillary radio we went to the SAR frequency, guard which is , and then the maritime guard frequency of .

: Who did you talk to?
The only person -- or the people we were able to get in touch with on any of those frequencies was one of the boats that was in the area. We thought we had found them because we saw a strobe light for about 20 minutes, but it turned out it was a boat with a strobe light. But, we were talking to someone, trying to get someone to those coordinates that we thought they were at. It was just -- it was a Japanese fisherman, or I don't know if he was a fisherman, but a Japanese guy in a boat. That's all we really know.

Is there any talk about using ambiens or go pills or anything?

I just know that several aircrew were requesting those from the flight doctor.

How did they request?

I'm not sure. The flight doctor put a message out on the all officers chat saying that --

All officers chat on WhatsApp?

Yes, sir. Saying that --

What did it say?

I don't remember the exact wording, but generally saying that several aircrew were asking about -- I'm not sure if it was go-no go pills, or just Ambien specifically, or what the exact pills were. I assume that the go to is Ambien for the
no-go's. But that he was not able to issue them, and that would be a 24 hour down as well. Actually, I take that back, I don't remember if he said it was necessarily 24 hour down, but that he was unable to issue it. And I believe it was him, it could have been someone else that said it was CG directed that we were not supposed to have any performance enhancers or any go-no go pills for the exercise.

: Okay.

: At least that's my understanding of it.

: Do you remember who in the chat was requesting?

: No.

: But it was on the chat --

: It was on the -- because on the chat it just said several people or several aircrew. So I don't know -- he never said the names specifically.

: So the doc, he said several aircrew have requested it?

: Yes.

: So you said the last time you did a night Tanking, was that the only time you've done night Tanking was a year ago?
That's the only time I've done night Tanking. Roughly, I'd have to actually check the --

How often do you guys Tank with 152? Usually before a transpacific flight to get, for example, before we go down to __________, where we'd be doing a lot of Tanking. The reason is that we need get --

It's, like, once or twice a year? About twice a year, roughly.

And then those are usually daytime? Yes. Because the TransPac would be during the day.

So you guys barely get any time in with the VMGR-152?

I wouldn't say that. That's more -- our main focus is before we go on a detachment so that everyone, all the pilots, can get Tanker current.

Okay.

Then occasionally during other times, to either maintain currency or just for, yes, just maintain currency. I don't work in ops so I don't really have good, like, good situational awareness to the plan in terms of when all that is set up or, like, how often really.
But since August of 2017, you've only gone once?

That I remember, yes. At night, yes.

When you did it at night, did you guys flip your goggles up, or leave them down, or do you remember?

I left mine down.

Do you know if anyone else flipped them up or how that was briefed or was there any discussion about it?

I don't think anyone would have flipped theirs up. Intuitively I want to be able to see it, and the only reason I could see why you might flip them up would be with, like, the light on the probe that was in the basket was, like, washing out of your goggles and you somehow couldn't turn off the light for whatever reasons.

But, intuitively you would want to keep the NVG's down so you can see the Tanker, the basket, and everything near, everything a little more clearly, rather than point of light.

Have you ever -- do you remember what kind of lighting configuration the Tanker was in?

Not off the top of my head.

Do you know what kind of lighting configuration your Hornet was in?
[b] (3) (A), [b] (6): Should have been in standard, having the navigation lights on, you know, collision lights should have been on. But, mostly I can't -- I can't really see the inner collision light very well from the backseat.

[b] (3) (A), [b] (6): Do you remember if the probe light was on?

[b] (3) (A), [b] (6): Not that I can remember to say yes or no. It was too long ago for me to actually, like, call it with sufficient detail.

[b] (3) (A), [b] (6): Okay. Do you fly with Captain Reslar a lot?

[b] (3) (A), [b] (6): A bit. Mostly in Guam last year when we were there for COBRA North.

[b] (3) (A), [b] (6): How was that?

[b] (3) (A), [b] (6): I mean, I had fun with it. He was one of my friends so I just enjoy flying with him.

[b] (3) (A), [b] (6): Yes. Sorry that you guys lost him, he seems like a nice guy.

[b] (3) (A), [b] (6): Yes.

[b] (3) (A), [b] (6): Did you ever know him to be struggling as a pilot or any challenges he was facing more than someone with his experience level?
Not that it would be outside the standard deviation. Did good on some things, not as good as others. But, within an acceptable standard, I guess, is how you put it.

Did you ever fly with [redacted]? 
Yes.
How was he? Was he pretty good?
I'd say so.
What do you think his reputation's like in the squadron as a pilot?
Good. Really good. Mission commander, like, pretty much the only thing he had left for his quals was to, I guess, go to MDTC, or Marine Division Tactics Course, and weapons training instructor, or weapons and tactics instructor, excuse me.

Is he going pretty soon, do you know?
It does not appear so.
Why is that?
It looks like the -- [ph] or was slated to go to WTI or MDTC and WTI next.
And that decision was made before the mishap?
Yes.
Why do you think that decision was made?
That would be an ops question, or ops and CO.

So you don't know?

I don't know the exact reasoning and I don't want to speculate on other people's thoughts on that. That made decision.

Yes, no that's a good answer, okay.

You ever fly with? Obviously he's a WISSO --

No. I mean, in terms of in the same flight --

Yes.

So we'd be in different aircraft.

Yes, that's the question.

Only one time that I can remember specifically. And that was -- that was, like, a year ago when they were -- him and were doing the section lead [inaudible] in the dash two backseat, with the dash two pilot being the instructor.

Do you remember anything significant about that?

No, sir.

How's reputation in the squadron?

Competent. In terms of stating the facts,
competent, but sometimes a little hard to work with. But, you can still work with him.

(b) (3) (A), *******: Was it -- were any of those, anybody from the mishap aircrew, did they have any human factors concerns that you are aware of?

(b) (3) (A), *******: I know that for *******, you know, *******.

(b) ****** ******* *******.

(b) (3) (A), *******: I think what you are eluding to is it --

(b) (3) (A), *******: was on the night page and ******* ******* *******

(b) (6),
(b) (7)
(C)

(b) (3) (A), *******: Yes.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), *******: So was there much discuss -- did you hear any discussion about who was on what shift and why?

(b) (3) (A), *******: Not that I was, I guess, privy to. I was on cross country down in Oki, or Okinawa, prior to the MAG-ULT. So I know there was some stuff going on before hand, like a meeting, but I wasn't there for that meeting so I, kind of, missed out on --

(b) (3) (A), *******: Like a meeting that talks about who's
going to be on what crew and that kind of stuff?

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: Yes. I just knew that I was day crew and when
(b) (6)
to show up.

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: Do you have any idea why you were
(b) (6)
selected for day crew?

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: Just a toss of the hat, I guess.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: [b] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(b) (6),
(b) (7)

(b) (6), (C)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: [b] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(b) (6),
(b) (7)

(b) (6), (C)

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(b) (6),
(b) (7)

(b) (6), (C)

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(b) (7)

(b) (6), (C)

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(b) (6),
(b) (7)

(b) (6), (C)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: [b] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(b) (6),
(b) (7)

(b) (6), (C)
Okay.

Does he have -- does he have a qualification for that flight that you or another WISSO doesn't have that was important for that flight?

Not that would be important for the flight, no.

For the dash 2 FAM Tank, you would think you could have a pretty basic WISSO back there, correct?

Yes.

He just needed to be night systems qualified, I guess.

Yes.

Are you night systems qualified?

Yes.

Are there other WISSO's that are night systems qualified that are on the day page?
Okay. Is there anything else about the mishap and the circumstances surrounding it that you'd like share with us, so you make it so that we could do a more balanced and complete report? Are there any other factors you want us to consider?

Not that I can think of right now.

Anything on your mind that contributed to it? From your perspective?

Not that I can think of, really, for -- no.

Okay.

Nothing, sir.

Judge will swear you out.
MISHAP DEBRIS RECOVERED

~162NM

~86NM
MISHAP RECOVERY LOCATIONS

~21NM

~11NM

Recovered Items
- Persons Recovered
- Rafts Recovered
- Survival Equipment Recovered
- Crew Gear Recovered
- Aircraft Pieces Recovered
- Other Items Recovered
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<td>5X RAFTS</td>
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<td>4X FIRST AID KITS</td>
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<tr>
<td>4X U/I AIRCRAFT PIECE</td>
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<td>2X CHAIR CUSHION</td>
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<td>2X WOODEN BLOCK</td>
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<td>2X GREEN SEA DYE MARKER</td>
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<td>2X TIRE</td>
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<tr>
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 101
Marine Aircraft Group 11
3D Marine Aircraft Wing, MARFORPAC
PO Box 452028
MCAS Miramar San Diego, California 92145

Flight Schedule For
Wednesday, 28 November 2018

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<tr>
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<th>Cnc</th>
<th>BRF</th>
<th>ETD</th>
<th>ETR</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>Aircrew</th>
<th>Mission</th>
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<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
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<th>Notes</th>
<th>Tac Freq</th>
<th>Pri</th>
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<tr>
<td>SHUTR-24</td>
<td>1A21</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>F/A-18C/D</td>
<td>SFXK</td>
<td>SFXK</td>
<td>1A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>HP/HS</td>
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** MSN COMMANDER
* FORMATION LEADER
# NATK AIRCRAFT
TWO-STICK JET REQUIRED
$ ADVISORY PAINT SCHEME
G LPOD CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT
M MIDS CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT

| EVENT Callsign | Cnc | BRF | ETD | ETR | A/C | Aircrew | Mission | TMR AREA | Start | End | Notes |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------|=========|----------|-------|-----|-------|
| SHUTR-91       | S-01/A/B | 1200| 1215| 1415| T-34C | SFXK   | LOW SAFE | 1A1 R-2301 C/W | 1300  | 1400|
| SHUTR-92       | S-01/A/B | 1300| 1330| 1500| T-34C | SFXK   | PRO-A    | 1A1    | 1    | 5    |
| SHUTR-93       | S-01/A/B | 1545| 1615| 2000| T-34C | SFXK   | TSO FERRY| 1A1 KNJK | 1    | 5    |

1 of 3
General Notes:
This flight schedule constitutes official orders.
ODO cancel unused ranges, post weather and NOTAMs.
RACs report incomplete events to schedules ASAP.
ODO coordinate back-up A/C and pass to flight lead prior to walk.
Simulator changes after schedule distribution require a phone call to Simulator CI Usage 26.5 Hours.
Flight Schedule written for 5C and 4D F/A-18 aircraft.
All aircrew shall log individual SHARP entries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIM</th>
<th>Brief</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Aircrew</th>
<th>Console</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFT 1(C/D)</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>STK W/U</td>
<td>18-6</td>
<td>CI</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFT 2(C/D)</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>STK W/U</td>
<td>18-6</td>
<td>CI</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFT 3(C)</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>SAWI 105</td>
<td>(3) (A)</td>
<td>CI</td>
<td>PIAB</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFT 4(C)</td>
<td>0730</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>NATOPS/INST CHECK</td>
<td>(3) (A)</td>
<td>VMFA - 232</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFT 5(C)</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>0900</td>
<td>SFAM 114</td>
<td>(3) (A)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFT 6(C)</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>SAWI 102</td>
<td>(3) (A)</td>
<td>VMFA - 232</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFT 1(C/D)</td>
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<td>1000</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>SFWT 3001</td>
<td>(3) (A)</td>
<td>VMFA - 232</td>
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<td>1100</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>SCQL 106</td>
<td>(3) (A)</td>
<td>VMFA - 232</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFT 3(C)</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1530</td>
<td>SAWI 103</td>
<td>(3) (A)</td>
<td>VMFA - 232</td>
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<td>AFT 4(C)</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1530</td>
<td>SAWI 103</td>
<td>(3) (A)</td>
<td>VMFA - 232</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFT 5(C)</td>
<td>1300</td>
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<td>1330</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>SAWI 102W</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFT 2(C/D)</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>SAWI 103</td>
<td>(3) (A)</td>
<td>Cather observe AN/VDI 402</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

ACADEMICS:
0800-0900: AFAM 116 - SOP Lecture - Shooters Court - 19-2 - A, (A)
0900-1000: AFAM 142 - CRS Rules - Shooters Court - 19-2 - A, (A)
1000-1045: ACQL 107 - Bingo / Divert Fields - Shooters Court - 19-2 - A, (A)
1430-1530: RPRB - CO's Conference Room - 19-2 - A, (A)
1500-1630: AFAM 112 - Flight Control 1 - Classroom 1 - 19-2 - A, (A)

GROUNDS EVENTS:
0630-0700: Maintenance Meeting - Maintenance Control - All Required - A, (A)
0730-0745: Ops Maintenance Meeting - Schedules Office - 19-2 - A, (A)
0800-1000: Key West Det Meeting - VMFA-314 Ops Office - A, (A)
0900-1000: Phase Meeting - AMO Conference Room - All Required - A, (A)
0900-1000: CDI Training - Shooters Court - 19-2 - A, (A)
1000-1130: MAG Ops Meeting - MAG Ops Office - A, (A)
1500-1600: Remedial Physical Training - Main Gym - All Required Personnel / Open to Everyone - S-3
1600-1600: Navy Career Training - Shooter's Court - E-6 and Above - A, (A)
1615-1615: CDI Training - Shooters Court - 19-2 - A, (A)
1600-1630: Maintenance Meeting - Maintenance Control - All Required - A, (A)
1800-0000: CDI Training - QA - A, (A)

TAD: none
TAD: none

QUESTIONS OF THE DAY
EMERGENCY: SINGLE ENGINE FAILURE IN LANDING CONFIGURATION?
NATOPS: WHAT ARE 3 INDICATIONS OF A PLAINING LINK FAILURE?
SOP: MAX # OF AIRCRAFT ON RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF?
T-34C: REAR COCKPIT ON FIRE?
THREAT: SA-15?
Enclosure 112
### Environmental Data
- **Sunrise / Sunset:** 0631 / 1842
- **Moonrise / Moonset:** 2240 / 1137
- **EENT / Iillum:** 1740 / 72%
- **LLI Period:** 1753-2313

### Airfield Hours
- **KNXX:** 0700-0600 PST (Z-8)
- **Quiet Hours:**
  - 0915-1200
  - 1200-1900 PMCF
  - 1900-0600

### Ordnance Notes
- **EP QOD:**
  - 1700 (A), (b) (6)
- **TAD:**
  - 1900 (A), (b) (6)

### Ordnance
- **Aircraft:**
  - KNITE: 31 (A), (b) (6)
- **Description:**
  - Aviation Material
- **Fuel:**
  - T /R
  - HP / HS
  - A
  - B
  - E
  - M
- **Ordnance:**
  - A
  - B
  - E
  - M
- **MSN #**
  - 19
  - 1
  - 18
  - 3
- **Remarks:**
  - THIS FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS

### Meetings & Academic Events
- **Time:**
  - 0700-0745
  - 1000-1010
  - 1100-1150
  - 1500-1530
  - 1600-1615
  - 1700-1730
- **Location:**
  - Flight Line
  - Bob Hope Theatre
  - Marion Carl Conference Room
  - CO's Office
  - CO's Conference Room
  - STAN Board
- **Description:**
  - Maintenance Control
  - Corporals Course Graduation
  - MAG-11 Operations Meeting
  - EAS Interview
  - Maintenance Meeting
  - All IP's, Capt Heiser
- **Personnel:**
  - All Available
  - All Interested
  - All Required, All Interested
  - LtCol Hinton, Sgt Cabral
  - All Required
  - All Required

### Questions of the Day
- **NATOPS QOD:**
  - What are the restraints that can be released if the Manual Override Handle is actuated on the ground or in the air prior to ejection?
- **TACTICAL QOD:**
  - What three problems must be solved by the shooter during a gun shot?
- **EP QOD:**
  - OBGOs DEGD caution in flight?
- **THREAT QOD:**
  - SA-11

### Officer Leave / TAD
- **Enclosure 114**
From: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION ICO 6 DECEMBER 2018 MID-AIR COLLISION MISHAP COMMAND INVESTIGATION

Ref: (a) IO Appointment Letter 5830/CG dated 10 Dec 18

1. I request an extension of time for completing the command investigation for which I have been appointed by the reference. I request a new submission date of 30 April 2019.

2. The reason for this request is to allow the transcription service provider to complete transcriptions for the interviews, and we are currently pending additional toxicology reports for the aircrew involved in the mishap.

Copy to:
SJA, 1st MAW
From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
To: [Redacted]

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION ICO 6 DECEMBER 2018 MID-AIR COLLISION MISHAP COMMAND INVESTIGATION

1. Returned. Your request for an extension is granted. Your investigation is now due 30 April 2019

T. D. WEIDLEY

Copy to:
SJA, 1st MAW
From: [b] (3) (A), (b) (6)
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION AND LINE OF DUTY DETERMINATIONS IN THE DEATHS OF 7557 USMC, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 6276 USMC, and Corporal William C. Ross (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 6276 USMC.

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN)

1. In accordance to the reference, the Command Investigation of the aviation mishap that occurred on 6 December 2018 off the coast of Japan is ongoing.

2. As the Investigating Officer, this letter records my line of duty recommendations conducted in accordance with Chapter II of the reference concerning the deaths of 7557 USMC, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 6276 USMC, and Corporal William C. Ross (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 6276 USMC.

3. At approximately 0150 on 6 December 2018, a VMGR-152 KC-130J aircraft with Bureau Number 1677981 and using call sign SUMO41, was struck by another aircraft during a mission and crashed into the ocean off the coast of Japan. William C. Ross were onboard the KC-130J. The flight originated at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan. The destination was Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan.

4. Corporal Daniel E. Baker, and died in the line of duty while performing their assigned military duties and not due to their own misconduct.

Copy to:
SJA, 1st MAW
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Col Schoolfield ltr 5830/IO of 28 Feb 19

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
To: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (MMSR-6)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION AND LINE OF DUTY DETERMINATIONS IN THE DEATHS OF USMC 7557 USMC, 6276 USMC, AND 6276 USMC.

1. Readdressed and forwarded.

2. USMC died in the line of duty while performing their assigned military duties and not due to their own misconduct.

3. On behalf of the Marines and Sailors of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, I wish to express my deepest sympathy and sincere condolences to the families, friends, and loved ones of the following:

Copy to:
SJA, 1st MAW
Marine Corps Task List
(MCTL - 2.0)
the airlift of personnel, supplies and equipment into or within the battle area by helicopter, tiltrotor or fixed-wing aircraft. (JP 3-0, 4-0, MCWP 3-2, MAWTS-1)

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<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Of MOS qualified and deployable aircrew available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of T/O personnel MOS qualified and deployable.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Of aircraft ready and available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of Full Mission Capable (FMC) aircraft of PAA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Of sorties daily sustained during contingency/combat operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M6</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Of J Model sorties daily sustained during contingency/combat operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M7</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Of F/R/T sorties daily sustained during contingency/combat operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M8</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Squadron pilots External Lift qualified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M9</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of Transport Assault Support Requests executed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M10</td>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>Flight hours devoted to Transport Assault Support.</td>
</tr>
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**MCT 1.3.4.1.1 Conduct Airborne Rapid Insertion/Extraction**

Airborne rapid insertion/extraction is the planned insertion/movement of forces conducted rapidly followed by a planned and rapid withdrawal. Helicopter Rope Suspension Techniques (HRST) provides Marines with the ability to conduct insertions and extractions where landings are impractical. Airborne rapid insertion/extraction includes methods such as rappelling, fast rope, special patrol insertion and extractions, etc. (MCWP 3-2, 3-11.4, 3-24, MCRP 3-11.4A)

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<td>Of T/O personnel MOS qualified and deployable.</td>
</tr>
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<td>M3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of Full Mission Capable (FMC) aircraft of PAA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Of sorties daily sustained during contingency/combat operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M6</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Squadron pilots HIE qualified.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M7</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>To provide insertion operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M8</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>To provide extraction operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M9</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>To friendly forces due to enemy action during I/E operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M10</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Squadron pilots SPIE qualified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M11</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>To friendly forces due to enemy action during SPIE operations.</td>
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**MCT 1.3.4.1.2 Provide Operational Airlift Support**

To plan, coordinate and provide Operational Airlift Support (OAS) missions via Service and Joint channels, including HQMC (ASM), Joint Operational Support Airlift Center (JOSAC), CO MCAS Futenma (WESTPAC), or Marine Corps component commands. (JP 1-0, 3-0, 3-30, MCWP 3-2, 3-27)

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<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of assigned missions that were successfully completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of flight hours ISO JOSAC missions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>Flown ISO of assigned missions.</td>
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**MCT 1.3.4.1.3 Provide Aerial Search and Rescue (SAR) Services**

Provide aerial Search and Rescue (SAR) services to tactical fixed wing aircraft or as requested by adjacent commands or the local community. (JP 1-0, 3-0, 3-30, 3-50.2, 3-50.21, MCWP 2-6, 3-2, 3-11.4, 3-24, 3-25.4, NDP 1, 6, NWP 3-50.1 Rev A, NTA 6.2, OPNAVINST 3130.6D)

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<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>SAR missions conducted.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
MCT 1.3.4.2 Conduct Air Refueling
Aerial refueling allows MAGTF aircraft, both fixed- and rotary-wing, to conduct Tactical and Force extension operations, extend time on station, and extend mission range. The Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR) has the primary task to provide the tactical aerial refueling service to Marine aviation units. (JP 3-0, 3-04, 4-0, 4-01, 4-03, MCWP 3-2, NDP 1, 4, NWP 3-01.10, 3-22.5 Series, 3-56.1, 4-01, 4-08)

MCT 1.3.4.2.1 Provide Aviation-Delivered Ground Refueling
Rapid ground refueling (RGR) is a method of providing fuel to aircraft and tactical ground vehicles (TGV) utilizing KC-130 and CH-53 aircraft in austere locations, where no other source of fuel is readily available. This method of refueling permits operation of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and TGV without the requirement to commit the significant logistical assets necessary to operate helicopter expeditionary refueling systems (HERS), or tactical airfield fuel dispensing systems (TAFDS). RGR can also quickly resupply established forward-arthing and refueling (FARP) sites and forward-operating bases (FOB). The capability of the KC-130/CH-53 to operate as a tactical ground refueler enhances MAGTF operations. (ANTTP 3-22.3-KC-130)
From: Commanding Officer
To: [b] (3) (A), (b) (6)

Subj: DESIGNATION AS MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER

Ref: (a) CNAF M-3710.7
     (b) MCO 5100.29B

1. In accordance with the references, you are hereby appointed as the Aviation Safety Officer for Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242. Your appointment will remain in effect until such time that you are debriefed or relieved of your responsibilities by competent authority.

2. You will indicate by endorsement of this letter that you have familiarized yourself with the references and that you have assumed the duties as the Aviation Safety Officer for this command.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT

From: [b] (3) (A), (b) (6)
To: Commanding Officer

1. I have read and understand the instructions contained in the references. I am aware of my responsibilities as the Aviation Safety Officer for the command.
Marine Corps declares remaining Marines involved in F/A-18 and KC-130 aviation mishap deceased; search and rescue operations concluded

MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP BUTLER, Okinawa, Japan – The Marine Corps has pronounced the five remaining Marines involved in the F/A-18 and KC-130 aviation mishap deceased. The change in status comes at the conclusion of search and rescue operations.

The next-of-kin for the five deceased Marines have been notified.

“Every possible effort was made to recover our crew and I hope the families of these selfless Americans will find comfort in the incredible efforts made by US, Japanese, and Australian forces during the search,” stated U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Eric Smith, commanding general, III Marine Expeditionary Force.

Our most valued asset is the individual Marine. We remain faithful to our Marines and their families as we support them through this difficult time. We ask for members of the public to please respect the family and allow them privacy.

The KC-130 Hercules was assigned to Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152, call sign “Sumo”), 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

"All of us in the Sumo family are extremely saddened following the announcement of the conclusion of search and rescue operations," said U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Col. Mitchell T. Maury, commanding officer of VMGR-152. "We know this difficult decision was made after all resources were exhausted in the vigorous search for our Marines. Our thoughts are heavy and our prayers are with all family and friends of all five aircrew."

The F/A-18 Hornet involved was assigned to Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 (VMFA-242). The aircraft were conducting regularly-scheduled training. It is not confirmed that aerial refueling was ongoing when the mishap occurred.

The Marine Corps rigorously investigates all aviation mishaps to identify the causes, learn from them, and mitigate future incidents.

