

Manpower Planning and Allocation

Ka-Bar Leadership Development Program

Cohort Four

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June 7, 2011

Civilianizing formerly military positions and vice versa are policies that are extremely complex to implement without adequate information. The simple observation that these policies are directly antagonistic in their goals leads to a host of attendant issues. The goal of establishing equitable shore duty for highly skilled and specialized military personnel and the conflicting awareness of life-cycle cost efficiencies available through utilizing civilian personnel, wherever possible, has resulted in issues that can be resolved only in a well-designed and effectively coordinated manner.¹

Introduction

Human Capital planning refers to the implementation of a model and a set of policies and processes to optimize the utilization of the workforce to achieve mission success,² and Team 4's ultimate goal is to assist the Enterprise in developing a Human Capital Strategic Plan that ensures "the right person with the right skills and experiences is assigned to the right job at the right time."³ Although the focus of this paper is towards leadership positions, the Human Capital Strategic Plan should take into account the same model for non-leadership positions, as they are equally important. The Office of Civilian Manpower Management opined that the policies associated with integrating a civilian and military workforce is complex to integrate without adequate information. This paper will seek to address this concern through presenting proposed business rules and courses of action to inform and implement within the Marine Corps Strategic Human Capital Plan. The Marine Corps Intelligence Enterprise should seek to build a balanced strategic plan that provides its Company and Field Grade Officers opportunities to continue to hone and develop leadership skills, as well as provide its cadre of government civilian personnel suitable opportunities for advancement. As Deloitte's Talent Edge 2020 states, 53 percent of exiting employees opined that the prospect of job advancement or promotion would persuade them to stay with their current companies.⁴ Promulgating a plan that takes this into account will

assist in ensuring the Marine Corps Intelligence Enterprise is better positioned to recruit, and retain the best and brightest intelligence professionals available.

Key Issues

There are several key issues⁵ to consider in the Enterprise Human Capital Strategic Plan including:

1. How the workforce is employed.
2. How contractors are employed—ensuring that they are not doing inherently government work.
3. The rationale behind decisions to assign military personnel or civilians to supervisory positions and whether the decisions result in the most effective choices.
4. The right workforce mix to effectively accomplish the mission and how this mix may vary over time and as functions change.
5. The costs of the different segments of the workforce and the potential tradeoffs.

Scope of this document

Given the limited time available to complete the project, this document is focused on addressing workforce planning and allocation issues pertaining specifically to MCIA leadership positions. For the purposes of this paper, leadership positions encompass all supervisory billets as well as non-supervisory ‘Team Lead’ or program management billets. The team categorizes these positions as long-term, cyclic, or situational-dependent and provides the Enterprise potential business rules and other issues for consideration in developing MCIA’s Human Capital Strategic Plan as it relates to military, civilian, and contract personnel assignments.

Developing a Strategic Manpower Planning and Allocation Doctrine for MCI (MCISR-E)

For any organization to grow, adapt, and excel, its leadership must balance implementing changes against maintaining continuity. In other words, when it comes to manpower allocation and resourcing, bringing in too many “fresh” leaders may cause organizational derailment, at least temporarily, while the lack of support for a healthy turnover (including in-house lateral movement) may lead to organizational stagnation. Such hiring or staffing decisions may be made because incumbent leadership seeks to keep MCI’s ability to quickly adapt to changing USMC conditions and requirements. However, as Michael Raynor, an organizational consultant and expert, states, "The ability to adapt successfully in the short term makes it impossible, ultimately, to adopt the kind of total transformation required to survive (over the long term) [parenthesis added by Team 4]."⁶

Despite Congressional requirements for DoD to develop and implement civilian-military workforce allocation policies, with the exception of an existing Table of Organization, MCIA or MCI currently lacks an institutional doctrine for selecting USMC Officer, Government Civilian, or Government Contractors to staff leadership positions.^{7, 8} This seeming lack of workforce allocation planning doctrine results in the perception that MCIA’s leadership staffing procedures and decisions are done on an ad-hoc basis and are sometimes focused on how quickly the position needs to be filled. **Recognizing that some positions require a long-term presence in order to grow institutional expertise and that other positions are more suited to be staffed on a more short-term manner, developing a manpower allocation doctrine is recommended. Furthermore, specific leadership billets—whether supervisory or subject matter expert billets—need to be designated as long-term, cyclic, or situational-dependent.**

Historically, through past hiring and staffing actions, MCIA has had plenty of opportunities to incorporate ‘fresh’ active duty leaders into its workforce. However, some are

assigned to billets that function as long-term rather than short-term (cyclic) leadership positions, thereby creating discontinuity, whereas MCIA desires or needs continuity. The first step to avoid this inefficiency is to review the current workforce leadership allocation positions and designate specific leadership billets as long-term, cyclic, or situational-dependent.

