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This Handbook is intended for informational use only.
If a DRRS-MC user finds the information in this handbook in error,
they are to follow the directions/policies listed in MCO 3000.13
“Readiness is like oxygen. You tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you will think about.” An adaptation of a quote from Dr. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. that discussed Security.

“The nation’s shock troops must be the most ready when the nation is least ready ... to provide a balanced force in readiness for a naval campaign and, at the same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale war.” 82nd Congress deliberating the role of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Readiness (JP 1-02): The ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels. a. unit readiness--The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. b. joint readiness--The combatant commander’s ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned missions.
Institutional Readiness

What is readiness? To some, it is a loosely defined term. To others, its codified definitions are too limiting. However, few would argue against the importance of maintaining readiness—a debatable and greatly misunderstood term whose significance is crucially important. This handbook is intended to help you better understand what readiness is and how readiness is reported.

In the abstract, the importance of readiness appears self-evident, a known truth. Like the self-evident truths of the constitution, however, the difficulty lies in the practical application of that truth. The principle of readiness is also an abstract truth that is difficult to apply. The expected characteristics of readiness for Marines, however, must be established prior to conflict, when even the potential for crisis may not yet be known. To establish these characteristics, statesman and commander must respond to three fundamental questions:

• Ready for what?
• Ready with what?
• Ready when?

The procedural definition of Readiness provided in Joint instructions—although somewhat helpful in providing a common lens to examine the manner in which readiness-related policy is formulated and put into practice—is also insufficient in providing a comprehensive framework for use by those who deal with readiness-related matters. There is no Joint Publication establishing readiness doctrine, nor does any service have such a touchstone doctrine. The Marine Corps is, however, developing one because readiness is so important to Marines.

All Marines deal with readiness-related matters as members of the Nation’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness. Commanders, however, are responsible for their units’ readiness and reporting of that readiness. To assist commanders and those involved in readiness-related matters, the Marine Corps uses a readiness framework to better manage its readiness as an institution.

Called the Five Pillars of Institutional Readiness, this framework seeks to ensure that Service-wide activities lead to the proper balance among five pillars underpinning the readiness of the Marine Corps. The pillars are the lens through which the Service, as an institution, views the distribution of resources and requirements to generate preparedness, ability, and capacity to fulfill its statutory obligations. The pillars are: 1. Unit Readiness, 2. Capability and Capacity to Meet Requirements, 3. High Quality People, 4. Infrastructure Sustainment, and 5. Equipment Modernization.
Your unit’s readiness and the reporting of that readiness influence how the Marine Corps makes its Service assessment using these five pillars. Service assessments are reported to Congress, examined by government auditors, relied on by Defense officials in policy formulation and resource allocation, and used in the making of war plans. Maintaining balance across these pillars is the key to achieving and sustaining the level of readiness expected of the Marine Corps. The paragraphs below briefly describe the Marine Corps’ approach for generating ready forces today and informing an investment strategy that will ensure the future readiness of the Marine Corps.

**Unit Readiness.** The operating forces are dependent upon funding for training and maintenance of equipment to safeguard readiness. Although deployed Marine forces are at the highest levels of readiness, this readiness comes at the expense of non-deployed units. Presently, the principal readiness detractor is the reduced availability of equipment at home stations with which to outﬁt and train units.

**Capability and Capacity to Meet Requirements.** The Marine Corps is expected to meet Commander-in-Chief direction in a manner that provides strategic decision makers with time to assess and formulate a more deliberate response. Marines, operating from the sea and forward deployed locations, provide an effective crisis-response capability when U.S. interests compel intervention. The Marine Corps is a stabilizing forward presence. After the drawdown from Afghanistan, the Marine Corps expects to be increasingly engaged around the world training with partners, deterring instability, and responding to all manner of crises and contingencies. Marines build trust with allies and friends; this trust cannot be surged when conﬂict looms. Simply put, forward presence matters. Actual presence demonstrates shared commitments and shared dangers. As the Nation’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness, the Marine Corps bolsters national credibility and deterrence through persistent forward naval engagement. Readiness reporting supports, in part, executing the strategic re-balance toward the Asia-Pacific and meeting the requirements of the New Normal.

**High Quality People.** Recruiting and retaining high quality people plays a key role in maintaining the Marine Corps’ high state of readiness. Recruiting quality youth ultimately translates into higher performance, reduced attrition, increased retention, and improved readiness for the operating forces. The Marine Corps needs the right quantities and occupational specialties to fulﬁll its role as an expeditionary force in readiness. Readiness reporting informs decision making processes regarding funding sources required to meet person nel end-strength; enhancements to family readiness, transition assistance, and behavioral health programs; the ofﬁcer-to-enlisted ratio and the quantities of the senior six enlisted ranks needed to support the force redesign.

**Infrastructure Sustainment.** Readiness also depends on the availability and condition of real property and infrastructure. Adequately resourcing the sustainment of Marine Corps bases and stations is essential to safeguarding unit readiness as they provide the means by which units conduct training and deploy. Being better stewards of our installations and facilities grows in importance as resources become more constrained. Readiness reporting informs decision making processes affecting long-term restoration and modernization, military construction and the Marine Corps Civilian Law Enforcement Program.

**Equipment Modernization.** Ground and aviation equipment must meet the needs of the current and emerging security environments. As the Marine Corps explores options to adjust to changing ﬁscal realities, there is a clear imperative to reset portions of legacy equipment used in OEF and OIF. This reset occurs as the Marine Corps modernizes what is required to guarantee dominance over future threats.

Readiness comes with a cost. Maintaining ready forces is expensive, especially in an era of persistent conﬂict that is compounded by an unprecedented fiscally-challenging environment. Whereas other Services are permitted to practice tiered readiness as a cost-saving means to link strategic ways and ends, the Marine Corps is expected and mandated to be the most ready of the Services. Accordingly, as the Nation’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness, the Marine Corps will maintain the highest levels of readiness to deploy and ﬁght at a moment’s notice anywhere in the world. Tiered readiness, the deliberate budgeted maintenance of speciﬁed units at a lower level of readiness for extended periods, is not Marine Corps policy. Cyclic readiness, the dwell – workup – deployment ﬂuctuation reﬂecting the normal rhythms of service renewal of units and missions, is not equivalent to tiered readiness.
Institutional readiness is monitored by HQMC. The readiness of individual units reported per MCO 3000.13 and the guidance in this handbook comprise force readiness, a large portion of the institutional outlook. Force readiness concerns the operating forces of the Marine Corps from the battalion/squadron level through the Marine component to Geographic Combatant Commanders; in other words, the forces available to be deployed in support of contingency. Of the total institution, readiness reporting is principally (though not entirely) concerned with force readiness: the forces that will be sent to crises. The guidelines under which reporting takes place are driven by directives beginning at the national level.

The Current Readiness Pillars are those pillars principally focused on what, with what, and when the Marine Corps must be ready at present. These pillars deal with the current state of operations and the readiness of forces to sustain those operations and react to crises. Initiatives that influence current affairs and current functions impact current readiness also through the issues associated with the current readiness pillars. When investment is applied against the pillars of readiness, the Corps consciously understands that by favoring current readiness over future investment, it is creating an imbalance. Nonetheless, as the Expeditionary Force in Readiness, Marines will at all times guarantee a ready force today.

The Current Readiness Pillars are Capability and Capacity versus Requirements; and Unit Readiness. These pillars represent the end-state of the investment pillars in that proper investment results in readiness in these pillars of the institution. The current readiness pillars are also most closely associated with Force Readiness discussed below. Figure 2 realigns the pillars to demonstrate how the investment pillars actually hold up the current readiness pillars; without investment, there cannot be current readiness.

![Figure 2: The Cumulative Model of Force Readiness](image-url)
Institutionally, the **Investment Pillars** are the Marine Corps’ future for readiness. Equipment Modernization, Infrastructure Sustainment, and High Quality People are the pillars that ensure the Service will continue to be successful (High Quality People arguably straddles the boundary between current and future readiness, but in broad terms is largely an investment pillar). Investing in these pillars fulfills the Marine vision of readiness by posturing the force to support future and emerging requirements against the policy expectations routinely levied on the service. Investment includes regular reexamination of doctrine and core competencies to ensure that they continue to fulfill the broad, overarching vision for the Corps. For fiscal purposes, Marines seek a balance between current and investment readiness. Sufficient resources must be applied to investment pillars so that the future remains secure; resources are reinvested to assure that today’s expeditionary force in readiness is also tomorrow’s.

