

Mission-Centric Innovation

The Customer and his Mission: First and Last

Ka-Bar—Cohort 6: Capstone Project

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Intelligence is not produced for its own sake; it has a specific purpose, which is to serve a decision-maker. MAGTF intelligence, for example, “provides decision-makers with an understanding of the battlespace.”¹ Consequently, intelligence producers must know—among *many* other things—who the decision-maker is and what type of decision he is trying to make. Concerning the first requirement, we might say that intelligence production should be *customer*-focused. Concerning the second, we can refine the first to say that intelligence should be *mission*-focused.

In order for intelligence to fulfill its own task, therefore, it must be relevant to the customer’s mission. “Intelligence answers the all-important question: ‘What effect does all this have on our ability to accomplish the mission?’”² The first intelligence failure, then, is not an incorrect assessment, but an assessment that fails to support the mission. The mission, in short, should drive every aspect of the intelligence process.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the situation at MCIA as it relates to customer- and mission-centric intelligence. In the first section, we consider the command’s customer set, both as it appears in the evolved mission statement and as revealed through a detailed study of actual production for FY2012. In the second section, we review the best practices in the private sector for managing an organization in a way that drives innovation and relevance. Finally, we outline some of the requirements for the command to take advantage fully of a mission-centric approach to intelligence.

MCIA’s Customers

A discussion of a customer-centric approach to intelligence naturally begins with reference to the customer. For MCIA, we ask two questions: *Who are MCIA’s customers?* and *How relevant are our products for those customers?* To answer the first question, we took two approaches. First, we analyzed MCIA’s evolving mission statements; then, we conducted an extensive review of the customers that MCIA served in FY 2012.

Evolving Mission

The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) was activated in 1988 as the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIC) subordinated to the Warfighting Center. The MCIC, General Gray explained, was to “provide high quality intelligence support to the full range of Marine Corps activities, *with emphasis on threat support to the acquisition process.*”³ That emphasis, however, did not negate the fact that the General understood the Center to be “essential to the satisfaction of Marine Corps needs for intelligence production integral to the development of Service doctrine and force structure; training and acquisitions policy & programs; and Fleet Marine Force [FMF] contingency planning for expeditionary operations and small wars.”⁴

In 1993, General Mundy published MCIA’s mission statement, listing MCIA’s *primary* mission to be focused on Marine Corps-unique intelligence requirements.⁵ Beyond support to the Commandant, MCIA was to provide mid- to long-term intelligence analysis to the development of service doctrine, training, force structure, research and development, and acquisition. MCIA’s *secondary* mission was to provide

intelligence supporting FMF contingency planning and requirements that other intelligence organizations do not satisfy.

Consistent with the last clause (requirements that other intelligence organizations could not satisfy), MCIA added significantly to its tasks in the aftermath of 9/11. After 9/11, MCIA's intelligence support focus shifted to the Global War on Terrorism and the Marine operating forces deployed in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. In particular, the command focused production efforts on Task Force-58, which was engaged in combat operations against al Qa'ida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

Finally, in 2012, Brigadier General Stewart officially revised MCIA's mission, significantly expanding it and establishing it as a mature, active member of the broader intelligence community (IC). He articulating it—in this order—in what we broadly group as support for 1) Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and supporting establishment; 2) Operating forces, other defense and intelligence elements, and allies; and 3) the entire MCISRE.⁶ Of particular note for the purposes of this paper, the mission statement generally retains the order of customers as articulated by General Mundy, and it removes the limitation on support to FMF (*i.e.*, providing what others do not). Now, MCIA is simply to support "Marine Corps operating forces...by providing comprehensive intelligence for expeditionary mission sets." (See the table "MCIA Mission Statement Comparison" for a comparison of the mission statements and "MCIA Customers Comparison" for a comparison of the explicit and implicit list of customers based on the mission statements.)

Non-prioritized

The release of the 2012 mission statement went largely unnoticed by the MCIA's analytic workforce, but not by MCIA's leadership. Just five months after the DIRINT officially promulgated MCIA's new mission statement, MCIA officially released a revised mission statement in its *MCIA Strategy: 2012-2017*.⁷ This new statement includes some significant changes, not the least of which has to do with MCIA's customers and their respective priorities. (See the table "MCIA Mission Statement Comparison" for a comparison of the mission statements and "MCIA Customers Comparison" for a comparison of the explicit and implicit list of customers based on the mission statements.)

