



OVERWATCH

*"The advancement and diffusion of knowledge is the only guardian of true liberty."
-James Madison*



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Photo By: Pfc. Aaron Bolser

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Inspector General of the Marine Corps

The Inspector General of the Marine Corps (IGMC) will promote Marine Corps combat readiness, institutional integrity, effectiveness, discipline, and credibility through impartial and independent inspections, assessments, inquiries, investigations, teaching, and training.

The Intelligence Oversight Division

To ensure the effective implementation of Marine Corps-wide oversight of Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Sensitive activities (to include USMC support to law enforcement agencies, special operations, and security matters), and Special Access Programs. To establish policy and ensure their legality, propriety and regulatory compliance with appropriate Department of Defense/ Department of the Navy guidance.

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<http://atsdio.defense.gov/>

Marine Corps Inspector General
<http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/igmc/UnitHome.aspx>

Naval Inspector General
<http://www.ig.navy.mil/>

Message from the Director, Intelligence Oversight

Happy Birthday Marines. As we celebrate the 240th anniversary of the founding of our Corps, let us reflect upon those great Marines that preceded us. Specifically, let's remember the Intelligence Marines whose hard work and dedication made our career field the respected entity that it is today. I urge you to take this opportunity to rededicate yourself to ensuring we pass our successors a healthy Marine Corps that can continue to thrive for many more centuries to come.

The feature article of this edition of *Overwatch* addresses a very serious accusation that could potentially have long-lasting effects on the Intelligence Community. A Defense Intelligence Agency analyst contended that his analytical conclusions were changed to indicate that combats operations were more effective than they appeared. While it is premature to comment on this specific instance since the investigation is on-going, it is appropriate to talk about how we can ensure the intelligence Marines in our commands are able to deliver their best informed analytical opinions—that are free from improper influence—to their consumers.



The second article discusses a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the difficulty that intelligence community entities encounter when trying to account for their contract personnel. Many of us work closely, if not directly, with contractors. They operate under very strict guidelines and rules. If there are any questions about the work of contractors in your command, Marines should contact their Contracting Officer's Technical Representative or attorney. It is crucial that contractors operate within the legal boundaries set, so that we can benefit from their great work and the viability of their contracts isn't jeopardized.

Thanks to those who attended the Marine Corps Inspector General symposium in *August*. It was a great pleasure to meet those of you who are out at the bases and stations, ensuring that Marines are conditioned to succeed. Please do not hesitate to contact us here at IGMC if we can provide any assistance.

I strongly welcome your thoughts, questions, and comments on the content of this, or any other, edition of *Overwatch*. Additionally, we would like to publish articles written by you. the reader. Please contact myself or Major Chris Doyle (Christopher.L.Doyle@usmc.mil).

Our Corps is stronger than ever. Thank you for all that you do.

Semper Fidelis,

Edwin T. Vogt

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Feature Article

Pentagon Probing Alleged Distorting of War Intelligence

By: Robert Burns, Associated Press

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon's inspector general is investigating an allegation that the military command overseeing the anti-Islamic State campaign distorted or altered intelligence assessments to exaggerate progress against the militant group, a defense official said Wednesday.

The official was not authorized to discuss the probe publicly and so spoke on condition of anonymity.

The investigation was first disclosed by The New York Times. The paper reported that the investigation began after at least one civilian Defense Intelligence Agency analyst told authorities that he had evidence that officials at U.S. Central Command were improperly reworking conclusions of assessments prepared for policy makers, including President Obama.

Details of the allegations were not available. A spokeswoman for the inspector general's office, Bridget Serchak, declined to comment.

Pentagon press secretary Peter Cook said he could not confirm the probe. The Pentagon typically does not publicly comment on the work of the inspector general's office, which is an independent arm of the Defense Department.

Cook said Defense Secretary Ash Carter "counts on independent intelligence and analysis from a variety of sources to help him make critical decisions about the nation's security."