**Force Readiness**
To inform national strategy and planning, another perspective of Marine Corps readiness is that of Force Readiness. Force Readiness refers to the extent of preparedness (for what, with what, and when) of the operating forces as measured against national, interagency, and theater requirements, operations plans, concept plans, theater security cooperation, and existing and on-going named operations.

Force Readiness is the foundation of most of the reporting that comprises national and Joint readiness reporting even though that reporting focuses on only a portion of total readiness: resources, training and current operating force capability. The supporting establishment enablers are less thoroughly reported. Reports will typically be reviewed against an accepted “yardstick” to establish a perspective. For example, when examining the impact of budgetary issues, the Office of the Secretary of Defense may task the Services to review the impact of a given decision on a particular set of existing operations plans using a particular unit as a “pacing item” – most often infantry battalions and/or fixed-wing flying squadrons. The question would be posed: how many battalions/squadrons can the Service field given a specified budgetary decision? This is force readiness for force sourcing.

Discussing force sourcing readiness, service chiefs respond with by describing the forces available for fielding and/or deployment. Force readiness typically does not thoroughly include installations, infrastructure, and other aspects of institutional readiness specific to investment in the future. Certain portions of training, however, overlap both institutional and force readiness. That training which is inherent in the preparation or “work-up” for deployment, for example, falls within force readiness where other administrative or social issue training may be much more institutional in nature.

Unit readiness reports (discussed below) provide the MARFORs and HQMC, as well the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and Combatant Commands a means to assess Marine forces as a whole and track force readiness trends for strategic and operational planning against resourcing allocation. Commanders should keep this in mind when assigning personnel to prepare readiness reports. Your personal comments explaining the readiness status of your unit when assessing its capabilities are critical to understanding your unit’s specific readiness, especially to explain situations not easily represented by processes and systems. Commanders should also emphasize the importance of report preparation and ensure the timeliness of submitted reports. Commanders should carefully review readiness reports before submission to guarantee accuracy. Without complete, accurate and timely reports, Force Readiness cannot be ascertained.

**Statutory Responsibilities**
Readiness is an extension of policy. Policy is the codification of the expectations of the national leaders who put that policy in place. Policy-makers are ultimately the representatives of the American people. In the largest sense, policy is an expression of the will and expectations of the people. Within the parameters set by the basis of the law of the republic, a military service must carry out policy in accordance with those expectations. For these reasons, the Senate and the House of Representatives Armed Services Committees have Readiness subcommittees. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness. The military
departments including the Department of the Navy have offices that closely monitor readiness. The responsibility of a commander is to report what can be measured in order to provide the measure of whether or not policy is being fulfilled.

Federal statute requires the Services to report their readiness per Title 10, United States Code. Regularly, Marine unit readiness reports are aggregated and used as part of the Chairman’s Readiness System: Joint Combat Capability Assessment; Commandant’s Planning Guidance; Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan; Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress; Congressional Testimony; Crisis Response Planning; Global Force Management; and the Planning, Programming, and Budget Execution process. These products and the leaders that employ them all focus on measurable aspects of readiness including resources and assessed capability to execute a given task against a standard (normally the METs).

Readiness is defined by CJCSM 3401D, the Chairman’s Readiness System, as the ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels.

(1) Unit Readiness. The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. Unit readiness is reported by the military services.

(2) Joint Readiness. This is the combatant commander’s (CCDR’s) or Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander’s ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute assigned missions. Accurate and timely unit readiness reports are essential for Joint Readiness reporting.

In terms of actual measures to represent readiness, the Department of Defense has developed systems to measure resource readiness and capabilities trained: Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS), Defense Readiness Reporting System-Strategic (DRRS-S), and for Marines of all commands (including MARSOC) – Defense Readiness Reporting System-Marine Corps (DRRS-MC). The focus on resource readiness stems from two related roots: measurability of resources and fiscal obligations that the provision of those resources entails. Congressional oversight consequently focuses on the employment of provided funds as they relate to readiness. That focus necessitates a measurable aspect of readiness; as discussed in the previous section, resources are the most measurable aspect of readiness. The capabilities to which the force has trained are also reported in readiness. The Chairman’s Readiness System (CJCS) also emphasizes the capabilities of the Joint Force against operations and concept plans as well as current Combatant Commander requirements.

If you have not done so already, familiarize yourself with Marine Corps Order 3000.13 Marine Corps Readiness Reporting Standard Operating Procedures. Ensure that those in your unit who deal with readiness-related matters are familiar with its contents as well.

Intangibles
Intangible aspects of readiness, those features that are not, or at least not easily, measurable, dominate the impression that most Marines have of holistic readiness. In assessing readiness, identifying the aspects of the issue under discussion is the foremost activity: where is the focus of discussion of readiness? The fundamental questions (readiness for what, with what, and when) result in a next step, the need to identify how much readiness is directly measurable by some means that produce data. While intangibles are not measurable, they can be assessed. Commanders and their staffs or outside observers can conduct an analysis that provides at least an informed opinion on intangible readiness.

Intangibles such as quality of leadership, unit cohesion, mental preparedness, and realistic training are just some of the features that most Marines can easily associate with readiness, because they relate directly to Marines and their units. Other factors that are outside the control of the Service, however, may prove equally important
for individual Marines or units as a whole including family issues (“family readiness”), levels of public support for the military or specific foreign policy, or societal changes that impact the inherent relationships between the national population, the government, and the military. These factors directly and indirectly impact the unit’s reportable readiness. That impact, however, is highly complex. If the commander considers it of importance, however, it can be added to remarks.

Resource and capability levels reported follow precise definitions that require comment. This commentary may be augmented or influenced by intangibles, but the reported levels provide a numerical representation of current readiness resulting in decisions from higher headquarters. For that reason, commanders must ensure that their readiness reporting adheres to the definitions provided by Marine Corps Orders and outlined in this guide.
COMMAND READINESS REPORTING

Unit Readiness

The manner in which your unit or installation tracks and reports its readiness is important and required by law. Your role as the Commanding Officer is essential to the Marine Corps meeting its statutory readiness reporting obligations as well as responding to both legislative and executive oversight. Furthermore, your handling of readiness-related matters affects the degree to which Marine Corps readiness is perceived by those involved in resource allocation, policy formulation, and strategic and operational planning.

Intermediate Level Commanders (i.e. regiments, groups, and higher) should use subordinate unit reports to identify to higher headquarters their units’ critical shortfalls and estimated time to recover. It is prudent and highly encouraged to host a monthly readiness meeting where subordinate commanders brief their units’ readiness (current and projected) and you “coach” them in the on-going effort to manage their readiness.

Marine units report their resource readiness (Personnel, Supply, Equipment Condition, and Training) and assess Mission Essential Tasks (METs) in the DRRS-MC. The input tool used to insert this information into DRRS-MC is called the Net-centric Unit Status Report-Marine Corps (NetUSR-MC). This input tool allows the unit to assess its METs/mission and report its ability to organize, train, maintain and equip forces for use by the Combatant Commands. After your review, your designated readiness officer will submit your unit’s readiness report, which populates the GSORTS database and the DRRS-S maintained by Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD).

At a minimum, your unit’s data will need to be revalidated every 30 days for units and 90 days for installations, meaning you will need to submit another readiness report. Although you may delegate day-to-day handling of readiness reporting-related matters to others within your unit, readiness reporting is fundamentally a commander’s responsibility that is not transferable. It is the commander who assesses the unit’s METs with appropriate specified conditions and performance standards. The commander is charged to accurately assess the unit’s ability to execute core and assigned missions.