Designating specific leadership billets as being of “long-term” interest allows MCIA to grow “in-house” knowledge, skills, and talent that can only come from employees whose career specializes in a specific function. For example, subject matter experts (SMEs) in specific regions, countries, and weapon or geospatial systems and who are employed for longer than five years serve to build and maintain MCIA’s institutional knowledge in those respective areas. They become de facto leaders for the MCISR-E in their own areas or functions. This offsets the inability of our operating force’s intelligence sections to organically grow such capability. However, this does not necessarily mean that MCIA should attempt to force SMEs to remain in a specific position at all costs. Lack of upward mobility may cause a frustrated leader or SME to depart, resulting in the loss of some institutional knowledge. In addition, leaders remaining in the same position for five or more years run the risk of stagnation. As such, cross-pollination opportunities and assigning additional responsibilities may be required.⁹ To further the development of the Strategic Human Capital Plan, identifying the type positions that exist across the enterprise and providing criteria for these positions is required. Developing an understanding of the type positions and their associated criteria will assist in determining business rules within the planning and allocation process.

Business Rules and Other Issues for Consideration

In selecting personnel to fill various billet types, three defining rules must be considered in the manpower assessment process:¹⁰

1. Whether the billet is an inherent government function.
2. Whether the billet requires military unique knowledge/skills.
3. Whether the billet requires commercial relevancy.

An “inherently governmental function” is one that, as a matter of law and policy, must be performed by federal government employees and cannot be contracted out because it is “intimately related to the public interest.” Billets shall be designated as civilian, except when one or more of the following conditions apply, which would therefore require military experience:

1. Military-unique knowledge and skills are required for performance of the duties
2. Military incumbency is required by law, Executive Order (EO), treaty, or International Agreement (IA).
3. Military performance is required for command and control, risk mitigation, or esprit de corps.
4. Military manpower is needed to provide for overseas and sea-to-shore rotation, career development, or wartime assignments.
5. Unusual working conditions or costs are not conducive to civilian employment.

Four additional factors impacting the decision process are: mission requirements, workload, prescribed performance objectives, and cost. Each plays a vital role and no single factor outweighs the other. However, mission and costs tend to have the largest impact on the selection process. In addition, each billet type brings various benefits and limitations.

<u>Billet Type</u>	<u>Benefits</u>	<u>Limitations</u>
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Long-Term	Subject Matter Expertise	Can become stagnant
Cyclical	Operationally relevant	Can be short sighted
Situational-Dependent	Technically relevant	Temporary & can be costly

Leadership Billet Designations

Long-Term

Because they constitute the bulk of MCIA’s institutional knowledge and expertise, full-time civilians are likely best suited to staff leadership billets that have a long-term demand. By staying with MCIA for a length of time, they grow the expertise needed not to be merely functional but to actually serve as a resident expert for the MCISR-E and possibly lead the IC by becoming a recognized ‘go-to’ expert. For instance, it may take three years for an employee to achieve a certain level of expertise in their field (i.e., Contract management, Geospatial Intelligence, Regional All-Source Analysis, or supervisor of civilians). This expertise leads to the ability to anticipate future problems and challenges, as well as the ability to formulate effective and legal solutions. This also supports the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) goals for acquiring, developing, and retaining federal workforce to achieve MCIA’s and MCI’s programmatic goals.¹¹

Cyclical

Active duty Marines are likely best suited to staff cyclical positions, which are defined as leadership billets that require “fresh” ideas based on recent experience in the operating forces. Because they have the most recent “pulse” on the force, these Marines are likely better able to anticipate what types of products the operators and planners requires, thus improving the

timeliness and relevance of MCIA's products to the enterprise's customer base. For example, these active duty Marines should lead ad-hoc working groups or teams that MCIA estimates will have a lifespan of two to three years. Also, Marines can fill liaison positions and serve as operational bridges between MCIA's producers and customers, especially if MCIA reorganizes its production element to parallel geographical combatant commands. If reorganized, each new MCIA GCC Division would be served well by creating a Marine LNO billet for communications with the Divisions' respective MARFOR.¹²

Situational-Dependent

Situational billets are normally slated for nongovernment functions and are associated with industry relevancy—for example, outsourcing support for technical expertise in the development of commonly used software (i.e., Microsoft Office). However, government civilian and military personnel can provide situational support during short-term projects or mission-related functions.

