



**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**

1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

UNIT 37101

FPO AP 96373-7101

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

SIA  
30 MAY 2019

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

To: File

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING A MID-AIR COLLISION OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL-  
WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE  
AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE  
COAST OF JAPAN

Ref: (k) M-SHARP Software User Manual, Software Version 2.16.9, Document Release Date  
of 12 Mar 19

1. I have reviewed the subject command investigation.
2. The investigating officer's findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations are approved, with the exception of the following findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations.
3. The following findings of fact are disapproved:
  - a. FF 10.
  - b. FF 14.
  - c. FF 15.
  - d. FF 17.
  - e. FF 23.
  - f. FF 25.
  - g. FF 43.
  - h. FF 57.
4. The following findings of fact are modified:
  - a. FF 16 is modified to read: [REDACTED] (CO of VMFA(AW)-242 during the mishap) provided a statement to the IO on 7 March 2019. The IO conducted an interview with [REDACTED] on 2 April 2019. [Encl (26-28)]"
  - b. FF 75 is modified to read: "The MT aircrew confirmed no visible damage to the tanker other than the sheared fuel hose and missing drogue, and the MT aircrew and crash fire rescue

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confirmed no fire before the MT taxied to the lower ramp and shut down. [Encl (16-21), (24-25)]”

5. The following findings of fact are added:

a. FF 138 – There is no evidence of a schedule change or modification for 28 April 2016. [Encl (62)]

b. FF 139 – The sortie pre-requisites to execute AAR-2202 are AAR-2201, FAM-2102, and SFAM 2101. [Ref (h)]

c. FF 140 – The definition of “currency” is: “Currency. A control measure used to provide an additional margin of safety based on exposure frequency to a particular skill. It is a measure of time since the last event demanding that specific skill. For example, currency determines minimum altitudes in rules of conduct based upon the most recent low altitude fly date. Specific currency requirements for aircrew individual type mission profiles can be found in Chapter 3 of the Program Manual.” [Ref (h)]

d. FF 141 – The M-SHARP 2.0 Software User Manual describes the “Log Book Adjustments” feature of M-SHARP that contains a tool used to “baseline” a Marine’s log book in order to ensure the accuracy of training logged in M-SHARP, which is accomplished by “adjusting the flight hour totals in an aircrew log book” and “entering T&R events into a flying squadron or a ground unit log book.” [Ref (k)]

e. FF 142 – The Event Proficiency Audit Report of the mishap pilot (MP) was provided to the investigating officer (IO). [Encl (68)]

f. FF 143 – The MP’s Event Proficiency Audit Report depicts that the code for day aerial refueling (AAR-2201) was “Chain Updated” for Method on 22 February 2016 for the Environment of “HLL” and a Parent Method of “Mirrored.” [Encl (68)]

g. FF 144 – The MP’s Event Proficiency Audit Report depicts that the code for night aerial refueling (AAR-2202) was “Mirrored” for Method on 22 February 2016 for the Environment of “HLL” and a Parent Method of “Baselined.” [Encl (68)]

h. FF 145 – The MP stated in his e-mail correspondence with the IO that his “Last Tanker: 3/28/16 (I believe it was a KC-135 on the way home from a detachment).” [Encl (66)]

i. FF 146 – The MP’s Event Proficiency Audit Report depicts that the code for day aerial refueling (AAR-2201) was “Mirrored” for Method on 28 March 2016 for the Environment of “Day” and a Parent Method of “Logged.” [Encl (68)]

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j. FF 147 – The MP's Event Proficiency Audit Report depicts that the code for night aerial refueling (AAR-2202) was "Chain Updated" for Method on 28 March 2016 for the Environment of "Day" and a Parent Method of "Mirrored." [Encl (68)]

k. FF 148 – As of 5 May 2016, the flight hours with night vision goggles (NVGs) for the MP over the proceeding 30/60/90 days were respectively 2.0 hours/3.2 hours/7.7 hours and 12.0 hours for his total career NVG hours. [Encl (65)]

l. FF 149 – As of 5 May 2016, the flight hours with NVGs for the MWSO over the proceeding 30/60/90 days were respectively 2.0 hours/4.9 hours/6.5 hours and 22.6 hours for his total career NVG hours. [Encl (65)]

m. FF 150 – Per M-SHARP, the MP met the sortie pre-requisites to execute AAR-2202. [Encls (67), (68)]

n. FF 151 – The MP was not "current" to execute AAR-2202. [Encls (67), (68)]

o. FF 152 – The MP and mishap flight lead (MFL) were not authorized to conduct night aerial refueling missions because the daily flight schedule did not include AAR-2202. [Encl (62)]

p. FF 153 – Because tanker support was coordinated and VMGR-152 accurately reflected the request for night aerial refueling on their flight schedule, some form of coordination took place between VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 prior to the mission brief on 28 April 2016. [Encls (58-59)]

q. FF 154 – Reference (j) is the NATO Standard for "Air-to-Air Refueling" published by the NATO Standardization Agency in November 2013. [Ref (j)]

r. FF 155 – Paragraph 2.5 of Reference (j) describes the standard NATO "Joining – Probe and Drogue Tankers" from the "Echelon Left Position" as the following: "The left-hand side of the tanker is allocated for joining aircraft, unless the lead tanker directs otherwise. The exact location of the Echelon Left position is dependent upon the availability of rearward facing observers or boom operators that can monitor receivers; see the Tanker's National SRD for tanker configuration." [Ref (j)]

s. FF 156 – Paragraph 2.6.d of Reference (j) states under "Collision Avoidance" the following: "Receivers are responsible for ensuring that the airspace they are moving into is clear of other aircraft. In addition, moving receivers are mutually responsible for ensuring that they do not collide with the other repositioning aircraft." [Ref (j)]

t. FF 157 – Paragraph 2.28.e.4 of Reference (j) states under "Contacts/Disconnects – Straight and Level" the following: "There is considerable potential for receiver pilot disorientation during AAR, particularly at night or when horizons are ill defined; this can be exacerbated by the wing

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anhedral/dihedral of some tankers giving false horizontal cues. Ideally, all contacts and disconnects should occur in straight and level flight, although by day experienced pilots may make contacts/disconnects in steady turns, climbs and descents providing the formation is clear of cloud and the drogues are stable.” [Ref (j)]

u. FF 158 – Paragraph 2.28.e.7 of Reference (j) states under “Contacts/Disconnects – Night” the following: “By night, extra caution is needed to guard against disorientation. Therefore, with due regard to prevailing visual conditions, the tanker may permit contacts and disconnects at night whilst in a steady turn/climb/descent. Where a receiver pilot subsequently elects to make contact or disconnect only in straight and level flight, they should, if possible, inform the tanker. Some nations will not permit night contacts or disconnects in a steady turn/climb/descent unless operationally necessary.” [Ref (j)]

v. FF 159 – The VMFA(AW)-242 standard operating procedures (SOP) for air-to-air refueling states the following: “When tanking in a MOA, ensure entry altitude is at or below the tanker block (post canceling IFR and proceeding VFR, take your rate of descent as required to meet altitude adherence).” [Encl (71)]

w. FF 160 – The VMFA(AW)-242 SOP does not address the use of Night Vision Goggles (NVGs). [Encl (71)]

x. FF 161 – The VMFA(AW)-242 SOP does not address the lighting configurations while conducting night aerial refueling. [Encl (71)]

y. FF 162 – A “Midair Collision (MIDAIR)” is defined as the following: “Collision between aircraft or UAV when intent for flight exists. Flight, UAV. Includes: Mishaps resulting from collision between aircraft or UAV when intent for flight exists. Includes inadvertent contact during formation takeoffs and air-refueling operations.” [Encl (95); Ref (c), Chapter 3, Para. 315.m]

z. FF 163 – Reference (e) is OPNAVINST 5102.1D / MCO P5102.1B – “Navy & Marine Corps Mishap and Safety Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping Manual” of 5 October 2010. [Ref (e)]

aa. FF 164 – Paragraph 3004 of Reference (e) defines “Reportable Mishaps.” [Ref (e)]

bb. FF 165 – Within the “Reportable Mishaps” section of Reference (e), paragraph 3004.1 states the following: “Class A, B and C government property damage mishaps. This includes property damage caused by a government evolution, operation or vehicle to other government or non-government property.” [Ref (e)]

6. The following opinion is disapproved:

a. Opinion 8.



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7. The following opinions are modified:

a. Opinion 1 is modified to read: “The Mishap Pilot (MP) lost spatial awareness in the low light level on the night of 28 April 2016 while wearing AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Goggles (NVGs). The F/A-18D he was flying impacted the tanker’s right refueling basket, wedged the tanker’s right refueling hose between the leading edge of the F/A-18D’s right wing and LAU, and ultimately sheared off the refueling hose. [FF (5-11), (13-15), (17-18), (20), (22), (23-27), (34-37), (41-44), (45-52), (53-64), (65-67)]”

b. Opinion 4 is modified to read: “Operational Risk Management: For the mishap flight (MF), the process of aircrew training management and schedule writing by Operations, DoSS, and the CO was inadequate as all levels of supervision failed to identify that the MF would be the MP’s first night aerial refueling since the Fleet Replacement Squadron. Mitigation measures should have been implemented 72-hours ahead of the planned sortie, rather than handing an unidentified risk to the event Flight Lead to be deciphered during event planning the day prior to or the day of the mission. VMFA(AW)-242 leadership failed to identify potential currency and proficiency risks. [FF (5-11), (13-15), (17-18), (20), (22), (23-27), (34-37), (39), (41-44), (45-52), (53-64), (65-67), (151)]”

c. Opinion 7 is modified to read: “The timeline for the stand-up of the joint VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 Aviation Mishap Board (AMB) was not in accordance with References (a) and (e) and contributed to the confusion of the classification of the mishap. Once initiated, the joint AMB prepared and released the Safety Investigation Report (SIR). [FF (87-89), (91), (93-94), (96-103), (111), (121-125), (162-165)]”

8. The following opinions are added:

a. Opinion 14 – The flight control inputs of the MP caused the MA to turn into the MT, make contact with the fuel drogue, and shear off a portion of the MT hose and the fuel drogue. [FF (59-62)]

b. Opinion 15 – Mission Planning: VMFA(AW)-242 leadership failed to supervise mission planning. The commanding officer (CO), executive officer (XO), department of safety and standardization (DoSS), and operations officer of VMFA(AW)-242 did not thoroughly review the daily flight schedule. These failures are evident in the fact that AAR-2202 was not included in the daily flight schedule. A close air support (CAS) mission in Okinawa, Japan, where the F/A-18D aircraft depart from and return to MCAS Iwakuni, requires a refueling event. This refueling event is a coded event (AAR-2202). The daily flight schedule should have included either AAR-2202 or AAR-2202X for the MP. There was also a failure of understanding by the VMFA(AW)-242 aircrews of what missions they were authorized to conduct. This is evident in the fact that the MP and MFL planned for and conducted a mission (AAR-2202) that was not authorized on the daily flight schedule for 28 April 2016. [FF (5-9), (12), (18-24), (34), (138-139), (152-153)]

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c. Opinion 16 – Risk Assessment: VMFA(AW)-242 leadership failed to conduct detailed risk assessment in coordination with the daily flight schedules. The CO, XO, DoSS, and operations officer also failed to identify that the MP would be conducting his first night aerial refueling mission since arriving from the Fleet Replacement Squadron. There is no evidence to demonstrate that VMFA(AW)-242 used a Risk Assessment Worksheet in their ORM process. [FF (5), (9), (13), (16), (18), (19-24), (138-151)]

d. Opinion 17 – When VMFA(AW)-242 identified illogical chaining of codes in M-SHARP, the VMFA(AW)-242 leadership should have, at a minimum, submitted a hazard report (HAZREP) in order to identify the illogical chaining. [FF (23), (26-27)]

e. Opinion 18 – There are significant irregularities within the MP's Event Proficiency Audit Report for the event codes proceeding 28 April 2016. Both "baselined" and illogically "chained" event codes likely caused M-SHARP to depict the MP as current for AAR-2202 (night aerial refueling) as of 28 March 2016. The MP improperly received a "baselined" event code of AAR-2202 (night aerial refueling) on 22 February 2016 because of the "chained" event code of RQD-6109 (Day or Night Strategic Aerial Refueling (DC-10)) on either 11 February 2016 or 21 February 2016. There was also an illogical chaining of the MP's "logged" event codes on 28 March 2016. The "logged" event code of AAR-2201 (day aerial refueling) on 28 March 2016 "chained" the two event codes of RQD-6109 (Day or Night Strategic Aerial Refueling (DC-10)) and RQD-6111 (Day or Night Strategic Aerial Refueling (KC-135)). The two event codes of RQD-6109 and RQD-6111 then illogically "chained" the MP's AAR-2202 (night aerial refueling) on 28 March 2016. Despite having only conducted day aerial refueling event codes after joining VMFA(AW)-242, M-SHARP credited him for night aerial refueling event codes on both 22 February 2016 and 28 March 2016. [FF (23), (26-27), (139-150)]

f. Opinion 19 – There is an appearance that the organizational culture within VMFA(AW)-242 prevented junior naval aviators from bringing issues with training and mission planning to the attention of their leadership. Despite acknowledging the manpower shortfalls in the squadron during the quarterly training plan, VMFA(AW)-242 did not empower junior naval aviators like the MP to bring to the attention of squadron leadership his lack of experience in night aerial refueling or the fact that the daily schedule did not include AAR-2202. The MP, as a naval aviator and Marine Corps officer, should have volunteered the fact that this was going to be his first night aerial refueling mission in a low light level (LLL) environment. [FF (5), (18-22), (26-27), (145)]

g. Opinion 20 – Unless necessary, the MP and MFL should not have requested non-standard joins/departures during the aerial refueling control times (ARCTs). Unless necessary, the MT TPC should not have authorized non-standard joins/departures. The VMFA(AW)-242 SOP was insufficient in providing standardization for aircrews conducting air-to-air refueling. [FF (49), (154-161)]

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h. Opinion 21 – There are significantly different versions of the departure instructions requested and granted in ARCT-2. Based on the multiple versions of the events as recounted by witnesses and the significant amount of time that has passed since the Class C flight mishap, there is no clear description of the series of events that resulted in the F/A-18D shearing off the hose drogue of the KC-130J on 28 April 2016. Generally, two versions of the events were described by the witnesses. The first version of the event, as indicated by the statements of the VMGR-152 aircrew and the MWSO, involved the MP making contact with the right MT hose drogue while moving from the left hose to the reform position on the right side of the MT and MFL. The witnesses describe what appeared to be two contacts with the right hose drogue: the first contact was with the canopy of the MA and the second contact was with the wing of the MA that resulted in the hose drogue being wedged between the right wing and LAU. The second version of the event, as indicated by the statements of the VMFA(AW)-242 aircrews, involve the MP in the right reform formation, moving out of the right reform formation for departure, and then making contact with the right hose drogue while moving out of the right reform formation. [FF (53-56), (58-67), (162)]

i. Opinion 22 – The MP was using his AN-AVS-9 NVGs during the ARCT-2. His lack of experience with the NVGs, the covert lighting configuration of the MT, and LLL environment contributed to the MP's loss of situational awareness. The VMFA(AW)-242's SOP was insufficient in addressing whether NVGs were to be used by aircrews during night ARCT missions, insufficient in addressing the lighting configurations to be used during night aerial refueling missions, and insufficient in addressing standard joining and departing procedures to be used during aerial refueling missions. Both the MP and MWSO should have remained focused on the evolution of night aerial refueling prior to joining the MT and until completing their departure from the MT. In the conduct of ARCTs, sole focus for the TACAIR crew should be the ARCT mission. Compounding his lack of experience, the MP rushing because of low fuel states contributed to the mishap. [FF (50-51), (54-55), (59), (65-67), (141-149), (154-161)]

j. Opinion 23 – The two separate aircrews involved in the MIDAIR subjected themselves to post-flight medical examinations in the early morning hours of 29 April 2016 because they were either (1) directed by their chains of command to undergo the post-mishap medical examination or (2) the aircrew members considered the flight mishap to have been such a significant event that they independently understood the importance of documenting their own medical readiness within hours of the flight mishap. Both aircrews took steps that are only required in the aftermath of a significant flight mishap. [FF (29), (79-80), (85), (86), (88)]

k. Opinion 24 – On 6 May 2016, the CO of MAG-12 informed the Commanding General of 1st MAW that the MIDAIR collision cost analysis crossed the threshold of a Class D flight mishap. Given the potential magnitude and severity of the MIDAIR, and though not explicitly required, the CO of MAG-12 should have directed an administrative investigation as a tool to gather, analyze, and record relevant information about the flight mishap. At a minimum, there should not have been a delay in initiating an AMB until 11 June 2016. The CO of MAG-12 should not have waited on the analysis of the Naval Safety Center to convene the AMB. The

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uncertainty related to the initial reporting of the incident further justified the importance of a prompt, neutral, and thorough examination of the flight mishap. It is evident through some of the actions of the squadrons (submission to medical examinations, taking pictures of the damage, reporting to the SDO, and estimating damage costs) that momentum at some point had begun towards conducting an administrative investigation. However, no administrative investigation was completed prior to this current investigation. [FF (68-69), (71-96), (123), (99-103), (162-165)]

l. Opinion 25 – Based on the timelines, the immediate actions of mishap aircrews, the concurrent efforts of cost analysis, and the statements regarding costs made by the CO of VMFA(AW)-242 in the days after the Class C flight mishap, the COs of MAG-12, VMFA(AW)-242, and VMGR-152 consistently undervalued the cost estimates of the flight mishap. Regardless, after the Naval Safety Center confirmed the actual threshold of the classification, the failure to order an administrative investigation into the underlying causes of the Class C flight mishap demonstrated a significant departure from a prudent and careful investigation of events. [FF (68-69), (71-96), (162-165)]

m. Opinion 26 – A Human Factors Board (HFB) is not designed to hold Marines accountable. Therefore, the convening of a HFB was insufficient to hold the aircrews and their leadership responsible for the aviation mishap. The VMFA(AW)-242 squadron leadership, MAG-12 leadership, or the 1st MAW leadership should have convened a Field Flight Performance Board for the aircrews. [FF (99), (104-110), (126-129), Ref (g)]

n. Opinion 27 – Some of the actions of and statements by members of VMGR-152 indicate that an administrative investigation was likely started by VMGR-152. However, it is unclear whether this administrative investigation was formally started by VMGR-152 and why the initial investigative steps were not followed up by either the squadron or MAG-12 leadership. [FF (79-80), (82-86), (90-94), (126-129)]

o. Opinion 28 – The COs and staffs of MAG-12, VMFA(AW)-242, and VMGR-152 failed to address the underlying issues identified in the Class C Mishap. The illogical chaining of events on M-SHARP was identified, but there is no evidence to demonstrate that the commands requested this issue be corrected. Though updates were made to the VMFA(AW)-242 SOP, the VMFA(AW)-242 leadership did not improve the efficacy of ORM, to include the use of RAWs, and detailed mission planning. Also, VMFA(AW)-242, VMGR-152, and MAG-12 failed to capture the Class C flight mishap in their command chronologies. Though the squadrons indicated that a joint squadron debrief occurred, there was no institutional knowledge captured about the Class C flight mishap. The command chronologies of VMFA(AW)-242, VMGR-152, and MAG-12 should have indicated the 28 April 2016 Class C flight mishap alongside any other Class A, B, C, or D flight mishaps in order to ensure proper situational awareness for squadrons of recent flight mishaps. [FF (26-27), (130-137), (141), (143-144), (146-147)]

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9. The recommendations are approved, with the exception of the following:

a. Recommendation 1 is approved with the following modification: "MAG-12" should  
replace "VMFA(AW)-242."

b. Recommendation 4 is disapproved.

10. The supervisory and leadership failures described above in Opinions 3, 4, 6, 15, 16, 17, 18,  
21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28 involve personnel who are no longer members of the 1st Marine  
Aircraft Wing. As such, I intend to forward this investigation to the appropriate General Court-  
Martial Convening Authorities for their review and determination of appropriate administrative  
or disciplinary action.

11. This investigation is closed.

12. The point of contact for this matter is the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Staff Judge Advocate,  
[REDACTED] available at [REDACTED] and  
[REDACTED]



T. D. WEIDLEY

Copy to:  
CG, III MEF  
CO, MAG-12



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
UNIT 37101  
FPO AP 96373-7101

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

IO

11 May 19

From:

To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

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OKINAWA, JAPAN

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F, Manual of the Judge Advocate General  
(b) OPNAVINST 3710.7U, Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures  
Standardization General Flight and Operating Instructions  
(c) OPNAVINST 3750.6S, Naval Aviation Safety Management System  
(d) MCO 5100.29B, Marine Corps Safety Program  
(e) OPNAVINST 5102.1D CH-2 / MCO P5102.1B Ch 2, Navy and Marine Corps  
Mishap and Safety Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping  
(f) COMNAVAIRFORINST 5420.1G, Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Board (FNAEB)  
Procedures  
(g) MCO 1000.6, Assignment, Classification, and Travel System Manual (ACTSMAN)  
(h) NAVMC 3500.50C, F/A18A/B/C/D Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual  
(i) NAVMC 3500.53B, KC-130J Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual  
(j) ATP-3.3.4.2, NATO Standard Air-to-Air Refueling ATP-56

Encl: (1) Appointing Order dtd 23 Jan 2019  
(2) Command Investigation Contacts - 28 April 16 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152  
Incident/Aviation Mishap  
(3) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: MAW CI) - Command Investigation Introduction  
to the Marines and Chains-of-Command involved with the 28 Apr 2016  
VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident dtd 7 and 24 Mar 2019  
(4) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: MAW CI - Written Statement Prep) - Command  
Investigation Introduction - Written Statement Preparation for the Marines and  
Chains-of-Command involved with the 28 April 16 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152  
Aerial Refueling Incident dtd 8 and 24 Mar 2019  
(5) Command Investigation Interview - Intent and Questions for the Marines and  
Chains-of-Command involved with the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152  
Aerial Refueling Incident dtd 9 Mar 2019  
(6) Command Investigation Extension Request dtd 19 Mar 2019  
(7) Command Investigation Extension Approval dtd 19 Mar 2019  
(8) Command Investigation Extension Request dtd 5 Apr 2019  
(9) Command Investigation Extension Approval dtd 5 Apr 2019  
(10) Command Investigation Extension Request dtd 24 Apr 2019

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- (11) Command Investigation Extension Approval dtd 30 Apr 2019
- (12) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 12 Mar 2019
- (13) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 12 Mar 2019
- (14) Summary of Interview with [REDACTED] dtd 25 Mar 2019
- (15) Interview follow-up from [REDACTED] dtd 1 Apr 2019
- (16) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 24 Mar 2019
- (17) Original Statement provided in April 2016 of [REDACTED] dtd  
24 Mar 2019
- (18) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 24 Mar 2019
- (19) Summary of Interview with [REDACTED] dtd 4 Apr 2019
- (20) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 13 Mar 2019
- (21) Summary of Interview with [REDACTED] dtd 20 Mar 2019
- (22) Privacy Act Statement [REDACTED] dtd 13 Mar 2019
- (23) Response to Questions from [REDACTED] dtd 3 Apr 2019
- (24) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 12 Mar 2019
- (25) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 12 Mar 2019
- (26) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 7 Mar 2019
- (27) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 7 Mar 2019
- (28) Summary of Interview with [REDACTED] dtd 2 Apr 2019
- (29) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 15 Mar 2019
- (30) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 26 Mar 2019
- (31) Summary of Interview with [REDACTED] dtd 2 Apr 2019
- (32) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 8 Mar 2019
- (33) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 8 Mar 2019
- (34) Summary of Interview with [REDACTED] dtd 1 Apr 2019
- (35) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 15 Mar 2019
- (36) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 30 Mar 2019
- (37) Summary of Interview with [REDACTED] dtd 1 Apr 2019
- (38) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 3 Apr 2019
- (39) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 3 Apr 2019
- (40) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 28 Mar 2019
- (41) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 1 Apr 2019
- (42) Summary of Interview with [REDACTED] dtd 2 Apr 2019
- (43) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 27 Mar 2019
- (44) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 1 Apr 2016
- (45) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 26 Mar 2019
- (46) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 27 Mar 2019
- (47) Summary of Interview with [REDACTED] dtd 30 Mar 2019
- (48) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 26 Mar 2019
- (49) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 28 Mar 2019
- (50) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 26 Mar 2019
- (51) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 1 Apr 2019
- (52) Summary of Interview with [REDACTED] dtd 20 Apr 2019



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- (53) Privacy Act Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 26 Mar 2019
- (54) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 26 Mar 2019
- (55) Summary of Interview with [REDACTED] dtd 28 Mar 2019
- (56) E-mail Correspondence - Request for Information (RFI) and Responses - VMGR-152 Schedule, Operational Risk Management - Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW)), Qualification, Currency, and Tanker Special Instructions (SPINS) RFI, dtd 8 Mar 2019
- (57) E-mail Correspondence - Request for Information (RFI) with Responses - VMFA(AW)-242 Schedule, Operational Risk Management - Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW), Qualification, Currency, and Tanker SPINS RFI, dtd 8 Mar 2019
- (58) VMGR-152 Flight Schedule dtd 28 Apr 2016
- (59) VMGR-152 Risk Assessment Worksheet dtd 28 Apr 2016
- (60) VMGR-152 Transport Pilot in Command Hotboard dtd 28 Apr 2016
- (61) VMGR-152 Transport Second Pilot Hotboard dtd 28 Apr 2016
- (62) VMFA(AW)-242 Flight Schedule dtd 28 Apr 2016
- (63) VMFA(AW)-242 Squadron Aircrew Qualifications dtd 20 Jan 2016
- (64) VMFA(AW)-242 Quarterly Training Plan for April-June 2016 dtd 16 Apr 2016
- (65) VMFA(AW)-242 Hotboard dtd 5 May 2016
- (66) Response to Currency Questions by [REDACTED] dtd 3 Apr 2019
- (67) MSHARP Log Book Report for [REDACTED] 5/1/2015-12/1/2018 dtd 1 Apr 2019
- (68) MSHARP Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR) Event Proficiency Audit Report for [REDACTED] as of 04/01/2019
- (69) Air to Air Refueling Card - Sumo 04 dtd 28 Apr 2016
- (70) Lite Level Planning Calendar for Kadena AB for April 27-30 2016
- (71) VMFA(AW)-242 Squadron Standard Operating Procedures dtd 23 Oct 2015
- (72) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: Flash Report) - Incident Description to MajGen Sanborn from [REDACTED] originating from [REDACTED] dtd 2247 28 Apr 2016
- (73) 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 In-Flight Emergency Incident Report, 1st MAW Incident Report System Database
- (74) VMFA(AW)-242 F/A-18D Pictures after recovery to Kadena Airbase from [REDACTED] dtd 28 Apr 2016
- (75) VMFA(AW)-242 F/A-18D Pictures after recovery to Kadena Airbase from [REDACTED] dtd 29 Apr 2016
- (76) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: information about April 2016) from [REDACTED] introducing four e-mails (Enclosures 69, 72, 74, and 75) discussing the Mishap Determination (of the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 13 Mar 2019
- (77) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: Aileron on 00) discussing Initial Cost Breakdown (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 1654 4 May 2016
- (78) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: Pictures of F/A-18 Damage) - Pictures of the VMFA(AW)-242 F/A-18D involved in the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-



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- 152 Aerial Refueling Incident to MajGen Sanborn from his Aide-de-Camp dtd 5 May 2016
- (79) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: 242 Aileron aircraft) discussing Initial Cost Estimate and Mishap Determination (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 0306 6 May 2016
  - (80) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: Class D SIR) discussing the Incident Cost and Mishap Determination (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 1231 6 May 2016
  - (81) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: RFI Answers) discussing the Maintenance and Supply Cost Determination, Mishap Determination, and Reporting Requirements (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 0723 11 May 2016
  - (82) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: CLASS D: \$48,364) discussing the final Maintenance and Supply Cost Determination (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 1259 11 May 2016
  - (83) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: VMFA(AW)-242 Mishap Upgrade) discussing the Class C Mishap Determination and Mishap Board Identification (for the 28 Apr 16 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 0107 1 June 2016
  - (84) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: Safety Center Email) discussing the Class C Mishap Determination and the Command Responsible for the Mishap Board (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 2127 1 Jun 2016
  - (85) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: AMB) discussing the Class C Mishap Aviation Mishap Board Member COAs (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 1305 9 Jun 2016
  - (86) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: 242 AMB) discussing the Class C Mishap Aviation Mishap Board Member Composition and Way Forward (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 1352 16 Jun 2016
  - (87) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: 152/242 AMB Composition Decision) discussing the Class C Mishap Aviation Mishap Board Member Composition and Way Forward (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 1526 16 Jun 2016
  - (88) VMFA(AW)-242 SOP rev 5 Draft dtd 18 Jul 2016
  - (89) VMFA(AW)-242 SOP dtd 1 May 2018
  - (90) VMFA(AW)-242 Risk Assessment Worksheet Blank dtd 25 Mar 2019
  - (91) Recall Letter, [REDACTED] dtd 6 May 2016
  - (92) MAG-12 Command Chronology (April-September 2016) dtd 28 Feb 17
  - (93) VMFA(AW)-242 Command Chronology (April-September 2016) dtd 12 Sep 16
  - (94) VMGR-152 Command Chronology (April-September 2016) dtd 18 Nov 16
  - (95) Marine Corps, Navy and Naval Aviation Safety, Aircrew Performance and Administrative References and Definitions

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### **Preliminary Statement**

1. In the research and writing of this Command Investigation report three years after the 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Air-to-Air Refueling Incident which was subsequently identified as a Class C Flight Mishap, the Investigating Officer recognized and repeatedly communicated to all witnesses that an objective inquiry into the incident was required. Isolating the associated facts of the April 2016 incident was extremely challenging given the December 2018 VMFA(AW)-242 – VMGR-152 Class A Flight Mishap which occurred in a strikingly similar environment. Repeatedly, it was vital to strive to isolate facts from opinion and hearsay understanding this administrative report will be scrutinized by those searching for an answer to why the December 2018 mishap occurred. Many of those interviewed took a step back once they understood fact based statements and interviews were required. However, passion still crept into statements and conversations. This passion is quite evident in much of the original e-mail communication referenced in this report. This report's findings of fact and enclosures must be understood in their entirety to effectively separate not fully informed conjecture and passionate opinions. The intent of this investigation is to evaluate all evidence with an aim to find the commonality in the statements and interviews in order to identify the unimpassioned facts of the 28 April 2016 Class C Flight Mishap and provide relevant opinions and salient recommendations.
2. This command investigation acknowledged the sentiments and perceptions of all interviewed witnesses about the 28 April 2016 Class C flight mishap and subsequent reporting. However, this command investigation relied on findings of fact supported by the evidence gathered during the course of the investigation. In accordance with Reference (a), a command investigation "shall arrive at findings of fact only if supported by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e., more likely than not" as the standard of proof. Further, an investigation "may not speculate on the causes of an incident. Reasonable inferences drawn from evidentiary enclosures or personal observations, however, are permissible."
3. At approximately 2015 on 28 Apr 2016 upon completion of low-light air-to-air refueling, the Mishap Pilot (MP) rejoined in the right echelon position. Subsequently as the F/A-18D section departed the tanker, the MP lost spatial awareness. In flight, the Mishap Aircraft (MA) canopy impacted the KC-130J's refueling basket before the refueling hose wedged between the leading edge of the F/A-18's right wing and LAU-7; ultimately the basket and 6-8 feet of refueling hose sheared off and was retained between the F-18D wing and LAU-7. During scheduling, VMFA(AW)-242 failed to properly identify the night aerial refueling event as the MP's initial night air-to-air refueling event in the fleet and subsequently did not adequately assess the associated risk nor facilitate relevant and appropriate risk decisions to be made at the appropriate level. During execution, the MP's lack of experience and the Mishap Flight Lead's (MFL) insufficient supervision contributed to the mishap.
4. Post-mishap reporting was efficient, but the subsequent timeline of the investigation was sub-optimal. While the incident's cost determination was in development, VMFA(AW)-242

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conducted a Human Factors Board (HFB) on 6 May 2019 with a report provided to [REDACTED] on 10 May 2016. This HFB report was turned over to [REDACTED] in conjunction with the 13 May 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 Change-of-Command. Due to slow cost determination at the squadron level and review by the Naval Safety Center, the stand-up of the Aviation Mishap Board (AMB) was not timely. Although slow to form, once initiated, the AMB efficiently prepared and released the Safety Investigation Report (SIR). The combined VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 AMB formed 17 June 2016 and completed 8 August 2016.

5. In accordance with reference (a) and as directed by enclosure (1), a 1st Marine Air Wing (1st MAW) Commanding General (CG) directed Command Investigation (CI) was conducted to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding a mid-air collision of an F/A-18D from Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 (VMFA(AW)-242) and a KC-130J from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152) off the coast of Okinawa, Japan on 28 April 2016. The directives and special requirements stated in enclosure (1) were met.

6. The 23 March 2019 deadline for the CI was not met. Extension requests were submitted and approved on 19 March, 5 April, and 24 April 2019. [Encls (6-10)]

7. In order to understand this command investigation, a reader must first understand the references. A list of pertinent direction and definitions was consolidated from Marine Corps, Navy, and Naval Aviation Safety, Aircrew Performance and Administrative orders and definitions to provide a baseline of relevant Aviation Mishap investigation and reporting requirements. Therefore, a thorough review of Enclosure (95) is required to create a common understanding of interrelated references that apply to the command investigation of a flight mishap. The references and definitions in Enclosure (95) will assist the reader in understanding key terms used throughout the investigation.

8. The deliberate process pursued to investigate the incident was (1) an initial e-mail introduction providing notice of the 1st MAW CG directed CI; (2) a follow-up phone call once contact was established; (3) a follow-up e-mail request for a factual statement accompanied by a Privacy Act Statement for signature and an explanation of the difference between statements provided to an AMB and a CI; (4) a subsequent interview when appropriate; and (5) follow-up actions as deemed necessary from facts communicated in the written statements and/or during interviews. [Encls (2-5)]

9. Imbedded in the request for a written statement was an explanation of why a JAGMAN is conducted; a review of the Privacy Act Statement; and a detailed review of the privileged nature of an AMB Investigation and the privileged information in the AMB produced Safety Investigation Report (SIR).

10. After the first General Officer in the Chain of Command was notified of the investigation by the current 1st MAW CG, initial contact was made with fifteen (15) individuals. After receipt of

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initial statements and conduct of initial interviews, the contact list expanded to twenty-four (24) persons.

11. The final contact list comprised of twenty (20) Officers, one (1) Staff Non-Commissioned Officer (SNCO), and three (3) Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), is broken into three identifiable groups:

- a. those directly involved in the 28 April 2016 mishap, inclusive of ten (10) Marine Officers, SNCO, and NCOs in VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242;
- b. the VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 Chains-of-Command, inclusive of six (6) Marine Officers; and
- c. those with direct knowledge of immediate and follow-on actions taken by the Chains-of-Command, inclusive of nine (9) Marine Officers in VMGR-152, VMFA(AW)-242 and MAG-12.

12. Receipt of the voluntary statements initiated coordination of twelve (12) interviews. The intent of the interviews was to amplify facts and provide professional perspective of the incident, incident reporting, and the subsequent investigations. The interviews focused on six topics: (1) Incident/Mishap Details; (2) Immediate Actions Taken (Incident Report and Initial Damage Assessment); (3) Continuing Actions Taken (Investigations initiated, the extent of the damage, and subsequent maintenance repairs); (4) External Influence (real or perceived); (5) Procedures/Lessons Learned; and (6) Accountability. In the wrap-up of each interview, the individual interviewed was asked for recommendations of additional questions that should be asked and for any additional facts of which the Investigating Officer (IO) should be made aware.

13. During the course of the investigation, contact and availability with the individuals involved with the 28 April 2016 incident now dispersed to commands world-wide challenged efficiency. The first statement was received 7 March 2019 and the final statement was received 11 April 2019. The first phone interview was conducted 20 March 2019 and final phone interview was conducted 22 April 2019.

14. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

15. Tragically, the VMGR-152 Commanding Officer (CO) at the time of the incident passed away in January 2019 and was therefore unable to provide a statement nor available to interview.

16. Both COs for VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152 turned over Command (13 May 2016 and 27 May 2016 respectively) during the period between the incident (28 April 2016); the conduct of the VMFA(AW)-242 Human Factors Board (6 May 2016); and the combined VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152 AMB (initiated on 17 June 2016 and completed on 8 August 2016).

17. In the aftermath of a flight mishap, two or three simultaneous investigations are conducted. For administrative investigations, the governing reference is Reference (a). For safety

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investigations, the governing reference is Reference (c). An important dimension of safety investigations is the concept of safety privilege. Members of the Aviation Mishap Board (AMB) may give promises of confidentiality. However, statements provided to members of the command outside of the members of the AMB are not privileged communications. On 6 May 2016, the MWSO confided in his commanding officer his memory of the Class C flight mishap on 28 April 2016 through a written statement. However, this statement is not a safety privileged communication. The AMB was not formed until 17 June 2016. Therefore, the MWSO's signed and written statement, provided to his commanding officer, maintained in the turnover documents between commanding officers of VMFA(AW)-242, and provided to the investigating officer by the post-mishap CO of VMFA(AW)-242 is a statement outside of the safety investigation and included in this administrative investigation.

18. As a Marine Officer and Fixed Wing Attack Pilot, the IO maintains intermittent professional and personal relationship with several individuals who provided statements and were interviewed during the investigation to include the COs of VMFA(AW)-242, VMGR-152, and Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12) and the Commanding General of 1st MAW at the time of the incident. There are no conflicts of interest that precluded the IO from conducting a thorough and unbiased investigation.

### **Findings of Fact**

#### **Scheduling, Qualifications, Currency, and Event Pre-Requisites**

1. On 28 April 2016 VMGR-152 Flight Schedule, "Event 2, Sumo 04" [REDACTED] (hereinafter referred to as "Mishap Tanker Transport Pilot in Command (MT TPC)") and [REDACTED] (hereinafter referred to as "Mishap Tanker Transport Second Pilot (MT T2P)") of VMGR-152 were scheduled for AAR-3602 (Air to Air Refueling (AAR) System / Panel Procedures), AAR-3600 (Fixed Wing Air to Air Refueling (FWAAR) / Tilt-Rotor Air to Air Refueling (TAAR)), and NS(H)-2151 (Night Systems (High) Low Light Level (LLL) Night Vision Device (NVD) Procedures). [Encl (58)]
2. VMGR-152 crewmembers included [REDACTED] (hereinafter referred to as "Mishap Tanker Crewmaster One (MT CM 1)"), [REDACTED] (MT CM 2), [REDACTED] (MT CM 3), and [REDACTED] (MT CM 4). [Encl (58)]
3. All VMGR-152 members were qualified, current and complete with required sortie pre-requisites to execute the Night Air-to-Air Refueling event. [Ref (i), Encls (16-21), (24-25), (57-61)]
4. The VMGR-152 Risk Assessment Worksheet for 28 April 2016 was completed. [Encl (59)]

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5. On the 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule, "Event 6-1, Profane 61" [REDACTED] (hereinafter referred to as "Mishap Pilot (MP)") and [REDACTED] (hereinafter referred to as "Mishap Weapon Systems Officer (MWSO)") of VMFA(AW)-242 were scheduled for SL-6307 (Section Leader Standardization and Designation (SL) Night CAS), CAS-3106 (Night CAS - Type 1, 2, and 3), CAS-3105 (Urban CAS), and NS-2402 (Night System Formation Flying). [Encl (62)]

6. On the 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule, "Event 6-2, Profane 62" [REDACTED] (hereinafter referred to as "Mishap Flight Lead (MFL)") and [REDACTED] (hereinafter referred to as "Mishap Flight Lead Weapon Systems Officer (MFL WSO)") of VMFA(AW)-242 were scheduled for CAS-3106 (Night CAS - Type 1, 2, and 3), CAS-3105 (Urban CAS), and NS-2402 (Night System Formation Flying). [Encl (62)]

7. On the VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule, "Event 6 (Profane 61 and 62)" was scheduled for a 4.0 hour Night Close Air Support (CAS) event. The mission was a Section Lead (SL) work-up with departure from Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, a CAS vulnerability (VUL) window in support of 5th ANGLICO/3rd RECON overhead Camp Courtney, and a return to MCAS Iwakuni. [Encl (63)]

8. Based on distances traveled, CAS missions originating from MCAS Iwakuni executed in Okinawa airspace require a tank-CAS-tank mission profile or a refueling stop on Okinawa (Kadena Airbase or MCAS Futenma). [Encl (63)]

9. On the 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule, "Event 6, Profane 61 and Profane 62" were not scheduled for AAR-2202 (Night Aerial Refueling). [Encl 63]

10. While not scheduled for AAR-2202, the MP was qualified, current and complete with required sortie pre-requisites to execute a Pre-mission Air-to-Air Refueling – Night CAS – Post-mission Night Air-to-Air Refueling event. [Encls (63-68)]

11. While not scheduled for AAR-2202, the MFL was qualified and current to execute as the designated Flight Lead for a Pre-mission Air-to-Air Refueling – Night CAS – Post-mission Night Air-to-Air Refueling event. [Encls (63-65)]

12. The 28 April 2016 VMGR-152 Air-to-Air Refueling support for VMFA(AW)-242 was coordinated in early April. [Encl (13-21), (45-47), (53-55)]

13. There is no record of the VMFA(AW)-242 Risk Assessment Worksheet for 28 April 2016. [Encls (58)]

14. During event planning for the 28 April 2016, VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 Day and subsequent night Air-to-Air Refueling events, MT T2P and MP executed detailed coordination under the supervision of MT TPC and MFL. [Encl (13-21)]



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15. In review of the daily flight schedule with the accompanying Hotboards and RAW; the VMFA(AW)-242 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED] did not recognize that the scheduled event was the MP's initial Night Aerial Refueling look in the Fleet. [Encls (62-69)]

16. [REDACTED] (CO of VMFA(AW)-242 during the mishap) provided a statement to the IO on 7 Mar 2016. The IO conducted an interview with [REDACTED] on 2 April 2016. [Encl (26-28)]

17. During the interview, when asked about ORM and Risk Assessment Worksheets used alongside the flight schedule, [REDACTED] communicated that ORM was continuous in the squadron. Though [REDACTED] did not recall specific risk assessment worksheets used, he did comment in his interview that he knew ORM associated with 'things that could get us in trouble' was a steady conversation within the Squadron Operations, Maintenance, and Safety and Standardization Departments. Commenting specifically on flight events in execution, "the brief captured the risks and the de-briefs assessed the ORM for the executed mission." [Encls (26-28)]

18. On 16 April 2016, the VMFA(AW)-242 "QUARTERLY AIRCREW TRAINING PLAN FOR APRIL-JUNE 2016" discussed combat readiness in depth. The training plan stated that "[t]he training department's focus is to maintain combat readiness in the near and distant future. Due to significant loss of highly qualified aircrew in the spring of 2016, the squadron will lack the instructor qualifications, combat leadership designations, and available aircrew (especially WSOs) required by [the F/A-18 T&R Manual] to execute all METs." [Encl (64)]

19. On 30 March 2019, [REDACTED] (post-mishap VMFA(AW)-242 [REDACTED]) provided a statement to the IO. On 2 April 2019, the IO conducted an interview with [REDACTED] [Encls (35-37)]

20. During his interview on 2 April 2019, [REDACTED] commented on the aircrew qualification build process in VMFA(AW)-242. He perceived that there was an overture of "Qual inflation and over reporting, over-reporting readiness" in the squadron and the "squadron pushed guys towards quals before they may have been ready." [Encl (37)]

21. [REDACTED] (VMFA(AW)-242) was a [REDACTED] from January 2016 until mid-May of 2016 before he turned over with the VMFA(AW)-242 [REDACTED] in late May 2016. [REDACTED] provided a statement to the IO on 1 April 2019. The IO conducted an interview with [REDACTED] on 18 April 2019. [Encl (50-52)]

22. During his interview, [REDACTED] commented broadly on his initial perceptions of VMFA(AW)-242 scheduling and the impact it had on pre-mission planning. [REDACTED] commented that "[i]t was open knowledge amongst the aircrew that the squadron did not plan adequately due to the lack of aircraft available." [REDACTED] expressed that it seemed "that many

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times the flight schedule may have been written with no anticipation of being achievable.” He perceived that the result was “stress amongst younger aircrew preparing for evaluated events with little lead time for preparation.” [Encl (52)]

#### Air-to-Air Refueling Qualification and Currency

23. An Event Proficiency Audit conducted on MP’s flight history utilizing MSHARP identified that AAR-2202 (Night Aerial Refueling) was chained on 21 February 2016 when he tanked during the day on a Strategic Tanker and logged RQD-6109 (Day or Night Strategic Aerial Refueling). [Encls (67-68)]

24. Prior to 28 April 2016, the only previous night tanking evolution MP completed was a 1000-level unaided Night Aerial Refueling sortie while at the Fleet Replacement Squadron. [Encls (66-68)]

25. During weekly and daily flight schedule builds in April 2016, MSHARP chaining MP’s AAR-2202 after he logged RQD-6109 on 21 February 2016 caused VMFA(AW)-242 Squadron Operations to not recognize that the MP had not completed AAR-2202. On 28 April 2016, MP flew the night Air-to-Air refueling portion of the event as a perceived AAR-2202R (Refresh) when in actuality it was an AAR-2202X (initial 2000-level night qualification). [Encls (66-68)]

26. When asked during the 2 April 2019 interview, [REDACTED] commented on the chaining of codes: “I don’t remember any specific issues with MSHARP . . . [however] I remember complaints in Ops of illogical chaining.” [Encl (28)]

27. When asked during the 2 April 2019 interview, [REDACTED] commented that as a learning organization, VMFA(AW)-242 learned from the 28 April 2016 incident and subsequently understood that MSHARP didn’t properly track Air-to-Air refueling codes and therefore had to be watched and tracked carefully until MSHARP was fixed. [Encl (37)]

#### Flight Planning, Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR) Coordination, and Brief

28. On 12 March 2019, the MFL provided a written statement to the IO. An interview was conducted on 25 March 2019 and a follow-up statement was provided on 1 April 2019. [Encls (12-15)]

29. On 24 March 2019, the MT TPC provided a written statement to the IO along with a copy of the original statement that he previously provided to the VMGR-152 ASO in April 2016. A follow-up interview was conducted on 4 Apr 2019. [Encls (16-19)]

30. On 20 March 2019, an interview with MT T2P was conducted by the IO. [Encls (20-21)]



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31. On 3 April 2019, the MFL WSO provided a written response to the IO after receiving the investigation interview question template. [Encls (22-23)]
32. On 12 March 2019, MT CM 4 provided a written statement to the IO. [Encls (24-25)]
33. On 2 April 2016, [REDACTED] provided the IO a statement from the MWSO dated 6 May 2016. The statement was found by [REDACTED] in personal historical files maintained from his VMFA(AW)-242 Command tour. [Encl (91)]
34. During planning, a 24,000 pound off-load was coordinated between the MT T2P and MP. MT TPC directly supervised the coordination; MT TPC and MFL directly reviewed the planning prior to the Mission Briefs. [Encls (12-23), (58-62), (69)]
35. The initial Aerial Refueling Control Time (ARCT) was 1830. The second ARCT planned for 1915. [Encl (69)]
36. In Okinawa, sunset was at 1851, End of Evening Nautical Twilight (EENT) was 1949, with Low Light Level from 1950 to 0100. [Encl (70)]
37. The weather forecast was clear with no anticipated cloud cover nor turbulence in the working area. [Encls (12-13)]
38. The VMGR-152 brief was at 1445, with a 1615 take-off and 2130 land. [Encls (16-21), (58-62), (69)]
39. The VMFA(AW)-242 brief was at 1530, with a 1730 take-off and 2130 land. [Encls (12-15), (62)]
40. The VMGR-152 brief given by MT TPC, was standard with no significant issues highlighted as remembered by TPC, T2P, or CM 4. [Ref (b), (i); Encls (17-21), (24-25), (58-61), (69-70)]
41. The VMFA(AW)-242 brief was given by the MP. [Ref (b), (h); Encls (12-15)]
42. MFL recalled the brief was 'solid'; strong administration, tactical administration, tactical, and tanker administration. [Ref (b), (h); Encls (12-15)]
43. MFL led the discussion of night tanking considerations to include a tanker administration conversation and lighting given the utilization of Night Vision Devices (NVDs). [Ref (b), (h), Encls (12-15)]
44. MFL WSO, a Weapons and Tactics Instructor, stated the brief was in accordance with Appendix B, the F/A-18 Briefing Guide. [Reference (b), (h); Encls (12-15), (22-23)]

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Flight Execution: Take-off, transit, and first ARCT

45. VMFA(AW)-242 aircraft take-off and transit was uneventful after departing approximately 30 minutes behind schedule due to maintenance issues. [Encls (12-15), (91)]
46. MFL statement of 12 March 2019 identified weather as “Wx: Overcast/broken 10’k, clear skies above, 0% illumination (no moon above the horizon). [Encls (12-13)]
47. MT TPC communicated during the 4 April 2019 interview, the “weather was clear...no turbulence was encountered, no cloud layers were observed” in vicinity of the refueling track. [Encl (19)]
48. The MT TPC indicated in his statement and interview that “Profane requested that we make a right turn to assist their join as they conducted an underrun of our aircraft due to what likely was misjudging closure rate.” [Encl (17), (19)]
49. MT TPC also commented that “They requested to join on the right, but I declined their request and told them to join on the left as originally cleared.” [Encl (17), (19)]
50. The MT TPC indicated that “Profane requested extra fuel on the front side due to lower than expected fuel state for their upcoming mission.” [Encl (17), (19)]
51. The F/A-18 section took 18,000 pounds of the 24,000 pounds of fuel during the initial ARCT. [Encls (18-19), (21)]
52. The MT TPC commented “post fueling, Profane flight was cleared right reform and once they were established they were cleared straight ahead and above.” Profane’s “departure was uneventful.” [Encl (18-19)]

In-flight Mishap

53. MFL indicated in his statement and interview that during the second ARCT rendezvous, “Profane 61” had radar issues – difficulties finding/obtaining SA to the C-130/tanker. “Profane 62” had radar SA – range to the tanker is beginning to get tight (decreasing), so Profane 62 took Tac-Lead [Tactical (TAC) Lead] on the right and executed an uneventful tanker join.” Due to the swap of TAC Lead to facilitate the tanker join, the Profane call-signs swapped as the section joined the MT’s ‘Echelon Left’ position. [Encls (12-15)]
54. MT TPC’s statement from 24 March 2019 commented that Profane “requested a join on the left and simultaneous plugging due to low fuel states.” [Encls (17-18)]
55. The MT TPC indicated that Profane “also requested we come to a 330 heading to assist in dragging them towards the northwest boundary of the Warning Area.” [Encls (17-18)]

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56. The scheduled '-2 or Wing' F/A-18D (MFL in TAC Lead position) was complete with refueling on the right hose, moved to, and stabilized in the 'Echelon Right' position. [Encls (12-25), (91)]

57. The MFL, MFL WSO, and MWSO corroborated that as the MFL coordinated departure high with intent for a slight left turn (with vertical deconfliction established towards the filed route of flight from the Tiger Tanker Track to MCAS Iwakuni), the MP backed out of the left basket to the 'Left Astern' position, then proceeded to the 'Echelon Right' position (Post Air to Air Refueling Reform Position) joining outside (right) of the MFL. [Encls (12-15), (22-23), (91)]

58. At approximately 2015 on 28 April 2016, the scheduled VMFA(AW)-242 'Lead' F/A-18D aircraft (MA in the TAC Wing position) completed tanking on the left hose of the VMGR-152 KC-130J (Mishap Tanker (MT)). [Encls (12-25), (91)]

59. The MWSO's statement from 6 May 2016 described the following: "At this point Sumo was covert lighting. Once we had good fuel flow I switched our AUX frequency to Naha Control to work our clearance, and I turned down the boom freq in PRI. For the next couple minutes I only heard bits and pieces of the comm between Sumo and Profane, but I heard the departure instructions: high and to the left. Profane 61 [MFL] was satisfied first, and they went to starboard observation. About 30 seconds later Profane 62 [MP] was satisfied. We backed out, crossed under the C-130, and joined on the right hand side of Profane 61. I was looking through the goggles at this point, and I could see both Profane 61 and Sumo. Once we were to the right of Profane 61 we began to accelerate to depart. At this point I stopped scanning outside, and instead came inside the aircraft to set up the nav and comm. I wanted to make sure we had everything in order when the lead got passed back to us. I knew it would be a quick transition because we were on the northern border of the Tiger airspace. Profane 61 began a left hand turn per the departure instructions. I was still looking inside the aircraft, but I felt our jet turn to the left. At this point I thought we were in front of and above Sumo. As we were turning there was a sudden and loud whack on the canopy, followed by a substantial yaw to the right. I looked at the canopy, and then at the right wing. Through the goggles, I saw a tanker hose wedged in between the leading edge flap and the LAU on the right wing. The basket was still attached to the hose. We began an immediate climb and I gained a visual of Sumo below us at our right 2 o'clock. I alerted Profane 61 that we had a tanker hose and basket attached to our wing. From there we turned towards Kadena, since it was about 300 miles closer than Iwakuni." [Encl (91)]

60. The MFL's statement from 12 March 2019 described the following: "Profane 61/62 are now joined in normal starboard side ops (61 right of the C-130, 62 right of 61). Profane 61 [TAC Lead] Pilot and WSO both confirm over ICS they are visual of Profane 62 [TAC Wing] (stepped down low, not too sucked).