Commanders, with staff assistance, must ensure the submission of complete, accurate, and timely readiness assessments. When done correctly throughout the operational and administrative chains of command (completeness), readiness reporting will enable higher headquarters to identify and understand your unit’s shortfalls and move to mitigate or address them. It will furthermore inform joint planning – these reports are used to determine the status of operations and concept plans spanning the range of military operations for major contingencies. If the day-to-day operations of a given battalion are to detach portions to support task-organized entities, such as a Marine Expeditionary Unit or other MAGTF, the fact that a portion of the unit is deployed away from its home battalion impacts the resources remaining in the battalion. That battalion has less remaining capacity to execute its core mission. Note that this is not a reflection of the performance of the battalion and its Marines, nor on the capabilities of those Marines and equipment that are not detached. It is a reflection of the consequences of the detachment to other missions that might require the entire battalion. Readiness reporting is not a report card; it is a reflection of the reality of a unit even when optimally supporting its missions.

Official Command Positions

A readiness report is official correspondence declaring a formal command position on the readiness of the unit. The readiness report represents the final word of the unit commander. The opening section of this handbook gives the statutory basis under which this is true and the DRRS-MC section provides a detailed review on how reported data and text are entered for each and every area. The final report contains objective data, subjective assessments, and potentially a commander’s subjective override of data. Because this is the case, commanders must pay particular attention to reporting issues.

In providing assessments and/or subjectively altering the results of a readiness report, commanders must remember the intent of readiness reporting and provide substantive justifications and responses. The readiness report is not a commentary on the performance of the unit’s Marines or on their individual abilities. It is, instead, an honest
appraisal of whether or not the unit is capable of all core or assigned tasks and all resources at the moment at which the report is made. If a unit during steady-state rotational requirements normally supports the generation of detachments to support other units, then it must honestly report that it does not possess the full capability organic to it for major contingency – this is a serious consideration and why this handbook has described where readiness reports go and how they are used. The unit supporting detachments is performing its mission, but that mission has a cost. Readiness reporting records that cost.

The next few paragraphs will briefly review the reporting areas including those of subjective command involvement or command assessment to which commander’s must pay close attention. For a review of how and in what order these sections are entered into DRRS-MC to create a report, see the DRRS-MC section.

**Report Content Overview**

Readiness reports provided via DRRS-MC are focused on the data required of the Marine Corps by the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to fulfill statutory reporting requirements as outlined in the previous section. The focus, therefore, is the reporting criteria specified in MCO 3000.13. The report of any given unit is about the available resources of that unit coupled with current capabilities. It is a reflection of whether appropriate resources, training, and personnel have been provided to meet expectations.

At the strategic level, policy results in the national strategy that answers the fundamental questions of readiness: for what, with what, and when. Subordinate policies, however, have major influence on reporting. The approach that the Department of Defense as a whole has taken over time is to tie measured readiness to specific data points. For example, a healthy individual Marine may be eminently capable of executing his/her core mission at a given moment; but if that Marine has not been to the dentist in over a year and is consequently “class 4,” then that Marine is technically not able to deploy – not ready. This readiness reporting result is due to the policy that governs readiness reporting, not just in the Marine Corps, but for serving personnel across all services. Visiting the dentist is a resource requirement, however, and it is therefore incumbent on the unit to report the status of those resources.

Complete, accurate, and timely reporting is a command responsibility and duty. It is understood at all levels that units cannot be at peak readiness at all times, especially for assigned missions. Any unit will naturally spend time training both for core and assigned missions. At the beginning of training for an assigned mission, for example, even a properly resourced, highly capable unit that has completed all basic annual requirements will likely report a low level of readiness for the new assigned tasks. The unit then trains to these tasks and improves. It is important to reflect those changes per reporting policy to show that training will lead to a ready-force at deployment. If it does not, then that unit may require more or different resources.

Only organizations designated by PP&O, POR will submit readiness reports. Requests for organizations to report in DRRS-MC will be forwarded to PP&O, POR through the chain of command. Combat, combat support, and combat service support units of the Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), MARFORs, and designated organizations and installations will report their readiness. Each type of organization is deployable, designed for warfighting, or provides support to the warfighting Marine. Marine Corps organizations passed OPCON to a non-Marine Corps command will still submit their reports through DRRS-MC. This applies to deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), units in contingency operations, and aviation squadrons participating in Navy carrier integration. Non-Marine Corps organizations OPCON to Marines will report their readiness per their channels, not in DRRS-MC. Exceptions may be requested of PP&O, POR through the chain of command.

**Core and Assigned Missions**

The readiness reporting system allows commanders of reporting organizations to uniformly determine and accurately report their organization’s ability to accomplish the core mission for which the organization was designed via a C-Level and core mission capability assessment. When applicable, commanders will also capture their organizations’ ability to accomplish assigned missions via the A-Level and an assigned mission capability assessment. Units may have more than one assigned mission at a particular time. All these assessments are captured in a single report within DRRS-MC.
Both assessments indicate the degree to which a unit has achieved prescribed levels of fill for personnel and equipment, the materiel condition of available equipment, and the training proficiency status of the unit. A significant aspect of readiness reporting is the requirement for Commanders to assess their organizations’ capabilities to accomplish their mission essential tasks (METs) to specified conditions and standards. Those assessments are then used by Commanders to assess their organizations’ capabilities to accomplish their missions.

**Mission Essential Tasks**

A MET is an event in which a unit or organization must be proficient to be capable of accomplishing an appropriate portion of its wartime mission. All readiness reporting Marine Corps organizations will have a mission essential task list (METL) per MCO 3500.110. Assessments at all levels will include evaluations of the resources available and training readiness to perform METs to prescribed standards. The assessments will assist the commander in determining the organization’s ability to execute core and assigned missions.

The Marine Corps Tasks (MCTs) are architecturally linked to the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), which includes strategic-national, strategic-theater, and operational level of war tasks used by joint task forces and Combatant Commanders. Core METs define the designed capabilities of a unit and are developed using tasks documented in the Marine Corps Task List (MCTL). Core METs are reflected in the T&R manuals and provide the foundation for a community’s T&R standards. The conditions and standards for training to Core METs are reflected by events which serve as the measures to gauge readiness against the performance of the task. Units without approved Core METs will establish their own (with conditions and standards), based on established doctrine, METLs of similar units, higher headquarters’ METLs, and Marine Corps publications.

There are several types of assigned METs. Assigned METs, for an assigned mission, are the result of a mission given to a Marine unit that does not match the Core wartime mission for which the unit was originally designed. Top priority plans are OPLANs/CONPLANs that require level four detail (established Time-Phased Force & Deployment Data (TPFDD)), per the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, result in assigned METs. Named operations, those operations designated as such by the President, Secretary of Defense, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff (e.g. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Global Response Force), also result in Assigned METs. Other Geographic Combatant Commander tasks resulting in unit missions may result in assigned METs also.

Core METs, top priority plan METs, METL templates, and deployment guidance provide the basis for the development and refinement of named operation METs. When such an operation or deployment requires specific or additional tasks, the commander revises the unit’s METL and associated standards and conditions accordingly and submits it to the next higher level of command for approval.

METs are assessed using one of three conditions: Yes “Y,” Qualified Yes “Q,” or No “N” (for official definitions, see DRRS-MC section). The organization can accomplish the task to established standards and conditions - Y; the organization can accomplish all or most of the task to standards under most conditions – Q; or the organization is unable to accomplish the task to prescribed standards and conditions at this time - N. Y and Q assessed units can be employed.

**Resource Levels**

The resource levels comprise the C- and/or the A-Level when aggregated together and coupled with the MET Assessment: P-Personnel, S-Supply, R-Condition, and T-Training. These resource levels are assessed against the Table of Organization (T/O) and the Table of Equipment (T/E) in the case of the Core Mission; they are assessed against the Manning Document and Equipment Density List (EDL) in the case of the Assigned Mission.

Reporting of personnel to determine a P-Level is based on the unit’s ability to provide deployable, military occupational specialty (MOS) qualified personnel to accomplish its missions. The P-Level is based on the lower percentage of the PERSONNEL STRENGTH and MOS FILL calculations.

Reporting on equipment to determine a S-Level and a R-Level is based on the unit’s ability to provide the quantities and quality of equipment to accomplish its missions. Equipment will be accounted for by only one organization.
at a time, and the present materiel status, not future projections, will be used. Selected pieces of equipment are designated to accurately capture the equipment readiness of Marine Corps units. The selected equipment is reported as either mission essential equipment (MEE) or principal end items (PEI) as published in Marine Corps Bulletin 3000.