For the immediate purposes of this paper, MCIA's version of the mission statement makes two significant changes to the I-Department version.⁸ The first has to do with the customer list. The MCIA statement drops reference to support for wargaming, which appears to remove the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) as a customer. It could be argued that the MCWL is still meant to be a customer because it is part of Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), which undoubtedly is still a customer. This interpretation, however, seems problematic. First, Training and Education Command (TECOM) is also part of MCCDC, but support for "training and education" remains in the new statement. Why would the statement *explicitly* include some components of MCCDC but only *implicitly* include others? Even more telling, however, is that wargaming is an explicit addition to the I-Department statement; the 1993 statement does not include it in the list. By removing it, the clear conclusion is that MCIA does not see MCWL as a customer.

The second significant change to the mission statement is that, although the 3 bullets in the MCI version are almost identical to the I-Department statement, the *order* of the statement has been dramatically altered. The MCI version first lists support to the operating forces, Department of Defense (DoD), the IC, and our allies; it moves to second place HQMC and the supporting establishment. In the I-Department version, priority goes to HQMC and the supporting establishment, as it had in since MCI's inception.

Clearly, it would be unreasonable to read the MCI version as implying a strictly prioritized list of customers: our allied partners, for example, are certainly not meant to be seen as more important than the Commandant. Likewise, though, it appears unlikely that we are to read the I-Department statement in a strictly prioritized way. If we did, MCISRE would be subordinate to our allies. Nevertheless, the change highlights the unanswered question about priorities.

MCI Mission Statement Comparison		
1993	2012 (I-Department)	2012 (MCI)
Under the operational supervision of the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC)/ Associate Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity will provide tailored intelligence and services which: support the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and his staff in his role as the Marine Corps member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, support the development of service unique doctrine, force structure, training and education, and acquisition policy and programming; and support Fleet Marine Force contingency planning and other requirements for intelligence products which are not satisfied by either theater, other service, or national research and analysis capabilities. Ensure that all supported elements of the service receive timely and concise intelligence which emphasizes the threat, terrain, and other considerations specifically pertinent to the mission of the Marine Corps and which are applicable to areas of the world in which the Marine Corps can expect to conduct expeditionary operations.	MCI provides intelligence forecasts and analysis in support of Marine Corps planning and decision-making; doctrine and force structure development; systems and equipment acquisition; wargaming; and training and education. MCI supports Marine Corps operating forces, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Intelligence Community (IC), and allied partners by providing comprehensive intelligence for expeditionary mission sets. MCI facilitates the efforts of the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISRE) through coordinated planning, guidance, and information technology.	<i>MCI will enable and support the deployment of Marines who are manned, trained, equipped, and informed to decisively engage across the range of military operations.</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MCI supports Marine Corps operating forces, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Intelligence Community (IC), and our allied partners by providing comprehensive intelligence for expeditionary mission sets. • MCI provides intelligence analysis and forecasts in support of Marine Corps planning and decision-making, doctrine and force structure development, systems and equipment acquisition, and training and education. • MCI facilitates the efforts of the MCISRE through Enterprise planning, guidance, knowledge management, and global network operations support.
Gen Mundy, <i>Table of Organization</i> , Number 7451 (26 July 1993)	BGen Stewart, <i>Table of Organization</i> , Number MS5122 (6 March 2012)	MCI—Strategy and Innovation Group, <i>Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Strategy: 2012-2017</i> (1 August 2012)

MCI Customers Comparison		
1993	2012 (I-Department)	2012 (MCI)