The circumstances of the mishap are currently under investigation. There is no additional information available at this time. The identities of the Marines will be provided 24 hours after next of kin have been notified. Media can contact III Marine Expeditionary Force public affairs at IIIMEF MEDIA@usmc.mil.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORWARD</th>
<th>FAITHFUL</th>
<th>FOCUSED</th>
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<tr>
<td>前衛</td>
<td>忠誠</td>
<td>専心</td>
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Enclosure 123
Today is the 26th of March, it's 2019. I'm [b] [3] [A], [b] [6]. I'm assisted by [b] [3] [A], [b] [6] and we're interviewing [b] [3] [A], [b] [6] from VMFA-242. Time now is approximately noon.

[b] [3] [A], can you please state your full name for the record, spelling your last name.

[b] [3] [A]: [b] [3] [A].

[b] [3] [A]: How would you like me to refer to you through this interview?

[b] [3] [A]: [b] [3] [A].

[b] [3] [A]: What is your Military Occupational Specialty?

[b] [3] [A]: 7525.

[b] [3] [A]: What is a 7525?

[b] [3] [A]: It's a weapons systems officer.

[b] [3] [A]: For the F-18?

[b] [3] [A]: Correct.

[b] [3] [A]: So you're basically an F-18 backseater?

[b] [3] [A]: Correct.

[b] [3] [A]: Cool. Tell me about your experience, hours, qualifications, and deployments as a 7525.

[b] [3] [A]: Sure. I've been in the operational forces since 2011 to the present. I have about 960 hours in the aircraft. Qualifications: LAT, ACM, and night systems. And
then for designations: Section lead and night systems
instructor. [(b)(6)]

(b)(6)

(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)

(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: Okay. What was your billet in the
squadron during the mishap, December 18th?

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: I was an aviation safety officer.

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: ASO. And you attended the Naval
Aviation Safety Officer Course in Pensacola, Florida?

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: Yes, sir.

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: When did you do that?

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: It would have been October and early
November of 2016.

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: Of 2016? How long is that course?

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: The ASO course is five weeks. I stayed an
extra week to do the Crew Resource Management Instructor Course.

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: So you're an ASO and a CRMI?

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: Correct.

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: Okay.

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: But I am not a NATOPSI.

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: Okay. What is it -- what is -- did
you know the mishap crew?

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: I did, sir.

[(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)]: Okay. Any personal knowledge of the
crew you'd like to share?
Unfortunately, because of the AMB I cannot go into any opinions on it.

Was a first tour pilot. Prior to the mishap, he had an incident where he took a precautionary arrestant on the overrun arresting gear. That incident was addressed by the Co, the DOS, the training officer, and the OPSO. Handled in that manner and then gave a debrief to the ready room.

Was your -- what was your personal participation in the mishap flight events or planning?

Did not have any, sir.

Okay. We might circle back to that. Okay.
Any personal observations on the mishap flight events or planning?

: No, sir. We were on different crews. I was day crew, they were night.

: Okay. So three crews. So you were on the early crew, if you will?

: Correct.

: Okay. And what was your approximate report time for the early crew? Like 0500, 0600, something like that?

: I want to say it was probably around zero -- between 0600 and 0630, probably. It might have been earlier.

: Okay. What was your personal participation in the mishap scheduling process at the squadroning MAC?

: So the scizzo's will work ahead on schedules that they know are coming up. So I had looked at the planned schedule for the mishap day, either a day or two prior. So the plan at that time was for the mishap flight to go to the seaside atca and do simulated casts. I was unaware of the last minute schedule change until after the schedule had been routed and signed. So I did not see the final version of the schedule where the change occurred.

: Let me ask a clarifying question there. So last minute schedule change, do you mean change to airspace? Because you said seaside atca, and the mishap was in
the Iteras South. So I went from an over land piece of airspace, to an offshore airspace, correct?

   Yes, right. Correct.

   And you never saw that as part of the change process, if you will?

   No, sir, I did not.

   Okay. And you say last minute change. It was before a commanding officer's signature, so that would be 1500, 1400, what time of day do you think that change occurred?

   I don't know exactly. I just know that I had been doing mission planning, and when I came out there was a note on the ODO board that stated aircrew couldn't start their engines prior to 0100 local. And I learned from the ODO at that time that they were planning to go to the Iteras South.

   Okay. And when you say 0100, you mean 0001 after midnight, not after 1 a.m.?

   Correct, after midnight.

   Okay.

   So that was my first indication that there was a schedule change --

   But you say schedule change, but the published flight schedule reflected the Iteras South.

   Correct.

   I would consider a schedule change to be a pen change after publication, but --

   Right. I understand, I'm being unclear
there. So what I'm referring to is the schedule that I had already looked at prior to that, and sometime that afternoon while I was debriefing from the previous flight and then in mission planning for the next day, there was a change that I became aware of after the schedule was already in front of the CO for his signature.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): I understand. I got it.

Okay. Did you have any personal observations on the days before the mishap regarding aircrew wellness?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): I didn't see them at all, sir, due to the misaligned --

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Did you have any personal observations of the mishap aircrew's professionalism, skill, or judgment? Aeronautical.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Sir, I'm unable to go into anything on that due to the A and B constraints because that would be an area of opinion.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Do you have any -- your personal understandings -- what is your personal understanding of the go/no go pill authorization, and how, and why you know that to be true?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): So the CO stated in an AOM that the CG had not approved go/no go pills for the exercise or for the MAG-ULT.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. And you know that to be true because you heard the CO say it, [b](3) (A), (b) (6)?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Correct.
Who can change the flight schedule at 242?

Per the admin SOP, it's the CO or XO.

Okay.

The admin SOP does not state what a -- constitutes a schedule change. It just talks about schedule changes, but it does not give examples of schedule changes.

So your inference there might be that adding a tanker code may not constitute a change in some peoples mind?

Not necessarily. All I'm referring to there from my perspective from reading of reading that, it appears that the admin SOP was written to give the local commander some broader authority to determine what constitutes schedule changes. Unfortunately, there is no clarifying documentation within the admin SOP on that, but it does clearly state CO or XO.

As the ASO, what would you consider a schedule change?

Times, aircrew, mission sets. So the F-18 has 12 mets, casts, FATGAY, Scar AR, Seed. Things along those lines, those are what -- when I think of mission sets, those are what I think of. So big ticket type changes to the schedule.

Okay. Does -- can you define a risk or hazard in the risk management process?

Sure. So, bare bones, I'm identifying the hazard, I'm assessing the hazard, and then I'm going to identify
controls, implement those controls, and then supervise. So that's the bare bones process.

Okay. What's the difference between a risk and a hazard?

A risk is something that you are -- you're assessing, so how much risk is involved with a particular hazard. So I believe risk is an assessment of a hazard. A hazard is something that can cause a mishap, cause injury, can hurt somebody, or damage property.

Does 242 use an ORM worksheet?

No, sir. Up to the mishap we did not. I have been the ASO under two different CO's with this command. [ph] did not want to use the risk management worksheet and neither did [inaudible]. They were not aware of any order that stated it was required.

So the answer is you don't use one because the CO doesn't want to and there's no order requiring it?

Correct, sir.

[inaudible].

Yes, sir.

Is there anything that you would like to add?

No, sir.

Is there anyone else that you would recommend that we speak with?

No, sir.
Okay. So I wanna go back and probe you a little bit on skip pre-mishap, all right. Pre-mishap, roles and responsibilities of the Aviation Safety Officer, and the schedule writing process at 242 pre-mishap. Okay. So we'll go slow, okay.

So when a schedule is written at 242 pre-mishap, what does that process look like and what is the ASO's involvement in that?

Sure. So it could come either to the DOSS or the Aviation Safety Officer, whoever was available. The scizzo's would bring it in a routing binder and it always had the hot board with it, it always had the previous day's schedule. And prior to, so under [ph], the flight schedule had three different signature lines on it. And the safety signature line could be signed either by the ASO or by the DOSS. That was the unwritten SOP, if you will. It was not in writing.

After took command some time that summer, that shifted to one signature on the flight schedule. The schedule's officers put another sheet behind it with a line for each day where either I or the DOSS would sign. The beginning of December, they didn't in there, they had forgotten to print it out. And I asked them a couple different times, like, hey put the signature page back here. I don't know if it ever did because I was out of the squadron after the mishap occurred, but those first few days of the writing in December
there was not a schedule, or there was not a -- sorry -- there was not a signature page back there.

Regardless, I still looked at the flight schedule, so I go through the hot board, I look at peoples day currency, I look at their night currency. If they're going out to do a dive, I look at their dive currency. And then I just, kind of, consider who is with who. You know, what aircrew are flying with who. That said, there -- there are not -- at the time, there were no known crew conflicts to me, prior to the mishap with people who should not be flying together. But those are, generally speaking, the things that I look at.

And then if it's a particular time of year, water temperatures and so on, then I'll ask questions about that. But usually that's more of a day of, kind of, walk into the ODO, like, hey they're going flying in this airspace, what's the water temperature out there? Okay. It's 55 degrees, do you have the CO's approval yet? No, I don't. And why not? That's more of a day of, kind of, current OPS. But as far as looking at the flight schedule, those are the things that I'm looking at.

[Enclosure 129]

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Why -- what reason did provide to you, as ASO, for removing your signature block from the flight schedule?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I didn't get one from him.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So how did you come to notice that? Just one day we change of command, and then a few days later you saw a flight schedule and it wasn't on there?
Yes. And I asked the scizzo's, like, hey why isn't this here? And the explanation that I was given was that the CO wanted to be the one to sign the flight schedule. He wanted to be the one because he was assuming the risk. That was my understanding.

Did [ph] not sign the flight schedule?

He did. So there was one line for him and there were three other small initial blocks, if you will.

Okay. So the initial blocks were removed because, as you understood it, the commanding officer's prerogative?

Correct.

And the absence of a published a requirement for the same?

Correct.

There's no order that says that it has to be initialed.

Correct, sir. And it's understanding also that East Coast is the same way. The Hornet fleet is just a commanding officer signature, without the other ones.

So if -- you're telling me if I were to get all the flight schedules from MAG-31, they would -- none of them would have an ASO initial block on it?

I believe that's correct, sir. I believe that's correct, it might be --
How does that improve safety at MAG-31?

I don't know that it does or doesn't, sir. I know that the Aviation Safety Officer at each command has a responsibility, or the DOSS has the responsibility, to review the flight schedule. That's the best information I have for you.

Okay.

They may have some other internal procedure that I'm not aware of, but --

Okay. We've talked about daily flight schedule routing, again, staying totally pre-mishap right here in our minds. How is the ASO involved in the publication of the weekly flight schedule?

Can you clarify?

I can. So when the Pilot Training Officer and WISSO Training Officer sit down with the Operations Officer to identify the training priorities and develop a schedule that covers a week or ten days or some kind of, you know, ATO cycle's three days.

So something more than a flight schedule dropping at 1600 for somebody that has to brief at 8 a.m. the next morning, who basically gets no planning time, how is a schedule developed that goes at least a few days or a week in advanced to give a potential pilot or WISSO time to properly rest, ramp, and prepare for a flight schedule? How is the Aviation Safety Officer integrated into that process at 242?
It's initial -- it's an individual effort. So it's initiative of the Aviation Safety Officer to go in and look at the board --

Can you tell me about the board, is there a dry erase board with magnets or --

There are two, or there have been two in the past.

Okay.

Where the, roughly, two weeks was flowed out with pucks and things like that.

Okay. So you had, like, a two week flow.

So I could walk in and I could look at the board and, kind of, see the rough of what's coming up. And, okay, well this guy is flying here, well, why is he flying on the day here. And I will say this, under there were a lot more issues with book ending aircrew. That really stopped when came onboard.

And by book ending, you mean flying very late one day and early the next day, with minimum crew rest interval?

Correct. It got to the point under that I sent him an email and I got a rather heated response with some other people copied on the email. And I went to each one those people and said, here's what I see, here's what I researched on flight schedules, and then we
had a sit down with the CO. And he actually had a very good response to it, that then triggered a conversation with the ready room.

This would have probably been about a year and a half ago, where he said, hey don't bust your crew rest for the entire week by showing up early to do something else on the flight schedule. So he clarified his intent after that meeting.

I did not see any of those issues with [b](6). The scheduling process of continuity across the week with aircrew and how they were scheduled was, in my opinion, handled better between the two commanding officers.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Do you guys do a human factors council?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (6), (b) (3) (A)

[b] (6), (b) (3) (A)

[b] (6), (b) (3) (A)

[b] (6): Okay.

[b] (6): And that's not on your list.


[b] (6): So we'll just, kind of, see how we get going on that so.

[b] (6): Okay.

[b] (6), (b) (3) (A)
So in the case of [b (6), b (3) (A)], you saw the flight schedule with [b (6), b (3) (A)] flying in the wee...
hours; is that correct? The flight schedule you saw as the ASO, the airspace changed, but did the aircrew change?

[redacted]: I think the time also changed. So, initially, from what I can remember, it was earlier in the evening.

[redacted]: Okay. As the ASO, did you see the crew shift assignments in the weeks, or in the days before the mishap event? When you guys went to a day, mid, and late night crew, were you afforded the opportunity --

[redacted]: Yes.

[redacted]: -- To review and play -- and provide input to who was selected for day, afternoon, and late night flights?

[redacted]: I was aware of who was put there.

[redacted]: Did the Operations Officer come to you, [redacted], come to you and ask you for your Aviation Safety Officer validation of his crew selection?

[redacted]: No.

[redacted]: Did the commanding officer ask you to validate crew selection?

[redacted]: No.

[redacted]: By shift, shift selection?

[redacted]: No.

[redacted]: Okay. Were you surprised to see [redacted] on the late shift, on the graveyard shift?

[redacted]: No. Not necessarily.
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Did it bring you any pause as the Aviation Safety officer to approve a flight, whether he has initial block or not; did it give you any pause to approve a flight schedule for [b] (3) (A), (b) (6), who was on the graveyard shift?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I will say I had a conversation the week prior with the OPSO about late night operations, and the ability to transition aircrew to that.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): And by transition, you mean move them from the mid shift to the graveyard shift?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): No. To transition aircrew to a night -- a night shift from a day shift.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): A ramping into the night page, kind of?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Correct.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Correct. It was more of a general conversation with not looking at individuals.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Well, let me stay on [b] (3) just for a little bit further, okay.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Sure.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So you knew that [b] (3) was on that shift, you knew that [b] (3) was scheduled for the mishap flight, and you know [b] (3) .
Okay. So lets go back to the ramping conversation. Tell me more about your conversation with [b](3) (A), [b](6) about ramping the day crew to the -- into the graveyard shift.

[b](3) (A), [b](6): It was an ASO conversation, it was the OPSO, like, I have a concern.

[b](3) (A), [b](6): Okay.

[b](3) (A), [b](6): That we don't have enough time to transition.

[b](3) (A), [b](6): Okay. So the crews were announced on Thursday or Friday before the mishap?

[b](3) (A), [b](6): Sounds correct.

[b](3) (A), [b](6): Okay. So, and I don't think you guys were flying Monday wee hours, I could be mistaken. I know you guys were flying Tuesday or maybe that was canceled. So you would at least have, like, four days, maybe three. So is it you
had concerns that three or four days is not enough time to go from being awake during the normal interval cycle to being awake in the middle of the run trop?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): That was the gist of my conversation.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): And what was your recommendation to the Operations Officer?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): That we have more time, but we didn't.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): That we go back in time a week and pick the crews a week before?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, it was a --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So that's a great question. So how far out did 242 -- how many weeks in advance did 242 know that you guys were conducting ULT during the mishap week?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't know.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): When did you come to learn of there being a ULT?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I knew there was going to be a ULT. I learned about the late night or 24-hour operations the week prior.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Judge.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): No questions, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Let's stop, thanks.

All right. The judge will swear you out.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) was warned, sworn, and departed.]
Good morning. Today is the 26th of March, 2019. We're in Iwakuni, Japan. My name is [b] [3] (A), [b] [6]. I'm assisted by [b] [3] (A), [b] [6] and [b] [3] (A), [b] [6]. Our next interview is with [b] [3] (A), [b] [6].

[b] [3] (A), [b] [6], could you please state your name for the record, spelling your full name.

[b] [3] (A), [b] [6]: It's [b] [3] (A), [b] [6]. It's spelling [b] [3] (A), [b] [6].

[b] [3] (A), [b] [6]: Okay. [b] [3] (A), [b] [6], how would you like me to refer to you in this interview -- [b] [3] (A), [b] [6] -- [b] [3] (A), [b] [6]: [b] [3] (A), [b] [6]. It's whatever --

[b] [3] (A), [b] [6]: Okay. [b] [3] (A), [b] [6], I guess, is your call sign?

[b] [3] (A), [b] [6]: Yes, sir.

[b] [3] (A), [b] [6]: Could you spell that for me?

[b] [3] (A), [b] [6]: [b] [3] (A), [b] [6].

[b] [3] (A), [b] [6]: [b] [6], [b] [3] (A)

[b] [6], [b] [3] (A)

[b] [3] (A), [b] [6]: Yes, sir.

[b] [3] (A), [b] [6]: Okay. What is your military occupational specialty?

[b] [3] (A), [b] [6]: It's a 7523, F-18 pilot.

[b] [3] (A), [b] [6]: Okay. And how long have you held that MOS?
Since 2011. So about 8 years or so? Approximately. Tell us a little bit about your experience with F-18 hours, quals, deployments, and whatnot.

I'm currently about 830 F-18 hours. I'm a mission commander, fighter tactics instructor. I've got a lat-eye qual, which is low-altitude tactics instructor qualification. And I'm a forward airborne -- or forward air-controller airborne FACA. That's as far as my quals go.

And in my experience, I finished the RAG, F-18 RAG in Miramar in about 2000 -- I think it was about 2011. And I reported to my first squadron, which was the VMFA-314 out of Miramar. I did two deployments with them. The first deployment was a combat deployment to SITCOM. I participated in OIR, Operation Inherent Resolve.

The second deployment was a EDP out here to Iwakuni in 2015. I did one year in factor with 1st Recon Battalion out at Pendleton. And reported here to Iwakuni in September of 2017. And I've been here since.

Okay. Great.

How long have you been in 242 then? When did you check into 242?

September of '17, so about a year and a half -- about a year and six months or so.

Okay. And the mishap occurred in
December of 18. So you said about a year and a half.

What billets have you held at 242?

[b] [3] (A), (b) [6]: When I checked in, I was the assistant operations officer. From there, I transitioned to the pilot training officer role, which is the current billet that I hold. And then, in between there in the assistant operations and pilot training officer billets, I was in a work-up to go to WTI, the weapons and tactics instructor course. So when you're in that work-up, you're kind of sequestered off from everything else.

So while I was the PTO on paper, pilot training officer on paper, from August of 2018 through -- really through the mishap. I was not fulfilling a significant amount of the role. I was fulfilling what I could administratively. But I was not, quote/unquote, the acting PTO.

[b] [3] (A), (b) [6]: Who was the acting PTO?

[b] [3] (A), (b) [6]: So it would have been the OPSO. So the OPSO, [b] [3] (A), (b) [6], was kind of filling in for what I could not administratively work out.

[b] [3] (A), (b) [6]: What are the roles and responsibilities of a pilot training officer in an F-18 squadron?

[b] [3] (A), (b) [6]: I'm responsible for really the overall adherence of the squadron to the training readiness manual in terms of career progression and the progression through the training of them. Making sure the squadron is all training for whatever a mission may be.

[b] [3] (A), (b) [6]: What kind of action steps do you take
to ensure a squadron is properly trained, or a pilot is properly trained? Tell me more about that.

Basically ensuring that the squadron -- or the aircrew -- are abiding by our training readiness manual, which kind of steps through progression of different events.

So until we get a get a "count 1" pilot, who is brand new and straight from the rack, has never flown, really, tactical sorties ever, there is a progression that we take them through with a couple FAM flights. We do a couple basic air-to-surface flights. And those involve sims and flights into an air-to-air syllabus for a "count 1" aircrew.

Then for aircrew that are beyond, or kind of, completed beyond those events, I kind of worry about getting them the mission skills and just progression through mission skills. So say for instance, close-air support is one of our mission skills that we have. Then, there's a progression where you start with a couple sims. And then, you go into a basic flight; and then, a little more advanced flight.

Then, you get into night CAS. So my responsibility as the PTO is to ensure that that training is kind of done and the aircrew receives lectures or classes on the front-end of that so that they can employ and they can do the missions correctly.

And then, another piece of it is, to kind of be one of the contra of instructors to ensure that the instruction is kind of standardized throughout the squadron.

And then, in addition to those things, we look into
combat leadership and ensure that we have the combat leadership that we need. So a section lead qualification, a division lead qualification, mission commanders, forward airborne controller. All of the qualifications we need to do our mission sets, ensuring we get the aircrew those qualification in kind of a progressed model. So that all goes into like an aircrew training plan that we'll write and publish and say, hey for the next -- we'll publish an annual aircrew training plan that says for the next year, these are roughly the things we'll be looking at. For the next three months, we'll be focusing on air-to-air. For the next three months, we'll focus on air-to-ground.

And then, well break that down into a quarterly training plan. We'll take that quarter and say that quarter was supposed to be air-to-air. These are the things were going to focus on; here's the individuals we're going to teach subject matter experts on classes "x" subject. And then, here's the events we're going to do, aircrew we're going to try to qualify as a section lead or division lead and so forth.

**Okay. Thanks for that.**

Where were you in December of '18? Were you here in Iwakuni?

**I was in Iwakuni. Yes, sir.**

**Were you -- did you know the mishap F-18 aircrew?**

**Yes, sir.**
Did you participate in the ULT at all?

\[b(3) (A), (b) (6)\]: No, sir. I did not. The ULT was -- I was supposed to go to MITC, so Marine Division Tactics Instructor Course, in Beaufort, South Carolina. The course was from January 7th through February 2nd. So for every MAW 1's sponsored formal course like that, there is a 45-day prior kind of cut off. 45 days prior, you're supposed to be sequestered -- kind of what I was talking about early -- and kind of sequestered off. And have -- you're supposed to be able to just focus on nothing else but training for that course.

Obviously in practice, that doesn't always work. So I'm still the new PTO trying to work through a few things here and there. But not --

\[b(3) (A), (b) (6)\]: So what I was tracking is you were scheduled to go to a MOTS course out in Beaufort, South Carolina in January. So that from about 15 November through the 1st of the year, you were not participating in squadron flight training. Is that correct?

\[b(3) (A), (b) (6)\]: Yes, sir. So squadron flight training in terms of -- I was participating in squadron flight training, but the training was for me. Not as much me out there training anyone. So I'm participating in squadron flight ops, but those flight ops are MDTC work-up events. So work-up events, sorties dedicated strictly for myself and \[b(3) (A), (b) (6)\], who was supposed to be the WISSO to go through. So that is what we were doing.
So the ULT came up and there was no training value for myself and him participating in the exercise. Because what MDTC is based on is basic fighting maneuvers. So 1 v. 1 F-18 --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So the Marine Division Tactics Course is focused on 1 v. 1 BFM's?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. It's an excellent question.

It progresses through. So it starts out with 1 v. 1 BFM's, so you get a -- basically, a 1 v. 1 BFM stand-check. Then, it builds to deployment, which is our 2 v. 2 section engagement, where you had two airplanes versus one or two airplanes. So that's the first week and a half of the course. It focuses on those two items. Kind of building blocks.

And then, the last two weeks is on division employment with division DCAs, defensive counter airs, and division AIs, division air indication missions.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. So tell me what you were doing in December.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): In December, I was standing and preparing airborne briefs for that. And I started to go --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So who was preparing the weekly flight schedule? Who was doing the things required to publish a flight schedule?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): The schedule officers and the flight officer are the ones who prepare the weekly flights.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): And --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): We don't have an actual weekly schedule that
we publish. It was being prepared by the flight officers and the SCISSOs. And then, I was helping where I could in terms of crew select pool.

and I sat down prior to the event when we finally had an idea of what we were supposed to do. And we sat down and were the ones that kind of came up with the walk-through with crews, the crew allocation through, and sat down at his white board and spent an hour kind of going through putting different Marines everywhere.

: So you and sat and worked together to develop the three crews.

Yes, sir.

: The day, mid, and graveyard shift?

Correct. Yes, sir.

: That were then scheduled for what I'm going to call, like, a weekly flight schedule?

Yes, sir.

Because the ULT was only like a week long.

Yes, sir.

Because you had to put people on early, mid --

Correct. So we just kind of flew everyone out.

And somehow those said named officers were notified, and were told --
Yes, sir.

-- with ample time to adjust their circadian rhythm because they would be flying late at night?

I would not define it as ample time, sir.

Tell me about that.