Units will calculate a S-Level as of the time of the report and report the lowest S-Level between the MEE and PEI calculations. As explained in the DRRS-MC section of this handbook, S-Level is the percentage of the equipment that the unit actually has compared with what it is supposed to have (T/E or EDL).

Units will calculate a R-Level as of the time of the report and report the lowest R-Level between the MEE and PEI calculations. R-Level reflects the percentage of equipment in a “mission-capable” status compared with what the unit possesses. One caveat is worth noting: Flying squadrons, to include MEU(ACE) designated squadrons, will consider their aircraft as MEE when calculating their S and R-Levels. Flying squadrons will not calculate aviation support equipment as PEI. MALS will calculate S and R-Levels using aviation support equipment/IMRL as PEI.

Finally, the T-Level is an assessment of the unit’s training to accomplish its mission. Units, to include intermediate level units, will base their T-Level on the percentage of METs trained to standard. Squadrons with aircraft have additional considerations to make when determining a T-Level. For aviation units, the T-Level reported will be the lower of the Combat Leadership assessment or the T-Level calculation.

**Task Organization**

Task organized units gaining personnel and the units providing personnel will adjust their personnel quantities accordingly. Coordination must occur between the task organized and providing units to avoid double counting of personnel. Remarks explaining the personnel adjustments will remain in the task organized and providing units’ reports until the detachments are returned to the providing units or transferred elsewhere. Task organized units that receive detachments of personnel will increase their Assigned Strength and MOS Fill quantities to account for those personnel. Task organized units will obtain their personnel Structure Strength from the unit’s manning documents. The Assigned Strength and MOS Fill quantities will be subtracted from the providing unit(s), but this subtraction does not alter the providing unit’s core Table of Organization (T/O) against which the P-Level is calculated. These features hold true also for S-Level in terms of equipment. While gaining units show additional equipment and reflect that against their Equipment Density List for their Assigned Missions, the providing units must still record the shortfall against their Table of Equipment (T/E) for their Core Mission.
**Commander’s Summary**

A commander’s evaluation of the unit’s ability to perform the assigned mission cannot be based solely on P, S, R, and T-levels. The cumulative effect of these measured areas could have a positive or negative implication on the unit’s ability to execute its assigned mission. For the commander to assess the unit’s current military capability for full spectrum mission requirements, the commander must consider additional factors. Although not all inclusive, other factors may include: personnel turnover, availability of ranges and training areas, installation support, operational tempo, exercises, and leadership.

The commander’s summary encompasses the C-level and capability assessments for the organization’s core mission, as well as the A-Level and capability assessments for any assigned mission(s). The commander’s assessments will be based on the organization’s present state, not a future projection. Complete, accurate, and timely assessments by commanders are essential for helping the Marine Corps, combatant commands, and the Department of Defense understand their capability to accomplish tactical, operational, and strategic goals.

General remarks are required of all C-Level, A-Level, core and assigned mission capability assessments and T-Level assessments to help higher headquarters understand the organization’s mission, readiness, and capabilities. Units executing an assigned mission different from core should comment on that assigned mission. These comments should be different from the core mission comments. This is especially important for intermediate commands, which must not simply repeat data and remarks from subordinate units. Key information needed from each Commander are resources and capabilities needed for the unit to be a 1 or Y and the length of time required to train to the unit’s METs once the resources are on hand.

Summaries should do the following:

- Explain, succinctly, the “bottom line” assessment of organization’s capability to carry out its core and assigned missions.

- Include the Commander’s top two readiness concerns to help higher headquarters understand the organization’s status.

- Identify changes to the unit’s tasking, organization, or renaming of the unit due to operational requirements.

- Describe readiness issues in sufficient detail to support corrective action and prioritization of resources.

- Intermediate level units will highlight subordinate unit issues, shortfalls, and state actions taken to assist them.

**Command Override**

The commander may subjectively raise or lower the C/A-Level. The Commander’s Override field is located on the Commander’s summary page. In determining the need for a subjective upgrade or downgrade of the C/A-Level, the commander will determine the C/A-level definitions (in MCO 3000.13 or the DRRS-MC section of this handbook) that best describe the unit’s current capabilities and deficiencies. In determining the need for a subjective upgrade or downgrade, commanders will decide whether the calculated C or A-Level is in consonance with the appropriate definitions and the intent of readiness resource reporting. Commanders must include a narrative summary explaining the rationale under the Commander’s comments, when subjectively upgrading or downgrading the C-or A-Level. For instance, units missing important personnel or equipment should be guarded against a subjective upgrade to C-1. Two caveats to this subjective upgrade or downgrade are worth noting:

- Resource and training levels (P, R, S and T) are reported without adjustment.

- A subjective change of the C/A-level results in the requirement to submit a Reason Code (see MCO 3000.13) and a mandatory remark (e.g. “supporting forces are providing engineer equipment”).
Mission Assessments

In the DRRS-MC section, specific procedures are provided regarding several differing types of assessment. Whereas the P, S, and R Levels are all data-related calculations, the T-Level is actually an assessed quantity requiring command attention to assess the METS as described above in Resource Levels. The most important overall assessment, however, is the command’s mission assessment.

Commanders will assess the capability of their organizations to execute their Core and Assigned missions using a Yes (Y), Qualified Yes (Q), and No (N) assessment based on their assessed METs for those missions. The mission assessments will consider the mission as a whole and should reflect the Commander’s experience and judgment on all the tasks and factors that affect the organization’s ability to meet mission objectives (see Table 1). Core and assigned mission capability assessments will correlate respectively with C-Level and A-level assessments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Guidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes (Y)</td>
<td>The organization can accomplish the mission to conditions and prescribed standards</td>
<td>The majority of the METs are assessed as Yes and the remaining METs are assessed as Qualified Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualified Yes (Q)</td>
<td>The organization can accomplish the mission to standard under most conditions. A “Qualified yes” equates to a “Yes” in that it sends the message the organization is prepared to conduct the mission under the prescribed conditions and standards.</td>
<td>The majority of the METs are assessed as Qualified Yes and the remaining METs are assessed as Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (N)</td>
<td>The organization cannot accomplish the mission to conditions and prescribed standards</td>
<td>A No MET assessment will normally preclude a mission assessment of Yes. The Commander must make a judgement if the mission can still be accomplished if a MET is assessed as No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Mission Capability Assessment Guidance
**Reporting Practices**

**Best Practices**

To increase the accuracy and effectiveness of readiness reporting.

Think CAT!

- Assign a Commissioned Officer, Warrant Officer or Senior Staff NCO as the Unit Readiness Officer. (The Commanding Officer is accountable for the Unit Readiness Report.)

- Task the S-1, S-4, Maintenance Officer (if applicable), and Communications Officer with providing readiness information to the S-3 for data input into DRRS-MC.

- Establish a Unit Readiness Board that meets monthly. The board should be chaired by the Executive Officer (or other experienced officer) and facilitated by the Unit Readiness Officer. The board should consist of the S-1, S-3, S-4, Maintenance Officer (if applicable), CBRN, and Communications Officer. Plan board meetings to leverage information gleaned from other Battle Rhythm events (e.g. Training Meetings). The unit medical offices can assist in determining personnel who are non-deployable due to medical reasons.

- Use your DRRS-MC METs and output standards to design your annual training plan.

- Design annual training plans to include readiness level (C, P, S, R and T) milestones.

- Use the checklists on the following pages to improve reporting accuracy.
Commander’s Checklist

- The C-Level or A-Level accurately reflects the unit’s lowest resource level. If you subjectively changed your C-Level or A-Level, your Commander’s remarks need to adequately explain the reason. Subjective changes of more than one level should receive strong scrutiny.
  
  - E.g. “Changed to A-2, when S-Level is S-3, because host nation support is providing engineer equipment and contracted maintenance in support of the battalion’s mission.”

- If two or more resource areas are at the same low level, the Commander must determine which resource level has the greatest degradation to the unit’s mission.