CMC & Staff (as member of JCS)	HQMC (planning and decision-making)	Operating Forces (intel for expeditionary missions)
MCCDC (doctrine, force structure)	PPO (planning and decision-making)	Department of Defense (intel for expeditionary missions)
MCCDC-TECOM (training and education)	MCCDC (doctrine & force structure development)	Intelligence Community (intel for expeditionary missions)
MCRDAC--Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command, presently MARCORSYSCOM (acquisition policy & programming)	MARCORSYSCOM (systems and equipment acquisition)	Allied Partners (intel for expeditionary missions)
Fleet Marine Forces (contingency planning & other requirements not met by others)	MCCDC-MCWL (wargaming)	HQMC (planning and decision-making)
	MCCDC-TECOM (training and education)	PPO (planning and decision-making)
	Operating Forces (intel for expeditionary missions)	MCCDC (doctrine & force structure development)
	Department of Defense (intel for expeditionary missions)	MARCORSYSCOM (systems and equipment acquisition)
	Intelligence Community (intel for expeditionary missions)	MCCDC-TECOM (training and education)
	Allied Partners (intel for expeditionary missions)	MCISRE (planning, guidance, & IT)
	MCISR-E (planning, guidance, & IT)	

Customers Served

In order to determine whether MCIA actually serves the customers that the mission statement identifies, we performed a detailed analysis of the entries in MCIA's task management system for FY12. We read every OTMS entry that entailed FY12 production⁹ for entities external to MCIA, and we refined the data according to a select set of criteria.

First, we assigned a Product Request (PR) *type* to each PR:

- *ad hoc*, any product requested by a customer
- *deliberate*, any product on the enterprise production plan
- *anticipatory*, a general category for products that did not fit in the other categories

Second, we assigned a general customer area to each PR:

- *Supporting Establishment (including HQMC, USMC supporting establishment, and supporting establishment of other services, e.g. the Air Force Research Lab)*
- *Operating Forces (FMF, non-USMC forces, and the Combatant Commands)*
- *Intelligence Community (the other 16 elements of the IC)*
- *Allies*


Third, we noted the specific customer for each PR.

Finally, we systematically analyzed the data; we particularly focused on 1) the amount and type of production for each of the customer areas and 2) the most frequently served individual customers within each customer area.

Our finding, in short, is that MCIA’s production generally corresponds to the breath of customers identified in the 2012 mission statement, but not the literal priorities of either the I-Department or the MCIA statements.

Though the types of products (Notes, briefs, reviews, exchanges, *etc.*) vary by customer and customer group, we found that MCIA produced for all its customer groups.¹⁰ Further, we found that, with the exception of our foreign partners, MCIA’s production percentages—in terms of products, not the amount of time or resources dedicated to the product—show a solid distribution between the three major categories (cf. “FY12 Production by General Customer Area,” below). In short, the numbers indicate that MCIA *generally* produces for whom it says it does.

On the other hand, the production numbers are not distributed according to the apparent customer priorities of either the I-Department or MCIA mission statements. The customer group receiving the greatest number of products was the non-USMC IC (38% of production). The supporting establishment and the operating forces were basically tied in second place for MCIA’s support (28% to 30% of production, respectively).



Relevance of MCIA’s Products

Producing something for one’s customers is not necessarily the same as producing something *relevant* for those customers. In fact, the relevance of intelligence has come under heavy fire from multiple quarters. Though far from the first to complain, Major General Flynn brought significant attention to the

problem when he chose an unorthodox approach to complain that “[t]he urgent task before us is to make our intelligence community not only stronger but, in a word, *relevant*.”¹¹

The IC is irrelevant, according to some critics, because it has incorrectly identified its primary management metric. After reviewing a series of high-level criticisms of the IC, two vocal critics paint this ironic image:

Although separated by decades, all of the above mentioned reports describe essentially the same phenomenon: the persistent metric for the IC is output, not utility. Ironically, the system resembles a production process in a Soviet-style planned economy, where higher-order management determines production quotas for what *ought* to be manufactured, without regard for whether the end-users really want or need what is coming out of the production cycle.”¹²

Such is the general assessment of intelligence. What is the situation for MCIA? Do its customers find its products to be useful when they make decisions? This question, it turns out, is extremely difficult to answer. This difficulty arises for two reasons.

No Systematic Feedback

It is difficult to answer this question, first, because MCIA does not have in place a systematic process for soliciting, collecting, and analyzing customer feedback. That is not to say that MCIA does not get any feedback; it certainly does. The command, however, does not have an effective, systematic approach to capturing and using it. Without strong customer metrics to analyze, the question remains largely unanswerable.

