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REORGANIZING THE MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY FOR EXCELLENCE

BLUF: The current organizational model that MCIA uses is inefficient and should be re-organized to provide more responsive and better support to our customers. It is recommended that we flatten the organization to streamline lines of command and control to be more agile, and to provide the analysts a direct line to the personnel and the tools they need to complete their mission.

Purpose

For our Ka-Bar project we were presented with the challenge of “Balancing Operations and Analysis”. After talking with Ms. Harman, the owner/author of this topic, about what she meant by this statement, we refined the topic to mean “*Reorganizing the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) for Excellence.*” The intent of this project is to suggest to the Commanding Officer of MCIA ways to better organize MCIA to meet the challenges of the 21st Century in a constrained budgetary environment.

Within this paper, our group came up with a course of action to streamline:

- 1.) Operations and Analysis by shortenings lines of command and control.
- 2.) Provide the analysts with a direct line to the personnel and the tools that they need to complete their mission.
- 3.) Make better use of our limited assets in an increasingly constrained budgetary environment.

Although these changes will be challenging and require some personnel movements/ reassignments, the benefits of these actions will ensure MCIA is organized to maximize use of its limited assets and react to customer requirements in a more cohesive and responsive manner.

Re-Organization Successful Models

In an age of increasing requirements, shrinking resources and uncertain political and economic landscapes, federal agencies are being challenged to reduce the cost of government while improving performance. Many federal agencies find themselves encumbered with structures and processes rooted in the past, aimed at the demands of earlier times. These agencies are poorly positioned to fulfill current and future missions and meet strategic goals. They need to consider replacing outmoded work processes with streamlined ones that more effectively serve the needs of customers. (GAO BPR)

As intelligence requirements are being adjusted to align with new and diverse challenges in the ever-evolving battlefield of the 21st century, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity is reaching a turning point. Can MCIA's existing mission and structure adapt quickly enough to remain flexible and effective in its support to the warfighter and supporting establishment in this new environment, as well as maintain or expand upon its traditional place in the larger Intelligence Community (IC) as a whole? From time to time, even successful corporations have to shake things up to stay ahead of the competition (Vermeluen, et al.) and when many organizations find themselves immersed in challenging times; one of the many options often examined by leadership to overcome these challenges is reorganization.

A recent example of an existing long-standing government agency restructuring to meet the demands of the emerging challenges associated with a new operating environment is the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) post-9/11 reorganization which began in December of 2001.

Since the events of September 11, 2001, the FBI has changed the way that it does business, established two new divisions for Records Management and Security, redistributed internal resources, and changed the way that it interacts with external partners. The central thrust of the reorganization plan was to build an FBI with a national terrorism response capability that is larger and more mobile, agile, and flexible than in the past. Changes included shifting of some resources from long-standing areas of focus, such as drugs, to counterterrorism and intelligence; building analytic capacity; and recruiting to address selected skill gaps (GAO FBI 2002). The results of the FBI's reorganization are less important for the purposes of this assessment than the process that the FBI used while developing its strategic reorganization plan.

During the process of plan development the FBI made the extra effort to ensure employee involvement in strategic planning and the transformation in general, which has been identified as a key practice of successful agencies as they transform, and FBI executive management seems to have recognized this. (GAO FBI 2004)

Field office managers and field staff generally reported being afforded the opportunity to provide input. For example, field management in 14 field offices visited reported that they had been afforded opportunities to provide input into the FBI's strategic planning process. In addition, 68 percent of the special agents and 24 of the 34 analysts who completed follow-up questionnaires reported that they had been afforded the opportunity to provide input to FBI management regarding FBI strategies, goals, and priorities by, among others, participating in focus groups or meetings and assisting in the development of the field offices' annual reports. Out of the field offices visited, 87 percent of the special agents and 31 of the 34 analysts who completed follow-up questionnaires indicated that FBI management had kept them informed of the FBI's progress in revising its strategic plan to reflect changed priorities. (GAO FBI 2004)