I know that normally ample time -- so traditionally, ample time to go to like a graveyard shift is like 2 weeks. 2 to 3 weeks to be totally adjusted and be fully adjusted without the need of --

How much time did these guys get?

They were given a week. About a week. So the announcement was made. Kind of, everyone's walk-through was kind of what the flight schedule would look like for the week on Thursday. And then, they were not scheduled to fly the graveyard until I think it was Wednesday night, Thursday morning. I believe that was what it was.

So about 5 or 6 days?

Yes, sir. About 6 days.

Okay.

Which I think characterizing it as ample time is an incorrect characterization.

Okay.

It was enough time, but I would not say it was ample time. Ample time would be, like, 2 weeks, 3 weeks.

What techniques would you use if given ample time, you personally, to shift your circadian rhythms to
fly at 2 a.m.?

[b](3)(A),(b)(6): My technique -- because I've done this at our combat deployment at SITCOM -- is we flew the graveyard shift. Our on-station times were 10 p.m. to 4 a.m. and midnight to 6 a.m.

So the technique is basically, it takes probably for me, it takes about 5 days of you stay up, kind of, as late as you can. And you go to bed and fall asleep for however long as you can. And when you wake up, provided that you have Ambien or sleep or something like that. So get up and take a sleep aid from a medical provider, which I have never been denied or never not been issued when asked for. Especially for switching cycles.

So my technique is sleep aid, go to sleep. Usually, I'll only be able to sleep for 2 to 3 hours. It's either bright outside or my circadian is ready. Take some Ambien, drink a glass of water, and go back to bed. And then, that will usually get me back to sleep for about 4 to 6 hours.

And then, wake up, resist the urge to go back to sleep because in about 6 hours you're going to really feel like you want to go back to sleep. Resist the urge to go back to sleep until basically as late as you can again. Basically do that for 2 to 3 days and get onto the kind of cycle.

You want to be at work on the cycle. So you want to wake up at about 5 p.m. or so, so you have 3 or 4 hours before going to work at 10 p.m. So once you get off work at say, 8 a.m., you can go back and spend about an hour and a half and then
go right to sleep for a nice 8 or 9 hour chunk.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So you said that -- it sounds like you've taken Ambien before?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): What other squadrons have you been that provide --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): This squadron and 314.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Tell me about the last time you were provided Ambien in 242.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Because of the timezones and whatnot?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. We crossed timezones. So any time you cross a timezone, you get a 72 hour down period. That's supposed to help with your circadian rhythm cycle.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So what month was this?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): July. I want to say July of 2018. It may have been June. June or July of 2018.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Who was your flight surgeon?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): It was [b] (3) (A), (b).
Yeah.
Okay. And so what is your -- what is your perception of who's authorized to dispense Ambien?

To dispense Ambien?

What is your knowledge? And, I mean, what do you --

So as --

It sounds like you feel like you can just go to the doctor and ask for it and if the flight surgeon gives it to you, You're good to go?

Yes, sir. That is -- yes.

Okay. Was Ambien used during this December 18 ULT's?

I do not know.

Was it authorized? There was no statement that said Ambien was not authorized. And I know that
this -- there was no statement that said Ambien is not authorized. There was a statement, and I don't remember the context of it or when or where it was said, but it mentioned that performance-enhancing drugs were not authorized. And I understand that I believe by definitions and some research and some of this information is information that has come out over the last three or four months. But Ambien, apparently, is classified as a performance-enhancing drug from what I understand.

Prior to this I would never have classified Ambien as a performance enhancing drug. So when performance-enhancing drug was said, hey performance-enhancing drugs are authorized, to me that's go pills. That is not Ambien.

So you -- when did you get your wings? You said in '11?

I was winged in 2011.

Okay. So you've been a naval aviator for a year? So you're familiar with OPNAV or CNAV 3710?

Yes, sir.

And you've read this section in 3710 about drugs?

Yes, sir.

And you read that obviously well before the mishap?

Right.

Yeah. Okay. So -- but you're saying
that you didn't know that Ambien or no-go pills were considered a performance-enhancing drug until after the mishap and everybody's talking about it now that it's been three months?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. I would say that's probably accurate.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): And you've taken a NATOPS check in the F-18 every year?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So you've had, like, eight NATOPS checks in the F-18, maybe more?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): But you didn't consider Ambien or no-go pills to be a performance-enhancing drug?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I would. No, sir. I would not consider Ambien to be a performance-enhancing drug.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. So do you believe that Ambien was authorized or not authorized for the ULT, based on the information. Not based on the information you have now, if you could try to rewind back on December the 3rd or whatever, you know, a few days before the mishap. Were you under the impression that Ambien was or was not authorized for the mishap? And if so, why did you feel -- how you feel -- how you perceived? Or do you recall?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I will be honest --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Please be honest.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): -- if I was flying those night events, and I
had a prescription for Ambien, I would have taken Ambien. I feel that would have been the responsible thing because, I mean, to me the responsible thing is to get eight hours of sleep. To get rest and be ready to perform my duties, which as a mission Commander or as a section lead, like, whatever your, you know, billet is. But for me, like, I think about things in terms of, you know, I don't know, you know, I'm the training officer. So I think about things in terms of taking care of the other aircrew out there.

And for me to be on my best game, I know that I need to get sleep. And that's, you know, I've always operated that way, like, sleep is very important. And I know that that shift, like, being on that shift with inadequate sleep is not going to work out well. Was there need for, you know -- I don't -- having -- there's a lot of what ifs, I guess. And I was somewhat removed intentionally so that I could focus on preparing for MDTC. Had I been involved in, like, hey you're flying on this night. You know, sir, I don't know exactly what I would have done because this is you know, I'm a quarterbacking a little bit. But I 100%
believe that I would have taken Ambien.

Now I may have asked additional questions and said hey performance-enhancing drugs, like, you're not talking about Ambien, right? Like, that's, you know, it's not a performance-enhancing drug. And maybe there would have been a conversation that would have said, no. That, like, that includes Ambien. Ambien is not authorized period.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): With whom would you have gotten an authorization from?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I would have talked to our flight doc.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): And what's his name?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): [ph].

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So you would have talked to her? And what if said, do not take Ambien? What would you have done?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I would not have taken Ambien.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I would not have taken the Ambien. I would have protested significantly and said, like, you realize that you are basically --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): How would you approach that?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): With him. I probably would -- and I would have personally gone and talked to see him, and said hey, sir, like you realize that we are --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you feel like the mishap aircrew went and talked to the CO?
I think that -- I would say that, I would say that probably did. I don't know that all of --

You have any knowledge of or were you present for any conversations between and about the use of Ambien?

No, sir.

Okay.

So were you involved in or privy to any conversations talking about performance-enhancing drugs or Ambien prior to the mishap?

I was not involved in the conversation. There was a blue -- there was a -- I think it was a WhatsApp message that -- maybe it was somewhat tongue-in-cheek. Maybe it wasn't. But it was like, hey Doc I need some Ambien. Or doc can we get some Ambien? And the response was, like, a copy and paste out of I don't remember if it was that 3710 or out of some Naval supplement manual.

Would you ever receive that WhatsApp chat as being facetious or as being literal?

The request was, I would say, I received that request as a lot of things in a Fighter Squadron. There's a little bit of jesting, but there's always a little bit of underlying truth in it. So their request was probably made in somewhat jest. Like, hey doc, like, we need some Ambien and yeah a little bit of jest. But everybody went, well yeah, of course we do, like, you know on the graveyard shift. And then the
response from the flight doc was -- it was basically just like a copy and paste out of a manual.

What manual? What was the copy and paste?

I don't remember.

So was his response, yes?

His response was no.

Okay. So you understood prior to the mishap, and the Squadron understood prior to the mishap, that the use of Ambien was not authorized?

The use of -- no.

So he requested it, and the doc said no.

He requested Ambien for himself and the doc was like, I will not issue Ambien.

Okay.

So yes. Inferring down the line, if what you said, you can make the inferences. Yes.

Yes, you can take Ambien or yes, you can not take Ambien?

What you said in terms of the interpretation of the doc saying no, I'm not giving you Ambien is the inferences that you can make.

Let me try this. Let me ask a very simple straightforward question. Okay? You know, we have these messages and we've read them and we've talked to 20 other people.
Absolutely.

So we're trying to get -- I don't consider instructions from a cognitive flight surgeon to be an inference. That's just my perspective, right, you know. And I've only been a pilot and record for like 22 years or whatever right? But if I went to my fly doc and I said, me personally, or said doc, may I have an Ambien and he said no, I might request mast as the case may be.

Right.

But I would understand that to be, I may not have Ambien and I may not take Ambien. What I think you're trying to articulate was, and maybe I'm confused and that's why I'm trying to clear up here. I'm trying to get you to help me understand. I think what you just said is the docs not going to give you any more Ambien, but if you have some Ambien from the previous period of time, what you do with it is up to you. Is that what you're articulating?

No. So I guess what I'm articulating is the doc basically said I am not going to broadly issue Ambien to everyone in the squadron.

Okay.

Like, the entire Squadron is not all getting Ambien.

Okay.

Which to me would mean that would be followed...
up by a personal conversation, not via group message chat to the
doc that said --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you know if [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) or
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) went to the doctor and got a prescription or a
downing chit? Do you have any knowledge?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : I do not. No, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Were you present for any conversations
between a cognizant flight surgeon and [b] (3) or [b] (3) ?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. I think we got enough on that
judge.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : I'm not trying to, like, evade or -- I
realized that there's gravity in what we're talking about.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : We just want you to be transparent.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : And honestly answer the questions.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : And my honest answer is that I would have gone
and talked to [b] (3) (A), (b) and said doc, like, why can I not have
Ambien?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : And if doc said because I'm doctor and
I said so, what would you do?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : I would take it higher.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And if you took it to,
hypothetically, Commanding General of the 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing and he said no, you're not taking Ambien. What would you
do?
Then I would not take Ambien. And there's high potential that I would order them out of the flight.

Okay. That's a great point. So if you report it -- if you were scheduled for a flight and you reported for duty and you felt that you weren't medically fit, properly rested, properly nourished, whatever. Weren't feeling good. What would you do?

I would without hesitation cancel. Or not, you know, whatever you want to call it. I'm safe, or I'm out of the flight. I will say that there was a perception that week of a -- I want to say to use the word -- I'm not going to use the word. There was a perception that week that this was very important and needed to be executed. That perception came pressure from MAG. That pressure came and was evidenced the first morning of it.

So I think the first day of execution was -- I can't remember if it was a Monday or Tuesday, but whatever the first day of execution was, it was supposed to be a four-ship of 242, a four-ship from 225, and I believe a four-ship from 121. So about 12 aircraft total and a two-ship; from VMGR. So I guess 14 aircraft total. The two-ship of VMGR warned when our fuel was going to go out and execute some tactics that we had kind of worked up, some briefed. It was actually a pretty cool event. I was kind of bummed that I wasn't flying it.

The CO was flying it. He was a mission commander and at the brief, the weather was briefed as really bad. And he
basically said, all right, we're not gonna -- because it was going to be a fly tank fly evolution. Then we were going to come back to the pits and then go back out. And he basically said, hey, we're going to cancel the first SORTY. And we're going to delay.

And we were going to launch the second SORTY. Same players. Same mission. We're just going to slide the thing to see if the weather gets better. So we rolexed [sic] everything by half an hour. Got the same weather report and the weather was the same or worse, and he said we're canceling for weather. And that was not received well from the southern MAG Operation Center. The MAG had stood up a moc MAG Operation Center in their war room. Where they were supposedly monitoring everything that was going on. And the call, and I don't know whether it was from the SWO or what individual at MAG. It may have been the MAG CO. I don't know that, but there was a call that was made, like, how dare you cancel your flight. How dare you cancel this event without consulting with us?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(5): So you say you don't know, was that because you weren't on the call.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(5): I wasn't on the call.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(5): Okay.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(5): Correct.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(5): So you heard this from somebody else?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(5): I was standing in the room when the CO was on
the phone.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): So the squadron commander, [b](3) (A), (b) (6), was in the ready room and he was on the telephone with someone at the MAG Operation Center?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Correct.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Do you feel like that was [b](3) (A), (b) (6)?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): I think it was, but I don't know.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): And are you using vernacular when you say how dare you? Or are you trying to communicate that you perceived that [b](3) (A), (b) (6) was very upset at the cancellation?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Yes. That I don't think that the words how dare you were used. But the implication, whatever the words are because I don't know what the words were, but the interpretation of that was basically, like, why are you canceling this flight?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Do you think controlling the MAG had access to the same weather report?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): I think the MAG had access to the same weather report.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Do you think the MAG is familiar with the weather capabilities and limitations associated with F-18 and C-130 operations in this AOR?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): I would say that as a general whole, they are, yes.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): So why wouldn't the MAG come up with
the exact same decision, with the same information, and the same regulations?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): That is an excellent question. And why they didn't and call us cancel us.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Yes. Why wasn't the MAG calling you and saying, hey, we looked at the weather, it's crummy. Let's go ahead and cancel.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): That's an excellent question, sir.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Let's take a three-minute break. I need to go to restroom. I was actually going to the head when you came in, so I got a bladder full. This is , the time is 0835-ish, a little after on the 26th of March. We're back on the record after a short intermission. We're here with , I want to talk to you a little bit about pilot training, schedule writing, and crew selection stuff. So you mentioned earlier that you and selected the crews for the shifts, for the mishap shifts?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): So what kind of considerations were you guys looking for when you chose , and for the graveyard shift?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Okay. So without -- just going to them specifically, but in general we were looking at being able to provide quals across all the shifts. So looking to have a minimum one mission commander per shift. Ideally, two mission commanders per shift. Looking to
provide primaries, kind of, during the daytime hours when most of work still, like, work was still going to go on during this ULT. It's not like we were deployed somewhere and could not totally, you know, focus on stuff. So looking to provide, for the most part, the primaries during the -- first, during the daytime shift, kind of, secondaries in that second mid shift. And then provide reps in the third shift that could, kind of, swing across all of it.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): What made Resliard an ideal candidate for this shift? Who do you think was the best choice for late night shift?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I would say that he was not chosen specifically for the late-night shift.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): But he was. He was on the late-night shift.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. So --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Let me ask it questionably. Why was on late night shift?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Because he was not a primary that needed to be on --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): By primary you mean administrative task. The S-1 officer --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. An S-1 and S-2 doesn't fly. But, you know, an S-1 officer and S-4 officer, really the OPSO and the CO. And it wasn't one of those. So the way the, you know, like, we didn't start with the junior aircrew in a sign that you we
start with the junior aircrew and assign them. We started with
the qualifications. You know, the big qualifications. So the
mission commander. So we divvied across the mission --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : But you had junior aircrew flying the
daytime?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Who was counterpart in terms
of qualification and designation who was operator during the
daytime? I'm sure there was several.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So a comparison would have been -- so 
was another, you know, pilot, similar timeframe. But
was the sched [sic] writer. So needs to execute duties during the day. 
was the adj. So in terms of duties that are, like, important for
functioning of the squadron and producing the schedule, 
duties in terms of that were not significant. You know, 
he can -- he has paperwork to do and things to do, but not
necessarily any of that falls in --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you believe the ground job during the mishap was squadron adjutant.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah, I think so.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. What about ? What made 
a great choice for that crew?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I honestly -- I'm not sure. I understand your
line of questioning. I disagree. I disagree with the way that
you're asking that in saying that as if we went -- as if we
picked. We were like alright, we've got to fill these two slots. All right. This guy is the perfect one for this and this guy's a perfect one for this.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Sir, in a perfect world I wish we could do that, and that we had all of the qualifications in the aircrew required to do that. The simple fact is we don't. And once you fill the required billets of hey, we need a mission commander, I need a div lead, and I need a section lead. What falls out at the end of that is only about probably six aircrew.

Maybe six pilots and four WISSOS that falls out at the end of that. And then it's a case of, okay. I've got these and probably it's not even that many because we had taxes to pay to -- there was something going on in Okinawa. I can't remember the name of it. Something went on Okinawa. We had someone on leave.

Anyways, there were, you know, there were a few out. So it was once the overall qualifications were assigned like hey, we've got a div lead and a section lead and, you know, mission commander on this shift and on this shift. So, like, for instance (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) was -- (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) was the mission commander. Very high trust and confidence in him and was a perfect selection in our mind for that night shift.

One of the reasons being that he wasn't the OPSO or AMO or the CO. He was a QAO. So he was a maintenance representative. He can be a maintenance representative that's
there for night. The AMO's during the day. He would be there
during the night. The double AMO I think was on the second
shift, the mid-shift. So he would be on the night shift.

Another excellent reason that he was chosen is he has
combat experience flying during that time. So he had done an OIR
deployment where they flew the graveyard shift. So, like, those
two things, like well, he's a perfect one for this selection. So
that's where he got the mission commander on the night shift.

And then -- so [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) was a section lead in its
div lead workup. And was an easy fit also in terms of kind of
the way that the job billets kind of shook out. Okay. We need
another section lead. [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) is a, you know, qualified
able-bodied WISSO. He is in div lead work-up, like, he's doing
well. We'll put him on the night shift as well as another
planner. Someone that we trust.

And then the rest of it, you know, so [b] (3) (A), (b) (6)
same thing. He's a section. We needed another section lead
WISSO on that shift. So he went to that shift because the other
shifts may have already been filled.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did you have other section lead
WISSOS, people with similar qualifications and experience as
[b] (6). [b] (7)(C) that were on the day page that had different family
situations? And what do you know about [b] (6), (b) (7)(C) situation? 
Or is ORM situation general? Because human factors. What do you
know about [b] (3), (A), (b)
's human factors and other people's human factors
as that was incorporated in the decision to make who's flying at
2 a.m. and who's flying at 2 p.m.?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. In terms of similar qualifications, him and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) are the -- were the only section lead WISSOS that we had at the time I believe.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Is there a WISSO whose call sign is (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What is his name?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): (b) (3) (A), (b) (6). Tell me about (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)’s qualifications.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): He's just a WISSO. He's not -- he doesn't have any section lead, any combat experience.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What flight position was (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) flying in? In the mishap. You wrote the schedule right? Was (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) -- was he --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) or (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): (b) (3) (A), (b) (6). (b) (3) (A), (b) (6).

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes. (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) WISSO.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Right.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Was he the section lead or was he the dash 2?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): They were the dash 2?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So a section lead qualification would not be required for that position?
Yes, sir.

Can we agree? What I'm trying to get at is could [b] have flown instead of [b]?

Probably. Yes, sir.

Probably or absolutely?

Well, I don't remember the reason why [b] was not on the flight schedule that night.

That's what I'm getting at. So what is -- you work in ops, you're the pilot training officer.

Right.

You worked directly with the operations officer, the dry erase board, to put people in the day, mid, and night shift.

Right.

I'm trying to ask why you put Resliard and to fly at 2 a.m.? That's what I'm asking you. I want you to see if you can answer that for me. Why did you choose those people and not other people?

I guess --

It's okay to say we didn't think about it. You can say that because that's what it looks like to me, without putting words in your mouth.
And I'm asking if you as a pilot training officer, and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) is the operations officer, gave that any consideration before putting him on this shift.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Are you on the graveyard shift?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I was not. And I've flown on the graveyard shift or that late-night shift before. And yes, it's not ideal. But it can be done. The answer -- the dogmatic answer to your question is that I consider -- do we consider every human factor associated with every aircrew when we assign them to the shift? The answer's no.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So our human factors council I think is the one where we focus on the aircrew.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.
So the pilot training officer and the OPSO sit in on the human factors council.

So the last human factors council before the mishap?

So in terms -- and the way I. You know, I guess in my view of it, that was not a -- everyone's got small kids. If we said, well if you got young kids, like, you can't fly on the graveyard shift. Well the only guys flying on graveyard shift would be the unmarried single guys. And frankly, like one, that's not fair for them. And two, we could do that based on the fact that one of the unmarried single guys is the OPSO and we need him on the day shift. You know, like, that --

Why did you need the OPSO on the day shift?

That was what was directed by the CO. The CO wanted --

So squadron commander decided they wanted the OPSO on the day shift?

Yes, sir. The CO said he wanted his primary on the day shift.

And okay.

So the OPSO and the AMO.

Okay. So I'm tracking that. So it
sounds like the CO prioritized ground duties over flight duties then. Because we all know the most hazardous time to fly is going to be in the middle of the run trough at 2 a.m. So we had basically junior crews with limited supervision, and there was no Lieutenant Colonel's flying at that time of day. But we had Lieutenant Colonel's day and mid-shift, Co and XO. Did we even have any majors? Were there any field grade officer scheduled to fly at all during the graveyard shift? Any one of your rank? Because it looks like it's all the JO's.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir. There was not.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): So we prioritized, and I'm conjecturing, you can disagree with me. The observation I'm making is that we prioritized ground duties over flight duties at 242. That the priority is -- the principle is to do the ground job. Do you disagree with that?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): I would disagree with that.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Tell me why.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): The reason that -- in my mind the reason the CO, obviously I don't know his exact reason why he wanted his primaries on that, but the reason that I understood the CO wanted the OPSO and the AMO on that daytime shift was because, one, that was when the MAG was around and we were still trying to figure out what exactly the MAG wanted us to do. So he wanted his primaries there, so that we can make decisions. So there was this thing about Poheng, going to Poheng. Could we go to Poheng, could we not go to Poheng? There was all kinds of stuff and I
was able to remain mostly removed from that discussion.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And why were you removed from that discussion?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): For the MDTC work-up.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So you said that earlier in the interview. So you're the pilot training officer for a gun squadron, you're a field grade officer, and you're focused on your own personal training. To prepare yourself personally to go do 1v1 to Beaufort in January, and you're not taking part in the planning and execution of the MAG ULT where (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and others are going to the Tanker at 2 a.m. Is that, kind of, what you're telling me? Because that's what I'm hearing. Am I characterizing that wrong? So, what's the priority?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Per the order for, like, the course catalog, 45 days prior you're supposed to be sequestered with zero ground jobs.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So commanding officer of MOTTS-1 has ordered the, I guess, the commanding general of 1st MAW that you're not to participate in proper scheduling of crew for a unit level training event? It's actually a Wing event, right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So it's really -- we call it a ULT, but I mean the walk was stood up at the Wing. The MOC is stood up at the MAG, and you guys are executing it. Definitely the MAG level.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): But, the MOTTS-1 skipper in Yuma is saying the pilot training officer, major, field grade officer is not going to fly late at night? Like, why weren't you
flying? I'm just asking you.

[b (3) (A). (b) (6)]: For the reason that I was doing -- executing the, kind of, the work-up stuff. Like, working through, briefing labs --

[b (3) (A). (b) (6)]: Why is it so important for you to go to -- what is your current qualification? You said you're a mission Commander?

[b (3) (A). (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

[b (3) (A). (b) (6)]: So, I mean, you could go out and lead a division. You're a division lead, right?

[b (3) (A). (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

[b (3) (A). (b) (6)]: So you can go out and lead a division of Hornets to strike a target, like, right now?

[b (3) (A). (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

[b (3) (A). (b) (6)]: So, why is it so important that you go to Beaufort and go to MDTC? What's the benefit of -- what is the readiness benefit to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing for you to go to MDTC?

[b (3) (A). (b) (6)]: Because MDTC is the stepping stone to go to WTI.

[b (3) (A). (b) (6)]: What is the benefit of you going to WTI?

[b (3) (A). (b) (6)]: WTI provides the squadron with the instructor cadre, as well as per the --

[b (3) (A). (b) (6)]: You said you're an FAI, right?
Yes, sir. Are you an NSI?
No, sir.
Okay. So would you come back from WTI as an NSI?
Yes, sir.
Okay. So then you would be a night systems instructor so you can do an initial night systems qualifications?
Correct.
Okay.
And per the order, a PTO, a training office, is actually supposed to be a WTI. So they're supposed --
So that's to give you the qualifications to do the job to which your billeted?
Correct. Yes, sir.
Okay.
And there's supposed to be X number of WTI's in a squadron, excluding the CO. I believe the number is 3.
Do you guys have enough WTI's at 242?
We have the -- we are -- we do on paper. However, one of those WTI's is at the MAG as the MAG XO. So while he counts on paper, practically, he is not. The other -- we have three WTI's in the squadron. The OPSO, the XO, and the CO. The CO sometimes doesn't, you know, usually traditionally not counted as one of the WTI's. So we just have those two.
the MAG XO, is our other one. And then, who was previously in the squadron, and then is now the MATS OIC was another WTI that was in the mix.