- Your unit’s Current Unit Status Activity Code must reflect your current mission accurately (e.g., Undergoing Training (TR), Combat Support (CS), Actual Combat (CA)). Non-mobilized reserve units will use (NA) RC training not annual ADT.

- Non-deployable personnel must be correctly broken down by category. (See MCO 3000.13 for non-deployable categories).

- Report the three most critical MOSs that have the greatest impact to the unit’s Core mission.

- Personnel and equipment are accurately reflected. Account for all personnel assigned to the unit. Of the total personnel assigned to the unit, enter the number of personnel detached/chopped to another unit ISO their assigned mission. When the mission is complete and personnel return to the parent unit, ensure the quantities in the detached field are updated.

- Personnel and equipment detached to task organized units are properly reported by both the losing and gaining commands.

- All comments are clear, concise, written in plain English, and do not use uncommon or MOS specific acronyms.

- Remarks should explain the impact of the resource levels on your unit’s readiness for both core and assigned missions.
  
  - Mandatory remarks if S and/or R-Levels are not 1 are: List equipment types with problems; state numbers possessed or in-reporting status; number available or in-reporting status that are mission capable; problems causes if known; identify requested assistance; and highlight further required actions. EXAMPLE: “8 of a PMAA of 12 aircraft are in-reporting status. 3 of the 8 are not mission capable for structural repair, which MALC will assist with completing within 24 hours. 4 aircraft out of reporting status are at depot. No further actions required.”

- Explain what help is required to improve readiness for the unit.

- C- and A-Levels should correlate to the mission capability assessments (Y/Q/N) as depicted in Table E-3, MCO 3000.13.

- Use the Remarks Guidance on Page 30 as a guide.

- Units reporting C1/C2 should be a YES or Qualified YES in Core Assessment. Units reporting C3/4/5 should be a NO.

- List the Commander’s Top Two Readiness Concerns to help HQMC, COCOMs & DoD to understand the capabilities of the unit to accomplish tactical, operational, and strategic goals.
Intermediate Level Commands:

Intermediate commands are Marine Expeditionary Forces, Marine Expeditionary Brigades (when deployed), Marine Expeditionary Units, Divisions, Wings, Marine Logistics Groups, Regiments, Marine Aircraft Groups, other Groups, and Marine Expeditionary Force/Brigade Headquarters Groups. All units from battalion/squadron commands through Marine Force Components report, but only units under Marine Force Components (including the MEF) complete all aspects of the report.

Intermediate Level Commanders assess their units’ ability to perform core/assigned missions and forecast when those assessments will change. The readiness assessments of subordinate units will be taken into consideration.

Ensure your subordinate commanders review their reports and appropriately staff assessments. You may deem it prudent to host monthly readiness meetings, where subordinate commanders brief you on their unit’s readiness (current and projected) so you can help manage their readiness.

Checklist:

- The readiness report should consider the collective readiness of your subordinate units.
- Resources comments must contain pertinent information concerning the readiness of your command as a whole.
- The report should avoid cutting and pasting of subordinate unit comments.
- There should be established procedures in place to monitor the readiness reporting of subordinate units to ensure their timeliness and accuracy.
- Establish procedures that ensure the timeliness and accuracy of your own readiness report.
- List the Commander’s Top Two Readiness Concerns.
- Ensure subordinate commands adequately explain reports and provide sufficient detail to understand resource concerns.

Component Responsibilities

Marine Corps Force Component Commands have responsibilities within the reporting process, both formal and informal. First and foremost is their responsibility to ensure that any and all assigned Marine units are fulfilling their Title 10 responsibilities to submit complete, accurate and timely reports. Errors in the execution of reporting through ignorance of the system should be recognized and corrected before the Marine Component level, but the component has a responsibility to ensure that this occurs.

Marines Components also have the following responsibilities:

- Monitor the readiness reporting of subordinate units for accuracy, timeliness, and validity and direct corrective actions.
- Inform the supporting MARFOR (MARFORCOM, MARFORPAC, MARFORRES, MARFORSOC) when OPLAN/CONPLAN assessments require assigned units to develop and report assigned Top Priority METLs. MARFORSOC is the exception, because it provides forces to Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).
- Support subordinate units’ development of Named Operation and Top Priority METLs. Inform HQMC (PP&O), MCCDC, and MARFORCOM if such METLs need to become the focus of resourcing and training efforts instead of Core Unit METLs.
- Integrate Named Operation and Top Priority METLs into unit deployment orders.
- Support DRRS-MC development, testing and training.
### Reporting Occasions

Reports will be submitted within 24 hours of the occasions listed below (MCO 3000.13, Table 1-1) for the organizations specified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occasion</th>
<th>Units (Core Msn)</th>
<th>Assigned Msn</th>
<th>MARFOR</th>
<th>Installations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  30 days since last report</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  90 days since last report</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Activation or deactivation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Change in C-Level</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Change in A-Level (Y,Q,N)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Change in Core Mission Assessment</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  Change in Assigned Mission Assessment</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  Change in Administrative Control (ADCON) or Operational Control (OPCON)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  Change of location of Command Element</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Change of geographic location of unit’s personnel or equipment.*</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Employed in support of an in-lieu mission (one that does not match the Core Mission)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Assigned to Named Operation (e.g. Operation Enduring Freedom) or (Top Priority Plans) by D-90</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Assignment to Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) mission</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Receipt of an order to execute missions ISO homeland defense/security*</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Receipt of an alert, formal warning, or execute order or NLT 90 days prior to deployment or assumption of assigned mission, whichever comes first</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 12 Months prior to a Reserve unit’s planned activation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Mobilization of Reserve Unit</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: See MCO 3000.13; page 1-5*
**DoD Banner Page**

The DoD Banner Enter page provides access into DRRS-MC. All authorized users can access DRRS-MC via two means; “LOGIN with SIPR TOKEN” or “LOGIN with USERNAME/PASSWORD”. All new users can request access via “REQUEST SYSTEM ACCESS”. Your request for access will be processed by your MARFOR Super Senior Readiness Officer (SRO). If you need help logging into DRRS-MC, DRRS-MC Helpdesk information is located at the bottom of the page.
**DRRS-MC Welcome Page**

The DRRS-MC Welcome Page displays messages such as DRRS-MC System status, announcement to units, and training package support on NetUSR-MC (Quick reference/User’s guide for input and output tools, helpdesk support, etc.)

**Netcentric Unit Status Report-Marine Corps (NetUSR-MC)**

Your Readiness Officer uses the DRRS-MC input tool application, NetUSR-MC, to complete and submit the unit’s readiness report on both resource and MET/mission assessments.

NetUSR-MC is a web-based desktop application that provides a streamlined flow of unit and installation readiness information enabling the USMC to make more efficient and well informed force management decisions.

Personnel structure and equipment requirements for Core missions are automatically populated in each unit’s report (excepting intermediate commands, MARFORs, and Installation reports).

The NetUSR-MC input tool automatically calculates the resource (P, S & R) levels as well as the C-Level and A-Level for the measured unit.

Intermediate Commands (regiment, group, division, and wing) resource and mission capability assessment levels must also consider subordinate unit reports that are OPCON to them. Intermediate reports will reflect ability to provide cognizance over subordinate unit’s critical shortfalls and estimated time to recover.

**Marine Readiness Management Output Tool (MRMOT)**

MRMOT is an executive output information system. MRMOT provides calculated readiness reporting information and statistics on reporting organizations. In the very near future, the MRMOT will be replaced by the Marine Corps Readiness Analytical Tool (MCRAT).
BUI Page

The Basic Unit Information (BUI) provides HQMC pertinent information about the unit’s “Administrative and Operational” information. This page consists of several auto-populated entries (by PP&O, POR) and numerous “mandatory entries that the unit must fill out under the headings of “Administrative, Unit Commander, Point of Contact, and Unit Operational Status”.

These entries allow HQMC to accurately report the readiness status of the unit to the Readiness Community of Interest (COI), internal and external to the Marine Corps.
**Personnel (P-Level)**

P-Level is based on the unit’s ability to provide deployable, military occupational specialty (MOS) qualified personnel to accomplish its missions.