Limitations to Tradecraft Standard 5: Relevance

There is *one* mechanism for systematically considering the usefulness of MCIA’s products, but it is woefully insufficient. Because relevance is an analytic tradecraft standard, two bodies regularly review MCIA’s products for relevance. Every month, the Center for Marine Expeditionary Intelligence Knowledge convenes a product review board to consider, on average, three products. In addition, the Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS) office at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reviews a minimum of 12 MCIA products annually.¹³ Though classification restrictions prevent us from detailing the findings of these two bodies, we can report that the findings show that MCIA has not met its standard of “excellence in expeditionary intelligence” with regard to relevance.¹⁴

Official ratings of relevance, however, are of limited value for the simple reason that the reviewers are not in contact, even indirectly, with the intended customer. Consequently, such ratings are the most subjective.¹⁵ “While it can be usefully studied in isolation, intelligence cannot be fully appreciated in the absence of knowledge about the strategy it seeks to serve or the resources dedicated by a government to the fulfillment of that strategy.”¹⁶ But official AIS ratings are generally issued by someone who is studying the product “in isolation.” If the analyst’s judgment of a product’s relevance is often an opinion unmoored from clear customer guidance, we can safely assume that the raters’ judgments are also opinions, and probably ones based on less guidance than the analyst has. Though we do not conclude that the rating is of no value, we do insist that it is insufficient.

Requirements of Customer-Centric Innovation

If intelligence is to come up with ways to be relevant—to provide customers what they need to make good decisions—then it must innovate. But innovation does not mean creating something from scratch; nor does intelligence need to create a new approach from scratch. In fact, private enterprise offers insights and a general approach that can be adopted and adapted to fit our needs. Specifically, an amplified version of the approach referred to as customer-centric innovation appears to provide an excellent basis for some of the needed reform.

Over the last 50 years, a body of literature has arisen about the relationship between customer-focus and innovation; this connection is variously called *customer-centric innovation*, *consumer-centric innovation*, and *customer-focused innovation*. According to the *Financial Times* Lexicon, “customer-centric innovation revolves around customers and their needs. The process starts with insights on customer needs with the goal of designing a new product or service that delivers on these needs in a way that is intuitive and accessible to customers.”¹⁷ This connection has come under close scrutiny because research has shown that customer-centric companies do better than companies that lack that focus.¹⁸

Based on our review of the literature on customer-centric innovation, we have identified two salient approaches. The first is a process for systematically managing innovation; it was developed by two business professors based on, as they say, “[h]aving collectively worked with senior executives of hundreds of companies all over the world and in all kinds of industries—from heavy manufacturing to abstract research, from retailing to financial services...”¹⁹ The second approach, which complements the first as a technique to use within a general strategy, is called “job mapping.” This technique simply helps a researcher “[break] down the task the customer wants done into a series of discrete process steps. By deconstructing a job from beginning to end, a company gains a complete view of all the points at which a customer might desire more help from a product or service – namely, at each step in the job.”²⁰

The key to systematically managing innovation (the strategy) is knowledge of one’s customer. Specifically, the process depends on a “rigorous customer R&D process” that helps the customer know two things: 1) who their customers are and 2) what those customers need.²¹ With this knowledge, companies can establish a solid foundation on which they can build.

This knowledge and its consequent growth, however, come in stages: it begins with a core group and systematically moves outward. In short, a company must first “[e]stablish a deep relationship with core customers, then extend the number of customers beyond the core, and, finally, stretch into new customer realms.”²² The expansion, however, is more nuanced than simply adding more and more customers. In fact, phases two and three each have critical double steps. Taken together, the whole process follows this course:

Phase 1: Establish and develop the core.²³

Phase 2a: Extend capabilities to meet other core-group needs²⁴

Phase 2b: Extend customer base to those with similar needs²⁵

Phase 3a: Stretch capabilities²⁶

Phase 3b: Stretch customer segments²⁷

But how is it that a company can truly know and, therefore, manage the satisfaction of its customers' needs? The knowledge comes from asking the customer, but asking in a particular way: "customers should be asked only for outcomes—that is, what they want a new product or service to do for them."²⁸ By systematically focusing on outcomes, questioners clarify customers' real needs (i.e., *requirements*). The problem, which this focus avoids, is that