A Pentagon spokesman, Navy Capt. Jeff Davis, said Pentagon and Central Command officials have been publicly candid about the difficulty of the war against the Islamic State. At times, however, they

have painted a rosier picture than was reflected by developments on the ground.

On May 15, for example, Brig. Gen. Thomas Weidley, who at the time was chief of staff to the military headquarters running the war, told reporters that the Islamic State was "losing and remains on the defensive." Even as he spoke, Iraqi officials were saying that IS fighters had captured the main government compound in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province. Two days later the city fell, marking a significant victory for IS and a setback for the U.S. and Iraq.

Air Force Col. Patrick Ryder, a spokesman for Central Command, said he could not discuss ongoing investigations.

"The (inspector general) has a responsibility to investigate all allegations made and we welcome and support their independent oversight," Ryder said.

Ryder said the government's numerous intelligence agencies routinely produce a wide range of "subjective assessments related to the current security environment," and that it is customary for agencies to comment on others' draft assessments.

"However, it is ultimately up to the primary agency or organization whether or not they incorporate any recommended changes or additions. Further, the multi-source nature of our assessment process purposely guards against any single report or opinion unduly influencing leaders and decision-makers," Ryder said.

Civilian Intelligence Community: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Reporting on and Planning for the Use of Contract Personnel

By: Timothy J. DiNapoli, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management, GAO

What GAO Found

Limitations in the intelligence community's (IC) inventory of contract personnel hinder the ability to determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and six components within the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury—use these personnel. The IC Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) conducts an annual inventory of core contract personnel that includes information on the number and costs of these personnel. However, GAO identified a number of limitations in the inventory that collectively limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole. For example, changes to the definition of core contract personnel limit the comparability of the information over time. In addition, the civilian IC elements used various methods to calculate the number of contract personnel and did not maintain documentation to validate the number of personnel reported for 37 percent of the records GAO reviewed. GAO also found that the civilian IC elements either under- or over-reported the amount of contract obligations by more than 10 percent for approximately one-fifth of the records GAO reviewed. Further, IC CHCO did not fully disclose the effects of such limitations when reporting contract personnel and cost information to Congress, which limits its transparency and usefulness.

The civilian IC elements used core contract personnel to perform a range of functions, such as information technology and program management, and reported in the core contract personnel inventory on the reasons for using these personnel. However, limitations in the information on the number and cost of core contract personnel preclude the information on contractor functions from being

used to determine the number of personnel and their costs associated with each function. Further, civilian IC elements reported in the inventory a number of reasons for using core contract personnel, such as the need for unique expertise, but GAO found that 40 percent of the contract records reviewed did not contain evidence to support the reasons reported.

Collectively, CIA, ODNI, and the departments responsible for developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the other six civilian IC elements have made limited progress in developing those policies, and the civilian IC elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that address contractor use. Only the Departments of Homeland Security and State have issued policies that generally address all of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy's requirements related to contracting for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. In addition, IC CHCO requires the elements to conduct strategic workforce planning but does not require the elements to determine the appropriate mix of government and contract personnel. Further, the inventory does not provide insight into the functions performed by contractors, in particular those that could inappropriately influence the government's control over its decisions. Without complete and accurate information in the inventory on the extent to which contractors are performing specific functions, the elements may be missing an opportunity to leverage the inventory as a tool for conducting strategic workforce planning and for prioritizing contracts that may require increased management attention and oversight.

Why GAO Did This Study

The IC uses core contract personnel to augment its workforce. These contractors typically work alongside government personnel and perform staff-like work. Some core contract personnel require enhanced oversight because they perform services that could significantly influence the government's decision making.

In September 2013, GAO issued a classified report that addressed (1) the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements use core contract personnel, (2)

the functions performed by these personnel and the reasons for their use, and (3) whether the elements developed policies and strategically planned for their use. GAO reviewed and assessed the reliability of the elements' core contract personnel inventory data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, including reviewing a non-generalizable sample of 287 contract records. GAO also reviewed agency acquisition policies and workforce plans and interviewed agency officials. In January 2014, GAO issued an unclassified version of the September 2013 report, GAO-14-204 . This statement is based on the information in the unclassified GAO report.