Temporary employees¹³ and contract personnel can, and should, also hold leadership positions for some situational-dependent work units but their options are limited. Contractors, by law, cannot supervise government employees, but they can serve as program managers (the private sector equivalent of supervisor) for groups of contractors. Contractors and Temporary employees can also serve as project managers, being put in functional charge of a specific account such as developing and implementing new technologies, processes, or analytical efforts.

As new technologies are constantly developed and released by the private sector, contract subject matter experts can and should be hired to help incorporate new software or hardware into MCIA in order to enhance our ability to receive, process, create, and disseminate analytical, collection, and/or geospatial products. However, an incumbent supervisor must ensure against

placing contractors in “situational-dependent” positions when doing so conflicts with a recent federal law discouraging the use of contractor personnel for inherently governmental work.¹⁴ In other words, if such technology or knowledge will be used by MCIA over a long period (i.e., 5-10 years), then MCIA should move to bring the requisite expertise ‘in house’ by developing our own SME.¹⁵ One example is the hiring of Courage Services contractors who already possessed advanced cultural analysis knowledge and skills regarding the Afghanistan population. The contractors were able to jump-start MCIA’s ability to support USMC forces in Afghanistan and grow our own long-term civilian and cyclical Marine analyst capabilities in that specific knowledge area. However, Courage Services’ presence may not be a long-term requirement, pending the potential draw-down of USMC forces in Afghanistan.

Potential Sources of Information and Planning Support

The team contacted other Department of Defense (DoD) organizations to solicit information on their policies or experiences in deciding civilian-military workforce planning and allocation matters as they developed their own human capital strategic plans, but the team received no responses before this paper was completed. The team, however, discovered the Organizational and Workforce Management Office—within USMC’s Administration and Resource Management Division—that provides strategic workforce planning assistance, among other services, to worldwide USMC commands.

The USMC Administration and Resource Management (AR) Division supports the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Marine Corps activities within the National Capital Region, and Marine Corps commands worldwide better support the war fighter by providing responsive

support services, sound policies, timely guidance, and expert program management.¹⁶ The Organizational and Workforce Management Branch (ARHM)¹⁷ provides a variety of organizational management services, including strategic workforce planning. ARHM analysts coordinate with appropriate Human Resources Specialists and Equal Employment Opportunity Specialists to analyze Marine Corps organizations' workforce needs, based on mission requirements and strategic priorities. Analysts assist in identifying, analyzing, and prioritizing significant workforce gaps with regard to demographics, employment trends, and other organizational conditions affecting the workforce. Formal MCIA contact with this office could perhaps be a step in the human capital strategic planning process. ARHM can provide:

1. Guidance in determining each organization's mission and strategic goals.
2. Research and analysis of present workforce conditions and future requirements (i.e., demographics, employment trends, competencies, affirmative employment, etc.).
3. Advice regarding the formulation and implementation of SWP action plans.
4. Assistance in gathering and analyzing performance data as a result of these plans.

The six-step Strategic Workforce Planning model developed by HQMC can be used to guide the Strategic Workforce Planning process:



Other Government Organizational Business Rules

As previously discussed, the information available from other government organizations may prove invaluable in informing the business rules or model for inclusion within the strategic plan. Each of the Marine Corps’ Intelligence Enterprise’s sister services have been faced with the same issue of defining a strategic plan for manpower. Although Team Four was unable to obtain insight into the sister service’s business rules related to manpower planning and allocation, the potential for these organizations to provide insight cannot be overstated. Based upon the type billets, recommended business rules and additional sources of information to inform the strategic plan, potential courses of action are presented.

Courses of Action (COA)

The MCIA and MCI may continue to plan and allocate manpower based upon the existing Tables of Organization (T/O). This COA will not provide the necessary insight into the strategic plan and will require a periodic review and request for change to ensure the T/O remain relevant to the future needs of the enterprise. The T/O and its associated management should be the results of the strategic plan.

The MCIA and MCI may solicit and obtain the support of the Marine Corps' Administration and Resource Management Division's Organizational and Workforce Management Branch. This COA will provide MCIA and MCI a team of experts within the Marine Corps that perform this function on a daily basis and may provide unique insight into the strategic manpower planning process. This COA may not inform the enterprise on Intelligence Community unique issues that may need resolution to complete the strategic plan.