- Profane 61 request to depart Sumo 'up and left'
- Sumo 04 clears Profane Flight 'up and left'

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- Profane 61 initiates climb / departure instructions (up/high and to the left).
- Approximately 40-60 seconds later, Profane 62 informs Profane 61 they have a part of hose/basket hanging from their right wingtip.
- Profane 61 conducts a battle damage check and confirms what Profane 62 was reporting; visual of a hanging refueling hose with basket intact to the hose that is wedged between the right leading edge flap and the LAU/AIM-9 CATM.
- Profane 61 informs Sumo 04 of the incident
- Profane 61/62 divert to Kadena AFB uneventfully.” [Encls (12-13)]

61. The MT TPC statement from 24 March 2019 described the following: “With Profane 62 [MP] satisfied on the left he was cleared to disconnect left go right reform. Profane 61/62 flight was then cleared to depart forward and above. I witnessed Profane 61 [MFL] start to depart as tasked. Profane 62 [MP] was witnessed passing from left to right past the tail section via my left window observer [MT CM4]. Prior to the right window observer attaining full visual of Profane 62 [MP] the crew felt a violent shake of the aircraft like severe turbulence. A few seconds later I witnessed Profane 62 [MP] moving from under my aircraft from the center towards the outer left side and forward. As this was not their cleared departure I called Profane 61 [MFL] over the AAR primary. ‘Profane 61 this is Sumo 04, be advised I cleared both aircraft to depart from my right side to proceed forward and above. I have Profane 62 on my left and low can you explain?’ ‘Sumo this is Profane 61, let my check with my dash 2.’ Approximately 4-5 seconds later he [MFL] came back ‘Yeah, Sumo my dash 2 has something on his wing that belongs to you.’ I immediately sent my Plane Captain into the back to inspect our hoses.” [Encls (16-17)]

62. The statement from MT CM4 described the following: “I [MT CM4] was positioned in the left paratroop window . . . The left receiver [MP] began to move aft to disconnect with the hose. I then called disconnect when the receiver decoupled the drogue. As the left receiver [MP] began moving to the right echelon, he crossed under our aircraft, and I gave the call that the receiver was crossing our six from left to right, low. The receiver [MP] then passed under the aircraft heading to the right side. At that time I hear what sounded like a jet and our aircraft had a jerking movement to the right. I stayed position in the left paratroop window while we received a call from the receivers that they have our drogue. I was then instructed to make sure that the drogue was still attached on the left hose, which it was still intact . . . Both hose were difficult to see since it was [sic] low visibility and between the strobes on the NVG’s they then confirmed that the entire hose was gone on the right side.” [Encls (24-25)]

63. The MFL and MFL WSO commented that with departure coordination complete, the MFL added power, climbed straight ahead for ~6-800’ and then turned left 20-30 degrees to intercept the filed route of flight to MCAS Iwakuni. [Encls (12-15), (22-23)]

64. The MFL, MFL WSO, and MWSO commented that at that point where the MFL added power, the MP went from a Right Echelon position, heard/felt a thump on the canopy (the right tanker basket), experienced a right yaw (induced by the right tanker hose wedging between the mishap aircraft (MA) right wing and LAU) followed by a left yaw (as the right tanker hose and

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basket separated from the MT), and then smooth forward flight, climbing to where the MA viewed the MT low and right. [Encls (12-15), (22-23), (91)]

#### Night Vision Devices and Lighting Package

65. VMFA(AW)-242 used AN-AVS-9s during the event. [Encls (12-15), (22-23), (91)]

66. In the MFL's statement from 12 March 2019, he indicated: "Lights: Overt on join, Covert once joined/AAR (this was requested by Profance 61/Tac-Lead)." [Encls (12-13)]

67. All members of the flight remember goggles being used throughout the second ARCT and did not communicate 'de-goggling' nor 'goggling' after completion of the ARCT. [Encls (12-25), (91)]

#### Post Mishap Inflight Actions

68. After realization that the MA had the MT's right refueling basket trailing off of the right wingtip, the F/A-18D section and KC-130J separated, conducted the appropriate emergency procedure for their platform, and diverted as individual flights to Kadena Air Base (AB). [Encls (12-25)]

69. The VMFA(AW)-242 section conducted a visual 'Battle Damage Check' on the MA, executed a controllability check on the way to Kadena AB, and conducted an uneventful visual straight-in landing to runway 05 at Kadena AB. [Encls (12-15)]

70. Once the MA cleared the runway, the aircraft taxied to the standard Marine transient parking on the fighter ramp and shut-down. [Encls (12-15), (22-23), (91)]

71. The VMGR-152 aircraft trouble shot in the Warning Area. [Encls (16-21), (24-25)]

72. Unable to see the refueling hose due to the low light level, the MT executed the 'landing with trailing hose' emergency procedure, the most conservative emergency procedure given the uncertainty of damage to the refueling pod assembly, the possible fuel or hydraulic fuel spillage which could be ignited if the aircrew decided to pursue the 'hose guillotine' emergency procedure. [Encls (16-21), (24-25)]

73. With the emergency procedure complete, the MT conducted an ILS 05L approach to Kadena AB, minimized brakes and beta on landing, and stopped on the runway. [Encls (16-21), (24-25)]

74. The crew masters then exited the aircraft via the ramp, conducted a visual inspection, and FOD sweep. [Encls (16-21), (24-25)]

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75. The aircrew confirmed no visible damage and the aircrew and crash fire rescue confirmed no fire before the MT taxied to the lower ramp and shut down. [Encl (16-21), (24-25)]

#### VMFA(AW)-242 Post-flight Actions

76. After shutdown, VMFA(AW)-242 pilots and WSOs conducted a walk around and post flight aircraft inspection of the MA. [Encls (12-15), (91)]

77. The tanker hose was wedged between the leading edge of the wing and the LAU and the basket was hanging, just barely touching the ground. [Encls (12-15), (22-23), (91)]

78. According to the MFL, the "plane was in pretty good shape, hose was there, some paint damage, minor dings on the leading edge, nothing gross...CATM-9 trailing fins damaged. Canopy, some black smear marks." [Encls (12-15)]

79. Immediately after the landing and post-flight inspection, the MFL WSO reported the incident to the chain of command: "Both F/A-18s were in right echelon (starboard reform) after refueling was completed. While departing the KC-130 aircraft, -2's aircraft contacted a portion of one of the two refueling hoses on the back of the KC-130 which resulted in a portion of the hose becoming attached to -2's aircraft right outboard wing." [Encls (22-23)]

80. MWSO commented that he and the MP reported to the MCAS Futenma Medical Clinic for lab-work on the morning of 29 April 2016. [Encl (91)]

#### VMGR-152 Post-flight Actions

81. After shutdown, VMGR-152 pilots and aircrew conducted "a thorough walk around and post flight inspection of the KC-130J, secured the aircraft, and reported safe on deck and the incident to the Squadron Flight Duty Officer (FDO). [Encls (16-21), (24-25)]

82. The MT TPC reported the incident details to the VMGR-152 FDO along with where and what time the incident occurred. [Encls (16-21), (24-25)]

83. The MT TPC asked the FDO to let him know if the CO wanted to discuss the incident. [Encls (16-19)]

84. The VMGR-152 Aviation Safety Officer (ASO) contacted the crew. [Encls (16-19)]

85. MP TPC took pictures of damage to the VMFA(AW)-242 aircraft on the night of 28 April 2016 and during the day on 29 April 2016. [Encls (74-75)]

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86. VMGR-152 pilots and crew coordinated a post mishap medical examination after completion of required post-flight actions. The examinations and lab work was conducted at MCAS Futenma in the early morning hours of 29 April 2016. [Encls (16-21), (24-25)]

#### Mishap Reporting

87. The incident was reported to the 1st MAW CG by the VMFA(AW)-242 CO via the MAG-12 CO at 2247 28 April 2016. [Encl (72)]

88. The VMFA(AW)-242 CO provided the initial incident details, "the last F-18 backed out, post refueling, the tanker entered a right turn as the hornet went left. When the F-18 was in reform he noticed that the refueling hose was wrapped around the right wing of the LAU-7 ... The F-18s landed in RODN (Kadena) uneventfully and post flight inspection didn't indicate damage beyond black scuff marks from the hose. No physical damage was evident. A more detailed inspection will be conducted in daylight. A FLASH report is currently being written." [Encl (72)]

89. The incident report (MAG-12, VMFA(AW)-242, Aviation, In-Flight Emergency, 04/28/2016, 2015) was filed by VMFA(AW)-242 as follows: "This is an Aviation, Non-Injury, Non-Alcohol related incident. While conducting a night Air-to-Air refueling mission in the Tiger airspace, the F/A-18 aircrew heard a loud bang and noticed that the refueling hose was wrapped around their wing tip and no longer attached to the tanker. The aircrew successfully diverted into Kadena Air Base. The incident and divert were conducted over water. This report has been reviewed by LtCol Shawn M. Basco, VMFA(AW)-242 CO." [Encl (73)]

90. On 8 March 2019, [REDACTED] (post-mishap CO of VMGR-152) provided a written statement to the IO. A follow-up interview was conducted on 1 April 2019. [Encls (32-33)]

91. [REDACTED] stated that "I was told by a VMGR officer who went to begin the investigation in April, that when they went to get pictures of the F-18, despite obvious damage to the aircraft, the VMFA-242 maintainers were already taking it apart in order to fix it and were just treating it like a broken aircraft." [Encl (33)]

92. On 3 April 2019, [REDACTED] (Executive Officer of VMFA(AW)-242 at the time of the mishap) provided a written statement to the IO. [Encls (38-39)]

93. In his 3 April 2019 statement, [REDACTED] commented that he met with the VMFA(AW)-242 "aircrew in the days following the incident in an effort to determine what happened, but there were gaps and variations in the story due to each person's situational awareness and memory of the event." [Encl (39)]

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94. [REDACTED] further commented in his statement that "I recall we were lacking aircraft data for either one o[r] both of the aircraft involved which is recorded through the manual depression of the 'POS REC' button in the aircraft, so we weren't initially able to piece the event together that way." [Encl (39)]

95. On 15 March 2019, [REDACTED] (CO of MAG-12 at the time of the mishap) provided a statement to the IO. [Encls (29-30)]

96. In his statement, [REDACTED] commented that "[t]he first time the incident came to my attention was a day after the event occurred. I received either a phone call or email from the Wing (either MajGen Sanborn or his chief of staff) inquiring as to what occurred. The CG saw the aircraft parked on the apron at Kadena AFB with the hose on the LAU. A picture was eventually sent to me from the Wing (either from the CG or the COS). Once informed, I immediately contacted the unit's CO, [REDACTED] to find out what had occurred. He came to my office to go over the incident." [Encl (30)]

#### Cost Determination

97. On 4 May 2016, VMFA(AW)-242's initial cost assessment of the F/A-18D damage was \$19,474.20. [Encl (77)]

98. On 4 May 2016, VMGR-152's initial cost assessment of the KC-130J damage was \$16,682.27. [Encl (77)]

99. On 6 May 2016, the MAG-12 initial assessment of cost using the 15% rule was \$21,976.54 – a Class D Mishap. [Encls (77), (79-80)]

100. On 11 May 2016, VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 met, reviewed costing data requirements and derived the VMFA(AW)-242 cost as \$28,072 and VMGR-152 cost as \$20,292 for a total cost of \$48,364 – a Class D Mishap. [Encl (82)]

101. The total cost of \$48,364 was submitted to the Naval Safety Center for review and final direction. [Encls (81-82)]

102. On 1 June 2016, the Naval Safety Center directed the 15% rule is not appropriate for two F/A-18D parts (aileron and the aileron shroud). [Encl (79)]

103. With no facts identifying the final cost determination by the Naval Safety Center, MAG-12, VMGR-152, or VMFA(AW)-242, the IO calculated the final cost determination. Adjusting the F/A-18D aileron and aileron shroud to full cost, VMFA(AW)-242's cost alongside the VMGR-152 cost increased the incident's total cost to \$146,510 – a Class C Flight Mishap. [Encl (95)]



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VMFA(AW)-242 Human Factors Board (HFB)

104. On 6 May 2016, VMFA(AW)-242 held a Human Factors Board (HFB). [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

105. The "Human Factors Board Results regarding the Flight Incident with VMGR-252 on 28 April 16 dtd 10 May 16" is maintained in the private files of the VMFA(AW)-242 Commanding Officer, [REDACTED] [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

106. [REDACTED] does not recall directing the convening of the HFB, however he did turn over the HFB Results to [REDACTED] as the recommendations and mitigation measures were not complete and/or not able to be completed in the short period of time before the VMFA(AW)-242 Change of Command. [Encls (26-28), (35), (37), (95)]

107. VMFA(AW)-242 personnel designated by the CO to convene the board were the VMFA(AW)-242 Executive Officer (Chairman), Aviation Safety Officer, Operations Officer (Senior WSO), and Flight Surgeon. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

108. The MP, MWSO, MFL, and MFL WSO were the subjects of the HFB. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

109. Applicable internal/external friction and mitigation measures were documented. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

a. High Squadron operational tempo was discussed as internal squadron friction and external friction with families. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

b. New jobs within the squadron without assistance was discussed as internal administrative friction. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

c. Crew Coordination was discussed as being an issue prior to and during the event. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

d. Night System proficiency, comfort with the goggles, and night tanking was discussed as an issue before and during the event. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

110. Applicable scheduling and training recommendations and mitigation measures were documented and maintained in the private files of the VMFA(AW)-242 Commanding Officer, [REDACTED] [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

VMFA(AW)-242 Change of Commands and Personnel Turnover

111. On 13 May 2016, the VMFA(AW)-242 Change of Command from [REDACTED] USMC to [REDACTED] was conducted. [Encls (26-28), (35-37)]

112. The VMFA(AW)-242 Human Factors Board Report was left for [REDACTED] review and use as the new Commanding Officer. [Encls (35-37)]

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113. After the mishap and change of command, [REDACTED] implemented training recommendations and mitigation measures for VMFA(AW)-242. [Encls (35-37), (48-52)]

114. On 16 May 2016, at [REDACTED] initial All Officers Meeting (AOM), he directed an immediate review of flight administrative procedures while operating in the vicinity of a tanker in the VMFA(AW)-242's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). [Encls (35-37)]

115. [REDACTED] changes were intended to be an immediate implementation of a very deliberate, administratively focused process approaching, refueling, and departing the tanker. [Encls (35-37)]

116. The process was imbedded and published in the 3 September 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 Squadron SOP. [Encls (35-37), (48-52)]

117. On 16 May 2016, [REDACTED] reduced the number of squadron personnel who had MSHARP Baseline privileges from fourteen (14) to approximately four (4). [Encl (35-37), (48-52)]

#### VMGR-152 Change of Commands and Personnel Turnover

118. The VMGR-152 Change of Command from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] was 27 May 2016. [Encls (32-34)]

119. [REDACTED] (the VMGR-152 Executive Officer (XO) at the time of the incident) provided a written statement on 26 March 2019. [Encls (45-47)]

120. In his statement, [REDACTED] commented that "I find it surprising that there was never a CI at either squadron, and actually think that one may have been done at 152, but it would now be irretrievable due to the unfortunate recent loss of the then-CO, [REDACTED]" [Encls (45-46)]

#### Aviation Mishap Board (AMB)

121. On 9 June 2016, to ensure the appropriate mix of subject matter expertise in order to properly analyze the mishap, the MAG-12 Director of Safety and Standardization (DoSS) recommended a joint composition VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 AMB to the MAG CO. [Encl (85)]

122. On 16 June 2016, the MAG-12 CO decided and communicated the specific make-up of the AMB joint composition directed to investigate the 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Class C Mishap. [Encls (86-87)]

123. On 17 June 2016, VMFA(AW)-242 released the Initial Notification of the mishap. [Encl (41)]

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124. The AMB composition was made up of the Senior Member – VMGR-152; ASO – VMFA(AW)-242; Maintenance Representative – VMGR-152; Operations Representative – VMFA(AW)-242; and Flight Surgeon – VMFA(AW)-242. [Encls (40-42), (82-87)]

125. On 8 August 2016, the AMB investigating the 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Class C Mishap released the Safety Investigation Report. [Encls (40-42)]

#### Lessons Learned

126. [REDACTED] (post-mishap VMFA(AW)-242 DoSS), provided a statement on 26 March 2019. [Encls (48-49)]

127. In his statement, [REDACTED] commented that “I do not believe there was ever a Field Flight Performance Board or Command Investigation directed by [VMFA(AW)-242].” [Encls (48-49)]

128. [REDACTED] stated that “[b]ased on the results of the AMB, my Commanding Officer implemented the following procedural changes: baselining privileges for Training and Readiness (T&R) codes were significantly reduced and specific verbiage was included in the Squadron’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) regarding the conduct of air-to-air refueling.” [Encls (48-49)]

129. [REDACTED] stated that “a combined ‘lessons learned’ session was held between the two squadrons involved to discuss what occurred during the mishap and how to mitigate future air-to-air refueling issues.” [Encls (48-49)]

#### Command Chronologies

130. On 28 February 2017, MAG-12 published their Command Chronology for the time period of April 2016 through September 2016. [Encl (92)]

131. In the section labeled “Safety and Standardization,” the MAG-12 Command Chronology does not mention the Class C mishap that occurred on 28 April 2016. [Encl (92)]

132. On 12 September 2016, VMFA(AW)-242 published their Command Chronology for the time period of 1 April 2016 through 30 September 2016. [Encl (93)]

133. The MP was the Command Historian and point of contact for the VMFA(AW)-242 Command Chronology. [Encl (93)]

134. In the section labeled “Safety and Standardization,” the VMFA(AW)-242 Command Chronology does not mention the Class C mishap that occurred on 28 April 2016. [Encl (93)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING A MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON  
242 F/A-18D AND A MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152  
KC-130J MID-AIR COLLISION ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE COAST OF  
OKINAWA, JAPAN

135. On 18 November 2016, VMGR-152 published their Command Chronology for the time period of 1 April 2016 through 30 September 2016. [Encl (94)]

136. The VMGR-152 Command Chronology states that “[p]otential hazards were identified, analyzed, and mitigated resulting in zero aircraft flight related and ground mishaps from April to September 2016.” [Encl (94)]

137. The VMGR-152 Command Chronology lists the last Class C Mishap to have occurred on 31 July 2015 and the last Class D Mishap to have occurred on 24 February 2015. [Encl (94)]

### Opinions

#### Mishap Cause

1. The Mishap Pilot (MP) lost spatial awareness in the low light level on the night of 28 April 2016 while wearing AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) which caused the F/A-18D he was flying to impact the tanker’s right refueling basket, further to wedge the tanker’s right refueling hose between the leading edge of the F/A-18D’s right wing and LAU, and ultimately shear off the refueling hose. [FF (5-11), (13-15), (17-18), (20), (22), (23-27), (34-37), (41-44), (45-52), (53-64), (65-67)]

2. Contributing factors to the mishap were (1) the limited proficiency and experience of the MP (10.0 NVG hours prior to 28 April 2016); (2) the low light level environment, (3) the resultant poor depth perception while using NVGs, and (4) the significant blooming of the MFL’s lights which amplified MFL’s movement as the MFL departed from the KC-130J’s right echelon as the MP had just settled into the re-join. Given the event description and training objectives as a section lead work-up, the MFL should have passed TAC Lead back to the MP, thus enabling the MP to continue the sortie as the lead aircraft focusing on flying his jet rather than overloading the MP’s bucket. [FF (5-11), (13-15), (17-18), (20), (22), (23-27), (34-37), (39), (41-44), (45-52), (53-64), (65-67)]

#### Supervision

3. VMFA(AW)-242’s insufficient monthly, weekly, and daily flight schedule planning and Operational Risk Management (ORM) contributed to the mishap. VMFA(AW)-242 leadership failed to (1) adequately address the concerns expressed in the Quarterly Training Plan through appropriate ORM; (2) properly plan for the air-to-air refueling mission (AAR-2202 (Night Aerial Refueling)) when it was not included in the daily flight schedule; and (3) schedule AAR-2202X (Night Air-to-Air Refueling - Initial) on the weekly nor daily schedule which resulted in insufficient ORM to be conducted for the mishap event. [FF (5-11), (13-15), (17-18), (20), (22), (23-27)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING A MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON  
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KC-130J MID-AIR COLLISION ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE COAST OF  
OKINAWA, JAPAN

4. As VMFA(AW)-242 monthly flight schedules turned into weeklies and subsequently into daily schedules for execution, VMFA(AW)-242 leadership failed to identify potential currency and proficiency risks. For the MF event, the review of weekly and daily schedules by Operations, DoSS, and the CO was inadequate as all levels of supervision failed to identify that the MF would be the MP's first night aerial refueling in the fleet. The aircrew portion of an effective Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW) identifies potential currency and proficiency risks to unit Pilot Training Officers, Weapons System Training Officers, and Schedulers to ensure timely and appropriate risk mitigation. Flight Leads should be fully enabled by the Command in the execution of events affected by dynamic environmental considerations (light levels, weather, etc.) which affect aircrew performance no matter the experience level. Specific to this incident, mitigation measures should have been implemented 72-hours ahead of the planned sortie rather than handing a yet to be identified risk to the event Flight Lead to be deciphered during event planning the day prior to or the day of the mission. [FF (5-11), (13-15), (17-18), (20), (22), (23-27), (34-37), (39), (41-44), (45-52), (53-64), (65-67)]

#### Mishap Reporting

5. The significant amount of time that passed between the 28 April 2016 Class C flight mishap and this investigation created challenges for those interviewed to accurately recall events and reporting timeline specifics. Marines interviewed provided various descriptions of the Class C Flight Mishap based on each individuals' situational awareness, vantage point, and memory. [FF (53-64), (68-75), (76-80), (81-86), (87-89), (91), (93-94), (96)]

6. The incident cost determination was convoluted – incident costs should have initially been estimated at the worst case (highest cost) and then reduced as corrective maintenance and associated supply details developed. [FF (97-103)]

7. The stand-up of the joint VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 Aviation Mishap Board (AMB) was not timely. However, once initiated the AMB efficiently prepared and released the VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Air-to-Air Refueling Class C Flight Mishap (FM) Safety Investigation Report (SIR). All required reports associated with the 28 April 2016 Class C Flight Mishap were ultimately released and given time, were effectively clarified to the chain of command. [FF (87-89), (91), (93-94), (96), (97-103), (111), (121-125)]

#### Accountability and Lessons Learned

8. The Mishap Pilot (MP), the Mishap Flight Lead (MFL), the Mishap Weapon Systems Officer (MWSO) and Mishap Flight Lead Weapon Systems Officer (MFL WSO) were held accountable by the VMFA(AW)-242 Commanding Officer. [FF (104-110), (120), (127), (129)]

9. The Human Factors Board conducted 6 May 2016 developed several training recommendations for the flight members as well as developed salient talking points for

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING A MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON  
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KC-130J MID-AIR COLLISION ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE COAST OF  
OKINAWA, JAPAN

subsequent All Officer Meetings where the flight members could share the lesson's learned with peers, seniors, and subordinates. [FF (104-110)]

10. VMFA(AW)-242 pro-actively standardized proper administrative procedures utilized in the aerial refueling environment by adjusting the Squadron SOP to ensure deliberate, steady airwork and headwork during Air-to-Air Refueling Operations. [FF (113-117), (128-129)]

11. A contemporaneous Command Investigation was likely not conducted even after the Air-to-Air Refueling incident was determined to be a Class C Flight Mishap. [FF (120), (127)]

#### Process Improvement

12. MSHARP should not chain AAR-2202 (Night Air-to-Air Refueling) after RQD-6109 (Day or Night Strategic Aerial Refueling) is executed and logged. [FF (5), (23-25)]

13. The new VMFA(AW)-242 SOP implemented on 3 September 2016 sufficiently addressed the air-to-air refueling procedural deficiencies identified in this investigation. [FF (114-116)]

#### Recommendations

1. VMFA(AW)-242 conduct a comprehensive review of night aerial refueling procedures and best practices as well as internal planning methodology inclusive of Operational Risk Management (ORM) policies and procedures and scheduling quality assurance.

2. VMFA(AW)-242, MAG-12, and 1st MAW review deliberate Operational Risk Management (ORM) tools available within the USMC tactical fixed-wing communities to develop and implement a Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW) that meets VMFA(AW)-242 requirements and needs.

3. No further investigation is required into the circumstances associated with the VMFA(AW)-242 F/A-18D and VMGR-152 KC-130J mid-air collision off the coast of Japan on 28 April 2016.

4. As no negligence existed nor was found during the investigation of the VMFA(AW)-242 F/A-18D and VMGR-152 KC-130J mid-air collision off the coast of Japan on 28 April 2016, no administrative action is required.





UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
UNIT 37101  
FPO AP 96373-7101

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
5830  
CG

23 JAN 2019

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

To: [REDACTED]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A MID-AIR COLLISION OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F

1. This letter appoints you to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding a mid-air collision involving a F/A-18D from Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 (VMFA(AW)-242) and a KC-130J from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152) off the coast of Japan on 28 April 2016.
2. You are directed to investigate the aviation mishap, the resulting damage to the aircraft, and any other military property so affected, and the manner in which the incident was reported. If no contemporaneous Command Investigation was conducted into the subject mishap, you will develop findings of fact, opinions and recommendations as to the rationale for the lack of contemporaneous investigative action. Reference (a) pertains.
3. Investigate any fault, neglect, or responsibility thereof, and recommend appropriate administrative or disciplinary action. Report your findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in writing, via letter form, within 60 days from the date of this appointment order, unless an extension of time is granted. If you have not previously done so, read Chapter II of reference (a) in its entirety before beginning your investigation. Reference (a) pertains.
4. This investigation is a top priority within the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. This investigation takes precedence over your regularly assigned duties until complete. However, given your extensive responsibilities within III Marine Expeditionary Force, you will have to manage your time and efforts accordingly. You are directed to consult with a member of the Armed Forces or an officer or employee of the Department of Defense who possesses knowledge and expertise relevant to aviation mishap investigations.
5. Other investigative team members may be added to provide necessary expertise or administrative support, as required. [REDACTED] a judge advocate, is hereby appointed as Legal Advisor. You are directed to seek legal advice from him. Additionally, you shall seek legal advice from the Staff Judge Advocate, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing prior to signing your report.

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A MID-AIR COLLISION OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

6. During the conduct of this investigation, you are to observe the requirements of the Privacy Act, Article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and paragraphs 0209, Parts E and F, and Appendix A-2-n of reference (a).

7. Note that there is an aviation mishap safety investigation into this incident. A JAGMAN investigation in accordance with reference (a) is considered collateral to the safety investigation. You are directed to ensure your investigation does not violate the privileged nature of the safety investigation. Specifically, you are prohibited from using privileged statements provided in conjunction with the aviation mishap safety investigation. You may not use the opinions, analysis, or conclusions of the aviation mishap safety investigation, or any subsequent endorsements thereof.

8. By copy of this appointing order, all staff sections and subordinate commanders are directed to furnish all necessary assistance.

9. The point of contact for this matter is 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Staff Judge Advocate, [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

  
T. D. WEIDLEY

Copy to:  
CG, III MEF  
CO, MAG-12  
CO, VMFA 242  
CO, VMGR-152  
SJA, 1st MAW  
File



CI Contacts - 160428 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Incident / Class C Aviation Mishap

Updated - 0800 25 Apr 19  
Initial Contacts (190306)

Pri	Pri	Unit	Billet	E C	P C	St	Int	Current CG	Name	Notified	Current Command
1	1	VMFA(AW)-242	MP	0307	0325 0	0402 0	0401 0	2nd MAW	BGen Heckl	190223	VMFAT-501, 2nd MAW (Stud Pers)
8	2	VMFA(AW)-242	MLead Pilot	0307	0307	0312	0326	III MEF	LtGen Smith	190218	5TH ANGLICO III MEF
10	3	VMGR-152	MTanker Pilot	0306	0312 0	0324 0	0404 0	4th MAW	MajGen James	190221	VMGR-234 MAG-41 4TH MAW
11	4	VMGR-152	MTanker Co-Pilot	0307	0314 0	0318	0320	MCU	BGen Bowers	190222	USMC EXP Warfare School (Quantico Student)
12	5	VMGR-152	MTanker Aircrew 1	0324 0	0312 0	NA	NA	2nd MAW	BGen Heckl	190223	VMGR-252 MAG-14 2D MAW
7	6	VMFA(AW)-242	MWSO	0308	0325 0	0318	0401 0	II MEF	LtGen Hedlund	190221	2D ANGLICO MIG II MEF (Camp Lejeune) - Air Officer
9	7	VMFA(AW)-242	MLead WSO	0307	0312 0	0404 0	0401 0	2nd MAW	BGen Heckl	190223	AIRCREW TRAINING DET 2D MAW BEAUFORT (MATSS Beaufort OIC)
13	8	VMGR-152	MTanker Aircrew 2	0306	0314 0	NA	NA	1st MAW	MajGen Weidley	190218	VMGR-152 MAG-12 1ST MAW
14	9	VMGR-152	MTanker Aircrew 3	0311	0312 3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	IRR
15	10	VMGR-152	MTanker Aircrew 4	0306	0311 0	0312	NA	4th MAW	MajGen James	190221	VMGR-452 MAG-49 4TH MAW / TAD to VMGR-152, MAG-12
2	11	VMFA(AW)-242	CO 1	0306	0307	0307	0402 0	DCMC	LtGen Love	190305	SHAPE NATO, Military Assistant to DCMC
3		VMGR-152	CO 1	NA	NA	NA	NA	Wounded Warrior	NA	NA	Wounded Warrior
4	14	VMGR-152	CO 2	0306	0307	0308	0401 0	Retired	NA	NA	Retired - United Training
5	12	MAG-12	CO	0306	0320 0	0326 0	0402 0	DC P&R	LtGen Jansen	190220	DC PROG & RES (P&R) DEPT HQMC (Pentagon)
6	15	1st MAW	CG	0418	0422	NA	0422	MARFOREUR	MajGen Sanborn	190221	CDR MARFOREUR/AF, SENIOR LEADER MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MMSL)
CG Aide (Current)				NA	NA	NA	NA	MARFOR AFRICOM, Aide-de-camp,			

Follow-up Contacts (190324)

		Unit	Billet	E C	P C	St	Int	Current CG	Name	Notified	Current Command
20	13	VMFA(AW)-242	CO 2 - MAG Ops	0314	0314 0	0330 0	0402	Retired		NA	FEDEX
16	16	VMFA(AW)-242	XO 1	0401 0	NA	0404	NA	CNO - OPNAV		190323	Office of the CNO - OPNAV Aviation/Ship Integration
17	17	VMGR-152	XO 1	0325	0325 0	0401 0	0402	HQMC (Safety Division)		190323	HQMC - Safety Division, Aviation Safety Officer
18	18	VMFA(AW)-242	XO 2 / DOSS 1	0325 0	0325	0328 0	NA 03	I MEF		190323	I MEF -G37 Exercise Cell OIC
22	19	VMGR-152	XO 2	0325 0	0325	0327 0	0330 0	MATSG-22		190323	MATSG-22 - VT-35
19	20	VMGR-152	DOSS	0324	NA	NA	NA	EAS (FEDEX)		NA	FEDEX
21	21	VMFA(AW)-242	DOSS 2	0325 0	NA 03	0328 0	NA	HQMC (P&R)		190323	HQMC - Program Coordinator, Operations Officer PANDR
23	22	MAG-12	XO	0324	NA	NA	NA	MATSG-22		190323	MATSG-22 TRNG COM NAS CORPUS CHRISTI TX
24	23	VMFA(AW)-242	Maint	0325 0	0325	0417 0	0418 0	WWBn		190323	WWBn San Diego
25	24	VMFA(AW)-242	OpsO 1	0325 0	NA 03	0326	0328	3d MAW		190323	(VMFA-225) MAG-11, 3d MAW

**190307 Introduction - MAW CI into 160428 VMFA(AW)-242 – VMGR-152 FWAR Incident**

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Weekday, MMM DD, 2019 HH:MM A/PM  
To: Witness  
Subject: MAW CI

Rank Last,  
First,

Good morning. [REDACTED]. As an AV-8B Pilot, I have been asked by the MAW CG to conduct a Command Investigation into the April 28, 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Mishap. To reduce potential angst, the simple reason behind the initiation of this investigation at this late date is no PI or CI was executed in 2016 for factual reference. Unfortunately, the sole investigation currently available is on the Safety side of the house which due to imbedded privileged information is unavailable to other investigations.

Please acknowledge receipt of this e-mail to let me know this is the correct e-mail address and provide a telephone number which I can follow-up for a voice conversation to discuss the administrative way forward (discussion of rights, request for statement, request for interview, etc...). I look forward to our discussion as I gather the unimpassioned facts required to complete a concise report for the 1st MAW Commanding General.

Semper Fidelis,

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

## 190308 MAW CI – Written Statement Prep

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Day, MMM DD, 2019 HH:MM A/PM

To: Witness

Subject: MAW CI - Written Statement Prep

Name,

As discussed on the phone (or via e-mail) earlier, this is the follow-up e-mail to push necessary admin details.

Attached is the Privacy Act Statement. If you would review, initial where applicable, and sign, I would appreciate it. As necessary, we can discuss while you review. For the CI report, a scan of the initialed/signed Privacy Act Statement is needed along with a scan of your signed statement.

For review, immediately below and attached in the word document is amplification on 'why separate statements' and 'what differs between statements' for a Mishap Investigation and a Command Investigation.

"Requisite Advisement iaw JAGINST 5800.7F, Manual of the Judge Advocate General

Pursuant to this Command Investigation (Circumstances of the 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aviation Mishap) and the previously conducted Aviation Mishap Safety Investigation:

(a) The different objectives of the two investigations:

- Command Investigation Purpose - "A command investigation functions as a tool to gather, analyze, and record relevant information about an incident or event of primary interest to a command."
- Aviation Mishap Safety Investigation Purpose - "Naval aviation mishap safety investigations have but one purpose and that is to answer the question, 'Why?' The mishap investigation is a search for causes; it looks for undetected hazards and tries to identify those factors that caused the mishap as well as those that caused any additional damage or injury during the course of the mishap. Mishap investigations also demonstrate an organization's commitment to their safety program. All naval aviation mishap safety investigations are conducted solely for safety purposes."

(b) the reasons why procedures vary:

- The procedures vary in order to ensure the integrity of both distinct investigations and to ensure the privileged nature of components of the aviation mishap safety investigation;

(c) the need to preserve the privileged nature of the aviation mishap safety investigation; and

(d) the fact that since neither command nor administrative action may alter the privileged character of statements provided to the aviation mishap board, and such statements will not be available to the JAGMAN investigation from any official source."

Appreciate your forthcoming time to be taken in the recall of facts.

The redactions on this page were made in accordance with exemption (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of the Freedom of Information Act.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

## **2019 MAW Command Investigation - Interview Intent and Questions**

### **28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Night Fixed Wing Aerial Refueling Incident**

#### **Investigation Direction:**

- 1 - Aircraft Mishap**
- 2 - Resultant Aircraft Damage**
- 3 - Incident Reporting**
- 4 - Incident Investigations**

#### **xxxxxx Interview – Name, First M. Rank USMC**

1. Mishap Details
  - a. Background, history, training, experience, qualification(s) and currency of the crew.
  - b. Sortie Purpose. SPINS available. Description of sortie planning and brief.
  - c. Atmospherics (Weather, light level, etc...).
  - d. Use of Night Vision Goggles.
  - e. Description of aircraft flight path and maneuver.
  - f. The incident/mishap description.
  - g. Where did the aircraft land after the mishap?
  - h. What occurred immediately after recovery?
  - i. Describe the post-mishap examination of the aircraft. Extent of damage?
  - j. Was any other military property affected? Extent of damage?
  - k. Were there sociological, psychological, and/or human factors related to the accident?  
(Potential stress factors, fatigue, use of medication, etc...)
2. Immediate Actions
  - a. Incident report
    - i. Who reported the mishap?
    - ii. When was the incident reported?
    - iii. What was reported?
  - b. Damage:
    - i. What was the initial assessment of the aircraft damage?
    - ii. Was the damage to the aircraft documented (pictures, sketches, reports, etc.)?
3. Continuing Actions
  - a. Investigation(s)
    - i. What investigation(s) (AMB, CI, FFPBs) were initiated?
    - ii. Who initiated the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs)
    - iii. When were results received of the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs)
  - b. Damage and Repair
    - i. What was the extent of the damage?

- ii. When were repairs initiated?
- iii. Who supervised the repairs?

4. External Influence

- a. Was there external influence irt the reporting?
- b. Was there external influence irt damage assessment?
- c. If external influence existed, who was being pressured and by whom?

5. Procedures/Lessons Learned

- a. For safety and standardization reasons, were any changes to procedures made as a result of the mishap?
- b. Was there any training post-mishap based on lessons learned?
- c. Do you think there was anything different that the squadron, MAG, or Wing should have done after the mishap?

6. Accountability

- a. Were Marines held accountable for the mishap?
- b. If so, to what extent?

7. Other

- a. Are there any additional questions that should be asked?
- b. Is there anything else that you believe I should know as the Investigating Officer?



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
UNIT 37101  
FPO AP 96373-7101

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

SJA

19 MAR 2019

From: [REDACTED]  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION FOR THE COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A MID-AIR COLLISION OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN


Ref: (a) IO Appointment Letter 5830/CG of 23 Jan 19

1. I request an extension of time for completing the command investigation for which I have been appointed by the reference. I request a new submission date of 5 April 2019.
2. The reason for this request is to allow the investigating officer to conduct additional interviews and collect additional evidence.



Copy to:  
SJA, 1st MAW





UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
UNIT 37101  
FPO AP 96373-7101

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

CG

19 MAR 2019

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

To: [REDACTED]

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION FOR THE COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A MID-AIR COLLISION OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

1. Returned. Your request for an extension is granted. Your investigation is now due 5 April 2019.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "S. M. Salene".

S. M. SALENE

Copy to:  
SJA, 1st MAW



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
UNIT 37101  
FPO AP 96373-7101

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

SJA


5 APR 2019

From: [REDACTED]  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION FOR THE COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE  
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A MID-AIR COLLISION OF A  
F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242  
AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON  
152 ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

Ref: (a) IO Appointment Letter 5830/CG of 23 Jan 19

1. I request an extension of time for completing the command investigation for which I have been appointed by the reference. I request a new submission date of 26 April 2019.
2. The reason for this request is to allow the investigating officer to conduct additional interviews and collect additional evidence.



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SJA, 1st MAW



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
UNIT 37101  
FPO AP 96373-7101

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
5830  
CG  
05 APR 2019

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing  
To: [REDACTED]

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION FOR THE COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE  
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A MID-AIR COLLISION OF A  
F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242  
AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON  
152 ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

1. Returned. Your request for an extension is granted. Your investigation is now due 26 April 2019.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "T. D. Weidley", is positioned above the printed name.

T. D. WEIDLEY

Copy to:  
SJA, 1st MAW



**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**  
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
UNIT 37101  
FPO AP 96373-7101

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

SJA

24 Apr 19

From: [REDACTED]  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION FOR THE COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A MID-AIR COLLISION OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

Ref: (a) IO Appointment Letter 5830/CG of 23 Jan 19

1. I request an extension of time for completing the command investigation for which I have been appointed by the reference. I request a new submission date of 3 May 2019.
2. The reason for this request is to allow for the completion of the written investigation report and for a thorough review of the report prior to submission.



Copy to:  
SJA, 1st MAW



**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**  
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
UNIT 37101  
FPO AP 96373-7101

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
5830  
CG  
30 APR 2019

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing  
To: [REDACTED]

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION FOR THE COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE  
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A MID-AIR COLLISION OF A  
F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242  
AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON  
152 ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

1. Returned. Your request for an extension is granted. Your investigation is now due 3 May 2019.

  
T. D. WEIDLEY

Copy to:  
SJA, 1st MAW

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Rank/Rate \_\_\_\_\_

Activity: \_\_\_\_\_

Unit: \_\_\_\_\_

Telephone number: \_\_\_\_\_

Today, 12-MARCH, 2019, I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement under the guidelines of the Privacy Act.

This statement is provided in compliance with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579) which requires that Federal agencies must inform individuals who are requested to furnish personal information about themselves as to certain facts regarding the information requested below.

1. AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301; 10 U.S.C. 972, 1201-1221, 2733, 2734-2734b., 2737, 5013, 5031-5036, 5131-5150, 5947, 6148, 7205, 7622-7623; 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680; 31 U.S.C. 240-243, 3521-3531, 3701-3702, 3717-3718; 37 U.S.C. 802; 38 U.S.C. 105; 42 U.S.C. 2651-2653; 44 U.S.C. 3101; 49 U.S.C. 1901.

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSES. The information which will be solicited is intended principally and may be used for the following purposes:

a. Determinations on the status of personnel regarding entitlements to pay during disability, disability benefits, severance pay, retirement pay, increases of pay for longevity, survivor's benefits, involuntary extensions of enlistments, date of expiration of active obligated service, and accrual of annual leave.

b. Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action.

c. Determinations on liability of personnel for losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.

d. Evaluation of petitions, grievances, and complaints.

e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.

f. Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration.

g. Public information releases.

h. Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.

3. ROUTINE USES: In addition to being used within the Department of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemen's Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; to the U.S. General Accounting Office for purposes of determinations concerning relief of accountable personnel from liability for losses of public funds and related fiscal matters; and to the Department of Justice for use in litigation involving the Government. Additionally, such investigations are sometimes furnished to agencies of the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlements, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, State, or local law enforcement authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.

4. MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE, CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:

a. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2a or 2b, above: Disclosure is voluntary. You are advised that you are initially presumed to be entitled to have the [personnel determination] [disciplinary determinations] in paragraph 2, above, resolved in your favor, but the final determination will be based on all the evidence in the investigative record. If you do not provide the requested information, you will be entitled to a favorable determination if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in your favor. If the completed record does contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in your favor, however, your election not to provide the requested information possible could prevent the investigation from obtaining evidence which may be needed to support a favorable determination.

b. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2c, above: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determination as to whether you should be held pecuniarily (monetarily) liable for repayment of the Government's loss would be based on the other evidence in the investigative record, which possibly might not support a favorable determination.


c. Where the individual is a claimant or potential claimant in an investigation for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could prevent the investigation from obtaining sufficient information to



substantiate any claim which you have made or may make against the Government as a result of the incident under investigation.

d. Where the individual was treated at Government expense for injuries caused by third parties in connection with a matter being investigated for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could result in a requirement for you to assign to the Government your medical care claims against third parties in connection with the incident, or authorize withholding of the records of your treatment in naval medical facilities.

e. In any other case: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, and determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.



[REDACTED]  
Statement in Regards to Aerial Refueling Incident on 28-April-2016:

The Event was for [REDACTED] Section Lead Work-up – Night Close Air Support:

Line up:

Bat 61 (Pilot: [REDACTED] WSO: [REDACTED] – both Section Lead Work up Air Crew)

Bat 62 (Pilot: [REDACTED] Division Lead / WSO: [REDACTED] – WTI, Training Officer)

Mission Overview:

- Profane 61/62 departed MCAS Iwakuni on 28-April-2016 at approximately 18:00 Local Japan Time to conduct Close Air Support IVO of CTA Okinawa Range/Airspace.
- Profane 61/62 conducted pre-mission tanking on Sumo 04 in the Tiger Airspace and then proceeded into the CTA Okinawa Range/Airspace.
- Upon completion of the tactical portion of the mission (CAS), Profane 61/62 returned to the Tiger Airspace to conduct post-mission tanking.
- Upon completion of post-mission tanking, it was discovered that Profane 62 had a portion of the refueling hose with the basket hanging from the right wing tip. Profane 61/62 divert uneventfully into Kadena AFB.

Tanker Join:

- Profane 61 ([REDACTED]) are having radar issues – difficulties finding/obtaining SA to the C-130/tanker.
- Profane 62 ([REDACTED]) have radar SA – range to the tanker is beginning to get tight (decreasing).
- Profane 62 takes Tac-Lead on the right, executes uneventful tanker join.
- Profane call-signs now swap upon joining portside tanker ops ([REDACTED]); this is due to the swapping of tac-lead to facilitate the tanker join.

Tanker Spins, etc:

- Join: 19,000'
- Tank: 20,000'
- Exit: 21,000'
- A/S: 220 kts
- Lights: Overt on join, Covert once joined/AAR (this was requested by Profane 61/Tac-Lead)
- Wx: Overcast/broken 10'k, clear skies above, 0% Illumination (no moon above the horizon).

Joining and Tanking Astern:

- Profane 61 ([REDACTED]) is cleared right astern hose, tanks/refuels uneventfully, rejoins starboard side.
- Profane 62 ([REDACTED]) approximately 30 seconds after Profane 61 joins right astern hose – Profane 62 is cleared left astern hose, tanks/refuels uneventfully, rejoins starboard side.

Joined Starboard Side:

- Profane 61/62 are now joined in normal starboard side ops (61 right of the C-130, 62 right of 61). Profane 61 Pilot and WSO both confirm over ICS they are visual of Profane 62 (stepped down low, not too sucked).
- Profane 61 requests to depart Sumo “up and left”
- Sumo 04 clears Profane Flight “up and left”

- Profane 61 initiates climb / departure instructions (up/high and to the left).
- Approximately 40-60 seconds later, Profane 62 informs Profane 61 they have a part of hose/basket hanging from their right wingtip.
- Profane 61 conducts a battle damage check and confirms what Profane 62 was reporting; visual of a hanging refueling hose with basket intact to the hose that is wedged between the right leading edge flap and the LAU/AIM-9 CATM.
- Profane 61 informs Sumo 04 of the incident – Profane 61/62 divert to Kadena AFB uneventfully.

Mission Brief:

-I felt the quality of the Brief was good and thorough, and encompassed all appropriate requirements (ORM, NS Considerations, AAR considerations). Discussion occurred in further detail in regards to each member's experience on which tanking platforms, preferred methods of tanker lighting, aided vs unaided, etc – discussed the coordination and lighting plan with the tanker during the mission planning phase.

This information is the best that I can recall since the incident. POC is [REDACTED] at e-mail: [REDACTED] Cell: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

## 2019 Command Investigation

### 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Night Fixed Wing Aerial Refueling Incident

#### Investigation Direction:

- 1 - Aircraft Mishap
- 2 - Resultant Aircraft Damage
- 3 - Incident Reporting
- 4 - Incident Investigations

190326 Interview – [REDACTED]

#### Mishap Flight Lead

##### 1. Mishap Details

- a. Background, history, training, experience, qualification(s) and currency of the crew. *2<sup>nd</sup> tour, at 242 since Apr 2015. S-4 (DoSS for short period)...previous squadron was Ops. Div Ld (Previously an NSI) ~850hrs in type. 30/60/90 to come. Last night. Last Tank. Last Night Tank.*
- b. Sortie Purpose. SPINS available. Description of sortie planning and brief. [REDACTED] *SL Work-up. Night CAS. Detailed SPINS iso 5th ANGLICO or 3<sup>rd</sup> RECON. Dry CAS overhead Camp Hansen (9-12k). LL received from a section which supported 1-2 nights previously. Face-to-face the night prior. Worked planning together. Brief – 1-1.25hr brief. Solid...strong brief by [REDACTED] (Admin, TAC Admin, Tactical, Tanker Admin). Good discussion of night tanking considerations...admin, lighting, etc...*
- c. Atmospherics (Weather, light level, etc...). *See statement.*
- d. Use of Night Vision Goggles. *AN/AVS-9 throughout...covert lighting.*
- e. Description of aircraft flight path and maneuver. *Standard Tanker Track.*
- f. The incident/mishap description. *Right rejoin. Request high and left departure. MA in position on right side. Start climb...'adequate' altitude clearance...turn left. ~1min, 'away from the tanker', Wingman is now on the left. 'Felt kind of a bump'...we have a basket hanging from our right wing. Pass Tac Lead iot execute Battle Damage Check. Basket and hose trailing from MA. Broke out checklists...can't remember precisely what checks, but executed controllability checks. Diverted uneventfully into Kadena.*
- g. Where did the aircraft land after the mishap? *Kadena, Visual Straight in...Rwy 05.*
- h. What occurred immediately after recovery? *Taxied to MWLK parking spots.*
- i. Describe the post-mishap examination of the aircraft. Extent of damage? *Plane was in pretty good shape, hose was there, some paint damage, minor dings on the leading edge flaps, nothing gross...CATM-9 trailing fins damaged. Canopy, some black smear marks.*
- j. Was any other military property affected? Extent of damage? *Basket and the hose.*
- k. Were there sociological, psychological, and/or human factors related to the accident? (Potential stress factors, fatigue, use of medication, etc...) *No...flight was really smooth.*

***Contacted squadron... [REDACTED] doing most of the communication. Secured for the night, re-evaluate the following day. Did not go to the FLAS, Clinic, or Hospital that night.***

2. Immediate Actions

- a. Incident report
  - i. Who reported the mishap? [REDACTED] ***to XO (believe)***
  - ii. When was the incident reported? ***Immediately after landing.***
  - iii. What was reported? ***Incident/Situation details***
- b. Damage:
  - i. What was the initial assessment of the aircraft damage?
  - ii. Was the damage to the aircraft documented (pictures, sketches, reports, etc.)? ***Took 2 or 3 pictures of the aircraft. [REDACTED] likely took some pictures.***

3. Continuing Actions

- a. Investigation(s)
  - i. What investigation(s) (AMB, CI, FFPBs) were initiated? ***AMB, Human Factors Board, Lessons Learned with Ready Room***
  - ii. Who initiated the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs) ***Assume DoSS or CO***
  - iii. When were results published/received of the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs) ***AMB led by [REDACTED], published 'maybe' in the fall. All four went through HFB while in Iwakuni (May). Lessons Learned at Iwakuni in May.***
- b. Damage and Repair
  - i. What was the extent of the damage?
  - ii. When were repairs initiated?
  - iii. Who supervised the repairs?

4. External Influence

- a. Was there external influence irt the reporting? ***Don't believe so***
- b. Was there external influence irt damage assessment? ***Not to my knowledge***
- c. If external influence existed, who was being pressured and by whom?

5. Procedures/Lessons Learned

- a. For safety and standardization reasons, were any changes to procedures made as a result of the mishap? ***Addressed and reiterated in the squadron, night tanking well briefed, turn away from the tanker, goggling-de-goggling communication, not sure if SOP adjusted***
- b. Was there any training post-mishap based on lessons learned? ***'Yes'...in May, Squadron OpsO briefed and directed specific TTPs to be utilized around Tankers.***

- c. Do you think there was anything different that the squadron, MAG, or Wing should have done after the mishap? *Not from my perspective. Things were going in the right way. AMB took the appropriate look. Lots of questions...under the microscope (in a good way)...never felt treated wrong.*

6. Accountability

- a. Were Marines held accountable for the mishap? *Flight lead you felt accountable, however not negatively. MP was held accountable.*
- b. If so, to what extent? *HFB and Lessons Learned*

7. Other

- a. Are there any additional questions that should be asked? *No*
- b. Is there anything else that you believe I should know as the Investigating Officer? *No*

**190401 Night & Aerial Refueling Sortie Data – [REDACTED]**

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Monday, April 01, 2019 8:29 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: Night & Aerial Refueling Sortie Data

Good morning Sir,

**Last** Sortie that I show in the logbook for **Night Aerial Refueling was: 21-December-2015.**

VR [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Saturday, March 30, 2019 4:27 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Re: Night & Aerial Refueling Sortie Data

[REDACTED],

Solid, thank-you. One follow-up, what was the date of your previous Night Aerial Refueling before 28 April 16?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

----- Original message -----

From: [REDACTED] >  
Date: 3/30/19 15:11 (GMT+09:00)  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Night & Aerial Refueling Sortie Data

Good afternoon Sir, apologies on the timeliness - had to tear apart the garage to find the logbooks - here is the data as requested:

**30/60/90 Night Sortie and Refueling Data:**

**-No Night aerial refueling sorties within the last 90 days**

**-No Night Sorties within last 30 days**



***-30 Days: Last aerial refueling sortie: 16-April-2019 - TRANSPAC, tanked off Singapore KC-135 with same drogue/basket as USMC KC-130; and tanked off of USAF KC-135 with [REDACTED] Drogue/Basket configuration.***

***-60 Days: Last Night Sortie: 8-March-2019***

\*\*\*\*\*

All flight Night & Refueling Sortie data from 1-January to 28-April:

-16 April 2019: KC-135 Day Tanking - Same Droge, KC-135 ([REDACTED] Drogue)

-2 March 2019: Night Flight / NS, Air to Ground

-8-March 2019: Night Flight / NS, Air to Ground

-February 2019: No Night Sorties Flown in month

-30 January 2019: Night Sortie / NS, Air to Ground

Please let me know if you need any other specifics on the logbook data, VR - [REDACTED]

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Name: [REDACTED] Rank/Rate: [REDACTED]  
Activity: [REDACTED] Unit: [REDACTED]  
Telephone number: [REDACTED]

Today, 24 Mar, 2019, I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement under the guidelines of the Privacy Act.

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b. Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action.

c. Determinations on liability of personnel for losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.

d. Evaluation of petitions, grievances, and complaints.

e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.

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h. Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.

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c. Where the individual is a claimant or potential claimant in an investigation for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could prevent the investigation from obtaining sufficient information to

substantiate any claim which you have made or may make against the Government as a result of the incident under investigation.

d. Where the individual was treated at Government expense for injuries caused by third parties in connection with a matter being investigated for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could result in a requirement for you to assign to the Government your medical care claims against third parties in connection with the incident, or authorize withholding of the records of your treatment in naval medical facilities.

e. In any other case: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, and determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]





statement- Sumo 04 on 28 April

I was the aircraft commander and in the left seat my co-pilot was in the right seat during the mission.

Mission overview was FWAAR ISO VMFA-242 a section of two F-18's call sign "Profane 61/62." There were two planned ARCT's to facilitate a pre and post mission fueling of 12k give per ARCT (6k/F-18) for 24k give total. First planned ARCT was at 1830 and second at 1945.

Approximate timeline with narrative (all times are in local time zone):

1130 arrived at work

1315 official crew show time

1315-1445 conducted flight preparations

1445-1505 flight brief

1505-1535 final flight prep

1535 signed for a/c 763 and walked to plane

1540-1600 pre-flight of aircraft

1600 started engines

1615 taxied for take-off

1623 take-off RJOI runway 02

Standard IFR routing to the Tiger track at FL180. Approaching the Tiger track Naha Control cleared us into the Warning Area with a 1400 squawk. We then canceled IFR and preceded VFR into the Warning Area descending to 10,000' for our pre-coordinated altitude with VMFA-242. At 1800 we were established in our coordinated tanker track, 10,000' left hand turns at 220 KIAS. We conducted the pre-AAR checklist and proceeded to hose checks. Once complete we opened the ramp & door as pre-coordinated so the two combat camera Marines with us could get the footage they requested. At 1855 we had still not heard from VMFA-242 and attempted to contact them over AAR primary frequency. At 1900 we picked them up on air-air TACAN. As a crew we re-ran hose checks and reel responses. 1907 we were visual with "Profane 61/62" at our 10

o'clock 9,000' attempting to join. Profane requested that we make a right turn to assist their join as they conducted an under-run of our aircraft due to misjudging closure rate. Once visual again on the right we notified "Profane 61/62" that we were coming right as requested and started a right hand turn to assist with the join. They request to join on the right, but I declined their request and told them to join on the left as originally cleared. Profane requested extra fuel on front side due to lower than expected fuel state for their upcoming mission. I explained I only had the 24,000 lbs as fragged to give total so they could have more now but less later. They accepted this and Profane 61 took 9,500 lbs and Profane 62 took 8,500 lbs. Movement was from left right with Profane 61 fueling on the right hose and Profane 62 on the left hose. Post fueling Profane flight was cleared right reform and once they were established they were cleared straight ahead and above. Departure was uneventful. Post their departure we conducted post AAR checks, brought in both hoses, closed the ramp & door and started our climb up to 20,000' as pre-coordinated. We debriefed the first ARCT and started prepping for the second. At 1940 Profane 61/62 started coordinating for their second join up. I advised them that we still only had 6,000 lbs total fuel left to give. They acknowledged and requested a join on the left and simultaneous plugging due to low fuel state. I discussed it with them and we proceeded as they requested. They also requested we come to a 330 heading to assist in dragging them towards the northwest boundary of the Warning Area. Prior to join up we were established heading 330, 230 KIAS, FL200 wings level on auto-pilot with auto-throttles engaged. Once established in the right astern Profane 61 was cleared contact on the right and Profane 62 once established in the left astern was cleared contact on the left. They each received 3,000 lbs each while we dragged them towards the northwest boundary. With Profane 61 satisfied on the right he was cleared disconnect right go right reform. With Profane 62 satisfied on the left he was cleared disconnect left go right reform. Profane 61/62 flight was then cleared to depart forward and above. I witnessed Profane 61 start to depart as tasked.



Profane 62 was witnessed passing from left to right past the tail section via my left window observer. Prior to the right window observer attaining full visual of Profane 62 the crew felt a violent shake of the aircraft like severe turbulence. A few seconds later I witnessed Profane 62 moving from under my aircraft from the center towards the outer left side and forward. As this was not their cleared departure I called Profane 61 over AAR primary. "Profane 61 this is Sumo 04, be advised I cleared both aircraft to depart from my right side to proceed forward and above. I have Profane 62 on my left and low can you explain?" "Sumo this is Profane 61, let me check with my dash 2." Approximately 4-5 seconds later he came back "Yeah, Sumo my dash 2 has something on his wing that belongs to you." I immediately sent my Plane Captain into the back to inspect our hoses. "Sumo from Profane 61 it would appear we have a section of your hose and drogue on my dash 2's wing." It was at this time my Plane Captain reported that the right hose was definitely missing the drogue and an unknown amount of hose. I immediately called for the "Drogue/Hose damage" emergency procedure that we executed right away. During this time Profane 61/62 flight coordinated with Naha Control for direct to Kadena and we could no longer reach them on AAR primary. Up to this point we were still flying the above profile for past 10+ minutes. Once they were visually clear of us, I had us enter a right hand hold within the Warning Area and we coordinated for 15 minutes of holding for trouble shooting. As a crew we discussed the possibility of "hose guillotine" emergency procedure. Due to the uncertainty of the full damage to the hose and assembly and possible fuel or hydraulic fluid spillage within the pod assembly and the high possibility for a pod fire we opted not to conduct this procedure. We proceeded with "landing with trailing hose" emergency procedure. I made the decision to land at Kadena due to the fact that it had a longer and wider runway than Iwakuni and we could remain over water for the entirety of the transit. Had we gone back to Iwakuni we would have had to fly for over 45 min over land with the possibility of the hose departing from the aircraft at anytime. This increase in risk to




possible death, damage or destruction to property or civilian personnel was unacceptable. I declared an emergency with Naha Control for the damaged hose situation stating we had 8 souls on board and 2.5 hours of fuel remaining. We requested radar vectors that kept us from overflying land and Naha Control complied and we backed them up by observing our digital map display.

During our transit we conducted our emergency and normal checklists. We flew the ILS 05L approach into Kadena. I flew a steeper than normal approach as per NATOPS and minimized beta and brakes upon landing. I came to a stop on the runway, set the parking brake and cleared two crew masters out the ramp & door to retrieve our trailing hose and conduct a quick FOD sweep. Land time was approximately 2040 on 28 April.

Once my crew masters were back on the aircraft we back taxied on 05L to taxiway delta. Once clear of the active runways we set the parking brake and crash fire rescue did a quick external inspection of my aircraft. They confirmed that we were not a fire hazard and we were cleared to park on spot 106. Upon shutdown we conducted a thorough post flight, secured the aircraft and reported safe on deck and the incident to our Flight Duty Officer to notify our command. Our ASO contacted us and we proceeded to coordinate getting the aviation post mishap medical examination. We proceeded to the Futenma flight clinic where at 0100 on 29 April we met with the duty flight doc and conducted the examinations and lab work for all six crew members. We were complete at 0400 and proceeded to the Shogun Inn on Kadena.

\* This is my original statement  
provided to VMGR-152 ASO.



The redactions on this page were made in accordance with exemption (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of the Freedom of Information Act.

Additional statement for the events associated with Sumo 04, 28 Apr 2016.

Upon landing, parking and securing our aircraft at Kadena Air Force Base we observed that both F-18 aircraft from tanking evolution were also present. The aircraft that impacted our hose & drogue assembly still had the hose and associated drogue wedged into the aircraft's front right flaperon. Damage was observed on multiple locations on the both fore and aft of the right wing and on the AIM-9X captive training missile. We attempted to find the aircrew but they had already departed and Kadena Base Ops did not have any contact information for them. The focus after landing was ensuring that our squadron was informed and that we were complying with all mishap requirements. It was the general belief of all in our crew that the crew from VMFA(AW)-242 were doing the same. At no point from the time of the incident to the our landing at Kadena did we ever hear the VMFA(AW)-242 aircraft declare an emergency. After coordinating with the Shogun Inn (Air Force managed on base temporary lodging) for a late checkout we entered crew rest and awaited direction from the squadron CO.

The squadron flew another crew down the next morning to fly our aircraft back and my crew flew home as extra crew. Upon arriving at MCAS Iwakuni and discussing what occurred with the squadron ASO I learned that the personnel from VMFA(AW)-242 did not go medical to get evaluated that night.

As the Maintenance Officer I coordinated with personnel from my department to provide whatever cost data or maintenance data was requested from our ASO. Primary point of contact for this was [REDACTED] (MCO) and [REDACTED] (MMCO). My interaction was minimal besides coordination between individuals within my command and MALS-12 occasionally.



## 2019 Command Investigation

### 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Night Fixed Wing Aerial Refueling Incident Investigation Direction:

- 1 - Aircraft Mishap
- 2 - Resultant Aircraft Damage
- 3 - Incident Reporting
- 4 - Incident Investigations

#### 190404 Interview – [REDACTED]

#### Mishap Tanker Transport Aircraft Commander / VMGR-152 Maintenance Officer

##### 1. Mishap Details

- a. Background, history, training, experience, qualification(s) and currency of the crew. *Original Statement provided to [REDACTED] (VMGR ASO) either morning after incident or upon return to MCAS Iwakuni the following day. Aircraft Transport Commander, Instructor, DL (SL), and NS Instructor, identified to build to be an Asst NATOPs Instructor).*
- b. Sortie Purpose. SPINS available. Description of sortie planning and brief. *Co-pilot put together FWAR Card, reviewed and shared with VMFA. Coordination between, Card's approved. Voice communication with VMFA by T2P.*
- c. Atmospherics (Weather, light level, etc...). *Weather was clear...no turbulence, no cloud layers.*
- d. Use of Night Vision Goggles. *Not certain...crew was goggled. Light package was overt during join-up until requested to adjust to covert. Normally return to overt after receivers depart...post AR checks...returning lower collision lights to overt. Receivers were still in airspace, tanker lights were covert.*
- e. Description of aircraft flight path and maneuver.
- f. The incident/mishap description. *Tac Lead aircraft departing high...looking for Tac Wing...aircraft experienced a massive shudder, clear air turbulence like down and up...saw Tac Wing low and left. Everybody OK inside the AC? Asked why Profane 62 is low and left...no direct response. He has a "piece of your aircraft". Directed his crew to inspect the Refueling Pod, assess the damage. Froze the reel from spinning (hydraulically and electrically)...potential for guillotine of the hose...decision not to do that to avoid dropping an unknown amount of the hose.*
- g. Where did the aircraft land after the mishap? *Declared an emergency. Kadena to avoid overflight of populated areas.*
- h. What occurred immediately after recovery? *On post flight, realized the hose was not extended out...it was gone. Hose wire had caught on the external part of the refueling pod, preserved the reel and stopped the auto rewind sequence.*
- i. Describe the post-mishap examination of the aircraft. Extent of damage? *No other damage to the aircraft.*

- j. Was any other military property affected? Extent of damage? *None.*
- k. Were there sociological, psychological, and/or human factors related to the accident? (Potential stress factors, fatigue, use of medication, etc...) *Not to my knowledge speaking to the 130 crew. Combat camera was aboard for pictures during the first ARCT.*

## 2. Immediate Actions

- a. Incident report
  - i. Who reported the mishap? *AC Commander reported to FDO, get ahold of the ASO. Assumption is 'we've had a mishap'. Let me know if the CO wants to discuss. Don't remember if he talked to CO or XO. ASO called back.*
  - ii. When was the incident reported? *Reported after inspection of 130, immediately following landing.*
  - iii. What was reported? *Time, what happened, when it happened...get ahold of the ASO.*
- b. Damage:
  - i. What was the initial assessment of the aircraft damage?
  - ii. Was the damage to the aircraft documented (pictures, sketches, reports, etc.)?

## 3. Continuing Actions

- a. Investigation(s)
  - i. What investigation(s) (AMB, CI, FFPBs) were initiated? *To my knowledge, never been a JAG investigation (PI or CI). Issue with MAW DoSS wanting to know what was going on...somewhat contentious. 152 initiated an AMB...242 did not. Post incident, a lot of back and forth between Sumos and Bats, who is responsible to initiate the investigation. Took external direction to get 242 to participate.*
  - ii. Who initiated the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs)
  - iii. When were results received of the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs) *During Squadron BITS (Jan 17)...all aircrew received brief...asked to give his perspective and lessons learned. VMGR ASO amplified...can't remember if VMGR CO made any comments. Not while I was at the MAG was there ever a joint de-brief, discussion, or shared lessons learned. This mishap was briefed fleet wide...MAWTS Briefed during Fall 16 or Spring 17 WTI Course. VMGR-234 used the incident as a topic for discussion in the Jan 18 BITS.*
- b. Damage and Repair
  - i. What was the extent of the damage? *Not factual, but probably about 8 feet of hose. Drogue fairly well in tact...*
  - ii. When were repairs initiated?
  - iii. Who supervised the repairs?

## 4. External Influence



- a. Was there external influence irt the reporting? *From my experience as the AMO, it took higher level influence (MAG and MAW) to initiate the AMB investigation.*
- b. Was there external influence irt damage assessment?
- c. If external influence existed, who was being pressured and by whom?

5. Procedures/Lessons Learned

- a. For safety and standardization reasons, were any changes to procedures made as a result of the mishap? *No. AR Procedures reemphasized...crew masters given a task to refine technique for visual observation and communication.*
- b. Was there any training post-mishap based on lessons learned?
- c. Do you think there was anything different that the squadron, MAG, or Wing should have done after the mishap? *Immediately following, discussed with senior enlisted crew master to brief this with crew masters to ensure/improve observer proficiency. In retrospect easy...difficult at the time...why didn't we discuss as a MAG after the incident. A general lessons learned vice discussed as separate communities.*

6. Accountability

- a. Were Marines held accountable for the mishap? *To my knowledge, no. A couple of months later (before the BITS), disappointing to hear about currency and proficiency of the MP.*
- b. If so, to what extent?

7. Other

- a. Are there any additional questions that should be asked? (b) (5)  
 (b) (5)  
 (b) (5)  
 (b) (5)  
 (b) (5)
- b. Is there anything else that you believe I should know as the Investigating Officer? *Why isn't there a formal requirement to have a multi-community hotwash/lessons learned with the relevant material in hand? Give the MAG CO a lot of credit as a facilitator to get the units to work together in pursuing the investigation. 1<sup>st</sup> MAW conducts a lot of FWAR...a lot of UDPs roll through...different unit subtleties...cross-community effort, who is actually in control; KC-130 is in control; 130 is not going to give gas unless receivers are 'safe'...unique rendezvous are concerning. Comfort of the jets to do what they want is loose.*

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Name: [REDACTED] Rank/Rate: [REDACTED]  
Activity: [REDACTED] Unit: [REDACTED]  
Telephone number: [REDACTED]

Today, 13 MARCH, 2019, I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement under the guidelines of the Privacy Act.

This statement is provided in compliance with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579) which requires that Federal agencies must inform individuals who are requested to furnish personal information about themselves as to certain facts regarding the information requested below.

1. AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301; 10 U.S.C. 972, 1201-1221, 2733, 2734-2734b., 2737, 5013, 5031-5036, 5131-5150, 5947, 6148, 7205, 7622-7623; 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680; 31 U.S.C. 240-243, 3521-3531, 3701-3702, 3717-3718; 37 U.S.C. 802; 38 U.S.C. 105; 42 U.S.C. 2651-2653; 44 U.S.C. 3101; 49 U.S.C. 1901.

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSES. The information which will be solicited is intended principally and may be used for the following purposes:

a. Determinations on the status of personnel regarding entitlements to pay during disability, disability benefits, severance pay, retirement pay, increases of pay for longevity, survivor's benefits, involuntary extensions of enlistments, date of expiration of active obligated service, and accrual of annual leave.

b. Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action.

c. Determinations on liability of personnel for losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.

d. Evaluation of petitions, grievances, and complaints.

e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.

f. Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration.

g. Public information releases.

h. Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.

3. ROUTINE USES: In addition to being used within the Department of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemen's Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; to the U.S. General Accounting Office for purposes of determinations concerning relief of accountable personnel from liability for losses of public funds and related fiscal matters; and to the Department of Justice for use in litigation involving the Government. Additionally, such investigations are sometimes furnished to agencies of the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlements, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, State, or local law enforcement authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.

4. MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE, CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:

a. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2a or 2b, above: Disclosure is voluntary. You are advised that you are initially presumed to be entitled to have the [personnel determination] [disciplinary determinations] in paragraph 2, above, resolved in your favor, but the final determination will be based on all the evidence in the investigative record. If you do not provide the requested information, you will be entitled to a favorable determination if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in your favor. If the completed record does contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in your favor, however, your election not to provide the requested information possible could prevent the investigation from obtaining evidence which may be needed to support a favorable determination.


b. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2c, above: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determination as to whether you should be held pecuniarily (monetarily) liable for repayment of the Government's loss would be based on the other evidence in the investigative record, which possibly might not support a favorable determination.



c. Where the individual is a claimant or potential claimant in an investigation for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could prevent the investigation from obtaining sufficient information to

substantiate any claim which you have made or may make against the Government as a result of the incident under investigation.

d. Where the individual was treated at Government expense for injuries caused by third parties in connection with a matter being investigated for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could result in a requirement for you to assign to the Government your medical care claims against third parties in connection with the incident, or authorize withholding of the records of your treatment in naval medical facilities.

e. In any other case: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, and determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

  
Signature and Date

  
Witness Signature and Date  




## 2019 Command Investigation

### 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Night Fixed Wing Aerial Refueling Incident Investigation Direction:

- 1 - Aircraft Mishap
- 2 - Resultant Aircraft Damage
- 3 - Incident Reporting
- 4 - Incident Investigations

190320 Interview – [REDACTED]

### Mishap Tanker Transport Second Pilot (T2P)

#### 1. Mishap Details

- a. Background, history, training, experience, qualification(s) and currency of the crew. *Joined 152 Jun/Jul 2015 ; Upgraded to Transport Second Pilot (T2P) in 22 Apr 2016 ; 400+ hours and completion of 2000-level syllabus (new T&R) completion of 3000-level syllabus) ; NVG – 4 events, 10-hrs required, 5 low-light; Just completed T2P check ride in the simulator. New AC Commanders normally fly 100 hours with a T2P prior to flying with a Basic Qualified Co-Pilot (T3P). 30/60/90 - 7.7/42.8/67.0*
- b. Sortie Purpose. SPINS available. Description of sortie planning and brief. *IWK to Pre (1830 - Day) and post (1945 - Goggles) mission FWAR in the Tiger Airspace (ALTRAV in the W1??) to IWK; Planned off-load 24k ; Pre-mission coordination with [REDACTED] ; Mission Planning Card worked up, (in general reviewed by Aircraft Commander (AC)) provided to [REDACTED] (potentially [REDACTED]) ; does not recall if a phone brief was executed. MAG or Station PAO on board for the FWAR mission.*  
*Normal tanker join, establish comms, monitoring current altimeter, report visual...once visual cleared to echelon left (30-100 feet low and left of aircraft), report noses cold switches safe. Clear lead to astern right, right observer reports lead stable astern right...clear contact right. Clear -2 to astern left, left observer reports -2 stable left...clear contact left. When receivers either at fragged off-load or satisfied, clear disconnect, go echelon right (aft to forward and above wingline). Flight state requested departure. Cleared to 1k above, and (then) cleared to request heading.*
- c. Atmospherics (Weather, light level, etc...). *5.2 Hrs / 0.3 Actual IFR / 2.1 Night Time. Don't specifically remember the area atmospherics (clouds, clear airspace, turbulence, etc...). Light level was low-light.*
- d. Use of Night Vision Goggles.
- e. Description of aircraft flight path and maneuver. *35 mile straight track (040-220). For the night portion work south to pick-up and then fly N towards IWK during second tanking evolution. Do not recall join...do not recall who was pilot flying/pilot monitoring, but straight and level for entire tanking evolution. In restricted airspace, normal procedure is to remain overt until receivers ask for covert.*

- f. The incident/mishap description. *Aircraft in both hoses. Right finished first, left finished second. Saw one aircraft high and right...felt moderate turbulence...then saw one aircraft low, left and moving forward. (Maybe flew through jet wash). Did not clear you low and left. "We have something that's yours." Right hose was ripped out, hanging from the jet. Came to conclusion something was wrong with the right hose. Senior Plane Captain observed but could not see anything...because it was dark could not ascertain how much of the hose was gone. 130 crew could not ascertain what was left of the right hose and basket. 130 executed the procedure for the damaged hose procedure. Secure hydraulics and fuel from pod. For ~20 minutes discussed options, decided to remain over water and land at Kadena AB.*
- g. Where did the aircraft land after the mishap? *Kadena AB*
- h. What occurred immediately after recovery? *Post flight inspection, secured aircraft, and then went to a couple different hospitals (Kadena, Foster, Futenma Clinic) to link-up with a Flight Surgeon.*
- i. Describe the post-mishap examination of the aircraft. Extent of damage? *Steel winding of the hose was the only thing remaining.*
- j. Was any other military property affected? Extent of damage? *No. (60-80 feet of the hose fell into the ocean.)*
- k. Were there sociological, psychological, and/or human factors related to the accident? (Potential stress factors, fatigue, use of medication, etc...) *None that I know.*

## 2. Immediate Actions

- a. Incident report
  - i. Who reported the mishap? *AC Commander*
  - ii. When was the incident reported? *After securing the aircraft.*
  - iii. What was reported? *Incident details.*
- b. Damage:
  - i. What was the initial assessment of the aircraft damage?
  - ii. Was the damage to the aircraft documented (pictures, sketches, reports, etc.)?

## 3. Continuing Actions

- a. Investigation(s)
  - i. What investigation(s) (AMB, CI, FFPBs) were initiated?  
Questioned by the AMB (40-50 days after the mishap). *Do not remember when the statement was prepared for the AMB.*
  - ii. Who initiated the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs)
  - iii. When were results received of the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs)
- b. Damage and Repair
  - i. What was the extent of the damage?
  - ii. When were repairs initiated?
  - iii. Who supervised the repairs?

4. External Influence

- a. Was there external influence irt the reporting? *No*
- b. Was there external influence irt damage assessment? *No*
- c. If external influence existed, who was being pressured and by whom? *No*

5. Procedures/Lessons Learned

- a. For safety and standardization reasons, were any changes to local procedures made as a result of the mishap? *None remembered.*
- b. Was there any training post-mishap based on lessons learned? *Discussed Mishap Results with AMB.*
- c. Do you think there was anything different that the squadron, MAG, or Wing should have done after the mishap? *Proud of how 130 crew handled mishap (by the book). Risk losing voice data if you fly the aircraft again. AMB established sooner.*

6. Accountability

- a. Were Marines held accountable for the mishap?
- b. If so, to what extent?

7. Other

- a. Are there any additional questions that should be asked?
- b. Is there anything else that you believe I should know as the Investigating Officer?  
*Wish this would have been done earlier so incident was clearer in my memory.*

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Name: [REDACTED]

Rank/Rate: [REDACTED]

Activity: [REDACTED]

Unit: [REDACTED]

Telephone number: [REDACTED]

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b. Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action.

c. Determinations on liability of personnel for losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.

d. Evaluation of petitions, grievances, and complaints.

e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.

f. Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration.

g. Public information releases.

h. Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.

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b. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2c, above: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determination as to whether you should be held pecuniarily (monetarily) liable for repayment of the Government's loss would be based on the other evidence in the investigative record, which possibly might not support a favorable determination.

c. Where the individual is a claimant or potential claimant in an investigation for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could prevent the investigation from obtaining sufficient information to


substantiate any claim which you have made or may make against the Government as a result of the incident under investigation.

d. Where the individual was treated at Government expense for injuries caused by third parties in connection with a matter being investigated for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could result in a requirement for you to assign to the Government your medical care claims against third parties in connection with the incident, or authorize withholding of the records of your treatment in naval medical facilities.

e. In any other case: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, and determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.



Signature and Date



Witness Signature and Date

## 2019 Command Investigation

### 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Night Fixed Wing Aerial Refueling Incident Investigation Direction:

- 1 - Aircraft Mishap
- 2 - Resultant Aircraft Damage
- 3 - Incident Reporting
- 4 - Incident Investigations

[REDACTED]

#### 1. Mishap Details

- a. Background, history, training, experience, qualification(s) and currency of the crew.
  - i. [REDACTED]
    - 1. Night Systems Instructor
    - 2. Weapons and Tactics Instructor
    - 3. Flight Lead Stan Evaluator
    - 4. On date of incident: Total Special Crew Hours: 1500.9
    - 5. Total Special Crew Hours in Model: 1347.5
    - 6. (30): 9.2
    - 7. Night (30): 0.0
    - 8. (60): 17.3
    - 9. Night (60): 2.2
    - 10. (90): 44.5
    - 11. Night (90): 6.3
  - b. Sortie Purpose. SPINS available. Description of sortie planning and brief.
    - i. Section Lead workup flight. For lead aircraft. Mission briefed by [REDACTED] (SLUI pilot). Mission was to provide Close Air Support (CAS) on to a unit on Okinawa, Japan. We performed pre and post mission Air-to-Air refueling (AAR) with a KC-130 from VMGR-152.
    - ii. Briefed per Appendix B – F/A-18 briefing guide
  - c. Atmospherics (Weather, light level, etc...)
    - i. Day transition to night
    - ii. Lux and weather unknown
  - d. Use of Night Vision Goggles.
    - i. I do not remember to what extent goggles were used by each individual in this flight. I wore my goggles during the night portion of the flight which included the post mission AAR.
  - e. Description of aircraft flight path and maneuver.
    - i. Lead a/c went from starboard position to up and over to the left of the KC-130. Unknown for -2.
  - f. The incident/mishap description.
    - i. Both F/A-18s were in right (starboard reform) after refueling was

completed. While departing the KC-130 aircraft, -2's a/c contacted a portion of one of the two refueling hoses on the back of the KC-130 which resulted in a portion of the hose becoming attached to -2's a/c right outboard wing.

- g. Where did the aircraft land after the mishap?
  - i. Kadena AFB, Japan
- h. What occurred immediately after recovery?
  - i. Notified our command ((VMFA(AW)-242)) of the incident
- i. Describe the post-mishap examination of the aircraft. Extent of damage?
  - i. Portion of a refueling hose hanging over the outboard portion on the right wing of -2's a/c.
- j. Was any other military property affected? Extent of damage?
  - i. unknown
- k. Were there sociological, psychological, and/or human factors related to the accident? (Potential stress factors, fatigue, use of medication, etc...)
  - i. None for myself

## 2. Immediate Actions

- a. Incident report
  - i. Who reported the mishap?
    - 1. I did, to my chain of command.
  - ii. When was the incident reported?
    - 1. Immediately upon landing in Kadena.
  - iii. What was reported?
    - 1. The description from portion 1.F. above.
- b. Damage:
  - i. What was the initial assessment of the aircraft damage?
    - 1. unknown
  - ii. Was the damage to the aircraft documented (pictures, sketches, reports, etc.)?
    - 1. unknown

## 3. Continuing Actions

- a. Investigation(s)
  - i. What investigation(s) (AMB, CI, FFPBs) were initiated?
    - 1. AMB
  - ii. Who initiated the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs)
    - 1. unknown
  - iii. When were results received of the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs)
    - 1. unknown
- b. Damage and Repair
  - i. What was the extent of the damage?
    - 1. unknown
  - ii. When were repairs initiated?
    - 2. unknown
  - iii. Who supervised the repairs?
    - 3. unknown



4. External Influence

- a. Was there external influence irt the reporting?
  - i. unknown
- b. Was there external influence irt damage assessment?
  - i. unknown
- c. If external influence existed, who was being pressured and by whom?
  - i. unknown

5. Procedures/Lessons Learned

- a. For safety and standardization reasons, were any changes to procedures made as a result of the mishap?
  - i. unknown
- b. Was there any training post-mishap based on lessons learned?
  - i. unknown
- c. Do you think there was anything different that the squadron, MAG, or Wing should have done after the mishap?
  - i. no

6. Accountability

- a. Were Marines held accountable for the mishap?
  - i. unknown
- b. If so, to what extent?

7. Other

- a. Are there any additional questions that should be asked?
  - i. none
- b. Is there anything else that you believe I should know as the Investigating Officer?
  - i. nothing

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Name: [REDACTED] Rank/Rate: [REDACTED]  
Activity: [REDACTED] Unit: [REDACTED]  
Telephone number: [REDACTED]

Today, 12 MAR, 2019, I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement under the guidelines of the Privacy Act.

This statement is provided in compliance with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579) which requires that Federal agencies must inform individuals who are requested to furnish personal information about themselves as to certain facts regarding the information requested below.

1. AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301; 10 U.S.C. 972, 1201-1221, 2733, 2734-2734b., 2737, 5013, 5031-5036, 5131-5150, 5947, 6148, 7205, 7622-7623; 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680; 31 U.S.C. 240-243, 3521-3531, 3701-3702, 3717-3718; 37 U.S.C. 802; 38 U.S.C. 105; 42 U.S.C. 2651-2653; 44 U.S.C. 3101; 49 U.S.C. 1901.

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c. Determinations on liability of personnel for losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.

d. Evaluation of petitions, grievances, and complaints.

e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.

f. Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration.

g. Public information releases.

h. Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.

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a. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2a or 2b, above: Disclosure is voluntary. You are advised that you are initially presumed to be entitled to have the [personnel determination] [disciplinary determinations] in paragraph 2, above, resolved in your favor, but the final determination will be based on all the evidence in the investigative record. If you do not provide the requested information, you will be entitled to a favorable determination if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in your favor. If the completed record does contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in your favor, however, your election not to provide the requested information possible could prevent the investigation from obtaining evidence which may be needed to support a favorable determination.


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Signature and Date

  
Witness Signature and Date



Sgt Handlen, Colin L.

Events that occurred on 28Apr2016

1315- Arrived at aircraft for preflight of 763. Preflight was according to NATOPS and there were no discrepancies noted.

1445- [REDACTED] briefed the crew on the events that were to take place for the two fixed wing aerial refueling evolutions.

1615- Started engines in preparation for takeoff.

1800- First evolution of the refueling went smoothly and nothing out of the ordinary occurred.

Approx. 2015- The second evolution of refueling took place. I [REDACTED] was positioned in the left paratroop window. The two receivers joined into the left echelon after circling around from the front. Once both receivers were in the left echelon, the first receiver was cleared to the right astern. I gave [REDACTED] who was positioned in the right paratroop window, the Passover of visuals. After the first receiver was in the right astern, the second receiver was cleared to the left astern. Both receivers were cleared to contact and began taking fuel. The receiver at the right hose was finished first and was cleared disconnect to move to the right echelon. Upon doing so, the receiver in the left hose was finished fueling and was then cleared disconnect and to move to the right echelon with his wingman. The left receiver began to move aft to disconnect with the hose. I then called disconnect when the receiver decoupled the drogue. As the left receiver began moving to the right echelon, he crossed under our aircraft, and I gave the call that the receiver was crossing our six from left to right, low. The receiver then passed under the aircraft heading to the right side. At that time I hear what sounded like a jet and our aircraft had a jerking movement to the right. I stayed position in the left paratroop window while we received a call from the receivers that they have our drogue. I was then instructed to make sure that the drogue was still attached on the left hose, which it was still intact. [REDACTED] then came to the cargo compartment to double check the hoses on the left and right side. He checked the left hose which he confirmed was intact, and then checked the right hose. Both hose were difficult to see since it was low visibility and between the strobes on NVG's they then confirmed that the entire hose was gone on the right side. All that was left was approximately 50ft. of wire from the hose. Our crew then discussed the options of either guillotining the wire or diverting and landing at Kadena AFB. We then decided that we will not guillotine due to that fact that the entire hose was gone and there was a possibility of pod and wing fire. After our decisions were made we declared the emergency and got rerouted to land at Kadena AFB with the trailing wires. We maintained visual on the wire for the duration of the flight to ensure nothing falls off in flight. Once we made our landing, we stopped as soon as possible, opened up the ramp and door, and grabbed the wire to pull it into the aircraft so that it would not drag on the taxi way. Once we were cleared to park by the tower and crash fire rescue, we shut down and did our post flight noting that there was no damage besides the missing hose.

[REDACTED]

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Name: [REDACTED] Rank/Rate: [REDACTED]

Activity: [REDACTED] Unit: [REDACTED]

Telephone number: [REDACTED]

Today, 7 MAR, 2012, I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement under the guidelines of the Privacy Act.

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b. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2c, above: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determination as to whether you should be held pecuniarily (monetarily) liable for repayment of the Government's loss would be based on the other evidence in the investigative record, which possibly might not support a favorable determination.

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e. In any other case: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, and determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.



---

Witness Signature and Date



ATTACH STATEMENT HERE.

I was the Squadron Commander of VMFA (AW)-242 during the time of a mishap that resulted from a night inflight refueling event. In April, 2016 a flight of two F/A-18D's from VMFA (AW)-242 were conducting pre-coordinated inflight refueling with a single KC-130J from VMGR-152. My recollection was that as the flight of F/A-18s completed their refueling, and were about to depart the tanker when one of the F/A-18s made contact with an extended refueling hose. The refueling hose became disconnected from the KC-130J refueling pod, was caught on the outer wing panel, and stuck in the gap between LAU-7 missile rail and the outer wing panel. It is also my recollection that the pilot flying the F/A-18D that struck the refueling hose lost situational awareness of the refueling hose when he redirected his attention back to his flight lead's aircraft in order to depart the tanker. Both F/A-18Ds recovered at Kadena Air Base.

Following the incident, notification was made to the MAG-12 Commander, a Flash Report, and a subsequent Safety Report was submitted. I do not recall a Mishap Class characterization (A/B/C/D) being determined prior to my change of command.

With any incident that occurred in the Squadron, it was standard practice to debrief any incident at an All Officer's Meeting (AOM). The Safety Officer would cover the event broadly, discuss HAZREPS, any Squadron safety-related issues, and typically the Aircrew (involved in any event) would stand up to articulate what happened and all lesson's learned. As the CO, I spoke last and would put into context each event with past experiences of my own or those of lost friends.



\_\_\_\_\_  
Witness Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

## 2019 Command Investigation

### 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Night Fixed Wing Aerial Refueling Incident Investigation Direction:

- 1 - Aircraft Mishap
- 2 - Resultant Aircraft Damage
- 3 - Incident Reporting
- 4 - Incident Investigations

190402 Interview – [REDACTED]

Former CO VMFA(AW)-242 19 May 14 - 13 May 16

#### 1. Mishap Details

- a. Background, history, training, experience, qualification(s) and currency of the crew.  
[REDACTED] *in the flight...no other names. Relatively junior pilot. Currency and proficiency, pretty confident through MSharp, qualified and current. (Speculative)*  
[REDACTED] *other pilot.*  
*Flight schedule routing. Training plans – Annual, Quarterly, and the ‘weekly’.*  
*Gonna be T1 or T2...inexcusable that this forward deployed, fully manned squadron in a FAD 2 status would not be T2 or T1. Ops-Maint engagement...continuous synergy. Sustainable narrative between Ops and Maint to sustain T2 and T1. Maint had the vote on resources available to the schedule...Ops was creative with the sorties available. Inside of Ops...who goes where...7-day flow on who was placed in events...best instructor for the ‘student’ for every sortie. From Ops to Safety guy to look...clip board that contained currency, proficiency, pre-requisites, etc...M-Sharp. Don’t remember if XO reviewed. 19 out of 20 times it was a good schedule. M-Sharp doesn’t catch everything...the ‘clipboard’ captured the currency requirements that M-Sharp didn’t capture. ORM – RAW...don’t remember if we had them...but discussed the things that could get us in trouble...the brief captured that. De-brief assessed the ORM for the executed event.*  
*Don’t remember any specific issues with M-Sharp. But the Ops and Stan guys were really good at working with M-Sharp. Remember complaints in Ops of illogical chaining.*
- b. Sortie Purpose. SPINS available. Description of sortie planning and brief. *CAS (think) tank CAS. Iwakuni or Okinawa.*
- c. Atmospherics (Weather, light level, etc...). *Do not remember (DNR)*
- d. Use of Night Vision Goggles. *DNR*
- e. Description of aircraft flight path and maneuver. *Recall, hard time understanding the description of how it played out. Described MP finished tanking, redirected attention away from the aircraft to reorient on the flight lead. Loss of situational awareness in spatial orientation to the tanker...was unaware of where the hose was. Speculation, I think I remember, where was the flight lead immediately after the mishap. Where was*

██████ that it caused the MP to hit the hose. How do you get there?