**P-Level is determined by the lowest percentage of Personnel Strength or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Fill**

\[
\text{Personnel Strength} = \frac{\{\text{Assigned Strength} - \text{*Non-deployables}\} \times 100}{\text{Structure Strength}}
\]

Or

\[
\text{MOS Fill} = \frac{\{\text{MOS Fill} - \text{*Non-deployables}\} \times 100}{\text{Structure Strength}}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Strength</th>
<th>MOS Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-1  100-90%</td>
<td>P-1  100-85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-2  89-80%</td>
<td>P-2  84-75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3  79-70%</td>
<td>P-3  74-65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-4  69-0%</td>
<td>P-6  4-0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Non-Deployable personnel as depicted on the Personnel Screen below includes total personnel detached and non-deployable personnel by category.*
Unit Personnel structure is automatically pre-populated for the CORE MISSION based on the Table of Organization resident in Total Force Management Structure (TFSMS). For an ASSIGNED MISSION, if the manning requirement is different from the Core mission T/O, personnel quantities will be manually entered on the assigned mission page based on manning document approved by higher headquarters.

Those Provisional units that have been deemed readiness reportable by DC, PP&O do not have structure in TFSMS therefore; will not have structure pre-populated in DRRS-MC. These units manually enter their manning numbers per their approved manning document on the Core Mission page of DRRS-MC. A Provisional unit’s Core mission is the same as its Assigned mission, therefore, an Assigned Mission page entry is not required.
Units must enter the personnel assigned strength quantities by type of personnel [MC (Marine Officers), ME (Marine Enlisted), NC (Navy Commissioned), NE (Navy Enlisted)]. Identify the temporary location of personnel away from the present location of the unit. Total assigned quantities include all personnel assigned to the unit. Personnel detached to another ISO that other unit’s Assigned Mission are also included in the assigned field. Commander’s comments should clearly state the impact the personnel shortfalls are having on the unit’s overall mission. Units gaining the detached personnel will add the personnel to their unit personnel assigned quantities. Refer to the Detachments vs Shortfalls paragraph below for further guidance.

Non-Deployable Personnel

All non-deployable personnel must be identified by personnel type, using only the non-deployable codes/categories contained in MCO 3000.13 (Table G-5, page G-9 and G-10) or NetUSR-MC.

Detachments vs Shortfalls

Commanders must be aware of the differences between providing a detachment and transferring personnel with regard to readiness reporting.

–Detached Personnel. Personnel sent to another readiness reportable unit to support a specific requirement or mission will be reported as detached. These personnel must be included in the assigned and MOS Fill fields. Of those personnel assigned to the unit that are detached/chopped to another unit ISO their assigned mission, enter those personnel quantities in the detached field. When a unit receives a detachment, the gaining unit will add the personnel quantities and MOS fill to their assigned quantities. The losing command shall make comments on where the personnel went by type personnel (MC/ME/NC/NE) e.g., 0/10/1/0 to VMFA-312. The gaining command shall make comments, e.g., assigned increased 0/10/1/0 from VMFA-122. Units should continue to comment on attached/detached personnel until the personnel return to their original unit.

Commanders must ensure that Personnel Reason Codes from MCO 3000.13 Table G-1 are used to explain the unit’s status (shortfall) when the P-Level is less than 1. Comments should clearly state the impact the personnel shortfalls are having on the unit’s overall mission. Units will use the employ/deploy code, listed in Table 8, Appendix E, of MCO 3000.13 to capture the percentage of personnel and/or equipment away from the unit.

–Shortfalls. Personnel sent to another unit to temporarily fill billet shortfalls, but still belonging to the parent unit, should not be reported as detached.

When the majority of a unit deploys and some personnel remain at the home location (i.e. RBE), the unit will continue to include these personnel in their unit’s report unless the personnel are transferred to another unit. MARFORRES unit RBEs shall be reported by the next higher HQ element in the chain of command.

Reporting of Individual Augmentee (IA)s, Training Teams (TT)s and Joint Military Duty (JMD)s

These personnel must be included in the assigned and MOS fill fields of their home unit.

Enter these personnel quantities under the Non Deployable Field in NetUSR-MC only. They are considered not available for deployment with the parent unit. Make comments on how this loss directly impacts the unit’s mission. Once the percentage of personnel losses reach 5% or more, the unit must use the employ/deployed code. Reserve units will not report these personnel as Non-deployable. They are transferred to an active component, and reported via that entity.

Percentage Employed/Deployed

The primary reason field allows you to report the portion of your unit that is unavailable due to deployment or, in the case of reserve units, employed somewhere other than at home location. The unit will use an employ/deploy code when the percentages of the personnel/equipment losses reach 5% or more (MCO 3000.13, table G-6, page G-10). A remark will be made on the location of where that portion of the unit is employed/deployed. The employed/deployed field is found on the Commander’s Summary Page in the primary and secondary reason fields.
Equipment and Supplies On-Hand (S-Level)

S-Level is a measure of your unit’s equipment and supply. Ground units report against Mission Essential Equipment (MEE) and Principal End Items (PEI). Flying Squadrons only report against MEE. S-Level says “This is the gear I actually have…and this is the gear I’m supposed to have.”

S-Level is determined by the lowest percentage of Mission Essential Equipment (MEE) or Principal End Items (PEI)

Ground Units

MEE or PEI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S-1</td>
<td>100-90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>89-80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>79-65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>64-0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aviation (Flying Squadrons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S-1</td>
<td>100-90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>89-80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>79-60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>59-0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE

The “Adjust Gain” function of DRRS-MC is authorized for MEU CLC use only. All other units will use the “possessed/in reporting column to show equipment gains not depicted on the unit T/E
**Condition (R-Level)**

R-Level is a measure of your unit’s equipment condition. R-Level says to Higher HQ, “Of the gear that I actually have, this is how much actually works like it’s supposed to.”

**R-Level is determined by the lowest percentage of mission capable Mission Essential Equipment (MEE) or Principal End Items (PEI)**

**Ground Units**

MEE or PEI

\[ R = \text{Possessed – NMC} \]

- **R-1** 100-90%
- **R-3** 89-70%
- **R-3** 69-60%
- **R-4** 59-0%

**Aviation (Flying Squadrons)**

MEE (Aircraft)

\[ R = \text{IR-NMC} \]

- **R-1** 100-75%
- **R-2** 74-60%
- **R-3** 59-50%
- **R-4** 49-0%

**IR = In Reporting Status**

**NMC = Non-mission Capable**
The PEI (Principal End Item)/IMRL (Aviation Support Equipment) and MEE (Mission Essential Equipment)/Aviation Aircraft requirements of the CORE mission are populated from the unit’s Table of Equipment (TE)/Primary Mission Authorized Aircraft (PMAA) for the Core mission. The above example shows the Equipment Resources page of a newly created report with the requirements from the unit’s T/E. Provisional Units do not have equipment listed on a T/E. These types of units will have to manually enter their requirements based on their Equipment Density List (EDL) or source document. Commanders must identify shortfalls in equipment that degrade unit readiness. S and R-Levels may also be used as part of the conditions for an organization’s METs.
The unit must manually enter equipment quantities from the EDL/resource document on the Assigned Mission page if equipment is different from the Core mission equipment. Do not use the adjust gain/loss field. These Fields must show zero.
**Task Organized Units**

Units providing personnel and/or equipment to support task organization (MEU ACE, MEU BLT, MEU CLB) will show the total personnel detached in the personnel assigned quantity/MOS fill and/or equipment quantities field. Of the total personnel/MOS fill quantities, show the total personnel detached/chopped to another unit ISO their assigned mission using the detached field. Comments must explain the changes (unit provide 2/34/0/1 to VMM-266 Rein) ISO the assigned mission. Comments must remain on the unit’s report until the personnel and/or equipment are returned to the parent command.

The task organized unit performing an Assigned mission (different from their Core mission) will use the manning document and/or equipment density list to enter the personnel manning requirements if different from their core mission. Enter the assigned personnel/MOS fill and equipment quantities on the Assigned Page. Comments must be made to explain the changes (unit received 2/34/0/1 [MC/ME/NO/NE] from VMM-162(rein) and 4 AH-1Z from HMLA-267). Comments must remain on the unit’s report until the personnel and/or equipment are returned to their parent command.
**Training (T-Level)**

T-Level is a measure of your organization’s ability to perform its mission essential tasks to standard. T-Level says to Higher HQ, “Out of all the things I’m supposed to be able to do, right now, I am trained to do this.”