FBI management also seems to have been effective in communicating the agency's top three priorities (i.e., counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime investigations) to the staff. In addition to the awareness of management staff in FBI headquarters and field offices, nearly all of the special agents and all of the analysts who answered follow-up questionnaires indicated that FBI executive management (i.e., Director and Deputy Director level) had communicated the FBI's priorities to their field offices. Further, over 90 percent of special agents and 28 of the 34 analysts who completed follow-up questionnaires generally or strongly agreed that their field office had made progress in realigning its goals to be consistent with the FBI's transformation efforts and new priorities. (GAO FBI 2004)

Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISRE), as described in Appendix 1 to Annex B of the Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan, provides strategic guidance and represents the new paradigm for how the organization will approach intelligence, encompassing people, processes, functions and material. The Roadmap is an appendix of the Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan and provides direction for operating and sustaining MCISRE to include: building the enterprise, professionalizing the intelligence workforce, institutionalizing predictive analysis and improving process proficiency across the Enterprise. Success in setting the foundation and optimizing performance of the Enterprise requires disciplined and collaborative execution from all stakeholders in both the operating forces and the supporting establishment. MCISRE encompasses ongoing working groups and analysis to determine progress, and challenges that will demand attention. Based on an analysis of the Roadmap, gaps were revealed that required consideration. One of MCI's seven identified gaps which will be addressed in this paper is the integration of Operations and Intelligence through reorganization.

Most companies and business units are organized around a single criterion—be it function, product, geography, or market. Over time, informal networks mirror the formal structure, which is how silos or stovepipes develop. This is true with both government and private sector organizations. The problem with this is that communication and collaboration tend to become trapped in functional, product, geographic, or other stovepipes. Restructuring, or reengineering, enables the formation of new networks, making the organization as a whole more creative (Vermeluen, et al.) and broadening the aperture through which the team, branch, division, or entire organization view the challenges they face.

Business process reengineering began as a private sector technique to help organizations fundamentally rethink how they do their work in order to dramatically improve customer service, cut operational costs, and become world-class competitors. (GAO BPR). Like all iterative process improvement, reorganization should follow a defined set of steps – assessment, development, implementation and results.

Reengineering, or reorganization starts with a high-level assessment of the organization's mission, strategic goals, and customer needs. Basic questions are asked, such as "Does our mission need to be redefined? Are our strategic goals aligned with our mission? Who are our customers?" An organization may find that it is operating on questionable assumptions, particularly in terms of the wants and needs of its customers. Only after the organization rethinks what it should be doing, can it go on to decide how best to do it. (GAO BPR)

An annual report is published on the state of the Marine Corps Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Enterprise. This report addresses an examination of MCIA's existing organizational structure and examines reorganization in the context of realigning to better meet current and future requirements development of the MCISRE and how changes in the MCI environment will impact implementation of the MCISRE. This ongoing annual assessment provides the opportunity to determine what has worked and determine if there is a requirement to change direction.

Methodology

The methodology used to gather information and ideas about this topic was through the use of stakeholder interviews at MCIA. A total of 12 leaders across the command were interviewed to get their perceptions, ideas and input to frame the problem and to come up with suggestions to move the command towards excellence. Each interviewee was asked a series of questions to prompt the discussion. These questions were:

- 1.) Are we organized properly?

2.) What could we do to better organize the command and facilitate supporting our customers?

The results showed unanimous agreement that re-organization of the command is necessary to bring about change, reduce duplicative roles/responsibilities and enhance MCIA capabilities. Some of the recommendations will also provide opportunities to better leverage civilian institutional knowledge while allowing military members to perform functions that they are better suited for and that will benefit their careers as well as the operating forces when they leave the command.