And the plan all along was that back to -- harken back to that summer where I was out doing [inaudible] stuff in Miramar. I was supposed to go to WTI in the fall class in September or August as an FAI with a waiver because MDTC is a required prereq for WTI. I had everything complete except for I had not been to MDTC because the class has been canceled and the waiver was not approved in the 11th hour.

So I did not go to WTI. Was not, you know, didn't go to WTI and get my WTI qual. And so now, I'm in a work-up again in November to go to MDTC so that I can in turn go to WTI in the Spring and provide the squadron with a qualified pilot training officer.

[Redacted]: So who is filling a pilot training officer roll while you're focused on your personal training as a field grade officer? Who's doing that? Who's doing that work?

[Redacted]: The -- myself and the OPSO.

[Redacted]: The squadron operations officer, [Redacted]

?:

?: Yes, sir.

?: Okay. So have you ever flown with

?: Yes.

?: How did he do?
Nothing noteworthy. Average. Average. Yes, sir. Fleet average. Like, nothing crazy. I had a -- my last flight with him was probably two weeks prior where we had gone out and done a -- around two weeks prior.

Was your flight with him at night? That you recall.

Not that I can recall off the top of my head. Did you ever go to the Tanker with him during the day?

Yes. I think the event that I mentioned the last time I flew with him was probably two weeks prior. And if I remember correctly it was kind of like a mission fairly similar to what we planned, kind of, for the ULT stuff. We had a Tanker. We were doing some SAM takedown tactics and stuff. And he was part of my -- he was my dash 2 of my -- of our fore-ship I think.

So nothing noteworthy about him.

Nothing noteworthy. We went to the Tanker, like, no issues.

Okay. Did you see the flight -- the mishap -- did you see the mishap flight schedule as an operations officer, working inside the operations department, did you have -- were you able to take a break from your studies with enough time to see the flight schedule before the commanding
officer signed? Did you have any role in the publication of the daily flight schedule at 242, as the PTO?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): The daily, not as much. I will usually --

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): How do you know the daily flight schedule reflects your PTO priorities if you don't review it?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): And that's why I say not as much. So it is everyday the -- I am not a required -- the PTO is not a required stop in the schedule routing process.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Who is? Tell me about your schedule writing process.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): So our schedule gets routed from the scizzo's and then it usually gets a -- an inside the ops department look by the PTO, the WTO, the assistant OPSO. Someone that's not one of the sched [sic] writers that just wrote it. Usually gets reviewed. Just, kind of, look through and make sure --

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Where do the sched writers get their ideas? I mean sched writer, that's a junior billet, right? Did you ever serve as a sched writer?


(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): So that's like a new guy job?


(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): So how did the new guys get their guidance?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): From the training officer and the flight officer.

So those -- if I remember correctly, we had the names and the events for that week flowed out for the entire week.

On something I might call weekly flight schedules?

On something you would call a weekly. It was not published as a weekly, but it was essentially, hey guys this is the plan for the week.

Okay.

And once that is done, like, the scizzo's -- it doesn't require a significant amount of work to take names from that and put them there. And ensure that they are, you know, current to perform the event, ensure that they --

Okay. Lets pause there. So how would a new guy scizzo know that for example, was qualified to conduct a night systems aerial refueling?

They would look at our our sim tracker. So the printout of M-SHARP that spits out a product that shows, like, a stoplight chart.

Okay.

That would show a --

So they would look at a code for example, a 2202, and see if he was red or current?

2202, or a 2402, or whatever, you know, hey he's going out to do night stuff. So the combination of that and our hot board. Which our hot board will show, hey the last night
flight, you know, is he current to fly at night? Yep, he's current to fly at night. And is he qualified to tank at night? Yes.

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: How effective is that process?

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: I feel like it's fairly effective. There's, I mean, there's human error involved with everything. I know that we have since gone to validate an inside of M-SHARP so that --

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: Were you previously writing it outside of M-SHARP on just, like, a spreadsheet or something?

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: Yes, sir. So I -- from the other squadrons that I know, I don't know many squadrons that -- so I've been to two squadrons. This squadron and 314. But, from talking with some of my friends in other squadrons, like, most squadrons write it based on a word or Excel document. However, it is -- just because the, I guess, the clunkiness of M-SHARP is kind of -- what M-SHARP spits out in terms of a flight schedule is, kind of, difficult and clunky to deal with. And it's hard to read. And so most writers operate off of a Word document.

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: Okay. So then how does an officer in the operations department that produces this document, whoever that might be, how does he ensure it's accurate and complete without using the M-SHARP validation process? What process is in place of that?

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: So that's what I was discussing with the hot board and the CMMR tracker.

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: Okay.
Okay. So who reviews the flight schedule before the CO signs it?

So once there, it goes to the OPSO, the OPSO reviews it. And then it'll go to our ASO or DOSS, like, a safety representative. They'll review it and then it goes to the CO for his signature.

So you've worked in the operations department at 242 since you joined a year and a half before the mishap; is that correct?

Yes, sir.

And so in that time, did you ever have occasion to publish and route a flight schedule perhaps earlier when you -- earlier when you were there or did you ever observe someone to do that?

Yes, sir.

Okay. And you just said the ASO. So you're saying the flight schedule goes to the ASO for review?

Yes, sir.

Okay. So did the mishap flight schedule go to an ASO for review?

I can only assume that it did, sir. I did not route that one.

Why would you believe -- what would cause you to believe that to be true?

Because that was our standard practice.
Okay. Did the ASO initial the flight schedule?

I don't know.

Have you looked at a 242 flight schedule in the last year?

Yes, sir.

Have you looked at the bottom of the flight schedule and noticed whose signatures are on that schedule, aside from the commanding officer?

Yes, sir. Since the mishap there is --

No. Before the mishap.

It was just commanding officer.

So the flight schedule went from the most junior guy in the squadron, who's the flight schedule writer?

Right.

With input that's very simple, directly to the commanding officer, and he signing it off and authorized flight? Without the ASO, OPSO, AMO, PTO, WTO, or anybody else looking at it? Is that what you're telling me?

No, sir.

Or is that not what you're telling me?

That's not what I'm telling you.

Okay. So who are the people who review the flight schedule for the commanding officer?

Someone else in ops, OPSO.
Okay.

The ASO or DOSS. And then it goes to the CO.

Okay. And how do you know that to be true?

I'm sorry, the AMO as well. It usually goes to the AMO as well.

Okay.

Because I understand what you're asking. There is no proof on the flight schedule that that is done.

Or anywhere. I mean there is no --

I know for a while there was a -- the scizzos were, kind of, keeping a copy for, like, a sheet that said, hey, you know, like had each block. Like, a block for the OPSO. Kind of like a routing sheet, like a block, but it was like a monthly block that just showed, hey the AMO, the OPSO, the ASO have all, you know, looked at this.

I know they were doing that for a little while, but --

We're supposed to ignore those.

That's what I heard.

Okay. So you guys ever use a risk assessment worksheet or an ORM worksheet before the mishap?

No, sir.

Did you ever use one at 314?

Yes, sir.

So you used one a MAG-11, but you don't use one at MAG-12?
Correct.

So when you checked into MAG-12 a year and a half ago, and you said where's the risk assessment worksheet, what were you told?

I did not ask about the risk assessment worksheet because the MAG-11 risk assessment worksheet is, in my opinion, nothing more than a pencil drill.

Tell me more about why you believe that to be true.

The questions that it asked, the things that it brings up, and the overall employment of it is just very -- I don't know if arbitrary is the right word. But it's like four questions, like, is it VFR? If the answer is yes, then it's low. If it's not VFR, then you get to decide what it is. Whether it's medium or high. You know, is the water temperature, you know, cold? Is it hot? You know, like what's the water temperature? Is the, you know, are you carrying live ordnance? You know, it was just -- it's like six or eight questions that provide a low, medium, or high, or dealer's choice because there's like a question mark associated with it. Like, well, you know, I think it's a low. To me that's medium.

And then there's a spot for the ODO to fill in based on the weather. And a spot for the aircrew to fill in based on, you know, any operational things that come up in the brief. Like, hey you know, I don't have any ORM to talk about this time. One guy was like, hey I didn't sleep that well last night. Okay.
(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) Yes, I'm able to fly. All right. And then, you know, there's a spot for that to fill out.

But in practice it was really nothing more than a pencil drill. Like hey, make sure you fill out your ORM worksheet before you go flying. And then those things -- like, no one ever collected them. No one -- it was just there, you know, there would just be a stack of 300 sheets of paper at the ODO desk from ORM worksheets that were filled out.

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): So based on your words and your nonverbals, I'm taking that you believe that the MAG-11 ORM worksheet was a waste of time?

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): I believe so. I think it could have been something. And maybe it was just, you know, new guy in a squadron. You know, young in a squadron that's like, I don't even understand why we're doing this. Like, it doesn't, you know, it doesn't make sense. There's no real thought put into this, and so it just kind of got, I guess, discarded -- discounted as something that was like --

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): So I'm hearing from you that the actual risk assessment worksheet that you previously experienced was not super effective?

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): Perhaps a distracter. What about the practice of risk management in general? How do you feel about that?

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): I think we all conduct risk management. In
general, like, more than.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) | I'm asking if you think it's important.
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) | It's absolutely important. Yes, sir.
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) | Okay. Do you feel that going to the Tanker in low light level at 2 a.m. 200 miles offshore would be medium or high risk?
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) | Yes, sir.
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) | Okay. So how was that communicated to And what mitigations were put in place to mitigate the risk associated with that, that was communicated on the flight schedule from the operations Department, which you work? How did you guys mitigate that? You didn't use the worksheet. The ASO didn't review the flight schedule.
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) | Right. The mitigation was .
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) | Okay.
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) | His experience. And the fact that he is a, you know, an FAI. So he was a qualified instructor. He's a mission commander.
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) | Fighter Attack --
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) | Fighter Attack Instructor. Yes, sir.
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) | Okay. Were we doing fighter attack that night or -- I thought we were just going to the Tanker and doing --
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) | Yes, sir. But, it still speaks to his abilities. It still speaks to his abilities as an aircrew. He
has been through a MOT certification. In terms of his ability to teach and his ability to conduct flight operations. So it speaks to his ability.

: Can you define a risk?

: A risk is -- a risk would be something that has the potential to cause harm.

: Can you define a hazard? I mean per 3710?

: Verbatim definitions, no.

: Can you tell me the difference between a risk and a hazard?

: A risk and a hazard -- my understanding of the difference between the two, so a risk could be something that could be mitigated. So something that can be mitigated, and then a hazard is just something that is there that can't necessarily be mitigated, I guess.

: You're a division leader in the F-18, you're a major of the Marine Corps, the pilot training officer of a fighter attack squadron, and I'm not hearing a clear definition of risk or hazard from you. I'm going to give you one more chance at that.

That's you -- okay. Who can change the flight schedule at 242? Who's authorized to change your squadron flight schedule?

: The CO and usually the CO's representative. So if the CO's gone, usually it falls to, like, the XO or the
OPSO.

[b](3) (A) (b) (6): So you believe that the Executive Officer or the Operations Officer can change the flight schedule?

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6): Yes. For the CO, like, for the CO. I know currently it is the CO only. Previously --

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6): I'm asking pre-mishap.

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6): So you feel like the Operations Officer, as the squadron CO's direct representative, can change the flight schedule? Would he do that after he talked to the CO or just in general he can make that decision?

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6): Not in general. Like, so when I say for the CO I mean for the CO, like, the CO is -- the CO is flying on a flight. Or the CO is doing something where he's indisposed and there's something that needs to be changed or addressed right then. But otherwise, it's the CO or the XO.

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6): CO and XO can change the flight schedule. And why do you believe that to be true?

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6): I'm not sure I understand. I think you're asking like --

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6): What reference guides you in that belief?

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6): Okay. I would say -- so what makes me believe that to be true is standard practice, and I cannot quote you the reference, sir.

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6): Okay. Are you familiar with the F-18
admin SOP?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Have you read it?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Judge, are we good on the Ambien stuff?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir. So you said you got a prescription for Ambien to adjust your circadian rhythm sometime in June or July 2018?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): And that was from [b] (3) (A), (b) (6)?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Is he the squadron flight surgeon?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): He was at the time.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. You said you went with a WISSO, also going out with you to Miramar?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): No. The WISSO wasn't placed in Miramar.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Was he taking Ambien or he didn't go?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): He wasn't placed in Miramar, like, no requirements at all.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Going back to the conversation that occurred discussing the canceling of flights on the first day of the ULT.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): What made you believe, or how did
you get your impressions from the conversation? You said you were in the room, but you didn't hear the conversation. What happened afterward that leads you to believe that the MAG was disappointed or upset?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Because when the CO got off the phone he basically in so many words -- if I remember correctly, I don't remember who was in the ready room. But he basically got off the phone and was like well MAG is not really excited that we canceled the flight schedule without talking to them. That was the gist of the conversation. Verbatim, I don't remember exactly what was said, but whatever was said made me believe that the MOC -- the MAG was displeased with the fact that he had canceled the flight schedule. Or canceled that event without consulting them.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Was there any follow-on discussions about that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Define follow-on discussions, like --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So he got off the phone, was he visibly upset? Did he make the comment to the entire ready room? Who was he --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It was not to the entire ready room. I would say he was -- I would say this -- I would say visibly upset. He just made the comment that that was, you know, it was like well, you know, the MAG is not pleased that, you know, we canceled this event and they want us to talk to him. And then I'm involved due to the nature of my billet involving plenty of, you know,
closed-door meetings with the OPSO and the CO and, you know, other senior leadership. I think was probably where some more of that came out with like, hey like the MAG was, I think that's where the rest of that my feeling -- my interpretation of that conversation came from.

(b)(3) (A), (b)(6): Is there anything that you'd like to add? Anything you would like to clarify?

(b)(3) (A), (b)(6): No, sir.

(b)(3) (A), (b)(6): Is there anyone that you recommend that we speak with that you don't know if we have. Maybe you bumped in to somebody and was like man, I really want to talk to and tell him what I know about this?

(b)(3) (A), (b)(6): No, sir. You pretty much talked to everybody. And our schedules talked to everyone.

(b)(3) (A), (b)(6): Have you -- are you a member of the A and B?

(b)(3) (A), (b)(6): No, sir.

(b)(3) (A), (b)(6): Okay. I mean with hindsight, being 20/20 we're talking about this a little bit. What do you think was, frankly I mean, what could we have done different about this mishap? I mean obviously you thought about it.

(b)(3) (A), (b)(6): Yes, sir. So I think some of it goes back to -- so our, you know, our total aircrew flight time. So, you know, I'm sure you have a copy of our hot board from the day of the mishap.

(b)(3) (A), (b)(6): I do.
You know, I have a copy on my bulletin board that I look at pretty frequently. And that just to remind me that we're not as good as we think we are and it's due to the fact that we don't have the flight time and the proficiency. So, you know five hours in 30 days is abysmal.

Was that how many hours had?

I -- without it in front of me, I know the entire -- the average across the squadron was very low. You know, I don't remember what it was. I know I was a high man and I was around 10 hours, because I had been flying a little more because I was in this work-up event. But across, you know, across the squadron when your average is, you know, five hours.

And there's -- I feel like there's so many things that play into the reason that our hours were low that it's more than can really be discussed. Systemic -- probably systemic things, like all kinds of things that lead to that low flight time.

But, being dealt the hand of the low flight time when we were -- looking back at it, I do not think that I would change anything that we did. Anything that we planned, you know, hindsight being 20/20 there's -- given the same problem, I don't think that I could solve it -- that I would solve it very differently than the way we solve the problem that we had.

Okay. Thanks.

Sir.

Judge, will you swear him out?
: Yes, sir.

was warned, sworn, and excused.]
Okay. We're on the record. I'm , it's 1120, on Wednesday, the 23rd of January, 2019. Present in the room are , and court reporter.

We are interviewing via FA, all weather, 242. please state your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

, what do you go by?.

, sir.

What -- do you go by ?

I go by , sir.

Is it okay if I call you ?

That's fine, sir.

I don't want to call you . Is that what means?

Yes.

Why do they call you ?

It's the standard new-guy call sign. He was
as well.

: Oh so you guys are like and . It's, like, is what they call the new guys at 242?

: Yes, sir.

: Your family calls you , so I'm going to call you . You can call me or sir, okay?

So, , what is your military occupational speciality?

: I am a 7523. I'm a pilot.

: Okay. You're a hornet pilot. And where were you trained?

: Miramar, BMFAT 101.

: When did you complete 101?

: I left 101 in May of last year?

: May of '18?

: Yes, sir.

: When did you check into the BAT?

: July of '18.

: July of '18. Who was your commanding officer when you checked in?
sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) was the CO already.

Awesome.

How many hours do you have in the hornet at 242?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) At 242, roughly fifteen.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Fifteen hours. So you've been in a squadron for seven months and you've logged fifteen hours.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Were you medically ill?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Have you been disqualified from flight?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Taking extensive personal leave?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Why is it that you only have fifteen hours and you're required to fly fifteen hours a month. You've been here for seven months, so you should have like -- I don't know, Math for Marines -- like one hundred hours.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Our jets have had some maintenance difficulties. I was able to -- I arrived here in July and we went to Australia right away. But as a guy who had only been here for a couple of days, I was -- my role at the time was to be an ODEO. And
so that was what I did. So I was not qualified to fly any ELFs. There wasn't any focus or time to do unit level training for me. So for the majority of our time in Australia, I did not fly.

I got some currency fights and then a couple of codes around the end of our time there. But then I was in our RBE for five or so weeks afterwards trying to get the jets back to Japan from Australia. After that, I went to ground safety school in October at Camp Pendleton. I was back here in the beginning of November. I took time off to go home for Christmas at the end of December and I have been back here since then. I flew twice on Saturday. That was the first time I had flown in 54.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6):  Okay.

Where were you in December of 2018?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6):  I was here, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6):  Did you participate in the LFE -- or there UFT rather?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6):  Not as a pilot. I was a designated ODO for the night shift. I was the ODO at the time of the mishap.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6):  Okay. So you took over from the person that's called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3). So you took over from (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) at about what time on the 5th?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6):  Probably right around 2200 that night, sir.

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(D) (3) (A), (b) (6): 2200, which is -- I don't have the flight schedule in front of me. But that seems to closely approximate the brief time that the mishap occurred.

Does that sound about right?

(D) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. They were -- I beleive they had just begun briefing as I arrived.

(D) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Did they brief in the ready room?

(D) (3) (A), (b) (6): No. Not that I was a witness to.

(D) (3) (A), (b) (6): So they went to a briefing space or some other space to brief.

Okay. As the ODO, how many flight hours did you have in the hornet when you were standing ODO at the mishap -- in the squadron. Sorry. How many flight hours did you have when you were standing duty in December of 18?

(D) (3) (A), (b) (6): About twelve.

(D) (3) (A), (b) (6): About twelve hours. And in those twelve hours, how many times have you done air refueling?

(D) (3) (A), (b) (6): None.

(D) (3) (A), (b) (6): Have you ever done air refueling?

(D) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes. I did. I tanked off of a C130 twice in 101.

(D) (3) (A), (b) (6): Day -- and one day flight and one night
flight?

: Day and night for both event.

: Okay. Did you wear night-vision goggles?

: No, sir. I was not aided.

: So you did a night unaided and obviously a day tanker fuel. And that was how long ago? Like nine months ago?

: Actually, probably a little longer than that, sir.

: So maybe a year ago?

So what are some of the ODO responsibility at 242? When you stand ODO, like, what's your job? How would you describe the role of the operations duty officer?

: So maintain the weather and the NOTAM's and make sure that's up to date. Make sure that we know the status of the devert fields as well as ground field. If there are anything applicable that the aircrew knows that. Coordinating range space and coordinating other units that are going to be in that range space. The main thing is to keep the flight schedule moving. So when jets come back, whether they're going to hop in or hop seat or if they're going to go in, and if there is going to be flexing with maintenance. Working with maintenance and then maintaining constant
communication control on any updates or changes that are coming.

That would be it in a nutshell, sir.

[O (A), (b) (6)]: How many times have you stood ODO at 242?

[O (A), (b) (6)]: Quite a few times, especially in Australia. I would probably say 25 to 30 times.

[O (A), (b) (6)]: Did you maintain the original flight schedule as the ODO?

[O (A), (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

[O (A), (b) (6)]: What are some of the things that you put on that flight schedule?

[O (A), (b) (6)]: Actual take-off and landing times. If there is something that comes back that's different or that they want noted, you'll do that. But mostly just in red ink the actual time they took off and the actual time they landed. And then, that will go in a folder with the NAFLERE** that the aircrew bring inside.

[O (A), (b) (6)]: Were you ever on when there was a flight schedule change?

[O (A), (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

If there was any kind of change then we'd ask for CO, XO, or OPSO approval.

[O (A), (b) (6)]: Tell me about how you documented that.

[O (A), (b) (6)]: If somebody -- if there was going to be an
aircrew change or something like that we would put it in red on the flight schedule that is on the TV, so the digital copy. And I would say "needs approval". And then, the first of those three that I saw, is "this okay with you?"

And then, whoever that person was I would say XO approved or OPSO approved.

[3] (A), (b) (6): Were you surprised to learn that at two a.m. that the mishap aircrew were conducting air refueling?


[3] (A), (b) (6): Why is that?

[3] (A), (b) (6): I was not aware when the flight schedule came out that we were going to be doing that. I told the AMB this when I interviewed with them. I --

[3] (A), (b) (6): So before we -- stop. Any discussions with AMB, you have to realize that statement is privileged and we're not asking you to talk about anything you discussed with AMB.


[3] (A), (b) (6): Well, he can tell us what he told the AMB. But he can't tell us what he discussed with AMB.

[3] (A), (b) (6): You don't have to.


Don't be defensive.

This is honestly a point that I've thought a lot about. I didn't know that they were going to be tanking that night until I got there. And I don't actually remember how I found out. I think it was just a conversation.

So when you assumed ODO, you said at 2200 you took over the deck, or there about. You did a turnover with Jim.

And what did he tell you?

That might have been. I don't remember the conversation super well. I don't think there was -- I don't think it was a long one. But I have to assume that's when I found out that we were going to be tanking because I knew they were going to be tanking when they were out there. But I cannot tell you exactly when I found out. And I know that -- I only know now. In retrospect, I wasn't on the flight schedule and it was something, I guess, that got added later. I don't know how that process went.

So yeah. I mean that's what we're getting at. So was the TNR code for night systems air refueling on the flight schedule?

I don't know about the actual TNR code. But at the bottom, there would normally be an air refueling.
In the flight note?

In the flight note, coordinate this person this phone number. There wasn't anything there.

Okay. So you're on the desk. At midnight, they start the jets. And then, a few minutes after that give you an outbound call and they take off at about one a.m., or whenever that shows.

What do you think they were going to do?

They were going to go turn circles in the intrasouth tank. Turn circles and come home.

Okay. At that time, when they called you telling you that they were taking off, you understood that they were going to the tanker?

Yes, sir.

What on the flight schedule document that you were maintaining as the ODO reflected that?

I don't think I put anything on the flight schedules, sir. It didn't click for me until later that it wasn't on there.

Did the mishap section leader -- is he senior to you?

Yes, sir. Quite a bit.
Okay. Would you consider him to be a more experienced F-18 pilot than you?

Yes, sir.

Would you consider him to be more experienced about how things go at 242 than you?

Yes, sir.

Would you expect him to offer you instruction on things like a flight schedule change?

Yes, sir.

Did he ask you to add a tanker code to the flight schedule?

No, sir. I did not interact with the aircrew that night.

So you didn't talk to until you talked to him on the radio when he called outbound.

Is that the only time you saw him?

That was the only time I interacted with him until the proposed mishap, sir. And their engines were on at 1201.

Okay.

That was a note that was brought down. There was a Japanese holiday on for fourth.

A Japanese holiday is what you were told?
There was a Japanese holiday on the fourth so there was a note that had come down somewhere that engines would be on at 1201 because it was not the fourth anymore.

Okay.

And they turned them on exactly as I expected them to be.

The fourth or the fifth.

I'm sorry. The day of the mishap. There was a Japanese holiday.

Okay. So let's go to the mishap a little bit. So you're sitting at the ODO desk and you get a call from.

No. That was not the first thing that happened.

Tell me the first thing that happened.

The first thing that happened was -- so I -- we had secured the ready room and I had a SIM the next day so I had a JUMPS computer in front of me. And so --

When you say, "secure the ready room," do you mean like cleaning it up for the night?

Make it a secure space.

Okay.
We made it a secure space. So we had a SIPR computer and a JUMPS machine out there. And so, I was studying. I got a phone call from a [redacted] at Langley Air Force Base and he said that there was an ejection seat beacon going off. And he assumed that it had accidently been tripped by maintenance downstairs and he wanted help tracking it so he could turn it off.