"...sometimes, customers are so accustomed to current conditions that they don't think to ask for a new solution—even if they have real needs that could be addressed. Habit tends to inure us to inconvenience; as consumers, we create "work-arounds" that become so familiar we may forget that we are being forced to behave in a less-than-optimal fashion—and thus we may be incapable of telling market researchers what we really want."²⁹

The systematic approach to seeking outcomes follows the "universal structure" of all jobs.³⁰ By asking outcome-oriented questions about each step in the process, researchers can "identify what customers are *trying* to get done at every step, not what they are doing currently."³¹ By the time researchers have questioned their way through the entire process, they will have mapped out a "comprehensive framework with which to identify the metrics customers themselves use to measure success in executing a task."³²

This approach to discovering customer's real needs through a job map can be applied at each of the strategic phases outlined above. The technique, however, is only the first step in meeting customers' needs, insofar as it clarifies what those needs actually are. The next step is to satisfy those needs.

"The process of innovation begins with identifying the outcomes customers want to achieve; it ends in the creation of items they will buy. When desired outcomes become the focus of customer research, innovation is no longer a matter of wish fulfillment or serendipity; it is instead a manageable, predictable discipline."³³


MCIA's Requirements for Mission-Centric Innovation

An obvious and immediate objection to our discourse on commercial best practices is that MCIA is not in the business of selling things for others to buy. A certain parallel between the IC and commerce, however, is not unprecedented. After all, we use the commercial language when naming the decision-makers for whom we produce: we call them *consumers* or *customers*. Despite these names, the IC does not treat them that way; or, better yet, we tend not to act as businesses systematically providing relevant services to our customers. As a provocative article in *Studies in Intelligence* recently noted:

"Kent and his colleagues may have called their end users *consumers*, just as the IC tends today to call them *customers*, but it is a telling omission that virtually no IC product delivery system has an easy way to check *sales*. The percentage of products actually used, by how many people, of what rank, and for what purpose, is a closely guarded secret in most analytic shops, if that information is even collected at all."³⁴

Tracking sales and gathering other customer metrics is how businesses determine whether what they provide meets a demand. To translate that point into analytic tradecraft language, it is how businesses determine whether what they provide is *relevant*. The IC, MClA included, is not in a position to make a sound determination about relevance.

This deficiency is all the more striking when we consult military doctrine: striking because it highlights our deficiency and because it sheds light on the solution. Joint Publication 2-0³⁵ depicts the intelligence process in the following way.



We find two elements of this process to be most striking. First, the entire process revolves around a mission: the customer’s mission. Second, the entire process is encircled by “evaluation and feedback.” Although we have found suggestions from private-enterprise that we think are appropriate in the IC, our recommendations are built solidly on this doctrinal base. Consequently, we summarize these following recommendations with the phrase: *The customer and his mission: first and last*. *First*, because the entire process begins and revolves around the customer’s mission; *last*, because we must evaluate how we have done, and that evaluation must incorporate customer feedback.

1. Clarify and Prioritize the Customer List

MClA must know—from top to bottom—what its mission is, who its customers actually are, and the priority that it gives to its many customers. Clarity about *our* mission will clarify who our customers are. Lacking that clarity, we simply cannot do our job—serve our customers—as effectively as possible.

If we hope to foster innovative approaches to meeting our customers’ requirements, then the strategic approach to managing customer-centric innovation insists that we first identify and focus on a core group of customers. In other words, we must prioritize our customer list.

Once these decisions are made, the command must develop and implement a strategic communication plan that consistently and authoritatively communicates our mission throughout the command and to our customers.³⁶

2. Learn the Customers' Missions

After MCIAs are clear about its own mission and its list of core customers, analysts must learn—and map—their customers' missions (their *jobs*, to use commercial language). It is their missions that must guide MCIAs' analysis because it is those missions that drive the real requirements.

MCIAs' analysts need to be in closer contact with their customers if they are to serve in an innovative way. If they are to know their customers and their needs, analysts should spend time with those customers. According to commercial best practices, "customer R&D propels the innovation effort away from headquarters and the traditional R&D lab out to those closest to the customer."³⁷ "[T]he only way to sustain customer R&D is by putting customer-facing employees behind the wheel."³⁸

As great as the problem might be providing relevant intelligence to the operating forces, the problem appears to be even greater in serving the supporting establishment. How many of MCIAs' analysts have extensive experience, for example, with customers such as PP&O or the Warfighting Lab? Even though, since 9/11, MCIAs have shifted to meet the dramatically increasing requirements of the operating forces, there is no reason to think that the supporting establishment's requirements have decreased. And yet, the growing workforce has not been prepared to serve the supporting establishment. Those charged with supporting HQMC's Title 10 responsibilities are justifiably consternated.