*Procedural...considered this was all part of the tanking evolution.*

- f. The incident/mishap description. *I believe they did...but do not remember what they said. Speculative...don't know they had done that until they separated the hose from the aircraft...until the hose was on their plane. Post fact realized the aircraft pulled the hose out of the pod. BDE checks. They'd have to feel it. Leading Edge Flap Light...lock it out.*
- g. Where did the aircraft land after the mishap? *Kadena*
- h. What occurred immediately after recovery? *Do not remember. Notified by who...don't remember. Next day, photos were sent by MAW (SgtMaj)...Wing CG had photos before I did.*
- i. Describe the post-mishap examination of the aircraft. Extent of damage? *Do not recall.*
- j. Was any other military property affected? Extent of damage? *Don't believe so.*
- k. Were there sociological, psychological, and/or human factors related to the accident? (Potential stress factors, fatigue, use of medication, etc...) *Not that I remember.*

## 2. Immediate Actions

- a. Incident report
  - i. Who reported the mishap? *No. OpsO or Flight Lead, do not remember.*
  - ii. When was the incident reported? *"MAG CO immediately." Don't remember phone or e-mail or both. Sending an incident report to the MAG CO (and MAW CG) is BOLD FACE...would have done it. Flash report...must have sent it.*
  - iii. What was reported? *5Ws.*
- b. Damage:
  - i. What was the initial assessment of the aircraft damage? *Someone sent me pictures.*
  - ii. Was the damage to the aircraft documented (pictures, sketches, reports, etc.)? *Pictures...phone snapshot?*

## 3. Continuing Actions

- a. Investigation(s)
  - i. What investigation(s) (AMB, CI, FFPBs) were initiated? *So much information provided...enough information to assess the situation... Not absent of the facts, comfortable with the facts/information in hand that a requirement to do an investigation was not pertinent. At the time, no missing part of the 5Ws to warrant further investigation. Do not recall doing an HFB.*
  - ii. Who initiated the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs)
  - iii. When were results received of the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs) *Was not aware a characterization occurred.*
- b. Damage and Repair
  - i. What was the extent of the damage? *Do not know how we determined the required fix of the aircraft.*

- ii. When were repairs initiated? ***Returned to service quite quickly***
- iii. Who supervised the repairs? ***Do not recall***

#### 4. External Influence

- a. Was there external influence irt the reporting? ***No, not at all***
- b. Was there external influence irt damage assessment? ***What is a consumable, what is not a consumable? Never felt pressure...wanted precision as opposed to guessing. MMCOs, AMOs, COs...would have talked to MALS...discussed on the telephone with the VMGR CO.***
- c. If external influence existed, who was being pressured and by whom? ***Characterization of the incident is financially based...handled maturely. Precision is important to costing. 'Show me the math' should not be construed as combative.***

#### 5. Procedures/Lessons Learned

- a. For safety and standardization reasons, were any changes to procedures made as a result of the mishap? ***Not that I can recall.***
- b. Was there any training post-mishap based on lessons learned? ***Not that I recall. Reflexive would have discussed it in the Ready Room.***
- c. Do you think there was anything different that the squadron, MAG, or Wing should have done after the mishap? ***Biased by the Dec 2018 mishap. Biased by that tragedy. Don't know it is the biggest event until an event occurs. Sufficiency of the response to the VMFA-VMGR incident. Difficult to articulate how to avoid a future tragedy.***

#### 6. Accountability

- a. Were Marines held accountable for the mishap? ***Not a case of malfeasance. Not a case of people doing the wrong thing. Case of a dangerous business. Capitalized on the lessons learned for the benefit of the aircrew and the squadron. (Not punitive in nature) – Reflexive, sit a guy down for a while...don't know if I did. Don't know if the guy was given a pause...usually bias the flight lead.***
- b. If so, to what extent?

#### 7. Other

- a. Are there any additional questions that should be asked? ***All good questions...wish I had more clarity...wish I was closer to the incident to communicate better questions. But I have no context.***
- b. Is there anything else that you believe I should know as the Investigating Officer? ***No***

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Name

Rank/Rate:

Activity:

Unit:

Telephone number:

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Signature and Date





Statement of [REDACTED]

Investigating Officer - [REDACTED]

Investigating Officer request:

Please take 30 min to write what you recall about the events surrounding the aerial refueling mishap in 2016 between VMGR 152 and VMFA 242. The desire is to gain an understanding of your perspective on what occurred with the event and how it was handled.

Statement:

The first time the incident came to my attention was a day after the event occurred. I received either a phone call or email from the Wing (either [REDACTED] or his chief of staff) inquiring as to what occurred. The CG saw the aircraft parked on the apron at Kadena AFB with the hose on the LAU. A picture was eventually sent to me from the Wing (either from the CG or the COS).

Once informed, I immediately contacted the unit's CO, [REDACTED] to find out what had occurred. He came to my office to go over the incident. He emphasized that it was an event surrounding the dangerous evolution of aerial refueling and not something beyond that. I asked him to clarify further as I didn't understand how the hose would end up on the LAU. The following is what was reported to me from the CO of VMFA 242:

The lead a/c was complete with refueling and had moved to the port reform position on the KC 130. The wingman was still receiving fuel from the port hose and once complete, followed the proper communications procedures with the tanker to disconnect and rejoin with his lead. The lead a/c then requested to depart up and to the left away from the tanker. The wingman transitioned his focus from the KC 130 to his lead while still in or near the 'pre-contact' position post-refueling. My understanding was that as they were moving away from the tanker, they pulled forward just enough for the wingman's LAU to contact the hose where it got entangled and separated from the KC 130. I also recall they didn't know what happened until the KC 130 crew informed them of the missing hose. At that time, the flight returned to Kadena AFB for an uneventful landing.

I relayed this information to the 1 MAW CG after which our focus turned to properly reporting the incident. There was the requirement in the report to classify it as a Class A, B, C or D depending on the cost of repair. Associated with the report is a time constraint, but the focus was to get the information correct vice rushing to get it complete.

We then started a safety investigation to look into the details of the incident to better understand what happened and prevent another occurrence. To ensure thoroughness, it was a joint effort between both VMFA 242 and VMGR 152. At this time of year, we were in the middle of change of command season (all my subordinate commands were turning over to include VMFA 242 and VMGR 152). Thus, the new VMFA 242 CO, [REDACTED] took over and the investigation was completed under his watch.

Upon completion of the investigation, I was satisfied that the mishap was thoroughly examined, corrective actions were sound and those actions implemented fully by both units. The COs of both units ([REDACTED] and [REDACTED]) made deliberate efforts to work together by having combined lessons

learned during full squadron meetings that covered the implementation of new procedures. As individual units, they held safety stand-downs to review the incident and the investigation results to further enforce understanding of the new changes. This was to preclude any misunderstanding, ensure future safe evolutions, and retain positive relations between the units.

I am steadfast in my view that, based on the above, this incident was examined completely and corrective actions thoughtfully and thoroughly implemented by both units.



## 2019 Command Investigation

### 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Night Fixed Wing Aerial Refueling Incident

#### Investigation Direction:

- 1 - Aircraft Mishap
- 2 - Resultant Aircraft Damage
- 3 - Incident Reporting
- 4 - Incident Investigations

190402 Interview – [REDACTED]

Former MAG-12 CO, July 2015 – July 2017

#### 1. Mishap Details

- a. Background, history, training, experience, qualification(s) and currency of the crew. *MP was newer 1<sup>st</sup> tour pilot. Others involved, do not recall (DNR). MFtLd Tanker, assume more senior.*
- b. Sortie Purpose. SPINS available. Description of sortie planning and brief. *N CAS tank CAS...don't recall specific order. No other details.*
- c. Atmospherics (Weather, light level, etc...). *No*
- d. Use of Night Vision Goggles. *Recall used, however no details.*
- e. Description of aircraft flight path and maneuver. *No specifics. Only description relayed, at the end of the event, lead was on the port side as the wingman completed. Moved forward and left...understanding was they were departing to the left.*
- f. The incident/mishap description. *(Maybe day after) Sqd CO communicated, standard tanking issue. Explain how it got on the right wing. Lead complete, -2 just finished. Cleared to depart. -2 started flying formation on the lead vice clearing the KC-130 and inadvertently moved forward as he turned left, ultimately impacting the basket/hose with right wingtip (LAU). They didn't realize the basket was on the aircraft...until the KC-130 communicated to the F/A-18.*
- g. Where did the aircraft land after the mishap? *Kadena*
- h. What occurred immediately after recovery? *DNR*
- i. Describe the post-mishap examination of the aircraft. Extent of damage? *DNR*
- j. Was any other military property affected? Extent of damage? *Don't believe so.*
- k. Were there sociological, psychological, and/or human factors related to the accident? (Potential stress factors, fatigue, use of medication, etc...) *Nothing communicated to my level.*

#### 2. Immediate Actions

- a. Incident report

- i. Who reported the mishap? *Heard it from CG or CoS who called to ask inquisitively. What happened to your jet in Kadena. No idea. CG saw it on the back side of a trip. Pictures sent to him from above.*
    - ii. When was the incident reported?
    - iii. What was reported? *Initial 5Ws do not remember; but Sqd CO was very thorough. Do not remember.*
  - b. Damage:
    - i. What was the initial assessment of the aircraft damage? *F/A-18 had potential damage to the leading edge flap (perhaps cosmetic); looking into it.*
    - ii. Was the damage to the aircraft documented (pictures, sketches, reports, etc.)? *Pictures.*
3. Continuing Actions
  - a. Investigation(s)
    - i. What investigation(s) (AMB, CI, FFPBs) were initiated? *Safety investigation.*
    - ii. Who initiated the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs) *Analysis initiated (Believe it started under [REDACTED] and continued under [REDACTED] before the CoC, but may have been initiated after the CoC. Do not remember conversation with [REDACTED] nor [REDACTED].*
    - iii. When were results received of the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs) *2-3 months later.*
  - b. Damage and Repair
    - i. What was the extent of the damage? *Recall F/A-18 was fine. Damage was the hose itself, under the threshold of a Class C. Working with MALS to get the costing right.*
    - ii. When were repairs initiated? *DNR*
    - iii. Who supervised the repairs? *DNR*
4. External Influence
  - a. Was there external influence in the reporting? *There was natural pressure to find out what happened. Do not recall any pressure*
  - b. Was there external influence in damage assessment? *Natural pressure to find the cost. Do this correctly not find out the right answer.*
  - c. If external influence existed, who was being pressured and by whom? *NA*
5. Procedures/Lessons Learned
  - a. For safety and standardization reasons, were any changes to procedures made as a result of the mishap? *Recall the squadrons got together and discussed. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] made a joint effort to execute a thorough and combined. Mutual discussion at the squadron level to emphasize lessons learned. Don't know of any specific lessons learned. Reemphasized or changed...do not recall.*

- b. Was there any training post-mishap based on lessons learned? *Don't know specifically.*
- c. Do you think there was anything different that the squadron, MAG, or Wing should have done after the mishap? *I don't think so, I was satisfied. Thorough and addressed everything.*

*MAG and Sqd emphasized Risk Assessment...but do not remember if it was a MAG standard or a Squadron standard. Required to do it.*

*Are we asking the right questions during the build of training plans, weeklies, and dailies...or are we assuming M-Sharp is covering, specifically tracking all qualification, currency, and prerequisites.*

6. Accountability /

- a. Were Marines held accountable for the mishap? *Yes...in the analysis of the incident, lessons were learned. Don't know if anything further. Do not recall...know what I would have done as a CO of a squadron, but I don't remember.*
- b. If so, to what extent?

7. Other

- a. Are there any additional questions that should be asked? *I don't think so.*
- b. Is there anything else that you believe I should know as the Investigating Officer? *Asked the Sqd CO, is this a mishap or not? Away from the tanker. Reemphasized proper procedures. Difference between a good pilot and a great pilot...a great pilot is always aware.*



### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Name: [REDACTED] Rank/Rate: [REDACTED]

Activity: [REDACTED] Unit: [REDACTED]

Telephone number: [REDACTED]

Today, March 8, 2019, I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement under the guidelines of the Privacy Act.

This statement is provided in compliance with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579) which requires that Federal agencies must inform individuals who are requested to furnish personal information about themselves as to certain facts regarding the information requested below.

1. AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301; 10 U.S.C. 972, 1201-1221, 2733, 2734-2734b., 2737, 5013, 5031-5036, 5131-5150, 5947, 6148, 7205, 7622-7623; 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680; 31 U.S.C. 240-243, 3521-3531, 3701-3702, 3717-3718; 37 U.S.C. 802; 38 U.S.C. 105; 42 U.S.C. 2651-2653; 44 U.S.C. 3101; 49 U.S.C. 1901.

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSES. The information which will be solicited is intended principally and may be used for the following purposes:

- a. Determinations on the status of personnel regarding entitlements to pay during disability, disability benefits, severance pay, retirement pay, increases of pay for longevity, survivor's benefits, involuntary extensions of enlistments, date of expiration of active obligated service, and accrual of annual leave.
- b. Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action.
- c. Determinations on liability of personnel for losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.
- d. Evaluation of petitions, grievances, and complaints.
- e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.
- f. Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration.
- g. Public information releases.

h. Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.

3. ROUTINE USES: In addition to being used within the Department of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemen's Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; to the U.S. General Accounting Office for purposes of determinations concerning relief of accountable personnel from liability for losses of public funds and related fiscal matters; and to the Department of Justice for use in litigation involving the Government. Additionally, such investigations are sometimes furnished to agencies of the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlements, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, State, or local law enforcement authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.

4. MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE, CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:

a. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2a or 2b, above: Disclosure is voluntary. You are advised that you are initially presumed to be entitled to have the [personnel determination] [disciplinary determinations] in paragraph 2, above, resolved in your favor, but the final determination will be based on all the evidence in the investigative record. If you do not provide the requested information, you will be entitled to a favorable determination if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in your favor. If the completed record does contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in your favor, however, your election not to provide the requested information possible could prevent the investigation from obtaining evidence which may be needed to support a favorable determination.

b. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2c, above: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determination as to whether you should be held pecuniarily (monetarily) liable for repayment of the Government's loss would be based on the other evidence in the investigative record, which possibly might not support a favorable determination.


c. Where the individual is a claimant or potential claimant in an investigation for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could prevent the investigation from obtaining sufficient information to



substantiate any claim which you have made or may make against the Government as a result of the incident under investigation.

d. Where the individual was treated at Government expense for injuries caused by third parties in connection with a matter being investigated for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could result in a requirement for you to assign to the Government your medical care claims against third parties in connection with the incident, or authorize withholding of the records of your treatment in naval medical facilities.

e. In any other case: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, and determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.



My name is [REDACTED], EDIPI [REDACTED] I was the Commanding Officer of VMGR-152 from May of 2016 through June of 2018.

During my career from January 1992 to November 2018, I served three tours at VMGR-152 (2001-2004, 2010-2012, 2015-2018), one at VMGR-452 (2006-2009), and a tour as the C/KC-130 class desk at PMA-207 (2012-2015).

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This statement regarding the April 2016 mishap involving VMGR-152 and VMFA-242 is as factual as I can recall based on the time elapsed. However, since the 2018 Class A mishap, I have gone back through old files in recent weeks, as well as spoken with Marines involved with the incident in 2016 due to the obvious similarities, and am refreshed with the information available to provide factual information.

I had just transitioned from being the MAG-12 XO around January of 2016 and served as the MAG Special Projects Officer (CI investigator for a cybersecurity issue) until the change of command of VMGR-152 in May 2016. I was aware that there was a midair in April 2016 during a refueling evolution between an aircraft from VMGR-152 and VMFA-242. The information I have is from being in the endorsing chain as well as speaking with Marines directly involved in the mishap or the SIR.

Marines I spoke to about the event:

[REDACTED] – CO, VMGR-152 at the time of the mishap  
[REDACTED] VMGR-152 at the time of the mishap  
[REDACTED], oncoming XO, VMGR-152 at the time of the mishap  
[REDACTED] Maintenance Officer, VMGR-152 at the time of the mishap  
[REDACTED] ATCO 1<sup>st</sup> MAW at the time of the mishap  
[REDACTED] ASO/Ops, VMGR-152 at the time of the mishap  
[REDACTED] DSS, VMGR-152 at the time of the mishap  
[REDACTED] MAG ASO (VMGR-152) at the time of the mishap  
[REDACTED] MAG-12 AMSO at the time of the mishap

Others not listed...

Facts:

- The KC-130 was in level flight when they were hit by the maneuvering F-18.
- The F-18 from VMFA-242 hit the left hose in the aileron area of the jet, which pulled the jet down and to the right and under the KC-130.
- The F-18 crew did not see the tanker when they turned into it, and did not realize they hit the KC-130.
- While correcting the downward motion of the jet from the resistance of the hose, the F-18 pilot pulled up right in front of the KC-130. The KC-130 crew saw the jet maneuver in right front of them at the 10 o'clock position.
- The F-18 severed about 20 ft. of hose from the tanker.

- I did my own math based on the amount of hose that was still on the jet when they landed, the dimensions of an F-18, and the dimensions of a KC-130, and I came to the conclusion that the F-18 missed the tail of the KC-130 by 5-10 ft. at most.
- By the end of May 2016 both VMGR-152 and VMFA-242 had turned over commands.
- When I took over command in at the end of May I was told that no investigations, either SIR or CI, had been initiated for the mishap.
- From doing a previous investigation, I know the cost of a hose alone was at least \$20,000 which would have made the midair a Class D mishap at a minimum before factoring the damage to the F-18.
- I was told by a VMGR officer who went to begin the investigation in April, that when they went to get pictures of the F-18, despite obvious damage to the aircraft, the VMFA-242 maintainers were already taking it apart in order to fix it and were just treating it like a broken aircraft.
- ██████████ stated to me that he brought, "at least two plane loads of parts down to fix the jet."
- ██████████ that stated in an email there was a delay in initiating the investigation, "due to undue command influence from adjacent and higher units."
- When the decision to form an AMB was finally made there were delays to the investigation due to VMFA-242's deployment to Alaska, although that did not impact the final outcome of the report.

These are the facts I can provide without going into the SIR and causal factors and command climate. I can expand of this further if necessary or if follow questions are asked. I could keep it at the wave tops and avoid privileged information, but I leave that to the investigators' discretion. The Marines listed above could provide amplifying information as required.



## 2019 Command Investigation

### 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Night Fixed Wing Aerial Refueling Incident

#### Investigation Direction:

- 1 - Aircraft Mishap
- 2 - Resultant Aircraft Damage
- 3 - Incident Reporting
- 4 - Incident Investigations

190401 Interview – [REDACTED]

Former CO VMGR-152 May 2016-June 2018

#### 1. Mishap Details

- a. Background, history, training, experience, qualification(s) and currency of the crew. *The only crewmember I am 100% sure was on the plane was [REDACTED]. This is from conversations with him and the callsign of the mishap tanker which is Sumo 04, the AMO's callsign which [REDACTED] was filling. He was a fully qualified aircraft commander. Although I'm not sure of his or other VMGR crew members currency at the time, the scrutiny that I had observed in my previous two tours at VMGR-152, and that all procedures remained the same when I took over a month later, leads me to conclude that all VMGR-152 crew members on the mishap flight would have been well vetted and qualified.*
- b. Sortie Purpose. SPINS available. Description of sortie planning and brief. *Air-to-air refueling training.*
- c. Atmospherics (Weather, light level, etc...). *Night, low light.*
- d. Use of Night Vision Goggles. *Yes*
- e. Description of aircraft flight path and maneuver. *The tanker was straight and level. Every tanking manual states that not hitting the tanker is the responsibility of the receiver. That is basically the same flight rules that the less maneuverable aircraft has the right of way.*
- f. The incident/mishap description. *The mishap F-18 turned into the non-maneuvering tanker and luckily got caught on the hose which prevented it from running into the tanker fuselage. Based on my own analysis the F-18 missed hitting the tanker by 5-10 feet at most. Both crews were fortunate that a 3 inch piece of reinforced rubber prevented a Class A mishap.*
- g. Where did the aircraft land after the mishap? *Both landed at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa.*
- h. What occurred immediately after recovery? *Unknown as I did not take over until a month after the mishap, however I do know that VMGR-152 sent a representative to document the mishap and the F-18 squadron was already repairing the jet.*

- i. Describe the post-mishap examination of the aircraft. Extent of damage? ***The only damage to the KC-130 was the loss of about 15 feet of aerial refueling hose, but the F-18 had more extensive damage.***
- j. Was any other military property affected? Extent of damage? ***No.***
- k. Were there sociological, psychological, and/or human factors related to the accident? (Potential stress factors, fatigue, use of medication, etc...) ***Without diving too deeply into the SIR there were definite supervisory issues at VMFA-242 that contributed to the mishap.***

## 2. Immediate Actions

- a. Incident report
  - i. Who reported the mishap? ***Unknown as I did not take over until a month after the mishap.***
  - ii. When was the incident reported? ***Unknown as I did not take over until a month after the mishap***
  - iii. What was reported? ***Unknown as I did not take over until a month after the mishap***
- b. Damage:
  - i. What was the initial assessment of the aircraft damage? ***I only know specifically for the KC-130 that the hose was a total loss.***
  - ii. Was the damage to the aircraft documented (pictures, sketches, reports, etc.)? ***I believe pictures were taken but I do not know who has copies.***

## 3. Continuing Actions

- a. Investigation(s) ***All dates are based on PST emails.***
  - i. What investigation(s) (AMB, CI, FFPBs) were initiated? ***A decision to convene an AMB was made on 5/31/16 but the AMB composition wasn't determined until 6/15/16. I do not believe any other investigations were conducted.***
  - ii. Who initiated the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs) ***Unknown who directed the investigations to begin, but I have an email that said the AMB composition was determined by MAG-12.***
  - iii. When were results received of the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs) ***The first SIR report I saw was on 7/28/16 which then needed to go through the endorsing chain. I have a FINAL NOTIFICATION report from the NSC dated 12/28/16.***
- b. Damage and Repair
  - i. What was the extent of the damage? ***Is the question what was the actual extent, or what was it eventually determined to be? It was determined to be a Class C mishap at \$52,000.***
  - ii. When were repairs initiated? ***From what I was told repairs were in work on the jet before a VMGR representative was even there to take pictures.***
  - iii. Who supervised the repairs? ***Unknown***

4. External Influence

- a. Was there external influence irt the reporting? *Based on email dated 6/1/16 I have from the DOSS, [REDACTED], yes but I do not know to what extent. However any "influence" to reduce the severity of a mishap would be a violation of the OPNAV 3750 the way I understand it. This opinion is based on two years serving as an ASO, 1 year as VMGR-152's DOSS, and being a graduate of the ASC course.*
- b. Was there external influence irt damage assessment? *Based on email dated 6/1/16 I have from the DOSS, [REDACTED], yes but I do not know to what extent.*
- c. If external influence existed, who was being pressured and by whom? *Based on email dated 6/1/16 I have from the DOSS, [REDACTED] yes but I do not know to what extent.*

5. Procedures/Lessons Learned

- a. For safety and standardization reasons, were any changes to procedures made as a result of the mishap? *Not at VMGR-152. Most of the recommendations in the SIR were directed at VMFA-242. / VMGR 'frustrated' that it appeared that fingers were being pointed at the VMGR for improper procedures...basically the tanker comms contributed. ATP 56B – Tanking is a visual maneuver and it is the receiver's responsibility to avoid the tanker.*
- b. Was there any training post-mishap based on lessons learned? *Most of the recommendations in the SIR were directed at VMFA-242, it is unknown if they implemented them.*
- c. Do you think there was anything different that the squadron, MAG, or Wing should have done after the mishap? *In hindsight of the December 2018 Class A, yes. In both instances a maneuvering F-18 hit a non-maneuvering tanker. In both cases the jet was from VMFA-242. In my opinion, there had to be training or command climate issues in both cases that allowed flight conditions to devolve to the point that VMFA-242 had two mid-air collisions in the span of less than 2 and a half years.*

6. Accountability

- a. Were Marines held accountable for the mishap? *Unknown*
- b. If so, to what extent?

7. Other

- a. Are there any additional questions that should be asked? *Command Climate. 152 did not go to the club. Significant jet-tanker animosity. 152 felt out of place. Fear of doing HAZREPs, Mishap Investigations, etc... Lessons Learned -> codify lessons learned.*
- b. Is there anything else that you believe I should know as the Investigating Officer? *Second hand, first-hand information.*

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Name: [REDACTED] Rank/Rate:                     

Activity:                      Unit:                     

Telephone number:                     

Today, 15 MAR, 2013, I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement under the guidelines of the Privacy Act.

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1. AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301; 10 U.S.C. 972, 1201-1221, 2733, 2734-2734b., 2737, 5013, 5031-5036, 5131-5150, 5947, 6148, 7205, 7622-7623; 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680; 31 U.S.C. 240-243, 3521-3531, 3701-3702, 3717-3718; 37 U.S.C. 802; 38 U.S.C. 105; 42 U.S.C. 2651-2653; 44 U.S.C. 3101; 49 U.S.C. 1901.

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSES. The information which will be solicited is intended principally and may be used for the following purposes:

a. Determinations on the status of personnel regarding entitlements to pay during disability, disability benefits, severance pay, retirement pay, increases of pay for longevity, survivor's benefits, involuntary extensions of enlistments, date of expiration of active obligated service, and accrual of annual leave.

b. Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action.

c. Determinations on liability of personnel for losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.

d. Evaluation of petitions, grievances, and complaints.

e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.

f. Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration.

g. Public information releases.



h. Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.

3. ROUTINE USES: In addition to being used within the Department of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemen's Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; to the U.S. General Accounting Office for purposes of determinations concerning relief of accountable personnel from liability for losses of public funds and related fiscal matters; and to the Department of Justice for use in litigation involving the Government. Additionally, such investigations are sometimes furnished to agencies of the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlements, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, State, or local law enforcement authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.

4. MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE, CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:

a. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2a or 2b, above: Disclosure is voluntary. You are advised that you are initially presumed to be entitled to have the [personnel determination] [disciplinary determinations] in paragraph 2, above, resolved in your favor, but the final determination will be based on all the evidence in the investigative record. If you do not provide the requested information, you will be entitled to a favorable determination if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in your favor. If the completed record does contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in your favor, however, your election not to provide the requested information possible could prevent the investigation from obtaining evidence which may be needed to support a favorable determination.


b. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2c, above: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determination as to whether you should be held pecuniarily (monetarily) liable for repayment of the Government's loss would be based on the other evidence in the investigative record, which possibly might not support a favorable determination.

c. Where the individual is a claimant or potential claimant in an investigation for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could prevent the investigation from obtaining sufficient information to

substantiate any claim which you have made or may make against the Government as a result of the incident under investigation.

d. Where the individual was treated at Government expense for injuries caused by third parties in connection with a matter being investigated for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could result in a requirement for you to assign to the Government your medical care claims against third parties in connection with the incident, or authorize withholding of the records of your treatment in naval medical facilities.

e. In any other case: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, and determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.



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Witness Signature and Date



30 Mar 2019

To: [REDACTED]  
From: [REDACTED]  
Subj: Statement ICO Apr 2016 Tanking Incident

1. I assumed command of VMFA(AW)-242 on May 13, 2016. In my turnover with [REDACTED] I was told that the subject tanking incident was not being classified as mishap and that while the final costing was still being ascertained, it was expected to be below the threshold for a Class D based on the turn in value of the Leading Edge Flap and the classification of the refueling hose as a Consumable. Additionally, it was conveyed that the involved aircrew would be evaluated via the Human Factors Board process prior to my assumption of command. I was left a copy of the HFB findings and retained it in my desk until I relinquished command to [REDACTED].
2. Within the first few days of assuming command, I ordered a rewrite of the squadron's SOP to address areas I felt needed modification, to align it with my focus and to better reflect my leadership style. One such area involved procedures in/around the tanker, specifically the prohibition of TacAdmin within 10nm the requirement to establish 1000' altitude separation prior to initiating any turns, and others.
3. Approximately one month after assuming command and while on a full squadron training detachment to Alaska, I received direction from 2d MAW CG via MAG 12 CO to convene an Aircraft Mishap Board for the tanking incident that had occurred nearly two months prior to ensure the event was documented and promulgate any Lessons Learned to the larger Aviation community. The required notifications were made shortly thereafter. During the investigation, the preliminary costing placed it in the Class C mishap category.
4. The Safety investigation confirmed much of what had been suspected/observed that was corrected/being corrected regarding previous processes. It also provided insight to additional areas that needed shoring up and informed further policy rudder corrections.



## 2019 Command Investigation

### 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Night Fixed Wing Aerial Refueling Incident

#### Investigation Direction:

- 1 - Aircraft Mishap
- 2 - Resultant Aircraft Damage
- 3 - Incident Reporting
- 4 - Incident Investigations

190402 Interview – [REDACTED]

#### VMFA(AW)-242 Commanding Officer

##### 1. Mishap Details

- a. Background, history, training, experience, qualification(s) and currency of the crew. *Technically current except for [REDACTED] who had never tanked in the fleet on goggles. Section Lead upgrade... [REDACTED] (DL) Flt Lead / [REDACTED] back seat – WTI PCS in May). Rendezvous...out of order... [REDACTED], [REDACTED] second. Second cycle...first cycle pinky. [REDACTED] in squadron in squadron approximately a year. [REDACTED] weak pilot. [REDACTED] very strong personality.*
- b. Sortie Purpose. SPINS available. *Description of sortie planning and brief.*
- c. Atmospherics (Weather, light level, etc...).
- d. Use of Night Vision Goggles. *Opinion – Valuable tool but goggles are a sensor, but must be very deliberate and precise understanding the goggles are a sensor and must be respected. Probe, light can be blinding...technique, Hornet establishes midnight...low light, significant impact to the environment. Starts with the brief. Back side appears very little time spent discussing goggle factors during the brief. Going to the tanker, any questions? MP admitted in later sit down conversation that he did not*
- e. Description of aircraft flight path and maneuver.
- f. The incident/mishap description. *Found out 2-3 days after the incident. Needed aide to get Marines down to Okinawa to fix a jet. Talked to the crew...only person I did not talk to was [REDACTED]. Sit down with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Tanking complete, slides to right echelon. Confusion created by Flight Lead request departing up and over...no, depart straight ahead. [REDACTED] did not hear, started shallow climb and the turned left. Flight lead started climb and left turn, MP did not climb high enough. Started left turn, subsequently losing altitude. Confusing to wingman, slides aft, climbs a bit, however slides to the inside the turn, loses altitude. From 4:30, goes to tankers 5 oclock...impacts the right hose, right to left...hits left basket with canopy. Under the KC-130 empennage. Starboard observer sees it and communicates the situation. What just happened? What's the plan? Declaring an emergency? No, but C-130 crew*
- g. Where did the aircraft land after the mishap?

- h. What occurred immediately after recovery?
- i. Describe the post-mishap examination of the aircraft. Extent of damage?
- j. Was any other military property affected? Extent of damage?
- k. Were there sociological, psychological, and/or human factors related to the accident? (Potential stress factors, fatigue, use of medication, etc...) ***MP is a Combat Wingman, taking forever...wants to be a Flight Lead. Wants to do well...wants to progress. Not the guy who is going to come forth with the statement, "I haven't done this before". Driven. The guy who wants to be a leader. MWSO, present...figuring out his way through his career. Go along to get along. No other external issues for either the MP or MWSO. MLead Pilot (Sortie Flight Leade) performance was not where it should have been...tough to get in the airplane...won't come to light until Guam DFT (Sep 16). Environment - Squadron (MAG and Wing) was all about being T2...drove the mind set to be T2 at all costs. Qual inflation, over-reporting readiness...pushed guys towards quals before they may have been ready. 14 people with baseline privilege.***

## 2. Immediate Actions

- a. Incident report
  - i. Who reported the mishap?
  - ii. When was the incident reported?
  - iii. What was reported? ***Perspective was there was no immediate report. No IRS...conversations between Sqd CO and MAG CO. MAG CO gave Sqd COs significant latitude. No reporting until days after...'think' [REDACTED] (MAG DoSS) started asking questions.***
- b. Damage:
  - i. What was the initial assessment of the aircraft damage? ***Damage to leading edge flap and right trailing edge flap. Ultimately the control surface was repaired.***
  - ii. Was the damage to the aircraft documented (pictures, sketches, reports, etc.)? ***Unknown, no SA.***

## 3. Continuing Actions

- a. Investigation(s)
  - i. What investigation(s) (AMB, CI, FFPBs) were initiated? ***Immediate HFB which results were turned over shortly before the CoC. AMB was initiated 15 Jun.***
  - ii. Who initiated the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs) ***M CO 1. MAG DoSS to Sqd CO 2...notified Sqd CO 2. MAW CG ordered the AMB. 242 stated not a mishap...an incident...costing short of a Class C. 152 disagreed...mid-air...required to report. 242, not a mid-air...tanking incident. 152, post tanking, mid-air. Believe MAG CO received information from COs that an AMB not required due to costing. Looking at pictures of the incident informally, MAW CG asked how is this not being investigated? CG directs AMB through MAG CO.***
  - iii. When were results received of the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs)

- b. Damage and Repair
  - i. What was the extent of the damage?
  - ii. When were repairs initiated?
  - iii. Who supervised the repairs?

#### 4. External Influence

- a. Was there external influence irt the reporting?
- b. Was there external influence irt damage assessment?
- c. If external influence existed, who was being pressured and by whom?

*No Annual or Quarterly training plans...figured it out month to month. Environment - Squadron (MAG and Wing) was all about being T2...drove the mind set to be T2 at all costs. Qual inflation, over-reporting readiness...pushed guys towards quals before they may have been ready. 14 people with baseline privilege.*

#### 5. Procedures/Lessons Learned

- a. For safety and standardization reasons, were any changes to procedures made as a result of the mishap? *Focused on Standardization...re-aligned training to the T&R, executed in proper sortie/sim order. 2 'C' sims, 1 'D' sims....go to states to execute sims to hit the pre-requisites.*

*After digging into the Ops processes, restricted number of personnel who could baseline training codes. Focus on night systems tanking illusions...ran entire squadron red on night tanking. Placed a WTI in Safety. No ASO in the ASO billet at the time...rearranged squadron manpower.*

*Routing of schedule (folder with hot board, currency requirements for training) to ensure qualifications and currency requirements met...changed to Ops-Maint coord, Maint, Ops, then DoSS, reviewed by XO (when able), then CO for signature. RAW was not utilized in the daily...ORM was imbedded in the routing process as well as imbedded in the weekly build. ORM is continuous...not a CYA...ORM are filters...Training Plan, Quarterly, Weekly builds the holistic operational risk management.*

*Strat tank at night, chain strat tank day...does not chain.*

- b. Was there any training post-mishap based on lessons learned? *Monday following the CoC first Dept Head meeting directed re-write of Squadron SOP. F/A-18 TACSOP maintained absolute Primacy. Sqd SOP signed and promulgated in Jul/Aug 16 – admin around the tanker stressed. Until Sqd SOP instilled, STAN notes utilized to stress forthcoming adjustments to the Sqd SOP.*
- c. Do you think there was anything different that the squadron, MAG, or Wing should have done after the mishap? *Opinion, MA crew was set up for failure. People who had the experience to say so were not effectively supervising. MAG-12 SOP? Unaided or aided tanking conversation...lighting configuration. Ready room discussions, but not codified.*



6. Accountability

- a. Were Marines held accountable for the mishap? *Those who remained, yes...those who left, no.*
- b. If so, to what extent? *Deliberate return to flight for both MP, MWSO, and MLd.*

7. Other

- a. Are there any additional questions that should be asked? *None that I can think of.*
- b. Is there anything else that you believe I should know as the Investigating Officer? *The lack of reporting is not surprising. It was how the squadron operated. 242 was a fortress...nothing came out of it. 242-152 relationship was abysmal. Personalities got in the way of doing the right thing. No belief it is tied to the recent mishap.*

*MAG/MAW – Administratively. Fault? Where or who...did this come off the tracks...everyone had the best intentions of the squadron. After actions is where it went wrong. 1<sup>st</sup> MAW is different...it is hard...running good guys ragged, more apt to not toe the line when they should be. Death by a thousand cuts. Man, train, and equip. Uber focus on fight tonight...more apt to not toe the line due to complacency. Focus on sub set of T&R? Prioritize. Systemic problem in the AO, in the community. Experience? How do you judge individuals? What metrics can be put in place to establish conditions for successful execution. Micro external forces contribute.*

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Name: [REDACTED]

Rank/Rate: [REDACTED]

Activity: [REDACTED]

Unit: [REDACTED]

Telephone number: [REDACTED]

Today, 3 APRIL, 2019 I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement under the guidelines of the Privacy Act.

This statement is provided in compliance with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579) which requires that Federal agencies must inform individuals who are requested to furnish personal information about themselves as to certain facts regarding the information requested below.

1. AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301; 10 U.S.C. 972, 1201-1221, 2733, 2734-2734b., 2737, 5013, 5031-5036, 5131-5150, 5947, 6148, 7205, 7622-7623; 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680; 31 U.S.C. 240-243, 3521-3531, 3701-3702, 3717-3718; 37 U.S.C. 802; 38 U.S.C. 105; 42 U.S.C. 2651-2653; 44 U.S.C. 3101; 49 U.S.C. 1901.

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSES. The information which will be solicited is intended principally and may be used for the following purposes:

- a. Determinations on the status of personnel regarding entitlements to pay during disability, disability benefits, severance pay, retirement pay, increases of pay for longevity, survivor's benefits, involuntary extensions of enlistments, date of expiration of active obligated service, and accrual of annual leave.
- b. Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action.
- c. Determinations on liability of personnel for losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.
- d. Evaluation of petitions, grievances, and complaints.
- e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.
- f. Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration.
- g. Public information releases.

h. Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.

3. ROUTINE USES: In addition to being used within the Department of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemen's Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; to the U.S. General Accounting Office for purposes of determinations concerning relief of accountable personnel from liability for losses of public funds and related fiscal matters; and to the Department of Justice for use in litigation involving the Government. Additionally, such investigations are sometimes furnished to agencies of the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlements, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, State, or local law enforcement authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.

4. MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE, CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:

a. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2a or 2b, above: Disclosure is voluntary. You are advised that you are initially presumed to be entitled to have the [personnel determination] [disciplinary determinations] in paragraph 2, above, resolved in your favor, but the final determination will be based on all the evidence in the investigative record. If you do not provide the requested information, you will be entitled to a favorable determination if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in your favor. If the completed record does contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in your favor, however, your election not to provide the requested information possible could prevent the investigation from obtaining evidence which may be needed to support a favorable determination.

b. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2c, above: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determination as to whether you should be held pecuniarily (monetarily) liable for repayment of the Government's loss would be based on the other evidence in the investigative record, which possibly might not support a favorable determination.

c. Where the individual is a claimant or potential claimant in an investigation for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could prevent the investigation from obtaining sufficient information to

substantiate any claim which you have made or may make against the Government as a result of the incident under investigation.

d. Where the individual was treated at Government expense for injuries caused by third parties in connection with a matter being investigated for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could result in a requirement for you to assign to the Government your medical care claims against third parties in connection with the incident, or authorize withholding of the records of your treatment in naval medical facilities.

e. In any other case: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, and determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3 Apr 2019

Statement - [REDACTED]

I joined VMFA(AW)-242 January 03, 2014. From March 03, 2015 to May 13, 2016 I served as the Executive Officer. On or about the evening of 28 April, 2016 (the night of the incident) I was informed by [REDACTED] (the flight lead) via cell phone that their wingman had the incident with the KC-130 during night refueling operations. Details of the incident were very vague that evening as both sets of aircrew (lead and wingman) were not sure exactly how the incident had occurred. As I recall, the Operations Duty Officer initiated a flash report that evening.

The next morning, as details began to emerge, I believe we initiated a HAZREP and/or an OPREP-3 through our S-S. I recall that we were gathering costs associated with the incident to determine if and what classification the MISHAP would be categorized. Unfortunately, the incident occurred a little over two weeks from a change of command, at which point I transitioned to the MAG-12. As I recall, costs associated with the incident were still pending at that point.

I don't recall if a command investigation was ever initiated. I remember meeting with the aircrew in the days following the incident in an effort to determine what happened, but there were gaps and variations in the story due to each person's situational awareness and memory of the event. I recall we were lacking aircraft data for either one of both of the aircraft involved which is recorded through the manual depression of the "POS REC" button in the aircraft, so we weren't initially able to piece the event together that way.

As I transitioned to MAG-12 just over two weeks after the incident, I was no longer privy to details and actions surrounding that evening.

[REDACTED]

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Name: [REDACTED] Rank/Rate: [REDACTED]  
Activity: [REDACTED] Unit: [REDACTED]  
Telephone number: [REDACTED]

Today, 28 Mar, 2019, I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement under the guidelines of the Privacy Act.

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c. Determinations on liability of personnel for losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.

d. Evaluation of petitions, grievances, and complaints.

e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.

f. Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration.

g. Public information releases.



h. Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.

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b. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2c, above: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determination as to whether you should be held pecuniarily (monetarily) liable for repayment of the Government's loss would be based on the other evidence in the investigative record, which possibly might not support a favorable determination.

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e. In any other case: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, and determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

01 Apr 19

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION STATEMENT

1. At the time of the 28 April 2016 midair collision between VMFA-242 and VMGR-152, I was assigned as VMGR-152 S-1 Officer in Charge. The VMGR-152 Commanding Officer was [REDACTED], the Executive Officer was [REDACTED], the Operations Officer was [REDACTED], the Maintenance Officer was [REDACTED], and the Director of Safety and Standardization (DSS) was [REDACTED].

2. At the time of this incident I had been with VMGR-152 for almost a year. I had been in Cherry Point and Yuma from February 2016 until early May 2016. Since I was training in Yuma I had no awareness of the local flight schedule or flight events were scheduled or taking place in Iwakuni Japan. However, I do know that the routing for the daily flight schedule was consistently very structured and taken seriously. The schedule writer had to route it through the Maintenance Department, Aircrew Training, Operations Officer, DSS, and Commanding Officer. Every aspect of it was screened from flight currency, T&R currency, NATOPS currency, pilot/instructor experience, etc. The only pilot I remember flying the KC-130J was [REDACTED].

3. I had heard about this mishap after returning from Yuma in early May and had been Ccd on some emails about the mishap costing etc. I assumed duties of VMGR-152 Executive Officer on 10 May. The final decision about cost calculation and mishap classification didn't happen until early to mid-June. Once it was determined that this would be a class C mishap, VMFA-242 released the initial notification on 17 June 2016. The AMB composition was: Senior Member: 152, ASO: 242, Mx Rep: 152, Ops Rep: 242, Flight Surgeon: 242. The AMB convened in Alaska while VMGR-152 and VMFA-242 were participating in a joint exercise there. The VMGR-152 members were [REDACTED] and (then) [REDACTED]. The SIR was released on 08 Aug 2016 with recommendations from the AMB.

4. These are the facts that were known to me at the time when everything unfolded.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

## 2019 Command Investigation

### 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Night Fixed Wing Aerial Refueling Incident

#### Investigation Direction:

- 1 - Aircraft Mishap
- 2 - Resultant Aircraft Damage
- 3 - Incident Reporting
- 4 - Incident Investigations

190402 Interview – [REDACTED]

#### VMGR-152

##### 1. Mishap Details

- a. Background, history, training, experience, qualification(s) and currency of the crew.  
**- [REDACTED] is the only pilot I can remember being on the flight. He was a qualified NSI and held multiple other tactical instructor designations. Any aircrew would have been NSQ or the instructor and NSI. Same for the FWAAR T&R event. Flight schedule routing and command direction wouldn't allow otherwise.**
- b. Sortie Purpose. SPINS available. Description of sortie planning and brief.  
**-Mostly unknown to me.**
- c. Atmospherics (Weather, light level, etc...).  
**-Unknown to me.**
- d. Use of Night Vision Goggles.  
**-Unknown, but I would bet on it since that's how we trained, both pilots and observers.**
- e. Description of aircraft flight path and maneuver.  
**-The C-130 would have most likely been established in a left hand race track pattern for FWAAR with autopilot engaged. Unknown to me where on the race track the mishap occurred (turn, wings level, etc).**
- f. The incident/mishap description.  
**-Post FWAAR, (single) Sumo cleared the Bat flight (section) to depart the area. The Bat flight requested to depart high and left, but Sumo cleared them high and forward. The Bats began to depart to the left and climb anyway. That's when the wingman came into contact with the AAR hose.**
- g. Where did the aircraft land after the mishap?  
**-Sumo and the Bats recovered at Kadena AB. FWAAR took place off the coast of Okinawa.**
- h. What occurred immediately after recovery?  
**-All aircraft recovered to Kadena. I'm pretty sure the VMGR-152 command directed the C-130 aircrew report to medical for urine samples, but I can't confirm and was in Yuma at the time of this mishap. Other specifics are unknown to me.**
- i. Describe the post-mishap examination of the aircraft. Extent of damage?

***-C-130 had a trailing right AAR hose that was ripped off approx. 10 feet from the refueling drogue. Upon seeing pictures of the F/A-18 with the hose stuck in the wing, it looked like there was damage to the right leading edge, aileron, and wingtip area. Total damage crossed the Class C mishap threshold.***

- j. Was any other military property affected? Extent of damage?

***-Not that I know of.***

- k. Were there sociological, psychological, and/or human factors related to the accident? (Potential stress factors, fatigue, use of medication, etc...)

***-Not that I know of.***

## 2. Immediate Actions

### a. Incident report

- i. Who reported the mishap?

***-Unknown to me for the initial CCIR. VMFA-242 released the Initial Notification in WESS for the Class C mishap.***

- ii. When was the incident reported?

***Unknown to me for the initial CCIR. Class C notification was released mid-June 2016.***

- iii. What was reported?

***-Class C midair between the two squadrons. Something to the effect of "F/A-18 struck the right hose of a KC-130 with the right wing."***

### b. Damage:

- i. What was the initial assessment of the aircraft damage?

***-Initial assessment was the cost would not trigger a class C mishap. VMGR-152 cost was around 20K for the drogue and hose etc. VMFA-242 was initially using the 15% repair cost (which would indicate the repair cost was not available). Eventually they were not allowed to use 15% which triggered the Class C. Int – Repaired – 15%. Naval Safety Center (██████████ – MAG ASO) stated that was good, but then NSC or MAG (or MAW). If you are going to turn something in to be repaired...if you can repair it, so use 15% of a new one. Consumables...not repairable, so 15% does not apply. At times, interpretation at the MALS, in Maint, at other levels.***

- ii. Was the damage to the aircraft documented (pictures, sketches, reports, etc.)?

***-Yes, there were pictures that the AMB had access to. Costing estimates were compiled by respective squadron Maintenance Departments.***

## 3. Continuing Actions

### a. Investigation(s)

- i. What investigation(s) (AMB, CI, FFPBs) were initiated?

***-Only an AMB was initiated once the Class C threshold was crossed. VMGR-152 had the senior member. No PI/CI, or FFPB was conducted at VMGR-152 or higher. Unknown about internal VMFA-242.***

- ii. Who initiated the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs)

***-I believe MAG-12 made the decision to stand up a joint AMB between the two mishap squadrons.***

- iii. When were results received of the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs)

***-AMB released the SIR in Aug 2016 to be routed up the endorsing chain.***

b. Damage and Repair

- i. What was the extent of the damage?