What GAO Recommends

In the January 2014 report, GAO recommended that IC CHCO take several actions to improve the inventory data's reliability, revise strategic workforce planning guidance, and develop ways to identify contracts for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. IC CHCO generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.

Marine Corps Willing To Make Sacrifices for Cyber

By: Scott Maucione
Federal News Radio

The Marine Corps is willing to make reductions in the capacity of its forces to grow its capabilities in cyber and information warfare.

“An infantry battalion may look a little bit smaller in some ways, but you may add more cyber information warfare capabilities, so that’s definitely an area that we are looking at,” said Deputy Commandant Lt. Gen. Robert Walsh during an Oct. 28 speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

The Marines have expanded the way they are operating in their concept plan, Expeditionary 21, Walsh said. They are no longer just about small landing teams; now the Marines want to be a

“middleweight” force that integrates sea power through communications between land and sea forces.

Doing that involves better cyber and command and control technologies that can be used in environments that could jam, interfere or scramble those signals.

“We have to be able to look at this future force. We know that in the information warfare area, cyber, leveraging space capabilities, ambiguous warfare, cyber] ops; that area there that you are seeing a lot of proliferation in, we know we’ve got to invest in that area,” Walsh said.

Integrate, communicate

The Marine Corps created the new position of assistant deputy commandant for information warfare in August. The position pulls together the Marine director of intelligence, director of command, control, communications, computers and intelligence and the chief of the Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command, Walsh said.

“Instead of three individual stovepipes kind of doing their own thing [this] pulls together everything from a capabilities development standpoint,” Walsh said. “It all comes back to that combat development integration, a lot of people doing good things, but how do you integrate it together.”

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the principle organization for Marine operations, has expanded from just air, sea and land to now encompass cyber and space.

Walsh said cyber and space are areas the Marine Corps is growing not only on the defensive side, but also through offensive capabilities.

Walsh said one of the struggles for the Marines is the ability to remain interoperable in cyber and command and control with itself and other services at sea.

“We’ve been on land for so long that we’ve got all our systems that work so well on land, they are not able to communicate with the shipboard command and controls. So therefore a typical Marine would rather get off the ship, get in the dirt, stand up its antennas because we can operate better that way,” Walsh said. “You go back aboard the ship that may get an upgrade or an integration every 6, 8, 10, 15 years, it’s got older technology. You want in there and go, ‘I don’t want to play in this environment.’”

Walsh said cruisers and destroyers are more up to date, but they still need to be able to communicate with ships that use older equipment.

Capacity for capability amid fiscal uncertainty

The Marine’s decision to risk capacity for capability in cyber is framed by the larger dilemma of budget uncertainty.

Walsh said in the past the military has had trouble planning for the future because it did not know what kind of funding it would receive the next year, let alone further into the future. And that isn’t counting the looming threats of sequestration cuts.

Now that Congress and the White House have reached a two-year budget deal that will raise the budget caps and temporarily fend off sequestration, Walsh said it helps, but does not solve the planning problem.

“There is goodness in it and it gives us some stability and we’ve had this before and we’ve come up with budgets for a year,” Walsh said. “It isn’t giving us that sense of here is where we are headed and here is how we can develop our long-range strategy and programs like we really need to be doing for that future force ... it’s going to solve our near-term problems. But the longer-term I think we are still looking for Congress to come together in new ways to solve these things so we can get back to more traditional program development strategy.”

Walsh’s remarks come on the heels of a new report that said the Marine Corp’s strength is at the lower end of marginal and has the potential to be described at weak within the near future. A

marginal score means modernization programs are appropriate to sustain current capability size, 40 to 59 percent of service requirements are met and equipment age is 41 to 60 percent of the expected life span.

The Heritage Foundation’s [2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength](#) rated the Marine Corps capacity as weak, however, because it operates with slightly less than 64 percent of the number of battalions required to fight two major wars at the same time.