3. Collect and Evaluate Feedback

Finally, we turn to the issue of "tracking sales" in the intelligence community. This amounts to a requirement to systematically collect, analyze, and evaluate customer feedback. Interestingly, the proposed revision of MCWP 2-1, if accepted, aligns nicely with this point. The draft—which has adopted the JP-2 intelligence process—describes the "evaluation and feedback" portion of the intelligence process in this way:

During evaluation and feedback, intelligence personnel at all levels assess how well each of the various types of intelligence operations are [*sic*] performed. The intelligence provided to the requester must be complete, timely, accurate and in a usable format in order to satisfy the requirement. All intelligence consumers are responsible for providing timely feedback to help improve any discrepancies and streamline the intelligence process.³⁹

Collecting and evaluating feedback is essential as a matter of both doctrine and sound tradecraft. Without a comprehensive, critical evaluation of how well MCIAs serve its customers, the command is blind. Ironically, MCIAs are an intelligence unit that plans and operates without this critical intelligence.

To rectify this intelligence gap, MCIAs must have a means of systematically evaluating whether it is meeting its customers' real intelligence requirements. We present two possible solutions; they are based on the results of a structured brainstorming activity by Ka-Bar Cohort 6. (We should note that these ideas are not mutually exclusive.)

One possibility is that the command create an ombudsman to investigate problems (whether recognized internally or raised externally) with our services. This position, which has precedent in the intelligence community, is perhaps best known to exist at major newspapers.

The other suggestion is that the command establish an assessment group (perhaps similar to a G-5 assessment cell). We (the authors) suggest that the group comprise members of multiple elements within the command such as SIG, CMEIK, and RMD, as well as mission managers and senior analysts. Such an inclusive group, if well managed, could provide the command with a wide range of mission-centric intelligence that would help it plan and direct.

Conclusion

Marine Corps Intelligence, like the rest of the IC, is struggling to fulfill its mission, which is to help decision-makers fulfill their missions. If MCIA is to be relevant to its customers, if it is to provide relevant intelligence, it must innovate. Real, sustainable innovation, however, is not the free-spirited huddling of good-idea fairies. On the contrary, it is the result of a strategic, managed process that brings focus.

Paradoxically, focus is not the enemy of imagination and creativity.⁴⁰ We need greater focus specifically because we need more creativity, because the last thing the IC needs is another failure of imagination.⁴¹ MCIA's parameters are currently out of focus. As a result, its work is less relevant than it could be. But an innovative approach—adapted from a strategy to make more money—offers a focus that can foster innovative, mission-centric intelligence. The focus comes from the customer and his mission; together, they set the right and left lateral limits. If MCIA truly begins with them and ends with them, its path will be sure.

¹ MCWP 2-12: *MAGTF Intelligence Production and Analysis*, p. 1-1.

² *Ibid.*

³ "Marine Corps Intelligence Initiatives and Objectives," 3800 C4I2/INT (1 Jun 1989). Emphasis added.

⁴ "5001 - USMC Intelligence Center - Program Summary," enclosure to 3800 INT 2/232 (6 Oct 88).

⁵ Cf. Gen Mundy, *Table of Organization*, Number 7451 (26 July 1993).

⁶ BGen Stewart, *Table of Organization*, Number MS5122 (6 March 2012).

⁷ MCIA Strategy and Innovation Group, *Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Strategy: 2012-2017* (1 August 2012), p. 1.

⁸ We note two other important changes that are beyond the direct scope of this paper, but that we think to be important.

The first has to do with MCIA's relationship to MCISRE. In the I-Department version, MCIA facilitates the efforts of the MCISRE "through coordinated planning, guidance, and information technology." In the MCIA version, MCIA facilitates these efforts "through Enterprise planning, guidance, knowledge management, and global network operations support." We understand the change from "information technology" to "knowledge management, and global network operations support" as a specification of what type of IT MCIA will provide. There is, however, a possibility that the change from "coordinated" to "Enterprise" planning indicates a major change. In the I-Department statement, MCIA coordinates its planning, presumably with the rest of the MCISRE; in the new version, MCIA appears to do the Enterprise planning for the whole MCISRE.