***-VMGR-152 had to replace the hose, coupling, and drogue. Unknown to me what was actually repaired/replaced on the VMFA-242 F/A-18 other than described in the email to [REDACTED]***

- ii. When were repairs initiated?

***-Exact date is unknown for the KC-130 (this would have been a PMC gripe). The KC-130 would have been flown back to RJOI for the repair once cleared. Same for VMFA-242, except they made the repairs at Kadena because VMGR-152 transported the parts for VMFA-242, most likely as opportune cargo. I recall it all taking place shortly after the mishap.***

- iii. Who supervised the repairs?

***-Unknown***

4. External Influence ***-you have my email I sent to [REDACTED], I can go in to detail below if required.***

- a. Was there external influence irt the reporting?  
b. Was there external influence irt damage assessment?  
c. If external influence existed, who was being pressured and by whom?

5. Procedures/Lessons Learned

- a. For safety and standardization reasons, were any changes to procedures made as a result of the mishap?

***-None for VMGR-152 other than reiterating to be directive with receivers in the refueling area. AAR procedures and communications are standardized across NATO aircraft in the ATP-56B.***

- b. Was there any training post-mishap based on lessons learned?

***-Event and lessons learned was briefed at aircrew training. Stressed importance of being directive (vs passive). Tried to engrain how close this was to a catastrophic midair.***

- c. Do you think there was anything different that the squadron, MAG, or Wing should have done after the mishap?



*-This should have been treated as a near miss Class A by everyone and how it got to that point instead of worrying about if cost would push it into a Class C. Neither aircraft should have been touched until the mishap classification was settled on and the AMB was done investigating them. MAG did the right thing by eventually standing up the joint AMB. Although not required, MAG or MAW should have initiated a command investigation at the time. Events like this are very rare (hose getting ripped off by a departing receiver vs while in the basket). Let alone the unintentional contact between two aircraft. Looking back now, had there been a CI, there would have been some serious questions to be answered, like how the none of the pilots or WSOs on the F/A-18 flight had flown at night in the past two months leading up to the mishap but were signed off by the VMFA-242 CO and scheduled for NS sorties. If VMFA-242 wanted to take that kind of risk, they probably should have had the MAG CO sign off on it (ORM 101, make risk decisions at the right level etc). From my recollection, the F/A-18 flight didn't even brief the AAR portion and one of the pilots had never refueled at night. All MAG-12 COs routinely fly with VMFA-242 and are in their spaces and sit through briefs too...Again, lots of serious questions. I think had this been taken seriously and the tough questions asked, there would have been changes made that would have been a real wakeup call for at least MAG-12 moving forward. That said, it's easy to say that looking back and after the recent mishap. Unfortunately in most cases it takes a catastrophic event with loss of life and aircraft to be taken seriously...had the Dec 18 Class A not happened, this CI would not be being conducted.*

6. Accountability /

- a. Were Marines held accountable for the mishap?

*-No Marines from VMGR-152 were held accountable for this mishap. I'm unaware of any action taken in VMFA-242.*

- b. If so, to what extent?

7. Other

- a. Are there any additional questions that should be asked?

*-See 5c above.*

*Int – Community and culture. FFPB are not punitive. Human Factors Boards, pilots can be boarded for anything...with the right leadership (wisdom) as the Board.*

- b. Is there anything else that you believe I should know as the Investigating Officer?

*-Nothing to add.*

*Int - HQMC Initiatives. Cultural workshops. Reservists who go out to Col IMA...United 20 years...1.98, maybe just went up...United if rate was 0.999, they would crash a plane every four days. Preponderance of mishaps are associated with administrative portions of flights.*

*Professionalism. FITREPs written on how good of a pilot...no...your MOS is tied to your qualification. NATOPs yes...not so much FAR 91, 'other' admin...*

*Report focus – flight schedule for both squadrons, currency of pilots, T&R stuff. Reviews, initials and signatures.*

*Recommendations – take jobs seriously; M-Sharp - qualifications, currency and proficiency (system and processes)*

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Name: [REDACTED] Rank/Rate [REDACTED]  
Activity: [REDACTED] Unit: [REDACTED]  
Telephone number: [REDACTED]

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
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28 Mar 16

Subj: 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aviation Mishap


This statement has been drafted from 3 year old memory and a couple emails that I still have on the subject.

When the subject mishap occurred, I was serving as the VMFA(AW)-242 Director of Safety and Standardization. I believe that I was first informed of the refueling mishap that occurred on 28 April in person or on the phone from the Squadron Duty Officer. I have an email with the suggested text of the flash report that I sent to [REDACTED] the squadron CO, but I don't remember if the flash report was ever sent. [REDACTED] was always reluctant to send any flash report or OPREP-3s. I instructed the aircrew to proceed to medical for a post mishap checkup. Discussion went back and forth between me and the XO, [REDACTED] as to whether or not the incident was a mishap. Ultimately it was decided that the incident was a mishap, I believe this happened after [REDACTED] took over as the commanding officer of VMFA(AW)-242 and I became the XO.

A human factors Board (HBF) was conducted in early May for the involved aircrew, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The result was something to the effect of the aircrew not being proficient for the flight in question. The HFB was conducted by [REDACTED] the training officer, because the squadron did not have an Aviation Safety Officer (ASO) at that time. [REDACTED] was in Pensacola for Aviation Safety School and would become the ASO upon returning.

While designated a division lead by his previous squadron, a control was put in place to prevent [REDACTED] from leading a division until the CO, [REDACTED], was comfortable with his abilities (this may have happened before this flight).

Once the decision was made to conduct the Aviation Mishap Board (AMB), there was some back-and-forth between 242, 152, and MAG-12 as to who should conduct it. Ultimately it was a combined AMB with members from each squadron. The senior member would be from VMGR-152 along with the maintenance rep. VMFA(AW)-242 would be responsible for submitting the report and supplying the ASO, Ops rep, and Flight Surgeon. The AMB started in Mid-June, at Eielson AFB in Alaska. Anything I learned after this point would be information uncovered by the AMB.





### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Name: [REDACTED] Rank/Rate: [REDACTED]  
Activity: [REDACTED] Unit: [REDACTED]  
Telephone number: [REDACTED]

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
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Statement Concerning the VMFA-242 / VMGR-152 AAR Mishap April 2016:

27 March 2019

I was the XO of VMGR-152 during the time of the subject incident/mishap. I was informed briefly the following day that the night prior, there was a broken hose during a night AAR and that one of the Hornet's involved had a section of hose still attached upon RTB to Iwakuni. Broken hoses are not particularly uncommon, so at first, this didn't seem to be very far out of the ordinary. When the CO and I were informed of the nature of the damage, it became clear that this may be more serious than the norm. This was due to the fact that a significant section of hose, greater than ten feet if memory serves, was in some way lodged against the jet in such a way that controllability was initially in question. Both crews obviously returned to base without incident, but it became clear that the monetary amount of damage would likely put this into a mishap category. An AMB was convened, with VMFA-242 in the lead.

My recollection is that early estimates put this near or at the threshold of a class "B" mishap, based largely on the damage done to the skin of the jet and the hose/drogue of the KC-130. Over the succeeding days, the category was brought down to "C", and maybe even "D", due to cost estimates being conducted. This is hearsay/conjecture only, but the feeling at VMGR-152 was that there may have been some excessive creativity with cost estimates happening at VMFA-242 maintenance with the intent of ensuring this was brought down to the lowest possible mishap category. Also during this time, I recall discussion about a Command Investigation but do not know if one was ever formally directed by either CO.

During the conduct of the Safety Investigation, non-participants were appropriately kept "out of the loop", including myself, so my recollection of any further details about the administrative conduct of the investigation is limited. However, at some point there was rumor/speculation that the pilots of the Hornet did not have their NVDs donned at the time of the incident which surprised us at 152. Further, there were rumors that the Hornet aircrew was claiming that the KC-130 made an "unbriefed turn" which they considered a potential contributor to the incident. I recall pilots at 152 finding this strange as well as frustrating, since 1) we normally call out turns as a courtesy, and 2) even if we didn't, it is not required or expected. I consider these conversations to be typical in the aftermath of any incident and at no point did I consider them to be anything other than unofficial rumor. They were not what I consider to be unprofessional in magnitude or scope and to my knowledge did not have any influence in the investigation either way. I provide this information only for context.

My memory is that after the mishap class reached a low enough level to negate the necessity of a full AMB, the remainder of the investigation was conducted at the ASO level, and subsequent SIR and endorsements routed per the norm. My time as XO came to an end roughly a month after this mishap, after which time I PCA'd to the Air Station Staff. Consequently, I have no memory of the final conclusions of the AMB or the content of the endorsements.

In summary, at the time of this incident, despite it being classified as a mishap after the fact, there was nothing particularly alarming in terms of underlying causality which would require a change to procedures on the KC-130 side. The flight was briefed and flown as fragged for our part, and the emergency procedures for broken hose were executed per NATOPS. In light of the mishap of December 2018, this 2016 mishap obviously becomes more noteworthy, but unfortunately there was no specific impetus at the time to treat this like any other non-class A/B mishap. I find it surprising that there was never a CI at either squadron, and actually think one may have been done at 152, but it would now be irretrievable due to the unfortunate recent loss of the then-CO, [REDACTED]

I stand by to assist further in any way that I can.



## 2019 Command Investigation

### 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Night Fixed Wing Aerial Refueling Incident Investigation Direction:

- 1 - Aircraft Mishap
- 2 - Resultant Aircraft Damage
- 3 - Incident Reporting
- 4 - Incident Investigations

190330 Interview – [REDACTED]

### VMGR-152 Executive Officer

#### 1. Mishap Details

- a. Background, history, training, experience, qualification(s) and currency of the crew. *Into Sqdn Jul 2014. 252 Extended 03-08. Whiting – HQMC I&L. Instructor at FRD. Previous A7I, NSI, Stage instructor, SL, TAC RAC. Everything but FLSE. AAR Training Flight. Usually L Areas.*
- b. Sortie Purpose. SPINS available. Description of sortie planning and brief. *FRAGd ahead of time. 2-5 weeks ahead of time...pilots would see it, Pilot and Co-Pilot see it and reach out to Receiver Squadron to ensure solid ARCP, etc. Quick call day of to ensure alignment.*
- c. Atmospherics (Weather, light level, etc...).
- d. Use of Night Vision Goggles.
- e. Description of aircraft flight path and maneuver.
- f. The incident/mishap description. *Vague terms – immediately next day was broken hose and the jet came home with the 130 parts. Not a terribly big deal. Pretty significant length of hose still attached to the jet...control surfaces or intake...pretty serious. Anytime we lose a basket, monetary cost related but not normally extend to mishap category. Leading edge damage to 18.*
- g. Where did the aircraft land after the mishap?
- h. What occurred immediately after recovery?
- i. Describe the post-mishap examination of the aircraft. Extent of damage?
- j. Was any other military property affected? Extent of damage?
- k. Were there sociological, psychological, and/or human factors related to the accident? (Potential stress factors, fatigue, use of medication, etc...)

#### 2. Immediate Actions

- a. Incident report
  - i. Who reported the mishap? *Flt Duty Officer normally received call initially. CO (or XO) and OpsO notified concurrently.*
  - ii. When was the incident reported? *XO found out about it the next day.*

- iii. What was reported?
- b. Damage:
  - i. What was the initial assessment of the aircraft damage? *Skin damage. Once the discussion shifted to skin damage, relatively soon...it was clear it was an investigatable mishap. Shifted to an AMB pretty soon. 130 was fine...not unusual.* RW happens all the time.
  - ii. Was the damage to the aircraft documented (pictures, sketches, reports, etc.)? *Recall seeing pics of the jet...close-up of scrapes and dents on a leading edge. Vague memory, VMFA fixed the jet 'before the investigation got everything they needed.'*

### 3. Continuing Actions

- a. Investigation(s)
  - i. What investigation(s) (AMB, CI, FFPBs) were initiated? *AMB was convened. Senior member 242, 152 ASO on AMB. Conversations about CI, but did not see one...appears that it didn't. Discussed in the Ready Room...but end of the day it was a broken hose (6-7 times per year event). Broken hose, executed NATOPS procedures, effective. Cojencture - 3-4 days after, superfluous chatter...started hearing 242 blaming, referring to an uncalled turn. Heard they may not have been on their goggles at the time. Lighting configuration, without goggles raised eyebrows at 152, but not significant.*
  - ii. Who initiated the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs) *242 and 152...perhaps MAG DoSS or MAG CO. Plausible MAG level gave direction.*
  - iii. When were results received of the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs) *PCA'd to station staff in June.*
- b. Damage and Repair
  - i. What was the extent of the damage? *Hose...nothing out of the norm. Basket fairly expensive. New hose. 10-20k.*
  - ii. When were repairs initiated? *I don't know (IDK). Potentially a couple of weeks.*
  - iii. Who supervised the repairs?

### 4. External Influence

- a. Was there external influence irt the reporting? *IDK. Reported cost at face value. Tone around the squadron (previous QAO)...hand-wringing, non-standard maneuvering around the basket was a concern. Class B (200k), Class C (50k), to Class D (below). Healthy rivalry between 152 and 242...may have been some MFing, but in a healthy manner. 152 showed up in 2014, perception MAG-12 was a Fighter Squadron...familial growing pains...OPCON to MAW, ADCON to MAG...source of contention with prior MAG CO. O-3, O-4 level translates into misunderstanding between TMS training requirements, etc...*



- b. Was there external influence irt damage assessment? *Potential internal motivation. Correct to be precise in reporting.*
- c. If external influence existed, who was being pressured and by whom? *Rumor, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was precise but not particularly popular/accommodating to other squadrons as well as 242. Contextual tone. Operate in an expeditionary fashion out of tents...value in operating out of comfort zone.*

5. Procedures/Lessons Learned

- a. For safety and standardization reasons, were any changes to procedures made as a result of the mishap? *No*
- b. Was there any training post-mishap based on lessons learned? *No.*
- c. Do you think there was anything different that the squadron, MAG, or Wing should have done after the mishap? *Refresher 'IF' 152 did something wrong...certainly; but not for a broken hose. Potentially 'more' training for observers...more comms internal to the 130 crew 'IF' the observers were seeing something abnormal.*

6. Accountability

- a. Were Marines held accountable for the mishap?
- b. If so, to what extent?

7. Other

- a. Are there any additional questions that should be asked? Relevant or appropriate. *Wish we didn't have the adversarial relationship with 242. Parallel billets between 152 and 242 didn't get along. View of F/A-18 pilots was VMGR existed to fuel Hornets for Operations. Banter, fish-hooking, etc... Sets a poor tone. However, in the air, it was ALWAYS professional!*
- b. Is there anything else that you believe I should know as the Investigating Officer? *No incident is insignificant. We did think about it, but didn't find anything significant.*

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Personal Statement of [REDACTED]

The following information is provided at the request of [REDACTED] regarding the facts surrounding a VMFA(AW)-242 / VMGR-152 aviation mishap that occurred on 28 April 2016. While I will attempt to provide as much detail as possible about this incident, much of what I know was received via third party conversation and from reviewing the results of the Aviation Mishap Board (AMB) contained within the subsequent Safety Investigation Report (SIR). My knowledge of the incident is limited because I was not assigned to the squadron when the mishap occurred; I did not join the unit until 12 June 2016 following my assignment as the Future Operations Officer of Marine Aircraft Group 12. When I arrived to the unit, the squadron was participating in Red Flag-Alaska at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Fairbanks, Alaska. Although I was quickly assigned the billet of Director of Safety and Standardization (DoSS), I was not involved in the safety investigation. Furthermore, I was not present in Alaska when the AMB concluded due to a death in my wife's family requiring me to return to Iwakuni prematurely; third week of July 2016. The below information is what I believe to be true:

There was a safety investigation conducted by a combined AMB (VMFA(AW)-242 / VMGR-152) during Red Flag-Alaska 2016 at Elmendorf Air Force Base. My Aviation Safety Officer was a member of the AMB while the VMGR-152 DoSS was the Senior Member of the AMB. I do not believe there was ever a Field Flight Performance Board or Command Investigation directed by the command but, as previously stated, I was not in the squadron yet when the mishap occurred. Based on the results of the AMB, my Commanding Officer implemented the following procedural changes: baselining privileges for Training and Readiness (T&R) codes were significantly reduced and specific verbiage was included in the Squadron's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) regarding the conduct of air-to-air refueling. Additionally, a combined "lessons learned" session was held between the two squadrons involved to discuss what occurred during the mishap and how to mitigate future air-to-air refueling issues. The Squadron SOP was signed on 3 Sept 2016.

For the following two years (until June 2018) while I was assigned to the squadron, I do not recall any additional incidents during air-to-air refueling involving VMFA(AW)-242 aircrew.

[REDACTED]

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b. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2c, above: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determination as to whether you should be held pecuniarily (monetarily) liable for repayment of the Government's loss would be based on the other evidence in the investigative record, which possibly might not support a favorable determination.

c. Where the individual is a claimant or potential claimant in an investigation for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could prevent the investigation from obtaining sufficient information to

substantiate any claim which you have made or may make against the Government as a result of the incident under investigation.

d. Where the individual was treated at Government expense for injuries caused by third parties in connection with a matter being investigated for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could result in a requirement for you to assign to the Government your medical care claims against third parties in connection with the incident, or authorize withholding of the records of your treatment in naval medical facilities.

e. In any other case: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, and determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1 Apr 2019

To [REDACTED]

I am writing this statement to assist in the investigation conducted by 1MAW regarding the event occurring in April 2016 between VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152. I am basing this statement on memory and the exact dates and people involved or conversations are to the best of my recollection.

I was assigned to VMFA(AW)-242 shortly after arriving to MAG-12 in January 2016. At that time the squadron had a partial detachment to the Philippines with a small contingency of maintainers and aircrew remaining behind. Following the deployment, I was sent to Okinawa for an exercise while the squadron was preparing to deploy to Singapore. I went with the squadron to Singapore and was a squadron pilot with no ground job at that time.

The incident occurred about two weeks after we returned from Singapore between a section of F/A-18D from VMFA(AW)-242 and a single KC-130J from VMGR-152. I was not on duty at that time nor part of the flight. However, the morning following the incident everyone was aware of it and I had discussion with the Operations Officer, [REDACTED] and the Executive Officer, [REDACTED]. They both asked me to be prepared to fly to Okinawa with a KC-130 to conduct a PRO-C for the aircraft and bring it back to Iwakuni. At that time, the discussion between us centered on the issue of the incident being a mishap or not and what reporting/investigation was needed. From the recollection of the pilots involved, I was convinced it was a mishap that needed to be investigated and the proper steps/procedures taken in order to determine what happened. I was skeptical as to why we wanted to bring the aircraft back or do repairs prior to having an AMB team examine the aircraft. During that time, the squadron's leadership determined that it was not a mishap due to an anticipated cost estimate from ALD of less than \$50,000. In addition, the squadron derived that there is no cost estimate required for the KC-130 basket and hose since they were wedged between the leading edge flaps and aileron of the F/A-18 and not lost.

I disagreed with the DHs at that time because conducting a preliminary investigation was a prudent step and in this instance warranted since the incident was an actual mid air between two aircraft. It was fortunate that both aircraft recovered safely and no loss of lives occurred, however I felt that the squadron needed to investigate from a safety perspective in order to prevent it from happening again. I stated that even if it was deemed only a near mid air, that would still require a safety investigation and reporting. From my discussions with friends at VMGR-152, they felt it was a mishap that required a

safety investigation but was being buried as a non-event from 242. All of this information was discussed between myself and the OPSO, XO and AMO. [REDACTED] informed me that the CO did not think it was a mishap, rather it was just a tanking incident no different than a pilot breaking a refueling probe or a basket and that no investigation was required.

I was sent down to Okinawa on May 1 to bring the jet back after completing the PRO. While sitting on the ramp next to the jet, the 1MAW DSS showed up to see the airplane, we had the same discussion as I mentioned above. It was my understanding that the 1MAW DSS felt it was a mishap that needed to be investigated as well.

After the change of command, [REDACTED] replaced [REDACTED], I became the AMO and there were multiple discussions between VMFA(AW)-242, VMGR-152, MAG-12, and 1MAW DSS about the incident. I once again relayed to the new CO ([REDACTED]) my sentiments that this incident should have been investigated as a mishap regardless of the damages or cost associated since it was an actual mid air between two aircraft post tanking in order to pull the lessons learned and not repeat them again. It is my understanding that [REDACTED] felt the same way and once more information was made available to the chain of command (MAG-12/1MAW), an AMB was convened. The contents and information relating the SIR and recommendations are protected under the concept of privilege information.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

## 2019 Command Investigation

### 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Night Fixed Wing Aerial Refueling Incident

#### Investigation Direction:

- 1 - Aircraft Mishap
- 2 - Resultant Aircraft Damage
- 3 - Incident Reporting
- 4 - Incident Investigations

#### 190418 Interview – [REDACTED]

1601-04 Squadron Pilot / 1605-1703 Aviation Maintenance Officer / 1704-1706 TAD promotion board / 1706-1807 MAG OPSO

#### 1. Mishap Details

- a. Background, history, training, experience, qualification(s) and currency of the crew.

*FL – [REDACTED] / Wingman – [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was a second tour division lead who completed a tour with VMFA-115 and a FAC tour with MARSOC. He completed an abbreviated CAT3 syllabus at VMFAT-101 while I was the OPSO at VMFAT-101 prior to joining the Bats. Although he was experienced, he was not proficient and had expressed numerous time that he was not yet comfortable in the aircraft as a flight lead. [REDACTED] was the previous WTO and a MAWTS-1 graduate with experience and proficiency. It was well known in the squadron at that time that the two of them did not get along in the cockpit.*

*[REDACTED] was a mid-first tour pilot who was average at that time (progressing on par). He was beginning his Flight lead syllabus and although he had been flying with the squadron consistently, recent maintenance challenges and multiple back to back half-squadron dets lent to little flying time and proficiency. The squadron hardly flew in the Philippines and Thailand and with only 4 jets in Singapore and a limited fly window, there weren't too many sorties available. His night time proficiency was also limited due to those same issues and lack of opportunities to fly at night. He was a hard worker and spent the time required to study to be an effective pilot.*

*[REDACTED] was a first tour WSO, he was also at VMFAT-101 while I was an instructor there. He was not as experienced but had proficiency that was average for the squadron's WSOs. He was a hard worker and had an average reputation in the squadron as well.*

*I do not recall the exact currency of the squadron during that time but the focus was on prepping the jets to go to the det and there were many days of cancellations prior to the det. Since I had recently joined the squadron, I stayed behind with a new join pilot and two other aircrew to manage the RBE operations. As it turned out, 4 aircraft were available for flight operations and the OPSO ([REDACTED]) asked that we executed a flight schedule in Iwakuni. We conducted a 2 jet flow during that time. As*



*a result, we flew more in Iwakuni than the majority of the squadron did on det. It skewed the overall squadron flight time average.*

*The squadron did not want to participate in the Commando Sling det in Singapore and fought hard to take the minimal amount of jets. However, the majority of the personnel went to Singapore with only 4 jets to conduct an air-to-air det with the RSAF. As a result, there was little flying available outside of the TRANSPAC. I attended the det and the intent was to start a turn-over with the current AMO prior to the change of command. The dynamics of the squadron on det resulted in little to no time allotted for a turn-over and I was there only as a squadron pilot. Due to a requirement for the out going AMO to participate in a OPLAN exercise, the CO appointed the XO (██████████) as the interim AMO following the Singapore det for a month until the change of command. I then became the AMO on the day of the change of command and my turn over with the out- going AMO was on that same day.*

- b. *Sortie Purpose. SPINS available. Description of sortie planning and brief. I do not know the exact details of SPINS but it was a CAS frag iso a ground unit (unknown) in Okinawa. It was typical of these flights to be conducted with a KC-130 either providing gas (pre-mission or post mission, and in some instance both). If no tankers were available, then the mission would require the use of the pits in Kadena or Futenma. In this instance, it was a tanking operation. I have no knowledge of the brief. The discussion in the ready room was that ██████████ was not quite prepared to be the evaluator, and he expressed his lack of comfort with being a flight lead evaluator.*
- c. *Atmospherics (Weather, light level, etc...). I do not recall. There should be archived Dash-1 for the flight.*
- d. *Use of Night Vision Goggles. Night time proficiency was lacking due to the issues mentioned above. I believe NVGs were utilized for the flight but no details available.*
- e. *Description of aircraft flight path and maneuver. I only know the details from the SIR and cannot discuss.*
- f. *The incident/mishap description. Once again, I only know the details of the incident from the SIR. The details that I can discuss that were open knowledge through ready room discussion were speculative but it was described as the wingman (flight lead under instruction) was actually in the wingman's position departing the tanker despite being briefed as the flight lead. "Rejoined already...departing the tanker...parade, cruise, tac wing?" "Parade off of the right wing...goggle up with altitude deconfliction established from the tanker." He lost SA as to his position relative to the flight lead's jet and KC-130 and flew into the hose path, colliding with the canopy and right wing. The hose and basket was ripped off the tanker and wedged between the right LAU, Leading edge FLAP and aileron. They somehow maintained control of the aircraft and recovered uneventfully to Kadena airbase.*
- g. *Where did the aircraft land after the mishap? Kadena AB*
- h. *What occurred immediately after recovery? Aircrew immediately notified the chain of command and remained overnight in Kadena.*

- i. Describe the post-mishap examination of the aircraft. Extent of damage? *I do not have details of what specific examination performed immediately following the mishap.*
- j. Was any other military property affected? Extent of damage? *None to my knowledge.*
- k. Were there sociological, psychological, and/or human factors related to the accident? (Potential stress factors, fatigue, use of medication, etc...) *The only human factors I was aware of is the open lack of confidence from [REDACTED] and the conflict between him and [REDACTED]. However, [REDACTED] was a competent WSO and he was professional with the situation. There was stress felt from [REDACTED] regarding the event since it was a short turn around from the Singapore det. It was open knowledge amongst the aircrew that the squadron did not plan adequately due to the lack of aircraft available and many times the flight schedule was written with no anticipation of being achievable. This created a stress amongst younger aircrew preparing for evaluated events with little lead time for preparation. The PTO and WTO at that time were frustrated with the lack of OPS/Maint coordination and openly conveyed to me that they felt the training plan was written in sand as it was habitual for the flight schedule to be written with no hope to be executed. These feelings were reciprocated by Maintenance from my discussion with the MMCO.  
"Without a logical thought towards sortie capacity that was executable...write a schedule...and execute what Maintenance can support."  
"ORM – Don't recall. Prior to change of command. Concurrent with building the daily flight schedule. After CoC...only CO or XO could change the flight schedule."*

## 2. Immediate Actions

- a. Incident report
  - i. Who reported the mishap? *I believe the mishap crew called the chain of command upon recovery to Kadena.*
  - ii. When was the incident reported? *Immediately following recovery.*
  - iii. What was reported? *I do not know what was said. The next morning, the discussion amongst the DHs indicated that the mishap crew reported hitting the tanker and damages to the aircraft as described.*
- b. Damage:
  - i. What was the initial assessment of the aircraft damage? *Right leading edge flap, aileron and LAU wingtip.*
  - ii. Was the damage to the aircraft documented (pictures, sketches, reports, etc.)? *I do not know if there were pictures taken by the flight crew or not.*

## 3. Continuing Actions

- a. Investigation(s)
  - i. What investigation(s) (AMB, CI, FFPBs) were initiated? *The only investigation I know that command did at the time of the incident was an HFB. After the change*

*of command, there was a renewed push to conduct an AMB and categorized it as a Mishap.*

- ii. Who initiated the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs) *I believe, [REDACTED] pushed all the information that might not have been available to the MAG-12 CO who then directed the standing up of the AMB with concurrence from the CG.*
- iii. When were results received of the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs) *The AMB was conducted while we were on det in Alaska.*

b. Damage and Repair

- i. What was the extent of the damage? *I believe the repairs required the right leading edge flap, and right aileron to be replaced.*
- ii. When were repairs initiated? *A KC-130J with maintenance Marines from 242 was sent almost immediately that weekend to perform the repairs. On Monday May 1<sup>st</sup>, I flew down with another KC-130 to perform the PRO-C and then fly the aircraft back to Iwakuni.*
- iii. Who supervised the repairs? *I do not recall the lead maintainer, but it was a standard rescue det size.*

4. External Influence

- a. Was there external influence irt the reporting? *I do not believe there was external influence irt reporting or whether or not to categorize this event as a mishap. It was my assessment from discussion with the DHs at the time that the squadron had no appetite to classify this event as a mishap. It was my impression that both IMAW DSS and VMGR-152 believed this incident should have been investigated as a mishap. From discussion amongst the Dept Head leadership, it was sensed the Squadron did not want to report the incident as a mishap. Example in Singapore...shearing a probe tip off when tanking on Warp Pod. Sentiment in the squadron...this is no different than shearing off a probe tip...cost of doing business.*
- b. Was there external influence irt damage assessment? *I do not know, however my discussions with the DHs indicated that 242 firmly believe that this incident should not be categorized as a mishap due to the anticipated cost estimate from MALS being below the threshold for a Class-C mishap. Furthermore, the squadron believed that the hose and basket were consumables and therefore do not count towards damage assessment.*
- c. If external influence existed, who was being pressured and by whom?

5. Procedures/Lessons Learned

- a. For safety and standardization reasons, were any changes to procedures made as a result of the mishap? *There were no procedural changes to my knowledge until post change of command. In addition, once the AMB was completed, [REDACTED] ordered implementation of new procedures regarding aerial refueling as well as tightening the process for M-Sharp override authority and aircrew qualifications.*

- b. Was there any training post-mishap based on lessons learned? *I was on leave immediately following the PRO until the change of command and to my knowledge there were only AOM discussions. I do not know if it was addressed thoroughly. However, once the AMB concluded, there were mandatory training for all aircrew on the SOP changes as well as a thorough aircrew training on the SIR from the AMB to discuss what happened in the incident and lessons learned.*
- c. Do you think there was anything different that the squadron, MAG, or Wing should have done after the mishap? *It was my firm belief then and still now that the squadron missed an opportunity at that time to follow established procedures for any mishap and thoroughly investigate the incident immediately. We were always taught that when in doubt, begin the AMB process and downgrade as required once actual damage assessment has been performed and cost estimates provided by unbiased authority. In this instance, there were no doubt with anyone that a midair occurred between an F-18 and a KC-130 post tanking mission. The midair collision resulted in minor damages, but the event itself was significant enough that it should have been given the gravitas needed to uncover what happened, why it happened and most importantly, how to prevent it from happening regardless of the actual cost of the damaged components. The aircrew involved, nearly killed themselves and everyone aboard the KC-130J and yet they were left to believe that it was just a tanking incident like shearing a refueling probe during refueling.*

6. Accountability

- a. Were Marines held accountable for the mishap?  
I do not believe anyone was held accountable prior to the change of command.
- b. If so, to what extent?

7. Other

- a. Are there any additional questions that should be asked? *No. If concerned whether flight schedule was executed as written...telling how many people held the 'override' authority.*
- b. Is there anything else that you believe I should know as the Investigating Officer? *No.*

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Name: [REDACTED] Rank/Rate: [REDACTED]  
Activity: [REDACTED] Unit: [REDACTED]  
Telephone number: [REDACTED]

Today, MARCH 26, 2019, I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement under the guidelines of the Privacy Act.

This statement is provided in compliance with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579) which requires that Federal agencies must inform individuals who are requested to furnish personal information about themselves as to certain facts regarding the information requested below.

1. AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301; 10 U.S.C. 972, 1201-1221, 2733, 2734-2734b., 2737, 5013, 5031-5036, 5131-5150, 5947, 6148, 7205, 7622-7623; 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680; 31 U.S.C. 240-243, 3521-3531, 3701-3702, 3717-3718; 37 U.S.C. 802; 38 U.S.C. 105; 42 U.S.C. 2651-2653; 44 U.S.C. 3101; 49 U.S.C. 1901.

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSES. The information which will be solicited is intended principally and may be used for the following purposes:

- a. Determinations on the status of personnel regarding entitlements to pay during disability, disability benefits, severance pay, retirement pay, increases of pay for longevity, survivor's benefits, involuntary extensions of enlistments, date of expiration of active obligated service, and accrual of annual leave.
- b. Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action.
- c. Determinations on liability of personnel for losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.
- d. Evaluation of petitions, grievances, and complaints.
- e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.
- f. Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration.
- g. Public information releases.



h. Evaluation of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.

3. ROUTINE USES: In addition to being used within the Department of the Navy and Defense for the purpose(s) indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans' and survivors' benefits; to Servicemen's Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; to the U.S. General Accounting Office for purposes of determinations concerning relief of accountable personnel from liability for losses of public funds and related fiscal matters; and to the Department of Justice for use in litigation involving the Government. Additionally, such investigations are sometimes furnished to agencies of the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlements, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, State, or local law enforcement authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.

4. MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE, CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO DISCLOSE:

a. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2a or 2b, above: Disclosure is voluntary. You are advised that you are initially presumed to be entitled to have the [personnel determination] [disciplinary determinations] in paragraph 2, above, resolved in your favor, but the final determination will be based on all the evidence in the investigative record. If you do not provide the requested information, you will be entitled to a favorable determination if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in your favor. If the completed record does contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in your favor, however, your election not to provide the requested information possible could prevent the investigation from obtaining evidence which may be needed to support a favorable determination.


b. Where an individual is a subject of an investigation for purpose 2c, above: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, any determination as to whether you should be held pecuniarily (monetarily) liable for repayment of the Government's loss would be based on the other evidence in the investigative record, which possibly might not support a favorable determination.

c. Where the individual is a claimant or potential claimant in an investigation for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could prevent the investigation from obtaining sufficient information to


substantiate any claim which you have made or may make against the Government as a result of the incident under investigation.

d. Where the individual was treated at Government expense for injuries caused by third parties in connection with a matter being investigated for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could result in a requirement for you to assign to the Government your medical care claims against third parties in connection with the incident, or authorize withholding of the records of your treatment in naval medical facilities.

e. In any other case: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, and determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.



Signature and Date



Witness Signature and Date

March 26, 2019

From: [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]

SUBJ: 2016 F/A-18D AND KC-130J REFUELING HOSE IMPACT NEAR OKINAWA

Sir,

1. Below is an account, to the best of my ability, of the event which resulted in the removal of a portion of the refueling hose from a KC-130J from VMGR-152 by an F/A-18D from VMFA(AW)-242 in April (or May) 2016.
2. In April/May of 2016, during a flight originating from MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, an F/A-18D from VMFA (AW)-242 impacted and subsequently removed a portion of the refueling hose from a KC-130J from VMGR-152, also based in MCAS Iwakuni.

The flight in question was a sortie to provide close air support (CAS) in a training range off the coast of Okinawa, Japan. The flight departed from Iwakuni and was scheduled to return to Iwakuni. The sortie was comprised of a CAS event followed by subsequent in-flight refueling to facilitate the return to base in Iwakuni.

At the completion of the refueling portion of the flight, as Dash-2 attempted to rejoin the lead aircraft (who was in the process of departing the tanker track), made contact with the refueling hose on the starboard side of the KC-130. The hose became lodged between the right leading edge flap and right wingtip of the F-18. As the F-18 flew away from the KC-130, a portion of the hose departed the KC-130 and remained on the F-18 wing.

The F/A-18D aircrew received flight control indications and made an uneventful straight-in landing at Kadena, however did not declare an emergency. Upon landing, the crew realized that a portion of the refueling hose was lodged between the right leading edge flap and wingtip.

A HAZREP and OPREP-3 were submitted by VMFA (AW)-242 after learning of the incident.

3. Please let me know if you have any additional questions or concerns. I can be reached at

[REDACTED] or [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

## 2019 Command Investigation

### 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Night Fixed Wing Aerial Refueling Incident

#### Investigation Direction:

- 1 - Aircraft Mishap
- 2 - Resultant Aircraft Damage
- 3 - Incident Reporting
- 4 - Incident Investigations

190328 Interview – [REDACTED]

#### VMFA(AW)-242 OpsO 1 (Jan 15 - May 16)

1. *Operations Officer. 7525. Jan of 15...Squadron XO – MAG XO in 15. Back to Squadron for last 8 months. PCSd in late May. Turned over to [REDACTED]. Pilot Training Officer and Weapons Systems Officer Training Officer, had luxury of an AOpsO [REDACTED]. BFM and tanking. MSHARP – online system used to catalogue training and qualification progression. Tracked tanking and night tanking, not certain if it tracks aided or unaided. Cannot remember if MSHARP tracked the two different qualifications. Qualifications, hot board and qual tracker normally routed with the schedule...Ops-Maint agreement was prior to the detailed development of the daily. Ops to DoSS to XO to CO...Maintenance reviewed (but not initialed). Stan boards quarterly, quals actively tracked closely...at the time had an academics department headed my MLWSO. From recollection, qualified for all facets; currency does not remember. Day time currency was likely high based upon recent Singapore Det, but cannot recall specifics of night currency.*
2. Mishap Details
  - a. Background, history, training, experience, qualification(s) and currency of the crew.
  - b. Sortie Purpose. SPINS available. Description of sortie planning and brief.
  - c. Atmospherics (Weather, light level, etc...).
  - d. Use of Night Vision Goggles.
  - e. Description of aircraft flight path and maneuver.
  - f. The incident/mishap description.
  - g. Where did the aircraft land after the mishap?
  - h. What occurred immediately after recovery?
  - i. Describe the post-mishap examination of the aircraft. Extent of damage?
  - j. Was any other military property affected? Extent of damage?
  - k. Were there sociological, psychological, and/or human factors related to the accident? (Potential stress factors, fatigue, use of medication, etc...)
3. Immediate Actions
  - a. Incident report

- i. Who reported the mishap? *Became aware of mishap shortly after landing in Kadena...XO called OpsO while at dinner. Fuzzy on details. Reported to the MAG may or may not have occurred that night, known that it occurred w/in 24 hours. Uncertain to the MAW or higher.*
    - ii. When was the incident reported?
    - iii. What was reported? *Incident with the tanker, unclear on what.*
  - b. Damage:
    - i. What was the initial assessment of the aircraft damage? *Took a while to receive detailed information.*
    - ii. Was the damage to the aircraft documented (pictures, sketches, reports, etc.)? *Did not get involved with the Maintenance side.*
- 4. Continuing Actions
  - a. Investigation(s)
    - i. What investigation(s) (AMB, CI, FFPBs) were initiated? *Informal aircrew discussion with the mishap aircraft, lead aircraft, CO, XO, AMO and OpsO. Intent was to understand the event...Flt Ld SA was low, MP SA was low. Looked at spatial orientation via ‘ ‘...knew KC-130 altitude. Low facts, spatial guesses. Flight lead departed high and to the left prior to MP being joined in starboard observation. MP perception...Flt lead perception. ‘MP tanked on the right and MFltLd tanked on left. MP backing out, MFltLd. Goggles – AN-AVS-9s...unknown, padlocked on flt lead. NSI in the flight...MFltLd and MFltLd WSO NSIs, MFltLd WTI...cannot remember where the goggles were. AMB initiated in June or July (after the CoC)...run by a KC-130 pilot, former Hornet WSO.*
    - ii. Who initiated the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs)
    - iii. When were results received of the investigation(s)? (AMB, CI, FFPBs)
  - b. Damage and Repair
    - i. What was the extent of the damage? *Jet was repairable...how much the hose would cost...Class D, maybe a Class C.*
    - ii. When were repairs initiated? *Fairly quickly...following day. Jet recovered to IWK a few days later.*
    - iii. Who supervised the repairs?
- 5. External Influence
  - a. Was there external influence irt the reporting? *No*
  - b. Was there external influence irt damage assessment? *No*
  - c. If external influence existed, who was being pressured and by whom?
- 6. Procedures/Lessons Learned



- a. For safety and standardization reasons, were any changes to procedures made as a result of the mishap? ***Administrative formation basics around the tanker. Flight joins before departing tanker. Aircrew conversation -> AOM where the lessons were shared. I think reinforced and sustained by the subsequent squadron leadership.***
- b. Was there any training post-mishap based on lessons learned?
- c. Do you think there was anything different that the squadron, MAG, or Wing should have done after the mishap? ***I don't believe so.***

7. Accountability

- a. Were Marines held accountable for the incident/mishap? ***Flt lead and MP may have been informally grounded. Nothing formal.***
- b. If so, to what extent?

8. Other

- a. Are there any additional questions that should be asked? ***I don't think so.***
- b. Is there anything else that you believe I should know as the Investigating Officer? ***I don't think so. Opinions, everything up to that point all had been executed correct during the flight up to departing the tanker. Poor formation flying around the tanker.***

**190308 VMGR-152 Schedule, ORM - RAW, Qualification, Currency, and Tanker SPINS RFI**

**Data Forwarded 190308**

VMGR-152 Flight Schedule dtd 28 Apr 2016

VMGR-152 TPC (Transport Pilot in Command) Hotboard dtd 28 April 2016

VMGR-152 T2P (Transport Second Pilot) Hotboard dtd 28 April 2016

VMGR-152 AAR Card (SPINS) dtd 28 Apr 2016

**Data Forwarded 190314**

VMGR-152 Risk Assessment Worksheet dtd 28 Apr 2016

RFI: "VMGR may not track 'Qualifications'...how does 152 (Ops and DoSS) track if the Pilots and Aircrew are qualified as well as current to conduct a specific mission (i.e. FWAR)?"

Response: "VMGR tracks Qualifications, accomplished via the Admin Qual feature of MSHARP. On this flight, the Qualification applicable would have been NSQ(H). After the CO signs a qualification letter, our DOSS clerks assign that Admin Qual in MSHARP.

WRT event proficiency tracking (for this event, FWAAR and NS would have been applicable), the T&R proficiency report in MSHARP is utilized, which is and was routed (hard copy) with the schedule and reviewed by the schedule writer, Ops, and DOSS prior to requesting schedule signing by the CO. We now use the MSHARP schedule validator tool in addition to the above (with hard copy validator printout routing with the schedule), but that was not an operable or accurate feature for VMGRs in the 2016 timeframe MSHARP coding."

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, March 14, 2019 10:00 AM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: RECORDS REQUEST

Sir,

1. We uncovered another file in searching for the RAWs during that period and were able to find the electronic version of the 48 hour RAW that was in use on that date. You'll see [REDACTED] line on the RAW, and the 48 hour assessment. The 24 hour and "day of" RAW updates would have been handwritten on the document by our schedule writer then [REDACTED] following the flight brief, respectively. You'll see that initial crewmaster training is listed on the 48 hour RAW for the event, and that was applicable to [REDACTED] AAR panel code, which is executed in the flight station during the event (balancing fuel, operating the AAR hoses/system). The observers in the back were risk-assessed and scheduled as proficient for the event.

2. VMGR tracks Qualifications, accomplished via the Admin Qual feature of MSHARP. On this flight, the Qualification applicable would have been NSQ(H). After the CO signs a qualification letter, our DOSS clerks assign that Admin Qual in MSHARP. WRT event proficiency tracking (for this event, FWAAR and NS would have been applicable), the T&R proficiency report in MSHARP is utilized, which is and was routed (hard copy) with the schedule and reviewed by the schedule writer, Ops, and DOSS prior to requesting schedule signing by the CO. We now use the MSHARP schedule validator tool in addition to the above (with hard copy validator printout routing with the schedule), but that was not an operable or accurate feature for VMGRs in the 2016 timeframe MSHARP coding.

I hope this answers your questions adequately, but please advise if you'd like more clarification or a phone call. VMGRs typically have about 120 total pilots/crewmasters in a flyable status, so our scheduling and screening process must be conducted in both a thorough and efficient manner.

Respectfully,

[REDACTED]  
VMGR-152 Operations Officer  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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-----Original Message-----

[REDACTED]  
Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2019 9:19 AM  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: RECORDS REQUEST

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
I appreciate the push of this valuable factual data and completely understand the reasons for a Squadron VFR direct push.

Two follow-ups.

- 1 - Understandable the historical records of the specific RAW are unavailable...with that said, even a blank RAW that was in use during that period would benefit the factual data pull.
- 2 - VMGR may not track 'Qualifications'...how does 152 (Ops and DoSS) track if the Pilots and Aircrew are qualified as well as current to conduct a specific mission (i.e. FWAR)?

■ - ■

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
-----Original Message-----  
[REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, March 11, 2019 4:51 PM

**Subject: RE: RECORDS REQUEST**

Sir,

Attached is the information requested and available from VMGR-152 for the purpose of your CI. I apologize for responding directly to you for this query, but feel it necessary to bypass the Ops Chief channels IOT protect the sensitive nature of the attachments, as the squadron has been taking every measure to prevent excessive speculation on causal factors of our Sumo41 mishap.

Attached you will find the following:

-TPC and T2P hotboards (30-60-90) from 28 April to cover the 2 pilots on the flight [REDACTED]  
Crewmaster hotboards are not available from that date. We do not have the ability to pull the qualification matrix from that date with the current MSHARP setup/permissions.

-Squadron flight schedule from 28 April. The signed copy is not in our files, but this is the saved, final version from that day.

-AAR card, which I obtained from [REDACTED]. These items would typically not be maintained, but SNM was a particularly meticulous individual who had it saved in his personal files. This would cover the SPINS aspect from the tanker side.

-Unfortunately, we do not have the RAW from that date, as there was no established requirement for RAWs or the maintenance of historical RAWs. The squadron did route RAWs daily with the flight schedule during that period, though.

Again sir, my apologies for coming direct and hope that our best effort to satisfy your requests is helpful. Please feel free to contact me directly for any more information.

Respectfully,

VMGR-152 Operations Officer

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-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, March 8, 2019 1:20 PM

Subject: 28 Apr 2016 - VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152 Records

[REDACTED]

In conjunction with a 1st MAW Command Investigation I am presently conducting, I am looking to pull nine (9) historical documents from the 1st MAW - MAG-12 - VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152 archives. The two attached schedules were provided previously, however do not provide the depth/details imbedded in the units' published schedules.

In reference to 28 April 2016, request support in pulling:

- 1, 2 - 242 and 152 Flight Schedules (Signed, Published Copies)
- 3, 4 - ORM Worksheets ico the 242 1757-2057 CAS-FWAR-CAS Event (Lead - [REDACTED] // Wing - [REDACTED] and the 152 1618-2130 FWAR Event [REDACTED])
- 5, 6 - 242 and 152 Squadron Qualification Matrices (Apr 2016 or Q3 FY16 Boards/Matrices)
- 7, 8 - 242 and 152 Squadron 30-60-90 Flight Hour Boards
- 9 - Tanker SPINS ico the 152 1618-2130 FWAR Event [REDACTED] and the 242 1757-2057 CAS-FWAR-CAS Event (Lead - [REDACTED] // Wing - [REDACTED])

I appreciate your assistance and/or redirect.

[REDACTED] - [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



**190308 VMFA(AW)-242 Schedule, ORM - RAW, Qualification, Currency, and Tanker SPINS RFI**

**Data Forwarded 190308**

VMFA(AW)-242 Flight Schedule dtd 28 Apr 2016

VMFA(AW)-242 Squadron Aircrew Qualifications

**Data Forwarded 190325**

VMFA(AW)-242 RAW (Current Version - 190325)

RFI: "A 242 Ops and/or Stan statement that articulates how the Squadron DoSS and Squadron Ops tracks qualifications and currency."