I said, "okay," and he read it out to me. He read the serial number and then the aircraft BUNO and then the aircraft 11.

Which is the mishap aircraft?

I told him that it was fine. And so, there was a change in voice and he said that you need to get in touch with them then.

And so, the first thing that I did after I hung up with him is [redacted] and [redacted] were the other two aircrew that were there that night. They were just on the night shift, but they didn't have any scheduled events that day. But I went out to the hallway and said, "[redacted], I think we have a problem," and I told him what the phone call had just been. And he said, "Oh, shit. That's not good. We need to call them." I said, "okay."

We got on the phone and tried tower. We got transferred to NOF. I think it was a proach and whitesnake is the controlling

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agency out there. And they all sit in the same room.

So a couple of things simultaneously happened after that. We got on the phone with [b](3) (A), (b) (6). They are receiving the initial emergency mayday call from [b](3) (A), (b) (6). At the same time, and at about the same moment, the same Sergeant from Langley calls back and there is another sea beacon going off and it corresponds to the AFT seat in the same aircraft. So that was pretty much out cue that something was definitely wrong. We told them to activate the crash alarm. Then we went from there.

: Okay. How long did you stay on duty?

: I suppose I got off the desk at around 1130 the next morning.

: So you were there for the whole search and rescue stuff?

: I insisted on staying as long as they'd let me.

: Okay. What time did your CO come in?

: So if the mishap had happened at, like, 1:42, he I think was in roughly an hour or so afterwards. The XO and the ASO were there before he was, so they were the first ones to get there.

But, pretty much, everyone was there by, I suppose, maybe

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Okay.

But that's just a guess. I'm not sure if that number is right.

Who were you guys communicating with at the MAG?

The MAG has set up a war room. And so, they had it from the yellow team, so there were people there already. So there was a chief warrant officer -- I believe his name was -- and he was the war room coordinator there.

So he was the person who I ended up speaking to, you know, most of the time throughout the night.

What kind of information were you two exchanging?

Coordination efforts on search and rescue. And then, as time went on they started wanting to talk about CACO things. Those are really kind of the main things, but search and rescue was my big focus.

So tell me about that.

So I was on the phone with pretty often with the radar room at proach. I was talking to a pair of civilians over there. I believe was the civilian in
charge there. He was having a hell of a time --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you know how to spell his name by chance?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Not --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : (b) (3) (A).?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : -- I don't know if this is one-hundred percent accurate -- but (b) (3) (A), (b) (6).

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He was the guy I talked to most of the time. And he was the person I told to activate the crach alarm and start working on the search and rescue assets.

There were multiple false alarms as the night went on of there's a bird flying when there was not. Now there is. Actually, we're just kidding. There's not.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I mean, what do you mean by that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We both got false reports from radar that a Japanese SARR asset had taken off and it was not true. I believe it was 4:06 in the morning that an actual SARR asset took off from an airfield in Fukuoka. And they were the first to respond.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So do you believe the ejection was about 0142?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : 0142 to 46. I believe at 47 was when is when...
I got the first phone call. And, yeah, it took about two hours to get an asset airborne.

[0347]: So that would be about 0347?

[0406]: 0406 I believe is when the actual -- we actually got a phone call that the aircraft took off. It was a 60 out of an airfield near Fukuoka.

[OK]: Okay. And what kind of information do you think maybe have been passed about location?

[OK]: We had a lot long that had passed. And we had pushed that up, so I'm sure that they had that. And then, he had stayed on station. And I believe they thought they had seen a strobe and they were trying to get a lat long. So I think we had two at that point. I think we had three by the end of the night.

Somebody from Scott Air Force Base called with a lat long associated with a beacon. But, by then, we had two. We had the initial one and then one where they thought they had seen a strobe.

I don't know this for sure. I never, actually, a single time directly communicated with a CHASDIV SARR asset. Later on in the night, I'll talk to a CHASDIV COC person. But that was it and that was not until much later.

So I think that they got that information. They went to
the right area and they started searching.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What time do you think they found at around 0600. So I'm sure they had found him 20 to 30 minutes before that. So that was when we got that phone call.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): They found at around 0600. So I'm sure they had found him 20 to 30 minutes before that. So that was when we got that phone call.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What else?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So multiple false alarms. They do get the SARR asset airborne. I don't know what kind of alert status they were on or like what they knew about our ULT training or our flight schedules. They eventually get out there.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Your body language communicates that you're surprised it took basically five hours from ejection until recovery on .

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Your body language communicates that you're surprised it took basically five hours from ejection until recovery on .

Is that fair?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Surprised could be one word.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Or maybe disappointed?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Frustrated. Disappointed. That was my main focus. That night and I'll admit that I've never had a scenario like this before. I had always kind of just thought that a SARR could be taking off ten minutes after we get the call and I don't think that's realistic, especially in hindsight. And I don't think
it was realistic that night. I don't know this for sure but I think that the crew that took off were taken out of bed and told take off and go fly. I don't know that for sure, but that's what it seemed like with the timeline. So, yeah, that was my focus. Getting SARR assets and getting a SAR aircraft airborne. And, yeah, it took way too long. So, yeah, frustrated, I would certainly say.

: What time was found?

: I think he was found a little bit before noon. Probably around 11:30 or so.

: The same day?

: The same day. Yes, sir.

: So you feel like you remained on duty until was located?

: I was there until they, and as I watched as they went through the efforts that they did to pick him up.

: What do you mean, "you watched?"

: There was a SIPR chat going?

: And without discussing classified information, you observed in the chat that one asset had located him and another asset was trying to extract.

Is that what you're trying to talk about?

: Yeah. One asset had seen him and did not
respond to a hoist.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Were those airborne assets?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I believe that was an airborne asset. It was a helicopter that found him. And I tried to drop a hoist to him, but did not have a rescue swimmer? So they were not able to pick him up because he did not respond to that. So I believe a Japanese destroyer went and actually picked him up.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So let me say back to you what I think you said.

You said you think a helicopter found him. Probably a Japanese 60. And you think it lowered a cable to him and he was floating on the surface of the water unresponsive in some way, deceased or unconscious or something.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. That's how I believe the course of events went.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And you believe that airborne asset communicated with the surface asset.

And what do you believe the surface asset did?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I believe the probably dropped some kind of boat to go and pick him up and bring him back to the main ship.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you remember the timeline? Do you
remember when the helicopter arrived and tried to drop the hoist?

: We were getting -- our information was roughly 20 minutes old by time we were getting it.

: Okay.

: So I would guess that about 11:00 o'clock is when they first found him and tried to drop a hoist. And probably about 11:30 --

: So the destroyer was already on its way out there?

: The destroyer was out there. I don't know exactly where it was.

: It was only about 30 minutes before --

: Yeah. It was not very long.

: Okay.

: And then, the ship went out to actually get him. I believe there were three Japanese destroyers that I read later that were out there.

: Okay. And you feel like the 60 didn't have a SAR swimmer on board?

: Yes, sir. That's what I believe. Based on my understanding, they dropped a hoist. They didn't have a SAR swimmer on board.
The 60 didn't have a SAR swimmer on board?

Yes, sir. That's what I believe. Based on my understanding, they dropped a hoist and when they dropped the hoist he didn't respond to it. So they couldn't effect the pick up if they had a swimmer.

Okay. You said earlier that you were surprised to learn that they were doing tanking that night. And then, later you told me that you knew they were going to the tanker when you were the ODO. So let me ask the question in a different way.

Is it because air refueling at that time of day was not briefed when you guys briefed the whole exercise? Why did you say that? Why did you say you're surprised and then later you said you weren't?

I don't think you're lying. I'm just trying to think at one point you were surprised that they were going to the tanker and at another point you understood that they were going to the tanker.

So why did you have one perspective at one time and then another perspective at and then a different perspective at a different time?
cross my mind that it was weird that they were going to the tanker. That didn't strike me as odd because that is a normal part of operations, going to the tanker. I didn't realize that it wasn't on the flight schedule. I was surprised later when I interview with AMB -- that they said it was not on the flight schedule. And they gave me the flight schedule because I had thought, okay. I knew they were tanking. I must have been on the flight schedule. And then, I looked at it was like, okay. That can't be true because it's not on the schedule. And so, that was when I was surprised and that's when I started to think back like how did I find out then that they were tanking. And I think it must have been that either in the turnover or just in conversation that I heard that they were doing it. So at the time, it didn't really cross my mind. It was later when I saw, kind of, the more complete picture that I was surprised.

**: When the exercise was briefed, did you attend a confirmation brief before or did you have any squadron like ULT overview brief?**

**: Yes, sir.**

**: What day was that?**

**: I guess that would have been the previous Wednesday or Thursday before it started.
Did they talk about night air refueling?

Not that I recall, sir.

Did they tell you that you would be the late night ODO?

Yes, sir. They did.

So you had several days notice to adjust your circadian rhythm to working the late shift?

We did get several days. I believe the brief was on Thursday. We had an event that we all had to be at on Friday morning. So we all, from what I understand --

Like a squadron formation or what?

I was not a formation. But it was something we were all supposed to be at.

Okay.

I do remember that I couldn't start adjusting over until Saturday. So Saturday, Sunday. And then, Monday, Tuesday, we were switching over. And, I guess, that would have been Thursday night, so Wednesday night as well. So we had about five days to start.

Was there any discussion about ambian or any kind of sleep aids?

Yes, sir. There was.
Tell me about that.

We were denied our request from any kind of sleep aids from the AMSO. And the AMSO -- or not the AMSO. Our flight doc.

So you asked the flight surgeon, hey man. Can we get some ambian and he said what?

He said, no. And I believe he gave justification, I believe, right out of the book that this was --

So along the lines of not authorized?

Not authorized by the MAG.

Okay. Who actually put in the request with the flight surgeon?

There was never, like, an official request. There were people asking him.

Who was asking him?

Did you ask him?

I didn't ask him. I wasn't flying. I knew I wasn't flying. So I didn't feel a sense of urgency. I don't exactly remember who would have asked.

Best guess?

Do you think the aircrew that were flying might have asked?
Possibly.

How did you hear about the request?

It was on WhatsApp.

So you guys have a big squadon WhatsApp chain? So if you look at your WhatsApp chain, you would be able to tell us who was asking. All right. Can you do that and get back to us?

Sure.

Thanks.

Going off the flight schedules, was it your understanding that either the CO, XO, or OPSO could all approve changes in the schedule?

Yes, sir.

How often did you get XO or OPSO approval in your time at the BFA-242?

It wasn't common, but it wasn't unheard of either.

Okay.

Any time that -- it would generally be an aircrew change. If somebody had something else on their schedule and they needed a replacement, then that would require approval. But it wouldn't be, it would generally not be that difficult to get
because it was pretty cut-and-dry.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : You said you did interact with the mishap flight crew or the other mishap aircraft the night of the incident. Is that normal? Did you interact with them the nights before?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Um-hmm.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : What did you guys talk about the nights before? How did they seem?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : So we were -- we didn't have much to do. It's hard to do your ground job when no one else's work sometimes. And we were just there to be adjusting.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : There was definitely talk of, you know, the witching hour around midnight to two a.m., people were tired and we were all trying to adjust. So that was in conversation. You know, I had a long talk with [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) about our girlfriends and personal lives. You know, that was really the last time I got to talk with him. So we were all just, kind of, shooting-the-shit and hanging out, waiting for the night to go by.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : How is [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) and his relationship with his [b] (6) ?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : They were really good.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Was she out in Iwakuni when this
happened?

: Um-hmm.

: Where was she visiting from?

: Okay.

: She was in town and I don't know where her permanent residence is. I know she's back in .

: Was he upset that he had to run twenty-four hour ops during her visit?

: No, I don't think so. did.

: Okay.

: She was here for -- she actually had like a one-year student visa. They weren't pressed for time.

: Okay. Did questions or talk come up about go-no pills during your talks the nights previous?

: With him and I or, well, with anyone?

: With anyone in the aircrew.

: Yeah. People were talking about it. Like, it'd be nice to get some Ambian so that way I can sleep later during this time of the day. So I could stay awake at night.

: Did anyone discuss that they had Ambian or that they were taking Ambian?
No. Or that they were coming up with other ways to go to sleep?

Not that I recall.

Did people usually brief in the ready room, where you're posted as ODO pre-flight?

No. We didn't. They would brief in briefing spaces.

You said post mishap you had a conversation with [ ].

What was that conversation?

I didn't really have a conversation with him one-on one.

Okay.

Did I say that?

Yeah. You just mentioned post-mishap you had a convo with [ ].

We talked on the radio. Part of the timeline was getting an initial call from [ ] as they were coming back.

Okay.

When they were coming back we got a report
from them. But, no. That night we didn't have a chance to talk one-one-one. I was busy and so was he.

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: You didn't talk with [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) or or anybody from the mishap?

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: So no. Same thing. [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) was back as well, but I was running as fast as I could, talking on the phone, getting SAR assets moving. Talking to radar and seeing where they are on their scope.

And then, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6), he gets picked up. He gets flown. They stop at a field in southern Japan to refuel and then they come back to Iwakuni. He goes to the hospital. I finally went home, I guess, around 4, 3 or 4, that day. And then I came back to work at like 5:30 because I thought we were going to keep working, but there wasn't much to do. So I came back to work and there was a group of people in our squadron bar and he was there. But he was there in civilian clothing. He didn't have a lot of -- he didn't really have any bandages on him. And that was the first time that we had spoken at all.

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: So you had spoken to [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) the day after the mishap?

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: So actually no. Let me take that back. He called us. He borrowed a Japanese person's cell phone and he called
the ready room.

: Okay.

: And he gave us a report of what he'd experienced. And then he asked, were we the only aircraft that went down? And I said, no, you weren't. And then he asked if they found and I said, no, they're still looking.

So he called us. We talked for about 10 or 15 -- no, as I recall it was 5 to 10 minutes. And then, he left because they were ready to take off again. He said that he would call as they were about to get airborne. And he called us again just to say we're leaving. We're coming to Iwakuni.

: Do you remember what you guys talked about in those 5 to 10 minutes, the details?

: Yeah. He called. We had been looking for him, we had been looking for all morning. And we knew he had been picked up, but then he calls. He goes, "Hey, it's ." I'm like okay, this is extremely surreal. And he asks, "Are we the only plane that went down?" And I said, "No."

"Did they find I said, "No. They're still looking. Can you tell me anything that you remember?"

And I believe the XO and also the ASO were there.

He said he thinks his arm is broken. He's not sure what
happened. He landed in the water. I think he said he started trying to swim to a light and he realized it was going to be too far away. So he stopped. He says he doesn't remember the wind being very strong, so he thought that him and [O] [3] (A), (b) (6) could not have landed too far away from each other.

And then I think he said something about when he was in the helicopter, the CHASDIV helicopter, they -- he was fighting through the language barrier. But he thought he heard one of the crewmen say they found him and that they were working on picking him up. And I don't think that was ultimately true, but that was what his impression was in the moment.

[O] [3] (A), (b) (6): Okay. Anything additional when you spoke to him at the bar?

[O] [3] (A), (b) (6): Not really. I'm just glad you're okay. I can't believe you're here.

[O] [3] (A), (b) (6): Okay.

[O] [3] (A), (b) (6): I'm not sure there is anything else we need from you [O] [3]?

[O] [3] (A), (b) (6): Is there anything else you would like to add or talk about?

[O] [3] (A), (b) (6): I wish we had a closer relationship with the CHASDIV, especially as our only search and seizure asset on this
base. I've only been here six months and I have a scan that's about two inches wide. But it seems to me like they live on their side of the base and we live on our side of the base, and yet we are putting out lives in their hands. And I wish that we had a closer relationship with them.

Like, I'm actually working on -- I would like to go take a tour of their squadron and them come take a tour of ours just so we know each other as people. It's not like -- because when we tried to make direct contact with them, [b] (3) (A), [b] (6), the ASO, drove over to their squadron hanger and couldn't get through the fence. And there is a phone number we have there, but we never directly talked to the local CHASDIV search and rescue squadron here as far as I know. And if I could do this again, I would cut out the middle man, which was radar in this case. And I would be talking to them directly. But I don't think we have a relationship with them where that would be normal.

[0] (3) (A), [0] (6): Have you ever known 242 to cancel a flight event for ORM considerations? Like when you were in Australia or something did you ever see a flight lead or a senior respected member of the squadron just say hey, we're not doing that. It's too much and too hard. It's too hazardous. Any stories of anything like that happening?
Not that I recall. But I could see that happening. I could also definitely see that being a possibility as the schedule is being signed.

What do you mean?

I could see -- because there's quite a few eyes that look at the schedule before it gets signed and published. And I've seen it have to go back and get redone before from people who have brought up concerns. And a lot of times it's this aircrew that's had X, Y, and Z the previous few days for prereqs.

Do you work as a schedule writer?

No, sir. I don't. And so my exposure to that is very limited. That's very antidotal.

What is your ground job in the squadron? You said safety, right?

I'm the NATOPS officer and the ground safety officer.

Oh, NATOPS and safety.

Have you ever been in air spaces and doss when the daily schedule writer was bringing the schedule by?

Yes, sir.

Tell me about that process.

He is looking for the DOSS. The DOSS will
look it over and say if he's okay with it or not.

What tools does the DOSS use to determine if it's okay or not?

You'd have to ask him. I'm sure he uses the hotboard and he'll ask questions. But you'll have to ask him, sir. Actually, was the DOSS that I had worked for and before him was .

Okay. So how many months have you been with this squadron?

Since July of last year.

When did they start calling you ?

The day that I arrived.

And that's standard for everybody?

Yes, sir. It is.

When do they stop calling you ?

Whenever you earn a call sign.

How long does it normally take to earn a call sign in your observation?

Probably six months. I think I'm a little bit longer than average. But you do something silly in the jet. You know how it is, sir. You do something silly and you get a call sign that's not meant to be endearing or complimentary.
How many guys in the squadron right now are referred to as?

Two. Myself and . And we will get a third one next week, I think.

And do you plan on calling him sir?

He'll be sir.

And what's the purpose of calling him? Why would you want to call him?

That's just the squadron tradition, sir.

Okay. Anything else?

No, sir.

All right.
It's about 1505 on Wednesday, the 23 of January, 2019. I am, assisted by staff judge advocate, and court reporter. We're here to interview -- is it?

Yes, sir.

, please state your full name for the record, spelling your last.

: And what do you go by?

or my call sign?

Either?

: My call sign is .

: It's not the most appropriate story for this room?

Okay. I'm just going to call you , okay, because I don't know what your call sign means and I wouldn't want to insult you by using it or mock you in any way.

You can call me or sir. Whatever you want, okay?

: Okay.
When did you get your wings? 2013. 2013? Where at? I was in Kingsville. Where did you go to the FRS? San Diego. 101? Yes, sir. When did you finish that? At the end of 2015. 2015? I'm sorry. I think I got winged in 2011 to tell you the truth. I don't really keep track, to be honest with you. 2011 I got winged. And then, I got -- I went to the FRS and finished at the end of 2015. It took you four years to get you to the FRS? No. To get my wings to go to primary. It took me about three and a half years from the start -- from TBS to my wings was about three and a half years. Okay. So what month and year did you get your wings?
August of -- oh my God, the year.

, am I stressing you out?

No. I honestly don't remember right now.

What month and year did you complete the FRS?

2015.

Okay. So you probably got your wings about a year before that?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Let's go with that.

Yes, sir.

When you completed the FRS, then what happened?

After the FRS, I came straight here.

Okay. What month and year did you come to Iwakuni?

January of 16.

January of '16?

The 12th.

Okay. So you've been here for three years?

Over three years. Yes, sir.
Okay. Cool. Did you go straight to 242?

Yes, sir.

Who was your commanding officer?

I was the NPCO and then the SKEZ officer.

What was your first job in the squadron?

So you wrote the daily flight schedule?

Yes, sir.

That's a thankless job, isn't it. How'd you like that job?

You learn a lot about the workings of the squadron itself because the input from maintenance, operations, safety, basically everyone coming together trying to make the schedule happen.

That's great. About how many hours do you have in the hornet?

411.

When -- what's your day job in the squadron now?

Flight officer.

So you're still in ops?

Yes, sir.
So you've been in ops for three years?

No, sir.

Okay. So you're SKEZO. Then what did you do?

From SKEZO, I became the power line officer. And then, I became the S-4a. And then, I was on an IA to the Middle East. And then, became the flight officer this past December.

Who sent you on an IA to the Middle East?

That was under tenure.

How long were you over there?

Six months.

Where did you go?

Qatar, or Qatar. However you want to pronounce it, sir.

Did you work at the K-Hawk?

Yes, sir.

How was that?

To be honest, it was kind of boring. There wasn't a lot to do as far as my billet. It was very easy.

Yeah.

But I learned Afghanistan and Iraq big-picture
type stuff.

That's good. You have 400 hours in the Hornet. I'd assume that you're night systems qualified?

Yes, sir.

Are you a night systems instructor?

Yes, sir.

That's great. How long have you been an NSI?

Last year in November I got the qualification.

So 3 months ago or?

Over a year ago.

-- 14?

Yes, sir. 14.

That's great. How many goggles hours do you have do you think, roughly?

I think around 45 to 50.

About 50 goggle hours and you're an NSI?

Yes, sir.

Cool. Of those 50 goggle hours, roughly how much do you have with the ANVS-9 and roughly how much with the ANVS-11, or do you have any with the ANVS-11?

I would say more with the 9s than the 11s. But
the NVCDs it's probably only 15 percent of my time.

: Okay.

: At best.

: So you flew on the ANVS-9s for a while.

Is that because you didn't have the ANVS-11s yet?

: That is correct, sir.

: So how -- when was the ANVS-11 introduced to VMFA-242?

: I couldn't put an exact date on it. But as soon as -- during Rino.

: So in '17. Probably fall or spring of '17?

: Yes, sir.

: So you guys only had ANVS-11s for only, like, a year, a year and a half, right?

: Not super long. And not everybody had their JHMCS helmet made as well. Because it slowly got -- it's a pretty expensive system, so you've got to, like, have the helmet itself available and cut to your face. And then, you can attach the 11s to it as well as the NVCDs.

: Does everybody in the squadron have ANVS-11s?
I'm not aware of that. I'm not sure.

Okay. That's a good answer. Thank you.

So when you transition from the ANVS-9 to the ANVS-11 -- you said you had about 1500 goggle hours total and maybe about 40, 30 to 40 on the ANVS-9, what specific training did you get for the ANVS-11?

You get briefed. So it's like a ground school lecture.

Who provides that?

The AMPSO does. They talk about it in their classes. And then -- I don't remember if we actually got an NSI to teach us about the ANVS-11s. But it is in our night considerations brief. We do speak about that.

Tell me about that.

So the night considerations brief, it goes over the pre-flight, some of the differences in the system; basically, the differences in the blooming of the goggles and the focus of the resolution of what you're actually going to see.

The ANVS-11s -- because they're JHMCS capable -- it has an extra attachment on the bottom right of the actual device itself. So it blocks a little bit of your view if you're looking down at the right side. So sometimes you have to kind of tilt your head a
little in a weird way to actually see your instruments a little more easily, sir. So basically, basic upkeep, pre-flight, how it works, some issues you may run into.

There is an inversion issue as well. But that's pretty easily solved. You just look through your HUD and it re-rights itself. But obviously, that could cause illusions.

: So you talked about a little thing sticking out of the right eye. Is that the NDU, the night display unit?

: Well, I don't know what's actually inside of it. It's probably, like, the hardware that actually runs it. So it's just something that kind of hampers your vision a little bit.

: What's the size of this thing you're talking about? Like the size of a 9-volt battery, the size of your thumb, the size of dice?

: It's not really noticeable while you're in the chair, sir.

: Okay.

: Like, you're just aware that you have to look differently. But it's not anything that would not really like --

: When you say "look differently," I think you're talking about your undergoggle scan. Is that what you're
talking about?

: Yes, sir.

: Okay. What about your under goggle outside the cockpit scan? Would it affect that?

: You're probably going to have to tilt your head up a little bit more on the right side.

: Right side. And what side is the HUD display on? Also on the right?

: Yes, it's only the right eye.

: But it looks like both are right when you're looking through it?

: You can't really tell unless you close your

: Okay. What about the performance characteristics. As an NSI, what are the performance characteristics differences between the 9 and the 11?

: With the 9, it helps -- well, one, they're easier to pre-flight. So the system itself basically baselines you at 20-20. So if you aren't 20-20, it's not going to be as good as the 9s are because you can't actually focus it to your individual eye issues if that makes sense.