The second significant change is that the MCIA statement adds an overarching sentence, under which the I-Department statement is presented in multiple bullets. The format of the document (this new sentence is in bold-italics font, the remainder of the "Mission" section is in normal font and bullets) gives the impression that the new sentence is the real mission statement and that the remainder explains the specific tasks in support of that mission.

⁹ "Production" means that MCIA produced something (e.g., a Note, brief, exchange, document review, map, or imagery).

¹⁰ The systems we studied did not record support to MCISRE; that MCIA supports the MCISRE through planning, guidance, and IT is not in doubt.

¹¹ MGen Michael T. Flynn, Capt Matt Pottinger, Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010), p. 10

¹² Josh Kerbel and Anthony Olcott, "Synthesizing with Clients, Not Analyzing for Customers," *Studies in Intelligence* 54.4 (Extracts, December 2010): 14. (Hereafter cited as "Synthesizing.") The referenced reports comprise the following: Cunningham Report (1966), Schlesinger Report (1971), Church Committee report (1976), Aspin-Brown Commission report (1996). We note that, based on anecdotal evidence, few at MCIA would say that its primary metric is different than the one here depicted. See, also, Adam Cobb, "Intelligence in Low Intensity Conflicts: Lessons from Afghanistan," in *Victory among People: Lessons from Countering Insurgency and Stabilising Fragile States*, edited by David Richards and Greg Mills (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2011): p. 109. Cobb offers another important image, that of an *iron triangle* of intelligence, strategy and resources, all three of which must be in harmony. Speaking specifically to the situation in Afghanistan, Cobb (a professor at Marine Corps University) concluded that "the intelligence system has never quite mastered the considerable difficulty of adapting to the new demands placed on it since the initial invasion."

¹³ For the purposes of full disclosure, we note that one of the authors of this paper serves as a member of the Board.

¹⁴ For a detailed presentation of findings of MCIA's AIS Evaluation Board and of ODNI/AIS, please see the classified annex: "MCIA's Production Relevance."

¹⁵ A reviewer need not confer with the customer, for example, to determine whether an argument is logically presented (standard 6) or whether a product clearly distinguishes between intelligence, assumptions, and judgments (standard 3). On the subjective nature of relevance without guidance by the customer, see "Synthesizing," p. 21: "Formal standards of analytic tradecraft...still do not ensure that policymakers receive the information they want or need. Present tradecraft standards require only that products be relevant to US national security, but as the Church Committee pointed out, absent consumer guidance, what defines that relevance is merely the opinion of an analyst, rather than stated policymaker needs."

¹⁶ Lessons, 109.

¹⁷ http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=customer_centric-innovation (accessed 11 January 2013).

¹⁸ "[I]nwardly facing companies that do not work in collaboration with consumers will likely struggle.....[while] companies that embrace consumer-centric innovation are often finding success." (Pat Conroy, Art Ash, and Diane Kutlya, "Consumer-centric Innovation: Tapping into Consumer Insights to Drive Growth" (Deloitte Development LLC, 2009), p. 8. http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/US_CP_Consumer%20Centric%20Innovation%20POV_2009%281%29.pdf) See, also, Denish Shah, Roland T. Rust, A. Parasuraman, Richard Staelin, and George S. Day, "The Path to Customer Centricity," *Journal of Service Research*, Volume 9, No. 2, (November 2006), p. 116: "When Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster (1993) compared four types of organizational cultures based on the degree of emphasis on customers, they found that market cultures that place the customer's interests first were the most profitable."

¹⁹ Larry Selden and Ian C. MacMillan, "Manage Customer-Centric Innovation—Systematically," *Harvard Business Review* (April 2006): p., 108. (Hereafter cited as "Manage.")