The MCIA and MCI may commission a team to conduct site visits to each of the Sister Service's Intelligence Headquarters and their associated Intelligence Centers to obtain insight into how they developed their strategic plan and how they allocate against their plan. This COA may provide insight into the service intelligence community business rules and models, but may result in inconsistencies with Marine Corps business rules and model for manpower planning and allocation.

The recommended COA for the MCIA and MCI is to solicit and secure the capabilities and services provided by the Organizational and Workforce Management Branch, combined with commissioning a team to conduct site visits to the Sister Services Intelligence Headquarters and Service Centers to develop insight into intelligence community unique issues as well as service specific goals and objectives for achieving the mandates proscribed by the National Defense Authorization Act 2008.

Conclusion

Manpower planning and allocation has been a issue that requires the attention of senior leadership across the Department of Defense since at least the seventies. Defining the type positions within the MCIA and MCI, as well as assigning criteria in segregating these positions,

is an initial phase in the development of the strategic plan. Developing a deep understanding of the business rules associated with manpower planning and allocation will provide constraints and restraints within the development of the plan. Soliciting the support of organic Marine Corps expertise coupled with the insight that may be gleaned from other organizations across the service landscape will provide focus in the development of the strategic plan and assist the MCI in achieving the spirit and intent of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008. Ultimately, researching, developing, promulgating and implementing a Strategic Human Capital Plan will ensure the MCIA and MCI will have the right people, in the right position, at the right time, for the right reason.

¹ Office of Civilian Manpower Management. Integrated Military-Civilian Workforce Analysis and Planning, OCMC Research Report no. 28 (Washington D.C.: August 1976). Available online at <http://www.eric.ed.gov:80/PDFS/ED130072.pdf>. Accessed on May 31, 2011.

² Department of the Navy. Force Management Oversight Council Strategic Plan for 2008-2013. (Washington D.C.: January 2009) Available online at <http://www.donhcs.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=6ESwj0nyug%3D&tabid=143>. Accessed on May 31, 2011. Hereafter referred to as FMOCSP, January 2009.

³ FMOCSF January 2009.

⁴ Deloitte Consulting, LLP. Talent Edge 2020: Building the Recovery Together—What Talent Expects and How Leaders are Responding. (United Kingdom: April 2011). Available online at: www.deloitte.com/view/en_us/us/Services/additional-services/talent-human-capital-hr/Talent-Library/talentedge2020Employee_042811.pdf. Accessed on May 31, 2011.

⁵ Email exchange between cohort four, team four and Mr. Schultz, I Dept. (April 29, 2011)

⁶ Raynor, Michael E. The Strategy Paradox: Why Committing to Success Leads to Failure. (New York: Doubleday) 2007.

⁷ *Leadership positions* are defined as critical billets that drive MCI's management or production efforts. Such positions may include supervisors, budget/contract managers, and functional/regional subject matter experts for areas where MCI needs 10+ years of experience or expertise.

⁸ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181 § 324. *See also* 10 U.S.C. § 2463. The law focuses on whether contract personnel are performing inherently governmental work. DoD later published DOD Memorandum, *In-sourcing Contracted Services – Implementation Guidance* (May 28, 2009), but MCI/MCIA never developed or adopted an implementation doctrine/strategy with respect to a government vs. contractor policy.

⁹ Cross-pollination refers to temporarily assigning a “stagnated” leader to a different section of MCI or MCI. Done in order to transfer knowledge and skills to the new section as well as help the leader broaden their knowledge base, experience, and understanding of how other sections operate.

¹⁰ Congressional Research Service 7-5700, R4061. Inherently Governmental Functions and Department of Defense Operations: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress. 1 Feb 2010.

¹¹ GAO. Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).

¹² For example: Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), Marine Forces Central Command (MARFORCENT or MARCENT).

¹³ “Not to Exceed” positions refers to temporary hires that usually have a billet specifically limited to 2-4 years.

¹⁴ Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, Div. D, § 736.

¹⁵ GAO-10-744T. “Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. Initial Agency Efforts to Balance the Government to Contractor Mix in the Multisector Workforce—Statement of John K. Needham, Director for Acquisition and Sourcing Management. 20 May 2010.

¹⁶ <http://www.marines.mil/unit/dmcs/ar/Pages/default.aspx>

¹⁷ http://www.marines.mil/unit/hqmc/hr/Pages/ARHM_Section.aspx