**MET = A task selected by a commander, deemed critical to mission accomplishment. Essential is defined as absolutely necessary; indispensible; critical.**

Mission Essential Tasks (METs) assessment is the method used to determine the T-Level. The unit’s T-Level will be based on the percentage of METs trained to standard for Ground Units.

Flying Squadrons’ T-Level will be the lower of the percentage of METs trained to standard or Combat Leadership Assessment*.

**METS TRAINED TO STANDARD**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-1</td>
<td>100-85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-2</td>
<td>84-70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-3</td>
<td>69-55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-4</td>
<td>54%-0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Set forth in Type/Model/Series Training and Readiness Manual.
Mission/Mission Essential Task (MET) Assessment

Initially, the Missions and METs Assessment page displays a collapsed table of all of the Missions that are assigned to this Unit. The mission identified as your primary focus will appear with “(Assigned Mission)” after its name. Each row of the table displays the percentage of METs trained to standard, a subjective Y/Q/N assessment, and a remarks icon for a single mission. The Y/Q/N assessment and remarks are modifiable while the mission row is collapsed. The MET trained percentage is automatically updated based on the assessment of the METs that are assigned to that mission.

YQN Definitions

**Y** – “Yes” The organization can accomplish the mission to conditions and prescribed standards.

**Q** – “Qualified yes” The organization can accomplish the mission to standards under most conditions, but this performance has not been observed or demonstrated in training or operations.

**N** – “No” The organization cannot accomplish the mission to standards and conditions prescribed.

Table 3 YQN Definitions
Combat Leadership

Marine Aviation units incorporate an additional Core Training Level assessment - Combat Leadership. Combat leadership is an integral component to defining the capability of Marine Aviation units to fully conduct their METL. Combat leadership consists of advanced, highly-specialized flight leadership qualifications that enable a unit to fully conduct/manage all aspects of aviation operations during a mission. Similar to aircrew Core Model Minimum Requirement (CMMR), each aviation community has an objective flight leadership CMMR standard established for both a full squadron and squadron (-) configurations as outlined in their respective T&R manuals.

Combat leadership is calculated per NAVMC 3500.14C, T&R Program Manual, Chapter 7, by first pulling T&R event completion data from MSHARP. Combat leadership qualified aircrew will be totaled per Combat leadership category per the unit’s status as a full unit or sqdn (-). Similar to the DRRS-MC METL calculation, a unit will then divide combat leadership categories trained to standard by the total number of combat leadership categories for the unit. The resulting percentage will be compared to Table 7-4 in the T&R Program Manual to assess the final rating.

A Marine flying squadron’s final Training Level assessment shall be the lower of the DRRS-MC calculated T-Level and the Combat leadership assessment.
The METs for a given mission can be viewed by expanding any given mission row. An individual mission can be expanded by clicking on the ‘plus’ icon to the left of the mission name. Additionally, all missions can be expanded by clicking on the “Expand All” or “Collapse All” links above the Mission name. Clicking on a task will present you with the standard types and performance measures for the MET.
The standards pop-up allows you to report the standards by which the MET is assessed. Each standard will appear on a row with an input box on the right where you report your assessment of the standard. Additionally, there are three checkboxes at the bottom of this window that allow you to enter your resourced, trained and observed assessments for this task. These assessments are based on the following criteria:

- **Resourced** – The Unit is resourced (people and equipment) for the task.

- **Trained** – The Unit has trained to the task. (Unit meets the standards published in the appropriate Training and Readiness Manual for this task.)

- **Observed** - The Unit has demonstrated in training or operations the ability to accomplish the task. (Reflects PTP certification where applicable.) Includes but not limited to TTECG, MAWTS or SOTG. The unit Commander may assess the unit’s ability to perform a task when observed in training or operations.
Core Mission Level (C-Level)

The C-Level reflects the status of the selected unit resources measured against the resources required to undertake the Core mission for which the unit is designed. The C-Level will be identical to the lowest (P, R, S or T) resource level, unless subjectively raised or lowered by the Commander. If the C-Level is subjectively raised or lowered, provide supporting comments on why the calculated level was changed.

Review each of the reported resource areas to determine if the C-Level reflects your unit’s ability to carry out the Core mission. Commander’s comments are required regardless of the C-Level. When the C-Level is C-2 or less, the Commander must forecast a level change and date with supporting comments. (See MCO 3000.13, page E-4)
C-1. The unit possessses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime missions for which it is organized. The resource and training area status will neither limit flexibility in methods for mission accomplishment nor increase vulnerability of unit personnel and equipment. The unit does not require any compensation for deficiencies.

C-2. The unit possesses the required required resources and is trained to undertake most of the wartime missions for which it is orgnanized or designed. The resource and training area status may cause isolate decreases in flexibility in methods for mission accomplishment, but will not increase vulnerability of the unit under most envisioned operational scenarios. The unit would require little, if any, compensation for deficiencies.

C-3. The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake many, but not all, portions of the wartimemission(s) for which it is organized or designed. The resource or training area status will result in significant decreases in flexibility for mission accomplishment and will increase vulnerability of the unit under manym but not all, envisioned operational scenarios. The unit would require significant compensation for deficiencies.

C-4. The unit requires additional resources or training to undertake its wartime missions, but it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime missions with resources on hand.

C-5. The unit is undertaking a CMC-directed resource action and is not prepared, at this time, to undertake the wartime missions for which it is organized or designed. (e.g. CH-46 Sqd converting to M-22 Sqdn) However, the unit may be capable of undertaking non-traditional, non-wartime related missions.

Table 4: C-Level Definitions

*Excerpts from CJCSI 3401.02B Force Readiness Reporting; C-1
The Assigned Mission Level (A-Level) reflects the status of the unit’s resources measured against the resources required to undertake the assigned mission (Top Priority Plans*, Named Operations, MEU ACE, MEU BLT, etc.). Units report resources for assigned missions against a manning document and an Equipment Density List (EDL).

Units will begin reporting on the Assigned mission upon receipt of a formal Warning Order/Execution Order for deployment or NLT 90 days prior to deployment or assumption of assigned mission, whichever comes first. Reserve units will begin reporting against an Assigned mission 12 months prior to activation.

*Top Priority Plans: OPLANS/CONPLANS
Assigned mission reporting will continue until the mission ends. Units will continue to use the activity code of TR (Training) on the Basic Unit Identification Page.

Units are expected to do “Mission Analysis” throughout their Assigned mission assessment/reporting to ensure their METs are appropriate and to incorporate specific or additional skills the Assigned mission requires. Unit Commanders can modify Assigned mission METs as appropriate with Higher Headquarters approval. Use the Unit Mission Manager in NetUSR-MC to modify as applicable. Only the Assigned mission METS and performance measures can be modified.

Commanders will make mandatory remarks against the Assigned mission. Commanders must clearly comment on issues that have impacts on the Assigned mission and/or resources. When the Assigned mission is assessed as 2-4, Q, or N, units will forecast the date that they expect that assessment to change, and comment why the change will occur. (See MCO 3000.13, page E-4)
The A-Level will be identical to the lowest rating in any of the unit’s individually measured resource areas P, R, S or T, which NetUSR-MC automatically calculates. Commanders may subjectively raise or lower the A-Level. Subjective changes of assessments will be fully explained and justified. Commanders will use the manning document and equipment density list (EDL or resource document) to determine personnel and equipment readiness if different from the core mission. Commander’s comments are required regardless of the A-Level. When the A-Level is 2 or below, (See MCO 3000.13, page E-4) the Commander must forecast a level and a change date with supporting comments.
As the unit Commander, you will want to review each of the reported resource areas to determine if the A-Level reflects your unit’s ability to carry out the Assigned mission.

**A-1.** Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the **Assigned mission**.

**A-2.** Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake **most** of the Assigned mission.

**A-3.** Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake **many**, but not all of the Assigned mission.

**A-4.** Unit requires additional resources or training to undertake the Assigned mission; however, the unit may be directed to undertake portions of the mission with resources on hand.