²⁰ Lance A. Bettencourt and Anthony W. Ulwick, "The Customer-Centered Innovation Map," *Harvard Business Review* (May 2008), p. 109. (Hereafter cited as "Innovation Map.") This method, which Bettencourt and Ulwick developed at Strategyn, an innovation management consultancy, clearly relies on the insights about customer input and innovation that Ulwick discusses in "Turn Customer Input into Innovation," *Harvard Business Review* (January 2002), pp. 91-97. (Hereafter cited as "Turn").

²¹ "Manage," p. 110.

²² "Manage," p. 110.

²³ "The first step in conducting customer R&D is to identify core customer segments and develop mutually beneficial value propositions that exceed the buyers' expectations. The value proposition represents the complete customer experience, including products, services, and any interaction with the company. Having identified this core, the customer R&D team then systematically identifies subsegments, sharpening the alignment between customers' desires and the company's offerings and generating additional profits. At the same time, the company

needs to build the capabilities (the organizational infrastructure, customer insight, technology, communications, and field sales operations and logistics support) to create, communicate, and then deliver the new value propositions to the targeted segments” (“Manage,” p. 110).

²⁴ “Extend existing capabilities to attend to additional needs of the core segments and subsegments” (“Manage,” 112).

²⁵ “Companies can extend the customer base by discovering potential *halo* customer segments, whose needs are similar to those of existing customers. Here, the goal is to understand the nuances and differences in their needs, modify the value proposition to target these groups, and then tailor products for them based on the existing capabilities of the firm. These halo segments serve to expand the firm’s core business” (“Manage,” 113).

²⁶ “To fulfill the needs of existing segments or new subsegments, a company identifies new capabilities to be developed, as well as new offerings and delivery mechanisms” (“Manage,” 113).

²⁷ “In this phase, the company identifies completely new segments unrelated to the core, where it can deploy current capabilities” (“Manage,” 113).

²⁸ “Turn,” p. 92.

²⁹ Dorothy Leonard and Jeffrey F. Rayport, “Spark Innovation through Empathic Design,” *Harvard Business Review* (November-December, 1997), p. 104.

³⁰ “That universal structure, regardless of the customer, has the following process steps: defining what the job requires; identifying and locating needed inputs; preparing the components and the physical environment; confirming that everything is ready; executing the task; monitoring the results and the environment; making modifications; and concluding the job. Because problems can occur at many points in the process, nearly all jobs also require a problem resolution step.” (“Innovation Map,” p. 110)

³¹ “Innovation Map,” p. 110. The quotation continues: “[f]or example, when an anesthesiologist checks a monitor during a surgical procedure, the action taken is just a means to an end. Detecting a change in patient vital signs is the job the anesthesiologist is trying to get done.”

³² “Innovation Map,” p. 110.

³³ “Turn,” p. 97.

³⁴ “Synthesizing,” p. 14. We would be negligent if we did not caveat this assessment insofar as it applies to MCIA: the command does keep detailed records of its distribution of printed products.

³⁵ JP 2-0: *Joint Intelligence* (22 June 2007), p. I-7.

³⁶ This strategic communication campaign should also address two other issues. First, various signs within MCIA’s spaces incorrectly purport to state MCIA’s mission; they should be removed. Second, the command should resolve the problem associated with the phrase *expeditionary intelligence*. Although not one of the mission statements mentions *expeditionary intelligence*, that undefined phrase regularly drives conversation about what MCIA does. We have identified two possible courses of action. One option is simply to drop the phrase, removing it from MCIA’s branding and building. Another option is to define the phrase clearly, relate it directly to MCIA’s mission statement, and disseminate that definition authoritatively throughout the command.

³⁷ “Manage,” p. 110. Such R&D investment is critical: “Companies cannot successfully innovate and grow unless they systematically invest in customer R&D” (*ibid.*, p. 114).

³⁸ “Manage,” 114

³⁹ MCWP 2-1 (working draft), p. 11, lines 442-7.

⁴⁰ Throughout the planning of this capstone project, we often referred to what we called the *paradox of innovation*; namely, that the greatest innovation could occur within very strict boundaries. Our guiding examples were Shakespeare, who composed some 150 beautiful, creative poems within the unforgiving sonnet structure, and the engineers at Mission Control for the Apollo 13 flight who, with a limited set of physical resources and a strict deadline, successfully squaring a circle.

⁴¹ Cf. the *9/11 Commission Report* (http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.htm): “The most important failure was one of imagination.”