Response: "We use MSHARP, the DoSS (NATOPS), and Training (ATJs) to track qualifications and currency. Training Officers write the training plan, Schedule Officers utilize MSHARP to generate schedule balancing qualifications and currency to achieve the training plan. Schedule is routed through Operations Officer, DoSS Officer, and Maintenance Officer for review/concurrence, initialed as having been reviewed, and presented to the Commanding Officer for final signature of the official flight schedule."

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 11:45 AM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: 28 Apr 2016 - VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152 Records

Sir,

In response to these RFIs:

1. See attached for our RAW worksheet.
2. CGRI inspectable items which have been captured on 2x no-notice IMAW inspections (once in December '18, and once in February '19), and will be inspected again this week during our official CGRI. Bottom line: we use MSHARP, the DoSS (NATOPS), and Training (ATJs) to track qualifications and currency. Training Officers write the training plan, Schedule Officers utilize MSHARP to generate schedule balancing qualifications and currency to achieve the training plan. Schedule is routed through Operations Officer, DoSS Officer, and Maintenance Officer for review/concurrence, initialed as having been reviewed, and presented to the Commanding Officer for final signature of the official flight schedule.

V/r,

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, March 14, 2019 9:03 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Re: 28 Apr 2016 - VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152 Records

[REDACTED]

Excellent. My thanks to you, MAG-12, VMGR-152, and VMFA(AW)-242 for the feed of information.

Acknowledge receipt of the applicable information from 152 as well as a follow-up statement due to the historical RAW and Qual Board not existing in records.

For 242, I appreciate the initial feed. Two requests given the understandable lack of records:

- 1 - A copy of the RAW utilized at 242.
- 2 - A 242 Ops and/or Stan statement that articulates how the Squadron DoSS and Squadron Ops tracks qualifications and currency.

Appreciate the follow-up.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2019 2:17 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: 28 Apr 2016 - VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152 Records

ALCON,

Most of these requests are not inspectable items per CGRI, and as such, are not available at the squadron level. We have scoured are sharedrive/sharepoint. Attached is what we have.

1, 2 - 242 and 152 Flight Schedules (Signed, Published Copies): 242 SCHEDULE ATTACHED (ignore the swim qual info...we are currently in Guam. RBE Marine is unfamiliar with the scanner.)  
3, 4 - ORM Worksheets ico the 242 1757-2057 CAS-FWAR-CAS Event (Lead - [REDACTED] // Wing - [REDACTED] and the 152 1618-2130 FWAR Event ([REDACTED]): THESE DO NOT EXIST.  
5, 6 - 242 and 152 Squadron Qualification Matrices (Apr 2016 or Q3 FY16 Boards/Matrices): THESE ARE NOT INSPECTABLE ITEMS. THE ONLY ONE WE COULD FIND IS FROM JANUARY 2016.  
7, 8 - 242 and 152 Squadron 30-60-90 Flight Hour Boards: THESE ARE NOT INSPECTABLE REQUIRED ITEMS AND AS SUCH THEY DO NOT EXIST FOR THE REQUESTED TIME FRAME.  
9 - Tanker SPINS ico the 152 1618-2130 FWAR Event ([REDACTED]) and the 242 1757-2057 CAS-FWAR-CAS Event (Lead - [REDACTED] // Wing - [REDACTED]): WE DO NOT HAVE.

V/r,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Operations Officer  
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, March 8, 2019 1:20 PM

Subject: 28 Apr 2016 - VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152 Records

[REDACTED]

In conjunction with a 1st MAW Command Investigation I am presently conducting, I am looking to pull nine (9) historical documents from the 1st MAW - MAG-12 - VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152 archives. The two attached schedules were provided previously, however do not provide the depth/details imbedded in the units' published schedules.

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7, 8 - 242 and 152 Squadron 30-60-90 Flight Hour Boards  
9 - Tanker SPINS ico the 152 1618-2130 FWAR Event [REDACTED] and the 242 1757-2057 CAS-FWAR-CAS Event (Lead - [REDACTED] // Wing - [REDACTED])

I appreciate your assistance and/or redirect.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**  
MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152  
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12  
MCAS IWAKUNI  
1st MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, MARFORPAC  
UNIT 37220, FPO AP 96310-7220



**Thursday, April 28, 2016 (16119)**

DUTIES				SBTP				
FDO:		FIELD HOURS	0630-2300	SCHEDULED	APR	QTR	FY	
SDO:				KC-130J	3	17.3	625 / 531.1	1825 / 531.1
SDD:				Total	3	17.3	FCST / ACT	FCST / ACT
UVA:								

BMNT: 0427	SR / SS: 0525/1853	MR / MS: 2359/0948	ILLUM: 71.6%	EENT: 1951	LLL: 2006-0030*	HLL: 1951-2006
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FLIGHTS										
EVENT	TMS	C/S	SHW/BRF/ETD/ETA	ICAO	CREW	T&R	TMR	MSN	SBTP	NOTES
1	KC-130J	SUMO 29	0500/0600/0700/1530	RJOI/PGUA	A C CM11 CM3 CM3	2162 2162 6921 6918X,3512,3510 3512,3510	2M4 1A1	LOGRUN	2/12.0	
2	KC-130J	SUMO 04	1315/1445/1615/2130	RJOI/RJOI	A C CM11 CM2 CM3 CM3	3602,3600,2151 3602,3600,2151 6928,2150 6926X,2150 3600,2150 3600,2150	2Q6 1A1	FWAAR	1/5.3	FN: 1,2
3	KC-130J		TBD		A C CM1 CM3			STBY		FN:3

EVENT DETAILS								
EVENT	FISO	ROF	FRAME	EQUIPMENT	FUEL	PRIORITY	MISSION NUMBER	RTB
1	MEF 1/MEF 38	RJOI-RODN-PGUA	CARGO	(1) HF, RADAR, RADALT NESA	48K	1		30-APR-16
2	MAG 12-13	RJOI-TIGER-RJOI	CARGO	TCAS, HSD	58K	2		28-APR-16

SIMULATORS							
EVENT	INSTRUCTOR	SHW/ETD/ETA	CREW	T&R	TMR	MSN	NOTES
SIM		0730/0800/1600		6120,3705,3704,3703 3702,3650,3550,2400 2350,2251,2250,2151 2150 6120,3705,3704,3703 3702,3650,3550,2400 2350,2251,2250,2151 2150	1A1		

**GENERAL NOTES:**

**GENERAL:**

- ALL HANDS FOD WALK AT 0730. DOUBLE HEARING PROTECTION IS REQUIRED.
- ALL AVAILABLE COMPANY GRADE PILOTS AT 1200 WILL REPORT TO THE EAGLE'S NEST FOR A LUNCH MEETING WITH THE 1ST MAW CG.

**AIRCRAFT ENROUTE:**

- SUMO 08/167983 (PHIK) ETA 28 APR: [REDACTED]
- SUMO 39/168074 (RODN) [REDACTED]
- SUMO 89/167109 (YPDN) ETA 29 APR [REDACTED]
- SUMO 21/168066 (PHIK) ETA 4 MAY: [REDACTED]

**FLIGHT NOTES:**

- [REDACTED] WILL EMBARK SUMO 39 AT RODN.
- [REDACTED] WILL EMBARK ON SUMO 04.
- STANDBY CREW CHECK IN AND OUT WITH FDO PRIOR TO SECURING. CREW-DAY IS 0900-2100.

The redactions on this page were made in accordance with exemption (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of the Freedom of Information Act.

QUESTION OF THE DAY:

Q: TRUE/FALSE: THE ENGINE START SWITCH CAN BE MOVED FROM STOP TO MOTOR AFTER AN ABORTED START BEFORE NG REACHES ZERO. THE FIRE HANDLE SHALL BE IN TO ALLOW THE MOTOR OPERATION.  
A: (TRUE)

DOSS \_\_\_\_\_ ACT \_\_\_\_\_ OPS \_\_\_\_\_ MAINT \_\_\_\_\_

COMMANDING OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_  
[REDACTED]



VMGR-152 RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

FLIGHT SCHEDULE DATE: 28-Apr-16

		RISK ASSESSMENT CATEGORIES																			
		<div>Flight ISO Combat Operations Schedule Change/Crew or Mission Multi-Agency or Multi-Aircraft Event High Visibility Event Airfield Facilities and Equipment Deficient Forecast WX Below Mins or Extreme WX Hazardous Animal Activity Crew Event Proficiency not met Crew Currency Not Met Crew Rest Not IAW SOP Circadian Fatigue Significant Life Event Mission Equipment Requirements Not Met Other Risk (Required Comment) Initial Risk Assessment (Highest of L, M, H, EH)</div>																			
EVENT	AC	M EH	M EH	L EH	L EH	L EH	L EH	M EH	M EH	M EH	M EH	M EH	L EH	L EH	L EH	L EH	Identified Risks and Control Measures	Final Risk Assessment Level	FLT LD/MC/AC Initials		
1	[REDACTED]	SKED															M	CM INITIAL INSTRUCTED BY CURRENT AND QUALIFIED CMI.	L		
		FDO																			
		AC																			
2	[REDACTED]	SKED			M												M	COORDINATION WITH SUPPORTED UNIT AND PAO. CM INITIAL INSTRUCTED BY CURRENT AND QUALIFIED CMI.	L		
		FDO																			
		AC																			
3	[REDACTED]	SKED															VL	STANDBY.	VL		
		FDO																			
		AC																			
		SKED																			
		FDO																			
		AC																			
		SKED																			
		FDO																			
		AC																			
		SKED																			
		FDO																			
		AC																			
		SKED																			
		FDO																			
		AC																			
		SKED																			
		FDO																			
		AC																			

1	
2	
3	
4	

- The SKED line will be filled out and routed with the flight schedule.
- The day of the flight risk category changes will be noted on the FDO line.
- The Aircraft Commander will make any final assessments or comments in the AC line and initial the "FLT LD/MC/AC Initials" Box.
- Fill out only those columns with identified risks (L, M, H, EH), otherwise leave blank.

- Each identified risk and a control shall be specified in the comment box.
- Risks previously identified do not require repeat comment.
- If no risks are identified, then put VL in the "Initial Risk Assessment" and "Final Risk Assessment" column.
- Risk assessments shall only be mitigated down one level by controls. E.G. a M Initial Risk can be mitigated to a L Final Risk.

Enclosure 59

## DIRECTIONS

### 1. NLT 48 HOURS PRIOR TO FLIGHT EVENT EXECUTION:

- PERFORM DELIBERATE RISK ANALYSIS (M-SHARP, RAW, ORM CHECKLIST, ETC).

### 2. 24 HRS PRIOR:

- SKEDS FILLS OUT HIGHLIGHTED (SCHEDULING) CATEGORIES FOR EACH EVENT, IDENTIFY RISKS/CONTROL MEASURES.
- DSS AND OPSO ASSIGN 24 HR FINAL OVERALL RISK LEVEL FOR EACH EVENT, AND SIGN.
- IF AN ELEVATED RISK LEVEL IS IDENTIFIED, OBTAIN APPROVAL FROM APPROPRIATE LEVEL AUTHORITY.
- DET OIC AND CO REVIEW AND SIGN 24 HR FLT SKED/RAW.

### 3. PRIOR TO WALKING:

- FLT LD/MC/PIC FOR EACH EVENT, REVIEW RAW, FILL OUT FLT BRF (ALL) CATEGORIES, IDENTIFY RISKS/CONTROL MEASURES, AND INITIAL.
- IF RISK LEVEL ELEVATES PRIOR TO WALKING, FLT LD/MC/PIC SHALL OBTAIN APPROVAL FROM APPROPRIATE LEVEL AUTHORITY.

### 4. ODO SHALL:

- GET CURRENT DAY'S RAW PRIOR TO COMMENCING FLT OPS.
- ENSURE THAT EACH FLT LD/MC/PIC HAS INITIALED RAW PRIOR TO WALKING.
- IF RISK LEVEL ELEVATES AFTER CREW WALKS (OR WHILE AIRBORNE), OBTAIN APPROVAL FROM APPROPRIATE LEVEL AUTHORITY.

## RISK LEVEL DETERMINATION / RISK MITIGATION

\* RISK LEVEL DETERMINATION IS BASED ON THE HAZARD, NOT ON DEVIATION FROM HHQ DIRECTIVE. USE RAC MATRIX TO DETERMINE RISK LEVEL.

\* IF DEVIATION FROM A HHQ DIRECTIVE IS NECESSARY, THE HHQ CO MUST APPROVE DEVIATION.

\* IF HHQ DIRECTIVE DELEGATES AUTHORITY DOWN, RISK LEVEL APPROVAL IS DELEGATED DOWN ACCORDINGLY.

\* MULTIPLE RISKS MAY RAISE THE OVERALL RISK LEVEL TO THE NEXT HIGHEST LEVEL. SOUND JUDGEMENT IN DETERMINING RISK LEVELS IS EXPECTED.

\* CONTROL MEASURES MAY BE INTRODUCED BY ANYONE AT ANYTIME. TO LOWER A RISK LEVEL, A CONTROL MEASURE MUST REMOVE EVENT FROM POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE RISK AND/OR REDUCE THE PROBABILITY/SEVERITY OF THE RISK TO A LOWER STANDARD ON THE RAC MATRIX.

## RISK ASSESSMENT CATEGORIES

\* RISK ASSESSMENT CATEGORIES LISTED ON THE FRONT IDENTIFY GENERAL AREAS OF CONCERN. IF NECESSARY, INDIVIDUAL UNITS SHOULD DEVELOP T/M/S AND MISSION SPECIFIC CHECKLISTS TO AID IN MORE DETAILED IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC RISKS.

\* RISK CONDITION (SEE WGO 3500.1J):

- NEW EVOLUTION OR ONE THAT THE UNIT HAS NOT BEEN EXPOSED TO FOR AN EXTENDED DURATION (JOINT/COMBINED/DEPLOYED OPS/ETC).
- HEIGHTENED SENSE OF AWARENESS, PROPER PLANNING, AND AGGRESSIVE USE OF CONTROL MEASURES IS REQUIRED.
- MEDIUM RISK LEVEL (MINIMUM) DESIGNATION IS MANDATORY
- FOR EXTENDED DEPLOYED OPS, DET OIC / DOSS SHALL REQUEST LOWERING OF MEDIUM RISK LEVEL REQUIREMENT FROM SQUADRON CO.

RAC MATRIX				
PROBABILITY				
	LIKELY	PROBABLY	MAY	UNLIKELY
SEVERITY				
CRITICAL	EH	EH	H	M
SERIOUS	EH	H	M	L
MEDIUM	H	M	L	VL
LOW	M	L	VL	VL

WGO 3500.1J FURTHER DEFINES SEVERITY/PROBABILITY CATEGORIES

**RISK LEVELS**

VL - VERY LOW - NEGLIGIBLE IMPACT ON THE MISSION  
(NO ELEVATED APPROVAL REQUIRED)

L - LOW - MINOR IMPACT ON MISSION CAPABILITIES  
(NO ELEVATED APPROVAL REQUIRED)

M - MEDIUM - MODERATELY DEGRADES MISSION CAPABILITIES  
(\*REQUIRES SQUADRON CO APPROVAL)


H - HIGH - SERIOUSLY DEGRADES MISSION CAPABILITIES  
(\*REQUIRES MAG CO APPROVAL)

EH - EX HIGH - CRITICALLY AFFECTS ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION  
(\*REQUIRES WING CG APPROVAL)

\*OR EQUIVALENT LEVEL COMMANDER

## NOTES:

## INFLIGHT ORM PROCESS





160428 VMGR-152 TPC Hotboard						
Name	Last	HLL	LLL	Last	HLL-FEB	LLL-FEB
	Month			25 Days - FEB		
	-	-	-	-	-	-
	38.4	0.0	0.0	44.9	0.0	0.0
	15.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	30.3	1.2	0.0	40.7	1.6	4.8
	8.8	0.0	4.7	33.3	4.6	6.2
	25.3	0.1	2.3	13.9	0.0	3.0
	8.9	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	28.2	0.0	1.5	2.6	0.0	0.0
	21.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	4.2	0.0	0.0	9.7	3.0	0.0
	38.1	0.0	3.0	15.1	0.0	0.0
	37.2	1.1	2.3	11.0	0.0	3.2
	15.4	0.0	0.0	30.3	0.0	0.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.7	0.0	0.0
	14.0	0.0	0.0	12.5	0.0	0.0
	27.0	0.0	0.0	12.1	1.0	0.0
	2.4	0.0	0.0	28.4	2.0	2.9
	17.1	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0
	5.4	0.0	1.1	9.7	0.0	1.7
	33.8	1.6	1.0	9.2	0.0	0.0
	21.9	0.0	0.0	29.6	0.0	0.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	19.5	1.2	1.2
	27.8	0.0	0.0	8.5	0.0	0.0
	35.2	0.0	2.0	6.6	0.0	2.0
	33.8	0.0	1.4	23.0	0.0	9.2
	17.1	0.0	0.0	20.7	0.0	0.0
	35.0	1.1	11.3	45.7	4.6	3.5
	41.1	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0
	18.9	0.0	3.0	27.1	0.0	0.0

		160428 VMGR-152 T2P Hotboard					
Name		Last	HLL	LLL	Last	HLL-FEB	LLL-FEB
		Month			25 Days - FEB		
		36.7	0.0	0.0	23.5	0.0	0.0
		44.7	0.0	0.0	28.0	0.0	1.7
		-	-	-	-	-	-
		51.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		35.1	0.0	1.0	7.7	0.0	0.0
		7.4	0.0	0.0	35.1	0.0	2.0
		12.2	0.0	1.4	8.2	0.0	0.0
		40.3	0.0	0.0	13.0	0.0	1.2
		38.0	0.0	0.0	17.9	0.0	3.0
		34.9	0.0	0.0	35.5	1.0	0.0
		38.7	0.0	0.0	5.9	0.0	0.0
		22.2	1.2	3.5	17.3	0.0	0.0
		24.9	0.2	1.3	29.7	2.5	3.7
		39.4	0.0	0.0	57.5	0.0	2.0
		16.6	0.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0





**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**  
**MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242**  
 Marine Aircraft Group 12  
 Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan  
 1st Marine Air Wing MARFORPAC  
 Unit 37310 FPO-AP 96310-7310



**Thursday, April 28, 2016 (16119)**

THIS FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS  
 ALL DOMESTIC TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED IAW MCO 3800.2B

ODO:	[REDACTED]	0745-1130	NCO OF THE 4TH QUARTER: [REDACTED] MARINE OF THE 4TH QUARTER [REDACTED] MCLD TOPIC OF THE MONTH: FAMILY	SCHEDULED	APR	QTR	FY	
GDO:		1400-1845		F/A-18D	9	16.5	296.1 / 175.5	832.5 / 175.5
AGDO:		1830-LPOD		FCST / ACT	FCST / ACT	FCST / ACT	FCST / ACT	
GDD:								
SDO:								
SDC:								
DNCO:								
ADNCO:								

BMNT:0429	SR / SS:0527/1851	MR / MS:2220/0810	ILLUM:87%	EENT:1949	LLL:2004-2241	HLL:1949-2004, 2144-0429
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RJOI FLIGHTS										
EVENT	TMS	C/S	BRF/ETD/ETA	ICAO	CREW	T&R	TMR	MSN	SBTP	NOTES
1-1	F/A-18D	Bat 11	0800/1000/1100	RJOI/RJOI	[REDACTED]	2102	1A1	CON HOP	1/1.0	
2-1	F/A-18D	Bat 21	0800/1000/1130	RJOI/RJOI	*	2508 2102	1A6	SEM	1/1.5	1
2-2	F/A-18D	Bat 22	0800/1000/1130	RJOI/RJOI		2508 2102	1A6	SEM	1/1.5	2
3-1	F/A-18D	Ivan 31	0800/1000/1130	RJOI/RJOI		2102	2K4	RED AIR	1/1.5	
4-1	F/A-18D	Bat 41	1400/1530/1630	RJOI/RJOI	*	2508 2102	1A6	SEM	1/1.0	3
4-2	F/A-18D	Bat 42	1400/1530/1630	RJOI/RJOI		2508 2102	1A6	SEM	1/1.0	
5-1	F/A-18D	Ivan 51	1400/1530/1630	RJOI/RJOI		2102	2K4	RED AIR	1/1.0	
6-1	F/A-18D	Profane 61	1530/1730/2130	RJOI/RJOI	@	6307 3106 3105 2402	1A7	CAS	1/4.0	
6-2	F/A-18D	Profane 62	1530/1730/2130	RJOI/RJOI	*\$	3106 3105 2402	1A7	CAS	1/4.0	

\* SECTION LEAD \*\* DIVISION LEAD @ ACUI # MISSION COMMANDER + BRIEFING OFFICER \$ INSTRUCTOR

SIMULATORS								
EVENT	DEVICE	BRF/ETD/ETA	CREW		T&R	TMR	SBTP	NOTES
1-1	RJOI - FA-18C - TOFT - 165230	0800/0830/0930	@ \$		6101 2101	NATOPS	1/1.0	4
2-1	RJOI - FA-18C - TOFT - 165230	1030/1100/1200	@ \$		6102 2101	INST	1/1.0	5
3-1	RJOI - FA-18C - TOFT - 165230	0930/1500/1600	*		3101 2301	1A7	1/1.0	
3-2	RJOI - FA-18D - TOFT - 165687	0930/1500/1600	@ @ \$		3101 2301	1A7	1/1.0	

RJOI EVENT DETAILS									
EVENT	Range Name	Range Times	Route	Fuel	Priority Systems	Load Out	LINK 16	Tac Freq	Priority
1-1	[REDACTED]	1000-1100	[REDACTED]	T	RDR CVRS LPOD	E	1	13	1
2-1	[REDACTED]	0900-1700	[REDACTED]	HP	RDR CATM CVRS	A B C D	2	14	
2-2	[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]	HP	RDR CATM CVRS	A B C D	3		
3-1	[REDACTED]	0900-1700	[REDACTED]	HP	RDR CATM CVRS	A B C D	4	15	
4-1	[REDACTED]	0900-1700	[REDACTED]	HP/HS	RDR CVRS LPOD	A B D	1	13	
4-2	[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]	HP/HS	RDR CVRS LPOD	A B D	2		
5-1	[REDACTED]	0900-1700	[REDACTED]	T	RDR CVRS LPOD	A B D	3	14	
6-1	[REDACTED]	1800-2200	[REDACTED]	T	RDR CVRS LPOD	A B D	1	13	
6-2	[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]	T	RDR CVRS LPOD	A B D	2		

SAFETY: [REDACTED]

GENERAL NOTES:		FLIGHT NOTES:	ORDNANCE NOTES:	QUESTIONS OF THE DAY:	
1-	0700 MAINTENANCE MEETING FOLLOWED BY FOD WALK.	1 -	EVENT 2 GO THROUGH PITS PRIOR TO LINE SHUTDOWN.	A - 2 TANKS.	EQOD: AV AIR HOT.
2-	1230 STAN BOARD. CO'S CONFERENCE ROOM. [REDACTED]	2 -	EVENT 2-2 TURNING SPARE FOR EVENT 1.	B - CATM-9X OR 9M.	NQOD: PLANING LINK INDICATIONS.
3-	1230-1330 COMPANY GRADE LUNCH WITH THE CG AT THE EAGLES NEST. ALL COMPANY GRADE ATTEND.	3 -	EVENT 4 LAND NLT 1630.	C - 30 CHAFF / 30 FLARE.	TQOD: PL-12.
4-	1330 CO'S STAND UP. CO'S CONFERENCE ROOM. [REDACTED]	4 -	BRING NATOPS JACKET AND COMPLETED OPEN BOOK, CLOSED BOOK, AND IMMEDIATE ACTION EXAMS.	D - LPD.	
5-	1645 NCO PME IN READY ROOM. ALL NCO'S ATTEND.		COMPLETE IGS PRIOR TO SIM.	E - 1 TANK.	

[REDACTED]



## Corrected Flight Schedule 28APR16

LEGEND
Scheduled Flight
Unscheduled Flight
Cancelled Flight

TMS	SCHED FLT HRS/SRTS	LOGGED FLT HRS/SRTS	CANCELLED HRS/SRTS	SCHED INITIAL T&R	LOGGED T&R	SCHED SIM HRS	LOGGED SIM HRS	SIM NOT LOGGED
FA-18D	16.5 / 9	11.3 / 6	0.0 / 0	0	20	15.0	3.0	12.0
	16.5 / 9	11.3 / 6	0.00	0	20	15.0	3.0	12.0

EVT	TMS	A C	NAVFLIR	ETD/ET A	ATD/ATA	TFT	SRT	TMR	CREW (SCHED)	T&R (SCHED)	CREW (LOG)	T&R (LOG)	T&R INCOMPLETE	T&R CANX
1	FA-18D	164659/08	<u>GF715PW</u>	10:00/11:00	10:00/11:10	1.2	1	1A2	[REDACTED]			2102,6735		
												2102,6735		
2-1	FA-18D			10:00/11:30	- / -	1.5	1		[REDACTED]					
2-2	FA-18D			10:00/11:30	- / -	1.5	1		[REDACTED]					
3-1	FA-18D	165685/01	<u>GF715Q1</u>	15:30/16:30	15:25/16:51	1.4	1	1A6	[REDACTED]					
3-2	FA-18D	165531/03	<u>GF715PZ</u>	15:30/16:30	15:25/16:48	1.4	1	1A6	[REDACTED]					
4	FA-18D			10:00/11:30	- / -	1.5	1		[REDACTED]					
5-1	FA-18D	164653/00	<u>GF715PX</u>	17:30/21:30	17:57/20:57	3.0	1	1A7	[REDACTED]					
5-2	FA-18D	165531/03	<u>GF715Q0</u>	17:30/21:30	17:57/20:58	3.0	1	1A7	[REDACTED]					

EVT	TMS	A C	NAVFLIR	ETD/ET A	ATD/ATA	TFT	SRT	TMR	CREW (SCHED)	T&R (SCHED)	CREW (LOG)	T&R (LOG)	T&R INCOMPLETE	T&R CANX
6	FA-18D	164659/08	<u>GF715PY</u>	15:30/16:30	15:27/16:47	1.3	1	1A6	[REDACTED]			[REDACTED]		
SIM	FA-18D	2F193A-16		15:00/21:30	- / -	6.5	1		[REDACTED]					
SIM	FA-18D	2F193B-37		15:00/21:30	- / -	6.5	1		[REDACTED]					
SIM	FA-18D	2F193A-16		08:30/09:30	08:30/09:30	1.0	1	1A0	[REDACTED]			[REDACTED]		
SIM	FA-18D	2F193A-16		11:00/12:00	11:00/12:00	1.0	1	1A0	[REDACTED]			[REDACTED]		
SIM	FA-18D	2F193B-37		- / -	15:00/16:00	1.0	1	1A7				[REDACTED]		



**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**  
MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242  
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12  
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
UNIT 37310  
FPO, AP 96310-7310

IN REPLY REFER TO  
3710  
OPS  
20 Jan 16


From: Operations Officer, Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242  
To: Mission Planner, Air Operations Squadron

Subj: VMFA(AW)-242 AIRCREW QUALIFICATIONS


Ref: (a) ACC AOS JB LANGLEY-EUSTIS VA 051505Z Jan 16  
(b) Allied Tactical Publication 56B, Air Refueling


Encl: (1) VMFA(AW)-242 Aircrew Qualifications

1. Per reference (a), the aircrew qualifications for VMFA(AW)-242 are provided.
2. Aircrew annotated as "CW" are current per reference (b).
3. The point of contact for this letter is [REDACTED], DSN [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]



VMFA(AW)-242 Aircrew Qualifications  
20 Jan 2016

<u>Pilot</u>	<u>MC</u>	<u>DL</u>	<u>SL</u>	<u>CW</u>	<u>PMCF</u>
	X	X	X	X	X
		X	X	X	X
	X	X	X	X	X
	X	X	X	X	X
	X	X	X	X	X
		X	X	X	
		X	X	X	X
		X	X	X	
			X	X	
	X	X	X	X	X
		X	X	X	X
		X	X	X	
				X	
				X	
				X	

<u>WSO</u>	<u>MC</u>	<u>DL</u>	<u>SL</u>	<u>CW</u>	<u>PMCF</u>
		X	X	X	X
	X	X	X	X	X
	X	X	X	X	X
		X	X	X	X
	X	X	X	X	X
	X	X	X	X	X
	X	X	X	X	X
				X	X
		X	X	X	X
		X	X	X	X
		X	X	X	X
			X	X	X
			X	X	X
				X	
				X	



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242  
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12  
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
UNIT 37310  
FPO, AP 96310-7310

IN REPLY REFER TO  
3502/1  
S-3/Tng  
16 Apr 16

From: Training Officers, Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242  
To: Aircrew, Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242

Subj: QUARTERLY AIRCREW TRAINING PLAN FOR APRIL-JUNE 2016

Ref: (a) NAVMC DIR 3500.50C F/A-18 T&R Manual  
(b) MAWTS-1 F/A-18 Course Catalog  
(c) CO ltr 3502 of 28 May 16 (MDTC Training Plan)  
(d) CO ltr 3502 of 15 Apr 16 (Electronic Kneeboard Training Plan)

1. Overview. Squadron aircrew will be deployed from Japan for the majority of this quarter and conduct tactical flight operations in Singapore and Alaska. Despite high personnel turnover, billet changes, and a reduction in available aircraft, the squadron will train to maintain combat readiness. To mitigate the loss of instructors and ensure the long term tactical readiness of the squadron, two crews will prepare for and execute Marine Division Tactics Course 2-16, which will remain the priority after CMMR goals. Available sorties not allocated for CMMR sustainment, nor planned per reference (c), will be utilized for 2000 and 3000-level sorties required to complete Category I aircrew, then for FAC(A), and section lead events. In Alaska, the squadron will execute LFEs, CAS, and FAC(A) flights during Red Flag, and execute LAT, CAS, and FAC(A) during the ULT period (Distant Frontier). The following table summarizes the quarter by events, milestones, and planned aircraft sorties.

<u>Week</u>	<u>Event/Phase</u>	<u>Flows</u>	<u>Focus</u>
01-03 Apr	Singapore/RJOI Dual Site Ops	4T4T4	AAR Currency
04-10 Apr	Singapore/RJOI Dual Site Ops	4T4T4	BFM/DACT/MDTC BFM
11-14 Apr	Singapore/RJOI Dual Site Ops	4T4T4	DACM/SEM/MDTC SEM
15-17 Apr	Retrograde/ RJOI Dual Site Ops	4 Jets	TRANSPAC/CMMR
18-24 Apr	RJOI Perch BFM/BAS/AR	4P4P4	MDTC BFM/CMMR
25-30 Apr	RJOI Div DCA/BAS/CAS	6T6P6	MDTC DCA/CMMR
01-08 May	RJOI HABFM/VID/SEM	4T4T4	MDTC 2V2/CMMR
09-15 May	RJOI BFM/VID/SEM	4T4T4	MDTC SEM/CMMR
16-22 May	RJOI Div AI/SEAD/NS	6T6P6	MDTC AI/CMMR
23-26 May	RJOI BFM/VID/SEM/BAS/CAS	6T6P6	AAR Currency
27-31 May	Cornet West Alaska	10 Jets	TRANSPAC
01-05 Jun	Red Flag Alaska (RF-A) FAM	6T4	FAM
06-12 Jun	RF-A AI/DCA/MC	6T4	OCA/DCA/AI/SEAD/CAS
13-19 Jun	RF-A SEAD/OCA/AI/MC	6T4	OCA/DCA/AI/SEAD/CAS
20-26 Jun	Distant Frontier CAS/FAC(A)	4T4T4	LAT/FAC(A)/CAS/BAS
27-30 Jun	Distant Frontier CAS/FAC(A)	4T4T4	LAT/FAC(A)/CAS/BAS



Subj: QUARTERLY AIRCREW TRAINING PLAN FOR APRIL-JUNE 2016

2. Readiness. The training department’s central focus is to maintain combat readiness in the near and distant future. Due to the significant loss of highly qualified aircrew in the spring of 2016, the squadron will lack the instructor qualifications, combat leadership designations, and available aircrew (especially WSOs) required by reference (a) to execute all METs. Additionally, as evident in the interim Training and Readiness Manual, more instructor qualifications will be required to execute the T&R syllabus than before. In order to overcome these challenges, the goal is to train two MDTC crews. With four new MDTIs, the squadron will be better positioned to execute the T&R, properly train aircrew, and be prepared to execute a WTI workup and course as required by the Weapons and Tactics Training Plan.

3. Deployments. Exercise Commando Sling in Singapore will allow aircrew to complete Section Lead events in BFM and Combat Wingman ACM qualifications. During Commando Sling, the squadron will execute dual-site operations from Singapore and Iwakuni; the Marines in Iwakuni will execute the first portion of the MDTC workup, execute flights to maintain T-2, train one section lead crew and Category I WSO. The division phase of the MDTC work-up and Red Flag Alaska will assist in regaining proficiency in SEAD, OCA, DCA, and AI, and produce Mission Commanders. Distant Frontier will provided the squadron the opportunity to execute LAT, LAT(I), FAC(A), CAS, and BAS, and start FAC(A) workups for two crews. Like last quarter, the training department will use a phased risk approach with aircrew completing academics (to include SME classes and chalk talks), simulator events, FAM/BAS/perch sets, and ending with full up tactical flights.

4. Tactical Mindset. The training department encourages aircrew to be tactical and lethal. A tactical plan is a safe plan. The blue threat is omnipresent in combat and training; the red threat is only present in combat. Therefore, we will mitigate the blue air threat by briefing and adhering to administrative procedures and training rules, executing standardized procedures, and being brilliant at the basics. By focusing on the basics, keeping an effective scan in the jet, and executing efficient and substantive debriefs, you will be prepared to make sound tactical decisions airborne.

5. Endstate. At the end of the quarter, the squadron will achieve significant training milestones: [redacted] will become the ready room’s newest MDTIs. [redacted] earn the privilege to lead a section of Hornets. [redacted] will be 2000-level complete with the exception of LAT, and the squadron designates [redacted] as mission commanders.

6. Qualification/Designation Priorities.

<u>Pri</u>	<u>Qual/Desig</u>	<u>Aircrew</u>
1	MDTC	[redacted]
2	SL	
3	CWT	
4	MC	

7. Combat Leadership Reading Assignments. Reading assignments will be prioritized per reference (a) and the following table.


Subj: QUARTERLY AIRCREW TRAINING PLAN FOR APRIL-JUNE 2016

<u>Week</u>	<u>P-CW</u>	<u>P-SL</u>	<u>P-MC</u>
4-8 Apr	TG OBFM	TG O/D/HABFM	TG Ch. LFE
11-15 Apr	TG DBFM	CS Course Rules	CS Course Rules
18-22 Apr	TG HABFM	BFM ASP (3)	TACSOP Ch 3 HSGP
25-29 Apr	TACSOP Ch 3	TACSOP Ch 3	ARM ASP
2-6 May	TACSOP Ch 4	TACSOP Ch 4	ASP A/G Employment
9-13 May	TN Shot Kill	TN Shot Kill	ASP F/A Missions
16-20 May	TN HSGP	TN 3-1 Debrief	TN 3-1 Debrief
23-27 May	RF-A Course Rules	RF-A Course Rules	RF-A Course Rules
1-3 Jun	ARM ASP	ARM ASP	Strike Msn Plan Guide
6-10 Jun	TN F/A Missions	TN F/A Missions	Fighter Integration ASP
13-17 Jun	LAT ASP (5)	LAT ASP (5)	Fighter Integration Stan
20-24 Jun	CAS ASP (2)	CAS ASP (2)	N/A
27-30 Jun	LPOD ASP	TACSOP SACT	N/A

8. SME Lectures.

<b>4-8 Apr</b>	<b>11-15 Apr</b>	<b>18-22 Apr</b>	<b>25-29 Apr</b>
OBFM/DBFM	SEM	ATTP	DCA
<b>2-6 May</b>	<b>9-13 May</b>	<b>16-20 May</b>	<b>23-27 May</b>
AI	LAT	CAS	RF-A
<b>1-3 Jun</b>	<b>20-24 Jun</b>	<b>27-30 Jun</b>	
MC Execution	FAC(A)	SACT	

9. Additional Chalk Talks.

<u>Topic</u>	<u>Audience</u>	<u>Instructor</u>
SACT	All P-CWs	
The Responsibilities of VMS	All P-CWs	
Briefing and Debriefing	All P-SLs	
Basic Flight Leadership	All P-SLs	
Instructorship	All P-DLs	
LFE Planning and Contracts	All P-MCs	
Go/No-criteria and Contingencies	All P-MCs	

10. Intel Requirements. Intel support to training should be prioritized according to the following deliverables: actual or OPLAN intelligence, combat leadership events, routine CMMR events. Imagery support to training should be prioritized to actual or OPLAN imagery, target or objective area imagery used for deployments, then imagery specific to work-up flights.

11. Please direct any questions regarding VMFA(AW)-242's quarterly training plan to the Training office at  email:  or 





UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242  
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12  
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
UNIT 37310  
FPO, AP 96310-7310


IN REPLY REFER TO  
3502/1  
S-3/Tng  
17 Apr 16

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on TRNG Officer's ltr 3502/1 of 16 Apr 16

From: Operations Officer, Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242  
To: Aircrew, Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242  
Via: Commanding Officer, Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242

Subj: QUARTERLY AIRCREW TRAINING PLAN FOR APRIL-JUNE 2016

1. Forwarded, recommending approval.




CO  
17 Apr 16

SECOND ENDORSEMENT

From: Commanding Officer, Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242  
To: Aircrew, Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242

1. Approved.



Copy to:  
MAG-12 S-3

Current as of: 05/05/2016											
Highlight	< 15	< 30	< 45					> 15			< 15
Name	Last 30 Days	Last 60 Days	Last 90 Days	30 Day NVG	60 Day NVG	90 Day NVG	Career Total NVG Time	Last Flight Date	FY Total Flight Time	Current Month Flight Time	Previous Month Flight Time
VMFA(AW)-242											
F/A-18 Pilot											
	11.0	24.8	42.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	238.0	04/30/16	64.6	0.0	12.1
	14.8	31.5	49.2	0.0	2.1	6.4	169.6	05/04/16	112.1	1.9	13.9
	14.9	20.5	27.7	2.0	3.3	4.8	81.8	04/29/16	50.2	0.0	15.8
	12.4	17.6	24.3	2.3	2.3	4.4	101.0	05/02/16	74.9	0.8	13.4
	7.2	10.3	31.6	0.0	0.0	8.1	317.3	05/02/16	46.2	1.9	6.2
	23.9	41.1	56.8	2.3	4.3	8.1	449.8	04/26/16	111.6	0.0	25.1
	26.1	34.2	49.4	1.6	3.1	4.7	134.0	05/03/16	110.9	6.1	20.9
	2.2	12.2	16.9	0.0	1.5	2.9	101.4	04/11/16	66.2	0.0	3.4
	7.2	27.3	50.3	2.0	3.2	7.7	12.0	04/28/16	114.6	0.0	8.3
	22.8	34.8	47.6	1.0	3.0	5.6	54.7	05/03/16	111.5	4.1	20.6
	3.2	14.9	20.9	0.0	0.7	2.2	80.4	04/22/16	91.5	0.0	3.2
	8.9	20.3	38.2	0.0	2.9	4.7	37.3	05/02/16	79.7	3.0	7.0
	2.0	7.4	18.7	0.0	1.5	4.0	4.0	04/22/16	18.7	0.0	3.1
	0.0	13.0	45.1	0.0	1.1	3.8	105.8	03/22/16	92.1	0.0	0.0
	4.1	7.3	17.3	0.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	04/22/16	20.3	0.0	6.2
	24.1	46.3	52.3	1.1	1.1	1.1	53.1	05/03/16	109.5	5.0	21.1
	9.4	28.2	53.6	3.5	3.5	6.2	22.4	05/02/16	114.2	0.8	8.6
AVERAGE	11.4	23.0	38.3	0.9	2.0	4.6			81.7	1.4	11.1
F/A-18D WSO											
	21.7	36.1	43.6	2.3	2.3	4.4	137.7	05/04/16	109.6	1.1	20.6
	5.6	19.5	38.4	0.0	0.0	1.7	97.9	05/02/16	74.0	3.8	4.0
	9.0	19.3	38.8	2.0	3.3	5.5	160.2	04/29/16	82.0	0.0	11.1
	21.6	32.8	63.5	4.0	9.5	19.3	115.1	04/23/16	99.3	0.0	25.9
	0.0	12.3	20.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	03/28/16	41.5	0.0	0.0
	10.6	25.9	44.7	2.0	4.9	6.5	22.6	05/02/16	89.8	1.9	11.0
	17.5	26.5	41.3	0.0	3.0	3.0	156.8	04/22/16	89.9	0.0	19.5
	27.3	43.1	58.2	1.1	2.7	8.3	61.3	05/03/16	107.5	5.0	24.3
	0.0	11.0	23.2	0.0	2.0	4.9	102.4	03/24/16	77.3	0.0	0.0
	15.1	30.7	38.9	3.5	5.6	5.6	10.5	04/24/16	78.5	0.0	16.1
	24.3	41.7	57.2	1.0	3.0	5.1	42.9	05/03/16	107.5	4.1	21.1
	25.0	42.7	69.6	3.9	6.4	12.3	177.7	05/03/16	133.7	6.9	21.2
	18.5	192.7	192.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	05/02/16	192.7	0.8	19.6
AVERAGE	15.1	41.1	56.2	1.6	3.4	6.0			98.7	1.8	15.0



**190403 Currency and Proficiency - Borman 30/60/90 - Hours, NVD Hours, Tanker  
Currency**

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 03, 2019 9:17 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: MAW CI - Statement Prep

Sir,

Sorry for the missed call this weekend.

Below is the data I was able to get from MSHARP:

- 1 - 30/60/90: 13.7/34.1/49.8    night: 0/4.9/7.7
- 2 - Last Tanker: 3/28/16 (I believe it was a KC-135 on the way home from a detachment)
- 3 - Last Night Tanker: occurred in FRS, unable to pull data on MSHARP since it was a Navy Command
- 4 - I'm unable to recall with confidence the exact goggle usage thus decline to make a response

V/R

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Monday, April 01, 2019 11:07 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: MAW CI - Statement Prep

[REDACTED],

Following up with no comms via the phone over the weekend.

Understand your discomfort and likely the trepidation in revisiting the incident. Let's work a new approach.

Request a feed of the following facts:

- 1 - 30/60/90 Flight Time
- 2 - Last Tanker
- 3 - Last Night Tanker

Additionally, request depth to actions surrounding the incident:

- 4 - Request a concise description of goggle use/position in the vicinity of tanker...approaching, tanking, and departing.

Finally, attached is a list of questions I use as a framework for conversations/interviews in my effort to fully understand the incident, immediate actions, continuing actions, and amplifying information associated with the CoC reaction. Of note, the final two questions are (1) what other question(s) should I ask and/or (2) is there anything else I should know as the investigator. Any of these questions that align to what you feel is important for the administrative investigation, please feed your input.

Reiterating, any statement is protected by the Privacy Act. Something else to consider, If you want something specific to be completely off the record, your inject will be solely between you and I. The

intent of this investigation is what USMC Aviation, MAW, MAG, and VMFA can do better to avoid the environment you found yourself in on 28 Apr 2016 after you received your FRAG'd offload. I do need a response in the next 48 hours (by 0900 Wed 3 Apr) to meet my 5 Apr deadline. I appreciate the consideration and I appreciate any input you are comfortable providing.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2019 6:31 AM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: MAW CI - Statement Prep

Sir,

Unfortunately I do not have any factual statements saved from the mishap. Anything I provide would be based on memory which I'm not comfortable doing given the scope of the CI and potential legal implications.

If I find anything I will be sure to reach out. I apologize if this hinders your investigation as that is not my intent.

V/R

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 10:26 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: MAW CI - Statement Prep

[REDACTED]

No worries and quite understandable the valid desire to avoid contradictory statements. If you have a factual statement in your records that you previously provided, that would help this administrative investigation significantly. I have no ability to pull any facts nor associated statements from the Mishap Investigation Report given the privileged nature of the Report.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2019 11:18 AM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: MAW CI - Statement Prep



Sir,

I apologize for the delay in my response; I have spent this time reflecting on the incident and consulting with an attorney. Due to my mishap occurring nearly 3 years ago, I will be declining the option of making a statement in order to prevent potentially contradicting previous statements due poor recall at this late date.

V/R

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

---

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2019 10:29 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: MAW CI - Statement Prep

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Good talking with you earlier; as discussed, following-up with appropriate/necessary admin details.

1- Attached is the Privacy Act Statement. If you would review, initial where applicable, and sign, I would appreciate it. As necessary, we can discuss while you review. For the CI report, a scan of the initialed/signed Privacy Act Statement is needed along with a scan of your signed statement.

2 - For review, immediately below and attached in the word document is amplification on 'why separate statements' and 'what differs between statements' for a Mishap Investigation and a Command Investigation.

"Requisite Advisement iaw JAGINST 5800.7F, Manual of the Judge Advocate General

Pursuant to this Command Investigation (Circumstances of the 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aviation Mishap) and the previously conducted Aviation Mishap Safety Investigation:

(a) The different objectives of the two investigations:

- Command Investigation Purpose - "A command investigation functions as a tool to gather, analyze, and record relevant information about an incident or event of primary interest to a command."
- Aviation Mishap Safety Investigation Purpose - "Naval aviation mishap safety investigations have but one purpose and that is to answer the question, 'Why?' The mishap investigation is a search for causes; it looks for undetected hazards and tries to identify those factors that caused the mishap as well as those that caused any additional damage or injury during the course of the mishap. Mishap investigations also demonstrate an organization's commitment to their safety program. All naval aviation mishap safety investigations are conducted solely for safety purposes."

(b) the reasons why procedures vary:

- The procedures vary in order to ensure the integrity of both distinct investigations and to ensure the privileged nature of components of the aviation mishap safety investigation;

(c) the need to preserve the privileged nature of the aviation mishap safety investigation; and

(d) the fact that since neither command nor administrative action may alter the privileged character of statements provided to the aviation mishap board, and such statements will not be available to the JAGMAN investigation from any official source."

Appreciate your forthcoming time to be spent in recall of facts. Let me know if you have any questions.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2019 3:39 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: MAW CI

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Good morning. Reaching out from Okinawa where I currently sit in the III MEF G-3 Aviation desk. As an AV-8B Pilot, I have been asked by the MAW CG to conduct a Command Investigation into the April 28, 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Mishap. To reduce potential angst, the simple reason behind the initiation of this investigation at this late date is no PI or CI was executed in 2016 for factual reference. Unfortunately, the sole investigation currently available is on the Safety side of the house which due to imbedded privileged information is unavailable to other investigations.