Caveat Emptor: Any Reorganization is the relatively easy part

- Regardless of organizational changes, *repeatable and documentable* procedures/business rules must be established
- Whether this happens before we reorganize or after, (i.e. “on the fly”) the consensus is that this is what is needed to move MCIA forward

In the next graphic the current organization of the MCIAs Production and Analysis Company (PAC) is shown.

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The way that MCIAs is currently organized



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The next graphic depicts the routing process that a task must go through once it is received and who is responsible during that stage.

Suppliers	Inputs	Process	Outputs	Customers
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Customer/Requestor 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Task request Task input into OTMS 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Task validated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PAC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PAC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EOS requested Task in pending 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EOS for review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> OPS validation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> OPS validation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revision 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EOS to customer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Customer
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Customer acceptance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EOS feedback 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EOS validation Task opened 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PAC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PAC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Production 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Product completion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q&D
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q&D 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Product Dissemination 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Product Delivery 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Customer
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Customer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feed back requested 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feedback form 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> OPS

At each one of the levels in the process there is the potential for lost time, induced errors, bias or other means of slowing or stopping the fulfillment of the requirement. This is why a change is needed to remove or limit the barriers between the taskers and the analysts; to improve efficiency while keeping oversight on what is being accomplished and to manage workload.

The following analogy was used in discussions to depict part of the problem. A task comes in to MCIA Operations (Ops) that deals with Fiji. Ideally it would have come from the operating forces through one of the Expeditionary Support Branch heads. From there, it is entered into the Operational Task Management System (OTMS) by either the branch head, or passed to the OTMS manager for entry. The task is then entered into the “pending” queue of OTMS. The next morning at the PAC morning meeting, the task is seen by the PAC OPS officer or his deputy and the Fijian task is discussed. If PAC Ops feels it is a valid requirement and can be fulfilled by the PAC, then it is passed to the responsible division head and then to the responsible branch head if he is in attendance. If not, they are told, either by email or face to face later in the day that there is a task in OTMS which requires their response.

Meanwhile, after the PAC meeting, at 0900 there is a MCIA Ops meeting to go through all of the pending tasks and current validated upcoming due tasks. Each task is discussed as to whether it should be validated, possible issues barring completion, and if the dates or the task itself needs to be re-scoped, etc. At this meeting, the task is either validated or shelved until the Estimate of Supportability (EoS) is completed by the analyst and/or the branch head.

The responsible division head or branch head, if they attended the morning meeting, takes the task back where it is finally passed to the Fiji analyst, whose job at this point is to develop an EoS. Once the analyst sees it, they have three choices to discuss with their branch head:

- 1.) Yes, we can do the task, no changes are needed.
- 2.) Yes, we can do it, but need to adjust task scope or due date.
- 3.) No, we cannot do it and an explanation why.

The Fiji analyst or his branch head enters the EOS into OTMS as soon as they can and once this is entered, one of three options occurs:

- 1.) The task is accepted and moved to the “Validated” queue in OTMS by MCIA Ops.
- 2.) The task is rejected and moved to the “Closed” queue in OTMS by MCIA Ops.
- 3.) The task is further refined or scoped until it is accepted by MCIA Ops/ PAC Ops/ the analyst and their management.

This is an example of a simple task, as the analogy was not an issue that crossed divisional or directorate boundaries, did not involve IC coordination or any other complex task that we deal with on a

routine basis. However, by the time the analyst sees the task for the first time, it has gone through five to seven people, and still (in most cases) has to have an EoS completed before the task should be validated. This means it either goes back up the full chain (which it should if an analyst is attempting to reject a task) or the analyst tells the branch head, who in turn contacts either MCIA Ops or PAC Ops and says the task is approved.

Suggested Course of action for reaching “Excellence”


As stated before, our Ka-Bar group was given this task, and 12 leaders across the command were interviewed to get their perceptions, ideas and input to frame the problem and to come up with suggestions to move the command towards excellence. The graphics below are part of the recommended structure and concepts that were discussed during these interviews. Each of the leaders had their own perception on how things should be organized given the lens through which they viewed the issues. These graphics are a compilation of the best and most prevalent ideas elicited during the interviews.