But it helps with blooming. So say the actual C-130 is

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over blooming of the goggles itself when you get close to bright lights. It's actually a lot more dim and you can see the aircraft a lot better. That's really -- that and the ability to see the JHMCS symbology is what makes it so much better.

It's a lot better weight. So the weight of it isn't as far forward. So it's a little bit easier on your neck.

: What about performance at different light levels -- is it more difficult or?

: I would say, for only my 50 hours on it, I couldn't really tell you the difference.

: Now I'm just saying as an NSI, when you're teaching it?

: I would say it's not noticeable under different light conditions. They operate the same way.

: There's no -- as an NSI, you wouldn't give a class to note any performance differences between the ANVS-9 and ANVS-11 under different light level conditions. Is that what your saying?

: Yes, sir. Only with the blooming, that's the only real difference.

: So in low light, ANVS-11s are just as good as ANVS-9s?
I believe so. Yes, sir. I don't notice anything and --

Why do you believe that -- you said you just don't notice any difference?

I don't notice a difference. Yes, sir. I would get back to the book.

But when you're briefing it or when you're going out to meet the new guy?

To be honest with you, I've never used my NSI qualification because I got sent to Qatar right away.

So you got your NSI and you got sent to Qatar. But I mean, you're a current qualified NSI.

Not according to the squadron right now.

Tell me about that.

Because I cannot take a new guy out in the aircraft at night time because I'm not current enough in the aircraft to do so.

How many hours have you flown in the last year?

8.5.

Over the last year?

Yes, sir.
How many months -- okay. So when did you get back from Qatar?

Like October of this past year.

So like three months ago?

Yes, sir.

So you've been here for three months and you've flown 8.5 hours?

Since this past January. So January of 2017 -- I'm sorry. Since January of '18 until now. About a year I've only flown eight and a half hours in a jet.

Total time?

Yes, sir.

And of that 13 months, you were gone for six?

Yes, sir.

So in 7 months, you flew 8.5 hours.

Thirteen minus six is seven.

Yes.

In 7 months of availability, you flew 8.5 hours?

Part of that was the PTP training to actually go to Qatar. I had to go to Okinawa to shoot the rifle. I missed a
DET and the whole squadron was gone. It was like a weird period of waiting for a spot at the rifle range while I was down in Okinawa.

: Which resulted in what?

: Like a month and a half delay of me actually leaving for Qatar, and I didn't go to the DET, and I didn't fly at all during that time because I was waiting for this rifle spot to open.

: Okay. So you're the "FlightO."

What does a "FlightO" do?

: I will secure range space for training. I try to help out the training officer as far as the flow of the schedule like who's going to be flying.

I basically try to take his plan and incorporate the range space with what he wants to do. So if we're trying to accomplish air-to-surface SORTYs, we're going to be reserving different ranges that are required -- I guess it's kind of a dumb way to say it. If we're doing air-to-air SORTYs, I would schedule over-the-water landing airspace. Or if we're doing air-to-surface, it needs to be land. That sort of thing, you know. I try to see what he wants to do in the future and try to schedule.

: Who locks on [inaudible]?

: It depends on the squadrons that are here.
Worst case, we just try to do it internally.

[292x47]15: I mean who in the squadron does it? Is it you two?

[231x659]: Mostly it's the training officer.

[231x602]: Who locks on Tankers?

[231x544]: That would be my responsibility.

[231x458]: Did you expect them to go to the tanker during the mishap?

[231x314]: I knew that they were probably going to go to the tanker, but I couldn't tell you exactly when that was put on the schedule.

[231x227]: Why did you know that they would probably go to the tanker?

[231x170]: Because the MAG had a flow of what they wanted to accomplish and there was a tanker on that line, or a possible tanker on that line.

[231x143]: So you were not surprised to learn that they were at the tanker at the time they were at the Tanker?

[231x83]: It did not shock me.

[231x161]: Did -- do you know why it wasn't on the flight schedule then?

[231x112]: I'm not aware of that.
Are you involved in the flight schedule publication as the "FlightO."

The way the checklist is set up is the check of the schedule skips me.

Why is that?

I'm not sure, sir. It just kind of depends on the operations officer?

Who is the OpSo that wrote the schedule for the mishap?

The operations officer would be .

So wrote the schedule?

He didn't write the schedule.

He was the OpSp?

Yes, sir.

Who was the daily schedule writer?

I'm ninety-nine percent positive it was that actually wrote the schedule.

and . Did he have an actual reason to believe -- I mean, do you have any other explanation as to why and failed to put the tanker on the flight schedule?

The actual ULT stuff was very chaotic and
constantly changing.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Tell me about that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Even the day before some of the stuff was happening, they had an explanation for what they wanted to do.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Who's they?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): The MAG.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): MAG-ops?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What do you mean by that? They couldn't tell you what time you took off?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir. So like, we were trying to do operations out in and even the day before we weren't even sure we were allowed to land even though we had Marines on deck ready to return aircraft.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What do you contribute that to?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It would have to had been from our flying issues. It just -- it shocked me to -- I'm sorry, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Please, go ahead.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It shocked me to think that we were planning on going to tomorrow at the time and not have the authority to land there the day before. Like, yes, we're doing this for sure.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Where does that authority come from?
I don't know.

How do you get your information?

Through the chain of command.

And your chain of command is who, for ops I mean. Who at MAG-ops do you talk to is what I'm asking.

For most of my flying, I went through current ops and it was and . They were my main sources.

So going to or not going to , how is that relevant to going to the tanker or not going to the tanker? Are those related?

Was it going to the tanker if we could not go to ? Was that the second order?

No. It was just an example of how jumbled everything seemed to be.

Is that common in actuality within your time frame?

I have never been through as much of a headache as this was before. There is always friction --

[inaudible].

To tell you the truth, I'm not sure, sir. But it just kind of seemed like it was thrown together at the last
minute. And they didn't have a good handle on what they wanted us to do as far as SORTY scale.

Okay. So you checked into the gun squadron in January of 2016. Did I get that right?

Yes, sir.

So has 242 ever had a mid-air collision with a tanker before?

There was an incident a couple years ago with -- they took a hose off of a C-130. It was down in Okinawa.

Down at 242?

Yes, sir.

It was in a 152 C-130?

Yes, sir.

What was your -- and you were the SCISS officer at this time?

I beleive I was in the power line.

Power line?

Yes, sir.

So tell me more about the [inaudible] in the squadron at this time.

What lead to the mishap?
Yeah. What happened, like, what do you know of what happened? Were you told -- you were not in flight, right?

No, I was not.

I mean, you were a brand new guy to the squadron.

I was at least a year, year and a half I'd say.

And then you heard some guys at the tanker. Was it daytime?

Night.

Night. So 242 went to the night tanker and took a hose home. What did you do? What did you hear about how that happened or whatever?

I don't know if I can actually disclose the actual incident itself. I think it's still privileged information.

Well, the only aspect that would be privileged would be if -- so I'm an ASO, by the way.

Yes, sir.

There are various concepts of privileged would be your statements to the AMB, AMB calculations, and AMB deliberations. So anything that you saw or heard outside of the AMB is not privileged or protected form disclosure.
So I'm asking you what do you think happened?

- He hit the SORTY.

- The C-130 guy?

- No, the mishap pilot.

- And was he, like, plugging and -- like crutch-plugging and too the basket?

- It was a very similar situation. They unplugged and they were trying to draw out the other aircraft, the lead aircraft.

- So the two Hornets?

- Yes, sir.

- So two Hornets from 242 at a tanker from 152 at night. Do you know if it was high light or low light?

- I don't remember.

- Do you know -- during that night, would you assume that they were using night vision goggles or do you know?

- I don't recall whether he was under the NVGs or not.

- Okay. He would have had them, either flipped up or flipped down.

- Yes, sir.

- Okay. Are you the power line?
Yes, sir.

Did you have the opportunity to observe the mishap hornet after the incident?

I only saw pictures.

How were those pictures?

It didn't have to be repaired.

It didn't have to be repaired. So you're guys didn't repair it?

The canopy had to be replaced.

The canopy had to be replaced?

Yes, sir. They scraped up the canopy.

Now when you saw canopy when talking to people you don't know, that's not the wind screen bow, but that's the big piece aft.

Yes, sir. The whole big piece got scraped off.

Well, I can't say for certain that it had to be replaced or if they buffed it out, but it was --

It was damaged?

-- it was damaged.

And you saw -- how can you hit a C-130 with a canopy, but they have a hose on the right wingtip, or do you not know?
The aircraft took the hose off with the right wing. The hose itself hit the canopy. It never hit aircraft to aircraft. It was only aircraft to hose.

I understand.

But it was a close mid-air.

Oh, it was actually in mid-air.

Correct. They never actually made contact with each other.

And you're saying it wasn't a mid-air because the hornet never touched the airframe of the C-130; is that your understanding?

That's my understanding.

But the hornet obviously touched the basket and the hose?

Yes, sir.

And you don't consider or that wasn't considered in your opinion. But the commands opinion is that was not part of the airplane because that was the hose.

I don't know if they classified it as a mid-air collision or not.

That's what I'm trying to get at.

Yes, sir. I don't remember.
What do you remember?

That they took the hose off.

Okay. And do you remember the month and year of that?

I couldn't recall, sir. I'm sorry.

Were you present when took the flight from ?

Yes, sir.

I was at his change of command.

Good for you. Do you remember the month and year of that change of command?

It was in -- I think it was in the same time. April-ish.

Maybe May of '16?

May of '16. Yes, sir. Because he was the CO in the summer. So May of '16.

I'm just trying to figure out how much time passed between the event and the change of command so I can understand what effect it may have had on reporting.

If you're the ADJ, you would have been familiar with new changes in the change of command schedule.

Well, do you mean the change of command sir and
the mishap? I couldn't tell you a solid time on that because I don't remember.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): A couple months?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It wasn't --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Was it possible that the mishap was on April the 28th and the change of command was on May the 16th? Would that be possible like two weeks later?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't recall.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Did your Marines prepare that airplane?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't recall either. I could tell you if I was the scizzo at the time if I knew the exact date. But whatever reason, I was a little further along --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did you guys have to do that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't recall that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did you guys have a safety standdown?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't recall.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did address the squadron about standardization behind the tanker or flight safety? Was there a thing? Do you remember the spaz saying we took at a C-130 last night because of a COD, so be careful. Was there something like that that happened?
I'm sure there was, sir. But I couldn't tell you a specific meeting that took place. Any time a close call happens, we do what's called "lessons learned." Flying with no rank sort of thing, sir. And with anything like that, there's always a class or some more additional training.

And how that was replaced during command or the command from?

The mishap?

No, the Friday's meeting.

It's always been that way.

Since you've been here?

Yes, absolutely.

Okay.

If there's time to get together, then it's every single time. And every little -- things that -- it's sort of like a use there errors in your favor and you're trying to learn form each other basically. And it happens almost every Friday.

Do you recall specifically anything after that incident happened?

I don't recall an exact meeting, but I'm sure it took place. Do you know what I mean?
I guess, like --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ ]: Do you remember any comments from the commanding officer or mishap pilot or mishap section after the event?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ ]: He -- I'm almost positive (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) had to give a class about mid-air tanking.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ ]: Okay. Do you remember going to that class?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ ]: Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ ]: Do you remember some of the things that were briefed?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ ]: Not specifics.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ ]: What do you remember if that was under (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) or (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ ]: I don't recall.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ ]: Do you find it eerie that these two events were so similar or do you think they're not? Do you see similarities between these incidents?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ ]: Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ ]: What were some similarities that you see?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ ]: They happened at almost identical times of the flight.
And what do you mean by that?

They were both trying to rejoin under a lead. They were a little bit different in circumstances.

Explain.

The first one, the flight lead was climbing the C-130 and the mishap pilot got disoriented and he thought that he had the same frame of reference. So the aircraft looked the same, but he didn't realize that he was pulling away. And that's why he went left prematurely. So he didn't have the altitude to clear the C-130, and that's when he hit the hose.

Which hose did he hit?

The right side. And then as soon as --

Is that the -- so he hit the right one with the canopy and then the left when he [inaudible]. Is that what you think happened?

I don't recall if it was the right hose that he actually tore off, sir.

But he hit both hoses?

I believe he only hit one. I would have to reread the --

So your information is limited to the SAR?
Yes.

Okay. We're can only talk about the SAR specifically and that's why we're dancing around. This is a JAGMAN, so the SAR is for safety purposes only. So I'm not -- the purpose of this interview is not to quiz you on the SAR. The purpose of this interview is to quiz you because you are one of the few people, if not the only, that was in the squadron at the time. In fact, I think you are the only one.

Was anyone else in the squadron then?

He came -- I think -- I don't know if he was there for the mishap, but he's the only other person that's been in the squadron as long as I have. I think I got here maybe 4 or 5 months after him.

Did -- do you know -- so you're the scizzo when that happened right?

If I knew the date of the mishap with .

It was April the 28th, 2016. That's what my records show --

I was the scizzo at that time.

-- plus or minus a couple of days. So you wrote the flight schedule then?
[Redacted]: I cannot recall if I was the actual scizzo. There was three of us.

[Redacted]: No. Not for the mishap, but I'm talking about -- not for the April of 2016 incident, but during that timeframe you were a schedule writer.

[Redacted]: Yes, sir.

[Redacted]: During that time frame as a schedule writer, do you recall if the mishap aircrew were forwarded an opportunity to have a significant period of time after the incident or at all?

[Redacted]: I don't think so because I think they flew back or at least the lead aircraft flew back because it wasn't damaged. The mishap aircrew I don't think flew right away. To be honest, I don't remember what happened.

[Redacted]: They maybe sat on the bench for a week or two, but nothing serious?

[Redacted]: I don't think anything serious happened.

[Redacted]: Do you remember them going to a field flight performance board?

[Redacted]: No.

[Redacted]: Do you recall an interview by a JAGMAN investigator doing a PI or a CI?
Yeah.

I don't recall if there was an investigation and there was no loss of life. It might have been a class, at least a Class B because the canopy is pretty expensive. I couldn't tell you the class of the mishap. I don't recall.

But you're confident that there was repair to the aircraft that had to of cost something?

Absolutely.

Do you have any recollection of the dollar cost to repair the aircraft?

No. And it would include the damage to the C-130 as well. I think that they combined the estimation of the actual mishap.

Okay. Do you recall any discussions about the mishap determination as to whether it was a C or a B?

I know it took place. I don't recall details.

Okay. Last line of questioning and then I'll let you get out of here so you're not too late for your thing.

Yes, sir.

The -- do you know what the word
re-baseline means in terms of NSHARP?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It's if you take a code that you haven't done in a while and then -- there's a way -- I don't know verbatim, sir. But basically, my understanding of base lining is that you're not current to do this and then you get your recurrency. And some codes have to be -- I couldn't give you an intelligent answer right now, sir.

Basically, you're out of currency for some things and you can get recurrent. Just because you are green or like ready to do a certain qualification, it doesn't mean you're actually proficient in that qualification.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So in the construct of NSHARP, have you ever known of anyone with administrative permissions to go to NSHARP and manipulate that data to create green squares or whatnot for NSHARP validation for scheduling purposes and what circumstances they might do that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I've -- there are ways you can do flights, or sims as flights. That's the only way I think someone could make a red square turn green. If it was a flight that also qualified as a sim. Because if we didn't have a sim available at the time, we could do some flights or some sims as flights.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did you ever know of anyone in the
operations department of 242 during your time to do something as such in NSHARP that you thought was questionable in terms of adjusting prerequisites and making sure guys -- they should be both current and proficient in things but they weren't actually?

: The prerequisites for certain flights in the past, I would say some of the flights might have been taken out of order. But it doesn't necessarily mean that. So when I went through the section syllabus, there are certain flights you're supposed to do in the order of the TNR, the Training Readiness Manual. Those flights are done out of order just based on what was available at the time, sir. Not as far as range space, crew, or things like that. I've never heard of anybody being not current for something. Or according to NSHARP, not being current and someone pencil-whipping a currency. And then, saying you're good to do this flight. If that makes sense.

: That's what I was asking.

So you feel like in both 2016 and 2018, all air crew were properly scheduled, current, and proficient?

: They were properly scheduled, sir. But could I say that I had awesome night currency. No, as far as everyone being super comfortable in the plane at night time.

: What do you mean? Why is that?
Well, we just weren't flying that much?

Why not?

Maintenance. We were having issues with the jets and I think at the time when I got back, we only had -- and another reason why I haven't been flying much myself -- is we just don't have the air crew to fly. You try to augment that with simulators, but there's numerous factors that you can't simulate.

Okay. I think that's all I need.
Anything from you, Judge?

That's all I have, sir.

[The witness was warned, sworn, and excused.]
Good afternoon, today is January 23rd, 2019. It's about 1415, we're in Iwakuni, Japan. Present in the room interviewing, VMFA-all weather-242.

Please state your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

And what do you like to go by?

I go by my middle name of, or my call sign.

I'm going to call you if that's okay. And you can call me or sir.

How long have you been at 242?

Approximately one year and eight months. I got here June 1st of 2017.

What's your job in the squadron?

Currently, I am the Family Readiness Officer and the SACO.

How many hours do you got in the Hornet?

Approximately 230.
And you're a Hornet pilot; is that correct, 7523?

Yes, sir.

Where did you go to the FRS?

101.

Math for Marines, you got what, about 130 hours at 242?  How many hours is the FRS?  About 100?

I had approximately -- Yes, sir.

Approximately 110 out of the FRS.  So I have a little over 100 hours here, sir.

So lets say 120 hours here.  So you've been here for 20 months and you have 120 hours in the Hornet.  Is that about right?

I believe so, sir.

So you're only flying six hours a month on average?

Well, this last six months has skewed that average quite heavily.  I've only got about 20 hours in this last six months.

Twenty hours in the last six months?  Are you medically disqualified from flying?

No, sir.
Did you take an extended period of leave or attend a formal training program?

No, sir.

Were you TAD for any reason? For an extended period of time?

No, sir. For two weeks.

So you were here for six months and you flew 20 hours.

That's -- yes, sir.

Ish.

Yes, sir.

Do you know what the Marine Corps policy is on the minimum hours per month for a pilot?

I know it's recommended that we achieve 15 hours every month, sir, and that reduces our mishap rate.

So six times 15 would be 75 hours?

Yes, sir.

And you've flown 20. So you're, like, 55 hours short of what you consider the Marine Corps standard would be for hours for safe flight operations?

That's about correct, sir.

Are you the only person in your squadron
in this condition?

[O (3) (A), ]
(b) (6)

: No.

[O (3) (A), ]
(b) (6)

: Is there -- what, there's another guy?

[O (3) (A), ]
(b) (6)

: There -- without looking at our records right now, but I know most of our air crew are in the same situation right now, sir.

[O (3) (A), ]
(b) (6)

: Why is that?

[O (3) (A), ]
(b) (6)

: We flew in Australia for August. We left for Australia in late July. July we didn't fly too much because we were grooming the jets to go to Australia. We flew heavily in August in Australia, and then September and October we flew very little as we were trying to get back to Iwakuni. And then November, December we were working on a maintenance slump in trying to get -- we didn't have too many RBA aircraft at that time.

[O (3) (A), ]
(b) (6)

: So basically, available jets to train with is what you're saying?

[O (3) (A), ]
(b) (6)

: Yes, sir.

[O (3) (A), ]
(b) (6)

: Have you ever stood ODO?

[O (3) (A), ]
(b) (6)

: Yes.

[O (3) (A), ]
(b) (6)

: Can you tell me briefly the key responsibilities of an ODO at 242?

[O (3) (A), ]
(b) (6)

: The ODO is responsible for all the daily
flight operations, as the Operations Duty Officer. There's a number of responsibilities that he's responsible for. He liaises with maintenance and ensures that the aircrew that are walking fully understand what jets they are going to.

He checks the weather, the nodums, make sure that all the conditions are good to go fly. He talks with the operations department to make sure that their intent is being met and that the flight schedule is being executed appropriately with the schedule that the CO signed. And he answers any questions that might arise about the daily flight schedule.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What are the key components of a daily flight schedule? What's the key information that's on the daily flight schedule for execution?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): We have the names of the aircrew. We have the airport that they take off and land from. We have their take off and land times. We have the TNR codes that they are executing. We also have the ordinance that's going to be on the jets. We have their hot pit or truck fuel plan, hot seat plan. We've got the duties delineated on schedule. And any flight notes about airspace. We have the airspace on the schedule as well. Any pertinent notes for the aircrew about the airspace of the operations they're doing.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Is there TNR code for area refueling?
Have you ever done area refueling in a Hornet?

Have you done it at 242?

Have you done it at night?

Have you done it with goggles?

Did you have your goggles up, or down, or both?

I did it with both.

ANVS-9 or ANVS-11?

Both.

How many hours do you have with the ANVS-9, with the old goggles, roughly?

Approximately 12-15 I believe. Greater than ten, less than 20, I know that.

How many hours with the ANVS-11, the NVCD, roughly?

Very roughly, I would probably say about the
same, sir.

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: So maybe 20 hours with the old goggles and about 20 hours with the new goggles -- ish?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: That would -- not quite that many, sir.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: A little less?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: Perhaps less I'd say.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: When did you transition from the nine to the eleven, personally?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: After I reached at least ten to 12 hours on the 9's.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: And why is that? Why did you wait until then?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: That was the minimum requirement before going to the 11's.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: Where is that written?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: I believe that was a squadron SOP.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: In your squadron flight SOP or do you have an NVG SOP?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: I can't say for certain, sir.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: But, you feel like you had to have 12 hours on the ANVS-9's before you could fly with the NVCD's?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [ ]: Yes.
And then tell me about your NVCD training. What specific training did you receive when you went from flying the 9's to flying the 11's?

We -- I believe I did it in the night lab for my annual refresher training. We bring the goggles that we use, and we train to those specifically. So I brought those to the night lab and received that training there.

With an AMSO?

Correct.

Okay. And what are some of the performance differences between the nine and the eleven?

The 11's, in my personal experience, are clearer. They, as in, they are not -- the image is sharper, crisper as compared to the 9's. But, some of the lights can have more of an intensity, like, more of a halo effect around them. But, I felt that the sharper, crisper image was better than the 9's and I like flying with those more.

Do you wear glasses?

I do not.

What is your vision? Are you 20/20, 20/15?

20/20.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So you have 20/20 uncorrected vision?
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you -- going back to your training, what specific features were you taught as far as performance characteristics that are different between the nine and the eleven? Aside from the display of the JAHEMIC's data.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What performance differences? I don't think I understand your question, sir.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Is there anything that an eleven does better than a nine or a nine does better than an eleven, aside from you said it being crisper, but, like, were you taught any differences?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): That was the main performance difference that I'd been taught.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): The performance is it's crisper?
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And you were -- how were you -- the AMSO just told you that, or did you get a training manual, or is there a computer aided training module that you went through with some online training, like, where did you get that training?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It -- I believe that was what the AMSO was teaching. My recollection is a little fuzzy though, sir.
Any differences in the -- are a night systems qualified pilot?

Yes.

Okay. And so you've flown with an NSI?

Yes.

Okay. At 242?

Yes.

Who was that?

I have flown with [ph] who is no longer here, and our old CO, [b](3)(A),[b](6),

[b](3)(A),[b](6).

[b](3)(A),[b](6): Do you remember any of those three gentlemen giving you, like, a detailed brief before you went flying?

Yes. We did when I did my 2400 series syllabus. We did talk extensively about the night systems and the NVG's and NVCD's. I don't remember --

But, you did that with the ANVS-9, right?

Yes.

So you did your initial training with the ANVS-9.

Yes.

Did you become night system qualified on

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the ANVS-9?

[Blank]: Yes.

[Blank]: And then you're already NSQ'd and then you walk to the jet one day and you've got a choice. You can put on the ANVS-11's or you can put on the ANVS-9's, if you have that equipment available; is that correct?

[Blank]: Yes.

[Blank]: And then one day, you had enough hours and you had a helmet and you had some ANVS-11's and you put those on and your flew with them, right?

[Blank]: That's correct.

[Blank]: What training happened for you to transition from nine to eleven? When did someone sit down with you and go, hey let me tell you a few things that are different between the nine and the eleven. Did something like that ever happen? Did you take any written test on that, was there any academic instruction?