**Table 5: A-Level Definitions**

*Excerpts from CJCSI 3401.02B Force Readiness Reporting; C-18*
Commander Override

Commanders should review the four C-Level/A-Level definitions and consider the percentage of core tasks that are resourced, trained, and observed (Y or Q). The commander may subjectively raise or lower the C-Level/A-Level using the commander’s override field located on the commander’s summary page. In determining the need for a subjective upgrade or downgrade, you will decide whether the calculated C or A-Level is in consonance with the appropriate definitions and the intent of readiness resource reporting. Readiness reports are not a performance report; they are a resource report to determine where resources might most effectively be applied.

In determining the need for a subjective upgrade or downgrade of the C-Level/A-Level, the commander will determine whether the subjective changed C-Level/A-Level would be in consonance with the C-Level/A-Level definitions listed on pages 34 & 38 of this handbook. For instance, units missing important personnel or equipment should be guarded against a subjective upgrade to C-1/A-1. Subjective changes of two or more levels should expect close scrutiny from higher headquarters.

A subjective change of the C-Level/A-Level does not permit a change to the resource and training levels (P, R, S, and T). They will be reported without adjustment. A subjective change of the C-Level/A-Level results in the requirement to submit a Reason Code (MCO 3000.13, Appendix E, Table E-2) and a mandatory remark.
**Forecast Change Date**

You must provide a change level and date if you are reporting other than C-1/A-1. The forecast get well date is a best estimate of when you anticipate the C-Level or A-Level will change. You may also use this field to report an anticipated decline in your C-Level. Remarks should be included to explain the rationale for the Commander’s forecast. For example, “Anticipate crews being combat ready by YYYYMMDD after gunnery qualifications.”

When units have an assigned mission with a start and end date, units must not forecast a change in level following the completion date of the mission. For example, an infantry battalion assigned as a Battalion Landing Team has a BLT assigned mission and that unit is reporting A-1/Y. The commander is aware of the end of that mission assignment on a future date. At the point at which the unit stops being the BLT, it also stops forecasting and reporting against the assigned mission of being the BLT. In other words, it is only the change relevant to the mission at hand that matters.
CBRN is a separate reporting requirement and does not automatically change the unit’s C-Level. To accurately determine the CBRN training readiness, the Commander must consider how the individual Marine and the unit can survive, continue their mission, and perform all duties properly in a Chemical -Biological environment.

All units will report against their ability to execute their Core METs while in a Chemical-Biological environment. CBRN equipment on-hand and in the consolidated facilities must be considered to accurately determine CBRN equipment readiness. The five CBRN equipment areas are: individual protection, detection, decontamination, radiation, and medical.

The CBRN Overall Level is automatically calculated as the lesser of the reported S and T Levels. If the CBRN Overall Level is not 1, a primary reason code must be reported, along with a directed narrative in the comment section to further clarify the issue. The value of this drop down is also determined by the lesser of the reported S and T Levels and the “5 Level Override” checkbox. In the event that the reported levels are the same, you must choose the primary reason for which area is responsible for the CBRN Overall Level, an additional overall descriptive narrative is also required in the comment section. When the “5 Level Override” checkbox is checked, the primary reason code is automatically set to N - Unit is reporting C-5 per HQMC direction. The CBRN Forecast section is used to indicate a predicted change to your Overall CBRN Level and the date at which that change will occur. A remark must be entered to capture the reasons for the predicted level change.
The Commander’s Summary page provides a means for the Commanding Officer to comment on the P, S, R, T and CBRN levels for both the Core and Assigned missions. When the level C, P, S, R, T and CBRN is not 1, the reason code dropdown will enable and a reason code must be selected. Commander’s comments are required for the C-Level and A-Levels as well as the T-Level for the Core and Assigned Missions. It is essential for commanders to address their primary concerns that would cause a degradation of effectiveness to their execution of their assigned MET. If the Commanding Officer feels that the Calculated C or A levels do not accurately reflect his capability, the Commander may over-ride calculated C-Level or A-Level using the Commander Override Function as discussed on Page 39. The Commander must fully explain an override in the Commander’s comments. C, P, S, R, or T l and CBRN levels less than “1” will “enable” the reason code drop down menu and a reason code must be selected.
If the Unit’s Core or Assigned Mission Assessment is not “Y” then the Commander must provide an explanation on the capability shortfall, as well as the resources, training, or forces required to resolve the shortfall. Commanders must provide a forecast assessment and date when the shortfall will change and state why.

- Commander’s Top Two (2) Readiness Concerns: Commanders should list their top two (2) readiness concerns to help the Marine Corps, Combatant Commands, and the Department of Defense to understand their capabilities to accomplish tactical, operational, and strategic goals.

**Mission Assessments**

See page 12 in the Command Readiness Reporting section. Commanders will assess the capability of their organizations to execute their core and assigned missions using a Yes (Y), Qualified Yes (Q), and No (N) criteria based on their assessed METs for those missions and the definitions established in Table 1.

Mandatory C/A-Level and Capability Assessment Remarks. When the C-Level/A-Level Is Other Than 1

- A mission capability assessment other than “Y” requires remarks
- Forecast C-Level/A-Level Changes
- C-5 Units
- Subjective Change in C or A-Level

**Remarks Guidance**

The Commander is responsible for the assessment of the unit. Make sure that your remarks explain the levels and put them in context. Be clear, concise and use plain English. Avoid the use of uncommon acronyms. If you do use acronyms, spell them out first.

You, as the Unit Commander, should be especially interested in what remarks are put into the Overall assessment of your unit’s readiness. Your remarks explain the true readiness of your unit to perform its core and assigned missions.

**Identify equipment and personnel shortfalls and the impact they have on the unit’s overall core and assigned missions. Provide an estimate of the resources and the time required to achieve P, S, R, T levels of 1/2.**

The key information needed is: what are the resources needed to get to C-1/C-2 and how long it will take to be ready once the resources are on hand. *(i.e. “80% TRAINED TO STANDARDS. NOT ABLE TO TRAIN AMPHIB OPS UNTIL DEC WHEN AMPHIB SHIPS AVAILABLE TO PERFORM AMPHIB PORTION OF MSN AFTER THIS TRNG.”)*

**Intermediate Level Units**

The Summary page of an Intermediate Unit Report differs from that of a Regular Report in that it allows for a subjective assessment of the Personnel and Equipment resource levels. The above example shows the resource level section of the Summary page for an Intermediate Unit report. Use the dropdowns to select a level for the resource. When the resource level is not 1, the reason code dropdown will enable and a reason code must be selected.
Readiness Points of Contact:

HQMC, Operations Division, (POR) Readiness Branch, Area code (703), DSN (312 – CONUS DSN Area code), DSN Prefix (671)

Readiness Branch Head  571-1064
Readiness Deputy Branch Head  571-1063
Systems Section  571-1031/1032/1018
Readiness Section  571-1033/1029

References:

Statutory:

DOD Directive 7730.65: Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System
DOD Instruction 3110.05: Readiness Based Material Condition Reporting for Mission Essential Systems and Equipment
CJCS Instruction 3401.02B: Force Readiness Reporting
CJCS Guide 3401D: Chairman’s Readiness System
CJCS Manual 3150.02B: Global Status of Resources and Training System
MCO 3000.13: Marine Corps Readiness Reporting Standard Operating Procedures
MCBul 3000: Marine Corps Readiness Reportable Ground Equipment
MCO 3000.11E: Ground Equipment Condition and Supply Material Readiness Reporting
MCO 3501.1C: Marine Corps Combat Readiness and Evaluation System
Non-Statutory:

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 – Warfighting

Marine Corps Interim Publication 3 – Expeditionary Operations

Marine Corps Interim Publication (DRAFT Pending) – Readiness


Jones, Frank L., A Hollow Army Reappraised, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2012.

Robinson, Jondrow, Junor & Oi, Avoiding a Hollow Force: An Examination of Navy Readiness, Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, VA 1996.


Subcommittee on Readiness and Management, Senate Armed Services Committee, The Current Readiness of U.S. Forces, United States Senate, Washington, DC 2010.