There were unanimous recommendations that the PAC needed to be dissolved to flatten the organization and that the lines of command and control be streamlined. It was also recommended by 11 of the 12 people interviewed that the Analysis Directorate also be dissolved and that the resources/manpower from both organizations be recapitalized across the command. The following descriptions/graphics will depict how this would occur.

The Command Element

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Proposed MCIA HQ Organization



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As a part of the recommendations for how the command element at MCIA should be reorganized, the following three recurring changes were recommended.

First, creation (or re-creation in this case) of an Executive Officer (XO) or Chief of Staff (CoS) billet. This billet historically existed before it was given up to create the PAC Commander's billet. With the recommendations that the PAC be dissolved, this billet can be recapitalized to fulfill its original function. Whether it is used as the XO or CoS is at the discretion of the Commander; however it is universally recognized that this needs to occur.


Second, that a *Director of Operations (DirOps)* and a *Director for Mission Support* be created. This would mean a simple title change for the Operations Officer billet and would align all operational functions of the command. The *Director for Mission Support (DirMS)* would be a new billet, and would have oversight of all mission support functions. (i.e. RMD, Human Capital, Installation & Logistics, etc.) This would allow there to be one focal point for all support functions to report to the commander and coordinate with the DirOps.

Finally, a possible realignment of the Adjutant shop and the Human Capital Directorate needs to be addressed. Some people felt very strongly that it should be an integrated shop, in which civilian and *military* issues were handled. Others dissented and felt that the system worked adequately as is.

The questions that really need to be addressed here are much the same as the questions concerning any realignment of operations and analysis; if combined, would the sections work more efficiently, would it streamline the lines of command and control and would it better serve the customer? These are considerations for the commander and outside the scope of this project.

The Directorate for Operations

Below is a visual representation of the consolidated recommendations on how the Directorate for Operations should be organized.



First, the PAC Production Manager function should be moved up into the Directorate of Operations. This would give the DirOps the ability to have a dedicated person devoted to managing MCIA’s production. This billet would have the responsibility of taking a holistic view of ensuring that MCIA was fulfilling its IC duties of producing Title X, Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI), Defense Intelligence Analysis Production (DIAP), Cultural Intelligence and supporting the operating forces.

The Collection Manager billet would be the DirOps representative at IC and MCISRE level conferences, and would act as the command’s focal point for all collections activities in response to taskers. This billet would oversee the activities of the other individuals devoted to collections that are

to be imbedded with each of the GCC's and the functional working groups, such as Weapons and Technology (W&T).

The Future Ops billet would manage the MARFORs OPLAN/CONPLAN intelligence requirements, and coordinate and develop the Command Intelligence Priority Framework (CIPF) in support of MCISRE.

The Current Ops billet would coordinate and de-conflict tasks pertaining to Ops personnel in the GCC's and functional working groups, ensure that working groups adhere to the CIPF, and run interference for issues that need to be addressed at the command level, if necessary.

The OTMS manager billet's functions would be the same as they currently are, and would not change under the new structure.

The Expeditionary Support billets' functions would largely remain the same also, and would support the deployed operating forces intelligence requirements to ensure that they are getting the priority support needed.

The MCISRE billet would have oversight of requirements and adjustments needed to support the implementation of the MCISRE roadmap.

Finally, the Cultural Science Manager billet, a new addition to the DirOps, would implement the culture program and would act as the focal point for all of the culture billets that are to be spread across the GCC's. This billet would act as the command and control for all culture efforts and would attend all of the IC level events that dealt with the cultural program.

Weapons & Technology Division

Weapons and Technology Division (WTD) would largely remain as is, with only three minor modifications.