[Blank]: I could tell you there was no written test and I didn't sit down and read a pub about it. My training officer, [Blank], who was also one of the NSI's, he did sit down and talk to me about JAHEMIC's and the NVCD's. I don't remember the exact content of our conversation. It was more of a chalk talk,
going down a flight-E, handling them type of thing, rather than an academic setting. That's about the best of my recollection, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So what do you do in a flight-E that's different between the nine and the eleven?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Wearing the JAHEMIC's mount. Basically, just the way it mounts to the helmet is really some of the only differences.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. What, if any, performance characteristics differences aside from you mentioned it's more crisp in your opinion and you mentioned that it has the HUD display data, any other physical characteristic differences you were taught between the two? Performance characteristic differences?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir, not that I remember.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. You said earlier that TNR codes go on flight schedules.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And you think there's probably a TNR code for air refueling?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): There's probably one for day and one for night?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.
If -- would that normally be on the flight schedule? If someone was going to the Tanker, would the night Tanker code normally be on the flight schedule, or is that often omitted?

As far as I know, the 2200 codes are the aerial refueling codes. And I don't remember if they have a re-flight currency. The general trend that we have is that we put the primary mission TNR code on the schedule and any auxiliary codes that have re-fly windows that we need to re-hack. So if it doesn't need to be re-hacked, if it's just a fly once and then you're good, there's a likelihood that it would not be on the schedule.

Do you think a Tanker code is fly once and then you're good?

No.

Okay. So, I mean, do you think you could go to the Tanker in 2010 and then go back to the Tanker in 2019, without having re-flown it?

No, sir.

Okay. If you were going to change the flight schedule, what process as the ODO would you take? So lets say that you're the duty and somebody says, hey we're going to go to the Tanker, and lets say the flight lead says there's no Tanker code
on the flight schedule. How would that go?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): As the ODO, first, I'd talk to ops and make sure that they're tracking with it. And if that's what the OPSO's intent is --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Say it is.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): -- then I would go to the CO, find him and say, hey, sir, this is what ops would like to have happen today.

This is their proposed change, we need your approval for this.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And lets say the CO approves it. How would he document his approval?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): He would tell me and then I keep a corrected flight schedule at the ODO desk and I make changes in red to that. Whether it's a paper copy or an Excel document that we have up on the computer. Make changes in red there and then voice that to the crew when they come by and they're walking, if they're not already aware, find them somehow and notify them of the change.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. And the CO would sign the flight schedule or initial the flight schedule to initial that change, or how would he --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): He gives his verbal approval and then that -- usually we use the letters OK CO on the corrected flight schedule.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Which is a Microsoft Excel document?
Yes, sir. And we also have a paper copy that we are using.

What would you annotate on the paper copy?

Same as that in red pen, write OK CO. Write the change, whatever it may be, OK CO.

Would the CO ever come in and personally sign his name to the flight schedule after a change? Would he ever personally approve a flight schedule change by making a pen entry on there. Would that be normal?

It depends. So things have changed with from how did it.

Tell me about that.

is much more -- he likes -- when he makes changes to the flight schedule, he likes to rewrite the entire schedule and put change one at the top, change whatever. it was much more of a we're executing the original schedule that is signed. So --

And, like, so you're saying didn't like schedule changes?

He --

Are you saying would take out a red
pen and scratch out a code and put on another code and initial it, or both?

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: Well, before we got to the day of execution, it would -- he was very particular about what we were doing and before he would sign the schedule the day before, he would -- he wanted it to be exactly as we were executing, so that if there was a change, it was something, like, a crew change. This guy is swapping out for that guy.

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: And how is [REDACTED] different?

(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: He prefers to just make a change to the flight schedule and write a change one.

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: On the day of execution?

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: Yes.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: So on the day of execution --

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: Well, I don't know if I've had too many times when this has happened, like, there's been sweeping changes to the flight schedule that require such things. The most that I've seen has just been minor deviations from whatever the schedule might be. Usually with a crew, this guy he can't clear his ears today, so he's out. But, we got this guy, he's going to take his place. OK CO on the Excel document.

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: Where did you get your wings?
At Kingsville, sir.

Wingsville baby.

Yes, sir.

I'm an Asteridian grad. What month and year?

April of 2016.

Was Reslar down there when you were there?

He was. We went to the boat together.

Cool. How was that?

The boat was great. We went to Key West, a lot of fun. Him and got another guy coming out here in the Summer, who we went to the boat with as well.

Nice.

Prior [inaudible] guy.

And you both went to 101 together too right?

Yes, we did.

How was that?

It was good. 101 was a good time, sir.

How did you do at the FRS?

Average, I think.
[b] [3] [A], [b] [6]: How'd Reslar do at the FRS? I have his records.

[b] [3] [A], [b] [6]: I would say average as well. I've never been as good of a judge about --

[b] [3] [A], [b] [6]: Did you know of him to have any -- did you guys do any together, like, go do range together, or big LFE's together, corrected weight shipments together? Or was he a class ahead or behind you?

[b] [3] [A], [b] [6]: He -- where was he? I think he was the class ahead of me. One class ahead of me.

[b] [3] [A], [b] [6]: Did he make it through the FRS at an -- in a normal amount of time, to your knowledge?

[b] [3] [A], [b] [6]: Yes. Yes, he did, sir, because we graduated at the same time.

[b] [3] [A], [b] [6]: Do you recall him having to re-fly a bunch of events or being under a lot of stress or anything like that at the FRS? Or was he just, kind of, another normal guy learning how to fly the Hornet?

[b] [3] [A], [b] [6]: As far as I remember he was just like the rest of us.

[b] [3] [A], [b] [6]: So you guys checked into 242 after receiving very similar training then. So in many ways, you and
have very similar experiences in the last couple of years. Is that an accurate statement?

: Yes, sir. We were pretty much just on opposite shifts for that whole week. I was the mid-shift, he was the night shift. We were both wingmen. And I was pretty much, I was filling the wingmen role on my mid-shift, and he was --

: No, no, I'm going back, like, three years. Did you guys go to TBS together? Like, where did you meet him, API, primary?

: I met him first at advanced in Kingsville.

: Okay. And that was two years ago, right?

: Probably late 2015. I think when we started working up for the boat is when I got to know him the best, sir.

: Three point five years ago, three years ago.

: Yes, sir.

: Did you guys go through the NSQ syllabus together at 242, roughly?

: Yes. Myself, him, and were all about the same track and on the same timeline, sir.

: Would it be fair to say that your night vision goggle experience and his night vision experience is
strikingly similar?

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Okay. And you've been to the Tanker at night with the goggles?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): C-130?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Goggles up or goggles down?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): I tried both.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): which did you prefer?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): I'm not sure I even have enough experience to have a preference yet, sir.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): That's okay. Was it a C-130?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): It was, actually, in Australia. It was a Canadian C-130. It was the most recent.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Do you recall the lighting configuration of the C-130? Overt, covert, bright, dim?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): It was dim. I'm not sure if it was covert. I have very little night Tanking experience, but I know it was dim.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Before you went to the night Tanker, what kind of instruction did you receive and who provided it?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): My -- I received my original 2202, the night
Tanking code. I got that in Australia in 2017. And then --

[Redacted]: Who provided that training? Who was your section lead?

[Redacted]: I think that night, that was our CO at the time, [Redacted]. He was my flight lead.

[Redacted]: What did [Redacted] talk to you about before he took you to the Tanker; do you remember?

[Redacted]: I can't remember, sir.

[Redacted]: Was Tanking the only thing you were doing that night, or was it, kind of, a side note?

[Redacted]: It was in the middle. We were doing basically two events. So we went to the range, did a bunch of break up and rendezvous, hit the Tanker, and then went back to the range and did some [inaudible] stuff.

[Redacted]: So he warmed you up with some BNR's, took you to the Tanker, and then went out and did some LGTR drops?

[Redacted]: I believe. We might have hit the Tanker before we went to the range as well, I can't remember, sir, that was a good long while ago.

[Redacted]: Understand.

[Redacted]: How many times have you gone to the C-130 since you've been at 242?
Day and night?
Correct. Just both.
A number of times.
More than ten?
It might be right around ten.
How about at night, then, just nighttime?
Very few times.
Rough guess?
I might have actually only been to a night C-130 probably three times. Maybe Australia of 2017 and then I think I did it two nights in a row in Australia this year, so this last August. So it might just be those three times I believe.
If you would have been asked to go to the Tanker the night that Reslar went, would you have any hesitation?
I don't think so, sir. Well --
Would that have been a big deal to you?
I ask that because your currency proficiency and training, I mean, you and Reslar have, like, identical recent experiences, you know what I mean? And so I'm just trying to ask frankly without, you know --
So my personal experience, when I was in
Australia I think we did it back to back I believe. The first night I had no issues and the second night I just couldn't get into the basket for whatever it was. It just kept moving around all over the place and I think I got 300 pounds of gas before we had to go execute the LFE. So I think my confidence was a little bit lower about being at the Tanker at night.

So I don't know how I would have felt, especially, being so late. I think they had a midnight, 0100 ARCT. It was, I think it was Wednesday night, so maybe they had a little bit of time to get used to their sleep schedule, but I think I might have been uncomfortable. It definitely doesn't sound like a fun time, sir. It's a challenge, that's for sure.

[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) ]: Are you familiar with OPNAV 3710?
[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) ]: Yes.
[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) ]: Do you know what it says about dry suites?
[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) ]: Yes.
[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) ]: Can you tell me a little bit about that?
[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) ]: I believe the figure is 55 degrees. When the water temperature is below 55 we have to wear dry suites basically, or if the air temperature with the wind chill is going to be 32 degrees, I don't know if those numbers are exactly correct, but
that's roughly where it is. So we have that -- we also have that page posted up at our ODO desk and we reference that along with water temps, especially in the Winter, whenever we're going to fly.

: So how many times have you worn a dry suite at 242?

: I've actually haven't had to wear my dry suite to go fly. The times that I'd been flying here, it's just the water temperature hasn't been cold enough to necessitate that.

: All right. Judge.

: So in your job as the SACO, how often do you guys do random urine analysis in the squadron?

: Every month?

: So is that pretty scheduled, or is it random, or is it all hands?

: It's random every month. Random ten percent, we usually aim for 13 percent of the Marines.

: Did you pull urine or blood from the mishap aircrew prior to mishap?

: I did not, no, I did not.

: So you weren't involved with that at all?

: I was not.
Okay. Have you had any recent positive urine analysis come back at 242?

We haven't had any positive pops the whole time I've been SACO since I got here in June of 2017.

Okay. Nothing else, sir.

Any discussion about using go-no go pills from the mishap flight, I mean, for the week that went into the mishap?

Yes.

Tell me about that.

Lets see, so I recall our flight doc said that go pills had to be authorized by the Wing CG and I believe our OPSO mentioned that the Wing CG did not approve the use of go pills. And I don't believe we got any no go pills. I did not personally ask for any and I don't know what the circumstances behind issuing the no go pills was.

Did you hear about anybody specifically complain or specifically ask for those? Like, were you present for a conversation when anybody said, man I really could use some Ambien and the flight surgeon said, can't fuckin' do it.

I was not present for any of those one on one conversations.
Were there any conversations on WhatsApp or any other, you know, electronic media discussing that, that you observed?

Yes.

Tell me about that.

I know we -- there were some aircrew that asked or had put out, hinted that they wanted no go pills or some sort of something, go pills, no go pills. And I don't remember the exact conversation, my impression was that our flight doc was hesitant to give them out.

Do you still have that WhatsApp conversation?

I think so.

We're going to need you to take screenshots of that conversation, at least two weeks prior to the exercise, and then through today and e-mail them to us.

Okay.

Yea, if you could do that, we won't have to confiscate your device.

Okay. So from two weeks prior through today?

Correct.

Roger.
And any adjunctive stuff and if there's any solatious commentary in there that's not germane, it's not going to be public. So don't worry about if it's, you know, people are making fun of in that app or something goofy like that. I know you guys don't know me, but if there's anything in there that's not related to the mishap, it's not coming out. I'm just looking for the stuff that's related to go pills, no go pills, who knew what. We're trying to understand what the junior officers in the squadron really understood about what was approved and what you guys were doing. And I'm trying to figure out between the CG and you, literally, how far down the communication path went up and down so we can effect some meaningful changes to do justice to, frankly, Reslar's death.

Yes, sir.

You know what I mean. So I don't -- don't be defensive about that, okay.

Yes, sir.

But, I mean, everybody uses Whats App now, I know that. We use it, you know, we text and chat all the time. So it's a great way to go back and find that stuff out, so I'd really appreciate if you'd do that and just give it to the judge so you don't have to give it to me, if that's okay.
Yes, sir.

Is there anything else that you would like to share that you think could have contributed to this mishap that we haven't touched on? Take your time.

I don't believe so. But, if I think of anything else, I'll bring it up to you, sir.

Yes, you can always e-mail me or or anybody else. We just want to make sure that when we put out this full report, you know, we'll take all the time we need, I don't want the report to go out and you and your peer group to be like, well, that's not the whole story. I need the whole story so I can, you know, use that information to effect meaningful change. Cool?

Yes, sir.

Judge will swear you out.

[The witness was warned, sworn, and excused.]
Good morning, my name is [b](A). I am conducting a JAGMAN investigation with [b](A), who's a VMGR-152 schedule writer. Present in the room today are our said Captain, as well as, [b](A), the judge advocate general of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and our court reporter, [b](A).

The time on deck is approximately 1046, or 44 rather.

And with that said, would you please state your rank and name for the record, spelling your last name.

Yes, sir. Last name spelled [b].

Thanks, first name [b] (A). What is your Military Occupational Specialty?

I'm a C-130J aircraft commander, 7557. 7557? So you're a C-130, a Herc pilot?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Awesome. How long have you been doing that?

I got out here last February of 2017. So I'm coming up on two years with the squadron. And I got my wings in June of 2016. So I haven't been -- I've been flying though since February of 2017.

Awesome. So where were you in the month of December of 2018? What were you doing?
I was planning for this exercise in December. So this happened the first week. A lot of November was spent planning --

Tell me about some of the planning that you did in November leading up to the exercise from the first week of December of '18.

So I attended a couple of meetings at MAG where the purpose was to just get everyone on board. For C-130's, I was focused on the transport of cargo to the airfield that we were flying to. And then also the aerial refueling with the other MAG-12 squadrons here.

So, roughly, as I've heard from other witnesses in the first of December, 2018, there'd be F-18's flying out of Iwakuni, rehearsing typical mission sets. And C-130's flying from Iwakuni to locations, dropping off and picking up people and cargo in support. And then there would also be C-130's conducting air refueling in different places of F-18's.

Do you understand that, in general, to be correct?

Yes, sir.

How did the Tanker squadron communicate with the fighter squadron, the receiver squadron, about what they would do together in terms of air refueling? How was air refueling communicated, the specifics of it, between receivers and Tanker about the what, where, and when?

Okay. So that -- and soo I was the go-to
basically, since I was planning this exercise. I was also the FDO.

[Redacted]: What does FDO stand for?

[Redacted]: The Flight Duty Officer.

[Redacted]: So it’s kind of like an ODO, or SDO, or any person at the desk?

[Redacted]: Yes, sir. So we stand at a week at a time, kind of, at 152.

[Redacted]: Okay.

[Redacted]: But since I was planning this I was also scheduled as the FDO for the entire week.

[Redacted]: Okay.

[Redacted]: So what would happen, we -- there was basically two ways we were communicating. The first was through the flows, and that was written months in advanced.

[Redacted]: So the flow, that's like a gant chart on a power point presentation, with horizontal lines that its got -- on a vertical axis it's got the squadrons, and a horizontal axis is times perhaps?

[Redacted]: Yes, sir.

[Redacted]: And then included in those lines would the specifics, like the give and the location?

[Redacted]: Yes, sir. So these were written months ago. And that was, kind of, the first way I think we were communicating. Was we were planning -- I was planning our SORTY's and writing the schedules a week before the actual
exercise, based off of the flows. And then I was revising them as the week went on with any changes that were happening last minute. So the first day comes up, we have the schedule written for the next day. And all I have to do is try and get the crews that I have assigned to the ariel refueling mission in contact with who's flying the mission for the jets. So --

\[(b)(3)(A)\]: E-mail between the OPSO's and --
\[(b)(6)\]: So I was calling their duty desk and I was just asking them, hey I have my C-130 crew assigned. I'd like to get them in touch with who you have flying the next day. And that worked for the first day. And that was mainly how we did it. And then they would link up and that's when they would start coordinating the specifics.

And then for the -- on Monday, I know that we had, or Sunday, I can't really remember which day it was. But, for the first day of flying, I had one of our C-130 crew members go over to the jet squadron to attend their confirmation brief. And then --

\[(b)(3)(A)\]: Did 242 have a confirmation brief?
\[(b)(6)\]: I think it was at 242, or it was at 225. I can't remember which building they went to specifically.

\[(b)(3)(A)\]: But, were all the jet guys at the same place?
\[(b)(6)\]: I think so.
\[(b)(3)(A)\]: They had a combined confirmation brief?
I think so. I'm not sure.

Okay.

I just know that we sent one member from the C-130 crew to the confirmation brief. And this was for the, I believe we did this on Sunday, for Monday's flight schedule.

Are you surprised to learn that night aerial refueling was being conducted at the time and place of the mishap? Or did you expect that?

I was expecting that. It would have just been a little bit of a different time if the President hadn't passed away. So the national day of mourning is what shifted Wednesday's schedule so drastically.

So tell me more about that. So, alright, we've got from previous interviews that, and of course we're familiar, that Wednesday was a national day of mourning. So it was declared to be a federal holiday. Obviously, we're in Japanese standard time out here, so that impacts all of that.

But, when did we find out about Wednesday being a national day of mourning? When did you find out?

So on Tuesday morning I had the crews assigned for Wednesday's lines. Which would have been a ten line schedule. So Tuesday morning I started calling the jet squadrons, seeing if they had their crews assigned and trying to just link up. Just like I had done the previous two days.

Yes.

They didn't really know what they were
doing yet, or they hadn't had the crew assigned, or they said they would get back to me when they had that information. So the day, kind of, went on like --

They didn't know because of the day of mourning or?

And I think it became clearer later. So I got an e-mail from around 1300 or so, that timeframe in the afternoon saying that the flow were probably going to be totally different due to the national day of mourning. And that he would have more information after they had the 1500 CUB on Tuesday.

So, basically, I was just waiting for that CUB to happen, and then waiting for my OPSO to come back to the squadron to tell me what Wednesday was going to look like. Before she came back from MAG, the FDO desk got a call from informing us, pretty much, what Wednesdays AR mission was going to look like. And that was -- we couldn't do anything until midnight, so the plan was to take off --

Which was actually Thursday, right.

Thursday morning at midnight, correct.

Okay.

But for Wednesday's schedule, we couldn't turn engines on until midnight basically. So we planned one AR mission to make up for the whole day lost, to take off at 0030 Thursday morning and conduct one ariel refueling mission, and then come back.
And when about did you know that was going to be the plan?

That was around, probably, 1600 -- between 1600 and 1700.

On Wednesday or Thursday?

On Tuesday.

On Tuesday?

To write Wednesday's schedule.

Okay. So that way at close of normal work day on Tuesday, you're able to publish a schedule that reflected what you just described to be executed on Wednesday, calendar day, to allow for planning and briefing before midnight to take off 30 minutes after midnight. So that the actual flight event is on Thursday?

Yes, sir.

Okay.

So the crew showed at 2130 Wednesday night.

I understand.

So that's why they were on the Wednesday schedule.

Cool. So when did 242 get the word on that now?

So I'm not sure because I was sitting at the FDO desk the whole time. Our OPSO, was at the CUB on Tuesday at 1500.
Okay.

And I can only assume that other representatives from the MAG were at this meeting to find out what they were doing. So I don't really know. I can't give you a solid answer on that. But --

But, you think -- and we'll talk to [b] (3) [b] (A), (b) (6) -- but, you think [b] (3) [b] (A), (b) (6) had similar information you just described? Was able to share that at the CUB on Tuesday?

Probably. I --

That would have been what you expected?

Correct. She was our rep there from 152.

Okay.

I would only assume that the other squadrons had sent one to find out what they were doing, since [b] (3) [b] (A), (b) (6) said that flows were going to be changing due to this national day of mourning. I only assume that the other squadrons were there to see what they were doing.

Okay.

Since MAG called us and, pretty much, told us what we were doing AR wise.

As to the shift in time, what time was that flight scheduled for?

Okay. So the crew of Sumo-41, normally Wednesday's schedule would have been a ten line schedule. Their
flight would have been part of a section that would have taken off at around -- they would have landed. They were scheduled to land, per the flows, at around midnight 30, so Thursday morning. And then we would have had an additional single C-130 landing at 0200 on Thursday morning.

(b) (3) (A):  Okay.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A):  So originally, the crew, Sumo-41, was going to be Sumo-48, I think, in a section, landing at 0030. And then Sumo-49 would have been landing at 0200.

(b) (3) (A):  So you had C-130's scheduled to fly past midnight prior to the day of mourning?

(b) (3) (A):  Yes. I had to aircraft's -- and this was just per the flow, yes. Just a tentative, rough, hard schedule was two C-130's would have landed, roughly, a little after midnight. And then a single one would have been landing around 0200. And that was just based off of what the flows -- that's how I wrote all the schedules until things changed and I had to just revise the schedule.

(b) (3) (A):  And you had the flows for some amount of time prior to the exercise?

(b) (3) (A):  The flows had been written for a while. And they had just been updated every so often. Originally, this was supposed to be Vigilant Ace, so some of the airspace was supposed to be somewhere else. And then when that got canceled, things like that changed. But, for the most part the times and the, you know, the gives were roughly the same.
Okay. So you said you're a schedule writer?

Just when I'm on FDO. Yes, sir.

Yes. So you're experienced in developing flight schedules and preparing them for your commanding officer's approval, right? To authorize flight?

Yes, sir.

Do you -- are you familiar with the program called MSHAR?

Yes, sir.

Do you use it?

Yes, sir.

Do you -- does the C-130 have training codes for specific types of flights, like, for cargo versus day, and versus night, and versus aerial delivery?

Yes, sir.

Is there a training code for night air refueling, when you're providing fuel to fighters?

No. So 3600 is the code that's for day and night for fixed wing. The only night code for AR that we have is if we are refueling a helicopter.

Interesting. So it's the same code, day or night, if you're providing fuel to a fixed wing?

Correct. But, we also add an additional code, which is 2151 or 2150, denoting if it's high light or low light. So we just have an extra code saying that it's going to
be on goggles, but the fixed wing AR code is the same day or
night, if it's for jets or [inaudible].

[laughter]

[b] (3) (A): So if you were going out and doing
night systems, low light level air refueling, what would the two
codes that you would typically include on the flight schedule?

[b] (3) (A): So it would have been 3600 and then 2151.

[b] (3) (A): What would be the purpose of putting
that on the flight schedule? Why is that?

[b] (3) (A): That's so that it gets screened properly.

[b] (3) (A): Tell me about that. What is screening?

[b] (3) (A): So whenever we put the -- we get the
codes, the training codes or whatever codes that are going to
happen for the flight, we put that on the schedule. I'm the
first person who should be screening it. So I go through MSHARP
and I try and catch anything. If I miss anything, the schedule
goes through DOSS. And their job is to screen the schedule.

[b] (3) (A): And DOSS, that's the Director of
Safety and Standardication? That's, like, the Flight Safety
Department?

[b] (3) (A): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A): And what is DOSS looking for when they
screen the flight schedule?

[b] (3) (A): They're looking for people who are
unqualified, not current. If they haven't received that code,
then it should be annotated as an initial code. And if it is an
initial code, do they have the prerequisites to get that code? Do they have their flight physical up-to-date? They're just -- they're screening all of these safety things to make sure that you are legal and qualified to fly.

[ blackout ]: Okay. Have you ever prepared a flight schedule that you walked down to the DOSS shop, and DOSS had a question about?

[ blackout ]: Well, probably.

[ blackout ]: Yes. And how -- and lets say, for example, you prepared a schedule that had an error in it and DOSS caught it. And how, I mean, how would that go down? What would -- the DOSS would tell you they had a problem and if you couldn't resolve that, then what would you and what would the DOSS representative do with that?

[ blackout ]: So if there is a mistake on it that can be corrected, then I just simply go back to the computer and correct the schedule and bring him a new one. But, if it's -- if it comes to the point where someone can't fly because we can't fix it before the flight, then we have to just reassign and find a new crew member to go who can do it. And that's really all I've ever experienced. It's either --

[ blackout ]: So hypothetically, what if the DOSS had, like, a huge problem with the schedule and there was, like, an argument between a hypothetical schedule writer and a hypothetical DOSS? What would those two officers do? Or how would they resolve that?
Like a disagreement about the risk associated with an event perhaps?

I think that's when the OPSO would get involved at that point.