Please acknowledge receipt of this e-mail to let me know this is the correct e-mail address and provide a telephone number which I can follow-up for a voice conversation to discuss the administrative way forward (discussion of rights, request for statement, request for interview, etc...). I look forward to our discussion as I gather the unimpassioned facts required to complete a concise report for the 1st MAW Commanding General.  
Semper Fidelis,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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# Log Book for [REDACTED] 5/1/2015 - 12/1/2018

Report run on 04/01/2019 1311 UTC+09:00

Date Range Totals				Hours										
	TMS	Device	Type	TPT	FPT	ACMDR	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG	SL	DL
<b>Totals</b>				<b>532.9</b>	<b>532.9</b>	<b>532.9</b>	<b>179.0</b>	<b>31.6</b>	<b>108.2</b>	<b>78.9</b>	<b>276.3</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>130.0</b>	<b>1.2</b>
05/30/15	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft	9.7	9.7	9.7	3.9	2.9	8.2					
05/30/15	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.3		0.7					
06/30/15	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft	12.7	12.7	12.7	2.7	6.7	5.3					
06/30/15	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft	0.6	0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6					
07/06/15	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7		0.5	1.5					
08/26/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.8	1.8	1.8	0.8							
08/28/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.3	0.1						
09/09/15	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.7							
09/10/15	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.1							
09/14/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.2							
09/15/15	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3								
09/16/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3								
09/18/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4							
09/30/15	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0								
10/08/15	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6								
10/08/15	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.9	1.9	1.9	0.3							
10/09/15	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6								
10/23/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5								
10/24/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	2.1	2.1	2.1								
10/24/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0							
10/25/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	2.0	2.0	2.0								
10/25/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	2.2	2.2	2.2								

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Date Range Totals				Hours		Landings							App		
	TMS	Device	Type	DLUI	XCNTY	6	F	G	7	P	1	W	1	2	3
Totals				11.6	61.0	268	65	1	2	2	1	1	51	84	1
05/30/15	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft												
05/30/15	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft												
06/30/15	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft												
06/30/15	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft												
07/06/15	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft												
08/26/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
08/28/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
09/09/15	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			1							2		
09/10/15	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			1									
09/14/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
09/15/15	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									
09/16/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
09/18/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
09/30/15	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									
10/08/15	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
10/08/15	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1								1	
10/09/15	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
10/23/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
10/24/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
10/24/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
10/25/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
10/25/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									

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Date Range Totals				App		T&R									
	TMS	Device	Type	A	B	T&R 1	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	NAVFLIR
Totals				9	19										
05/30/15	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft												
05/30/15	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft												
06/30/15	FA-18C	Baseline	Aircraft												
06/30/15	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft												
07/06/15	FA-18D	Baseline	Aircraft												
08/26/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF714VF</a>
08/28/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1		2102	6735								<a href="#">GF714VN</a>
09/09/15	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF714XK</a>
09/10/15	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			2102	2501								<a href="#">GF714XS</a>
09/14/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF714YM</a>
09/15/15	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">GF714YT</a>
09/16/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			3800									<a href="#">GF714Z8</a>
09/18/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			3800	2101								<a href="#">GF714ZC</a>
09/30/15	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			2505									<a href="#">GF714ZQ</a>
10/08/15	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			2102	2303								<a href="#">GF7151I</a>
10/08/15	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF71517</a>
10/09/15	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			2303	2102	6735							<a href="#">GF7151D</a>
10/23/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft												<a href="#">GF7153G</a>
10/24/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft												<a href="#">GF7153I</a>
10/24/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft												<a href="#">GF7153H</a>
10/25/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			2308	2309								<a href="#">GF7153J</a>
10/25/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			2309	2308								<a href="#">GF7153K</a>

Enclosure 67

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Date Range Totals				Hours										
	TMS	Device	Type	TPT	FPT	ACMDR	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG	SL	DL
10/27/15	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8		1.8	1.8				
10/29/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7	0.2	0.5						
11/05/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.1							
11/07/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9							
11/08/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7								
11/08/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5							
11/09/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7	0.5							
11/10/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	0.3							
11/13/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8							
11/16/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	0.7	0.7	0.7								
11/17/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9							
11/19/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	0.7	0.7	0.7								
11/23/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2		1.2	1.2				
11/25/15	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.4							
12/02/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.5							
12/07/15	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3		1.3	1.3				
12/08/15	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7		0.1						
12/11/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	2.6	2.6	2.6	0.5		0.5		2.6			
12/11/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	2.3	2.3	2.3	1.0				2.3			
12/13/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	2.5	2.5	2.5					2.5			
12/13/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.9	1.9	1.9	0.2				1.9			
12/30/15	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.8	1.8	1.8					1.8			
01/05/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	0.5							
01/07/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5			0.2					
01/08/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0								
01/09/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	5.0	5.0	5.0	0.3		0.3					
01/11/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	2.2	2.2	2.2								

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Date Range Totals					Hours		Landings						App		
	TMS	Device	Type	DLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	G	7	P	1	W	1	2	3
10/27/15	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft				1								
10/29/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
11/05/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1								1	
11/07/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2								3	
11/08/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
11/08/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1								1	
11/09/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1								1	
11/10/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
11/13/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
11/16/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
11/17/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1								1	
11/19/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
11/23/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft				1								
11/25/15	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft						1					1	
12/02/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1								1	
12/07/15	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft				1								
12/08/15	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
12/11/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1								1	
12/11/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1							2	3	
12/13/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
12/13/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
12/30/15	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									
01/05/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
01/07/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft				1								
01/08/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
01/09/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2	1								
01/11/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									

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Date Range Totals				App		T&R									
	TMS	Device	Type	A	B	T&R 1	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	NAVFLIR
10/27/15	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2402									<a href="#">GF7154N</a>
10/29/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft		2	2304									<a href="#">GF7154M</a>
11/05/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2101									<a href="#">GF7155F</a>
11/07/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2102	3800	2101							<a href="#">GF7155K</a>
11/08/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			3800	2102								<a href="#">GF7155P</a>
11/08/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2306	3800	2102							<a href="#">GF7155L</a>
11/09/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			2310									<a href="#">GF7155U</a>
11/10/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			2310									<a href="#">GF7155Y</a>
11/13/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2101	2102								<a href="#">GF71568</a>
11/16/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2502	2102								<a href="#">GF7156D</a>
11/17/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF7156M</a>
11/19/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2503	2102	2501							<a href="#">GF7156Q</a>
11/23/15	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			2101	2404	2402							<a href="#">GF7156U</a>
11/25/15	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2508	2101								<a href="#">GF71579</a>
12/02/15	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2304	2102	6735							<a href="#">GF7157L</a>
12/07/15	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft			2405	2402								<a href="#">GF71583</a>
12/08/15	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1		3202	2309	2102	2303	6735	2308				<a href="#">GF7158A</a>
12/11/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF7158K</a>
12/11/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF7158J</a>
12/13/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2101	2102	2308							<a href="#">GF7158L</a>
12/13/15	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF7158M</a>
12/30/15	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			4601	6714	6111							<a href="#">GF715AH</a>
01/05/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			2509									<a href="#">GF715AL</a>
01/07/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF715B8</a>
01/08/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF715B9</a>
01/09/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			3104	3105	3800							<a href="#">GF715BA</a>
01/11/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2102	6111	6726							<a href="#">GF715BH</a>

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Date Range Totals				Hours										
	TMS	Device	Type	TPT	FPT	ACMDR	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG	SL	DL
01/12/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.3							
01/14/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.1				1.5			
01/26/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	0.7	0.7	0.7					0.7			
01/30/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	0.2				1.2			
02/01/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3					1.3			
02/11/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2								
02/15/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1					1.1			
02/16/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0		0.2					0.5	
02/21/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	7.1	7.1	7.1	1.0				7.1			
02/23/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5		1.5	1.5				
02/25/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3		1.3	1.3				
02/29/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.0						1.4	
03/01/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7		1.8	1.7				
03/04/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	4.3	4.3	4.3	3.1		1.6		4.3			
03/05/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	2.3	2.3	2.3	1.3				2.3			
03/06/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	3.9	3.9	3.9	1.0		0.3		3.9			
03/09/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.2		1.2	1.2				
03/16/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	0.2				1.4			
03/22/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	1.9	1.9	1.9								
03/24/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.9	1.9	1.9		0.4						
03/28/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	7.4	7.4	7.4					7.4			
03/30/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0								
04/01/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1		0.3			1.1			
04/05/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1								
04/08/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1					1.1			
04/11/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.1	0.1			0.8			
04/19/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2							

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Date Range Totals			Hours		Landings								App		
	TMS	Device	Type	DLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	G	7	P	1	W	1	2	3
01/12/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1								2	
01/14/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									
01/26/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
01/30/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
02/01/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
02/11/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1									
02/15/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
02/16/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
02/21/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1								1	
02/23/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft				1						1		
02/25/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft				1								
02/29/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1								2	
03/01/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft				1						1		
03/04/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			1	1						2	1	
03/05/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			2								2	
03/06/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			2	1								
03/09/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1								1	
03/16/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									
03/22/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft						1						
03/24/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1									
03/28/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
03/30/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
04/01/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
04/05/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
04/08/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
04/11/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
04/19/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									

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Date Range Totals				App		T&R									
	TMS	Device	Type	A	B	T&R 1	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	NAVFLIR
01/12/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF715BM</a>
01/14/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			3102	3104	3105							<a href="#">GF715BS</a>
01/26/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			3800	2102	6735							<a href="#">GF715CW</a>
01/30/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			3101	3103	3105	2102						<a href="#">GF715DE</a>
02/01/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			3202	3103	6701	3800	3104	2102	6735			<a href="#">GF715DO</a>
02/11/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			6109	2201								<a href="#">GF715F4</a>
02/15/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			3800	2102								<a href="#">GF715FG</a>
02/16/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft		1	3800	2101	2102							<a href="#">GF715FM</a>
02/21/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			6109	3800								<a href="#">GF715H1</a>
02/23/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2402									<a href="#">GF715H8</a>
02/25/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			2402	2403								<a href="#">GF715HD</a>
02/29/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			6301									<a href="#">GF715HV</a>
03/01/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			2402									<a href="#">GF715I3</a>
03/04/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			3102	2201	3104	2102						<a href="#">GF715IG</a>
03/05/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			3800	2503	2508	2102						<a href="#">GF715II</a>
03/06/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			2503	2508	2102	2501	3800	2502				<a href="#">GF715IL</a>
03/09/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			3703	3705								<a href="#">GF715J9</a>
03/16/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			3404	3403								<a href="#">GF715K4</a>
03/22/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF715LV</a>
03/24/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	2		2102									<a href="#">GF715KV</a>
03/28/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2102	6109	2201	2101	3800	6111				<a href="#">GF715L0</a>
03/30/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft												<a href="#">GF715LS</a>
04/01/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1		6308	2504	3800							<a href="#">GF715M5</a>
04/05/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2504	2508	2102	2101	3800					<a href="#">GF715MJ</a>
04/08/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			2102	2504	3800	2508	6310					<a href="#">GF715N0</a>
04/11/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1		2101	3800	2102							<a href="#">GF715N9</a>
04/19/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft												<a href="#">GF715OL</a>

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Date Range Totals				Hours										
	TMS	Device	Type	TPT	FPT	ACMDR	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG	SL	DL
04/28/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	3.0	3.0	3.0			2.0	2.0				
05/19/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	2.0	2.0	2.0		0.3						
05/23/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4					1.4			
05/24/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7	0.2				1.7			
05/25/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	0.9	0.9	0.9								
05/26/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	8.1	8.1	8.1	5.0							
06/01/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	0.6							
06/06/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	0.5							
06/08/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.0				1.9			
06/10/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	3.0	3.0	3.0								
06/14/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7								
06/15/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	2.2	2.2	2.2								
06/20/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.3						1.1	
06/21/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.4							
06/23/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0								
06/27/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.2						1.5	
06/29/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	0.9	0.9	0.9					0.9			
06/30/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	0.8	0.8	0.8								
07/07/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.2				1.3			
07/08/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5					1.5			
07/11/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.3				1.3			
07/12/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2								
07/13/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2					1.2			
07/15/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2								
07/25/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	0.7	0.7	0.7								
07/27/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3								
07/31/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	2.0	2.0	2.0	0.3							

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Date Range Totals				Hours		Landings							App		
	TMS	Device	Type	DLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	G	7	P	1	W	1	2	3
04/28/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft				1								
05/19/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
05/23/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
05/24/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									
05/25/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
05/26/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1									
06/01/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									
06/06/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									
06/08/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1								1	
06/10/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1									
06/14/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
06/15/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1									
06/20/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1									
06/21/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1								1	
06/23/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
06/27/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft			1									
06/29/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
06/30/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1									
07/07/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1									
07/08/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1									
07/11/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1								1	
07/12/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
07/13/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1									
07/15/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
07/25/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
07/27/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
07/31/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1								1	

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Date Range Totals			App		T&R										NAVFLIR
	TMS	Device	Type	A	B	T&R 1	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	
04/28/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			3102	3106	2101							<a href="#">GF715PX</a>
05/19/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1		2201	6111	2303	6109						<a href="#">GF715SA</a>
05/23/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			2101	2303	2308							<a href="#">GF715SL</a>
05/24/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF715SP</a>
05/25/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft												<a href="#">GF715SU</a>
05/26/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			2101	3800	2102	6109	6111	2201				<a href="#">GF715SW</a>
06/01/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">GF715T5</a>
06/06/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			4601	2102	3800							<a href="#">GF715TT</a>
06/08/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			3800	3604	2201	2102	4601					<a href="#">GF715UF</a>
06/10/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2201	4601	3402	3401	4501	3800	3403			<a href="#">GF715V5</a>
06/14/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			4601	3800	3502	2201						<a href="#">GF715VP</a>
06/15/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2102	4601	3503	2101	3800					<a href="#">GF715VY</a>
06/20/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			6703	6313	3702							<a href="#">GF715WX</a>
06/21/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			2102	3800	3103	6306						<a href="#">GF715X0</a>
06/23/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			2102	6735	2602	6701	3800					<a href="#">GF715XU</a>
06/27/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft			6735	3104	2303	3103	3800	2304	6306			<a href="#">GF715YJ</a>
06/29/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			6203	3800	2603	2102	6735					<a href="#">GF715YP</a>
06/30/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			3800	6706	2102	3704						<a href="#">GF715Z9</a>
07/07/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			3202	6713	3800	2102	6735	6703				<a href="#">GF715ZP</a>
07/08/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			3104	2102	3105	3800						<a href="#">GF715ZU</a>
07/11/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			3800	2102	3704							<a href="#">GF7160V</a>
07/12/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			2102	6735	3800							<a href="#">GF71610</a>
07/13/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			3800	2102	6314							<a href="#">GF7161I</a>
07/15/16	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			3104	3103								<a href="#">GF7161X</a>
07/25/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			3800	2102								<a href="#">GF7162C</a>
07/27/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">GF7162K</a>
07/31/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			3800	2102	6109	6111						<a href="#">GF7162P</a>

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Date Range Totals				Hours										
	TMS	Device	Type	TPT	FPT	ACMDR	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG	SL	DL
08/04/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	0.8							
08/12/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	8.3	8.3	8.3	0.7				8.3			
08/23/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	0.2							
08/23/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7		0.7	0.7				
08/24/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		1.0	1.0				
08/25/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.2							
08/26/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.0							
08/31/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4				
09/01/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	0.5				1.2			
09/06/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	4.3	4.3	4.3	2.5	1.0	1.5		4.3			
09/13/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3		0.2						
09/14/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	2.2	2.2	2.2	0.2							
09/17/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.0				3.3			
09/21/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft	3.0	3.0	3.0	1.0	0.5	0.7		3.0		2.0	
09/22/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.1				1.5			
09/23/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2		1.2	1.0				
09/27/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6								
09/29/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1		2.1	2.1				
10/01/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	0.5							
10/20/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4		1.4						
10/25/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1		1.1	1.1			1.1	
10/26/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5		1.5	1.3				
10/28/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft	2.8	2.8	2.8	1.0				2.8			
10/29/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft	2.4	2.4	2.4	1.0				2.4			
10/30/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft	2.3	2.3	2.3	0.1				2.3			
10/31/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8		1.8		1.8			
11/01/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.4							

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Date Range Totals					Hours		Landings						App		
	TMS	Device	Type	DLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	G	7	P	1	W	1	2	3
08/04/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
08/12/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
08/23/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
08/23/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft				1						3		
08/24/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft				1								
08/25/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1								1	
08/26/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1							1		
08/31/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft				1						2		
09/01/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									
09/06/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			1	1								
09/13/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
09/14/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
09/17/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									
09/21/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft				1							1	
09/22/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1								1	
09/23/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft				1							1	
09/27/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft			1									
09/29/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft				1							3	
10/01/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
10/20/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1									
10/25/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft				1								
10/26/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft				1								
10/28/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft			2									
10/29/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft			2									
10/30/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft			2									
10/31/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft				1								
11/01/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1								1	

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Date Range Totals			App		T&R										NAVFLIR
	TMS	Device	Type	A	B	T&R 1	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	
08/04/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			3800	2102								<a href="#">GF71630</a>
08/12/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2101	2102	3800							<a href="#">GF7163Z</a>
08/23/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			3202	3201	2102	6735						<a href="#">GF71654</a>
08/23/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2401									<a href="#">GF71656</a>
08/24/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			3203									<a href="#">GF7165L</a>
08/25/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			3301	6735	4202	3202						<a href="#">GF7165U</a>
08/26/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF71666</a>
08/31/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft			3404	3405	2402							<a href="#">GF7166H</a>
09/01/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2501									<a href="#">GF7166O</a>
09/06/16	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft		2	2102	2201	2101	6111						<a href="#">GF71675</a>
09/13/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft		1	3402	3800	2102	4601	6109	6312				<a href="#">GF7167K</a>
09/14/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			3703	6111	2102	3704	3702	3800	2201	4601	4402	<a href="#">GF7167V</a>
09/17/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			6109	3800	6111	2201	4601					<a href="#">GF7168M</a>
09/21/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft			3800	3403	2201	2102	4601	6109	6732	3402		<a href="#">GF7169X</a>
09/22/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			6735	2101	3800							<a href="#">GF716A6</a>
09/23/16	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			3800	6735	2304	6304	2402					<a href="#">GF716AB</a>
09/27/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft			3800	3403								<a href="#">GF716AW</a>
09/29/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			2202	3800	2402							<a href="#">GF716BF</a>
10/01/16	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			3103	3800	6735							<a href="#">GF716C9</a>
10/20/16	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">GF716DN</a>
10/25/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			6735	3106	6307							<a href="#">GF716EE</a>
10/26/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2402									<a href="#">GF716EQ</a>
10/28/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF716FA</a>
10/29/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF716FB</a>
10/30/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF716FE</a>
10/31/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft												<a href="#">GF716F9</a>
11/01/16	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			3202	3201	2102	6735						<a href="#">GF716FO</a>

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Date Range Totals				Hours										
	TMS	Device	Type	TPT	FPT	ACMDR	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG	SL	DL
11/02/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.0		1.4	1.4				
11/15/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1							1.1	
11/22/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	0.1				1.6			
11/30/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.2							
12/05/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.5		1.5	1.5				
12/06/16	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1								
12/08/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5								
12/15/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.5							
12/16/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	0.2				1.6		1.6	
01/05/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	0.2	0.5					1.4	
01/11/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4				
01/12/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	4.2	4.2	4.2	0.1				4.2			
01/13/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.2							
01/24/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	0.2	1.4	0.4					
01/25/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	2.3	2.3	2.3	0.5	0.3	2.0	1.5				
01/26/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2			1.2	1.0			0.2	
01/26/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	0.9	0.9	0.9								
01/27/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5								
01/27/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	0.8	0.8	0.8							0.7	
01/28/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7							1.6	
01/28/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1							0.9	
01/31/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5		0.7			1.5		1.5	
02/02/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	0.9	0.9	0.9		0.3			0.9			
02/11/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	7.9	7.9	7.9	2.0				7.9			
02/13/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2		0.3			1.2		1.2	
02/14/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6		0.3	1.6	1.6			1.6	
02/16/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.8	1.8	1.8		0.3			1.8		1.8	

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Date Range Totals					Hours		Landings						App		
	TMS	Device	Type	DLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	G	7	P	1	W	1	2	3
11/02/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft				1								
11/15/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									
11/22/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1									
11/30/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1									
12/05/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft							1					
12/06/16	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									
12/08/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
12/15/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1								1	
12/16/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1								1	
01/05/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
01/11/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft				1								
01/12/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
01/13/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			1									
01/24/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft				1							1	
01/25/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft				1								
01/26/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft				1								
01/26/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
01/27/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
01/27/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
01/28/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
01/28/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
01/31/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
02/02/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
02/11/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
02/13/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
02/14/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft				1								
02/16/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1									

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Date Range Totals				App		T&R									
	TMS	Device	Type	A	B	T&R 1	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	NAVFLIR
11/02/16	FA-18D	164945	Aircraft			6315	2402								<a href="#">GF716G2</a>
11/15/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			3102	3104	2102							<a href="#">GF716H1</a>
11/22/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2102	3105								<a href="#">GF716IK</a>
11/30/16	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2102	6735	2306	2304						<a href="#">GF716J9</a>
12/05/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			3203	3302	2402							<a href="#">GF716JV</a>
12/06/16	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			3202	3201	3301							<a href="#">GF716JX</a>
12/08/16	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF716KQ</a>
12/15/16	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF716LC</a>
12/16/16	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF716LI</a>
01/05/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft		1	2101	6103	2102	6735						<a href="#">GF716MV</a>
01/11/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			2402									<a href="#">GF716ND</a>
01/12/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			2201	2102	6735	6701	3102	2101				<a href="#">GF716NI</a>
01/13/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF716NO</a>
01/24/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">GF716PM</a>
01/25/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft		1	4602	2202	2402							<a href="#">GF716PN</a>
01/26/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			3105	3106	3800							<a href="#">GF716P5</a>
01/26/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			2503	2508	2102	3800	2504					<a href="#">GF716P4</a>
01/27/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			3800	2102	4601							<a href="#">GF716P7</a>
01/27/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			2503	2102	3800							<a href="#">GF716P8</a>
01/28/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			3202	6103	3800	3301	2102	6735				<a href="#">GF716PB</a>
01/28/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			3104	3800	3102	3105	6103					<a href="#">GF716PA</a>
01/31/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1		6111	2102	6109	6103	2201					<a href="#">GF716Q3</a>
02/02/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF716QF</a>
02/11/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			6109	2102	6111	2201	3800					<a href="#">GF716R3</a>
02/13/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			6103	2102	6735	3800						<a href="#">GF716R6</a>
02/14/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft		1	3106	6103	3800	2402						<a href="#">GF716RK</a>
02/16/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			3800	3103	2201	2102	6735					<a href="#">GF716RR</a>

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Date Range Totals				Hours										
	TMS	Device	Type	TPT	FPT	ACMDR	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG	SL	DL
02/17/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	1.8	1.8	1.8					1.8			
02/22/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	2.1	2.1	2.1		1.0			2.1			
02/23/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4		0.5						
03/28/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.7				1.3			
03/30/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6		0.3	1.6	1.6			1.0	
04/03/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6		0.3	1.6	1.5	1.6		1.0	
04/04/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7		1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7		1.7	
04/05/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	0.5				1.6		1.6	
04/05/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.6						1.5	
04/06/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6		1.6	1.6	1.6			
04/12/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4	1.4			
04/13/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.0		1.0	0.1	1.6		1.6	
04/14/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1		1.1		1.1		1.1	
04/15/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.8	1.8	1.8	0.4		0.4		1.8		1.8	
04/15/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0	
04/16/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.8	1.8	1.8	0.5	0.2			1.8		1.8	
04/18/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4	1.4			
04/18/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6							1.6	
04/19/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	2.7	2.7	2.7	1.0		0.6				2.7	
04/19/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	2.7	2.7	2.7	0.5						2.7	
04/20/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7	0.6						1.7	
04/24/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4			1.4	
04/25/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.5							
04/26/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4	1.4			
04/27/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.8				1.5		1.5	
04/28/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1					1.1			
04/28/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6				1.6			

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Date Range Totals				Hours		Landings							App		
	TMS	Device	Type	DLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	G	7	P	1	W	1	2	3
02/17/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			1									
02/22/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
02/23/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1									
03/28/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1							2		
03/30/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft				1								
04/03/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft				1								
04/04/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft				1								
04/05/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
04/05/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
04/06/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft							1			4	2	
04/12/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft				1								
04/13/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft				1								
04/14/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft		1.1		1						1		
04/15/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft		1.8		1						3		
04/15/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft		1.0		1						2		
04/16/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									
04/18/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft				1							1	
04/18/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									
04/19/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft				1							1	
04/19/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									
04/20/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									
04/24/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft				1						2		
04/25/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
04/26/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft				1							1	
04/27/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
04/28/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.1	14									
04/28/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.6	1									

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Date Range Totals				App		T&R									
	TMS	Device	Type	A	B	T&R 1	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	NAVFLIR
02/17/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			2201	2102	6735	2101	3103	2302	3800			<a href="#">GF716S4</a>
02/22/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			2102	2201	2101	3800						<a href="#">GF716SY</a>
02/23/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2201	3601	6103	3800	2102	4601				<a href="#">GF716TE</a>
03/28/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF716XA</a>
03/30/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			6103	2403	6730							<a href="#">GF716XN</a>
04/03/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			6732	6103	2402	6730						<a href="#">GF716XW</a>
04/04/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2202	6103	2402							<a href="#">GF716Y7</a>
04/05/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			6103	2102								<a href="#">GF716YC</a>
04/05/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF716YE</a>
04/06/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2402									<a href="#">GF716YR</a>
04/12/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2402	3705	4602							<a href="#">GF716ZE</a>
04/13/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2402									<a href="#">GF716ZK</a>
04/14/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft												<a href="#">GF716ZV</a>
04/15/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">GF716ZW</a>
04/15/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft												<a href="#">GF716ZY</a>
04/16/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft		1	3800	2102								<a href="#">GF716ZZ</a>
04/18/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2402	3106								<a href="#">GF7170D</a>
04/18/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2102	6103								<a href="#">GF7170E</a>
04/19/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2201	3104	2102	6735						<a href="#">GF7170C</a>
04/19/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2102	6735	2201	3103						<a href="#">GF71709</a>
04/20/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2102	6103	2306							<a href="#">GF71707</a>
04/24/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			3203	6103	2402							<a href="#">GF7171D</a>
04/25/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			3301	2102	6735	3202						<a href="#">GF7171K</a>
04/26/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2402									<a href="#">GF7171S</a>
04/27/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2102	6103								<a href="#">GF7171Y</a>
04/28/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2503	2102	3800							<a href="#">GF7172D</a>
04/28/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">GF7172E</a>

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Date Range Totals				Hours										
	TMS	Device	Type	TPT	FPT	ACMDR	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG	SL	DL
04/29/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3					1.3			
04/30/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0				2.0			
04/30/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5					1.5			
05/01/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6								
05/08/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2		1.2	1.2	1.2			
05/18/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5					1.5			
05/19/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	2.1	2.1	2.1					2.1		2.1	
06/05/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6		1.6			1.6		1.6	
06/07/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	2.0	2.0	2.0								
06/08/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.8	1.8	1.8		0.5			1.8			
06/12/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5					1.5		1.5	
06/13/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.9	1.9	1.9					1.9			
06/15/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	2.1	2.1	2.1					2.1			
06/16/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6		0.5					1.6	
06/20/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	2.4	2.4	2.4	1.0		2.0	2.0	2.4			
06/23/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4					1.4		1.4	
06/26/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.9	1.9	1.9					1.9			
06/27/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.5							
06/28/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5					1.5		1.5	
06/30/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5		0.5			1.5		1.5	
07/05/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	0.5		1.6	1.6	1.6			
07/07/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.5		1.5	1.5	1.5		1.5	
07/12/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4	1.4		1.4	
07/14/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6		1.6	1.6	1.6		1.6	
07/19/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5		1.5	1.5	1.5		1.5	
07/26/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1								
07/26/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	0.7	0.7	0.7								

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Date Range Totals				Hours		Landings							App		
	TMS	Device	Type	DLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	G	7	P	1	W	1	2	3
04/29/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.3	1									
04/30/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		2.0	1									
04/30/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.5	1									
05/01/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
05/08/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft				1							1	
05/18/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									
05/19/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									
06/05/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			1									
06/07/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			1									
06/08/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1									
06/12/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
06/13/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
06/15/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
06/16/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
06/20/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft				1							1	
06/23/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									
06/26/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
06/27/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			1									
06/28/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
06/30/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									
07/05/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft				1								
07/07/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft				1							1	
07/12/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft				1							1	
07/14/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft				1							1	
07/19/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft				1							1	
07/26/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									
07/26/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									

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Date Range Totals				App		T&R									
	TMS	Device	Type	A	B	T&R 1	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	NAVFLIR
04/29/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			3202	3201	2102	3800						<a href="#">GF7172H</a>
04/30/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2101	3800	2102							<a href="#">GF7172K</a>
04/30/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			3800	2503	2102							<a href="#">GF7172J</a>
05/01/17	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft												<a href="#">GF7172Q</a>
05/08/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2402									<a href="#">GF7173N</a>
05/18/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2101	2102								<a href="#">GF71749</a>
05/19/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2102	6109	6103	6111	2201					<a href="#">GF7174I</a>
06/05/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			3202	2102	6735	6103						<a href="#">GF7175M</a>
06/07/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			3800	3503	3704	4601						<a href="#">GF71769</a>
06/08/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2102	6735	3800	3202	2201					<a href="#">GF7176S</a>
06/12/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			6103	3800	4601	2102						<a href="#">GF7177C</a>
06/13/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			2102	3602	2201	4601	3800					<a href="#">GF7177O</a>
06/15/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			3800	6103	2102	4601	2201					<a href="#">GF7178B</a>
06/16/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft		1	3703	6103	4601	3800	2201					<a href="#">GF7178Q</a>
06/20/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2202	3800	4602	2402						<a href="#">GF71798</a>
06/23/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			6103	3800	2102							<a href="#">GF7179P</a>
06/26/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			3800	3403	4601	6732						<a href="#">GF7179R</a>
06/27/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			2102	4601	6709	3800						<a href="#">GF717A4</a>
06/28/17	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			6103	3104	2102							<a href="#">GF717AM</a>
06/30/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft		1	2307	2102	6735	3800	6103					<a href="#">GF717B5</a>
07/05/17	FA-18D	165686	Aircraft			6706	6735	6701	3800	3106					<a href="#">GF717BE</a>
07/07/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			2405	6735	6701	3800	6703					<a href="#">GF717C4</a>
07/12/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			2401	6735	3800	6703	2405	6701				<a href="#">GF717CH</a>
07/14/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			6735	6103	6701	6733	6703					<a href="#">GF717D9</a>
07/19/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			6735	6103	5705	6703	6733					<a href="#">GF717DQ</a>
07/26/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft												<a href="#">GF717EK</a>
07/26/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft												<a href="#">GF717EJ</a>

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Date Range Totals				Hours										
	TMS	Device	Type	TPT	FPT	ACMDR	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG	SL	DL
08/08/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5		1.5	1.5	1.5		1.5	
08/09/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4				1.4			
08/09/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3					1.3			
08/10/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2					1.2		1.2	
08/10/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	0.9	0.9	0.9					0.9		0.9	
08/11/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1				2.1			
08/11/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8				1.8			
08/12/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3				1.3			
08/16/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	0.8				1.4			
08/22/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3		1.3	1.3	1.3			
08/23/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1		1.1	1.1	1.1			
08/24/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.0						1.0	
08/24/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4				1.4			
08/25/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.0				1.7		1.7	
08/25/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7		1.7	1.7	1.7		1.7	
08/26/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5				1.0		1.0	
08/26/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	0.5				1.6			
09/13/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4			1.4	
09/13/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2		0.5			1.2		1.2	
09/19/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5					1.5		1.5	
09/29/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	0.5							
10/02/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	2.6	2.6	2.6					2.6			
10/05/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5							
10/17/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	2.1	2.1	2.1	1.0				2.1			
10/18/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3		1.3	1.3	1.3		1.3	
10/19/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3		1.3	1.3				
10/20/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	0.9	0.9	0.9					0.9			

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Date Range Totals				Hours		Landings							App		
	TMS	Device	Type	DLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	G	7	P	1	W	1	2	3
08/08/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft				1						1		
08/09/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.4	1							1		
08/09/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.3	1									
08/10/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.2	1									
08/10/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		0.9	1									
08/11/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		2.1	1							1		
08/11/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.8	1							1		
08/12/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.3	1									
08/16/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1							1		
08/22/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft				1							1	
08/23/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft				1						1		
08/24/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1								1	
08/24/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.4	1							1		
08/25/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.7	1							4		
08/25/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.7		1							4	
08/26/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.0	1								1	
08/26/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft		1.6	1								1	
09/13/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft				1								
09/13/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
09/19/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									
09/29/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									
10/02/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft		2.6	3									
10/05/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft		1.5	1								1	
10/17/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1								1	
10/18/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft				1								1
10/19/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft				1						1		
10/20/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									

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Date Range Totals				App		T&R									
	TMS	Device	Type	A	B	T&R 1	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	NAVFLIR
08/08/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			2402	2403	6103							<a href="#">GF717FK</a>
08/09/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">GF717FT</a>
08/09/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">GF717FU</a>
08/10/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2508	2102	3800							<a href="#">GF717FY</a>
08/10/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">GF717G0</a>
08/11/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">GF717G2</a>
08/11/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">GF717G4</a>
08/12/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">GF717G6</a>
08/16/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2102	6735								<a href="#">GF717GG</a>
08/22/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			3405	2402								<a href="#">GF717GS</a>
08/23/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			3203	2402	3302	6735						<a href="#">GF717GY</a>
08/24/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			3800	3104	2102							<a href="#">GF717HB</a>
08/24/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2101	3800	2102							<a href="#">GF717HA</a>
08/25/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			3105	6103	3800	2102	6735					<a href="#">GF717HC</a>
08/25/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			3800	3106	2402							<a href="#">GF717HD</a>
08/26/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2102	3800	3202							<a href="#">GF717HG</a>
08/26/17	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2102	6735								<a href="#">GF717HE</a>
09/13/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			3705	2402	6103							<a href="#">GF717IT</a>
09/13/17	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft		1	2102	3704	6735	6103						<a href="#">GF717IW</a>
09/19/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			6111	6735	3702	2201						<a href="#">GF717JM</a>
09/29/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			3105	3102	2102							<a href="#">GF717L7</a>
10/02/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			3102	3103	3104	2102	6735	3101	3202			<a href="#">GF717LI</a>
10/05/17	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">GF717M9</a>
10/17/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2201	6109	2102	6111						<a href="#">GF717NH</a>
10/18/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			2403	2402								<a href="#">GF717NN</a>
10/19/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft												<a href="#">GF717NW</a>
10/20/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2102	2101								<a href="#">GF717O1</a>

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Date Range Totals				Hours										
	TMS	Device	Type	TPT	FPT	ACMDR	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG	SL	DL
10/25/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0								
10/26/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2		1.2	1.2	1.2		1.2	
10/31/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2		1.2	1.2	1.2			
10/31/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	3.0	3.0	3.0					3.0			
11/01/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	4.0	4.0	4.0	1.5		1.5	1.5	1.5			
11/02/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	0.1				1.2		1.2	
11/07/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1		1.1	1.0	1.0			
11/07/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	0.1			1.5			
11/08/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2		1.2	1.1	1.2			
11/08/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	0.9	0.9	0.9		0.1			0.9			
11/09/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3		1.3	1.2	1.2			
11/09/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5		0.1			1.5			
11/10/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.2	0.1			1.4		1.4	
11/21/17	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft	0.8	0.8	0.8								
12/14/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	0.5				1.4			
01/11/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7					1.7			
01/12/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1								
01/17/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4				1.4		1.4	
01/23/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5		1.6	1.6		1.6	1.6	
01/26/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1					1.1			
01/31/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7					1.7		1.7	
02/06/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1					1.1			
02/07/18	FA-18C	164221	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2		0.5			1.2		1.2	
02/08/18	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft	3.4	3.4	3.4	0.4				3.4		3.4	
02/13/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	0.4						1.2	
02/15/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0					1.0			
02/19/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6								

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Date Range Totals				Hours		Landings							App		
	TMS	Device	Type	DLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	G	7	P	1	W	1	2	3
10/25/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									
10/26/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft				1								
10/31/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft		1.2		1								
10/31/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft		3.0	1									
11/01/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft		4.0	1									
11/02/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft		1.2						1				
11/07/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1.1		1							1	
11/07/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1.5	1									
11/08/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1.2		1							1	
11/08/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		0.9	1									
11/09/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1.3		1							1	
11/09/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1.5	1									
11/10/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1.4	1									
11/21/17	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft			1									
12/14/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									
01/11/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2									
01/12/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1									
01/17/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1							2		
01/23/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft				1								
01/26/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
01/31/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1									
02/06/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1									
02/07/18	FA-18C	164221	Aircraft			1									
02/08/18	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			1									
02/13/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1								1	
02/15/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
02/19/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									

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Date Range Totals				App		T&R									
	TMS	Device	Type	A	B	T&R 1	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	NAVFLIR
10/25/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			2102	6206								<a href="#">GF717QG</a>
10/26/17	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			6735	6103	2304	2402						<a href="#">GF717QN</a>
10/31/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			3106	3800								<a href="#">GF717PE</a>
10/31/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			3800	3103	3104							<a href="#">GF717PD</a>
11/01/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			2402	3104	3103	3203						<a href="#">GF717PM</a>
11/02/17	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF717PO</a>
11/07/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2402	6703	6733	5702	3800	6735				<a href="#">GF717QG</a>
11/07/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1	2102									<a href="#">GF717QD</a>
11/08/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2402	6735	5702	3800						<a href="#">GF717QO</a>
11/08/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1	3800	2102	2503							<a href="#">GF717QK</a>
11/09/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			6733	2402	3800	5702	6735					<a href="#">GF717QR</a>
11/09/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1	3800	2102								<a href="#">GF717QP</a>
11/10/17	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1	2102									<a href="#">GF717QV</a>
11/21/17	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">GF717S4</a>
12/14/17	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			6406	2102								<a href="#">GF717UV</a>
01/11/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			3102	3104								<a href="#">DSC18E3</a>
01/12/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">NW019EE</a>
01/17/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">1Q6NLDK</a>
01/23/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2402									<a href="#">RUWWDRY</a>
01/26/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">EXJJC4P</a>
01/31/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			2503	2102	6109	6103	6111					<a href="#">GV1TB7C</a>
02/06/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			6206									<a href="#">17CXB6K</a>
02/07/18	FA-18C	164221	Aircraft		1	2102									<a href="#">WZKRLD8</a>
02/08/18	FA-18D	164659	Aircraft			2102	3800	6111							<a href="#">QEAFT9</a>
02/13/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			2503	2102	3800							<a href="#">87J6BSC</a>
02/15/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2503	2504	3800	6103						<a href="#">9JAF4D3</a>
02/19/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			3103	3104	4303	6704	6735					<a href="#">NDWBXUE</a>

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Date Range Totals				Hours										
	TMS	Device	Type	TPT	FPT	ACMDR	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG	SL	DL
02/21/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	2.2	2.2	2.2					2.2			
02/23/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2					1.2			
02/27/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3					1.3		1.3	
02/28/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.5				1.3		1.3	
03/02/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7					1.7		1.7	
03/07/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4		1.4	1.3	1.4		1.4	
03/09/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4								
03/12/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3					1.3		1.3	
03/13/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3					1.3		1.3	
03/19/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	4.3	4.3	4.3	1.5				4.3		4.3	
03/20/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	0.5				1.4		1.4	
03/23/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	0.5				1.2		1.2	
03/23/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.5				1.3		1.3	
03/23/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6		1.4			1.6		1.6	
03/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.3				0.9		0.9	
03/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.5				1.9		1.9	
03/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8				1.8		1.8	
03/25/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1				1.1		1.1	
03/27/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3					1.3		1.3	
03/28/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.8		0.8	0.8	1.3	0.8	1.3	
03/29/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2					1.2		1.2	
04/11/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.0				1.7		1.7	
04/13/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	0.8	0.8	0.8					0.8			
04/16/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2		1.2	1.2		1.2		1.2
04/17/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4		
04/18/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4		1.4		
04/25/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5				1.0			

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Date Range Totals				Hours		Landings							App		
	TMS	Device	Type	DLUI	XCNTRY	6	F	G	7	P	1	W	1	2	3
02/21/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft	2.2		1									
02/23/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft	1.2		1									
02/27/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	1.3		1									
02/28/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.3		1								1	
03/02/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			1									
03/07/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.4			1							1	
03/09/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									
03/12/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			1									
03/13/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.3		1									
03/19/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
03/20/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1								1	
03/23/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1									
03/23/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1.3	1								1	
03/23/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1.6	1									
03/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		0.9	1								1	
03/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1.9	1								1	
03/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1.8	1							1		
03/25/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft		1.1	1								1	
03/27/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			1									
03/28/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft				1								
03/29/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			1									
04/11/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.7		1									
04/13/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									
04/16/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft				1							1	
04/17/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft					1						1	
04/18/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft				1							1	
04/25/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			3							2		

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Date Range Totals				App		T&R									
	TMS	Device	Type	A	B	T&R 1	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	NAVFLIR
02/21/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			6402	3602	6111							<a href="#">ZMQL7CP</a>
02/23/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			2102	3704	4601	6103	6406	6710	3800	6735		<a href="#">F84G00A</a>
02/27/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			2102	4601	3800	3403						<a href="#">JV8O0NV</a>
02/28/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			2102	3703	4601	3800	3704					<a href="#">KLJUW1C</a>
03/02/18	FA-18D	164653	Aircraft			2102	4601								<a href="#">HZ86GJW</a>
03/07/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			2402	3705	6703	6407	6315					<a href="#">GCNEAXW</a>
03/09/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft												<a href="#">FC7S07N</a>
03/12/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			2102	6730								<a href="#">D5MG4VI</a>
03/13/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			3701	3702								<a href="#">U6TDGEZ</a>
03/19/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			2102	3800	6111							<a href="#">8KWSJVY</a>
03/20/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft												<a href="#">J1XUXVM</a>
03/23/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">XDBV0SN</a>
03/23/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			3202	3800								<a href="#">ZX5L8VH</a>
03/23/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">QEJ5SBU</a>
03/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2503	3800								<a href="#">F04H1IF</a>
03/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2102	2201	3800							<a href="#">IHPZUSA</a>
03/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2102	3800								<a href="#">DOP8TEN</a>
03/25/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">LXZMYEE</a>
03/27/18	FA-18D	165529	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">4PX4IHW</a>
03/28/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			3203	3302								<a href="#">5MYM9HZ</a>
03/29/18	FA-18D	164953	Aircraft			3702	6735								<a href="#">BVLQA35</a>
04/11/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			2102	6103								<a href="#">IPK029K</a>
04/13/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">8EH5ZHI</a>
04/16/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			6404	3405	3404							<a href="#">IBKL67U</a>
04/17/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2402	3405	6103							<a href="#">JEW3JEU</a>
04/18/18	FA-18D	165528	Aircraft			3405	3503	3404							<a href="#">6E27ZRA</a>
04/25/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft												<a href="#">79Z24JO</a>

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Date Range Totals				Hours										
	TMS	Device	Type	TPT	FPT	ACMDR	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG	SL	DL
05/20/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4		0.8						
05/29/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0							
06/04/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	0.5	0.5	0.5		0.5			0.5			
06/07/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.5						1.3	
06/11/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7							
06/12/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5				1.0			
06/13/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft	0.9	0.9	0.9		0.5						
06/15/18	FA-18C	164230	Aircraft	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.5						1.5	
06/15/18	FA-18C	164230	Aircraft	1.4	1.4	1.4	0.5						1.4	
06/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft	0.4	0.4	0.4								
06/25/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1					1.1			
06/25/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.0	1.0	1.0					1.0			
06/29/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.0				1.3		1.3	
07/02/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.5				1.1		1.1	
07/11/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3		1.3	1.3		1.3	1.3	
07/12/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2		1.2	1.2				
07/14/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft	1.1	1.1	1.1								
07/23/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3							
07/24/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8							
08/07/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.2							
08/10/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft	1.2	1.2	1.2								
08/13/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft	2.0	2.0	2.0	0.2							
08/14/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.0							

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Date Range Totals					Hours		Landings						App		
	TMS	Device	Type	DLUI	XCNTY	6	F	G	7	P	1	W	1	2	3
05/20/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft			1									
05/29/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft			1							2		
06/04/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
06/07/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft			1								1	
06/11/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1							1		
06/12/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft			1									
06/13/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			1									
06/15/18	FA-18C	164230	Aircraft			1							1		
06/15/18	FA-18C	164230	Aircraft			1								1	
06/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			1									
06/25/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
06/25/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1									
06/29/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			1						1		2	
07/02/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			1									
07/11/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft				1							1	
07/12/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft				1							1	
07/14/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			1									
07/23/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft			1							2	2	
07/24/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft			1								1	
08/07/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft			1									
08/10/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft			1									
08/13/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft			1								1	
08/14/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft			1								1	

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Date Range Totals			App		T&R										
	TMS	Device	Type	A	B	T&R 1	T&R 2	T&R 3	T&R 4	T&R 5	T&R 6	T&R 7	T&R 8	T&R 9	NAVFLIR
05/20/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft		1	2102	3800								<a href="#">FMU614U</a>
05/29/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft			3800	6111	2102							<a href="#">LK772XR</a>
06/04/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft	1		2102									<a href="#">M412BHW</a>
06/07/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft			2102	3104								<a href="#">7CLPBXQ</a>
06/11/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft												<a href="#">ZX49E9H</a>
06/12/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft			2102	2503								<a href="#">6PHPW0X</a>
06/13/18	FA-18D	165416	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">XQZY7Q8</a>
06/15/18	FA-18C	164230	Aircraft			3104	2306	6735	2309						<a href="#">7T6ZIL0</a>
06/15/18	FA-18C	164230	Aircraft			3103	2303	2304	2306	6735					<a href="#">ISIT0F9</a>
06/24/18	FA-18D	164674	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">V0C8PPC</a>
06/25/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">BNK5RKV</a>
06/25/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">OU2RFE5</a>
06/29/18	FA-18D	165531	Aircraft			2502									<a href="#">JZK7CR7</a>
07/02/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			2502									<a href="#">MEQDH17</a>
07/11/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			2402									<a href="#">PMIJH66</a>
07/12/18	FA-18D	164662	Aircraft			3106	6735								<a href="#">3323N9Q</a>
07/14/18	FA-18D	165685	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">ELC9WF0</a>
07/23/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft			2102	6735								<a href="#">W7IS322</a>
07/24/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft			2102	6735								<a href="#">ZH8DGQS</a>
08/07/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">XVOUTFE</a>
08/10/18	FA-18C	165230	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">NQJRUAf</a>
08/13/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">1U1MF4Y</a>
08/14/18	FA-18D	164955	Aircraft			2102									<a href="#">L67NNRG</a>

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Career Totals		Hours													
	TMS	TPT	FPT	CPT	ACMDR	SCT	ACT	SIM	NIGHT	FWNVG	JHMCS	JHNVG	SL	DL	DLUI
Totals	All	893.1	859.4	33.7	626.6	28.7	199.5	71.7	161.9	78.9	276.3	7.7	130.0	1.2	11.6
	AH-1W	7.8	2.4	5.4											
	F-35B	22.2	22.2		22.2		5.4	4.0							
	FA-18C	79.3	79.3		79.3		16.4	14.4	21.8		2.2		5.4		
	FA-18D	544.2	543.5	0.7	517.5		170.9	23.2	102.6	78.9	274.1	7.7	124.6	1.2	11.6
	FA-18F	1.5	1.5		1.5		0.3								
	T-34C	84.3	67.9	16.4	6.1		0.2	16.4	12.6						
	T-45	153.8	142.6	11.2		28.7	6.3	13.7	24.9						

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Career Totals		Hours	Landings										Approaches		
	TMS	XCNTRY	6	8	9	0	F	G	7	P	1	W	1	2	3
Totals	All	61.0	279	9	5	2	65	1	2	2	1	1	56	92	1
	AH-1W														
	F-35B		11	9	5	2							5	8	
	FA-18C		9										3	2	
	FA-18D	61.0	259				65	1	2	2	1	1	48	82	1
	FA-18F														
	T-34C														
	T-45														