First, it would become a functional working group charged with supporting all aspects of the Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS). It is recommended that the Futures Branch be moved under its purview. The Futures Branch provides the future operational threat environment to MCCDC and MCWL in support of Title X wargaming and the EFDS by providing the Long Range Threat Estimate.

Second, another function that is recommended to be moved under WTD would be Joint Country Force Assessment support. This process provides data which feeds the Multi-Service Force Deployment builds that support scenario development/wargaming to Title X activities through the Defense Planning and Programing Guidance set of scenarios which feeds the DoD analytical agenda and the EFDS for weapons procurement/capabilities development.

Finally, WTD will continue to provide personnel in *General Support (GS)* to each of the GCC's on an ad-hoc basis. This ensures that during a crisis or production surge the right functional expert can be utilized. Two examples of this support would be Afghan operational support and Libyan crisis support. WTD's IED analyst provides dedicated support to operating forces in Afghanistan on a case by case basis, while still supporting Title X and CMC requirements and the Air Defense analyst provided products to the MEU air component conducting air operations in Libya.

The Geospatial Intelligence Directorate (GID)


During the interviews, no changes to GID were recommended and it is the recommendation of the Ka-Bar group that none are needed at this time. GID should continue to provide personnel in General Support (GS) of each of the GCC's so that they may provide the country analyst with the geospatial products that they need to conduct their analysis. It is also recommended that a Geospatial analyst continue to be imbedded with WTD to facilitate the enhancement of WTD's products.

The Cryptological Support Group (CSG)

For the CSG, it is recommended that they stay largely as they are. However, an observation of several of the interviewees was that the CSG needs to better integrated with the GCC's and WTD to provide personnel in General Support (GS) so that they may provide the analysts with the products that they need to conduct their analysis.

It is recommended that the CSG educate the workforce on their capabilities, limitations and processes for developing collection requirements, as well as ways that they can enhance the analytical process.

The GCC Working Groups



For the final reorganization piece, it is strongly recommended by 11 of the 12 interviewees (and the members of this Ka-bar Group) that we move to the GCC model which is depicted in the above chart. The GCC concept is sound, and will pay big dividends in the future if provided the right assets so that they may be as self-sufficient as possible. By organizing the GCC's in the manner outlined above, lines of command and control will be shortened and will provide each analyst with access to the personnel and the tools needed to produce better products.

Additionally, by implementing the GCC concept, the command's resources will be aligned along the MARFORs responsibilities and allow the organization to be more responsive to *ad-hoc* taskings. If done correctly, less time will need to be devoted to ad-hoc taskings as the Ops officer imbedded in each GCC will coordinate with their respective MARFOR's G-3/5 on upcoming production requirements and these requirements will subsequently become planned production items.

The single dissenting opinion on implementing the GCC concept centered on the interviewee's opinion that the right people to run the GCC's were not resident within the command. In the opinion of the group, this assertion is arguable as there are several extremely capable personnel within MCIA that could make this concept work. While the five most qualified candidates might not reside in the command currently, this should not stop the command from moving forward with this concept. MCIA has very capable, talented and educated personnel who will rise to the challenge and make this concept work. As with any new organization or challenge, there will be bumps in the road and mistakes will be made, but this should not hinder us in making the right move to provide the best products to our customers.

By placing a dedicated operations officer in the GCC, along with a dedicated collections person, analysts will have direct lines to the resources they need to do their mission. This places the assets "closer to the fight" where they can gain a better understanding of the realms of the possible. An example would be that an Ops Officer in a GCC would be able to get closer to the analysts and understand the analysts' workload, schedules, upcoming training, etc., so that they are able to make better choices when it comes to scheduling production and recommending the validation of tasks.

By placing a dedicated collections person in each of the GCC's, that person can concentrate on the assets/tracks and capabilities that are available in that MARFOR and can tailor the collection strategy in support of the analytical agenda. They will also be able to interact with the analysts on a daily basis and suggest collection strategies to fill intelligence gaps developed while writing analytical products.