And maybe even the CO, depending on the situation?

Then she would probably take it to the CO if she deemed it necessary.

It would be elevated to your chain of command?

Correct. It would be.

Well, how do you know -- how does the CO know the DOSS has seen the flight schedule?

There is an initial. So there's four people I need to take the schedule to, to get it initialed before the CO signs it.

Okay. Who are those people and what are they looking for?

So the first person I take it to is Air Crew Training. And they're looking at the training side of it. They're seeing who's getting initial codes, who needs what, and they're also -- they should also be screening to make sure on MSHARP that they're also legal to fly. So they're also, you know, they're kind of a back-stop before it gets to DOSS.

When Air Crew Training initials it, they're telling me
okay, I like who you have on the schedule, I like the codes, continue. I take it to DOSS. That's where DOSS is now screening all of the codes that Air Crew Training screened to make sure are correct. And they're also checking to make sure -- they're not checking so much for Air Crew Training, of course, but they're checking to make sure, like I said earlier, that the crew member is legal, and current, and --

Are you familiar with OPNAV 3710, SOP for flight operations?

Yes, sir.

Does OPNAV 3710 require that your flight schedule have those little initial blocks at the bottom of it? What is OPNAV 3710 require? Are you familiar?

I can't recall that one, sir. I'm sorry.

Okay. Are familiar with the operational risk management process, ORM? You ever heard of ORM?

Yes, sir.

Can you, in the aviation context, can you define a hazard?

So it's something that --

In your own words, I mean.

Yes, sir. It's just something that can pose a potential threat to the aircraft. And that's where we have a risk assessment worksheets that we fill out as FDO's, as well. They go --
risk? You just defined a hazard for me, something that can happen to the aircraft. Then what's this -- what is a risk? Is that -- are they the same thing, or is that something different or?

[b] (3) (A): No. So I would define risk as something that we are, kind of, willing to accept to a certain degree to get the mission done and get training done. But, a hazard is something that, you know, I would say a thunderstorm is a hazard. That's something that's, kind of, rigid and can actually --

[b] (3) (A): Okay. So you were talking about an ORM worksheet. Tell me about that.

[b] (3) (A): Yes, sir. So we fill out -- they're called risk assessment worksheets, that we put in with the schedule. And that's where we fill these out and we just try to identify any risks, I guess.

[b] (3) (A): When you identify risks, what do you do with it?

[b] (3) (A): So on the backs of the sheet, there's a bunch of a different boxes depending on what kind of mission that we're doing. So if we're doing an AR mission, some of the things are like, is it a formation, is it at night, I think. I'd have to review it.

[b] (3) (A): What's the purpose of this document?

[b] (3) (A): It's to identify any risk. Like, on all of them it's, like, is the crew qualified and current? If you're doing HELO AR, is the plan going to be above 140,000 pound? Just
things like that. It would be easier if I have one in front of me. I could explain it.

[291x44]16

[63x690]It's okay. I've seen one. All right.

[149x618]: Yes, sir. So I fill it out and I -- if it is a medium or above, then the whole RAW is now a medium. And I fill it out with any, you know, to try and make it low. And then DOSS does the same thing. They look at it and they'll fill it out and the CO signs it, as well.

[291x44]16

[63x666]Lets talk a little bit about your skill and experience as a C-130 pilot and aircraft commander.

Have you ever conducted night air refueling of a fixed wing aircraft?

[291x44]16

[63x594]: Yes, sir.

[149x570]And in your conduct of night air refueling of fixed wing aircraft, have you ever done that under night systems, while you were wearing night vision goggles?

[291x44]16

[63x556]: Yes, sir.

[149x522]: Were you wearing the ANVS-9 perhaps, night vision goggle?

[291x44]16

[63x546]: I believe so. Yes, sir.

[149x498]: Yes. You get issued that one. What external lighting configuration would be normal for the C-130?

[291x498]: Usually, just overt and then if the aircraft -- if the jets request covert, then we'll go up covert.

[291x498]: Okay. So overt, so that's position lights, anti-collision beacon, strip lights --
(b) (3) (A): We'll turn the bottom strip off for refueling.

(b) (3) (A): The bottom strobe on the C-130, which is the red anti-collision light, which is labeled strobe. And that's normally off during your refueling. If you turn it on, does that communicate something?

(b) (3) (A): If we turn that on, that would signal to break away from the aircraft. But, we always turn -- that's part of our pre AR flow is to turn that off. So it's always off.

(b) (3) (A): Okay. And there's another strobe that's on top of the vertical stabilizer, right, near the elevator?

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A): And that one would normally be on?

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A): Okay. If you switched the C-130, KC-130J external lighting system to covert or at night, aided if you will, what does that do to all the external lights on the aircraft?

(b) (3) (A): It allows, if you're on NVG's, it just makes it easier for the jets to be able to see the aircraft without it blinding them out, or hailing them out with the overt lighting. It just makes it, like, NVG compatible.

(b) (3) (A): So the assumption being that the receiver is wearing night vision goggles and looking the tubes at the C-130?
Yes.

It, kind of, dims the C-130 lights and the -- so the C-130 have something called strip lights on the fuselage of the aircraft?

Yes, sir. There's formation lights.

Formation, form lights?

Yes, sir.

And the form lights are -- that's like a green, kind of? And are they overt, or covert, or both, or tell me about those.

They're IR.

They're IR strip lights?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Do you have --

If you turn the form lights up all the way you can see them. They just get brighter.

Okay.

But, if -- they will work over covert I believe.

Okay. So you think it's just one light that you dim and don't dim? Is that how you think it works? Or do you think it's two lights next to each other, one is overt, one is covert? Or are you not sure?

I think it's one light.

Okay. All right. Are there any other special lights that the C-130 has, external, for the purpose of
air refueling that you can think of?

[b] (3) (A): There's pod lights.
(b) (6)

[b] (3) (A): Tell me about pod lights.
(b) (6)

[b] (3) (A): So at the end of the refueling road, our -- so just in front of the -- so when the jet is about to plug, they should be able to see, it's either going to be a circle with a -- it's, like, either going to be a green circle, an amber yellow, or all of it which is would be red I believe. If it's yellow with the circle. And that's just being able -- that's telling them different things. Like, green is good fuel flow. If it's amber, the Tanker is ready to plug. And then if it's red, it's don't plug, basically.

[b] (3) (A): And that's on the external store that kind of looks like a pod, if you will. It kind of looks like an external fuel tank that contains the reel and the basketer drone assembly. It's up there on the wing, is that where you're talking on where that is? Or is that actually on the basket?

[b] (3) (A): It's on the basket, sir.
(b) (6)

[b] (3) (A): So there's a light that changes colors. It's actually on the basket of the C-130?

[b] (3) (A): No, sir. I think it's on the pod.
(b) (6)

[b] (3) (A): Yes. It's up on the pod, right? Yes. But, if your probe is in the basket and you could look up the hose on the pod, then you would see that and that would give the air crew information about how far up they pushed in or pulled out or whatever on the hose. Okay.
And then the basket itself, does it have any kind of illumination on it? Does it light up or does it have a ridiom or a tridiom or glow in the dark stuff? Or do you know much about that?

(b) (3) (A): Not really, sir. I'm not sure.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Okay. It's okay to answer. It's a -- you're supposed to fly the Herc, right? Not the lit basket.

What about on the horizontal stabilizer of the C-130? Are there any lights there that shine forward, or do you have landing lights, or taxi lights, or other kinds of lights on the C-130?

(b) (3) (A): I think there is a strip light on the horizontal stabilizer.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Okay.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): I'd have to review though.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Is there a light on the horizontal stabilizer that shines forward that illuminates the back of the C-130 for use of receivers to, kind of, light up the back of your airplane to make it easier to fly formation? Or are you familiar with anything like that?

(b) (3) (A): I'm not sure, sir. I don't think so.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Okay. Have you ever conducted air refueling at night where the fixed wing receivers asked you to go covert?

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Is that normal, not normal?
It's I would say typically normal.

Normal? And in what kind of airspace would you do that in?

Special use airspace.

Some kind of, like, restricted area or some place where it was scheduled so you're protected?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Is the Itras South, when operating disregard, would you consider that special use airspace?

I would consider it special use. Yes, sir.

Okay. Even when it's -- even when the flight schedule notes it says to regard, it would still be special use airspace?

I have never flown it. I didn't think it would ever be do regard. It's always been under control ever since I have been here.

Okay.

I know it was VFR procedures that night.

Yes.

I guess it wouldn't -- I would always consider it special use airspace if you're in those confine --

Okay. And if you're in the Herc, and the Herc is covert only, would a unaided pilot of another aircraft be able to see you pretty well, or not? Or are you not
sure? In low light level conditions, you're low light only.

They should be able to, sir.

So when you're --

Unaided, no. I'm sorry, not unaided.

Unaided?

Unaided, no. No, sir.

Okay. So then that would necessitate that another person, no matter where they were, they'd have to have goggles on to see.

Yes, sir.

Okay. Have you ever been conducting air refueling at night, covert, with an F-18, and the F-18 went midnight where he turned off all his lights. Have you ever seen or heard of that?

No, sir. Usually, the last person -- if they do that then at least the last jet in the formation should be carrying all of the lights, basically. They should be overt if they do that.

Overt with, like, red wing tip, green wing tip, white tail light, and maybe an overt strobe or anti-collision beacon?

With the strobe lights and position lights. Yes, sir.

And what's the purpose of that?

That's just to -- so if we're in a formation, if we're -- we're basically one flight. We are
conducting MARSA, but for other aircraft, they know there's an aircraft there at least.

Okay.

We're just so close to each other it's, you know, like one big airplane basically, I guess.

Okay. When you conduct air refueling, do you have an enlisted crew member in the back performing observer duties?

Yes, sir.

Tell me where he or she is, and the purpose of that crew station.

So there's one in each of the observer windows. And they are telling us, and they're our main line of communication because we can't see anything behind our wing. They are telling us when the jet is in the observation or left, echelon left, basically. And they are telling us when they're stable, when there's no rate of closure, and when they're actually in that position. They tell us when they are stern, so that's when they get right behind the basket. They tell us when they are stable and there's no rate of closure, and then that's when we clear them to contact.

Okay.

So they play a pretty important role in this.

So if a Hornet was in the stern position and had all of his or her lights completely off, then
the observer would have to be looking through the night vision goggles to see that Hornet?

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): Okay. What are -- at 15,00 feet, what doors would you have open?
(b) (3) (A): We wouldn't have any doors open.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): You'd have all the doors closed, right?
(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): And why is that?
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): Well, we -- above 10,000 we're not -- you would have to be on oxygen above 10,000. But, we never do jet refueling or almost any refueling with the doors open.

(b) (3) (A): So the aircraft's pressurized?
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): So you would have all the doors closed because the doors, because the aircraft is pressurized?
(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): And where are the windows this observer or observers in the back, where are those in the C-130?
(b) (3) (A): They're on the paratroop doors. And that's the window that they're looking out of.

(b) (3) (A): Okay. Rough size of that window?
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): Probably, I'd say you'd be able to -- probably the size of your head.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): So maybe 12 inches square?
(b) (3) (A): Around. Yes, sir.
(b) (6)  
(b) (3) (A): Plus or minus four or five inches? Maybe a little bigger?
(b) (6)  
(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)  
(b) (3) (A): What about the window to dead six o'clock. Is there a big window in the very back of the C-130?
(b) (6)  
(b) (3) (A): No, sir.
(b) (6)  
(b) (3) (A): So there's window. So the ramp and door when they're closed, there's no transparent -- 
(b) (6)  
(b) (3) (A): No.
(b) (6)  
(b) (3) (A): -- there. So really, there's a door out to the left, parachute. There's a window at the left parachute door and a window at the right parachute door, but there's -- if the aircraft is not in any of those positions, and the observer is not wearing night vision goggles, then the receiver would not be visible to the observer. Am I saying that right?
(b) (6)  
(b) (3) (A): For the most part. Yes, sir. Running up along towards the flight station there are a couple more windows. They'd be able to see a receiver.
(b) (6)  
(b) (3) (A): Okay.
(b) (6)  
(b) (3) (A): But, that's not the windows that they look at because -- 
(b) (6)  
(b) (3) (A): That's not where they are.
(b) (6)  
(b) (3) (A): -- the parachute door, the paratroop door window is the farthest aft window that they can look out of. And
that's what they look out of to see the jets.

[deleted]: Okay. Were you surprised to learn that we were doing, or that your MAG was doing air refueling at 2 a.m., 200 miles offshore? Or is that, kind of, normal stuff?

[deleted]: For the exercise, I was not surprised. Why is that? Why were you not surprised?

[deleted]: Because that was part of the flows. It was the plan?

[deleted]: I was anticipating it for, pretty much, months leading up. The only thing that really changed was the airspace was different.

[deleted]: So in anticipation of that plan, what types of action were taken at the squadron level to identify and schedule crews to fly at that hour when I think maybe most people are asleep. I don't know if you guys regularly do 24 hour ops, but was it -- were crews identified the day prior, the week, the month? How far out were crews identified?

[deleted]: I started writing the schedules for the -- of the week prior, but names changed pretty consistently when DOSS or Air Crew Training identifies when someone can't fly. It's very common for names to change. It's not unheard of for us to fly after midnight. We do red eyes to Alaska and to Hawaii every so often. That requires us to show late in the day and then fly ten or 11 hours past midnight. What we did is just what we normally do for a reschedule. All the crews were assigned...
12 hours of crew rest.

(b (3) (A)):  Okay. How many days in advanced do you think the mishap air crew of the C-130 had notice before they were flying at that hour to adjust their circadian rhythms, and their clocks, and what not?

(b (3) (A)):  I would say probably one or two days prior.

(b (3) (A)):  At least one day?

(b (3) (A)):  So I had it on our -- are you familiar with our prog?

(b (3) (A)):  I am not familiar with the prog.

(b (3) (A)):  Okay.

(b (3) (A)):  Is that the prognostic?

(b (3) (A)):  I don't really don't even know what it stands for, but it's basically --

(b (3) (A)):  It's the forecast?

(b (3) (A)):  It's the forecast, so everyone can see on the prog what they're doing for the next month or so.

(b (3) (A)):  Okay.

(b (3) (A)):  So I started assigning crews on prog about a week or two weeks before. But, those changed so drastically all the time with just different changes. Especially with the airfield that we were flying to, those hours changed. So that changed the amount of SORTY's we were doing on one day vice the other.

(b (3) (A)):  Are familiar with a drug called
Ambien?

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir. I've heard of it.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): You have heard of it? Have you ever taken it, to your knowledge?
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): No, sir.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): Was Ambien prescribed to your ready room for this event?
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): No, sir.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): What about any type of go pill, some type of go-no go pills? Did the flight surgeon give you guys go pills to help you keep up?
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): No, sir. I didn't hear about anything being prescribed by the doc for this exercise.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): Okay.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): So you were talking about the flight schedule and the different individuals that it has to go to before it gets to the CO. You said Air Crew Training and the DOSS. Where else does the flight schedule have to go in VMGR-152?
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): It then goes to the OPSO.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): Okay.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): So she signs it. She's basically doing the same thing, everything everyone else is doing. She's just screening it, checking for any mistakes, and then it goes to maintenance. And maintenance is just seeing if they can support the schedule with aircraft. They're not screening for --
(b) (3) (A): So they are not an initial block on the flight schedule?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Pardon?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Do they have an initial block on the flight schedule?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): They have an initial block, but --
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Okay.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): -- they're basically just on the maintenance side of it though. Seeing if they can support.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): So they're screening it for their functional area, which is aircraft availability for that time of day?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir. They're not screening it for safety or anything like that. But, the other three usually are.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): And then where does it go after maintenance?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): And then that's where I take it to the CO and he signs it.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Okay. How about changes to the flight schedule. How is that done at VMGR-152? Once it's signed by the CO?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Once it's signed?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Correct.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Okay. So once it's signed, it's usually red penned. If something needs to change, I mean, we try and avoid this at all cost to red pen anything, but I think on the
schedule, on Wednesday's schedule we had a red pen because one of the pilots we identified later couldn't -- wasn't going to be available for that flight. So we red penned it and put a new pilot on. And then the CO usually initials next to it so he's made aware of any changes after the schedule's been signed.

(b) (3) (A): Why does your CO initial it?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Because he's the one signing the dockets. He signed it. I think it's just showing that RCO knows about any changes.

(b) (3) (A): So you think your CO is the approval authority for flight schedule changes?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Could the ODO just change it and not tell the CO? Would that be a big deal?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): I think it would, yes, it would be a big deal.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): So that's not okay. Could the ODO add a training code to one of your flight schedules and, like, could you -- if someone was scheduled to go do I don't know aerial delivery and then decided for whatever reason to do aerial delivery and then do fixed wing aerial refueling, and that code was not included in the flight schedule and the aircraft commander went out and did that, would the CO be cool with that? Would that be okay?

(b) (3) (A): No. I don't think he would be cool with it. It's supposed to -- everything should be screened. So if
we're doing something --

[b] (3) (A): So the flight schedule should include the times, the crew, and the specific TNR code, and be approved by the commanding officer?

[b] (3) (A): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A): Is that your understanding?

[b] (3) (A): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A): Okay. Have you ever read Wing Order 3710, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Flight SOP? Have you ever read that?

[b] (3) (A): I think I looked at it when I first got here, but I didn't --

[b] (3) (A): How did you receive a copy of that document?

[b] (3) (A): I believe I found it on the Sharepoint, I think.

[b] (3) (A): Okay. So it was a PDF or a Word document? Do you remember?

[b] (3) (A): I think so. Yes, sir. Something like that.

[b] (3) (A): Okay. Just like [inaudible] you flipped through it. Has it been updated since you checked into the wing, or do you know?

[b] (3) (A): I'm not sure, sir.

[b] (3) (A): Okay. Does the MAG have an SOP, a 3710, flight -- MAG-12 SOP for flight operations?
I believe so. We have our inflight guide. That's what we reference a lot.

Okay. What kind of information is in the inflight guide?

VFAR operations here, like, if you're coming in from the break, or down -- there's a lot of stuff down in Oki as well.

Procedural stuff?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Does VMGR-152 have a squadron order 3710 SOP for flight operations?

Yes, sir.

Have you ever read that document?

Yes, sir.

Is that a Word document on Sharepoint, or is that a PDF, or do you know what form it normally takes?

It's a PDF on -- our new CO, kind of, wrote it back in September. He took over the 152 in June and then published a new 152 SOP. And that got sent out around September of last year, August/September timeframe. And that got disseminated throughout the squadron.

Okay. Is it a document that you feel like the members of your squadron take seriously?

Yes, sir.

So if your commanding officer -- what's your CO's name?
provided written guidance and put his signature on a document that said do or don't do something, and your aircrew did something different, do you think that would be a problem?

Yes, sir. It's going against what the CO -- it's a written order.

It's a -- and you feel like your CO would hold people accountable for that?

I think so. Yes, sir.

Okay. Have you ever known of a flight to be canceled at 152?

Yes, sir.

Have you ever known of a flight to be canceled for safety, or ORM, or some kind of personal consideration?

Not that I'm aware of. I'm sure at some point that has happened. But, nothing that I'm aware of.

If you felt unsafe to fly, maybe you came to work and you were sick, or you were emotionally upset because you learned of a death in the family, or some other personal issue arose in your life, or if you were asked to do something you didn't feel that you were current proficient to do, but somehow you got scheduled for it anyway. And you showed up to the ODO and you just, kind of, threw your head up and said, you know what, I can't do this. What kind of repercussions would
you expect from your CO for that?

(b) (3) (A): I wouldn't expect any repercussions.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): What about from your MAG commander?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): From the MAG CO?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): I wouldn't expect that he would probably know about it.

(b) (3) (A): Why is that?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): I'm not sure what line of communication the CO has with the MAG CO on name changes to the schedule.

(b) (3) (A): So you feel like your CO would just handle it at the squadron level, put in another qualified crew member, pen the schedule, sign it, ORM it, brief it up, and probably get it done if he -- assuming he probably could?

(b) (3) (A): I -- that's under my -- I don't know what he talks to the MAG CO about. I don't know if he does, but I would think that it would stop with my CO. And if he approves it then --

(b) (3) (A): You don't think you would get in trouble though?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): No. I don't think I would get in trouble at all. I think if you're making a safe choice, he'd actually be happy.

(b) (3) (A): Have you ever seen anybody get in trouble for --
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): No, sir.
Have you ever -- has the CO, as your squadron commander, ever stood up in the ready room and said, "the next person that comes in here and says they can't fly because they're congested is out of my squadron."

Have you ever heard anything like that?

Absolutely not, sir.

Would you be shocked to hear something like that?

I would be. I would be shocked.

Yes. Okay. All right.

How many aerial refueling missions have you said you have flown? So how many times have you done AR?

Probably ten or so.

Out of those ten, when fixed wing aircraft approach, what echelon do you usually put them in?

Left.

Always?

Yes.

And after they're finished, how do you usually direct the aircraft?

So when we're all done with it, we should all usually be in the echelon right, unless we direct them elsewhere depending on where they want to depart. But, normally they have just joined echelon left, go through the baskets, and echelon right, and then we depart them depending on where they
want to go.

They will say we want to head South. We'll either descend them or climb them 1,000 feet before they initiate any turns. So we will say you're clear to depart to the South, climb to 1,000 feet above before initiating any turns. And then they'll say copy, see you.

[b] (3) (A): Have you ever split a section of fixed wing aircraft? So one on echelon right, one on echelon left?

[b] (3) (A): Not that I remember. But, it's -- I'm sure it has been done before.

[b] (3) (A): But, I'm saying in your experience.

[b] (3) (A): No. No.

[b] (3) (A): You're an aircraft commander or are you a co-pilot?

[b] (3) (A): Aircraft commander, sir.

[b] (3) (A): Would you be authorized at your current qualification level to be the aircraft commander conducting night systems low light level air refueling of fixed wing aircraft? Do you have that code?

[b] (3) (A): I have that code. Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A): So you can go do that all by yourself?

[b] (3) (A): I could go do that with another person who was NSQ'd, so night system qualified and has that code. I'm not a BIP, which is a Basic Instructor Pilot. I can't assign any initial codes.
You couldn't teach it, but you could do it?

I could do it with another qualified pilot.

Okay. Would you feel comfortable doing that?

I would. Yes, sir.

Are you familiar with the document called the ATP-56?

Yes, sir.

What does that document say about night systems aerial refueling? Do you know? You know where the -- have you ever read a section in the ATP-56 that talks about night systems air refueling?

Yes, sir. A while ago.

What were some of the key components to that document?

So it's not very different from daytime. It's -- you have to maintain separation at least 1,000 feet until the jets are visual, so that's day or night. And then I would say it's not really conducted any much differently. I've never done it differently than I would in day and night. It's just you're on NVG's.

Are there different sections of the ATP-56 for fixed wing refueling and helicopter refueling, HAAR and fixed wing AAR?
No, sir.

What are -- are there differences between day and night for helicopter, HAAR, helicopter refueling or are they similar?

No. I think there's a night section.

There is. So there's a night and a night systems. So I'm breaking up the word night and night systems when we speak right now. So do you think that there is a night systems fixed wing section in the ATP-56?

I believe there is.

And do you feel like there's a night systems helicopter section in the ATP-56, as you recall?

Yes, sir.

That's some stuff that you would have been read, and taught, and discussed in your training to be prepared to be an aircraft commander?

Yes, sir.

For part of your NSQ.

Normally review it before you go on a flight too.

Okay. And there's -- clearly there's copies of current ATP-56's to be found in VMGR and V2 spaces?

Yes, sir.

Okay. All right. I think that's it. Is there anything you would like to add that I have skipped over. You can comment anything that you think is germane about this

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mishap. We really are committed to finding out where we can approve, not only documenting what happened, but, you know, where we can improve and any contributing factors. Anything on your mind, please.

[b] (3) (A): I don't have anything, sir.

[b] (6)

[b] (3) (A): How do you feel about the culture of safety and the command climate with VMGR-152?

[b] (3) (A): I think it's really good. The CO, before the exercise, gave a brief for the exercise on Friday before the week, and the CO at the end of it stood up in front of the squadron and said, if this is training do not push it if you are uncomfortable. He specifically said, if it's weather or anything that you deem not safe, don't feel like you have to push it for this exercise.

[b] (3) (A): That's great.

(b) (6)

[b] (3) (A): Nothing else, sir.

(b) (6)

[b] (3) (A): Thank you, [b] (3) (A). The judge will swear you out.

[b] (3) (A): was warned, sworn, and excused.

(b) (6)