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Career Totals		Approaches	
	TMS	A	B
Totals	All	13	22
	AH-1W		
	F-35B	4	3
	FA-18C		2
	FA-18D	9	17
	FA-18F		
	T-34C		
	T-45		

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**Event Proficiency Audit Report for [REDACTED] as of 04/01/2019 1243 UTC+09:00**

Code	Method	Proficient	Expires	Environment	Parent	Parent Method
2201	Chain Updated	05/29/18	05/29/19	Day	6111	Logged
2201	Mirrored	03/24/18	03/25/19	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	03/19/18	03/20/19	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	02/21/18	02/21/19	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	02/08/18	02/09/19	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	01/31/18	02/01/19	Day	6109	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	01/31/18	02/01/19	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	10/17/17	10/18/18	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	10/17/17	10/18/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	10/17/17	10/18/18	Day	6109	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	09/19/17	09/20/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	09/19/17	09/20/18	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	06/20/17	06/21/18	LLL	2202	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	06/16/17	06/17/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Mirrored	06/15/17	06/16/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Mirrored	06/13/17	06/14/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Mirrored	06/08/17	06/09/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	05/19/17	05/20/18	Day	6109	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	05/19/17	05/20/18	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	05/19/17	05/20/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Mirrored	04/19/17	04/20/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Mirrored	04/19/17	04/20/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	04/04/17	04/05/18	HLL	2202	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	02/23/17	02/24/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Mirrored	02/22/17	02/23/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Mirrored	02/17/17	02/18/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Mirrored	02/16/17	02/17/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	02/11/17	02/11/18	Day	6109	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	02/11/17	02/11/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	02/11/17	02/11/18	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	01/31/17	02/01/18	Day	6109	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	01/31/17	02/01/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	01/31/17	02/01/18	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	01/25/17	01/26/18	HLL	2202	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	01/12/17	01/13/18	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	09/29/16	09/30/17	LLL	2202	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	09/21/16	09/22/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	09/21/16	09/22/17	Day	2201	Logged

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Code	Method	Proficient	Expires	Environment	Parent	Parent Method
2201	Mirrored	09/17/16	09/18/17	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	09/17/16	09/18/17	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	09/17/16	09/18/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	09/14/16	09/15/17	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	09/14/16	09/15/17	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	09/13/16	09/14/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	09/06/16	09/07/17	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	09/06/16	09/07/17	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	08/01/16	08/02/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	08/01/16	08/02/17	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	06/14/16	06/15/17	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Mirrored	06/11/16	06/11/17	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Mirrored	06/09/16	06/09/17	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Mirrored	05/26/16	05/27/17	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	05/26/16	05/27/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	05/26/16	05/27/17	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	05/19/16	05/20/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	05/19/16	05/20/17	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	05/19/16	05/20/17	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Mirrored	04/30/16	04/30/17	Day	2201	Baselined
2201	Chain Updated	04/30/16	04/30/17	HLL	2202	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	03/28/16	03/29/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	03/28/16	03/29/17	Day	6111	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	03/28/16	03/29/17	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Mirrored	03/04/16	03/05/17	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	02/22/16	02/21/17	HLL	2202	Mirrored
2201	Chain Updated	02/21/16	02/20/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	02/11/16	02/11/17	Day	2201	Logged
2201	Chain Updated	02/11/16	02/11/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2201	Mirrored	01/12/16	01/11/17	Day	2201	Baselined
2202	Chain Updated	05/29/18	05/29/19	Day	6111	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	03/19/18	03/20/19	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	02/21/18	02/21/19	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	02/08/18	02/09/19	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	01/31/18	02/01/19	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	01/31/18	02/01/19	Day	6109	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	10/17/17	10/18/18	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	10/17/17	10/18/18	Day	6109	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	09/19/17	09/20/18	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Mirrored	06/20/17	06/21/18	LLL	2202	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	05/19/17	05/20/18	Day	6109	Mirrored

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Code	Method	Proficient	Expires	Environment	Parent	Parent Method
2202	Chain Updated	05/19/17	05/20/18	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Mirrored	04/04/17	04/05/18	HLL	2202	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	02/11/17	02/11/18	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	02/11/17	02/11/18	Day	6109	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	01/31/17	02/01/18	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	01/31/17	02/01/18	Day	6109	Mirrored
2202	Mirrored	01/25/17	01/26/18	HLL	2202	Logged
2202	Mirrored	09/29/16	09/30/17	LLL	2202	Logged
2202	Chain Updated	09/21/16	09/22/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	09/17/16	09/18/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	09/17/16	09/18/17	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	09/14/16	09/15/17	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	09/13/16	09/14/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	09/06/16	09/07/17	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	08/01/16	08/02/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	08/01/16	08/02/17	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	05/26/16	05/27/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	05/26/16	05/27/17	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	05/19/16	05/20/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	05/19/16	05/20/17	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Mirrored	04/30/16	04/30/17	HLL	2202	Baselined
2202	Chain Updated	03/28/16	03/29/17	Day	6109	Mirrored
2202	Chain Updated	03/28/16	03/29/17	Day	6111	Mirrored
2202	Mirrored	02/22/16	02/21/17	HLL	2202	Baselined

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AAR BRIEFING CARD					
<b>TRACK INFORMATION</b>					
TRACK NAME:	TIGER-1	TRACK DATE:	28-Apr-16		
ARCT:	1830/1945	RV TYPE:	ALPHA		
NO. OF TANKERS:	1	RV ALT:	A090/F180		
SPARE:	N/A	JOINUP ALT:	A100/F180		
SIMULTANEOUS:	N/A	AR ALT:	A100/F180		
LIGHTING:	PER ATP C	AIRSPD:	220I		
ALT SET:	Local	FUEL OFF:	14K		
LIGHT SIGNALS:	STANDARD	ENDAR:	2015		
<b>TANKER / RECEIVER INFORMATION</b>					
	ELEMENT 1	ELEMENT 2	SPARE		
TANKER C/S:	SUMO 04				
TANKER TACAN:	105Y				
RCVR C/S (1):	PROFANE 61		<b>Training Requested</b>  NONE		
RCVR C/S (2):	PROFANE 62				
RCVR C/S (3):					
RCVR C/S (4):					
RCVR TACAN:	42Y				
RCVR MODE 1:					
RCVR MODE 3:					
FUEL RQD EA:	12K Each				
FUEL RQD TOT:	24K				
RCVR TCN SEP:	1 NM				
<b>COMMUNICATIONS / PRESETS (* Denotes Secure)</b>					
PRIMARY:	290.8	TERTIARY:	281.9		
SECONDARY:	136.15	EMCON:	ONE		
<b>TRACK LOCATION INFORMATION</b>					
ID	ACP	HDG	DIS	MGRS / LAT LON	ELEV
ARCP				N2657 E12921	
ARTP		040	35	N2628 E12859	
<b>ABORT / DIVERT POINT INFO</b>					
AP	RJOI				
DIV	RODN				
ARCT: 1830/1915					
RCVR POC: [REDACTED]					
TANKER POC: [REDACTED]					
PAO Marines will be on board to conduct photo shoot of VMGR-152 and VMFA-242 for Sakura theatre national anthem and higher HQ demands.  Left Hand Turns from ARTP outbound heading 040 Sumo 04 will climb to F180 after Profane departs from first AR					

The redactions on this page were made in accordance with exemption (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of the Freedom of Information Act.




# LLPC Kadena AB

April 27<sup>th</sup> – 30<sup>th</sup> 2016



## Lite Level Planning Calendar

Unclassified




Enclosure 70

Lat/Lon: **26-21N 127-46E**

Time Offset: **+0900**

- Sun Above Horizon
- Moon Below Horizon
- Low Moonlight Level ( < 0.0022 lux)
- High Moonlight Level ( >= 0.0022 lux)
- Nautical Twilight
- Civil Twilight





**160428 2024 (Subject: Flash Report) - Flash Report E-mail to MajGen Sanborn**

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2016 8:24 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Subject: Fw: Flash Report

General

Please see below. I spoke with [REDACTED] and have thoughts on what occurred. Will see you before you depart and discuss then.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2016 22:47  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Flash Report

Sir,

This is initial reporting and I won't know all the details until the morning. Here is what I know now:

Tonight's CAS event in oki involved SUMO tankers that we used for gas. During a refueling at night, as the last (2nd) F-18 backed out, post refueling, the tanker entered a right turn as the hornet went left. When the F-18 was in reform he noticed that the refueling hose was wrapped around the right wing at the LAU-7.

The F-18s went back to Kadena, with the hose wrapped around the wing at the LAU-7. The incident was a night goggle sortie and this happened in the Tiger MOA (140 miles away from RODN). The F-18s landed in RODN uneventfully and post flight inspection didn't indicate damage beyond black scuff marks from the hose. No physical damage was evident.

A more detailed inspection will be conducted in daylight. A FLASH report is currently being written.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
VMFA(AW)-242

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



1st MAW IRS Staff MWHS-1 MAG-12 MACG-12 MAG-24 MAG-36 1st MAW Home

## View-Update

### 1st MAW CCIRs and Notification Events

### III MEF CCIRs and Notification Events

Note: When clicking the **SUBMIT** button, please wait for the confirmation page to display.

If you do not see this, please try clicking the **SUBMIT** button again.

If you have any questions, please contact the IMO at:

IMO Email: [REDACTED]

IMO Phone: DSN [REDACTED]

Wing Duty Officer Phone: DSN [REDACTED] or Japan Cell Phone [REDACTED]

Wing Duty Officer Email: [REDACTED]

General Information	
Group *	MAG-12
Squadron *	VMFA(AW)-242
Type *	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Aviation <input type="radio"/> Ground
Category *	In-Flight Emergency Other
Incident Date *	04/28/2016 <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown
Incident Time *	2015 <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <small>(see: 2359)</small>
Incident Location *	Other (not listed) Tiger Airspace
Aircraft TMS *	F/A-18D
BUNO *	164653
Flight Mission *	1A7 - TRNG SYL/EXC ATCK
Flight Origin *	MCAS Iwakuni
Current A/C Location *	Kadena AB
Aviation Mishap?	None
Severity *	MEDIUM
Duty Status *	On-Duty
Injuries?	NO
Narrative & Description of Incident *	This is an Aviation, Non-Injury, Non-Alcohol related incident. While conducting a night Air-to-Air refueling mission in the Tiger airspace, the F/A-18 aircrew heard a loud bang and noticed that the refueling hose was wrapped around their wing tip and no longer attached to the tanker. The aircrew successfully diverted into Kadena Air Base. The incident and the divert were conducted over water. This report has been reviewed by [REDACTED], VMFA(AW)-242 CO.

**160428 Kadena [REDACTED] F/A-18 Damage (FWAR Incident)**  
**Source - Maj Robert S. Kemper, KC-130 Pilot in Command**





**160428 Kadena [REDACTED] F/A-18 Damage (FWAR Incident)**  
**Source - Maj Robert S. Kemper, KC-130 Pilot in Command**



**160429 Kadena [REDACTED] F/A-18 Damage (FWAR Incident)**  
**Source - Maj Robert S. Kemper, KC-130 Pilot in Command**





**160429 Kadena [REDACTED] F/A-18 Damage (FWAR Incident)**  
**Source - Maj Robert S. Kemper, KC-130 Pilot in Command**





**160429 Kadena [REDACTED] F/A-18 Damage (FWAR Incident)**  
**Source - Maj Robert S. Kemper, KC-130 Pilot in Command**



**190313 E-mail (Subject: information about April 2016) - Determination Intro**

- 1 - 160504 1654 Initial Cost Break-Down
- 2 - 160506 1231 Incident Cost Determination
- 3 - 160511 1259 Incident Cost Determination
- 4 - 160601 0107 Mishap Upgrade

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2019 12:50 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: FW: information about April 2016

Sir,

Good afternoon! I've reached out to the Aide (CG and the Aide are currently in Hawaii) for assistance with the CG points of contact.

Also, below and attached are additional e-mail traffic received by [REDACTED] regarding the 2016 mishap. Please let me know if there is anything else that you need from me. Semper fidelis!

Very respectfully,

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Information contained within this document or its attachments may contain personnel information, disclosure of which is generally prohibited by the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a). Protected information included in this document or its attachments are in accordance with section (b)1 of the Act which permits disclosure to individuals within the Department of Defense (DoD) with an official need to know. Release of such protected information outside of the DoD is prohibited.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2019 8:25 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: FW: information about April 2016

More info for the 2016 mishap investigation

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2019 8:24 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: FW: information about April 2016

Judge,

This stuff keeps trickling in. Swing by when able. Forward as appropriate.  
S/F,

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2019 1:54 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: information about April 2016

Sir,

Attached as requested. If you can't open the emails, let me know and I'll forward them individually. I took over as VMGR-152 XO on 10 May 2016 so I was included in some of the email traffic concerning the mishap classification of the 2016 152/242 midair. I think they are relevant given that you are looking at command climate at the time. When you put these together it seems like there was more concern with crossing into a Class C than the bigger picture of a Class A near miss (nickel and dime to keep the classification low). You can see the names, dates, and what was said/implied etc.

I came across these emails when I was looking for the pictures from the 2016 midair following the Class A you are investigating. I hadn't remembered that I had them, but I don't delete anything. There were pics of the F/A-18 on the ground with the refueling hose embedded in the leading edge of the wing and dented fuselage from the coupling bouncing around while flying for 30 minutes to Kadena. There was 10-20 feet of hose if I remember right. I probably received the pics via text. It's unbelievable that this was only a Class C. I'll forward the pics if I can find them. I have others looking as well.

[REDACTED]

In our organization, unfortunately real climate/culture change across the enterprise doesn't happen unless the bottom drops out. The MC is ready for a culture shift as was evident from the Culture OPT I was just part of.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Respectfully,

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Monday, March 11, 2019 8:13 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: information about April 2016

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] mentioned you may have e-mail traffic about the 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 mishap. If so please forward them to me for use in my investigation.  
Thanks,

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**160504 1654 E-mail (Subject: Aileron on 00) - Initial Cost Breakdown**

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 4:54 PM

To: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Aileron on 00

[REDACTED],

Bottom line, \$16.7k

Here is the breakdown on our costs:

Non-Metallic Hose- 4,741.46

O-Ring- .55

O-Ring- .66

Pipe Hangar- 4.66

Fitting Assembly- 1,633.92

Compression Helical Spring- 1,953.12

Coupling Adapter- 527.30

Non-Electrical Wire- 5.23

Ground Clamp Coupling- 543.51

Seat-Ejecting Spring- 770.86

Aerial Pressure Refueling Nozzle- 6,501-Net Cost as a repairable (Previously 18,577 for a brand new one)

Total= 16,682.27

Let me know if you need anything else, Sir.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 4:00 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: FW: Aileron on 00

Please assist in the below RFI. Thanks.

S/F,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 3:56 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Fw: Aileron on 00

[REDACTED]

Need to find out the cost of the basket for the hose that was damaged by the 242 jet. As you can see below, we are less than \$1K from a Class D.

SF

[REDACTED]

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

----- Original Message -----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, May 4, 2016 14:23  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Fw: Aileron on 00

Sir,  
Update from AMO.

Just under \$20k. I will need to ask about the basket.

VR

[REDACTED]

----- Original Message -----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 02:17 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: Aileron on 00

Sir,



This is where we as logistics/maintenance guys clash with DOSS. The OPNAV 3750 is used by them to find cost associated with damaged parts in Mishaps. [REDACTED] is not wrong because he is using 15% of the full cost. My argument to that is the Bats have turn-ins and they were BCM'd. We are paying only the repair cost for these parts since turn-ins were provided just as if they were turning them in for regular maint. The cost that M-12 will pay for these parts are:

- (1) Aileron- 74A170006-1002 - \$108,175
- (1) Aileron Shroud - 74A170103-1014 - \$21,653

15% of that will be:

- (1) Aileron- 74A170006-1002 - \$16,226.25
- (1) Aileron Shroud - 74A170103-1014 - \$3247.95

Total Cost: \$19,474.20

VR  
-AMO

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 1:18 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Fw: Aileron on 00

AMO,  
Please provide some feed back, is this as low as we can get this?  
SF  
CO

----- Original Message -----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 01:01 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Fw: Aileron on 00

[REDACTED]  
Hey man, take a look at this. Can that number be under Class D threshold?  
VR,

[REDACTED]  
Commanding Officer  
VMFA(AW)-242

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
----- Original Message -----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 11:33 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: Aileron on 00

Sir,

Below is the associate cost of the two components that were changed and BCM'd by MALS.

(1) Aileron- 74A170006-1002 - \$139,140  
(1) Aileron Shroud - 74A170103-1014 - \$27,851

Per OPNAVINST 3750.6S, Para. 316.a.2 we are able to utilize 15% of this cost when we have a turn in available (which we do) and the and planning and estimate information is not available. With that said below is the associated cost for each item.

(1) Aileron- 74A170006-1002 - \$20,870  
(1) Aileron Shroud - 74A170103-1014 - \$4177.65  
(9.9) Man hours were spent on the task with a \$24 per man-hour for labor costs. - \$237.60

Total Cost: \$25,285.25

Please let me know if you need anything else.

r/

[REDACTED]  
-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 9:40 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Aileron on 00

Gents,

I need an email from ya regarding the cost, after calculation of having the turn in, for the parts damaged.

Give me a list and price AFTER the turn in calculations.

Thanks.

VR,

[REDACTED]  
Commanding Officer  
VMFA(AW)-242

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**160505 1247 E-mail (Pictures of F/A-18 Damage) - VMFA(AW)-242 FWAR Incident**

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, May 5, 2016 12:47 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Pictures of F/A-18 Damage

Sir,  
Per your request:



**160505 1247 E-mail (Pictures of F/A-18 Damage) - VMFA(AW)-242 FWAR Incident**





**160505 1247 E-mail (Pictures of F/A-18 Damage) - VMFA(AW)-242 FWAR Incident**





**160506 0306 242 Aileron Aircraft - Sanborn**

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, May 6, 2016 3:06 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: 242 Aileron aircraft

General -

We have the final costing for the 242 / 152 refueling damage. After turn-ins and using the 15% rule, we trip the Class D threshold by just under \$2K --- total = \$21,976.54. Breakdown for each is below:

-----  
(1) Aileron- 74A170006-1002 - \$108,175  
(1) Aileron Shroud - 74A170103-1014 - \$21,653

15% of that will be:

(1) Aileron- 74A170006-1002 - \$16,226.25  
(1) Aileron Shroud - 74A170103-1014 - \$3247.95

Total Cost: \$19,474.20  
-----

Non-Metallic Hose- 4,741.46  
O-Ring- .55  
O-Ring- .66  
Pipe Hangar- 4.66  
Fitting Assembly- 1,633.92  
Compression Helical Spring- 1,953.12  
Coupling Adapter- 527.30  
Non-Electrical Wire- 5.23  
Ground Clamp Coupling- 543.51  
Seat-Ejecting Spring- 770.86  
Aerial Pressure Refueling Nozzle- 6,501-Net Cost as a repairable (Previously 18,577 for a brand new one)

Total= 16,682.27

15% of that will be -- \$2,502.34

OVERALL TOTAL = \$21,976.54  
-----

We are proceeding with the reporting requirements for the Class D which is less intensive than A - C.  
Per OPNAVINST 3710.6S :

"Class D mishap reports are required but require less information than a class A, B, or C report under

Enclosure 79

relaxed WAMHRS validation rules. Also, see paragraph 208 for reduced investigator requirements for class D mishap investigations."

"Appointment of AMBs. ....Class D mishaps and some minor injury class C mishaps do not require an AMB. ....This reduced board is at the discretion of the reporting custodian or appointing authority. All class D mishaps may be investigated, as determined by the reporting custodian or appointing authority, by one commissioned officer or by on Civil Service employee in an aviation safety billet."

- This is required to be done by the senior custodian who is [REDACTED]. His ASO will conduct the investigation.

There is no MDR required so we are not behind any timelines. The next step is to have the SIR completed within 30 days.

Per our discussion, VMFA 242 is in the process of completing the HFB for all aircrew in that flight. It will be completed today.

WRT the midair discussion, 3710.6S defines a midair as follows:

"Midair Collision (MIDAIR). Collision between aircraft or UAV when intent for flight exists. Flight, UAV. Includes: Mishaps resulting from collision between aircraft or UAV when intent for flight exists. Includes inadvertent contact during formation takeoffs, and air-refueling operations."

This can be sea-lawyered in many different directions. My interpretation of this is the inadvertent contact between the aircraft themselves and not the hose. While I do understand this was different in that the planes were in the process of separating, but if we include this incident under the definition of midair, then we risk inserting a lot of confusion for all aerial refueling operations as there is almost always inadvertent contact with the hose.

Standing by for any questions and/or thoughts.

VR,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**160506 1231 E-mail (Subject: Class D SIR) - Incident Cost and Mishap Determination**

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, May 06, 2016 12:31 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: FW: Class D SIR

[REDACTED]

Here is the email I was referencing. I misspoke WRT MDR vs SIR, I had it backwards. I couldn't get in touch with the MAG XO so I will try again later.

S/F

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, May 06, 2016 12:01 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Class D SIR

Gents,

Just tried calling both CO's but trying to level bubbles here quickly. According to [REDACTED], the total cost we are at right now is going to trip the Class D threshold. According to the 3750, technically 152 will be responsible for doing the SIR since [REDACTED] is the senior man regarding the two squadrons involved. That's what our DOSS briefed [REDACTED] and that is what he briefed the CG. The good news is that there is no MDR required for a Class D, one person can knock it out, and the SIR is due 30 days after the incident. Any questions please give me or the boss a call. Thanks gents.

S/F,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

## 160511 0723 RFI Answers - Sanborn

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2016 7:23 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Fw: RFI Answers

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2016 07:59  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RFI Answers

Sir,  
Here the answers from yesterday's questions pending 242's input. Sorry to send this in a separate email, but I'm running down to the 542 brief now. [REDACTED] are tracking to have you the additional info by 0900.

RFIs IRT Parts ordering:

-Was the aileron ordered for the broken jet on the shelves/available locally?  
No, Both parts were cannibalized from their phase aircraft.

Was it new?  
N/A, both replacement parts are shipping from the states.

Where is it now?  
Document number 621G027 is awaiting shipment from Travis AFB under pallet # SUUC4A / manifest # TBC1U810A129/ LKL YOKOTA AB . Document number 621G028 shipped from Jacksonville to Travis AFB VIA Estes express lines/tracking # M-HEJFJF00104284215.

-When we order an aileron for an aircraft, it isn't ordered as new correct?  
They just order an aileron and they get what the system gives them.

-Can you explain the process of transferring an aileron off a CAN JET to the down aircraft?  
See attached CANN MAF's. They originally ordered it against the down aircraft (00). Once they knew that the local supply system could not fill the requisition, they initiated a cannibalization Work Order through the OOMA and the requisitions were automatically transferred to the aircraft that the RFI component was removed from (07).

Regarding the suspicions there should be none. The appropriate action was taken WRT ordering and the subsequent cannibalization of the parts (WO's attached). This is a standard practice in the day to day aircraft maintenance process when parts are not readily available in the local supply system. The parts were obviously cannibalized to get the aircraft in a flyable status to return to MCAS Iwakuni.

Mishap reporting requirements:

As a reminder, Class D threshold is \$20K, Class C threshold is \$50K.

Phone Report within 60 min to COMNAVSAFECEN for Class A MISHAP (Reporting Custodian, A/C Type/Model/Series, BUENO, Mishap Location, Brief Narrative, Damage, Injuries and Fatalities, POCs)

WAMHRS IN (Web Enabled Aviation Mishap Reporting System Initial Notification aka WESS) within 4 hours of the mishap for all class A and class B mishaps. Submit class C INs within 24 hours of the mishap. Class D INs may be submitted but are not required.

The first updated MDR adds additional information to the IN. If an IN is correct, no updated MDR is required and the next required report is the HAZREP or SIR. Subsequent updated MDRs update or correct data in the IN or previous MDRs. MDRs help inform the endorsing chain of the progress of the investigation. Submit updated MDRs when additional information is available.

SIR for all mishaps are due 30 days after the incident (can be extended by request, the 242 incident was April 28, SIR is due 28 May or we need an extension).

V/R,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



**160511 1259 E-mail (Subject: CLASS D: \$48,364) - Incident Cost Determination**

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2016 12:59 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Fw: CLASS D: \$48,364

Gents,

FYSA

S/F

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

----- Original Message -----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2016 12:14 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
Subject: Re: CLASS D: \$48,364

Copy all - thanks for the work.

SF

[REDACTED]

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

Original Message

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2016 11:24  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
Subject: CLASS D: \$48,364

Sir

I have everyone in the room and we just went over the numbers, all the references and parts. This is our unified initial assessment. [REDACTED] wants to push it up to the Naval Safety Center for review.

The following apply the 15% rule:

Aileron: \$139,140 (15% = \$20,871)

Shroud: \$27,851 (15% = \$4,177)

Nozzle: \$18,351 (15% = \$2,752)

9X fins: \$1,810 (15% = \$271)

=====

Total: \$187,152 (15% = \$28,072)

The following DO NOT use the 15% rule because we have their known costs:

Basket: \$9,391

Hose: \$10,181

Labor: \$720

=====

Total: \$20,292

GRAND TOTAL: \$48,364 (\$28,072 + \$20,292)

VR,

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**160601 0107 E-mail (Subject: VMFA(AW)-242 Mishap Upgrade) - Mishap Upgrade**

-----Original Message-----

Sent: Wednesday, June 01, 2016 1:07 AM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: VMFA(AW)-242 Mishap Upgrade

Sir,

Word has come down that we cannot use the 15% rule and should proceed with the assumption of full replacement cost for the aileron and shroud. This costing data wil push us into Class C territory requiring that an AMB be formed. The primary AMB members are as follows:

Senior Member: [REDACTED]

Aviation Safety: [REDACTED]

Flight Surgeon: [REDACTED]

Operations: [REDACTED]

Maintenance: [REDACTED]

My plan is to have [REDACTED] conduct turnover with [REDACTED] once he gets back from Alaska after which we'll on convene the AMB. We'll most likely have to grab another Operations rep as [REDACTED] is scheduled to go to AATTC next week. We looked at the possibility of kicking this back to 242 as [REDACTED] is senior to you but the consensus was it is the senior commander at the time of the mishap that determines who is responsible for the investigation. Do you have any additional guidance?

S/F, [REDACTED]

## 160601 2127 VMGR-152 Safety Center Email

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, June 01, 2016 9:27 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Safety Center Email

Sir,

Below is the text I was planning on sending to the Safety Center:

\*\*\*

As I'm sure you're aware it was recently determined that the aerial refueling midair was a Class C mishap requiring that an AMB be convened. In the days that followed the incident adjacent and higher units exercised undue influence that resulted in VMGR-152 going against our better judgement to initially estimate costs high and lower them once the actual costing data became available. Because of this influence we maintained that the incident was a Class D and did not require an AMB. My question to you is that in light that this mishap was determined to be a Class C only a few days ago and we are already so late in convening the AMB would it not make sense that the current senior command now be responsible and have a vested interest in taking over the Class C investigation and convening the AMB themselves? I appreciate your guidance in this matter.

\*\*\*

[REDACTED]

**160609 1305 E-mail (Subject: AMB) - AMB Composition Recommendation**

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, June 09, 2016 1:05 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: FW: AMB

FYSA.  
S/F,  
[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, June 09, 2016 12:24 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: AMB

Gents,

Sorry to leave you hanging on the preferred AMB COA. I've had input from the NSC, MARFORPAC, and MAW to consider at this point. Just wanted to let you know what my recommendation is going to be to the Command deck here: A joint composition AMB, with VMFA(AW)-242 doing the Initial Notification for the Class C, and VMGR-152 providing 2 members to the Board. The consensus from Higher echelons, is that there is little concern over who we determine to do it (especially for a lower category Class C), but just that it gets done. Regardless of what squadron's name goes on the IN and SIR, it will be MARFORPAC that determines final accountability after looking at the investigation (i.e. who's records the Class C is reflected on...also not really that big of a deal for a Class C regardless of how it turns out). I think both of your chief concerns it more about the manning burden of staffing an AMB, so that's why I'm going to advocate for a joint AMB. It also ensures that you have a mix of subject matter expertise represented on the Board so you can properly analyze the event from both perspectives (tanking giver and receiver).

Speak now if you see any flaws in my recommendation; otherwise, this is what I'm pitching to the MAG CO. We need to get final determination and have an Initial Notification launched in WESS by tomorrow (Friday) (242, please be prepared for that if my recommendation is accepted).  
Questions?

Very respectfully,

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**160616 1352 E-mail (Subject: 242 AMB) - AMB Stand-up**

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2016 1:52 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: 242 AMB

[REDACTED]

The Bats aren't going to be back here until 10Jul16 at the earliest and I don't see them sending folks home early to meet in person down here. They would like to hold the board up in Alaska which would facilitate getting it knocked out sooner rather than later. Our primary AMB is Me and [REDACTED]. Secondary is you and [REDACTED] (although since this isn't our AMB I do not believe we are tied to these names).

With the above in mind I'd put [REDACTED] as senior member as he is a Major, has been an F-18 guy, is a C-130 guy, is going to be an ASO, and most importantly is in Alaska. I'd also grab whoever the MX rep is for the Det. All the legwork is done from when we thought it was a class delta so we're down to causal factors. [REDACTED] says it shouldn't take more than four or so days of a couple hours a day meetings. My 2 cents.

S/F,

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2016 11:03 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: 242 AMB

If I remember right, I believe the primary AMB members for those roles are you and [REDACTED] ...

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2016 10:53 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: 242 AMB

Waiting on [REDACTED] to get back to me on both.

S/F,

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2016 10:48 AM  
To: [REDACTED]



Subject: RE: 242 AMB

Ok. When does it convene and is it going to be here etc?

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2016 10:43 AM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: 242 AMB

[REDACTED]

MAG Came back and the MAG CO has determined that the AMB will be composed of the following:

Senior Member: 152

ASO: 242

Mx Rep: 152

Ops Rep: 242

Flight Surgeon: 242

Feels like an XO decision when it comes to manning. 242 is currently in Alaska and I've written [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] (242 ASO) as to when their members would be available and am awaiting a response.

S/F,

[REDACTED]

**160616 1526 E-mail (Subject: 152/242 AMB Composition Decision) - AMB Composition and Way Forward**

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2016 3:26 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Re: 152/242 AMB Composition Decision

Go with COA 1. It gets the ball rolling while they are still in place with 242.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2016 14:34  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: 152/242 AMB Composition Decision

Sir,

Group has come down and made the following decision with regard to the AMB:

Senior Member: 152  
ASO: 242  
Mx Rep: 152  
Ops Rep: 242  
Flight Surgeon: 242


242 is currently in Alaska and not scheduled to return until 10Jul16 at the earliest and would like to kick off the AMB on Monday at 0900 Alaska time.


We have a couple of options for executing the AMB and are looking for your guidance:

1. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] act as Senior Member and MX representative. We like this option the best as [REDACTED] is a Major, has been an F-18 guy, is a C-130 guy, is going to be an ASO, and most importantly is in Alaska. [REDACTED] is also in Alaska so it would be easy to get the AMB started and at the conclusion we could commercial them back.
2. We delay the meeting of the AMB until 242 has returned and ask for whatever extensions are required. [REDACTED] said that extending through August shouldn't be a problem.
3. We conduct the AMB telephonically with 152 personnel here in Iwakuni.  
Our least favorite as it would be difficult for the senior member to effectively control the board and run the meeting this way.

S/F,

[REDACTED]





**Tuesday, March 26, 2019**

### C. Weather and Environmentals

1. FLIGHT BRIEF AND AIRFIELD	V	1	2	3	4	5
Schedule Change <2 hrs Before Brief	3					
BASH Medium	1					
BASH High	3					
R&I, EP Sim, EP Quiz Not Current <sup>1,4</sup>	5					
<8000' Runway Available	3					
FOD Concern	1					
No VL Surface Available	5					
Wet Runway	3					
<b>2. WEATHER</b>						
WX < 3000 / 3	1					
WX <1000 / 3	3					
WX < 200 / 1/2 <sup>3,4</sup>	15					
Divert < 1000 / 3	5					
No Viable Divert if Required <sup>2,4</sup>	10					
Crosswind >15 Knots	1					
Crosswind 15-25 Knots	3					
Crosswind >25 Knots <sup>1,4</sup>	7					
Airfield >90F or <32F	1					
Dry Suit Required	1					
IMC In Fight Airspace	5					
IMC Enroute	3					
Icing, Light, Enroute	5					
Icing, Moderate, Enroute <sup>1</sup>	10					
Icing, Severe, Enroute <sup>2</sup>	15					
Icing in Fight Airspace (Avoidable)	3					
Icing in Fight Airspace (Unavoidable) <sup>2</sup>	15					
<b>3. AIRCRAFT STATUS</b>						
Aircraft Not Loaded Per Schedule	1					
Required Mission Systems Not Available	1					
<b>WEATHER AND ENVIRONMENTALS TOTAL</b>						

**CO/OPSO/AMO/DOSS/ODO/FLIGHT LEAD COMMENTS**

1. Automatic MEDIUM risk for event.
2. Automatic HIGH risk for event.
3. Automatic EXTREME risk for event.
4. Event requires CO approval.
5. Event requires MAW CG approval.

██████████ recall

Overview: Myself, ██████████ were fragged with a CAS sortie ISO 5<sup>th</sup> ANGLICO in the CTA overhead Camp Hansen. The event was a section lead event for ██████████ meaning that he would brief/debrief, and lead the flight. I was in ██████████ backseat, and ██████████ was the instructor. The callsigns for the event were Profane 61 and 62. The brief/takeoff/land times were: 1530/1730/2130. Sunset was around 1850, EENT was around 1945, and the moonrise wasn't until 2220, so the night portion would be LLL. The plan was to pre-mission tank with Sumo 04 in the Tiger airspace, transit to the CTA, conduct CAS, transit back to the Tiger, post-mission tank, then RTB Iwakuni. The transition from day to night, tanking, and entering and exiting multiple airspaces were all identified as potential points of friction during the planning process.

On 28 April I arrived at the squadron around 1030. Our scheduled land time was 2130, so I gave myself one hour of slide time. Around 1115 all the Junior Officers drove to the Eagle's Nest for lunch with ██████████ I got back to the squadron around 1300. Most of the pre-mission planning was accomplished the night before, so all that was left was to print out knee board cards, load AMUs, and set up a briefing space. The brief was scheduled for 1530, but we started at 1500 because we were hot-seating into the jets, and we anticipated the event preceding us would be on deck before their scheduled land time. Throughout the planning process ██████████ emphasized that this event would be 95% Admin/Tacadmin, and 5% tactics. As such, we spent about 30 min covering admin/tacadmin, and only about 25 min covering the tactical execution. During the ORM portion of the brief we identified low flight time (particularly at night), and night tanking as hazards.

We walked to the jets around 1630. Due to maintenance we took off at 1800- 30 minutes late. The transit to the Tiger airspace was uneventful. After canceling with Naha Control we got comms with Sumo. A Combat Camera Marine was onboard the C-130 to take pictures. As a result the first tanking evolution was conducted at 10,000 feet. Other than that the pre-mission tanking was standard. Upon departing, we asked Sumo to rendezvous with us in the middle of the area for the second tanking evolution, and then to drag us towards the northern border.

After leaving the tanker I donned my goggles, and we departed the Tiger for the CTA. We had to set a high Bingo for the CAS portion due to Iwakuni being almost 500 miles away, and Sumo only having 3k lbs of give per aircraft for the second tanking evolution. As a result, the CAS portion was short. We were on station for about 15 minutes, and we executed two 9-lines.


Following the last attack we proceeded back to the Tiger airspace. When we got comms with Sumo they were in the middle of the airspace at 20,000 feet. Profane 62 found Sumo on their radar, but Profane 61 was clean (no radar SA). After a short discussion we concluded that Profane 62 would take the tac lead and the callsign Profane 61, because they would be better able to facilitate the join. The plan was to pass the lead back to myself and ██████████ after we departed the tanker. Additionally we were fuel limited, so we wanted to make the process as expeditious as possible. ██████████ began directing Sumo when to turn, and we ended up about 2 miles in trail at 19,000. At this point Sumo wanted to go to covert lighting, but ██████████ requested they keep the 'Christmas lights' on until we




were pre-contact. We also requested to have Profane 61 ([REDACTED]) join on the right hose, and Profane 62 ([REDACTED]) join on the left hose- in other words, a nonstandard join. Profane 61 plugged uneventfully, and about 30 seconds later we plugged. At this point Sumo was covert lighting. Once we had good fuel flow I switched our AUX frequency to Naha Control to work our clearance, and I turned down the boom freq in PRI. For the next couple minutes I only heard bits and pieces of the comm between Sumo and Profane, but I heard the departure instructions: high and to the left. Profane 61 was satisfied first, and they went to starboard observation. About 30 seconds later Profane 62 was satisfied. We backed out, crossed under the C-130, and joined on the right hand side of Profane 61. I was looking through the goggles at this point, and I could see both Profane 61 and Sumo. Once we were to the right of Profane 61 we began to accelerate to depart. At this point I stopped scanning outside, and instead came inside the aircraft to set up the nav and comm. I wanted to make sure we had everything in order when the lead got passed back to us. I knew it would be a quick transition because we were on the northern border of the Tiger airspace. Profane 61 began a left hand turn per the departure instructions. I was still looking inside the aircraft, but I felt our jet turn to the left. At this point I thought we were in front of and above Sumo. As we were turning there was a sudden and loud whack on the canopy, followed by a substantial yaw to the right. I looked at the canopy, and then at the right wing. Through the goggles I saw a tanker hose wedged in between the leading edge flap and the LAU on the right wing. The basket was still attached to the hose. We began an immediate climb and I gained visual of Sumo below us at our right 2 o'clock. I alerted Profane 61 that we had a tanker hose and basket attached to our wing. From there we turned towards Kadena, since it was about 300 miles closer than Iwakuni.


[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] maintained the lead and took us to Kadena. We made sure not to overfly land due to a potential TFOA. The recovery went relatively smoothly, all things considered. Upon landing we called our chain of command. At this point we did not think it was a mishap. The next morning [REDACTED] and myself went to the Futenma Medical Clinic for labwork.

All of these events were recounted to the best of my ability.









## **Marine Corps, Navy and Naval Aviation Safety, Aircrew Performance and Administrative References and Definitions**

### Aviation Safety (OPNAV 3750.6S, MCO 5100.29B and OPNAV 3710.7U)

1. OPNAVINST 3750.6S (The Naval Aviation Safety Management System (SMS). “Aviation Mishap Reporting. Aircraft mishap classification is a complex process. The first reports of an aircraft mishap will be both muddled and confused. The earliest information will be limited and incomplete, and require best estimates from the reporting custodian as to the extent of damage and injury. Knowing this, the reporting system provides ample opportunity to correct initial estimates.” [Reference (c), Chapter 3, Paragraph 301.]
2. Per OPNAVINST 3750.6S (The Naval Aviation Safety Management System (SMS), “a naval aviation mishap is an unplanned event or series of events, directly involving a defined naval aircraft or UAV, that results in damage to DoD property”...“damage and injury thresholds determine how they will be reported.” [Reference (c), Chapter 3, Paragraph 305.a.]
3. OPNAVINST 3750.6S (The Naval Aviation Safety Management System (SMS)) defines Class C and Class D Mishap severity classes. “The following mishap severity classes, based on an involved defined naval aircraft or UAV, personnel injury and property damage, apply to all three subcategories of mishaps listed below. Controlling custodians, in consultation and coordination with the NAVSAFECEN, shall ensure that mishaps are properly classified and that exceptions to mishap definitions are properly used. COMNAVSAFECEN is the final authority for mishap classification and the determination of mishaps exceptions. To determine mishap costs see paragraph 316.” [Reference (c), Chapter 3, Paragraph 313]
  - a. Class A and Class B Mishaps are not germane to this incident.
  - b. “Class C Mishap. A class C mishap is one in which the total cost of damage to DoD or non-DoD property, aircraft or UAVs is \$50,000 or more, but less than \$500,000, or a nonfatal injury or illness that results in 1 or more days away from work, not including the day of the injury.” [Reference (c), Chapter 3, Paragraph 313.c.]
  - c. “Class D Mishap. A class D mishap is one in which the total cost of damage to DoD or non-DoD property, aircraft or UAVs is \$20,000 or more, but less than \$50,000; or a recordable injury (greater than first aid) or illness results not otherwise classified as a class A, B, or C mishap.” [Reference (c), Chapter 3, Paragraph 313.d.]
4. OPNAVINST 3750.6S (The Naval Aviation Safety Management System (SMS), “Midair Collision (MIDAIR). Collision between aircraft or UAV when intent for flight exists. Flight, UAV. Includes: Mishaps resulting from collision between aircraft or UAV when intent for flight exists. Includes inadvertent contact during formation takeoffs and air-refueling operations.” [Reference (c), Chapter 3, Paragraph 315.m.]
5. Per OPNAVINST 3750.6S (The Naval Aviation Safety Management System (SMS), “the AMB calculates aviation mishap costs by totaling the cost of property and aircraft or UAV damage.” [Reference (c), Chapter 3, Paragraph 316.]
  - a. “Parts, labor, repair costs and environmental damage repair are used as a methodology to determine the scope of the incident and determine when mishap thresholds are met.” “Base

these cost estimates on the price of materials and man-hours necessary to repair the damage. For assessing damage cost to aircraft, use figures provided by the fleet readiness center that has cognizance of the damaged aircraft. If depot man-hour cost estimates are not available, use \$75 per depot-level man-hour. For intermediate and organizational level repair, use \$24 per man-hour for labor costs. Report direct man-hours spent removing and replacing damaged components.” [Reference (c), Chapter 3, Paragraph 316.a.(1)]

b. “Include in the cost estimates the man-hours spent removing undamaged parts to gain access to those that are damaged.” [Reference (c), Chapter 3, Paragraph 316.a.(4)]

c. “Reporting custodians are responsible for informing the endorsement chain, via the WAMHRS MDR update feature, when changes in total cost will change mishap severity classification.” [Reference (c), Chapter 3, Paragraph 316.a.(9)]

6. OPNAVINST 3750.6S (The Naval Aviation Safety Management System (SMS)) “defines hazards and describes hazard detection and reporting.” “A hazard is any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to personnel; damage to or loss of a system, equipment or property; or damage to the environment. A near miss is an undesired event that, under slightly different circumstances, would have resulted in personal harm, property damage, or undesired loss of resources. The goal of the Naval Aviation SMS is to identify and eliminate hazards and identify near misses before they result in mishaps. While HAZREPs are by definition not privileged, and promises of confidentiality are not offered, HAZREPs shall not be used for any administratively or judicially adverse process.” [Reference (c), Chapter 5, Paragraph 501.a.]

a. One of the four purposes of a HAZREP is “to report a hazard and the remedial action taken, so others may take similar action.” [Reference (c), Chapter 5, Paragraph 501.a.(1)]

b. “Corrective Actions. HAZREPs and SIRs are the media for recommending corrective action to eliminate hazards.” [Reference (c), Chapter 5, Paragraph 502.a.]

c. “Hazard Detection Before a Mishap. Observing, identifying and analyzing hazards, near misses and incidents that fall short of mishap thresholds, conducting safety surveys, and reviewing command plans, policies, procedures and instructions will aid in detecting hazards before a mishap occurs. Proper risk management, applied in the planning stages of an operation, will identify hazards at the earliest possible opportunity. Individuals or commands with direct, first-hand knowledge of the circumstances surrounding a hazard are the most effective at detecting and reporting hazards. An essential element of an effective command safety program, risk management includes a review of operating procedures, analysis of equipment failures, etc., for hazard detection and assessment.” [Reference (c), Chapter 5, Paragraph 502.b.]

d. “Hazard Reporting. Everyone associated with naval aviation has an obligation to report hazards. It is essential that COs encourage, and command safety programs foster, hazard reporting. Once identified, the attendant risk should be assessed both for mishap probability and severity. Hazards that threaten people or organizations outside the command must be reported to higher authority.” [Reference (c), Chapter 5, Paragraph 502.b.]

e. “The following hazards shall be reported and may require details in a special data section: Human factors, near midair collision (NMAC), unintentional out of control flight, embarked landing (EMBLAND), ATC, PHYSEP, BASH, electromagnetic interference (EMI), laser strikes on naval aircraft, and FF hazards.” [Reference (c), Chapter 5, Paragraph 502.c.(3)(a)]



Aircrew Performance (CNAFINST 5420.1G, MCO 1000.6, and MCO 5100.29B)

7. Per COMNAVAIRFORINST 5420.1G, Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Board (FNAEB) Procedures, “a FNAEB shall be convened for all Class A and B flight mishaps except in those cases where the aircrew’s performance is not in question (i.e., mechanical failures). In these cases the Convening Authority shall request a waiver from the FNAEB process as outlined in paragraph 1.e. A separate board shall be convened for each aviator involved in a Class A or B flight mishap. [Reference (f), Paragraph 1.a]

a. “Field Flight Performance Board (FFPB). The FFPB is the Marine Corps equivalent to the FNAEB.” MCO 1000.6, Assignment, Classification, and Travel System Manual (ACTSMAN) “provides instruction for the implementation of Marine Corps administrative boards.” [Reference (f), Cover Letter, Paragraph 1.c. / Reference (g), Chapter 2, Section 2]

8. COMNAVAIRFORINST 5420.1G, Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Board (FNAEB) Procedures is the source document for Human Factors Councils and Boards (HFCs and HFBs).

a. COMNAVAIRFORINST 5420.1G, Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Board (FNAEB) Procedures (Reference (f)) defines Human Factors Councils/Boards and the Councils/Boards utility. “Human Factors Councils and Boards are valuable tools for the commanding officer. A Human Factors Board (HFB) should normally precede a FNAEB. However, if a situation arises, such as a mishap, where the commanding officer determines that a FNAEB is warranted, an HFB is not required prior to initiating the FNAEB. All Human Factors Council/Board results shall be maintained in strict confidentiality and shall not follow an officer from one squadron to another with the following exception: on HFB result which is included as an enclosure to a FNAEB Report of Proceedings shall remain with the report as it is forwarded through the endorsing chain of command.” [Reference (f), Paragraph 2]

b. OPNAVINST 3750.6S (The Naval Aviation Safety Management System (SMS)) further discusses the utility of Human Factors Board as one of “two methods by which” a Commanding Officer “may stay apprised of the physical condition, the psychological well-being, the attitudes, and the motivation of their aircrews.” “Human factors boards will conduct a formal review of any area of an aircrew member's performance, training, health, attitude or motivation felt by the CO to be relevant. The human factors board should include, as a minimum, the ASO, flight surgeon, and any additional officers of the CO's choosing. The human factors board should be proactive. It is to be convened early on, once a significant problem is discovered. Its goal is to identify the specific problem(s) and provide a course of action for resolution. A formal report with conclusions and recommendations should be produced and forwarded to the CO for determination of final action.” [Reference (c), Chapter 2, Paragraph 204.g.(2)]

Administrative (JAGINST 5800.7F)

9. JAGINST 5800.7F, Manual of the Judge Advocate General provides specific guidance when conducting an administrative investigation into aviation mishaps. “When an aviation mishap results in death or serious injury, extensive damage to Government property, or the possibility of a claim exists for or against the Government, an administrative investigation shall be ordered to determine the cause and responsibility for the mishap, nature and extent of any injuries, description of all damage to property, and any attendant circumstances.” [Reference (a), Appendix n.]