Intelligence Photographs in the News



Galveston, Texas - Lance Cpl. Alexander Adams, intelligence specialist with Company C., 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion, 4th Marine Division, Marine Forces Reserve uses his blouse to float during his intermediate swim qualification at the Galveston Marine Corps Reserve Home Training Center, Aug. 8, 2015. All Marines with Company C. are required to complete and maintain an annual intermediate swim qualification. **Photo by Cpl. Ian Ferro**

MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, California - Marines from 1st Intelligence Battalion, 1st Marine Logistics Group present the national and Marine Corps colors during a ceremony where The Gary Sinise Foundation presented and newly built Smart home to retired Staff Sgt. Jason Ross and his family in Fallbrook, California, August 21, 2015. Ross stepped was injured by an improvised explosive device in Afghanistan in 2011 while serving as an explosive ordnance disposal technician and lost both of his legs as a result. The new home has smart technology that will significantly reduce the difficulty of everyday tasks for Ross and allow him and his family to live more comfortably. **Photo by Cpl. Carson Gramley**



Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point - U.S. Marine Corps 1st Lt. Matthew Lake, center, welcomes intelligence specialists participating in a Squadron Intelligence Training Certification Course (SITCC) at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, N.C., The SITCC is a four-week course designed for junior intelligence analysts providing in-depth aviation intelligence information to better support squadron commanders and pilots. **Photo by Pfc. Jered T. Stone**

Intelligence Oversight Division

MISSION: To ensure the effective implementation of Marine Corps-wide Oversight of Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Sensitive activities (to include USMC support to law enforcement agencies, special operations, and security matters), and special Access Programs. To establish policy and ensure their legality, propriety and regulatory compliance with appropriate Department of Defense/ Department of the Navy guidance.

Examples of sensitive activities include:

- Military support to Civil Authorities
- Lethal support/training to non-USMC agencies
- CONUS off-base training
- Covered, clandestine, undercover activities
- Intelligence collection of information on U.S. persons

SECNAVINST 5430.57G states:

"...personnel bearing USMC IG credentials marked 'Intelligence Oversight/Unlimited Special Access' are certified for access to information and spaces dealing with intelligence and sensitive activities, compartmented and special access programs, and other restricted access programs in which DON participates. When performing oversight of such programs pursuant to Executive Order, they shall be presumed to have a 'need to know' for access to information and spaces concerning them."

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT?

Intelligence Oversight ensures that intelligence personnel shall not collect, retain, or disseminate information about U.S. persons unless done in accordance with specific guidelines, proper authorization, and within only specific categories ([See References](#)).

DEFINITIONS

- INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO):** Ensures that intelligence personnel shall not collect, retain, or disseminate information about U.S. persons unless done in accordance with specific guidelines, proper authorization, and within only specific categories. References: E.O. 12333, DoD Dir 5240.01, DoD Reg 5240.1-R, SECNAVINST 3820.3E, MCO 3800.2B
- SENSITIVE ACTIVITY OVERSIGHT:** Any activity requiring special protection from disclosure which could embarrass compromise or threaten the DON. Any activity which, if not properly executed or administered, could raise issues of unlawful conduct, government ethics, or unusual danger to DON personnel or property. These activities may include support to civilian law enforcement. Reference: SECNAVINST 5000.34E
- SPECIAL ACTIVITIES OVERSIGHT:** As defined by Executive Order 12333, activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but which are not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies or media, and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support activities. Reference: SECNAVINST 5000.34E
- SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM (SAP):** Any Program imposing need-to-know or access controls beyond those normally required for Confidential, Secret or Top Secret information. Such a program includes but is not limited to a special clearance, more stringent adjudication or investigation requirements; special designation of officials authorized to determine need-to-know; or special lists of persons determined to have a need-to-know. A special access program may be a sensitive activity.
- QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES:** Any conduct that may constitute a violation of applicable law, treaty, regulation or policy.