Another benefit stems from the fact that these billets should be manned by military personnel. Are we really doing the USMC or a Marine Corps officer or enlisted a service by making them an analyst in the (insert name here) branch? What skills are they really learning here at MCIA that they can take back with them when they return to the operating forces? The coordination process for an NIE? The ODNI Analytical Integrity Standards?

The billets that could be filled by military, like operations, collections, etc., are where we should invest our military resources. These billets are where the Marines can do the most good for MCIA and in turn, give them the education, skills and training that will benefit them when they return to the operating forces.

Intelligence Department's Role in Operations

The Executive Summary of the 2010 State of the Marine Corps Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Enterprise Report says, "Successful Marine Corps operations are predicated on valuable and timely intelligence. Such intelligence can only be achieved by a premier thinking force that can collect, analyze, solve, and translate knowledge of the enemy and environment into operational opportunities for commanders and decision makers." (The intelligence cycle does not operate in a vacuum, it starts with the commander and his direction, then works through the entire sequence to develop material that is actionable, timely, and useful). In order to achieve success for the Marine Corps Intelligence Enterprise, Intelligence Department (HQMC(I)) and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity need to work together.

MCIA has its own challenges within the Operations Division due to layers of bureaucracy and tasks coming from multiple directions. This creates an environment of confusion and frustration due to the ongoing shift in priorities and tasks which has proven to be ineffective and disruptive; thereby causing delays in getting the product to the customer.

Currently, MCIA and HQMC (I) act independently of each other in regards to operations . This can be mitigated by ensuring MCIA has a planning cell or liaison officer permanently stationed within HQMC (I). Based on discussions with personnel from MCIA and HQMC(I), Marine Corps Intelligence as a whole could benefit from collaboration between MCIA and HQMC(I) to ensure that appropriate tasks are vetted, and timely service provided to the customer; thereby exceeding expectations in operations. An iteration of Marine Corps Staff Planning would be helpful to ensure that all parties are talking apples to apples. Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic is a source to provide this training via a Mobile Task Team (MTT). HQMC(I) benefits from this relationship as well because the department is able to leverage relationships to address Intelligence Community tasks, while MCIA is left to focus on operations that impact the Marine on the ground.

BGen Vincent Stewart, Director of Marine Corps Intelligence, said in a town hall meeting with the Ka-BAR, Cohort 4, "If you don't know where you are going, you will not know when you get there." A "Roadmap" for MCIA will provide a vision that is in line with the MCISRE Roadmap for future MCIA commanding officers and others in leadership positions to follow.

Collaboration between HQMC (I) and MCIA

The 2010 state of the Marine Corps Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Enterprise Report discusses the incorporation of The Enterprise Production Plan. This plan should provide annual

goals in the MCISRE for MCIA and incorporate the vision for the Operations Division at MCIA, in collaboration with Intelligence Department. Intelligence Department, along with key operations personnel at MCIA, would shape the way ahead for operations. This combined effort will provide direction and empower personnel from the Operations Division, mitigate confusion, flatten the levels of bureaucracy and most importantly, send the appropriate people to meetings, while allowing other personnel to focus on what they were hired to do: Operations.

Conclusion

If the organization spends a considerable portion of its energies sorting out the line and block diagrams and what it is that they actually do, there is an opportunity to be had in taking an iconoclastic tact and reforming the entire institution in one fell swoop. This level of confusion should not exist, particularly at a time when we as a Corps and a nation have been at war for a decade.

Twelve high-level leaders within MCIA were polled regarding their thoughts on whether MCIA is properly organized and if not, how could the command be reorganized for excellence. They unanimously and independently stated that MCIA is not properly organized and that a move to reorganize under a Director of Operations and a Director of Mission Support would flatten the organization, allow for more streamlined command and control, and most importantly, better serve the needs of the customers.

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